Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa

Homage to the Blessed One, the Arahant, the Perfectly Self-Enlightened One.

Abhidhammapiṭake

The Abhidhamma Piṭaka

Pañcapakaraṇa-anuṭīkā

The Subcommentary to the Five Treatises

Dhātukathāpakaraṇa-anuṭīkā

The Subcommentary to the Treatise on the Discourse on Elements

Ganthārambhavaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Beginning of the Text

Dhātukathāpakaraṇadesanāya [Pg.1] desadesakaparisāpadesā vuttappakārā evāti kālāpadesaṃ dassento ‘‘dhātukathāpakaraṇaṃ desento’’tiādimāha. ‘‘Tasseva anantaraṃ adesayī’’ti hi iminā vibhaṅgānantaraṃ dhātukathā desitāti tassā desanākālo apadiṭṭho hoti. Ye pana ‘‘vibhaṅgānantaraṃ kathāvatthupakaraṇaṃ desita’’nti vadanti, tesaṃ vādaṃ paṭikkhipanto ‘‘vibhaṅgānantaraṃ…pe… dassetu’’nti āha.

Showing the indication of time, he said, 'teaching the Dhātukathāpakaraṇa,' and so on, because the indications of place, teacher, and assembly for the teaching of the Dhātukathāpakaraṇa are of the type already stated. Indeed, by the statement, 'Immediately after that, he taught,' it is pointed out that the Dhātukathā was taught after the Vibhaṅga, and thus the time of its teaching is indicated. But refuting the view of those who say, 'The Kathāvatthupakaraṇa was taught immediately after the Vibhaṅga,' he said, 'Immediately after the Vibhaṅga... to show.'

‘‘Kāmā te paṭhamā senā’’tiādivacanato (su. ni. 438; mahāni. 28; cūḷani. nandamāṇavapucchāniddesa 47) kilesaviddhaṃsanampi devaputtamārassa balavidhamananti sakkā vattuṃ, ‘‘appavattikaraṇavasena kilesābhisaṅkhāramārāna’’nti pana vuccamānattā khantibalasaddhābalādiānubhāvena ussāhaparisābalabhañjanameva devaputtamārassa balaviddhaṃsanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Visayātikkamanaṃ kāmadhātusamatikkamo. Samudayappahānapariññāvasenāti pahānābhisamayapariññābhisamayānaṃ vasena. Nanu cetaṃ pañcannaṃ mārānaṃ bhañjanaṃ sāvakesupi labbhatevāti codanaṃ manasi katvā āha ‘‘parūpanissayarahita’’ntiādi. Vīrassa bhāvo vīriyanti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘mahāvīriyoti mahāvīro’’ti. Mahāvīriyatā ca paripuṇṇavīriyapāramitāya caturaṅgasamannāgatavīriyādhiṭṭhānena [Pg.2] anaññasādhāraṇacatubbidhasammappadhānasampattiyā ca veditabbā. Tato eva hissa vīriyāhānisiddhipīti.

From the statement, 'Sensual pleasures are your first army' (Snp 438; Mahā Nidd I 28; Cūḷa Nidd IV 47), it can be said that the destruction of defilements is also a destruction of the power of Devaputta Māra. However, since it is said, 'by way of causing non-arising, of the Māras of defilements and formations,' the destruction of the power of Devaputta Māra should be seen as the breaking of the power of the retinue of zeal through the influence of the powers of patience, faith, and so on. Transcendence of an object is transcendence of the sense-sphere realm. 'By means of the full understanding of the abandoning of the origin' means by means of the direct knowledge of abandoning and the direct knowledge of full understanding. Now, considering the objection, 'Is this destruction of the five Māras not also attainable by disciples?', it is said, 'free from dependence on others,' etc. The state of a hero is heroism; hence it is said, 'great heroism means the great hero.' And great heroism should be understood through the perfection of the pāramī of energy, endowed with the four-factored resolution on energy, and through the attainment of the unique fourfold right exertion. From this very fact, his non-decline of energy and its success are established.

Khandhādike dhamme adhiṭṭhāya nissāya visayaṃ katvā abhidhammakathā pavattāti āha ‘‘abhidhammakathādhiṭṭhānaṭṭhena vā’’ti. Tesaṃ kathanatoti tesaṃ khandhādīnaṃ kathābhāvato. Etena atthavisesasannissayo byañjanasamudāyo pakaraṇanti vuttaṃ hoti. Atha vā dhātuyo kathīyanti ettha, etena vāti dhātukathā, tathāpavatto byañjanatthasamudāyo. Yadi evaṃ sattannampi pakaraṇānaṃ dhātukathābhāvo āpajjatīti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘yadipī’’tiādi. Tattha sātisayanti savisesaṃ vicittātirekavasena anavasesato ca desanāya pavattattā. Tathā hi vuttaṃ ‘‘sabbāpi dhammasaṅgaṇī dhātukathāya mātikā’’ti (dhātu. 5). Tenevāha ‘‘ekadesakathanameva hi aññattha kata’’nti.

Because the discourse on the Abhidhamma proceeds by establishing, depending on, and taking as its object the phenomena such as the aggregates, he said, 'or in the sense of being the foundation for the Abhidhamma discourse.' 'Because of their discussion' means because it is a discussion of those aggregates, and so on. By this, it is said that a treatise is a collection of expressions based on a specific meaning. Alternatively, 'the elements are discussed herein, or by this,' thus it is Dhātukathā; such is the proceeding collection of expression and meaning. Anticipating the objection, 'If so, the status of being a Dhātukathā would apply to all seven treatises,' he said, 'even if,' and so on. Therein, 'with special emphasis' means with distinction, because the teaching proceeds by way of abundant variety and without remainder. For it is said: 'The entire Dhammasaṅgaṇī is the matrix for the Dhātukathā' (Dhātukathā 5). Therefore, he said: 'Elsewhere, only a partial discussion is made.'

Idāni sāsane yesu dhātu-saddo niruḷho, tesaṃ vasena aññehipi asādhāraṇaṃ imassa pakaraṇassa dhātukathābhāvaṃ dassento ‘‘khandhāyatanadhātūhi vā’’tiādimāha. Tattha tatthāti khandhāyatanadhātūsu. Mahanto pabhedānugato visayo etāsanti mahāvisayā, dhātuyo, na khandhāyatanāni appatarapadattā. Yena vā sabhāvena dhammā saṅgahāsaṅgahasampayogavippayogehi uddesaniddese labhanti, so sabhāvo dhātu. Sā dhātu idha sātisayaṃ desitāti savisesaṃ dhātuyā kathanato idaṃ pakaraṇaṃ ‘‘dhātukathā’’ti vuttaṃ. Sabhāvattho hi ayaṃ dhātu-saddo ‘‘dhātuso, bhikkhave, sattā saṃsandantī’’tiādīsu (saṃ. ni. 2.98) viya. Dhātubhedanti dhātuvibhāgaṃ. Pakaraṇanti vacanaseso. Kuto pakaraṇa-saddo labbhatīti āha ‘‘sattannaṃ pakaraṇānaṃ kamena vaṇṇanāya pavattattā’’ti. Tena yojanaṃ katvāti tena pakaraṇa-saddena ‘‘dhātukathāva pakaraṇaṃ dhātukathāpakaraṇa’’nti yojanaṃ katvā. Taṃ dīpananti taṃ dhātukathāpakaraṇassa atthadīpanaṃ, atthadīpanākārena pavattaṃ vaṇṇanaṃ. ‘‘Atthaṃ dīpayissāmī’’ti vatvā ‘‘taṃ suṇāthā’’ti vadanto sotadvārānusārena tattha upadhāraṇe niyojetīti āha ‘‘taṃdīpanavacanasavanena upadhārethāti attho’’ti.

Now, showing that the status of this treatise as a 'Discourse on Elements' is not shared with others—by means of those senses in which the word 'dhātu' is established in the Teaching—he said, 'or by aggregates, sense bases, and elements,' and so on. 'Therein, therein' means in the aggregates, sense bases, and elements. 'They have a great scope that follows the divisions,' thus they are of great scope—this refers to the elements, not the aggregates and sense bases, because they have fewer terms. Or, that intrinsic nature by which phenomena receive summary and detailed exposition through inclusion, non-inclusion, association, and dissociation—that intrinsic nature is 'element.' That element is taught here with special emphasis; thus, because of the distinctive discussion of the element, this treatise is called 'Dhātukathā.' For this word 'dhātu' has the meaning of intrinsic nature, as in 'Monks, beings associate according to their element' (SN 14.15), and so on. 'Division of elements' means the classification of elements. 'Treatise' is the remainder of the phrase. When asked, 'From where is the word "treatise" obtained?', he said, 'Because it proceeds by way of commenting on the seven treatises in sequence.' 'Having made the connection with that' means having made the connection with that word 'treatise' as 'the Dhātukathā itself is the treatise, thus Dhātukathāpakaraṇa.' 'That illumination' means the illumination of the meaning of the Dhātukathāpakaraṇa, the commentary that proceeds in the manner of an illumination of the meaning. Having said, 'I will illuminate the meaning,' and then saying, 'Listen to that,' he enjoins them to pay attention to it through the avenue of the ear-door; thus he said, 'The meaning is that one should pay attention by hearing the words of that illumination.'

Ganthārambhavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Beginning of the Text is concluded.

1. Mātikāvaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Matrix

1. Nayamātikāvaṇṇanā

1. The Exposition of the Matrix of Methods

1. Cuddasavidhenāti [Pg.3] cuddasappakārena, cuddasahi padehīti attho. Tattha ‘‘saṅgaho asaṅgaho’’ti idamekaṃ padaṃ, tathā ‘‘sampayogo vippayogo’’ti. ‘‘Saṅgahitena sampayuttaṃ vippayutta’’ntiādīni pana tīṇi tīṇi padāni ekekaṃ padaṃ. Itaresu padavibhāgo suviññeyyova. Etehīti saṅgahādippakārehi. Nayanaṃ pāpanaṃ, taṃ pana pavattanaṃ ñāpanañca hotīti ‘‘pavattīyati ñāyantī’’ti ca dvidhāpi attho vutto. Nayā eva uddisiyamānā mātikā. Atthadvayepi pavattanañāṇakiriyānaṃ karaṇabhāvena saṅgahādippakārā nayāti vuttā. Tenāha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘iminā saṅgahādikena nayenā’’ti (dhātu. aṭṭha. 1). Padānanti atthadīpakānaṃ vacanānaṃ. Pajjati etena atthoti hi padaṃ. Padānanti ca saṃsāmisambandhe sāmivacanaṃ, pakaraṇassāti pana avayavāvayavīsambandhe.

1. 'Fourteenfold' means in fourteen ways, that is, with fourteen terms. Herein, 'inclusion, non-inclusion' is one term; similarly, 'association, dissociation.' But the phrases beginning 'associated with the included, dissociated...' are three terms, each being a single term. The division of the remaining terms is easily understood. 'By these' means by the modes of inclusion, and so on. 'Nayana' is leading (pāpana), and that is both causing to proceed (pavattana) and making known (ñāpana); thus the meaning is stated in two ways as 'it is made to proceed and it is known.' The methods themselves are the matrix being set forth. In both meanings, the modes of inclusion, etc., are called 'methods' because they are the instrument for the actions of causing to proceed and knowing. Therefore, the commentary states: 'By this method of inclusion, etc.' (Dhātukathā-aṭṭhakathā 1). 'Of the terms' (padānaṃ) means of the words that illuminate the meaning. For a 'term' (pada) is that by which the meaning is reached (pajjati). And 'of the terms' (padānaṃ) is a genitive in the sense of a possessive relationship, whereas 'of the treatise' (pakaraṇassa) is in the sense of a part-whole relationship.

2. Abbhantaramātikāvaṇṇanā

2. The Explanation of the Inner Matrix

2. Tadatthānīti paṭiccasamuppādatthāni. Paṭicca samuppajjati saṅkhārādikaṃ etasmāti hi paṭiccasamuppādo, paccekaṃ avijjādiko paccayadhammo. Tathā hi vuttaṃ saṅkhārapiṭake ‘‘dvādasa paccayā, dvādasa paṭiccasamuppādā’’ti. Tesanti khandhādīnaṃ. Tathādassitānanti gaṇanuddesavibhāgamattena dassitānaṃ. Kasmā panettha paṭiccasamuppādo dvādasabhāveneva gahito, nanu tattha bhavo kammabhavādibhedena, sokādayo ca sarūpatoyeva idha pāḷiyaṃ gahitāti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘tatthā’’tiādi. Tattha tatthāti tasmiṃ ‘‘pañcavīsādhikena padasatenā’’ti evaṃ vutte aṭṭhakathāvacane. Kammabhavassa bhāvanabhāvena, upapattibhavassa bhavanabhāvena. Padatthato pana kammabhavo bhavati etasmāti bhavo, itaro bhavati, bhavanaṃ vāti. Tannidānadukkhabhāvenāti jarāmaraṇanidānadukkhabhāvena.

2. 'Having that meaning' means having the meaning of dependent origination. For 'dependent origination' (paṭiccasamuppāda) is so called because formations and so forth arise in dependence on it (paṭicca samuppajjati etasmā); each is a conditioning phenomenon, such as ignorance. Thus it is said in the Saṅkhārapiṭaka: 'Twelve conditions, twelve dependent originations.' 'Of those' refers to the aggregates and so forth. 'Shown thus' means shown merely by way of enumeration, summary, and classification. Anticipating the objection: 'Why is dependent origination here taken only in its twelvefold aspect? Is it not that in that context becoming is divided into kamma-becoming and so forth, and sorrow and so forth are included here in the Pāli text in their own forms?'—he says 'tatthā' and so on. 'Therein, therein' means in that commentarial statement where it is said: 'with one hundred and twenty-five terms.' Of kamma-becoming, by way of being a producer; of rebirth-becoming, by way of being a state of becoming. From the standpoint of the word, however, kamma-becoming is called 'becoming' (bhavo) because one becomes from it (bhavati etasmā); the other is so called because it becomes (bhavati) or is a state of being (bhavanaṃ). 'By way of being suffering with that as its cause' means by way of being suffering with aging-and-death as its cause.

‘‘Sabbāpi dhammasaṅgaṇī dhātukathāya mātikā’’ti idampi dhātukathāya mātikākittanamevāti ‘‘sabbāpi…pe… mātikāti ayaṃ dhātukathāmātikāto bahiddhā vuttā’’ti vacanaṃ asambhāvento ‘‘atha vā’’tiādimāha[Pg.4]. Pakaraṇantaragatā vuttā dhātukathāya mātikābhāvenāti attho. Kāmañcettha mātikābhāvena vuttā, pakaraṇantaragatattā pana aññato gahetabbarūpā ito bahibhūtā nāma honti, sarūpato gahitāva pañcakkhandhātiādikā abbhantarā. Tenāha ‘‘sarūpato dassetvā ṭhapitattā’’ti. Mātikāya asaṅgahitattāti mātikāya sarūpena asaṅgahitattā, na aññathā. Na hi mātikāya asaṅgahito koci padattho atthi. Vikiṇṇabhāvenāti khandhavibhaṅgādīsu visuṃ visuṃ kiṇṇabhāvena visaṭabhāvena.

“The entire Dhammasaṅgaṇī is the matrix for the Dhātukathā”—this too is merely a declaration of the Dhātukathā’s matrix. Unable to reconcile the statement, “The entire…the matrix,” which implies that this matrix is stated externally to the Dhātukathā’s matrix, he says, “Or else,” etc. The meaning is that it is stated as the Dhātukathā’s matrix, though it is contained in another treatise. Although it is spoken of here as a matrix, because it is contained in another treatise, it is considered external, being of a nature to be taken from elsewhere. But the five aggregates, etc., when grasped in their own form, are internal. Therefore, he says: “Because they are placed after being shown in their own form.” “Because it is not included in the matrix” means because it is not included in the matrix in its own form, not otherwise. For there is no entity of meaning that is not included in the matrix. “By way of being scattered” means by way of being scattered and spread out separately in the Khandhavibhaṅga and other texts.

3. Nayamukhamātikāvaṇṇanā

3. The Explanation of the Matrix of the Introduction to Methods

3. Nayānaṃ saṅgahādippakāravisesānaṃ pavatti desanā, tassā viniggamaṭṭhānatāya dvāraṃ. Yathāvuttadhammā yathārahaṃ khandhāyatanadhātuyo arūpino ca khandhāti tesaṃ uddeso nayamukhamātikā. Tenāha ‘‘nayāna’’ntiādi. Viyujjanasīlā, viyogo vā etesaṃ atthīti viyogino, tathā sahayogino, saṅgahāsaṅgahadhammā ca viyogīsahayogīdhammā ca saṅgahā…pe… dhammā, saṅgaṇhanāsaṅgaṇhanavasena viyujjanasaṃyujjanavasena ca pavattanakasabhāvāti attho. Cuddasapītiādinā tamevatthaṃ pākaṭataraṃ karoti. Yehīti yehi khandhādīhi arūpakkhandhehi ca. Te cattāroti te saṅgahādayo cattāro. Saccādīhipīti saccaindriyapaṭiccasamuppādādīhipi saha. Yathāsambhavanti sambhavānurūpaṃ, yaṃ yaṃ padaṃ saṅgahito asaṅgahitoti ca vattuṃ yuttaṃ, taṃ tanti attho.

3. The exposition is the occurrence of the various kinds of methods such as inclusion, and it is the door by virtue of being the place of their emergence. The setting forth of those previously stated phenomena—the aggregates, sense bases, elements, and also the formless aggregates, as appropriate—is the introductory matrix of methods. Hence he says: “by methods,” etc. “Viyujjanasīlā” means “having the nature of separating”; or “viyogino” means “those for whom separation exists.” Similarly, “sahayogino” means “those for whom association exists.” And “saṅgahāsaṅgahadhammā” (included and excluded phenomena) and “viyogīsahayogīdhammā” (separating and associating phenomena) are phenomena that have the nature of functioning by way of inclusion and exclusion, and by way of separation and connection—this is the meaning. By “fourteen,” etc., he makes that same meaning clearer. “By which” (yehi) means by which aggregates and so on, and by the formless aggregates. “Those four” (te cattāro) refers to those four: inclusion and so forth. “With truths and so on” (saccādīhipi) means together with the truths, faculties, dependent origination, and so on. “As is possible” (yathāsambhavaṃ) means in accordance with what is possible, i.e., whatever term is suitable to say, whether included or excluded, that is the meaning.

So panāti saṅgahāsaṅgaho. Saṅgāhakabhūtehīti saṅgahaṇakiriyāya kattubhūtehi. Tehīti saccādīhi. Na saṅgahabhūtehīti saṅgahaṇakiriyāya karaṇabhūtehi saccādīhi saṅgahāsaṅgaho na vutto. Tatthāpi hi khandhāyatanadhātuyo eva karaṇabhūtāti dasseti. Khandhādīheva saṅgahehīti khandhādīhiyeva saṅgaṇhanakiriyāya karaṇabhūtehi, ‘‘khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitā, āyatanasaṅgahena asaṅgahitā, dhātusaṅgahena asaṅgahitā, te dhammā catūhi khandhehi, dvīhāyatanehi, aṭṭhahi dhātūhi asaṅgahitā’’ti saṅgahāsaṅgaho niyametvā vutto. Tasmāti yasmā saccādīni saṅgāhakabhāvena vuttāni, na saṅgahabhāvena, khandhādīniyeva ca saṅgahabhāvena vuttāni, tasmā.

“So pana” refers to inclusion and exclusion. “By those which are the agents of inclusion” (saṅgāhakabhūtehi) means by those which are the doers of the act of including. “By those” (tehi) means by the truths and so on. “Not by the means of inclusion” (na saṅgahabhūtehi) means that inclusion and exclusion is not stated by the truths and so on, which are the instruments for the act of including. For in that case too, he shows that the aggregates, sense bases, and elements are indeed the instruments. “Only by the aggregates and so on, as means of inclusion” (khandhādīheva saṅgahehīti) means that inclusion and exclusion is stated by defining it as: “Included by the inclusion of aggregates, not included by the inclusion of sense bases, not included by the inclusion of elements; those phenomena are not included by four aggregates, two sense bases, and eight elements”—by the aggregates and so on, which are indeed the instruments for the act of including. “Therefore” (tasmā) means because the truths and so on are stated as being agents of inclusion, not as means of inclusion, and only the aggregates and so on are stated as means of inclusion, therefore.

Kasmā [Pg.5] panettha saccādayo saṅgahavasena na vuttāti? Tathādesanāya asambhavato. Na hi sakkā rūpakkhandhādīnaṃ samudayasaccādīhi, saññādīnaṃ vā indriyādīhi saṅgahanayena pucchituṃ vissajjituṃ vāti. Tathā ariyaphalādīsu uppannavedanādīnaṃ saccavinimuttatāya ‘‘vedanākkhandho katihi saccehi saṅgahito’’ti pucchitvāpi ‘‘ekena saccena saṅgahito’’tiādinā niyametvā saṅgahaṃ dassetuṃ na sakkāti. Yathāsambhavanti yehi sampayogo, yehi ca vippayogo, tadanurūpaṃ.

Why are the truths and so on not stated here by way of inclusion? Because such a teaching is impossible. For it is not possible to question or answer by way of inclusion regarding the aggregate of form and so on with the truths of origin and so on, or regarding perception and the like with the faculties and so on. Similarly, in the case of the noble fruits and so on, because the arisen feeling and so on are freed from the truths, even if one asks, “By how many truths is the feeling aggregate included?” it is not possible to show the inclusion by definitively saying, “Included by one truth,” and so on. “As is possible” (yathāsambhavaṃ) means in accordance with what is possible, i.e., in accordance with what they are associated with and what they are dissociated from.

Rūpaṃ rūpena nibbānena vā vippayuttaṃ na hoti, nibbānaṃ vā rūpena. Kasmā? Sampayuttanti anāsaṅkanīyasabhāvattā. Catunnañhi khandhānaṃ aññamaññaṃ sampayogībhāvato ‘‘rūpanibbānehipi so atthi natthī’’ti siyā āsaṅkā, tasmā tesaṃ itarehi, itaresañca tehi vippayogo vuccati, na pana rūpassa rūpena, nibbānena vā, nibbānassa vā rūpena katthaci sampayogo atthīti tadāsaṅkābhāvato vippayogopi rūpassa rūpanibbānehi, nibbānassa vā tena na vuccati, arūpakkhandhehiyeva pana vuccatīti āha ‘‘catūhevā’’tiādi. Anārammaṇassa cakkhāyatanādikassa. Anārammaṇaanārammaṇamissakehīti anārammaṇena sotāyatanādinā anārammaṇamissakena ca dhammāyatanādinā. Missakassa dhammāyatanādikassa. Anārammaṇaanārammaṇamissakehi na hotīti yojetabbaṃ. Yesaṃ pana yehi hoti, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘anārammaṇassa panā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Yathā hi sārammaṇassa anārammaṇena anārammaṇamissakena ca vippayogo hoti, evaṃ sārammaṇenapi so hotiyeva. Tena viya anārammaṇassa anārammaṇamissakassa cāti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

Form is not dissociated from form or from Nibbāna, nor is Nibbāna from form. Why? Because the question of association is of a nature not to give rise to doubt. For since the four aggregates are mutually associated, there might be a doubt: “Is it associated with form and Nibbāna, or not?” Therefore, their dissociation from others, and others’ dissociation from them, is spoken of. But since there is nowhere any association of form with form, or with Nibbāna, nor of Nibbāna with form, there is no such doubt, and thus dissociation of form from form or Nibbāna, or of Nibbāna from form, is not spoken of. It is only spoken of in relation to the formless aggregates, as he says: “By the four,” etc. For the non-objective, such as the eye-base, etc. “By the non-objective and the non-objective-mixed” (anārammaṇaanārammaṇamissakehi) means by the non-objective, such as the ear-base, etc., and by the non-objective-mixed, such as the mind-object base, etc. For the mixed, such as the mind-object base, etc., it should be construed as “it is not with the non-objective and the non-objective-mixed.” To show for which it is with which, it is said: “But for the non-objective,” etc. Just as the objective is dissociated from the non-objective and the non-objective-mixed, so too is it dissociated from the objective itself. Similarly, it should be understood for the non-objective and the non-objective-mixed.

4. Lakkhaṇamātikāvaṇṇanā

4. The Explanation of the Characteristics Matrix

4. Visuṃ yojanā kātabbāti yo tīhi saṅgaho catūhi ca sampayogo vutto, taṃ sabhāgo bhāvo payojeti, yo ca tīhi asaṅgaho catūhi ca vippayogo vutto, taṃ visabhāgo bhāvoti imamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘saṅgaho…pe… viññāyatī’’ti āha. Yassa saṅgaho, so dhammo khandhādiko sabhāgo. Yassa asaṅgaho, so visabhāgo. Tathā sampayogesupi veditabbaṃ. Idāni yathāvuttaṃ sabhāgataṃ sarūpato niddhāretvā dassetuṃ ‘‘tatthā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha [Pg.6] samānabhāvo saṅgahe sabhāgatā, ekuppādādiko sampayogeti iminā ruppanādividhuro asamānasabhāvo asaṅgahe visabhāgatā, nānuppādādiko vippayogeti ayamattho atthasiddhoti na vuttoti.

4. The phrase 'the application should be made separately' means that what is stated as the threefold inclusion and the fourfold association is applied by a state of a similar nature, while what is stated as the threefold non-inclusion and the fourfold dissociation is a state of a dissimilar nature. To show this meaning, it is said: 'Inclusion... is to be understood.' A phenomenon for which there is inclusion is of a similar nature. That for which there is non-inclusion is of a dissimilar nature. The same should be understood regarding associations. Now, to show the aforesaid state of similarity, having determined it by its intrinsic nature, it is said: 'Therein…' Therein, a common state in inclusion is similarity, while arising together, etc., is association. By this it is implied that a dissimilar intrinsic nature, devoid of being affected, etc., is dissimilarity in non-inclusion, and that not arising together, etc., is dissociation. This meaning is established by implication and is therefore not stated.

5. Bāhiramātikāvaṇṇanā

5. The Explanation of the External Matrix

5. Etena ṭhapanākārenāti sarūpena aggahetvā yathāvuttena pakaraṇantaramātikāya idha mātikābhāvakittanasaṅkhātena ṭhapanākārena. Pakaraṇantaraṭhapitāya mātikāya avibhāgena pacchato gahaṇaṃ bahi ṭhapananti āha ‘‘bahi piṭṭhito ṭhapitattā’’ti. Idha aṭṭhapetvāti imissā dhātukathāya sarūpena avatvā. Tathā pakāsitattāti mātikābhāvena jotitattā. Dhammasaṅgaṇīsīsena hi dhammasaṅgaṇiyaṃ āgatamātikāva gahitāti. Yehi nayehi dhātukathāya niddeso, tesu nayesu, tehi vibhajitabbesu khandhādīsu, tesaṃ nayānaṃ pavattidvāralakkhaṇesu ca uddiṭṭhesu dhātukathāya uddesavasena vattabbaṃ vuttameva hotīti yaṃ uddesavasena vattabbaṃ, taṃ vatvā puna yathāvuttānaṃ khandhādīnaṃ kusalādivibhāgadassanatthaṃ ‘‘sabbāpi dhammasaṅgaṇī dhātukathāya mātikā’’ti vuttanti evamettha mātikāya nikkhepavidhi veditabbo.

5. By this method of placement—that is, without taking it by its intrinsic nature, but by the aforesaid method of placement of the matrix of another treatise, which is here designated as the declaration of its status as a matrix. The taking of the matrix placed in another treatise afterwards without division is 'placing outside'; hence it is said, 'because it is placed outside, behind.' 'Not having placed it here' means: without stating it in its own form in this Dhātukathā. 'Because it is thus revealed' means: because it is illuminated as being a matrix. For by the heading of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, only the matrix that has come in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī is taken. By the methods through which the exposition of the Dhātukathā proceeds, in those methods, when the aggregates, etc., to be analyzed by them, and the characteristics of the doors of occurrence of those methods are stated, what should be said by way of recitation for the Dhātukathā has already been said. Having stated what should be said by way of recitation, then, in order to show the classification of the aforesaid aggregates, etc., into wholesome, etc., it is said, 'The entire Dhammasaṅgaṇī is the matrix for the Dhātukathā.' Thus, the method of laying out the matrix here should be understood.

‘‘Gāvīti ayamāhā’’ti ettha gāvī-saddo viya ‘‘saṅgaho asaṅgaho’’ti ettha padatthavipallāsakārinā iti-saddena atthapadatthako saṅgahāsaṅgaha-saddo saddapadatthako jāyatīti adhippāyenāha ‘‘aniddhāritatthassa saddasseva vuttattā’’ti. Tena atthuddhārato saṅgahasaddaṃ saṃvaṇṇetīti dasseti. Aniddhāritavisesoti asaṅgahitajātisañjātiādiviseso. Sāmaññena gahetabbatanti saṅgahasaddābhidheyyatāsāmaññena viññāyamāno vuccamāno vā. Na cettha sāmaññañca ekarūpamevāti codanā kātabbā bhedāpekkhattā tassa. Yattakā hi tassa visesā, tadapekkhameva tanti. ‘‘Attano jātiyā’’ti viññāyati yathā ‘‘matteyyā’’ti vutte attano mātu hitāti.

In the phrase 'gāvīti ayamāha' ('gāvī,' this he says), just as with the word 'gāvī,' so in the phrase 'saṅgaho asaṅgaho' ('inclusion, non-inclusion'), by the word 'iti,' which reverses the function of a term, the expression 'saṅgaha-asaṅgaha,' which denotes a meaning, comes to denote a mere term. With this intention, he says: 'because only the word, whose meaning is not determined, has been stated.' Thus, he shows that he explains the word 'saṅgaha' by extracting its meaning. 'Undetermined distinction' means a distinction such as the kind, class, etc., of what is not included. 'To be taken generally' means being understood or expressed with the generality of what is denotable by the word 'saṅgaha.' And here the objection should not be made that 'generality is of a single form,' because it is relative to distinctions. For however many distinctions it has, it is relative to them. 'By its own kind' is understood just as when 'matteyyā' is said, it means 'beneficial to one's own mother.'

Dhammavisesaṃ aniddhāretvāti saṅgahitatādinā pucchitabbavissajjetabbadhammānaṃ visesanaṃ akatvā. Sāmaññenāti avisesena. Dhammānanti khandhādidhammānaṃ. Avasesā niddhāretvāti ‘‘saṅgahitena asaṅgahita’’ntiādikā avasesā [Pg.7] dvādasapi pucchitabbavissajjetabbadhammavisesaṃ niddhāretvā dhammānaṃ pucchanavissajjananayauddesāti yojanā. Nanu ca ‘‘saṅgahitena asaṅgahita’’ntiādayopi yathāvuttavisesaṃ aniddhāretvā sāmaññena dhammānaṃ pucchanavissajjananayuddesāti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘saṅgahitena asaṅgahita’’ntiādi. Yassa attho ñāyati, saddo ca na payujjati, so lopoti veditabbo, āvuttiādivasena vā ayamattho dīpetabbo. Tenāti luttaniddiṭṭhena asaṅgahita-saddena. Saṅgahitavisesavisiṭṭhoti cakkhāyatanena khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitatāvisesavisiṭṭho, tena sotāyatanādibhāvena asaṅgahito sotapasādādiko yo ruppanasabhāvo dhammaviseso. Tannissito taṃ dhammavisesaṃ nissāya labbhamāno. ‘‘Te dhammā katihi khandhehi…pe… catūhi khandhehi asaṅgahitā’’tiādinā asaṅgahitatāsaṅkhāto pucchāvissajjananayo parato pucchitvā vissajjiyamāno idha uddiṭṭho hoti. Visesane karaṇavacananti iminā tassa dhammassa yathāvuttasaṅgahitatāvisesavisiṭṭhataṃyeva vibhāveti. Evamete pucchitabbavissajjetabbadhammavisesaṃ niddhāretvā pucchanavissajjananayuddesā pavattāti veditabbā.

'Without determining a specific phenomenon' means: without making a specification of the phenomena to be questioned and answered by way of 'includedness,' etc. 'Generally' means: without specification. 'Of phenomena' means: of phenomena such as the aggregates. 'The remaining ones, having determined' means: the exposition of the method of questioning and answering about phenomena, having determined the remaining twelve specific phenomena to be questioned and answered, such as 'by the included, the non-included.' In reference to the objection, 'But is it not so that even "by the included, the non-included," etc., are expositions of the method of questioning and answering about phenomena generally, without determining the aforesaid specific phenomena?', he says: 'by the included, the non-included,' etc. That of which the meaning is understood but the word is not used should be known as an elision; or this meaning should be shown by way of repetition, etc. 'By that' means: by the elided word 'non-included.' 'Distinguished by the specific of the included' means: the specific phenomenon, such as the sensitive matter of the ear, etc., which has the nature of being affected, which is distinguished by the specific of includedness by the eye-base through aggregate-inclusion, and is non-included by that in the state of being the ear-base, etc. 'Dependent on that' means: being obtained by relying on that specific phenomenon. The method of questioning and answering, designated as 'non-includedness,' which is questioned and answered later on by 'Those phenomena by how many aggregates... are non-included by four aggregates,' etc., is expounded here. 'The instrumental case in the sense of specification': by this he clarifies that that phenomenon is indeed distinguished by the aforesaid specific of includedness. Thus it should be understood that these expositions of the method of questioning and answering proceed having determined the specific phenomena to be questioned and answered.

Nanu ca ‘‘saṅgahitena asaṅgahita’’nti ettāvatāpi ayamattho labbhatīti? Na labbhati tassa dhammamattadīpanato. Nayuddeso heso, na dhammuddeso. Tathā hi pāḷiyaṃ saṅgahitenaasaṅgahitapadaniddese ‘‘cakkhāyatanena ye dhammā khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitā, āyatana…pe… dhātusaṅgahena asaṅgahitā’’ti vatvā ‘‘te dhammā katihi khandhehi…pe… asaṅgahitā’’ti (dhātu. 171) pucchitvā ‘‘te dhammā catūhi khandhehi dvīhāyatanehi aṭṭhahi dhātūhi asaṅgahitā’’ti dutiyaṃ asaṅgahitapadaṃ gahitaṃ. Aññathā ‘‘cakkhāyatanena ye dhammā khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitā, te dhammā āyatanasaṅgahena asaṅgahitā, dhātusaṅgahena asaṅgahitā. Te katame’’icceva niddisitabbaṃ siyā.

But isn't this meaning obtained even by just 'the non-included by the included'? It is not obtained, because that merely indicates a phenomenon. This is an exposition of a method, not an exposition of a phenomenon. For in the Pāli, in the exposition of the phrase 'the non-included by the included,' it is said: 'With the eye-base, those phenomena that are included by aggregate-inclusion are non-included by base…pe… element-inclusion.' Then it is asked: 'By how many aggregates... are those phenomena non-included?' (Dhātuk. 171). It is answered: 'Those phenomena are non-included by four aggregates, two bases, and eight elements.' Thus, the second term 'non-included' is taken. Otherwise, it should have been stated thus: 'With the eye-base, those phenomena that are included by aggregate-inclusion are non-included by base-inclusion, are non-included by element-inclusion. What are they?'

Esa nayoti atidesena dassitamatthaṃ pākaṭataraṃ kātuṃ ‘‘tesupī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tatiyapadenāti luttaniddesena gahetabbanti vuttapadaṃ sandhāyāha. Kattuatthe karaṇaniddeso saṅgahitāsaṅgahitehi tehi dhammehi dhammānaṃ saṅgahitatāsaṅgahitatāya vuttattā. Tathā [Pg.8] hi tattha pāḷiyaṃ ‘‘tehi dhammehi ye dhammā’’ti dhammamukheneva saṅgahitatāsaṅgahitatā vuttā. Dutiyatatiyesu pana saṅgahitatāsaṅgahitatāsaṅkhātavisesanadvārena dhammānaṃ asaṅgahitatāsaṅgahitatā vuttāti tattha ‘‘visesane karaṇavacana’’nti vuttaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘tattha hi…pe… dhammantarassā’’ti. Tattha sabhāvantarenāti saṅgahitatāsaṅgahitatāsaṅkhātena sabhāvantarena pakārantarena. Sabhāvantarassāti asaṅgahitatāsaṅgahitatāsaṅkhātassa sabhāvantarassa. Etesūti catutthapañcamesu. Dhammantarenāti aññadhammena. Dhammantarassāti tato aññassa dhammassa visesanaṃ kataṃ. Tattha hi antarena pakāravisesāmasanaṃ dhammeneva dhammo visesitoti. Ādipadenevāti ‘‘saṅgahitenā’’tiādinā vuttena paṭhamapadeneva. Itarehīti ‘‘sampayuttaṃ vippayutta’’ntiādinā vuttehi dutiyatatiyapadehi. Etthāti ekādasamādīsu catūsu. Dutiyatatiyesu viya visesane eva karaṇavacanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ, na catutthapañcamesu viya kattuattheti adhippāyo. Pucchāvissajjanānantiādinā tamevatthaṃ vibhāveti.

'This is the method': to make clearer the meaning shown by extension, it is said, 'among them as well,' etc. 'By the third phrase' refers to the phrase that is said to be understood through the elided exposition. The instrumental is used in the sense of the agent because the includedness or non-includedness of phenomena is stated by means of those phenomena themselves, which are included or non-included. For so there in the Pāli, includedness and non-includedness are stated directly by way of the phenomena: 'by those phenomena, which phenomena...' But in the second and third pairs, the non-includedness and includedness of phenomena are stated by way of the distinction designated as includedness and non-includedness. Therefore it was said there, 'the instrumental case in the sense of specification.' Therefore he says, 'for there... of another phenomenon.' There, 'by another intrinsic nature' means by another characteristic, a different mode, designated as includedness and non-includedness. 'Of another intrinsic nature' means of another intrinsic nature designated as non-includedness and includedness. 'In these' means in the fourth and fifth pairs. 'By another phenomenon' means by a different phenomenon. 'Of another phenomenon' means a specification is made of a phenomenon different from that. For there, a phenomenon is specified by a phenomenon itself, without recourse to a specific characteristic. 'By the first phrase itself' means by the first phrase stated, such as 'by the included.' 'By the others' means by the second and third phrases stated, such as 'associated, dissociated.' 'Here' means in the four beginning with the eleventh. The instrumental should be seen as being in the sense of specification, as in the second and third, not in the sense of the agent, as in the fourth and fifth. This is the intention. By 'of questions and answers,' etc., he clarifies that very meaning.

Vividhakappanatoti vividhaṃ bahudhā kappanato, saṅgahāsaṅgahānaṃ visuṃ saha ca visesanavisesitabbabhāvakappanatoti attho. Taṃ pana vikappanaṃ vuttākārena vibhajanaṃ hotīti āha ‘‘vibhāgatoti attho’’ti. Sanniṭṭhānalakkhaṇena adhimokkhena sampayuttadhammā ārammaṇe nicchayanākārena pavattiyā sanniṭṭhānavasena vuttadhammā. Te ca tehi saddhiṃ tadavasiṭṭhe dvipañcaviññāṇavicikicchāsahagatadhamme ca saṅgahetvā āha ‘‘sanniṭṭhānavasena vuttā ca sabbe ca cittuppādā sanniṭṭhānavasena vuttasabbacittuppādā’’ti. Itareti phassādayo. Sabbesanti ekūnanavutiyā cittuppādānaṃ. Pariggahetabbāti saṅgahādivasena pariggaṇhitabbā. Mahāvisayena adhimokkhena. Aññesanti vitakkādīnaṃ. Vacanaṃ sandhāyāti ‘‘adhimuccanaṃ adhimokkho, so sanniṭṭhānalakkhaṇo’’ti dhammasaṅgahavaṇṇanāyaṃ (dha. sa. aṭṭha. yevāpanakavaṇṇanā) ‘‘taṇhāpaccayā adhimokkho, adhimokkhapaccayā bhavo’’ti paṭiccasamuppādavibhaṅge ca āgataṃ vacanaṃ sandhāya. Atthe satīti ‘‘sanniṭṭhāna…pe… sādhāraṇato’’ti evamatthe vuccamāne. Vattabbesūti saṅgahādipariggahatthaṃ vattabbesu. Vuttā phassādayo manasikārapariyosānā. Tādisassāti [Pg.9] phassādisadisassa sādhāraṇassa adhimokkhasadisassa asādhāraṇassa aññassa dhammassa abhāvā.

“By various determination” means because of various and manifold determinations; that is, the determination of what is to be included and excluded, separately and together, and the determination of the relationship between what is specified and what is to be specified. But since that determination is a division in the way stated, he says “it has the meaning of division.” The states associated with decision, which has the characteristic of resolution, are called “states spoken of by way of resolution” because they proceed in the mode of certainty regarding their object. Including these, and with them the remaining states—the two sets of fivefold consciousness and the states associated with doubt—he said: “The cittuppādas spoken of by way of resolution and all cittuppādas are what is meant by ‘all cittuppādas spoken of by way of resolution.’” The others are contact and so on. “Of all” means of the eighty-nine cittuppādas. “Are to be comprehended” means they are to be grasped by way of inclusion, etc. “By the great object” means by decision. “Of others” means of applied thought, etc. “Referring to the statement” refers to the statement found in the commentary on the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, “Decision (adhimokkha) is resolving (adhimuccanaṃ); it has the characteristic of resolution (sanniṭṭhānalakkhaṇo),” and in the Analysis of Dependent Origination, “With craving as condition, decision; with decision as condition, becoming.” “When the meaning is present” means when the meaning is stated thus: “resolution …pe… because of being common.” “Among what is to be stated” means among what is to be stated for the purpose of grasping by inclusion, etc. “Stated” are contact and so on, ending with attention. “Of such a one” is said because of the absence of any other state that is like contact and so on in being common, and like decision in being uncommon.

Nanu jīvitindriyacittaṭṭhitiyopi sādhāraṇāti? Saccaṃ sādhāraṇā, atthi pana visesoti dassento āha ‘‘jīvitindriyaṃ panā’’tiādi. Asamādhisabhāvā balabhāvaṃ appattā sāmaññasaddeneva vattabbāti yojanā. Sāmaññavisesasaddehi cāti sāmaññavisesasaddehi vattabbā ca samādhisabhāvā cittekaggatā. Visesasaddavacanīyaṃ aññanti balappattasamādhito aññaṃ sāmaññasaddena byāpetabbaṃ, visesasaddena ca nivattetabbaṃ natthi samādhisabhāvāya eva cittekaggatāya gahitattā. Na aññabyāpakanivattako sāmaññaviseso anañña…pe… viseso, tassa dīpanato. Tasseva dhammassāti tasseva balappattasamādhidhammassa. Bhedadīpakehīti visesadīpakehi samādhibalādivacanehi vattabbā. Vuttalakkhaṇā anaññabyāpakanivattakasāmaññavisesadīpanā saddā. Tato viparītehi aññaṃ byāpetabbaṃ nivattetabbañca gahetvā pavattehi sāmaññavisesasaddeheva na sukhādisabhāvā vedanā viya vattabbā. Tasmāti yasmā asamādhisabhāvā samādhisabhāvāti dvedhā bhinditvā gahitā cittekaggatā, tasmā. Asamādhisabhāvameva pakāseyya visesasaddanirapekkhaṃ pavattamānattā. Itaroti samādhibalādiko visesasaddo. Idhāti imasmiṃ abbhantaramātikuddese, sādhāraṇe phassādike, mahāvisaye vā adhimokkhe uddisiyamāne. Nanu ca abhinditvā gayhamānā cittekaggatā vedanā viya sādhāraṇā hotīti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘abhinnāpi vā’’tiādi. ‘‘Cittassa ṭhiti cittekaggatā avisāhaṭamānasatā (dha. sa. 11, 15). Arūpīnaṃ dhammānaṃ āyu ṭhitī’’ti (dha. sa. 19) vacanato samādhijīvitindriyānaṃ aññadhammanissayena vattabbatā veditabbā. Na arahatīti idha uddesaṃ na arahati samukheneva vattabbesu phassādīsu uddisiyamānesūti attho.

Is it not that the life faculty and the stability of mind are also common? Truly, they are common, but there is a distinction. To show this, he says: “But the life faculty…” and so on. The construction is: that which lacks the nature of concentration and has not attained strength should be spoken of only by the general term. “And by general and specific terms” means that one-pointedness of mind that has the nature of concentration is to be spoken of by both general and specific terms. There is nothing else to be spoken of by a specific term—other than concentration that has attained strength—that should be pervaded by the general term and excluded by the specific term, because one-pointedness of mind, which is the very nature of concentration, has been taken. A general-and-specific [term] is not one that pervades something else and excludes [from it]; [it is] a specific [term] for what is not something else... because that is being elucidated. “Of that very state” means of that very state of concentration that has attained strength. “By terms that elucidate the difference” means it is to be spoken of by words that elucidate the distinction, such as “strength of concentration,” etc. The words described are those that elucidate a general-and-specific [relationship] that does not pervade and exclude something else. Therefore, it is not to be spoken of like feeling, which has the nature of pleasure, etc., by general-and-specific terms that proceed by taking what is to be pervaded and excluded as being different. Therefore (tasmā): because one-pointedness of mind is taken as twofold, divided into that which lacks the nature of concentration and that which has the nature of concentration, therefore… It would clarify only that which lacks the nature of concentration, as it proceeds without regard for the specific term. The other (itaro) is the specific term, such as “strength of concentration.” Here (idhā) means in this exposition of the internal mātikā, when the common factors such as contact, etc., or decision, which has a great scope, are being pointed out. Referring to the objection, “But is it not that one-pointedness of mind, when grasped without being divided, is common like feeling?” he says “Or even undivided…” and so on. In accordance with the statements, “Stability of mind is one-pointedness of mind, an unscattered mind” (Dhs 11, 15) and “For immaterial states, life is stability” (Dhs 19), it should be understood that concentration and the life faculty are to be spoken of in dependence on other states. “It is not fit” (na arahati) means it is not fit for inclusion here in the exposition when contact and so on, which are to be stated at the forefront, are being pointed out.

Mātikāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Mātikā is completed.

2. Niddesavaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Exposition

1. Paṭhamanayo saṅgahāsaṅgahapadavaṇṇanā

1. First Method: Commentary on the Terms of Inclusion and Non-inclusion

1. Khandhapadavaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Term 'Aggregate'

6. ‘‘Abhiññeyyadhammabhāvena [Pg.10] vuttā cattāro khandhā hontī’’tiādinā, ‘‘rūpakkhandho abhiññeyyo’’tiādinā ca abhiññātalakkhaṇavisayāti āha ‘‘sabhāvato abhiññātāna’’nti. Pariññeyyatādīti ādi-saddena pahātabbasacchikātabbabhāvetabbatā saṅgayhati. Adhipatiyādīti adhipatipaccayabhāvaupaṭṭhānapadahanādīni. Saccādiviseso viyāti dukkhasaccādipariyāyo abhiññeyyapīḷanaṭṭhādiviseso viya. Evañca katvāti nayamukhamātikāya abhiññeyyanissayena vuccamānattā eva. Tesaṃ rūpadhammānaṃ pañcannaṃ khandhānaṃ khandhabhāvena viya rūpakkhandhabhāvena sabhāgatā hoti, na vedanākkhandhādibhāvenāti saṅgahalakkhaṇamāha. Itīti tasmā, yasmā rūpadhammā aññamaññaṃ rūpakkhandhabhāvena sabhāgā, tasmāti attho. Rūpakkhandhabhāvasaṅkhātena rūpakkhandhabhāvena atthamukheneva gahaṇe. Saddadvārena pana gahaṇe rūpakkhandhavacanasaṅkhātena vā rūpakkhandhavacanavacanīyatāsaṅkhātena. Idāni tamevatthaṃ pākaṭataraṃ kātuṃ ‘‘rūpakkhandhoti hī’’tiādi vuttaṃ.

6. By the statements beginning, “The four aggregates are said to be states to be directly known,” and “The form aggregate is to be directly known,” they are the domain of the characteristic of what has been directly known. Thus he says, “of those directly known by their intrinsic nature.” “Comprehensibility, etc.” (pariññeyyatādi): by the word “etc.” are included the states of being what should be abandoned, what should be realized, and what should be developed. “Dominance, etc.” (adhipatiyādi) refers to dominance as a condition, establishment, exertion, etc. “Like the distinction of the truths, etc.” (saccādiviseso viya) means like the distinction in the exposition of the truth of suffering, etc., which has the meaning of oppression, etc., with regard to what is to be directly known. “And having done so” (evañca katvā) means because in the mātikā of the introduction to the method, it is spoken of in dependence on what is to be directly known. He states the characteristic of inclusion thus: for those material phenomena, there is a common nature by way of being the form aggregate, just as for the five aggregates there is a common nature by way of being aggregates, but not by way of being the feeling aggregate, etc. Therefore (iti): the meaning is, because material phenomena are mutually of a common nature by way of being the form aggregate, therefore… When grasping is by way of meaning, it is by the state of the form aggregate, which is designated as “the state of the form aggregate.” But when grasping is by way of the word, it is by what is designated as the term “form aggregate” or by what is designated as being expressible by the term “form aggregate.” Now, to make that meaning clearer, the passage beginning “For it is the form aggregate…” is stated.

Purimenāti rūpakkhandhena. Saññākkhandhamūlakātiādīsu ‘‘purimena yojiyamāne’’tiādiṃ ānetvā yathārahaṃ yojetabbaṃ. Abhedato pañcakapucchāvissajjanaṃ khandhapadaniddese sabbapacchimamevāti āha ‘‘bhedato pañcakapucchāvissajjanānantara’’nti.

“By the preceding” (purimena) means by the form aggregate. In cases such as “rooted in the perception aggregate,” the phrase “when connected with the preceding,” etc., should be supplied and applied as appropriate. Because the answer to the fivefold question without distinction comes at the very end in the exposition of the term “aggregate,” he says “after the answer to the fivefold question with distinction.”

Āyatanapadādivaṇṇanā

The Commentary Beginning with the Section on the Bases

40. Yadipi ekakepi sadisaṃ vissajjanaṃ vissajjanaṃ samudayamaggasaccānaṃ ‘‘samudayasaccaṃ ekena khandhena…pe… maggasaccaṃ ekena khandhena ekenāyatanena ekāya dhātuyā saṅgahitaṃ, catūhi khandhehi ekādasahi āyatanehi sattarasahi dhātūhi asaṅgahita’’nti (dhātu. 41) niddiṭṭhattā. Etthāti etasmiṃ indriyapadaniddese[Pg.11]. Cakkhusotacakkhusukhindriyadukānanti cakkhusotadukaṃ cakkhusukhindriyadukanti etesaṃ dukānaṃ. Cakkhusotasukhindriyānañhi ‘‘ekena khandhena ekenāyatanena ekāya dhātuyā saṅgahitaṃ, catūhi khandhehi ekādasahi āyatanehi sattarasahi dhātūhi asaṅgahita’’nti ekake sadisaṃ vissajjanaṃ. Cakkhusotindriyadukassa pana ‘‘cakkhundriyañca sotindriyañca ekena khandhena dvīhāyatanehi dvīhi dhātūhi saṅgahitā, catūhi khandhehi dasahāyatanehi soḷasahi dhātūhi asaṅgahitā’’ti, ‘‘cakkhundriyañca sukhindriyañca dvīhi khandhehi dvīhāyatanehi dvīhi dhātūhi saṅgahitā, tīhi khandhehi dasahāyatanehi soḷasahi dhātūhi asaṅgahitā’’ti cakkhusukhindriyadukassa ca asadisaṃ vissajjanaṃ. Nāpi dukehi tikassāti cakkhusotacakkhusukhindriyādidukehi cakkhusotasukhindriyāditikassa nāpi sadisaṃ vissajjanaṃ. Idhāti saccapadaniddese. Tikena cāti dukkhasamudayamaggāditikena ca. ‘‘Pañcahi khandhehi dvādasahāyatanehi aṭṭhārasahi dhātūhi saṅgahitā, na kehici khandhehi na kehici āyatanehi na kāhici dhātūhi asaṅgahitā’’ti sadisaṃ vissajjanaṃ.

40. Although in the individual case there is a similar reply concerning the truths of origin and path—as it is stated: “The truth of origin is included in one aggregate… the truth of the path is included in one aggregate, one base, and one element, but unincluded by four aggregates, eleven bases, and seventeen elements” (Dhk 41). Here means in this exposition of the section on the faculties. ‘Of the pairs of the eye-and-ear-faculties and the eye-and-pleasure-faculties’ means of these pairs. For the eye, ear, and pleasure faculties individually, the reply is similar: “Included in one aggregate, one base, and one element, but unincluded by four aggregates, eleven bases, and seventeen elements.” For the pair of the eye and ear faculties, however, the reply is dissimilar: “The eye faculty and the ear faculty are included in one aggregate, two bases, and two elements, but unincluded by four aggregates, ten bases, and sixteen elements.” And for the pair of the eye and pleasure faculties, the reply is dissimilar: “The eye faculty and the pleasure faculty are included in two aggregates, two bases, and two elements, but unincluded by three aggregates, ten bases, and sixteen elements.” ‘Nor for the triplet by the pairs’ means that the reply for a triplet, such as the eye, ear, and pleasure faculties, is also not similar to that for the pairs. Here means in the exposition of the section on the truths. ‘And by the triplet’ means by the triplet such as the truths of suffering, origin, and path. The reply is similar: “They are included in five aggregates, twelve bases, and eighteen elements, and not unincluded by any aggregates, any bases, or any elements.”

6. Paṭiccasamuppādavaṇṇanā

6. The Explanation of Dependent Origination

61. Avijjāvacanenāti ‘‘avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā’’ti ettha avijjāggahaṇena. Visesanaṃ na kattabbaṃ, ‘‘sabbampi viññāṇa’’nti vattabbanti adhippāyo. Tattha kāraṇamāha ‘‘kusalādīnampī’’tiādinā. Vissajjanāsadisena sabbaviññāṇādisaṅgahaṇato. Tesanti viññāṇādipadānaṃ. Idhāti imasmiṃ paṭhamanaye. Akammajānampi saṅgahitatā viññāyati saddāyatanassapi gahitattā.

61. By the word ‘ignorance’ means by the taking up of ‘ignorance’ here in the phrase “with ignorance as condition, formations.” A qualification should not be made; the intention is that one should say “all consciousness whatsoever.” There he states the reason with the words beginning “even of the wholesome, etc.,” because of the inclusion of all consciousness, etc., which is similar to the reply. Of them means of the terms beginning with consciousness. Here means in this first method. The inclusion of what is not born of kamma is also understood, because the sound base is also taken.

71. Jāyamāna…pe… mānānanti jāyamānādiavatthānaṃ dhammānaṃ. Jāyamānādibhāvamattattāti nibbattanādiavatthāmattabhāvato. Vinibbhujjitvāti avatthābhāvato vinibbhogaṃ katvā. Paramatthato avijjamānāni, sabhāvamattabhūtānīti paramatthadhammānaṃ avatthābhāvamattabhūtāni. Aparamatthasabhāvānipi rūpadhammassa nibbattiādibhāvato ruppanabhāvena gayhanti. Tato ‘‘rūpakkhandhassa sabhāgāni, arūpānaṃ pana jātijarāmaraṇānī’’ti ānetvā yojanā. Ekekabhūtānīti yathā ekasmiṃ rūpakalāpe jātiādīni ekekāniyeva honti, evaṃ ekasmiṃ arūpakalāpepīti vuttaṃ. Tenāha [Pg.12] ‘‘rūpakalāpajātiādīni viyā’’tiādi. Anubhavanasañjānanavijānanakiccānaṃ vedanādīnaṃ nibbattiādibhūtānipi jātiādīni tathā na gayhantīti āha ‘‘vediyana…pe… agayhamānānī’’ti. Tena vedanākkhandhādīhi jātiādīnaṃ saṅgahābhāvamāha. ‘‘Jāti, bhikkhave, aniccā saṅkhatā’’tiādivacanato jātiādīnampi saṅkhatapariyāyo atthīti saṅkhatābhisaṅkharaṇakiccena saṅkhārakkhandhena tesaṃ saṅgahoti vuttaṃ ‘‘saṅkhatā…pe… sabhāgānī’’ti. Teneva ca saṅkhārakkhandhassa anekantaparamatthakiccatā veditabbā. Tathā duvidhānīti vuttappakārena rūpārūpadhammānaṃ nibbattiādibhāvena dvippakārāni. Tenāti yathāvuttasabhāgatthena. Tehi khandhādīhīti rūpakkhandhasaṅkhārakkhandhadhammāyatanadhammadhātūhi.

71. Being born… and so on…: the words ending in ‘-māna’ mean ‘of the dhammas that are in the state of being born, etc.’ Because of being merely the state of being born, etc., means because of being merely the state of arising, etc. Having separated means having made a separation from their nature as a state. Ultimately non-existent, being mere concepts means they are merely the nature of a state of ultimate realities. Even those that are not ultimate realities are grasped by way of the characteristic of being afflicted, because they are the arising, etc., of material phenomena. Therefore, having brought the quote “the form aggregate has its counterparts, but for the immaterial aggregates there are birth, aging, and death,” the connection is made. Being one by one means: just as in a single material group birth, etc., are each single, so too, it is said, in a single immaterial group. Hence he says, “like the birth, etc., of a material group,” and so on. Although birth, etc., are the arising, etc., of feeling, etc., which have the functions of experiencing, perceiving, and cognizing, they are not grasped in that way; hence he says, “feeling… not being grasped.” Thereby he states the non-inclusion of birth, etc., by the feeling aggregate, etc. Because of the statement beginning “Birth, bhikkhus, is impermanent, conditioned,” birth, etc., also have the designation ‘conditioned’; thus their inclusion by the formations aggregate, which has the function of forming the conditioned, is stated with the words “conditioned… counterparts.” And by that itself, the non-exclusive ultimate function of the formations aggregate should be understood. Likewise twofold means they are of two kinds, in the way stated, as the arising, etc., of material and immaterial phenomena. Therefore means because of the correspondence stated above. By those aggregates, etc., means by the form aggregate, the formations aggregate, the dhamma base, and the dhamma element.

Paṭhamanayasaṅgahāsaṅgahapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the terms of inclusion and non-inclusion in the first method is concluded.

2. Dutiyanayo saṅgahitenaasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

2. The Second Method: Explanation of the term 'unincluded by what is included'.

171. ‘‘Saṅgahitena asaṅgahita’’nti ettha saṅgahitāsaṅgahitasaddā bhinnādhikaraṇā na gahetabbā visesanavisesitabbatāya icchitattā. Yo hi dhammo saṅgahitatāvisesavisiṭṭho asaṅgahito heṭṭhā uddiṭṭho, sveva idha asaṅgahitabhāvena pucchitvā vissajjīyatīti dassento ‘‘yaṃ taṃ…pe… tadeva dassento’’ti āha. Ye hi dhammā cakkhāyatanena khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitā, āyatanadhātusaṅgahena ca asaṅgahitā, tesaṃyeva puna khandhādīhi asaṅgaho pucchitvā vissajjito. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘cakkhāyatanena…pe… āhā’’ti. Sabbatthāti sabbesu nayesu vāresu ca. Khandhādisaṅgahasāmaññānanti ‘‘khandhasaṅgahenā’’tiādinā avisesena vuttānaṃ khandhādisaṅgahānaṃ. ‘‘Sāmaññajotanā visese avatiṭṭhatī’’ti āha ‘‘niccaṃ visesāpekkhattā’’ti. Visesāvabodhanatthāni pañhabyākaraṇānīti vuttaṃ ‘‘bhedanissitattā ca pucchāvissajjanāna’’nti. Savisesāva khandhādigaṇanāti ‘‘khandhasaṅgahenā’’tiādinā avisesena vuttāpi rūpakkhandhādinā savisesāva khandhādigaṇanā, khandhādinā saṅgahoti attho. Suddhāti kevalā anavasesā, sāmaññabhūtāti vuttaṃ hoti.

171. “Unincluded by what is included”: here, the terms “included” and “unincluded” should not be taken as having different referents, because they are intended as qualifier and qualified. For that phenomenon which, qualified by the distinction of being included, was indicated below as unincluded, is here questioned and answered regarding its state of being unincluded; showing this, he said, “that which… and so on… showing that very thing.” For those phenomena that are included by the eye-base by way of the aggregate-inclusion but are unincluded by way of the base- and element-inclusions—their non-inclusion by the aggregates, etc., is again questioned and answered. Hence it was said: “by the eye-base… and so on… he said.” “Everywhere” means in all methods and sections. “The generality of the aggregate-inclusions, etc.” refers to the aggregate-inclusions, etc., spoken of without specification by such phrases as “by the aggregate-inclusion.” He said, “The illumination of the general settles on the particular,” because “it always requires particulars.” It is said that the questions and answers are for the purpose of understanding the particulars, because “the questions and answers are based on differentiation.” The enumeration of the aggregates, etc., is indeed with particulars: although spoken of without specification by such phrases as “by the aggregate-inclusion,” the enumeration of the aggregates, etc., is with particulars, such as the form aggregate; the meaning is inclusion by the aggregates, etc. “Pure” means sole, without remainder; it is said to have become general.

Tatthāti yathādhikate dutiyanaye. Sāmaññajotanāya visesaniddiṭṭhattā āha ‘‘saṅgahi…pe… niddhāritattā’’ti. Tīsu saṅgahesūti khandhādisaṅgahesu [Pg.13] tīsu. Aññehīti vuttāvasesehi dvīhi ekena vā. Ettakeneva dassetabbā siyuṃ tāvatāpi saṅgahitena asaṅgahitabhāvassa pakāsitattā. Tesanti saṅgahitenaasaṅgahitabhāvena vuttadhammānaṃ. Evaṃvidhānanti ‘‘cakkhāyatanaṃ sotāyatana’’ntiādinā aniddhāritavisesānaṃ. Asambhavāti vuttappakārena niddisituṃ asambhavā. Saṅgahādinayadassanamattaṃ nayamātikāya byāpāro, yattha pana saṅgahādayo, te khandhādayo kusalādayo ca tesaṃ visayabhūtāti tehi vinā saṅgahādīnaṃ pavatti natthi. Tenāha ‘‘nayamātikāya abbhantarabāhiramātikāpekkhattā’’ti. Saṅgāhakaṃ asaṅgāhakañcāti vattabbaṃ. Yo hi idha saṅgāhakabhāvena vutto dhammo asaṅgāhakabhāvenapi vuttoyevāti.

“Therein” means in the second method, as is relevant. Because a particular is specified by way of illuminating the general, he said: “included... and so on... because it is determined.” “Among the three inclusions” means among the three—the aggregate-inclusions, etc. “By others” means by the remaining two or one that have been mentioned. Only this much should be shown, for by that much the state of being unincluded by what is included has been clarified. “Of these” means of the phenomena spoken of as being unincluded by what is included. “Of such a kind” means of those whose particulars have not been determined, such as “the eye-base, the ear-base,” etc. “Impossible” means it is impossible to specify in the manner stated. The function of the method-mātikā is merely showing the method of inclusion, etc.; but where there are inclusions, etc., those—the aggregates, etc., and the wholesome states, etc.—are their domain, for without them the process of inclusion, etc., does not occur. Therefore he said: “because the method-mātikā is dependent on the internal and external mātikās.” It should be stated as “what includes and what does not include.” For a phenomenon that is stated here as an includer is also stated as a non-includer.

‘‘Ye dhammā khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitā, āyatanadhātusaṅgahena asaṅgahitā’’ti, ‘‘ye dhammā khandhasaṅgahena asaṅgahitā, āyatanadhātusaṅgahena saṅgahitā’’ti ca yattha pucchitabbavissajjitabbadhammavisesaniddhāraṇaṃ natthi, tattha paṭhamanaye chaṭṭhanaye ca ‘‘rūpakkhandho katihi khandhehi saṅgahito? Ekena khandhenā’’ti (dhātu. 6), ‘‘rūpakkhandho katihi khandhehi sampayuttoti? Natthi. Catūhi khandhehi vippayutto’’ti (dhātu. 228) ca evaṃ pucchitabbavissajjitabbabhāvena. Itaresūti dutiyādinayesu. Tassa tassāti yaṃ pucchitabbaṃ vissajjitabbañca ‘‘ye dhammā’’ti aniyamitarūpena niddhāritaṃ, tassa tassa ‘‘te dhammā’’ti niyāmakabhāvena.

“Those phenomena that are included by the aggregate-inclusion but are unincluded by the base- and element-inclusions,” and “those phenomena that are unincluded by the aggregate-inclusion but are included by the base- and element-inclusions”—where there is no determination of the particular phenomena to be questioned and answered, there, in the first and sixth methods, it is asked and answered in the manner of “By how many aggregates is the form aggregate included? By one aggregate” (Dhk. 6), and “With how many aggregates is the form aggregate associated? With none. It is dissociated from four aggregates” (Dhk. 228), thus by way of what is to be questioned and answered. “In the others” means in the second and subsequent methods. “Of that and that” means: whatever is to be questioned and answered has been determined in an indefinite form as “those phenomena”; of that and that, the answer is given in a defining manner as “those phenomena.”

Etthāti etasmiṃ pakaraṇe. Yena yena cakkhāyatanādinā saṅgāhakena. Khandhādisaṅgahesūti khandhāyatanadhātusaṅgahesu. Tena tenāti khandhādisaṅgahena. Aññanti tato tato saṅgāhakato aññaṃ. Tabbinimuttaṃ saṅgahetabbāsaṅgahetabbaṃ yaṃ dhammajātaṃ atthi, taṃ tadeva ‘‘cakkhāyatanena ye dhammā khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitā, āyatanadhātusaṅgahena asaṅgahitā’’ti saṅgāhakāsaṅgāhakabhāvena uddhaṭaṃ. Añño dhammo natthi tassa sabhāgabhāvena saṅgāhakasseva abhāvato. Siyā panetaṃ sabhāgena ekadesena saṅgahoti, taṃ paṭikkhipanto āha ‘‘na ca so…pe… hotī’’ti. Yañcātiādinā vacanantaraṃ pariharati.

“Herein” means in this treatise. “By whatever” means by whatever includer, such as the eye-base, etc. “In the aggregate-inclusions, etc.” means in the aggregate-, base-, and element-inclusions. “By this and that” means by the aggregate-inclusion, etc. “Other” means other than that particular includer. Whatever class of phenomena exists, apart from that, that should be included or unincluded, that very thing is set forth by way of being an includer and a non-includer, as in: “Those phenomena that are included by the eye-base by way of the aggregate-inclusion, but are unincluded by way of the base- and element-inclusions.” There is no other phenomenon, because of the absence of an includer that is of the same kind as it. But it might be that there is inclusion by a part that is of the same kind; rejecting this, he said: “And that is not... and so on... it is.” By “And what,” etc., he refutes another statement.

Yadi [Pg.14] cātiādināpi tasseva tena saṅgahābhāvaṃ pāṭhābhāvadassanena vibhāveti. Tattha so evāti yo rūpādikkhandho saṅgāhakabhāvena vutto, so eva tena rūpādikkhandhena saṅgayheyya saṅgahetabbo bhaveyya, teneva tassa saṅgahābhāve lakkhaṇaṃ dassento āha ‘‘na hi so eva tassa sabhāgo visabhāgo cā’’ti. Ekadesā viya cakkhāyatanādayo samudāyassa rūpakkhandhādikassa. Rūpakkhandho cakkhāyatanādīnaṃ na saṅgāhako asaṅgāhako ca sabhāgavisabhāgabhāvābhāvato. Esa nayo sesesupi. Samudāyantogadhānantiādinā vuttamevatthaṃ pākaṭataraṃ karoti. Tattha yenāti vibhāgena. Teti ekadesā. Tesanti ekadesānaṃ. Ettha tadantogadhatāya vibhāgābhāvo, vibhāgābhāvena sabhāgavisabhāgatābhāvo, tena saṅgāhakāsaṅgāhakatābhāvo dassitoti veditabbo.

Also by “And if,” etc., he clarifies the absence of inclusion of that by that, by showing the absence of a text. Therein, “that very one” means: that same form aggregate, etc., which was stated as the includer, would itself be included or should be included by that same form aggregate, etc. Showing the characteristic for the absence of its inclusion by that very thing, he says: “For that very one is not similar nor dissimilar to itself.” Just as the parts, the eye-base, etc., are of the whole, the form aggregate, etc. The form aggregate is neither an includer nor a non-includer of the eye-base, etc., because of the absence of a state of similarity and dissimilarity. This is the method in the remaining cases too. By “being included within the whole,” etc., he makes the meaning already stated clearer. Therein, “by which” means by distinction. “They” means the parts. “Of them” means of the parts. Here it should be understood that because they are included within that, there is an absence of distinction; because of the absence of distinction, there is an absence of similarity and dissimilarity; and because of that, the absence of being an includer or a non-includer is shown.

Yathā sabbena sabbaṃ sabhāgavisabhāgābhāvena ekadesānaṃ samudāyo saṅgāhako asaṅgāhako ca na hoti, evaṃ ekadesasabhāgavisabhāgānanti dassento ‘‘tathā’’tiādimāha. Tattha yathātiādi udāharaṇadassanena yathāvuttassa atthassa pākaṭakaraṇaṃ. Khandhasaṅgahena saṅgāhakaṃ asaṅgāhakañcāti yojanā. Tathā sesesupi. Na hi ekadesa…pe… visabhāgaṃ yena samudāyo saṅgāhako asaṅgāhako ca siyāti adhippāyo. Ettha ca saṅgāhakattaṃ tāva mā hotu, asaṅgāhakattaṃ pana kasmā paṭikkhipīyatīti codanaṃ manasi katvā āha ‘‘tasmā’’tiādi. Tattha tasmāti vuttamevatthaṃ hetubhāvena parāmasati. Attato aññassa, attani antogadhato aññassa, attekadesasabhāgato aññassa satipi asaṅgāhakatteti yojanā. Taṃ panetaṃ ‘‘rūpakkhandho rūpakkhandhena saṅgahito asaṅgahito ca na hotī’’tiādinā vutte tayo pakāre sandhāya vuttaṃ. Saṅgāhakattameva etesaṃ natthīti etesaṃ attā, attani antogadho, attekadesasabhāgo cāti vuttānaṃ saṅgāhakabhāvo eva natthi sabhāgābhāvato. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘na hi so eva tassa sabhāgo’’tiādi. Yenāti saṅgāhakattena. Evarūpānanti yathāvuttānaṃ tippakārānaṃ aggahaṇaṃ veditabbaṃ satipi visabhāgabhāveti adhippāyo.

Just as a whole is not an includer or a non-includer of its parts in every way, due to the absence of similarity and dissimilarity, so too, to show the similarity and dissimilarity of the parts, he said, “Thus,” etc. Therein, “Just as,” etc., is a clarification of the aforesaid meaning by showing an example. The connection is: an includer and a non-includer by way of the aggregate-inclusion. Similarly in the remaining cases. The intention is: “For a part is not...pe...dissimilar, whereby the whole would be an includer or a non-includer.” And here, having considered the objection, “Let there be no state of being an includer, but why is the state of being a non-includer rejected?” he said, “Therefore,” etc. Therein, “therefore” refers to the aforesaid meaning as the reason. The connection is: [the state of being a non-includer is rejected] even though there is a state of being a non-includer with respect to another different from oneself, to another different from what is included in oneself, and to another different from a similar part of oneself. But this was said with reference to the three types stated in, “The form aggregate is neither included nor not included by the form aggregate,” etc. For these, there is simply no state of being an includer. That is, for those stated as oneself, what is included in oneself, and a similar part of oneself, there is no state of being an includer because of the absence of similarity. Hence it was said: “For that very one is not similar to itself,” etc. “By which” means by the state of being an includer. The intention is: “Of such kinds” should be understood as the non-inclusion of the three types mentioned, even though there is a state of dissimilarity.

Tenāti [Pg.15] ‘‘dhammāyatana’’ntiādinā vacanena. Ekadesassa vedanākkhandhādikassa samudāyassa dhammāyatanassa saṅgāhakattaṃ ekadesena samudāyassa saṅgahitabhāvanti attho, samudāyassa rūpakkhandhassa ekadesassa cakkhāyatanassa sotāyatanassa ca saṅgāhakattaṃ samudāyena ekadesassa saṅgahitabhāvanti vuttaṃ hoti. Yadi evaṃ na dasseti, atha kiṃ dassetīti āha ‘‘catukkhandhagaṇanabhedehī’’tiādi. Tattha catukkhandhagaṇanabhedehīti rūpādicatukkhandhagaṇanavibhāgehi. Pañcadhāti rūpādicatukkhandhasaṅgaho viññāṇakkhandhasaṅgahoti evaṃ pañcappakārena bhinnataṃ. Tenāha ‘‘gaṇetabbāgaṇetabbabhāvenā’’ti. ‘‘Ekena khandhenā’’tiādīsu karaṇatthe karaṇavacanaṃ, na kattuattheti katvā āha ‘‘saṅgāhakāsaṅgāhakanirapekkhāna’’nti. Tenevāha ‘‘kammakaraṇamattasabbhāvā’’ti. Dutiyādayo pana nayā. Agaṇanādidassanānīti agaṇanagaṇanadassanāni. Nanu ca dutiyādīsu gaṇanādīnipi vijjantīti? Saccaṃ vijjanti, tāni pana visesanabhūtāni appadhānānīti visesitabbabhūtānaṃ padhānānaṃ vasenevaṃ vuttaṃ. ‘‘Cakkhāyatanena ye dhammā khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitā’’tiādinā kattuādayo niddiṭṭhāti āha ‘‘kattukaraṇakammattayasabbhāvā’’ti.

“By that” means by the statement, “the base of phenomena,” etc. The meaning is that the whole—the base of phenomena—being the includer of its parts—the feeling aggregate, etc.—means that a part is included by the whole; and it is said that the whole—the form aggregate—being the includer of its parts—the eye-base and the ear-base—means that a part is included by the whole. If it does not show this, then what does it show? He said: “by the divisions in the counting of the four aggregates,” etc. Therein, “by the divisions in the counting of the four aggregates” means by the divisions in the counting of the four aggregates beginning with form. “Fivefold” means being divided in five ways, thus: the inclusion of the four aggregates beginning with form, and the inclusion of the consciousness aggregate. Therefore he said: “by way of what is to be counted and what is not to be counted.” Considering that in “by one aggregate,” etc., the instrumental expression is in the sense of instrument, not in the sense of agent, he said: “independent of an includer and a non-includer.” For that very reason he said: “because of the mere existence of object and instrument.” The second and subsequent methods, however, are showings of non-counting, etc., that is, showings of non-counting and counting. But do not counting, etc., also exist in the second and subsequent methods? Truly, they exist, but they are qualifiers and are secondary; thus it is spoken in accordance with the primary factors, which are what is to be qualified. Because agent, etc., are specified by, “Those phenomena that are included by the eye-base by way of the aggregate-inclusion,” etc., he said: “because of the existence of the triad of agent, instrument, and object.”

Tathā tathāti tena tena rūpakkhandhādippakārena. Taṃtaṃkhandhādibhāvābhāvo sabhāgavisabhāgatāti rūpadhammādīnaṃ rūpakkhandhādibhāvo sabhāgatā, vedanākkhandhādiabhāvo visabhāgatāti attho. Yathāniddhāritadhammadassaneti ‘‘ye dhammā, te dhammā’’ti niddhāritappakāradhammanirūpane. Saṅgāhakasaṅgahetabbānanti cakkhāyatanādikassa saṅgāhakassa sotāyatanādikassa ca saṅgahetabbassa. Samānakkhandhādibhāvoti ekakkhandhādibhāvo, rūpakkhandhādibhāvoti attho. Tadabhāvoti tassa samānakkhandhādibhāvassa abhāvo aññakkhandhādibhāvo. Ayanti yvāyaṃ paṭhamanaye tathā tathā gaṇetabbāgaṇetabbatāsaṅkhāto dutiyādinayesu yathāvuttānaṃ samānakkhandhādibhāvābhāvasaṅkhāto taṃtaṃkhandhādibhāvābhāvo vutto, ayametesaṃ dvippakārānaṃ nayānaṃ sabhāgavisabhāgatāsu viseso.

“In such and such a way” means: by this and that mode, such as the form aggregate, etc. “The presence or absence of this or that aggregate, etc., is similarity and dissimilarity” means: for form phenomena, etc., their being the form aggregate, etc., is similarity, while their not being the feeling aggregate, etc., is dissimilarity—this is the meaning. “In the seeing of phenomena as determined” means: in the investigation of phenomena in the manner determined as, “whatever phenomena, those phenomena.” “Of the includer and the included” means: of the eye-base, etc., as the includer, and of the ear-base, etc., as what is to be included. “The state of being a similar aggregate, etc.” means: the state of being a single aggregate, that is, the state of being the form aggregate, etc. “Its absence” means: the absence of that state of being a similar aggregate, etc., is the state of being a different aggregate. “This” means: this which in the first method is designated as what is to be counted and not to be counted in such and such a way, and in the second and subsequent methods is designated as the presence or absence of the state of being a similar aggregate, etc., as stated—this stated presence or absence of this or that aggregate, etc., is the distinction between these two kinds of methods in regard to similarity and dissimilarity.

Samudayasaccasukhindriyādīti ādi-saddena maggasaccadukkhindriyādi saṅgayhati. Asaṅgāhakattābhāvatoti saṅgahitatāvisiṭṭhassa asaṅgāhakattassa abhāvato[Pg.16]. Na hi sakkā ‘‘samudayasaccena ye dhammā khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitā, āyatanadhātusaṅgahena asaṅgahitā’’tiādi vattuṃ. Dukkhasaccasadisāni abyākatapadādīni. Itarehīti āyatanadhātusaṅgahehi saṅgāhakattāsaṅgāhakattābhāvato na uddhaṭānīti yojanā. Evantiādi yathāvuttassa atthassa nigamanavasena vuttaṃ. Na rūpakkhandhoti na sabbo rūpakkhandhadhammoti attho.

“The truth of the origin, the pleasure faculty, etc.”: by the word “etc.” the truth of the path, the pain faculty, etc., are included. “Because of the absence of the state of being a non-includer” means: because of the absence of the state of being a non-includer which is qualified by the state of being included. For it is not possible to say: “Those phenomena that are included by the truth of the origin by way of the aggregate inclusion are not included by way of the base and element inclusions,” and so on. Similar to the truth of suffering are the indeterminate terms, etc. “By the others” means: because of the absence of the state of being an includer and the state of being a non-includer by the base and element inclusions, they are not extracted. This is the connection. “Thus,” etc., is stated by way of a conclusion to the meaning as explained. “Not the form aggregate” means: not every phenomenon of the form aggregate.

‘‘Khandhapadenā’’ti idaṃ karaṇatthe karaṇavacanaṃ, na kattuattheti āha ‘‘khandhapadasaṅgahenāti attho’’ti. Tenevassa kattuatthataṃ paṭisedhetuṃ ‘‘na saṅgāhakenā’’ti vuttaṃ. Karaṇaṃ pana katturahitaṃ natthīti āha ‘‘kenaci saṅgāhakenāti idaṃ pana ānetvā vattabba’’nti. Saṅgāhakesu na yujjati na saṅgahetabbesūti adhippāyo. Rūpakkhandhadhammā hi ‘‘ye dhammā khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitā’’ti vuttāti. Samudāye vuttavidhi tadavayavepi sambhavatīti codanaṃ samuṭṭhāpento ‘‘etena nayenā’’tiādimāha. Paṭiyogīnivattanaṃ eva-saddena karīyatīti āha ‘‘na hi aññamattanivāraṇaṃ eva-saddassa attho’’ti. Tenāha ‘‘saṅgāhakato aññanivāraṇaṃ eva-saddassa attho’’ti. So ca…pe… pekkhanti iminā tamevatthaṃ pākaṭataraṃ karoti. Saṅgāhakāpekkhatte hi ‘‘so cā’’tiādivacanassa ‘‘cakkhāyatanena rūpakkhandhova saṅgahito’’ti ettha cakkhāyatanaṃ saṅgāhakanti yathādhippetassa atthassa asambhavo evāti idāni taṃ asambhavaṃ vibhāvento ‘‘katha’’ntiādimāha, taṃ suviññeyyameva.

“By the aggregate term”: this is an instrumental expression in the sense of the instrument, not in the sense of the agent. Hence he says: “the meaning is by the aggregate-term inclusion.” For that reason, to deny its agentive sense, it is said, “not by an includer.” But since there is no instrument without an agent, he says: “But this should be supplied and stated: ‘by some includer.’” The intention is that it is not applicable among includers, nor among things to be included. For the phenomena of the form aggregate are stated as, “those phenomena that are included by the aggregate inclusion.” Raising the objection that the method stated for the whole is also possible for its parts, he says, “by this method,” etc. The exclusion of a counterpart is done by the word ‘eva.’ Hence he says: “For the meaning of the word ‘eva’ is not the mere prevention of another.” Therefore he says: “The meaning of the word ‘eva’ is the prevention of what is other than the includer.” “And that... etc. ... they expect”: by this he makes that very meaning clearer. For when the includer is expected, the meaning of the statement, “and that,” etc., would be: “the form aggregate alone is included by the eye-base,” where the eye-base is the includer. Thus the intended meaning would be quite impossible. Now, explaining that impossibility, he says, “How?,” etc., which is easily understood.

Etthāti ‘‘aḍḍhekādasahi āyatanadhātūhī’’ti ettha. ‘‘Rūpakkhandhenā’’ti ānetvā vattabbaṃ āyatanadhātuvisesanatthaṃ. Na so eva tassa, samudāyo vā tadekadesānaṃ saṅgāhako asaṅgāhako ca hotīti vuttovāyamatthoti āha ‘‘rūpakkhandho…pe… na hotī’’ti. Iminā pariyāyenāti yasmā vuttappakāraṃ saṅgāhakattaṃ natthi ‘‘yena saṅgahitassa asaṅgāhakaṃ siyā’’ti iminā pariyāyena. Asaṅgahitatāya abhāvo vutto aṭṭhakathāyaṃ (dhātu. aṭṭha. 171) ‘‘so ca…pe… natthī’’ti. Saṅgahitatāyāti nippariyāyena saṅgahitabhāvena asaṅgahitatāya abhāvo vuttoti na yujjatīti yojanā. Sā saṅgahitatāti attanā attano, attekadesānaṃ [Pg.17] vā saṅgahitatā. Tenāti rūpakkhandhena. Tesanti rūpakkhandhatadekadesānaṃ. Atthi ca vippayuttatā vedanākkhandhādīhi. Cakkhāyatanādīhi viyāti visadisudāharaṇaṃ. Etehi rūpavedanākkhandhādīhi aññehi ca evarūpehi. Etāni aññāni cāti etthāpi eseva nayo.

‘Here’ means: in the phrase ‘with ten and a half sense bases and elements.’ ‘By the form aggregate’ should be supplied for the purpose of specifying the sense bases and elements. This meaning has already been stated, that it is not its own includer, nor is a whole an includer and non-includer of its own parts. Hence he says: ‘the form aggregate… etc. … is not.’ ‘By this way’ means: because there is no state of being an includer of the kind described, ‘by which way what is included could be a non-includer.’ The absence of the state of being unincluded is stated in the Commentary (Dhs-a. 171) as: ‘And that… etc. … is not.’ ‘By the state of being included’ means: it is not correct that the absence of the state of being unincluded is stated because of the state of being included without qualification. This is the connection. That state of being included is the inclusion of itself by itself, or of its own parts. ‘By that’ means: by the form aggregate. ‘Of those’ means: of the form aggregate and its parts. And there is dissociation from the feeling aggregate, etc. ‘Like the eye-base, etc.’ is a dissimilar example. By these, that is, the form and feeling aggregates, etc., and by other such things. Here too, in ‘these and others,’ this is the method.

Teneva tassa saṅgahitattābhāvadassanena heṭṭhā dassitena. Etthāti etasmiṃ vāre. Aggahaṇeti akathane, adesanāyanti attho. Samudayasaccādīsūti samudayasaccasukhindriyādīsu yujjeyya taṃ kāraṇaṃ. Kasmā? Tehi samudayasaccādīhi khandhādisaṅgahena saṅgahite dhammajāte sati tassa āyatanasaṅgahādīhi asaṅgahitattassa abhāvato. Rūpakkhandhādīhīti rūpakkhandhavedanākkhandhādīhi. Saṅgahitameva natthi, kasmā? ‘‘So eva tassa saṅgāhako na hotī’’ti vuttovāyamattho. Yadipi rūpakkhandhādinā rūpakkhandhādikassa attano…pe… natthīti sambandho. Aññassa pana vedanākkhandhādikassa rūpakkhandhādinā saṅgahitattābhāvena asaṅgahitattaṃ atthīti yojanā. Ubhayābhāvoti saṅgahitattāsaṅgahitattābhāvo. Ettha etasmiṃ vāre. Dhammāyatanajīvitindriyādīnanti dhammāyatanādīnaṃ khandhacatukkasaṅgāhakatte, jīvitindriyādīnaṃ khandhadukasaṅgāhakatteti yojanā. Pāḷiyaṃ anāgatattā ‘‘satī’’ti sāsaṅkaṃ vadati. Ādi-saddena paṭhamena dhammadhātusaḷāyatanādīnaṃ sukhindriyādīnañca, dutiyena ekakkhandhassa saṅgaho daṭṭhabbo. Sukhindriyañhi vedanākkhandhasseva saṅgāhakaṃ. Tesanti khandhacatukkakhandhadukādīnaṃ asaṅgahitatā na natthi atthevāti tassā abhāvo anekantiko. Pubbe vuttanayenāti ‘‘rūpakkhandhādīhi panā’’tiādinā vuttanayena.

By that very demonstration shown below of its absence of the state of being included. ‘Here’ means: in this section. ‘By not taking’ means: by not stating, by not teaching—this is the meaning. ‘In the truth of the origin, etc.’ means: that reason would be applicable in the case of the truth of the origin, the pleasure faculty, etc. Why? Because when there is a class of phenomena included by the aggregate inclusion, etc., by the truth of the origin, etc., there is an absence of its state of being unincluded by the sense-base inclusions, etc. ‘By the form aggregate, etc.’ means: by the form aggregate, the feeling aggregate, etc. There is no state of being included at all. Why? This meaning has been stated: ‘It itself is not its own includer.’ The connection is: although by the form aggregate, etc., of the form aggregate, etc., itself… etc. … there is not. But for another, such as the feeling aggregate, etc., because of the absence of the state of being included by the form aggregate, etc., there is the state of being unincluded. This is the connection. ‘Absence of both’ means: the absence of the state of being included and the state of being unincluded. Here, in this section. ‘Of the phenomena-base, the life faculty, etc.’ means: in the case of the phenomena-base, etc., being an includer of the four aggregates, and in the case of the life faculty, etc., being an includer of the two aggregates. This is the connection. Because it does not occur in the Pāḷi, he speaks doubtfully, saying ‘if there is.’ By the word ‘etc.’, firstly, the inclusion of the phenomena-element, the six sense bases, etc., and the pleasure faculty, etc., should be understood; and secondly, the inclusion of a single aggregate. For the pleasure faculty is an includer of only the feeling aggregate. ‘Of them’ means: the state of being unincluded of the four aggregates, the two aggregates, etc., is not non-existent, it does exist. Thus its absence is not invariable. ‘By the previously stated method’ means: by the method stated in the passage beginning ‘But by the form aggregate, etc.’

Tatthevāti tasmiṃyeva pubbe vutte sanidassanasappaṭighapade. Nivattetvā gaṇhantoti pubbe vuttaṃ paṭinivattetvā gaṇhanto paccāmasanto. Tadavattabbatāti tesaṃ saṅgāhakāsaṅgāhakasaṅgahitattāsaṅgahitattānaṃ avattabbatā. Asaṅgāhakattābhāvato eva…pe… na saṅgāhakattābhāvatoti yasmā nesaṃ asaṅgāhakattaṃ viya saṅgāhakattampi natthi, tato eva saṅgahitattāsaṅgahitattampīti dasseti.

‘Just there’ means: in that very term ‘with manifestation and with resistance’ stated previously. ‘Taking after turning back’ means: taking after turning back what was said before, reconsidering it. ‘Their unutterability’ means: the unutterability of their states of being an includer, a non-includer, included, and unincluded. ‘Because of the absence of the state of being a non-includer… etc. … not because of the absence of the state of being an includer’ means: because for them there is no state of being an includer just as there is no state of being a non-includer, for that very reason he shows there is also no state of being included and unincluded.

Dutiyanayasaṅgahitenaasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the term ‘Unincluded by the Included’ in the Second Method is finished.

3. Tatiyanayo asaṅgahitenasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

3. The Third Method: Explanation of the term ‘Included by the Not-Included’.

179. Rūpakkhandhena [Pg.18] khandhasaṅgahena asaṅgahitesūti niddhāraṇe bhummaṃ. Tasmāti yasmā ekadesasabhāgatā samudāyasabhāgatā na hoti, tasmā. Tenāti rūpakkhandhena. Tānīti vedanādikkhandhattayanibbānāni. Yathā ca ekadesavisabhāgatāya na saṅgahitatā, evaṃ ekadesasabhāgatāya asaṅgahitatāpi natthīti dassento ‘‘na kevala’’ntiādimāha. Saṅgahitāneva na na hontīti yojanā. Teti vedanādikkhandhattayanibbānasukhumarūpadhammā. Tehīti viññāṇakkhandhacakkhāyatanādīhi. Na kathañci sammissāti kenacipi pakārena na sammissāti asammissatāya saṅgahitattābhāvaṃ sādheti. Rūpakkhandhena viya…pe… na hotīti yathā rūpakkhandhena sabhāgatābhāvato nibbānaṃ na kenacipi saṅgahaṇena saṅgahitaṃ, evaṃ viññāṇakkhandhacakkhāyatanādīhi taṃ āyatanadhātusaṅgahehi saṅgahitaṃ na hotīti khandhasaṅgahābhāvo pākaṭo vuttovāti evaṃ vuttaṃ.

179. In the expression ‘in what is not included by the aggregate-inclusion by means of the aggregate of form,’ the locative case is used for specification. ‘Therefore’ means: because partial similarity is not total similarity, therefore. ‘By that’ means by the aggregate of form. ‘Those’ means the three aggregates beginning with feeling, and Nibbāna. And to show that just as there is no inclusion due to partial dissimilarity, so too there is no state of being unincluded due to partial similarity, he said ‘not only,’ etc. The construction is: they are indeed included, they are not not-included. ‘Those’ are the three aggregates beginning with feeling, Nibbāna, and subtle material phenomena. ‘By them’ means by the aggregate of consciousness, the eye base, etc. ‘Not mixed in any way’ means not mixed in any manner; by this non-mixing, he establishes the absence of the state of being included. The passage ‘as by the aggregate of form … is not’ means: just as Nibbāna is not included by any inclusion by the aggregate of form because of its lack of similarity, so it is not included by the aggregate of consciousness, the eye base, etc., by means of the base-inclusion and element-inclusion. Thus, the absence of aggregate-inclusion has been clearly stated. This is what is said.

Evarūpānanti rūpakkhandhaviññāṇakkhandhacakkhāyatanādīnaṃ. Na hi nibbānaṃ sandhāya ‘‘rūpakkhandhena viññāṇakkhandhena cakkhāyatanena ye dhammā khandhasaṅgahena asaṅgahitā, āyatanadhātusaṅgahena saṅgahitā’’ti sakkā vattuṃ. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘saṅgāhakattābhāvato evā’’ti. Tathā ‘‘abyākatehi dhammehi ye dhammā khandhasaṅgahena asaṅgahitā, āyatanadhātusaṅgahena saṅgahitā’’tiādi na sakkā vattuṃ tādisassa dhammassa abhāvatoti āha ‘‘sanibbāna…pe… bhāvatovā’’ti. Aggahaṇaṃ veditabbanti yojanā. Tenāha ‘‘na hī’’tiādi. Kañcīti kañci dhammajātaṃ. Teti abyākatadhammādayo. Attanoti abyākatadhammādiṃ sandhāyāha. Ekadesoti rūpakkhandhādi. Attekadesasabhāgoti nibbānaṃ. Tañhi dhammāyatanadhammadhātupariyāpannatāya tadekadesasabhāgo. Asaṅgahitasaṅgāhakattāti khandhasaṅgahena asaṅgahitānaṃ saññākkhandhādīnaṃ āyatanadhātusaṅgahena saṅgāhakattāti attho.

‘Of such kinds’ means of the aggregate of form, the aggregate of consciousness, the eye base, etc. For it is not possible to say in reference to Nibbāna: ‘those phenomena that are not included by the aggregate-inclusion by means of the aggregate of form, the aggregate of consciousness, and the eye base, are included by the base- and element-inclusion.’ Therefore it is said: ‘precisely because of the absence of the state of being an includer.’ Similarly, it is not possible to say ‘those phenomena that are not included by the aggregate-inclusion by means of indeterminate phenomena, are included by the base- and element-inclusion,’ etc., because such a phenomenon does not exist. Thus he says: ‘with Nibbāna … because of the existence of….’ The construction is: ‘the non-inclusion should be understood.’ Therefore he says ‘For not…,’ etc. ‘Any’ means any class of phenomena. ‘Those’ means the indeterminate phenomena, etc. ‘By itself’—he says this in reference to the indeterminate phenomena, etc. ‘A part’ means the aggregate of form, etc. ‘Partially similar to it’ means Nibbāna. For it is partially similar to that because it is comprised in the dhamma-base and the dhamma-element. ‘Because of being an includer of the unincluded’ means: because of being an includer, by means of the base- and element-inclusion, of the aggregates of perception, etc., which are not included by the aggregate-inclusion. This is the meaning.

Visabhāgakkhandhanibbānasamudāyattā khandhasaṅgahena dhammāyatanena na koci dhammo saṅgahito atthīti yojanā. Etassāti ‘‘dhammāyatanena saṅgahitā’’ti etassa padassa dhammāyatanagaṇanena saṅgahitāti attho. Oḷārikarūpasammissaṃ dhammāyatanekadesaṃ.

The construction is: because of the combination of dissimilar aggregates and Nibbāna, no phenomenon is included by the aggregate-inclusion and the dhamma-base. ‘Of this’—of this phrase ‘included by the dhamma-base,’ the meaning is ‘included by the count of the dhamma-base.’ A portion of the dhamma-base mixed with gross matter.

Tatiyanayaasaṅgahitenasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the term ‘Included by the Not-Included’ in the Third Method is finished.

4. Catutthanayo saṅgahitenasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

4. The Fourth Method: Explanation of the term ‘Included by the Included’.

191. Tiṇṇaṃ [Pg.19] saṅgahānanti khandhāyatanadhātusaṅgahānaṃ. Saṅgahaṇapubbaṃ asaṅgahaṇaṃ, asaṅgahaṇapubbaṃ saṅgahaṇañca vuccamānaṃ saṅgahaṇāsaṅgahaṇānaṃ pavattivisesena vuttaṃ hotīti āha ‘‘saṅgahaṇā…pe… uddiṭṭhā’’ti. Saṅgahābhāvakato asaṅgaho saṅgahahetuko saṅgahassa pavattivisesoyeva nāma hotīti āha ‘‘saṅgahaṇappavattivisesavirahe’’ti. Kenaci samudayasaccādinā tīhipi saṅgahehi saṅgahitena saṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannena dhammavisesena puna tatheva saṅgahito so eva samudayasaccādiko dhammaviseso saṅgahitena saṅgahito. Saṅgāhakattābhāvasabbhāvā saṅgāhakabhāvena na uddhaṭā, na asaṅgāhakattā eva. Yathā hi tīhi saṅgahehi na saṅgāhakā, evaṃ dvīhi, ekenapi saṅgahena na saṅgāhakā idha na uddhaṭā. Tehi saṅgahitāti tehi tīhi saṅgahehi saṅgahitā dhammā. Yassāti yassa attano saṅgāhakassa.

191. 'Of the three inclusions' means of the aggregate-, base-, and element-inclusions. Inclusion preceding non-inclusion, and non-inclusion preceding inclusion, being spoken of, is said to be a specific mode of occurrence of inclusion and non-inclusion. Thus he says: 'of inclusion... are pointed out.' Non-inclusion, which is due to an absence of inclusion, is indeed just a specific mode of occurrence of inclusion, being caused by inclusion. Thus he says: 'in the absence of a specific mode of occurrence of inclusion.' A particular phenomenon comprised in the aggregate of formations, included by the three inclusions by means of something like the truth of origin, is again included in the same way; that very particular phenomenon, such as the truth of origin, is 'included by the included.' Because of the existence of the absence of the state of being an includer, they are not set forth as having the nature of an includer, nor just as having the nature of a non-includer. For just as they are not includers by the three inclusions, so too they are not includers by two or even by one inclusion; here they are not set forth. 'Included by them' means phenomena included by those three inclusions. 'Of which' means of its own includer.

Sakalavācakenāti anavasesaṃ khandhādiatthaṃ vadantena. Tena khandhādipadenāti ‘‘teneva saṅgahaṃ gaccheyyā’’ti ettha tena khandhādipadenāti evaṃ yojetabbaṃ. Evaṃ pana ayojetvā ‘‘yaṃ attano saṅgāhakaṃ saṅgaṇhitvā puna teneva saṅgahaṃ gaccheyya, taṃ aññaṃ saṅgahitaṃ nāma natthī’’ti evaṃ na sakkā vattuṃ. Kasmāti ce? Na hi yena samudayasaccādinā yaṃ saṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannaṃ dhammajātaṃ khandhādisaṅgahehi saṅgahitaṃ, teneva samudayasaccādinā tassa tadavasiṭṭhassa saṅkhārakkhandhadhammassa, na ca tasseva kevalassa samudayasaccādikassa saṅgaho pucchito vissajjitoti yojanā, atha kho tena saṅkhārakkhandhadhammena phassādinā. Saṅgahitassāti saṅgahitatāvisiṭṭhassāti attho. Tasmā attano saṅgāhakaṃ sakalakkhaṇādiṃ saṅgaṇhitvā puna tena khandhādipadena yaṃ saṅgahaṃ gaccheyya, taṃ tādisaṃ natthīti attho veditabbo. Vedanā saddo ca khandho āyatanañcāti vedanā visuṃ khandho, saddo ca visuṃ āyatananti attho. Aññena khandhantarādinā. Asammissanti abyākatadukkhasaccādi viya amissitaṃ. Na hi…pe… etthāti saṅgahitatāvisiṭṭhena dhammena yo dhammo saṅgahito, tassa saṅgahitatāvisiṭṭhoyeva yo saṅgaho, so na ettha vāre pucchito vissajjito ca. Saṅgahovāti kevalo saṅgaho[Pg.20], na kattāpekkhoti attho. Na saṅgāhakenāti idaṃ yathāvuttena atthena nivattitassa dassanaṃ. Na hītiādi taṃsamatthanaṃ.

'By a term denoting the whole' means by one that speaks of the meaning of the aggregates, etc., without remainder. 'By that term for the aggregates, etc.'—here, in the phrase 'it would go into inclusion by that very thing,' it should be construed as 'by that very term for the aggregates, etc.' However, without construing it thus, it is not possible to say: 'Whatever, having grasped its own includer, would again go into inclusion by that very thing, there is no other thing called "included".' If it is asked why: for it is not the case that what is asked and answered is the inclusion of the remaining phenomena of that aggregate of formations by means of that very truth of origin, etc., by which the class of phenomena comprised in the aggregate of formations was included by the aggregate-inclusions, etc.; nor is it the inclusion of just that truth of origin, etc., itself. Rather, it is by that phenomenon of the aggregate of formations, such as contact. 'Of the included' means 'of that which is qualified by the state of being included.' Therefore, the meaning should be understood thus: having grasped its own includer—its own characteristic, etc.—whatever would go into inclusion by that term for the aggregates, etc., there is no such thing. 'Feeling and sound are an aggregate and a base' means: feeling is a separate aggregate, and sound is a separate base. This is the meaning. By another, such as another aggregate, etc. 'Unmixed' means not mixed, like the indeterminate truth of suffering, etc. The passage 'For not... here' means: the inclusion of a phenomenon by a phenomenon that is itself qualified by being included—that inclusion, which is itself qualified by being included, is not what is asked and answered in this section. 'Just inclusion' means mere inclusion, not with reference to an agent. This is the meaning. 'Not by an includer'—this is a demonstration of the refutation of the aforesaid meaning. 'For not...,' etc., is the support for that.

Catutthanayasaṅgahitenasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Here ends the explanation of the term 'Included by the Included' in the Fourth Method.

5. Pañcamanayo asaṅgahitenaasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

5. The Fifth Method: Explanation of the term 'Not Included by the Not Included'.

193. Vuttanayenāti yasmā saṅgahappavattivisesavirahito asaṅgahitadhammavisesanissito pañcamanayo, tasmā yo ettha kenaci asaṅgahitena dhammavisesena puna asaṅgahito dhammaviseso asaṅgahitena asaṅgahito asaṅgahitatāya pucchitabbo vissajjitabbo ca. Tameva tāva yathāniddhāritaṃ dassento ‘‘rūpakkhandhena ye dhammā khandha…pe… asaṅgahitā, tehi dhammehi ye dhammā khandha…pe… asaṅgahitāti āhā’’ti catutthanaye vuttanayānusārena. Yathāniddhāritadhammadassananti pāḷiyaṃ niddhāritappakāradhammadassanaṃ. Saha sukhumarūpenāti sasukhumarūpaṃ, tena sukhumarūpena saddhiṃ gahitaṃ viññāṇaṃ, tena sahitadhammasamudāyā sasukhuma…pe… dāyā. Ke pana teti āha ‘‘dukkhasaccā’’tiādi. Kesañcīti nibbānacakkhāyatanādīnaṃ. Tīhipi saṅgahehi. Paripuṇṇasaṅgahehi tīhipi saṅgahehi asaṅgāhakā paripuṇṇasaṅgahāsaṅgāhakā. Abyākatadhammasadisā nevadassanenanabhāvanāyapahātabbanevasekkhānāsekkhādayo. Itareti rūpakkhandhādayo. Tabbipariyāyenāti vuttavipariyāyena, tīhipi saṅgahehi asaṅgahetabbassa atthitāya paripuṇṇasaṅgahāsaṅgāhakattāti attho.

193. “By the method stated”: Since the fifth method is devoid of a special mode of proceeding with inclusion and is based on a special class of phenomena that are not included, therefore, here, whatever special phenomenon is not further included by some special phenomenon that is itself not included, should be questioned and answered as 'not included by the not included.' To show this just as it has been determined, in accordance with the method stated in the fourth way, he says: “'With the form aggregate, whatever phenomena are... not included; by those phenomena, whatever phenomena are... not included,' etc.” “The seeing of phenomena as determined” means the seeing of phenomena in the manner determined in the Pāli text. “Together with subtle form” (`saha sukhumarūpena`): `sasukhumarūpaṃ`; consciousness is taken together with that subtle form; the collection of phenomena associated with it is `sasukhuma...` etc. “But what are they?” He says: “the truth of suffering,” etc. “Of some”: of Nibbāna, the eye-base, and so on. “By the three inclusions.” “‘Non-includers by the complete inclusion’ means those that are non-includers by the three complete inclusions.” “Similar to indeterminate phenomena”: those that are to be abandoned neither by seeing nor by development, that are neither trainees nor those beyond training, etc. “The others”: the form aggregate, etc. “By the reverse of that”: by the reverse of what was stated. The meaning is: because there exists that which is not to be included by the three inclusions, there is the state of being a non-includer by the complete inclusion.

Asaṅgāhakesu nibbānaṃ antogadhaṃ, tasmā taṃ anidassanaappaṭighehi asaṅgahetabbaṃ na hotīti attho. Tenāha ‘‘na ca tadeva tassa asaṅgāhaka’’nti. ‘‘Vedanākkhandhena ye dhammā’’tiādayo nava pañhā dutiyapañhādayo, te paṭhamapañhena saddhiṃ dasa, nāmarūpapañhādayo pana catuvīsatīti āha ‘‘sabbepi catuttiṃsa hontī’’ti. Rūpakkhandhādivisesakapadanti ‘‘rūpakkhandhenā’’tiādinā asaṅgāhakattena visesakaṃ rūpakkhandhādipadaṃ. Pucchāyāti ca pucchanatthanti attho. ‘‘Rūpakkhandhenā’’tiādi sabbampi vā viññāpetuṃ icchitabhāvena vacanaṃ pañhabhāvato pucchā. Tenāha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ [Pg.21] ‘‘pañhā panettha…pe… catuttiṃsa hontī’’ti. Te hi lakkhaṇato dassitāti te niddhāritadhammā teneva asaṅgahitāsaṅgahitatāya niddhāraṇasaṅkhātena lakkhaṇena dassitā.

Nibbāna is included among the non-including phenomena. Therefore, the meaning is that it is not to be regarded as un-included by the non-manifestative and non-impingent phenomena. For that reason he says: “And that itself is not its non-includer.” The nine questions beginning, “With the aggregate of feeling, which phenomena…,” are the second question and so on. These, together with the first question, make ten. But the questions beginning with “name-and-form,” etc., are twenty-four. Thus he says: “Altogether, they become thirty-four.” The term specifying distinctions like “the aggregate of form,” etc., is the term “aggregate of form,” etc., which specifies by way of its being a non-includer. And “question” means the purpose of questioning. Or, all the phrases like “by the aggregate of form,” etc., are questions because they are statements with the intention of having something explained. Therefore it is said in the commentary: “Here the questions… become thirty-four.” For they are shown by way of a characteristic: those determined phenomena are shown by that very characteristic called “determination,” which is the state of being not included by the not included.

Tadevāti eva-saddenāti ‘‘tadevā’’ti ettha eva-saddena. ‘‘Yaṃ pucchāya uddhaṭaṃ padaṃ, taṃ khandhādīhi asaṅgahita’’nti ettha ‘‘khandhādīhevā’’ti avadhāraṇaṃ nippayojanaṃ pakārantarassa abhāvato. ‘‘Tīhi asaṅgaho’’ti hi vuttaṃ. Tathā ‘‘asaṅgahitamevā’’ti saṅgahitatānivattanassa anadhippetattā. Tadevāti pana icchitaṃ uddhaṭasseva asaṅgahitenaasaṅgahitabhāvassa avadhāretabbattāti dassento ‘‘na kadācī’’tiādimāha. Tattha aññassāti anuddhaṭassa. Aniyatataṃ dassetīti idaṃ avadhāraṇaphaladassanaṃ. Niyamatoti sakkā vacanaseso yojetunti idampi eva-kārena siddhamevatthaṃ pākaṭataraṃ kātuṃ vuttaṃ. Yato hi eva-kāro, tato aññattha niyamoti. Evaṃpakāramevāti pucchāya uddhaṭappakārameva, yaṃ pakāraṃ pucchāya uddhaṭaṃ, taṃpakāramevāti attho. Tassāti asaṅgahitassa. Aññassāti pucchāya anuddhaṭappakārassa. Etena yo pucchāya uddhaṭo tīhipi saṅgahehi asaṅgahito, tasseva idha pucchitabbavissajjitabbabhāvo, na aññassāti dasseti. Tenāha ‘‘pucchāya uddhaṭañhī’’tiādi. Āyatanadhātusaṅgahavasena cettha rūpakkhandhādīnaṃ aññasahitatā, viññāṇakkhandhādīnaṃ asahitatā ca veditabbā.

“`Tadeva`” (`that very thing`): by the word `eva` in `tadevā`. In the statement, “The term extracted for the question is not included by the aggregates, etc.,” the emphasis in “by the aggregates, etc., only” (`khandhādīheva`) is purposeless because there is no alternative, for it has been said, “There is non-inclusion by three.” Similarly with “not included only” (`asaṅgahitamevā`), since the reversal of “being included” is not intended. But `tadeva` is intended. To show that it is because the state of being “not included by the not included” of the very term extracted is to be determined, he says, “never at any time,” etc. Here, “of another” means of what is not extracted. “It shows indeterminacy”: this shows the result of the emphasis. “From the determination, it is possible to supply the rest of the statement”: this too is said to make the meaning, already established by the word `eva`, even clearer. For where there is `eva`, there is determination in regard to something else. “Only of this kind”: only of the kind extracted for the question; the meaning is, only the kind that was extracted for the question. “Of that”: of what is not included. “Of another”: of a kind not extracted for the question. By this he shows that only what is extracted for the question and is not included by the three inclusions is to be questioned and answered here, not anything else. For that reason he says: “For what is extracted for the question,” etc. Here, the association with others of the form aggregate, etc., and the non-association of the consciousness aggregate, etc., should be understood by way of inclusion in terms of bases and elements.

Avasesā vedanādayo tayo khandhā nibbānañca sakalena rūpakkhandhena tesaṃ saṅgaho natthīti ‘‘saṅgahitā’’ti na sakkā vattuṃ, ekadesena pana saṅgaho atthīti ‘‘asaṅgahitā na hontīti evaṃ daṭṭhabba’’nti āha. ‘‘Rūpadhammāvā’’ti niyamanaṃ pucchāya uddhaṭabhāvāpekkhanti dassento ‘‘pucchāya…pe… adhippāyo’’ti āha. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘anuddhaṭā vedanādayopi hi asaṅgahitā evā’’ti. Etthāti etasmiṃ pañcamanayaniddese. Paṭhame nayeti paṭhame atthavikappe. Tathā dutiyeti etthāpi. Rūpaviññāṇehīti asukhumarūpadhammehi viññāṇena cāti ayamettha adhippāyoti dassento ‘‘oḷārika…pe… attho’’ti āha. Kathaṃ pana rūpadhammāti vutte oḷārikarūpasseva gahaṇanti āha ‘‘rūpekadeso hi ettha rūpaggahaṇena gahito’’ti.

The remaining three aggregates—feeling and so on—and Nibbāna cannot be said to be “included,” because there is no inclusion of them by the entire form aggregate. But since there is partial inclusion, he says they “should be seen as not being not-included.” To show that the restriction in “or form phenomena” has regard to its being extracted for the question, he says: “in the question… this is the intention.” For this reason it is said: “For even feeling and so on, which are not extracted, are indeed not included.” “Here”: in this exposition of the fifth method. “In the first method”: in the first alternative meaning. “Similarly in the second”: here too. To show that “by form and consciousness” means by gross form phenomena and by consciousness, this being the intention here, he says: “gross… this is the meaning.” But when it is asked, “How is it ‘form phenomena’?”, it is only gross form that is taken. For this reason he says: “For here a part of form is taken by the taking of ‘form.’”

196. Asaṅgāhakanti [Pg.22] ‘‘cakkhāyatanena…pe… asaṅgahitā’’ti evaṃ asaṅgāhakabhāvena vuttaṃ pucchitabbavissajjetabbabhāvena vuttampi kāmaṃ vedanādīheva catūhi asaṅgahitaṃ, taṃ pana na cakkhāyatanamevāti dassetuṃ ‘‘cakkhāyatanena panā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Yehi dhammehīti khandhādīsu yehi. Sabbaṃ dhammajātaṃ teva rūpādike dhamme udāneti pāḷiyaṃ. Kasmā panetaṃ udānetīti āha ‘‘sadisavissajjanā’’tiādi. Paṭhamena udānena. Dveti ‘‘bāhirā upādā dve’’ti ettha vuttaṃ dve-saddaṃ sandhāyāha. Tassa asaṅgahitassa. Yathādassitassāti ‘‘rūpa’’ntiādinā dassitappakārassa. Dhammanvayañāṇuppādanaṃ nayadānaṃ. ‘‘Rūpaṃ dhammāyatana’’ntiādīnaṃ padānaṃ vasena dvevīsapadiko esa nayo.

196. “Non-includer”: this is stated by way of being a non-includer, as in “…not included by the eye-base… etc.” Although what is stated as something to be questioned and answered is indeed not included by the four aggregates beginning with feeling, to show that it is not the eye-base alone, it is said, “but by the eye-base,” etc. “By which phenomena”: by which among the aggregates, etc. He recites in the Pāli text the entire class of phenomena, that is, the phenomena beginning with form. But why does he recite this? He says: “for the sake of a similar answer,” etc. By the first recitation. “Two”: he says this referring to the word “two” stated in “the two external derivative [bases].” “Of that which is not included.” “Of the manner shown”: of the manner shown by “form,” etc. The giving of the method is the production of the knowledge of conformity with phenomena. This method consists of twenty-two terms, such as “form is the dhamma-base,” etc.

Pañcamanayaasaṅgahitenaasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the term 'not included by the not included' in the Fifth Method is concluded.

6. Chaṭṭhanayo sampayogavippayogapadavaṇṇanā

6. The sixth method: The explanation of the terms of association and dissociation.

228. ‘‘Tatthā’’ti iminā ‘‘sampayogavippayogapadaṃ bhājetvā’’ti ettha sampayogavippayogapadaṃ bhājitaṃ, saṃvaṇṇetabbatāya ca padhānabhūtaṃ paccāmaṭṭhaṃ, na rūpakkhandhādipadanti dassento ‘‘yaṃ labbhati…pe… veditabba’’nti vatvā puna ‘‘rūpakkhandhādīsu hī’’tiādinā tamatthaṃ vivarati. Tattha na labbhatīti ‘‘sampayuttaṃ vippayutta’’nti vā gahetuṃ na labbhati, alabbhamānampi pucchāya gahitaṃ paṭikkhepena vissajjetuṃ. Paṭikkhepopi hi pucchāya vissajjanameva. Tathā hi yamake (yama. 1.khandhayamaka.59-61) ‘‘yassa rūpakkhandho nuppajjittha, tassa vedanākkhandho nuppajjitthā’’ti pucchāya ‘‘natthī’’ti vissajjitaṃ. Tena panettha rūpadhammesu sampayogaṭṭho na labbhatīti ayamattho dassito hoti. Alabbhamānampi sampayogapadaṃ gahitanti sambandho. Sabbatthāti rūpakkhandhavedanākkhandhādīsu. Etesanti rūpanibbānānaṃ. Visabhāgatāti ataṃsabhāgatā. Ekuppādādibhāvo hi sampayoge sabhāgatā, na saṅgahe viya samānasabhāgatā, tasmā ekuppādādibhāvarahitānaṃ rūpanibbānānaṃ sā ekuppādāditā visabhāgatā vuttā. Tadabhāvatoti tassā visabhāgatāya ekuppādāditāya abhāvato. Vippayogopi nivārito eva hoti, visabhāgo bhāvo vippayogoti vuttovāyamatthoti. ‘‘Catūsu [Pg.23] hī’’tiādinā vuttamevatthaṃ pākaṭataraṃ karoti. Tattha tesaṃ tehīti ca arūpakkhandhe eva parāmasati. Visabhāgatā ca hoti rūpanibbānesu avijjamānattāti attho. Tenāha ‘‘na ca rūpekadesassā’’tiādi. Tenevāti catukkhandhasabhāgattā eva.

228. By the word 'therein,' in the phrase 'having divided the term of association and dissociation,' the term of association and dissociation is divided. And being primary for the purpose of explanation, it is reconsidered, showing that it is not the term for the form aggregate, etc. Having said 'what is obtained...pe... should be understood,' he again explains that meaning with the words beginning 'For in the form aggregate, etc.' Therein, 'it is not obtained' means it is not possible to take it as 'associated' or 'dissociated'; and even what is unobtainable is taken up in a question in order to answer it with a denial. For a denial is indeed an answer to a question. Thus, in the Yamaka, to the question, 'For one for whom the form aggregate did not arise, for him did the feeling aggregate not arise?' the answer was, 'There is not.' By this it is shown that here the meaning of association is not obtained in regard to material phenomena. The connection is: even the unobtainable term 'association' is taken up. 'In all' means in the form aggregate, feeling aggregate, etc. 'Of these' means of form and Nibbāna. 'Dissimilarity' means not having that nature. For the state of co-arising, etc., is similarity in association, not a common nature as in inclusion. Therefore, for form and Nibbāna, which are devoid of that state of co-arising, etc., that state of co-arising is called dissimilarity. 'Because of its absence' means because of the absence of that dissimilarity, that is, the state of co-arising, etc. Dissociation, too, is thereby precluded, for the meaning is said to be that a dissimilar state is dissociation. With the words beginning 'For in the four,' he makes the meaning already stated clearer. Therein, 'of them' and 'with them' refer only to the immaterial aggregates. And there is dissimilarity because of its non-existence in form and Nibbāna—this is the meaning. Hence he says, 'and not of a part of form,' etc. 'For that very reason' means precisely because of having the nature of the four aggregates.

Tīhi viññāṇadhātūhīti ghānajivhākāyaviññāṇadhātūhi vippayutte anārammaṇamissake rūpadhammamissake dhamme dīpeti rūpabhavoti yojanā. Pañcahīti cakkhuviññāṇādīhi pañcahi viññāṇadhātūhi. Ekāya manodhātuyā. Na sampayutteti na sampayutte eva. Tathā hi ‘‘vippayutte ahonte sattahipi sampayutte sattapi vā tā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tenāti vippayuttatāpaṭikkhepena. Tāhīti sattaviññāṇadhātūhi. Sampayutte dīpentīti sampayutte dīpentiyeva, na sampayutte evāti evamavadhāraṇaṃ gahetabbaṃ. Esa nayo sesesupi. Sampayutte vedanādike. Sampayuttavippayuttabhāvehi navattabbaṃ, taṃyeva viññāṇadhātusattakaṃ. Sampayuttabhāvena navattabbāni sampayuttanavattabbāni, bhinnasantānikāni, nānākkhaṇikāni ca arūpānipi dhammajātāni. Anārammaṇamissakasabbaviññāṇadhātutaṃsampayuttā dhammāyatanādipadehi dīpetabbā, anārammaṇamissakasabbaviññāṇadhātuyo acetasikādipadehi dīpetabbā, tadubhayasamudāyā dukkhasaccādipadehi dīpetabbāti veditabbā.

'By three consciousness elements' means it indicates phenomena dissociated from the nose-, tongue-, and body-consciousness elements, which are mixed with the objectless and mixed with material phenomena; the connection is to 'material existence.' 'By five' means by the five consciousness elements beginning with eye-consciousness. 'By one' means by the mind-element. 'Not associated' means not associated indeed. For it is said: 'Those seven, whether they are dissociated or associated with the seven.' 'By that' means by the denial of being dissociated. 'With them' means with the seven consciousness elements. 'Indicating as associated' means indicating as associated indeed; the emphasis should be understood as 'not exclusively associated.' This is the method in the remaining cases as well. Associated with feeling, etc. The very septad of consciousness elements should not be spoken of in terms of being associated and dissociated. What should not be spoken of in terms of being associated are kinds of immaterial phenomena that are in different continuities and at different moments. It should be understood that: things associated with all the consciousness elements that are mixed with the objectless should be indicated by terms such as the base of phenomena, etc.; all the consciousness elements that are mixed with the objectless should be indicated by terms such as non-mental, etc.; and the combination of both should be indicated by terms such as the truth of suffering, etc.

Yadi evanti yadi anārammaṇamissānaṃ dhammānaṃ vippayogo natthi. Anārammaṇamissobhayadhammāti rūpanibbānasahitasabbaviññāṇadhātutaṃsampayuttadhammā. Khandhādīhevāti khandhāyatanadhātūhi eva, na arūpakkhandhamattena. Arūpakkhandheyeva pana sandhāya ‘‘tehi dhammehi ye dhammā vippayuttā’’ti vuttanti nāyaṃ dosoti dasseti. Tadekadesāti ‘‘anārammaṇamissā’’tiādinā vuttadhammasamudāyassa ekadesā. Tadekadesaññasamudāyāti tasseva yathāvuttassa samudāyassa ekadesā hutvā aññesaṃ avayavānaṃ rūpakkhandhādīnaṃ samudāyabhūtā. Vibhāgābhāvatoti bhedābhāvato. Bhedoti cettha accantabhedo adhippeto. Na hi samudāyāvayavānaṃ sāmaññavisesānaṃ viya accantabhedo atthi bhedābhedayuttattā. Tesaṃ accantabhedameva hi sandhāya ‘‘samudāyantogadhānaṃ ekadesānaṃ na vibhāgo atthī’’ti saṅgahepi vuttaṃ. Tenāti avibhāgasabbhāvato sabhāgavisabhāgattābhāvena. Tesanti anārammaṇamissakasabbaviññāṇadhātuādīnaṃ[Pg.24]. Te ca akusalābyākatā. Tesanti kusalākusalābyākatadhammānaṃ. Tasmāti yasmā vibhattasabhāvānaṃ na tesaṃ samudāyekadesādibhāvo, tasmā. Yasmā pana kusalādayo eva khandhādayoti khandhādiāmasanena samudāyekadesādibhāvo āpanno evāti vuttanayena vippayogābhāvo hoti, tasmā taṃ pariharanto ‘‘khandhādīni anāmasitvā’’tiādimāha. Tesanti kusalādīnaṃ. Aññamaññavippayuttatā vuttā ‘‘kusalehi dhammehi ye dhammā vippayuttā’’tiādinā. Sabbesūti dutiyādisabbapañhesu.

'If so' means if there is no dissociation of phenomena mixed with the objectless. 'Both kinds of phenomena mixed with the objectless' means phenomena associated with all the consciousness elements together with form and Nibbāna. 'By the aggregates, etc.,' means by the aggregates, bases, and elements, not by the immaterial aggregates alone. He shows that this is not a fault, since it was said with reference to the immaterial aggregates alone, 'phenomena that are dissociated from those phenomena.' 'A part of that' means a part of the collection of phenomena stated beginning with 'mixed with the objectless.' 'A part of that and a collection of others' means being a part of that aforesaid collection, they are a collection of other components, the form aggregate, etc. 'Because of the absence of division' means because of the absence of distinction. And here 'distinction' is intended to mean absolute distinction. For there is no absolute distinction between the components of a collection, as there is between a universal and a particular, because they are connected by both distinction and non-distinction. For it is with reference to their absolute distinction that it is also said in the Compendium: 'There is no division of the parts included within a collection.' 'By that' means because of the existence of non-division, through the absence of similarity and dissimilarity. 'Of them' means of all the consciousness elements mixed with the objectless, etc. And they are unwholesome and indeterminate. 'Of them' means of wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate phenomena. 'Therefore' means because for those with a distinct nature there is no state of being a part of a collection, etc., therefore. But since the wholesome, etc., are themselves the aggregates, etc., by referring to the aggregates, etc., the state of being a part of a collection, etc., is indeed incurred, and thus, by the method stated, there is an absence of dissociation. Therefore, to avoid that, he says, beginning with, 'Without referring to the aggregates, etc.' 'Of them' means of the wholesome, etc. Mutual dissociation is stated with the words beginning, 'phenomena that are dissociated from wholesome phenomena.' 'In all' means in all the questions, from the second onwards.

Chattiṃsāya piṭṭhidukapadesu vīsati dukapadāni imasmiṃ naye labbhanti, avasiṭṭhāni soḷasevāti āha ‘‘soḷasāti vattabba’’nti. Tato eva ‘‘tevīsapadasata’’nti ettha ‘‘tevīsa’’nti idañca ‘‘ekavīsa’’nti vattabbanti yojanā. Sabbatthāti sabbapañhesu. Ekakālekasantānānaṃ bhinnakālabhinnasantānānañca anekesaṃ dhammānaṃ samudāyabhūtā saṅkhārakkhandhadhammāyatanadhammadhātuyoti āha ‘‘kālasantāna…pe… dhātūna’’nti. Ekadesasammissāti cittiddhipādādinā attano ekadeseneva khandhantarādīhi sammissā iddhipādādayo, anārammaṇehi rūpanibbānehi ca asammissā. Samānakālasantānehīti ekakālasantānehi kālasantānabhedarahitehi ekadesantarehi, saṅkhārakkhandhādīnaṃ ekadesantarehi, saṅkhārakkhandhādīnaṃ ekadesavisesabhūtehi satipaṭṭhānasammappadhānasaññākkhandhādīhi vibhattā eva samudayasaccādayo sampayogīvippayogībhāvena, rūpakkhandhādayo vippayogībhāvena gahitāti yojanā. Tehi samudayasaccādīhi. Te saññākkhandhādayo. Kehici sahuppajjanārahehi ekadesantarehi vibhattehi. Na hi saṅkhārakkhandhādipariyāpannattepi samudayasaccādayo maggasaccādīhi sampayogaṃ labhanti. Tesanti vedanākkhandhasaññākkhandhādīnaṃ. Ekuppādā…pe… visabhāgatā cāti ekuppādāditāsaṅkhātā yathārahaṃ sabhāgatā visabhāgatā ca. Tena yathāvuttakāraṇena sampayogassa vippayogassa ca labhanato.

Among the thirty-six pairs of terms (piṭṭhiduka), twenty pairs of terms are obtained in this method; the remaining are sixteen. Thus he says, 'sixteen should be stated.' For that very reason, in the phrase 'one hundred and twenty-three terms,' the connection is that 'twenty-three' should be stated as 'twenty-one.' 'In all' means in all questions. He says 'of time, continuity...pe... elements' because the formations aggregate, the phenomena base, and the phenomena element are a collection of many phenomena belonging to a single time and continuity, and to different times and different continuities. 'Mixed in part' means the bases of spiritual power, etc., are mixed with other aggregates, etc., only by a part of themselves, and are not mixed with the objectless, i.e., form and Nibbāna. The connection is as follows. 'With the same time and continuity' means: with other parts that are of a single time and continuity, devoid of distinction in time and continuity; with other parts of the formations aggregate, etc.; the truth of origin, etc., are distinguished by the foundations of mindfulness, right strivings, the perception aggregate, etc.—which are particular parts of the formations aggregate, etc.—by way of being associated and dissociated, while the form aggregate, etc., are taken by way of being dissociated. By them, that is, by the truth of origin, etc. They, that is, the perception aggregate, etc. Distinguished by some other parts that are fit to arise together. For even though they are included in the formations aggregate, etc., the truth of origin, etc., do not obtain association with the truth of the path, etc. 'Of them' means of the feeling aggregate, perception aggregate, etc. 'Co-arising...pe... and dissimilarity' means the so-called similarity and dissimilarity, designated as co-arising, etc., as is appropriate. Because, for the aforesaid reason, both association and dissociation are obtained.

Bhinnakālānaṃ samudāyīnaṃ samudāyā bhinnakālasamudāyā. Vattamānā ca ekasmiṃ santāne ekekadhammā vattanti. Tasmāti yasmā etadeva, tasmā. Tesaṃ vedanākkhandhādīnaṃ vibhajitabbassa ekadesabhūtassa abhāvato. Sukhindriyādīni vedanākkhandhekadesabhūtānipi. Tena vibhāgākaraṇena[Pg.25]. Yadi samānakālassa vibhajitabbassa abhāvato cakkhuviññāṇadhātādayo viññāṇakkhandhassa vibhāgaṃ na karonti, atha kasmā ‘‘cakkhuviññāṇadhātu…pe… manoviññāṇadhātu soḷasahi dhātūhi vippayuttā’’ti vuttanti codanaṃ manasi katvā āha ‘‘khandhāyatana…pe… vippayuttāti vutta’’nti. Evamevanti yathā dhātuvibhāgena vibhattassa viññāṇassa, evamevaṃ.

Collections of things collected at different times are collections of different times. And in the present, individual phenomena occur in a single continuity. 'Therefore' means because it is just so, therefore. Because of the absence of a part of the feeling aggregate, etc., that can be divided. Even the pleasure faculty, etc., are just a part of the feeling aggregate. Because of that non-making of a division. Having kept in mind the objection, 'If the eye-consciousness element, etc., do not make a division of the consciousness aggregate because of the absence of something of the same time to be divided, then why is it said, "The eye-consciousness element...pe... the mind-consciousness element is dissociated from the sixteen elements"?' he says, 'The aggregates, bases...pe... are said to be dissociated.' 'Just so' means just as consciousness is divided by the division of elements, just so.

235. Taṃsampayogībhāvanti tehi khandhehi sampayogībhāvaṃ. Yathā hi samānakālasantānehi ekacittuppādagatehi vedanāsaññāviññāṇakkhandhehi samudayasaccassa sampayuttatā, evaṃ bhinnasantānehi bhinnakālehi ca tehi tassa vippayuttatāti āha ‘‘evaṃ taṃvippayogībhāvaṃ…pe… na vutta’’nti. Visabhāgatānibandhassa vibhāgassa abhāvena avibhāgehi tehi tīhi khandhehi. Vibhāge hītiādinā tamevatthaṃ pākaṭataraṃ karoti. Vibhāgarahitehīti samānakālasantānehi ekacittuppādagatattā avibhattehi vedanākkhandhādīhi na yuttaṃ vippayuttanti vattuṃ. Tenāha ‘‘vijjamānehi…pe… bhāvato’’ti. Tattha vijjamānassa samānassa samānajātikassāti adhippāyo. Na hi vijjamānaṃ rūpārūpaṃ aññamaññassa visabhāgaṃ na hoti. Anuppannā dhammā viyāti idaṃ visadisudāharaṇadassanaṃ. Yathā ‘‘anuppannā dhammā’’ti anāgatakālaṃ vuccatīti āmaṭṭhakālabhedaṃ, evaṃ yaṃ āmaṭṭhakālabhedaṃ na hotīti attho. Uddharitabbaṃ desanāya desetabbanti vuttaṃ hoti. Vijjamānasseva vijjamānena sampayogo, sampayogārahasseva ca vippayogoti atthibhāvasannissayā sampayuttavippayuttatāti āha ‘‘paccuppannabhāvaṃ nissāyā’’ti. Tenevāha ‘‘avijjamānassā’’tiādi. Tañcāti uddharaṇaṃ.

235. The state of being associated with them means the state of association with those aggregates. Just as the truth of origin is associated with the aggregates of feeling, perception, and consciousness that arise simultaneously in the same mental continuum, so too is it dissociated from those that occur in separate continuums and at different times. Hence it is said: 'Thus, the state of being dissociated from them... is not stated.' This is with those three aggregates, which are undivided because of the absence of a division founded on dissimilarity. By the words 'because of division,' etc., he makes this same meaning clearer. 'Devoid of division' means that since the aggregates of feeling, etc., arise simultaneously in the same mental continuum and are thus undivided, it is not proper to say they are dissociated. Therefore, he said: 'with what is existent... because of its nature.' Here, 'existent' is intended to mean of the same kind and of a similar nature. For existent material and immaterial phenomena are not dissimilar to each other. 'Like unarisen phenomena' is an example shown to illustrate dissimilarity. Just as 'unarisen phenomena' refers to the future, thus indicating a difference in the time referred to, so the meaning is that which does not have a difference in the time referred to. It is said that what should be extracted is what is to be taught by the teaching. Association is of what is existent with what is existent, and dissociation is of what is fit for association; thus association and dissociation are dependent on the state of existence. Therefore he said: 'relying on the present state.' For that reason he said: 'of what is non-existent,' etc. And that is the extraction.

Vibhāgarahitehīti visabhāgatābhāvato avibhāgehi. Anāmaṭṭhakālabhedeti anāmaṭṭhakālavisese. Avijjamānassa…pe… sampayogo natthīti etena pārisesato vijjamānassa ca vijjamānena sampayogo dassito. Avijjamānatādīpake bhede gahiteti yathāgahitesu dhammesu tehi vippayogīnaṃ avijjamānabhāvadīpake tesaṃyeva visese ‘‘arūpabhavo ekena khandhena dasahāyatanehi soḷasahi dhātūhi vippayutto’’tiādinā (dhātu. 246) gahite teneva ruppanādinā bhedena tesaṃ [Pg.26] aññamaññaṃ visabhāgatāpi gahitā evāti vippayogo hotīti yojanā. Bhede pana aggahite tena tena gahaṇenāti yathāvutte avijjamānatādīpake visese, visabhāge vā aggahite ‘‘vedanā, saññā, saṅkhārakkhandho tīhi khandhehi ekenāyatanena sattahi dhātūhi sampayutto’’tiādinā tena tena gahaṇena sabhāgatādīpanena visabhāgatāya aggahitattā sabhāgatāva hoti. Tathā ca sati sabhāgatte kā panettha sabhāgatāti āha ‘‘vijjamānatāya…pe… hotī’’ti. Tassāti sabhāgatāya. Tasmāti visabhāgatāya alabbhamānattā, sabhāgatāya ca labbhamānattā.

‘Devoid of division’ means: undivided due to the absence of dissimilarity. ‘In a specific time not touched upon.’ By the statement, ‘Of what is non-existent … there is no association,’ the association of what is existent with what is existent is shown by way of elimination. ‘When a division indicating non-existence is taken’: When, in regard to the phenomena taken up, a specific instance indicating the non-existence of things dissociated from them is taken up—as in the text ‘formless existence is dissociated from one aggregate, ten bases, and sixteen elements,’ etc.—then by that same division based on susceptibility to change, etc., their mutual dissimilarity is also taken up. Thus the construction is: there is dissociation. But when a division is not taken up by this or that grasp—that is, when in a specific instance indicating non-existence as stated, or in a dissimilarity, it is not taken up—then by this or that grasp which indicates similarity, as in the text ‘the aggregate of feeling, the aggregate of perception, and the aggregate of formations are associated with three aggregates, one base, and seven elements,’ etc., since dissimilarity is not taken up, there is only similarity. This being so, when there is similarity, what here is similarity? He says: ‘by existence … it is.’ ‘Of that’ means: of similarity. ‘Therefore’ means: because dissimilarity is not obtained, while similarity is obtained.

262. Vitakko viyāti savitakkasavicāresu cittuppādesu vitakko viya. So hi vitakkarahitattā avitakko vicāramatto ca. Tenāha ‘‘koṭṭhāsantaracittuppādesu alīnā’’ti. Tato eva so appadhāno, dutiyajhānadhammā evettha padhānāti āha ‘‘ye padhānā’’ti. Tenevāti savitakkasavicāresu cittuppādesu vitakkassa avitakkavicāramattaggahaṇena idha aggahitattā, vitakkattike dutiyarāsiyeva ca adhippetattā. Anantaranayeti sampayuttenavippayuttapadaniddese. Samudayasaccena samānagatikā sadisappavattikā. Itīti iminā kāraṇena. Te avitakkavicāramattā dhammā na gahitā, samudayasaccaṃ viya na desanāruḷhā. Na savitakkasavicārehi samānagatikāti yojanā. Yadi hi te savitakkasavicārehi samānagatikā siyuṃ, ‘‘avitakkavicāramattehi dhammehi ye dhammā sampayuttā, tehi dhammehi ye dhammā vippayuttā, te dhammā na kehici khandhehi, na kehici āyatanehi, ekāya dhātuyā vippayuttā’’ti vattabbā siyuṃ. Yasmā pana te samudayasaccena samānagatikā. Yathā hi ye samudayasaccena sampayuttehi vippayuttā, tesaṃ kehici vippayogaṃ vattuṃ na sakkā, evaṃ tehipi. Tathā hi vakkhati ‘‘samudayasaccādīnī’’tiādi. Dasamo…pe… vuttoti ettha dasamanaye tehi avitakkavicāramattehi vippayuttehi vippayuttānaṃ soḷasahi dhātūhi vippayogo vutto, osānanaye tehi vippayuttānaṃ aṭṭhārasahi dhātūhi saṅgaho ca vuttoti tasmā na te savitakkasavicārehi samānagatikāti dasseti.

262. ‘Like initial thought’ means: like initial thought in mind-moments with initial and sustained thought. For that is without initial thought because it is devoid of initial thought, and it is sustained thought only. Therefore he said: ‘not included in the mind-moments of the other portions.’ For that very reason it is not primary; the factors of the second jhāna are primary here. Thus he said: ‘those that are primary.’ For that very reason: because initial thought is not taken up here by the grasp of ‘sustained thought only without initial thought’ in mind-moments with initial and sustained thought, and because the second group in the triad on initial thought is intended. ‘In the immediately following method’ means: in the exposition of the term ‘dissociated by way of the associated.’ They have the same destination as the truth of origin, a similar occurrence. ‘Thus’ means: for this reason. Those phenomena that are sustained thought only without initial thought are not taken up; like the truth of origin, they have not ascended into the teaching. The construction is: they do not have the same destination as things with initial and sustained thought. For if they had the same destination as things with initial and sustained thought, it would have to be said: ‘Whatever phenomena are associated with phenomena that are sustained thought only without initial thought, whatever phenomena are dissociated from those phenomena, those phenomena are dissociated from no aggregates, from no bases, but are dissociated from one element.’ But since they have the same destination as the truth of origin, just as it is not possible to state the dissociation from anything for those things that are dissociated from things associated with the truth of origin, so too for these. For so he will say: ‘the truth of origin, etc.’ ‘The tenth … is stated’: Here, in the tenth method, the dissociation from sixteen elements is stated for things dissociated from those things dissociated from phenomena that are sustained thought only without initial thought; and in the final method, the inclusion with eighteen elements is stated for things dissociated from them. Therefore, it is shown that they do not have the same destination as things with initial and sustained thought.

Vitakkasahitesūti [Pg.27] sahavitakkesu. Tesūti avitakkavicāramattesu saha vitakkena dutiyajjhānadhammesu, ‘‘avitakkavicāramattā’’ti gahitesu vuttesūti attho. Sabbepi teti dutiyajjhānadhammā vitakko cāti sabbepi te dhammā sakkā vattuṃ. Tathā hi sampayogavippayogapadaniddese ‘‘avitakkavicāramattā dhammā ekena khandhena ekenāyatanena ekāya dhātuyā kehici sampayuttā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tattha ekena khandhenāti saṅkhārakkhandhena. So hi samudāyoti ‘‘avitakkavicāramattā dhammā’’ti vuttadhammasamudāyo. Nanu vitakkopettha dhammasaṅgahaṃ gato, so ca vicārato aññenapi sampayuttoti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘na hi tadekadesassa…pe… hotī’’ti. Yathātiādinā tamevatthaṃ iddhipādanidassanena vibhāveti. Tassattho – yathā iddhipādasamudāyassa ekadesabhūtānaṃ chandiddhipādādīnaṃ tīhi khandhehi sampayogo vutto, taṃsamudāyassa na hoti, evaṃ idhāpi vitakkassa aññehi sampayogo avitakkavicāramattassa samudāyassa na hotīti.

‘With initial thought’ means: in things together with initial thought. ‘In those’ refers to the factors of the second jhāna together with initial thought, which are spoken of as being included when ‘sustained thought only without initial thought’ is taken up. All those—the factors of the second jhāna and initial thought—all those phenomena can be spoken of. For in the exposition of the terms on association and dissociation, it is said: ‘Phenomena that are sustained thought only without initial thought are associated with one aggregate, one base, one element, and with certain things.’ There, ‘with one aggregate’ refers to the aggregate of formations. For that is the collection of phenomena spoken of as ‘phenomena that are sustained thought only without initial thought.’ But is not initial thought included here in the collection of phenomena, and is it not also associated with something other than sustained thought? To address this objection, it is said: ‘For it is not the case that of one part of it….’ By ‘just as,’ etc., he clarifies this same meaning with the example of the bases of spiritual power. The meaning is this: Just as the association with three aggregates is stated for the bases of spiritual power beginning with zeal, which are parts of the aggregate of the bases of spiritual power, but this is not so for the aggregate as a whole, so too here, the association of initial thought with other things does not apply to the aggregate of ‘sustained thought only without initial thought.’

Yadi evaṃ ‘‘iddhipādo dvīhi khandhehi sampayutto’’tiādi na vattabbanti ce? No na vattabbanti dassento ‘‘yathā panā’’tiādimāha. Tattha tesūti iddhipādesu. Samudāyassāti iddhipādasamudāyassa. Tehi vedanākkhandhādīhi sampayuttatā vuttā ‘‘iddhipādo dvīhi khandhehi sampayutto’’tiādinā. Tenāti vicārena. Na hītiādinā yathādhigatadhammānaṃ sampayuttatāya navattabbābhāvaṃ udāharaṇadassanavasena vibhāveti. Keci vicikicchā taṃsahagatā ca mohavajjā mohena sampayuttā, keci asampayuttā. Mohenāti vicikicchāsahagatamohameva sandhāya vadati. Iti iminā kāraṇena na samudāyo tena mohena sampayutto. Añño koci dhammo hetubhāvo nāpi atthi, yena hetunā so dassanenapahātabbahetukoti vutto samudāyo. Evanti iminā nayena ‘‘bhāvanā…pe… yopi sampayuttā’’ti navattabbatāya nidassetabbāti attho. Evanti yathā dassanenapahātabbahetukasamudāyassa sampayuttatā na vattabbā, evaṃ yena dhammena avitakka…pe… siyā, taṃ na natthi. Tasmāti yasmā avitakkavicāramattesu kocipi vicārena asampayutto natthi, tasmā. Teti avitakkavicāramattā [Pg.28] dhammā. Ekadhammepi…pe… kato yathā ‘‘appaccayā dhammā asaṅkhatā dhammā’’ti.

If so, should it not be said: ‘The basis of spiritual power is associated with two aggregates,’ etc.? To show that it should indeed be said, he says: ‘But just as,’ etc. Here, ‘in those’ refers to the bases of spiritual power. ‘Of the aggregate’ refers to the aggregate of the bases of spiritual power. Their association with the aggregates of feeling, etc., is stated by the text ‘The basis of spiritual power is associated with two aggregates,’ etc. ‘By that’ means: by sustained thought. By the words ‘For not,’ etc., he clarifies by way of example that the association of the phenomena as they are ascertained should not be unstatable. Some doubt and the things co-nascent with it, apart from delusion, are associated with delusion; some are unassociated. ‘With delusion’ refers specifically to the delusion co-nascent with doubt. For this reason, the aggregate is not associated with that delusion. Nor is there any other phenomenon that is a condition, for which reason that aggregate is said to have a condition to be abandoned by seeing. ‘Thus’ means: the meaning is that by this method it should be pointed out that it should not be said: ‘by development … even those that are associated.’ ‘Thus’ means: just as the association of the aggregate that has a condition to be abandoned by seeing should not be stated, so there is no phenomenon by which it could be without initial thought…. ‘Therefore’ means: because among phenomena that are sustained thought only without initial thought there is no phenomenon whatsoever that is unassociated with sustained thought, therefore…. ‘Those’ are the phenomena that are sustained thought only without initial thought. Even in a single phenomenon … it is done, as in ‘unconditioned phenomena, unformed phenomena.’

Chaṭṭhanayasampayogavippayogapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the terms on association and dissociation in the sixth method is finished.

7. Sattamanayo sampayuttenavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā

7. The Seventh Method: Explanation of the Term ‘Dissociated by way of the Associated’

306. Tehi samudayasaccādīhi khandhattayakhandhekadesādike sampayutte satipi, sampayuttehi ca vippayutte rūpanibbānādike tadaññadhamme satipi vippayogābhāvato. Saṅkhepena vuttamatthaṃ vitthārena dassetuṃ ‘‘na hī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tato lobhasahagatacittuppādato aññadhammānaṃ avasiṭṭhānaṃ kusalākusalābyākatadhammānaṃ khandhādīsu kenaci vippayogo na hi atthi khandhapañcakādīnaṃ saṅgaṇhanato tesaṃ. Te eva cittuppādāti te lobhasahagatacittuppādā eva. Tadaññadhammānanti tadaññadhammānampīti pi-saddalopo daṭṭhabbo. Tathāti iminā na ca te eva dhammā aḍḍhadutiyāyatanadhātuyo, atha kho te ca tato aññe cāti imamatthaṃ upasaṃharati.

306. Even though there are things associated with the truth of origin, etc.—the three aggregates, a part of one aggregate, and so on—and even though there are other states, such as form and Nibbāna, dissociated from those associated things, it is because there is no dissociation. To show in detail the meaning stated in brief, 'for not,' etc., was stated. Therefore, there is indeed no dissociation whatsoever of the remaining wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate states—which are other than that consciousness-arising accompanied by greed—with the aggregates, etc., because of their inclusion within the five aggregates, etc. 'Those very consciousness-arisings' means precisely those consciousness-arisings accompanied by greed. 'Of those other states' (tadaññadhammānaṃ): here the elision of the particle pi should be seen, so it means 'of those other states as well.' By 'Thus' (tathā), he concludes this meaning: it is not that those states are just one and a half bases and elements, but rather it is those states and others apart from them.

Nanu tadaññabhāvato eva tehi itaresaṃ vippayogo siddhoti āha ‘‘na cā’’tiādi. Tadaññasamudāyehīti tato lobhasahagatacittuppādato aññasamudāyehi aññe lobhasahagatā dhammā vippayuttā na honti. Kasmā? Samudāye…pe… vippayogābhāvato. Tassattho – samudāyena lobhasahagatatadaññadhammarāsinā ekadesānaṃ lobhasahagatadhammānaṃ vippayogābhāvato, tathā ye ekadesā hutvā aññesaṃ avayavānaṃ samudāyabhūtā, tesañca samudāyena vippayogābhāvatoti. Anena samudāyena avayavassa samudāyassa avayavena ca tassa na vippayogo, avayavasseva pana avayavenāti dasseti. Esa nayoti yvāyaṃ samudayasacce vutto vidhi, eseva maggasaccasukhindriyādīsu arūpakkhandhekadesattā tesanti dasseti. Niravasesesūti abahikatavitakkesu. Vitakko hi samudāyato abahikato. ‘‘So hi samudāyo’’tiādiko vuttanayo labbhatīti āha ‘‘aggahaṇe kāraṇaṃ na dissatī’’ti.

One might object: 'Is it not so that the dissociation of other things from them is established precisely because they are other?' To this, he says, 'na ca,' etc. 'By other aggregates' means: other states associated with greed are not dissociated from aggregates other than that arising of consciousness accompanied by greed. Why? 'Because of the absence of dissociation with the aggregate...' and so on. Its meaning is: because there is no dissociation of a part of the states associated with greed from the aggregate—that is, the mass of states other than those associated with greed; and similarly, for those which, being parts, form an aggregate of other components, there is no dissociation of them from the aggregate. By this he shows that there is no dissociation of a component from the aggregate, nor of the aggregate from its component, but only of one component from another. 'This is the method': this shows that just as this procedure was stated in the case of the truth of origination, so too it applies to the truth of the path, the faculty of pleasure, etc., because they are parts of the formless aggregates. 'In the cases without remainder' means in the cases where thought is not excluded. For thought is not excluded from the aggregate. Because the stated method beginning 'For that is the aggregate...' is applicable, he says, 'no reason is seen for not including it.'

Aññesupi [Pg.29] samudayasaccādīsu vissajjanassa…pe… daṭṭhabbaṃ, yato samudayasaccādi idha na gahitanti adhippāyo. Sampayuttādhikārato ‘‘aññenā’’ti padaṃ sampayuttato aññaṃ vadatīti āha ‘‘asampayuttena asammissanti attho’’ti. Idāni byatirekenapi tamatthaṃ patiṭṭhāpetuṃ ‘‘adukkhamasukhā…pe… gahitānī’’ti vuttaṃ. Etena lakkhaṇenāti ‘‘asampayuttena asammissa’’nti vuttalakkhaṇena. Cittanti ‘‘cittehi dhammehi ye dhammā’’ti pañhaṃ upalakkheti. Sahayuttapadehi sattāti ‘‘cetasikehi dhammehi ye dhammā’’tiādinā cittena sahayutte dhamme dīpentehi padehi āgatā satta pañhā. Tiṇṇaṃ tikapadānamaggahaṇena ūnoti katvā. Ye sandhāya ‘‘tike tayo’’ti vuttaṃ. Taṃ pana vedanāpītittikesu pacchimaṃ, vitakkattike paṭhamanti padattayaṃ veditabbaṃ.

In other cases too, such as the truth of origination, the explanation... (pe)... should be seen; the intention is that the truth of origination, etc., is not taken up here. Because the governing topic is association, the term 'by another' (aññena) speaks of something other than the associated. Thus he says, 'the meaning is "unmixed with the unassociated."' Now, to establish that meaning also by way of the negative, it is said, 'neither-painful-nor-pleasant... (pe)... are taken.' 'By this characteristic' means by the characteristic stated as 'unmixed with the unassociated.' 'Consciousness' indicates the question beginning, 'With the states of consciousness, which states....' 'Seven by the terms conjoined with it' means the seven questions that come in the terms showing states conjoined with consciousness, beginning with 'With the mental factors, which states....' This is deficient due to the non-inclusion of three triad-terms, with reference to which it was said, 'three in the triad.' That set of three terms should be understood as the last in the feeling triad, the last in the zest triad, and the first in the thought triad.

309. Uddhaṭapadena pakāsiyamānā atthā abhedopacārena ‘‘uddhaṭapada’’nti vuttāti āha ‘‘uddhaṭapadena sampayuttehī’’ti. Tena ca yathāvuttena uddhaṭapadena. Manena yuttāti ettha mananamattattā manodhātu ‘‘mano’’ti vuttāti āha ‘‘manodhātuyā ekantasampayuttā’’ti.

309. The meanings being explained by the extracted term are called 'the extracted term' by a figurative identification. Thus he says, 'by the extracted term, with the associated things.' And by that aforesaid extracted term. 'Conjoined with mind': here, because it is the mere act of minding, the mind-element is called 'mind.' Thus he says, 'exclusively associated with the mind-element.'

Sattamanayasampayuttenavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Here ends the Explanation of Dissociated Terms by way of the Associated, the Seventh Method.

8. Aṭṭhamanayo vippayuttenasampayuttapadavaṇṇanā

8. The Eighth Method: Explanation of Associated Terms by way of the Dissociated.

317. Rūpakkhandhena vippayuttā nāma cattāro arūpino khandhā, tesaṃ aññehi sampayogo nāma natthi tādisassa aññassa sampayogino abhāvato. Samudāyassa ca ekadesena sampayogo natthīti vuttovāyamattho. Vedanākkhandhādīhi vippayuttaṃ rūpaṃ nibbānañca, tassa kenaci sampayogo natthevāti āha ‘‘rūpakkhandhādīhi…pe… natthī’’ti. Tenāti ‘‘rūpakkhandhena ye dhammā vippayuttā’’tiādivacanena.

317. The four formless aggregates are what is dissociated from the form aggregate. There is no association of them with other things, because of the absence of any other such thing to be associated with. And the meaning that there is no association of an aggregate with a part of it has been stated. Form and Nibbāna are dissociated from the feeling aggregate, etc., and there is no association of them with anything whatsoever. Thus he says, 'From the form aggregate, etc.... (pe)... there is none.' 'By that' means by the statement beginning, 'Those states that are dissociated from the form aggregate....'

Aṭṭhamanayavippayuttenasampayuttapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Here ends the Explanation of Associated Terms by way of the Dissociated, the Eighth Method.

9. Navamanayo sampayuttenasampayuttapadavaṇṇanā

9. The Ninth Method: Explanation of the Term 'Unassociated' by way of the 'Associated'.

319. ‘‘Samāsapadaṃ [Pg.30] ida’’nti vatvā ayaṃ nāma samāsoti dassento ‘‘yassa khandhādino’’tiādimāha, yassa vedanākkhandhādinoti attho. Yaṃ idha sampayuttaṃ vuttanti imasmiṃ navamanaye yaṃ dhammajātaṃ sampayuttanti vuttaṃ. Rūpakkhandhādīsu araṇantesu abbhantarabāhiramātikādhammesūti niddhāraṇe bhummaṃ. Tañhi dhammajātaṃ attanā sampayuttena vedanākkhandhādinā sayaṃ sampayuttanti niddhāritaṃ. Ayogoti asampayogo. Vakkhati dasamanaye. Tattha hi ‘‘rūpakkhandhena vedanādayo vippayuttā, tehi rūpakkhandho vippayutto’’ti vatvā nibbānaṃ kathanti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘nibbānaṃ pana sukhumarūpagatikamevā’’ti vuttaṃ. ‘‘Manāyatanaṃ ekenāyatanena ekāya dhātuyā kehici vippayutta’’nti ettha hi yathā sukhumarūpaṃ viya sarūpato anuddhaṭampi nibbānaṃ kehicītipadena gahitameva hotīti edisesu ṭhānesu nibbānaṃ sukhumarūpagatikanti viññāyati, evamidhāpi ‘‘rūpamissakehi vā’’ti etena anupādinnaanupādāniyādīhi nibbānamissakehipi asampayogo vutto hotīti daṭṭhabbo. Avikalacatukkhandhasaṅgāhakehi padehi sahavattino aññassa sampayogino abhāvato atītānāgatehi ca sampayogo natthevāti tassa ayujjamānataṃ dassento ‘‘vattamānānameva…pe… arūpabhavādīhīti attho’’ti āha. Itareti ye sampayogaṃ labhanti, ke pana te rūpena asammissā arūpekadesabhūtā. Tenāha ‘‘vedanākkhandhādayo’’ti.

319. Having said, 'This is a compound term,' in order to show what kind of compound it is, he states the passage beginning 'of which aggregates, etc.,' which means 'of which feeling aggregate, etc.' When it is said, 'What is here associated,' this means, 'In this ninth method, what collection of dhammas is said to be associated.' The locative case in 'among the form aggregate, etc., ending with the passionless, the internal and external matrix-dhammas' has the sense of specification. For that collection of dhammas is specified as being associated by itself with its own associated feeling aggregate, etc. 'Non-conjunction' means non-association. He will speak of this in the tenth method. For there, having said, 'Feeling, etc., are dissociated from the form aggregate, and the form aggregate is dissociated from them,' and having raised the objection, 'Then he should speak of Nibbāna,' he says, 'But Nibbāna has the nature of subtle form.' For here, in the passage 'The mind base is dissociated from one base, one element, by some things,' just as Nibbāna, though not explicitly stated in its own right, is included by the term 'by some things' just like subtle form, so in such places Nibbāna is understood as having the nature of subtle form. So too here, by the phrase 'or by those mixed with form,' it should be seen that non-association is stated also with those mixed with Nibbāna, such as the unappropriated and unappropriable, etc. Since, for terms that include the four unimpaired aggregates, there is no other co-existent associated state, and since there is no association at all with past and future states, to show its non-conjunction he says: 'Only of present states … the meaning is … with the formless existences, etc.' The others are those that obtain association. But who are they? They are those that are not mixed with form, being a portion of the formless. Therefore he says: 'the feeling aggregate, etc.'

Navamanayasampayuttenasampayuttapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Here ends the Explanation of the Term 'Unassociated' by way of the 'Associated', the Ninth Method.

10. Dasamanayo vippayuttenavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā

10. The Tenth Method: Explanation of the Term 'Dissociated' by way of the 'Dissociated'.

353. Ye vippayuttena vippayuttabhāvena pāḷiyaṃ aggahitā, tesu keci vippayuttassa dhammantarassa abhāvato keci khandhādīhi vippayogasseva asambhavatoti imamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘dhammāyatanādidhammā’’tiādimāha. Tattha sabbacittuppādagatadhammabhāvatoti iminā bhinnakālatādivisesavato arūpakkhandhassa vippayuttassa dhammantarassa abhāvamāha, anārammaṇamissakabhāvatoti iminā pana sabbassapi. Kāmabhavo [Pg.31] upapattibhavo saññībhavo pañcavokārabhavoti ime cattāro mahābhavā. Vippayogābhāvatoti vippayogāsambhavato. Na hi ye dukkhasaccādīhi vippayuttā, tehi vippayuttānaṃ tesaṃyeva dukkhasaccādīnaṃ khandhādīsu kenaci vippayogo sambhavati.

353. To show the meaning of this—that of those states which are not taken in the Pāli text as being dissociated from what is dissociated, some are not taken because of the absence of another dissociated dhamma, and some because dissociation from the aggregates, etc., is simply impossible—he states the passage beginning 'the dhammas of the mind-object base, etc.' Therein, by the phrase 'because they are dhammas included in every arising of consciousness,' he indicates the absence of another dissociated dhamma for the formless aggregates, which have distinctions such as being in different times; but by the phrase 'because they are mixed with the objectless,' he indicates this for all of them. Sense-sphere existence, existence as rebirth, existence with perception, and five-constituent existence: these are the four great kinds of existence. 'Because of the absence of dissociation' means because dissociation is impossible. For it is not possible that those very truths of suffering, etc., which are dissociated from those states, could in any way be dissociated from the aggregates, etc.

Dasamanayavippayuttenavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Here ends the Explanation of the Term 'Dissociated' by way of the 'Dissociated', the Tenth Method.

11. Ekādasamanayo saṅgahitenasampayuttavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā

11. The Eleventh Method: Explanation of the Terms 'Associated' and 'Dissociated' with Reference to the Included.

409. Teti saṅkhārakkhandhadhammā. Sesehīti avasiṭṭhehi vedanāsaññāviññāṇakkhandhehi. ‘‘Etena saha sambandho’’ti iminā padānaṃ sambandhadassanamukhena ‘‘samudayasaccena ye dhammā sampayuttā’’ti pāḷiyā atthavivaraṇaṃ pākaṭataraṃ katvā kehicītipadassatthaṃ kātuṃ ‘‘kehicīti etassa panā’’tiādimāha. Atthaṃ dassetuṃ āhāti sambandho. Visesetvāti ettha tesaṃ dhammānaṃ taṇhāvajjānaṃ saṅkhārakkhandhadhammāyatanadhammadhātupariyāpannatākittanaṃ visesanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ, yato te samudayasaccena khandhādisaṅgahena saṅgahitāti vuttā. Sayaṃ attanā sampayutto na hotīti vuttaṃ ‘‘attavajjehī’’ti. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘cittaṃ na vattabbaṃ cittena sampayuttantipi, cittena vippayuttantipī’’ti. Sampayogārahehīti visesanaṃ sukhumarūpaṃ nibbānanti dve sandhāya kataṃ, na taṇhādike.

409. 'They' are the dhammas of the formations aggregate. 'By the remaining' means by the remaining aggregates of feeling, perception, and consciousness. By the phrase 'the connection with this,' having made the explanation of the meaning of the Pāli passage 'the dhammas that are associated with the truth of the origin' clearer by way of showing the connection of the terms, in order to give the meaning of the word 'by some,' he states the passage beginning 'But as for this "by some"...' The connection is: 'He says this to show the meaning.' Here, in 'having specified,' the specification should be seen as the declaration that those dhammas—excluding craving—are included in the formations aggregate, the mind-object base, and the mind-object element, because it is said that they are included by the truth of the origin by way of inclusion in the aggregates, etc. That a thing is not associated with itself is stated by the phrase 'excluding itself.' Therefore it is said: 'Consciousness should not be said to be associated with consciousness, nor should it be said to be dissociated from consciousness.' The specification 'by those fit for association' is made with reference to two things—subtle form and Nibbāna—not to craving and so on.

Ekādasamanayasaṅgahitenasampayuttavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the terms 'associated' and 'dissociated' by way of the included in the Eleventh Method is finished.

12. Dvādasamanayo sampayuttenasaṅgahitāsaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

12. The Twelfth Method: Explanation of the Terms 'Included' and 'Unincluded' with Reference to the Associated.

417. Navamanaye sampayogavisiṭṭhā sampayuttā uddhaṭā, dvādasamanaye ca sampayogavisiṭṭhā saṅgahitāsaṅgahitāti ubhayatthāpi sampayogavisiṭṭhāva gahitāti āha ‘‘dvādasama…pe… labbhantī’’ti.

417. In the ninth method, those distinguished by association are treated as 'associated' and are extracted; and in the twelfth method, those distinguished by association are treated as 'included' and 'unincluded.' Thus, since in both cases those distinguished by association are taken, he says: 'twelfth... are obtained.'

Dvādasamanayasampayuttenasaṅgahitāsaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the terms 'included' and 'unincluded' by way of the associated in the Twelfth Method is finished.

13. Terasamanayo asaṅgahitenasampayuttavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā

13. The Thirteenth Method: Explanation of the Terms 'Associated' and 'Dissociated' by way of the Unincluded.

448. Yehīti [Pg.32] rūpakkhandhadhammāyatanādīhi. Tīhipi khandhāyatanādisaṅgahehi. Puna yehīti arūpabhavādīhi. Oḷārikāyatanāneva honti āyatanadhātusaṅgahehipi asaṅgahitattā. Teti catuvokārabhavādayo. Vuttāvasesāti rūpakkhandhadhammāyatanādīhi avasiṭṭhā. Satipi asaṅgāhakatte tehi asaṅgahitānaṃ sampayogo na sambhavatīti vedanākkhandhādayo idha terasamanaye vissajjanaṃ na ruhanti nārohanti. Tenāha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘vedanākkhandhena hi khandhādivasena rūpārūpadhammā asaṅgahitā honti, tesañca sampayogo nāma natthī’’ti (dhātu. 448) asaṅgāhakā eva na honti avikalapañcakkhandhādisamudāyabhāvato.

448. By 'those which' is meant by the aggregate of form, the mind-object base, etc.; also by the three kinds of inclusion, namely, as aggregates, bases, etc. Again, by 'those which' is meant by the formless existences, etc. They are only the gross bases, because they are not included even by the inclusion as bases and elements. Those are the four-constituent existences, etc. 'The remainder from what has been said' means those remaining from the aggregate of form, the mind-object base, etc. Even when there is a non-includer, association with those not included by it is not possible; thus the feeling aggregate and so on do not arise as an answer in this thirteenth method. Therefore it is said in the commentary: 'For by the feeling aggregate, material and immaterial phenomena are not included by way of aggregates, etc., and for them there is no such thing as association.' They are simply not non-includers, because they are an indivisible collection of the five aggregates, etc.

Teti ‘‘dukkhasaccādī’’ti ādi-saddena vuttadhammā. Asabba…pe… siyuṃ avitakkāvicārādidhammā viya. Na tesaṃ vippayogo natthi tabbinimuttassa cittuppādassa sambhavato. Vedanākkhandhena asaṅgahitānaṃ anārammaṇamissakattā na ‘‘vippayogassa atthitāyā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tathā cāha ‘‘rūpārūpadhammā asaṅgahitā’’ti. Ubhayābhāvatoti sampayogavippayogābhāvato. Anārammaṇasahitasabbaviññāṇataṃdhātusampayuttatadubhayadhammā acetasikacetasikalokiyapadādīnaṃ vasena veditabbā.

Those are the states expressed by the term 'etc.' in 'the truth of suffering, etc.' ...they may be like states such as those without initial and sustained thought. Their dissociation is not absent, since the arising of a mind freed from them is possible. It is not said that 'dissociation exists' because those not included by the feeling aggregate are mixed with the objectless. Similarly, it is said, 'material and immaterial phenomena are not included.' 'The absence of both' means the absence of association and dissociation. Objectless states, all consciousness with its concomitants, phenomena associated with that element, and phenomena of both kinds should be understood by way of non-cetasikas, cetasikas, mundane terms, etc.

Terasamanayaasaṅgahitenasampayuttavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Here ends the explanation of the Thirteenth Method concerning the terms 'associated' and 'dissociated' by way of the unincluded.

14. Cuddasamanayo vippayuttenasaṅgahitāsaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

14. The Fourteenth Method: Explanation of the terms 'included' and 'unincluded' by way of the dissociated.

456. Dhammasabhāvamattattāti sabhāvadhammānaṃ dhammamattattā avatthāvisesamattattā.

456. 'Because it is merely the own-nature of phenomena' means: because it is the mere phenomenality of own-nature phenomena, and because it is merely a non-specific state.

Samucchijjati etenāti samucchedo. Saṅgahādivicārapariniṭṭhānabhūto cuddasamanayo. Tenāha ‘‘pariyosāne naye’’ti. Vissajjetabbadhammavivittā pucchā moghapucchā, sā tathābhūtāpi vissajjetabbadhammābhāvassa ñāpikā hotīti āha ‘‘tesaṃ pucchāya moghattā te na labbhantī’’ti. Moghā pucchā etassāti moghapucchako. Aṭṭhamo nayo [Pg.33] tattha sabbapucchānaṃ moghattā. Tena ca sahāti tena aṭṭhamanayena saddhiṃ imasmiṃ osānanaye aṭṭhamanaye ca osānanaye ca ete dhammāyatanādayo sabbappakārena na labbhanti. Vippayogassapi abhāvāti tattha kāraṇamāha.

By this it is cut off, thus it is 'eradication.' The fourteenth method is the culmination of the investigation into inclusion, etc. Therefore, he said, 'in the concluding method.' A question devoid of phenomena to be answered is a futile question. Even being so, it indicates the absence of phenomena to be answered; hence he said, 'because their question is futile, they are not obtained.' One whose question is futile is a 'futile questioner.' The eighth method is so because all questions there are futile. 'And together with that' means: together with that eighth method, in this concluding method—that is, in both the eighth method and the concluding method—these, the mind-object base and so on, are not obtained in any way. 'Because of the absence of dissociation also'—here he states the reason.

Cuddasamanayavippayuttenasaṅgahitāsaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Here ends the explanation of the Fourteenth Method concerning the terms 'included' and 'unincluded' by way of the dissociated.

Dhātukathāpakaraṇa-anuṭīkā samattā.

The Subcommentary to the Treatise on the Discussion of Elements is complete.

Puggalapaññattipakaraṇa-anuṭīkā

The Subcommentary to the Treatise on the Designation of Persons

1. Mātikāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Matrix

1. ‘‘Dhātukathaṃ [Pg.35] desayitvā anantaraṃ tassa āha puggalapaññatti’’nti vutte tattha kāraṇaṃ samudāgamato paṭṭhāya vibhāvento ‘‘dhammasaṅgahe’’tiādimāha. Tattha yadipi dhammasaṅgahe phassādīnaṃ pathavīādīnañca dhammānaṃ nānānayavicitto anupadavibhāgopi kato, na saṅgaho eva, so pana tesaṃ kusalattikādihetudukāditikadukehi saṅgahasandassanatthoti vuttaṃ ‘‘dhammasaṅgahe tikadukādivasena saṅgahitānaṃ dhammāna’’nti. Teneva hi taṃ pakaraṇaṃ ‘‘dhammasaṅgaho’’ti samaññaṃ labhi. Kāmañca dhammasaṅgahepi ‘‘tasmiṃ kho pana samaye cattāro khandhā hontī’’tiādinā (dha. sa. 58) khandhādivibhāgo dassito, so pana na tathā sātisayo, yathā vibhaṅgapakaraṇeti sātisayaṃ taṃ gahetvā āha ‘‘vibhaṅge khandhādivibhāgaṃ dassetvā’’ti, yato taṃ ‘‘vibhaṅgo’’tveva paññāyittha. Dhātukathāyāti ādhāre bhummaṃ, tathā ‘‘dhammasaṅgahe vibhaṅge’’ti etthāpi. Ādhāro hi saṅgahaṇavibhajanappabhedavacanasaṅkhātānaṃ avayavakiriyānaṃ taṃsamudāyabhūtāni pakaraṇāni yathā ‘‘rukkhe sākhā’’ti. Karaṇavacanaṃ vā etaṃ, dhātukathāya karaṇabhūtāyāti attho.

1. When it is said, 'Having taught the Dhātukathā, immediately after it he spoke the Puggalapaññatti,' explaining the reason for this, starting from the origin, he said, 'in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī,' etc. There, although in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī a detailed word-by-word analysis of phenomena such as contact and the earth element, etc., is made in various ways, it is not merely a collection. Rather, it is for the purpose of showing their inclusion by way of the wholesome triplets, the dyads of roots, etc., that it is said: 'in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, of the phenomena included by way of triplets, dyads, etc.' For this very reason that treatise obtained the designation 'Dhammasaṅgaho' (A Collection of Phenomena). And although in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī a division of aggregates, etc., is also shown with statements like, 'At that time there are four aggregates' (Dhs §58), this is not as pre-eminent as in the Vibhaṅga treatise. Taking its pre-eminence into account, he said, 'in the Vibhaṅga, having shown the division of aggregates, etc.,' since that treatise is known precisely as 'Vibhaṅga' (The Book of Analysis). 'In the Dhātukathā' is a locative of location; similarly also in 'in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī' and 'in the Vibhaṅga.' For the treatises, which are a collection of them, are the location for the constituent actions designated by the words 'collection,' 'analysis,' and 'differentiation,' just as one says, 'branches in a tree.' Or this is an instrumental expression, meaning, 'by the Dhātukathā which serves as the instrument.'

Ettha ca abhiññeyyadhamme desento desanākusalo bhagavā tikadukavasena tāva nesaṃ saṅgahaṃ dassento dhammasaṅgaṇiṃ desetvā saṅgahapubbakattā vibhāgassa tadanantaraṃ khandhādivasena vibhāgaṃ dassento vibhaṅgaṃ desesi. Puna yathāvuttavibhāgasaṅgahayutte dhamme saṅgahāsaṅgahādinayappabhedato dassento dhātukathaṃ desesi tassā abbhantarabāhiramātikāsarīrakattā. Na hi sakkā khandhādike kusalādike ca vinā saṅgahāsaṅgahādinayaṃ netunti. Tenāha ‘‘tathāsaṅgahitavibhattāna’’nti. Evaṃ saṅgahato vibhāgato pabhedato ca dhammānaṃ desanā yassā [Pg.36] paññattiyā vasena hoti, yo cāyaṃ yathāvuttadhammupādāno puggalavohāro, tassa ca samayavimuttādivasena vibhāgo, taṃ sabbaṃ vibhāvetuṃ puggalapaññatti desitāti idametesaṃ catunnaṃ pakaraṇānaṃ desanānukkamakāraṇaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ.

Here, the Blessed One, skilled in teaching, while explaining the knowable phenomena, first taught the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, showing their inclusion by way of triplets and dyads. Then, because division is preceded by inclusion, he next taught the Vibhaṅga, showing the division by way of aggregates, etc. Again, to show the phenomena connected with the aforesaid inclusion and division from the perspective of the different methods of inclusion, non-inclusion, etc., he taught the Dhātukathā, because its substance consists of the internal and external matrices. For it is not possible to apply the methods of inclusion, non-inclusion, etc., without the aggregates, etc., and the wholesome states, etc. Hence, it is said, 'of those thus included and divided.' Thus the teaching of phenomena by way of inclusion, division, and differentiation occurs by means of designation. The Puggalapaññatti was taught in order to clarify all this: the conventional usage 'person,' which is based on the aforesaid phenomena, and its division by way of 'one liberated by occasion,' etc. This should be seen as the reason for the sequence of teaching of these four treatises.

Tesanti dhammānaṃ. Sabhāvatoti ‘‘phasso vedanā’’tiādisabhāvato. Upādāyāti ‘‘puggalo satto poso’’tiādinā khandhe upādāya. Paññāpanaṃ yāya tajjāupādādibhedāya paññattiyā hoti, taṃ paññattiṃ. Pabhedatoti khandhādisamayavimuttādivibhāgato. Yāya paññattiyā sabhāvato upādāya ca paññāpananti saṅkhepato vuttamatthaṃ vivaranto ‘‘tattha ye dhamme’’tiādimāha. Tattha asabhāvapaññattiyāpi mūlabhūtaṃ upādānaṃ sabhāvadhammo eva, kevalaṃ pana tesaṃ pavattiākārabhedasannissayato visesoti dassento ‘‘ye dhamme…pe… hotī’’ti āha. Tattha pubbāpariyabhāvena pavattamāneti iminā pabandhasannissayataṃ dassento santānapaññattiṃ vadati, asabhāvasamūhavasenāti iminā sesapaññattiṃ. Tisso hi paññattiyo santānapaññatti samūhapaññatti avatthāvisesapaññattīti. Tattha pabandho santāno. Samudāyo samūho. Uppādādiko daharabhāvādiko ca avatthāviseso. Tesu asabhāvaggahaṇena vinā pabandhasamūhānaṃ asabhāvatte siddhe asabhāvasamūhavasenāti asabhāvaggahaṇaṃ pabandhasamūhavinimuttapaññattisandassanatthanti tena avatthāvisesapaññattiyā pariggaho vuttoti veditabbo.

‘Of them’ means of phenomena. ‘By own-nature’ means by the own-nature of such things as 'contact, feeling,' etc. ‘By grasping’ means by grasping the aggregates with terms such as 'person, being, individual,' etc. The designation which occurs by means of a designation differentiated as 'born of that,' 'grasping,' etc.—that designation is meant. ‘By distinction’ means by the division into aggregates, 'one liberated by occasion,' etc. Expanding on the meaning briefly stated—'the designation by which there is designation both by own-nature and by grasping'—he said, 'Here, those phenomena...' etc. Here, even for a designation without own-nature, the root grasping is indeed an own-nature phenomenon. However, showing that the distinction is merely due to dependence on the differentiation of modes of occurrence, he said: 'Those phenomena... occur.' Here, by 'occurring in sequence,' he shows dependence on continuity and refers to the designation of continuity. By 'by way of a collection without own-nature,' he refers to the remaining designations. There are, indeed, three kinds of designations: designation of continuity, designation of collection, and designation of a particular state. Here, a series is continuity. An assemblage is a collection. Arising, etc., and states like youth are a particular state. Among these, since the non-own-nature of the series and the collection is established even without the term 'non-own-nature,' the term 'non-own-nature' in the phrase 'by way of a collection without own-nature' is for showing a designation free from series and collection. Therefore, it should be understood that by this the inclusion of the designation of a particular state is stated.

Tesanti pubbe yaṃ-saddena parāmaṭṭhānaṃ indriyabaddhadhammānaṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘aññesañca bāhirarūpanibbānāna’’nti. Sasabhāvasamūhasasabhāvappabhedavasenāti rūpakkhandhādisasabhāvasamūhavasena cakkhāyatanādisasabhāvavisesavasena ca. ‘‘Sasabhāvasamūhasabhāvabhedavasenā’’ti ca pāṭho. Tattha samūhasabhāvoti sabhāvasantānaṃ avatthāvisesavidhuraṃ samūhavasena lakkhaṇamevāha. Tathā hi khandhapaññattiyāpi sabhāvapaññattitā vuttā. Tāyāti āyatanapaññattiādippabhedāya sabhāvapaññattiyā. Vibhattā sabhāvapaññattīti ‘‘phasso phusanā’’tiādinā (dha. sa. 2) vibhattā phassādisabhāvapaññatti. Sabbāpīti pi-saddena sabhāvadhammesu sāmaññavasena pavattaṃ kusalādipaññattiṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Rūpādidhammānaṃ samūho santānena [Pg.37] pavattamāno avatthāvisesasahito ekattaggahaṇanibandhano sattoti voharīyatīti so sabhāvadhammo nāma pana na hotīti āha ‘‘puggalapaññatti pana asabhāvapaññattī’’ti. Tāyāti puggalapaññattiyā. Yasmā pana dhammānaṃ pabandho samūho ca dhammasannissitoti vattabbataṃ arahati, tasmā ‘‘pariññeyyādisabhāvadhamme upādāya pavattito’’ti vuttaṃ.

‘Of them’ means of the phenomena bound up with the faculties, which were previously referred to by the word 'yaṃ'. Hence he said, 'and of other external form and Nibbāna.' ‘By way of a collection of own-natures and a distinction of own-natures’ means by way of the aggregate of form, etc., as a collection of own-natures, and by way of the eye-base, etc., as a specific own-nature. The reading 'by way of a collection-own-nature and a distinction-own-nature' is also found. Therein, 'own-nature of a collection' states the characteristic by way of a collection, as a continuity of own-nature devoid of particular states. For even the designation of the aggregates is said to be a designation of own-nature. ‘By that’ means by the designation of own-nature, which is differentiated as the designation of the bases, etc. ‘The analyzed designation of own-nature’ means the designation of the own-nature of contact, etc., analyzed with terms such as 'contact is touching' (Dhs §2). ‘All’—by the particle 'pi' he includes the designation of 'wholesome,' etc., which occurs generally in regard to own-nature phenomena. The collection of phenomena such as form, etc., occurring as a continuum, together with particular states, is conventionally designated as a 'being' because it is the basis for grasping unity; but that is not what is called an own-nature phenomenon. Hence he said, 'the designation of a person, however, is a designation without own-nature.' ‘By that’ means by the designation of a person. But since the series and collection of phenomena deserve to be called 'dependent on phenomena,' it is therefore said, 'it operates by taking as its basis own-nature phenomena such as the fully knowable, etc.'

Vijjamānapaññatti pana ‘‘sabhāvapaññattī’’ti vuttā, avijjamānapaññatti ‘‘asabhāvapaññattī’’ti vuttā. Sabbā paññattiyoti upādāyapaññattikiccapaññattiādayo sabbā paññattiyo. Yadi sabbā paññattiyo idha dassitā honti, kathaṃ ‘‘puggalapaññattī’’ti nāmaṃ jātanti āha ‘‘khandhādipaññattīsū’’tiādi. Aññatthāti dhammasaṅgahādīsu. Ye dhammeti ye khandhādidhamme. Paññattiyā vatthubhāvenāti paññāpanassa adhiṭṭhānabhāvena. Adhiṭṭhānañhi paññāpetabbadhammā paññāpanassa. Evañca katvā khandhādīhi saddhiṃ puggalo gahito. Ye dhammeti vā ye paññattidhamme. Paññāpetukāmoti nikkhipitukāmo vatthubhedato asaṅkarato ṭhapetukāmo. Paññattiparicchedanti ca vatthubhedabhinnaṃ paññattibhūtaṃ paricchedaṃ. Evamettha attho daṭṭhabbo.

A designation of what is existent is called a 'designation of own-nature'; a designation of what is non-existent is called a 'designation without own-nature.' 'All designations' means all designations such as derivative designation, functional designation, and so on. If all designations are shown here, how did the name 'designation of a person' arise? He says: 'Among the designations of the aggregates, etc.' and so on. 'Elsewhere' means in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī and other texts. 'Those phenomena' means those phenomena that are the aggregates, etc. 'As the basis for designation' means as the ground for designating. For the ground for designating are the phenomena to be designated. And having done so, the person is taken together with the aggregates, etc. Or, 'those phenomena' means those phenomena that are designations. 'Wishing to designate' means wishing to lay down, wishing to establish without confusion according to the difference of the basis. And 'the delimitation of designation' means the delimitation which is a designation, distinguished by the difference of the basis. Thus the meaning should be understood here.

Sāmaññappabhedapaññāpanāti sāmaññabhūtānaṃ visesabhūtānañca atthānaṃ paññāpanā. Tesanti attha-saddāpekkhāya pulliṅganiddeso. Tatthāti paññāpanāya atthadassanabhūtesu dassanādīsu. Idamevaṃnāmakanti idaṃ ruppanādiatthajātaṃ itthannāmakaṃ rūpakkhandhavedanākkhandhādisamaññaṃ. Taṃtaṃkoṭṭhāsikakaraṇanti rūpavedanāditaṃtaṃatthavibhāgapariyāpannatāpādanaṃ. Tathā saññuppādānamevāti āha ‘‘bodhanameva nikkhipanā’’ti. Bodhanañhi bodhaneyyasantāne bodhetabbassa atthassa ṭhapananti katvā ‘‘nikkhipanā’’ti vuttaṃ. ‘‘Paññāpanā’’tiādinā bhāvasādhanena vatvā sādhanantarāmasanena atthantaraparikappāsaṅkā siyāti taṃ nivāretuṃ ‘‘yo panāyaṃ…pe… veditabbo’’ti āha. Tesaṃ tesaṃ dhammānanti taṃtaṃpaññāpetabbadhammānaṃ. Dassanabhūtāya nāmapaññattiyā diṭṭhatāya, ṭhapanabhūtāya ṭhapitatāya. Taṃnimittatanti tassa dassanassa ṭhapanassa ca nimittakāraṇataṃ. Nimittañhi kattubhāvena voharīyati yathā ‘‘bhikkhā vāsetī’’ti, ‘‘ariyabhāvakarāni saccāni ariyasaccānī’’ti ca.

'Designating the general and the particular' is the designating of meanings that are general and meanings that are particular. 'Of them' (tesaṃ) is a masculine specification with reference to the word 'meaning' (attha). 'Therein' means in seeing, etc., which are the seeing of the meaning for the purpose of designation. 'This has such a name' means this collection of meanings, such as 'being afflicted,' etc., has such-and-such a name, the common term 'aggregate of form,' 'aggregate of feeling,' etc. 'Making into respective portions' means bringing about inclusion in the division of the respective meanings of form, feeling, etc. Similarly, concerning 'the arising of what is made known,' he says: 'Making known is itself laying down.' For making known is the establishing of the meaning to be made known in the continuity of that which is to be made known; therefore it is called 'laying down.' Having spoken with a term indicating a state, such as 'designating,' to prevent the doubt that a different meaning might be conceived by considering another derivation, he says: 'But this... should be understood.' 'Of those respective phenomena' means of the respective phenomena to be designated. By the seen-ness of the name-designation which is the seeing; by the established-ness of that which is the establishing. 'Being the sign for that' means being the sign-cause for that seeing and establishing. For a sign is spoken of in the sense of an agent, as in 'almsfood makes one dwell' and 'the truths that make one noble are the noble truths.'

Pāḷiyaṃ [Pg.38] anāgatatanti vijjamānatādivisesavacanena saha pāṭhānāruḷhataṃ. Vijjamānassa satoti vijjamānassa samānassāti imamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘vijjamānabhūtassāti attho’’ti āha. Tathāti saccikaṭṭhaparamatthavasena avijjamānassa anupalabbhamānassa. Taṃ pana anupalabbhamānataṃ tathā-saddena byatirekavasena dīpitaṃ pākaṭataraṃ kātuṃ ‘‘yathā kusalādīnī’’tiādimāha. Tattha vinivattasabhāvānīti vibhattasabhāvāni. Upaladdhīti gahaṇaṃ. Tenākārenāti tena rūpavedanādiākārena avijjamānassa. Aññenākārenāti tato rūpavedanādito aññena tabbinimuttena paññāpetabbapaññāpanākārena vijjamānassa. Paññattiduke vuttameva ‘‘ayañca vādo sevatthikathāya paṭisiddho’’tiādinā. Lokaniruttimattasiddhassāti ettha mattaggahaṇaṃ tassa paññattivatthussa na kevalaṃ vijjamānasabhāvatānivattanatthameva, atha kho viparītaggāhanivattanatthampīti dassento ‘‘anabhinivesena cittenā’’ti āha. Catusaccapañcakkhandhādivinimuttaṃ saccantarakhandhantarādikaṃ pañcamasaccādikaṃ. Sace taṃ koci atthīti paṭijāneyya, ayāthāvagahitassa taṃ vācāvatthumattamevassāti dassento āha ‘‘sābhinivesena…pe… vutta’’nti. Uddese niddese ca sattavantaṃ padhānabhāvena āgamanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘sarūpato tissannaṃ āgatata’’nti. Guṇabhāvena pana uddhaṃsotapaññāvimuttapāsāṇalekhādiggahaṇesu itarāpi tisso paññattiyo imasmiṃ pakaraṇe āgatā eva.

'Not coming in the Pāḷi' means not being included in the text along with words specifying existence, etc. Showing that 'of the existent, being' means 'of the existent, being present,' he says: 'The meaning is "of what has become existent."' 'Similarly' means of what is non-existent, of what is not apprehended in the sense of a real and ultimate meaning. But to make that non-apprehensibility—clarified by the word 'similarly' in a negative sense—more evident, he says: 'just as with wholesome states, etc.' Therein, 'having distinct natures' means having separate natures. 'Apprehension' means grasping. 'In that mode' means of what is non-existent in that mode of form, feeling, etc. 'In another mode' means of what is existent in another mode, one distinct from form, feeling, etc., a mode of designating what is to be designated. In the Duka on Designation it is said: 'And this view is refuted by the discussion on the real meaning,' etc. Here, in the phrase 'established merely by worldly convention,' to show that the inclusion of 'merely' is not only for the purpose of negating an existent intrinsic nature for the object of designation, but also for the purpose of negating a wrong grasp, he says: 'with a non-adherent mind.' Freed from the four truths, the five aggregates, etc., is a further truth, a further aggregate, etc., such as a fifth truth. To show that if someone were to claim, 'That exists,' for one who has grasped it incorrectly it would be a mere matter of words, he says: 'with adherence... it is said.' Referring to the primary inclusion of the 'being' in the summary and the detailed exposition, he says: 'the coming of the three in their own form.' But in a secondary sense, in the instances of 'one who goes upstream,' 'one liberated by wisdom,' 'an inscription on a rock,' etc., the other three designations are also included in this treatise.

Yathāvuttassa…pe… avirodhenāti ‘‘vijjamānapaññatti avijjamānapaññattī’’ti evaṃ vuttappakārassa avilomanena. Ācariyavādāti cettha attanomatiyo veditabbā, aññattha pana aṭṭhakathā ca. Yathā ca avirodho hoti, taṃ dassento ‘‘tasmā’’tiādimāha. Tattha avijjamānattā paññāpetabbamattatthena paññattīti etena ‘‘avijjamānā paññatti avijjamānapaññattī’’ti imaṃ samāsavikappamāha. Avijjamānapaññattīti ettha hi dve samāsā avijjamānassa, avijjamānā vā paññattīti avijjamānapaññatti. Tesu purimena nāmapaññatti vuttā, dutiyena upādāpaññattiādibhedā itarāpi. Sasabhāvaṃ vedanādikaṃ. Tajjaparamatthanāmalābhatoti tajjassa tadanurūpassa paramatthassa anvatthassa nāmassa labhanato, anubhavanādisabhāvānaṃ dhammānaṃ paramatthikassa vedanādināmassa labhanattāti attho[Pg.39]. Etena visesanivattiattho matta-saddo, tena cāyaṃ viseso nivattitoti dasseti. Parato labhitabbanti paraṃ upādāya laddhabbaṃ yathā rūpādike upādāya sattoti nissabhāvasamūhasantānādi paññattivatthu. Ekattenāti anaññattena. Anupalabbhasabhāvatā ñāṇena aggahetabbasabhāvatā, yato te navattabbāti vuccanti.

'Without contradiction... to what has been said' means in conformity with the manner stated thus: 'designation of the existent, designation of the non-existent.' Here, 'the view of the teacher' should be understood as one's own opinions, but elsewhere it refers to the commentary. And to show how there is no contradiction, he says: 'Therefore,' etc. Therein, by this—'because of non-existence, it is a designation in the sense of being merely what is to be designated'—he states this alternative analysis of the compound: 'a non-existent designation is a designation of the non-existent.' For here in the term 'designation of the non-existent' there are two compounds: 'designation of the non-existent' (avijjamānassa paññatti) or 'a non-existent designation' (avijjamānā paññatti). Among these, by the first, name-designation is stated; by the second, the others with their divisions, such as derivative designation. Feeling, etc., which has its own intrinsic nature. 'From obtaining a name that is an ultimate meaning corresponding to it' means: because of obtaining a literal name for an ultimate meaning that is suitable for it, that is, because of obtaining the ultimate name 'feeling,' etc., for phenomena that have the intrinsic nature of experiencing, etc. By this he shows that the word 'merely' has the meaning of excluding a specific quality, and by this that specific quality is excluded. 'To be obtained from another' means to be obtained in dependence on another, just as 'a being' is dependent on form, etc. The basis for designation is a collection, a continuity, etc., that is without intrinsic nature. 'By oneness' means by non-otherness. 'The nature of being unapprehendable' is the nature of being ungraspable by knowledge, for which reason they are said to be 'inexpressible.'

Sasūkasālirāsiādiākārena saṃkucitaggo vāsavavāsudevādīnaṃ viya moliviseso kirīṭaṃ, so pana makuṭavisesopi hotiyevāti āha ‘‘kirīṭaṃ makuṭa’’nti. Sabbasamorodhoti sabbāsaṃ vijjamānapaññattiādīnaṃ channaṃ paññattīnaṃ antokaraṇaṃ. Saṅkhātabbappadhānattāti idaṃ lakkhaṇavacanaṃ. Na hi sabbāpi upanidhāpaññattisaṅkhāvasena pavattā, nāpi sabbā saṅkhātabbappadhānā. Dutiyaṃ tatiyantiādikaṃ pana upanidhāpaññattiyā, dve tīṇītiādikaṃ upanikkhittapaññattiyā ekadesaṃ upalakkhaṇavasena dassento tassa ca saṅkhyeyyappadhānatāyāha ‘‘saṅkhātabbappadhānattā’’ti. Pūraṇattho hi saddo tadatthadīpanamukhena pūretabbamatthaṃ dīpeti. So ca saṅkhāvisayo padhānovāti dutiyādīnaṃ paññattīnaṃ saṅkhātabbappadhānatā vuttā. Yāva hi dasasaṅkhā saṅkhyeyyappadhānāti. Tathā dve tīṇītiādīnampi paññattīnaṃ. Saṅkhātabbo pana attho koci vijjamāno, koci avijjamāno, koci saha visuñca tadubhayaṃ missoti chapi paññattiyo bhajatīti.

A `kirīṭa` is a special kind of topknot, like those of Vāsava and Vāsudeva, with a pointed top in the shape of a heap of bearded rice, etc. But since this is also a specific kind of diadem, he says: 'a `kirīṭa` is a `makuṭa`.' 'Total inclusion' means the inclusion of all six designations, beginning with the designation of the existent. 'Because what is to be counted is primary'—this is a statement of a characteristic. For not all comparative designations proceed by way of number, nor are all primarily concerned with what is to be counted. But showing a portion of comparative designation with 'second,' 'third,' etc., and of deposited designation with 'two,' 'three,' etc., by way of illustration, he says, 'because what is to be counted is primary,' on account of the primacy of what is to be numbered. For a word with an ordinal sense clarifies the meaning to be completed by way of clarifying the meaning of that number. And since the object of counting is primary, the primacy of what is to be counted is stated for designations such as 'second,' etc. For up to the number ten, what is to be numbered is primary. Likewise for designations such as 'two,' 'three,' etc. But the meaning to be counted is sometimes existent, sometimes non-existent, sometimes both together and separately, and sometimes mixed; thus it partakes of all six designations.

Itarāti upādāsamodhānatajjāsantatipaññattiyo vuttāvasesā upanidhāpaññattiupanikkhittapaññattiyo ca. Sattarathādibhedā upādāpaññatti, dīgharassādibhedā upanidhāpaññatti ca avijjamānapaññatti. Hatthagatādivisiṭṭhā upanidhāpaññatti, samodhānapaññatti ca avijjamānenaavijjamānapaññatti. Tatheva ‘‘suvaṇṇavaṇṇo brahmassaro’’tiādikā vijjamānagabbhā vijjamānenaavijjamānapaññattiṃ bhajantīti āha ‘‘yathāyogaṃ taṃ taṃ paññatti’’nti. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘dutiyaṃ tatiyaṃ…pe… bhajantī’’ti. Yañhītiādi yathāvuttaupanidhāupanikkhittapaññattīnaṃ avijjamānenaavijjamānapaññattibhāvasamatthanaṃ. Tattha tañca saṅkhānanti yaṃ ‘‘paṭhamaṃ eka’’ntiādikaṃ saṅkhānaṃ, tañca saṅkhāmukhena gahetabbarūpaṃ. Ca-saddena saṅkhyeyyaṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Tampi hi paññāpetabbaṃ paññattīti. Tassā pana paramatthato abhāvo vuttoyeva. Kiñci [Pg.40] natthīti paramatthato kiñci natthi. Tathāti iminā avijjamānenaavijjamānabhāvanti etaṃ ākaḍḍhati. Tenāha ‘‘na hi…pe… vijjamāno’’ti.

'The others' means derivative designation, collective designation, tendency designation, and continuity designation, and the remaining ones that were mentioned: comparative designation and deposited designation. Derivative designation, with its divisions such as 'seven chariots,' and comparative designation, with its divisions such as 'long' and 'short,' are designations of the non-existent. Specific comparative designations, such as 'gone to the hand,' and collective designation are designations of the non-existent by means of the non-existent. Similarly, those like 'golden-colored,' 'Brahma's voice,' etc., which have an existent core, partake of designation of the non-existent by means of the existent. Thus he says: 'that respective designation according to suitability.' Therefore it is said: 'The second, the third... partake.' 'For what...' etc., is the justification for the aforesaid comparative and deposited designations being designations of the non-existent by means of the non-existent. Therein, 'that number' means the number such as 'first,' 'one,' and the form to be grasped by way of the number. By the word 'and' he includes what is to be numbered. For that too is to be designated and is a designation. But its non-existence in an ultimate sense has already been stated. 'There is nothing' means ultimately there is nothing. 'Thus'—by this he refers to the state of being non-existent by means of the non-existent. Therefore he says: 'For there is not... any existent thing.'

Okāseti avīciparanimmitavasavattīparicchinne padese. So hi kāmādhiṭṭhānato ‘‘kāmo’’ti vuccati. Kammanibbattakkhandhesūti iminā uttarapadalopena kāmabhavaṃ ‘‘kāmo’’ti vadati. Bhaṇanaṃ saddo cetanā vā, taṃsamaṅgitāya tabbisiṭṭhe puggale bhāṇakoti paññattīti āha ‘‘vijjamānenaavijjamānapaññattipakkhaṃ bhajatī’’ti. Yebhuyyena rūpāyatanaggahaṇamukhena rūpasaṅkhātena saṇṭhānaṃ gayhatīti tassa tena abhedopacāraṃ katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘rūpāyatanasaṅkhātena saṇṭhānenā’’ti. Yaṃ abhedopacāraṃ bhindituṃ ajānantā nikāyantariyā rūpāyatanaṃ saṇṭhānasabhāvaṃ paṭijānanti. ‘‘Kiso puggalo, thūlo puggalo, kiso daṇḍo, thūlo daṇḍo’’tiādinā puggalādīnaṃ paññāpanā tathātathāsanniviṭṭhe rūpasaṅkhāte kisādisaṇṭhānapaññatti, na rūpāyatanamatteti āha ‘‘saṇṭhānanti vā rūpāyatane aggahite’’ti. Paccattadhammanāmavasenāti ‘‘pathavī phasso’’tiādinā dhammānaṃ taṃtaṃnāmavasena. Kiccapaññattiādivibhāgena pavatto ayampi ācariyavādo ‘‘kiccapaññatti ekaccā bhūmipaññatti paccattapaññatti asaṅkhatapaññatti ca vijjamānapaññatti, liṅgapaññatti ekaccā paccattapaññatti ca avijjamānapaññatti, ekaccā kiccapaññatti vijjamānenaavijjamānapaññatti, ekaccā bhūmisaṇṭhānapaññatti vijjamānena vā avijjamānena vā avijjamānapaññattī’’ti dassitattā ‘‘dhammakathā itthiliṅga’’ntiādīnaṃ vijjamānenavijjamānapaññattibhāvo, avijjamānenaavijjamānapaññattibhāvo ca dassitanayoti āha ‘‘sabbasaṅgāhakoti daṭṭhabbo’’ti. Upādāpaññattiādibhāvo cettha kiccapaññattiādīnaṃ kiccapaññattiādibhāvo ca tāsaṃ yathārahaṃ vibhāvetabbo.

It occupies a limited region bounded by Avīci and the Paranimmitavasavattī gods. For because it is the basis of sensual desire, it is called 'sensual desire' (kāma). By 'in the aggregates produced by kamma,' with the elision of the latter word, he speaks of sensual existence (kāmabhava) as 'sensual desire' (kāma). Speaking is sound or volition; because of being endowed with that, a person distinguished by it is designated as a 'speaker' (bhāṇaka). Thus he says: 'It partakes of the class of designation by what is existent of what is nonexistent.' Generally, by way of grasping the form base, configuration (saṇṭhāna) is grasped through what is reckoned as form (rūpa); therefore, having made a metaphorical identification of the one with the other, it is said, 'by the configuration reckoned as the form base.' Not knowing how to break this metaphorical identification, the adherents of other schools maintain that the form base has the intrinsic nature of configuration. The designation of persons and so on by such terms as 'a thin person,' 'a fat person,' 'a thin stick,' 'a thick stick,' is a designation of a configuration such as thinness, etc., in what is reckoned as form arranged in such and such a way, not merely the form base. Thus he says: 'or configuration, when the form base is not grasped.' By way of the names of individual phenomena: by way of the respective names of phenomena such as 'earth, contact,' etc. This teaching of the teachers, which proceeds by way of the division into functional designation, etc., has also been shown thus: 'Functional designation, some ground designations, individual designation, and unconditioned designation are designations of the existent. Gender designation and some individual designations are designations of the nonexistent. Some functional designations are designations by what is existent of what is nonexistent. Some ground-configuration designations are designations of the nonexistent by what is existent or by what is nonexistent.' Therefore, since the method has been shown whereby 'discourse on the Dhamma is feminine gender,' etc., has the nature of a designation by what is existent of what is nonexistent, and the nature of a designation by what is nonexistent of what is nonexistent, he says: 'it should be seen as all-inclusive.' And here, the status of functional designations and so on as derived designations and so on, and their status as functional designations and so on, should be explained as is appropriate.

2. Saṅkhepappabhedavasenāti ‘‘yāvatā pañcakkhandhā’’ti sabbepi khandhe khandhabhāvasāmaññena saṃkhipanavasena, ‘‘yāvatā rūpakkhandho’’tiādinā khandhānaṃ tato sāmaññato pakārehi bhindanavasena ca. Ayaṃ atthoti ayaṃ paññattisaṅkhāto attho. Sāmaññato vā hi dhammānaṃ paññāpanaṃ hoti visesato vā. Viseso cettha attano sāmaññāpekkhāya veditabbo, visesāpekkhāya pana sopi sāmaññaṃ sampajjatīti ‘‘kittāvatā khandhānaṃ khandhapaññattī’’ti pucchāya saṅkhepato vissajjanavasena [Pg.41] ‘‘yāvatā pañcakkhandhā’’ti vuttanti tatthāpi ‘‘khandhānaṃ khandhapaññattī’’ti ānetvā yojetabbanti āha ‘‘yāvatā…pe… paññattī’’ti. ‘‘Yāvatā pañcakkhandhā, ettāvatā khandhānaṃ khandhapaññatti. Yāvatā rūpakkhandho…pe… viññāṇakkhandho, ettāvatā khandhānaṃ khandhapaññattī’’ti evamettha pāḷiyojanā kātabbā. Evañhi saṅkhepato pabhedato ca khandhapaññatti vissajjitā hoti. Tathā hi imasseva atthassa aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttabhāvaṃ dassento ‘‘yattakena…pe… ādikenā’’ti āha. Tatthāti tasmiṃ vissajjanassa atthavacane, tasmiṃ vā vissajjanapāṭhe tadatthavacane ca. Pabhedanidassanamattanti pabhedassa udāharaṇamattaṃ. Avuttopi sabbo bhūtupādiko, sukhādiko ca pabhedo. Taṃ pana bhūmimukhena dassetuṃ ‘‘rūpakkhandho kāmāvacaro’’tiādi vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

2. 'By way of summary and analysis': this means by way of summarizing all the aggregates under the general state of being an aggregate with 'as far as the five aggregates,' and by way of analyzing the aggregates from that generality into their specific kinds with 'as far as the form aggregate,' etc. This is the meaning: this is the meaning reckoned as designation. For the designation of phenomena occurs either generally or specifically. Here, the specific should be understood in relation to its own general aspect, but in relation to a specific aspect, that too becomes a general aspect. Thus, in response to the question, 'To what extent is there the designation of aggregates as aggregates?' it is stated 'as far as the five aggregates' by way of a concise answer. Even there, the phrase 'the designation of aggregates as aggregates' should be supplied and connected. Thus he says: 'as far as ... designation.' 'As far as the five aggregates, to that extent there is the designation of aggregates as aggregates. As far as the form aggregate ... as far as the consciousness aggregate, to that extent there is the designation of aggregates as aggregates.' Thus the construction of the Pāli should be made here. For in this way the designation of aggregates is answered both summarily and analytically. Indeed, showing that this very meaning is stated in the commentary, he says: 'by whatever ... by the initial, etc.' Therein: in the statement of the meaning of the answer, or in the text of the answer and the statement of its meaning. Merely an illustration of the analysis: it is merely an example of the analysis. Also unstated is the entire analysis into primary and derived matter, and into the pleasant, etc. But to show this by way of the planes, it is said, 'The form aggregate is of the sense sphere,' etc. This should be understood.

Evaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ āgatanayena pāḷiyā atthayojanaṃ dassetvā idāni taṃ pakārantarena dassetuṃ ‘‘ayaṃ vā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha ayaṃ vāti vuccamānaṃ sandhāyāha. Etthāti etasmiṃ khandhapaññattivissajjane. Idanti idaṃ padaṃ. Yattako…pe… khandhapaññattiyā pabhedoti iminā saṅkhepato vitthārato ca khandhānaṃ pabhedaṃ pati paññattivibhāgoti dassitaṃ hoti. Tenāha ‘‘vatthubhedena…pe… dassetī’’ti. Pakaraṇantareti vibhaṅgapakaraṇe. Tattha hi sātisayaṃ khandhānaṃ vibhāgapaññatti vuttā. Tenāha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘sammāsambuddhena hi…pe… kathitā’’ti. Ettha ca paṭhamanaye samukhena, dutiye vatthumukhena paññattiyā vibhāgā dassitāti ayametesaṃ viseso.

Having thus shown the construction of the meaning of the Pāli according to the method found in the commentary, now, to show it by another method, 'Or this...' etc., is said. Therein, 'Or this...' refers to what is about to be said. 'Herein' means in this explanation of the designation of aggregates. 'This' means this word. By 'Whatever ... the analysis of the designation of aggregates,' it is shown that the division of designation pertains to the analysis of the aggregates both in summary and in detail. Therefore he says: 'by the analysis of the subject matter ... it shows.' 'In another treatise' means in the Vibhaṅga. For there the division and designation of the aggregates are stated with excellence. Therefore it is said in the commentary: 'For by the Perfectly Self-Enlightened One ... it has been spoken.' And here, in the first method the division of designation is shown directly, in the second by way of the subject matter. This is the difference between them.

Esa nayoti iminā khandhapaññattiyā vuttamatthaṃ āyatanapaññattiyādīsu atidisati. Tattha ‘‘yāvatā pañcakkhandhā’’ti, ‘‘khandhānaṃ khandhapaññattī’’ti idaṃ paññattiniddesapāḷiyā ādipariyosānaggahaṇamukhena dassanaṃ. ‘‘Yāvatā dvādasāyatanānī’’ti, ‘‘āyatanānaṃ āyatanapaññattī’’ti imassa attho ‘‘yattakena paññāpanena saṅkhepato dvādasāyatanānī’’ti etena dassito, ‘‘yāvatā cakkhāyatana’’ntiādikassa pana ‘‘pabhedato cakkhāyatana’’ntiādikenāti. Tattha ‘‘cakkhāyatanaṃ…pe… dhammāyatana’’nti pabhedanidassanamattametaṃ. Etena avuttopi sabbo saṅgahito hotīti ‘‘tatrāpi dasāyatanā kāmāvacarā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Ayaṃ vā ettha pāḷiyā atthayojanā – ‘‘yāvatā’’ti idaṃ sabbehi padehi [Pg.42] yojetvā ‘‘yattakāni dvādasāyatanāni…pe… yattako dvādasannaṃ āyatanānaṃ, tappabhedānañca cakkhāyatanādīnaṃ pabhedo, tattako āyatanānaṃ āyatanapaññattiyā pabhedo’’ti pakaraṇantare vuttena vatthupabhedena āyatanapaññattiyā pabhedaṃ dassetītiādinā itarapaññattīsupi nayo yojetabbo.

'This is the method': by this he extends the meaning stated for the designation of aggregates to the designation of the bases, etc. Therein, 'as far as the five aggregates' and 'the designation of aggregates as aggregates' is a demonstration by way of taking the beginning and the end of the Pāli exposition of designation. The meaning of 'as far as the twelve bases' and 'the designation of bases as bases' is shown by 'by whatever designation, in summary, the twelve bases'; but the meaning of 'as far as the eye-base,' etc., is shown by 'analytically, the eye-base,' etc. Herein, 'the eye-base ... the mind-object base' is merely an illustration of the analysis. By this, all that is unstated is also included; thus it is said, 'Therein, too, ten bases are of the sense sphere,' etc. Or this is the construction of the meaning of the Pāli here: connecting 'as far as' with all the terms, it means: 'Whatever is the analysis of the twelve bases ... and the analysis of their divisions, the eye-base, etc., that much is the analysis of the designation of bases as bases.' Thus it shows the analysis of the designation of bases by means of the analysis of the subject matter stated in another treatise; and by this principle, the method should be applied to the other designations as well.

7. ‘‘Cha paññattiyo…pe… puggalapaññattī’’ti imaṃ apekkhitvā ‘‘kittāvatā…pe… ettāvatā indriyānaṃ indriyapaññattī’’ti ayaṃ pāḷipadeso niddesopi samāno pakaraṇantare vatthubhedena vuttaṃ khandhādipaññattippabhedaṃ upādāya uddesoyeva hotīti āha ‘‘uddesamattenevāti attho’’ti.

7. With reference to 'Six designations ... designation of a person,' this Pāli passage, 'To what extent ... to that extent there is the designation of faculties as faculties,' although it is an exposition, becomes merely a summary statement with reference to the analysis of the designations of aggregates, etc., stated in another treatise by way of the analysis of the subject matter. Thus he says: 'The meaning is: merely by way of a summary statement.'

Mātikāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Mātikā is completed.

2. Niddesavaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Exposition

1. Ekakaniddesavaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Exposition of the Ones

1. Paccanīkadhammānaṃ [Pg.43] jhāpanaṭṭhena jhānaṃ, tato suṭṭhu vimuccanaṭṭhena vimokkhoti nippariyāyena jhānaṅgāneva vimokkhoti aṭṭhakathāadhippāyo. Ṭīkākārena pana ‘‘abhibhāyatanaṃ viya sasampayuttaṃ jhānaṃ vimokkho’’ti maññamānena ‘‘adhippāyenāhā’’ti vuttaṃ. Jhānadhammā hi sampayuttadhammehi saddhiṃyeva paṭipakkhato vimuccanti, na vinā, tathā abhirativasena ārammaṇe nirāsaṅkappavattipīti adhippāyo. Yathā vā jhānaṅgānaṃ jhānapaccayena paccayabhāvato saviseso jhānapariyāyo, evaṃ vimokkhakiccayogato tesaṃ saviseso vimokkhapariyāyo, tadupacārena sampayuttānaṃ veditabbo. Paṭhamaṃ samaṅgibhāvatthanti paṭilābhaṃ sandhāyāha. ‘‘Phusitvā viharatīti paṭilabhitvā iriyatī’’ti hi vuttaṃ. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘yena hi saddhiṃ…pe… paṭiladdhā nāma hontī’’ti tehi sādhetabbasahajātādipaccayalābhoyevettha paṭilābho daṭṭhabbo. Yathā phasso yattha uppanno, taṃ ārammaṇaṃ phusatīti vuccati, evaṃ sampayuttadhammepi taṃsabhāvattāti āha ‘‘samphassena phusanattha’’nti. Tassa ‘‘vivaratī’’ti iminā sambandho. Itarehīti upacārampītiādinā upacārapurimappanāparappanānaṃ paṭilābhakāraṇanti vacanehi. Itare kāraṇattheti ‘‘upacārena…pe… phusatiyevā’’ti vutte kāraṇatthadīpake atthe. Phusati phalaṃ adhigacchati etāyāti kāraṇabhāvassa phusanāpariyāyo veditabbo.

1. In the sense of burning up opposing states, it is jhāna; in the sense of being thoroughly liberated from them, it is liberation (vimokkha). Thus, without any specific distinction, the jhāna factors themselves are liberation—this is the intention of the commentary. But the sub-commentator, thinking, 'Like the bases of mastery, jhāna together with its associated states is liberation,' says, 'This is said with that intention.' For the jhāna states are liberated from their opposites only together with their associated states, not without them. Similarly, the meaning is that by way of delight, it proceeds in its object without hesitation. Just as the jhāna factors, because they are a condition by way of the jhāna-condition, have a special aspect as 'jhāna,' so too, because of their connection with the function of liberation, they have a special aspect as 'liberation.' By transference from that, this should be understood of the associated states as well. The first meaning, 'being endowed with,' refers to attainment. For it is said: 'Having touched, he dwells' means 'having attained, he abides.' In the commentary, where it says 'by which... they are indeed acquired,' here the attainment should be seen as just the obtaining of the conditions to be accomplished by them, such as co-nascence. Just as contact, wherever it arises, is said to 'touch' that object, so too with the associated states, because they have the same nature, he says 'in the sense of touching by way of contact.' Its connection is with the word 'discloses.' 'By others' refers to the statements such as 'also by access,' which state that access, the preceding absorption, and the subsequent absorption are the cause of attainment. The other words are in the causal sense, in the passage that explains the causal sense when it is said 'by access... it indeed touches.' 'By this one touches, that is, attains the fruit'; thus the term 'touching' should be understood as being in the sense of a cause.

Paṭhamatthamevāti samaṅgibhāvatthameva. Tāni aṅgānīti iminā jhānakoṭṭhāsabhāvena vuttadhammāyeva gahitā, na phassapañcamakaindriyaṭṭhakādibhāvenāti vuttaṃ ‘‘sesā…pe… saṅgahitānī’’ti. Evaṃ satīti sukhasaṅkhātajhānaṅgato vedanāsomanassindriyānaṃ sesitabbabhāve sati. Evañhi nesaṃ phassakatā itarassa phassitabbatāva siyā. Tenāha ‘‘sukhassa phusitabbattā’’ti. Vedayitādhipateyyaṭṭhehīti ārammaṇānubhavanasaṅkhātena vedayitasabhāvena, tasseva sātavisesasaṅkhātena sampayuttehi anuvattanīyabhāvena ca. Upanijjhāyanabhāvopi yathāvuttavedayitādhipateyyaṭṭhavisiṭṭho oḷārikassa ārammaṇassa nijjhāyanabhāvo. Abhinnasabhāvopi hi dhammo purimavisiṭṭhapaccayavisesasambhavena visesena [Pg.44] bhinnākāro hutvā visiṭṭhaphalabhāvaṃ āpajjati. Yathekaṃyeva kammaṃ cakkhādinibbattihetubhūtaṃ kammaṃ. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘vedayitā…pe… vuttattā’’ti. Aṅgānīti nāyaṃ tapparabhāvena bahuvacananiddeso anantabhāvato, kevalañca aṅgānaṃ bahuttā bahuvacanaṃ, tena kiṃ siddhaṃ? Paccekampi yojanā siddhā hoti. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘paccekampi yojanā kātabbā’’ti. Yadi ‘‘sukhaṃ ṭhapetvā’’ti yojanāyaṃ sesā tayo khandhā honti, sesā tayo, cattāro ca khandhā hontīti vattabbaṃ siyāti? Na, catūsu tiṇṇaṃ antogadhattā. Tenāha ‘‘sabbayojanā…pe… vutta’’nti.

Just the first meaning, that is, just the meaning of 'being endowed with.' By 'those factors,' only the states described as constituents of jhāna are taken, not in the sense of the fivefold contact, the octad of faculties, etc., as it is said: 'the rest... are included.' This being so, when, from the jhāna factor called pleasure, the feeling faculty and the joy faculty are to be left remaining. For in this way, their being the toucher would imply the other's being the one to be touched. Therefore he says: 'because pleasure is to be experienced.' 'By the sense of the dominance of feeling' means: by its nature as feeling, which is characterized as the experiencing of the object, and by its nature of being followed by the associated states, which is characterized as a special agreeableness. The state of close contemplation is also the state of contemplating a gross object, which is distinguished by the aforesaid sense of the dominance of feeling. For even a phenomenon with an undivided nature, due to the occurrence of a special distinction in its preceding distinctive conditions, takes on a distinct form and attains a distinctive result. Just as one and the same kamma is the kamma that is the cause for the production of the eye, etc. Therefore it is said: 'feeling... as stated.' 'Factors'—this plural designation is not used because they are subsequent to that, on account of being infinite, but it is a plural simply because the factors are many. What is established by this? The application to each one individually is also established. Therefore it is said: 'the application should be made to each one individually.' If, in the application 'setting pleasure aside,' the remaining three aggregates are present, should it be said that the remaining three, and also four, aggregates are present? No, because the three are included within the four. Therefore it is said: 'all applications... as stated.'

2. Asamayavimokkhenāti heṭṭhāmaggavimokkhena. So hi lokiyavimokkho viya adhigamavaḷañjanatthaṃ pakappetabbasamayavisesābhāvato evaṃ vutto. Aggamaggavimokkho pana ekaccāsavavimuttivacanato idha nādhippeto. Tenāha ‘‘ekacce āsavā parikkhīṇā hontī’’ti. Ekaccehi āsavehi vimuttoti diṭṭhāsavādīhi samucchedavimuttiyā vimutto. Asamaya…pe… lābhenāti yathāvuttaasamayavimokkhassa upanissayabhūtassa adhigamena. Tato eva sātisayena, ekaccehi kāmāsavehi vimutto vikkhambhanavasenāti attho. So eva ekaccasamayavimokkhalābhī yathāvutto samayavimutto asamayavimokkhavisesassa vasena samayavimokkhapaññattiyā adhippetattā. Soti asamayavimokkhūpanissayasamayavimokkhalābhī. Tena sātisayena samayavimokkhena. Tathāvimuttova hotīti ettha iti-saddo hetuattho. Yasmā tathāvimutto hoti, tasmā samayavimuttapaññattiṃ laddhuṃ arahatīti pariññātatthaṃ hetunā patiṭṭhāpeti. Byatirekamukhenapi tamatthaṃ pākaṭataraṃ kātuṃ ‘‘puthujjano panā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha samudācārabhāvatoti samudācārassa sambhavato. Soti jhānalābhī puthujjano.

2. 'By untimely liberation' means by liberation of the lower path. For it is so called because, like worldly liberation, it lacks a special occasion to be determined for the purpose of attainment and use. But liberation by the highest path is not intended here, because of the statement 'some taints are destroyed.' 'Liberated from some taints' means liberated by the liberation of eradication from taints such as the taint of views. 'By the gain of... untimely... liberation' means by the attainment of the aforesaid untimely liberation which has become a decisive support condition. Therefore, with something more, the meaning is 'liberated from some taints of sensual desire by way of suppression.' That very one who has gained a certain timely liberation is the aforesaid 'timely liberated' one, because he is intended for the designation 'timely liberation' by reason of the distinction of the untimely liberation. 'He' is one who has gained the timely liberation that has the untimely liberation as its decisive support condition. By that excellent timely liberation. 'He is thus liberated'; here the particle 'iti' is in the sense of a reason. Because he is thus liberated, he is worthy to receive the designation 'timely liberated'; thus he establishes the understood meaning with a reason. In order to make that meaning clearer also by way of contrast, 'But a worldling...' and so on is said. There, 'because of its occurrence' means because of the possibility of its occurrence. 'He' is a worldling who is a gainer of jhāna.

Yadi punarāvattakadhammatāya puthujjano samayavimuttoti na vutto, tadabhāvato kasmā arahā tathā na vuttoti āha ‘‘arahato panā’’tiādi. Tadakāraṇabhāvanti tesaṃ vimokkhānaṃ, tassa vā samayavimuttibhāvassa akāraṇabhāvaṃ. Sabboti sukkhavipassakopi samathayānikopi aṭṭhavimokkhalābhīpi. Bahiabbhantarabhāvā apekkhāsiddhā, vattu adhippāyavasena gahetabbarūpā cāti āha ‘‘bāhirānanti lokuttarato bahibhūtāna’’nti.

If a worldling is not called 'timely liberated' because his nature is to return, then why, due to the absence of that nature, is an arahant not called so? To this he replies with 'But for an arahant...' and so on. 'The state of not being a cause for that' means the state of not being a cause for those liberations or for that state of timely liberation. 'All' means one who practices insight-only, one who follows the vehicle of serenity, and one who has attained the eight liberations. The states of being external and internal are established by dependence, and are to be grasped in a form according to the speaker's intention. Thus he says: ''External' means those that are external to the supramundane.'

3. Rūpato [Pg.45] aññaṃ na rūpanti tattha rūpapaṭibhāgaṃ kasiṇarūpādi rūpa-saddena gahitanti tadaññaṃ paṭhamatatiyāruppavisayamattaṃ arūpakkhandhanibbānavinimuttaṃ arūpa-saddena gahitaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Paṭipakkhabhūtehi kilesacorehi amūsitabbaṃ jhānameva cittamañjūsaṃ. Samādhinti vā samādhisīsena jhānameva vuttanti veditabbaṃ.

3. That which is other than form is formless. There, the counterpart of form, such as the kasiṇa-form, is taken by the word 'form.' What is other than that—namely, the mere object of the first and third formless attainments, which is distinct from the formless aggregates and Nibbāna—should be seen as taken by the word 'formless.' The mind-casket is jhāna itself, which is not to be stolen by the thieves of the defilements, which are its opponents. It should be known that jhāna itself is meant by 'concentration' or by the heading 'concentration'.

4. Attano anurūpena pamādenāti ettha anāgāmino adhikusalesu dhammesu asakkaccaasātaccakiriyādinā. Khīṇāsavassa pana tādisena pamādapatirūpakena, tādisāya vā asakkaccakiriyāya. Sā cassa ussukkābhāvato veditabbā. Paṭippassaddhasabbussukkā hi te uttamapurisā. Samayena samayanti samaye samaye. Bhummatthe hi etaṃ karaṇavacanaṃ upayogavacanañca. Anipphattitoti samāpajjituṃ asakkuṇeyyato. Assāti ‘‘tesañhī’’tiādinā vuttassa imassa aṭṭhakathāvacanassa. Tenāti yathābhatena suttena.

4. Regarding 'by negligence appropriate to oneself': here, for a non-returner, it is by not acting respectfully and continuously in regard to higher wholesome states, etc. But for one whose taints are destroyed, it is by something that resembles such negligence, or by such a disrespectful action. And that action of his should be understood as due to an absence of striving. For those supreme persons have all striving completely calmed. 'At the proper time' means at the right time, at every time. For this instrumental and 'application' case is in the sense of the locative. 'Because of non-accomplishment' means because of being unable to enter into attainment. 'Of this' refers to this statement of the commentary which was stated beginning with 'For of them...' 'By that' means by the sutta as cited.

5. Yenādhippāyena ‘‘dhammehī’’ti vattabbanti vuttaṃ, taṃ vivaranto ‘‘idhā’’tiādimāha. Tattha idhāti ‘‘parihānadhammo aparihānadhammo’’ti etasmiṃ padadvaye. Tatthāti ‘‘kuppadhammo akuppadhammo’’ti padadvaye. Sati vacananānatte attheva vacanatthanānattanti āha ‘‘vacanatthanānattamattena vā’’ti. Vacanatthaggahaṇamukhena gahetabbassa pana vibhāvanatthassa natthettha nānattaṃ, yato tesaṃ pariyāyantaratāsiddhi.

5. Explaining the intention with which it was said 'by states,' he said 'here,' etc. Therein, 'here' refers to the pair of terms 'of a nature to decline' and 'not of a nature to decline.' Therein, 'there' refers to the pair 'of a nature to be shaken' and 'not of a nature to be shaken.' Stating that although there is a difference in wording, there is only a difference in the meaning of the words, he says, 'or merely by a difference in the meaning of the words.' However, regarding the meaning to be explained, which is to be grasped by way of grasping the meaning of the words, there is no difference here, since their status as synonyms is established.

7-8. Samāpatticetanāti yāya cetanāya samāpattiṃ nibbatteti samāpajjati ca. Tenāha ‘‘tadāyūhanā’’ti. Ārakkhapaccupaṭṭhānā satīti katvā āha ‘‘anurakkhaṇā…pe… satī’’ti. Tenāha ‘‘ekārakkho satārakkhena cetasā viharatī’’ti. Tathā hi sā ‘‘kusalākusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ gatiyo samannesatī’’ti vuttā.

7-8. 'Volition for attainment' is the volition by which one generates and enters into an attainment. Therefore he says: 'that exertion.' Because mindfulness has guarding as its manifestation, he says: 'guarding... mindfulness.' Therefore he says: 'He dwells with a mind guarded by mindfulness.' For it is said that it 'investigates the destinations of wholesome and unwholesome states.'

11. Aggamaggaṭṭhopi itaramaggaṭṭhā viya anupacchinnabhayattā bhayūparatavohāraṃ labhatīti āha ‘‘arahattamaggaṭṭho ca…pe… bhayūparato’’ti.

11. Even one standing on the highest path, like those standing on the other paths, obtains the designation 'one who has desisted from fear' because fear is not yet cut off. Thus he says: 'And one standing on the path to arahantship... is one who has desisted from fear.'

12. Kecīti tihetukapaṭisandhike mandabuddhike sandhāyāha. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘duppaññāti iminā gayhantī’’ti. Dubbalā paññā yesaṃ te duppaññāti.

12. 'Some'—he says this referring to those with a three-rooted relinking-consciousness who are of dull intellect. Therefore it is said, 'By this, the dull-witted are included.' 'Dull-witted' are those whose wisdom is weak.

14. Aniyatadhammasamannāgatasseva [Pg.46] paccayavisesena niyatadhammapaṭilābhoti āha ‘‘yattha…pe… hontī’’ti. Tadabhāvāti niyatāniyatavomissāya pavattiyā abhāvā.

14. He says, 'where... they are,' because it is only one endowed with indeterminate states who, through a special condition, attains determinate states. 'Because of the absence of that' means because of the absence of an occurrence mixed of determinate and indeterminate states.

16. Pariyādiyitabbānīti pariyādakena maggena khepetabbāni. Taṇhādīnaṃ palibudhanādikiriyāya matthakappattiyā sīsabhāvo veditabbo, nibbānassa pana visaṅkhārabhāvato saṅkhārasīsatā. Tenāha ‘‘saṅkhāravivekabhūto nirodho’’ti. Keci pana ‘‘saṅkhārasīsaṃ nirodhasamāpattī’’ti vadanti, taṃ tesaṃ matimattaṃ paññattimattassa sīsabhāvānupapattito taduddhañca saṅkhārappavattisabbhāvato. Saha viyāti ekajjhaṃ viya. Etena sama-saddassa atthamāha. Sahattho hesa sama-saddo. Saṃsiddhidassanenāti saṃsiddhiyā niṭṭhānassa uparamassa dassanena.

16. ‘They are to be completely taken up’ means they are to be exhausted by the path that exhausts. The state of being the head should be understood as the attainment of the summit through the action of obstructing by craving and so on; but for Nibbāna, because of its unconditioned nature, its headship is over formations. Hence it is said: ‘Cessation is seclusion from formations.’ Some, however, say, ‘The attainment of cessation is the head of formations,’ but that is merely their opinion, since headship is inapplicable to what is merely a concept, and also because above that there is still the occurrence of formations. ‘Saha viya’ means ‘as if together.’ By this, he states the meaning of the word ‘sama,’ for this word ‘sama’ has the meaning of ‘with.’ ‘By seeing the accomplishment’ means by seeing the conclusion and ceasing of the accomplishment.

Idhāti imissā puggalapaññattipāḷiyā, imissā vā tadaṭṭhakathāya. Kilesapavattasīsānanti kilesasīsapavattasīsānaṃ. Tesu hi gahitesu itarampi pariyādiyitabbaṃ kilesabhāvena pariyādiyitabbatāsāmaññena ca gahitameva hotīti kilesavaṭṭapariyādānena maggassa itaravaṭṭānampi pariyādiyanaṃ. Vaṭṭupacchedakena maggeneva hi jīvitindriyampi anavasesato nirujjhatīti. Kasmā panettha pavattasīsaṃ visuṃ gahitanti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘pavattasīsampī’’tiādi. Odhiso ca anodhiso ca kilesapariyādāne sati sijjhamānā paccavekkhaṇavārā tena nipphādetabbāti vuttā. Tenevāha ‘‘kilesapariyādānasseva vārā’’ti. Idāni tamatthaṃ āgamena sādhento ‘‘vimuttasmi’’ntiādimāha. Cuticittena hotīti idaṃ yathāvuttassa kilesapariyādānasamāpanabhūtassa paccavekkhaṇavārassa cuticittena paricchinnattā vuttaṃ, tasmā cuticittena paricchedakena paricchinnaṃ hotīti attho.

‘Here’ means in this Pāḷi text of the Puggalapaññatti, or in its commentary. ‘Of the heads of the occurrence of defilements’ means of the heads of defilements and the heads of occurrence. For when these are grasped, the remainder, which is also to be exhausted, is included because of its nature as defilement and by the commonality of being what is to be exhausted. Thus, by the path’s exhaustion of the cycle of defilements, the other cycles are also exhausted. For it is by the very path that cuts off the cycle that the life faculty also ceases without remainder. Anticipating the objection, ‘Why is the head of occurrence taken separately here?’ he says, ‘the head of occurrence also,’ etc. It is said that the occasions for reviewing, which are accomplished when there is exhaustion of defilements with and without remainder, are to be produced by that. Hence he said: ‘occasions of the very exhaustion of defilements.’ Now, establishing that meaning with scripture, he says, ‘When one is liberated,’ etc. ‘It occurs with the death-consciousness’—this is said because the occasion for reviewing, which constitutes the completion of the exhaustion of defilements as stated, is delimited by the death-consciousness. Therefore, the meaning is that it is delimited by the death-consciousness as the delimiter.

17. Tiṭṭheyyāti na upagaccheyya. Ṭhānañhi gatinivatti. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘nappavatteyyā’’ti.

17. ‘It would stand’ means it would not go towards. For standing is the cessation of movement. Hence it was said: ‘it would not proceed.’

18. Payirupāsanāya bahūpakārattā payirupāsitabbattā.

18. Because it is of great help and because it is fit to be attended upon.

20. Aggavijjā yassa anadhigatavijjādvayassa hoti, so ce pacchā vijjādvayaṃ adhigacchati, tassa paṭhamaṃ adhigatavijjādvayassa viya atevijjatābhāvā [Pg.47] yadipi nippariyāyatā tevijjatā, paṭhamaṃ adhigatavijjādvayassa pana sā savisesāti dassento ‘‘yāya katakiccatā’’tiādimāha. Tattha aggavijjāti āsavakkhayañāṇaṃ, aggamaggañāṇameva vā veditabbaṃ. Sā ca tevijjatāti yojanā.

20. To show that for one who has the supreme knowledge but has not yet attained the twofold knowledge, if he later attains the twofold knowledge, then although for him the threefold knowledge is direct, since he is not without the threefold knowledge like one who first attained the twofold knowledge, for the one who first attained the twofold knowledge that threefold knowledge is distinctive, he says, ‘by which the task is done,’ etc. Therein, ‘supreme knowledge’ should be understood as the knowledge of the destruction of the taints, or as the knowledge of the supreme path itself. And the connection is: ‘that is the threefold knowledge.’

22. Tatthevāti saccābhisambodhe eva.

22. ‘Right there’ means at the very full awakening to the truths.

24. Tanti nirodhasamāpattilābhino ubhatobhāgavimuttatāvacanaṃ. Vuttalakkhaṇūpapattikoti dvīhi bhāgehi dve vāre vimuttoti evaṃ vuttalakkhaṇena upapattito yuttito samannāgato. Eseva nayoti yathā catunnaṃ arūpasamāpattīnaṃ ekekato nirodhato ca vuṭṭhāya arahattaṃ pattānaṃ vasena pañca ubhatobhāgavimuttā vuttā, tathā sekkhabhāvaṃ pattānaṃ vasena pañca kāyasakkhino hontīti katvā vuttaṃ.

24. That statement about being liberated in both ways is for one who has obtained the attainment of cessation. ‘Possessing the stated characteristic and suitability’ means: endowed with the stated characteristic and with suitability in this way: ‘liberated in two parts, on two occasions.’ ‘This is the method’ means: it is said thus: just as five kinds of those liberated in both ways are spoken of with reference to those who attain arahantship after emerging from each of the four formless attainments and from cessation, so there are five kinds of body-witnesses with reference to those who have attained the state of a trainee.

Dassanakāraṇāti iminā ‘‘disvā’’ti ettha tvā-saddo hetuatthoti dasseti yathā ‘‘sīhaṃ disvā bhayaṃ hotī’’tiādīsu. Dassane sati parikkhayo, nāsatīti āha ‘‘dassanāyattaparikkhayattā’’ti. Purimakiriyāti āsavānaṃ khayakiriyāya purimakiriyā. Samānakālattepi hi kāraṇakiriyā phalakiriyāya purimasiddhā viya voharīyati. Tato nāmakāyato muccanato. Yato hi yena muccitabbaṃ, taṃ nissito hotīti vuttaṃ ‘‘nāmanissitako’’ti. Tassāti kāyadvayavimuttiyā ubhatobhāgavimuttabhāvassa. Arūpaloke hi ṭhitārahantavasenāyamattho vutto. Tenāha ‘‘sutte hī’’tiādi.

‘The cause is seeing’: by this he shows that here in ‘disvā,’ the suffix ‘-tvā’ has the meaning of cause, as in such examples as ‘on seeing a lion, fear arises.’ He says, ‘because destruction is dependent on seeing,’ meaning that when there is seeing, there is destruction, and when there is not, there is not. ‘Prior action’ means the action prior to the action of destroying the taints. For even when they are simultaneous, the causal action is spoken of as if established prior to the resultant action. ‘From that’ means from being liberated from the mental body. Because one depends on that from which one is to be liberated, it is said, ‘dependent on the mental body.’ ‘Of that’ means of the state of being liberated in both ways, which is liberation from the two bodies. For this meaning is stated with reference to an arahant abiding in the formless world. Hence he says, ‘For in the sutta,’ etc.

Dvīhi bhāgehīti vikkhambhanasamucchedabhāgehi. Dve vāreti kilesānaṃ vikkhambhanasamucchindanavasena dvikkhattuṃ. Kilesehi vimuttoti idaṃ paṭhamatatiyavādānaṃ vasena vuttaṃ, itaraṃ dutiyavādassa. Arūpajjhānaṃ yadipi rūpasaññādīhi vimuttaṃ taṃsamatikkamādinā pattabbattā, pavattinivārakehi pana kāmacchandādīhiyevassa vimutti sātisayāti dassento ‘‘nīvaraṇasaṅkhātanāmakāyato vimutta’’nti āha. Yañcāpi arūpajjhānaṃ rūpaloke vivekaṭṭhatāvasenapi rūpakāyato vimuttaṃ, taṃ pana rūpapaṭibandhachandarāgavikkhambhaneneva hotīti vikkhambhanameva padhānanti vuttaṃ ‘‘rūpataṇhāvikkhambhanena [Pg.48] rūpakāyato ca vimuttattā’’ti. Ekadesena ubhatobhāgavimuttaṃ nāma hoti samucchedavimuttiyā abhāvā.

‘By two parts’ means by the parts of suppression and cutting off. ‘On two occasions’ means twice, by way of suppressing and cutting off the defilements. ‘Liberated from defilements’: this is said according to the first and third theses, the other according to the second thesis. To show that although the formless jhāna is liberated from perceptions of form and so on, since it is to be attained by transcending them, its liberation from the hindrances that prevent occurrence, such as sensual desire, is surpassing, he says: ‘liberated from the mental body designated as the hindrances.’ And although the formless jhāna is also liberated from the physical body by way of abiding in seclusion from the form world, since this occurs only by the suppression of desire and lust that are an impediment to form, suppression is primary. Thus it is said: ‘and from being liberated from the physical body by the suppression of craving for form.’ It is called ‘liberated in both ways’ in part, because of the absence of liberation by cutting off.

25. ‘‘Sattisayo’’ti viya samudāye pavatto vohāro avayavepi dissatīti dassento āha ‘‘aṭṭhavimokkhekadesena…pe… vuccatī’’ti.

25. To show that, just as with the expression ‘a hundred spears,’ a term current for a collection is also seen applied to a part, he says: ‘it is called … by a part of the eight liberations … etc.’

26. Phuṭṭhānanti phassitānaṃ, adhigatānanti attho. Antoti antasadiso phassanāya parakālo. Tadanantaro hi tappariyosāno viya hotīti. Kālavisayo cāyaṃ anta-saddo, na pana kālattho. Tenāha ‘‘adhippāyo’’ti. Nāmakāyekadesatoti nīvaraṇasaṅkhātanāmakāyekadesato. Ālocito pakāsito viya hoti vibandhavikkhambhanena ālocane pakāsane samatthassa ñāṇacakkhuno adhiṭṭhānasamuppādanato. Na tu vimuttoti vimuttoti na vuccateva.

26. ‘Of those touched’ means of those contacted; the meaning is ‘of those attained.’ ‘End’ means the time after the contact, which is similar to the end, for what immediately follows it is like its conclusion. This word ‘anta’ refers to a domain of time, but does not mean time itself. Hence he says: ‘this is the intention.’ ‘From a part of the mental body’ means from a part of the mental body designated as the hindrances. It is as if illuminated and revealed, because by the suppression of impediments, the foundation is laid for the arising of the eye of wisdom, which is capable of illuminating and revealing. But it is not called ‘liberated’; it is simply not said to be liberated.

28. Imaṃ pana nayanti ‘‘apica tesa’’ntiādinā āgatavidhiṃ. Yena visesenāti yena kāraṇavisesena. Soti diṭṭhippattasaddhāvimuttānaṃ yathāvutto paññāya viseso. Paṭikkhepo kato kāraṇassa avibhāvitattā. Ubhatobhāgavimutto viya, paññāvimutto viya vā sabbathā avimuttassa sāvasesavimuttiyampi diṭṭhippattassa viya paññāya sātisayāya abhāvato saddhāmattena vimuttabhāvo daṭṭhabbo. Saddhāya adhimuttoti idaṃ āgamanavasena saddhāya adhikabhāvaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, maggādhigamato panassa paccakkhameva ñāṇadassanaṃ.

28. But this method is the procedure that has come down beginning with ‘Moreover, for them…’ ‘By which distinction’ means by which particular reason. ‘That’ is the aforesaid distinction in wisdom of one attained-to-view and one liberated-by-faith. The rejection is made because the reason has not been made clear. Because, unlike one liberated in both ways or one liberated by wisdom, there is an absence of surpassing wisdom even in the partial liberation of one not entirely liberated, such as one attained-to-view, the state of being liberated by mere faith should be understood. ‘Resolved by faith’: this is said with reference to the predominance of faith by way of the scriptures, but from the attainment of the path, his knowledge and vision are indeed direct.

31. ‘‘Sototi ariyamaggassa nāma’’nti nippariyāyena taṃsamaṅgī sotāpannoti adhippāyena codako ‘‘api-saddo kasmā vutto’’ti codanaṃ uṭṭhāpetvā ‘‘nanū’’tiādinā attano adhippāyaṃ vivarati. Itaro ‘‘nāpanna’’ntiādinā pariharati. Samannāgato eva nāma lokuttaradhammānaṃ akuppasabhāvattā. Itarehīti dutiyamaggaṭṭhādīhi. So evāti paṭhamaphalaṭṭho eva. Idhāti imasmiṃ sattakkhattuparamaniddese. Sotaṃ vā ariyamaggaṃ ādito panno adhigatoti sotāpannoti vuccamāne dutiyamaggaṭṭhādīnaṃ [Pg.49] nattheva sotāpannabhāvāpatti. Sutte pana sotaṃ ariyamaggaṃ ādito mariyādaṃ amuñcitvāva panno paṭipajjatīti katvā maggasamaṅgī ‘‘sotāpanno’’ti vutto. Pariyāyena itaropi tassa aparihānadhammattā sotāpannoti veditabbaṃ. Pahīnāvasiṭṭhakilesapaccavekkhaṇāya samudayasaccaṃ viya dukkhasaccampi paccavekkhitaṃ hoti saccadvayapariyāpannattā kilesānanti āha ‘‘catusaccapaccavekkhaṇādīna’’nti. Ādi-saddena phalapaccavekkhaṇauparimaggaphaladhamme ca saṅgaṇhāti.

31. ‘“Stream” is the name for the noble path’: with the intention that, in the direct sense, one endowed with it is a stream-enterer, an objector raises the objection, ‘Why is the word “api” used?’ and then reveals his own intention with ‘Is it not…?’ etc. The other refutes it with ‘not entered,’ etc. Indeed, ‘endowed’ by name, because of the unshakeable nature of the supramundane states. ‘By others’ means by those standing on the second path, etc. ‘He himself’ means the one standing at the first fruition. ‘Here’ means in this exposition of one bound to at most seven more existences. When it is said that one is a stream-enterer because one has entered and attained the stream—the noble path—from the beginning, then there is no possibility of those on the second path, etc., being stream-enterers. But in the Sutta, one endowed with the path is called a ‘stream-enterer’ because he practices having entered the stream—the noble path—from the beginning without abandoning its boundary. Indirectly, another too should be understood as a stream-enterer because of his nature of not being subject to falling away. He says, ‘of the reviewing of the four truths, etc.’ because, for the reviewing of abandoned and remaining defilements, the truth of suffering is reviewed just like the truth of origin, since the defilements are included in the two truths. By the word ‘etc.’ he includes the reviewing of fruition and the states of the higher paths and fruitions.

32. Mahākulamevāti uḷārakulameva vuccati ‘‘kulīno kulaputto’’tiādīsu viya.

32. ‘Just a great family’ means simply a noble family, as in such phrases as ‘a man of good family, a son of good family.’

33. Sajjhānako aparihīnajjhāno kālakato brahmalokūpago hutvā vaṭṭajjhāsayo ce, uparūpari nibbattitvā nibbāyatīti āha ‘‘anāgāmisabhāgo’’ti. Yato so jhānānāgāmīti vuccati. Tenāha ‘‘anāvattidhammo’’ti.

33. He says, ‘he has a share in non-returning,’ meaning: if one with jhāna, who has not fallen away from jhāna, having passed away and gone to the brahma-world, has an inclination for the round, he is reborn higher and higher and attains Nibbāna. Since he is called a ‘jhāna non-returner,’ he says, ‘one whose nature is not to return.’

36. Parayoge tvā-saddo tadanto hutvā ‘‘parasaddayoge’’ti vutto, appatvāti vuttaṃ hotīti ‘‘appattaṃ hutvā’’ti iminā vuccati.

36. When connected with another word, the suffix ‘-tvā’, being at the end of the word, is referred to as ‘in connection with another word.’ That ‘appatvā’ is said is expressed by ‘appattaṃ hutvā’ (having become ‘unreached’).

37. Tenāti ‘‘upahaccā’’ti padena. Nanu ca vemajjhātikkamo ‘‘atikkamitvā vemajjha’’nti iminā pakāsito hotīti adhippāyo.

37. ‘By that’ means by the word ‘upahaccā.’ The intention is: is not the transcending of the midway point revealed by this phrase ‘atikkamitvā vemajjha’ (having transcended the midway point)?

40. Taṇhāvaṭṭasotā taṇhāvaṭṭabandhā. Tassāti sotassa. Sambandhe cetaṃ sāmivacanaṃ. Uddhaṃsotassa uparibhavūpagatā ekaṃsikāti āha ‘‘yattha vā tattha vā gantvā’’ti. Tassāti uddhaṃsotassa. Tatthāti avihesu. Lahusālahusagatikāti lahukālahukāyugatikā, lahukālahukañāṇagatikā vā. Uppajjitvāva nibbāyanakādīhīti ādi-saddena ‘‘ākāsaṃ laṅghitvā nibbāyatī’’tiādinā vuttā tisso upamā saṅgaṇhāti. Antarāupahaccaparinibbāyīhi adhimattatā, uddhaṃsotato anadhimattatā ca asaṅkhārasasaṅkhāraparinibbāyīnaṃ na veditabbāti yojanā. Te evāti antarāupahaccaparinibbāyiuddhaṃsotā eva. Yadi evaṃ asaṅkhārasasaṅkhāraparinibbāyīnaṃ upamāvacanena tato mahantatarehi kasmā vuttanti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘tato mahanta…pe… dassanattha’’nti.

40. The stream of the round of craving is the bondage of the round of craving. ‘Of that’ means of that stream. This is a genitive in the sense of connection. Of one who goes upstream, who has gone to a higher becoming, it is certain, as he says: ‘having gone either here or there.’ ‘Of that’ means of one who goes upstream. ‘There’ means in the Aviha realm. ‘Having a swift and a not-swift course’ means having a swift and a not-swift pair of courses, or having a swift and a not-swift course of knowledge. By ‘one who attains Nibbāna immediately upon arising, and so on,’ the word ‘and so on’ includes the three similes stated, such as ‘leaping into the sky, he attains Nibbāna.’ The construction is: one should not understand that those who attain Nibbāna without exertion and with exertion are of greater intensity than those who attain Nibbāna in the interval or upon landing, and of lesser intensity than one who goes upstream. ‘They themselves’ means those who attain Nibbāna in the interval, upon landing, and who go upstream. If so, why are they spoken of by way of similes as being much greater than those? Anticipating this objection, he says: ‘much greater than that … for the purpose of showing.’

Tenāti [Pg.50] ‘‘no cassa, no ca me siyā’’ti vacanena. Tenāti vā yathāvuttena tassa atthavacanena. Imassa dukkhassāti imassa sampati vattamānassa viññāṇādidukkhassa. Udayadassanaṃ ñāṇaṃ. Catūhipīti ‘‘no cassā’’ti catūhi padehi. Yaṃ atthīti yaṃ paramatthato vijjati. Tenāha ‘‘bhūtanti sasabhāva’’nti, bhūtanti khandhapañcakanti attho. Yathāha ‘‘bhūtamidanti, bhikkhave, samanupassathā’’ti. Vivaṭṭamānaso viviccamānahadayo taṇhādisotato nivattajjhāsayo. Upekkhako hotīti cattabhariyo viya puriso bhayaṃ nandiñca pahāya udāsino hoti.

‘By that’ means by the statement ‘it might not be, and it might not be for me.’ Or ‘by that’ means by the aforesaid explanation of its meaning. ‘Of this suffering’ means of this presently existing suffering of consciousness and so on. ‘Seeing arising’ means knowledge. ‘By the four’ means by the four terms beginning with ‘it might not be.’ ‘What is’ means what exists in an ultimate sense. Hence he says, ‘“Become” means with its own nature’; ‘become’ means the five aggregates. As he says: ‘Bhikkhus, you should closely observe this as become.’ ‘With mind turning away’ means with a heart that is detached, with an inclination turned away from the stream of craving and so on. ‘He becomes equanimous’ means that having abandoned fear and delight, he becomes indifferent, like a man who has laid down his burden.

Avisiṭṭheti hīne. Visiṭṭheti uttame. ‘‘Bhave’’ti vatvā ‘‘sambhave’’ti vuccamānaṃ avuttavācakaṃ hotīti dassento ‘‘paccuppanno’’tiādimāha. Bhūtameva vuccatīti yaṃ bhūtanti vuccati, tadeva bhavoti ca vuccati, bhavati ahosīti vā. Sambhavati etasmāti sambhavo. Tadāhāro tassa bhavassa paccayo. Anukkamena maggapaññāyāti vipassanānukkamena laddhāya ariyamaggapaññāya. Tenāti sekkhena.

‘In the undistinguished’ means in the inferior. ‘In the distinguished’ means in the superior. Showing that what is said as ‘in becoming’ after saying ‘in existence’ is not a tautology, he says ‘the present,’ and so on. What is called ‘become’ is also called ‘existence,’ or ‘it becomes, it was.’ ‘It arises from this,’ thus it is ‘arising.’ That nutriment is the condition for that existence. ‘By the wisdom of the path in sequence’ means by the wisdom of the noble path obtained in the sequence of insight. ‘By that’ means by the trainee.

Ekakaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Exposition of the Ones is concluded.

2. Dukaniddesavaṇṇanā

2. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Twos

63. Kassacīti kassacipi. Kathañcīti kenaci pakārena, vikkhambhanamattenāpīti vuttaṃ hoti. Ajjhattaggahaṇassāti attānaṃ adhikicca uddissa pavattaggāhassa.

63. ‘Of anyone’ means of anyone at all. ‘In any way’ means in any manner; it is said, ‘even by mere suppression.’ ‘Of internal grasping’ means of the grasping that proceeds by referring to and being directed towards the self.

83. Purimaggahitanti ‘‘karissati me’’tiādinā cittena paṭhamaṃ gahitaṃ. Taṃ katanti taṃ tādisaṃ upakāraṃ. Puññaphalaṃ upajīvanto kataññupakkhe tiṭṭhatīti vuttaṃ ‘‘puññaphalaṃ anupajīvanto’’ti.

83. ‘Previously grasped’ means first grasped by the mind with such thoughts as ‘he will do for me.’ ‘That which was done’ means such an assistance. It is said ‘not living on the fruit of merit’ because one who lives on the fruit of merit stands on the side of the grateful.

90. Guṇapāripūriyā paripuṇṇo yāvadattho idha tittoti āha ‘‘niṭṭhitakiccatāya nirussukko’’ti.

90. Because he is fulfilled by the fullness of virtues, has attained his purpose, and is satisfied in this life, he says: ‘without longing because his task is finished.’

Dukaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Exposition of the Twos is concluded.

3. Tikaniddesavaṇṇanā

3. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Threes

91. Sesasaṃvarabhedenāti [Pg.51] kāyikavācasikavītikkamato sesena saṃvaravināsena. So pana dvāravasena vuccamāno manodvāriko hotīti āha ‘‘manosaṃvarabhedenā’’ti. Idāni taṃ pakārabhedena dassento ‘‘satisaṃvarādibhedena vā’’ti āha, muṭṭhasaccādippavattiyāti attho. Yaṃ kiñci sabhāvabhūtaṃ caritampi ‘‘sīla’’nti vuccatīti akusalassapi sīlapariyāyo vutto.

91. ‘By the breaking of the remaining restraint’ means by the destruction of the restraint that remains apart from bodily and verbal transgression. But when this is spoken of in terms of the doors, it is the mind-door; thus he says, ‘by the breaking of mental restraint.’ Now, showing this by way of its different kinds, he says, ‘or by the breaking of restraint of mindfulness, etc.’; the meaning is, by the occurrence of forgetfulness and so on. Since whatever is practiced as one’s nature is called ‘virtue,’ a description of virtue is given even for the unwholesome.

94. Samānavisayānanti paṭhamaphalādiko samāno evarūpo visayo etesanti samānavisayā, tesaṃ.

94. ‘Of those with a common object’: they have a common object of such a kind as the first fruition, etc., thus they are ‘those with a common object’; of them.

107. Tadattho tappayojano lokuttarasādhakoti attho. Tassa paramatthasāsanassa. Mūlekadesattāti mūlabhāvena ekadesattā.

107. The meaning is: having that as its purpose, having that as its aim, it accomplishes the supramundane. Of that teaching of the ultimate truth. ‘Because it is a portion of the root’ means because it is a portion by way of being the root.

118. Unnaḷo uggatatucchamāno.

118. 'Arrogant' (unnaḷo) means with risen, empty conceit.

123. Sīlassa anuggaṇhanaṃ aparisuddhiyaṃ sodhanaṃ apāripūriyaṃ pūraṇañcāti āha ‘‘sodhetabbe ca vaḍḍhetabbe cā’’ti. Adhisīlaṃ nissāyāti adhisīlaṃ nissayaṃ katvā uppannapaññāya.

123. The undertaking of virtue, the cleansing of what is impure, and the fulfilling of what is incomplete—this is what is meant by 'in what should be cleansed and in what should be augmented.' 'Relying on the higher virtue' (adhisīlaṃ nissāya) means by the wisdom that has arisen having made the higher virtue its support.

124. Gūthasadisattameva dasseti, na gūthakūpasadisattanti adhippāyo. Gūthavaseneva hi kūpassapi jigucchanīyatāti. Ayañca attho gūtharāsiyeva gūthakūpoti imasmiṃ pakkhe navattabbo siyā.

124. The intention is that it shows only the similarity to excrement, not the similarity to a cesspool. For a cesspool is disgusting only because of the excrement. And this meaning would not be tenable in the case where 'a heap of excrement is a cesspool.'

130. Sarabhaṅgasatthārādayo rūpabhavādikāmādipariññaṃ katvā paññapento lokiyaṃ pariññaṃ sammadeva paññapentīti āha ‘‘yebhuyyena na sakkontī’’ti. Asamatthabhāvaṃ vā sandhāya no ca paññāpetuṃ sakkontīti vuttanti yojanā.

130. Because teachers like Sarabhaṅga, when they make known the full understanding of sensual pleasures, etc., of the form realm, etc., make known only the worldly full understanding correctly, he says: 'for the most part, they are unable.' Or the construction is that it is said 'they are not able to make it known' with reference to their inability.

Tikaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Threes is concluded.

4. Catukkaniddesavaṇṇanā

4. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Fours

133. Parenāti [Pg.52] aññena, āṇattenāti attho. Āṇattiyā attanā cāti āṇāpakassa āṇattiyā, attanā ca āṇattena kataṃ tañca tassa āṇāpakassa yaṃ vacīpayogena katanti yojanā. Āṇattiyā pāpassāti āṇāpanavasena pasutapāpassa.

133. "By another" (parena) means by someone else; "by command" (āṇattena) is the meaning. "By command and by oneself" (āṇattiyā attanā ca) means by the commander's instruction, and done by oneself who is commanded; and that which is done by verbal application belongs to that commander—such is the connection. "By command of evil" (āṇattiyā pāpassa) means of evil that arises through instigation.

148. Desanāya karaṇabhūtāya. Dhammānanti desanāya yathābodhetabbānaṃ sīlādidhammānaṃ.

148. "By means of teaching" (desanāya) means by teaching as the instrument. "Of the states" (dhammānaṃ) means of the states, such as virtue and so on, that should be made known through teaching.

152. Anantaranti ñāṇassa upaṭṭhitanti anantaraṃ vuttaṃ. Kiṃ pana tanti āha ‘‘vacana’’nti. Lujjatīti idaṃ yena kāraṇena loka-saddo tadatthe pavatto, taṃ dassetīti āha ‘‘kāraṇayutta’’nti.

152. "Immediate" (anantaraṃ) means present to knowledge; hence, it is called "immediate." But what is that? He says, "speech" (vacanaṃ). "Is destroyed" (lujjati): this shows the reason why the term "world" (loka) is applied in that sense. Therefore, he says, "connected with the cause" (kāraṇayuttaṃ).

156. Sahitāsahitassāti kusalasaddayogena sāmivacanaṃ bhummattheti dassento āha ‘‘sahitāsahiteti attho’’ti. Sahitabhāsanena desakasampatti, sahitāsahitakosallena sāvakasampatti veditabbā. Parisasampattipi ñāṇasampannassa dhammakathikassa paṭibhānasampadāya kāraṇaṃ hotīti āha ‘‘sāvakasampattiyā bodhetuṃ samatthatāyā’’ti.

156. "Of what is connected and unconnected" (sahitāsahitassa): showing that this is a genitive case used in the sense of the locative in conjunction with the word 'skill' (kusala), he says, "the meaning is 'in what is connected and unconnected.'" The accomplishment of the teacher is to be understood by means of connected speech, and the accomplishment of the disciple is to be understood by skill in what is connected and unconnected. The accomplishment of the assembly also becomes a reason for the eloquence of the Dhamma speaker endowed with knowledge; therefore, he says, "through the accomplishment of the disciple, which is the ability to be enlightened."

157. Kusaladhammehīti samathavipassanādhammehi. Catuttho vutto, yo neva saṅghaṃ nimanteti, na dānaṃ deti.

157. "By wholesome states" (kusaladhammehi) means by the states of serenity and insight. The fourth is said to be one who neither invites the Saṅgha nor gives a gift.

166. Yamidaṃ ‘‘kālenā’’ti vuttanti ‘‘yo tattha avaṇṇo, tampi bhaṇati kālena. Yopi tattha vaṇṇo, tampi bhaṇati kālenā’’ti yaṃ idaṃ pāḷiyaṃ vuttaṃ, tatra tasmiṃ vacane vākye yo puggalo ‘‘kālena bhaṇatī’’ti vutto, so kīdisoti vicāraṇāya tassa dassanatthaṃ ‘‘kālaññū hotī’’tiādi pāḷiyaṃ vuttanti dassento saṅgahe āhāti yojanā.

166. Regarding that which was said as "at the right time" (kālena)—that is, what is stated in the Pāḷi, "he speaks dispraise at the right time, and he speaks praise at the right time"—there, in that statement, to show through analysis what sort of person is the one described as "speaking at the right time," he states in the summary that the Pāḷi says, "he is one who knows the right time" (kālaññū hoti), etc. Such is the connection.

168. Pubbuppannapaccayavipattīti tasmiṃ attabhāve paṭhamuppannapaccayavipatti. Tesaṃ vipatti pavattappaccayavipattīti yojanā.

168. "The failure of conditions that arose previously" (pubbuppannapaccayavipatti) refers to the failure of conditions that first arose in that existence. The connection is that their failure is the failure of currently operating conditions.

173. Tesanti [Pg.53] pahīnāvasiṭṭhakilesānaṃ. Vimuttidassanameva hoti vimuttiatthattā taṃdassanassa.

173. "Of those" (tesaṃ) means of those whose remaining defilements have been abandoned. The vision of liberation is itself liberation, because that vision has the meaning of liberation.

174. Tantāvutānaṃ vatthānanti niddhāraṇe sāmivacanaṃ.

174. "Of cloths that are woven" (tantāvutānaṃ vatthānaṃ) is a genitive of specification.

178. Nāmakāyoti nāmasamūho. Idameva ca dvayanti sīlasaṃvarapūraṇaṃ, sājīvāvītikkamanañcāti idameva dvayaṃ. Tatoti sājīvāvītikkamanato. Kathāya haliddarāgādisadisatāti yojanā. Tenāha ‘‘na puggalassā’’ti.

178. "The name-body" (nāmakāyo) means a collection of mental phenomena. "This very pair" (idaṃ dvayaṃ) refers to this very pair: the fulfillment of moral restraint and non-transgression regarding livelihood. "From that" (tato) means from non-transgression regarding livelihood. The connection is: "the similarity of speech to a turmeric stain, etc." Therefore, he says, "not of the person" (na puggalassa).

179. Iti-saddenāti ‘‘dārumāsako’’ti ettha vuttaiti-saddena. Evaṃpakāreti imināpi salākādike saṅgaṇhāti.

179. By the word "iti" (iti-saddena) is meant the "iti" mentioned in the phrase "a wooden token" (dārumāsako). By "of this kind" (evaṃpakāre), he also includes things like voting-tickets.

181. Avisaṭasukhanti avikkhepasukhaṃ.

181. "Unscattered happiness" (avisaṭasukhaṃ) means happiness without distraction.

187. Khandhadhammesūti saṅkhatadhammesu. Tadalābhenāti maggaphalālābhena. Atthenāti sīlādiatthena.

187. "In the aggregates and states" (khandhadhammesu) means in the conditioned states. "By the non-attainment of that" (tadalābhena) means by the non-attainment of the path and its fruit. "By the meaning" (atthena) means by the meaning of virtue and so on.

Catukkaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Fours is concluded.

5. Pañcakaniddesavaṇṇanā

5. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Fives

191. Yathā tesu paṭipajjitabbanti tesu pañcasu puggalesu yathārahaṃ upameyyopamādassanamukhena hitūpadesapaṭipattiyā yathā aññehi paṭipajjitabbanti attho. Kiriyāvācī ārambha-saddo adhippeto, na ‘‘ārambhakattussa kasāvapucchā’’tiādīsu viya dhammavācīti āha ‘‘ārambhakiriyāvācako saddo’’ti. ‘‘Nirujjhantī’’ti vuttattā ‘‘maggakiccavasenā’’ti vuttaṃ.

191. "How one should act towards them" (yathā tesu paṭipajjitabbaṃ) means how others should act appropriately towards those five individuals, through the practice of beneficial instruction by means of showing similes and things to be compared as is fitting. The word "ārambha" is intended to mean action, not a doctrinal term as in passages like "the initiator's question about the ochre robe" (ārambhakattussa kasāvapucchā). Thus he says, "the word 'ārambha' expresses action." Because it is said, "they cease" (nirujjhanti), it is said "in terms of the function of the path" (maggakiccavasena).

192. Gahaṇaṃ ‘‘evameta’’nti sampaṭicchanaṃ.

192. "Grasping" (gahaṇaṃ) means acceptance, as in "so it is" (evametaṃ).

199. Na evaṃ sambandho asamānajātikattā.

199. There is no such connection, because they are of different kinds.

Pañcakaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Fives is concluded.

6. Chakkaniddesavaṇṇanā

6. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Sixes

202. Idaṃ [Pg.54] saccābhisambodhādikaṃ saṅgahitaṃ hoti phalassa hetunā avinābhāvato. Tenāha ‘‘sāma’’ntiādi. Anācariyakena attanā uppāditenāti idaṃ sabbaññutaññāṇe vijjamānaguṇakathanaṃ, na tabbidhuradhammantaranivattanaṃ tathārūpassa aññassa abhāvato. Tenassa sācariyakatā, parato ca uppatti paṭikkhittāti imamatthamāha ‘‘tatthā’’tiādinā. Tattha sācariyakattaṃ parūpadesahetukatā, parato uppatti upadesena vināpi sannissāya nibbattīti ayametesaṃ viseso.

202. This includes the full awakening to the truth and so on, because of the cause's invariable connection with the fruit. Hence, he says, "directly" (sāmaṃ), etc. "Produced by oneself without a teacher" (anācariyakena attanā uppāditena): this is a statement of a quality present in omniscient knowledge, not the exclusion of another state devoid of that quality, since there is no other of that kind. Therefore, for this knowledge, its being "with a teacher" and its "arising from another" are rejected. To clarify this meaning, he says, "there" (tattha), etc. There, being "with a teacher" means having the instruction of another as its cause, while "arising from another" means arising in dependence on something even without instruction. This is the distinction between them.

Chakkaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Sixes is concluded.

7. Sattakaniddesavaṇṇanā

7. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Sevens

203. Kusalesu dhammesūti ādhāre bhummaṃ, na visayeti dassento ‘‘kusalesu dhammesu antogadhā’’ti āha. Idāni visayalakkhaṇaṃ etaṃ bhummanti dassento ‘‘bodhipakkhiyadhammesu vā’’tiādimāha. ‘‘Tadupakāratāyā’’ti idaṃ kusalesu dhammesu sādhetabbesūti imamatthaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Ummujjanapaññāyāti ummujjāpanapaññāya, ummujjanākārena vā pavattapaññāya. Tenevāti ummujjanamattattā eva. Yathā hi ñāṇuppādo saṃkilesapakkhato ummujjanaṃ, evaṃ saddhuppādopīti āha ‘‘saddhāsaṅkhātameva ummujjana’’nti. Cittavāroti cittappabandhavāro. Paccekaṃ ṭhānavipassanāpataraṇapatigādhappattiniṭṭhattā tesaṃ puggalānaṃ ‘‘aneke puggalā’’ti vuttaṃ. Kasmā? Tenattabhāvena arahattassa aggahaṇato. Tatiyapuggalādibhāvanti ummujjitvā ṭhitapuggalādibhāvaṃ.

203. "In wholesome states" (kusalesu dhammesu): showing that this is the locative of location, not of object, he says, "included within wholesome states." Now, to indicate that this locative has the characteristic of an object, he says, "or in the factors of enlightenment" (bodhipakkhiyadhammesu), etc. "By way of being helpful to that" (tadupakāratāya) is said with reference to this meaning: that it is to be accomplished in wholesome states. "With wisdom of emerging" (ummujjanapaññāya) means with wisdom that causes emerging, or with wisdom that proceeds in the manner of emergence. "Just by that" (teneva) means just because it is the mere act of emerging. For just as the arising of knowledge is an emerging from the side of defilements, so too is the arising of faith. Thus he says, "emergence is simply what is called faith" (saddhāsaṅkhātameva ummujjanaṃ). "The mental series" (cittavāro) means the series of the mental continuum. Because those individuals have individually attained completion in the state, insight, crossing over, and plunging into, it is said of them, "many individuals" (aneke puggalā). Why? Because of not grasping arahantship in that same existence. "The state of being the third individual, etc." (tatiyapuggalādibhāvaṃ) means the state of individuals who, having emerged, are established.

Sattakaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Exposition of the Heptad is concluded.

10. Dasakaniddesavaṇṇanā

10. Commentary on the Exposition of the Decad

209. Sotāpannādayoti [Pg.55] vuttavisesayuttā sotāpannasakadāgāmijhānānāgāmino. Asā…pe… panāti ettha pana-saddo visesatthadīpano. Tena ‘‘ajjhattasaṃyojanānaṃ samucchinnattā’’ti idaṃ visesaṃ dīpetīti veditabbaṃ.

209. “Stream-enterers, etc.”: these are the stream-enterers, once-returners, and non-returners who have attained jhāna, who are endowed with the stated distinction. In the passage abbreviated as “But…,” the word “but” illuminates a special meaning. By this, it should be understood that it reveals this distinction: “because the internal fetters have been eradicated.”

Dasakaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Decad is finished.

Puggalapaññattipakaraṇa-anuṭīkā samattā.

The Sub-commentary on the Puggalapaññatti is completed.

Kathāvatthupakaraṇa-anuṭīkā

The Sub-commentary on the Kathāvatthu

Ganthārambhavaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Beginning of the Book

Samudāye [Pg.57] ekadesā antogadhāti samudāyo tesaṃ adhiṭṭhānabhāvena vutto yathā ‘‘rukkhe sākhā’’ti dasseti ‘‘kathāsamudāyassā’’tiādinā. Tattha kathānanti tisso kathā vādo jappo vitaṇḍāti. Tesu yena pamāṇatakkehi pakkhapaṭipakkhānaṃ patiṭṭhāpanapaṭikkhepā honti, so vādo. Ekādhikaraṇā hi aññamaññaviruddhā dhammā pakkhapaṭipakkhā yathā ‘‘hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā, na hoti tathāgato paraṃ maraṇā’’ti (dī. ni. 1.65). Nānādhikaraṇā pana aññamaññaviruddhāpi pakkhapaṭipakkhā nāma na honti yathā ‘‘aniccaṃ rūpaṃ, niccaṃ nibbāna’’nti. Yena chalajātiniggahaṭṭhānehi pakkhapaṭipakkhānaṃ patiṭṭhāpanaṃ paṭikkhepārambho, so jappo. Ārambhamattamevettha, na atthasiddhīti dassanatthaṃ ārambhaggahaṇaṃ. Yāya pana chalajātiniggahaṭṭhānehi paṭipakkhapaṭikkhepāya vāyamanti, sā vitaṇḍā. Tattha atthavikappupapattiyā vacanavighāto chalaṃ yathā ‘‘navakambaloyaṃ puriso, rājā no sakkhī’’ti evamādi. Dūsanabhāsā jātayo, uttarapatirūpakāti attho. Niggahaṭṭhānāni parato āvi bhavissanti. Evaṃ vādajappavitaṇḍappabhedāsu tīsu kathāsu idha vādakathā ‘‘kathā’’ti adhippetā. Sā ca kho aviparītadhammatāya patiṭṭhāpanavasena, na viggāhikakathābhāvenāti veditabbaṃ. Mātikāṭhapanenevāti uddesadesanāya eva. Ṭhapitassāti desitassa. Desanā hi desetabbamatthaṃ vineyyasantānesu ṭhapanato nikkhipanato ṭhapanaṃ, nikkhepoti ca vuccati.

A part is included in a collection; the collection is spoken of as their basis, as in the saying “branches in a tree,” which is shown by the phrase “of the collection of discussions,” and so on. Therein, “discussions” refers to three types: debate, wrangling, and cavil. Among these, debate is that by which a thesis and antithesis are established or refuted through proof and reasoning. For, propositions that are mutually contradictory concerning a single topic are a thesis and antithesis, such as “The Tathāgata exists after death,” and “The Tathāgata does not exist after death” (DN 1.65). But propositions that are mutually contradictory concerning different topics are not called a thesis and antithesis, such as “Form is impermanent,” and “Nibbāna is permanent.” Wrangling is that which begins the establishment or refutation of a thesis and antithesis by means of sophistry, casuistry, and points of defeat; the word “beginning” is used to show that this is merely a beginning, not the accomplishment of the meaning. Cavil is the effort to refute an opponent’s position by means of sophistry, casuistry, and points of defeat. Therein, sophistry is the distortion of a statement by assuming a different meaning, as in “This man has a new blanket,” and so on. Casuistry is censorious speech, meaning spurious rejoinders. The points of defeat will become clear later on. Thus, among these three kinds of discussion—debate, wrangling, and cavil—here “discussion” is intended to mean the discussion that is debate. And it should be understood that this is for the sake of establishing the true nature of things, not in the sense of a contentious discussion. “By the laying down of the matrix” means simply by the exposition of the summary. “Of what is laid down” means of what is taught. For a teaching, because it lays down or deposits the meaning to be taught in the mental continuities of those to be trained, is called “laying down” and also “depositing.”

Ganthārambhavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Beginning of the Book is finished.

Nidānakathāvaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Introductory Discourse

Parinibbānameva [Pg.58]…pe… vuttaṃ. Abhinnasabhāvampi hi atthaṃ tadaññadhammato visesāvabodhanatthaṃ aññaṃ viya katvā voharanti yathā ‘‘attano sabhāvaṃ dhārentīti dhammā’’ti (dha. sa. aṭṭha. 1). Sāti asaṅkhatā dhātu. Karaṇabhāvena vuttā yathāvuttassa upasamassa sādhakatamabhāvaṃ sandhāya. Dhammavādī…pe… dubbalatā vuttā tathārūpāya paññāya bhāve tādisānaṃ pakkhabhāvābhāvato. Laddhiyāti ‘‘atthi puggalo saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, parihāyati arahā arahattā’’tiādiladdhiyā. Suttantehīti devatāsaṃyuttādīhi. Liṅgākappabhedaṃ parato sayameva vakkhati.

“Parinibbāna itself…” and so on, is said. For even when a thing has an undivided nature, in order to make its distinction from other things understood, they speak of it as if it were something else, as in the statement: “Dhammas are so called because they bear their own intrinsic nature” (Dhs-a. 1). That is the unconditioned element. It is spoken of in an instrumental sense with reference to its being the most effective means for the aforesaid pacification. “The Dhamma-speaker… weakness” is spoken of in relation to the presence of such wisdom, on account of which there is either the existence or non-existence of a faction for such views. “By view” means by a view such as: “A person exists in the real and ultimate sense,” or “An arahant falls away from arahantship,” and so on. “By the suttas” means by the Devatāsaṃyutta and others. He himself will explain later the distinction of signs and arrangements.

Bhinditvā mūlasaṅgahanti mūlasaṅgītiṃ vināsetvā, bhedaṃ vā katvā yathā sā ṭhitā, tato aññathā katvā. Saṅgahitato vā aññatrāti mūlasaṅgītiyā saṅgahitato aññatra. Tenāha ‘‘asaṅgahitaṃ sutta’’nti. Nītatthaṃ yathārutavasena viññeyyatthattā. Neyyatthaṃ vipariṇāmadukkhatādivasena niddhāretabbatthattā. Tīhi ṭhānehīti ‘‘sūrā satimanto idha brahmacariyavāso’’ti (a. ni. 9.21) evaṃ vuttehi tīhi kāraṇehi. Aññaṃ sandhāya bhaṇitanti ekaṃ pabbajjāsaṅkhātaṃ brahmacariyavāsaṃ sandhāya bhaṇitaṃ. Aññaṃ atthaṃ ṭhapayiṃsūti sabbassapi brahmacariyavāsassa vasena ‘‘natthi devesu brahmacariyavāso’’tiādikaṃ (kathā. 269) aññaṃ atthaṃ ṭhapayiṃsu. Suttañca aññaṃ sandhāya bhaṇitaṃ tato aññaṃ sandhāya bhaṇitaṃ katvā ṭhapayiṃsu, tassa atthañca aññaṃ ṭhapayiṃsūti evamettha yojanā veditabbā. Suññatādīti ādi-saddena aniccatādiṃ saṅgaṇhāti.

“Having broken the original collection” means having destroyed the original recital, or having created a schism, they made it different from how it stood. “Or elsewhere than what was collected” means elsewhere than what was collected in the original recital. Therefore he said, “a sutta that was not collected.” A teaching is of explicit meaning because its meaning is to be understood as stated. It is of inferred meaning because its meaning has to be drawn out by way of the suffering due to change, and so on. “By three grounds” means by the three reasons stated thus: “Here, heroes, mindful ones, is the living of the holy life” (AN 9.21). “Spoken with reference to something else” means it was spoken with reference to one thing, namely, the holy life designated as the going forth. “They established another meaning” means that with regard to the entire holy life, they established another meaning, such as “There is no holy life among the gods,” etc. (Kvu 269). The construction here should be understood thus: They took a sutta spoken with reference to one thing, made it out to be spoken with reference to another, and also established its meaning as something else. “Emptiness, etc.”: by the word “etc.,” impermanence and so on are included.

Gambhīraṃ ekadesaṃ mahāpadesaparivārādiṃ. Ekacce sakalaṃ abhidhammaṃ vissajjiṃsu chaḍḍayiṃsu seyyathāpi suttantikā. Te hi taṃ na jinavacananti vadanti. Kathāvatthussa savivādattetiādi heṭṭhā nidānaṭṭhakathāya āgatanayaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Keci pana puggalapaññattiyāpi savivādattaṃ maññanti. ‘‘Tatiyasaṅgītito pubbe pavattamānānaṃ vasenā’’ti idaṃ kasmā vuttaṃ, nanu tatiyasaṅgītito pubbepi taṃ mātikārūpena pavattateva? Niddesaṃ vā sandhāya tathā vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Aññānīti aññākārāni abhidhammapakaraṇādīni akariṃsu, pavattantānipi tāni aññathā katvā paṭhiṃsūti attho[Pg.59]. Mañjusirīti idaṃ kasmā vuttaṃ. Na hi taṃ nāmaṃ piṭakattayaṃ anuvattantehi bhikkhūhi gayhati? Itarehi gayhamānampi vā sāsanikapariññehi na sāsanāvacaraṃ gayhatīti katvā vuttaṃ. Nikāyanāmanti mahāsaṅghikādinikāyanāmaṃ, duttaguttādivagganāmañca.

A profound part, such as the Great References, the appendix, and so on. Some rejected and abandoned the entire Abhidhamma, just like the Suttantikas. For they say it is not the word of the Conqueror. The statement “Because the Kathāvatthu is controversial,” etc., is said with reference to the method found below in the commentary on the introduction. Some, however, also consider the Puggalapaññatti to be controversial. Why was this said: “by means of those existing before the Third Council”? Did it not exist even before the Third Council in the form of a mātikā? It should be understood that this was said with reference to the Exposition. “Others” means they composed other kinds of works, such as Abhidhamma treatises, and they recited even the existing ones after altering them; this is the meaning. Why is “Mañjuśrī” mentioned here? Is that name not accepted by the monks who follow the Tipiṭaka? It is said because, even if it is accepted by others, it is not accepted as belonging to the Dispensation by those with full understanding of the Dispensation. “Names of Nikāyas” means the names of the Nikāyas such as the Mahāsaṅghikas, and the names of sections such as the Duttaguttas.

Saṅkantikānaṃ bhedo suttavādīti saṅkantikānaṃ anantare eko nikāyabhedo suttavādī nāma bhijjittha. Sahāti ekajjhaṃ katvā, gaṇiyamānāti attho.

“The Suttavādins are a schism from the Saṅkantikas”: this means that immediately after the Saṅkantikas, a schism in the Nikāya named Suttavādī broke off. “With” means having put them together; the meaning is “being counted.”

Uppanne vāde sandhāyāti tatiyasaṅgītikāle uppanne vāde sandhāya. Uppajjanaketi tato paṭṭhāya yāva saddhammantaradhānā etthantare uppajjanake. Suttasahassāharaṇañcettha paravādabhañjanatthañca sakavādapatiṭṭhāpanatthañca. Suttekadesopi hi ‘‘sutta’’nti vuccati samudāyavohārassa avayavesupi dissanato yathā ‘‘paṭo daḍḍho, samuddo diṭṭho’’ti ca. Te panettha suttapadesā ‘‘atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’’tiādinā āgatā veditabbā.

“With reference to a dispute that arose”: this means with reference to the dispute that arose at the time of the Third Council. “Liable to arise”: this means liable to arise in the interval from then until the disappearance of the good Dhamma. And here the adducing of a thousand suttas was for the purpose of refuting the theses of others and establishing one’s own thesis. For even a single part of a sutta is called a “sutta,” since the designation for the whole is also seen to be used for its parts, as in “the cloth is burnt” or “the ocean is seen.” Here those sutta passages should be understood as those that come in the text beginning, “There is a person who is practicing for his own welfare,” and so on.

Nidānakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Introductory Discourse is finished.

Mahāvaggo

The Great Division

1. Puggalakathā

1. Discourse on Individuals

1. Suddhasaccikaṭṭho

1. The Pure True Sense

1. Anulomapaccanīkavaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Forward and Reverse Order

1. Sambarādīhi [Pg.60] pakappitavijjā, tathābhisaṅkhatāni osadhāni ca ‘‘māyā’’ti vuccanti, idha pana māyāya āhitavisesā abhūtaññeyyākārā adhippetāti dassento ‘‘māyāya amaṇiādayo maṇiādiākārena dissamānā māyāti vuttā’’ti āha. Saccaññeva saccikaṃ, so eva attho aviparītassa ñāṇassa visayabhāvaṭṭhenāti saccikaṭṭho. Tenāha ‘‘bhūtaṭṭho’’ti. Aviparītabhāvato eva paramo padhāno atthoti paramattho, ñāṇassa paccakkhabhūto dhammānaṃ aniddisitabbasabhāvo. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘uttamattho’’ti.

1. The arts devised by Sambara and others, as well as concocted medicines, are called 'illusion.' Here, however, showing that what is intended are the unreal appearances of knowable things, which have a special quality imparted by illusion, he said: 'By illusion, non-gems and so on, appearing in the form of gems and so on, are called illusion.' What is true is itself the real; that very meaning, by virtue of being the domain of unperverted knowledge, is the 'real meaning' (saccikaṭṭho). Therefore, he said, 'the actual meaning' (bhūtaṭṭho). Precisely because of its unperverted nature, the ultimate meaning (paramattho) is the supreme and principal meaning—that which is directly perceptible to knowledge, the indescribable own-nature of phenomena. Hence, it is said, 'the supreme meaning' (uttamattho).

Atthīti vacanasāmaññenāti ‘‘atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’’tiādīsu (a. ni. 4.96; kathā. 22) ‘‘atthī’’ti pavattavacanasāmaññena. Atthavikappupapattiyā vacanavighāto chalanti vadanti. Patiṭṭhaṃ pacchindantoti hetuṃ dūsento, ahetuṃ karontoti attho. Hetu hi paṭiññāya patiṭṭhāpanato patiṭṭhā, taṃ pana hetuṃ atthamattato dassento ‘‘yadi saccikaṭṭhenā’’tiādimāha. Payogato pana dūsanena saddhiṃ parato āvi bhavissati. Okāsaṃ adadamānoti yathānurūpaṃ yuttiṃ vattuṃ avasaraṃ adento. Atha vā patiṭṭhaṃ pacchindanto, paṭiññaṃ eva parivattentoti attho. Upalabbhati puggaloti hi sakavādiṃ uddissa paravādino paṭiññāva na yuttā appasiddhattā visesitabbassa. Tenevāha ‘‘anupalabbhaneyyato na tava vādo tiṭṭhatīti nivattento’’ti. Rūpañca upalabbhati…pe… dassetīti etena paravādinā adhippetahetuno viparītatthasādhakattaṃ dasseti.

'By the generality of the word 'is'' means: by the generality of the word 'is' as it occurs in such phrases as 'there is a person practicing for his own welfare' (A.N. 4.96; Kathā. 22). They say that a disruption of speech due to the arising of various meanings is a quibble. 'Cutting off the foundation' means corrupting the reason, that is, rendering it no reason. For a reason is a foundation because it establishes the proposition. But by presenting that reason merely in terms of meaning, he says, 'if in the real sense,' and so on. Its application, however, along with the refutation, will become clear later. 'Not giving an opportunity' means not giving a chance to state a suitable argument. Alternatively, 'cutting off the foundation' means overturning the proposition itself. For the proposition of the opponent addressed to our own proponent, 'a person is found,' is not proper, because that which is to be qualified is unestablished. Therefore, retracting, he said, 'Since it is not found, your thesis does not stand.' By 'And form is found... he shows,' he demonstrates that the reason intended by the opponent proves the opposite meaning.

Upalabbhamānaṃ nāma hotīti ākārato taṃākāravantānaṃ anaññattāti adhippāyo. Aññathāti ākāra, ākāravantānaṃ bhede. Etissāti ‘‘tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamaṭṭhenā’’ti evaṃ [Pg.61] vuttāya dutiyapucchāya. Esa visesoti yo yathāvutto dvinnaṃ pucchānaṃ visayassa sabhāvākārabhedo, esa dvinnaṃ pucchānaṃ viseso. Sabhāvadhammānaṃ sāmaññalakkhaṇena abhinnānampi salakkhaṇato bhedoyevāti aññadhammassa aññenākārena na kadācipi upalabbho bhaveyya. Yadi siyā, aññattameva na siyāti ruppanādisapaccayādiākārena anupalabbhamānopi puggalo attano bhūtasabhāvaṭṭhena upalabbhatevāti vadantaṃ paravādinaṃ pati ‘‘yo saccikaṭṭho’’tiādi codanā anokāsāti dassento āha ‘‘yathā pana…pe… niggaho ca na kātabbo’’ti. Tattha niggahoti ‘‘ājānāhi niggaha’’nti evaṃ vuttaniggaho, parājayāropanena paravādino niggaṇhananti attho.

The meaning is: what is found is so called because of the non-otherness of those possessing a form from that form. 'Otherwise' means: when there is a difference between the form and those possessing the form. 'Of this' refers to the second question, stated thus: 'Therefore, is that person found in the real and ultimate sense?' This is the distinction: the aforesaid difference in the own-nature and form of the subject of the two questions is the distinction between the two questions. Although things with an own-nature are not different in their general characteristic, there is indeed a difference in their specific characteristic; thus one thing would never be found with the form of another. If it were, there would be no otherness at all. Showing that the objection 'What is the real meaning?' and so on has no basis against the opponent who says, 'Even though a person is not found in the form of being afflicted, conditions, and so on, they are still found by their own real nature,' he says, 'Just as... and no censure should be made.' Here, 'censure' (niggaho) refers to the censure stated as 'Acknowledge your censure,' meaning the censuring of the opponent by imposing defeat.

Svāyaṃ pana yasmā tassa vādāparādhahetuko, tasmā taṃ dassetuṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ dosāparādhapariyāyehi vibhāvito. Avajānanañhettha niggahaṭṭhānaṃ. Tathā hi paṭiññāhāni, paṭiññāntaraṃ, paṭiññāvirodho, paṭiññāsaññāso, hetvantaraṃ, atthantaraṃ, niratthakaṃ, aviññātatthaṃ, asambandhatthaṃ, appattakālaṃ, ūnaṃ, adhikaṃ, punaruttaṃ, ananubhāsanaṃ, aviññātaṃ, appaṭibhā, vikkhepo, matānuññā, anuyuñjitabbassa upekkhanaṃ, ananuyuñjitabbassa anuyogo, apasiddhantaraṃ, hetvābhāsā cāti dvāvīsati niggahaṭṭhānāni ñāyavādino vadanti.

But since this is caused by a fault in his thesis, it is therefore explained in the commentary by the terms 'fault' and 'offense.' Here, the ground for censure is disregard. Indeed, the logicians declare twenty-two grounds for censure: 1. abandoning the proposition (paṭiññāhāni), 2. shifting the proposition (paṭiññāntaraṃ), 3. contradicting the proposition (paṭiññāvirodho), 4. renouncing the proposition (paṭiññāsaññāso), 5. shifting the reason (hetvantaraṃ), 6. shifting the topic (atthantaraṃ), 7. the meaningless (niratthakaṃ), 8. the unintelligible (aviññātatthaṃ), 9. the incoherent (asambandhatthaṃ), 10. the inopportune (appattakālaṃ), 11. the deficient (ūnaṃ), 12. the superfluous (adhikaṃ), 13. repetition (punaruttaṃ), 14. failure to restate (ananubhāsanaṃ), 15. incomprehension (aviññātaṃ), 16. inability to reply (appaṭibhā), 17. evasion (vikkhepo), 18. admission of a counter-argument (matānuññā), 19. overlooking the censurable (anuyuñjitabbassa upekkhanaṃ), 20. censuring the non-censurable (ananuyuñjitabbassa anuyogo), 21. deviation from doctrine (apasiddhantaraṃ), and 22. fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsā).

Tattha visadisūdāharaṇadhammānujānanaṃ paṭhamudāharaṇe paṭiññāhāni. Paṭiññātatthapaṭisedhe tadaññatthaniddeso paṭiññāntaraṃ. Paṭiññāviruddhahetukittanaṃ paṭiññāvirodho. Paṭiññātatthāpanayanaṃ paṭiññāsaññāso. Avisesavutte hetumhi paṭisiddhe visesahetukathanaṃ hetvantaraṃ. Adhikatatthānupayogiatthakathanaṃ atthantaraṃ. Mātikāpāṭho viya atthahīnaṃ niratthakaṃ. Tikkhattuṃ vuttampi sakkhipaṭivādīhi aviditaṃ aviññātatthaṃ. Pubbāparavasena sambandharahitaṃ asambandhatthaṃ. Avayavavipallāsavacanaṃ appattakālaṃ. Avayavavikalaṃ ūnaṃ. Adhikahetūdāharaṇaṃ adhikaṃ. Ṭhapetvā anuvādaṃ saddatthānaṃ punappunaṃ vacanaṃ atthāpannavacanañca punaruttaṃ. Parisāya viditassa tīhi vuttassa apaccudāhāro ananubhāsanaṃ. Yaṃ vādinā [Pg.62] vuttaṃ parisāya viññātaṃ paṭivādinā duviññātaṃ, taṃ aviññātaṃ. Taṃvādinā vattabbe vutte paravādino paṭivacanassa anupaṭṭhānaṃ appaṭibhā. Kiccantarappasaṅgena kathāvicchindanaṃ vikkhepo. Attano dosānujānanena parapakkhassa dosappasañjanaṃ paramatānujānanaṃ matānuññā. Niggahappattassa niggaṇhanaṃ anuyuñjitabbassa upekkhanaṃ. Sampattaniggahassa aniggahaṭṭhāne ca niggaṇhanaṃ anuyuñjitabbassa anuyogo. Ekaṃ siddhantamanujānitvā aniyamato tadaññasiddhantakathāppasañjanaṃ apasiddhantaraṃ. Asiddhā anekantikā viruddhā ca hetvābhāsā, hetupatirūpakāti attho. Tesañca kathanaṃ niggahaṭṭhānanti.

Among these: Abandoning the proposition (paṭiññāhāni) is, in the first example, admitting a property in a dissimilar example. Shifting the proposition (paṭiññāntaraṃ) is, when the proposed meaning is refuted, stating another meaning. Contradicting the proposition (paṭiññāvirodho) is stating a reason that contradicts the proposition. Renouncing the proposition (paṭiññāsaññāso) is withdrawing the proposed meaning. Shifting the reason (hetvantaraṃ) is, when a reason stated without qualification is refuted, stating a qualified reason. Shifting the topic (atthantaraṃ) is stating a meaning that is not useful for the matter at hand. The meaningless (niratthakaṃ) is what is devoid of meaning, like a recitation of the table of contents. The unintelligible (aviññātatthaṃ) is what is not understood by the witnesses and the opponent even when stated three times. The incoherent (asambandhatthaṃ) is what is devoid of connection between the preceding and succeeding parts. The inopportune (appattakālaṃ) is a statement with its parts in the wrong order. The deficient (ūnaṃ) is what is missing a part. The superfluous (adhikaṃ) is stating more than one reason or example. Repetition (punaruttaṃ) is, apart from restatement for clarification, the repeated statement of words and meanings, and the statement of what is already implied. Failure to restate (ananubhāsanaṃ) is not restating what has been stated three times and is known to the assembly. Incomprehension (aviññātaṃ) is when what is stated by the proponent and understood by the assembly is not understood by the opponent. Inability to reply (appaṭibhā) is the opponent's failure to reply when what should be said by the proponent has been said. Evasion (vikkhepo) is interrupting the discussion on the pretext of other business. Admission of a counter-argument (matānuññā) is attributing a fault to the opponent's side by admitting a fault in one's own. Overlooking the censurable (anuyuñjitabbassa upekkhanaṃ) is not censuring one who has become worthy of censure. Censuring the non-censurable (ananuyuñjitabbassa anuyogo) is censuring one in a situation that is not a ground for censure. Deviation from doctrine (apasiddhantaraṃ) is, having accepted one doctrine, to resort to another doctrine without principle. Fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsā) are the unproven, the inconclusive, and the contradictory, meaning semblances of a reason. Stating these is a ground for censure.

Imesu dvāvīsatiyā niggahaṭṭhānesu idaṃ paṭiññāya apanayanato sayameva paccakkhānato paṭiññāsaññāso nāma niggahaṭṭhānaṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘avajānaneneva niggahaṃ dassetī’’ti. Asiddhattāti etena paccakkhato anumānato ca puggalassa anupalabbhamāha. Na hi so paccakkhato upalabbhati. Yadi upalabbheyya, vivādo eva na siyā, anumānampi tādisaṃ natthi, yena puggalaṃ anumineyyuṃ. Tathā hi taṃ sāsaniko puggalavādī vadeyya ‘‘puggalo upalabbhati, atthi puggalo’’ti bhagavatā vuttattā rūpavedanādi viya. Yañhi bhagavatā ‘‘atthī’’ti yadi vuttaṃ, taṃ paramatthato atthi yathā taṃ rūpaṃ vedanā saññā saṅkhārā viññāṇaṃ. Yaṃ pana paramatthato natthi, na taṃ bhagavatā ‘‘atthī’’ti vuttaṃ yathā taṃ pakativādiādīnaṃ pakatiādīti, taṃ micchā. Ettha hi yadi vohārato puggalassa atthibhāvo adhippeto, siddhaṃ sādhanaṃ, atha paramatthato, asiddho hetu tathā avuttattā. Viruddho ca tassa aniccasaṅkhatapaṭiccasamuppannādibhāvāsādhanato rūpavedanādīsu tathā diṭṭhattātiādinā tassa ahetukabhāvasseva pākaṭabhāvato.

Among these twenty-two grounds for censure, this one, because it is a withdrawal of the proposition, a personal disavowal, is the ground for censure called 'renouncing the proposition' (paṭiññāsaññāso). Hence it is said, 'He shows censure simply by disregard.' By 'due to its unestablished nature,' he states the non-finding of a person by direct perception and by inference. For a person is not found by direct perception. If one were found, there would be no dispute. Nor is there any such inference by which they could infer a person. Thus, a personalist within the teaching might say: 'A person is found, a person exists, because it has been stated by the Blessed One, just like form, feeling, etc.' For whatever has been stated by the Blessed One as 'exists' exists in an ultimate sense, such as form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. But what does not exist in an ultimate sense has not been stated by the Blessed One as 'exists,' such as the primordial nature and so on of the proponents of primordial nature. That is false. Here, if the existence of a person is intended conventionally, the proof is established. But if it is meant ultimately, the reason is unestablished, because it was not stated in that way. And it is a contradictory reason, because it does not prove the person's nature as impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, etc.—as is seen in the case of form, feeling, etc.—and because its baselessness is thereby made evident.

Yaṃ pana bāhirakā puthu aññatitthiyā vadanti. Attheva ca paramatthato attā ñāṇābhidhānassa pavattiyā nimittabhāvato rūpādi viya. Atha vā attātirittapadatthantaro rūpakkhandho khandhasabhāvattā yathā taṃ itarakkhandhā. Yañhettha padatthantaraṃ, so puggaloti adhippāyo.

But what the external, various other sectarians say is this: 'Indeed, there is a self in the ultimate sense, because it is the basis for the occurrence of the designation 'knowledge,' like form and so on.' Or else, 'The form aggregate is a different entity from the self, and because it has the nature of an aggregate, it is like the other aggregates.' Here, the meaning is that the different entity is the person.

Ettha [Pg.63] ca purimassa hetuno paññattiyā anekantikatā asiddhatā ca. Na hi asato sakavādinaṃ pati paramatthato ñāṇābhidhānappavattiyā nimittabhāvo sijjhati. Vohārato ce, tadasiddhasādhanatā rūpādisabhāvavinimuttarūpopi puggalo na hotīti evamādiviruddhatthatā. Pacchimassa pana hetuno sādhetabbatthasāmaññapariggahe siddhasādhanatā, rūpakkhandhato padatthantarato paramatthantarabhūtavedanādisambhavassa icchitattā ca. Tabbisesapariggahe ca sakavādinaṃ pati udāharaṇābhāvo paraparikappitajīvapadatthavirahato. Itarakkhandhānaṃ vedanādivinimuttaubhayasiddhajīvapadatthasahitopi rūpakkhandho na hoti itarakkhandhā viyāti viruddhatthatā ca.

Here, for the first reason, there is inconclusiveness and it is unestablished. For, with respect to one’s own proponents, the status of being a basis for the occurrence of the designation 'knowledge' in the ultimate sense is not established for what is non-existent. If it is by way of convention, then it is a proving of what is unestablished, and there is the contradiction that a person would not have a nature distinct from the nature of form, and so on. As for the latter reason, if one takes the generality of what is to be proven, it is a proving of what is already proven, because the existence of feeling and so on—which are ultimately different entities from the form aggregate—is accepted. And if one takes the specific case, for one’s own proponent there is a lack of an example, due to the absence of the entity 'soul' postulated by others. There is also the contradiction that the form aggregate, even when accompanied by the entity 'soul' which is established for both parties and is distinct from feeling and so on, is not like the other aggregates.

Yaṃ pana kāṇādā ‘‘sukhādīnaṃ nissayabhāvato’’ti anumānaṃ vadanti, te idaṃ vattabbā – kiṃ sukhādīnaṃ attani paṭibaddhaṃ yato sukhādinissayatāya attā anumīyati. Yadi uppādo, evaṃ sante sabbepi sukhādayo ekato eva bhaveyyuṃ kāraṇassa sannihitabhāvato aññanirapekkhato ca. Atha aññampi kiñci indriyādikāraṇantaramapekkhitabbaṃ, tadeva hotu kāraṇaṃ, kimaññena adiṭṭhasāmatthiyena parikappitena payojanaṃ. Atha pana tesaṃ attādhīnā vuttīti vadeyyuṃ, evampi na sijjhati udāharaṇābhāvato. Na hi rūpādivinimutto tādiso koci sabhāvadhammo sukhādisannissayabhūto atthi, yato attano attatthasiddhiyā udāharaṇaṃ apadiseyyuṃ. Iminā nayena asamāsapadābhidheyyattātiādīnampi ayuttattā nivāretabbā. Tathā ‘‘aññassa saccikaṭṭhassa asiddhattā’’ti iminā ca pakatiaṇuādīnampi bāhiraparikappitānaṃ asiddhatā vuttāvāti veditabbā. Kathaṃ pana tesaṃ asiddhīti? Pamāṇena anupalabbhanato. Na hi paccakkhato pakati siddhā kapilassapi isino tassa apaccakkhabhāvassa kāpilehi anuññāyamānattā.

As for the Kāṇādas who state the inference, 'Because of being the basis for happiness and so on,' they should be told this: Is happiness and so on connected to the self in such a way that the self is inferred from its being the basis of happiness and so on? If it is a matter of origination, then all happiness and so on would arise simultaneously, since the cause is present and independent of anything else. If some other cause, such as a faculty, must also be awaited, let that itself be the cause; what is the use of postulating another with unseen capacity? If they were to say that their functioning is dependent on the self, even this is not established, due to the lack of an example. For there is no such intrinsic phenomenon, separate from form and so on, that serves as the basis for happiness and so on, from which they could cite an example to establish their own thesis of a self. By this method, arguments such as 'due to being designated by a non-compound term' should also be refuted as unreasonable. Similarly, by the statement 'because the real nature of another is unproven,' it should be understood that the unproven nature of external postulations like primordial matter, atoms, and so on is also stated. But how are they unproven? Because they are not apprehended by a valid means of knowledge. For primordial matter is not established by direct perception even for the sage Kapila, since its nature of not being directly perceptible is acknowledged by the Kāpilas.

Yaṃ pana ‘‘atthi padhānaṃ bhedānaṃ anvayadassanato sakalakalāpamattaṃ viyā’’ti te anumānaṃ vadanti. Iminā hi bhedānaṃ satvādīnaṃ vijjamānapadhānatā paṭiññātā. Ettha ca vuccate – sakalādīnaṃ padhānaṃ tabbibhāgehi kiṃ aññattaṃ, udāhu anaññanti, kiñcettha yadi aññattaṃ, sabbo loko padhānamayoti samayavirodho siyā, saṇṭhānabhedena aññattha paṭijānanato [Pg.64] na dosoti ce? Taṃ na, valayakaṭakādisaṇṭhānabhedepi kanakābhedadassanato. Na hi saṇṭhānaṃ vatthubhedanimittaṃ tassa anupādānattā. Yaṃ yassa bhedanimittaṃ, na taṃ tassa anupādānaṃ yathā suvaṇṇamattikādighaṭādīnaṃ suvaṇṇaghaṭo mattikāghaṭo koseyyapaṭo kappāsapaṭoti ca sādhetabbadhammarahitañca udāharaṇaṃ. Na hi padhānekakāraṇapubbakattaṃ sakalādīnaṃ pakativādino siddhaṃ, nāpi kāpilānaṃ kathañci aññattānujānanato. Anaññatte pana udāharaṇābhāvo. Na hi tadeva sādhetabbaṃ tadeva ca udāharaṇaṃ yuttaṃ, anvayadassanampi asiddhaṃ. Na hi tadeva tena anvitaṃ yujjati. Padhānena anvayadassanampi asiddhaṃ paravādinoti guṇassa padhānassa ananujānanato. Atha yaṃ kiñci kāraṇaṃ padhānaṃ ‘‘padhīyati ettha phala’’nti, evampi asiddhameva kāraṇe phalassa atthibhāvānanujānanato, hetuno ca asiddhanissayatāparābhimatabhedānanujānanato. Atha visesena kāraṇāyattavuttitā phalassa sādhīyati, na kiñci viruddhaṃ dhammānaṃ yathāsakaṃ paccayena paṭiccasamuppattiyā icchitattāti.

As for the inference they state, 'There is a primary cause, because of seeing a connection among its modifications, like an entire collection,' by this, the existence of a primary cause for modifications such as sattva and so on is asserted. Here it is said: Is the primary cause of the whole and so on different from its divisions, or not different? If it is different, then the entire world would be composed of the primary cause, which would be a contradiction of their doctrine. If it is said there is no fault because a difference is asserted based on a difference in configuration, that is not so, because even when there is a difference in the configuration of bracelets, bangles, and so on, the non-difference of the gold is seen. For configuration is not the cause of a difference in substance, since it is not the material cause. Whatever is the cause of difference for something is not its material cause, as in the case of a golden pot, a clay pot, a silk cloth, or a cotton cloth; and the example is devoid of the property to be proven. For it is not established for the proponents of primordial nature that the whole and so on are preceded by a single primary cause, nor is difference in any way acknowledged by the Kāpilas. If, on the other hand, it is not different, there is a lack of an example. For it is not right that the very thing to be proven is also the example, and the seeing of a connection is also unestablished. For the same thing is not connected with itself. The seeing of a connection with the primary cause is also unestablished for the opponent, because of their non-acknowledgement of the quality and the primary cause. If any cause is called primary because 'the effect is placed therein,' even this is unestablished, because the existence of the effect in the cause is not acknowledged, and because the distinctions assumed by the other party, which depend on an unestablished reason, are not acknowledged. If, however, the particular dependence of the effect on the cause is being established, there is no contradiction, for it is accepted that phenomena arise dependently, each through its own conditions.

Apica pakativādino ‘‘satvarajatamasaṅkhātānaṃ tiṇṇaṃ guṇānaṃ samabhāvo pakati, sā ca niccā satvādivisamasabhāvato aniccato mahatādivikārato anaññā’’ti paṭijānanti. Sā tesaṃ vuttappakārā pakati na sijjhati tato viruddhasabhāvato vikārato anaññattā. Na hi assassa visāṇaṃ dīghaṃ, tañca rassato govisāṇato anaññanti vuccamānaṃ sijjhati. Kiñca bhiyyo? Tiṇṇaṃ ekabhāvābhāvato. Satvādiguṇattayato hi pakatiyā anaññattaṃ icchantānaṃ tesaṃ satvādīnampi pakatiyā anaññattaṃ āpajjati, na ca yuttaṃ tiṇṇaṃ ekabhāvoti. Evampi pakati na sijjhati. Kathaṃ? Anekadosāpattito. Yadi hi byattasabhāvato vikārato abyattasabhāvā pakati anaññā, evaṃ sante hetumantatā aniccatā abyāpitā sakiriyatā anekatā nissitatā liṅgatā sāvayavatā paratantratāti evamādayo aneke dosā pakatiyā āpajjanti, na jātivikārato anaññā paṭijānitabbā. Tathā ca sati samayavirodhoti kappanāmattaṃ pakatīti asiddhā sāti niṭṭhamettha gantabbaṃ.

Moreover, the proponents of primordial nature assert: 'Primordial nature is the equilibrium of the three qualities known as sattva, rajas, and tamas; and it is eternal, yet not different from the impermanent modifications such as mahat, which have the unequal nature of sattva and so on.' This primordial nature of theirs, of the kind stated, is not established, because of being not different from its modifications, which are of a contradictory nature. For it is not established when it is said, 'A horse's horn is long, and it is not different from a short cow's horn.' Furthermore, why? Because the three do not have a single nature. For those who wish primordial nature to be not different from the triad of qualities, sattva and so on, it would follow that sattva and so on are also not different from primordial nature; and it is not right for three to have a single nature. In this way too, primordial nature is not established. How? Because it would incur many faults. For if primordial nature, which has an unmanifest nature, is not different from its modifications, which have a manifest nature, then many faults would befall primordial nature, such as being conditioned, impermanent, not all-pervading, active, multiple, dependent, an indicator, composite, and reliant on another. Thus, it should not be asserted that it is not different from its class of modifications. And this being so, there is a contradiction with their doctrine. Therefore, the conclusion to be reached here is that primordial nature is a mere postulation and is thus unestablished.

Pakatiyā [Pg.65] ca asiddhāya taṃnimittakabhāvena vuccamānā mahatādayopi asiddhā eva. Yathā ca pakati mahatādayo ca, evaṃ issarapajāpatipurisakālasabhāvaniyatiyadicchādayopi. Etesu hi issaro tāva na sijjhati upakārassa adassanato. Sattānañhi jātiyaṃ mātāpitūnaṃ bījakhettabhāvena kammassa hīnatādivibhāgakaraṇena, tato parañca utuāhārānaṃ brūhanupatthambhanena, indriyānaṃ dassanādikiccasādhanena upakāro dissati, na, evamissarassa. Hīnatādivibhāgakaraṇamissarassāti ce? Taṃ na, asiddhattā. Yathāvutto upakāraviseso issaranimmito, na kammunāti sādhanīyametaṃ. Itaratrāpi samānametanti ce? Na, kammato phalaniyamasiddhattā. Sati hi katūpacite kammasmiṃ tattha yaṃ akusalaṃ, tato hīnatā, yaṃ kusalaṃ, tato paṇītatāti siddhametaṃ. Issaravādināpi hi na sakkā kammaṃ paṭikkhipituṃ.

And since primordial nature is unproven, mahat and so on, which are said to be caused by it, are also unproven. And just as primordial nature and mahat and so on, so too are God, Pajāpati, Puruṣa, time, inherent nature, fate, chance, and so on. Among these, God, in the first place, is not established, because no assistance from him is seen. For in the birth of beings, the assistance of parents is seen in their being the seed and the field, of kamma in causing the division into inferior and superior, and further, of climate and food in promoting growth and providing support, and of the faculties in accomplishing the functions of seeing and so on; but no such assistance from God is seen. If it is said that the causing of the division into inferior and superior is God's doing, that is not so, because it is unproven. This must be proven: that the specific assistance as described is created by God, not by kamma. If it is said that this is the same in the other case too, that is not so, because the determination of the result from kamma is established. For when kamma has been done and accumulated, it is established that from what is unwholesome comes inferiority, and from what is wholesome comes excellence. Indeed, even a proponent of God cannot reject kamma.

Apicetassa lokavicittassa issaranimmānabhāve bahū dosā sambhavanti. Kathaṃ? Yadi sabbamidaṃ lokavicittaṃ issaranimmitaṃ, saheva vacanena pavattitabbaṃ, na kamena. Na hi sannihitakāraṇānaṃ phalānaṃ kamena uppatti yuttā, kāraṇantarāpekkhāya issarassa sāmatthiyahāni. Cakkhādīnaṃ cakkhuviññāṇādīsu kāraṇabhāvo na yutto. Karotīti hi kāraṇanti. Issaro eva ca kārakoti sabbakāraṇānaṃ kāraṇabhāvahāni. Yehi puthuvisesehi issaro pasīdeyya, tesañca sayaṃkāratā āpajjati, tathā sabbesaṃ hetukānaṃ kāraṇabhāvo. Yañjetaṃ nimmānaṃ, tañcassa attadatthaṃ vā siyā, paratthaṃ vā siyā. Attadatthatāyaṃ attano issarabhāvahāni akatakiccatāya isitāvasitābhāvato. Tena vā nimmitena yaṃ attano kātabbaṃ, taṃ kasmā sayameva na karoti. Paratthatāyaṃ pana paro nāmettha loko evāti kimatthiyaṃ tassa nirayādirogādivisādinimmānaṃ. Yā cassa issaratā, sā sayaṃkatā vā siyā paraṃkatā vā ahetukā vā. Tattha sayaṃkatā ce, tato pubbe anissarabhāvāpatti. Paraṃkatā ce, pacchāpi anissarabhāvāpatti sauttaratā ca siyā. Ahetukā ce, na kassaci anissaratāti evamissarassapi asiddhi veditabbā.

Moreover, if this diverse world were created by a lord, many faults would arise. How so? If all this diverse world were created by a lord, it should come to be by his mere word, not gradually. For the gradual arising of effects from present causes is not fitting, and dependence on other causes would imply a diminishment of the lord’s power. The status of the eye and so on as causes for eye-consciousness and so on would not be fitting. For a cause is so called because it acts. But if the lord himself is the sole agent, then the causal status of all causes is lost. By whatever particular qualities the lord might be pleased, those qualities themselves would have to be self-made, and thus the causal status of all causes would be lost. And this creation might be for his own benefit or for the benefit of others. If for his own benefit, his lordship is lost because his task is undone, due to his lack of mastery and control. And whatever must be done for himself by means of that creation, why does he not do it himself? If, on the other hand, it is for the sake of others—and here 'other' is simply the world—for what purpose is his creation of hells, diseases, poisons, and the like? And as for his lordship, is it self-made, made by another, or without cause? If it is self-made, then he would previously have been without lordship. If it is made by another, then he would afterwards be without lordship, and there would be a superior. If it is without cause, then no one would be without lordship. Thus, it should be understood that the lord is not established.

Yathā ca issaro, evaṃ pajāpati puriso ca. Nāmamattameva hettha viseso. Tehi vādīhi pakappitaṃ yadidaṃ ‘‘pajāpati puriso’’ti. Taṃnimittakaṃ [Pg.66] pana lokappavattiṃ icchantānaṃ pajāpativāde purisavāde ca issaravāde viya dosā asiddhi ca vidhātabbā. Yathā cete issarādayo, evaṃ kālopi asiddho lakkhaṇābhāvato. Paramatthato hi vijjamānānaṃ dhammānaṃ sabhāvasaṅkhātaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ upalabbhati. Yathā pathaviyā kathinatā, na evaṃ kālassa, tasmā natthi paramatthato kāloti. Kālavādī panāha ‘‘vattanālakkhaṇo kālo’’ti. So vattabbo ‘‘kā panāyaṃ vattanā’’ti. So āha ‘‘samayamuhuttādīnaṃ pavattī’’ti. Tampi na, rūpādīhi atthantarabhāvena aniddhāritattā. Paramatthato hi aniddhāritasabhāvassa vattanālakkhaṇatāyaṃ sasavisāṇādīnampi taṃlakkhaṇatā āpajjeyya.

Just as the lord is unestablished, so too are Pajāpati and Puruṣa. Here, the difference is merely in name. For those who maintain that the world's process is caused by that which is conceived by these theorists as 'Pajāpati' and 'Puruṣa,' the same faults and lack of establishment should be demonstrated in the doctrines of Pajāpati and Puruṣa as in the doctrine of the lord. And just as these—the lord and the others—are unestablished due to the absence of a characteristic, so too is time unestablished. For in an ultimate sense, a characteristic, designated as intrinsic nature, is found only for existing phenomena. For example, the earth element has hardness, but time has no such characteristic. Therefore, in an ultimate sense, time does not exist. The proponent of time, however, says: 'Time is characterized by progression.' He should be asked: 'But what is this progression?' He replies: 'The proceeding of moments, instants, and so on.' That too is not so, because it is not defined as an entity distinct from form and so on. For if, in an ultimate sense, something with an undefined intrinsic nature could have progression as its characteristic, then even a hare’s horn and the like would come to possess that characteristic.

Yaṃ pana vadanti kāṇādā ‘‘aparasmiṃ aparaṃ yugapadi ciraṃ khippamiti kālaliṅgānīti liṅgasabbhāvato atthi kālo’’ti, taṃ ayuttaṃ liṅgino anupalabbhamānattā. Siddhasambandhesu hi liṅgesu liṅgamattaggahaṇena liṅgini avabodho bhaveyya. Na ca kenaci aviparītacetasā tena liṅgena saha kadāci kālasaṅkhāto liṅgī gahitapubboti. Ato na yuttaṃ ‘‘liṅgasabbhāvato atthi kālo’’ti. ‘‘Aparasmiṃ apara’’ntiādikassa visesassa nimittabhāvato yuttanti ce? Na, paṭhamajātatādinimittakattā tassa. Na ca paṭhamajātatādi nāma koci dhammo atthi aññatra samaññāmattatoti nattheva paramatthato kālo. Kiñca bhiyyo, bahūnaṃ ekabhāvāpattito. Atītādivibhāgena hi lokasamaññāvasena bahū kālabhedā. Tvañcetaṃ ekaṃ vadasīti bahūnaṃ ekabhāvābhāvato nattheva paramatthato kālo. Tathā ekassa anekabhāvāpattito. Yo hi ayaṃ ajja vattamānakālo, so hiyyo anāgato ahosi, sve atīto bhavissati. Hiyyo ca vattamāno ajja atīto ahosi, tathā sve vattamānopi aparajja. Na cekasabhāvassa anekasabhāvatā yuttāti asiddho paramatthato kālo. Dhammappavattiṃ pana upādāya kappanāmattasiddhāya lokasamaññāya atītādivibhāgato voharīyatīti vohāramattakoti daṭṭhabbo.

As for what the Kāṇādas say, "Because of the characteristics of time—such as 'after another,' 'simultaneous,' 'long,' and 'brief'—time exists by the existence of these characteristics," this is incorrect because the characterized, time, is not found. For if the characteristics were established in a valid relation, then by merely grasping the characteristics, one would understand the characterized. Yet no one with an undistorted mind has ever apprehended, through those characteristics, anything called 'time' as the characterized. Therefore, it is not correct to say, "Time exists by the existence of its characteristics." But might it be reasonable to say so because terms like 'after another,' etc., serve as distinguishing marks? No, because their distinguishing characteristic is initial arising and so on. And there is no real phenomenon called 'initial arising' and so on, apart from mere convention. Thus, ultimately, time does not exist. Moreover, time cannot exist because it would lead to many becoming one. For by worldly convention, time is divided into many distinctions like past, etc. Yet you claim it is a single entity; thus, since many cannot become one, time does not exist ultimately. Similarly, time cannot exist because one would become many. For instance, the present time today was future yesterday and will be past tomorrow. Likewise, yesterday’s present became past today, and tomorrow’s present will be past the day after tomorrow. But it is not reasonable for a single nature to have multiple natures. Thus, time is not established ultimately. Rather, one should see that divisions like past, etc., are spoken of in terms of mere convention, based on the occurrence of phenomena and established by worldly designations; it is merely a matter of usage.

Sabhāvaniyatiyadicchādayopi asiddhā. Kiṃ kāraṇā? Lakkhaṇābhāvā. Na hi sabhāvato niyatiyadicchā sambhavati. Aññathā evaṃvidho koci [Pg.67] bhāvo atthi ce, tesaṃ sabhāvasaṅkhātena lakkhaṇena bhavitabbaṃ, patiṭṭhāpakahetunā ca na catthi. Kevalaṃ panete vādā vimaddiyamānā ahetuvāde eva tiṭṭhanti, na cāhetukaṃ lokavicittaṃ visesābhāvappasaṅgato. Ahetukabhāve hi pavattiyā yvāyaṃ narasuranirayatiracchānādīsu indriyādīnaṃ viseso, tassa abhāvo āpajjati, na cāyaṃ paṇḍitehi icchito. Kiñca? Diṭṭhabhāvato. Diṭṭhā hi cakkhādito cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ bījādito aṅkurādīnaṃ pavatti, tasmāpi hetutovāyaṃ pavatti. Tathā pure pacchā ca abhāvato. Yato yato hi paccayasāmaggito yaṃ yaṃ phalaṃ nibbattati, tato pubbe pacchā ca na tassa nibbatti sambhavati, kiñca bahunā. Yadi ahetuto pavatti siyā, ahetukā pavattīti imāpi vācā yathāsakapaccayasamavāyato pure pacchā ca bhaveyyuṃ, na ca bhavanti aladdhappaccayattā, majjhe eva ca bhavanti laddhappaccayattā. Evaṃ sabbepi saṅkhatā dhammāti na sijjhati ahetuvādo. Tasmiñca asiddhe pavattiyā ahetubhāvo viya ahetupariyāyavisesabhūtā sabhāvaniyatiyadicchādayopi asiddhā eva hontīti veditabbā.

Inherent nature, necessity, chance, and so on are also unestablished. Why? Because of the absence of a characteristic. For the world's diversity does not arise from inherent nature, necessity, or chance. Otherwise, if any such state were to exist, it would have to possess a characteristic designated as its intrinsic nature, and an establishing cause; but there is none. These views, when refuted, merely amount to a doctrine of causelessness. But the world's diversity is not without a cause, for that would lead to the absence of distinctions. If arising were without a cause, the distinctions among faculties and so on in humans, gods, hell-beings, and animals would be absent—a conclusion not accepted by the wise. Furthermore, this is because of what is observed. The arising of eye-consciousness from the eye and of sprouts from seeds is seen; therefore, this arising is from a cause. Likewise, because of its absence before and after. For whenever a result is produced from an assemblage of conditions, its production is not possible before or after that. What more need be said? If arising were without a cause, then even these words, 'arising is without cause,' would arise before and after their respective combination of conditions. But they do not, because the conditions have not been obtained; they arise only in the middle, when the conditions have been obtained. Thus, since all are conditioned phenomena, the doctrine of causelessness is not established. And since that is unestablished, it should be understood that just as the causelessness of arising is unestablished, so too inherent nature, necessity, chance, and so on—which are particular varieties of the doctrine of causelessness—are also unestablished.

Yaṃ pana kāṇādā ‘‘paramāṇavo niccā, tehi dviaṇukādiphalaṃ nibbattati, tañca aniccaṃ, tassa vasenetaṃ lokavicitta’’nti vadanti, tampi micchāparikappamattaṃ. Na hi paramāṇavo nāma santi aññatra bhūtasaṅghātā. So pana aniccova, na ca niccato aniccassa nibbatti yuttā tassa kāraṇabhāvānupapattito tathā adassanato ca. Yadi ca so kassaci kāraṇabhāvaṃ gaccheyya, anicco eva siyā vikārāpattito. Na cāyaṃ sambhavo atthi, yaṃ vikāraṃ anāpajjantameva kāraṇaṃ phalaṃ nibbatteyyāti. Vikārañce āpajjati, kutassa niccatāvakāso, tasmā vuttappakārā paramāṇavo sattā aniccā, aññepi niccādibhāvena bāhirakehi parikappitā asiddhā evāti veditabbaṃ. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘dhammappabhedato pana aññassa saccikaṭṭhassa asiddhattā’’ti.

As for what the Kāṇādas say—"Atoms are permanent, and from them the dyad and subsequent things arise, which are impermanent; and due to that, this world is diverse"—this too is mere false conjecture. For there are no so-called atoms apart from aggregates of primary elements. And that aggregate is impermanent. It is not logical that the impermanent should arise from the permanent, because its being a cause is untenable and because such a thing is not seen. And if it were to become a cause for something, it would have to be impermanent because it would be subject to change. And this possibility does not exist: that a cause could produce an effect without itself undergoing change. If it undergoes change, where is there room for its permanence? Therefore, it should be understood that atoms of the kind described, if they exist, are impermanent, and that other things imagined by outsiders as permanent and so on are also unestablished. Therefore it was said: 'because apart from the distinctions of phenomena, no other true reality is established'.

Etthāha ‘‘yadi paramatthato puggalo na upalabbhati, evaṃ pana puggale anupalabbhamāne atha kasmā bhagavā ‘atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’ti (a. ni. 4.95; kathā. 22), ‘cattārome, bhikkhave, puggalā santo saṃvijjamānā lokasmi’nti [Pg.68] (a. ni. 4.95; kathā. 22) ca tattha tattha puggalassa atthibhāvaṃ pavedesī’’ti. Vineyyajjhāsayavasena. Tathā tathā vinetabbānañhi puggalānaṃ ajjhāsayavasena vineyyadamanakusalo satthā dhammaṃ desento lokasamaññānurūpaṃ tattha tattha puggalaggahaṇaṃ karoti, na paramatthato puggalassa atthibhāvato.

Here one might say: "If a person is not found in an ultimate sense, why then does the Blessed One declare in various places that a person exists, saying: 'There is a person who has undertaken practice for his own benefit' (AN 4.95; Kv 1.1), and 'Monks, these four persons exist and are found in the world' (AN 4.95; Kv 1.1)?" It is according to the inclinations of those to be trained. For the Teacher, skilled in taming those to be trained, teaches the Dhamma according to the inclinations of the particular persons to be trained. In doing so, he makes use of the term 'person' here and there in conformity with worldly convention, not because a person exists in an ultimate sense.

Apica aṭṭhahi kāraṇehi bhagavā puggalakathaṃ katheti hirottappadīpanatthaṃ, kammassakatādīpanatthaṃ, paccattapurisakāradīpanatthaṃ, ānantariyadīpanatthaṃ, brahmavihāradīpanatthaṃ, pubbenivāsadīpanatthaṃ, dakkhiṇāvisuddhidīpanatthaṃ, lokasammutiyā appahānatthañcāti. ‘‘Khandhā dhātū āyatanāni hirīyanti ottappantī’’ti hi vutte mahājano na jānāti, sammohaṃ āpajjati, paṭisattu vā hoti ‘‘kimidaṃ khandhā dhātū āyatanāni hirīyanti ottappanti nāmā’’ti. ‘‘Itthī hirīyati ottappati, puriso, khattiyo, brāhmaṇo’’ti pana vutte jānāti, na sammohaṃ āpajjati, na paṭisattu hoti, tasmā bhagavā hirottappadīpanatthaṃ puggalakathaṃ katheti. ‘‘Khandhā kammassakā, dhātuyo āyatanānī’’ti vuttepi eseva nayo. Tasmā kammassakatādīpanatthampi puggalakathaṃ katheti. ‘‘Veḷuvanādayo mahāvihārā khandhehi kārāpitā, dhātūhi, āyatanehī’’ti vuttepi eseva nayo. Tathā ‘‘khandhā mātaraṃ jīvitā voropenti, pitaraṃ, arahantaṃ, ruhiruppādakammaṃ, saṅghabhedakammaṃ karonti, dhātuyo, āyatanānī’’ti vuttepi, ‘‘khandhā mettāyanti, dhātuyo, āyatanānī’’ti vuttepi, ‘‘khandhā pubbenivāsaṃ anussaranti, dhātuyo, āyatanānī’’ti vuttepi eseva nayo. Tasmā bhagavā paccattapurisakāradīpanatthaṃ ānantariyadīpanatthaṃ brahmavihāradīpanatthaṃ pubbenivāsadīpanatthañca puggalakathaṃ katheti. ‘‘Khandhā dānaṃ paṭiggaṇhanti, dhātuyo, āyatanānī’’ti vuttepi mahājano na jānāti, sammohaṃ āpajjati, paṭisattu vā hoti ‘‘kimidaṃ khandhā dhātū āyatanāni paṭiggaṇhanti nāmā’’ti. ‘‘Puggalo paṭiggaṇhātī’’ti pana vutte jānāti, na sammohaṃ āpajjati, na paṭisattu hoti, tasmā bhagavā dakkhiṇāvisuddhidīpanatthaṃ puggalakathaṃ katheti. Lokasammutiñca buddhā bhagavanto nappajahanti lokasamaññāya lokābhilāpe ṭhitāyeva dhammaṃ desenti, tasmā bhagavā lokasammutiyā appahānatthampi puggalakathaṃ kathetīti imehi aṭṭhahi [Pg.69] kāraṇehi bhagavā puggalakathaṃ katheti, na paramatthato puggalassa atthibhāvatoti veditabbaṃ.

Furthermore, the Blessed One gives discourse concerning a person for eight reasons: to explain moral shame and moral dread, to explain ownership of kamma, to explain individual effort, to explain the heinous offenses, to explain the divine abidings, to explain the recollection of past lives, to explain the purification of offerings, and for the sake of not abandoning worldly convention. For if it were said, "The aggregates, elements, and sense bases feel shame and dread," the populace would not understand; they would become confused or even hostile, asking, "What does it mean that aggregates, elements, and sense bases feel shame and dread?" But when it is said, "A woman feels shame and dread, a man, a noble, a brahmin," they understand, do not become confused, and are not hostile. Therefore, the Blessed One gives discourse concerning a person to explain moral shame and moral dread. The same reasoning applies if it were said, "The aggregates are the owners of their kamma, as are the elements and sense bases." Therefore, he also gives discourse concerning a person to explain ownership of kamma. The same reasoning applies if it were said, "The great monasteries like the Veḷuvana were built by the aggregates, by the elements, by the sense bases." And likewise if it were said: "The aggregates deprive their mother of life, or their father, or an arahant; they shed the blood of a Tathāgata or cause a schism in the Saṅgha—as do the elements and sense bases"; or, "The aggregates abide in loving-kindness—as do the elements and sense bases"; or, "The aggregates recollect past lives—as do the elements and sense bases." Therefore, the Blessed One gives discourse concerning a person to explain individual effort, the heinous offenses, the divine abidings, and the recollection of past lives. If it were said, "The aggregates receive a gift—as do the elements and sense bases," the populace would not understand; they would become confused or even hostile, asking, "What does it mean that aggregates, elements, and sense bases receive a gift?" But when it is said, "A person receives it," they understand, do not become confused, and are not hostile. Therefore, the Blessed One gives discourse concerning a person to explain the purification of offerings. Moreover, the Blessed Buddhas do not abandon worldly convention; they teach the Dhamma while abiding by worldly designations and worldly expressions. Therefore, the Blessed One also gives discourse concerning a person for the sake of not abandoning worldly convention. It should be understood that the Blessed One gives discourse concerning a person for these eight reasons, not because a person exists in an ultimate sense.

Dhammappabhedākārenevāti yathāvuttarūpādidhammappabhedato aññassa saccikaṭṭhassa asiddhattā rūpādidhammappabhedākāreneva puggalassa upaladdhiyā bhavitabbanti attho. Tena ‘‘kiṃ tava puggalo upalabbhamāno ruppanākārena upalabbhati, udāhu anubhavanasañjānanābhisaṅkharaṇavijānanesu aññatarākārenā’’ti dasseti tabbinimuttassa sabhāvadhammassa loke abhāvato. Avisesavisesehi puggalūpalabbhassa paṭiññāpaṭikkhepapakkhā anujānanāvajānanapakkhā. Yadipime dvepi pakkhā anulomapaṭilomanayesu labbhanti, ādito pana paṭhamaṃ ṭhapetvā pavatto paṭhamanayo, itaro dutiyanti imaṃ nesaṃ visesaṃ dassento ‘‘anujānanā…pe… veditabbo’’ti āha. Yathādhikatāya laddhiyā anulomanato cettha paṭhamo nayo anulomapakkho, tabbilomanato itaro paṭilomapakkhoti vuttoti veditabbanti.

The meaning is that, since a truly existing entity is not established apart from the differentiation of phenomena such as form, etc., as previously mentioned, the apprehension of a person must be through the mode of differentiating phenomena like form, etc. Therefore, it is shown: "Is your person, when apprehended, apprehended in the mode of form, or in any one of the modes of experiencing, perceiving, volitional formations, or consciousness?" This is because there is no inherent nature of phenomena in the world apart from these. The sides of affirmation and rejection concerning the apprehension of a person, which are characterized by non-distinction and distinction, are the sides of acceptance and denial. If both these sides are obtainable in the modes of accordance and opposition, then the first mode, being initially posited, is the primary mode, while the other is the secondary. To show this distinction, it is said: "One should understand acceptance... etc." Here, the first mode, being in accordance with the way things are obtained, is the side of accordance, while the other, being in opposition to that, is the side of opposition. This should be understood.

Tena vata reti ettha tenāti kāraṇavacanaṃ. Yena puggalūpalabbho patiṭṭhapīyati, tena hetunā. Svāyaṃ hetu sāsanikassa bāhirakassa ca vasena heṭṭhā dassito eva. Hetupatirūpake cāyaṃ hetusamaññā paramatthassa adhippetattā. Heṭṭhā ‘‘ājānāhi niggaha’’nti niggahassa saññāpanamattaṃ kataṃ, taṃ idāni ‘‘yaṃ tattha vadesī’’tiādinā nigamanarūpena micchābhāvadassanena ca vibhāviyamānaṃ pākaṭabhāvakaraṇato āropitaṃ patiṭṭhāpitaṃ hotīti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘āropitattā’’ti vuttaṃ.

Here, the word "tena" is a term denoting cause. By whatever the apprehension of a person is established and grounded, by that very reason. This reason has already been shown below in terms of both the follower of the Teaching and the outsider. And this designation of "cause" is in regard to what resembles a cause, because the ultimate reality is intended. Earlier, only the making known of the 'understand the censure' was done, but now, by 'whatever you say there' and so forth, being made distinct by means of the concluding form and the showing of falsity, it becomes applied and established through making it apparent. Hence, in the commentary, it is said, "because it has been applied."

Ettha ca ‘‘puggalo upalabbhatī’’ti paṭiññāvayavo sarūpeneva dassito. ‘‘Tenā’’ti iminā sāmaññato hetāvayavo dassito. Yvāyaṃ yasmā paṭiññādhammo hutvā sadisapakkhe vijjamāno, visadisapakkhe avijjamānoyeva hetu lakkhaṇūpapanno nāma hoti, na itaro, tasmā yattha so vijjati na vijjati ca, so sadisāsadisabhāvabhinno duvidho diṭṭhantāvayavo. Yathā rūpādi upalabbhati, tathā puggalo. Yathā ca sasavisāṇaṃ na upalabbhati, na tathā puggaloti upanayo. Svāyaṃ ‘‘vattabbe kho puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’’ti imāya pāḷiyā dīpito, yo aṭṭhakathāyaṃ saddhiṃ hetudāharaṇehi ‘‘pāpanā’’ti vutto. Nigamanaṃ pāḷiyaṃ sarūpeneva āgataṃ, yā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘ropanā’’ti [Pg.70] vuttāti. Evaṃ porāṇena ñāyakkamena sādhanāvayavā niddhāretvā yojetabbā.

Here, the statement "a person is found" is shown in its own form as the proposition. "Therefore," by this, the reason is shown in a general way. Because that which, being a principle to be established, exists in the similar case but does not exist in the dissimilar case, is indeed called a reason possessing the characteristic; the other is not. Thus, where it exists and where it does not exist, that is the twofold example, distinguished by similarity and dissimilarity. Just as form, etc., is found, so is a person. Just as a hare's horn is not found, so is not a person—this is the application. This is illuminated by the passage: "It should be said that a person is found in the ultimate sense of truth," which in the commentary, along with the reason and examples, is called "establishing." The conclusion in the text comes in its own form, which in the commentary is called "the ascription." Thus, the parts of the proof should be determined and connected according to the ancient method of reasoning.

Idāni vattanena parapakkhupalakkhite hetudāharaṇe anvayabyatirekadassanavasena niddhāretvā sādhanapayogo yojetabbo. Kāraṇaṃ vattabbanti kimettha vattabbaṃ. Hetudāharaṇehiyeva hi saparapakkhānaṃ sādhanaṃ dūsanaṃ vā, na paṭiññāya, tassā sādhetabbādibhāvato. Taṃ pana dvayaṃ ‘‘tena vata re’’tiādipāḷiyā vibhāvitaṃ. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pāpanāropanāsīsena dassitaṃ. Paṭiññāṭhapanā pana tesaṃ visayadassanaṃ kathāyaṃ taṃmūlatāyāti veditabbaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘yaṃ pana vakkhatī’’tiādi. Teneva ca aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘idaṃ anuloma…pe… ekaṃ catukkaṃ veditabba’’nti vakkhati. Tathā cāha ‘‘yathā pana tatthā’’tiādi. Niggahova visuṃ vutto, na paṭikammanti adhippāyo. Visuṃ vuttoti ca pāpanāropanāhi asammissaṃ katvā visuṃ aṅgabhāvena vutto, na tadaññataro viya tadantogadhabhāvena vutto, nāpi ṭhapanā viya agaṇanupagabhāvenāti attho. Ye panāti padakāre sandhāyāha. Dutiye…pe… āpajjati tattha niggahassa ayathābhūtattā paṭikammassa ca yathābhūtabhāvatoti adhippāyo.

Now, by the current method, having determined the reason and example, which are characterized by the opponent's side, by way of showing positive and negative concomitance, the application of proof should be made. What is to be stated here by 'the reason should be stated'? For indeed, the proof or refutation of one's own and the opponent's sides is by means of the reason and example themselves, not by the proposition, because it has the nature of what is to be proven, etc. That pair is explained in the Pāli text beginning with "tena vata re." In the commentary, it is shown under the headings of 'bringing forward' and 'imposition'. The establishment of the proposition, however, should be understood as for the purpose of showing their subject matter and for the discussion being rooted in that. Therefore, he said, "but what one will say," etc. And for that reason, in the commentary, it will be said, "this is in order... one should understand it as a tetrad." And so he said, "but as there," etc. The refutation is stated separately, not as a counter-action—this is the intention. And "stated separately" means it is stated as a distinct factor, not mixed with 'bringing forward' and 'imposition'; it is not stated as being included within them like one of them, nor like an 'establishment' by way of not being counted—this is the meaning. When he says, "But those," he speaks with reference to the word analysts. In the second... it occurs there because the refutation is not as it truly is, and the counter-action is as it truly is—this is the intention.

2. Paramatthato puggalaṃ nānujānāti, vohārato pana anujānātīti sakavādimataṃ jānantenapi paravādinā chalavasena vibhāgaṃ akatvā ‘‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’’ti pucchāya katāya sakavādī tattha ayaṃ puggalavādī, imassa laddhi paṭikkhipitabbāti paramatthasaccaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘āmantā’’ti. ‘‘Na upalabbhatī’’ti hi vuttaṃ hoti. Puna itaro sammutisaccaṃ sandhāya ‘‘yo saccikaṭṭho’’tiādimāha. Tassattho – yo lokavohārasiddho saccikaṭṭho, tato eva kenaci apaṭikkhipitabbato paramatthato tato so puggalo nupalabbhatīti. Puna sakavādī pubbe paramatthasaccavasena puggale paṭikkhitte idāni sammutisaccavasenāyaṃ pucchāti mantvā taṃ appaṭikkhipanto ‘‘na hevaṃ vattabbe’’ti āha. Tenāha ‘‘attanā adhippetaṃ saccikaṭṭhamevāti sammutisaccaṃ sandhāyāti adhippāyo’’ti[Pg.71]. Evamavaṭṭhite ‘‘yadi paravādinā…pe… nārabhitabbā’’ti idaṃ na vattabbaṃ paṭhamapucchāya paramatthasaccassa saccikaṭṭhoti adhippetattā. ‘‘Atha sakavādinā…pe… āpajjatī’’ti idampi na vattabbaṃ dutiyapucchāya sammutisaccassa saccikaṭṭhoti adhippetattā.

2. In the ultimate sense, it does not acknowledge a person, but in conventional terms, it does acknowledge one—this is the view of the proponent. Even knowing this, the opponent, without making a distinction and by way of deceit, asks, "Is a person not found in the true and ultimate sense?" When such a question is posed, the proponent, referring to ultimate truth and thinking, 'This is a personalist; his view should be rejected,' says, "Yes." For what is said is, "It is not found." Then, the other, referring to conventional truth, says, "That which is the true reality..." Its meaning is this: That which is the true reality is established by worldly convention, and for that very reason is not to be rejected by anyone; is that person, therefore, not found from that in the ultimate sense? Again, the proponent, having earlier rejected the person on the basis of ultimate truth, now thinking, 'This question is on the basis of conventional truth,' and not rejecting it, says, "It should not be said thus." Therefore, it is said: 'The intention is that one refers to conventional truth as being the very true reality intended by oneself.' When this is established, the statement, "If by the opponent... it should not be undertaken," should not be said, because the first question intended the true reality to be ultimate truth. And the statement, "But if by the proponent... one falls into fault," this also should not be said, because the second question intended the true reality to be conventional truth.

Yadi ubhayaṃ adhippetanti idaṃ yadi paṭhamapucchaṃ sandhāya, tadayuttaṃ tassā paramatthasaccasseva vasena pavattattā. Atha dutiyapucchaṃ sandhāya, tassā sammutisaccavasena paṭhamatthaṃ vatvā puna missakavasena vattuṃ ‘‘sammutisaccaparamatthasaccāni vā ekato katvāpi evamāhā’’ti vuttattā tampi na vattabbameva. Dvepi saccānīti sammutiparamatthasaccāni. Tesu paramatthasaccasseva nippariyāyena saccikaṭṭhaparamatthabhāvo, itarassa upacārena. Tathā ca vuttaṃ ‘‘māyā marīci…pe… uttamaṭṭho’’ti. Tasmā sammutisaccavasena upaladdhiṃ icchantenapi paramatthasaccavasena anicchanato ‘‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’’tiādinā anuyogo yutto. ‘‘Padhānappadhānesu padhāne kiccasiddhī’’ti eteneva ‘‘na ca saccikaṭṭhekadesena anuyogo’’tiādi nivattitañca hoti saccikaṭṭhekadesabhāvasseva asiddhattā. Nāssa paramatthasaccatā anuyuñjitabbāti assa saccikaṭṭhassa paramatthasaccatā paravādinā na anuyuñjitabbā ‘‘puggalo nupalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’’ti sakavādinopi saccikaṭṭhaparamatthato tassa icchitabbattāti adhippāyo. Voharitasaccikaṭṭhassa attanā adhippetasaccikaṭṭhatāpi yuttā tassa tena adhippetattā. Svāyamattho heṭṭhā dassitoyeva. Vuttanayova dosoti ‘‘dvepi saccānī’’tiādinā anantarameva vuttaṃ sandhāyāha. Tassa pana adosabhāvo dassitoyeva. Atha na iti atha na bhūtasabhāvatthena upalabbheyyāti yojanā. Vattabboti yadettha vattabbaṃ, taṃ ‘‘yo lokavohārasiddho’’tiādinā vuttameva, tasmā ettha ‘‘paramatthato puggalaṃ nānujānātī’’tiādinā adhippāyamagganaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ.

If "both are intended," if this refers to the first question, then it is inappropriate, because that proceeds solely on the basis of ultimate truth. But if it refers to the second question, since it first states the meaning on the basis of conventional truth and then speaks again in a mixed manner, it being said, "or having combined conventional truth and ultimate truth, he spoke thus," then that too should not be said. "Both truths" means conventional and ultimate truth. Of these, only ultimate truth has the nature of true and ultimate reality in a direct sense; the other has it figuratively. And so it is said: "illusion, a mirage… the supreme meaning." Therefore, even for one who desires the apprehension of a person on the basis of conventional truth, because he does not desire it on the basis of ultimate truth, the inquiry beginning with "is a person found in the true and ultimate sense?" is appropriate. By this very principle that 'among the primary and secondary, the task is accomplished by the primary,' the objection beginning with 'and an inquiry concerning a partial true reality is not valid' is also refuted, because its very state of being a partial true reality is unestablished. "Its ultimate truthfulness should not be questioned" means that the ultimate truthfulness of this true reality should not be questioned by the opponent, because the proponent also accepts, from the standpoint of the true and ultimate reality, that 'a person is not found in the true and ultimate sense'—this is the intention. It is also appropriate for the conventionally spoken true reality to be the true reality intended by oneself, because it is intended by him as such. This very meaning has already been shown below. "The fault is in the manner stated" refers to what was said immediately before, beginning with "both truths." However, its faultlessness has already been shown. "If not" is to be construed as: if it were not found in the sense of a real nature. "What is to be said" means that what should be said here has already been stated, beginning with "that which is established by worldly convention." Therefore, here, the seeking of the intention should be understood through statements beginning with "from the ultimate standpoint, it does not acknowledge a person."

Anuññeyyametaṃ siyāti etaṃ anupalabbhanaṃ paṭhamapucchāyaṃ viya dutiyapucchāyampi anujānitabbaṃ siyā. Na vā kiñci vattabbanti atha vā kiñci na vattabbaṃ ṭhapanīyattā pañhassa. Tathā hissa ṭhapanīyākāraṃ dassento ‘‘yathā hī’’tiādimāha. Ettha ca kāmaṃ saccadvayākārena puggalo nupalabbhati, sammutiyākārena pana nupalabbhatīti upalabbhanabhāvassa vasena paṭikkhepo katoti ayamettha adhippāyo daṭṭhabbo. Anuññātaṃ paṭikkhittañcāti [Pg.72] paṭhamapucchāyaṃ anuññātaṃ, dutiyapucchāyaṃ paṭikkhittaṃ. Etaṃ chalavādaṃ nissāyāti etaṃ ekaṃyeva vatthuṃ uddissa anujānanapaṭikkhipanākāraṃ chalavacanaṃ nissāya. Tvaṃ niggahetabboti yojanā. Sambhavantassa sāmaññenāti niggahaṭṭhānabhāvena sambhavantassa anulomanayena anujānanapaṭikkhepassa samānabhāvena. Asambhavantassa kappananti paccanīkanayena tassa niggahaṭṭhānabhāvena asambhavantassa tathā kappanaṃ saṃvidhānaṃ chalavādo bhavituṃ arahati. ‘‘Atthavikappupapattiyā vacanavighāto chala’’nti vuttovāyamattho. Tenāti yathāvuttakappanaṃ chalavādoti vuttattā. Vacanasāmaññamattaṃ kappitaṃ chalaṃ vadati etenāti chalavādo. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘chalavādassa kāraṇattā chalavādo’’ti. Vacanasāmaññamattaṃ atthabhūtaṃ tadatthaṃ chalavādaṃ nissāya. ‘‘Vicāretabba’’nti vuttaṃ, kimettha vicāretabbaṃ. Yadipi pakkhassa ṭhapanāmūlakaṃ anujānanāvajānanānaṃ micchābhāvadassanaṃ tabbisayattā, pāpanāropanāhi eva pana so vibhāvīyati, na ṭhapanāyāti pākaṭoyamattho.

"This should be allowed" means: this non-apprehension should be acknowledged in the second question just as in the first. "Or nothing should be said" means: or nothing should be said, because the question is to be set aside. Thus, showing the manner of setting it aside, he says, "Just as..." and so forth. Here, this is the intention to be understood: granted, a person is not apprehended in the manner of the two truths, but the rejection of the statement 'he is not apprehended in a conventional manner' is made on the basis of the fact that he is apprehended. "Allowed and rejected" means: allowed in the first question, rejected in the second question. "This relies on deceptive argument" means: relying on deceptive speech which has the character of allowing and rejecting with reference to one and the same matter. The connection is: "You are to be refuted." "For what is possible by commonality" means: for what is possible as a ground for refutation, by the similarity of allowing and rejecting in the direct method. "The construing of what is impossible" means: by the opposing method, for what is impossible as a ground for refutation, such a construction or arrangement is fit to be a deceptive argument. This meaning has been stated: "Deception is the obstruction of speech through the occurrence of a distortion of meaning." "Therefore" means: because the aforesaid construction is called a deceptive argument. "Deceptive argument" (chalavādo) is so called because by means of it one speaks of a mere commonality of speech that has been construed as deception (chalaṃ). Thus it is said: "It is a deceptive argument because it is the cause of a deceptive argument." This is relying on a deceptive argument for the sake of that which is its actual meaning, a mere commonality of speech. It is said, "It should be investigated." What is to be investigated here? Although the demonstration of the falsity of allowing and disallowing is rooted in the setting aside of the position, since that is its subject, it is nevertheless clarified by 'bringing forward' and 'imposition', not by the 'setting aside'. This meaning is clear.

4-5. Tenāti sakavādinā. Tena niyāmenāti yena niyāmena sakavādinā catūhi pāpanāropanāhissa niggaho kato, tena niyāmena nayena. So niggaho dukkaṭo aniggahoyevāti dassento āha ‘‘aniggahabhāvassa vā upagamitattā’’ti, pāpitattāti attho. Evamevāti yathā ‘‘tayā mama kato niggaho’’tiādinā aniggahabhāvūpanayo vutto, evameva. Etassāti ‘‘tena hī’’tiādinā imāya pāḷiyā vuttassa.

4-5. 'By him' means by the proponent of his own doctrine. 'By that method' refers to the method by which the proponent of his own doctrine made a refutation by means of the four types of imputation and rejection, by that very method. That refutation was a wrong-doing and not a proper refutation at all. To show this, it is said, 'due to agreeing to the state of not being refuted,' meaning it was brought about, i.e., inflicted. 'Similarly' means just as the application of the state of not being refuted was stated by 'the refutation you made against me,' and so forth, just so. 'Of this' refers to what is stated in this passage beginning with 'therefore.'

Anulomapaccanīkavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of Conformity and Opposition is concluded.

2. Paccanīkānulomavaṇṇanā

2. The Exposition of Opposition and Conformity

7-10. Aññenāti sammutisaccabhūtena. Parassāti sakavādino. So hi paravādinā paro nāma hoti. Paṭiññāpaṭikkhepānaṃ bhinnavisayattā ‘‘avirodhitattā’’ti vuttaṃ. Abhinnādhikaraṇaṃ viya hi abhinnavisayameva viruddhaṃ nāma siyā, na itaranti adhippāyo. Tamevatthaṃ vibhāvetuṃ ‘‘na hi…pe… āpajjatī’’ti āha. Yadi evaṃ kathamidaṃ niggahaṭṭhānaṃ jātanti āha ‘‘attano [Pg.73] panā’’tiādi. Tena paṭiññāntaraṃ nāma aññamevetaṃ niggahaṭṭhānanti dasseti.

7-10. 'By another' means by way of conventional truth. 'Of another' refers to the proponent of his own doctrine. For he is called 'another' in relation to an opponent. Because the affirmation and denial have different objects, it is said to be 'non-contradictory.' For just as in a non-different subject matter, only what pertains to the same object can be called contradictory, not otherwise—this is the intended meaning. To elaborate this point, it is said, 'For indeed...does not result.' If so, how does this basis for defeat arise? He says, 'But in one's own...' and so on. Thus, he shows that another affirmation is indeed another basis for defeat.

Paccanīkānulomavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of Opposition and Conformity is concluded.

Suddhasaccikaṭṭhavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Pure Truth Section is concluded.

2. Okāsasaccikaṭṭho

2. The Section on Truth Regarding Location

1. Anulomapaccanīkavaṇṇanā

1. The Exposition of Conformity and Opposition

11. Sāmaññena vuttaṃ visesaniviṭṭhaṃ hotīti āha ‘‘sabbatthāti sabbasmiṃ sarīreti ayamattho’’ti. Sāmaññajotanā hi visese avatiṭṭhatīti visesatthinā viseso anupayujjitabboti. Etenāti desavasena sabbattha paṭikkhepavacanena.

11. What is stated generally becomes specific, hence it is said: ''Everywhere' means in the entire body—this is the meaning.' For a general indication rests upon the specific, so a specific should not be employed by one who intends a specific. 'By this' means by way of location, by the statement of rejection 'everywhere.'

3. Kālasaccikaṭṭho

3. The Section on Truth Regarding Time

1. Anulomapaccanīkavaṇṇanā

1. The Exposition of Conformity and Opposition

12. Majjhimajātikāleti paccuppannattabhāvakāle. Attabhāvo hi idha ‘‘jātī’’ti adhippeto. Tato atīto purimajātikālo, anāgato pacchimajātikālo. Imesu tīsūti sabbattha, sabbadā, sabbesūti imesu tīsu nayesu. Pāṭhassa saṃkhittatā suviññeyyāti taṃ ṭhapetvā atthassa sadisataṃ vibhāvento ‘‘idhāpi hi…pe… yojetabba’’nti āha. Etthāpi ‘‘na kenaci sabhāvena puggalo upalabbhatī’’ti ayamattho vutto hoti. Na hi kenaci sabhāvena upalabbhamānassa sakalekadesavinimutto pavattikālo nāma atthīti.

12. 'The time of middle birth' refers to the present state of existence. Here, 'birth' is intended as 'existence.' Before that is the past birth-time, and after is the future birth-time. 'In these three' means in all places, at all times, and in all things—these three methods. The condensed phrasing of the text is easily understood, so setting that aside and explaining the similarity of the meaning, he says: 'Here too... it should be applied.' Here too, this meaning is stated: 'A person is not found by any intrinsic nature.' For of that which is not found by any intrinsic nature, there is no time of occurrence separate from the whole and the part.

4. Avayavasaccikaṭṭho

4. The Section on Truth Regarding Components

1. Anulomapaccanīkavaṇṇanā

1. The Exposition of the Direct and Reverse Order

13. Tatiyanaye na sabbekadhammavinimuttaṃ pavattiṭṭhānaṃ nāma atthīti yojetabbaṃ.

13. In the third method, it should be construed that there is no place of occurrence called entirely separate from every single phenomenon.

Okāsādisaccikaṭṭho

The Section on Truth Regarding Location, etc.

2. Paccanīkānulomavaṇṇanā

2. The Exposition of the Reverse and Direct Order

14. Anulomapañcakassātiādimhi [Pg.74] aṭṭhakathāvacane. Puna tatthāti yathāvutte aṭṭhakathāvacane, tesu vā anulomapañcakapaccanīkesu. Sabbattha puggalo nupalabbhatītiādikassa pāṭhappadesassa attho ‘‘sarīraṃ sandhāyā’’tiādinā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttanayena veditabbo attho. Paṭikammādipāḷinti paṭikammaniggahaupanayananigamanapāḷiṃ. Tīsu mukhesūti ‘‘sabbatthā’’tiādinā vuttesu tīsu vādamukhesu. Paccanīkassa pāḷi vuttāti sambandho. Tanti pāḷiṃ. Saṅkhipitvā āgatattā sarūpena avutte. Suddhika…pe… vuttaṃ hoti tattha ‘‘sabbatthā’’tiādinā sarīrādino parāmasanaṃ natthi, idha atthīti ayameva viseso, aññaṃ samānanti.

14. In the commentary passage beginning 'Anulomapañcakassa' (of the fivefold direct order). Again, 'there' means in the aforementioned commentary passage, or in those direct fivefold and reverse sections. The meaning of the textual passage beginning 'a person is not found anywhere' should be understood according to the method stated in the commentary, beginning with 'with reference to the body,' etc. The 'Paṭikammādi text' means the text on preliminary procedure, refutation, application, and conclusion. 'In the three openings' means in the three modes of debate stated beginning with 'everywhere,' the text of the reverse is stated—this is the connection. 'That' means the text. Because it came condensed, it was not stated in its full form. The Suddhika...etc., is stated there. The difference is only this: there, in 'everywhere,' etc., there is no reference to the body, etc., but here there is; the rest is the same.

Saccikaṭṭhavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the True Meaning is concluded.

5. Suddhikasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā

5. The Exposition of the Simple Conjunction

17-27. Saccikaṭṭhassa, saccikaṭṭhe vā saṃsandanaṃ saccikaṭṭhasaṃsandananti samāsadvayaṃ bhavatīti dassento ‘‘saccikaṭṭhassā’’tiādimāha. Tattha saccikaṭṭhassa puggalassāti saccikaṭṭhasabhāvassa paramatthato vijjamānasabhāvassa puggalassa. Rūpādīhi saddhiṃ saṃsandananti saccikaṭṭhatāsāmaññena rūpādīhi samīkaraṇaṃ. Saccikaṭṭheti saccikaṭṭhahetu, tattha vā taṃ adhiṭṭhānaṃ katvā. ‘‘Tulyayoge samuccayo’’ti samuccayatthattā eva ca-kārassa saccikaṭṭhena upaladdhisāmaññena idha rūpamāhaṭanti tassa udāhaṭabhāvo yuttoti ‘‘yathārūpa’’nti nidassanavasena attho vutto, aññathā idha rūpassa āharaṇameva kimatthiyaṃ. Evaṃ sesadhammesupi. Yā panettha aññattapucchā, sāpi nidassanatthaṃ upabrūheti aññattanibandhanattā tassa. Opammasaṃsandane pana nidassanattho gāhīyatīti imasmiṃ suddhikasaṃsandane kevalaṃ samuccayavaseneva atthadassanaṃ yuttanti adhippāyo. Rūpādīni upādāpaññattimattattā puggalassa so tehi añño, anañño cāti na vattabboti ayaṃ sāsanakkamoti āha ‘‘rūpādīhi…pe… samayo’’ti. Anuññāyamāneti tasmiṃ samaye sutte ca appaṭikkhipiyamāne. Ayañca attho sāsanikassa paravādino vasena vuttoti veditabbaṃ.

17-27. Showing that 'saccikaṭṭhassa' and 'saccikaṭṭhe vā saṃsandanaṃ' form the two compounds 'saccikaṭṭhasaṃsandana,' he says 'saccikaṭṭhassā' and so on. Here, 'saccikaṭṭhassa puggalassa' (of the person of true meaning) means of the person whose nature is true meaning, whose nature truly exists in the ultimate sense. 'Saṃsandanaṃ with material form, etc.' means equating with material form, etc., through the commonality of being a true meaning. 'Saccikaṭṭhe' (in the true meaning) means due to the true meaning, or having made that its foundation. Because 'Tulyayoge samuccayo' (collection in equal connection) means a collection, the particle 'ca' here indicates that material form is brought up due to the commonality of apprehension as a true meaning. The appropriateness of its being cited is stated by way of illustration with 'yathārūpa' (just as material form); otherwise, what would be the purpose of merely bringing up material form here? The same applies to the remaining phenomena. The question about difference here also serves to clarify by way of illustration, as it is tied to the concept of difference. However, in the simile of conjunction, the illustrative purpose is taken, whereas in this simple conjunction, the meaning is appropriately shown solely through the method of collection—this is the intended meaning. Because material form, etc., are mere conceptual designations dependent on conditions, it cannot be said that the person is either different from them or not different—this is the method of the teaching, as stated: 'rūpādīhi…pe… samayo' (with material form, etc., ... doctrine). 'Anuññāyamāne' (being allowed) means not being rejected at that time in the discourse. And this meaning should be understood as spoken from the perspective of an opponent within the Teacher's dispensation.

‘‘Ājānāhi [Pg.75] niggaha’’nti pāṭho diṭṭho bhavissati, aññathā ‘‘paṭilomapañcakāni dassitāni, paṭikammacatukkādīni saṃkhittānī’’ti na sakkā vattunti adhippāyo. Codanāya vinā paravādino paṭijānāpanaṃ natthīti vuttaṃ ‘‘paṭijānāpanatthanti…pe… codanattha’’nti. Codanāpubbakañhi tassa paṭijānāpanaṃ. Tena phalavohārena kāraṇaṃ vuttanti dasseti. Abyākatattāti abyākaraṇīyattā, bhagavatā vā na byākatattā. Yadi ṭhapanīyattā paṭikkhipitabbanti imasmiṃ paccanīkanaye ṭhapanīyattā pañhassa sakavādinā paṭikkhipitabbaṃ. Parenapīti paravādināpi ṭhapanīyattā laddhimeva nissāya anulomanaye paṭikkhepo katoti ayamettha suddhikasaṃsandanāya adhippāyo yutto anulomepi rūpādīhi aññattacodanāyameva paravādinā paṭikkhepassa katattāti adhippāyo.

The reading 'Ājānāhi niggaha' (Understand the refutation) will have been seen; otherwise, the meaning is that it cannot be said, 'the reverse fivefold has been shown, the preliminary fourfold, etc., are concise.' It was said that there is no making an opponent admit without accusation: 'for the purpose of making admit... for the purpose of accusation.' For his admission is preceded by accusation. Therefore, he shows that the reason is stated by way of the result-designation. 'Due to being undeclared' means because it is not to be declared, or because it was not declared by the Blessed One. If it is to be set aside, it should be rejected—in this reverse method, the question should be rejected by the proponent of his own doctrine because it is to be set aside. 'By the opponent too' means even by the opponent, relying on the very doctrine of being set aside, the rejection is made in the direct method—this is the suitable meaning here for the simple conjunction. Even in the direct method, the opponent makes a rejection only in the case of an accusation of difference with form, etc.—this is the meaning.

Suddhikasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Simple Conjunction is concluded.

6. Opammasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā

6. The Exposition of the Simile Conjunction

28-36. Upaladdhisāmaññena aññattapucchā cāti iminā dvayampi uddharati upaladdhisāmaññena aññattapucchā, upaladdhisāmaññena pucchā cāti. Tattha pacchimaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘dvinnaṃ samānatā’’tiādi. Tassattho – dvinnaṃ rūpavedanānaṃ viya rūpapuggalānaṃ saccikaṭṭhena samānatā tesaṃ aññattassa kāraṇaṃ yuttaṃ na hoti. Atha kho…pe… upalabbhanīyatāti idañca saṃsandanaṃ vicāretabbaṃ. Ayaṃ hettha adhippāyo – yadi saccikaṭṭhasāmaññena rūpapuggalānaṃ upaladdhisāmaññaṃ icchitaṃ, teneva nesaṃ aññattampi icchitabbaṃ. Atha paramatthavohārabhedato tesaṃ aññattaṃ na icchitaṃ, tato eva upaladdhisāmaññampi na icchitabbanti.

28-36. By 'the question of difference by the commonality of apprehension,' etc., he extracts both: the question of difference by the commonality of apprehension, and the question by the commonality of apprehension. Here, referring to the latter, he says 'the sameness of the two,' etc. Its meaning is: just as with material form and feeling, the sameness of form and a person by way of true meaning is not a suitable reason for their difference. But... being able to be apprehended—this conjunction too should be considered. This is the intended meaning here: if the commonality of apprehension is desired for form and a person by the commonality of true meaning, then their difference should also be desired by that. But if their difference is not desired due to the distinction between ultimate and conventional usage, then by that very fact, the commonality of apprehension should also not be desired.

37-45. Upaladdhīti puggalassa upaladdhi vijjamānatā. ‘‘Paṭikammapañcaka’’nti viññāyatīti yojanā.

37-45. 'Apprehension' (upaladdhi) means the apprehension of a person, their existence. The construction is: 'Paṭikammapañcaka' (the fivefold preliminary action) is understood.

Opammasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Conjunction of Similes is concluded.

7. Catukkanayasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā

7. Exposition of the Reconciliation of the Fourfold Method

46-52. Ekadhammatopīti [Pg.76] sattapaññāsāya saccikaṭṭhesu ekadhammatopi. Etena tato sabbatopi puggalassa aññattānanujānanaṃ dasseti. Tenāha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘sakalaṃ paramatthasaccaṃ sandhāyā’’ti. Rūpādiekekadhammavasena nānuyuñjitabbo avayavabyatirekena samudāyassa abhāvato. Yasmā pana samudāyāvayavā bhinnasabhāvā, tasmā ‘‘samudāyato…pe… niggahāraho siyā’’ti paravādino āsaṅkamāha. Etaṃ vacanokāsanti yadipi sattapaññāsadhammasamudāyato puggalassa aññattaṃ na icchati tabbinimuttassa saccikaṭṭhassa abhāvato, tadekadesato panassa anaññattampi na icchateva. Na hi samudāyo avayavo hotīti. Tasmā ‘‘taṃ paṭikkhipato kiṃ niggahaṭṭhānanti vattuṃ mā labbhethā’’ti dassetuṃ ‘‘ayañcā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Rūpādidhammappabhedavibhāgamukheneva anavasesato puggaloti gahaṇākāradassanavasena pavatto paṭhamavikappo, dutiyo pana avibhāgato paramatthasaccabhāvasāmaññenāti ayaṃ imesaṃ dvinnaṃ vikappānaṃ viseso. Itīti vuttappakāraparāmasananti āha ‘‘eva’’nti.

46-52. “Even from a single principle” means even from a single one of the fifty-seven real existents. By this, it shows the non-permission of the person’s otherness from them in any way. Therefore, it is said in the commentary, “referring to the entire ultimate truth.” One should not be questioned about form, etc., by way of individual phenomena, because the aggregate does not exist apart from its components. Since, however, the aggregate and its components have distinct natures, he states the opponent's objection: “from the aggregate… he might be worthy of reproach.” This provides an opportunity for a statement: although one does not accept the otherness of the person from the aggregate of the fifty-seven phenomena—due to the absence of a real existent apart from them—one still does not accept its non-otherness from a part of that aggregate. For an aggregate is not a component. Therefore, to show that it should not be possible to say, “what ground for reproach is there for one who rejects that?”, the phrase “and this,” etc., is stated. The first alternative proceeds by way of showing the manner of grasping the 'person' completely, through the division of the distinctions of phenomena such as form, etc.; the second, however, proceeds from non-division, by the commonality of the state of being ultimate truth. This is the distinction between these two alternatives. `Iti` is a reference to the manner stated; thus, he says `evaṃ`.

Sabhāvavinibbhogatoti sabhāvena vinibbhujjitabbato. Sabhāvabhinno hi dhammo tadaññadhammato vinibbhogaṃ labhati. Tenāha ‘‘rūpato aññasabhāgattā’’ti. Rūpavajjeti rūpadhammavajje. Tīsupīti ‘‘rūpasmiṃ puggalo, aññatra rūpā, puggalasmiṃ rūpa’’nti imesu evaṃ pavattesu tīsupi anuyogesu. Sāsaniko evāyaṃ puggalavādīti katvā āha ‘‘na hi so sakkāyadiṭṭhiṃ icchatī’’ti. ‘‘Rūpavā’’ti iminā rūpena sakiñcanatāva ñāpīyati, na rūpāyattavuttitāti āha ‘‘aññatra rūpāti ettha ca rūpavā puggaloti ayamattho saṅgahito’’ti.

“From separation by inherent nature” means because of being separable by inherent nature. For a phenomenon distinct in its inherent nature obtains separation from other phenomena. Hence, it is said, “because of having an inherent nature different from form.” “Excluding form” means excluding the phenomena of form. “In the three” refers to these three inquiries that proceed thus: “Is the person in form? Is the person apart from form? Is form in the person?” Considering that this personalist is indeed one who adheres to the teaching, he says, “for he does not accept the personality-view.” By “having form,” possession by means of form is indicated, not that its existence is dependent on form. Hence, he says, “and here in ‘apart from form,’ the meaning ‘the person has form’ is included.”

Catukkanayasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Reconciliation of the Fourfold Method is concluded.

Niṭṭhitā ca saṃsandanakathāvaṇṇanā.

And the Exposition of the Discourse on Reconciliation is concluded.

8. Lakkhaṇayuttivaṇṇanā

8. Exposition of the Connection by Characteristics

54. Lakkhaṇayuttikathāyaṃ [Pg.77] ‘‘chalavasena pana vattabbaṃ ājānāhi niggaha’’nti pāṭho gahetabbo.

54. In the discourse on the connection by characteristics, the reading should be taken as, “But it should be stated in six ways—understand the reproach.”

Lakkhaṇayuttivaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Connection by Characteristics is concluded.

9. Vacanasodhanavaṇṇanā

9. Exposition on the Purification of Speech

55-59. Padadvayassa atthato ekatteti padadvayassa ekattatthe satīti attho. Parikappavacanañhetaṃ dosadassanatthaṃ ‘‘evaṃ sante ayaṃ doso’’ti. Tayidaṃ ekattaṃ upalabbhati evāti pacchimapadāvadhāraṇaṃ veditabbaṃ. ‘‘Kehici puggalo kehici na puggalo’’ti byabhicāradassanato parena na sampaṭicchitanti katvā tameva asampaṭicchitattaṃ vibhāvento ‘‘puggalassa hī’’tiādimāha. Tattha avibhajitabbatanti ‘‘upalabbhati cā’’ti evaṃ avibhajitabbataṃ. Vibhajitabbatanti ‘‘puggalo ca tadaññañca upalabbhatī’’ti evaṃ vibhajitabbataṃ. Etena ‘‘puggalo upalabbhati evā’’ti pacchimapadāvadhāraṇaṃ veditabbaṃ, na ‘‘puggalo eva upalabbhatī’’ti imamatthaṃ dasseti. Taṃ vibhāganti yathāvuttaṃ vibhajitabbāvibhajitabbaṃ vibhāgaṃ vadato sakavādino, aññassa vā kassaci. Etassāti paravādino. Yathāvuttavibhāganti ‘‘puggalo upalabbhati…pe… kehici na puggalo’’ti evaṃ pāḷiyaṃ vuttappakāraṃ vibhāgaṃ. Yathāāpāditenāti ‘‘puggalo upalabbhatīti padadvayassa atthato ekatte’’tiādinā āpāditappakārena. Na bhavitabbanti yadipi tena puggalo upalabbhati eva vuccati, upalabbhatīti pana puggalo eva na vuccati, atha kho aññopi, tasmā yathāvuttena pasaṅgena na bhavitabbaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘maggitabbo ettha adhippāyo’’ti.

55-59. “When there is a unity of meaning of the two words”: this means when the two words have a single meaning. And this is a hypothetical statement for the purpose of showing a fault, meaning, “if this is so, this is the fault.” “That this unity is indeed found”—this should be understood as an emphasis on the last word. Because of seeing the inconsistency, “by some a person, by some not a person,” and because this is not accepted by the other party, he explains that very non-acceptance, saying, “for of the person…” and so on. Therein, “indistinguishability” means the indistinguishability implied by “and it is found.” “Distinguishability” means the distinguishability implied by “the person and what is other than that are found.” By this, the emphasis on the last word in “a person is indeed found” should be understood; it does not show this meaning: “only a person is found.” “That distinction” refers to the aforesaid distinction between what is to be distinguished and what is not to be distinguished, as stated by one’s own proponent or by anyone else. “Of this” refers to the opponent. “The distinction as stated” means the kind of distinction stated in the Pāli thus: “a person is found… by some not a person.” “By the manner brought forth” means by the manner brought forth by “when there is a unity of meaning of the two words ‘a person is found’,” and so on. “It should not be” means that although it is said by him that “a person is indeed found,” it is not said that what is found is “only a person,” but rather something else too. Therefore, it should not be by the stated consequence. Hence he says, “the intention here must be sought.”

60. Atthato puggalo natthīti vuttaṃ hoti attasuññatādassanena anattalakkhaṇassa vihitattā.

60. It is said that in reality a person does not exist, because the characteristic of not-self has been established through seeing the emptiness of self.

Vacanasodhanavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Purification of Speech is concluded.

10. Paññattānuyogavaṇṇanā

10. The Exposition on the Investigation of Concepts

61-66. Rūpakāyāvirahaṃ [Pg.78] sandhāya āha, na rūpataṇhāsabbhāvaṃ. Tathā sati anekantikattā paṭikkhipitabbameva siyā, na anujānitabbanti. ‘‘Atthitāyā’’ti āhāti sambandho. Kāmībhāvassa anekantikattā kassaci kāmadhātūpapannassa kāmadhātuyā āyattattābhāvato ca kadāci bhāvassevāti yojanā.

61-66. He speaks with reference to the non-separation from the form body, not the existence of craving for form. That being so, because it is inconclusive, it should indeed be rejected, not permitted. “Of existence”—he says this as the connection. Because the state of being a sensuous being is inconclusive, and because for someone who has arisen in the sense-sphere there is an absence of dependence on the sense-sphere, the construction is: “sometimes of the state itself.”

67. Kāyānupassanāyāti kāyānupassanādesanāya. Sā hi kāyakāyānupassīnaṃ vibhāgaggahaṇassa kāraṇabhūtā, kāyānupassanā eva vā. Evaṃladdhikattāti añño kāyo añño puggaloti evaṃladdhikattā. Āhacca bhāsitanti ṭhānakaraṇāni āhantvā kathitaṃ, bhagavatā sāmaṃ desitanti attho.

67. “By the contemplation of the body” means by the instruction on the contemplation of the body. For it is the cause for those who contemplate the body in the body to grasp the distinction, or it is simply the contemplation of the body itself. “Because of holding such a view” means because of holding the view that “the body is one thing and the person is another.” “Spoken after reference” means spoken having brought up the grounds and reasons, the meaning being that it was taught by the Blessed One himself.

Paññattānuyogavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Investigation of Concepts is concluded.

11. Gatianuyogavaṇṇanā

11. The Exposition on the Investigation of Destinations

69-72. Yānissa suttāni nissāya laddhi uppannā, tesaṃ dassanato parato ‘‘tena hi puggalo sandhāvatī’’tiādinā pāḷi āgatā, purato pana ‘‘na vattabbaṃ puggalo sandhāvatī’’tiādinā, tasmā vuttaṃ ‘‘dassento…pe… bhavitabba’’nti. Dassetvāti vā vattabbanti ‘‘yānissa…pe… tāni dassetvā ‘tena hi puggalo sandhāvatī’tiādimāhā’’ti vattabbanti attho. Dassentoti vā idaṃ dassanakiriyāya na vattamānatāmattavacanaṃ, atha kho tassā lakkhaṇatthavacanaṃ, hetubhāvavacanaṃ vāti na koci doso.

69-72. A view has arisen for him based on certain suttas. Because of showing these, the Pāli text beginning with 'then the person transmigrates,' etc., comes later, while the text beginning with 'it should not be said that the person transmigrates,' etc., comes earlier. Therefore it is stated 'showing... it must be.' Or, 'having shown' should be said—the meaning is that it should be said: 'having shown those suttas... he says "then the person transmigrates," etc.' Or, this word 'showing' is not merely a word expressing the present act of showing, but rather a word expressing its characteristic, purpose, or causal nature—there is no fault in this.

91. So vattabboti so jīvasarīrānaṃ anaññatāpajjanākāro vattabbo, natthīti adhippāyo. ‘‘Rūpī attā’’ti imissā laddhiyā vasena ‘‘yena rūpasaṅkhātena attano sabhāvabhūtena sarīrena saddhiṃ gacchatī’’ti evaṃ pana atthe sati so ākāro vutto eva hoti, tathā ca sati ‘‘rūpaṃ puggaloti ananuññātattā’’ti evampi vattuṃ na sakkā. Yasmā pana ‘‘idha sarīranikkhepā’’ti anantaraṃ vakkhati, tasmā [Pg.79] ‘‘so vattabbo’’ti vuttaṃ. Nirayūpagassa puggalassa antarābhavaṃ na icchatīti idaṃ purātanānaṃ antarābhavavādīnaṃ vasena vuttaṃ. Adhunātanā pana ‘‘uddhaṃpādo tu nārako’’ti vadantā tassapi antarābhavaṃ icchanteva, keci pana asaññūpagānaṃ. Arūpūpagānaṃ pana sabbepi na icchanti. Tattha ye ‘‘saññuppādā ca pana te devā tamhā kāyā cavantī’’ti suttassa atthaṃ micchā gahetvā cutūpapātakālesu asaññīnaṃ saññā atthīti antarābhavatova asaññūpapattiṃ icchanti, tadaññesaṃ vasena ‘‘savedano…pe… paṭikkhipatī’’ti dassento ‘‘ye panā’’tiādimāha. Ke panevaṃ icchanti? Sabbatthivādīsu ekacce.

91. That should be said—that is, the mode of the life-principle and the body becoming non-different should be stated; the intention is that this does not exist. According to the view 'the self is material,' if there is the meaning that 'it goes along with its own inherent body, which is designated as form,' then that mode is indeed stated. And if that is so, it cannot be said 'form is the person,' as this is not permitted. But because he will say immediately afterwards 'here, the laying down of the body,' therefore 'that should be said' is stated. That he does not accept an intermediate existence for a person bound for hell—this is said according to the ancient proponents of intermediate existence. But the moderns, saying 'the hell-being is feet-upward,' do indeed accept an intermediate existence for such a one, and some do so for those bound for the non-percipient realm. However, none accept it for those bound for the formless realm. Therein, some misunderstand the meaning of the sutta, 'And because of the arising of perception, those devas pass away from that body,' and thus hold that non-percipient beings have perception at the times of death and rebirth, and so they accept their arising in the non-percipient realm from an intermediate existence. To show this, and to reject the view of others that the intermediate being is 'endowed with feeling...', he says 'But those who...' and so on. Who, then, hold this view? Some among the Sarvāstivādins.

92. Nevasaññānāsaññāyataneti nevasaññānāsaññāyatane bhave, acittuppāde vā saññā atthīti icchantīti na vattabbanti sambandho. Yato so saññābhavena asaṅgahito, bhavantarabhāvena ca saṅgahito.

92. In the realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception—that is, in the existence in the realm of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, or where there is no arising of consciousness, it should not be said that they hold that perception exists; this is the connection. For that is not included by way of an existence with perception, but it is included by way of an intermediate existence.

93. Indhanupādāno aggi viya indhanena rūpādiupādāno puggalo rūpādinā vinā natthīti ettha ayamadhippāyavibhāvanā – yathā na vinā indhanena aggi paññāpīyati, na ca taṃ aññaṃ indhanato sakkā paṭijānituṃ, nāpi anaññaṃ. Yadi hi aññaṃ siyā, na uṇhaṃ indhanaṃ siyā, atha anaññaṃ, nidahitabbaṃyeva dāhakaṃ siyā, evaṃ na vinā rūpādīhi puggalo paññāpīyati, na ca tehi añño, nāpi anañño sassatucchedabhāvappasaṅgatoti paravādino adhippāyo. Tattha yadi aggindhanopamā lokavohārena vuttā, apaḷittaṃ kaṭṭhādiindhanaṃ nidahitabbañca, paḷittaṃ bhāsuruṇhaṃ aggidāhakañca, tañca ojaṭṭhamakarūpaṃ pabandhavasena pavattaṃ aniccaṃ saṅkhataṃ paṭiccasamuppannaṃ. Yadi evaṃ puggalo rūpādīhi añño anicco ca āpanno, atha paramatthato ca, tasmiṃyeva kaṭṭhādisaññite rūpasaṅkhātapaḷitte yaṃ usumaṃ so aggi taṃsahajātāni tīṇibhūtāni indhanaṃ. Evampi siddhaṃ lakkhaṇabhedato aggindhanānaṃ aññattanti aggi viya indhanato rūpādīhi añño puggalo anicco ca āpajjatīti.

93. Herein is the exposition of the meaning that just as fire is dependent on fuel, so a person, being dependent on form and so on, does not exist without form and so on. Just as fire is not designated without fuel, nor can it be acknowledged as other than the fuel, nor as non-different from it. For if it were other, the fuel would not be hot; and if it were non-different, that which is to be laid down would itself be the burner. Similarly, a person is not designated without form and so on, nor is he other than them, nor non-different, because of the consequence of falling into eternalism or annihilationism—this is the opponent's intention. In that regard, if the analogy of fire and fuel is stated according to worldly convention, then unlit fuel like wood is what is laid down, while the blazing, hot fire is the burner. And that, being form with nutriment as its eighth constituent, proceeds by way of continuity, is impermanent, conditioned, and dependently arisen. If it is thus established that a person is other than form and so on, and is impermanent, then from an ultimate perspective as well: in that very thing designated as wood, etc., which is lit and designated as form, that which is heat is the fire; the three co-arisen elements are the fuel. Thus, it is established from the difference in their characteristics that fire and fuel are other than each other. Therefore, like fire from fuel, a person is other than form and so on, and is thereby established as impermanent.

Gatianuyogavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Inquiry into Destinations is concluded.

12. Upādāpaññattānuyogavaṇṇanā

12. Exposition of the Inquiry into Dependent Designations

97. Nīlaguṇayogato [Pg.80] nīlo, nīlo eva nīlako, tassa, ayaṃ panassa nīlapaññatti nīlarūpupādānāti āha ‘‘nīlaṃ…pe… paññattī’’ti. Evaṃ pana pāṭhe ṭhite nīlaṃ upādāya nīloti kathamayaṃ paduddhāroti āha ‘‘nīlaṃ rūpaṃ…pe… ettha yo puṭṭho nīlaṃ upādāya nīlo’’ti. Etthāti etasmiṃ vacane. Tadādīsūti ‘‘pītaṃ rūpaṃ upādāyā’’tiādikaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ādi-saddena gahitameva tadatthadassanavasena gaṇhāti.

97. Because of its connection with the quality of blue, it is 'blue'; 'blue' itself is 'the blue one'. Regarding this, its designation as 'blue' is based on blue form; thus he says, 'blue... designation.' However, with this reading established, how is this phrase, 'blue based on blue,' extracted? He says, 'The blue form... here, the one who was asked, "blue based on blue."' 'Here' means in this statement. Regarding 'and so on': he takes up what is already included in the commentary by the word 'etc.', such as 'based on yellow form,' for the purpose of showing its meaning.

98. Vuttanti ‘‘maggakusalo’’tiādīsu chekaṭṭhaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Kusalapaññattiṃ kusalavohāraṃ.

98. 'It is said' means: it is stated with reference to the meaning of 'skilled' in phrases such as 'skilled in the path.' He explains the designation 'wholesome,' that is, the conventional expression 'wholesome'.

112. Pubbapakkhaṃ dassetvā uttaramāhāti paravādī pubbapakkhaṃ dassetvā sakavādissa uttaramāha.

112. 'Having shown the prior position, he states the rejoinder' means the opponent, having shown the prior position, states the rejoinder to the proponent.

115. ‘‘Rūpaṃ rūpavā’’tiādinayappavattaṃ paravādivādaṃ bhindituṃ ‘‘yathā na nigaḷo negaḷiko’’tiādinā sakavādivādo āraddhoti āha ‘‘yassa rūpaṃ so rūpavāti uttarapakkhe vuttaṃ vacanaṃ uddharitvā’’ti.

115. To refute the opponent's argument, which proceeds according to the method 'form is one who has form,' and so on, the proponent's argument is initiated with 'just as a fetter is not the fettered one,' and so on. Thus he says: 'Having quoted the statement, "He who has form is one with form," which was stated in the rejoinder...'

118. Viññāṇanissayabhāvūpagamananti cakkhuviññāṇassa nissayabhāvūpagamanaṃ. Tayidaṃ visesanaṃ cakkhussāti imināva siddhanti na kataṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ.

118. 'Attaining the state of being a support for consciousness' means attaining the state of being a support for eye-consciousness. This specification is established by the word 'eye' itself, so it should be understood as not having been explicitly stated.

Upādāpaññattānuyogavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Inquiry into Dependent Designations is concluded.

13. Purisakārānuyogavaṇṇanā

13. Exposition of the Inquiry into Human Endeavor

123. Kammānanti kusalākusalakammānaṃ. Taggahaṇeneva hi taṃtaṃkiccakaraṇīye kiriyānampi saṅgaho daṭṭhabbo. Nipphādakappayojakabhāvenāti kārakakārāpakabhāvena.

123. 'Of actions' means of wholesome and unwholesome actions. Indeed, by the inclusion of these, the inclusion of functional actions, which perform their respective duties, should also be understood. 'By way of being the accomplisher and the instigator' means by way of being the agent and the one who causes the action.

125. Kammakārakassa puggalassa yo añño puggalo kārako. Tenapīti kārakakārakenapi. Tassāti kārakakārakassa. Aññanti aññaṃ kammaṃ. Evanti iminā vuttappakārena. Tehi tehi kārakehi puggalā viya aññāni kammāni karīyantīti dasseti. Tenāha [Pg.81] ‘‘kammavaṭṭassa anupacchedaṃ vadantī’’ti. Evaṃ sante puggalassa kārako, kammassa kārakoti ayaṃ vibhāgo idha anāmaṭṭho hoti, tathā ca sati kārakaparamparāya vacanaṃ virujjheyyāti āha ‘‘puggalassa…pe… vicāretabbameta’’nti. Tassa kārakanti puggalassa kārakaṃ. Idañcāti na kevalaṃ puggalakārakassa kammakārakatāpattiyeva doso, atha kho idaṃ kammakārakatāya kārakaparamparāpajjanampi vicāretabbaṃ, na yujjatīti attho. Puggalānañhi paṭipāṭiyā kārakabhāvo kārakaparamparā.

125. The doer of the person who is the doer of an action. 'Even by that' means even by the doer of the doer. 'Of that' refers to the doer of the doer. 'Another' means another action. 'Thus' means in this stated manner. It shows that other actions are performed by those various doers, just as persons are. Therefore, he says, 'they speak of the non-interruption of the cycle of action.' This being the case, the distinction here between 'the doer of the person' and 'the doer of the action' is not considered. And if that were so, the statement about the succession of doers would be contradicted. Hence, he says, 'the person... this should be considered.' 'The doer of that' means the doer of the person. 'And this' means: not only is there the fault that the doer of the person incurs the state of being the doer of the action, but this incurring of a succession of doers from the state of being the doer of the action should also be considered; the meaning is that this is not logical. For the succession of doers is the state of being a doer in sequence for persons.

170. Eko antoti ‘‘gāho’’ti sassatagāhasaṅkhāto antoti attho.

170. 'One extreme' means the extreme designated as the grasping at eternalism; this is the meaning.

176. Siyā añño, siyā anañño, siyā na vattabbo ‘‘aññoti vā anaññoti vā’’ti, evaṃ pavattanigaṇṭhavādasadisattā so eva eko neva so hoti, na aññoti laddhimattaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘idaṃ pana natthevā’’ti. Parassa icchāvasenevāti paravādino laddhivaseneva. Ekaṃ anicchantassāti ekaṃ ‘‘so karoti, so paṭisaṃvedetī’’ti gahaṇaṃ sassatadiṭṭhibhayena paṭikkhipantassa itaraṃ ucchedaggahaṇaṃ āpannaṃ. Tañca paṭikkhipantassa aññaṃ missakaṃ niccāniccaggahaṇaṃ, vikkhepaggahaṇañca āpannaṃ. Kārakavedakicchāya ṭhatvāti sveva kārako vedako cāti imasmiṃ ādāye ṭhatvā. Taṃtaṃanicchāyāti tassa tassa vādassa asampaṭicchanena. Āpannavasenapīti āpannagāhavasenapi ayaṃ anuyogo vuttoti yojanā. Sabbesaṃ āpannattāti heṭṭhā vuttanayena sabbesaṃ vikappānaṃ anukkamena āpannattā nāyamanuyogo katoti yojanā. Ekekassevāti tesu visuṃ visuṃ ekekasseva āpannattā. Tantivasena pana te vikappā ekajjhaṃ dassetvāti adhippāyo. Ekato yojetabbaṃ catunnampi pañhānaṃ ekato puṭṭhattā.

176. Because of its similarity to the doctrine of the Nigaṇṭhas, which proceeds thus: 'It may be another, it may not be another, it may not be said "it is another or it is not another,"' it is merely the view that 'it is neither that same one, nor another.' Therefore, he says, 'But this is not the case.' 'According to the inclination of another' means according to the doctrine of the opponent. 'For one who does not accept one' means for one who rejects the notion 'he does, he experiences' out of fear of the eternalist view, the other grasping of annihilationism is incurred. And for one who rejects that, another mixed grasping of permanence and impermanence, as well as the grasping of equivocation, is incurred. 'Standing on the position of doer and experiencer' means standing on this principle that the same one is the doer and the experiencer. 'By not accepting each of those' means by not accepting each of those doctrines. 'Even by way of having incurred' means this inquiry is stated even by way of having incurred a grasping; this is the connection. 'Because all have incurred' means this inquiry is not made because all the alternatives, by the method stated previously, have been incurred in sequence; this is the connection. 'Each one individually' means because each one of them has incurred it individually. But the intention is that, according to the text, those alternatives are shown together. It should be construed together, because all four questions are asked together.

Purisakārānuyogavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Inquiry into Human Endeavor is concluded.

Kalyāṇavaggo niṭṭhito.

The Kalyāṇa Chapter is concluded.

14. Abhiññānuyogavaṇṇanā

14. Exposition of the Inquiry into Higher Knowledge

193. Vikubbatīti [Pg.82] ettha iti-saddo ādiattho, pakārattho vā. Tena ‘‘dibbāya sotadhātuyā saddaṃ suṇātī’’tiādikaṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Abhiññānuyogo daṭṭhabboti yojanā. Tadabhiññāvatoti āsavakkhayābhiññāvato. Arahato sādhananti arahato saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena puggalattābhāvasādhanaṃ. Tabbhāvassāti arahattassa. Arahattadhārānañhi khandhā nāma puggalattaṃ tassapi hotīti.

193. 'Vikubbati'—here, the word 'iti' has the meaning of 'and so forth' or 'manner.' Therefore, it includes such things as, 'he hears sounds with the divine ear-element,' and so on. The inquiry into higher knowledge should be understood—this is the connection. 'One possessing that higher knowledge' means one possessing the higher knowledge of the destruction of the taints. 'Establishing the Arahant' means establishing the non-existence of a person for the Arahant in the ultimate sense of reality. 'Of that state' refers to arahantship. For indeed, for those who possess arahantship, there are aggregates by name, and for him there is also personhood.

Abhiññānuyogavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Inquiry into Higher Knowledge is concluded.

15-18. Ñātakānuyogādivaṇṇanā

15-18. The Exposition of the Inquiry into Relatives, etc.

209. Tatiyakoṭibhūtassāti tatiyakoṭisabhāvassa saṅkhatāsaṅkhatavinimuttasabhāvassa. Sabhāvassāti ca sabhāvadhammassa. Laddhiṃ nigūhitvāti puggalo neva saṅkhato, nāsaṅkhatoti laddhiṃ avibhāvetvā.

209. 'Of one who has become the third category' means of one who has the nature of the third category, the nature of being released from the conditioned and the unconditioned. And 'of its nature' means of the real phenomenon. 'Having concealed the view' means not making clear the view that a person is neither conditioned nor unconditioned.

Ñātakānuyogādivaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Inquiry into Relatives, etc., is concluded.

19. Paṭivedhānuyogādivaṇṇanā

19. The Exposition of the Inquiry into Penetration, etc.

218. Pajānanaṃ nāma na hoti nibbidādīnaṃ appaccayattā. Paricchedanasamatthatañca dassetīti sambandho.

218. There is no such thing as understanding, because of the non-conditionality of disenchantment and so on. And it shows the ability to delimit; this is the connection.

228. Saharūpabhāvo rūpena samaṅgitā, vinārūpabhāvo tato vinissaṭatāti tadubhayaṃ rūpassa abbhantaragamanaṃ bahinikkhamanañca hoti. Tasmā taṃ dvayaṃ saharūpabhāvavinārūpabhāvānaṃ lakkhaṇavacananti vuttaṃ.

228. 'The state with form' is being endowed with form; 'the state without form' is being separated from it. Thus, both of these are the entering into and emerging from form. Therefore, it is said that these two are a statement of the characteristic of the state with form and the state without form.

237. Oḷārikoti thūlo. Āhito ahaṃ māno etthāti attā, attabhāvo. So eva yathāsakaṃ kammunā paṭilabhitabbato paṭilābho. Padadvayenapi kāmāvacarattabhāvo kathito. Manomayo attapaṭilābho rūpāvacarattabhāvo. So hi jhānamanena nibbattattā [Pg.83] manomayo. Arūpo attapaṭilābhoti arūpāvacarattabhāvo. So hi rūpena amissitattā arūpoti evamettha attho veditabbo. ‘‘Attā’’ti pana jīve lokavohāro niruḷho, asatipi jīve tathāniruḷhaṃ lokavohāraṃ gahetvā sammāsambuddhāpi voharantīti dassento ‘‘iti imā lokassa samaññā, yāhi tathāgato voharatī’’ti vatvā idāni yathā voharanti, taṃ pakāraṃ vibhāvento ‘‘aparāmasa’’ntiādimāha.

237. 'Gross' means coarse. 'Self' (attā) or 'individuality' (attabhāvo) is so called because 'I-conceit' is placed (āhito) therein (ettha). That very individuality is an 'acquisition' (paṭilābho) because it is to be acquired (paṭilabhitabbato) according to one's own kamma. By these two terms, the sense-sphere individuality is described. The mind-made acquisition of self is the fine-material sphere individuality, for it is mind-made because it is produced by the mind of jhāna. The formless acquisition of self is the immaterial sphere individuality, for it is formless because it is unmixed with form; thus, the meaning here should be understood. However, the term 'self' (attā) is a conventional expression for a living being, well-established in the world. Even though there is no living being, the Perfectly Enlightened Ones also use such a well-established worldly convention. To show this, having said, 'These are the world's designations, which the Tathāgata uses,' and now explaining the manner in which they use them, he said, 'without grasping,' and so on.

Paccattasāmaññalakkhaṇavasenāti kakkhaḷaphusanādisalakkhaṇavasena aniccatādisāmaññalakkhaṇavasena ca. Imināti ‘‘paccattasāmaññalakkhaṇavasenā’’tiādinā vuttena paramatthato puggalābhāvavacanena. Ito purimāti tattha tattha sakavādipaṭikkhepādivibhāvanavasena pavattā ito atthasaṃvaṇṇanato purimā. Imināti vā ‘‘yathā rūpādayo dhammā’’tiādinā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttavacanena. Yathā cāti ettha ca-saddo samuccayattho. Tena samaññānatidhāvanaṃ sampiṇḍeti. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – yathā parāmāso ca na hoti janapadaniruttiyā abhinivisitabbato, yathā ca samaññātidhāvanaṃ na hoti, evaṃ ito purimā ca atthavaṇṇanā yojetabbā. Samaññātidhāvane hi sati sabbalokavohārūpacchedo siyāti.

'By means of individual and general characteristics' means by means of the individual characteristic of hardness in touch, etc., and by means of the general characteristics of impermanence, etc. 'By this' means by this statement declaring the absence of a person in the ultimate sense, beginning with 'by means of individual and general characteristics.' 'Before this' means the explanations that proceeded before this exposition of the meaning, by way of refuting one's own doctrine, etc., here and there. Or 'by this' means by the statement in the commentary beginning with 'just as material qualities and other phenomena.' And in 'just as,' the word 'and' has a cumulative meaning. Thereby it includes the non-overrunning of conventions. This is what is said: Just as there is no grasping, since one should not be insistent on local dialects, and just as there is no overrunning of conventions, so too should the preceding exposition of the meaning be connected. For if there were an overrunning of conventions, the cessation of all worldly communication would result.

Tasmā saccanti yasmā tattha paramatthākāraṃ anāropetvā samaññaṃ nātidhāvanto kevalaṃ lokasammutiyāva voharati, tasmā saccaṃ paresaṃ avisaṃvādanato. Tathakāraṇanti tatho avitatho dhammasabhāvo kāraṇaṃ pavattihetu etassāti tathakāraṇaṃ, paramatthavacanaṃ, aviparītadhammasabhāvavisayanti attho. Tenāha ‘‘dhammānaṃ tathatāya pavatta’’nti.

Therefore, it is 'truth' (sacca) because, not imposing an ultimate aspect thereon, not overrunning the convention, one speaks merely according to worldly convention; therefore, it is truth because it does not mislead others. 'Having a true cause' (tathakāraṇa) means that for which the true, non-deceptive nature of phenomena is its cause, its reason for occurring; this is a term for ultimate reality, meaning its sphere is the non-perverted nature of phenomena. Therefore, he said, 'proceeded in accordance with the thusness of phenomena.'

Paṭivedhānuyogādivaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Inquiry into Penetration, etc., is concluded.

Puggalakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Person is concluded.

2. Parihānikathā

2. The Discourse on Decline

1. Vādayuttiparihānikathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Exposition of the Discourse on Decline in Relation to Debate

239. Idaṃ [Pg.84] suttanti idaṃ lakkhaṇamattaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. ‘‘Pañcime, bhikkhave, dhammā samayavimuttassa bhikkhuno parihānāya saṃvattantī’’ti (a. ni. 5.149-150) idampi hi suttaṃ anāgāmiādīnaṃyeva parihāninissayo, na arahato. Samayavimuttoti aṭṭhasamāpattilābhino sekkhassetaṃ nāmaṃ. Yathāha –

239. 'This sutta'—this should be seen as merely an indication. For this sutta, 'Monks, these five things lead to the decline of a bhikkhu who is liberated at a time' (AN 5.149–150), is also a basis for the decline of non-returners and others, not of an Arahant. 'Liberated at a time' is a designation for a trainee who has gained the eight attainments. As it is said:

‘‘Katamo ca puggalo samayavimutto? Idhekacco puggalo kālena kālaṃ samayena samayaṃ aṭṭha vimokkhe kāyena phusitvā viharati, paññāya cassa disvā ekacce āsavā parikkhīṇā honti. Ayaṃ vuccati puggalo samayavimutto’’ti (pu. pa. 1).

'And what kind of person is liberated at a time? Here, a certain person, from time to time, on occasion, dwells having attained the eight liberations with the body, and some of his taints are destroyed through seeing with wisdom. This is called a person liberated at a time' (Pug 1.4).

‘‘Parihānidhammo’’ti ca puthujjano ca ekacco ca sekkho adhippeto, na arahāti. Tasmāti yasmā yathādassitāni suttāni anāgāmiādīnaṃ parihāniladdhiyā nissayo, na arahato, tasmā. Taṃ nissāya taṃ apekkhitvā yasmā ‘‘arahatopī’’ti ettha arahatopi parihāni, ko pana vādo anāgāmiādīnanti ayamattho labbhati, tasmā pi-saddasampiṇḍitamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘arahatopi…pe… yojetabba’’nti āha. Yasmā vā kāmañcettha dutiyasuttaṃ sekkhavasena āgataṃ, paṭhamatatiyasuttāni pana asekkhavasenapi āgatānīti tesaṃ laddhi, tasmā ‘‘arahatopī’’ti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘idaṃ suttaṃ arahato’’tiādi.

And by 'one who is subject to decline,' an ordinary person and a certain trainee are intended, not an Arahant. 'Therefore' means: because the suttas as shown are a basis for the doctrine of the decline of non-returners and others, not of an Arahant, for that reason. Relying on that and considering it, since from the phrase 'even of an Arahant' the meaning is obtained that even an Arahant may decline—what need is there to speak of non-returners and others?—therefore, showing the meaning included by the particle 'pi,' he said, 'Even of an Arahant... should be connected.' Or, because although here the second sutta is presented in terms of a trainee, while the first and third suttas are also presented in terms of non-trainees—such is their doctrine—therefore, 'even of an Arahant' is said in the commentary. For that reason, he said, 'This sutta is of an Arahant,' and so on.

Tatiyasminti ‘‘sabbesaññeva arahantānaṃ parihānī’’ti etasmiṃ pañhe. So hi ‘‘sabbeva arahanto’’tiādinā āgatesu tatiyo pañho. Tesanti mudindriyānaṃ. Tatiyasmimpīti pi-saddo vuttatthasamuccayo. Tena paṭhamapañhaṃ samuccinoti ‘‘tatthapi tikkhindriyā adhippetā’’ti.

'In the third' means in this question, 'Is there decline for all Arahants?' For it is the third question among those that are presented beginning with 'Are all Arahants...?' 'Of them' means of those with dull faculties. 'In the third also'—the particle 'pi' is for combining the stated meaning. Thereby it combines the first question: 'There too, those with keen faculties are intended.'

Soyeva na parihāyatīti sotāpannoyeva sotāpannabhāvato na parihāyatīti attho. Na cettha sakadāgāmibhāvāpattiyā sotāpannabhāvāpagamo parihāni hoti visesādhigamabhāvato. Pattavisesato [Pg.85] hi parihānīti. Itareti sakadāgāmiādikā. Uparimaggatthāyāti uparimaggattayapaṭilābhatthāya ‘‘niyato’’ti vuttamatthaṃ aggahetvā.

'He himself does not decline' means that a stream-enterer does not decline from the state of a stream-enterer. And here, the departure from the state of a stream-enterer by the attainment of the state of a once-returner is not a decline, because it is the attainment of a higher distinction. For decline is from a special state attained. 'The others' means once-returners and so on. 'For the sake of a higher path' means for the sake of attaining the three higher paths, without grasping the meaning stated as 'fixed'.

Vādayuttiparihānikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Decline in Relation to Debate is concluded.

2. Ariyapuggalasaṃsandanaparihānikathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Exposition of the Discourse on Decline by Comparing Noble Persons

241. Tatoti arahattato. Tatthāti dassanamaggaphale. Vāyāmenāti vipassanussāhanena. Tadanantaranti sotāpattiphalānantaraṃ. Paṭhamaṃ dassanamaggaphalānantaraṃ arahattaṃ pāpuṇāti, tato parihīno puna vāyamanto tadanantaraṃ na arahattaṃ pāpuṇātīti kā ettha yuttīti adhippāyo. Paravādī nāma yuttampi vadati ayuttampīti kiṃ tassa vāde yuttigavesanāyāti pana daṭṭhabbaṃ. Aparihānasabhāvo bhāvanāmaggo ariyamaggattā dassanādassanamaggo viya. Na cettha asiddhatāsaṅkā lokuttaramaggassa parassapi ariyamaggabhāvassa siddhattā, nāpi lokiyamaggena anekantikatā ariyasaddena visesitattā. Tathā na viruddhatā dutiyamaggādīnaṃ bhāvanāmaggabhāvassa oḷārikakilesappahānādīnañca parassapi āgamato siddhattā.

241. “From that” means from arahantship. “There” means in the path and fruit of vision. “With effort” means through the exertion of insight. “Immediately after that” means immediately after the fruit of stream-entry. The intention is: what is the reason that one who first attains arahantship immediately after the path and fruit of vision, but having fallen away from that, when striving again, does not attain arahantship immediately after that? It should be noted, however, that an opponent speaks both reasonably and unreasonably, so why search for reasoning in his argument? The path of development has the nature of non-decline, because it is a noble path, like the path of vision. And here there is no doubt of it being unestablished, because the supramundane path’s nature as a noble path is established even for the opponent. Nor is there any ambiguity due to the mundane path, because it is specified by the word “noble.” Likewise, there is no contradiction, since the status of the second path and so on as the path of development, and the abandoning of the grosser defilements and so on, are established for the opponent as well through the scriptures.

Ariyapuggalasaṃsandanaparihānikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Discourse on Comparing the Decline of Noble Individuals is concluded.

3. Suttasādhanaparihānikathāvaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of the Discourse on Decline from an Attainment Established by Sutta

265. Puggalapaññattiaṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘patti, phusanā’’ti ca paccakkhato adhigamo adhippetoti vuttaṃ ‘‘pattabbaṃ vadatīti āha phusanāraha’’nti.

265. In the commentary to the Puggalapaññatti, it is said that 'patti, phusanā' refers to direct attainment. 'He speaks of something to be attained, therefore it is said to be worthy of contact.'

267. Katasanniṭṭhānassāti imasmiṃ sattāhe māse utumhi antovasse vā aññaṃ ārādhessāmīti katanicchayassa.

267. “One who has made a resolution” means one who has made a firm decision that “Within this week, month, season, or rains-retreat period, I will accomplish something further.”

Suttasādhanaparihānikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Discourse on Decline from an Attainment Established by Sutta is concluded.

Parihānikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Discourse on Decline is concluded.

3. Brahmacariyakathā

3. The Discourse on the Holy Life

1. Suddhabrahmacariyakathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Discourse on the Pure Holy Life

269. Heṭṭhāpīti [Pg.86] paranimmitavasavattidevehi heṭṭhāpi. Maggabhāvanampi na icchantīti viññāyati ‘‘idha brahmacariyavāso’’ti iminā ‘‘dvepi brahmacariyavāsā natthi devesūti upaladdhivasenā’’ti vuttattā.

269. “Even below” means even below the Paranimmitavasavattī devas. It is understood that they do not desire even the development of the path, because by the phrase, “Here is the holy life,” it is stated, “Both holy lives do not exist among the devas, according to what has been ascertained.”

270. Tassevāti paravādino eva. Puggalavasenāti ‘‘gihīnañceva ekaccānañca devāna’’nti evaṃ puggalavasena. Tassāti paravādino. Paṭikkhepo na yuttoti evaṃ puggalavasena atthayojanā na yuttāti adhippāyo. Puggalādhiṭṭhānena pana katāpi atthavaṇṇanā okāsavasena paricchijjatīti nāyaṃ doso. Tassāyaṃ adhippāyoti ayaṃ ‘‘gihīnañcevā’’tiādinā vutto tassa paravādino yadi adhippāyo, evaṃ saññāya paravādino sakavādinā samānādāyoti na niggahāraho siyā. Tenāha ‘‘saka…pe… tabbo’’ti. Paṭhamaṃ pana anujānitvā pacchā paṭikkhepeneva niggahetabbatā veditabbā. Keci ‘‘yattha natthi pabbajjā, natthi tattha brahmacariyavāsoti pucchāya ekaccānaṃ manussānaṃ maggappaṭivedhaṃ sandhāya paravādino paṭikkhepo. Yadipi so devānaṃ maggappaṭilābhaṃ na icchati, sambhavantaṃ pana sabbaṃ dassetuṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘gihīna’micceva avatvā ‘ekaccānañca devāna’nti vutta’’nti vadanti, taṃ na sundaraṃ ‘‘sandhāyā’’ti vuttattā, purimoyevattho yutto.

270. “Tassevāti” means of the opponent. “Puggalavasenāti” means “by way of individuals,” as in “of householders and of some devas.” “Tassāti” means of the opponent. “Paṭikkhepo na yuttoti” means that the application of meaning by way of individuals is not proper—this is the intention. However, an explanation of meaning made with individuals as its basis is limited by context, and so this is not a fault. “This is his intention”—if this is the opponent’s intention as stated in “of householders and so on,” then, with this understanding, the opponent, having the same view as the proponent, would not be worthy of censure. Hence it is said, “his own… should be…” But it should be understood that he is to be censured first by conceding and afterwards by refuting. Some say: “The opponent’s refutation to the question, ‘Where there is no going forth, is there no dwelling in the holy life there?’ is with reference to the path-penetration of some human beings. Although he does not accept the attainment of the path by devas, in order to show everything that is possible, the commentary states ‘and of some devas’ without saying just ‘of householders.’” This is not well-reasoned, because it is said “with reference to,” and the earlier explanation is more appropriate.

Suddhabrahmacariyakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Discourse on the Pure Holy Life is concluded.

2. Saṃsandanabrahmacariyakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Discourse on Comparing the Holy Life

273. Rūpāvacaramaggenāti rūpāvacarajjhānena. Tañhi rūpabhavūpapattiyā upāyabhāvato maggoti vutto. Yathāha ‘‘rūpupapattiyā maggaṃ bhāvetī’’ti (dha. sa. 160). Idanti idaṃ rūpāvacarajjhānaṃ. ‘‘Idhavihāyaniṭṭhahetubhūto rūpāvacaramaggo’’tiādikaṃ dīpentaṃ vacanaṃ anāgāmimaggassa tabbhāvadīpakena ‘‘idha bhāvitamaggo’’tiādikena kathaṃ sametīti codetvā yathā sameti[Pg.87], taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘pubbe panā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha ‘‘pubbe’’ti iminā ‘‘idha bhāvitamaggo’’tiādikaṃ vadanti, idhāpi pana ‘‘rūpāvacaramaggenā’’tiādikaṃ. Tattha anāgāmī evāti anāgāmiphalaṭṭho eva. Jhānānāgāmīti asamucchinnajjhattasaṃyojanopi rūpabhave uppajjitvā anāvattidhammamaggaṃ bhāvetvā tattheva parinibbāyanato. Adhippāyoti yathāvutto dvinnaṃ aṭṭhakathāvacanānaṃ avirodhadīpako adhippāyo.

273. “By the path of the form realm” means by the jhāna of the form realm. For that is called a path because it is a means for rebirth in the form realm. As it is said: “One develops the path for rebirth in the form realm” (Dhs. 160). “This” means this jhāna of the form realm. Having raised the objection, “How does the statement beginning ‘The form-realm path is the cause for being established in this state of abiding,’ which explains this, fit with the phrase ‘the path developed here,’ etc., which indicates the state of the non-returner’s path?”—in order to show how it fits, the passage beginning “But previously” is stated. There, by “previously” is meant those who say “the path developed here,” etc., while here it is “by the path of the form realm,” etc. There, “only the non-returner” means only one standing in the fruit of non-returning. “A jhāna non-returner” is so-called because, although the internal fetters are not cut off, one is reborn in the form realm and, having developed the path of the state of non-returning, attains final Nibbāna right there. The intention is the intention that shows the non-contradiction between the two commentarial statements, as has been explained.

Idhāti kāmaloke. Tatthāti brahmaloke. Ettha ca paravādī evaṃ pucchitabbo ‘‘tīhi, bhikkhave, ṭhānehī’’ti suttaṃ kiṃ yathārutavasena gahetabbatthaṃ, udāhu sandhāyabhāsitanti? Tattha jānamāno sandhāyabhāsitanti vadeyya. Aññathā ‘‘paranimmitavasavattideve upādāyā’’tiādi vattuṃ na sakkā ‘‘deve ca tāvatiṃse’’ti vuttattā. Yathā hi tassa ‘‘seyyathāpi devehi tāvatiṃsehi saddhiṃ mantetvā’’tiādīsu viya sakkaṃ devarājānaṃ upādāya kāmāvacaradevesu tāvatiṃsadevā pākaṭā paññātāti tesaṃ gahaṇaṃ, na teyeva adhippetāti suttapadassa sandhāyabhāsitatthaṃ sampaṭicchitabbaṃ, evaṃ ‘‘idha brahmacariyavāso’’ti etthāpi anavajjasukhaabyāsekasukhanekkhammasukhādisannissayabhāvena mahānisaṃsatāya sāsane pabbajjā ‘‘idha brahmacariyavāso’’ti imasmiṃ sutte adhippetā. Sā hi uttarakurukānaṃ devānañca anokāsabhāvato dukkarā dullabhā ca. Tattha sūriyaparivattādīhipi devesu maggapaṭilābhāya atthitā vibhāvetabbā, uttarakurukānaṃ pana visesānadhigamabhāvo ubhinnampi icchito evāti.

“Here” means in the desire realm. “There” means in the Brahmā realm. Here, the opponent should be asked: “Should the sutta ‘Monks, by three grounds’ be taken according to its literal meaning, or is it spoken with an implicit meaning?” One who knows would say it is spoken with an implicit meaning. Otherwise, it would not be possible to say “with reference to the Paranimmitavasavattī devas,” because it is said “and the Tāvatiṃsa devas.” For just as in passages like “just as when consulting with the Tāvatiṃsa devas,” with reference to Sakka, king of the devas, the Tāvatiṃsa devas are prominent and well-known among the desire-realm devas, so they are mentioned, but they alone are not intended—thus the meaning of the sutta passage should be accepted as spoken with an implicit meaning—so too here, in “here is the holy life,” the going forth in the Dispensation is intended in this sutta, which is of great benefit because it is a support for blameless happiness, unadulterated happiness, the happiness of renunciation, and so on. For that is difficult and rare for the inhabitants of Uttarakuru and for the devas, because there is no opportunity. There, the existence of the attainment of the path among the devas, such as those of the Sūriyaparivatta, should be made clear, but the non-attainment of special distinction by the inhabitants of Uttarakuru is indeed wished for by both parties.

Saṃsandanabrahmacariyakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Discourse on Comparing the Holy Life is concluded.

Brahmacariyakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Discourse on the Holy Life is concluded.

3. Odhisokathāvaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of the Odhiso Discourse

274. Odhisoti bhāgaso, bhāgenāti attho. Bhāgo nāma yasmā ekadeso hoti, tasmā ‘‘ekadesena ekadesenā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tattha yadi catunnaṃ maggānaṃ vasena samudayapakkhikassa kilesagaṇassa catubhāgehi pahānaṃ ‘‘odhiso pahāna’’nti adhippetaṃ, icchitamevetaṃ sakavādissa ‘‘tiṇṇaṃ saṃyojanānaṃ parikkhayā diṭṭhigatānaṃ pahānāyā’’ti [Pg.88] ca ādivacanato. Yasmā pana maggo catūsu saccesu nānābhisamayavasena kiccakaro, na ekābhisamayavasenāti paravādino laddhi, tasmā yathā ‘‘maggo kālena dukkhaṃ parijānāti, kālena samudayaṃ pajahatī’’tiādinā nānakkhaṇavasena saccesu pavattatīti icchito, evaṃ paccekampi nānakkhaṇavasena pavatteyya. Tathā sati dukkhādīnaṃ ekadesaekadesameva parijānāti pajahatīti dassetuṃ pāḷiyaṃ ‘‘sotāpatti…pe… ekadese pajahatī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Sati hi nānābhisamaye paṭhamamaggādīhi pahātabbānaṃ saṃyojanattayādīnaṃ dukkhadassanādīhi ekadesaekadesappahānaṃ siyāti ekadesasotāpattimaggaṭṭhāditā, tato eva ekadesasotāpannāditā ca āpajjati anantaraphalattā lokuttarakusalānaṃ, na ca taṃ yuttaṃ. Na hi kālabhedena vinā so eva sotāpanno, asotāpanno cāti sakkā viññātuṃ. Tenāha ‘‘ekadesaṃ sotāpanno, ekadesaṃ na sotāpanno’’tiādi.

274. 'Odhiso' means 'partially,' that is, 'by a part.' Since 'bhāga' means a part, it is therefore said, 'by one part, by one part.' Here, if by 'partial abandonment' is intended the abandonment of the group of defilements belonging to the side of arising in four parts by means of the four paths, this is indeed desired by the proponent of his own doctrine, from such statements as 'through the destruction of the three fetters' and 'for the abandonment of wrong views.' However, since the path performs its function in the four truths by way of diverse realizations, not by way of a single realization—this is the tenet of the opponent—therefore, just as it is held that the path proceeds in the truths by way of different moments, as in 'the path at one time fully understands suffering, at another time abandons the origin,' and so on, so too it might proceed with respect to each truth by way of diverse realizations. That being so, to show that it fully understands and abandons suffering and so on only part by part, it is stated in the Pāḷi, 'stream-entry... abandons a part,' and so on. For if there are diverse realizations, there would be a part-by-part abandonment of the three fetters and so on—which are to be abandoned by the first path and so on—through the seeing of suffering and so on. This would lead to the state of being on the partial stream-entry path, and so on. From that, due to the immediate fruition of supramundane wholesome states, the state of being a partial stream-enterer, and so on, would arise; but this is not proper. For without a difference in time, it is not possible to know that the very same person is a stream-enterer and not a stream-enterer. Therefore, it is said, 'partially a stream-enterer, partially not a stream-enterer,' and so on.

Apicāyaṃ nānābhisamayavādī evaṃ pucchitabbo ‘‘maggañāṇaṃ saccāni paṭivijjhantaṃ kiṃ ārammaṇato paṭivijjhati, udāhu kiccato’’ti. Yadi ārammaṇatoti vadeyya, tassa vipassanāñāṇassa viya dukkhasamudayānaṃ accantaparicchedasamucchedā na yuttā tato anissaṭattā, tathā maggadassanaṃ. Na hi sayameva attānaṃ ārabbha pavattatīti yuttaṃ, maggantaraparikappanāyaṃ anavaṭṭhānaṃ āpajjatīti, tasmā tīṇi saccāni kiccato, nirodhaṃ kiccato ārammaṇato ca paṭivijjhatīti evamasammohato paṭivijjhantassa maggañāṇassa nattheva nānābhisamayo. Vuttañhetaṃ ‘‘yo, bhikkhave, dukkhaṃ passati, dukkhasamudayampi so passatī’’tiādi. Na cetaṃ kālantaradassanaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. ‘‘Yo nu kho, āvuso, dukkhaṃ passati, dukkhasamudayampi so passati, dukkhanirodhampi…pe… dukkhanirodhagāminipaṭipadampi so passatī’’ti (saṃ. ni. 5.1100) ekasaccadassanasamaṅgino aññasaccadassanasamaṅgibhāvavicāraṇāyaṃ tadatthasādhanatthaṃ āyasmatā gavaṃpatittherena ābhatattā paccekañca saccattayadassanassa yojitattā. Aññathā purimadiṭṭhassa puna adassanato samudayādidassane dukkhādidassanamayojanīyaṃ siyā. Na hi lokuttaramaggo lokiyamaggo viya katakāribhāvena pavattati samucchedakattā. Tathā yojane ca sabbaṃ dassanaṃ [Pg.89] dassanantaraparanti dassanānuparamo siyā. Evaṃ āgamato yuttito ca nānābhisamayassa asambhavato paccekaṃ maggānaṃ odhiso pahānaṃ natthīti niṭṭhamettha gantabbaṃ.

Moreover, this proponent of diverse realizations should be asked thus: 'When path-knowledge penetrates the truths, does it penetrate them by way of object or by way of function?' If he were to say 'by way of object,' then, like insight-knowledge, the complete comprehension and eradication of suffering and its origin would not be proper, because of not being released from them; similarly with the seeing of the path. For it is not proper that the path should arise by taking itself as an object, as this would lead to an infinite regress in postulating other paths. Therefore, for path-knowledge that penetrates without confusion in this way—penetrating the three truths by way of function, and cessation by way of both function and object—there is indeed no diverse realization. For it has been said: 'Bhikkhus, whoever sees suffering also sees the origin of suffering,' and so on. And this was not said with reference to seeing at different times. For it was adduced by the Venerable Gavampati Thera to establish that meaning in the inquiry into whether one endowed with seeing one truth is also endowed with seeing the other truths, and because the seeing of each of the three truths was connected. Otherwise, since what was previously seen is not seen again, the seeing of suffering and so on would be unconnected with the seeing of the origin and so on. For the supramundane path does not proceed like the mundane path in the manner of doing what has been done, because it is an eradicator. And if it were so connected, all seeing would be dependent on another seeing, and there would be no end to seeing. Thus, since a diverse realization is impossible according to both scripture and reason, it should be concluded here that there is no partial abandonment by each of the paths.

Odhisokathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on Partial Abandonment is concluded.

4. Jahatikathāvaṇṇanā

4. Explanation of the Discussion on 'Abandons'

1. Nasuttāharaṇakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Discussion on Not Adducing a Sutta

280. Yadipi pāḷiyaṃ ‘‘tayo magge bhāvetī’’ti vuttaṃ, maggabhāvanā pana yāvadeva kilesasamucchindanatthāti ñatvā ‘‘kiccasabbhāvanti tīhi pahātabbassa pahīnata’’nti āha. Tattha tīhīti heṭṭhimehi tīhi ariyamaggehi pahātabbassa ajjhattasaṃyojanassa pahīnataṃ samucchindananti attho. Taṃ pana kiccanti adhobhāgiyasaṃyojanesu maggassa pahānābhisamayakiccaṃ. Teneva maggenāti anāgāmimaggeneva. Etaṃ na sametīti evaṃ magguppādato pageva kāmarāgabyāpādā pahīyantīti laddhikittanaṃ iminā maggassa kiccasabbhāvakathanena na sameti na yujjati. Tasmāti iminā yathāvuttameva virodhaṃ paccāmasati. Pahīnānanti vikkhambhitānaṃ. Yo hi jhānalābhī jhānena yathāvikkhambhite kilese maggena samucchindati, so idhādhippeto. Tenāha ‘‘dassanamagge…pe… adhippāyo’’ti.

280. Although it is said in the Pāḷi, 'One develops the three paths,' knowing that the development of the path is for the purpose of eradicating defilements, he says, 'The existence of the function means the abandonment of what is to be abandoned by the three.' Herein, 'by the three' means the eradication, the abandonment, of the internal fetters that are to be abandoned by the three lower noble paths. That function, however, is the path's function of realization through abandonment with regard to the lower-part fetters. 'By that very path' means by the non-returner path alone. 'This does not agree' means that the assertion of the tenet that sensual desire and ill will are abandoned even before the arising of the path does not agree, does not accord, with this statement about the existence of the path's function. 'Therefore'—with this, he touches upon the very contradiction mentioned. 'Of the abandoned' means of the suppressed. For one who has attained jhāna and eradicates with the path the defilements that have been suppressed by jhāna—that is what is intended here. Therefore he said, 'on the path of seeing... is the intention.'

Jahatikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on 'Abandons' is concluded.

5. Sabbamatthītikathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Explanation of the Discussion on 'All Exists'

1. Vādayuttivaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Logic of Argumentation

282. Sabbaṃ atthīti ettha yasmā paccuppannaṃ viya atītānāgatampi dharamānasabhāvanti paravādino laddhi, tasmā sabbanti kālavibhāgato atītādibhedaṃ sabbaṃ. So pana ‘‘yampi natthi, tampi atthī’’ti kālavimuttassa vasena anuyogo, taṃ atippasaṅgadassanavasena paravādipaṭiññāya dosāropanaṃ. Nayadassanaṃ vā atītānāgatānaṃ natthibhāvassa. Atthīti [Pg.90] pana ayaṃ atthibhāvo yasmā desakālākāradhammehi vinā na hoti, tasmā taṃ tāva tehi saddhiṃ yojetvā anuyogaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘sabbattha sabbamatthī’’tiādinā pāḷi pavattā. Tattha yadipi sabbatthāti idaṃ sāmaññavacanaṃ, taṃ pana yasmā visesaniviṭṭhaṃ hoti, parato ca sabbesūti dhammā vibhāgato vuccanti, tasmā oḷārikassa pākaṭassa rūpadhammasamudāyassa vasena atthaṃ dassetuṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘sabbatthāti sabbasmiṃ sarīre’’ti vuttaṃ, nidassanamattaṃ vā etaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tathā ca kāṇādakāpilehi paṭiññāyamānā ākāsakālādisattapakatipurisā viya paravādinā paṭiññāyamānaṃ sabbaṃ sabbabyāpīti āpannameva hotīti. ‘‘Sabbattha sarīre’’ti ca ‘‘tile tela’’nti viya byāpane bhummanti sarīrapariyāpannena sabbena bhavitabbanti vuttaṃ ‘‘sirasi pādā…pe… attho’’ti.

282. Regarding 'All exists,' here, because it is the opponent's tenet that the past and future, like the present, have an enduring nature, therefore 'all' means everything divided by time into past, and so on. But that is an interrogation by way of what is timeless, implying 'what does not exist, that too exists'; this is an attribution of fault to the opponent's assertion by way of showing an over-extension. Or it is a way of showing the non-existence of the past and future. Now, since this 'existence' does not occur without place, time, mode, and phenomena, therefore, to present the interrogation by first connecting it with these, the Pāḷi proceeds with 'everywhere, all exists,' and so on. Here, although 'everywhere' is a general term, since it is invested with specifics, and further on, phenomena are spoken of by division as 'in all,' therefore, to show the meaning by way of the gross and manifest aggregate of material phenomena, it is said in the commentary, ''everywhere' means in the entire body.' Or this should be seen as a mere illustration. And thus, just as space, time, etc., the seven prakṛtis, and puruṣa are asserted by the followers of Kaṇāda and Kapila, so too it necessarily follows that the 'all' asserted by the opponent is all-pervading. And 'everywhere in the body' is a locative of pervasion, like 'oil in sesame seeds,' meaning it must be with all that is included in the body; this is stated as 'in the head are the feet... the meaning is...'

Sabbasmiṃ kāle sabbamatthīti yojanā. Etasmiṃ pakkheyevassa aññavādo paridīpito siyā ‘‘yaṃ atthi, attheva taṃ, yaṃ natthi, nattheva taṃ, asato natthi sambhavo, sato natthi vināso’’ti. Evaṃ sabbenākārena sabbaṃ sabbesu dhammesu sabbaṃ atthīti atthoti sambandho. Imehi pana pakkhehi ‘‘sabbaṃ sabbasabhāvaṃ, anekasattinicitābhāvā asato natthi sambhavo’’ti vādo paridīpito siyā. Yogarahitanti kenaci yuttāyuttalakkhaṇasaṃyogarahitaṃ. Taṃ pana ekasabhāvanti saṃyogarahitaṃ nāma atthato ekasabhāvaṃ, ekadhammoti attho. Etena devavādīnaṃ brahmadassanaṃ atthevātivādo paridīpito siyā. Atthīti pucchatīti yadi sabbamatthīti tava vādo, yathāvuttāya mama diṭṭhiyā sammādiṭṭhibhāvo atthīti ekantena tayā sampaṭicchitabbo, tasmā ‘‘kiṃ so atthī’’ti pucchatīti attho.

The interpretation is that everything exists at all times. In this regard, another doctrine might be elucidated: 'What exists, truly exists; what does not exist, truly does not exist. From the non-existent, there is no arising; from the existent, there is no destruction.' Thus, in every mode, everything exists in all phenomena; this is the connection, namely, 'it exists.' By these arguments, the statement 'Everything is of one nature, because of the non-existence of a collection of manifold powers, for from the non-existent there is no arising' might be elucidated. 'Devoid of connection' means devoid of any connection characterized by being connected or unconnected. However, that which is called 'devoid of connection' is in essence of one nature; the meaning is 'a single phenomenon.' By this, the overstatement 'it certainly exists' of the Brahmā-view of the divine proponents might be elucidated. The question 'Does it exist?' means: if your doctrine is that everything exists, then the state of right view, according to my aforementioned view, must be entirely accepted by you as existing. Therefore, the meaning is that he asks, 'Does it exist?'

Vādayuttivaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Logic of Argumentation is concluded.

2. Kālasaṃsandanakathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Explanation of the Discussion on the Junction of Times

285. Atītā …pe… karitvāti etthāyaṃ saṅkhepattho – atītaṃ anāgatanti rūpassa imaṃ visesaṃ, evaṃ visesaṃ vā rūpaṃ aggahetvā paccuppannatāvisesavisiṭṭharūpameva appiyaṃ paccuppannarūpabhāvānaṃ samānādhikaraṇattā etasmiṃyeva [Pg.91] visaye appetabbaṃ, vacīgocaraṃ pāpetabbaṃ satipi nesaṃ visesanavisesitabbatāsaṅkhāte vibhāge tathāpi avibhajitabbaṃ katvāti. Yasmā pana pāḷiyaṃ ‘‘paccuppannanti vā rūpanti vā’’ti paccuppannarūpasaddehi tadatthassa vattabbākāro itisaddehi dassito, tasmā ‘‘paccuppannasaddena…pe… vuttaṃ hotī’’ti āha. Rūpapaññattīti rūpāyatanapaññatti. Sā hi sabhāvadhammupādānā tajjāpaññatti. Tenevāha ‘‘sabhāvaparicchinne pavattā vijjamānapaññattī’’ti. Rūpasamūhaṃ upādāyāti taṃtaṃattapaññattiyā upādānabhūtānaṃ abhāvavibhāvanākārena pavattamānānaṃ rūpadhammānaṃ samūhaṃ upādāya. Upādānupādānampi hi upādānamevāti. Tasmāti samūhupādāyādhīnatāya avijjamānapaññattibhāvato. Vigamāvattabbatāti vigamassa vatthabhāvāpagamassa avattabbatā. Na hi odātatāvigamena avatthaṃ hoti. Na pana yuttā rūpabhāvassa vigamāvattabbatāti yojanā. Rūpabhāvoti ca rūpāyatanasabhāvo cakkhuviññāṇassa gocarabhāvo. Na hi tassa paccuppannabhāvavigame vigamāvattabbatā yuttā.

285. Herein, the condensed meaning of 'having made past... and so forth' is this: without grasping this distinction of form as past or future, or such a distinguished form, only the present form, distinguished by its present characteristic, should be applied to this very subject, because of the co-referentiality of present forms, and should be brought into the range of speech. Even though there is a division of them designated as 'to be distinguished and not to be distinguished', still, having made it undivided. Since in the Pali text, 'present' or 'form' is indicated by terms like 'paccuppanna' and 'rūpa,' the manner of expressing that meaning is shown by the word 'iti.' Therefore, it is said, 'By the term 'present'... it is stated.' The designation of form refers to the designation of the form base. Indeed, it is a designation born of that, having intrinsic phenomena as its basis. Hence, it is said, 'It occurs as an existing designation, delimited by intrinsic nature.' Taking the aggregate of form means taking the aggregate of form phenomena that occur in the mode of envisioning the non-existence of those which are the basis for individual designations of self. For even the basis of the basis is indeed the basis. Therefore, because of its dependence on the aggregate as a basis, it is a designation of something non-existent. The unstateability of cessation means the unstateability of the cessation of the substantial state of the object. For it is not the case that the disappearance of whiteness makes something unsupported. However, the unstateability of cessation is not appropriate for the nature of form; this is the connection. The nature of form refers to the intrinsic nature of the form base, the object-field of eye-consciousness. Indeed, it is not fitting for the unstateability of cessation to apply to the cessation of its present nature.

Kālasaṃsandanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on the Junction of Times is concluded.

Vacanasodhanavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Purification of Speech

288. Anāgataṃ vā paccuppannaṃ vāti ettha vā-saddo aniyamattho yathā ‘‘khadire vā bandhitabbaṃ palāse vā’’ti. Tasmā ‘‘hutvā hotī’’ti ettha hoti-saddo anāgatapaccuppannesu yaṃ kiñci padhānaṃ katvā sambandhaṃ labhatīti dassento ‘‘anāgataṃ…pe… daṭṭhabba’’nti āha. Tattha paccuppannaṃ hontanti paccuppannaṃ jāyamānaṃ paccuppannabhāvaṃ labhantaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘taññeva anāgataṃ taṃ paccuppannanti laddhivasenā’’ti. Tampi hutvā hotīti yaṃ anāgataṃ hutvā paccuppannabhāvappattiyā ‘‘hutvā hotī’’ti vuttaṃ, kiṃ tadapi puna hutvā hotīti pucchati. Tabbhāvāvigamatoti paccuppannabhāvato hutvāhotibhāvānupagamato. Paccuppannābhāvatoti paccuppannatāya abhāvato.

288. "Whether future or present"—here, the word "or" (vā) has the meaning of indefiniteness, just as in "one should bind with either khadira wood or palāsa wood." Therefore, in "having been, it becomes," the word "becomes" (hoti) indicates that it obtains a connection by making either the future or the present primary. Hence, showing this, it is said, "the future... should be seen." There, "present becomes" means the present, arising, attains the state of being present. Therefore it is said, "that very future is the present by way of attainment." And as for "having been, it becomes," that which, being future, having become, attains the state of being present, is said to be "having been, it becomes." Is that too again "having been, it becomes"? This is the question. "Without the disappearance of that state"—because there is no return from the state of being present to the state of "having been, it becomes." "Due to the absence of the present state"—due to the absence of the present.

Vacanaṃ [Pg.92] arahatīti iminā vacanamatte na koci dosoti dasseti. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – yadipi tassa puna hutvā bhūtassa puna hutvāhotibhāvo natthi, punappunaṃ ñāpetabbatāya pana dutiyaṃ tato parampi tathā vattabbataṃ arahatīti ‘‘āmantā’’ti paṭijānātīti. Dhammeti sabhāvadhamme. Tappaṭikkhepato adhamme abhāvadhamme. Tenāha ‘‘sasavisāṇe’’ti.

By 'the statement is fit,' it is shown that there is no fault in the mere statement. This is what is meant: even if there is no repeated 'having been, it becomes' for what has already become by having been, yet, for the sake of repeated understanding, it is fit to be spoken thus a second time and even further—hence, he agrees, saying, 'certainly.' 'Dhamma' means inherent nature. By rejecting that, it is 'adhamma,' the nature of non-existence. Hence, it is said, 'like a hare's horn.'

Paṭikkhittanayenāti ‘‘hutvā hoti, hutvā hotī’’ti ettha pubbe yadetaṃ tayā ‘‘anāgataṃ hutvā paccuppannaṃ hotī’’ti vadatā ‘‘taṃyeva anāgataṃ taṃ paccuppanna’’nti laddhivasena ‘‘anāgataṃ vā paccuppannaṃ vā hutvā hotī’’ti vuttaṃ, ‘‘kiṃ te tampi hutvā hotī’’ti pucchite yo paravādinā hutvā bhūtassa puna hutvāabhāvato ‘‘na hevā’’ti paṭikkhepo kato, tena paṭikkhittanayena. Svāyaṃ yadeva rūpādi anāgataṃ, tadeva paccuppannanti satipi atthābhede anāgatapaccuppannanti pana attheva kālabhedoti taṃkālabhedavirodhāya paṭikkhepo pavattoti āha ‘‘paṭikkhittanayenāti kālanānattenā’’ti. Tena hi so ayañca paṭikkhepo nīto pavattitoti. Paṭiññātanayenāti idampi yathāvuttapaṭikkhepānantaraṃ yaṃ paṭiññātaṃ, taṃ sandhāyāha. Yathā hi sā paṭiññā atthābhedena nītā pavattitā, tathāyampi. Tenevāha ‘‘atthānānattenā’’ti, anāgatādippabhedāya kālapaññattiyā upādānabhūtassa atthassa abhedenāti attho. Yathā upādānabhūtarūpādiatthābhedepi tesaṃ khaṇattayānāvatti taṃsamaṅgitā anāgatapaccuppannabhāvāvattitā, tathā tattha vuccamānā hutvāhotibhāvā yathākkamaṃ purimapacchimesu pavattitā purimapacchimakiriyāti katvāti imamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘atthānānattaṃ…pe… paṭijānātī’’ti vatvā puna ‘‘atthānānattameva hī’’tiādinā tameva atthaṃ samattheti. Yathā pana ‘‘taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīra’’nti paṭijānantassa jīvova sarīraṃ, sarīrameva jīvoti jīvasarīrānaṃ anaññattaṃ āpajjati, evaṃ ‘‘taññeva anāgataṃ taṃ paccuppanna’’nti ca paṭijānantassa anāgatapaccuppannānaṃ anaññattaṃ āpannanti paccuppannānāgatesu vuttā hotibhāvahutvābhāvā anāgatapaccuppannesupi āpajjeyyunti vuttaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘evaṃ sante anāgatampi hutvāhoti nāma, paccuppannampi hutvāhotiyeva nāmā’’ti.

By 'the method of refutation' (paṭikkhittanayena), it is meant that when, in the context of 'having been, it becomes, having been, it becomes,' previously, when you said 'the future, having been, becomes the present,' and by way of acceptance, 'that very future is the present,' it was said 'the future or the present, having been, it becomes.' When asked, 'Does that too, having been, become?', the opponent made the refutation 'Certainly not,' because what had been cannot be again. This is by that method of refutation. Even though there is no difference in meaning when that very form etc. which is future is also present, yet there is indeed a difference in time in 'future and present.' Therefore, the refutation proceeds due to the contradiction of that temporal difference, as he says, 'The method of refutation refers to the difference in time.' Thus, that refutation is brought into effect. The method of acknowledgment refers to what is acknowledged after the aforementioned refutation. Just as that acknowledgment was presented based on the non-difference in meaning, so too is this. Hence, it is said, 'due to the non-difference in meaning,' meaning that the essence, which serves as the basis for the temporal designation that distinguishes future, etc., is undivided. Just as, although the essence of form, etc., which serves as the basis, is undivided, their non-recurrence in the three moments and the consequent alternation of future and present states, so too here, the states of 'having been, it becomes' spoken there are presented successively as earlier and later actions. To illustrate this meaning, he says, 'He acknowledges the non-difference in meaning…' and then, 'Indeed, it is the non-difference in meaning alone…' thus confirming the same point. Just as one who acknowledges 'that life is that body' implies that life is the body, and the body is life, leading to the non-distinction of life and body, so too, one who acknowledges 'that very future is the present' risks implying the non-distinction of future and present. Thus, the states of 'being' and 'having been' stated regarding the present and future would also apply to the future and present. As the commentary says, 'In that case, even the future would be called 'having been, it becomes,' and the present would likewise be called 'having been, it becomes.''

Anuññātapañhassāti [Pg.93] ‘‘taññeva anāgataṃ taṃ paccuppannanti? Āmantā’’ti evaṃ atthānānattaṃ sandhāya anuññātassa atthassa. Ñātuṃ icchito hi attho pañho. Doso vuttoti anāgataṃ hutvā paccuppannabhūtassa puna anāgataṃ hutvā paccuppannabhāvāpattisaṅkhāto doso vutto purimanaye. Pacchimanaye pana anāgatapaccuppannesu ekekassa hutvāhotibhāvāpattisaṅkhāto doso vuttoti attho. Paṭikkhittapañhanti ‘‘taṃyeva anāgataṃ taṃ paccuppannanti? Na hevaṃ vattabbe’’ti evaṃ kālanānattaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhittapañhaṃ. Tenāti anāgatapaccuppannānaṃ hotihutvābhāvapaṭikkhepena. Codetīti anāgataṃ tena hoti nāma, paccuppannaṃ tena hutvā nāma, ubhayampi anaññattā ubhayasabhāvanti codeti. Etthāti ‘‘hutvā hotī’’ti etasmiṃ pañhe kathaṃ hoti dosoti codetīti. ‘‘Tassevā’’ti pariharati. Kathaṃ katvā codanā, kathañca katvā parihāro? Anujānanapaṭikkhepānaṃ bhinnavisayatāya codanā, atthābhedakālabhedavisayattā abhinnādhāratāya tesaṃ parihāro. Tassevāti hi paravādino evāti attho.

By 'the question regarding what is allowed,' it refers to the meaning that is allowed, by referring to the non-difference in meaning, as in 'Is that very future the present?' 'Yes.' Indeed, the meaning desired to be known is the question. The fault stated: the fault described in the former method is the designation of the recurrence of the state of 'having been future, becoming present' for that which has already become present by having been future. In the latter method, the fault described is the designation of the occurrence of the state of 'having been, it becomes' for each of the future and present. The rejected question: 'Is that very future the present?' 'It should not be said thus,' thus, referring to the diversity of time, the question is rejected. Therefore: by rejecting the states of 'being' and 'having been' for the future and present. He accuses: 'The future is called 'is' by that, the present is called 'has been' by that; both are not different, both have the same nature,' thus he accuses. Here: in the question 'having been, it is,' how is there a fault? Thus he accuses. 'Of that very,' he defends. How is the accusation made, and how is the defense? The accusation is made by the distinct objects of allowance and rejection; their defense is made by the non-different support due to the non-difference in meaning but the diversity in time. Indeed, 'of that very' means 'of the opponent himself.'

Tadubhayaṃ gahetvāti ‘‘taṃ anāgataṃ taṃ paccuppanna’’nti ubhayaṃ ekajjhaṃ gahetvā. Ekekanti tesu ekekaṃ. Ekekamevāti ubhayaṃ ekajjhaṃ aggahetvā ekekameva visuṃ visuṃ imasmiṃ pakkhe tathā na yuttanti attho. Esa nayoti atidesaṃ katvā saṃkhittattā taṃ dubbiññeyyanti ‘‘anāgatassa hī’’tiādinā vivarati. Paṭijānitabbaṃ siyā anāgatapaccuppannānaṃ yathākkamaṃ hotihutvābhāvatoti adhippāyo. ‘‘Yadetaṃ tayā’’tiādinā pavatto saṃvaṇṇanānayo purimanayo, tattha hi ‘‘yadi te anāgataṃ hutvā’’tiādinā hutvāhotibhāvo codito. ‘‘Aparo nayo’’tiādiko dutiyanayo. Tattha hi ‘‘anāgatassa…pe… hutvāhotiyeva nāmā’’ti anāgatādīsu ekekassa hutvāhotināmatā coditā.

By 'taking both,' it means taking both 'that future, that present' together. 'Each' means each one of them. 'Each only' means that, without taking both together, it is not fitting for each one separately in this context. By 'this is the method,' it means that because it is concise, having made an indication, it is hard to understand, thus it is explained by 'of the future,' etc. The intention is that it should be acknowledged that the future and present have, in order, the states of 'being' and 'having been.' 'What is that by you,' etc., the course of explanation that proceeds is the former method; there, 'if for you the future having been,' etc., the state of 'having been, it becomes' is questioned. 'Another method,' etc., is the second method. There, 'of the future... indeed the name of having been, it becomes,' in the future, etc., the naming of each as 'having been, it becomes' is questioned.

Vacanasodhanavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the clarification of the statement is concluded.

Atītañāṇādikathāvaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Discourse on the Knowledge of the Past, and So Forth.

290. Kathaṃ [Pg.94] vuccatīti kasmā vuttaṃ. Tenāti hi iminā dutiyapucchāya ‘‘atītaṃ ñāṇa’’nti idaṃ paccāmaṭṭhaṃ, tañca paccuppannaṃ ñāṇaṃ, atītadhammārammaṇatāya atītanti vuttaṃ. Tenāha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘puna puṭṭho atītārammaṇaṃ paccuppannaṃ ñāṇa’’ntiādi.

290. Why is it said? This means, why was it spoken? By this, in the second question, 'knowledge of the past' is referred to. And that is present knowledge, but because it has past phenomena as its object, it is called 'past.' Therefore, the commentary says, 'When asked again, it is present knowledge with a past object,' etc.

Atītañāṇādikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Knowledge of the Past, and So Forth, is concluded.

Arahantādikathāvaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Discourse on the Arahant, and So Forth.

291. ‘‘Arahaṃ khīṇāsavo’’tiādinā suttavirodho pākaṭoti idameva dassento ‘‘yuttivirodho…pe… daṭṭhabbo’’ti āha. Tattha anānattanti aviseso. Evamādikoti ādi-saddena katakiccatābhāvo anohitabhāratāti evamādīnaṃ saṅgaho daṭṭhabbo.

291. 'The Arahant, one whose taints are destroyed,' etc., the contradiction with the Sutta is evident. Showing just this, he said, 'The contradiction in reasoning... should be seen.' Herein, 'anānatta' means 'no distinction.' By 'and so forth,' it should be understood that the word 'ādi' (etc.) includes such terms as 'the state of having done what was to be done' and 'the state of not having laid down the burden'.

Arahantādikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Arahant, and So Forth, is concluded.

Padasodhanakathāvaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Discourse on Word Analysis.

295. Yo atītasaddābhidheyyo attho, so atthisaddābhidheyyoti dvepi samānādhikaraṇatthāti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘atītaatthisaddānaṃ ekatthattā’’ti, na, atītasaddābhidheyyasseva atthisaddābhidheyyattā. Tenāha ‘‘atthisaddatthassa ca nvātītabhāvato’’ti. Tena kiṃ siddhanti āha ‘‘atītaṃ nvātītaṃ, nvātītañca atītaṃ hotī’’ti. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – yadi tava matena atītaṃ atthi, atthi ca nvātītanti atītañca no atītaṃ siyā, tathā atthi no atītaṃ atītañca no atītaṃ atītaṃ siyāti, yathā ‘‘atītaṃ atthī’’ti ettha atītameva atthīti nāyaṃ niyamo gahetabbo anatītassapi atthibhāvassa icchitattā. Tenevāha ‘‘atthi siyā atītaṃ, siyā nvātīta’’nti. Yena hi ākārena atītassa atthibhāvo paravādinā icchito, tenākārena anatītassa anāgatassa paccuppannassa ca so icchito. Kena pana ākārena icchitoti[Pg.95]? Saṅkhatākārena. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘tenātītaṃ nvātītaṃ, nvātītaṃ atīta’’nti. Tasmā atītaṃ atthiyevāti evamettha niyamo gahetabbo. Atthibhāve hi atītaṃ niyamitaṃ, na atīte atthibhāvo niyamito, ‘‘na pana nibbānaṃ atthī’’ti ettha pana nibbānameva atthīti ayampi niyamo sambhavatīti so eva gahetabbo. Yadipi hi nibbānaṃ paramatthato atthibhāvaṃ upādāya uttarapadāvadhāraṇaṃ labbhati tadaññassapi abhāvato, tathāpi asaṅkhatākārena aññassa anupalabbhanato tathā nibbānameva atthīti purimapadāvadhāraṇe atthe gayhamāne ‘‘atthi siyā nibbānaṃ, siyā no nibbāna’’nti codanā anokāsā. Atītādīsu pana purimapadāvadhāraṇaṃ paravādinā na gahitanti natthettha atippasaṅgo. Aggahaṇañcassa pāḷito eva viññāyati. Evamettha atītādīnaṃ atthitaṃ vadantassa paravādissevāyaṃ iṭṭhavighātadosāpatti, na pana nibbānassa atthitaṃ vadantassa sakavādissāti. Paṭipādanā patiṭṭhāpanā veditabbā.

295. The meaning referred to by the word 'past' is the same as that referred to by the word 'existent.' It is said that 'the words "past" and "existent" have the same meaning' because both have the same referent. No, it is because the meaning referred to by 'past' is itself the meaning referred to by 'existent.' Hence, it is stated: 'And because the meaning of the word 'existent' is not past.' What, then, is established by this? It is said: 'The past is not past, and the not-past is past.' This means: If, according to your view, the past exists, and the not-past also exists, then the past would be not-past. Similarly, the existent would be not past, and the not-past would be past. Thus, in the statement 'the past exists,' it should not be strictly concluded that only the past exists, since the existence of the non-past is also intended. Therefore, it is said: 'The existent may be past, or it may be not-past.' The manner in which the opponent asserts the existence of the past is the same manner in which they assert the existence of the non-past, the future, and the present. By what manner is this asserted? By the conditioned manner. Hence, it is said: 'Therefore, the past is not past, and the not-past is past.' Thus, it should be strictly concluded here that the past indeed exists. For the past is determined in existence, but existence is not determined in the past. However, regarding the statement 'Nibbāna exists,' here, the rule 'only Nibbāna exists' is possible, and that should be adopted. Even though Nibbāna, in the ultimate sense, is established as existing by the subsequent term, because of the absence of anything else, still, because nothing else is found in the unconditioned manner, if the meaning of the determination of the initial term 'only Nibbāna exists' is taken, then objections like 'the existent may be Nibbāna, or it may be not-Nibbāna' are irrelevant. But in the case of the past, etc., the opponent does not take the determination of the initial term, so there is no excessive fault here. The non-acceptance is also evident from the Pāli text itself. Thus, for the opponent who asserts the existence of the past, etc., this is an instance of incurring the fault of undermining their own position, but not for the proponent who asserts the existence of Nibbāna. The exposition and establishment should be understood.

Etthāha ‘‘atītaṃ atthī’’tiādinā kiṃ panāyaṃ atītānāgatānaṃ paramatthato atthibhāvo adhippeto, udāhu na paramatthato. Kiñcettha – yadi tāva paramatthato, sabbakālaṃ atthibhāvato saṅkhārānaṃ sassatabhāvo āpajjati, na ca taṃ yuttaṃ āgamavirodhato yuttivirodhato ca. Atha na paramatthato, ‘‘sabbamatthī’’tiādikā codanā niratthikā siyā, na niratthikā. So hi paravādī ‘‘yaṃ kiñci rūpaṃ atītānāgata’’ntiādinā atītānāgatānampi khandhabhāvassa vuttattā asati ca atīte kusalākusalassa kammassa āyatiṃ phalaṃ kathaṃ bhaveyya, tattha ca pubbenivāsañāṇādi anāgate ca anāgataṃsañāṇādi kathaṃ pavatteyya, tasmā attheva paramatthato atītānāgatanti yaṃ paṭijānāti, taṃ sandhāya ayaṃ katāti. Ekantena cetaṃ sampaṭicchitabbaṃ. Yepi ‘‘sabbaṃ atthī’’ti vadanti atītaṃ anāgataṃ paccuppannañca, te sabbatthivādāti.

Here it is said, 'The past exists,' etc. Now, is the existence of the past and future intended ultimately, or not ultimately? What is the point here? If it is ultimately, then since formations would exist at all times, the eternalist view arises, and this is not proper due to contradiction with scripture and reasoning. But if it is not ultimately, then objections like 'all exists' would be meaningless. But they are not meaningless. For the opponent, stating 'whatever form is past or future,' etc., has stated the state of aggregates even for the past and future. If the past did not exist, how could the result of past wholesome or unwholesome kamma arise in the future? And how could knowledge of past lives, etc., and knowledge of the future, etc., function? Therefore, when he declares that the past and future exist ultimately, it is with reference to this that the statement is made. This must be fully accepted. Those who say 'all exists'—the past, the future, and the present—are called the Sarvāstivādins.

Catubbidhā cete te sabbatthivādā. Tattha keci bhāvaññattikā. Te hi ‘‘yathā suvaṇṇabhājanassa bhinditvā aññathā kariyamānassa saṇṭhānasseva aññathattaṃ, na vaṇṇādīnaṃ, yathā ca khīraṃ dadhibhāvena pariṇamantaṃ rasavīriyavipāke pariccajati, na vaṇṇaṃ, evaṃ dhammāpi anāgataddhuno paccuppannaddhaṃ saṅkamantā anāgatabhāvameva jahanti, na attano sabhāvaṃ. Tathā [Pg.96] paccuppannaddhuno atītaddhaṃ saṅkame’’ti vadanti. Keci lakkhaṇaññattikā, te pana ‘‘tīsu addhāsu pavattamāno dhammo atīto atītalakkhaṇayutto, itaralakkhaṇehi ayutto. Tathā anāgato paccuppanno ca. Yathā puriso ekissā itthiyā ratto aññāsu aratto’’ti vadanti. Aññe avatthaññattikā, te ‘‘tīsu addhāsu pavattamāno dhammo taṃ taṃ avatthaṃ patvā añño aññaṃ niddisīyati avatthantarato, na sabhāvato. Yathā ekaṃ akkhaṃ ekaṅge nikkhittaṃ ekanti vuccati, sataṅge satanti, sahassaṅge sahassanti, evaṃsampadamida’’nti. Apare aññathaññattikā, te pana ‘‘tīsu addhāsu pavattamāno dhammo taṃ taṃ apekkhitvā tadaññasabhāvena vuccati. Yathā taṃ ekā itthī mātāti ca vuccati dhītā’’ti ca. Evamete cattāro sabbatthivādā.

These Sarvāstivādins are of four kinds. Among them, some are proponents of the alteration of state. They say: 'Just as when a golden vessel is broken and made otherwise, only its form is altered, not its color and so on; and just as milk, when turning into curd, gives up its taste, potency, and effect, but not its color—so too, phenomena, in passing from the future to the present, give up only their future state, not their intrinsic nature. Likewise when passing from the present to the past.' Some are proponents of the alteration of characteristic. They say: 'A phenomenon occurring in the three periods of time is, when past, conjoined with the characteristic of the past and disjoined from the other characteristics. So too with the future and the present. It is as a man is attached to one woman and unattached to others.' Others are proponents of the alteration of condition. They say: 'A phenomenon occurring in the three periods of time, having reached a particular condition, is designated differently due to a difference in condition, not in intrinsic nature. Just as a single counter placed on the 'one' spot is called 'one,' on the 'hundred' spot 'a hundred,' and on the 'thousand' spot 'a thousand'—so is this matter.' Still others are proponents of relative alteration. They say: 'A phenomenon occurring in the three periods of time is spoken of with a different nature in relation to this or that. Just as one and the same woman is called 'mother' and also 'daughter.'' Thus, these are the four kinds of Sarvāstivādins.

Tesu paṭhamo pariṇāmavāditāya kāpilapakkhikesu pakkhipitabboti. Dutiyassapi kālasaṅkaro āpajjati sabbassa sabbalakkhaṇayogato. Catutthassapi saṅkarova. Ekasseva dhammassa pavattikkhaṇe tayopi kālā samodhānaṃ gacchanti. Purimapacchimakkhaṇā hi atītānāgatā, majjhimo paccuppannoti. Tatiyassa pana avatthaññattikassa natthi saṅkaro dhammakiccena kālavavatthānato. Dhammo hi sakiccakkhaṇe paccuppanno, tato pubbe anāgato, pacchā atītoti.

Among these, the first should be included with the followers of Kapila, due to their doctrine of transformation. For the second, a confusion of time arises, due to the connection of everything with all characteristics. For the fourth, there is likewise confusion, for in a single phenomenon at the moment of its occurrence, all three times converge: the preceding and subsequent moments are past and future, while the middle moment is present. For the third, however, the proponent of alteration of condition, there is no confusion, because the determination of time is based on the function of the phenomenon. For a phenomenon is present at the moment of its own function; before that, it is future; and after that, it is past.

Tattha yadi atītampi dharamānasabhāvatāya atthi anāgatampi, kasmā taṃ atītanti vuccati anāgatanti vā, nanu vuttaṃ ‘‘dhammakiccena kālavavatthānato’’ti. Yadi evaṃ paccuppannassa cakkhussa kiṃ kiccaṃ, anavasesapaccayasamavāye phaluppādanaṃ. Evaṃ sati anāgatassapi cassa tena bhavitabbaṃ atthibhāvatoti lakkhaṇasaṅkaro siyā. Idañcettha vattabbaṃ, teneva sabhāvena sato dhammassa kiccaṃ, kiccakaraṇe ko vibandho, yena kadāci karoti kadāci na karoti paccayasamavāyabhāvato, kiccassa samavāyābhāvatoti ce? Taṃ na, niccaṃ atthibhāvassa icchitattā. Tato eva ca addhunaṃ avavatthānaṃ. Dhammo hi teneva sabhāvena vijjamāno kasmā kadāci atītoti vuccati kadāci anāgatoti kālassa vavatthānaṃ na siyā. Yo hi dhammo ajāto, so anāgato. Yo jāto na ca niruddho, so paccuppanno. Yo niruddho, so atīto. Idamevettha vattabbaṃ. Yadi yathā vattamānaṃ atthi[Pg.97], tathā atītaṃ anāgatañca atthi, tassa tathā sato ajātatā niruddhatā ca kena hotīti. Teneva hi sabhāvena sato dhammassa kathamidaṃ sijjhati ajātoti vā niruddhoti vā. Kiṃ tassa pubbe nāhosi, yassa abhāvato ajātoti vuccati, kiñca pacchā natthi, yassa abhāvato niruddhoti vuccati. Tasmā sabbathāpi addhattayaṃ na sijjhati, yadi ahutvā saṅgati hutvā ca vinassatīti na sampaṭicchanti. Yaṃ pana vuttaṃ ‘‘saṅkhatalakkhaṇayogato na sassatabhāvappasaṅgo’’ti, tayidaṃ kevalaṃ vācāvatthumattaṃ udayavayāsambhavato, atthi ca nāma sabbadā so dhammo, na ca niccoti kutoyaṃ vācāyutti.

In that case, if the past and the future also exist due to an enduring intrinsic nature, why is one called 'past' and the other 'future'? Was it not said, 'because the determination of time is based on the function of the phenomenon'? If so, what is the function of the present eye? It is the production of a result when there is a complete assemblage of conditions. This being the case, the future eye must also have that function, because it exists; thus there would be a confusion of characteristics. And this should be said here: the function belongs to a phenomenon that exists with that very intrinsic nature. What obstruction is there to its performing its function, that it sometimes performs it and sometimes does not? If it is said that this is due to the presence of an assemblage of conditions, or due to the absence of an assemblage for the function, that is not so, because its constant existence is asserted. And for that very reason, there would be no determination of the periods of time. For if a phenomenon exists with that same intrinsic nature, why is it sometimes called 'past' and sometimes 'future'? There would be no establishment of time. For the phenomenon that is not yet born is future. That which is born and has not ceased is present. That which has ceased is past. This is what should be stated here. If the past and the future exist just as the present exists, how can that which so exists be unborn or ceased? For a phenomenon that exists with that very intrinsic nature, how can it be established that it is 'unborn' or 'ceased'? What did it lack before, due to the absence of which it is called 'unborn'? And what will it lack afterwards, due to the absence of which it is called 'ceased'? Therefore, the threefold division of time is in no way established if they do not accept that what has not been comes to be, and what has been perishes. As for what was said, 'due to its connection with the characteristics of the conditioned, there is no consequence of eternalism'—this is a mere matter of words, because of the impossibility of arising and passing away. For that phenomenon exists at all times, and yet it is not eternal—whence this verbal logic?

Sabhāvo sabbadā atthi, nicco dhammo na vuccati;

Dhammo sabhāvato nāñño, aho dhammesu kosalaṃ.

The intrinsic nature always exists, yet the phenomenon is not called eternal; the phenomenon is not other than its intrinsic nature—oh, what skill in the doctrines!

Yañca vuttaṃ ‘‘yaṃ kiñci rūpaṃ atītānāgata’’ntiādinā atītānāgatānaṃ khandhabhāvassa vuttattā atthevāti, vadāma. Atītaṃ bhūtapubbaṃ, anāgataṃ yaṃ sati paccaye bhavissati, tadubhayassapi ruppanādisabhāvānātivattanato rūpakkhandhādibhāvo vutto. Yathādhammasabhāvānātivattanato atītā dhammā anāgatā dhammāti, na dharamānasabhāvatāya. Ko ca evamāha ‘‘paccuppannaṃ viya taṃ atthī’’ti. Kathaṃ panetaṃ atthīti? Atītānāgatasabhāvena. Idaṃ pana taveva upaṭṭhitaṃ, kathaṃ taṃ atītaṃ anāgatañca vuccati, yadi niccakālaṃ atthīti.

And as for what was said, 'Whatever form is past, future...,' etc., we say that because the state of being aggregates was stated for past and future phenomena, they exist. The past is what has been before; the future is what will be when there is a condition. For both, the state of being the form aggregate, etc., is spoken of because they do not transcend the nature of being afflicted and so on. They are called 'past phenomena' and 'future phenomena' because they do not transcend the intrinsic nature of phenomena as such, not because they have an enduring nature. And who says that they exist in the same way as the present? How then do they exist? By their nature of being past and future. But this very point is presented against you: how can something be called past and future if it exists at all times?

Yaṃ pana ‘‘na tāva kālaṃ karoti, yāva na taṃ pāpaṃ byantī hotī’’ti (ma. ni. 3.250) sutte vuttaṃ, taṃ yasmiñca santāne kammaṃ katūpacitaṃ, tattha tenāhitaṃ taṃphaluppādanasamatthataṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, na atītassa kammassa dharamānasabhāvattā. Tathā sati sakena bhāvena vijjamānaṃ kathaṃ taṃ atītaṃ nāma siyā. Itthañcetaṃ evaṃ sampaṭicchitabbaṃ, yaṃ saṅkhārā ahutvā sambhavanti, hutvā pativenti tesaṃ udayato pubbe vayato ca pacchā na kāci ṭhiti nāma atthi, yato atītānāgataṃ atthīti vucceyya. Tena vuttaṃ –

As for what is stated in the sutta, 'He does not die so long as that evil deed is not exhausted' (MN 3.250), that was said with reference to the potential, established by that deed in the continuum wherein the kamma was performed and accumulated, to produce its result; it was not said because past kamma has an enduring nature. If that were so, how could something that exists by its own nature be called 'past'? And this should be accepted thus: formations, not having been, come to be; and having been, they pass away. Before their arising and after their passing away, there is no state called 'duration' from which it could be said that the past and future exist. Thus it is said—

‘‘Anidhānagatā bhaggā, puñjo natthi anāgate;

Uppannā yepi tiṭṭhanti, āragge sāsapūpamā’’ti. (mahāni. 10, 39);

"Not stored away, but broken; there is no heap in the future. And even those that, having arisen, remain, are like a mustard seed on the point of an awl." (Mahāni. 10, 39)

Yadi [Pg.98] cānāgataṃ paramatthato siyā, ahutvā sambhavantīti vattuṃ na sakkā. Paccuppannakāle ahutvā sambhavantīti ce? Na, dhammappavattimattattā kālassa. Atha attano sabhāvena ahutvā sambhavantīti, siddhametaṃ anāgataṃ paramatthato natthīti. Yañca vuttaṃ ‘‘asati atīte kusalākusalassa kammassa āyatiṃ phalaṃ kathaṃ bhaveyyā’’ti, na kho panettha atītakammato phaluppatti icchitā, atha kho tassa katattā tadāhitavisesato santānato. Vuttañhetaṃ bhagavatā ‘‘kāmāvacarassa kusalassa kammassa katattā upacitattā vipākaṃ cakkhuviññāṇaṃ uppannaṃ hotī’’ti (dha. sa. 431). Yassa pana atītānāgataṃ paramatthato atthi, tassa phalaṃ niccameva atthīti kiṃ tattha kammassa sāmatthiyaṃ. Uppādane ce, siddhamidaṃ ahutvā bhavatīti. Yaṃ pana vuttaṃ ‘‘asati atītānāgate kathaṃ tattha ñāṇaṃ pavatteyyā’’ti, yathā taṃ ālambaṇaṃ, taṃ tathā atthi, kathañca taṃ ālambaṇaṃ, ahosi bhavissati cāti. Na hi koci atītaṃ anussaranto atthīti anussarati, atha kho ahosīti. Yathā pana vattamānaṃ ārammaṇaṃ anubhūtaṃ, tathā taṃ atītaṃ anussarati. Yathā ca vattamānaṃ bhavissati, tathā buddhādīhi gayhati. Yadi ca taṃ tatheva atthi, vattamānameva taṃ siyā. Atha natthi, siddhaṃ ‘‘asantaṃ ñāṇassa ārammaṇaṃ hotī’’ti. Vijjamānaṃ vā hi cittasaññātaṃ avijjamānaṃ vā ārammaṇaṃ etesaṃ atthīti ārammaṇā, cittacetasikā, na vijjamānaṃyeva ārabbha pavattanato, tasmā paccuppannameva dharamānasabhāvaṃ na atītānāgatanti na tiṭṭhati sabbatthivādo. Keci pana ‘‘na atītādīnaṃ atthitāpaṭiññāya sabbatthivādā, atha kho āyatanasabbassa atthitāpaṭiññāyā’’ti vadanti, tesaṃ matena sabbeva sāsanikā sabbatthivādā siyunti.

If the future were to exist in the ultimate sense, it would not be possible to say that things come into being without having been. If it were said, 'They come into being in the present moment without having been,' this would not hold, because time is merely the occurrence of phenomena. Alternatively, if it were said, 'They come into being by their own nature without having been,' this proves that the future does not exist in the ultimate sense. And as to what was said—'If the past does not exist, how could there be a future result of wholesome and unwholesome kamma?'—here, the arising of a result is not intended from past kamma itself, but rather from the continuum, due to that kamma having been done and the specific quality it has imparted. For this was said by the Blessed One: 'Because wholesome kamma pertaining to the sense-sphere has been done and accumulated, eye-consciousness arises as its result' (Dhs. 431). But for one who holds that the past and future exist in the ultimate sense, the result would always exist; what then would be the efficacy of kamma? If its efficacy is in producing, this proves that things come into being without having been. And as to what was said—'If the past and future do not exist, how could knowledge operate regarding them?'—however that object is, so it exists. And how is that object? As 'it was' and 'it will be.' For no one recollecting the past recollects it as 'it exists,' but rather as 'it was.' Just as a present object is experienced, so one recollects that past. And just as a present thing will be, so it is apprehended by the Buddhas and others. But if it were to exist in that very way, it would be the present. If it does not exist, then it is established that 'what is non-existent becomes an object of knowledge.' For mind and mental factors are 'things with an object' because they have an object—cognized by the mind as either existing or non-existing—since they do not proceed by taking up only what exists. Therefore, since only the present has an enduring nature, not the past or future, the Sarvāstivāda doctrine does not stand. Some, however, say, 'They are not Sarvāstivādins by their avowal of the existence of the past, etc., but by their avowal of the existence of the "all" of the sense spheres.' According to their view, all followers of the Teaching would then be Sarvāstivādins.

Padasodhanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of the Elucidation of Terms is concluded.

Sabbamatthītikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of 'Everything Exists' is concluded.

6. Atītakkhandhādikathā

6. Discussion on Past Aggregates, etc.

1. Nasuttasādhanakathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Commentary on the Discussion of the Establishment of 'Not' in the Sutta

297. ‘‘Atītaṃ [Pg.99] anāgataṃ paccuppanna’’nti ayaṃ kālavibhāgaparicchinno vohāro dhammānaṃ taṃ taṃ avatthāvisesaṃ upādāya paññatto. Dhammo hi sakiccakkhaṇe paccuppanno, tato pubbe anāgato, pacchā atītoti vuttovāyamattho. Tattha yadipi dhammā aniccatāya anavaṭṭhitā, avatthā pana tesaṃ yathāvuttā vavatthitāti tadupādānā kālapaññattipi vavatthitā eva. Na hi atītādi anāgatādibhāvena voharīyati, khandhādipaññatti pana anapekkhitakālavisesā. Tīsupi hi kālesu rūpakkhandho rūpakkhandhova, tathā sesā khandhā āyatanadhātuyo ca. Evamavaṭṭhite yasmā paravādī ‘‘atthī’’ti imaṃ paccuppannaniyataṃ vohāraṃ atītānāgatesupi āropeti, tasmā so addhasaṅkaraṃ karoti. Paramatthato avijjamāne vijjamāne katvā voharatīti tato vivecetuṃ ‘‘atītaṃ khandhā’’tiādikā ayaṃ kathā āraddhā.

297. "Past, future, present"—this conventional usage, delimited by temporal division, is established with reference to the particular states of phenomena. For a phenomenon is called 'present' at the moment of performing its function, 'future' before that, and 'past' after that—this is the meaning that has been stated. Although phenomena are unabiding due to their impermanence, their states are nevertheless established as described above; therefore, based on that, the designation of time is also established. Indeed, the past, etc., are not spoken of as future, etc., but the designation of aggregates, etc., is independent of particular temporal distinctions. For in all three times, the form aggregate is indeed the form aggregate, and similarly for the remaining aggregates, sense bases, and elements. Since, when this is established, the opponent imposes this convention of 'exists,' which is restricted to the present, upon the past and future as well, he creates a confusion of time. In order to distinguish from that—since he speaks of what does not exist ultimately as existing—this discussion beginning with 'past aggregates,' etc., has been undertaken.

Yasmā pana ruppanādisabhāve atītādibhedabhinne dhamme ekajjhaṃ gahetvā tattha rāsaṭṭhaṃ upādāya khandhapaññatti, cakkhurūpādīsu kāraṇādiatthaṃ suññataṭṭhañca upādāya āyatanapaññatti dhātupaññatti ca, tasmā sā addhattayasādhāraṇā, na atītādipaññatti viya addhavisesādhiṭṭhānāti āha ‘‘khandhādibhāvāvijahanato atītānāgatāna’’nti. Te panete atītādike khandhādike viya sabhāvadhammato sañjānanto paravādī ‘‘atthī’’ti paṭijānātīti āha ‘‘atītānāgatānaṃ atthitaṃ icchantassā’’ti. Sesamettha yaṃ vattabbaṃ, taṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayameva.

Since, however, the aggregates are designated by taking those phenomena—which are of the nature of affliction, and so on, and are divided into past, etc.—together and referring to the meaning of a heap, and the sense bases and elements are designated by referring to the meaning of cause, etc., and the meaning of emptiness in the eye and form, etc., therefore, that designation is common to the three periods of time, not based on a particular period of time like the designations of past, etc. Thus it is said: 'Because of not abandoning the nature of aggregates, etc., it applies to the past and future.' But the opponent, perceiving these past things, etc., as existing by their own nature, like the aggregates, etc., asserts 'it exists.' Thus it is said: 'For one who desires the existence of past and future.' The rest of what should be said here is just as explained above.

‘‘Tayome, bhikkhave, niruttipathā’’ti suttaṃ niruttipathasuttaṃ. Tattha hi paccuppannasseva atthibhāvo vutto, na atītānāgatānaṃ. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘atthitāya vāritattā’’ti. Yadi evaṃ ‘‘atthi, bhikkhave, nibbāna’’nti idaṃ kathanti? Taṃ sabbadā upaladdhito vuttaṃ niccasabhāvañāpanatthaṃ asaṅkhatadhammassa, idha pana saṅkhatadhammānaṃ khaṇattayasamaṅgitāya atthibhāvo na tato pubbe pacchā cāti paññāpanatthaṃ ‘‘yaṃ, bhikkhave, rūpaṃ…pe… na tassa saṅkhā bhavissatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Etena ‘‘atthī’’ti samaññāya anupādānato atītaṃ anāgataṃ paramatthato [Pg.100] natthīti dassitaṃ hoti. Imināvūpāyenāti ‘‘khandhādibhāvāvijahanato’’ti evaṃ vuttena hetunā. Upapattisādhanayutti hi idha ‘‘upāyo’’ti vuttā.

The sutta beginning 'These, bhikkhus, are the three paths of language' is the Niruttipatha Sutta. For therein, the existence of only the present is stated, not of the past or future. Therefore, it is said: 'because its existence is denied.' If so, how is it said: 'Bhikkhus, there is Nibbāna'? That is stated because it is always found, in order to make known the permanent nature of the unconditioned Dhamma. Here, however, for the purpose of making known that the existence of conditioned phenomena is only in conjunction with the three moments, and not before or after that, it is said: 'Whatever form, bhikkhus...there will be no reckoning of it.' By this, through not taking up the designation 'exists,' it is shown that the past and future do not exist in the ultimate sense. By this means—that is, by the reason stated as 'because of not abandoning the nature of the aggregates, etc.' For here, the reasoning that establishes arising is called 'means'.

Nasuttasādhanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of the Establishment of 'Not' in the Sutta is concluded.

2. Suttasādhanakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discussion of Proof by the Suttas

298. Ete dhammāti ete khandhaāyatanadhātudhammā. Suttāharaṇanti niruttipathasuttāharaṇaṃ. Nesanti atītānāgatānaṃ.

298. These phenomena: these are the phenomena of the aggregates, sense bases, and elements. The adducing of a sutta: the adducing of the Niruttipatha Sutta. Of them: of the past and future.

Suttasādhanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of Proof by the Suttas is concluded.

Atītakkhandhādikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of Past Aggregates, etc., is concluded.

7. Ekaccaṃatthītikathā

7. Discussion that 'Some Exist'

1. Atītādiekaccakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discussion concerning 'Some' of the Past, etc.

299. Ye katūpacitā kusalākusalā dhammā vipākadānāya akatokāsā, katokāsā ca ye ‘‘okāsakatuppannā’’ti vuccanti. Ye ca vippakatavipākā, te sabbepi ‘‘avipakkavipākā’’ti veditabbā. Tesaṃ vipākadānasāmatthiyaṃ anapagatanti adhippāyena paravādī atthitaṃ icchati. Ye pana paravādī sabbena sabbaṃ vipakkavipākā kusalākusalā dhammā, tesaṃ apagatanti natthitaṃ icchati. Tenāha ‘‘atthīti ekaccaṃ atthi ekaccaṃ natthī’’tiādi. Evaṃ icchantassa pana paravādino yathā avipākesupi ekaccaṃ natthīti āpajjati, evaṃ vipakkavipākesu avipakkavipākesu ca āpajjatevāti dassetuṃ ‘‘avipakkavipākā dhammā ekacce’’tiādinā pāḷi pavattā. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘tiṇṇaṃ rāsīnaṃ vasenā’’tiādi. Vohāravasenāti phalassa anuparamavohāravasena, hetukiccaṃ pana anuparataṃ anupacchinnaṃ atthīti laddhiyaṃ ṭhitattā codetabbova. Avicchedavasena pavattamānañhi phalassa pabandhavohāraṃ paravādī vohārato atthīti icchati, hetu panassa kammaṃ paramatthato ca kammūpacayavādibhāvato pattiappattisabhāvatādayo [Pg.101] viya cittavippayutto kammūpacayo nāma eko saṅkhāradhammo avipanno, sopi tasseva vevacananti paravādī. Yaṃ sandhāyāha –

299. Those wholesome and unwholesome phenomena that have been done and accumulated and have not yet found an opportunity to yield a result, and those that have found an opportunity—these are called 'arisen from opportunity having been made.' And all those whose results are incomplete should be understood as 'having unripened results.' The opponent desires their existence with the intention that their capacity to yield a result has not ceased. But as for those wholesome and unwholesome phenomena whose results are entirely ripened, the opponent desires their non-existence, holding that they have ceased. Therefore, it is said: 'Some exist, some do not exist,' and so on. Yet, to show that for the opponent who holds this view, just as it follows that some do not exist even among those that have not yet given a result, so too it follows regarding both those whose results are ripened and those whose results are unripened, the text proceeds with 'some phenomena with unripened results,' and so on. Hence it is said: 'By way of the three groups,' and so on. 'By way of conventional speech' means by way of the uninterrupted conventional designation of the result. But he must be challenged because he stands on the view that the function of the cause exists, being uninterrupted and unbroken. For the opponent holds that the continuous conventional designation of the result, which proceeds without interruption, exists conventionally. But as for its cause, kamma, from the ultimate standpoint—and because he is an advocate of the accumulation of kamma—the opponent holds that, like the natures of obtainability and non-obtainability, etc., there is a certain conditioned phenomenon called 'kammic accumulation,' which is dissociated from consciousness and has not perished; and that this too is a synonym for the same. Concerning which it is said:

‘‘Nappacayanti kammāni, api kappasahassato;

Patvā paccayasāmaggiṃ, kāle paccanti pāṇina’’nti.

Karmic actions do not perish, even after thousands of aeons; having reached a confluence of conditions, at the proper time they ripen for beings.

Yañca sandhāya parato paribhogamayapuññakathāya ‘‘paribhogamayaṃ pana cittavippayuttaṃ uppajjatīti laddhiyā paṭijānātī’’ti vakkhati.

And concerning which, later on, in the discourse on merit arisen from enjoyment, he will state, accepting the doctrine, that 'merit arisen from enjoyment, dissociated from consciousness, arises.'

Ekaccaṃatthītikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discourse on 'Something Exists' is concluded.

8. Satipaṭṭhānakathāvaṇṇanā

8. The Commentary on the Discourse on the Foundations of Mindfulness.

301. Paramatthasatipaṭṭhānattāti etena lokuttarāya eva sammāsatiyā tatthāpi maggabhūtāya nippariyāyena satipaṭṭhānabhāvo niyyānikattā itarāya pariyāyenāti dasseti. Maggaphalasammāsatiyā dhammānussatibhāvapariyāyo atthīti ‘‘lokiyalokuttarasatipaṭṭhānasamudāyabhūtassā’’ti vuttaṃ. Satisamudāyabhūtassa na satigocarabhūtassāti adhippāyo. Satigocarassa hi satipaṭṭhānataṃ codetuṃ pāḷiyaṃ ‘‘cakkhāyatanaṃ satipaṭṭhāna’’nti āraddhaṃ. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘sabbadhammānaṃ pabhedapucchāvasena vutta’’nti. Suttasādhanāyaṃ pana paṭhamaṃ lokiyasatipaṭṭhānavasena, dutiyaṃ missakavasena, tatiyaṃ lokuttaravasena dassitanti veditabbaṃ.

301. By 'ultimate establishment of mindfulness,' it is shown that supramundane right mindfulness, especially that which is path-constituent, is the establishment of mindfulness in the direct sense because it leads to deliverance, while the other (mundane) is so in an indirect sense. There is an indirect way in which right mindfulness of the path and fruition is mindfulness of phenomena, hence it is said, 'It is the collection of both mundane and supramundane establishments of mindfulness.' The meaning is that it is the collection of mindfulness, not the object of mindfulness. For, to challenge the notion that the object of mindfulness is the establishment of mindfulness, the Pāli text begins with 'the eye-base is an establishment of mindfulness.' Therefore it is said: 'It is stated by way of questioning the distinctions of all phenomena.' However, in this exposition of the suttas, it should be understood that the first is shown in terms of mundane establishment of mindfulness, the second in terms of the mixed, and the third in terms of the supramundane.

Satipaṭṭhānakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Foundations of Mindfulness is concluded.

9. Hevatthikathāvaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Discourse on 'It Is Thus'

304. Hevatthikathāyaṃ ‘‘sabbo dhammo sakabhāvena atthi parabhāvena natthī’’ti pavatto paravādīvādo yathā vibhajja paṭipucchā vā na byākātabbo, evaṃ ekaṃsato na byākātabbo visesābhāvato, kevalaṃ ṭhapanīyapakkhe tiṭṭhatīti adhippāyenāha ‘‘avattabbuttarenā’’ti. Yathā hi sabbe [Pg.102] vādā sappaṭivādāvāti paṭiññā bhūtakathanattā avattabbuttarā upekkhitabbā, evamayampīti veditabbaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘upekkhitabbenā’’ti. Atha vā avattabbaṃ uttaraṃ avattabbuttaraṃ. Yathā aniccavādinaṃ pati anicco saddo paccayādhīnavuttitoti, uttaraṃ na vattabbaṃ siddhasādhanabhāvato, evaṃ idhāpi daṭṭhabbaṃ. Siddhasādhanañhi daḍḍhassa ḍahanasadisattā niratthakameva siyā, aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana yasmā paravādinā yena sabhāvena yo dhammo atthi, teneva sabhāvena so vinā kālabhedādiparāmasanena natthīti patiṭṭhāpīyati, tasmā ‘‘ayoniso patiṭṭhāpitattā’’ti vuttaṃ.

304. In the Discourse on 'It Is Thus,' the opponent's view, which proceeds with 'all phenomena exist by their own intrinsic nature but do not exist by another's nature,' should not be answered definitively, just as a question that requires analysis or a counter-question should not be answered, due to the absence of distinction. It is said with the intention that it merely stands in the category of what should be set aside, hence 'by what has an unutterable answer.' For just as the claim 'all views have counter-views,' being a statement of fact, has an unutterable answer and should be disregarded, so too should this be understood. Therefore it is said: 'By what should be disregarded.' Alternatively, 'an unutterable answer' means a reply that should not be given. For example, to an advocate of impermanence, if one says 'sound is impermanent because its arising is dependent on conditions,' no reply should be given because it is proving what is already established; similarly, it should be understood here. For proving what is already proven would be meaningless, being like burning what is already burnt. However, in the commentary, because the opponent establishes that a phenomenon exists by a certain intrinsic nature, and yet by that very same nature it does not exist, without considering distinctions such as time, it is said, 'because it is established improperly.'

Ettha ca ‘‘hevatthi, hevaṃ natthī’’ti paṭijānantena paravādinā yathā saparabhāvehi rūpādīnaṃ atthitā paṭiññātā, evaṃ kāladesādibhedehipi sā paṭiññātā eva. Tenevāha ‘‘atītaṃ anāgatapaccuppannavasena, anāgatapaccuppannāni vā atītādivasena natthī’’ti. Evaṃ sati nigaṇṭhācelakavādo paridīpito siyā. Te hi ‘‘siyā atthi, siyā natthi, siyā atthi ca natthi cā’’tiādinā sabbapadatthesu pattabhāge paṭijānanti. Tattha yadi vatthuno sabhāveneva, desakālasantānavasena vā natthitā adhippetā, taṃ siddhasādhanaṃ sakavādinopi icchitattā. Yassa hi dhammassa yo sabhāvo, na so tato aññathā upalabbhati. Yadi upalabbheyya, añño eva so siyā. Na cettha sāmaññalakkhaṇaṃ nidassetabbaṃ salakkhaṇassa adhippetattā tassa natthibhāvassa abhāvato. Yathā ca parabhāvena natthitāya na vivādo, evaṃ desakālantaresupi ittarakālattā saṅkhārānaṃ. Na hi saṅkhārā desantaraṃ, kālantaraṃ vā saṅkamanti khaṇikabhāvato. Eteneva pariyāyantarena natthitāpi paṭikkhittā veditabbā. Yathā ca atthitā, natthitā vinā kālabhedena ekasmiṃ dhamme patiṭṭhaṃ na labhanti aññamaññaviruddhattā, evaṃ sabbadāpi niccattā.

As for what they say: 'Just as gold, while existing in the form of a bracelet, assumes the state of an ornament, it is both permanent and impermanent. For that gold, not abandoning its nature as gold, is permanent; but due to the cessation of its state as a bracelet, it is impermanent—so too are all phenomena.' They should be asked this: 'Is the state of being a bracelet the bracelet's own, or is it the gold's?' If it is the bracelet's, then it would be independent of the gold, like something entirely different. But if it is the gold's, then it should be found there permanently, just like the nature of gold itself. Moreover, it cannot be said that both have a single nature, since the gold does not perish even when the bracelet perishes. If it is held that this is no fault because gold and bracelets are in a relationship of designated and designation, such that just as when the designation 'bracelet' ceases and the designation 'ornament' arises, the designated thing remains the same, so too, when the designation 'human' ceases and the designation 'deva' arises, the designated living substance persists, being both permanent and impermanent, and so it is with all substances—this, however, is like answering a question about a mango with a statement about a breadfruit. For one who says that the very same thing is permanent and impermanent is positing permanence in one thing and impermanence in another. If the non-otherness of the designation and the designated is intended, then the designation would be permanent due to its non-otherness from the designated, like the nature of the designated itself; or the designated would be impermanent due to its non-otherness from the designation, like the nature of the designation itself. If they are held to be both other and non-other, then one does not escape the two faults mentioned. Furthermore, what is this so-called designation? If it is shape, then let that be so for gold; but how could it apply to a living substance, which is formless? If it is intended that it too has shape, then in a single being’s continuum, multiplicity would arise, and its own nature would be like that seen in things with shape, such as boils. If it is a particular mode of occurrence, even then multiplicity and momentariness would arise. Therefore, for now, the very nature of designation must first be established.

Yaṃ pana te vadanti ‘‘yathā suvaṇṇaṃ kaṭakādirūpena ṭhitaṃ rucakādibhāvaṃ āpajjatīti niccāniccaṃ. Tañhi suvaṇṇabhāvāvijahanato niccaṃ kaṭakādibhāvahānito aniccaṃ, evaṃ sabbadhammā’’ti. Te idaṃ vattabbā ‘‘kiṃ kaṭakabhāvo kaṭakassa, udāhu suvaṇṇassā’’ti. Yadi kaṭakassa, suvaṇṇanirapekkho siyā tadaññabhāvo viya. Atha suvaṇṇassa, niccakālaṃ tattha upalabbheyya suvaṇṇabhāvo viya. Na ca sakkā ubhinnaṃ ekabhāvoti vattuṃ kaṭakavināsepi suvaṇṇāvināsato. Atha mataṃ, suvaṇṇakaṭakādīnaṃ pariyāyīpariyāyabhāvato [Pg.103] nāyaṃ dosoti. Yathā hi kaṭakapariyāyanirodhena rucakapariyāyuppādepi pariyāyī tatheva tiṭṭhati, evaṃ manussapariyāyanirodhe devapariyāyuppādepi pariyāyī jīvadrabyaṃ tiṭṭhatīti niccāniccaṃ, tathā sabbadrabyānīti. Tayidaṃ ambaṃ puṭṭhassa labujabyākaraṇaṃ. Yaṃ sveva nicco aniccoti vā vadanto aññattha niccataṃ aññattha aniccataṃ paṭijānāti, atha pariyāyapariyāyīnaṃ anaññatā icchitā, evaṃ sati pariyāyopi nicco siyā pariyāyino anaññattā pariyāyasarūpaṃ viya, pariyāyī vā anicco pariyāyato anaññattā pariyāyasarūpaṃ viyāti. Atha nesaṃ aññā anaññatā, evañca sati vuttadosadvayānativatti. Apica koyaṃ pariyāyo nāma, yadi saṇṭhānaṃ, suvaṇṇo tāva hotu, kathaṃ jīvadrabye arūpibhāvato. Yadi tassapi saṇṭhānavantaṃ icchitaṃ, tathā satissa ekasmimpi sattasantāne bahutā āpajjati sarūpatā ca saṇṭhānavantesupi pīḷakādīsu tathādassanato. Atha pavattiviseso, evampi bahutā khaṇikatā ca āpajjati, tasmā pariyāyasarūpameva tāva patiṭṭhapetabbaṃ.

As for what was said, 'gold exists in the form of a bracelet, etc.': in that case, among the distinguished forms, smells, tastes, and tangibles that are known through their conjunction, is gold one of them, or is it their combination, or is it a separate phenomenon apart from them? Here, firstly, gold is not any single one of the forms, etc., because the function of gold would not be achieved thereby. Nor is it a separate phenomenon apart from them, since such a thing does not exist. If, then, it is the combination, that is merely a designation, so neither permanence nor impermanence is possible for it. And just as with gold, so too with the bracelet—it is merely a designation. This illustration proves that the opponent's 'living substance' is also merely a designation. How, then, can permanence or impermanence be possible for it? Enough of this excessive proliferation.

Yaṃ pana vuttaṃ ‘‘suvaṇṇaṃ kaṭakādirūpena ṭhita’’nti, tattha sampattiyogato viññāyamānesu visiṭṭhesu rūpagandharasaphoṭṭhabbesu kiṃ ekaṃ, udāhu tesaṃ samudāyo, tabbinimuttaṃ vā dhammantaraṃ suvaṇṇanti? Tattha na tāva rūpādīsu ekekaṃ suvaṇṇaṃ tena suvaṇṇakiccāsiddhito, nāpi tabbinimuttaṃ dhammantaraṃ tādisassa abhāvato. Atha samudāyo, taṃ pana paññattimattanti na tassa niccatā, nāpi aniccatā sambhavati. Yathā ca suvaṇṇassa, evaṃ kaṭakassapi paññattimattattāti. Tayidaṃ nidassanaṃ paravādino jīvadrabyassapi paññattimattaṃ tasseva sādhetīti kuto tassa niccāniccatāti alamatippapañcena.

The Commentary on the Discourse on 'It Is Thus' is concluded.

Hevatthikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Mahāvagga is concluded.

Mahāvaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Second Section

2. Dutiyavaggo

2. The Exposition on Harming Others

1. Parūpahāravaṇṇanā

1. The Exposition on Harming Others

307. Vikkhambhitarāgāva avikkhambhitarāgānaṃ adhimānikatāya asambhavatoti yāva adhimānikaṃ, tāva sampajānā niddaṃ okkamantīti adhippāyo. ‘‘Adhimānikāna’’nti [Pg.104] idaṃ bhūtapubbagatiyā vuttanti āha ‘‘adhimānikapubbā adhippetā siyu’’nti.

307. Since the state of those whose passion is suppressed is impossible for those whose passion is not suppressed due to their conceit, the meaning is that as long as there is conceit, they do not fall asleep with clear comprehension. He says that this phrase, 'of the conceited,' is said by way of a past state, meaning, 'those who were formerly conceited are intended.'

308. Yaṃ vimatigāhakāraṇaṃ vuccamānaṃ, taṃ ‘‘handa hī’’ti paraṃ jotetīti adhippāyenāha ‘‘kāraṇattheti yutta’’nti. Vimatigāhassa pana nicchitataṃ ‘‘handa hī’’ti paraṃ jotetīti vuttaṃ ‘‘vacasāyatthe’’ti.

308. With the intention that what is being called a cause for grasping doubt illuminates another with the phrase 'come, indeed,' he says, 'it is appropriate in the sense of cause.' But it is said to be 'in the sense of verbal expression' because 'come, indeed' illuminates for another the certainty of the grasping of doubt.

Parūpahāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on Harming Others is concluded.

5. Vacībhedakathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Exposition on the Discussion of the Utterance of Speech

326. Soti paṭhamamaggaṭṭho. Tasmāti yasmā ‘‘virajaṃ vītamalaṃ dhammacakkhuṃ udapādi ‘yaṃ kiñci samudayadhammaṃ, sabbaṃ taṃ nirodhadhamma’’’nti suttassa atthaṃ aññathā gahetvā udayabbayānupassanānissandena maggakkhaṇepi dukkhanti vipassanā upaṭṭhāti, tasmā ‘‘so dukkhamicceva vācaṃ bhāsatī’’ti vadanti.

326. 'So' means one standing on the first path. Therefore, because the meaning of the sutta—'the dust-free, stainless Dhamma-eye arose: "Whatever is of the nature to arise, all that is of the nature to cease"'—is grasped otherwise, and because through the consequence of the contemplation of arising and passing away, insight that this is suffering is present even at the moment of the path, therefore, they say, 'he speaks only the word "suffering".'

328. Icchiteti paravādinā sampaṭicchite. Āropiteti yuttiniddhāraṇena tasmiṃ atthe patiṭṭhāpite yujjati, vacīsamuṭṭhāpanakkhaṇato pana pacchā taṃ saddaṃ suṇātīti icchite na yujjati sotaviññāṇassa paccuppannārammaṇattāti adhippāyo. Yasmā pana attanā nicchāritaṃ saddaṃ attanāpi suṇāti, tasmā sotaviññāṇaṃ ‘‘yena taṃ saddaṃ suṇātī’’ti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

328. 'Icchite' means 'when accepted by the opponent.' 'Āropite' means it is fitting when established in that meaning through logical determination. However, the intended meaning is that it is not fitting to accept that one hears that sound after the moment of the arising of speech, because auditory consciousness has a present object. Moreover, since one also hears the sound that one has uttered oneself, it should be understood that auditory consciousness is described in the commentary as 'that by which one hears that sound.'

332. Lokuttaramaggakkhaṇeti paṭhamajjhānikassa paṭhamamaggassa khaṇe. Abhibhūsuttāharaṇe adhippāyo vattabboti etena tadāharaṇassa asambandhataṃ dasseti. Tenāha ‘‘tasmā asādhaka’’nti.

332. 'At the moment of the supramundane path' means at the moment of the first path of one in the first jhāna. By saying, 'The intention in citing the Abhibhū Sutta should be stated,' he shows the irrelevance of that citation. Therefore he said, 'Therefore, it is not a proof.'

Vacībhedakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Discussion of the Utterance of Speech is concluded.

7. Cittaṭṭhitikathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Exposition on the Discussion of the Duration of Mind

335. Evanti ‘‘ekacittaṃ yāvatāyukaṃ tiṭṭhatī’’ti vuttākārena. Aññatthāti arūpabhavato aññasmiṃ. Etenāti ‘‘ekameva cittaṃ āruppe tiṭṭhati[Pg.105], yāvatāyukaṃ tiṭṭhatī’’ti evaṃvādinā dutiyāpi aḍḍhakathā passitabbā paṭhamakathāya cirakālāvaṭṭhānavacanassa aññadatthu bhāvavibhāvanatoti adhippāyo. Purimāyāti ‘‘yāvatāyukaṃ tiṭṭhatī’’ti pañhato purimāya. Tattha hi ‘‘vassasataṃ tiṭṭhatī’’ti pucchāya ‘‘āmantā’’ti anuññā katā, pacchimāyaṃ pana ‘‘manussānaṃ ekaṃ cittaṃ yāvatāyukaṃ tiṭṭhatī’’ti ‘‘na hevaṃ vattabbe’’ti paṭikkhepo kato. Avirodho vibhāvetabbo, yato tattheva anuññā katā, na pacchāti adhippāyo. Vassasatādīti ca ādi-saddena na kevalaṃ ‘‘dve vassasatānī’’ti evamādiyeva saṅgahitaṃ, atha kho ‘‘ekaṃ cittaṃ divasaṃ tiṭṭhatī’’ti evamādipīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. ‘‘Muhuttaṃ muhuttaṃ uppajjatīti pañho sakavādinā pucchito viya vutto’’ti idaṃ vicāretabbaṃ. ‘‘Muhuttaṃ muhuttaṃ uppajjatī’’ti pañho paravādissa. ‘‘Uppādavayadhammino’’tiādisuttatthavasena paṭiññā sakavādissāti hi vuttaṃ.

335. 'Thus' means in the manner stated: 'One mind abides for a lifetime.' 'Elsewhere' means in a state other than the formless realm. By this, the meaning is that the second discussion should also be considered by one who holds the view that 'only one mind abides in the formless realm, lasting for a lifetime,' because the statement in the first discussion about long-lasting existence is for the purpose of clarifying the nature of existence in another way. 'By the former' means by the one prior to the question, 'Does it last for a lifetime?' For there, in response to the question, 'Does it last for a hundred years?' approval was given with 'Yes.' But in the latter, regarding 'Does a single mind of humans last for a lifetime?' a rejection was made with 'It should not be said so.' The meaning is that the lack of contradiction should be explained, since approval was given in that case, not in the latter. And by 'a hundred years, etc.,' it should be understood that the word 'etc.' includes not only 'two hundred years' and so on, but also 'a single mind lasts for a day' and so on. This statement, 'The question, "Does it arise moment by moment?" was spoken as if asked by one's own proponent,' should be investigated. The question, 'Does it arise moment by moment?' belongs to the opponent. For it is said that the thesis, in accordance with the meaning of the sutta beginning 'subject to arising and passing away,' belongs to one's own proponent.

Cittaṭṭhitikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Discussion of the Duration of Mind is concluded.

9. Anupubbābhisamayakathāvaṇṇanā

9. The Exposition on the Discussion of Gradual Realization

339. ‘‘Tāni vā cattāripi ñāṇāni eko sotāpattimaggoyevāti paṭijānātī’’ti imaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘atha vā’’tiādi. Catunnaṃ ñāṇānanti dukkheñāṇādīnaṃ catunnaṃ ñāṇānaṃ. Ekamaggabhāvatoti sotāpattiādiekamaggabhāvato. Kamena pavattamānānipi hi tāni ñāṇāni taṃtaṃmaggakiccassa sādhanato ekoyeva maggo hotīti adhippāyo. Tenāha ‘‘ekamaggassa…pe… paṭijānātī’’ti.

339. With reference to this—'he professes that those four knowledges are only the single stream-entry path'—he said, 'or else,' and so forth. 'Of the four knowledges' means of the four knowledges beginning with the knowledge of suffering. 'From being a single path' means from being a single path such as stream-entry and so on. For the meaning is that even though those knowledges proceed in sequence, since they accomplish the function of each respective path, they are just one path. Therefore, he said, 'he professes... of a single path...'

344. Dassaneti maggadassane.

344. 'In seeing' means in the seeing of the path.

345. Dhammatthānaṃ hetuphalabhāvato dhammatthapaṭisambhidānaṃ siyā sotāpattiphalahetutā, tadabhāvato na itarapaṭisambhidānanti āha ‘‘nirutti…pe… vicāretabba’’nti. Sabbāsampi pana paṭisambhidānaṃ paṭhamaphalasacchikiriyāhetutā vicāretabbā maggādhigameneva laddhabbattā phalānaṃ viya, tasmā ‘‘aṭṭhahi ñāṇehī’’ti ettha nikkhepakaṇḍe āgatanayena dukkhādiñāṇānaṃ pubbantādiñāṇānañca vasena ‘‘aṭṭhahi ñāṇehī’’ti yuttaṃ viya dissati.

345. Because phenomena and their meanings have the nature of cause and effect, the analytical knowledges of phenomena and meaning might be a cause for the fruit of stream-entry; in their absence, the other analytical knowledges are not. Therefore, he said, 'Etymology... should be investigated.' However, the status of all the analytical knowledges as a cause for the realization of the first fruit should be investigated, since, like the fruits, they are to be obtained only through the attainment of the path. Therefore, the phrase 'by eight knowledges' here, according to the method that comes in the chapter on summaries, seems fitting in the sense of the knowledges of suffering and so forth, and the knowledges of the past and so forth.

Anupubbābhisamayakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Discussion of Gradual Realization is concluded.

10. Vohārakathāvaṇṇanā

10. The Exposition on the Discussion of Conventional Expression

347. Visayavisayīsūti [Pg.106] rūpacakkhādike sandhāyāha. Te hi rūpakkhandhapariyāpannattā ekantena lokiyā. Visayassevāti saddasseva. So hi voharitabbato vohārakaraṇatāya ca ‘‘vohāro’’ti pāḷiyaṃ vutto. Natthettha kāraṇaṃ visayīnaṃ visayassapi āsavādianārammaṇatābhāvato. Asiddhalokuttarabhāvassa ekantasāsavattā tassa saddāyatanassa yathā lokuttaratā tava matenāti adhippāyo.

347. 'In objects and subjects' is said with reference to form, the eye, and so forth. For they are entirely worldly because they are included in the form aggregate. 'Of the object only' means of sound only. For it is called 'conventional expression' in the Pāli text because it is to be expressed and is the instrument of expression. There is no reason here, because the subjects and even the object are objects for the taints and so forth. The meaning is: How, according to your view, is that sound-base supramundane, since its supramundane nature is unestablished and it is entirely subject to the taints?

Paṭihaññeyyāti idaṃ parikappavacanaṃ. Parikappavacanañca ayāthāvanti āha ‘‘na hi…pe… atthī’’ti. Na hi jalaṃ analanti parikappitaṃ dahati pacati vā. Kiṃ lokiyena ñāṇena jānitabbato lokiyo rūpāyatanādi viya, udāhu lokuttaro paccavekkhiyamānamaggādi viyāti evamettha hetussa anekantabhāvo veditabbo. Tenāha ‘‘lokiye lokuttare ca sambhavato’’ti.

'It should be refuted' is a statement of supposition. And a statement of supposition is not in accordance with reality, so he said: 'For indeed... it is not.' For water, when supposed to be fire, does not burn or cook. Is it worldly because it is to be known by worldly knowledge, like the form-base and so forth, or is it supramundane, like the path and so forth being reviewed? In this way, the inconclusive nature of the reason here should be understood. Therefore, he said: 'Because of its possibility in both the worldly and the supramundane.'

Vohārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Discussion of Conventional Expression is concluded.

11. Nirodhakathāvaṇṇanā

11. The Exposition on the Discussion of Cessation

353. Yesaṃ dvinnanti yesaṃ dvinnaṃ dukkhasaccānaṃ. Dvīhi nirodhehīti appaṭisaṅkhāpaṭisaṅkhāsaṅkhātehi dvīhi nirodhehi. Tattha dukkhādīnaṃ paṭisaṅkhāti paṭisaṅkhā, paññāviseso. Tena vattabbo nirodho paṭisaṅkhānirodho. Yo sāsavehi dhammehi visaṃyogoti vuccati, yo paccayavekallena dhammānaṃ uppādassa accantavibandhabhūto nirodho, so paṭisaṅkhāya navattabbato appaṭisaṅkhānirodho nāmāti paravādino laddhi. Paṭisaṅkhāya vinā niruddhāti paccayavekallena anuppattiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘na uppajjitvā bhaṅgā’’ti. Anuppādopi hi nirodhoti vuccati yato ‘‘imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjatī’’ti lakkhaṇuddesassa paṭilome ‘‘imassa nirodhā idaṃ nirujjhatī’’ti dassito. Tenāti paṭisaṅkhāya nirodhassa khaṇikanirodhassa ca idha nādhippetattā.

353. 'Of which two' means of the two truths of suffering. 'By two cessations' means by the two cessations designated as cessation through deliberation and cessation not through deliberation. Therein, deliberation about suffering and so forth is 'deliberation,' a special kind of wisdom. The cessation attained by that is cessation through deliberation, which is called 'disjunction from states with taints.' That cessation which is the absolute prevention of the arising of phenomena due to a lack of conditions is called 'cessation not through deliberation' because it is not to be spoken of by deliberation—this is the opponent's doctrine. 'Ceased without deliberation' is said with reference to non-arising due to a lack of conditions. Therefore, he said, 'not by dissolution after having arisen.' For non-arising is also called cessation, since, in the reverse of the exposition of the characteristic 'from the arising of this, this arises,' it is shown 'from the cessation of this, this ceases.' 'Therefore' means because neither cessation through deliberation nor momentary cessation is intended here.

Nirodhakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Discussion of Cessation is concluded.

Dutiyavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Second Chapter is concluded.

3. Tatiyavaggo

3. The Third Chapter

1. Balakathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Exposition on the Discussion of Strength

354. Niddesatoti [Pg.107] ‘‘aṭṭhānametaṃ anavakāso’’tiādinā niddiṭṭhappakārato. So pana yasmā vitthāro hoti, tasmā vuttaṃ ‘‘vitthārato’’ti. Sabbaṃ kilesāvaraṇādiṃ, tameva paccekaṃ pavattiākārabhedato sabbākāraṃ. ‘‘Sabba’’nti hi idaṃ sarūpato gahaṇaṃ, ‘‘sabbākārato’’ti pavattiākārabhedato. Bhagavā hi dhamme jānanto tesaṃ ākārabhede anavasesetvāva jānāti. Yathāha ‘‘sabbe dhammā sabbākārato buddhassa bhagavato ñāṇamukhe āpāthaṃ āgacchantī’’ti (mahāni. 156; cūḷani. mogharājamāṇavapucchāniddesa 85; paṭi. ma. 3.5). Uddesatoti ekadesato. Ekadeso ca vitthāro na hotīti āha ‘‘saṅkhepato’’ti. Yathā jānantīti sambandho. Uddesamattenapīti diṭṭhigatayathābhūtañāṇādippabhedānaṃ āsayādīnaṃ uddesamattenapi. Tenāha ‘‘indriyānaṃ tikkhamudubhāvajānanamattaṃ sandhāyā’’ti. Therenāti anuruddhattherena. Evamevāti uddesato ṭhānādimattajānanākāreneva. Svāyamattho sakavādināpi icchitoyevāti āha ‘‘kathamayaṃ codetabbo siyā’’ti.

354. The phrase 'by way of exposition' (niddesato) means in the manner expounded in 'this is impossible, there is no chance,' and so forth. However, since that is detailed, it is said 'in detail' (vitthārato). All defilements, obstructions, and so forth, each individually, in every aspect according to the modes of occurrence. Here, 'all' (sabbaṃ) refers to inclusion by essence, while 'in every aspect' (sabbākārato) refers to the modes of occurrence. For the Blessed One, knowing phenomena, comprehends them without omission in all their aspects. As it is said: 'All phenomena in every aspect enter the range of knowledge of the Blessed One, the Buddha' (Mahāni. 156; Cūḷani. Mogharājamāṇavapucchāniddesa 85; Paṭi. Ma. 3.5). The phrase 'by way of summary' (uddesato) means partially. And since the partial is not detailed, he said 'briefly' (saṅkhepato). The connection is 'as they know'. The phrase 'even by mere summary' (uddesamattenapi) refers to mere summaries of the distinctions of views, true knowledge, and so forth, and of inclinations, and so forth. Therefore, he said: 'referring merely to knowing the sharpness or dullness of the faculties.' The phrase 'by the elder' (therena) means by the elder Anuruddha. The phrase 'similarly' (evameva) means in the same way, by merely knowing the basis, and so forth. He said, 'how could this be challenged?' because this meaning is intended even by the proponent himself.

356. Sesesūti indriyaparopariyattañāṇato sesesu. Paṭikkhepoti asādhāraṇatāpaṭikkhepo. Nanu ca sesānaṃ asādhāraṇatāpi atthīti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘ṭhānā…pe… adhippāyo’’ti.

356. The phrase 'in the rest' (sesesu) means in the remaining aspects apart from the knowledge of the faculties of others. The phrase 'rejection' (paṭikkhepo) means the rejection of non-exclusivity. But isn’t there also non-exclusivity in the rest? It is with reference to this objection that he said, 'the basis...the intention.'

Balakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition on the discourse on strength is concluded.

2. Ariyantikathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Commentary on the Discourse on the Noble Ones

357. Saṅkhāre sandhāya paṭijānantassāti diṭṭhiyā parikappitena sattena suññe saṅkhāre sandhāya ‘‘suññatañca manasi karotī’’ti pucchāya ‘‘āmantā’’ti paṭijānantassa. Dvinnaṃ phassānaṃ samodhānaṃ kathaṃ āpajjati ṭhānāṭhānabhūte saṅkhāre vuttanayena suññataṃ manasi karontassāti adhippāyo. Yathāvuttanayenāti ‘‘diṭṭhiyā parikappitena sattena suññā [Pg.108] pañcakkhandhā’’ti pakārena nayena. Atha vā yathāvuttanayenāti ‘‘ṭhānāṭhānamanasikāro saṅkhārārammaṇo, suññatāmanasikāro nibbānārammaṇo’’ti evaṃ vuttanayena. ‘‘Saṅkhāre sandhāya paṭijānantassā’’ti vuttattā ‘‘dvinnaṃ phassānaṃ samodhānaṃ kathaṃ āpajjatī’’ti āha. Sattasuññatāya suññattepi saṅkhārānaṃ aññova ṭhānāṭhānamanasikāro, añño suññatāmanasikāroti yujjateva dvinnaṃ phassānaṃ samodhānāpatticodanā, saṅkhāre sandhāya paṭijānantassa pana kathaṃ ariyabhāvasiddhi ṭhānāṭhānañāṇādīnanti vicāretabbaṃ. Kiṃ vā etāya yutticintāya. Ummattakapacchisadiso hi paravādivādo. Aññesupi ṭhānesu īdisesu eseva nayo. Āropetvāti itthipurisādiākāraṃ, sattākārameva vā asantaṃ rūpādiupādāne āropetvā. Abhūtāropanañhettha paṇidahananti adhippetaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘parikappanavasenā’’ti. Soti yathāvutto paṇidhi. Ekasmimpi khandhe.

357. Regarding one who claims with reference to formations: This refers to one who, with reference to formations that are empty of a being conceived by wrong view, answers 'yes' to the question, 'Does he attend to emptiness?' The intention is: how does the concurrence of two contacts occur for one who attends to emptiness in the manner described, regarding formations which are the basis for what is possible and impossible? 'In the aforementioned way' means in the manner: 'The five aggregates are empty of a being conceived by wrong view.' Alternatively, 'in the aforementioned way' means in the manner described: 'Attention to what is possible and impossible has formations as its object, while attention to emptiness has Nibbāna as its object.' Because it is said, 'regarding one who claims with reference to formations,' the question is asked: 'How does the concurrence of two contacts occur?' Even though formations are empty of a being, attention to what is possible and impossible regarding formations is one thing, and attention to emptiness is another—thus, the objection about the concurrence of two contacts is valid. But for one who claims with reference to formations, how is the attainment of noble status possible through knowledge of what is possible and impossible, etc.? This should be investigated. Or what is the point of this line of reasoning? For the opponent's argument is like the talk of a madman. The same method applies in other similar cases. 'Imputing' means superimposing the form of a man or woman, or even the form of a being, onto the aggregates of clinging, such as materiality, which are non-existent (as a being). Here, the intention is the establishing of a false imputation. Hence, it is said, 'by way of conceptualization.' 'So' refers to the aforementioned establishing. Even in a single aggregate.

Ariyantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Noble Ones is concluded.

4. Vimuccamānakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Commentary on the Discourse on Being Liberated

366. Maggakkhaṇe cittaṃ ekadesena vimuttaṃ ekadesena avimuttanti ayaṃ ‘‘vimuttaṃ vimuccamāna’’nti laddhiyā doso. Tathā hi vuttaṃ ‘‘ekadesaṃ vimuttaṃ, ekadesaṃ avimutta’’nti. Aṭṭhakathāyañca ‘‘tañhi tadā samucchedavimuttiyā vimuttekadesena vimuccamānantissa laddhī’’ti dassitovāyamattho. Vippakataniddeseti vimuccanakiriyāya apariyositatāniddese. Yaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘vimuttaṃ vimuccamānanti vippakatabhāvena vuttattā’’ti. Tenāti paravādinā. Vimucca…pe… vuttaṃ vimuccamānassa vimuttabhāvābhāvato, vimuttabhedena pana tathā vuttanti adhippāyo. Sati ca dose vippakataniddeseti ānetvā yojetabbaṃ. Ekadeso visesanaṃ hoti nippadesavimuttiyā avicchinnato. Phalacittenāti paṭhamaphalacittena uppannena.

366. At the moment of the path, the mind is partly liberated and partly not liberated—this is the fault in the doctrine 'liberated, being liberated.' For it is said, 'partly liberated, partly not liberated.' And in the commentary this meaning is shown: 'For it is the doctrine of one who is being liberated in part by the liberation of eradication at that time.' 'Incomplete exposition' refers to the exposition of the uncompleted act of liberation. With reference to which, it is said, 'because it is stated as 'liberated, being liberated' due to its incomplete nature.' 'By him' means by the opponent. 'Being liberated…,' etc., is said with regard to the non-existence of the state of being liberated for one who is being liberated; but the intention is that it is stated thus by a distinction of liberation. And if there is a fault, 'incomplete exposition' should be brought in and connected. 'Partly' is a qualification indicating the unbroken nature of liberation without parts. 'By the fruition mind' means arisen by the first fruition mind.

Vimuccamānakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Being Liberated is concluded.

5. Aṭṭhamakakathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Commentary on the Eighth Discourse

368. Pahīnā [Pg.109] nāma bhaveyyuṃ, na pahiyyamānāti adhippāyo.

368. They should be abandoned, not in the process of being abandoned—this is the intention.

Aṭṭhamakakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Eighth Discourse is concluded.

6. Aṭṭhamakassa indriyakathāvaṇṇanā

6. The Commentary on the Discourse on the Faculties in the Eighth (Section)

371. Lokuttarānaṃyeva saddhādīnaṃ indriyabhāvo, na lokiyānanti paravādino adhippāyavasenāha ‘‘appaṭiladdhindriyattā’’tiādi. Tattha niyyānikāni bhāventoti yathā niyyānikā honti, evaṃ uppādento brūhento vā. Indriyabhāvaṃ pana pattesu tesu puna bhāvanākiccaṃ natthīti tassa adhippāyoti dassento āha ‘‘na pana indriyāni bhāvento’’ti.

371. The state of faculties such as faith belongs only to the supramundane, not the mundane—this is stated according to the intention of the opponents when they say, 'because the faculties are not attained,' and so on. Here, 'developing those that lead to liberation' means producing or strengthening them so that they lead to liberation. However, once these faculties have been attained, there is no further work of development to be done—to show this intention, it is said, 'but one does not develop the faculties.'

Aṭṭhamakassa indriyakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Faculties in the Eighth (Section) is concluded.

7. Dibbacakkhukathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Commentary on the Discourse on the Divine Eye

373. Visinoti visesena bandhati visayīnaṃ attapaṭibandhaṃ karotīti visayo, ārammaṇaṃ, anubhavati etenāti ānubhāvo, sāmatthiyaṃ, balanti attho, gocarakaraṇaṃ gocaro, visaye ānubhāvagocarā visaya…pe… carāti. Tehi yathā visiṭṭhaṃ visesaṃ hoti, tathā paccayabhūtena jhānadhammena āhitabalaṃ katabalādhānaṃ. Visayaggahaṇañcettha ānubhāvagocarakaraṇānaṃ pavattiṭṭhānadassanaṃ yatthassa tehi upatthaddhattā balādhānaṃ pākaṭaṃ hoti. Tenāha ‘‘yādise visaye’’tiādi. Balādhānañca uttarimanussadhammato mahaggatadhammavisesato uppannehi paṇītehi cittajarūpehi visesāpatti. Yaṃ nissāya parāvuttīti eke vadanti. Purimaṃ maṃsacakkhumattamevāti yathāvuttabalādhānato purimaṃ maṃsacakkhumattameva. Vadanto saṅgahakāro. Visayaggahaṇaṃ pāḷiyaṃ kataṃ. Na visayavisesadassanatthanti na visayassa visesadassanatthaṃ. Yato ubhinnampi rūpāyatanameva visayoti visayassa sadisataṃ avisesaṃ āha, sadisassa vā visesaṃ dīpetīti yojanā.

373. It singles out, binds, and creates self-attachment for those who are subject to it—thus it is an object (visaya). It is an object (ārammaṇa). That by which one experiences—thus it is experience (ānubhāva); the meaning is power, strength. The act of ranging—thus it is range (gocara). In the object, the range of experience... it ranges. By these, as there is a particular distinction, a special quality, so too the jhāna factors, serving as conditions, give power and establish strength. Here, the grasping of the object is the showing of the place of occurrence of experiencing and ranging, where the establishment of strength becomes evident through its support by these. Therefore, it is said, 'in whatever object,' and so on. The establishment of strength is the attainment of distinction through superior human states and a distinction of sublime qualities, arising from refined mind-produced matter. Some say it is the basis for transformation. The compiler speaks, [saying that] 'it is merely the former fleshly eye' (compared to the establishment of strength as previously described). The grasping of the object is stated in the Pāli. It is not for the purpose of seeing distinctions in the object, meaning it is not for seeing a special quality of the object. Since for both the object is merely the sphere of form, it states the similarity of the object, its non-distinction, or it illuminates the distinction of what is similar—this is the interpretation.

Dhammupatthaddha [Pg.110]…pe… adhippāyo, aññathā laddhiyeva na siyāti bhāvo. Maggoti upāyo, kāraṇanti attho. Pakaticakkhumato eva hi dibbacakkhu uppajjati. Kasmā? Kasiṇālokaṃ vaḍḍhetvā dibbacakkhuñāṇassa uppādanaṃ, so ca kasiṇamaṇḍale uggahanimittena vinā natthi, tasmā vuttaṃ ‘‘maṃsacakkhupaccayatādassanatthameva vutta’’nti. Tenāti ‘‘maggo’’ti vacanena. Rūpāvacarajjhānapaccayenāti rūpāvacarajjhānena paccayabhūtena uppannāni rūpāvacarajjhānacittasamuṭṭhitāni. Jhānakammasamuṭṭhitesu vattabbameva natthi. Tassa hesā laddhi.

The mind is supported by the Dhamma …pe… this is the intention, otherwise the view itself would not exist. The path is the means, the cause is the meaning. For the divine eye arises only from the natural eye. Why? By developing the light of the kasiṇa, the knowledge of the divine eye arises. And that (development) is not possible without the learning sign in the kasiṇa circle; therefore it is said, 'It is stated only for the purpose of showing that the fleshly eye is a condition.' Thus, by the word 'path.' Dependent on the form-sphere jhāna—that is, those arisen dependent on form-sphere jhāna, which serves as a condition, and produced by the form-sphere jhāna consciousness. There is nothing to be said regarding those arisen from jhāna kamma. This is its view.

374. Yena dibbacakkhuno paññācakkhubhāvassa icchanena paṭijānanena. Tīṇi cakkhūni maṃsadibbapaññācakkhūni cakkhuntarabhāvaṃ vadato bhaveyyuṃ, tasmā taṃ na icchatīti attho.

374. By which, by desiring and declaring the divine eye's state of being a wisdom eye. There would be three eyes—the fleshly eye, the divine eye, and the wisdom eye—for one speaking of them as different; therefore, that is not desired—this is the meaning.

Dibbacakkhukathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Divine Eye is concluded.

9. Yathākammūpagatañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

9. The Explanation of the Discourse on the Knowledge of Beings Faring According to Their Deeds

377. Dibbacakkhupādakattā ‘‘yathākammūpagatañāṇassa upanissaye dibbacakkhumhī’’ti vuttaṃ, na yathākammūpagatajānanakiccake dibbacakkhumhi tassa taṃkiccakatābhāvato. Yato yaṃ anaññaṃ, tampi tato anaññamevāti āha ‘‘iminā…pe… bhavitabba’’nti. Tattha atthantarabhāvaṃ nivāretīti dibbacakkhuñāṇassa pakkhikattā yathākammūpagatañāṇassa tato atthantarabhāvaṃ nivāreti. Tassa hi taṃ paribhaṇḍañāṇaṃ. Dibbacakkhussa yathākammūpagatañāṇato atthantarabhāvaṃ na nivāreti atappakkhikattāti adhippāyo. Dibbacakkhussa yathākammūpagatañāṇakiccatā paravādinā icchitā, na yathākammūpagatañāṇassa dibbacakkhukiccatāti tamatthaṃ ‘‘yathākammūpagatañāṇameva dibbacakkhu’’nti ettha yojetvā dassento ‘‘eva-saddo cā’’tiādimāha.

377. Because the divine eye is its basis, it is said, 'In the divine eye is the supporting condition for the knowledge of beings faring according to their deeds,' not 'in the divine eye' as performing the function of knowing what accords with deeds, since it does not have that function. Because whatever is not other is also not different from it, he said, 'By this... it must be.' Here, 'it prevents a difference in meaning' means that because it is on the side of the divine eye-knowledge, it prevents the knowledge of beings faring according to their deeds from being different in meaning from that; for that is its accessory knowledge. It does not prevent the divine eye from being different in meaning from the knowledge of beings faring according to their deeds, because it is not on its side—this is the intention. That the divine eye performs the function of the knowledge of beings faring according to their deeds is desired by the opponent, not that the knowledge of beings faring according to their deeds performs the function of the divine eye. To show this meaning by connecting it to 'The knowledge of beings faring according to their deeds is itself the divine eye,' he said, 'And the word "eva"...' and so on.

Yathākammūpagatañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Knowledge of Beings Faring According to Their Deeds is concluded.

10. Saṃvarakathāvaṇṇanā

10. The Explanation of the Discourse on Restraint

379. Āṭānāṭiyasutte [Pg.111] ‘‘santi, bhikkhave, yakkhā yebhuyyena pāṇātipātā appaṭiviratā’’ti (dī. ni. 3.276, 286) āgatattā cātumahārājikānaṃ saṃvarāsaṃvarasabbhāvo avivādasiddho. Yattha pana vivādo, tameva dassentena tāvatiṃsādayo gahitāti imamatthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘cātumahārājikāna’’nti vuttaṃ. Evaṃ satīti yadi tāvatiṃsesu saṃvarāsaṃvaro natthi, evaṃ sante. Surāpānanti etthāpi ‘‘suyyatī’’ti padaṃ ānetvā sambandhitabbaṃ. Kathaṃ suyyatīti? Vuttañhetaṃ kumbhajātake –

379. In the Āṭānāṭiya Sutta, it is said, 'Bhikkhus, there are yakkhas who for the most part do not abstain from killing living beings' (Dī. Ni. 3.276, 286). Therefore, the existence of restraint and non-restraint among the devas of the Four Great Kings is indisputably established. But where there is dispute, the Tāvatiṃsa gods and others are taken up to show that very point. To show this meaning, 'of the Cātumahārājikas' was said. This being the case, if there is no restraint and non-restraint among the Tāvatiṃsa gods, so be it. Regarding liquor-drinking—here too, the word 'is heard' should be brought in and connected. How is it 'heard'? For it is said in the Kumbha Jātaka:

‘‘Yaṃ ve pivitvā pubbadevā pamattā,Tidivā cutā sassatiyā samāyā;

Taṃ tādisaṃ majjamimaṃ niratthaṃ,Jānaṃ mahārāja kathaṃ piveyyā’’ti. (jā. 1.16.58);

'Having drunk that, the former gods became heedless, fallen from Tidiva, for an eternity, together with their illusion. Knowing such useless intoxicating liquor as this, great king, how could you drink it?' (Jā. 1.16.58)

Tattha pubbadevā nāma asurā. Te hi tāvatiṃsānaṃ uppattito pubbadevāti paññāyiṃsu. Pamattāti surāpānena pamādaṃ āpannā. Tidivāti manussacātumahārājikaloke upādāya tatiyalokabhūtā devaṭṭhānā, nāmameva vā etaṃ tassa devaṭṭhānassa. Sassatiyāti kevalaṃ dīghāyukataṃ sandhāya vadati. Samāyā saha attano asuramāyāya, asuramantehi saddhiṃ cutāti attho. Aṭṭhakathāyañca vuttaṃ ‘‘āgantukadevaputtā āgatāti nevāsikā gandhapānaṃ sajjayiṃsu. Sakko sakaparisāya saññamadāsī’’ti. Tenāha ‘‘tesaṃ surāpānaṃ asaṃvaro na hotīti vattabbaṃ hotī’’ti. Ettha ca tāvatiṃsānaṃ pātubhāvato paṭṭhāya surāpānampi tattha nāhosi, pageva pāṇātipātādayoti viramitabbābhāvato eva tāvatiṃsato paṭṭhāya upari devalokesu samādānasampattavirativasena puretabbā saṃvarā na santi, lokuttarā pana santiyeva. Tathā tehi pahātabbā asaṃvarā. Na hi appahīnānusayānaṃ maggavajjhā kilesā na santīti.

There, the 'former gods' are the Asuras. For they were known as the former gods because they were there before the arising of the Tāvatiṃsa gods. 'Heedless' means they fell into heedlessness due to drinking liquor. 'Tidiva' refers to the divine abode that is the third world, taking into account the human world and the world of the Four Great Kings, or it is simply the name of that divine abode. By 'sassatiyā,' he speaks with reference only to their long lifespan. 'Samāyā' means 'together with their own Asura-illusion'; the meaning is that they fell along with their Asura-mantras. And in the commentary it is said: 'When the visiting devaputtas arrived, the resident devas prepared fragrant drink. Sakka gave a sign to his assembly.' Therefore he says, 'It should be said that for them drinking liquor is not non-restraint.' Here, from the appearance of the Tāvatiṃsa gods onwards, drinking liquor did not exist there, let alone killing living beings and so on. Therefore, precisely because there is nothing to abstain from, from the Tāvatiṃsa realm upwards in the higher deva worlds, there are no restraints to be fulfilled by way of undertaking, accomplishment, and abstention. The supramundane restraints, however, do indeed exist. Likewise, there are states of non-restraint to be abandoned by them. For it is not the case that for those whose underlying tendencies have not been abandoned, the defilements to be abandoned by the path do not exist.

Saṃvarakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Restraint is concluded.

Tatiyavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Third Chapter is concluded.

4. Catutthavaggo

4. The Fourth Chapter

1. Gihissa arahātikathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Discourse on Whether a Householder is an Arahant

387. Gihichandarāgasampayuttatāyāti [Pg.112] gihibhāve kāmabhogibhāve chandarāgasahitatāya.

387. By 'being associated with the desire and lust of a householder' is meant being accompanied by desire and lust in the state of a householder, in the state of one who enjoys sensual pleasures.

Gihissa arahātikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Whether a Householder is an Arahant is concluded.

4. Samannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Explanation of the Discourse on Being Endowed

393. Pattinti adhigamo. Adhigamo nāma samannāgamo hotīti pāḷiyaṃ catūhi phassādīhi samannāgamo coditoti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

393. By 'patti' is meant acquisition. Acquisition is called being endowed. It should be understood that in the Pāli text, being endowed with four things, beginning with contact, is indicated.

Samannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Being Endowed is concluded.

5. Upekkhāsamannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Explanation of the Discourse on Being Endowed with Equanimity

397. Sabbaṃ yojetabbanti ettha yadi te arahā catūhi khandhehi viya chahi upekkhāhi samannāgato, evaṃ sante cha upekkhā paccekaṃ phassādisahitāti ‘‘chahi phassādīhi samannāgato’’tiādinā yojetabbaṃ.

397. Here, by 'all should be connected': if that arahant is endowed with six kinds of equanimity as with the four aggregates, then, this being the case, since each of the six equanimities is accompanied by contact and so on, it should be connected with 'endowed with six contacts and so on' and similar phrases.

Upekkhāsamannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Being Endowed with Equanimity is concluded.

6. Bodhiyābuddhotikathāvaṇṇanā

6. The Explanation of the Discourse on 'Is One a Buddha by Enlightenment?'

398. Pattidhammavasenāti ‘‘pattidhammo nāmā’’tiādinā vuttassa cittavippayuttassa saṅkhārassa vasena. ‘‘Bodhiyā buddho’’ti pucchā. ‘‘Bodhiyā niruddhāya vigatāya paṭippassaddhāya abuddho hotī’’ti anuyogo. Evamaññatthāpi pucchānuyogā veditabbā.

398. By 'by way of the principle of attainment' is meant by way of the formation dissociated from consciousness, which was stated beginning with 'What is called the principle of attainment.' The question is: 'Is one a Buddha by enlightenment?' The counter-question is: 'When enlightenment has ceased, vanished, and subsided, is one not then a Buddha?' In this way, questions and counter-questions should be understood elsewhere as well.

Bodhiyābuddhotikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on 'Is One a Buddha by Enlightenment?' is concluded.

7. Lakkhaṇakathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Commentary on the Discourse on Characteristics

402. Tasmāti [Pg.113] yasmā abodhisattassapi cakkavattino lakkhaṇehi samannāgamo bodhisattassapi carimabhavato aññattha asamannāgamo hoti, tasmā lakkhaṇasamannāgato bodhisattovāti imassatthassa asādhakaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘ābhatampi anābhatasadisamevā’’ti.

402. Therefore, since even a non-Bodhisatta wheel-turning monarch is endowed with the marks, while a Bodhisatta is not endowed with them elsewhere than in his final existence, this is not a proof for the meaning that 'one endowed with the marks is a Bodhisatta.' Hence it is said: 'Even what is adduced is just like what is not adduced.'

Lakkhaṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Characteristics is concluded.

8. Niyāmokkantikathāvaṇṇanā

8. The Commentary on the Discourse on Entering the Fixed Order

403. Pāramīpūraṇanti idaṃ bodhicariyāya upalakkhaṇaṃ, na pāramīnaṃ puṇṇabhāvadassanaṃ. Tena tesaṃ ārambhasamādānādīnampi saṅgaho katoti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Mahābhinīhārato paṭṭhāya hi mahāsattā niyatāti vuccanti. Yathāha – ‘‘evaṃ sabbaṅgasampannā, bodhiyā niyatā narā’’ti, ‘‘dhuvaṃ buddho bhavissatī’’ti ca, na niyāmassa nāma kassaci dhammassa uppannattā byākaronti, atha kho ekaṃsenāyaṃ pāramiyo pūretvā buddho bhavissatīti katvā byākarontīti paravādīparikappitaṃ dhammantaraṃ paṭisedheti, na bodhiyā niyatattaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘kevalañhi na’’ntiādi.

403. 'Fulfillment of the perfections' is a characteristic of the Bodhisatta's conduct, not an indication of the completeness of the perfections. Therefore, it should be understood that this includes their beginning, undertaking, and so forth. Indeed, great beings are called 'assured' from the time of their great aspiration. As it is said: 'Thus, men endowed with all qualities are assured of enlightenment,' and 'He will surely become a Buddha.' They do not make this prediction because some state called 'assurance' has arisen, but rather they make the prediction thinking, 'Having fulfilled the perfections, he will certainly become a Buddha.' This refutes the alternative doctrine fabricated by opponents, not the assuredness of enlightenment. Hence it is said: 'For it is not merely...' and so on.

Niyāmokkantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Entering the Fixed Order is concluded.

10. Sabbasaṃyojanappahānakathāvaṇṇanā

10. Commentary on the Discourse on the Abandoning of All Fetters

413. Satipi kesañci saṃyojanānaṃ heṭṭhimamaggehi pahīnatte ‘‘pañcannaṃ orambhāgiyānaṃ saṃyojanānaṃ parikkhayā’’tiādīsu viya vaṇṇabhaṇanamukhena anavasesatañca sandhāya sabbasaṃyojanappahānakittanaṃ pariyāyavacananti āha ‘‘imaṃ pariyāyaṃ aggahetvā’’ti. Arahattamaggena pajahanato evāti gaṇhātīti aggamaggo eva sabbasaṃyojanāni pajahatīti laddhiṃ gaṇhātīti vadanti padakārā. Evaṃ satīti yadi anavasesatāmattena tathā paṭijānāti.

413. Even though some fetters are abandoned by the lower paths—as in statements like 'with the destruction of the five lower fetters'—the declaration of the abandonment of all fetters is a conventional expression, referring to their completeness in the manner of descriptive language. Thus, it is said: 'Not grasping this convention...' The commentators say that one who holds that it is only by abandoning them with the path of Arahantship, holds the view that the supreme path alone abandons all fetters. This being so, if one asserts this solely on the basis of completeness...

Sabbasaṃyojanappahānakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Abandoning of All Fetters is concluded.

Catutthavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Fourth Chapter is concluded.

5. Pañcamavaggo

5. The Fifth Chapter

1. Vimuttikathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discourse on Liberation

418. Phalañāṇaṃ [Pg.114] na hoti, sesāni vipassanāmaggapaccavekkhaṇañāṇāni vimuttānīti na vattabbānīti sambandho. Etthāti etesu catūsu ñāṇesu. Vipassanāggahaṇena gahitaṃ maggādikiccavidūrakiccattā vipassanāpariyosānattā ca.

418. Fruition-knowledge is not [liberation]; the remaining knowledges—namely, insight-knowledge, path-knowledge, and reviewing-knowledge—cannot be said to be 'liberated.' The connection is this: 'here' means in these four knowledges. Insight is included by the term 'insight' because its function is distant from the function beginning with the path, and because it culminates in insight.

Vimuttikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Liberation is concluded.

2. Asekhañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discourse on the Knowledge of the Non-learner

421. Asekhe ārabbha pavattattā asekhañāṇanti parassa laddhi, na asekhe asekhadhamme pariyāpannanti imamatthamāha ‘‘etena…pe… dassetī’’ti.

421. Because it arises in connection with the non-learner, it is called 'the knowledge of the non-learner.' This is the view of others, not that it is included in the non-learner or in the qualities of a non-learner. This is the meaning of the statement: 'By this... he shows...'

Asekhañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Knowledge of the Non-learner is concluded.

3. Viparītakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discourse on the Contrary

424. Asive sivāti vohāraṃ viya aññāṇe…pe… vadati.

424. Just as one speaks conventionally of what is inauspicious as 'auspicious,' so one speaks of non-knowledge... he says.

Viparītakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Contrary is concluded.

4. Niyāmakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Discourse on the Fixed Course

428-431. Yanti yaṃ ñāṇaṃ. Saccānulomanti saccappaṭivedhānukūlaṃ. Viparītānuyogato pabhuti gaṇetvā ‘‘catuttha’’nti āha na aniyatassa niyāmagamanāyāti aviparītānuyogato pabhuti gaṇetvā, tathā sati pañcamabhāvato visesabhāvato ca.

'They go to that knowledge.' 'In accordance with the truth' means conducive to the penetration of the truths. Counting from the application of the contrary, he says 'the fourth.' He does not count from the application of the non-contrary, which is for leading the unfixed to the fixed course, because in that case it would be the fifth and a special state.

Niyāmakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Fixed Course is concluded.

5. Paṭisambhidākathāvaṇṇanā

5. Commentary on the Discourse on Analytical Knowledge

432-433. Sabbaṃ [Pg.115] ñāṇanti idaṃ ‘‘ariyāna’’nti iminā na visesitanti adhippāyenāha ‘‘anariyānampi hi ñāṇaṃ ñāṇamevā’’ti. Atha vā pāḷiyaṃ avisesena sabbaṃ ñāṇanti vuttaṃ gahetvā evamāha. Ariyassa ce ñāṇanti, so pana paṭikkhepeyyāti āha ‘‘anariyassa etaṃ ñāṇaṃ sandhāyā’’ti.

With the intention that this 'all knowledge' is not specified by 'of the noble ones,' it is said, 'For the knowledge of even the ignoble is still knowledge.' Alternatively, taking 'all knowledge' as stated in the Pāli text without specification, it is explained thus. If it were the knowledge of a noble one, then he might reject it; therefore, it is said, 'This refers to the knowledge of an ignoble one.'

Paṭisambhidākathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Analytical Knowledge is concluded.

7. Cittārammaṇakathāvaṇṇanā

7. Commentary on the Discourse on Mind as Object

436-438. Vattabbapaṭiññāti phassārammaṇe ñāṇaṃ vattabbaṃ cetopariyañāṇanti evaṃ pavattā paṭiññā.

'A declaration to be made' is a declaration made thus: 'Knowledge with contact as its object should be declared as knowledge of the minds of others.'

Cittārammaṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Mind as Object is concluded.

8. Anāgatañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Commentary on the Discourse on Knowledge of the Future

439-440. Anantarānāgatepi citte ñāṇaṃ icchanti, tattha pana khaṇapaccuppanne viya tādisena parikammena kadāci ñāṇaṃ uppajjeyya. Tenāha ‘‘anantare ekanteneva ñāṇaṃ natthī’’ti.

They desire knowledge even regarding a mind in the immediately following future. However, there, just as in the present moment, knowledge might occasionally arise through such preparatory work. Therefore, he says, 'There is absolutely no knowledge in the immediately following moment.'

Anāgatañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Knowledge of the Future is concluded.

9. Paṭuppannañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Discourse on Knowledge of the Present

441-442. ‘‘Sabbasaṅkhāresu aniccato diṭṭhesū’’ti vutte yaṃ dassanabhūtaṃ ñāṇaṃ, tampi saṅkhārasabhāvattā tathādiṭṭhaṃ siyāti atthato āpajjati, evaṃbhūtaṃ vacanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘atthato āpannaṃ vacana’’nti. Taṃ pana yasmā ‘‘tampi ñāṇaṃ aniccato diṭṭhaṃ hotī’’ti paṭijānanavasena pavattaṃ, tasmā ‘‘anujānanavacana’’nti vuttaṃ. Bhaṅgānupassanānaṃ pabandhavasena pavattamānānaṃ.

When it is said, 'Having seen impermanence in all conditioned things,' it is implied that the knowledge which is the act of seeing, due to its being of the nature of conditioned things, may itself be seen in that way. With reference to such a statement, he said, 'A statement with implied meaning.' But since it proceeds by way of acknowledging that 'even that knowledge is seen as impermanent,' therefore it is called 'a statement of agreement.' Of the contemplations of dissolution proceeding by way of continuity.

Paṭuppannañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Knowledge of the Present is concluded.

10. Phalañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

10. Commentary on the Discourse on the Knowledge of Fruition

443-444. Phalaparopariyattaṃ [Pg.116] phalassa uccāvacatā. Balenāti ñāṇabalena.

443-444. Phalaparopariyattaṃ means the higher and lower gradations of the fruit. Balena means by the power of knowledge.

Phalañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the discourse on the knowledge of fruition is concluded.

Pañcamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the fifth chapter is concluded.

Mahāpaṇṇāsako samatto.

The Great Fifty (Mahāpaṇṇāsaka) is concluded.

6. Chaṭṭhavaggo

6. The Sixth Chapter

1. Niyāmakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Discourse on Certainty

445-447. Etassa ariyassa puggalassa.

445-447. Of this noble individual.

Niyāmakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the discourse on certainty is concluded.

2. Paṭiccasamuppādakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Discourse on Dependent Origination

451. Kāraṇaṭṭhena ṭhitatāti kāraṇabhāvena byabhicaraṇābhāvamāha. Yo hi dhammo yassa dhammassa yadā kāraṇaṃ hoti, na tassa tadā aññathābhāvo atthi, sā ca atthato kāraṇabhāvoyevāti ‘‘kāraṇabhāvoyevā’’ti āha.

451. Kāraṇaṭṭhena ṭhitatā means the absence of deviation from the state of being a cause. For whatever phenomenon is the cause of another phenomenon at any time, there is no otherness for it at that time. And since that, in essence, is indeed the state of being a cause, therefore it is said, 'it is indeed the state of being a cause.'

Paṭiccasamuppādakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the discourse on Dependent Origination is concluded.

5. Nirodhasamāpattikathāvaṇṇanā

5. Explanation of the Discourse on the Attainment of Cessation

457-459. Sabhāvadhammataṃ paṭisedheti tadubhayalakkhaṇarahitassa sabhāvadhammassa abhāvā. ‘‘Vodānampi vuṭṭhāna’’nti vacanato ‘‘vodānañca vuṭṭhānapariyāyovā’’ti āha. Sabhāvadhammatte siddhe saṅkhatavidūratāya asaṅkhataṃ siyāti āha ‘‘sabhāvadhammattāsādhakattā’’ti.

457-459. It refutes the state of being an intrinsic phenomenon because of the absence of an intrinsic phenomenon devoid of both those characteristics. From the saying, 'purification is also emergence,' he says, 'purification is a synonym for emergence.' If the state of being an intrinsic phenomenon were established, the unconditioned could exist due to its remoteness from the conditioned; thus he says, 'because it does not establish the state of being an intrinsic phenomenon.'

Nirodhasamāpattikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the discourse on the attainment of cessation is concluded.

Chaṭṭhavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the sixth chapter is concluded.

7. Sattamavaggo

7. The Seventh Chapter

1. Saṅgahitakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Discourse on Comprehension

471-472. Saṅgahitāti [Pg.117] saṅgahaṇādivasena saddhiṃ gahitā. Te pana yasmā ekavidhatādisāmaññena bandhā viya honti, tasmā āha ‘‘sambandhā’’ti.

471-472. Saṅgahitā means taken together by way of comprehension and so forth. And because they are like bonds due to the commonality of being of one kind and so on, therefore it is said, 'related.'

Saṅgahitakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the discourse on comprehension is concluded.

2. Sampayuttakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Discourse on Association

473-474. Anuppavisitabbānuppavisanabhāvo tesaṃ bhede sati yujjeyya, nāññathāti upamābhindanena upameyyassa bhinnataṃ dassento ‘‘nānattavavatthā…pe… dassetī’’ti āha.

473-474. The condition of not encroaching upon that which is not to be encroached upon would be fitting if there were a distinction among them, and not otherwise. Thus, by breaking the simile and showing the distinctness of the object of comparison, he says, 'He reveals the establishment of diversity... and so on.'

Sampayuttakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the discourse on association is concluded.

3. Cetasikakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of the Discourse on Mental Factors

475-477. Phassikādayoti ettha ādi-saddo vavatthāvācī. Tena cittuppādadesanāyaṃ dassitappabhedā vedanādayo gayhanti, na taṃsamuṭṭhānā rūpadhammāti āha ‘‘ekuppādatādivirahitā sahajātatā natthī’’ti.

475-477. In Phassikādayo, the word ādi indicates specification. By this, feeling and other mental factors, whose various kinds are shown in the exposition on the arising of consciousness, are included, but not the material phenomena that arise from the same origin. Hence it is said: 'There is no co-arising devoid of single arising, etc.'

Cetasikakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the discourse on mental factors is concluded.

4. Dānakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Explanation of the Discourse on Giving

479. Phaladānabhāvadīpanatthanti phaladānasabbhāvadīpanatthaṃ. Phaladānaṃ vuttaṃ viya hotīti cittena phaladānaṃ padhānabhāve vuttaṃ viya hotīti attho. Aññathā dānabhāvoti na sakkā vattuṃ. Dānabhāvopi hi ‘‘dānaṃ aniṭṭhaphala’’ntiādinā vuttoyevāti. Tannivāraṇatthanti phaladānanivāraṇatthaṃ. Etanti ‘‘dānaṃ aniṭṭhaphala’’ntiādivacanaṃ. Bhesajjādivasena ābādhāniṭṭhatā deyyadhammassa aniṭṭhaphalatāpariyāyo daṭṭhabbo.

479. Phaladānabhāvadīpanatthaṃ means for the purpose of explaining the true nature of fruit-giving. Phaladānaṃ vuttaṃ viya hotīti means that fruit-giving by the mind is as if stated in its principal aspect. Otherwise, the nature of giving could not be stated. For the nature of giving is indeed stated in such phrases as, 'giving has an undesired fruit.' Tannivāraṇatthaṃ means for the purpose of preventing that fruit-giving. Etaṃ refers to the statement 'giving has an undesired fruit,' and so on. By way of medicine and so forth, the undesirability of the illness should be understood as a synonym for the 'undesired fruit' of the gift-object.

Kathaṃ [Pg.118] tatheva suttaṃ sakavādiparavādivādesu yujjatīti codanāya ‘‘na pana ekenatthenā’’ti vuttaṃ vibhāvetuṃ ‘‘deyyadhammova dāna’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha nivattanapakkheyeva eva-kāro yutto, na sādhanapakkhe dvinnampi dānabhāvassa icchitattā. Tenāha ‘‘cetasikovāti attho daṭṭhabbo, deyyadhammovā’’ti ca. Tenevāha ‘‘dvinnañhi dānānantiādi. Saṅkarabhāvamocanatthanti satipi dānabhāve sabhāvasaṅkaramocanatthaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘cetasikassā’’tiādi.

To clarify the statement 'but not with a single meaning,' which is in response to the objection 'How then does the same sutta apply in debates between proponents of one's own view and proponents of other views?', it is said, 'Only the gift-object is a gift,' and so on. There, the particle eva ('only') is appropriate only on the side of exclusion, not on the side of affirmation, because the status of being a gift is intended for both. Therefore, he says, 'The meaning should be understood as "mental, or only the gift-object,"' and so on. For this very reason, he says, 'For of two gifts,' and so on. Saṅkarabhāvamocanatthaṃ means for the purpose of releasing from the confusion of intrinsic nature, even when the state of being a gift is present. Therefore, he says, 'Of the mental,' and so on.

Dānakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the discourse on giving is concluded.

5. Paribhogamayapuññakathāvaṇṇanā

5. Explanation of the Discourse on Merit Arising from Use

485. Tassā laddhiyāti pañcannaṃ viññāṇānaṃ samodhānaṃ hotīti laddhiyā. Etesanti vattamānacittaparibhogamayapuññānaṃ.

485. “Tassā laddhiyā” means by the doctrine that there is a convergence of the five kinds of consciousness. “Etesaṃ” refers to the merits consisting of the enjoyment of present consciousness.

486. Ayaṃ vādo hīyati paribhogasseva abhāvato. Cāgacetanāya eva puññabhāvo, na cittavippayuttassa. Evanti iminā pakārena, aparibhutte deyyadhamme puññabhāvenāti attho. Aparibhutte deyyadhamme puññabhāvato eva hi puthujjanakāle dinnaṃ arahā hutvā paribhuñjante tampi puthujjane dānamevāti nicchitaṃ. Paravādīpaṭikkhepamukhena sakavādaṃ patiṭṭhāpeti paṭhamo atthavikappo, dutiyo pana ujukameva sakavādaṃ patiṭṭhāpetīti ayametesaṃ viseso.

486. This assertion is weakened because of the very absence of use. Merit arises solely from the intention of giving, not from that which is dissociated from the mind. “Evaṃ” means in this manner; that is, the meaning is that merit arises even when the gift-worthy thing is not used. For indeed, because merit arises even when the gift-worthy thing is not used, it is certain that what was given when one was an ordinary person is still the gift of an ordinary person even when an arahant later uses it. The first interpretation establishes one's own doctrine by way of refuting the doctrines of others, while the second simply establishes one's own doctrine straightforwardly—this is the difference between them.

Paribhogamayapuññakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the discourse on merit arising from use is concluded.

6. Itodinnakathāvaṇṇanā

6. Exposition of the Discourse on What is Given From Here

488-491. Teneva cīvarādidānenāti anumodanaṃ vinā dāyakena pavattitacīvarādidānena. Tenāha ‘‘sayaṃkatena kammunā vināpī’’ti. Iminā kāraṇenāti anumoditattāva tesaṃ tattha bhogā uppajjantīti etena kāraṇena. Yadi yantiādi paravādino laddhipatiṭṭhāpanākāradassanaṃ. Tattha yadi na yāpeyyuṃ, kathaṃ anumodeyyuṃ, cittaṃ pasādeyyuṃ [Pg.119], pītiṃ uppādeyyuṃ, somanassaṃ paṭilabheyyunti ekacce aññe pete anumodanādīni katvā yāpente disvā anumodanādīni karonti, tasmā te ito dinnena yāpentīti adhippāyo.

488-491. “By that very giving of robes, etc.” refers to the giving of robes and other things performed by the donor without their approval. Hence it is said, “even without action done by oneself.” “For this reason” means: because of their approval, their enjoyments arise there; for this reason. “If they go,” etc. — this shows the way others establish their doctrines. Here, if they could not maintain themselves, how could they approve, clarify their minds, arouse joy, or attain gladness? Some, seeing other departed ones maintaining themselves by having performed acts of approval and so on, also perform acts of approval and so on. Therefore, the meaning is that they maintain themselves by what is given from here.

Itodinnakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on What is Given From Here is concluded.

7. Pathavīkammavipākotikathāvaṇṇanā

7. Exposition of the Discourse on Earth as a Result of Kamma

492. Attavajjehīti phassavajjehi. Na hi so eva tena sampayutto hoti. Soti phassameva paccāmasati. Sāvajjaneti āvajjanasahite, āvajjanaṃ purecārikaṃ katvā eva pavattanaketi attho. Kammūpanissayabhūtamevāti yena kammunā yathāvuttā phassādayo nibbattitā, tassa kammassa upanissayabhūtameva. Dukkhassāti āyatiṃ uppajjanakadukkhassa. ‘‘Mūlataṇhā’’ti dassetīti yojanā, tathā ‘‘upanissayabhūta’’nti etthāpi. Kammāyūhanassa kāraṇabhūtā purimasiddhā taṇhā kammassa upanissayo, katūpacite kamme bhavādīsu namanavasena pavattā hi vipākassa upanissayo.

492. “Attavajjehīti” means “excluding itself,” that is, “excluding contact.” For it is not associated with that itself. “Soti” refers to contact itself. “Sāvajjaneti” means “accompanied by attention,” meaning it proceeds by making attention the precursor. “Kammūpanissayabhūtamevāti” means it is the proximate condition of that very kamma by which the aforementioned contact and so forth are produced. “Dukkhassāti” refers to future suffering that arises. The construction is that it shows “root-craving,” and similarly here also with “being a proximate condition.” The craving that is the cause of kammic accumulation, established previously, is the proximate condition for kamma. Indeed, the craving that proceeds by inclining towards existences and so on in accumulated kamma is the proximate condition for the result.

493. Okāsakatuppannaṃ akhepetvā parinibbānabhāvo sakasamayavasena codanāya yujjamānatā.

493. The state of final Nibbāna without having exhausted what has arisen due to circumstance is the applicability to an objection according to one's own doctrine.

494. Kamme satīti iminā kammassa pathavīādīnaṃ paccayatāmattamāha, na janakattaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘taṃsaṃvattanikaṃ nāma hotī’’ti.

494. “Kamme satīti” (When kamma exists) — with this, it states that kamma is merely a condition, like earth, etc., not a generative cause. Hence, it is said, “it is called ‘conducive to that.’”

Pathavīkammavipākotikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Earth as a Result of Kamma is concluded.

8. Jarāmaraṇaṃvipākotikathāvaṇṇanā

8. Exposition of the Discourse on Aging-and-Death as Result

495. Ekārammaṇāti idaṃ anārammaṇatāsādhanavasena sampayogalakkhaṇābhāvassa uddhaṭattā vuttaṃ, na tasseva sampayogalakkhaṇattā.

495. “Ekārammaṇāti” (having one object) is said here because of the establishment of the absence of the characteristic of association by way of proving the state of having no object, not because it itself has the characteristic of association.

496. Abyākatānanti vipākābyākatānaṃ. Itarattha vattabbameva natthi.

496. “Abyākatānanti” refers to the resultant indeterminate phenomena. In other cases, there is nothing to be said.

497. Tanti ‘‘aparisuddhavaṇṇatā jarāyevā’’ti vacanaṃ.

497. “Tanti” refers to the statement, “impure complexion is aging itself.”

Jarāmaraṇaṃvipākotikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Aging-and-Death as Result is concluded.

10. Vipākovipākadhammadhammotikathāvaṇṇanā

10. Exposition of the Discourse 'Result is a Phenomenon of the Nature of Result'

501. Vipāko [Pg.120] vipākassa paccayo honto aññamaññapaccayo hotīti adhippāyenāha ‘‘yassa vipākassa vipāko aññamaññapaccayo hotī’’ti. ‘‘Tappaccayāpi aññassa vipākassa uppattiṃ sandhāyā’’tiādivacanato pana jātijarāmaraṇādīnaṃ upanissayapaccayoti sakkā viññātuṃ. Purimapaṭiññāyāti ‘‘vipāko vipākadhammadhammo’’ti paṭiññāya. Imassa codanassāti ‘‘vipāko ca vipākadhammadhammo cā’’tiādinā pavattassa codanassa.

501. He said, with the intention that “a result, being a condition for a result, is a mutual condition,” “that result for which a result is a mutual condition.” However, from statements such as “referring to the arising of another result even due to that condition,” it is possible to understand that it is a support condition for birth, aging, death, and so on. “Purimapaṭiññāyāti” refers to the prior assertion, “the result is a phenomenon of the nature of result.” “Imassa codanassāti” refers to the objection that begins “result and a phenomenon of the nature of result,” etc.

Vipākovipākadhammadhammotikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse 'Result is a Phenomenon of the Nature of Result' is concluded.

Sattamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Seventh Chapter is concluded.

8. Aṭṭhamavaggo

8. Eighth Chapter

1. Chagatikathāvaṇṇanā

1. Exposition of the Discourse on the Six Destinations

503-504. Vaṇṇā eva nīlādivasena nibhātīti vaṇṇanibhā, vaṇṇāyatananti attho. Saṇṭhānaṃ dīghādi.

503-504. “Vaṇṇanibhā” is when colors themselves appear as blue, etc.; the meaning is “vaṇṇāyatana” (the color base). Shape is long, etc.

Chagatikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Six Destinations is concluded.

2. Antarābhavakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Exposition of the Discourse on Intermediate Existence

505. Antaraṭṭhānānīti antarikaṭṭhānāni. Nivārakaṭṭhānāni bhinditvā ca ākāsena ca gamanato. Yadi so bhavānaṃ antarā na siyāti so antarābhavo kāmabhavādīnaṃ bhavānaṃ antare yadi na bhaveyya. Na nāma antarābhavoti ‘‘sabbena sabbaṃ natthi nāma antarābhavo’’ti evaṃ pavattassa sakavādivacanassa paṭikkhepe kāraṇaṃ natthi, tassa paṭikkhepe kāraṇaṃ hadaye ṭhapetvā na paṭikkhipati, atha kho tathā anicchanto kevalaṃ laddhiyā paṭikkhipatīti attho.

505. “Antaraṭṭhānānīti” means “intervening places.” Because of traveling by breaking obstructing locations and through space. “Yadi so bhavānaṃ antarā na siyā” means: if that intermediate existence were not between existences such as the sensual realm. Regarding “Na nāma antarābhavoti” (There is no such thing as an intermediate existence): in the refutation of this statement of our own school, which runs, “There is absolutely no intermediate existence,” there is no reason. For one does not refute it having placed a reason for its refutation in the heart, but rather, not wishing it to be so, one refutes it merely due to doctrine—this is the meaning.

506. Jātīti na icchatīti sambandho.

506. The connection is “one does not desire birth.”

507. Evaṃ [Pg.121] taṃ tattha na icchatīti kāmabhavādīsu viya taṃ cutipaṭisandhiparamparaṃ tattha antarābhavāvatthāya na icchati. So hi tassa bhāvibhavanibbattakakammato eva pavattiṃ icchati, tasmā jātijarāmaraṇāni aniccato kuto cutipaṭisandhiparamparā. Ayañca vādo antarābhavavādīnaṃ ekaccānaṃ vutto. Ye ‘‘appakena kālena sattāheneva vā paṭisandhiṃ pāpuṇātī’’ti vadanti, ye pana ‘‘tattheva cavitvā āyātīti sattasattāhānī’’ti vadanti, tehi anuññātāva cutipaṭisandhiparamparāti te adhunātanā daṭṭhabbā pāḷiyaṃ ‘‘antarābhave sattā jāyanti jīyanti mīyanti cavanti upapajjantīti? Na hevaṃ vattabbe’’ti āgatattā. Yathā cetaṃ, evaṃ nirayūpagādibhāvampissa adhunātanā paṭijānanti. Tathā hi te vadanti ‘‘uddhaṃpādo tu nārako’’tiādi. Tattha yaṃ nissāya paravādī antarābhavaṃ nāma parikappeti, taṃ dassetuṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘antarāparinibbāyīti suttapadaṃ ayoniso gahetvā’’ti vuttaṃ. Imassa hi ‘‘avihādīsu tattha tattha āyuvemajjhaṃ anatikkamitvā antarā aggamaggādhigamena anavasesakilesaparinibbānena parinibbāyati, antarāparinibbāyī’’ti suttapadassa ayamattho, na antarābhavabhūtoti. Tasmā vuttaṃ ‘‘antarāparinibbāyīti suttapadaṃ ayoniso gahetvā’’ti.

507. “Thus, one does not desire it there” means: just as one does not desire that succession of death and rebirth in the sensual realms, etc., so too one does not desire it there in the state of intermediate existence. For one wishes for continuity based only on the kamma that will produce a future existence; therefore, since birth, aging, and death are impermanent, whence could there be a succession of death and rebirth? And this argument is stated by some who advocate for the intermediate existence. Those who say, “one attains rebirth in a short time or even within seven days,” and those who say, “after dying there, one arrives within seven weeks,” by them the succession of death and rebirth is indeed acknowledged—these are to be seen as moderns, because it is stated in the Pāli texts: “Are beings in the intermediate state born, aged, dead, passing away, and reappearing? It should not be said so.” And just as this is, so too the moderns acknowledge the state of one who has gone to hell, etc. For indeed they say, “the hell-being is feet-upwards,” and so on. Therein, to show what the proponents of other doctrines rely on to conceive of an intermediate existence, it is stated in the commentary: “having wrongly taken the sutta-passage ‘antarāparinibbāyī’.” For the meaning of this sutta-passage “antarāparinibbāyī” is: “in the Aviha realms and so on, there and there, without exceeding the midpoint of the lifespan, one finally passes away in the interval through the attainment of the highest path with the complete final passing away of the defilements”—not that one is an intermediate-existence-being. Therefore, it is said: “having wrongly taken the sutta-passage ‘antarāparinibbāyī’.”

Ye pana ‘‘sambhavesīti vacanato attheva antarābhavo. So hi sambhavaṃ upapattiṃ esatīti sambhavesī’’ti vadanti, tepi ye bhūtāva na puna bhavissanti, te khīṇāsavā ‘‘bhūtānaṃ vā sattānaṃ ṭhitiyā’’ti ettha ‘‘bhūtā’’ti vuttā. Tabbidhuratāya sambhavamesantīti sambhavesino, appahīnabhavasaṃyojanattā sekkhā puthujjanā. Catūsu vā yonīsu aṇḍajajalābujā sattā yāva aṇḍakosaṃ vatthikosañca na bhindanti, tāva sambhavesī nāma, aṇḍakosato vatthikosato ca nikkhantā bhūtā nāma. Saṃsedajaopapātikā ca paṭhamacittakkhaṇe sambhavesī nāma, dutiyacittakkhaṇato paṭṭhāya bhūtā nāma. Yena vā iriyāpathena jāyanti, yāva tato aññaṃ na pāpuṇanti, tāva sambhavesī nāma, tato paraṃ bhūtā nāmāti evaṃ ujuke pāḷianugate atthe sati kiṃ aniddhāritassa patthiyena antarābhavena attabhāvena parikappitena payojananti paṭikkhipitabbā.

However, those who say, “The term ‘sambhavesī’ implies the intermediate state itself, for it seeks becoming (sambhava), thus it is called ‘sambhavesī’,” should be told that those who have already come into being and will not be reborn, namely the Arahants, are called “bhūtā” in the phrase “for the stability of beings (bhūtānaṃ vā sattānaṃ ṭhitiyā).” Because they are devoid of that state, they seek becoming (sambhava), thus they are called ‘sambhavesino,’ namely the trainees (sekkhā) and ordinary people (puthujjanā) who have not abandoned the fetter of existence. Or, among the four types of birth, egg-born and womb-born beings are called ‘sambhavesī’ as long as they have not broken the eggshell or the womb. Once they emerge from the eggshell or womb, they are called ‘bhūtā.’ And moisture-born and spontaneously born beings are called ‘sambhavesī’ at the moment of their first consciousness. From the second mind-moment onward, they are called ‘bhūtā.’ Alternatively, by whatever posture they are born, as long as they have not yet attained another, they are called ‘sambhavesī.’ Beyond that, they are called ‘bhūtā.’ Thus, when there is a straightforward meaning in accordance with the Pāli, what is the use of a desired, undetermined, and imagined intermediate existence or self-existence? It should be rejected.

Yaṃ [Pg.122] paneke ‘‘santānavasena pavattamānānaṃ dhammānaṃ avicchedena desantaresu pātubhāvo diṭṭho. Yathā taṃ vīhiādiaviññāṇakasantāne, evaṃ saviññāṇakasantānepi avicchedena desantare pātubhāvena bhavitabbaṃ. Ayañca nayo sati antarābhave yujjati, nāññathā’’ti yuttiṃ vadanti, tehi iddhimato cetovasippattassa cittānugatikaṃ kāyaṃ adhiṭṭhahantassa khaṇena brahmalokato idhūpasaṅkamane ito vā brahmalokūpagamane yutti vattabbā. Yadi sabbattheva vicchinnadese dhammānaṃ pavatti na icchitā, yadipi siyā ‘‘iddhimantānaṃ iddhivisayo acinteyyo’’ti, taṃ idhāpi samānaṃ ‘‘kammavipāko acinteyyo’’ti vacanato, tasmā taṃ tesaṃ matimattameva. Acinteyyasabhāvā hi sabhāvadhammā, te katthaci paccayavasena vicchinnadese pātubhavanti, katthaci avicchinnadese ca. Tathā hi mukhaghosādīhi paccayehi aññasmiṃ dese ādāsapabbatapadesādike paṭibimbapaṭighosādikaṃ nibbattamānaṃ diṭṭhanti.

However, some argue thus: “The manifestation of phenomena in different places is observed as an unbroken continuity of the stream. Just as with the stream of rice and other non-sentient phenomena, so too must there be an unbroken manifestation in different places for the stream of sentient phenomena. This reasoning is consistent if there is an intermediate existence, but not otherwise.” In that case, they should explain the rationale of one who has psychic power, who has attained mastery over mind, and who wills a body produced by the mind, translocating in an instant from the Brahma world to here or going from here to the Brahma world. If they do not accept the manifestation of phenomena in entirely disconnected locations, even if it is said, “The range of psychic power of those with psychic abilities is inconceivable,” it is equally applicable here, since it is said, “The result of karma is inconceivable.” Therefore, that is merely their opinion. Natural phenomena are by their very nature inconceivable; they manifest in disconnected locations due to conditions, and in connected locations as well. For example, it is seen that reflections, echoes, and the like arise in another place, such as on mirror-like surfaces or mountain slopes, due to conditions such as vocal sounds.

Etthāha – paṭibimbaṃ tāva asiddhattā asadisattā ca na nidassanaṃ. Paṭibimbañhi nāma aññadeva rūpantaraṃ uppajjatīti asiddhametaṃ. Siddhiyampi asadisattā na nidassanaṃ siyā ekasmiṃ ṭhāne dvinnaṃ sahaṭhānābhāvato. Yattheva hi ādāsarūpaṃ paṭibimbarūpañca dissati, na ca ekasmiṃ dese rūpadvayassa sahabhāvo yutto nissayabhūtadesato, asadisañcetaṃ sandhānato. Na hi mukhassa paṭibimbasandhānabhūtaṃ ādāsasandhānasambandhattā sandhānaṃ uddissa avicchedena desantare pātubhāvo vuccati, na asantānanti asamānameva tanti.

Here it is said: “First, the reflection is not an illustration because it is unestablished and dissimilar. For, it is unestablished that a reflection arises as a distinct, other form. Even if established, due to its dissimilarity, it would not be an illustration, because there is no simultaneous existence of two forms in one place. Indeed, where both the mirror's form and the reflection's form are seen, the co-existence of two forms in one location is not proper, given their support-place; and this is dissimilar in terms of contiguity. For the contiguity of the reflection with the face—because of its connection with the contiguity of the mirror—is not spoken of as an uninterrupted appearance in another place; thus, it is not a continuity, and the analogy is entirely dissimilar.”

Tattha yaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘paṭibimbaṃ nāma aññadeva rūpantaraṃ uppajjatīti asiddhaṃ ekasmiṃ ṭhāne dvinnaṃ sahaṭhānabhāvato’’ti, tayidaṃ asantānameva sahaṭhānaṃ coditaṃ bhinnanissayattā. Na hi bhinnanissayānaṃ sahaṭhānaṃ atthi. Yathā anekesaṃ maṇidīpādīnaṃ pabhārūpaṃ ekasmiṃ padese pavattamānaṃ acchitamānatāya nirantaratāya ca abhinnaṭṭhānaṃ viya paññāyati, bhinnanissayattā pana bhinnaṭṭhānameva taṃ, gahaṇavisesena tathāabhinnaṭṭhānamattaṃ, evaṃ ādāsarūpapaṭibimbarūpesupi daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tādisapaccayasamavāyena hi tattha taṃ uppajjati ceva vigacchati ca, evañcetaṃ sampaṭicchitabbaṃ cakkhuviññāṇassa gocarabhāvūpagamanato. Aññathā ālokena vināpi paññāyeyya, cakkhuviññāṇassa vā na gocaro viya siyā. Tassa pana sāmaggiyā [Pg.123] so ānubhāvo, yaṃ tathā dassanaṃ hotīti. Acinteyyo hi dhammānaṃ sāmatthiyabhedoti vadantenapi ayamevattho sādhito bhinnanissayassapi abhinnaṭṭhānassa viya upaṭṭhānato. Eteneva udakādīsu paṭibimbarūpābhāvacodanā paṭikkhittā veditabbā.

Regarding what was said—that a reflection arises as a distinct, other form, and that this is unestablished because two things cannot coexist in the same place—this co-existence is challenged as being non-existent because their supports are different. For things with different supports do not have the same location. Just as the light of many gems or lamps, appearing in one place due to being unbroken and uninterrupted, seems to occupy the same spot, yet because their supports are separate, they actually occupy different places—it is only due to a specific perception that they appear to occupy the same place. The mirror’s form and the reflection’s form should be understood in this same way. Due to the convergence of such conditions, it arises and ceases there, and this should be accepted because it becomes an object for eye-consciousness. Otherwise, it would be perceived even without light, or it would not be an object for eye-consciousness at all. But it is the power of that combination of conditions that such a perception occurs. Even by saying, “The diversity in the efficacy of phenomena is inconceivable,” this very meaning is established: that something with a different support can appear as if occupying the same place. By this, the objection regarding the absence of reflection-forms in water and so on should be understood as refuted.

Siddhe ca paṭibimbarūpe tassa nidassanabhāvo siddhoyeva hoti hetuphalānaṃ vicchinnadesatāvibhāvanato. Yaṃ pana vuttaṃ ‘‘asadisattā na nidassana’’nti, tadayuttaṃ. Kasmā? Na hi nidassanaṃ nāma nidassitabbena sabbadā sadisameva hoti. Cutikkhandhādhānato vicchinnadese upapattikkhandhā pātubhavantīti etassa atthassa sādhanatthaṃ mukharūpato vicchinne ṭhāne tassa phalabhūtaṃ paṭibimbarūpaṃ nibbattatīti ettha tassa nidassanatthassa adhippetattā. Etena asantānacodanā paṭikkhittā veditabbā.

When the form of the reflection is established, its state of being an illustration is also established, because it demonstrates that cause and effect occur in distinct locations. But what was said, “because of dissimilarity, it is not an illustration,” is inappropriate. Why? Because an illustration does not always have to be entirely similar to what is being illustrated. For the purpose of proving the meaning that rebirth-linking aggregates arise in a location distinct from the basis of the aggregates at death—here, the reflection's form, being its result, arises in a location distinct from the face's form—the state of being an illustration regarding that is intended. By this, the objection of non-connection is known to be refuted.

Yasmā vā mukhapaṭibimbarūpānaṃ hetuphalabhāvo siddho, tasmāpi sā paṭikkhittāva hoti. Hetuphalabhāvasambandhesu hi santānavohāro. Yathāvuttadvīhikāraṇehi paṭibimbaṃ uppajjati bimbato ādāsato ca, na cevaṃ upapattikkhandhānaṃ vicchinnadesuppatti. Yathā cettha paṭibimbarūpaṃ nidassitaṃ, evaṃ paṭighosadīpamuddādayopi nidassitabbā. Yathā hi paṭighosadīpamuddādayo saddādihetukā honti, aññatra agantvā honti, evameva idaṃ cittanti.

Or, because the relationship of cause and effect is established for the forms of the face and reflection, that objection is also refuted. For the designation of continuity applies to cause and effect relationships. A reflection arises from both the object and the mirror due to the two aforementioned causes, but the arising of the rebirth aggregates in a disconnected place is not so. Just as the reflection of form is illustrated here, so too should the echo, the lamp-flame, the seal impression, and so forth be illustrated. For just as echoes, lamp-flames, seal impressions, and so forth are produced by sound and other causes, and come to be without having gone elsewhere, so too is this mind.

Apicāyaṃ antarābhavavādī evaṃ pucchitabbo – yadi ‘‘dhammānaṃ vicchinnadesuppatti na yuttā’’ti antarābhavo parikappito, rāhuādīnaṃ sarīre kathamanekayojanasahassantarikesu pādaṭṭhānahadayaṭṭhānesu kāyaviññāṇamanoviññāṇuppatti vicchinnadese yuttā. Yadi ekasantānabhāvato, idhāpi taṃsamānaṃ. Na cettha arūpadhammabhāvato alaṃ parihārāya pañcavokāre rūpārūpadhammānaṃ aññamaññaṃ sambandhattā. Vattamānehi tāva paccayehi vicchinnadese phalassa uppatti siddhā, kimaṅgaṃ pana atītehi pañcavokārabhavehi. Yattha vipākaviññāṇassa paccayo, tatthassa nissayabhūtassa vatthussa sahabhāvīnañca khandhānaṃ sambhavoti laddhokāsena kammunā nibbattiyamānassa avasesapaccayantarasahitassa vipākaviññāṇassa uppattiyaṃ nālaṃ vicchinnadesatā vibandhāya. Yathā ca anekakappasahassantarikāpi cutikkhandhā upapattikkhandhānaṃ anantarapaccayoti na kāladūratā, evaṃ anekayojanasahassantarikāpi te tesaṃ anantarapaccayo hontīti na desadūratā. Evaṃ [Pg.124] cutikkhandhanirodhānantaraṃ upapattiṭṭhāne paccayantarasamavāyena paṭisandhikkhandhā pātubhavantīti nattheva antarābhavo. Asati ca tasmiṃ yaṃ tassa keci ‘‘bhāvibhavanibbattakakammuno tato eva bhāvipurimakālabhavākāro sajātisuddhadibbacakkhugocaro ahīnindriyo kenaci appaṭihatagamano gandhāhāro’’ti evamādikāraṇākārādiṃ vaṇṇenti, taṃ vañjhātanayassa rassadīghasāmatādivivādasadisanti veditabbaṃ.

Moreover, one who advocates for an intermediate existence should be questioned thus: If an intermediate existence is conceived because 'the arising of phenomena in a disconnected location is not appropriate,' how then, in the bodies of beings like Rāhu, which are many thousands of yojanas apart, is the arising of body-consciousness and mind-consciousness in disconnected locations such as the place of the feet and the place of the heart considered appropriate? If it is due to the continuity of a single stream, the same applies here. Nor is it sufficient to refute this on the grounds of the nature of formless phenomena, for in the five-aggregate existence, material and immaterial phenomena are mutually connected. The arising of a result in a disconnected location from present conditions is already established; what more then of past five-aggregate existences? Wherever there is a condition for resultant consciousness, there is the possibility for its supporting basis and co-arisen aggregates. Thus, for resultant consciousness, being produced by karma that has found its opportunity and accompanied by other remaining conditions, disconnectedness of location is not able to be an obstruction. And just as the aggregates at death, though separated by many thousands of eons, are an immediate condition for the aggregates at rebirth, so there is no hindrance by the distance of time; in the same way, though separated by many thousands of yojanas, they are an immediate condition for them, so there is no hindrance by the distance of space. Thus, immediately after the cessation of the aggregates at death, the rebirth-linking aggregates arise in the place of rebirth through the conjunction of other conditions. Therefore, there is no intermediate existence. And in the absence of such, when some describe its characteristics and causes, saying, 'The karma that generates a future existence produces from that very state a form of existence resembling the prior state, visible to the pure divine eye of its own kind, with unimpaired faculties, with movement unobstructed by anything, subsisting on odors,' and so on—this should be understood to be like a dispute over the shortness, length, complexion, and so forth of a barren woman's son.

Antarābhavakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discourse on the intermediate existence is concluded.

3. Kāmaguṇakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discourse on the Strands of Sensual Pleasure

510. Sabbepīti kusalākusalakkhandhādayopi. Tesampi hi ālambanatthikatālakkhaṇassa kattukamyatāchandassa vasena siyā kamanaṭṭhatāti adhippāyo. Dhātukathāyaṃ ‘‘kāmabhavo pañcahi khandhehi ekādasahi āyatanehi sattarasahi dhātūhi saṅgahito. Katihi asaṅgahito? Na kehici khandhehi ekenāyatanena ekāya dhātuyā asaṅgahito’’ti āgatattā āha ‘‘upādinnakkhandhānameva kāmabhavabhāvo dhātukathāyaṃ dassito’’ti. Pañcāti gaṇanaparicchedo, tadaññagaṇananivattanatthoti ‘‘pañca kāmaguṇā’’ti vacanaṃ tato aññesaṃ tabbhāvaṃ nivattetīti āha ‘‘pañceva kāmakoṭṭhāsā kāmoti vuttā’’ti. Tato eva kāmadhātūti vacanaṃ na aññassa nāmaṃ, tesaṃyeva nāmanti attho. Tayidaṃ paravādino matimattanti vuttaṃ ‘‘iminā adhippāyenā’’ti. Evaṃ vacanamattanti evaṃ ‘‘pañcime kāmaguṇā’’ti vacanamattaṃ nissāya, na panatthassa aviparītaṃ atthanti attho.

510. ‘All’ means the wholesome and unwholesome aggregates, and so on. The intention is that for these too, by way of the characteristic of needing an object and the desire to act, there may be the meaning of being desired. Because it is stated in the Dhātukathā: ‘The sensual existence is comprised of five aggregates, eleven sense bases, and seventeen elements. By how many is it not comprised? It is not comprised by any aggregates, by one sense base, or by one element,’ he says, ‘Only the state of the clung-to aggregates is shown as sensual existence in the Dhātukathā.’ ‘Five’ is a numerical delimitation, for the purpose of excluding other numbers. Thus, the statement ‘the five strands of sensual pleasure’ excludes that state from other things. Therefore, he says, ‘Only the five portions of sensuality are called “sensual pleasure.”’ For that very reason, the term ‘sensual realm’ is not a name for anything else; it is the name for these very things—this is the meaning. That this is merely the opinion of the opponent is stated with ‘by this intention.’ ‘Thus, it is a mere statement’ means that it relies on the mere statement ‘these five are the strands of sensual pleasure,’ but it does not have a non-perverted meaning.

Kāmaguṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discourse on the strands of sensual pleasure is concluded.

5. Rūpadhātukathāvaṇṇanā

5. Commentary on the Discourse on the Form Realm

515-516. Rūpadhātūti vacanatoti ‘‘kāmadhāturūpadhātuarūpadhātū’’ti ettha rūpadhātūti vuttattā. Rūpīdhammehevāti ruppanasabhāvehiyeva dhammehi. ‘‘Tayome bhavā’’tiādinā paricchinnāti tayome bhavā[Pg.125], tisso dhātuyoti ca evaṃ paricchinnā. ‘‘Dhātuyā āgataṭṭhāne bhavena paricchinditabbaṃ, bhavassa āgataṭṭhāne dhātuyā paricchinditabba’’nti hi vuttaṃ, tasmā kāmarūpārūpāvacaradhammāva taṃtaṃbhummabhāvena paricchinnā evaṃ vuttā.

515-516. Because of the term ‘form realm’: because it is stated as ‘form realm’ in the phrase ‘the sensual realm, the form realm, the formless realm.’ ‘Only by phenomena possessing form’ means only by phenomena having the nature of being afflicted. ‘Delimited by “these three existences,” etc.’ means delimited thus by ‘these three existences’ and ‘the three realms.’ For it is said: ‘Where a realm is mentioned, it should be delimited by an existence; where an existence is mentioned, it should be delimited by a realm.’ Therefore, the phenomena pertaining to the sensual, form, and formless spheres, being delimited by their respective planes, are spoken of in this way.

Rūpadhātukathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discourse on the form realm is concluded.

6. Arūpadhātukathāvaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Discourse on the Formless Realm

517-518. Purimakathāyanti rūpadhātukathāyaṃ. Avisesenāti pavattiṭṭhānavasena visesaṃ akatvā.

517-518. ‘In the previous discourse’ means in the discourse on the form realm. ‘Without distinction’ means without making a distinction by way of the place of occurrence.

Arūpadhātukathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discourse on the formless realm is concluded.

7. Rūpadhātuyāāyatanakathāvaṇṇanā

7. Commentary on the Discourse on the Sense Bases in the Form Realm

519. Okāsabhāvenāti vatthubhāvena. Tathāvidhanti ghānādiākāraṃ.

519. ‘By way of being a location’ means by way of being a basis. ‘Of such a kind’ means the form of the nose, and so on.

Rūpadhātuyāāyatanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discourse on the sense bases in the form realm is concluded.

8. Arūperūpakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Commentary on the Discourse on Form in the Formless Realm

524-526. Nissaraṇaṃ nāma nissaritabbe sati hoti, na asati, tasmā ‘‘arūpabhave sukhumarūpaṃ atthi, yato nissaraṇaṃ taṃ āruppa’’nti āha.

524-526. Escape, by name, occurs when there is something to be escaped from, not when there is not. Therefore, he said: ‘In the formless existence there is subtle form, from which there is an escape; this is the meaning of “formless” (āruppa).’

Arūperūpakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discourse on form in the formless realm is concluded.

9. Rūpaṃkammantikathāvaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Discourse: ‘Is Form Kamma?’

527-537. Pakappayamānāti pakārehi kappayamānā attano sampayuttānañca kiccaṃ samatthayamānā. Tenāha ‘‘sampayuttesu adhikaṃ byāpāraṃ kurumānā’’ti.

527-537. ‘Configuring’ means arranging in various ways and accomplishing the function of itself and its associated factors. Therefore, he said, ‘making an additional exertion with regard to associated factors.’

Rūpaṃkammantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discourse, ‘Is Form Kamma?’ is concluded.

10. Jīvitindriyakathāvaṇṇanā

10. Commentary on the Discourse on the Life Faculty

540. Antaṃ [Pg.126] gahetvā vadatīti ‘‘atthi arūpadhammānaṃ āyu ṭhiti yapanā yāpanā iriyanā vattanā pālanā, atthi arūpajīvitindriya’’nti tasmiṃ pañhe ‘‘atthi arūpajīvitindriya’’nti imaṃ antaṃ pariyosānaṃ gahetvā vadati. Vattuṃ yutto samudāyassa icchanto tadavayavassa icchatīti. Na hi avayavehi vinā samudāyo nāma atthi.

540. ‘Taking up the end, he speaks’ means that in that question, taking up this end, this conclusion, ‘there is a formless life faculty,’ he speaks. ‘There is for formless phenomena a life-span, a duration, subsistence, maintenance, proceeding, continuance, preservation; there is a formless life faculty.’ It is right to say that one who desires the whole desires its parts. For there is no whole, by name, without its parts.

541. Tamevāti arūpaṃ cittavippayuttameva.

541. ‘That very’ means the formless, which is indeed dissociated from consciousness.

542. Tadāpīti samāpajjanavuṭṭhānakālepi.

542. ‘Even then’ means even at the time of entering and emerging from attainment.

544-545. So yutto dvinnaṃ rūpārūpajīvitindriyānaṃ sakasamaye icchitattā.

544-545. That is appropriate, because the two life faculties, material and immaterial, are desired at their respective times.

Jīvitindriyakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discourse on the life faculty is concluded.

11. Kammahetukathāvaṇṇanā

11. Commentary on the Discourse: ‘Is Kamma a Cause?’

546. ‘‘Pāṇātipātakammassa hetū’’tiādikassa parihānikathāyaṃ anāgatattā yo tattha āgatanayo, tameva dassento ‘‘sesanti…pe… vadatī’’ti āha. Sampaṭicchanavacananti sampaṭicchāpanavacanaṃ. Taṃ paravādiṃ. Taṃtaṃladdhisampaṭicchāpanaṃ vā gāhāpananti dassento ‘‘pakkha’’ntiādimāha.

546. Because the method beginning with ‘the cause of the kamma of killing living beings’ was not dealt with in the discourse on decline, showing that very method which was dealt with there, he said, ‘the rest… he speaks.’ ‘The word of acceptance’ means the word that causes acceptance. That refers to the opponent. To show the causing of acceptance or the causing to grasp of that particular view, he said ‘side,’ and so on.

Kammahetukathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discourse, ‘Is Kamma a Cause?’ is concluded.

Aṭṭhamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the eighth chapter is concluded.

9. Navamavaggo

9. The Ninth Chapter

1. Ānisaṃsadassāvīkathāvaṇṇanā

1. Exposition of the Discourse on One Who Sees Benefits

547. Daṭṭhabbassa ādīnavato ānisaṃsato ca yadipi paravādinā pacchā nānācittavasena paṭiññātaṃ, pubbe pana ekato katvā paṭijāni, na ca [Pg.127] taṃ laddhiṃ pariccaji. Tenassa adhippāyamaddanaṃ yuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘anicca…pe… paṭiññātattā’’ti. Ārammaṇavasenāti ārammaṇakaraṇavasena, na kiccanipphattivasenāti adhippāyo. Idaṃ ānisaṃsakathānuyuñjanaṃ ānisaṃsadassanañca. Ñāṇaṃ vipassanā paṭivedhañāṇassa viya anubodhañāṇassapi yathārahaṃ pavattinivattīsu kiccakaraṇaṃ yuttanti adhippāyo.

547. It should be understood that even though the opponent, seeing the danger and the benefit of what is to be seen, later admitted something with a divided mind, yet previously he made a unified declaration and did not abandon that doctrine. Therefore, it is fitting to crush his intention. Hence it is said: ‘because of the admission of impermanence…etc.’ ‘By way of the object’ means by way of making it an object, not by way of the accomplishment of the task—this is the meaning. This is the inquiry into the discourse on benefits and the seeing of benefits. Knowledge, namely insight, like the knowledge of penetration and also the knowledge of comprehension, it is fitting for it to perform its function regarding arising and ceasing as is appropriate—this is the meaning.

Ānisaṃsadassāvīkathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on One Who Sees Benefits is concluded.

2. Amatārammaṇakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Exposition of the Discourse on the Deathless as Object

549. Evamādinā suttabhayenāti ettha ādi-saddena ‘‘anāsavañca vo, bhikkhave, dhammaṃ desessāmi anāsavagāminiñca paṭipada’’ntiādīni suttapadāni saṅgaṇhāti.

549. In the phrase 'by such fear of the suttas': here, the word 'ādi' includes sutta passages such as, “Bhikkhus, I will teach you the Dhamma that is without taints, and the path leading to the taintless.”

Amatārammaṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Deathless as Object is concluded.

3. Rūpaṃsārammaṇantikathāvaṇṇanā

3. The Exposition of the Discourse on Form Having an Object

552-553. ‘‘Tadappatiṭṭhaṃ anārammaṇa’’ntiādīsu paccayattho ārammaṇa-saddo. ‘‘Rūpāyatanaṃ cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyā taṃsampayuttakānañca dhammānaṃ ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’tiādīsu olubbhaṭṭhoti āha ‘‘paccayaṭṭho olubbhaṭṭho’’ti. Evaṃ vibhāge vijjamāneti tattha paccayāyattavuttitā paccayaṭṭho, daṇḍarajjuādi viya dubbalassa cittacetasikānaṃ ālambitabbatāya upatthambhanaṭṭho olubbhaṭṭho. Visesābhāvaṃ paccayabhāvasāmaññena kappetvā vā.

552-553. In phrases such as “unestablished, without an object,” the word “ārammaṇa” signifies the meaning of condition. In statements like “the visible object is a condition for the eye-consciousness element and its associated mental states by way of the object condition,” it is said to have the meaning of support, as stated: “the meaning of condition is the meaning of support.” Thus, in this analysis, the state of being dependent on conditions is the meaning of condition, while the meaning of supporting is like a stick or a rope, propping up the weak mind and mental factors by being something to be taken as a support. Or, by positing an absence of distinction through the generality of being a condition.

Rūpaṃsārammaṇantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Form Having an Object is concluded.

4. Anusayāanārammaṇātikathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Exposition of the Discourse on Latent Tendencies Being Without an Object

554-556. ‘‘Imasmiṃ satī’’ti iminā maggena aniruddhatāpi saṅgahitāti āha ‘‘appahīnattāva atthīti vuccatī’’ti. Na pana vijjamānattāti avadhāraṇena [Pg.128] nivattitaṃ dasseti, vijjamānattā dharamānattā khaṇattayasamaṅgibhāvatoti attho.

554-556. By the phrase 'when this exists,' the state of not being eradicated by this path is also included; hence it is said: 'it is said to exist simply because it has not been abandoned.' The determination 'but not because of existing' shows what is excluded; the meaning is that it is not because of its existing, being present, and being endowed with the three moments.

Anusayāanārammaṇātikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Latent Tendencies Being Without an Object is concluded.

5. Ñāṇaṃanārammaṇantikathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Exposition of the Discourse on Knowledge Being Without an Object

557-558. Yassa adhigatattā arahato pariññeyyādīsu anavasesato sammoho vigato, taṃ aggamaggañāṇaṃ sandhāya ‘‘maggañāṇassā’’ti vadanti. Yasmā tassa sabbassa satokāritā viya sampajānakāritā, tasmā tena ñāṇena so ñāṇī. Satipaññāvepullappatto hi so uttamapuriso.

557-558. The term 'of path knowledge' refers to the supreme path knowledge, due to the attainment of which all delusion regarding what should be fully understood, etc., is completely eradicated in an Arahant. Because for him, everything is done with clear comprehension as if with mindfulness, therefore, by that knowledge, he is a 'knower'. For that supreme person has attained the abundance of mindfulness and wisdom.

Ñāṇaṃanārammaṇantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Knowledge Being Without an Object is concluded.

7. Vitakkānupatitakathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Exposition of the Discourse on Applied Thought Following

562. Dvīhipīti dvīhi visesehi, visesena visesaṃ akatvāti attho.

562. “Dvīhipi” means by two distinctions; that is, without making a distinction by means of a distinction.

Vitakkānupatitakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Applied Thought Following is concluded.

8. Vitakkavipphārasaddakathāvaṇṇanā

8. The Exposition of the Discourse on the Diffusion of Applied Thought and Sound

563. Sabbasoti sabbappakārato, so pana pakāro pavattiṭṭhānakālavasena gahetabboti āha ‘‘sabbattha sabbadā vā’’ti. Te ca ṭhānakālā ‘‘vitakkayato’’tiādivacanato cittavisesavasena gahetabbāti vuttaṃ ‘‘savitakkacittesū’’ti. ‘‘Vitakketvā vācaṃ bhindatī’’ti suttapadaṃ ayoniso gahetvā ‘‘vitakkavipphāramattaṃ saddo’’ti āha.

563. “Sabbaso” means in every way. But that way should be understood by way of occurrence, place, and time, as stated: “everywhere or always.” And those places and times should be understood by way of particular states of mind, from the saying 'when one thinks,' etc.; hence it is said: 'in consciousness accompanied by applied thought.' Taking the sutta phrase 'having thought, one breaks into speech' unsystematically, it is said: 'sound is merely the diffusion of thought.'

Vitakkavipphārasaddakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Diffusion of Applied Thought and Sound is concluded.

9. Nayathācittassavācātikathāvaṇṇanā

9. The Exposition of the Discourse on Speech Not Being in Accordance with Thought

565. Musāvādo [Pg.129] na hotīti vuttaṃ anāpattīti sambandho.

565. The statement 'There is no false speech' is connected to 'no offense'.

Nayathācittassavācātikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Speech Not Being in Accordance with Thought is concluded.

11. Atītānāgatasamannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā

11. The Exposition of the Discourse on Being Endowed with Past and Future Qualities

568-570. Samannāgatapaññattiyāti samaṅgibhāvapaññattiyā. Tenevāha ‘‘paccuppannadhammasamaṅgī samannāgatoti vuccatī’’ti. Paṭilābhapaññattiyāti adhigamanapaññattiyā. Ayanti ‘‘samannāgato’’ti vuccamānapuggalassa yo tathā vattabbākāro, ayaṃ samannāgatapaññatti nāma. Esa nayo sesesupi.

568-570. 'By the designation “endowed with”' means by the designation of the state of being equipped. Hence it is said, “one equipped with presently arisen states is called ‘endowed with.’” 'By the designation of acquisition' means by the designation of attainment. This means: that mode of speech by which a person is called 'endowed with' is named the 'endowed with' designation. This method applies to the remaining cases as well.

Atītānāgatasamannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Being Endowed with Past and Future Qualities is concluded.

Navamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Ninth Chapter is concluded.

10. Dasamavaggo

10. The Tenth Chapter

1. Nirodhakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Exposition of the Discourse on Cessation

571-572. Sakasamaye ‘‘purimacittassa nirodhānantaraṃ pacchimacittaṃ uppajjatī’’ti icchitaṃ, paravādī pana ‘‘yasmiṃ khaṇe bhavaṅgacittaṃ, tasmiṃyeva khaṇe kiriyamayacittaṃ uppajjatī’’ti vadati. Evaṃ sati purimapacchimacittānaṃ sahabhāvopi anuññāto hoti. Tenāha ‘‘bhaṅgakkhaṇena sahevā’’ti. Tathā ca sati vipākakiriyakkhandhānaṃ viya kiriyavipākakkhandhānaṃ vipākavipākakkhandhānaṃ kiriyakiriyakkhandhānañca vuttanayena sahabhāvo vattabboti imamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘bhavaṅgacittassā’’tiādimāha. Tattha upapattibhavabhāvena esiyā icchitabbāti upapattesiyā vipākakkhandhā, te ca yebhuyyena bhavaṅgapariyāyakāti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘upapattesiyanti saṅkhaṃ gatassa bhavaṅgacittassā’’ti. Ādipariyosānamattañhi tassa paṭisandhicuticittaṃ, tadārammaṇaṃ bhavaṅgantveva vuccatīti. Cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ kiriyāvemajjhe [Pg.130] patitattā kiriyācatukkhandhaggahaṇena gahaṇaṃ yuttanti vuttaṃ. Cakkhuviññāṇādīnanti hi ādi-saddena na sotaviññāṇādīnaṃyeva gahaṇaṃ, atha kho sampaṭicchanasantīraṇānampīti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

571-572. In one’s own system, it is maintained that 'the subsequent consciousness arises immediately after the cessation of the preceding consciousness.' But the opponent argues, 'at the very moment when the life-continuum consciousness exists, the functional consciousness arises.' Thus, the simultaneous existence of preceding and subsequent consciousnesses is also admitted. Therefore, it is said, 'together with the moment of dissolution.' And when this is the case, just as with the aggregates of resultant and functional consciousness, so too the aggregates of functional-resultant, resultant-resultant, and functional-functional consciousness should be spoken of as coexisting, according to the manner stated. To show this meaning, it is said, 'bhavaṅgacittassā,' etc. Here, 'resultant aggregates pertaining to becoming' are those to be sought by way of the state of rebirth-existence; these are, for the most part, synonymous with the life-continuum, as stated in the commentary: 'The life-continuum consciousness is reckoned as “pertaining to becoming.”' For its beginning and end are merely the rebirth-linking and death consciousnesses; that which has that as its object is simply called the life-continuum. Because eye-consciousness, etc., fall in the middle of functional activity, it is fitting that they are included by way of the four functional aggregates, it is said. Indeed, by the word 'ādi' in 'cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ' (eye-consciousness, etc.), not only ear-consciousness, etc., are meant, but also the receiving and investigating consciousnesses are to be understood.

Nirodhakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Cessation is concluded.

3. Pañcaviññāṇasamaṅgissamaggakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Exposition of the Discourse on the Path of One Endowed with the Five Consciousnesses

576. Lakkhaṇanti pañcaviññāṇānaṃ uppannārammaṇatādiavitathekappakāratālakkhaṇaṃ. Kāmaṃ manoviññāṇaṃ avatthukampi hoti, savatthukatte pana tampi uppannavatthukameva. Tathā hi pāḷiyaṃ ṭhapanāyaṃ ‘‘hañci pañcaviññāṇā uppannārammaṇā’’tveva vuttaṃ. Manoviññāṇassapi uppannavatthukatāpariyāyo atthīti ‘‘pañca viññāṇā’’ti avatvā ‘‘cha viññāṇā uppannavatthukā’’ti vutte ‘‘no ca vata re vattabbe pañcaviññāṇasamaṅgissa atthi maggabhāvanā’’ti vattuṃ na sakkāti dassento āha ‘‘cha viññāṇā…pe… adhippeta’’nti.

576. The characteristic is the characteristic of the five consciousnesses, such as having an arisen object, etc., and being unwavering in their single mode. Although mental consciousness may be without a physical base, when it has a physical base, it too has an arisen physical base. Thus, in the Pāli text, in the statement of the thesis, it is said only, 'If the five consciousnesses have an arisen object.' Since there is also a context where mental consciousness has an arisen physical base, showing that if, instead of saying 'the five consciousnesses,' it were said 'the six consciousnesses have an arisen physical base,' it would be impossible to assert, 'But it should not be said that for one endowed with the five consciousnesses there is path development,' he says, 'the six consciousnesses... are intended.'

577. ‘‘Animittaṃ suññataṃ appaṇihita’’nti nibbānassa te pariyāyā. Cakkhuviññāṇassa animittagāhibhāve suññatārammaṇatāpi siyāti vuttaṃ ‘‘tadeva suññatanti adhippāyo’’ti.

577. “The signless, the empty, the undirected”—these are designations for Nibbāna. To indicate that when eye-consciousness apprehends the signless, it can also have emptiness as its object, it was said, '“that itself is emptiness” is the intended meaning.'

Pañcaviññāṇasamaṅgissamaggakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Path of One Endowed with the Five Consciousnesses is concluded.

5. Pañcaviññāṇāsābhogātikathāvaṇṇanā

5. Exposition of the Discourse on 'The Five Consciousnesses are with Attention'

584-586. Sā pana namitvā pavatti. Ārammaṇappakāraggahaṇanti ārammaṇassa iṭṭhāniṭṭhappakārassa gahaṇaṃ. Yena ārammaṇappakāraggahaṇena kusalacittassa alobhādīhi sampayogo akusalacittassa lobhādīhi sampayogo hoti, so ābhogoti dasseti.

584-586. That, however, is an occurrence after inclining. 'Grasping the mode of the object' means grasping the desirable or undesirable mode of the object. He shows that this is 'attention,' that by which, through the grasping of the mode of the object, wholesome consciousness is associated with non-greed, etc., and unwholesome consciousness is associated with greed, etc.

Pañcaviññāṇāsābhogātikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on 'The Five Consciousnesses are with Attention' is concluded.

6. Dvīhisīlehītikathāvaṇṇanā

6. Exposition of the Discourse on Twofold Virtue

587-589. Appavattinirodhanti [Pg.131] anuppādanirodhaṃ. Sīlassa vītikkamoyeva nirodho sīlavītikkamanirodho. Ninnānaṃ khaṇikanirodhaṃ sallakkhento.

587-589. 'Cessation of non-occurrence' means cessation by non-arising. The cessation of virtue is the very transgression of virtue; this is cessation by transgression of virtue. Discerning momentary cessation as a downward slope.

Dvīhisīlehītikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Twofold Virtue is concluded.

7. Sīlaṃacetasikantikathāvaṇṇanā

7. Exposition of the Discourse on 'Virtue is Non-Mental'

590-594. Ṭhitena avinaṭṭhena. Upacayenāti sīlabhūtena kammūpacayena. ‘‘Dānaṃ acetasika’’nti kathāyaṃ vuttanayenāti yathā ‘‘na vattabbaṃ cetasiko dhammo dānanti? Āmantā. Dānaṃ aniṭṭhaphalanti…pe… tena hi cetasiko dhammo dāna’’nti pāḷi pavattā, evaṃ tadanusārena ‘‘na vattabbaṃ cetasikaṃ sīlanti? Āmantā. Sīlaṃ aniṭṭhaphala’’ntiādinā sīlassa cetasikabhāvasādhakāni suttapadāni ca ānetvā tadatthadassanavasena acetasiko rūpādidhammo āyatiṃ vipākaṃ deti. Yadi so sīlaṃ bhaveyya, vinā saṃvarasamādānena vinā viratiyā sīlavā nāma siyā. Yasmā pana samādānacetanā virati saṃvaro sīlaṃ, tasmā ‘‘sīlaṃ iṭṭhaphalaṃ kantaphala’’ntiādinā yojanā kātabbāti imamatthaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ ‘‘vuttanayenā’’ti, vuttanayānusārenāti attho. Yasmā pana pāḷiyaṃ yathā ‘‘sīlaṃ acetasika’’nti kathā āgatā, tathā ‘‘dānaṃ acetasika’’nti visuṃ āgatā kathā natthi, tasmā ‘‘sā pana kathā maggitabbā’’ti vuttaṃ.

590-594. By what is established, by what is not destroyed. 'By accumulation' means by the accumulation of kamma that has become virtue. 'According to the method stated' refers to the method in the discussion on 'Giving is non-mental.' This means: just as a Pāli argument proceeds, 'Should it not be said that giving is a mental factor? Yes. Does giving have an undesirable result?... Therefore, giving is a mental factor,' so too, in accordance with that, the argument about virtue should proceed. By bringing forward sutta passages that establish the mental nature of virtue—such as 'Should it not be said that virtue is mental? Yes. Does virtue have an undesirable result?'—and by showing their meaning, the point is made. A non-mental phenomenon like form gives a future result. If that were virtue, one could be called virtuous even without the undertaking of restraint or without abstinence. But since virtue is the intention of undertaking, abstinence, and restraint, therefore the connection should be made with passages like 'virtue has a desirable result, a pleasant result,' etc. With this meaning in mind, it is said 'according to the method stated,' which means 'in accordance with the stated method.' However, since in the Pāli canon, while a discussion on 'virtue is non-mental' has come down, there is no separate discussion that has come down on 'giving is non-mental,' therefore it is said, 'that discussion should be sought.'

Sīlaṃacetasikantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on 'Virtue is Non-Mental' is concluded.

9. Samādānahetukathāvaṇṇanā

9. Exposition of the Discourse on the Cause of Undertaking

598-600. Samādānahetukathāyaṃ ‘‘phasso detī’’ti ārabhitvā yāva kaṇhasukkasappaṭibhāgā dhammā sammukhībhāvaṃ āgacchantīti ārāmaropādisuttāharaṇañcāti ettakameva paribhogakathāya sadisanti āha ‘‘samādāna…pe… daṭṭhabbā’’ti.

598-600. In the discussion on the cause of undertaking, beginning with 'contact gives,' and extending to 'dark and bright counterpart phenomena come into direct presence,' including the citation of the sutta on planting parks, etc.—only this much is similar to the discussion on use. He said, 'Undertaking... should be seen.'

Samādānahetukathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Cause of Undertaking is concluded.

11. Aviññattidussīlyantikathāvaṇṇanā

11. Exposition of the Discourse on Immorality by Non-Intimation

603-604. Mahābhūtāni [Pg.132] upādāya pavatto aññacittakkhaṇepi labbhamāno kusalākusalānubandho aviññattīti ayaṃ vādo ‘‘cittavippayutto apuññūpacayo’’ti iminā saṅgahitoti tato aññānubandhāyaṃ ‘‘āṇattiyā’’tiādi vuttanti taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘āṇattiyā…pe… adhippāyo’’ti vuttaṃ. Tattha āṇatto yadā āṇattabhāvena vihiṃsādikiriyaṃ sādheti, tadā āṇattiyā pāṇātipātādīsu aṅgabhāvo veditabbo. Sā panāṇatti pārivāsikabhāvena viññattirahitā nāma hotīti paravādino adhippāyo, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘ekasmiṃ divase’’tiādi vuttaṃ.

603-604. The assertion that 'non-intimation, arising dependent on the great elements and obtainable even in another mind-moment, is connected to the wholesome or unwholesome,' is included in the phrase 'disconnected from mind, an accumulation of demerit.' Therefore, in connection with another, the statement 'by command,' etc., is said. To illustrate that, the statement 'by command... is the intention' is said. Here, when one who is commanded accomplishes an act of harming, etc., by being commanded, then the command should be understood as a factor in actions such as killing living beings. However, that command, being probationary (pārivāsika), is said to be devoid of intimation – this is the opponent's intention. To illustrate that, the phrase 'in a single day,' etc., is stated.

Aviññattidussīlyantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Immorality by Non-Intimation is concluded.

Dasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Tenth Chapter is concluded.

Dutiyo paṇṇāsako samatto.

The second fifty is completed.

11. Ekādasamavaggo

11. The Eleventh Chapter

4. Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Exposition of the Discourse on Knowledge

614-615. ‘‘Andhakā’’ti vuttā pubbaseliyaaparaseliyarājagirikasiddhatthikāpi yebhuyyena mahāsaṅghikā evāti vuttaṃ ‘‘pubbe…pe… bhaveyyu’’nti. Tattha aññeti vacanaṃ dvinnaṃ kathānaṃ ujuvipaccanīkabhāvato. Purimakānañhi cakkhuviññāṇādisamaṅgī ‘‘ñāṇī’’ti vuccati, imesaṃ so eva ‘‘ñāṇī’’ti na vattabboti vutto. Rāgavigamo rāgassa samucchindanaṃ, tathā aññāṇavigamo. Yathā samucchinnāvijjo ‘‘ñāṇī’’ti, paṭipakkhato ‘‘aññāṇī’’ti, evaṃ asamucchinnāvijjo ‘‘aññāṇī’’ti, paṭipakkhato ‘‘ñāṇī’’ti vutto. Aññāṇassa vigatattā so ‘‘ñāṇī’’ti vattabbataṃ āpajjati, na pana satataṃ samitaṃ ñāṇassa pavattanatoti adhippāyo.

614-615. The 'Andhakas' mentioned—the Pubbaseliyas, Aparaseliyas, Rājagirikas, and Siddhatthikas—are said to be for the most part Mahāsaṅghikas; thus it is stated, 'formerly... they would be.' Here, the word 'another' is used because the two discussions are directly opposed. For the former, one endowed with eye-consciousness, etc., is called 'knowledgeable'; for these latter, it is said that that same one cannot be called 'knowledgeable.' The removal of passion is the eradication of passion, and likewise the removal of ignorance. Just as one whose ignorance is eradicated is called 'knowledgeable,' while in the opposite case one is called 'ignorant,' so too one whose ignorance is not eradicated is called 'ignorant,' while in the opposite case one is called 'knowledgeable,' it is said. Because ignorance is gone, one attains the state of being able to be called 'knowledgeable,' but not because knowledge is proceeding continuously and constantly—this is the intended meaning.

Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Knowledge is concluded.

7. Iddhibalakathāvaṇṇanā

7. Exposition of the Discourse on Psychic Power

621-624. Yasmiṃ [Pg.133] āyukappe kammakkhayena maraṇaṃ hoti, taṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ ‘‘kammassa vipākavasenā’’ti, yasmiṃ pana āyukkhayena maraṇaṃ hoti, taṃ sandhāya ‘‘vassagaṇanāyā’’ti. Tattha ‘‘na ca tāva kālaṃ karoti, yāva na taṃ pāpakammaṃ byantī hotī’’ti (ma. ni. 3.250; a. ni. 3.36) vacanato yebhuyyena niraye kammakkhayena maraṇaṃ hotīti āha ‘‘kammassa vipākavasena vāti nirayaṃva sandhāya vutta’’nti. ‘‘Vassasataṃ vassasahassaṃ vassasatasahassānī’’tiādinā manussānaṃ devānañca āyuparicchedavacanato yebhuyyena tesaṃ āyukkhayena maraṇaṃ hotīti vuttaṃ ‘‘vassagaṇanāya vāti manusse cātumahārājikādideve ca sandhāyā’’ti. ‘‘Vutta’’nti ānetvā yojetabbaṃ.

621-624. Regarding the life-span in which death occurs due to the exhaustion of kamma, it is said, "by the power of kamma's result." But regarding the life-span in which death occurs due to the exhaustion of the life-span, it is said, "by the counting of years." Here, because of the statement, "And he does not die until that evil kamma is exhausted" (MN 3.250; AN 3.36), it is generally said that in hell, death occurs due to the exhaustion of kamma—thus it is stated, "or by the power of kamma's result," and this is said with reference to hell. From the statements defining the life-spans of humans and devas, such as "a hundred years, a thousand years, a hundred thousand years," etc., it is generally said that their death occurs due to the exhaustion of the life-span—thus it is stated, "or by the counting of years," and this is said with reference to humans and the devas of the Four Great Kings and so on. The word "stated" should be brought in and connected.

Iddhibalakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Psychic Power is concluded.

8. Samādhikathāvaṇṇanā

8. Exposition of the Discourse on Samādhi

625-626. Samaṃ ṭhapanaṭṭhenāti samaṃ visamaṃ līnuddhaccādiṃ paṭibāhitvā, vikkhepameva vā viddhaṃsetvā ṭhapanaṭṭhena. ‘‘Cittasantati samādhī’’ti vadantena tassa cetasikabhāvo paṭikkhitto hotīti āha ‘‘cetasikantaraṃ atthīti aggahetvā’’ti. Bhāvanāya āhitavisesāya ekaggatāya vijjamānavisesapaṭikkhepo chalaṃ, so panassa anāhitavisesāya ekaggatāya sāmaññenāti āha ‘‘sāmaññamattenā’’ti.

625-626. "By the meaning of establishing balance" means by repelling unevenness, such as sloth and restlessness, or by destroying distraction and thereby establishing balance. By saying "samādhi is the continuity of mind," its nature as a mental factor is rejected; hence it is said, "without grasping it as another mental factor." The rejection of a specific quality of one-pointedness acquired through cultivation is a pretext; but this refers only to the general one-pointedness without acquired qualities, hence it is said, "merely in a general way."

Samādhikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Samādhi is concluded.

9. Dhammaṭṭhitatākathāvaṇṇanā

9. Exposition of the Discourse on the Stability of Phenomena

627. Avijjāya yā ṭhitatāti avijjāya saṅkhārānaṃ anantarapaccayabhāve yā niyatatā dhammaniyāmatāsaṅkhātā, yā ṭhitasabhāvatā nipphannā[Pg.134], na dhammamattatāṭṭhitatāya nipphannāya vasena, anantarapaccayabhāvasaṅkhātā ṭhitatā paccayatā hotīti attho. Aññamaññapaccayabhāvarahitassāti idaṃ sahajātanissayādipaccayānaṃ paṭikkhepapadaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ, na aññamaññapaccayatāmattassa. Sabbo tādisoti iminā samanantaraanantarūpanissayanatthivigatāsevanādikaṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Aññamaññapaccayatañcāti etthāpi vuttanayena attho veditabbo. Ettha pana paccayuppannassapi paccayabhāvato saṅkhārānampi vasena yojetabbaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘tassā ca itarā’’ti.

627. "The stability of ignorance" refers to the fixed nature of ignorance as the immediate condition for formations, which is called the natural law of phenomena. This stability is an established, inherent nature, not established by way of the stability of mere phenomena. The meaning is that this stability, known as the state of being an immediate condition, is conditionality. "Devoid of mutual conditionality" here should be understood as rejecting co-nascence, dependence, and other conditions, not merely mutual conditionality itself. "All such" includes contiguity, immediacy, decisive support, absence, disappearance, repetition, and so on. "And mutual conditionality" should also be understood in the same way. Here, since even what arises from a condition can be a condition, it should also be construed in terms of formations. Hence it is said, "and the others from it."

Dhammaṭṭhitatākathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Stability of Phenomena is concluded.

10. Aniccatākathāvaṇṇanā

10. Exposition of the Discourse on Impermanence

628. Rūpādīnaṃ aniccatā rūpādike sati hoti, asati na hotīti iminā pariyāyena tassā tehi saha uppādanirodho vutto, uppādādīsu tīsu lakkhaṇesu aniccatāvohāro hotīti yathā tayo daṇḍe upādāya pavatto tidaṇḍavohāro tesu sabbesu hoti, evaṃ jātijarāmaraṇadhammo na nicco anicco, tassa jātiādipakatitā aniccatāsaddena vuccatīti uppādādīsu lakkhaṇesu aniccatāvohāro sambhavatīti vuttaṃ ‘‘tīsu…pe… hotī’’ti. Vibhāgānuyuñjanavasenāti pabhedānuyuñjanavasena. Tattha yathā jarābhaṅgavasena aniccatā pākaṭā hoti, na tathā jātivasenāti pāḷiyaṃ jarāmaraṇavaseneva aniccatāvibhāgo dassitoti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

628. The impermanence of form, etc., exists when form, etc., is present, and does not exist when it is absent. In this way, its arising and cessation together with them are described. The term "impermanence" is applied to the three characteristics of arising, etc. Just as the term "tripod," which depends on three sticks, applies to all of them, similarly, that which is subject to birth, aging, and death is not permanent, but impermanent. Its nature of being subject to birth, etc., is called "impermanence"; hence the term "impermanence" can be applied to the characteristics of arising, etc., as stated: "in the three... it occurs." "By way of applying analysis to divisions" means by way of applying analysis to distinctions. There, just as impermanence is evident through aging and disintegration, but not so clearly through birth, it should be understood that in the Pāli text, the division of impermanence is shown primarily through aging and death.

Aniccatākathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Impermanence is concluded.

Ekādasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Eleventh Chapter is concluded.

12. Dvādasamavaggo

12. The Twelfth Chapter

1. Saṃvarokammantikathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Section on Restraint and Action

630-632. Sabbassapi manaso manodvārabhāvato ‘‘vipākadvāranti bhavaṅgamanaṃ vadatī’’ti āha.

630-632. Because the entire mind has the nature of a mind-door, he said: “The resultant-door means the life-continuum mind.”

Saṃvarokammantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section on Restraint and Action is concluded.

2. Kammakathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Explanation of the Discourse on Kamma

633-635. Savipākāpi [Pg.135] dassitāyeva nāma hoti vuttāvasiṭṭhā savipākāti atthasiddhattā.

633-635. That which is 'with result' is indeed shown, because its meaning is established from the fact that the remaining things spoken of are 'with result'.

Kammakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Kamma is concluded.

4. Saḷāyatanakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Explanation of the Section on the Six Sense Bases

638-640. Manāyatanekadesassa vipākassa atthitāya ‘‘avisesenā’’ti vuttaṃ.

638-640. Because there is a resultant state for a part of the mind-base, it is said “without distinction.”

Saḷāyatanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section on the Six Sense Bases is concluded.

5. Sattakkhattuparamakathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Explanation of the Section on the Seven-Times-at-Most

641-645. Assāti imassa sattakkhattuparamassa. Tenāha ‘‘sattakkhattuparamabhāve ca niyāmaṃ icchasī’’ti. Yena ānantariyakammena. Antarāti satta bhave anibbattetvā tesaṃ antareyeva. Kecīti abhayagirivāsino. Apareti padakārā. Tassāti yo sattakkhattuparamoti vā, kolaṃkoloti vā, ekabījīti vā bhagavatā ñāṇena paricchinditvā byākato, tassa yathāvuttaparicchedā antarā uparimaggādhigamo natthi avitathadesanattā. Yathāparicchedameva tassa abhisamayo, svāyaṃ vibhāgo tesaṃyeva puggalānaṃ indriyaparopariyattena veditabbo bhavaniyāmena tādisassa kassaci abhāvato. Yasmā kassaci mudukānipi indriyāni paccayavisesena tikkhabhāvaṃ āpajjeyyuṃ, tasmā tādisaṃ sandhāya ‘‘bhabboti vuccati, na so abhabbo nāmā’’ti ca vuttaṃ. Yasmā pana bhagavā na tādisaṃ ‘‘sattakkhattuparamo’’tiādinā niyametvā byākaroti, tasmā āha ‘‘na pana antarā abhisametuṃ bhabbatā vuttā’’ti. Ayañca nayo ekantena icchitabbo. Aññathā puggalassa saṅkaro siyāti dassento ‘‘yadi cā’’tiādimāha.

641-645. The word ‘assa’ refers to this seven-times-at-most. Therefore, he said: “And do you desire certainty in the state of being a seven-times-at-most?” ‘Antarā’ means without generating seven existences, but within their interval. ‘Keci’ refers to the Abhayagirivāsins. ‘Apare’ refers to the Padakāras. ‘Tassa’ refers to one who has been declared by the Blessed One, having been defined by his knowledge, as a seven-times-at-most, or a family-to-family, or a single-seed. For such a one, there is no attainment of a higher path in the interim of the aforesaid definition, because the teaching is not false. Their realization occurs exactly as defined. This distinction should be understood through the mastery over the faculties of those very individuals, because there is no one of such a kind with a fixed destiny of existence. Because for someone, even soft faculties may become sharp due to special conditions, it is said with reference to such a one: “He is called capable, and is not called incapable.” However, since the Blessed One does not declare such a one, having fixed him as a seven-times-at-most, etc., it is stated: “But the capability to attain realization in the interim is not stated.” This principle should be accepted without exception. To show that otherwise there would be a confusion of persons, he said: “If, however…” and so on.

Sattakkhattuparamakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section on the Seven-Times-at-Most is concluded.

Dvādasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Twelfth Chapter is concluded.

13. Terasamavaggo

13. The Thirteenth Chapter

1. Kappaṭṭhakathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Section on Remaining for an Aeon

654-657. ‘‘Heṭṭhā [Pg.136] vuttādhippāyamevā’’ti idaṃ iddhibalakathāyaṃ yaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘atītaṃ anāgatanti idaṃ avisesena kappaṃ tiṭṭheyyāti paṭiññātattā codetī’’tiādi, taṃ sandhāya vuttanti āha ‘‘heṭṭhāti iddhibalakathāya’’nti. Tattha ‘‘dve kappe’’tiādiāyuparicchedātikkamasamatthatācodanāvasena āgatā, idha pana saṅghabhedako āyukappameva aṭṭhatvā yadi ekaṃ mahākappaṃ tiṭṭheyya, yathā ekaṃ, evaṃ anekepi kappe tiṭṭheyyāti codanā kātabbā.

654-657. The statement “The meaning is just as stated previously” refers to what was said in the section on the power of psychic potency: “Because he has declared, ‘The past and future—I could remain for an aeon without distinction,’ he reproaches”—this is said with reference to that. He says “previously” refers “to the section on the power of psychic potency.” There, “two aeons,” etc., came up by way of reproach for the ability to exceed the limit of the lifespan. Here, however, regarding the schismatic, having stood for his life-aeon, if he were to remain for one great aeon—just as for one, so too he might remain for many aeons—reproach should be made.

Kappaṭṭhakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section on Remaining for an Aeon is concluded.

4. Niyatassaniyāmakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Explanation of the Discourse on the Fixed and the Unfixed.

663-664. Appattaniyāmānanti ye anuppannamicchattasammattaniyatadhammā puggalā, tesaṃ dhamme. Ke pana te? Yathāvuttapuggalasantānapariyāpannā dhammā. Te hi bhūmittayapariyāpannatāya ‘‘tebhūmakā’’ti vuttā. Ye pana pattaniyāmānaṃ santāne pavattā aniyatadhammā, na tesamettha saṅgaho kato. Na hi tehi samannāgamena aniyatatā atthi. Tenevāha ‘‘tehi samannāgatopi aniyatoyevā’’ti. Imaṃ vohāramattanti iminā niyāmo nāma koci dhammo natthi, upacitasambhāratāya abhisambujjhituṃ bhabbatāva tathā vuccatīti dasseti. Niyatoti vacanassa kāraṇabhāvena vuttoti yojanā. Ubhayassapīti niyato niyāmaṃ okkamatīti vacanadvayassa.

663-664. ‘Appattaniyāmānaṃ’ refers to the states of persons for whom the fixed states of wrongness or rightness have not yet arisen. And who are they? The states included within the continuity of persons as described. Indeed, they are called “belonging to the three planes” because they are included within the three planes. However, the unfixed states occurring in the continuum of those who have attained certainty are not included here. For by association with them, there is no unfixedness. Hence it is said: “Even associated with them, one is still unfixed.” By the statement “This is merely a conventional expression,” it is shown that there is no state actually called “certainty,” but it is so called because of the accumulated conditions, the potential for awakening. The connection is that the word 'certain' is stated as the cause of the expression. “Of both” refers to the two expressions: “the certain one enters into certainty.”

Niyatassaniyāmakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Fixed and the Unfixed is concluded.

8. Asātarāgakathāvaṇṇanā

8. The Explanation of the Discourse on Lust for the Disagreeable.

674. Evaṃ pavattamānoti ‘‘aho vata me bhaveyyā’’ti evaṃ patthanākārena pavattamāno. Aññathāti nandanādiākārena.

674. The phrase ‘evaṃ pavattamāno’ means proceeding in the manner of wishing, “Oh, would that it might be for me!” ‘Aññathā’ means in the manner of delight and so on.

Asātarāgakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Lust for the Disagreeable is concluded.

9. Dhammataṇhāabyākatātikathāvaṇṇanā

9. The Explanation of the Discourse that Craving for States is Undetermined.

676-680. Gahetvāti [Pg.137] etena gahaṇamattameva taṃ, na pana sā tādisī atthīti dasseti. Na hi lokuttarārammaṇā abyākatā vā taṇhā atthīti. Tīhi koṭṭhāsehīti kāmabhavavibhavataṇhākoṭṭhāsehi. Rūpataṇhādibhedā chapi taṇhā.

676-680. By the word ‘gahetvā’ it is shown that this is a mere grasping, but that such a craving does not exist. For there is no craving that is undetermined and has the supramundane as its object. “By three divisions” refers to the divisions of craving for sensual pleasures, craving for existence, and craving for non-existence. The six kinds of craving are also distinguished as craving for forms, etc.

Dhammataṇhāabyākatātikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse that Craving for States is Undetermined is concluded.

Terasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Thirteenth Chapter is concluded.

14. Cuddasamavaggo

14. The Fourteenth Chapter

1. Kusalākusalapaṭisandahanakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Discourse on the Linking of Wholesome and Unwholesome.

686-690. Anantarapaccayabhāvoyevettha paṭisandhānaṃ ghaṭanañcāti āha ‘‘anantaraṃ uppādetī’’ti.

686-690. Here, the very state of being an immediate condition is the linking and connecting, thus he said, “It produces immediately after.”

Kusalākusalapaṭisandahanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Linking of Wholesome and Unwholesome is concluded.

2. Saḷāyatanuppattikathāvaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Discourse on the Arising of the Six Sense Bases.

691-692. Keci vādinoti kāpile sandhāyāha. Te hi abhibyattavādino vijjamānameva kāraṇe phalaṃ anabhibyattaṃ hutvā ṭhitaṃ pacchā abhibyattiṃ gacchatīti vadantā bījāvatthāya vijjamānāpi rukkhādīnaṃ na aṅkurādayo āvibhavanti, bījamattaṃ āvibhāvaṃ gacchatīti kathenti.

691-692. “Some theorists” refers to the followers of Kapila. They, being proponents of manifestation, say that the effect, existing in the cause, stands unmanifest and later becomes manifest. They state that even though trees and so forth exist in the seed state, sprouts and the like do not appear; only the seed itself becomes manifest.

Saḷāyatanuppattikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Arising of the Six Sense Bases is concluded.

3. Anantarapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of the Discourse on the Contiguity Condition.

693-697. Anantaruppattiṃ sallakkhentoti cakkhuviññāṇānantaraṃ sotaviññāṇuppattiṃ maññamāno. Sotaviññāṇanti vacaneneva tassa cakkhusannissayatā [Pg.138] rūpārammaṇatā ca paṭikkhittā, paṭiññātā ca sotasannissayatā saddārammaṇatā cāti āha ‘‘na so cakkhumhi saddārammaṇa’’nti. Tattha saddārammaṇanti ‘‘sotaviññāṇaṃ icchatī’’ti ānetvā sambandhitabbaṃ. Tayidaṃ cakkhuviññāṇassa anantaraṃ sotaviññāṇaṃ uppajjatīti laddhiyā evaṃ ñāyatīti āha ‘‘anantarūpaladdhivasena āpannattā’’ti.

693-697. ‘Considering immediate arising’ means thinking that the arising of ear-consciousness occurs immediately after eye-consciousness. By the very term “ear-consciousness,” its dependence on the eye and having form as its object are rejected, while dependence on the ear and having sound as its object are affirmed. Therefore, he said, “It is not with sound as its object in the eye.” There, “with sound as its object” should be connected by supplying “he desires ear-consciousness.” He says that this is known thus—that ear-consciousness arises immediately after eye-consciousness—'because of being committed by way of the doctrine of immediate succession'.

Anantarapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Contiguity Condition is concluded.

4. Ariyarūpakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Explanation of the Discourse on Noble Form.

698-699. Sammāvācādīti sammāvācākammantā. Tattha sammāvācā saddasabhāvā, itaro ca kāyaviññattisabhāvo, ubhayampi vā viññattīti adhippāyena rūpantissa laddhi.

698-699. “Right speech, etc.” refers to right speech and right action. Here, right speech has the nature of sound, while the other has the nature of bodily intimation; or, with the intention that both are intimation, his doctrine is that they are material form.

Ariyarūpakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Noble Form is concluded.

5. Aññoanusayotikathāvaṇṇanā

5. Explanation of the Discourse that the Underlying Tendency is Other.

700-701. Tasmiṃ samayeti kusalābyākatacittakkhaṇe. So hīti pacchimapāṭho.

700-701. “At that time” refers to the moment of wholesome or undetermined consciousness. “So hi” is the later reading.

Aññoanusayotikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse that the Underlying Tendency is Other is concluded.

6. Pariyuṭṭhānaṃcittavippayuttantikathāvaṇṇanā

6. Explanation of the Discourse that Obsession is Disassociated from Mind.

702. Teti rāgādayo. Tasmāti yasmā vipassantassapi rāgādayo uppajjanti, tasmā.

702. “They” refers to lust and the like. “Therefore” means: because lust and the like arise even for one practicing insight, therefore.

Pariyuṭṭhānaṃcittavippayuttantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse that Obsession is Disassociated from Mind is concluded.

7. Pariyāpannakathāvaṇṇanā

7. Explanation of the Discourse on Encompassment.

703-705. Kilesavatthuokāsavasenāti [Pg.139] kilesakāmavatthukāmabhūmivasena. Rūpadhātusahagatavasena anusetīti kāmarāgo yathā kāmavitakkasaṅkhātāya kāmadhātuyā saha paccayasamavāye uppajjanāraho, tameva rūpadhātuyāpīti attho. Rāgādikāraṇalābhe uppattiarahatā hi anusayanaṃ.

703-705. 'By way of the basis and location of defilements' means by way of sensual desire as a defilement, sensual objects as a basis, and the sensual-desire plane as a location. 'Lies latent accompanied by the form element' means: just as sensual lust is fit to arise in the sensual-desire element, designated as sensual thought, when there is a combination of conditions, so too is it in the form element. For an underlying tendency is the fitness to arise upon obtaining a cause such as lust and so on.

Pariyāpannakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Encompassment is concluded.

8. Abyākatakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Explanation of the Discourse on the Undetermined

706-608. Sabbathāpīti avipākabhāvenapi sassatādibhāvenapi.

706-708. “In every way” means both by the nature of not being a result and by the nature of eternalism and so on.

Abyākatakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Undetermined is concluded.

9. Apariyāpannakathāvaṇṇanā

9. Explanation of the Discourse on Non-Encompassment

709-710. Tasmā diṭṭhi lokiyapariyāpannā na hotīti atthaṃ vadanti, evaṃ sati atippasaṅgo hoti vītadosādivohārabhāvatoti. Tato aññathā atthaṃ vadanto ‘‘rūpadiṭṭhiyā’’tiādimāha. Tattha ādi-saddena arūpadiṭṭhiādiṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Paravādiadhippāyavasena ayamatthavibhāvanāti āha ‘‘yadi ca pariyāpannā siyā’’ti. Tathā ca satīti diṭṭhiyā kāmadhātupariyāpannatte satīti attho. Tasmāti ‘‘vītadiṭṭhiko’’ti evaṃ vohārābhāvato. Na hi sā tassa avigatā diṭṭhi, yato so vītadiṭṭhikoti na vuccati. Yenāti kāmadiṭṭhibhāvena.

709-710. Therefore, they state the meaning that a view is not included in the mundane; if this were so, there would be an over-extension because of the absence of such usages as 'one free from aversion,' and so on. Therefore, stating the meaning otherwise, he says, 'by the view of form,' etc. There, by the word 'etc.', he includes the view of the formless and so on. To show that this explanation of the meaning is according to the intention of the opponent, he says, 'if it were included.' And 'if that were so' means if the view were included in the sensual-desire element. 'Therefore' means because of the absence of the usage 'one free from views.' For that view has not departed from him, wherefore he is not called 'one free from views.' 'By which?' means by the state of being a sensual view.

Apariyāpannakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Non-Encompassment is concluded.

Cuddasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Fourteenth Chapter is concluded.

15. Pannarasamavaggo

15. The Fifteenth Chapter

1. Paccayatākathāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Discourse on Conditionality

711-717. Vavatthitoti [Pg.140] asaṃkiṇṇo. Yo hi dhammo yena paccayabhāvena paccayo hoti, tassa tato aññenapi paccayabhāve sati paccayatā saṃkiṇṇā nāma bhaveyya. Viruddhāsambhavīnaṃ viya tabbidhurānaṃ paccayabhāvānaṃ sahabhāvaṃ paṭikkhipati.

711-717. “Defined” means unmixed. For if a phenomenon that is a condition through one mode of conditionality were also a condition through another mode, its conditionality would be called 'mixed'. This rejects the co-occurrence of modes of conditionality that are contradictory or impossible, like those that are mutually exclusive.

Paccayatākathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Conditionality is concluded.

2. Aññamaññapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Discourse on the Mutuality Condition

718-719. Sahajātāti vuttattā na saṅkhārapaccayā ca avijjāti vuttattāti adhippāyo. Anantarādināpi hi saṅkhārā avijjāya paccayā hontiyeva. Aññamaññānantaraṃ avatvā avigatānantaraṃ sampayuttassa vacanaṃ kamabhedo, atthiggahaṇeneva gahito atthipaccayabhūtoyeva dhammo nissayapaccayo hotīti. Asādhāraṇatāyāti padantarāsādhāraṇatāya. Tenāha ‘‘vakkhati hī’’tiādi.

718-719. The intention is: because 'co-nascent' is stated, and because it is stated that ignorance is not conditioned by formations. For formations are indeed conditions for ignorance by way of contiguity, etc. Without mentioning mutual contiguity, the statement about the non-disappearance contiguity of an associated state is a difference of sequence; the meaning is grasped by the grasping of 'presence'—a state that is a presence condition is itself a dependence condition. 'Due to non-commonality' means due to non-commonality with other terms. Therefore he says, 'For he will say,' etc.

Aññamaññapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Mutuality Condition is concluded.

9. Tatiyasaññāvedayitakathāvaṇṇanā

9. Explanation of the Third Discourse on Perception and Feeling

732. Yadipi sesaṃ nāma gahitato aññaṃ, tathāpi pakaraṇaparicchinnamevettha taṃ gayhatīti dassento ‘‘yesaṃ…pe… adhippāyo’’ti vatvā puna anavasesameva saṅgaṇhanto ‘‘asaññasattānampi cā’’tiādimāha. Tattha sabbasatte sandhāyāti adhippāyoti yojanā. Pāṇisamphassāpi kamantītiādikaṃ sarīrapakatīti sambandho.

732. Although 'the remainder' is indeed different from what has been taken, still, to show that here only what is defined by the treatise is to be grasped, having said, 'of which...pe... is the intention,' he then, including everything without remainder, says, 'and also of non-percipient beings,' etc. Here, the construction is: 'the intention is that it refers to all beings.' The connection of such phrases as 'even contacts by hand cause movement' is with 'the nature of the body'.

733-734. Pañcahi viññāṇehi na cavati, na upapajjatīti vādaṃ paravādī nānujānātīti āha ‘‘sutta…pe… vattabba’’nti.

733-734. The opponent does not concede the view that one does not pass away or arise by means of the five consciousnesses; therefore, it is said: 'the sutta...pe... should be stated.'

Tatiyasaññāvedayitakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Third Discourse on Perception and Feeling is concluded.

10. Asaññasattupikākathāvaṇṇanā

10. Explanation of the Discourse concerning Non-Percipient Beings

735. Yathā [Pg.141] vitakkavicārapītisukhavirāgavasena pavattā samāpatti vitakkādirahitā hoti, evaṃ saññāvirāgavasena pavattāpi saññārahitāva siyāti tassa laddhīti dassento āha ‘‘sāpi asaññitā…pe… dassetī’’ti.

735. Just as the attainment that proceeds by way of the fading away of thought, examination, rapture, and happiness is devoid of thought and so on, so too the attainment that proceeds by way of the fading away of perception might be devoid of perception. To show that this is his view, he says: 'That too is non-percipient...pe... he shows.'

736. Yadi catutthajjhānasamāpatti kathaṃ asaññasamāpattīti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘saññāvirāgavasena samāpannattā asaññitā, na saññāya abhāvato’’ti.

736. Referring to the objection, 'If it is the attainment of the fourth jhāna, how can it be the attainment of non-perception?' he says: 'It is non-percipient because it is attained by way of dispassion towards perception, not because of the absence of perception.'

Asaññasattupikākathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse concerning Non-Percipient Beings is concluded.

11. Kammūpacayakathāvaṇṇanā

11. Explanation of the Discourse on the Accumulation of Kamma

738-739. ‘‘Kammūpacayo kammena sahajāto’’ti puṭṭho sampayuttasahajātataṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, vippayuttasahajātataṃ sandhāya paṭijānātīti. Vippayuttassapi hi atthi sahajātatā cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa viyāti adhippāyo.

738-739. When asked, 'Is the accumulation of kamma co-arisen with kamma?' he rejects this with reference to associated co-arising but accepts it with reference to dissociated co-arising. The intention is that even what is dissociated has co-arisenness, like mind-originated matter.

741. Tiṇṇanti kammakammūpacayakammavipākānaṃ.

741. 'Of the three' means of kamma, the accumulation of kamma, and the result of kamma.

Kammūpacayakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Accumulation of Kamma is concluded.

Pannarasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Fifteenth Chapter is concluded.

Tatiyo paṇṇāsako samatto.

The Third Fifty is completed.

16. Soḷasamavaggo

16. The Sixteenth Chapter

3. Sukhānuppadānakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discourse on Bestowing Happiness

747-748. Na tassāti yassa taṃ anuppadissati, na tassa. Yo hi anuppadeti, yassa ca anuppadeti, tadubhayavinimuttā idha pareti adhippetā.

747-748. 'Not for him' means: not for him to whom one would bestow it. For here 'others' is intended to mean those distinct from both the one who bestows and the one to whom one bestows.

Sukhānuppadānakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Bestowing Happiness is finished.

4. Adhigayhamanasikārakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Discourse on Attention by Comprehension

749-753. Taṃcittatāyāti [Pg.142] ettha manasikaronto yadi sabbasaṅkhāre ekato manasi karoti, yena cittena manasi karoti, sabbasaṅkhārantogadhattā tasmiṃyeva khaṇe taṃ cittaṃ manasi kātabbaṃ etassāti taṃcittatā nāma doso āpajjatīti dassento āha ‘‘tadeva ārammaṇabhūta’’ntiādi. Etena tasseva tena manasikaraṇāsambhavamāha, taṃ vātiādinā pana sasaṃvedanāvādāpattinti ayametesaṃ viseso.

749-753. Here, regarding 'having that as its mind': to show that the fault named 'having that as its mind' is incurred, he says, 'that very thing has become the object,' etc. The fault is this: if one attending brings all formations to mind at once, the mind with which one does so, since it is included within 'all formations,' would itself have to be brought to mind at that very moment. By this, he states the impossibility of that very mind attending to itself. But by 'or that,' etc., the fault of incurring the theory of self-awareness arises. This is the difference between them.

Adhigayhamanasikārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Attention by Comprehension is finished.

Soḷasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Sixteenth Chapter is finished.

17. Sattarasamavaggo

17. The Seventeenth Chapter

1. Atthiarahatopuññūpacayakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discourse: 'For an Arahant There Is Accumulation of Merit'

776-779. Kiriyacittaṃ abyākataṃ anādiyitvāti ‘‘kiriyacittaṃ abyākata’’nti aggahetvā, dānādipavattanena dānamayādipuññattena ca gahetvāti attho.

776-779. 'Without taking the functional mind as indeterminate' means: not grasping it as 'the functional mind is indeterminate,' but grasping it by way of the occurrence of giving, etc., and by way of its nature as merit consisting of giving, etc. This is the meaning.

Atthiarahatopuññūpacayakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse: 'For an Arahant There Is Accumulation of Merit' is finished.

2. Natthiarahatoakālamaccūtikathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discourse: 'For an Arahant There Is No Untimely Death'

780. Aladdhavipākavārānanti vipākadānaṃ pati aladdhokāsānaṃ. Byantībhāvanti vigatantataṃ, vigamaṃ avipākanti attho.

780. 'Of those whose turn for fruition has not been obtained' means: of those who have not obtained the opportunity for the giving of fruition. 'Termination' means the state of having come to an end, cessation, non-fruition; this is the meaning.

781. Tato paranti byatirekena atthasiddhi, na kevalena anvayenāti āha ‘‘tāva na kamati, tato paraṃ kamatīti laddhiyā paṭikkhipatī’’ti. Tattha tato paranti pubbe katassa kammassa parikkhayagamanato paraṃ. Natthi pāṇātipāto pāṇātipātalakkhaṇābhāvatoti adhippāyo. Tameva lakkhaṇābhāvaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘pāṇopāṇasaññitā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha na tenāti yo parena upakkamo kato[Pg.143], tena upakkamena na mato, dhammatāmaraṇeneva matoti dubbiññeyyaṃ avisesavidūhi, dubbiññeyyaṃ vā hotu suviññeyyaṃ vā, aṅgapāripūriyāva pāṇātipāto.

781. He says that 'beyond that' indicates the establishment of the meaning by way of exclusion, not merely by inclusion; thus he rejects the view that 'for a time it is not effective, but beyond that it is effective.' Here, 'beyond that' means after the previously done kamma has gone to exhaustion. The intention is that there is no killing of a living being because of the absence of the characteristic of killing a living being. To show this very absence of the characteristic, it is said, 'a living being, and perception of it as a living being,' etc. Here, 'not by that' means he did not die from the assault made by another but died a natural death. This is difficult to understand for those who do not know the distinctions. However, whether it is difficult or easy to understand, the killing of a living being consists simply in the completeness of the factors.

Natthiarahatoakālamaccūtikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse: 'For an Arahant There Is No Untimely Death' is finished.

3. Sabbamidaṃkammatotikathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discourse: 'All This Is from Kamma'

784. Abījatoti sabbena sabbaṃ abījato aññabījato ca. Tanti deyyadhammaṃ, gilānapaccayanti attho.

784. 'From no seed' means entirely from no seed and from another seed. 'That' means a gift; the meaning is 'requisites for the sick.'

Sabbamidaṃkammatotikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse: 'All This Is from Kamma' is finished.

4. Indriyabaddhakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Discourse on Being Bound by the Faculties

788. Vināpi aniccaṭṭhenāti aniccaṭṭhaṃ ṭhapetvāpi aṭṭhapetvāpīti attho, na aniccaṭṭhavirahenāti. Na hi aniccaṭṭhavirahitaṃ anindriyabaddhaṃ atthi.

788. 'Even without the characteristic of impermanence' means: even having set aside the characteristic of impermanence, even not having established it; this is the meaning. It does not mean by the absence of the characteristic of impermanence. For there is nothing bound by the faculties that is devoid of the characteristic of impermanence.

Indriyabaddhakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Being Bound by the Faculties is finished.

7. Navattabbaṃsaṅghodakkhiṇaṃvisodhetītikathāvaṇṇanā

7. Commentary on the Discourse: “It Should Not Be Said, ‘The Saṅgha Purifies an Offering’”

793-794. Appaṭiggahaṇatoti paṭiggāhakattābhāvato.

793-794. 'From non-acceptance' means: due to the absence of a recipient.

Navattabbaṃsaṅghodakkhiṇaṃvisodhetītikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse: “It Should Not Be Said, ‘The Saṅgha Purifies an Offering’” is finished.

11. Dakkhiṇāvisuddhikathāvaṇṇanā

11. Commentary on the Discourse on the Purification of an Offering

800-801. Paṭiggāhakanirapekkhāti paṭiggāhakassa guṇavisesanirapekkhā, tassa dakkhiṇeyyabhāvena vināti attho. Tenāha ‘‘paṭiggāhakena [Pg.144] paccayabhūtena vinā’’ti. Saccametanti laddhikittanena vuttabhāvameva paṭijānāti. Paṭiggāhakassa vipākanibbattanaṃ dānacetanāya mahāphalatā. Paccayabhāvoyeva hi tassa, na tassā kāraṇattaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘dānacetanānibbattanena yadi bhaveyyā’’tiādi.

800-801. 'Independent of the recipient' means independent of the recipient’s special qualities; that is, the meaning is without his state of being worthy of offerings. Therefore it is said: ‘without the recipient who has become a condition.’ By the words 'This is true,' he acknowledges the very state of things stated in the tenet. The production of the result for the recipient is the great fruitfulness of the volition to give. For the recipient is merely a condition for it, not its cause. Therefore it is said: ‘if it were by what is produced from the volition to give,’ and so on.

Dakkhiṇāvisuddhikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Purification of an Offering is finished.

Sattarasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Seventeenth Chapter is finished.

18. Aṭṭhārasamavaggo

18. The Eighteenth Chapter

1. Manussalokakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discourse on the Human World

802-803. Gahaṇanti micchāgahaṇaṃ.

Grasping means wrong grasping.

Manussalokakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Human World is finished.

2. Dhammadesanākathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discourse on the Teaching of the Dhamma

804-806. Tassa ca nimmitabuddhassa desanaṃ sampaṭicchitvā āyasmatā ānandena sayameva ca desito.

And having accepted the teaching of that emanated Buddha, it was taught by the Venerable Ānanda himself.

Dhammadesanākathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Teaching of the Dhamma is finished.

6. Jhānasaṅkantikathāvaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Discourse on the Transition of Jhāna

813-816. Vitakkavicāresu virattacittatā tattha ādīnavamanasikāro, tadākāro ca dutiyajjhānūpacāroti āha ‘‘vitakkavicārā ādīnavato manasi kātabbā, tato dutiyajjhānena bhavitabba’’nti.

The state of a mind detached from directed thought and evaluation, attention to the danger in them, and that very mode is the access to the second jhāna. Thus he says: “Directed thought and evaluation should be attended to from the point of view of their danger; then one should attain the second jhāna.”

Jhānasaṅkantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Transition of Jhāna is finished.

7. Jhānantarikakathāvaṇṇanā

7. Commentary on the Discourse on the Interval between Jhānas

817-819. Na [Pg.145] paṭhamajjhānaṃ vitakkābhāvato, nāpi dutiyajjhānaṃ vicārasabbhāvatoti jhānametaṃ na hotīti dassento āha ‘‘paṭhamajjhānādīsu aññatarabhāvābhāvato na jhāna’’nti.

Since it is not the first jhāna due to the absence of directed thought, nor the second jhāna due to the presence of evaluation, he shows that this is not a jhāna, saying: “Because it does not have the state of being one or another among the first jhāna and so on, it is not a jhāna.”

Jhānantarikakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Interval between Jhānas is finished.

9. Cakkhunārūpaṃpassatītikathāvaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Discourse: “One Sees a Form with the Eye”

826-827. ‘‘Cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā’’ti iminā cakkhuviññāṇena paṭijānanassa aggahaṇe aruciṃ sūcento āha ‘‘manoviññāṇapaṭijānanaṃ kira sandhāyā’’ti. Tenevāha ‘‘manoviññāṇapaṭijānanaṃ panā’’tiādi. Tasmāti manoviññāṇapaṭijānanasseva adhippetattāti attho. Evaṃ santeti yadi rūpena rūpaṃ paṭivijānāti, rūpaṃ paṭivijānantampi manoviññāṇaṃ rūpavijānanaṃ hoti, na rūpadassananti āha ‘‘manoviññāṇapaṭijānanaṃ pana rūpadassanaṃ kathaṃ hotī’’ti.

Indicating his displeasure at the non-acceptance of cognition by eye-consciousness with the phrase “having seen a form with the eye,” he says: “It seems this refers to cognition by mind-consciousness.” For that reason he says: “But cognition by mind-consciousness…” and so on. Therefore means: because only cognition by mind-consciousness is intended. This being so, if one cognizes form by means of form, then even while cognizing form, mind-consciousness is the cognition of form, not the seeing of form. Thus he says: “But how can cognition by mind-consciousness be the seeing of form?”

Cakkhunārūpaṃpassatītikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse: “One Sees a Form with the Eye” is finished.

Aṭṭhārasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Eighteenth Chapter is finished.

19. Ekūnavīsatimavaggo

19. The Nineteenth Chapter

1. Kilesapajahanakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discourse on the Abandonment of Defilements

828-831. Te panāti ye ariyamaggena pahīnā kilesā, te pana. Kāmañcettha maggena pahātabbakilesā maggabhāvanāya asati uppajjanārahā khaṇattayaṃ na āgatāti ca anāgatā nāma siyuṃ, yasmā pana te na uppajjissanti, tasmā tathā na vuccantīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘nāpi bhavissantī’’ti.

But those means those defilements that are abandoned by the noble path. And here, although the defilements to be abandoned by the path are capable of arising if the path is not cultivated, and although they have not reached the three moments and thus might be called “future,” it should be understood that because they will not arise, they are not called so. Therefore he says: “nor will they be future.”

Kilesapajahanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Abandonment of Defilements is finished.

2. Suññatakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discourse on Emptiness

832. Yena [Pg.146] avasavattanaṭṭhena paraparikappito natthi etesaṃ attano visayanti anattāti vuccanti sabhāvadhammā, svāyaṃ anattatāti āha ‘‘avasavattanākāro anattatā’’ti. Sā panāyaṃ yasmā atthato asārakatāva hoti, tasmā tadekadesena taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘atthato jarāmaraṇamevā’’ti āha. Evaṃ sati lakkhaṇasaṅkaro siyā, tesaṃ panidaṃ adhippāyakittananti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Arūpadhammānaṃ avasavattanākāratāya eva hi anattalakkhaṇassa saṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannatā.

832. Conditioned phenomena are called 'not-self' because, in the sense of being uncontrollable, a self conceived by others has no power over them. This is the state of not-self. Thus he says: “The mode of non-control is the state of not-self.” And since this is, in reality, simply insubstantiality, in order to show this by one of its aspects, he says: “In reality, it is just aging and death.” This being so, there would be a confusion of characteristics, but it should be understood that this is a statement of the intended meaning. For it is precisely because of the mode of non-control of formless phenomena that the characteristic of not-self is included in the aggregate of formations.

Suññatakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Emptiness is finished.

3. Sāmaññaphalakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discourse on the Fruits of the Contemplative Life

835-836. Pattidhammanti heṭṭhā vuttaṃ samannāgamamāha.

The state to be attained: he speaks of the endowment mentioned below.

Sāmaññaphalakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Fruits of the Contemplative Life is finished.

5. Tathatākathāvaṇṇanā

5. Commentary on the Discourse on Suchness

841-843. Rūpādīnaṃ sabhāvatāti etena rūpādayo eva sabhāvatāti imamatthaṃ paṭikkhipati. Yato taṃ paravādī rūpādīsu apariyāpannaṃ icchati. Tenāha ‘‘bhāvaṃ hesa tathatāti vadati, na bhāvayoga’’nti. Tattha bhāvanti dhammamattaṃ, pakatīti attho ‘‘jātidhamma’’ntiādīsu viya. Rūpādīnañhi ruppanādipakati tathā asaṅkhatāti ca paravādino laddhi. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘na bhāvayoga’’nti. Yena hi bhāvo sabhāvadhammo yujjati, ekībhāvameva gacchati, taṃ ruppanādilakkhaṇaṃ bhāvayogo. Taṃ pana rūpādito anaññaṃ, tato eva saṅkhataṃ, aviparītaṭṭhena pana ‘‘tatha’’nti vuccati.

By the phrase 'the intrinsic nature of form, etc.,' it refutes the meaning that form and so forth are themselves intrinsic nature. For that opponent holds that there is something in form, etc., that is not included in them. Therefore, it is said: 'For he calls being suchness, not a connection with being.' Here, 'being' means a mere phenomenon; the meaning is 'nature,' as in such phrases as 'subject to birth.' For it is the opponent's doctrine that the nature of form, etc.—that is, their nature of being afflicted, etc.—is thus unconditioned. Hence it is said, 'not a connection with being.' For that with which being, the intrinsic phenomenon, is connected, with which it comes to be unified, that is the connection with being, which has the characteristic of being afflicted, etc. But that is not other than form, etc., and is therefore conditioned; however, in the sense of being non-deviating, it is called 'such.'

Tathatākathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Suchness is finished.

6. Kusalakathāvaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Discourse on the Wholesome

844-846. Anavajjabhāvamatteneva [Pg.147] kusalanti yojanā. Tasmāti yasmā avajjarahitaṃ anavajjaṃ, anavajjabhāvamatteneva ca kusalaṃ, tasmā nibbānaṃ kusalanti.

844-846. The connection is: it is wholesome merely by its state of being blameless. Therefore, since what is devoid of blame is blameless, and it is wholesome merely by its state of being blameless, therefore Nibbāna is wholesome.

Kusalakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Wholesome is finished.

7. Accantaniyāmakathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Exposition of the Discourse on Absolute Fixedness

847. Yaṃ ‘‘ekavāraṃ nimuggo tathā nimuggova hoti, etassa puna bhavato vuṭṭhānaṃ nāma natthī’’ti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ āgataṃ, so pana ācariyavādo, na aṭṭhakathānayoti dassento ‘‘tāya jātiyā…pe… maññamāno’’ti āha. Tattha tāya jātiyāti yassaṃ jātiyaṃ puggalo kammāvaraṇādiāvaraṇehi samannāgato hoti, tāya jātiyā. Saṃsārakhāṇukabhāvo vassabhaññādīnaṃ viya makkhaliādīnaṃ viya ca daṭṭhabbo. So ca ahetukādimicchādassanassa phalabhāveneva veditabbo, na accantaniyāmassa nāma kassaci atthibhāvato. Yathā hi vimuccantassa koci niyāmo nāma natthi ṭhapetvā maggena bhavaparicchedaṃ, evaṃ avimuccantassapi koci saṃsāraniyāmo nāma natthi. Tādisassa pana micchādassanassa balavabhāve aparimitakappaparicchede cirataraṃ saṃsārappabandho hoti, apāyūpapatti ca yattha saṃsārakhāṇusamaññā.

847. To show that the statement found in the commentary—'Once submerged, one remains so submerged; for such a one there is no such thing as rising up again from existence'—is a view of the teachers and not the method of the commentary, he said: 'in that birth ...pe... thinking.' Here, 'in that birth' means that birth in which a person is possessed of obstructions such as the kamma-obstruction. The state of being a stump in saṃsāra should be understood as being like that of the Vassabhaññas, etc., and like that of Makkhali and his followers. And this should be understood as the result of wrong view, such as the view of no-cause, not because of the existence of anything called absolute fixedness. For just as for one who is being liberated there is no fixed course apart from the cutting off of existence by the path, so too for one who is not being liberated there is no such thing as a fixed course in saṃsāra. But when such a wrong view is strong, the continuity of saṃsāra lasts for a very long time, for an immeasurable number of eons, and there is rebirth in the plane of misery, which is designated 'a stump in saṃsāra.'

Yaṃ paneke vadanti ‘‘attheva accantaṃ saṃsaritā anantattā sattanikāyassā’’ti, tampi apuññabahulaṃ sattasantānaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ siyā. Na hi mātughātakādīnaṃ tenattabhāvena sammattaniyāmokkamanantarāyabhūto micchattaniyāmo viya sattānaṃ vimuttantarāyakaro saṃsāraniyāmo nāma natthi. Yāva pana na maggaphalassa upanissayo upalabbhati, tāva saṃsāro aparicchinno. Yadā ca so upaladdho, tadā so paricchinno evāti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

As for what some say, 'There are indeed those who wander on absolutely, because of the infinity of the host of beings,' this too may have been said with reference to the stream of a being abounding in demerit. For there is no such thing as a fixed course in saṃsāra that obstructs the liberation of beings, in the way that for matricides and so on, by their very state, there is the fixed course of wrongness which is an immediate obstruction to entering the fixed course of rightness. However, for as long as a supporting condition for the path and fruit is not found, saṃsāra is boundless. But when that is found, it should be seen that it is indeed bounded.

Yathā niyatasammādassanaṃ, evaṃ niyatamicchādassanenapi savisaye ekaṃsagāhavasena ukkaṃsagatena bhavitabbanti tena samannāgatassa puggalassa sati accantaniyāme kathaṃ tasmiṃ abhinivesavisaye anekaṃsagāho uppajjeyya, abhinivesantaraṃ vā viruddhaṃ yadi uppajjeyya, accantaniyāmo eva na [Pg.148] siyāti pāḷiyaṃ vicikicchuppattiniyāmantaruppatticodanā katā. Na hi vicikicchā viya sammattaniyatapuggalānaṃ yathākkamaṃ micchattasammattaniyatapuggalānaṃ sammattamicchattaniyatā dhammā kadācipi uppajjanti, aviruddhaṃ pana niyāmantarameva hotīti ānantarikantaraṃ viya micchādassanantaraṃ samānajātikaṃ na nivattetīti viruddhaṃyeva dassetuṃ pāḷiyaṃ vicikicchā viya sassatucchedadiṭṭhiyo eva uddhaṭā. Evamettha vicikicchuppattiniyāmantaruppattīnaṃ niyāmantaruppattinivattakabhāvo veditabbo, accantaniyāmo ca nivattissatīti ca viruddhametanti pana ‘‘vicāretvāva gahetabbā’’ti vuttaṃ siyā.

Just as there is fixed right view, so too there must be fixed wrong view that has reached a peak by way of a one-sided grasp in its own domain. Thus, for a person possessed of this, if there were an absolute fixedness, how could a non-one-sided grasp arise in that sphere of adherence? Or if another, contrary adherence were to arise, would the absolute fixedness itself not cease to be? In the Pāḷi text, an objection is thus raised concerning the arising of doubt and the arising of an interruption to the fixed course. For just as doubt does not arise for persons fixed in rightness, so the fixed states of rightness and wrongness never arise for persons fixed in wrongness and rightness respectively. To show what is indeed contradictory—that another wrong view of a similar kind does not prevent the first, like another immediately effective kamma—views of eternalism and annihilationism, like doubt, are cited in the Pāḷi. Thus here it should be understood that the arising of doubt and the arising of an interruption to the fixed course have the nature of preventing the arising of another fixed course. But that this is contradictory—that the absolute fixed course would be reversed—may have been stated as: 'This should be accepted only after investigation.'

Accantaniyāmakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Absolute Fixedness is finished.

8. Indriyakathāvaṇṇanā

8. The Exposition of the Discourse on the Faculties

853-856. Yathā lokuttarā saddhādayo eva saddhindriyādīni, evaṃ lokiyāpi. Kasmā? Tatthāpi adhimokkhalakkhaṇādinā indaṭṭhasabbhāvato. Saddheyyādivatthūsu saddahanādimattameva hi tanti imamatthaṃ dassento āha ‘‘lokuttarānaṃ…pe… daṭṭhabbo’’ti.

853-856. Just as the supramundane qualities such as faith are the faith faculty and so forth, so too are the mundane ones. Why? Because even in the latter case, the meaning of 'faculty' exists by way of the characteristic of resolution and so on, which is the sense of exercising sovereignty. To show this meaning—that in regard to objects of faith and so on, it is simply a matter of trusting, etc.—he said: 'of the supramundane ...pe... should be seen.'

Indriyakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Faculties is finished.

Ekūnavīsatimavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Nineteenth Chapter is finished.

20. Vīsatimavaggo

20. The Twentieth Chapter

2. Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discourse on Knowledge

863-865. Kāmaṃ pubbabhāgepi attheva dukkhapariññā, atthasādhikā pana sā maggakkhaṇikā evāti ukkaṃsagataṃ dukkhapariññaṃ sandhāya avadhārento āha ‘‘dukkhaṃ…pe… maggañāṇameva dīpetī’’ti. Taṃ pana avadhāraṇaṃ na ñāṇantaranivattanaṃ, atha kho ñāṇantarassa yathādhigatakiccanivattanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘na tasseva ñāṇabhāva’’ntiādi.

863-865. Though in the prior stage there is indeed a full understanding of suffering, it is only at the moment of the path that it is truly effective. Thus, focusing on the supreme full understanding of suffering, he states by way of emphasis: 'Suffering… indeed, illuminates only the path knowledge.' But that emphasis is not a rejection of other knowledges, but rather should be seen as a rejection of the function fulfilled by those other knowledges. Therefore, he said, 'Not the very nature of that knowledge,' and so on.

Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Knowledge is concluded.

3. Nirayapālakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discourse on the Hell Wardens

866-868. Nerayike [Pg.149] niraye pālenti, tato niggantuṃ appadānavasena rakkhantīti nirayapālā. Nirayapālatāya vā nerayikānaṃ narakadukkhena pariyonaddhāya alaṃ samatthāti nirayapālā. Kiṃ panete nirayapālā nerayikā, udāhu anerayikāti. Kiñcettha – yadi tāva nerayikā, nirayasaṃvattaniyena kammena nibbattāti sayampi nirayadukkhaṃ paccanubhaveyyuṃ, tathā sati aññesaṃ nerayikānaṃ yātanāya asamatthā siyuṃ, ‘‘ime nerayikā, ime nirayapālā’’ti vavatthānañca na siyā. Ye ca ye yātenti, tehi samānarūpabalappamāṇehi itaresaṃ bhayasantāsā na siyuṃ. Atha anerayikā, tesaṃ tattha kathaṃ sambhavoti? Vuccate – anerayikā nirayapālā anirayagatisaṃvattaniyakammanibbattā. Nirayūpapattisaṃvattaniyakammato hi aññeneva kammunā te nibbattanti rakkhasajātikattā. Tathā hi vadanti –

866-868. They guard the denizens of hell in hell; because they prevent them from escaping from there on account of their lack of giving, they are called 'hell-guardians.' Alternatively, because they are fully capable of tormenting the denizens of hell, who are afflicted by the sufferings of hell, they are called 'hell-guardians.' Now, are these hell-guardians themselves denizens of hell, or are they not? For if they were denizens of hell, they would be born of kamma leading to hell and would themselves experience the suffering of hell. In that case, they would be incapable of tormenting other denizens of hell, and there would be no distinction such as, 'these are denizens of hell' and 'these are hell-guardians.' And those who torment would not inspire fear and terror in others if they were of the same form, strength, and size. But if they are not denizens of hell, how is their existence there possible? It is said: The hell-guardians are not denizens of hell, but are born of kamma that does not lead to a hellish destination. They arise from a kamma different from that which leads to rebirth in hell, because they are of the rāksasa-kind. Thus it is said:

‘‘Kodhanā kurūrakammantā, pāpābhirucino tathā;

Dukkhitesu ca nandanti, jāyanti yamarakkhasā’’ti.

'The angry, those of cruel deeds, and those who delight in evil, and who rejoice in the afflicted—they are born as Yama's rāksasas.'

Tattha yadeke vadanti ‘‘yātanādukkhassa appaṭisaṃvedanato, aññathā puna aññamaññaṃ yāteyyu’’nti ca evamādi, tayidaṃ ākāsaromaṭṭhanaṃ nirayapālānaṃ nerayikabhāvasseva abhāvato. Ye pana vadeyyuṃ – yadipi anerayikā nirayapālā, ayomayāya pana ādittāya sampajjalitāya sajotibhūtāya nirayabhūmiyā parivattamānā kathaṃ nāma dukkhaṃ nānubhavantīti? Kammānubhāvato. Yathā hi iddhimanto cetovasippattā mahāmoggallānādayo nerayike anukampantā iddhibalena nirayabhūmiṃ upagatā tattha dāhadukkhena na bādhīyanti, evaṃ sampadamidaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ.

There, some say: 'Because they do not experience the suffering of torment; otherwise they would torment one another,' and so on. This is like making the sky hairy, since hell-guardians do not have the nature of being denizens of hell. But if some should say: 'Even if the hell-guardians are not denizens of hell, how is it that they do not experience suffering while roaming on the iron ground of hell, which is burning, blazing, and glowing?' It is due to the power of kamma. For just as those with psychic power who have attained mastery over mind, like the Great Moggallāna and others, out of compassion for the denizens of hell, go to the hell-plane by means of their psychic power and are not afflicted there by the suffering of burning, so too should this be understood.

Taṃ iddhivisayassa acinteyyabhāvatoti ce? Idampi taṃsamānaṃ kammavipākassa acinteyyabhāvato. Tathārūpena hi kammunā te nibbattā yathā nirayadukkhena abādhitā eva hutvā nerayike yātenti, na cettakena bāhiravisayābhāvo vijjati iṭṭhāniṭṭhatāya paccekaṃ dvārapurisesu vibhattasabhāvattā. Tathā hi ekaccassa dvārassa purisassa iṭṭhaṃ [Pg.150] ekaccassa aniṭṭhaṃ, ekaccassa ca aniṭṭhaṃ ekaccassa iṭṭhaṃ hoti. Evañca katvā yadeke vadanti ‘‘natthi kammavasena tejasā parūpatāpana’’ntiādi, tadapāhataṃ hoti. Yaṃ pana vadanti ‘‘anerayikānaṃ tesaṃ kathaṃ tattha sambhavo’’ti nerayikānaṃ yātakabhāvato. Nerayikasattayātanāyoggañhi attabhāvaṃ nibbattentaṃ kammaṃ tādisanikantivināmitaṃ nirayaṭṭhāneyeva nibbatteti. Te ca nerayikehi adhikatarabalārohapariṇāhā ativiya bhayānakasantāsakurūratarapayogā ca honti. Eteneva tattha kākasunakhādīnampi nibbatti saṃvaṇṇitāti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

(If it is said:) 'Is that because the domain of psychic power is inconceivable?' This too is similar, due to the inconceivability of the results of kamma. For they are born by such kamma that they torment the denizens of hell while being themselves unafflicted by the suffering of hell. And by this, there is no absence of an external object, since the gatekeepers have distinct individual natures with respect to what is desirable and undesirable. For what is desirable to one gatekeeper is undesirable to another, and what is undesirable to one is desirable to another. Thus, the statement of some, 'There is no scorching of others by fire through the power of kamma,' and so on, is refuted. As for the question, 'How can those who are not denizens of hell exist there?'—it is because they are the tormentors of the denizens of hell. For the kamma that produces an individual existence suitable for tormenting hell-beings, being bent by such a predilection, generates it right in the location of hell. And they are of greater strength, stature, and girth than the denizens of hell, and extremely terrifying, dreadful, and cruel in their methods. By this same reasoning, the arising there of crows, dogs, and the like should be understood as explained.

Kathamaññagatikehi aññagatikabādhananti ca na vattabbaṃ aññatthāpi tathā dassanato. Yaṃ paneke vadanti ‘‘asattasabhāvā nirayapālā nirayasunakhādayo cā’’ti, taṃ tesaṃ matimattaṃ aññattha tathā adassanato. Na hi kāci atthi tādisī dhammappavatti, yā asattasabhāvā, sampatisattehi appayojitā ca atthakiccaṃ sādhentī diṭṭhapubbā. Petānaṃ pānīyanivārakānaṃ daṇḍādihatthapurisānampi asattabhāve visesakāraṇaṃ natthi. Supinūpaghātopi atthakiccasamatthatāya appamāṇaṃ dassanādimattenapi tadatthasiddhito. Tathā hi supine āhārūpabhogādinā na atthasiddhi atthi, nimmānarūpaṃ panettha laddhaparihāraṃ iddhivisayassa acinteyyabhāvato. Idhāpi kammavipākassa acinteyyabhāvatoti ce? Taṃ na, asiddhattā. Nerayikānaṃ kammavipāko nirayapālāti asiddhametaṃ, vuttanayena pana nesaṃ sattabhāvo eva siddho. Sakkā hi vattuṃ sattasaṅkhātā nirayapālasaññitā dhammappavatti sābhisandhikā parūpaghāti atthakiccasabbhāvato ojāhārādirakkhasasantati viyāti. Abhisandhipubbakatā cettha na sakkā paṭikkhipituṃ tathā tathā abhisandhiyā yātanato, tato eva na saṅghāṭapabbatādīhi anekantikatā. Ye pana vadanti ‘‘bhūtavisesā eva te vaṇṇasaṇṭhānādivisesavanto bheravākārā narakapālāti samaññaṃ labhantī’’ti, tadasiddhaṃ. Ujukameva pāḷiyaṃ ‘‘atthi niraye nirayapālā’’ti vādassa patiṭṭhāpitattā.

And it should not be said, 'How can there be affliction of those in one destination by those in another?' since such is seen elsewhere. As for what some say—'The hell-guardians, hell-hounds, and the like are non-sentient'—that is merely their opinion, since such is not seen elsewhere. For no such process of phenomena has ever been seen that is non-sentient and, without being directed by existing beings, accomplishes a purposeful task. There is no special reason to consider as non-sentient even the men with sticks in hand who prevent the hungry ghosts from drinking water. Even the harm in a dream is not a valid measure of the capacity to accomplish a real task, since that purpose is accomplished by mere seeing and the like. For in a dream, there is no real accomplishment from consuming food and the like. Here, a created form is an exception, due to the inconceivability of the domain of psychic power. (If it is said:) 'Is it the same here, due to the inconceivability of the results of kamma?' No, because that is unproven. That the hell-guardians are the kamma-result of the denizens of hell is unproven; rather, their sentient nature is established by the method stated. Indeed, it can be said that this process of phenomena called 'hell-guardians,' reckoned as beings, is intentional and harms others, having a real purpose, like the lineage of rāksasas who sustain themselves on nutritive essence, food, and the like. Here, the presence of prior intention cannot be denied, as the tormenting proceeds from such and such an intention. Therefore, this is not rendered inconclusive by the case of the Saṅghāṭa mountain and the like. As for those who say, 'They are merely a special class of spirits, terrifying in appearance, distinguished by color and form, who receive the designation 'hell-guardians''—that is unproven. For the position 'There are hell-guardians in hell' is established straightforwardly in the Pāli Canon.

Apica yathā ariyavinaye narakapālānaṃ bhūtamattatā asiddhā, tathā paññattimattavādinopi tesaṃ bhūtamattatā asiddhāva. Na hi tassa bhūtāni nāma santi. Yadi paramatthaṃ gahetvā voharati, atha kasmā vedanādike [Pg.151] eva paṭikkhipatīti? Tiṭṭhatesā anavaṭṭhitatakkānaṃ appahīnasammohavipallāsānaṃ vādavīmaṃsā, evaṃ attheva nirayapālāti niṭṭhamettha gantabbaṃ. Sati ca nesaṃ sabbhāve, asatipi bāhire visaye narake viya desādiniyamo hotīti vādo na sijjhati evāti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

Moreover, just as in the noble discipline the status of hell-guardians as mere spirits is unproven, so too for one who holds that they are mere concepts, their status as mere spirits is also unproven. For such a one, there are no such things as spirits. If one speaks taking ultimate reality as one's basis, then why does one reject feeling and the like? Let this debate and investigation of those with unsettled logic and unabandoned delusion and distortion stand aside. Thus, one should come to the conclusion here that hell-guardians do indeed exist. And it should be seen that, given their real existence, the argument that 'even in the absence of an external object, there is a determination of place, etc., as in hell' is simply not established.

Nirayapālakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Hell-Guardians is concluded.

4. Tiracchānakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Commentary on the Discourse on Animals

869-871. Tassāti erāvaṇanāmakassa devaputtassa. Tahiṃ kīḷanakāle hatthivaṇṇena vikubbanaṃ sandhāya ‘‘hatthināgassā’’ti vuttaṃ. Dibbayānassāti etthāpi eseva nayo. Na hi ekantasukhappaccayaṭṭhāne sagge dukkhādhiṭṭhānassa akusalakammasamuṭṭhānassa attabhāvassa sambhavo yutto. Tenāha ‘‘na tiracchānagatassā’’ti.

869-871. Tassa’ti: of the devaputta named Erāvaṇa. With reference to his transformation into the form of an elephant during a time of play, it is said, “of the elephant nāga.” The same principle applies to “of a divine vehicle.” For in heaven, a place that is a condition for exclusive happiness, the arising of an individual existence that has suffering as its basis and originates from unwholesome kamma is not fitting. Therefore, it is said, “not of one gone to the animal destination.”

Tiracchānakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Animals is finished.

6. Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

6. The Commentary on the Discourse on Knowledge

876-877. ‘‘Dvādasavatthukaṃ ñāṇaṃ lokuttara’’nti ettha dvādasavatthukassa ñāṇassa lokuttaratā patiṭṭhāpīyatīti dassento paṭhamavikappaṃ vatvā puna lokuttarañāṇassa dvādasavatthukatā patiṭṭhāpīyatīti dassetuṃ ‘‘taṃ vā…pe… attho’’ti āha. Pariññeyyanti ettha iti-saddo ādiattho, pakārattho vā. Tena ‘‘pahātabba’’nti evamādiṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Pariññātanti etthāpi eseva nayo. ‘‘Pariññeyyaṃ pariññāta’’ntiādinā parijānanādikiriyāya nibbattetabbatā nibbattitatā ca dassitā, na nibbattiyamānatāti. Yena pana sā hoti, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘saccañāṇaṃ panā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha saccañāṇanti dukkhādisaccasabhāvāvabodhakaṃ ñāṇaṃ, yaṃ sandhāya ‘‘idaṃ dukkha’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. Maggakkhaṇepīti api-saddena tato [Pg.152] pubbāparabhāgepīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Parijānanādikiccasādhanavasena hoti asammohato visayato cāti adhippāyo.

876-877. Here, in the passage “The knowledge with twelve bases is supramundane,” showing that the supramundane nature of the knowledge with twelve bases is established, and having stated the first alternative, then to show that the twelve-based nature of the supramundane knowledge is established, he said: “That, or …pe… the meaning.” Here, in pariññeyyaṃ, the particle iti has the sense of “and so on” or the sense of “type.” Thereby it includes “to be abandoned,” and so on. The same principle applies here too in pariññātaṃ. By such phrases as “to be fully understood, has been fully understood,” it is shown that the activity of full understanding, etc., is something to be accomplished and has been accomplished, not that it is in the process of being accomplished. But to show that by which this occurs, “But the knowledge of the truths…” etc., is said. Therein, “knowledge of the truths” is the knowledge that awakens to the intrinsic nature of the truths of suffering, etc., with reference to which “This is suffering,” etc., is said. In “even at the moment of the path,” by the word api, it should be understood as “also in the stages before and after it.” The meaning is that it occurs by way of accomplishing the function of full understanding, etc., because of non-delusion and because of its object.

Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Knowledge is finished.

Vīsatimavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Twentieth Chapter is finished.

Catuttho paṇṇāsako samatto.

The Fourth Fifty is completed.

21. Ekavīsatimavaggo

21. The Twenty-First Chapter

1. Sāsanakathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Commentary on the Discourse on the Dispensation

878. Samudāyāti ‘‘sāsanaṃ navaṃ kata’’ntiādinā pucchāvasena pavattā vacanasamudāyā. Ekadesānanti tadavayavānaṃ. ‘‘Tīsupi pucchāsū’’ti evaṃ adhikaraṇabhāvena vuttā.

878. Samudāyā’ti: collections of statements that proceed by way of questions, beginning with “Is the Dispensation newly made?” Ekadesānaṃ’ti: of their parts. It is stated as “In the three questions” in the sense of a locative case.

Sāsanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Dispensation is finished.

4. Iddhikathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Commentary on the Discourse on Psychic Power

883-884. Adhippāyavasenāti tathā tathā adhimuccanādhippāyavasena.

883-884. Adhippāyavasena’ti: by the power of the intention to resolve in such and such a way.

Iddhikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Psychic Power is finished.

7. Dhammakathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Commentary on the Discourse on the Dhamma

887-888. Rūpasabhāvo rūpaṭṭhoti āha ‘‘rūpaṭṭho nāma koci rūpato añño natthī’’ti. Yaṃ pana yato aññaṃ, na taṃ taṃsabhāvanti āha ‘‘rūpaṭṭhato aññaṃ rūpañca na hotī’’ti, rūpameva na hotīti attho. Etena byatirekato tamatthaṃ sādheti. Tasmāti yasmā rūpato añño rūpaṭṭho natthi, rūpaṭṭhato ca aññaṃ rūpaṃ, tasmā rūpaṃ rūpameva rūpasabhāvamevāti [Pg.153] eva-kārena nivattitaṃ dasseti ‘‘na vedanādisabhāva’’nti. Adhippāyenāti rūparūpaṭṭhānaṃ anaññattādhippāyena. Aññathāti tesaṃ aññatte rūpaṭṭhena niyamena rūpaṃ niyatanti vattabbanti yojanā. Dassitoyeva hoti atthato āpannattā. Na hi abhinne vatthusmiṃ pariyāyantarabhedaṃ karoti. Aññattanti rūpasabhāvānaṃ rūparūpaṭṭhānañca. Sasāminiddesasiddhābhedā ‘‘silāputtakassa sarīra’’nti viya, kappanāmattato cāyaṃ bhedo, na paramatthatoti āha ‘‘gahetvā viya pavatto’’ti. Vedanādīhi nānattamevāti vedanādīhi aññattameva. So sabhāvoti so rūpasabhāvo. Nānattasaññāpanatthanti rūpassa sabhāvo, na vedanādīnanti evaṃ bhedassa ñāpanatthaṃ. Tañca vacananti ‘‘rūpaṃ rūpaṭṭhena na niyata’’nti vacanaṃ. Vuttappakārenāti ‘‘rūpaṭṭhato aññassa rūpassa abhāvā’’tiādinā vuttākārena. Yadi sadosaṃ, atha kasmā paṭijānātīti yojanā.

887-888. The intrinsic nature of form is the characteristic of form. He says: “The characteristic of form, indeed, is not anything other than form.” But whatever is other than something is not its intrinsic nature. He says: “And form is not other than the characteristic of form,” the meaning being, “it would not be form itself.” By this, he establishes that meaning through exclusion. Tasmā’ti: since the characteristic of form is not other than form, and form is not other than the characteristic of form, therefore form is just form, just the intrinsic nature of form. By the particle eva, he shows the exclusion: “not the intrinsic nature of feeling, etc.” Adhippāyena’ti: by the intention of the non-otherness of form and the characteristic of form. Aññathā’ti: if they were other, the connection is that one would have to say that form is invariably determined by the characteristic of form. It is in fact already shown, as it is arrived at by implication. For one does not make a distinction of different terms for an identical thing. Aññattaṃ’ti: the otherness of the intrinsic nature of form and the characteristic of form. Just as in “the body of a stone doll,” the non-difference is established by the designation of possession. And this distinction is a mere concept, not ultimately real. Thus he says, “it proceeds as if having been grasped.” Vedanādīhi nānattamevā’ti: it is just otherness from feeling, etc. So sabhāvo’ti: that intrinsic nature of form. Nānattasaññāpanatthaṃ’ti: for the purpose of making known the distinction, thus: “the intrinsic nature of form, not of feeling, etc.” Tañca vacanaṃ’ti: that statement, “form is not determined by the characteristic of form.” Vuttappakārenā’ti: in the manner stated, beginning with “because of the absence of a form that is other than the characteristic of form.” The connection is: “If it is faulty, then why does one acknowledge it?”

Vuttameva kāraṇanti ‘‘rūpaṃ rūpameva, na vedanādisabhāva’’nti evaṃ vuttameva yuttiṃ. Parena coditanti ‘‘na vattabbaṃ rūpaṃ rūpaṭṭhena niyata’’ntiādinā paravādino codanaṃ sandhāyāha. Tameva kāraṇaṃ dassetvāti tameva yathāvuttaṃ yuttiṃ ‘‘ettha hī’’tiādinā dassetvā. Codanaṃ nivattetīti ‘‘atha kasmā paṭijānātī’’ti vuttaṃ codanaṃ nivatteti. Yamatthaṃ sandhāya ‘‘ito aññathā’’ti vuttaṃ, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘rūpādī’’tiādi vuttaṃ.

Vuttameva kāraṇaṃ’ti: the reason already stated, that is, the argument already stated thus: “Form is just form, not the intrinsic nature of feeling, etc.” Parena coditaṃ’ti: he says this with reference to the opponent’s objection, beginning with: “It should not be said that form is determined by the characteristic of form.” Tameva kāraṇaṃ dassetvā’ti: having shown that same reason as stated, beginning with “For here…” Codanaṃ nivatteti’ti: he refutes the objection stated as “Then why does one acknowledge it?” To show the meaning with reference to which “otherwise than this” was said, “form, etc.” was said.

Dhammakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Dhamma is finished.

Ekavīsatimavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Twenty-First Chapter is finished.

22. Bāvīsatimavaggo

22. The Twenty-Second Chapter

2. Kusalacittakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discourse on Wholesome Consciousness

894-895. Purimajavanakkhaṇeti parinibbānacittato anantarātītapurimajavanavārakkhaṇe.

894-895. “At the moment of the first javana”: this means at the moment of the javana-series immediately preceding the parinibbāna-consciousness.

Kusalacittakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Wholesome Consciousness is concluded.

3. Āneñjakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discourse on Imperturbability

896. Hetusarūpārammaṇasampayuttadhammārammaṇādito [Pg.154] bhavaṅgasadisattā cuticittaṃ ‘‘bhavaṅgacitta’’nti āha.

896. Because it is similar to the life-continuum consciousness in having the same cause, nature, object, associated mental factors, and so on, the death-consciousness is called ‘life-continuum consciousness.’

Āneñjakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Imperturbability is concluded.

5-7. Tissopikathāvaṇṇanā

5-7. Commentary on the Discourse concerning Tissa and the Maidens

898-900. Arahattappattipi gabbheyeva atthīti maññati. Sattavassikā hi sopākasāmaṇerādayo arahattaṃ pattā. Sattavassikopi gabbho atthīti paravādino adhippāyo. Ākāsena gacchanto viya supinaṃ ākāsasupinaṃ. Taṃ abhiññānibbattaṃ maññatīti nidassanaṃ katvā dassento āha ‘‘ākāsagamanādiabhiññā viyā’’ti. Heṭṭhimānaṃ catunnaṃ vā maggānaṃ adhigamena dhammābhisamayo aggaphalādhigamena arahattappatti ca supine atthīti maññatīti yojanā.

898-900. He holds that attainment of arahantship is possible even in the womb. For novices such as Sopāka attained arahantship when they were seven years old. The opponent’s opinion is that there can also be a seven-year-old fetus. A dream of the sky is a dream like one going through the sky. To show that he considers this to be produced by direct knowledge, he gives an illustration, saying: ‘like the direct knowledge of going through the sky and so on.’ The construction is that he thinks that the penetration of the Dhamma by attaining the four lower paths, and the attainment of arahantship by attaining the highest fruit, are possible in a dream.

Tissopikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse concerning Tissa and the Maidens is concluded.

9. Āsevanapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Discourse on the Repetition Condition

903-905. Bījaṃ catumadhurabhāvaṃ na gaṇhātīti idaṃ sakasamayavasena vuttaṃ, parasamaye pana rūpadhammāpi arūpadhammehi samānakkhaṇā eva icchitā. Tenevāha ‘‘sabbe dhammā khaṇikā’’ti. Khaṇikattepi vā acetanesupi anindriyabaddharūpesu bhāvanāviseso labbhati, kimaṅgaṃ pana sacetanesūti dassetuṃ ‘‘yathā bījaṃ catumadhurabhāvaṃ na gaṇhātī’’ti nidassananti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Āsevento nāma koci dhammo natthi ittaratāya anavaṭṭhānatoti adhippāyo. Ittarakhaṇatāya eva pana āsevanaṃ labbhati. Kusalādibhāvena hi attasadisassa payogena karaṇīyassa punappunaṃ karaṇappavattanaṃ attasadisatāpādanaṃ vāsanaṃ vā āsevanaṃ pure paricitagantho viya pacchimassāti.

903-905. The statement, ‘A seed does not acquire the state of fourfold sweetness,’ is said according to our own system. In other systems, however, material phenomena are held to be of the same moment as immaterial phenomena. Therefore it is said: ‘All phenomena are momentary.’ To show that even within momentariness a special quality of development is found even in inanimate, non-sentient material phenomena—how much more so in sentient ones—the illustration, ‘Just as a seed does not acquire the state of fourfold sweetness,’ should be understood. The opinion is that there is no phenomenon called a ‘repeating one’ because of its transient and unstable nature. But it is precisely because of its transient momentariness that repetition is obtained. For repetition is the repeated undertaking of what is to be done by an application similar to itself in being wholesome, etc., which produces a similarity to itself or an impression, just as a later portion of a text is familiar from a previously recited portion.

Āsevanapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Repetition Condition is concluded.

10. Khaṇikakathāvaṇṇanā

10. Commentary on the Discourse on Momentariness

906-907. Pathaviyādirūpesūti [Pg.155] anekakalāpasamudāyabhūtesu sasambhārapathavīādirūpesu. Tattha hi kesuci purimuppannesu ṭhitesu kesañci tadaññesaṃ uppādo, tato purimantaruppannānaṃ kesañci nirodho hoti ekekakalāparūpesu samānuppādanirodhattā tesaṃ. Evaṃ patiṭṭhānanti evaṃ vuttappakārena asamānuppādanirodhena pabandhena patiṭṭhānapavattīti attho. Sā panāyaṃ yathāvuttā pavatti kasmā rūpasantatiyā evāti āha ‘‘na hi rūpāna’’ntiādi. Tassattho – yadi sabbe saṅkhatadhammā samānakkhaṇā, tathā sati arūpasantatiyā viya rūpasantatiyāpi anantarādipaccayena vidhinā pavatti siyā, na cetaṃ atthi. Yadi siyā, cittakkhaṇe cittakkhaṇe pathavīādīnaṃ uppādanirodhehi bhavitabbanti.

906-907. In material phenomena such as earth, etc.: in composite material phenomena consisting of multiple groups, such as earth with its components. For there, while some previously arisen phenomena persist, others arise, and then some of those that arose earlier cease; this is because for them, within each single material group, arising and cessation are simultaneous. Thus, the establishment: the meaning is that the process of establishment occurs as a sequence with non-simultaneous arising and cessation in the way described. But why does this aforesaid process occur only in the material continuum? He says: ‘For not of material phenomena…,’ etc. The meaning is this: If all conditioned phenomena were of the same moment, then, like the immaterial continuum, the material continuum too would proceed by way of conditions such as proximity, etc. But this is not so. If it were, the arising and cessation of earth, etc., would have to occur at every mind-moment.

Khaṇikakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Momentariness is concluded.

Bāvīsatimavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Twenty-Second Chapter is concluded.

23. Tevīsatimavaggo

23. The Twenty-Third Chapter

1. Ekādhippāyakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discourse on the Single Intention

908. Eka-saddo aññatthopi hoti ‘‘ittheke abhivadantī’’tiādīsu viya, aññattañcettha rāgādhippāyato veditabbaṃ, puthujjanassa pana sachandarāgaparibhogabhāvato āha ‘‘rāgādhippāyato aññādhippāyovāti vuttaṃ hotī’’ti. Ko pana so aññādhippāyoti? Karuṇādhippāyo. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘karuṇādhippāyena ekādhippāyo’’ti. Ayañca nayo itthiyā jīvitarakkhaṇatthaṃ kāruññena manorathaṃ pūrentassa bodhisattassa saṃvaravināso na hotīti evaṃvādinaṃ paravādiṃ sandhāya vutto, paṇidhānādhippāyavādinaṃ pana sandhāya ‘‘eko adhippāyoti etthā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Puttamukhadassanādhippāyopi ettheva saṅgahaṃ gatoti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Ekatobhāveti sahabhāve.

908. The word ‘eka’ (one) also has the meaning ‘other,’ as in such phrases as ‘some here declare.’ And here this otherness should be understood in relation to an intention of lust. But in the case of a worldling, because of his nature of enjoying things with desire and lust, it is said: ‘It means an intention other than one based on lust.’ What, then, is that other intention? An intention of compassion. Thus it is said: ‘a single intention, meaning an intention of compassion.’ This principle is stated in reference to an opponent who holds that for a bodhisatta who fulfills a woman’s wish out of compassion to save her life, there is no breach of his restraint. But in reference to those who advocate an intention based on aspiration, it is said: ‘Here, the single intention is…,’ etc. The intention to see his son’s face should be understood as included right here. Ekatobhāve’ti: in a state of co-existence.

Ekādhippāyakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Single Intention is concluded.

3-7. Issariyakāmakārikākathāvaṇṇanā

3-7. Commentary on the Discourse on Actions Driven by the Desire for Sovereignty

910-914. Issariyenāti [Pg.156] cittissariyena, na cetovasibhāvenāti attho. Kāmakārikaṃ yathicchitanipphādanaṃ. Issariyakāmakārikāhetūti issariyakāmakāribhāvanimittaṃ, tassa nibbattanatthanti attho. Micchādiṭṭhiyā karīyatīti micchābhiniveseneva yā kāci dukkarakārikā karīyatīti attho.

910-914. By sovereignty: the meaning is by sovereignty of mind, not by mastery over the mind. Acting according to one’s wish: accomplishing things according to one’s wish. Because of acting according to one’s wish from sovereignty: this means as the cause for the state of acting according to one’s wish from sovereignty, for the purpose of producing it. Is done with wrong view: the meaning is that whatever difficult action is done, it is done out of stubborn adherence to wrong view.

Issariyakāmakārikākathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Actions Driven by the Desire for Sovereignty is concluded.

8. Patirūpakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Commentary on the Discourse on Counterparts

915-916. Mettādayo viyāti yathā mettā karuṇā muditā ca sinehasabhāvāpi arañjanasabhāvattā asaṃkiliṭṭhattā ca na rāgo, evaṃ rāgapatirūpako koci dhammo natthi ṭhapetvā mettādayo, aññacittassa siniyhanākāro rāgasseva pavattiākāroti attho. Tenevāha ‘‘rāgameva gaṇhātī’’ti. Evaṃ dosepīti ettha issādayo viya na doso dosapatirūpako koci atthīti dosameva gaṇhātīti yojetabbaṃ. Ṭhapetvā hi issādayo aññacittassa dussanākāro dosasseva pavattiākāroti.

915–916. “Like loving-kindness, etc.”: Just as loving-kindness, compassion, and sympathetic joy, although having a nature of affection, are not lust because of their non-coloring and undefiled nature, so too, apart from loving-kindness and so on, there is no other phenomenon that is a counterpart of lust. The mode of affection for another’s mind is simply the mode of occurrence of lust itself—this is the meaning. Therefore it is said: “It takes only lust.” “Similarly with aversion”: Here, just as with envy and so on, there is no counterpart to aversion that is not itself aversion; thus, “it takes only aversion” should be connected here. For apart from envy and so on, the mode of vexation toward another’s mind is simply the mode of occurrence of aversion itself.

Patirūpakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Counterparts is finished.

9. Aparinipphannakathāvaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Discourse on the Not-Fully-Realized

917-918. Aniccādiko bhāvoti aniccasaṅkhārapaṭiccasamuppannatādiko bhāvo dhammo pakati etassāti attho. Dukkhaññeva parinipphannanti ‘‘dukkhasaccaṃ sandhāya pucchā katā, na dukkhatāmatta’’nti ayamattho viññāyati ‘‘na kevalañhi paṭhamasaccameva dukkha’’nti vacanena. Tathā sati paravādinā cakkhāyatanādīnaṃ aññesañca taṃsarikkhakānaṃ dhammānaṃ parinipphannatā nānujānitabbā siyā. Kasmā? Tesampi hi dukkhasaccena saṅgaho, na itarasaccehi. Yañhi samudayasaccato nibbattaṃ, taṃ nippariyāyato dukkhasaccaṃ[Pg.157], itaraṃ saṅkhāradukkhatāya dukkhanti imamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘na kevalañhī’’tiādimāha. Tattha na hi anupādinnānīti iminā cakkhāyatanādīnaṃ samudayasaccena saṅgahābhāvamāha. Lokuttarānīti iminā nirodhamaggasaccehi. Yadi evamettha yutti vattabbā, kimettha vattabbaṃ? Sabhāvo hesa paravādivādassa, yadidaṃ pubbenāparamasaṃsandanaṃ. Tathā hi so viññūhi paṭikkhitto. Tathā ceva taṃ amhehi tattha tattha vibhāvitaṃ. Etanti ‘‘rūpaṃ aparinipphannaṃ, dukkhaññeva parinipphanna’’nti yadetaṃ tayā vuttaṃ, etaṃ no vata re vattabbe. Kasmā? Rūpassa ca dukkhattā. Rūpañhi aniccaṃ dukkhādhiṭṭhānañca. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘yadaniccaṃ taṃ dukkhaṃ. Saṃkhittena pañcupādānakkhandhā dukkhā’’ti ca.

917–918. “The state characterized by impermanence, etc.”: This means that for which the state, the phenomenon, the nature, is being dependently arisen from impermanent formations, and so on—this is the meaning. “Only suffering is fully realized”: By this it is understood that the question was asked with reference to the truth of suffering, not merely suffering as such. This is known from the statement: “For not only the first truth is suffering.” This being so, the opponent might not concede that the eye-base and other similar phenomena are fully realized. Why? Because they too are included under the truth of suffering, not under the other truths. For whatever is produced from the truth of the origin is unequivocally the truth of suffering; the other is suffering because of the suffering inherent in formations. Showing this meaning, he said: “For not only…,” etc. Here, by “not clung to,” he indicates the non-inclusion of the eye-base and so on under the truth of the origin. By “supramundane,” he refers to the truths of cessation and the path. If this is so, what is the proper thing to say here? What is there to be said? This is the nature of the opponent’s thesis, this non-correspondence of the preceding with the subsequent. For in that way it is refuted by the wise. And we have explained this accordingly in various places. As to this—that which was said by you: “Material form is not fully realized, only suffering is fully realized”—this, indeed, should not be said. Why? Because material form is also suffering. For material form is impermanent and a basis for suffering. Therefore it was said: “Whatever is impermanent is suffering,” and, “In brief, the five aggregates subject to clinging are suffering.”

Aparinipphannakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Not-Fully-Realized is finished.

Tevīsatimavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Twenty-Third Chapter is finished.

Kathāvatthupakaraṇa-anuṭīkā samattā.

The Sub-commentary on the Kathāvatthu Treatise is complete.

Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa

Homage to the Blessed One, the Arahant, the Perfectly Self-Enlightened One.

Yamakapakaraṇa-anuṭīkā

The Sub-commentary on the Yamaka Treatise

Ganthārambhavaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Beginning of the Book

Saṅkhepenevāti [Pg.159] uddeseneva. Yaṃ ‘‘mātikāṭhapana’’nti vuttaṃ. Dhammesūti khandhādidhammesu kusalādidhammesu ca. Aviparītato gahitesu dhammesu mūlayamakādivasena pavattiyamānā desanā veneyyānaṃ nānappakārakosallāvahā pariññākiccasādhanī ca hoti, na viparītatoti āha ‘‘viparītaggahaṇaṃ…pe… āraddha’’nti. Etena kathāvatthupakaraṇadesanānantaraṃ yamakapakaraṇadesanāya kāraṇamāha. Tattha viparītaggahaṇanti puggalapariggahaṇādimicchāgāhaṃ. Dhammapuggalokāsādinissayānanti ‘‘ye keci kusalā dhammā, sabbe te kusalamūlā’’tiādinā (yama. 1.mūlayamaka.1) dhamme, ‘‘yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjati, tassa vedanākkhandho uppajjatī’’tiādinā (yama. 1.khandhayamaka.50) puggalaṃ ‘‘yattha rūpakkhandho uppajjati, tattha vedanākkhandho uppajjatī’’tiādinā (yama. 1.khandhayamaka.51) okāsaṃ nissāya ārabbha pavattānaṃ. Ādi-saddena puggalokāsauppādanirodhatadubhayapariññādīnaṃ saṅgaho daṭṭhabbo. Sanniṭṭhānasaṃsayānanti pāḷigatipaṭivacanasarūpadassanapaṭikkhipanapaṭisedhananayehi yathāpucchitassa atthassa nicchayakaraṇaṃ sanniṭṭhānaṃ, tadabhāvato saṃsayanaṃ saṃsayo. Tesaṃ sanniṭṭhānasaṃsayānaṃ.

“In brief” means by way of an outline. This is what was called “the laying down of the matrix.” “Regarding phenomena” means regarding phenomena such as the aggregates and regarding wholesome phenomena, etc. When phenomena are grasped without distortion, the teaching, proceeding by way of the Root Pairs and so on, brings various kinds of skill to those to be trained and accomplishes the task of full understanding; it does not do so when they are grasped with distortion. Thus he said: “distorted grasping … was undertaken.” By this he states the reason why the teaching of the Yamaka treatise comes after the teaching of the Kathāvatthu treatise. Therein, “distorted grasping” means the wrong grasp of assuming a person, etc. “Based on phenomena, persons, locations, etc.” refers to those that proceed based on phenomena, as in: “Whatever wholesome phenomena there are, all of them have a wholesome root,” etc. (Yama. 1. Mūlayamaka §1); the person, as in: “For whomever the material form aggregate arises, for them the feeling aggregate arises,” etc. (Yama. 1. Khandhayamaka §50); and the location, as in: “Where the material form aggregate arises, there the feeling aggregate arises,” etc. (Yama. 1. Khandhayamaka §51). By the word “etc.,” the inclusion of the arising and cessation of persons and locations, the full understanding of both, and so on, should be understood. “Of resolutions and doubts”: Resolution is the determination of the meaning of what was asked, by way of the methods of the textual passage, the reply, demonstration, refutation, and denial. Doubt is the state of doubting due to the absence of that. Of these resolutions and doubts.

Kāmañcettha dhammapaṭiggāhakānaṃ saṃsayapubbakaṃ sanniṭṭhānanti paṭhamaṃ saṃsayo vattabbo, desentassa pana bhagavato sanniṭṭhānapubbako saṃsayoti dassanatthaṃ ayaṃ padānukkamo kato. Sabbañhi pariññeyyaṃ hatthāmalakaṃ viya paccakkhaṃ katvā ṭhitassa dhammasāmino na katthaci saṃsayo, vissajjetukāmatāya pana vineyyajjhāsayagataṃ saṃsayaṃ dassento saṃsayitavasena pucchaṃ karotīti evaṃ vissajjanapucchanavasena na sanniṭṭhānasaṃsayā labbhantīti ayamattho dassito, nicchitasaṃsayadhammavaseneva panettha sanniṭṭhānasaṃsayā [Pg.160] veditabbā. Tenāha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘kusalesu kusalā nu kho, na nu kho kusalāti sandehābhāvato’’tiādi. Teneva ca ‘‘sanniṭṭhānasaṃsayāna’’nti, ‘‘sanniṭṭhānasaṃsayavasenā’’ti ca paṭhamaṃ sanniṭṭhānaggahaṇaṃ kataṃ.

Although here, for the recipients of the Dhamma, resolution is preceded by doubt, and thus doubt should be stated first, this word order has been adopted to show that for the Blessed One who is teaching, doubt is preceded by resolution. For the Lord of the Dhamma, who stands having directly experienced all that is to be fully understood as if it were a myrobalan fruit on the palm of his hand, there is no doubt anywhere. But out of a desire to answer, showing the doubt that lies in the disposition of those to be trained, he asks a question as if he were doubting. Thus it is shown that resolution and doubt are not obtained by way of answering and questioning. Here, resolution and doubt should be understood simply by way of determined and doubted phenomena. Therefore it is said in the Commentary: “Because there is no uncertainty regarding wholesome things, such as, ‘Are they wholesome, or are they not wholesome?’” and so on. And for that very reason, the word ‘resolution’ was taken first in ‘of resolutions and doubts’ and ‘by way of resolution and doubt.’

Tanti yamakapakaraṇaṃ. Tassa ye samayādayo vattabbā, te kathāvatthupakaraṇadesanānantaro desanāsamayo, tāvatiṃsabhavanameva desanādeso, kusalākusalamūlādiyamakākārena desanāti vibhāgato ‘‘saṅkhepenevā’’tiādigāthāhi vibhāvitā nimittena saddhiṃ saṃvaṇṇanapaṭiññā cāti imamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘samayadesadesanāvasenā’’tiādimāha. Nimittañhetaṃ idha saṃvaṇṇanāya, yadidaṃ kamānuppatti āgatabhāravāhitā ca paṇḍitānaṃ paṇḍitakiccabhāvato. Tattha anuppattaṃ dassetvāti sambandho.

“Tanti” means the Yamaka treatise. Whatever things are to be stated about it, such as the time, etc.—the time of the teaching is immediately after the teaching of the Kathāvatthu treatise; the place of the teaching is the Tāvatiṃsa celestial world; the teaching is in the form of pairs of wholesome and unwholesome roots, etc.—these have been explained in detail by the verses beginning “In brief,” etc., along with the sign and the promise to commentate. Showing this meaning, he said, “by way of time, place, and teaching,” etc. Here, this is a sign for the commentary: namely, the sequential succession, the bearing of the transmitted burden, and its being a task for the wise because it is a wise person’s duty. Therein, the connection is: “having shown what has come in succession.”

Tatthāti tasmiṃ samayādidassane. Yamanaṃ uparamananti yamo maraṇanti āha ‘‘jātiyā sati maraṇaṃ hotīti…pe… visayo’’ti. Tattha yathā ‘‘jātiyā sati maraṇaṃ hotī’’ti jāti yamassa visayo, evaṃ ‘‘upādānakkhandhesu santesu maraṇaṃ hotī’’ti upādānakkhandhā yamassa visayoti yojetabbaṃ. Te hi maraṇadhamminoti. Anuppattamaraṇaṃyeva kibbisakārinaṃ puggalaṃ yamapurisā vividhā kammakāraṇā karonti, na appattamaraṇanti maraṇaṃ yamassa visayo vutto. Āṇāpavattiṭṭhānanti idaṃ visaya-saddassa atthavacanaṃ. Desaṃ vāti kāmādidhātuttayadesaṃ sandhāyāha. Dhātuttayissaro hi maccurājā. Pañcānantariyāni aññasatthāruddeso ca, tena vā saddhiṃ pañca verāni cha abhabbaṭṭhānāni. Āvattāti padakkhiṇāvattā. Tanuruhāti lomā.

“Therein” means in that exposition of time, etc. “Restraining, ceasing, is Yama, that is, death.” He said: “When there is birth, there is death … the domain.” Therein, just as birth is the domain of Yama because “when there is birth, there is death,” so too it should be connected that the aggregates subject to clinging are the domain of Yama because “when the aggregates subject to clinging exist, there is death.” For they are by nature subject to death. Yama’s men inflict various punishments on a wrongdoer who has met with death, not on one who has not met with death; thus death is said to be the domain of Yama. “The place where command holds sway” is an explanation of the meaning of the word “domain.” “Or the place” is said with reference to the place of the three realms: the desire realm, etc. For the King of Death is the lord of the three realms. The five heinous offenses, and the designation of another teacher; or, along with that, the five enmities and the six impossibilities. “Whirls” means clockwise whirls. “Body-growths” means body hairs.

Ganthārambhavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Beginning of the Book is finished.

1. Mūlayamakaṃ

1. The Root Yamaka

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Summary Section

1. Yamakasamūhassāti [Pg.161] mūlayamakādikassa yamakasamūhassa. Mūlayamakādayo hi pakaraṇāpekkhāya avayavabhūtāpi niccāvayavāpekkhāya yamakasamūhoti vutto. Tenāha ‘‘taṃsamūhassa ca sakalassa pakaraṇassā’’ti.

1. ‘Of the collection of pairs’ means of the collection of pairs beginning with the Root Yamaka. For the Root Yamaka and the others, though they are parts in relation to the treatise, are called a ‘collection of pairs’ in relation to their invariable components. Therefore it is said: ‘…and of that collection, of the entire treatise.’

Kusalākusalamūlavisesānanti dutiyapucchāya vuttānaṃ saṃsayapadasaṅgahitānaṃ kusalasaṅkhātānaṃ, tathā paṭhamapucchāya vuttānaṃ kusalamūlasaṅkhātānaṃ visesānaṃ atthayamakabhāvassa vuttattāti yojanā. Yathā hi paṭhamapucchāya visesavantabhāvena vuttāyeva kusaladhammā dutiyapucchāyaṃ visesabhāvena vuttā, evaṃ paṭhamapucchāyaṃ visesabhāvena vuttāyeva kusalamūladhammā dutiyapucchāyaṃ visesavantabhāvena vuttā. Vattuvacanicchāvasena hi dhammānaṃ visesavisesavantatāvibhāgā hontīti. Kusalamūlakusalavisesehi saṃsayitapadasaṅgahitehi kusalakusalamūlānaṃ visesavantānanti adhippāyo. Ettha ca visesavantāpekkhavisesavasena paṭhamo atthavikappo vutto, dutiyo pana visesāpekkhavisesavantavasenāti ayametesaṃ viseso. Tenāha ‘‘ñātuṃ icchitānaṃ hī’’tiādi.

‘Of the distinctions of wholesome and unwholesome roots’: the connection is that the state of being a meaning-pair has been stated for the distinctions of what is termed ‘wholesome’—included in the doubtful terms of the second question—and of what is termed ‘wholesome root’—mentioned in the first question. For just as the wholesome dhammas mentioned in the first question as possessing distinctions are described in the second question as being distinctions, so the wholesome root dhammas mentioned in the first question as being distinctions are described in the second question as possessing distinctions. Indeed, the division of phenomena into being a distinction and possessing a distinction occurs according to the speaker's intention. The meaning is that wholesome states and wholesome roots are what possess distinctions, which are included in the doubtful terms along with their respective distinctions. Here, the first alternative of meaning is stated from the perspective of the distinction in relation to what possesses the distinction, while the second is from the perspective of what possesses the distinction in relation to the distinction—this is the difference between them. Hence it is said: ‘For of those who wish to know…’ and so on.

Tattha ñātuṃ icchitānanti pucchāya visayabhūtānanti attho. Visesānanti kusalakusalamūlavisesānaṃ. Visesavantāpekkhānanti kusalamūlakusalasaṅkhātehi visesavantehi sāpekkhānaṃ. Visesavatanti kusalamūlakusalānaṃ. Visesāpekkhānanti kusalakusalamūlavisesehi sāpekkhānaṃ. Etthāti etasmiṃ mūlayamake. Padhānabhāvoti paṭhamavikappe tāva saṃsayitappadhānattā pucchāya visesānaṃ padhānabhāvo veditabbo. Te hi saṃsayitānaṃ visesavantoti. Dutiyavikappe pana visesā nāma visesavantādhīnāti visesavantānaṃ tattha padhānabhāvo daṭṭhabbo. Dvinnaṃ pana ekajjhaṃ padhānabhāvo na yujjati. Sati hi appadhāne padhānaṃ nāma siyā. Tenāha ‘‘ekekāya pucchāya ekeko eva attho saṅgahito hotī’’ti. Evañcetaṃ sampaṭicchitabbaṃ, aññathā vinicchitavisesitabbabhāvehi idha padhānabhāvo na yujjatevāti. Na dhammavācakoti na sabhāvadhammavācako. Sabhāvadhammopi [Pg.162] hi atthoti vuccati ‘‘gambhīrapaññaṃ nipuṇatthadassi’’ntiādīsu (su. ni. 178). ‘‘Hetuphale ñāṇaṃ atthapaṭisambhidā’’tiādīsu (vibha. 720) attha-saddassa hetuphalavācakatā daṭṭhabbā. Ādi-saddenassa ‘‘atthābhisamayā’’tiādīsu (saṃ. ni. 1.129) āgatā hitādivācakatā saṅgayhati. Tenevāti pāḷiatthavācakattā eva.

Here, ‘of those who wish to know’ means being the object of the question. ‘Of distinctions’ refers to the distinctions of wholesome states and wholesome roots. ‘Of those concerned with what possesses distinctions’ means being concerned with things that possess distinctions, namely, wholesome roots and wholesome states. ‘Possessing distinctions’ refers to wholesome roots and wholesome states. ‘Of those concerned with distinctions’ means being concerned with the distinctions of wholesome states and wholesome roots. ‘Here’ means in this Root Yamaka. ‘Primacy’ should be understood as follows: in the first alternative, the distinctions in the question have primacy, because what is doubted has primacy. For they are the distinctions for the doubters. In the second alternative, however, since distinctions depend on what possesses them, the primacy there should be seen as belonging to what possesses them. But it is not suitable for both to be primary at the same time, for a ‘primary’ can exist only if there is a ‘secondary.’ Therefore, it is said: ‘For each question, only one meaning is gathered.’ This should be accepted thus; otherwise, primacy here would not be appropriate, as there are things to be decided and distinguished. ‘Not a designator of dhamma’ means not a designator of the intrinsic nature of phenomena. For the intrinsic nature of phenomena is also called ‘meaning,’ as seen in phrases like ‘one of profound wisdom, a seer of the subtle meaning’ (Snp 178). In passages like ‘knowledge of cause and effect is the analytical knowledge of meaning’ (Vibh 720), the word ‘meaning’ should be understood as designating cause and effect. The term ‘etc.’ includes its designation of ‘benefit’ and so on, as found in phrases like ‘through the comprehension of the meaning’ (SN 1.129). ‘Therefore’ means precisely because it designates the meaning of the Pāli text.

Tīṇipi padānīti ettha pi-saddo samuccayattho, samuccayo ca tulyayoge siyā. Kiṃ nāma-padena anavasesato kusalādīnaṃ saṅgahoti āsaṅkāya tadāsaṅkānivattanatthamāha ‘‘tīṇipi…pe… saṅgāhakatta’’nti. Tattha saṅgāhakattamattanti matta-saddo visesanivattiatthoti. Tena nivattitaṃ visesaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘na niravasesasaṅgāhakatta’’nti vuttaṃ. Na hi rūpaṃ nāma-padena saṅgayhati. Kusalādiyeva nāmanti niyamo daṭṭhabbo, na nāmaṃyeva kusalādīti imameva ca niyamaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘kusalādīnaṃ saṅgāhakattamattameva sandhāya vutta’’nti. Yadipi nāma-padaṃ na niravasesakusalādisaṅgāhakaṃ, kusalādisaṅgāhakaṃ pana hoti, tadatthameva ca taṃ gahitanti nāmassa kusalattikapariyāpannatā vuttāti dassento āha ‘‘kusalādi…pe… vutta’’nti.

‘The three terms too’: here the particle ‘pi’ has the meaning of inclusion, and inclusion occurs between items of equal status. On the suspicion, ‘Does the term “name” include wholesome states, etc., without remainder?,’ to dispel that suspicion it is said: ‘The three…pe…because of being inclusive.’ Here, ‘mere inclusiveness’ means that the word ‘matta’ has the function of excluding a specification. To show the specification excluded by it, it is stated: ‘not because of including without remainder.’ For material form is not included by the term ‘name.’ The restriction ‘Only wholesome states, etc., are name’ should be understood, not ‘Only name is wholesome, etc.’ Referring to this very restriction, it is said: ‘spoken with reference only to the mere inclusiveness of wholesome states, etc.’ Although the term ‘name’ does not include all wholesome states, etc., without remainder, it does include wholesome states, etc., and it is taken for that purpose. To show that the term ‘name’ is included in the wholesome triad, it is said: ‘wholesome…pe…spoken.’

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Summary Section is concluded.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Exposition Section

52. Dutiyayamaketi ekamūlayamake. Evamidhāpīti yathā ekamūlayamake ‘‘ye keci kusalā’’icceva pucchā āraddhā, evaṃ idhāpi aññamaññamūlayamakepi ‘‘ye keci kusalā’’icceva pucchā ārabhitabbā siyā. Kasmā? Purimayamaka…pe… appavattattāti. Idañca dutiyayamakassa tathā appavattattā vuttaṃ, tatiyayamakaṃ pana tatheva pavattaṃ. Kecīti padakārā. Te hi yathā paṭhamadutiyayamakesu purimapucchā eva parivattanavasena pacchimapucchā katāti pacchimapucchāya purimapucchā samānā ṭhapetvā paṭilomabhāvaṃ, na tathā aññamaññayamake. Tattha hi dvepi pucchā aññamaññavisadisā. Yadi tatthāpi dvīhipi pucchāhi sadisāhi bhavitabbaṃ[Pg.163], ‘‘ye keci kusalā’’ti paṭhamapucchā ārabhitabbā, pacchimapucchā vā ‘‘sabbe te dhammā kusalamūlena ekamūlā’’ti vattabbā siyā. Evaṃ pana avatvā paṭhamadutiyayamakesu viya purimapacchimapucchā sadisā akatvā tatiyayamake tāsaṃ visadisatā ‘‘ye keci kusalā’’ti anāraddhattā, tasmā paṭilomapucchānurūpāya anulomapucchāya bhavitabbanti imamatthaṃ sandhāya ‘‘ye keci kusalāti apucchitvā’’ti vuttanti vadanti.

52. ‘In the second yamaka’ means in the single-root yamaka. So too here: just as in the single-root yamaka the question begins with ‘Whatever wholesome states…,’ so too in this mutual-root yamaka, the question should have begun with ‘Whatever wholesome states….’ Why? Because the previous yamaka…pe…did not proceed thus. This is stated because the second yamaka did not proceed so, whereas the third yamaka proceeds in that very way. ‘Some’ means the grammarians. They argue that whereas in the first and second yamakas the latter question is formulated by reversing the former, so that the latter question is similar to the former except for being the converse, this is not so in the mutual-root yamaka. There, both questions are dissimilar to each other. If there too both questions had to be similar, the first question should have begun with ‘Whatever wholesome states…,’ or the latter question should have been phrased as ‘All those dhammas have a single root with the wholesome root.’ However, since this was not done, and since, unlike in the first and second yamakas, the former and latter questions were not made similar in the third yamaka—a dissimilarity arising because it was not begun with ‘Whatever wholesome states…’—it follows that the forward question must conform to the reverse question. Referring to this meaning, they say it is stated ‘without asking “Whatever wholesome states…”’.

Atthavasenāti sambhavantānaṃ nicchitasaṃsayitānaṃ atthānaṃ vasena. Tadanurūpāyāti tassā purimapucchāya atthato byañjanato ca anucchavikāya. Purimañhi apekkhitvā pacchimāya bhavitabbaṃ. Tenāti tasmā. Yasmā anulome saṃsayacchede jātepi paṭilome saṃsayo uppajjati, yadi na uppajjeyya, paṭilomapucchāya payojanameva na siyā, tasmā na pacchimapucchānurūpā purimapucchā, atha kho vuttanayena purimapucchānurūpā pacchimapucchā, tāya ca anurūpatāya atthādivasena dvinnaṃ padānaṃ sambandhattā atthādiyamakatā vuttā. Desanākkamato cettha anulomapaṭilomatā veditabbā ‘‘kusalā kusalamūlā’’ti vatvā ‘‘kusalamūlā kusalā’’ti ca vuttattā. Sesayamakesupi eseva nayo. Visesavantavisesa, visesavisesavantaggahaṇato vā idha anulomapaṭilomatā veditabbā. Paṭhamapucchāyañhi ye dhammā visesavanto, te nicchayādhiṭṭhāne katvā dassento ‘‘ye keci kusalā dhammā’’ti vatvā tesu yasmiṃ viseso saṃsayādhiṭṭhāno, taṃdassanatthaṃ ‘‘sabbe te kusalamūlā’’ti pucchā katā. Dutiyapucchāyaṃ pana tappaṭilomato yena visesena te visesavanto, taṃ visesaṃ sanniṭṭhānaṃ katvā dassento ‘‘ye vā pana kusalamūlā’’ti vatvā te visesavante saṃsayādhiṭṭhānabhūte dassetuṃ ‘‘sabbe te dhammā kusalā’’ti pucchā katā. Aniyatavatthukā hi sanniṭṭhānasaṃsayā anekajjhāsayattā sattānaṃ.

'By way of meaning' means by way of the possible meanings that are certain and doubtful. 'In conformity with that' means being suitable to that former question both in meaning and in letter. For the latter question must be formulated in relation to the former. Therefore: because even when a doubt is resolved in the forward order, a doubt arises in the reverse order—if it did not arise, the reverse question would have no purpose—it is not that the former question conforms to the latter, but rather, in the way stated, the latter question conforms to the former. And because of this conformity, since the two terms are connected by way of meaning, etc., this is called a yamaka of meaning, etc. Here, the forward and reverse order should be understood from the sequence of exposition, since after saying, 'Wholesome states are wholesome-rooted,' it is also said, 'Wholesome-rooted states are wholesome.' The same method applies to the remaining yamakas. Alternatively, the forward and reverse order here should be understood from the taking up of, respectively, what-possesses-distinction and distinction, and distinction and what-possesses-distinction. In the first question, having presented the dhammas that possess distinctions as the basis for certainty by saying, 'Whatever wholesome dhammas there are,' the question 'Are they all wholesome-rooted?' is asked in order to show the distinction in them which is the basis for doubt. In the second question, however, reversing that, having presented as the basis for certainty the distinction by which they possess distinctions by saying, 'Or whatever are wholesome-rooted,' the question 'Are all those dhammas wholesome?' is asked in order to show that the things possessing distinctions are the basis for doubt. For certainties and doubts have indeterminate subjects, due to the manifold dispositions of beings.

Imināpi byañjanenāti ‘‘ye keci kusalamūlena ekamūlā’’ti imināpi vākyena. Evaṃ na sakkā vattunti yenādhippāyena vuttaṃ, tamevādhippāyaṃ vivarati ‘‘na hī’’tiādinā. Tattha tenevāti kusalabyañjanatthassa kusalamūlena ekamūlabyañjanatthassa bhinnattā eva. Vissajjananti vibhajanaṃ[Pg.164]. Itarathāti kusalamūlena ekamūlabyañjanena pucchāya katāya. Tāni vacanānīti kusalavacanaṃ kusalamūlena ekamūlavacanañca. Kusalacittasamuṭṭhānarūpavasena cassa abyākatadīpanatā daṭṭhabbā. Etthāti ‘‘imināpi byañjanena tassevatthassa sambhavato’’ti etasmiṃ vacane. Ye keci kusalā…pe… sambhavatoti etena kusalānaṃ kusalamūlena ekamūlatāya byabhicārābhāvaṃ dasseti. Tenevāha ‘‘na hi…pe… santī’’ti. Vuttabyañjanatthasseva sambhavatoti hi iminā avuttabyañjanatthassa sambhavābhāvavacanena svāyamadhippāyamattho vibhāvito. Yathā hi kusalamūlena ekamūlabyañjanattho kusalabyañjanatthaṃ byabhicarati, na evaṃ taṃ kusalabyañjanattho. Kathaṃ katvā codanā, kathañca katvā parihāro? Kusalamūlena ekamūlā kusalā evāti codanā katā, kusalamūlena ekamūlā eva kusalāti pana parihāro pavattoti veditabbaṃ. Dutiyayamake viya apucchitvāti ‘‘ye keci kusalā’’ti apucchitvā. Kusalamūlehīti kusalehi mūlehi. Teti kusalamūlena ekamūlā.

By this phrasing too: by this statement too, namely, ‘Whatever states are one-rooted with a wholesome root.’ Thus it cannot be said: he discloses the intention with which this was said by the passage beginning ‘For not….’ There, by that very means: because the meaning of the phrasing ‘wholesome’ is different from the meaning of the phrasing ‘one-rooted with a wholesome root.’ Answer: analysis. Otherwise: if the question were asked with the phrasing ‘one-rooted with a wholesome root.’ Those statements: the statement ‘wholesome’ and the statement ‘one-rooted with a wholesome root.’ Its indication of the indeterminate should be seen by way of the matter that arises from wholesome consciousness. Here: in the statement, ‘because by this phrasing too that same meaning is possible.’ With the words, ‘Whatever wholesome states… are possible,’ he shows that there is no deviation from wholesome states being one-rooted with a wholesome root. Therefore he says: ‘For not… exist.’ For by this statement—‘only the meaning of the stated phrasing is possible,’ which denies the possibility of the meaning of an unstated phrasing—this intended meaning is clarified. For just as the meaning of the phrasing ‘one-rooted with a wholesome root’ deviates from the meaning of the phrasing ‘wholesome,’ the latter does not so deviate from the former. How is the objection made, and how is the refutation applied? It should be understood that the objection is made thus: ‘States that are one-rooted with a wholesome root are wholesome.’ But the refutation proceeds thus: ‘It is wholesome states that are one-rooted with a wholesome root.’ Like in the second pair, without asking: without asking, ‘Whatever states are wholesome.’ By wholesome roots: by wholesome roots. They: those that are one-rooted with a wholesome root.

Ekato uppajjantīti ettha iti-saddo ādiattho pakārattho vā. Tena ‘‘kusalamūlāni ekamūlāni ceva aññamaññamūlāni cā’’tiādipāḷisesaṃ dasseti. Yaṃ sandhāya ‘‘heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva vissajjanaṃ kātabbaṃ bhaveyyā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tattha heṭṭhāti anulomapucchāvissajjane. Vuttanayenāti ‘‘mūlāni yāni ekato uppajjantī’’tiādinā vuttanayena. Tampīti ‘‘kusalamūlenā’’tiādi aṭṭhakathāvacanampi. Tathāti tena pakārena, anulomapucchāyaṃ viya vissajjanaṃ kātabbaṃ bhaveyyāti iminā pakārenāti attho. Yena kāraṇena ‘‘na sakkā vattu’’nti vuttaṃ, taṃ kāraṇaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘ye vā panā’’tiādimāha. Tattha ‘‘āmantā’’icceva vissajjanena bhavitabbanti ‘‘sabbe te dhammā kusalā’’ti pucchāyaṃ viya ‘‘sabbe te dhammā kusalamūlena ekamūlā’’ti pucchitepi paṭivacanavissajjanameva labbhati, na anulomapucchāyaṃ viya sarūpadassanavissajjanaṃ vibhajitvā dassetabbassa abhāvato. Ye hi dhammā kusalamūlena ekamūlā, na te dhammā kusalamūlena aññamaññamūlāva. Ye pana kusalamūlena aññamaññamūlā, te kusalamūlena ekamūlāva. Tenāha ‘‘na hi…pe… vibhāgo kātabbo bhaveyyā’’ti.

They arise together: here the word ‘iti’ has the sense of ‘etc.’ or ‘manner.’ Thereby he indicates the remainder of the Pāḷi text, such as: ‘Wholesome roots are both one-rooted and mutually rooted.’ In reference to this it was said: ‘The answer should be given in the way stated below.’ There, below: in the answer to the direct question. In the way stated: in the way stated by the passage beginning, ‘The roots that arise together.’ That too: the commentary’s statement beginning ‘by a wholesome root.’ Thus: in that manner; the meaning is, in this manner: ‘the answer should be given as in the direct question.’ To show the reason why it was said, ‘it cannot be said,’ he states the passage beginning ‘Or else….’ There, the answer must be simply ‘Yes.’ Just as to the question, ‘Are all those phenomena wholesome?’, so too when asked, ‘Are all those phenomena one-rooted with a wholesome root?’, only a direct reply is obtained, not an answer that shows the specific nature as in a direct question, because there is nothing to be shown by analysis. For those phenomena that are one-rooted with a wholesome root are not mutually rooted with a wholesome root. But those that are mutually rooted with a wholesome root are indeed one-rooted with a wholesome root. Hence he says: ‘For not… a distinction should be made.’

Tattha [Pg.165] yenāti yena aññamaññamūlesu ekamūlassa abhāvena. Yatthāti yasmiṃ ñāṇasampayuttacittuppāde. Aññamaññamūlakattā ekamūlakattā cāti adhippāyo. Dvinnaṃ dvinnañhi ekekena aññamaññamūlakatte vutte tesaṃ ekekena ekamūlakattampi vuttameva hoti samānattho ekasaddoti katvā. Tenevāha ‘‘yattha pana…pe… na ekamūlānī’’ti. Tayidaṃ micchā, dvīsupi ekekena itarassa ekamūlakattaṃ sambhavati evāti. Tenāha ‘‘etassa gahaṇassa nivāraṇattha’’ntiādi. ‘‘Ye dhammā kusalamūlena aññamaññamūlā, te kusalamūlena ekamūlā’’ti imamatthaṃ vibhāventena idha ‘‘āmantā’’ti padena yattha dve mūlāni uppajjanti, tattha ekekena itarassa ekamūlakattaṃ pakāsitamevāti āha ‘‘āmantāti imināva vissajjanena taṃgahaṇanivāraṇato’’ti. Nicchitattāti ettha ekato uppajjamānānaṃ tiṇṇannaṃ tāva mūlānaṃ nicchitaṃ hotu aññamaññekamūlakattaṃ, dvinnaṃ pana kathanti āha ‘‘aññamaññamūlānaṃ hī’’tiādi. Samānamūlatā evāti avadhāraṇena nivattitatthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘na aññamaññasamānamūlatā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tena aññamaññamūlānaṃ samānamūlatāmattavacanicchāya ekamūlaggahaṇaṃ, na tesaṃ aññamaññapaccayatāvisiṭṭhasamānamūlatādassanatthanti imamatthaṃ dasseti. Dvinnaṃ mūlānanti dvinnaṃ ekamūlānaṃ ekato uppajjamānānaṃ. Yathā tesaṃ samānamūlatā, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘tesu hī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Taṃmūlehi aññehīti itaramūlehi mūladvayato aññehi sahajātadhammehi.

Therein, 'yena' means: due to the absence of the state of being one-rooted among those that are mutually rooted. 'Yattha' refers to a consciousness-arising associated with knowledge. The intention is to state the condition of being mutually rooted and the condition of being one-rooted. For when, with respect to two roots, the state of being mutually rooted is stated of each by the other, the state of being one-rooted is also stated of each by the other, taking the word 'eka' to have the meaning of 'samāna' (common). Therefore, he says: "But where... etc., they are not one-rooted." This is incorrect, for with respect to two roots, the state of being one-rooted of each with the other is indeed possible. Hence, he says: "To prevent this grasping," etc. To clarify this meaning—"Those states that are mutually rooted with a wholesome root are one-rooted with a wholesome root"—it is said that here, by the word 'Yes,' it is already made clear that where two roots arise, each is one-rooted with the other. This is because, as he says, 'by this very reply, "Yes," that grasping is prevented.' Regarding 'being ascertained': here, let the state of being mutually-and-one-rooted of three roots arising together first be ascertained. But how is it for two? Thus he says: "For those mutually rooted..." etc. To show the meaning excluded by the restrictive particle in 'sameness of root alone,' it is said: "There is no mutual sameness of root." Thereby he shows this meaning: the term 'one-rooted' is used with the intention of stating the mere sameness of root for mutually rooted states, not to show their sameness of root as qualified by mutual conditionality. 'Two roots' means: two one-rooted states arising together. To show their sameness of root, it is said: "For in their case..." etc. 'With other roots than those' means: with other roots, with other co-nascent states apart from the pair of roots.

Idāni yena adhippāyena paṭilome ‘‘kusalā’’icceva pucchā katā, na ‘‘kusalamūlena ekamūlā’’ti, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘aññamaññamūlatte pana…pe… katāti daṭṭhabba’’nti āha. Na hi kusalamūlena aññamaññamūlesu kiñci ekamūlaṃ na hotīti vuttovāyamattho. Mūlayuttatameva vadati, na mūlehi ayuttanti adhippāyo. Aññathā pubbenāparaṃ virujjheyya. Tenevāti mūlayuttatāya eva vuccamānattā. Ubhayatthāpīti aññamaññamūlā ekamūlāti dvīsupi padesu. ‘‘Kusalamūlenā’’ti vuttaṃ, kusalamūlena sampayuttenāti hi attho. Yadi ubhayampi vacanaṃ mūlayuttatameva vadati, atha kasmā anulomapucchāyameva ekamūlaggahaṇaṃ kataṃ, na paṭilomapucchāyanti ubhayatthāpi taṃ gahetabbaṃ na vā gahetabbaṃ. Evañhi mūlekamūlayamakadesanāhi ayaṃ aññamaññayamakadesanā samānarasā siyāti codanaṃ manasi katvā āha ‘‘tatthā’’tiādi.

Now, to show the intention with which the question in the reverse order was asked as just 'wholesome,' and not 'singly rooted by a wholesome root,' he said, 'But in the case of mutual rootedness… it should be seen as done.' For this is the meaning stated: that with a wholesome root, there is nothing among the mutually rooted that is not also singly rooted. The intention is that it speaks only of being connected with roots, not of being disconnected from roots. Otherwise, the former would contradict the latter. Therefore, it is said to be spoken only because of the connection with roots. 'In both cases' means in both terms: 'mutually rooted' and 'singly rooted.' When it is said 'by a wholesome root,' the meaning is 'associated with a wholesome root.' If both statements speak only of being connected with roots, then why was the term 'singly rooted' used only in the forward question and not in the reverse question? For in both cases it should either be taken up or not taken up. Considering the objection that in this way this teaching on the mutual-root dyad would have the same flavor as the teachings on the root and single-root dyads, he said, 'Therein…' and so on.

Tattha [Pg.166] tatthāti tasmiṃ aññamaññayamake. Yadipi ekamūlā aññamaññamūlāti idaṃ padadvayaṃ vuttanayena mūlayuttatameva vadati, tathāpi sāmaññavisesalakkhaṇe attheva bhedoti dassetuṃ ‘‘mūlayogasāmaññe’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Samūlakānaṃ samānamūlatā ekamūlattanti ekamūlavacanaṃ tesu avisesato mūlasabbhāvamattaṃ vadati, na aññamaññamūlasaddo viya mūlesu labbhamānaṃ visesaṃ, na ca sāmaññe nicchayo visese saṃsayaṃ vidhamatīti imamatthamāha ‘‘mūlayogasāmaññe…pe… pavattā’’ti iminā. Visese pana nicchayo sāmaññe saṃsayaṃ vidhamanto eva pavattatīti āha ‘‘mūlayogavisese pana…pe… nicchitameva hotī’’ti. Tasmāti vuttasseva tassa hetubhāvena parāmasanaṃ, visesanicchayeneva avinābhāvato, sāmaññassa nicchitattā tattha vā saṃsayābhāvatoti attho. Tenāha ‘‘ekamūlāti pucchaṃ akatvā’’ti. Kusalabhāvadīpakaṃ na hotīti kusalabhāvasseva dīpakaṃ na hoti tadaññajātikassapi dīpanato. Tenāha ‘‘kusalabhāve saṃsayasabbhāvā’’ti. Aññamaññamūlavacananti kevalaṃ aññamaññamūlavacananti adhippāyo. Kusalādhikārassa anuvattamānattāti iminā ‘‘sabbe te dhammā kusalā’’ti kusalaggahaṇe kāraṇamāha. Ekamūlaggahaṇe hi payojanābhāvo dassito, kusalassa vasena cāyaṃ desanāti.

'Therein' means in that mutual dyad. Although this pair of terms, 'singly rooted' and 'mutually rooted,' speaks only of being connected with a root in the manner stated, nevertheless, to show that there is indeed a distinction in their general and specific characteristics, it is stated, 'in the general connection with the root,' etc. The term 'singly rooted'—which is the sameness of root for those that have roots—speaks merely of the existence of a root in them without distinction, unlike the term 'mutually rooted,' which speaks of a specific quality found in the roots. And that certainty regarding the general does not dispel doubt regarding the specific—this meaning he states with 'in the general connection with the root... it proceeds.' But certainty regarding the specific, while dispelling doubt regarding the general, does indeed proceed; thus he said, 'But in the specific connection with the root... it is definitely settled.' 'Therefore' is a reference to that which has been stated as the reason, because of its inseparability from the specific determination, and because the general is ascertained, or because there is no doubt there. Therefore he said, 'without asking the question "singly rooted".' 'It does not illuminate the wholesome nature' means it does not illuminate the wholesome nature exclusively, because it also illuminates that which is of another class. Therefore he said, 'because of the possibility of doubt regarding the wholesome nature.' 'The term mutually rooted' means the term 'mutually rooted' alone. With 'because the context of wholesomeness continues,' he states the reason for including 'wholesome' in 'all those phenomena are wholesome.' For in the inclusion of 'singly rooted,' an absence of purpose has been shown, and this teaching is by way of the wholesome.

53-61. Mūlanaye vutte eva attheti mūlanaye vutte eva kusalādidhamme. Kusalādayo hi sabhāvadhammā idha pāḷiatthatāya atthoti vutto. Kusalamūlabhāvena, mūlassa visesanena, mūlayogadīpanena ca pakāsetuṃ. Kusalamūlabhūtā mūlā kusalamūlamūlāti samāsayojanā. Mūlavacanañhi nivattetabbagahetabbasādhāraṇaṃ. Akusalābyākatāpi mūladhammā atthīti kusalamūlabhāvena mūladhammā visesitā. Mūlaggahaṇena ca mūlavantānaṃ mūlayogo dīpito hoti. Samānena mūlena, mūlassa visesanena, mūlayogadīpanena ca pakāsetuṃ ‘‘ekamūlamūlā’’ti, aññamaññassa mūlena mūlabhāvena, mūlassa visesanena, mūlayogadīpanena ca pakāsetuṃ ‘‘aññamaññamūlamūlā’’ti mūlamūlanayo vuttoti yojanā. Tīsupi yamakesu yathāvuttavisesanamevettha pariyāyantaraṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ.

'When the root method is stated, there is meaning' means when the root method is stated, there are wholesome and other states. For wholesome states and so on, being intrinsic phenomena, are here said to be the meaning, in the sense of the Pāli text. To clarify by way of the wholesome-root-nature, by the specification of the root, and by the illumination of the root-connection. The roots that are wholesome roots are 'roots of wholesome roots'—this is the construction of the compound. For the word 'root' is common to that which should be removed and that which should be adopted. Since there are also unwholesome and indeterminate root-phenomena, the root-phenomena are specified by way of the wholesome-root-nature. And by the taking up of 'root,' the root-connection of those possessing roots is illuminated. The construction is that the root-of-roots method is stated as 'roots of a single root' to clarify by a common root, by the specification of the root, and by the illumination of the root-connection; and as 'roots of mutual roots' to clarify by the nature of being one another's root, by the specification of the root, and by the illumination of the root-connection. In all three dyads, the very specification stated should be seen here as an alternative phrasing.

Mūlayogaṃ [Pg.167] dīpetunti mūlayogameva padhānaṃ sātisayañca katvā dīpetunti adhippāyo. Yathā hi kusalāni mūlāni etesanti kusalamūlakānīti bāhiratthasamāse mūlayogo padhānabhāvena vutto hoti, na evaṃ ‘‘kusalasaṅkhātā mūlā kusalamūlā’’ti kevalaṃ, ‘‘kusalamūlamūlā’’ti savisesanaṃ vā vutte uttarapadatthappadhānasamāse. Tenāha ‘‘aññapadattha…pe… dīpetu’’nti. Vuttappakārovāti ‘‘kusalamūlabhāvena mūlassa visesanenā’’tiādinā mūlamūlanaye ca, ‘‘aññapadatthasamāsantena ka-kārenā’’tiādinā mūlakanaye ca vuttappakāro eva. Vacanapariyāyo mūlamūlakanaye ekajjhaṃ katvā yojetabbo.

'To illuminate the root-connection' means the intention is to illuminate the root-connection itself, making it primary and pre-eminent. For just as in an external-meaning compound (bahubbīhi), 'having wholesome roots' (`kusalamūlakāni`), meaning 'those for whom wholesome things are roots,' the root-connection is stated as primary, it is not so in a final-member-dominant compound (tappurisa) when it is stated merely as 'wholesome roots' (`kusalamūlā`), meaning 'roots designated as wholesome,' or with a qualifier as 'roots of wholesome roots' (`kusalamūlamūlā`). Therefore he said, 'to illuminate the meaning of another word…' etc. 'The method already stated' is the very method stated in the root-of-roots method with 'by way of the wholesome-root-nature, by the specification of the root,' etc., and in the root-suffix method with 'by the suffix -ka at the end of an external-meaning compound,' etc. The turn of phrase should be construed by combining the root-of-roots and root-suffix methods.

74-85. Na ekamūlabhāvaṃ labhamānehīti abyākatamūlena na ekamūlakaṃ tathāvattabbataṃ labhamānehi aṭṭhārasaahetukacittuppādāhetukasamuṭṭhānarūpanibbānehi ekato alabbhamānattā. Yathā hi yathāvuttacittuppādādayo hetupaccayavirahitā ahetukavohāraṃ labhanti, na evaṃ sahetukasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘ahetukavohārarahitaṃ katvā’’ti. Ettha ca ‘‘sabbaṃ rūpaṃ na hetukameva, ahetukamevā’’ti vuttattā kiñcāpi sahetukasamuṭṭhānampi rūpaṃ ahetukaṃ, ‘‘abyākato dhammo abyākatassa dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo, vipākābyākatā kiriyābyākatā hetū sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānānañca rūpānaṃ hetupaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.403) pana vacanato hetupaccayayogena sahetukasamuṭṭhānassa rūpassa ahetukavohārābhāvo vutto. Keci pana ‘‘abbohārikaṃ katvāti sahetukavohārena abbohārikaṃ katvāti atthaṃ vatvā aññathā ‘ahetukaṃ abyākataṃ abyākatamūlena ekamūla’nti na sakkā vattu’’nti vadanti. Tattha yaṃ vattabbaṃ, taṃ vuttameva ahetukavohārābhāvena sahetukatāpariyāyassa atthasiddhattā. Apica hetupaccayasabbhāvato tassa sahetukatāpariyāyo labbhateva. Tenāha ‘‘na vā sahetukaduke viya…pe… abbohārikaṃ kata’’nti. Ettha etthāti etasmiṃ ekamūlakaduke. Hetupaccayayogāyogavasenāti hetupaccayena yogāyogavasena, hetupaccayassa sabbhāvāsabbhāvavasenāti attho. Sahetukavohārameva labhati paccayabhūtahetusabbhāvato.

'By those not obtaining the state of being singly rooted' means by the eighteen rootless mind-arisings, rootless-originated matter, and Nibbāna, which do not obtain the designation 'singly rooted by an indeterminate root,' because they are not obtainable together. For just as the aforementioned mind-arisings and so on, being devoid of a root-condition, obtain the designation 'rootless,' it is not so for matter originated with a root. Therefore he said, 'having excluded the designation "rootless".' And here, although it is stated that 'all matter is not only with a root, but also rootless,' so that even matter originated with a root is rootless, nevertheless, according to the statement, 'An indeterminate phenomenon is a condition for an indeterminate phenomenon by way of root-condition; resultant-indeterminate and functional-indeterminate roots are a condition by way of root-condition for the associated aggregates and for matter originated from consciousness,' the absence of the designation 'rootless' for matter originated with a root is stated, due to its connection with the root-condition. Some, however, say: ''Having made it non-conventional' means 'having made it non-conventional by the convention "with a root",' and otherwise it cannot be stated as 'rootless, indeterminate, singly rooted by an indeterminate root.' Therein, what should be said has already been said, because the intended meaning of the alternative phrasing 'with a root' is established by the absence of the designation 'rootless'. Moreover, because of the very existence of the root-condition, that alternative phrasing 'with a root' is indeed obtained. Therefore he said, 'Or it is not, as in the with-a-root dyad... made non-conventional.' 'Here' means in this single-root dyad. 'By way of connection and disconnection with the root-condition' means by way of the presence and absence of the root-condition. It obtains the very designation 'with a root' because of the existence of the root that is a condition.

Apare [Pg.168] pana bhaṇanti ‘‘sahetukacittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ ahetukaṃ abyākatanti iminā vacanena saṅgahaṃ gacchantampi samūlakattā ‘abyākatamūlena na ekamūla’nti na sakkā vattuṃ, satipi samūlakatte nippariyāyena sahetukaṃ na hotīti ‘abyākatamūlena ekamūla’nti ca na sakkā vattuṃ, tasmā ‘ahetukaṃ abyākataṃ abyākatamūlena na ekamūlaṃ, sahetukaṃ abyākataṃ abyākatamūlena ekamūla’nti dvīsupi padesu anavarodhato abbohārikaṃ katvāti vutta’’nti, taṃ tesaṃ matimattaṃ ‘‘sahetukaabyākatasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ abyākatamūlena ekamūlaṃ hotī’’ti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ tassa ekamūlabhāvassa nicchitattā, tasmā vuttanayeneva cettha attho veditabbo.

Others, however, say: 'Although material form originated by a cause-rooted mind is included by this statement as rootless and indeterminate, because it is rooted, one cannot say, "it is not single-rooted with an indeterminate root." And although it is rooted, it is not unconditionally cause-rooted, so one cannot say, "it is single-rooted with an indeterminate root." Therefore, it is said that since it does not fit into either of the two statements—"the rootless indeterminate is not single-rooted with an indeterminate root" and "the cause-rooted indeterminate is single-rooted with an indeterminate root"—it has been rendered inapplicable.' This, however, is merely their opinion, for in the commentary it is determined that 'material form originated by a cause-rooted indeterminate mind is single-rooted with an indeterminate root.' Therefore, the meaning here should be understood in the way that has been stated.

86-97. Kusalākusalābyākatarāsito namananāmanasaṅkhātena visesena arūpadhammānaṃ gahaṇaṃ niddhāraṇaṃ nāma hotīti āha ‘‘nāmānaṃ niddhāritattā’’ti. Tena tesaṃ adhikabhāvamāha viññāyamānameva pakaraṇena aparicchinnattā. Yadi evaṃ ‘‘ahetukaṃ nāmaṃ sahetukaṃ nāma’’nti pāṭhantare kasmā nāmaggahaṇaṃ katanti āha ‘‘supākaṭabhāvattha’’nti, paribyattaṃ katvā vutte kiṃ vattabbanti adhippāyo.

86-97. He says, 'because of the determination of names,' meaning that the grasping and determination of immaterial states from the collection of wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate states, by means of the specific characteristic designated as 'bending towards' and 'naming,' is what is called 'name.' By this he indicates their predominance, because although they are cognizable, they are not limited by the treatise. If so, why in the variant reading 'rootless name, cause-accompanied name' is the term 'name' included? He says, 'For the purpose of making it very clear.' The intention is: when it has been stated explicitly, what more is there to say?

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Exposition Section is concluded.

Mūlayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Root Yamaka is concluded.

2. Khandhayamakaṃ

2. The Pairs on Aggregates

1. Paṇṇattivāro

1. The Section on Designations

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Summary Section

2-3. Khandhayamake …pe… pariññā ca vattabbāti idaṃ padhānabhāvena vattabbadassanaṃ. Abhiññeyyakathā hi abhidhammo, sā ca yāvadeva pariññattāti pariññāsu ca na vinā tīraṇapariññāya pahānapariññā, tīraṇañca sampuṇṇaparānuggahassa adhippetattā kālapuggalokāsavibhāgamukhena khandhānaṃ visuṃ saha ca uppādanirodhalakkhaṇapariggahavasena sātisayaṃ sambhavati, nāññathāti imamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘chasu kālabhedesu…pe… pariññā ca vattabbā’’ti padhānaṃ vattabbaṃ uddharati. Tattha pana yathā na tīraṇapariññāya vinā pahānapariññā, evaṃ tīraṇapariññā vinā ñātapariññāya. Sā [Pg.169] ca sutamayañāṇamūlikāti desanākusalo satthā anvayato byatirekato ca samudāyāvayavapadatthādivibhāgadassanamukhena khandhesu pariññāppabhedaṃ pakāsetukāmo ‘‘pañcakkhandhā’’tiādinā desanaṃ ārabhīti dassento ‘‘te pana khandhā’’tiādimāha. Pañcahi padehīti pañcahi samudāyapadehi.

2-3. In the Pairs on Aggregates… 'and full understanding should be stated'—this shows what should be stated as the main point. For the Abhidhamma is the discourse on what is to be directly known, and that is for the sake of full understanding. And among the kinds of full understanding, there is no full understanding as abandoning without full understanding as judgment. And full understanding as judgment—since the complete welfare of others is intended—is especially possible by way of grasping the characteristics of the aggregates' arising and cessation, both separately and together, through the method of division by time, person, and location, and not otherwise. Showing this meaning, he extracts the main point to be stated: 'in the six divisions of time… and full understanding should be stated.' There, just as there is no full understanding as abandoning without full understanding as judgment, so too there is no full understanding as judgment without full understanding as knowing. And that is rooted in knowledge based on learning. Thus the Teacher, skilled in teaching, wishing to illuminate the varieties of full understanding in regard to the aggregates by way of showing the division of the meaning of terms for collections, components, etc., both by positive and negative concomitance, begins the teaching with 'the five aggregates.' Showing this, he says, 'But those aggregates…,' etc. 'By five terms' means by five collective terms.

Tatthāti tesu samudāyāvayavapadesu. Dhammoti ruppanādiko ñeyyadhammo. Samudāyapadassāti rūpakkhandhādisamudāyapadassa. Yadipi avayavavinimutto paramatthato samudāyo nāma natthi, yathā pana avayavo samudāyo na hoti, evaṃ na samudāyopi avayavoti satipi samudāyāvayavānaṃ bhede dvinnaṃ padānaṃ samānādhikaraṇabhāvato atthevābhedoti padadvayassa samānatthatāya siyā āsaṅkāti āha ‘‘etasmiṃ saṃsayaṭṭhāne’’ti. ‘‘Cakkhāyatanaṃ rūpakkhandhagaṇanaṃ gacchati, viññāṇakkhandho tajjā manoviññāṇadhātū’’tiādīsu ekadeso samudāyapadattho vutto, ‘‘yaṃ kiñci rūpaṃ…pe… ayaṃ vuccati rūpakkhandho’’tiādīsu (vibha. 2) pana sakaloti āha ‘‘rūpādi…pe… attho’’ti. Avayavapadānañcettha visesanavisesitabbavisayānaṃ samānādhikaraṇatāya samudāyapadatthatā vuttā, tato eva samudāyapadānampi avayavapadatthatā. Na hi visesanavisesitabbānaṃ atthānaṃ accantaṃ bhedo abhedo vā icchito, atha kho bhedābhedo, tasmā abhedadassanavasena paṭhamanayo vutto, bhedadassanavasena dutiyanayo. Yo hi ruppanādisaṅkhāto rāsaṭṭho avayavapadehi rūpādisaddehi ca khandhasaddena ca visesanavisesitabbabhāvena bhinditvā vutto, svāyaṃ atthato rāsibhāvena apekkhito ruppanādiattho evāti.

'Therein' means in those terms for collection and component. 'Dhamma' means the knowable phenomenon such as 'being afflicted,' etc. 'Of the collective term' means of the collective term 'form-aggregate,' etc. Although in an ultimate sense there is no collection apart from its components, just as a component is not a collection, so too a collection is not a component. Thus, although there is a difference between collection and component, because the two terms have the same referent, there is indeed non-difference in meaning. Because of the sameness of meaning of the pair of terms, a doubt might arise. Thus he says, 'in this point of doubt.' In passages such as, 'The eye-base is reckoned under the form-aggregate; the consciousness-aggregate is the mind-consciousness-element born from that,' a part of the meaning of the collective term is stated. But in passages such as, 'Whatever material form… this is called the form-aggregate' (Vibh 2), the whole is meant. Thus he says, 'material form, etc.… the meaning.' Here, because the component terms, which are the domain of the qualifier and the qualified, have the same referent, the meaning of the collective term is stated. From that very fact, the collective terms also have the meaning of the component terms. For it is not intended that the meanings of the qualifier and the qualified be absolutely different or absolutely non-different, but rather different-and-non-different. Therefore, the first method is stated from the perspective of seeing non-difference, and the second method from the perspective of seeing difference. For that meaning of 'mass,' designated as 'being afflicted,' etc., which is stated as distinguished by the component terms such as 'material form,' etc., and by the term 'aggregate' through the relationship of qualifier and qualified—this, when considered in terms of meaning as a mass, is precisely the meaning of 'being afflicted,' etc.

Yathā avayavapadehi vuccamānopi samudāyapadassa attho hoti, evaṃ samudāyapadehi vuccamānopi avayavapadassa atthoti ‘‘rūpakkhandho rūpañceva rūpakkhandho ca, rūpakkhandho rūpanti? Āmantā’’tiādinā padasodhanā katāti dassento āha ‘‘rūpādiavayavapadehi…pe… padasodhanavāro vutto’’ti. Tattha ekaccassa avayavapadassa aññattha vuttiyā avayavapadatthassa samudāyapadatthatāya siyā anekantikatā, samudāyapadassa pana taṃ natthīti samudāyapadatthassa avayavapadatthatāya byabhicārābhāvo [Pg.170] ‘‘rūpakkhandho rūpanti? Āmantā’’ti pāḷiyā pakāsitoti vuttaṃ ‘‘rūpādi…pe… dassetu’’nti.

Just as the meaning of a collective term is conveyed even when expressed by component terms, so too the meaning of a component term is conveyed even when expressed by a collective term. To show that the clarification of terms has been done with such passages as, 'Is the form-aggregate both material form and the form-aggregate? Is the form-aggregate material form? Yes,' he says: 'By component terms such as material form… the section on the clarification of terms has been stated.' Therein, because a certain component term has application elsewhere, there might be inconclusiveness in the meaning of a component term being the meaning of a collective term. But for a collective term, this is not the case. The absence of deviation in the meaning of a collective term being the meaning of a component term is revealed by the Pāli passage, 'Is the form-aggregate material form? Yes.' Thus it is said, 'By material form, etc.… to show.'

‘‘Rūpakkhandho’’tiādīsu khandhatthassa visesitabbattā vuttaṃ ‘‘padhānabhūtassa khandhapadassā’’ti. Vedanādiupapadatthassa ca sambhavato ‘‘vedanākkhandho’’tiādīsu. Rūpāvayavapadena vuttassāti rūpasaṅkhātena avayavapadena visesanabhāvena vuttassa khandhatthassa rūpakkhandhabhāvo hoti. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘rūpakkhandho rūpanti? Āmantā’’ti. Tatthāti tasmiṃ rūpakkhandhapade. Padhānabhūtena visesitabbattā khandhāvayavapadena vuttassa ruppanaṭṭhassa kiṃ vedanākkhandhādibhāvo hotīti yojanā. Samāne avayavapadābhidheyyabhāve appadhānena padena yo attho viññāyati, so kasmā padhānena na viññāyatīti adhippāyo. Khandhāvayavapadena vutto dhammoti rāsaṭṭhamāha. Tattha kocīti ruppanaṭṭho. Kenaci samudāyapadenāti rūpakkhandhapadena, na vedanākkhandhādipadena. Tenāha ‘‘na sabbo sabbenā’’ti. Esa nayo vedanākkhandhādīsu. Rūparūpakkhandhādiavayavasamudāyapadasodhanamukhena tattha ca catukkhandhavasena pavattā pāḷigati padasodhanamūlacakkavāro. Evañca dassentenāti iminā yvāyaṃ rūpādiavayavapadehi rūpakkhandhādisamudāyapadehi ca dassitākāro atthaviseso, taṃ paccāmasati. Visesanabhāvo bhedakatāya sāmaññato avacchedakattā, visesitabbabhāvo abhedayogena bhedantarato avicchinditabbattā, samānādhikaraṇabhāvo tesaṃ bhedābhedānaṃ ekavatthusannissayattā.

In such phrases as 'the form-aggregate,' it is said 'of the term "aggregate" which is primary' because the meaning of 'aggregate' is what is to be qualified. And in 'the feeling-aggregate,' etc., because the meaning of the subordinate terms 'feeling,' etc., is possible. 'Of what is stated by the component term "material form"' means: the meaning of 'aggregate' which is stated by way of a qualifier by the component term designated 'material form' becomes the 'form-aggregate.' Hence it is said, 'Is the form-aggregate material form? Yes.' 'Therein' means in that term 'form-aggregate.' The construction is: Does the meaning 'being afflicted,' which is stated by the component term 'aggregate' because it is primary and to be qualified, become the 'feeling-aggregate,' etc.? The intention is: when the state of being designated by a component term is the same, why is the meaning that is cognized by the non-primary term not cognized by the primary term? 'The dhamma stated by the component term "aggregate"' refers to the meaning 'mass.' 'Therein, a certain one' means the meaning 'being afflicted.' 'By some collective term' means by the term 'form-aggregate,' not by the term 'feeling-aggregate,' etc. Therefore he says, 'Not all by all.' This is the method for the feeling-aggregate, etc. The cycle of the root of the clarification of terms is the course of the Pāli which proceeds by way of the four aggregates through the method of clarifying the component and collective terms such as 'material form' and 'form-aggregate.' And by 'showing it thus,' he re-examines that specific meaning which is shown by the component terms such as 'material form,' etc., and the collective terms such as 'form-aggregate,' etc. The state of being a qualifier is due to its being a differentiator, because it delimits from the general. The state of being qualified is due to its connection with non-difference, because it is to be distinguished from other different things. The state of having a common referent is because those differences and non-differences are dependent on a single thing.

Tenāti yathāvuttena visesanavisesitabbabhāvena. Etthāti etasmiṃ samānādhikaraṇe. Tenāti vā samānādhikaraṇabhāvena. Etthāti rūpakkhandhapade. Yathā nīluppalapade uppalavisesanabhūtaṃ nīlaṃ visiṭṭhameva hoti, na yaṃ kiñci, evamidhāpi khandhavisesanabhūtaṃ rūpampi visiṭṭhameva siyāti dassento ‘‘kiṃ khandhato…pe… hotī’’ti āha. Tathā ‘‘rūpañca taṃ khandho cā’’ti samānādhikaraṇabhāveneva yaṃ rūpaṃ, so khandho. Yo khandho, taṃ rūpanti ayampi āpanno evāti āha ‘‘sabbeva…pe… visesitabbā’’ti. Visesanena ca nāma niddhāritarūpena bhavitabbaṃ avacchedakattā, na aniddhāritarūpenāti āha ‘‘kiṃ pana ta’’ntiādi, tasseva gahitattā na piyarūpasātarūpassāti adhippāyo. Na [Pg.171] hi taṃ khandhavisesanabhāvena gahitaṃ, vissajjanaṃ kataṃ tassevāti yojanā. Na khandhato aññaṃ rūpaṃ atthīti idaṃ ruppanaṭṭho rūpanti katvā vuttaṃ, na hi so khandhavinimutto atthi. Tenevāti yathāvuttarūpassa khandhavinimuttassa abhāveneva. ‘‘Piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ, dassentenappaka’’nti ca ādīsu atadatthassa rūpasaddassa labbhamānattā ‘‘tena rūpasaddenā’’ti visesetvā vuttaṃ. Vuccamānaṃ bhūtupādāyampi bhedaṃ dhammajātaṃ. Suddhenāti kevalena, rūpasaddena vināpīti attho. Tayidaṃ pakaraṇādiavacchinnataṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, samānādhikaraṇataṃ vā. Yo hi rūpasaddena samānādhikaraṇo khandhasaddo, tena yathāvuttarūpasaddena viya tadattho vuccateva. Tenāha ‘‘khandhā rūpakkhandho’’ti. Yadipi yathāvuttaṃ rūpaṃ khandho eva ca, khandho pana na rūpamevāti āha ‘‘na ca sabbe…pe… visesitabbā’’ti. Tenevāti arūpasabhāvassa khandhassa atthibhāveneva. Teti khandhā. Vibhajitabbāti ‘‘khandhā rūpakkhandho’’ti padaṃ uddharitvā ‘‘rūpakkhandho khandho ceva rūpakkhandho ca, avasesā khandhā na rūpakkhandho’’tiādinā vibhāgena dassetabbā.

'Tenāti' means, by the way stated, through the nature of being a qualifier and that which is to be qualified. 'Etthāti' means in this appositional context. Or 'Tenāti' means through the nature of apposition. 'Etthāti' refers to the term 'form aggregate'. Just as in the term 'blue lotus', the blue, which is a qualifier of the lotus, is indeed specific, not just anything, so here too, showing that the form (rūpa), which is a qualifier of the aggregate, should be specific, he says, 'What from the aggregates... exists?' Similarly, by the appositional nature of 'rūpañca taṃ khandho cā' (and that is form, and it is an aggregate), what is form is the aggregate, and what is the aggregate is form. This too is included. Thus, he says, 'All... should be qualified'. A qualifier, moreover, must be of a determined nature, being a delimiting factor, not of an undetermined nature. Thus, he says, 'But what is that?' and so on. The intention is that since that very thing is grasped, it is not the pleasant form or the agreeable form. For it is not grasped as a qualifier of the aggregate, and the reply is given concerning that very thing—this is the connection. The statement 'There is no form (rūpa) apart from the aggregate' is made by taking 'rūpa' in the sense of 'being afflicted' (ruppana). Indeed, it does not exist free from the aggregate. 'Tenevāti' means precisely because there is no form free from the aggregate, as stated. In phrases like 'pleasant form, agreeable form, dassentenappaka' and so on, since the term 'rūpa' is found in a sense other than that, it is stated with the qualification 'by that term rūpa'. What is spoken of is a class of phenomena, a division comprising even the primary elements and derived matter. 'Suddhenāti' (purely) means solely, that is, even without the term 'rūpa'. This is stated with reference to its delimitation by context and so on, or by apposition. For the term 'aggregate' (khandha) which is in apposition with the term 'form' (rūpa), its meaning is indeed expressed by it, just as by the term 'form' as stated. Therefore, he says, 'The aggregates are the form aggregate'. Although the form (rūpa) as stated is indeed an aggregate, yet the aggregate is not only form. Thus, he says, 'But not all... should be qualified'. 'Tenevāti' means precisely because there exists an aggregate of an immaterial nature. 'Te' refers to those aggregates. 'Vibhajitabbāti' (should be divided) means that the phrase 'the aggregates are the form aggregate' should be extracted and shown through division, such as: 'The form aggregate is both an aggregate and the form aggregate, while the remaining aggregates are not the form aggregate,' and so on.

Khandhānaṃ rūpavisesana…pe… saṃsayo hotīti ettha kiṃ khandhato aññāpi vedanā atthi, yato vinivattā vedanā khandhavisesanaṃ hoti, sabbe ca khandhā kiṃ khandhavisesanabhūtāya vedanāya visesitabbāti evaṃ yojanā veditabbā. Kecīti anubhavanādippakārā. Kenaci visesanenāti vedanādinā visesanena.

Here, concerning 'the qualification of the aggregates by form... doubt arises,' the connection should be understood thus: Is there also feeling (vedanā) apart from the aggregates, such that feeling, being distinct, becomes a qualifier of the aggregates? And should all aggregates be qualified by feeling, which has become a qualifier of the aggregates? 'Kecīti' (some) refers to modes such as experiencing and so on. 'Kenaci visesanenāti' (by some qualifier) means by a qualifier such as feeling and so on.

Ettha ca rūpādipaṇṇatti khandhapaṇṇatti ca ‘‘rūpaṃ khandho, khandhā rūpakkhandho’’tiādinā visuṃ saha ca ruppanādike atthe pavattamānā kadāci avayavabhūte pavattati, kadāci samudāyabhūte, tassā pana tathā pavattanākāre niddhārite yasmā rūpādikkhandhā padato atthato ca visodhitā nāma honti tabbisayakaṅkhāpanodanato, tasmā ‘‘rūpakkhandho rūpañceva rūpakkhandho ca, rūpakkhandho rūpanti? Āmantā’’tiādinayappavattena paṭhamavārena rūpādiavayavapadehi avayavattho viya samudāyatthopi vuccati, tathā samudāyapadehipīti ayamattho dassito. ‘‘Rūpaṃ rūpakkhandho, khandhā vedanākkhandho’’tiādinayappavattena pana dutiyavārena visesavācī viya rūpādiavayavapadehi sāmaññabhūtenapi taṃtaṃvisiṭṭhena khandhāvayavapadena so [Pg.172] so eva samudāyattho vuccati, na sabboti ayamattho dassito. Khandhavinimuttassa yathādhippetassa abhāvā yadipi khandhoyeva rūpaṃ, so pana na sabbo rūpaṃ, atha kho tadekadeso, tathā vedanādayopīti ayamattho ‘‘rūpaṃ khandho, khandhā rūpa’’ntiādinayappavattena tatiyavārena dassito. ‘‘Rūpaṃ khandho, khandhā vedanākkhandho’’tiādinayappavattena pana catutthavārena ‘‘rūpaṃ khandho’’ti rūpassa khandhabhāve nicchite khandho nāmāyaṃ na kevalaṃ rūpameva, atha kho vedanādi cāti vedanādīnampi khandhabhāvappakāsane na sabbe khandhā vedanādivisesavanto, kecideva pana tena tena visesena tathā vuccantīti ayamattho dassito. Evaṃ dassentī cesā pāḷi khandhānaṃ yathāvuttapaṇṇattisodhanamukhena sarūpāvadhāraṇāya saṃvattati, tañca tesaṃ yāvadeva uppādādinicchayatthanti dassento ‘‘evaṃ yesaṃ…pe… veditabbo’’ti āha.

Here, the designations of form and so on, and the designations of the aggregates, such as 'form is an aggregate, aggregates are the form aggregate,' and so on, operate separately and together in meanings such as 'being afflicted' and so on. Sometimes they operate in relation to the part, sometimes in relation to the collection. When their mode of operation in this way is discerned, since the aggregates of form and so on are indeed purified in terms of both word and meaning by dispelling doubts regarding them, therefore, by the method of the first section, which proceeds with 'Is the form aggregate both form and the form aggregate? Is the form aggregate form? Yes,' and so on, this meaning is shown: by terms for the parts, such as form and so on, the meaning of the collection is expressed just as the meaning of the part is, and likewise by terms for the collection. By the method of the second section, however, which proceeds with 'Form is the form aggregate, aggregates are the feeling aggregate,' and so on, this meaning is shown: by terms for the parts, such as form and so on, which are like specific designators, and also by the term for the aggregate-part, which, though general, is qualified by this or that, that very collective meaning is expressed, not all of it. Because what is intended as free from the aggregates does not exist, although form itself is an aggregate, it is not the whole aggregate, but only a portion of it. Similarly with feeling and so on—this meaning is shown by the method of the third section, which proceeds with 'Form is an aggregate, aggregates are form,' and so on. By the method of the fourth section, however, which proceeds with 'Form is an aggregate, aggregates are the feeling aggregate,' and so on, this meaning is shown: when it is determined that 'form is an aggregate,' this 'aggregate' is not merely form but also feeling and so on; in revealing that feeling and so on also have the nature of an aggregate, not all aggregates are endowed with qualifiers like feeling and so on, but only some are called so by those specific qualifiers. Thus, this Pāli passage, by clarifying the designations of the aggregates as stated, conduces to the proper determination of their intrinsic nature. And showing that this is for the purpose of determining their arising and so on, he states, 'Thus, for those... it should be understood.'

Ekadesepi samudāyavohāro dissati yathā paṭo daḍḍho, samuddo diṭṭhoti āha ‘‘cakkāvayavabhāvato cakkānīti yamakāni vuttānī’’ti. Bandhitvāti yamakabhāvena bandhitvā, yamakamūlabhāveneva vā. Mūlabhāvena gahaṇaṃ sambandhabhāvo, taṃsambandhatā ca mūlapadādīnaṃ nābhiādisadisatā daṭṭhabbā. Apubbassa vattabbassa abhāvato nayidha desanā maṇḍalabhāveneva sambajjhatīti āha ‘‘na maṇḍalabhāvena sambajjhanato’’ti. Yadipi rūpakkhandhamūlake apubbaṃ natthi, vedanākkhandhādimūlakesu pana saññādimukhena desanappavattiyaṃ apubbavaseneva gato siyā maṇḍalabhāvena sambandho, na tathā pāṭho pavattoti āha ‘‘vedanākkhandha…pe… sambandhenā’’ti. Pacchimassa purimena asambajjhanameva hi heṭṭhimasodhanaṃ. Suddhakkhandhalābhamattameva gahetvāti ‘‘khandhā rūpa’’nti ettha khandhāti khandhasaddena labbhamānaṃ rūpādīhi asammissaṃ khandhaṭṭhamattameva uddesavasena gahetvā. Yadipi uddese khandhavisesanaṃ rūpādi ‘‘khandhā rūpa’’nti suddharūpādimattameva gahitaṃ, tathāpi visesarahitassa sāmaññassa abhāvato tattha suddharūpādimattatāya aṭṭhatvā. Khandhavisesanabhāvasaṅkhātanti yathādhigataṃ khandhānaṃ visesanabhāvena kathitaṃ ruppanādikaṃ visesanatthaṃ dassetuṃ. Kevalameva taṃ aggaṇhanto khandhasaddena saha yojetvā…pe… vibhattattā suddhakkhandhavāroti vuttoti yojanā.

The use of a term for the whole is seen even for a part, as when one says, 'The cloth is burnt,' or 'The ocean is seen.' Thus, he says, 'Because they are parts of a wheel (cakka), the pairs (yamakāni) are called "wheels" (cakkāni).' 'Bandhitvāti' means having bound by way of being pairs, or by way of being the root of pairs. Taking as a root is the state of connection, and that connection of the root word and so on should be seen as a similarity to the navel and the like. Because there is nothing new to be stated, the teaching here does not connect in the form of a circle. Thus, he says, 'because it does not connect in the form of a circle.' Although there is nothing new in the section rooted in the form aggregate, in the sections rooted in the feeling aggregate and so on, the teaching might proceed by way of something new through perception and so on, and the connection would be in the form of a circle, but the text does not proceed in such a way. Thus, he says, 'the feeling aggregate... by connection.' Indeed, the non-connection of the latter with the former is the purification below. 'Taking only the mere attainment of the pure aggregate' means: in 'the aggregates are form,' taking, by way of exposition, only the mere meaning of 'aggregate' obtained by the word 'aggregate', unmixed with form and so on. Although in the exposition the qualifier of the aggregates, form etc., in 'the aggregates are form', is taken as merely pure form etc., nevertheless, because there is no generality without a particular, it does not stand as merely pure form etc. To show the qualifying meaning, 'being afflicted' etc., which is spoken of as the qualifier of the aggregates as has been learned, which is designated as 'the state of being a qualifier of the aggregates'. Not taking that alone, but joining it with the word 'aggregate'... because it is analyzed, it is called the section on the pure aggregate—this is the connection.

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Exposition Section is concluded.

1. Paṇṇattivāro

1. The Section on Designations

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Exposition Section.

26. Evaṃ [Pg.173] vuttanti evaṃ dvārālambanehi saddhiṃ dvārappavattadhammavibhāgavasena vuttaṃ. Piyasabhāvaṃ piyajātikaṃ ‘‘kathaṃ rūpena kho, āvuso’’tiādīsu viya piyasabhāvaṭṭhena rūpaṃ, na ruppanaṭṭhenāti vuttaṃ ‘‘piyarūpaṃ…pe… rūpaṃ na rūpakkhandho’’ti. Ruppanaṭṭhena rūpakkhandhapariyāpannampi cakkhādi piyasabhāvamattavacanicchāvasena piyarūpameva anuppavisati, na rūpakkhandhanti āha ‘‘piyasabhāva…pe… na rūpakkhandhoti vutta’’nti. ‘‘Yo pana yattha viseso’’ti vutto visesasaddo nānuvattatīti adhippāyenāha ‘‘vacanaseso’’ti. Na hi adhikārato labbhamānassa ajjhāharaṇakiccaṃ atthi. Diṭṭhisaññāti vā paduddhāroyaṃ veditabbo. Visesatā panassā ‘‘visesaṃ vaṇṇayissāmā’’ti paṭiññāya eva pākaṭā. ‘‘Avasesā saṅkhārā’’ti etthāpi eseva nayo. Saṃyojanavasena jānāti abhinivisatīti saññā diṭṭhīti āha ‘‘diṭṭhi eva saññā’’ti. Diṭṭhi cāti ca-saddena avasiṭṭhaṃ papañcaṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Tathā hi ‘‘papañcasaññāsaṅkhā’’ti ettha papañcasūdaniyaṃ (ma. ni. aṭṭha. 1.201) vuttaṃ ‘‘saññānāmena vā papañcā eva vuttā’’ti.

26. ‘Thus it is said’ means: thus it is said by way of the division of phenomena occurring through the doors together with their objects. ‘The nature of the beloved, the kind that is dear’—as in “how, friend, with form?” and so on—is said to be form by the meaning of being beloved, not by the meaning of being afflicted, as stated: “beloved form… form is not the form aggregate.” Even the eye and so on, which are included in the form aggregate by the meaning of being afflicted, enter only as beloved form by the wish to express merely the nature of being beloved, not as the form aggregate. Hence it is said: “the nature of being beloved… not the form aggregate.” With the intention that the word ‘distinction’ (visesa), which was stated in the phrase ‘But whatever distinction there is,’ does not carry over, he says ‘the remainder of the statement.’ For what is obtained from the context does not require supplementation. Or, ‘perception of views’ should be understood as an elucidation of a term. Its distinctness is evident from the very declaration: “We will explain the distinction.” In the case of “the remaining formations,” this same method applies. Because one knows and adheres by way of the fetters, perception is a view; hence it is said: “view is indeed perception.” And with the word ‘and’ in ‘view and,’ he includes the remaining proliferation. For thus, regarding the phrase ‘the data of perception-proliferation,’ it is said in the Papañcasūdanī: “Or by the name of perception, proliferations themselves are stated.”

28. ‘‘Khandhā vedanākkhandho’’ti etasmiṃ anulome yathā sarūpadassanena vissajjanaṃ labbhati, na evaṃ ‘‘na khandhā na vedanākkhandho’’ti paṭilome, idha pana paṭivacanena vissajjananti tadatthaṃ vivaranto ‘‘khandhasaddappavattiyā ca abhāve vedanākkhandhasaddappavattiyā ca abhāvo’’ti āha. Tena sattāpaṭisedhe ayaṃ na-kāroti dasseti. Saddaggahaṇañcettha saddanibandhanattā paññattiyā saddasabhāgataṃ vā sandhāya kataṃ. Paṇṇattisodhanañhetaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘paṇṇattisodhanamattameva karotī’’ti. Tena niddhāretabbassa dhammantarassa abhāvaṃ dasseti. Yato vuttaṃ ‘‘na aññadhammasabbhāvo evettha pamāṇa’’nti. Evañca katvātiādinā yathāvuttamatthaṃ pāṭhantarena samattheti. Kāmaṃ katthaci satipi khandhe natthi vedanākkhandho, akhandhattasabhāvā pana natthi vedanāti ‘‘na khandhā na vedanākkhandhoti? Āmantā’’ti vuttanti evaṃ vā etaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tenāha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘paññattinibbānasaṅkhātā’’tiādi.

28. In this direct sequence, ‘The aggregates are the feeling aggregate,’ an answer is obtained by seeing its own nature, but not so in the reverse sequence, ‘not the aggregates, not the feeling aggregate.’ Here, however, the answer is given by way of a reply, and explaining its meaning he says, ‘when there is an absence of the application of the word “aggregate,” there is also an absence of the application of the word “feeling aggregate.”’ By this he shows that this ‘na’-particle is for the negation of a being. And the inclusion of the word ‘term’ here is done because designation is bound to words, or with reference to the similarity of words. This is a purification of designation. Hence he says, ‘it performs merely a purification of designation.’ By this he shows the absence of any other phenomenon to be determined. Since it is said, ‘the existence of another phenomenon is not the measure here.’ And by ‘having done so,’ and so on, he supports the aforesaid meaning with another reading. Granted, in some cases, although the aggregates exist, the feeling aggregate does not. However, because of the nature of not being an aggregate, there is no feeling. Thus it is said, ‘Are they not the aggregates and not the feeling aggregate? Yes.’ Or it should be seen in this way. Therefore, it is said in the commentary: ‘what are designated as concepts and Nibbāna,’ and so on.

39. ‘‘Rūpato aññe’’ti ettha bhūtupādāya dhammo viya piyasabhāvopi rūpasaddābhidheyyatāsāmaññena gahitoti āha ‘‘lokuttarā vedanādayo [Pg.174] daṭṭhabbā’’ti. Appavattimattamevāti khandhasaddappavattiyā abhāve rūpasaddappavattiyā ca abhāvoti paṇṇattisodhanamattataṃyeva sandhāya vadati, tathā cāha ‘‘evañca katvā’’tiādi. Tenetaṃ dasseti – yathā cakkhuto aññassa sabbassapi sabhāvadhammassa āyatanaggahaṇena gahitattā tadubhayavinimuttaṃ kiñci natthīti kevalaṃ paññattisodhanatthaṃ tameva abhāvaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘cakkhuñca āyatane ca ṭhapetvā avasesā na ceva cakkhu na ca āyatana’’nti vuttaṃ, evamidhāpi tadatthameva ubhayavinimuttassa abhāvaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘rūpañca khandhe ca ṭhapetvā avasesā na ceva rūpaṃ na ca khandhā’’ti vuttanti. Visamopaññāso. ‘‘Cakkhuñca āyatane ca ṭhapetvā’’ti ettha hi avasesaggahaṇena gayhamānaṃ kiñci natthīti sakkā vattuṃ āyatanavinimuttassa sabhāvadhammassa abhāvā. Tenāha ‘‘yadi siyā’’ti. ‘‘Rūpañca khandhe ca ṭhapetvā’’ti ettha pana na tathā sakkā vattuṃ khandhavinimuttassa sabhāvadhammassa atthibhāvato. Yadi pana tādisaṃ khandhagataṃ dhammajātaṃ natthīti evamidaṃ vuttaṃ siyā, evaṃ sati yuttametaṃ siyā. Tathā hi ‘‘aṭṭhakathāyaṃ panā’’tiādinā paññattiggahaṇameva uddharīyati. Taṇhāvatthu ca na siyā avasesaggahaṇena gayhamānanti ānetvā sambandho. Khandho ca siyāti yojanā.

39. Here, in ‘other than form,’ just as a phenomenon derived from the great elements, so too the nature of the beloved is included by the commonality of being designated by the word ‘form’; hence he says, ‘the supramundane feelings and so on should be seen.’ ‘It is merely non-occurrence’ means: when there is an absence of the application of the word ‘aggregate’ and an absence of the application of the word ‘form,’ he speaks with reference only to the purification of designation. And thus he says, ‘And having done so,’ and so on. By this he shows the following: just as, since all real phenomena other than the eye are included by the term ‘sense bases,’ there is nothing free from both, and to show this very absence merely for the purpose of purifying designation, it is said, ‘setting aside the eye and the sense bases, the remainder is neither the eye nor a sense base,’ so too here, to show the absence of what is free from both for that same purpose, it is said, ‘setting aside form and the aggregates, the remainder is neither form nor the aggregates.’ This is an unequal presentation. For in the case of ‘setting aside the eye and the sense bases,’ it can be said that there is nothing to be grasped by the term ‘remainder,’ because of the absence of any real phenomenon free from the sense bases. Hence he says, ‘if there were.’ But in the case of ‘setting aside form and the aggregates,’ it cannot be said so, because of the existence of real phenomena free from the aggregates. If, however, this were said thus: ‘there is no such class of phenomena included in the aggregates,’ then this would be correct. For thus, by ‘But in the commentary,’ and so on, the inclusion of concepts is brought up. The connection is to be made by bringing in the phrase: ‘And the object of craving would not be what is grasped by the term “remainder.”’ The connection is: ‘And it would be an aggregate.’

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Niddesa Section is finished.

2. Pavattivāravaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Section on Occurrence

50-205. Missakakālabhedesu yamakesu padānaṃ bhinnakālattā siyā atthavisesoti āha ‘‘amissakakālabhedesu vāresu atthavisesābhāvato’’ti. Idāni tamevatthaṃ ‘‘purimassa hī’’tiādinā vivarati. Tenāti atthavisesābhāvena. Etthāti etasmiṃ pavattivārapāṭhe, etissaṃ vā pavattivāravaṇṇanāyaṃ. Cha eva vuttā, na navāti adhippāyo. Tenāha ‘‘atītenā’’tiādi. Ete pana tayoti attanā visuṃ anantaraṃ dassite sandhāyāha. Yathādassitāti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ niddhāretvā dassitabbākārā paccuppannenātītādayo ye pāḷiyaṃ ujukameva āgatā. ‘‘Na visuṃ vijjantī’’ti vuttamevatthaṃ ‘‘tattha tattha hī’’tiādinā pākaṭataraṃ karoti. Tattha paṭilomapucchāhīti ‘‘yassa vā pana vedanākkhandho [Pg.175] uppajjittha, tassa rūpakkhandho uppajjatī’’ti evamādikāhi paṭhamapade vuttassa paṭilomavasena pavattāhi. Tenevāti nayato yojetuṃ sakkuṇeyyattā eva. Missakakālabhedesu cāti na kevalaṃ amissakakālabhedesuyeva, atha kho missakakālabhedesu cāti attho. Na yojanāsukaratāya eva purime ayojanā, atha kho sukhaggahaṇatthampīti dassento āha ‘‘amissaka…pe… vuttānī’’ti.

In the Yamakas with mixed time-divisions, because the terms have different times, there might be a special meaning; thus he says: ‘because in the sections with unmixed time-divisions there is no special meaning.’ Now he explains that very meaning with ‘For of the former…’ and so on. ‘By that’ means: because of the absence of a special meaning. ‘Here’ means: in this text of the Section on Occurrence, or in this commentary on the Section on Occurrence. The intention is that only six are stated, not nine. Therefore he says: ‘by the past…’ and so on. ‘But these three’—he says this referring to those he himself has shown separately just before. ‘As shown’ means: the past and so on in relation to the present, which have come directly in the Pāli, in the manner that should be determined and shown in the commentary. He makes the meaning of what was said—‘they are not found separately’—clearer with ‘for in each case…’ and so on. ‘There, by the reverse questions’ means: by those such as ‘Or for whomever the feeling aggregate arose, for him does the form aggregate arise?’ which proceed in reverse to what was stated in the first term. ‘By that very reason’ means: precisely because it is possible to apply it by way of method. ‘And in the mixed time-divisions’ means: not only in the unmixed time-divisions, but also in the mixed time-divisions. Showing that the non-application in the former cases is not merely for ease of application, but also for the sake of easy comprehension, he says, ‘unmixed…pe… stated.’

Yena kāraṇenāti yena ekapadadvayasaṅgahitānaṃ khandhānaṃ uppādassa nirodhassa lābhasaṅkhātena kāraṇena. Yathākkamaṃ purepañho pacchāpañhoti ca nāmaṃ vuttaṃ. Ca-saddena purepacchāpañhoti ca nāmaṃ vuttanti niddhāretvā yojetabbaṃ. Tattha pana ‘‘ekapadadvayasaṅgahitāna’’nti idaṃ ekajjhaṃ katvā gahetabbaṃ. Tamevatthampi vivarati ‘‘yassa hī’’tiādinā. Tattha yassāti yassa pañhassa. ‘‘Pañho’’ti cettha pucchanavasena pavattaṃ vacanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘paripūretvā vissajjetabbatthasaṅgaṇhanato’’ti. Taṃ sarūpadassanena vissajjanaṃ taṃvissajjanaṃ, taṃ vā yathāvuttaṃ vissajjanaṃ etassāti taṃvissajjano, tassa taṃvissajjanassa. Purimakoṭṭhāsenāti purimena uddesapadena. Tena hi vissajjanapadassa samānatthatā idha sadisatthatā. Ekena padenāti ekena padhānāppadhānena yamakapadena, na paṭhamapadenevāti attho. Uppādanirodhalābhasāmaññamattenāti uppādassa vā nirodhassa vā labbhamānatāya samānatāmattena. Sanniṭṭhānapada…pe… yuttanti idaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘yattha rūpakkhandho nuppajjatī’’tiādinā purepañhassa dassitattā vuttaṃ. Yadipi tattha ‘‘uppajjatī’’ti vissajjitattā vedanākkhandhassa uppādo labbhatīti vuttaṃ, yo pana sanniṭṭhānapadasaṅgahito rūpakkhandhassa anuppādo pāḷiyaṃ anuññātarūpena ṭhito, tassa vasena purepañho yuttoti adhippāyo. Evañhi purimakoṭṭhāsena sadisatthatā hoti.

`By which reason` means: by the reason designated as the obtaining of the arising and cessation of the aggregates included by one or two terms. Respectively, they are named 'the former question' and 'the latter question.' It should be construed by determining that by the word `ca`, the name 'former-and-latter question' is also stated. There, however, 'included by one or two terms' should be taken as a single whole. He explains that very meaning with 'for of which…' etc. `There, of which` means: of which question. `Question` here should be understood as a statement that proceeds by way of inquiry. Therefore he says: 'because it comprises the meaning to be answered completely.' The answer by showing its own nature is `taṃvissajjana`; or, he for whom there is that aforesaid answer is `taṃvissajjano`; of that `taṃvissajjana`. `By the former part` means: by the former term of the proposition. Therefore, the sameness of meaning of the answer-term here is similarity of meaning. `By one term` means: by one pair-term, whether principal or secondary, not just by the first term; this is the meaning. `By the mere commonality of obtaining arising and cessation` means: by the mere sameness of what is obtainable, whether of arising or of cessation. `The thesis term…pe… is appropriate`—this is said because in the commentary the former question is shown by 'where the form aggregate does not arise,' etc. Although it is said there that because the answer is 'it arises,' the arising of the feeling aggregate is obtained, still the non-arising of the form aggregate, which is included in the thesis term and stands in the form permitted in the Pāli, is the basis on which the former question is appropriate—this is the intention. For in this way there is similarity of meaning with the former part.

‘‘Yassa rūpakkhandho nuppajjittha, tassa vedanākkhandho nuppajjitthā’’ti ettha rūpakkhandhassa anuppannapubbatāpaṭikkhepamukhena itarassa paṭikkhipīyatīti rūpakkhandhasseva yathāvuttapaṭikkhepo padhānabhāvena vutto. Eseva nayo aññesupi edisesu ṭhānesūti āha ‘‘sanniṭṭhānatthasseva paṭikkhipanaṃ paṭikkhepo’’ti[Pg.176]. ‘‘Yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjati, tassa vedanākkhandho nirujjhatī’’ti ettha pana rūpakkhandhassa uppādalakkhaṇaṃ katvā vedanākkhandhassa nirodho pucchīyatīti so eva ‘‘no’’ti paṭisedhīyati. Esa nayo aññesupi edisesu ṭhānesūti vuttaṃ ‘‘saṃsayatthanivāraṇaṃ paṭisedho’’ti. ‘‘Na-kāravirahita’’nti etena paṭisedhassa paṭisedhitamāha. Yadi evaṃ pāḷigatipaṭisedhavissajjanānaṃ ko visesoti āha ‘‘tattha uppattī’’tiādi.

'For whomever the form aggregate did not arise, for him did the feeling aggregate not arise?'—here, the other is rejected by way of rejecting the previous non-arising of the form aggregate. Thus the aforesaid rejection of the form aggregate itself is stated as primary. This same method applies in other such cases, so he says: 'Rejection is the rejection of the very meaning of the thesis.' 'For whomever the form aggregate arises, for him does the feeling aggregate cease?'—but here, having made the arising of the form aggregate the characteristic, the cessation of the feeling aggregate is questioned, so that very thing is denied with 'no.' This method applies in other such cases, so it is said: 'Denial is the warding off of the meaning of doubt.' By 'devoid of the particle `na`,' he states what is denied by a denial. If so, what is the difference between the denials and answers in the Pāli method? He says: 'There, arising…' etc.

Tadekadesapakkhepavasenāti tesaṃ catunnaṃ pañhānaṃ pañcannañca vissajjanānaṃ ekadesassa pakkhipanavasena. Tenāha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘paṭhame ṭhāne paripuṇṇapañhassa purimakoṭṭhāse sarūpadassanenā’’tiādi. Yo panettha pañhesu vissajjanesu ca sattavīsatiyā ṭhānesu pakkhepaṃ labhati, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘paripuṇṇapañho evā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Pāḷivavatthānadassanāditoti ettha ādi-saddena pucchāvibhaṅgo vissajjanāṭhānāni ekasmiṃ pañhe yojanānayoti imesaṃ saṅgaho daṭṭhabbo.

`By way of including a single part` means: by way of including a part of those four questions and five answers. Therefore the commentary says: 'In the first instance, in the former part of a complete question, by showing its own nature…' etc. To show which inclusion is obtained here in twenty-seven instances in the questions and answers, it is said: 'It is indeed a complete question…' etc. `From seeing the Pāli determination, etc.`—here, by the word `etc.`, the inclusion of the analysis of the question, the instances for answers, and the method of application in a single question should be seen.

Suddhāvāsānantiādi pāḷiyā padaṃ uddharitvā atthadassanatthaṃ āraddhaṃ. ‘‘Yassa yattha rūpakkhandho nuppajjittha, tassa tattha vedanākkhandho nuppajjitthā’’ti imassa vissajjanaṃ hoti ‘‘suddhāvāsānaṃ tesaṃ tatthā’’ti. Tattha ekabhūmiyaṃ dutiyā upapatti natthīti ekissā bhūmiyā ekassa ariyapuggalassa dutiyavāraṃ paṭisandhiggahaṇaṃ natthīti attho. Tatiyavārādīsu vattabbameva natthi. Svāyamattho yathā ñāpito hoti, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘paṭisandhito pabhuti hi…pe… pavattā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tena addhāpaccuppannavasenāyaṃ desanā pavattāti dasseti. Ādānanikkhepaparicchinnaṃ kammajasantānaṃ ekattena gahetvā tassa vasena uppādanirodhesu vuccamānesu akammajesu kusalādīsu kathanti codanāyaṃ tepi idha taṃnissitā eva katāti dassento āha ‘‘tasmiñhi…pe… dassitā’’ti. Tenevāti kammajasantāneneva. Tasmāti ekakammanibbattassa vipākasantānassa ekattena gahitattā. Tassāti kammajasantānassa. Pañcasu suddhāvāsesu yathā paccekaṃ ‘‘ekissā bhūmiyā dutiyā upapatti natthī’’ti yathāvuttapāḷiyā viññāyati, evaṃ ‘‘suddhāvāsāna’’nti avisesavacanato sakalepi suddhāvāse sā natthīti tāya kasmā na viññāyatīti codanaṃ samuṭṭhāpetvā sayameva pariharituṃ ‘‘kasmā panā’’tiādimāha. Tattha suddhāvāsesu heṭṭhābhūmikassa asati indriyaparipāke uparibhūmisamuppatti na sakkā [Pg.177] paṭisedhetuṃ uddhaṃsotavacanato. Uddhamassa taṇhāsotaṃ vaṭṭasotañcāti hi uddhaṃsoto. Tenāha ‘‘uddhaṃsotapāḷisabbhāvā’’ti. Saṃsandetabbāti yathā na virujjhanti, evaṃ netabbā. Tathā ceva saṃvaṇṇitaṃ.

The passage beginning `Suddhāvāsānaṃ` is undertaken by extracting the term from the Pāli to show its meaning. The answer to 'For whomever the form aggregate did not arise there, for him the feeling aggregate did not arise there?' is 'For those in the Pure Abodes, for them there.' `There, in one plane a second arising does not occur` means: for one noble person in one plane, there is no second taking of rebirth-linking. There is nothing at all to be said about a third time, etc. To show how this meaning is made known, it is said: 'For from rebirth-linking onwards…pe… it proceeds.' By this he shows that this teaching proceeds by way of the temporally present. When, with regard to the continuum born of kamma—which is defined by taking up and laying down—being taken as a unity, arising and cessation are spoken of, and an objection is raised about states not born of kamma, such as the wholesome, to show that these too are here made dependent on that, he says: 'For in that…pe… shown.' `By that very thing` means: by the very continuum born of kamma. `Therefore` means: because the resultant continuum produced by a single kamma is taken as a unity. `Of that` means: of the continuum born of kamma. Just as in the five Pure Abodes it is understood from the aforesaid Pāli text that for each 'in one plane a second arising does not occur,' so too, since 'for those in the Pure Abodes' is an unspecified statement, why is it not understood by that statement that it does not occur in the entire Pure Abode sphere? Having raised this objection, to resolve it himself, he says, 'But why…' etc. There, in the Pure Abodes, for one from a lower plane, if there is no maturity of faculties, arising in a higher plane cannot be rejected, because of the statement on the 'one who goes upstream.' For 'one who goes upstream' means his stream of craving and stream of the round go upstream. Therefore he says: 'because of the existence of the Pāli text on the one who goes upstream.' `They should be reconciled` means: they should be construed in such a way that they do not conflict. And it has been explained just so.

Etena sanniṭṭhānenāti aṅkitokāsabhāvirūpuppādasannissayena nicchayena. Visesitā tathābhāvirūpabhāvino. Asaññasattāpīti na kevalaṃ pañcavokārā eva, atha kho asaññasattāpi. Te eva asaññasatte eva gahetvā purimakoṭṭhāseti adhippāyo. Tena ye sanniṭṭhānena vajjitāti tena yathāvuttasanniṭṭhānena ye virahitā, te tathā na vattabbāti attho. Idāni ‘‘te tato’’tiādinā dasseti. Tatoti asaññābhavato. Pacchimabhavikānanti ettha pacchimabhavaṃ sarūpato dassetuṃ ‘‘kiṃ pañcavokārādī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Apacchimabhavikānampi arūpānaṃ arūpabhave yathā rūpakkhandho nuppādi, evaṃ tattha pacchimabhavikānaṃ vedanākkhandhopīti āha ‘‘etena sanniṭṭhānena saṅgahitattā’’ti. Tenāha ‘‘tesaṃ…pe… āhā’’ti. Tattha tesanti pacchimabhavikānaṃ. Tatthāti arūpabhave. Itarānuppattibhāvañcāti itarassa vedanākkhandhassa anuppajjanasabbhāvampi. Sappaṭisandhikānampi suddhāvāsānaṃ khandhabhedassa parinibbānapariyāyo oḷārikadosappahānato kilesūpasamasāmaññena vuttoti veditabbaṃ.

`By this thesis` means: by the certainty dependent on the arising of form that has a manifest nature in a marked opportunity. `Distinguished` means: those who have a nature of such manifest form. `Also non-percipient beings` means: not only those of the five-constituent existence, but also non-percipient beings. The intention is that he has taken those very non-percipient beings as the former part. `Therefore, those excluded by the thesis` means: those who are devoid of the aforesaid thesis are not to be spoken of thus; this is the meaning. Now he shows this with 'they from there…' etc. `From there` means: from the non-percipient existence. `Of those in their last existence`—here, to show the last existence in its own nature, it is said, 'whether of the five-constituent existence…' etc. Just as for formless beings not in their last existence the form aggregate did not arise in the formless existence, so too for those there in their last existence the feeling aggregate also did not arise; he says: 'because they are included by this thesis.' Therefore he said: 'for them…pe…' `There, for them` means: for those in their last existence. `There` means: in the formless existence. `And the state of non-arising of the other` means: also the very state of non-arising of the other, the feeling aggregate. It should be understood that even for those in the Pure Abodes who have rebirth-linking, the breaking up of the aggregates is spoken of as a synonym for parinibbāna because of the abandonment of gross defilements and the commonality of the pacification of defilements.

Sabbesañhi tesanti taṃtaṃbhūmiyaṃ ṭhitānaṃ sabbesaṃ suddhāvāsānaṃ. Yathā panātiādinā vuttamevatthaṃ pākaṭataraṃ karoti. Anantā lokadhātuyoti idaṃ okāsassa paricchedābhāvaṃyeva dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Puggalavasena samānādhāratāya samānakālattena asambhavanto okāsavasena pana sambhavanto saṃkiṇṇā viya hontīti āha ‘‘saṃkiṇṇatā hotī’’ti.

“Of all of them” means of all those established in their respective planes, the Pure Abodes. By the words “Just as…” and so on, he makes the meaning already stated clearer. The phrase “infinite world-systems” is stated precisely to show the absence of any limit to space. He says, “there is intermingling,” indicating that although this is impossible in terms of individuals, common basis, and simultaneity, it is possible in terms of space, and thus they seem to be intermingled.

Pavattivāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Round of Occurrence is finished.

3. Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of the Round of Full Understanding

206-208. Tassāpīti puggalokāsavārassapi. Okāse puggalassevāti yathāgahite okāse yo puggalo, tasseva okāsavisiṭṭhapuggalassevāti [Pg.178] attho. Yathā pana puggalavāre labbhamāne puggalokāsavāropi labbhati, evaṃ okāsavāropi labbheyyāti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘okāsavāropi cā’’ti. Tasmāti yasmā vuccamānopi okāso puggalassa visesabhāveneva vucceyya, na visuṃ, tasmā.

206-208. “Of that too” means of the round on the individual and space. “Of the individual in space” means: of that very individual who is in the space as grasped; the meaning is, of the very individual distinguished by space. Referring to the objection, “Just as when the round on the individual is obtained, the round on the individual and space is also obtained, so too the round on space should be obtainable,” he says, “and the round on space too.” “Therefore” means: because even when space is spoken of, it would be spoken of only as a distinguishing feature of the individual, not separately; for that reason.

Aññathāti pavattivāre viya ādānanikkhepaparicchinnaṃ kammajasantānaṃ ekattena gahetvā tassa uppādanirodhavasena pariññāvacane. ‘‘Yo rūpakkhandhaṃ parijānātī’’ti sanniṭṭhānapadasaṅgahitatthābhāvadassanamukhena itarassapi abhāvaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘rupakkhandhaparijānanassa abhāvā’’ti vuttaṃ. ‘‘Āmantā’’ti ca kataṃ, tasmā pavatte cittakkhaṇavasenevettha tayo addho labbhantīti attho. ‘‘Aggamaggasamaṅgiñca arahantañcā’’ti dvinnaṃ padānaṃ ‘‘rūpakkhandhañca na parijānanti vedanākkhandhañca na parijānitthā’’ti dvīhi padehi yathākkamaṃ sambandho. ‘‘Ṭhapetvā avasesā puggalā’’ti pana paccekaṃ yojetabbaṃ. Aggamagga…pe… natthīti iminā arahattamaggañāṇasseva pariññāmatthakappattiyā pariññākiccaṃ sātisayaṃ, tadabhāvā na itaresanti dasseti. Yato tasseva vajirūpamatā vuttā, sesānañca vijjūpamatā. Tenāti tena yathāvuttena vacanena. Tadavasesasabbapuggaleti tato aggamaggasamaṅgito avasesasabbapuggale. Imaṃ pana yathāvuttadosaṃ pariharantā ‘‘puthujjanādayo sandhāyā’’ti vadanti.

“Otherwise” means: if, as in the round of occurrence, one were to speak of full understanding in terms of the arising and cessation of the kamma-born continuity taken as a single unit defined by taking up and laying down. To show the absence of the other as well, by way of showing the absence of the meaning included in the conclusion-term 'one who fully understands the form aggregate,' it is said, 'because of the absence of fully understanding the form aggregate.' And “Yes” is said. Therefore, the meaning is that here the three periods of time are obtained only by way of the mind-moment in the course of events. The two terms “the one endowed with the highest path and the arahant” are connected in respective order with the two terms “they do not fully understand the form aggregate and they did not fully understand the feeling aggregate.” But “excluding the remaining individuals” should be applied to each. By “The highest path… and so on… does not exist,” he shows that only the knowledge of the path of arahatship has reached the state of being for the purpose of full understanding, and its function of full understanding is pre-eminent; because of its absence, the others do not. Since for that alone the simile of the thunderbolt is stated, and for the others the simile of lightning. “By that” means by that statement as stated. “All the remaining individuals” means all the individuals remaining after that one endowed with the highest path. But those who wish to avoid this fault as stated say, “this refers to worldlings and so on.”

Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Round of Full Understanding is finished.

Khandhayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Yamaka on the Aggregates is finished.

3. Āyatanayamakaṃ

3. The Yamaka on the Bases

1. Paṇṇattivāro

1. The Round on Designations

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Round of the Summary Statement

1-9. Vuttanayenāti ‘‘avayavapadehi vutto ekadeso sakalo vā samudāyapadānaṃ attho, samudāyapadehi pana vutto ekantena avayavapadānaṃ attho’’tiādinā vuttena nayena. Etena yathāvuttaatthavaṇṇanānayadassanatāya sabbapaṇṇattivārādīsu yathārahaṃ attho netabboti dasseti.

1-9. “By the method stated” means by the method stated thus: “When stated by terms for the parts, the meaning of the collective terms is a portion or the whole; but when stated by the collective terms, the meaning of the terms for the parts is expressed entirely,” and so on. By this he shows that in all the rounds on designations and so on, the meaning should be inferred as is appropriate, following the method shown for explaining the meaning as stated.

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Round of the Summary Statement is finished.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Round of Exposition

10-17. Vāyanaṃ [Pg.179] savisayaṃ byāpetvā pavattanaṃ, tayidaṃ yathā gandhāyatane labbhati, evaṃ sīlādīsupīti pāḷiyaṃ ‘‘sīlagandho’’tiādi vuttaṃ ‘‘sīlādiyeva gandho’’ti katvā. Tenāha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘sīlagandho…pe… nāmānī’’ti. Yasmā pana savisayabyāpanaṃ tattha pasaṭabhāvo pākaṭabhāvo vā hoti, tasmā ‘‘pasāraṇaṭṭhena pākaṭabhāvaṭṭhena vā’’ti vuttaṃ. Attano vatthussa sūcanaṃ vā vāyanaṃ. ‘‘Devakāyā samāgatā (dī. ni. 2.332; saṃ. ni. 1.37), paṇṇattidhammā’’tiādīsu (dha. sa. dukamātikā 108) samūhapaññattīsupi kāyadhammasaddā āgatāti ‘‘sasabhāva’’nti viseseti. Kāyavacanena…pe… natthīti idaṃ ‘‘na dhammo nāyatana’’nti ettha dhammasaddassa vinivattavisesasabbasabhāvadhammavācakataṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, na dhammāyatanasaṅkhātadhammavisesavācakatanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

10-17. Spreading is the pervasion that extends over its own object. Just as this is found in the odor base, so too in regard to virtue, etc. Thus in the Pāḷi it is said, “the fragrance of virtue,” etc., taking it as “virtue itself is fragrance.” Therefore the commentary says, “the fragrance of virtue… and so on… names.” Since the pervasion of its own object is there a state of being diffused or a state of being manifest, it is therefore said, “in the sense of spreading or in the sense of being manifest.” Or spreading is the indication of its own basis. In such cases as “The hosts of devas have assembled” and “designated dhammas,” the words “body” and “dhamma” occur even in collective designations, so he specifies “with its own nature.” By “through body and speech… and so on… does not exist,” this is said with reference to the word “dhamma” in “not a dhamma and not a base” as denoting all phenomena with their specific characteristics excluded, not as denoting the specific dhammas included in the dhamma base; this should be understood.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Round of Exposition is finished.

2. Pavattivāravaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Round of Occurrence

18-21. Etasminti pavattivāre. Pucchāmattalābhenāti moghapucchābhāvamāha. Ekekanti ‘‘yassa cakkhāyatanaṃ uppajjati, tassa saddāyatanaṃ uppajjatī’’tiādikaṃ ekekaṃ. Pañcāti ‘‘yassa saddāyatanaṃ uppajjati, tassa gandhāyatanaṃ uppajjatī’’tiādīni pañca. Pucchāmattalābhena saṅgahaṃ anujānanto ‘‘vissajjanavasena hāpetabbānī’’ti āha. ‘‘Vakkhati hī’’tiādinā yathāvuttamatthaṃ aṭṭhakathāya samattheti.

18-21. “In this” means in this round of occurrence. “By the mere obtaining of the question” means he states the absence of a futile question. “One by one” means each one such as “For one for whom the eye base arises, does the sound base arise for him?” “Five” means the five beginning with “For one for whom the sound base arises, does the odor base arise for him?” Allowing their inclusion by the mere obtaining of the question, he says, “they should be omitted by way of the answer.” By the words “For he will say…” and so on, he supports with the commentary the meaning as stated.

Sadisavissajjananti sāmaññavacanaṃ visesaniviṭṭhameva hotīti taṃ visesaṃ dassento ‘‘puggalavārameva sandhāya vutta’’nti vatvā tassā pana sadisavissajjanatāya abyāpitattā yattha sadisaṃ, tatthāpi vissajjitanti dassento ‘‘okāsavāre pana…pe… vissajjita’’nti āha. Tattha tanti dutiyaṃ. Puggalavārepīti yattha sadisaṃ vissajjanaṃ, tattha puggalavārepi vissajjitaṃ, pageva okāsavāreti adhippāyo. Virattakāmakammanibbattassāti bhāvanābalena viratto kāmo etenāti virattakāmaṃ, rūpāvacarakammaṃ, tato nibbattassa. Paṭisandhi eva bījaṃ [Pg.180] paṭisandhibījaṃ, tassa. ‘‘Evaṃsabhāvattā’’ti etena ekantato kāmataṇhānidānakammahetukāni ghānādīnīti dasseti. Gandhādayo ca na santīti sabbena sabbaṃ tesampi abhāvaṃ sandhāya vadati. Tattha yaṃ vattabbaṃ, taṃ heṭṭhā vuttameva.

“Similar reply” is a general expression that is established in a specific case. Showing that specific case, having said, “It was stated with reference only to the round on individuals,” he then shows that since its nature of being a similar reply is not pervasive, a reply is given wherever it is similar, saying, “But in the round on space… and so on… a reply is given.” Therein, “that” is the second. “In the round on individuals too” means: wherever the reply is similar, a reply is given there in the round on individuals too; how much more so in the round on space. This is the intention. “Of one produced by kamma with sensual desire faded” means: sensual desire has faded for him by the power of development, thus “with sensual desire faded,” which is form-sphere kamma; of one produced from that. Rebirth-linking itself is the seed, the rebirth-linking seed; of that. By “because its nature is thus,” he shows that the nose, etc., are exclusively caused by kamma originating from sensual craving. And “odors, etc., do not exist” is said with reference to their complete absence. Whatever should be said about that has already been said above.

‘‘Sacca’’nti yathāvuttavasena gahetabbaṃ codakena vuttamatthaṃ sampaṭicchitvā puna yenādhippāyena tāni yamakāni sadisavissajjanāni, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘yathā panā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tatrāyaṃ saṅkhepattho – tattha cakkhāyatanamūlakesu ghānāyatanayamakena ‘‘sacakkhukānaṃ aghānakānaṃ upapajjantāna’’ntiādinā nayena jivhākāyāyatanayamakāni yathā sadisavissajjanāni, tathā idha ghānāyatanamūlakesu ghānāyatanayamakena tāni jivhākāyāyatanayamakāni ‘‘yassa ghānāyatanaṃ uppajjati, tassa jivhāyatanaṃ uppajjatīti? Āmantā’’tiādinā nayena sadisavissajjanānīti. Evamettha ubhayesaṃ visuṃ aññamaññaṃ sadisavissajjanatāya idaṃ vuttaṃ, na ekajjhaṃ aññamaññaṃ sadisavissajjanatāya. Tenāha ‘‘tasmā tattha tattheva sadisavissajjanatā pāḷianāruḷhatāya kāraṇa’’nti. Evañca sati cakkhāyatanamūlaggahaṇaṃ kimatthiyanti āha ‘‘nidassanabhāvenā’’tiādi. Tattha nidassanabhāvenāti nidassanabhūtānaṃ aññamaññasadisavissajjanatāsaṅkhātena nidassanabhāveneva, na pana tesaṃ nidassitabbehi sabbathā sadisavissajjanatāyāti adhippāyo. ‘‘Yebhuyyatāyā’’ti vuttaṃ yebhuyyataṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘tesu hī’’tiādi vuttaṃ.

“True” should be taken in the way stated. Having accepted the meaning stated by the questioner, then to show the intention with which those yamakas have similar replies, the words “But as…” and so on are stated. Herein this is the summary meaning: Therein, among those rooted in the eye base, just as the yamakas on the tongue base and body base have similar replies by the method of the yamaka on the nose base, “of those with eyes and without a nose who are being reborn,” and so on, so here, among those rooted in the nose base, those yamakas on the tongue base and body base have similar replies by the method of the yamaka on the nose base, “For one for whom the nose base arises, does the tongue base arise for him? Yes,” and so on. Thus this is stated here because of the mutual similarity of the replies of both taken separately, not because of their mutual similarity of replies taken together. Therefore he says, “Therefore, in each case, the similarity of the reply is the reason for its not being included in the Pāḷi.” This being so, regarding the question of for what purpose the eye base is taken as the root, he says, “for the sake of an illustration,” and so on. Therein, “for the sake of an illustration” means: for the sake of an illustration designated as the mutual similarity of replies of those that serve as illustrations; the intention is not that they are similar in their replies in every way to the things they illustrate. To show the majority for which “by the majority” was stated, the words “for among them…” and so on are stated.

Evanti iminā ‘‘āmantā’’ti paṭivacanavissajjanena yathāvuttavacanasseva vissajjanabhāvānujānanaṃ kattabbanti imamatthaṃ ākaḍḍhati. Sāti dutiyapucchā. Ghānāyatanayamakenāti cakkhāyatanamūlakesu ghānāyatanayamakeneva. Taṃsesānīti tena ghānāyatanamūlakakāyāyatanayamakena saddhiṃ sesāni. Sadisavissajjanattā anāruḷhānīti ettha ‘‘anāruḷhānī’’ti ettakameva tathā-saddena anukaḍḍhīyati, na ‘‘sadisavissajjanattā’’ti dassento ‘‘tathāti…pe… samaññenā’’ti vatvā idāni ‘‘kāraṇasāmaññenā’’ti vuttassa sadisavissajjanattassa tattha abhāvaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘ghānajivhākāyāyatanānaṃ panā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha [Pg.181] agabbhaseyyakesu pavattamānānanti etthāpi ‘‘sahacāritāyā’’ti padaṃ ānetvā sambandhitabbaṃ, tathā ‘‘gabbhaseyyakesu ca pavattamānāna’’nti. Itarāni ghānāyatanamūlakāni jivhākāyāyatanayamakāni dve na vissajjīyanti, ghānāyatanamūlakesu ca yamakesu vissajjitesu itaradvayamūlakāni jivhākāyāyatanamūlakāni na vissajjīyanti avisesattā appavisesattā cāti yojetabbaṃ. Tattha kāyāyatanayamake dutiyapucchāvasena appaviseso, itaravasena aviseso veditabbo. Rūpāyatanamanāyatanehi saddhinti idaṃ rūpāyatanamūlakamanāyatanavasena vuttanti āha ‘‘rūpāyatana…pe… adhippāyo’’ti. Tenevāha ‘‘rūpāyatanamūlakesu hī’’tiādi. Yamakānanti rūpāyatanamūlakagandharasaphoṭṭhabbāyatanayamakānaṃ. Dutiyapucchānanti yathāvuttayamakānaṃyeva dutiyapucchānaṃ. Vuttanayenāti ‘‘sarūpakānaṃ acittakāna’’ntiādinā vuttena nayena. Ādipucchānanti tesaṃyeva yamakānaṃ paṭhamapucchānaṃ.

Thus, by this reply-exposition 'Yes,' it draws this meaning: that one should acknowledge that the reply is just as stated. That is the second question. 'Ghānāyatanayamakena' means with the nose-base yamaka, among those rooted in the eye-base, by the nose-base yamaka itself. 'Taṃsesāni' refers to the remaining ones, together with that body-base yamaka rooted in the nose-base. In the phrase 'Because the replies are similar, they are not included'—here, only 'are not included' is drawn in by the word 'tathā,' not 'because the replies are similar,' showing this by saying 'tathā…pe… by similarity.' Now, to show the absence of similarity in replies, which was stated as 'due to similarity of reason,' it is said, 'but as for the nose, tongue, and body bases…' etc. There, to the phrase 'in those occurring in non-womb-born beings'—here too, the word 'by concomitance' should be brought in and connected, and similarly, to 'and in those occurring in womb-born beings.' The other yamakas rooted in the nose-base—the two yamakas on the tongue and body-bases—are not expounded; and when the yamakas rooted in the nose-base are expounded, the other two, rooted in the tongue-base and body-base, are not expounded, due to non-distinction and little distinction, it should be connected. There, in the body-base yamaka, little distinction is to be understood by way of the second question, and non-distinction is to be understood by way of the other. 'With the form-base and the mind-base'—this is said with reference to the mind-base rooted in the form-base, as he says: 'the form-base…pe… the intention.' Therefore, he says, 'for in those rooted in the form-base…' etc. 'Yamakas' refers to the yamakas rooted in the form-base, namely, the smell, taste, and tangible bases. 'Second questions' refers to the second questions of the aforementioned yamakas themselves. 'By the stated method' refers to the method stated by 'of those with form, of those without consciousness…' etc. 'First questions' refers to the first questions of those same yamakas.

Heṭṭhimehīti idaṃ avisesavacanampi yesu sadisavissajjanatā sambhavati, tadapekkhanti āha ‘‘gandharasa…pe… attho’’ti. Uddiṭṭhadhammesu uddesānurūpaṃ labbhamānavisesakathanaṃ vissajjanaṃ, yo tattha na sabbena sabbaṃ uddesānurūpaguṇena upalabbhati, tassa akathanampi atthato vissajjanameva nāma hotīti āha ‘‘avissajjaneneva alabbhamānatādassanena vissajjitāni nāma hontī’’ti.

“With those below”—this is a non-specific statement, but with reference to those where a similar reply is possible, he says, “smell, taste… the meaning.” Among the doctrines that have been pointed out, an exposition is a statement of a distinction that is found corresponding to the outline. If something is not found in every way with a quality conforming to the outline, even not stating it is, in meaning, indeed an exposition. Hence, he says, “By the very non-exposition, by showing their unobtainability, they are, indeed, expounded.”

Cakkhuvikalasotavikalā viya cakkhusotavikalopi labbhatīti so pana aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pi-saddena saṅgahitoti dassento ‘‘jaccandhampi…pe… veditabbo’’ti āha. Paripuṇṇāyatanameva opapātikaṃ sandhāya vuttanti ettha aṭṭhānappayutto eva-saddoti tassa ṭhānaṃ dassento ‘‘vuttamevāti attho’’ti vatvā tena paripuṇṇāyatanassa tattha aniyatattā aparipuṇṇāyatanassapi saṅgaho siddhoti dassento ‘‘tena jaccandhabadhirampi sandhāya vuttatā na nivāritā hotī’’ti āha.

Just as those deficient in the eye or deficient in the ear, so too one deficient in both eye and ear is found. However, showing that this is included in the commentary by the particle 'pi,' he says, 'Even one born blind... should be understood.' Only the complete sense-base is spoken of with reference to spontaneous birth, and here the particle 'eva' is misplaced. To indicate its proper place, he says, 'The meaning is just as stated.' By this, showing that since a complete sense-base is not fixed in that case, the inclusion of an incomplete sense-base is also established, he says, 'Therefore, it is not denied that the statement also refers to one born blind and deaf.'

22-254. Tasmiṃ puggalassa anāmaṭṭhattāti kasmā vuttaṃ, yāvatā ‘‘rūpībrahmalokaṃ pucchatī’’ti imināpi okāsoyeva āmaṭṭhoti. ‘‘Āmantā’’ti paṭiññāya kāraṇavibhāvanādhippāyeneva ‘‘kasmā paṭiññāta’’nti codanaṃ samuṭṭhāpetvā taṃ kāraṇaṃ dassetukāmo ‘‘nanū’’tiādimāha[Pg.182]. Gabbhaseyyakabhāvaṃ gantvā parinibbāyissatīti pacchimabhavikaṃ sandhāyāha. Tadavatthassāti pacchimabhavāvatthassa. Bhavissantassāti bhāvino. Paṭiññātabbattāti ‘‘uppajjissatī’’ti paṭiññātabbattā.

22-254. Why is it said, 'Because in that case the person is not touched'? Inasmuch as even with the statement, 'He asks about the Rūpībrahma world,' only the location is touched upon. Having acknowledged with 'Yes,' with the very intention of explaining the reason, having raised the objection, 'Why was it acknowledged?', and wishing to show that reason, he says, 'Is it not...' and so on. He speaks with reference to one in their final existence who, having gone to the state of being womb-born, will attain final Nibbāna. 'Of that state' refers to the state of the final existence. 'Of one who will be' means of a future one. 'Because it was acknowledged' means because 'He will arise' was acknowledged.

Atha kasmāti etthāyaṃ saṅkhepattho – yadi ‘‘yassa rūpāyatanaṃ uppajjissati, tassa cakkhāyatanaṃ uppajjissatī’’ti pucchāyaṃ vuttena vidhinā paṭiññātabbaṃ, atha kasmā atha kena kāraṇena paṭilome ‘‘yassa vā pana rūpāyatanaṃ nuppajjissati, tassa cakkhāyatanaṃ nuppajjissatī’’ti pucchāya ‘‘āmantā’’ti paṭiññātaṃ, nanu idaṃ aññamaññaṃ viruddhanti? Nanūtiādināpi codako tameva virodhaṃ vibhāveti. No ca nuppajjissati uppajjissati evāti attho. ‘‘Tasmiṃ bhave’’tiādi tassa parihāro. Tattha tasmiṃ bhaveti yasmiṃ bhave ‘‘rūpāyatanaṃ nuppajjissatī’’ti vuttaṃ pavattamānattā, tasmiṃ bhave. Anāgatabhāvena avacanatoti bhāvībhāvena avattabbato āraddhuppādabhāvena pavattamānattāti adhippāyo. Tenevāha ‘‘bhavantare hī’’tiādi. Na pana vuccatīti sambandho. Evañca katvātiādinā pāṭhantarena yathāvuttamatthaṃ samattheti.

Why then? Herein is the condensed meaning: If, in the question 'For whom the form base will arise, for him will the eye base arise?', it should be acknowledged according to the stated method, then why—for what reason—is it acknowledged with 'Yes' in the reverse question, 'For whom, on the other hand, the form base will not arise, for him will the eye base not arise?' Is this not mutually contradictory? And with 'Is it not...' and so on, the questioner clarifies that very contradiction. The meaning is: And it is not that it will not arise; it will certainly arise. Its resolution is given with 'In that existence,' and so on. There, 'in that existence' means in that existence where 'the form base will not arise' is stated, because of its present occurrence. The intention is: because it is not spoken of as future, because it is not to be spoken of in terms of its future state, because it is presently occurring as having begun to arise. Therefore, it is said, 'For in another existence,' and so on. 'But it is not said' is the connection. And having done so, with another reading, he supports the aforementioned meaning.

Yasmiṃ attabhāve yehi āyatanehi bhavitabbaṃ, taṃtaṃāyatananibbattakakammena avassaṃbhāvīāyatanassa sattassa, santānassa vā, ‘‘yassa vā pana rūpāyatanaṃ uppajjissati, tassa cakkhāyatanaṃ uppajjissatīti? Āmantā, yassa vā pana rūpāyatanaṃ nuppajjissati, tassa cakkhāyatanaṃ nuppajjissatīti? Āmantā’’ti ca evaṃ pavattaṃ pucchādvayavissajjanaṃ āyatanapaṭilābhassa jātibhāvato suṭṭhu upapannaṃ bhavati. Pacchimabhavikādayoti ettha ādi-saddena arūpe uppajjitvā parinibbāyanakā saṅgayhanti. Idampi vissajjanaṃ. Abhinanditabbattāti ‘‘āmantā’’ti sampaṭicchitabbattā.

In whatever individual existence the sense bases are to arise, for that being or continuum, the sense bases are inevitably produced by the kamma that generates those respective sense bases. 'Or for whom the form base will arise, for him will the eye base arise?' 'Yes.' 'Or for whom the form base will not arise, for him will the eye base not arise?' 'Yes.' Thus, this pair of questions and answers, proceeding in this way, is very fitting because the acquisition of sense bases is due to birth. 'Those who are in their last existence, etc.'—here, by the term 'etc.' are included those who, having arisen in the formless realm, will attain final Nibbāna. This too is a resolution. 'Because it is to be rejoiced over' means it is to be accepted with 'Yes.'

Yaṃ pana aghānakānaṃ kāmāvacaraṃ upapajjantānanti vuttanti sambandho. Yassa vipāko ghānāyatanuppattito puretarameva upacchijjissati, taṃ ghānāyatanānibbattakakammanti vuttaṃ. Kathaṃ panīdisaṃ kammaṃ atthīti viññāyatīti āha ‘‘yassa yatthā’’tiādi. Evampi gabbhaseyyako eva idha aghānakoti adhippetoti kathamidaṃ viññāyatīti codanāya ‘‘na hī’’tiādiṃ vatvā tamatthaṃ sādhetuṃ ‘‘dhammahadayavibhaṅge’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Avacanattampi hi yathādhammasāsane abhidhamme paṭikkhepoyevāti[Pg.183]. Idhāti imasmiṃ āyatanayamake. Yathādassitāsūti ‘‘yassa vā pana sotāyatanaṃ nuppajjissati, tassa cakkhāyatanaṃ nuppajjati, yassa yattha ghānāyatanaṃ na nirujjhati, tassa tattha rūpāyatanaṃ na nirujjhissatī’’ti ca dassitappakārāsu pucchāsu. Āmantāti vuttanti atha kasmā na viññāyatīti yojanā. Etāsu pucchāsu kasmā paṭivacanena vissajjanaṃ na katanti adhippāyo. Sanniṭṭhānena gahitatthassāti ‘‘yassa vā pana sotāyatanaṃ nuppajjissati, yassa yattha ghānāyatanaṃ na nirujjhissatī’’ti ca evamādikena sanniṭṭhānapadena gahitassa atthassa. Ekadese saṃsayatthassa sambhavenāti ekadese saṃsayitabbassa atthassa sambhavena sanniṭṭhānatthapaṭiyogabhūtasaṃsayatthassa paṭivacanassa akaraṇato ‘‘āmantā’’ti paṭivacanavissajjanassa akattabbato atthassa abhinditvā ekajjhaṃ katvā avattabbato. Tenāha ‘‘bhinditabbehi na paṭivacanavissajjanaṃ hotī’’ti.

As for what is said concerning those reborn in the sense-sphere without a nose, this is the connection. That kamma is called the kamma that does not produce the nose base, the result of which will be cut off even before the arising of the nose base. But how is it known that such kamma exists? He says, 'For whom, where...' and so forth. Even so, it is intended here that the one lying in the womb is 'without a nose.' How is this known? In response to the objection, having said 'For not...' and so forth, to establish that meaning, 'in the Dhammahadayavibhaṅga,' and so forth, is stated. Even the absence of a statement is indeed a rejection in the Abhidhamma according to the Teaching. Here—in this Āyatana Yamaka. As shown—as in questions of the type shown, such as, 'Or for whom the ear base will not arise, for him the eye base does not arise?' and 'For whom, where the nose base does not cease, for him there the form base will not cease?' 'Yes'—it is said. But then, why is it not understood? This is the connection. Why, in these questions, is there no resolution with an answer? This is the intention: Because of the possibility of a doubtful meaning in one part, because a reply to the doubtful meaning—which is the counterpart of the conclusive meaning—is not given, because the answer 'Yes' is not to be given, since the meaning must be broken up and not stated as a single whole. Therefore, he says: 'When there are things to be broken up, there is no resolution with an answer.'

Yadi siyāti bhinditvā vattabbepi atthe yadi paṭivacanavissajjanaṃ siyā, paripuṇṇavissajjanameva na siyā anokāsabhāvato bhinditabbato cāti attho. Tathā hi ‘‘pañcavokāre parinibbantānaṃ, arūpe pacchimabhavikānaṃ, ye ca arūpaṃ upapajjitvā parinibbāyissanti, tesaṃ cavantānaṃ tesaṃ sotāyatanañca nuppajjissati, cakkhāyatanañca nuppajjatī’’ti ca, tathā ‘‘rūpāvacare parinibbantānaṃ, arūpānaṃ tesaṃ tattha ghānāyatanañca na nirujjhati, rūpāyatanañca na nirujjhissatī’’ti ca tattha vibhāgavasena pavatto pāṭhaseso. Atha kasmāti yadi abhinditabbe paṭivacanavissajjanaṃ, na bhinditabbe, evaṃ sante ‘‘yassa vā pana somanassindriyaṃ uppajjati, tassa cakkhundriyaṃ uppajjatīti? Āmantā’’ti iminā paṭivacanavissajjanena gabbhaseyyakānaṃ somanassapaṭisandhi natthīti kasmā na viññāyati, bhinditabbe na paṭivacanavissajjanaṃ hotīti sampaṭicchitabbanti? Taṃ na, aññāya pāḷiyā tadatthassa viññāyamānattāti dassento ‘‘kāmadhātuyā’’tiādimāha.

'If it were so, even when the meaning is to be stated by splitting, if there were a resolution with an answer, there would not be a complete resolution, because there is no opportunity and because it must be split—this is the meaning. For example: 'For those who attain final Nibbāna in the five-aggregate existence, for those in the formless realm who are in their last existence, and for those who, having been reborn in the formless realm, will attain final Nibbāna—for them, when they pass away, both the ear base will not arise and the eye base does not arise.' Similarly: 'For those who attain final Nibbāna in the form realm, and for those in the formless realm—for them, there, both the nose base does not cease and the form base will not cease.' Here, the remaining text proceeds by way of distinction. But why? If a resolution with an answer is for what is not to be split, and not for what is to be split, then in that case, with this resolution with an answer, 'Or for one for whom the joy faculty arises, for him does the eye faculty arise? Yes,' why is it not understood that those in the womb do not have joy as their rebirth-linking? Should it be accepted that when splitting is necessary, there is no resolution with an answer? That is not so, because the meaning is understood through another passage of the Pāli; showing this, he says, 'in the sense-sphere,' etc.

‘‘Yaṃ cittaṃ uppajjati, na nirujjhati, taṃ cittaṃ nirujjhissati, nuppajjissatīti? Āmantā’’ti tasseva cittassa nirodho anāgatabhāvena tassa uppādakkhaṇe yathā vutto, evaṃ tasseva kammajasantānassa nirodho tassa uppāde anāgatabhāvena vattabbo. Tenetaṃ dasseti ‘‘ekacittassa nāma uppādakkhaṇe nirodho anāgatabhāvena vuccati, kimaṅgaṃ pana ekasantānassā’’ti[Pg.184]. Sabbattha sabbasmiṃ anāgatavāre. Upapajjantānaṃ eva vasena so nirodho tathā anāgatabhāvena vutto, kasmā panettha nirodho upapannānaṃ vasena na vuttoti āha ‘‘uppannānaṃ panā’’tiādi. Tasseva yathāpavattassa kammajasantānassa eva. Tasmāti yasmā uppādakkhaṇato uddhaṃ nirodho āraddho nāma hoti, tasmā. Bhede satipi kālabhedāmasanassa kāraṇe satipi. Anāgatakālāmasanavaseneva nirodhasseva vasena vissajjanadvayaṃ upapannameva yuttameva hotīti. Aññesaṃ vasena nirodhasseva vattuṃ asakkuṇeyyattā ‘‘arahata’’nti vuttaṃ.

'The mind that arises does not cease; will that mind cease and not arise again? Yes.' The cessation of that very mind is spoken of as future at the moment of its arising, as stated. Similarly, the cessation of that very kamma-born continuity is to be spoken of as future at its arising. This he shows: 'For a single mind, cessation is called future at the moment of its arising—how much more so for a single continuity?' Everywhere, in every future section. That cessation is spoken of as future in that way, with regard to those who are being reborn. But why is cessation not spoken of here in terms of those who have already arisen? He says, 'But for those who have arisen...' and so on. It is of that very kamma-born continuity as it proceeds. Therefore, because cessation is considered to begin from the moment of arising onward, therefore— Even when there is a distinction, even when there is a reason for referring to a different time, it is solely by way of referring to the future time that the two resolutions concerning cessation are appropriate and right. Because it is impossible to speak of cessation in terms of others, 'for the arahant' is stated.

Yadi upapattianantaraṃ nirodho āraddho nāma hoti, atha kasmā cutiyā nirodhavacananti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘tanniṭṭhānabhāvato pana cutiyā nirodhavacana’’nti. Tanniṭṭhānabhāvatoti tassa santānassa niṭṭhānabhāvato. Pavattetiādi vuttassevatthassa pākaṭakaraṇaṃ. Tattha tassāti santānassa. Vakkhatītiādipi pavatte nirodhaṃ anādiyitvā cutinirodhasseva gahitatāya kāraṇavacanaṃ. Tenāti tena yathāvuttena pāṭhantaravacanena. Etthāti etasmiṃ ‘‘yassa cakkhāyatanaṃ nirujjhissatī’’tiādike āyatanayamake. Yadi pavatte niruddhassapi cutiyā eva nirodho icchito, ‘‘sacakkhukāna’’ntiādi kathanti āha ‘‘sacakkhukānantiādīsu ca paṭiladdhacakkhukānantiādinā attho viññāyatī’’ti. Teti arūpe pacchimabhavikā. Acakkhukavacanañca sāvasesanti yojanā.

If cessation is considered to begin immediately after rebirth, then why is cessation spoken of as death? Addressing this question, he says, 'But because it is the termination of that, cessation is spoken of as death.' 'Because it is the termination of that' means because it is the termination of that continuum. 'In the course of existence, etc.' is a clarification of the meaning already stated. Therein, 'of that' means of the continuum. And 'will state, etc.' is a statement of the reason for taking only cessation at death, disregarding cessation in the course of existence. 'By that' means by that aforementioned alternative reading. 'Here' means in this Āyatana Yamaka, such as 'for whom the eye base will cease,' and so on. If, even for what has ceased in the course of existence, cessation is desired to be only at death, then how is 'for those with eyes,' etc., stated? He says, 'And in phrases like 'for those with eyes,' the meaning is understood as 'for those who have obtained the eye,' etc.' 'They' refers to those in the formless realm who are in their final existence. And the term 'without eyes' is with a remainder; this is the connection.

Pavattivāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the section on occurrence is concluded.

Āyatanayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Āyatana Yamaka is concluded.

4. Dhātuyamakaṃ

4. The Dhātu Yamaka

1-19. Saddadhātusambandhānanti idaṃ yāni cakkhudhātādimūlakesu saddayamakāni, sabbāni ca saddadhātumūlakāni, tāni sandhāya vuttaṃ. Na hi tāni cakkhuviññāṇadhātādisambandhāni viya cutipaṭisandhivasena labbhanti, eteneva āyatanayamakepi pavattivāre saddadhātusambandhānaṃ yamakānaṃ alabbhamānatā ca veditabbā.

1-19. ‘Connected with the sound-element’—this is said with reference to the sound-pairs in the sections rooted in the eye-element, etc., and all the pairs rooted in the sound-element. For they are not obtained by way of death and rebirth-linking, like those connected with the eye-consciousness-element, etc.; and by this very reason, the unobtainability of the pairs connected with the sound-element in the occurrence section, even in the Āyatana Yamaka, should also be understood.

Dhātuyamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Dhātu Yamaka is concluded.

5. Saccayamakaṃ

5. The Sacca Yamaka

1. Paṇṇattivāravaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Section on Concepts

10-26. Soti [Pg.185] dukkhasaddo. Aññatthāti saṅkhāradukkhavipariṇāmadukkhadukkhādhiṭṭhānesu. Aññanirapekkhoti saṅkhārādipadantarānapekkho. Tenāti aññanirapekkhadukkhapadaggahaṇato. Tasmiṃ dukkhadukkhe visayabhūte. Esa dukkhasaddo ‘‘dukkhaṃ dukkhasacca’’nti ettha paṭhamo dukkhasaddo. Tañca dukkhadukkhaṃ. ‘‘Dukkhaṃ dukkhasacca’’nti ettha dukkhameva dukkhasaccanti nayidaṃ avadhāraṇaṃ icchitabbaṃ, dukkhaṃ dukkhasaccamevāti pana icchitabbanti āha ‘‘ekantena dukkhasaccamevā’’ti. Saccavibhaṅge vuttesu samudayesu koci phaladhammesu natthīti saccavibhaṅge pañcadhā vuttesu samudayesu ekopi phalasabhāvesu natthi, phalasabhāvo natthīti attho. ‘‘Phaladhammo natthī’’ti ca pāṭho. Maggasaddo ca phalaṅgesūti sāmaññaphalaṅgesu sammādiṭṭhiādīsu ‘‘maggaṅgaṃ maggapariyāpanna’’ntiādinā (vibha. 492, 495) āgato maggasaddo maggaphalattā pavattati kāraṇūpacārenāti adhippāyo. Tenāha ‘‘na maggakiccasabbhāvā’’tiādi. Tasmāti yasmā saccadesanāya pabhavādisabhāvā eva dhammā samudayādipariyāyena vuttā, na appabhavādisabhāvā, tasmā. Ettha ca tebhūmakadhammānaṃ yathārahaṃ dukkhasamudayasaccantogadhattā asaccasabhāve sabhāvadhamme ca uddharanto phaladhamme eva uddhari. Nanu ca maggasampayuttāpi dhammā asaccasabhāvāti tepi uddharitabbāti? Na, tesaṃ maggagatikattā. ‘‘Phaladhammesū’’ti ettha dhammaggahaṇena vā phalasampayuttadhammānaṃ viya tesampi gahaṇaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ.

10-26. The word is ‘dukkha.’ ‘Elsewhere’ means in the contexts of the suffering of formations, the suffering of change, and the bases of suffering-as-suffering. ‘Without regard for another’ means without regard for other terms such as ‘formations.’ ‘Therefore’ refers to the taking of the term ‘suffering’ without regard for another. When that suffering-as-suffering is the object, this word ‘dukkha’ is the first word ‘dukkha’ in the phrase ‘suffering is the noble truth of suffering.’ And that is suffering-as-suffering. In the phrase ‘suffering is the noble truth of suffering,’ the emphasis that suffering itself is the noble truth of suffering should not be accepted; rather, it should be accepted that suffering is exclusively the noble truth of suffering. Thus, he says, ‘exclusively the noble truth of suffering.’ Among the origins mentioned in the Saccavibhaṅga, none exist among resultant phenomena—meaning that among the five kinds of origins mentioned in the Saccavibhaṅga, not even one has a resultant nature; the meaning is that a resultant nature is absent. There is also a variant reading: ‘a resultant phenomenon does not exist.’ And the word ‘path’ in ‘in the factors of the fruit’ refers to the common factors of the fruit such as right view, etc., where the word ‘path’ is mentioned in the Vibhaṅga (492, 495) as ‘a path factor is included in the path,’ etc.; the intention is that it functions because of being a fruit of the path, by way of a metaphor for the cause. Hence, he says, ‘not because of the existence of the path-function,’ etc. ‘Therefore’ means: because in the teaching of the truths, only phenomena with a nature of origination, etc., are described by the term ‘origin,’ etc., not phenomena with a nature of non-origination, etc., therefore. And here, since the phenomena of the three realms are included, as appropriate, within the truth of suffering and the truth of origin, when extracting phenomena that have an untrue nature from among phenomena that have a nature, he extracted only resultant phenomena. But is it not so that path-associated phenomena also have an untrue nature, so they too should be extracted? No, because they have the path as their destination. In the phrase ‘among resultant phenomena,’ by the term ‘dhammā,’ the inclusion of those path-associated phenomena too should be understood, just like other phenomena associated with the fruit.

Padasodhanena…pe… idha gahitāti etena asaccasabhāvānaṃ dhammānaṃ pakaraṇena nivattitataṃ āha. Tesanti dukkhādīnaṃ. Tabbisesanayogavisesanti tena dukkhādivisesanayogena visiṭṭhataṃ. Saccavisesanabhāveneva dukkhādīnaṃ pariññeyyatādibhāvo siddhoti āha ‘‘ekantasaccattā’’ti. Yathā cetthāti yathā etasmiṃ saccayamake suddhasaccavāre saccavisesanabhūtā eva dukkhādayo gahitā. Evaṃ khandhayamakādīsupīti na suddhasaccavāre eva ayaṃ nayo dassitoti attho. Padasodhanavāre taṃmūlacakkavāre ca ‘‘rūpaṃ rūpakkhandho’’tiādinā samudāyapadānaṃyeva vuttattā vattabbameva natthīti ‘‘suddhakkhandhādivāresū’’ti vuttaṃ. Tathā cetthāpi [Pg.186] suddhavāre eva ayaṃ nayo dassito. Yadi suddhakkhandhādivāresu khandhādivisesanabhūtānameva rūpādīnaṃ gahaṇena bhavitabbaṃ, atha kasmā khandhādivisesanato aññesampi rūpādīnaṃ vasena attho dassitoti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘aṭṭhakathāyaṃ panā’’tiādi. Purimo eva attho yutto, yuttito pāṭhova balavāti.

By ‘purification of words’ …pe… and ‘taken here,’ he states that phenomena of an untrue nature are excluded by the context. ‘Of them’ refers to suffering and so on. ‘Their specific connection with a qualifier’ means their being qualified by that connection with the qualifier ‘suffering,’ and so on. The fact that suffering and the like are to be fully understood, etc., is established precisely by their being qualified by ‘truth’; hence he says, ‘because of being exclusively true.’ And just as here, in this Yamaka on Truths, in the pure truth section, suffering and the like are taken only as being qualified by ‘truth.’ Similarly, in the Yamaka on Aggregates, etc., this method is not shown only in the pure truth section—this is the meaning. In the purification of words section and the root-cycle section, since only collective terms like ‘form is the aggregate of form’ are stated, there is nothing to be said; hence it is stated, ‘in the pure aggregates, etc., sections.’ Similarly, here too, this method is shown only in the pure section. If in the pure aggregates, etc., sections, only form and the like, being qualified as aggregates, etc., should be taken, then why is the meaning shown by way of other forms and the like, apart from the qualification as aggregates? Addressing this objection, he says, ‘but in the commentary,’ etc. The former meaning is indeed appropriate; the text itself is stronger than reasoning.

Paṇṇattivāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Section on Designations is concluded.

2. Pavattivāravaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Occurrence Section

27-164. Dukkhapariññā yāva dukkhasamatikkamanatthāti sappadesaṃ pavattāpi sā tadatthāvahā bhaveyyāti kassaci āsaṅkā siyāti dassento āha ‘‘ariyattā…pe… katvā vutta’’nti. Keci panettha ‘‘antimabhave ṭhitattā’’ti kāraṇaṃ vadanti, taṃ na yujjati upapattiyā dukkhavicārattā, na ca sabbe suddhāvāsā antimabhavikā uddhaṃsotavacanato. ‘‘Yassa dukkhasaccaṃ uppajjatī’’ti uppādāvatthā. Avisesena dukkhasaccapariyāpannā dhammā sambandhībhāveneva taṃsamaṅgī ca puggalo vuttoti dassento ‘‘sabbe upapajjantā’’tiādiṃ vatvā svāyamattho yasmā nicchayarūpena gahito, nicchitasseva ca atthassa vibhāgadassanena bhavitabbaṃ, tasmā ‘‘tesveva…pe… upapannamevā’’ti āha. Tattha tesveva keci dassīyantīti sambandho. Ekakoṭṭhāsuppattisamaṅginoti dukkhakoṭṭhāsuppattisamaṅgino. Tesūti sanniṭṭhānena gahitesu. Maggaphaluppādasamaṅgīsūti maggaphaluppādasamaṅgīnaṃ, ayameva vā pāṭho.

27-164. Showing that someone might have the doubt that ‘the full understanding of suffering up to the transcendence of suffering’ might bring about that purpose even if it occurs partially, he says, ‘because of being noble… having done it, it is said.’ Some here say the reason is ‘because of being in the final existence,’ but this is not valid because of the investigation of suffering by way of rebirth; and not all pure abode beings are in their final existence, according to the statement about those who go upstream. ‘For whom the truth of suffering arises’—this refers to the state of arising. To show that, without distinction, the phenomena included in the truth of suffering and the person endowed with it are stated by way of their connection, after saying ‘all who are reborn,’ etc., since this meaning is grasped definitively, and the meaning of what is definitively understood must be shown by analysis, therefore he says, ‘among those very ones… only the reborn.’ Here, the connection is that some are shown among those very ones. ‘Endowed with arising in one portion’ means endowed with arising in the portion of suffering. ‘In those’ means among those grasped by the thesis. ‘In those endowed with the arising of path and fruit’ means ‘of those endowed with the arising of path and fruit,’ or this is the reading itself.

Ettha cātiādinā ‘‘sabbesa’’ntiādipāḷiyā piṇḍatthaṃ dasseti. Tattha samudayasaccuppādavomissassa dukkhasaccuppādassāti idaṃ anādare sāmivacanaṃ. Katthaci samudayasaccuppādavomissepi dukkhasacce taṃrahitassa samudayasaccuppādarahitassa dukkhasaccuppādassa dassanavasena vuttanti yojanā. Keci pana ‘‘samudayasaccāvomissassā’’ti paṭhanti, tesaṃ ‘‘taṃrahitassā’’ti idaṃ purimapadassa atthavivaraṇaṃ veditabbaṃ. Taṃsahitassāti samudayasaccuppādasahitassa dukkhasaccuppādassa dassanavasena vuttanti yojanā. Tesanti asaññasattānaṃ, pavattiyaṃ dukkhasaccassa uppādo ‘‘pavatte’’tiādinā vuttesu dvīsupi koṭṭhāsesu na gahitoti attho. Paṭisandhiyaṃ pana [Pg.187] tesaṃ uppādassa paṭhamakoṭṭhāsena gahitatā dassitā eva. Tathā nirodho cāti yathā asaññasattānaṃ paṭisandhiyaṃ dukkhasaccassa uppādo paṭhamakoṭṭhāsena gahito, pavattiyaṃ pana so dvīhi koṭṭhāsehi na gahito, tathā tesaṃ dukkhasaccassa nirodhopīti attho. Tathā hi ‘‘sabbesaṃ cavantānaṃ pavatte taṇhāvippayuttacittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe’’tiādinā (yama. 1.saccayamaka.88) nirodhavāre pāḷi pavattā. Eseva nayoti yvāyaṃ ‘‘ettha cā’’tiādinā samudayasaccayamake pāḷiyā atthanayo vutto, maggasaccayamakepi eseva nayo, evameva tatthāpi attho netabboti attho. Tathā hi ‘‘sabbesaṃ upapajjantāna’’ntiādinā tattha pāḷi pavattā.

By ‘and here,’ etc., he shows the collective meaning of the Pāli passage beginning with ‘of all.’ In this context, ‘of the arising of the truth of suffering mixed with the arising of the truth of origin’ is a genitive case of disregard. In some places, the explanation is that even when the truth of suffering is mixed with the arising of the truth of origin, it is stated by way of showing the arising of the truth of suffering devoid of that—devoid of the arising of the truth of origin. Some, however, read ‘of the unmixed with the truth of origin,’ and for them, ‘devoid of that’ should be understood as an explanation of the meaning of the preceding term. ‘Together with that’ means it is explained by way of showing the arising of the truth of suffering together with the arising of the truth of origin. ‘Of those’ refers to non-percipient beings, and the meaning is that the arising of the truth of suffering in the course of existence is not included in either of the two sections mentioned by ‘in the course of existence,’ etc. However, their arising at rebirth-linking is indeed shown to be included in the first section. Similarly, ‘and cessation’ means that just as the arising of the truth of suffering for non-percipient beings at rebirth-linking is included in the first section, but in the course of existence it is not included in the two sections, so too is the cessation of their truth of suffering. For the Pāli in the cessation section proceeds thus: ‘For all who are passing away, in the course of existence, at the moment of dissolution of consciousness dissociated from craving,’ etc. (Yamaka 1, Saccayamaka, 88). ‘This is the same method’ means that just as this method of meaning of the Pāli passage was stated with ‘and here,’ etc., in the Yamaka on the Truth of Origin, the same method applies to the Yamaka on the Truth of the Path; the meaning should be construed in the same way there too. For there, the Pāli proceeds: ‘For all who are arising,’ etc.

Evañca satīti evaṃ khaṇavasena okāsaggahaṇe satīti yathāvuttamatthaṃ ananujānanavasena paccāmasati. Etassa vissajjaneti etassa yamakapadassa vissajjane. ‘‘Aggamaggassa uppādakkhaṇe, arahantānaṃ cittassa uppādakkhaṇe, yassa cittassa anantarā aggamaggaṃ paṭilabhissanti, tassa cittassa uppādakkhaṇe, asaññasattaṃ upapajjantānaṃ tesaṃ tattha dukkhasaccaṃ uppajjati, no ca tesaṃ tattha samudayasaccaṃ uppajjissatī’’ti (yama. 1.saccayamaka.71) purimakoṭṭhāsassa āgatattā virodho natthīti ‘‘pacchimakoṭṭhāse’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha tasmāti yasmā na upapatticittuppādakkhaṇo bhāvino samudayapaccuppādassa ādhāro, atha kho kāmāvacarādiokāso, tasmā. Puggalokāsavāro hesāti yasmā puggalokāsavāro esa, tasmā ‘‘tesaṃ tatthā’’ti ettha okāsavasena tattha-saddassa attho veditabbo. Yadi puggalokāsavāre kāmāvacarādiokāsavaseneva attho gahetabbo, na khaṇavasena, atha kasmā ‘‘sabbesaṃ upapajjantāna’’ntiādinā okāsaṃ anāmasitvā tattha vissajjanaṃ pavattanti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘tattha…pe… so evā’’ti. Tattha tatthāti okāsavāre. Puggalavisesadassanatthanti puggalasaṅkhātavisesadassanatthaṃ. Yattha teti yasmiṃ kāmāvacarādiokāse te puggalā.

‘This being the case’ (evaṃ ca sati) means that when the opportunity is taken in this moment-by-moment way, one reflects on the meaning as stated, by not acknowledging it. ‘The reply to this’ (etassa vissajjane) refers to the reply to this pair of terms. ‘At the moment of the arising of the highest path, at the moment of the arising of the minds of the Arahants, at the moment of the arising of the mind of one who will attain the highest path immediately afterward—for them, the truth of suffering arises there, but the truth of the origin will not arise there.’ (Yamaka 1, Saccayamaka, 71) Since the first section has been stated, there is no contradiction; hence ‘in the latter section’ (pacchimakoṭṭhāse), etc., is stated. Here, ‘therefore’ (tasmā) means because the moment of the arising of rebirth-linking consciousness is not the basis for the future arising of the origin, but rather the realm of sense-desire etc. is the opportunity, therefore. ‘This is a section on the person and opportunity’ (puggalokāsavāro hesa) means that because this is a section on the person and opportunity, the meaning of the word ‘there’ (tattha) in ‘for them there’ (tesaṃ tattha) should be understood in terms of opportunity. If in the section on the person and opportunity, the meaning should be taken only in terms of the opportunity of the realm of sense-desire etc., and not in terms of moments, then why is the reply given there without referring to the opportunity in phrases like ‘for all those who are being reborn’ (sabbesaṃ upapajjantānaṃ)? Addressing this objection, he says, ‘there…pe… it is indeed so’ (tattha…pe… so evā). ‘There, there’ (tattha tattha) refers to the opportunity section. ‘The purpose is to show the distinction among individuals’ (puggalavisesadassanatthaṃ) means the purpose is to show the distinction designated as ‘individual.’ ‘Where they are’ (yattha te) refers to the realm of sense-desire etc., where those individuals are.

Kecīti dhammasirittheraṃ sandhāyāha. So hi ‘‘pavatte cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe dukkhasaccaṃ nuppajjatī’’ti ettha cittajarūpameva adhippetaṃ cittapaṭibaddhavuttittāti kāraṇaṃ vadati. Apare ‘‘arūpeti imaṃ purimāpekkhampi hotīti tena pavattaṃ visesetvā arūpabhavavasena ayamattho vutto[Pg.188], tasmā ‘yassa vā pana samudayasaccaṃ nirujjhati, tassa dukkhasaccaṃ uppajjatīti? No’tiādīsupi evamattho veditabbo’’ti vadanti. Puggalo na cittaṃ apekkhitvāva gahitoti idaṃ cittassa anadhikatattā vuttaṃ. Yattha pana samudayasaccassa uppādanicchayo, tattheva tassa anuppādanicchayenapi bhavitabbaṃ cittena ca vinā puggalasseva anupalabbhanatoti ‘‘yassa samudayasaccaṃ nuppajjatī’’ti ettha samudayasaccādhāraṃ cittaṃ atthato gahitamevāti sakkā viññātuṃ. Apica indriyabaddhepi na sabbo rūpuppādo ekantena cittuppādādhīnoti sakkā vattuṃ cittuppattiyā vināpi tattha rūpuppattidassanato, tasmā cittajarūpameva cittassa uppādakkhaṇe uppajjati, na itaraṃ, itaraṃ pana tassa tīsupi khaṇesu uppajjatīti niṭṭhamettha gantabbaṃ. Vibhajitabbā avibhattā nāma natthīti siyāyaṃ pasaṅgo paṭhamavāre, dutiyavāre pana vibhajanā eva sāti nāyaṃ pasaṅgo labbhati, paṭhamavārepi vā nāyaṃ pasaṅgo. Kasmā? Esā hi yamakassa pakati, yadidaṃ yathālābhavasena yojanā.

‘Some’ refers to the Elder Dhammasiri. For he states the reason that 'at the moment of the dissolution of a mind in the course of existence, the truth of suffering does not arise,' is that here only mind-born matter is intended, because its occurrence is connected to the mind. Others say: 'In the formless realm, this is also with reference to the previous; therefore, having distinguished the occurrence, this meaning is stated in terms of formless existence. Thus, in statements like, “For whom the truth of the origin ceases, does the truth of suffering arise? No,” the meaning should be understood in this way.' The individual is not taken with reference to the mind alone—this is said because the mind is not the topic of discussion. However, where there is a determination of the arising of the truth of origin, there must also be a determination of its non-arising, and since the individual is not found without the mind, in the statement 'for whom the truth of origin does not arise,' the mind, as the basis of the truth of origin, is implicitly understood. Moreover, even in what is bound up with the faculties, not all material arising is entirely dependent on the arising of the mind. It can be said that matter arises there even without the arising of the mind, since the arising of matter is seen there. Therefore, only mind-born matter arises at the moment of the mind's arising, not other matter; the other matter, however, arises in all three moments—thus, this should be the conclusion here. 'There is nothing to be analyzed that remains unanalyzed'—this issue might arise in the first section. In the second section, however, it is itself an analysis, so this issue is not found. Or even in the first section, this issue does not apply. Why? Because this is the nature of the Yamaka, namely, application according to what is obtained.

Dutiye citte vattamāneti ettha ‘‘paṭhamaṃ bhavaṅgaṃ, dutiyaṃ citta’’nti vadanti. Bhavanikantiyā āvajjanampi vipākappavattito visadisattā ‘‘dutiya’’nti vattuṃ sakkā, tato paṭṭhāya pubbe tassa tattha samudayasaccaṃ nuppajjitthāti vattabbāti apare. Bhavanikantiyā pana sahajātaṃ paṭhamaṃ cittaṃ idha dutiyaṃ cittanti adhippetaṃ. Tato pubbe pavattaṃ sabbaṃ abyākatabhāvena samānajātikattā ekanti katvā tato paṭṭhāya heṭṭhā tassa tattha samudayasaccaṃ nuppajjitthevāti. Tenāha ‘‘sabbantimena paricchedenā’’tiādi. Tasminti dutiye citte. Tena samānagatikattāti tena yathāvuttadutiyacittena ca taṃsamaṅgino vā dukkhasaccaṃ uppajjittha, no ca samudayasaccanti vattabbabhāvena samānagatikattā. Evañca katvāti tena samānagatikatāya dassitattā eva. Yathāvuttāti dutiyākusalacittato purimasabbacittasamaṅgino aggahitā honti itarabhāvābhāvato. Vuttamevatthaṃ pāṭhantarena samatthetuṃ ‘‘yathā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Teti catuvokārā. Vajjetabbāti ‘‘itaresa’’nti visesanena nivattetabbā. Pañcavokārā viya yathāvuttā suddhāvāsāti dutiyacittakkhaṇasamaṅgibhāvena vuttappakārā yathā suddhāvāsasaṅkhātā pañcavokārā pubbe vuttā santi, evaṃ catuvokārā pubbe vuttā na hi santīti yojanā.

Regarding 'when the second consciousness is occurring,' they say: 'The first is the life-continuum, the second is the consciousness.' Others say that regarding craving for existence, even the adverting consciousness is dissimilar to the resultant process, so it can be called 'the second'; from that point onward, it should be stated that the truth of origin had not arisen for him there before. However, the first consciousness co-arisen with craving for existence is intended here as the second consciousness. All that occurred before, being of the same kind due to its indeterminate nature, is considered as one; from that point onward, the truth of origin had not arisen for him there below. Therefore, he said, 'by the very last delimitation,' and so on. In that second consciousness. 'Because of having the same course as that' means because it has the same course in that it must be said of the aforementioned second consciousness and one endowed with it that the truth of suffering had arisen, but not the truth of origin. 'And having done so' means precisely because its having the same course has been shown. 'As stated' means that those endowed with all consciousnesses prior to the second unwholesome consciousness are not taken, due to the absence of another state. To support the meaning already stated with another reading, 'as,' and so on, is said. 'Those' are the four-constituent beings. 'To be excluded' means to be removed by the qualifier 'other.' The connection is: just as the five-constituent beings called the Pure Abodes, of the type stated as being endowed with the second consciousness-moment, have been previously stated, so the four-constituent beings have not indeed been previously stated.

‘‘Yassa [Pg.189] yatthā’’ti puggalokāsā ādheyyādhārabhāvena apekkhitāti āha ‘‘puggalokāsā aññamaññaparicchinnā gahitā’’ti. Kāmāvacare…pe… upapannāti ettha kāmāvacare abhisametāvino rūpāvacaraṃ upapannā, rūpāvacare abhisametāvino arūpāvacaraṃ upapannā, vā-saddena kāmāvacare abhisametāvino arūpāvacaraṃ upapannāti ca yojetabbaṃ. Tatthāti upapannokāse. Abhisamayoti uparimaggābhisamayo yāva upapanno na bhavissati, tāva te tattha upapannapuggalā ettha etasmiṃ ‘‘abhisametāvīna’’ntiādinā vutte dutiyakoṭṭhāse na gayhanti puggalokāsānaṃ aññamaññaṃ paricchinnattā. Yadi evaṃ kiṃ te imasmiṃ yamake asaṅgahitāti āha ‘‘te panā’’tiādi. Tattha yaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘samānagatikāti visuṃ na dassitā’’ti, taṃ pākaṭataraṃ kātuṃ ‘‘anabhisametāvīna’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. Tassattho – ‘‘anabhisametāvīna’’nti iminā paṭhamapadena gahitā sabbattha magguppattirahe sampattibhave tattha suddhāvāse ye anabhisametāvino, tesu dvippakāresu suddhāvāsā yasmiṃ kāle tattha anabhisametāvinoti gahetabbā, tattha nesaṃ tathā gahetabbakālassa visesanatthaṃ ‘‘suddhāvāsānaṃ dutiye citte vattamāne’’ti vuttanti.

Regarding 'whose where,' individuals and locations are considered as the supported and the support; hence it is said, 'individuals and locations are taken as mutually delimited.' In the realm of sensual desire...up to...reborn—here, those who have comprehended in the realm of sensual desire are reborn in the realm of form; those who have comprehended in the realm of form are reborn in the formless realm; and by the word 'or,' those who have comprehended in the realm of sensual desire are reborn in the formless realm—this should be connected. 'There' means in the location of rebirth. 'Comprehension' means the comprehension of a higher path. As long as one has not been reborn, those individuals reborn there are not included in this second category stated as, 'of those who have comprehended,' etc., because persons and locations are mutually delimited. If so, are they not included in this Yamaka? He says, 'but those,' etc. There, to make clearer what was stated—'those of the same destiny are not shown separately'—'of those who have not comprehended,' and so on, is said. Its meaning is: by this first phrase, 'of those who have not comprehended,' are taken those who have not comprehended in the Pure Abodes, in a present existence devoid of the arising of the path everywhere. Among these two kinds in the Pure Abodes, they should be taken as 'those who have not comprehended' at the time when they are there. To specify the time when they should be so taken, it is said, 'when the second consciousness of the Pure Abodes beings is occurring.'

Etenāti etena vacanena. Vodānacittaṃ nāma maggacittānaṃ anantarapaccayabhūtaṃ cittaṃ, idha pana aggamaggacittassa. Tatoti yathāvuttavodānacittato purimataracittasamaṅgino, anulomañāṇasampayuttacittasamaṅgino, avasiṭṭhavuṭṭhānagāminivipassanācittādisamaṅginopi. Tenāha ‘‘yāva sabbantimataṇhāsampayuttacittasamaṅgī, tāva dassitā’’ti.

‘By this’ means by this statement. The purification consciousness is the consciousness that serves as the immediately preceding condition for the path consciousnesses; here, however, it is for the highest path consciousness. ‘From that’ means those endowed with a consciousness preceding the aforementioned purification consciousness, those endowed with consciousness conjoined with conformity knowledge (anuloma-ñāṇa), and also those endowed with the remaining insight consciousnesses leading to emergence, and so on. Therefore it was said, 'They are shown as far as one endowed with the very last craving-conjoined consciousness.'

Paṭisandhicuticittānaṃ bhaṅguppādakkhaṇā pavatte cittassa bhaṅguppādakkhaṇehi dukkhasaccādīnaṃ nuppādādīsu samānagatikāti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘pavatte cittassā’’tiādi. Tattha cuticittassapi uppādakkhaṇassa gahaṇaṃ daṭṭhabbanti yojanā. Dvīsupi koṭṭhāsesūti samudayasaccassa bhāvino nirodhassa appaṭikkhepapaṭikkhepavasena pavattesu purimapacchimakoṭṭhāsesu. Na visesitanti yathāvutte appaṭikkhepe ca satipi visesetvā na vuttanti attho. Ekassapi puggalassa tādisassa maggassa ca phalassa ca bhaṅgakkhaṇasamaṅgino purimakoṭṭhāsasseva abhajanato koṭṭhāsadvayasambhavābhāvatoti attho. Idāni tamevatthaṃ vivarituṃ ‘‘yassa dukkhasacca’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. Kesañci puggalānaṃ. Niddhāraṇe cetaṃ sāmivacanaṃ. ‘‘Maggassa ca phalassa [Pg.190] cā’’ti vuttamaggaphalāni dassento ‘‘tiṇṇaṃ phalānaṃ dvinnañca maggāna’’nti āha. Tāni pana heṭṭhimāni tīṇi phalāni majjhe ca dve maggā veditabbā. Nirantaraṃ anuppādetvāti paṭipakkhadhammehi avokiṇṇaṃ katvā saha vipassanāya maggaṃ uppādentena yā sātaccakiriyā kātabbā, taṃ akatvāti attho. Tenāha ‘‘antarantarā…pe… uppādetvā’’ti. ‘‘Arūpe maggassa ca phalassa ca bhaṅgakkhaṇe’’ti avisesato vutte kathamayaṃ viseso labbhatīti āha ‘‘sāmaññavacanenapī’’tiādi. Tena apavādavisayapariyāyena upasaggā abhinivisantīti lokasiddhoyaṃ ñāyoti dasseti.

Because the moments of dissolution and arising of rebirth-linking and death consciousnesses, and the moments of dissolution and arising of consciousness in the active process, have the same course regarding the non-arising of the truths of suffering, etc., it is said, 'in the active process of consciousness,' and so on. Here, the moment of arising of the death consciousness should also be understood as included in the explanation. In both sections means in the first and last sections that occur by way of non-rejection and rejection of the cessation of the truth of origin that is about to arise. It is not distinguished means that even when there is non-rejection as stated, it is not specifically stated. For a single individual endowed with such a path and fruit at the moment of dissolution, since he partakes only of the first section, the possibility of two sections does not arise—this is the meaning. Now, to elaborate on this very point, it is said, 'for whom the truth of suffering,' and so on. This refers to certain individuals. And this is a genitive of specification. By saying 'the path and the fruit,' indicating the aforementioned path and fruits, he states, 'three fruits and two paths.' These should be understood as the lower three fruits and the two paths in the middle. Without producing uninterruptedly means not performing the continuous action that should be done by one producing the path together with insight, having made it unmixed with opposing factors—this is the meaning. Hence it is said, 'intermittently… producing.' When it is said without distinction, 'at the moment of dissolution of the path and fruit in the formless realm,' how is this distinction obtained? It is explained by saying, 'even by a general term,' and so on. Thus, he shows that this is a principle well-known in the world, that prefixes are applied by way of circumstances relating to an exception.

Pavattivāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the section of the active process is concluded.

3. Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Section of Full Understanding

165-170. Etthevāti imasmiṃ saccayamake eva. Apariññeyyatādassanatthanti ettha a-kāro na pariññeyyābhāvavacano, nāpi pariññeyyapaṭipakkhavacano, atha kho tadaññavacanoti yathārahaṃ saccesu labbhamānānaṃ pahātabbatādīnampi dassane āpanneyeva samayavāro dassanaparo, yesañca na dassanaparo, tesu kesuci saccesu labbhamānānampi kesañci visesānaṃ ayaṃ vāro na dassanaparoti dassento ‘‘sacchikaraṇa…pe… dassanatthañcā’’ti āha. Samudaye pahānapariññāva vuttā, na tīraṇapariññāti yuttaṃ tāvetaṃ samudayassapi tīretabbasabhāvattā, ‘‘dukkhe tīraṇapariññāva vuttā, na pahānapariññā’’ti idaṃ pana kasmā vuttaṃ, nanu dukkhaṃ appahātabbamevāti? Samudayasaccavibhaṅge vuttānaṃ kesañci samudayakoṭṭhāsānaṃ dukkhasacce saṅgahaṇato dukkhasamudaye vā asaṅkaratova gahetvā bhūtakathanametaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Ubhayatthāti dukkhe samudaye ca vuttā. Kasmā? Tesaṃ sādhāraṇāti. Evaṃ sādhāraṇāsādhāraṇabhedabhinnaṃ yathāvuttaṃ pariññākiccaṃ pubbabhāge nānakkhaṇe labbhamānampi maggakāle ekakkhaṇe eva labbhati ekañāṇakiccattāti dassetuṃ ‘‘maggañāṇañhī’’tiādi vuttaṃ.

165-170. Here means in this very Yamaka on the Truths. In the phrase for the purpose of showing what is not to be fully understood, the prefix ‘a-’ is not a term for the absence of what is to be fully understood, nor is it a term for the opposite of what is to be fully understood, but rather it is a term for something other than that. Thus, showing that as is appropriate, even when showing things to be abandoned and so on, which are found in the truths, the section on the occasion is concerned with showing, and for those which it is not concerned with showing, in some truths where certain distinctions are found, this section is not concerned with showing, he said: “for the purpose of realization… and for the purpose of showing.” For the origin, only full understanding as abandoning is stated, not full understanding as investigation. This is proper, for the nature of the origin is also to be investigated. But why is it said, “For suffering, only full understanding as investigation is stated, not full understanding as abandoning”? Is it not that suffering is indeed not to be abandoned? This should be seen as a statement of fact, taken either from the inclusion of some portions of the origin mentioned in the Analysis of the Truth of Origin within the truth of suffering, or from being taken without confusion in regard to suffering and its origin. For both means it is stated for both suffering and its origin. Why? Because it is common to them. Thus, to show that the function of full understanding, divided as stated into what is common and what is not common, although obtainable at various moments in the preliminary stage, is obtained at the time of the path in a single moment because it is the single task of one knowledge, it is said, “For path knowledge…” and so on.

Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Section of Full Understanding is finished.

Saccayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Yamaka on the Truths is finished.

6. Saṅkhārayamakaṃ

6. The Yamaka on Formations

1. Paṇṇattivāravaṇṇanā

1. The Commentary on the Section on Designations

1. Satipi [Pg.191] kusalamūlādīnampi vibhattabhāve khandhādivibhāgo tato sātisayoti dassento ‘‘khandhādayo viya pubbe avibhattā’’ti āha. Pakārattho vā ettha ādi-saddo ‘‘bhūvādayo’’tiādīsu viyāti kusalamūlādīnampi saṅgaho daṭṭhabbo. Aviññātattā nisāmentehi. Hetuattho vā ettha luttaniddiṭṭho aviññāpitattāti attho. Yadipi kāyasaṅkhārānaṃ vikappadvayepi hetuphalabhāvoyeva icchito, sāmivacanarūpāvibhūto pana attheva atthabhedoti dassento ‘‘kāyassa…pe… kattuatthe’’ti āha. So panāti kattuattho.

1. To show that although wholesome roots and so on are also divided, the division of the aggregates and so on is superior to that, he said: “Like the aggregates, etc., previously undivided.” Or here the word ādi (etc.) has the sense of variety, as in such phrases as “existence, etc.,” so the inclusion of wholesome roots and so on should be understood. By those who are listening because it was not understood. Or the meaning of cause here is indicated by an elided term, meaning “because it was not made known.” Although in both alternatives for bodily formations a cause-and-effect relationship is intended, to show that there is indeed a difference in meaning, though it is not manifest in the form of the genitive case, he said: “Of the body… in the sense of agent.” And that is the sense of agent.

2-7. Suddhikaekekapadavasenāti ‘‘kāyo saṅkhāro’’tiādīsu dvīsu dvīsu padesu aññamaññaṃ asammissaekekapadavasena. Atthābhāvatoti yathādhippetatthābhāvato. Aññathā karajakāyādiko attho attheva. Tenevāha ‘‘padasodhana…pe… avacanīyattā’’ti. Idāni tameva atthābhāvaṃ byatirekavasena dassento ‘‘yathā’’tiādimāha. Kasmā pana ubhayattha samāne samāsapadabhāve tattha attho labbhati, idha na labbhatīti? Bhinnalakkhaṇattā. Tattha hi rūpakkhandhādipadāni samānādhikaraṇānīti padadvayādhiṭṭhāno eko attho labbhati, idha pana kāyasaṅkhārādipadāni bhinnādhikaraṇānīti tathārūpo attho na labbhatīti. Tenāha ‘‘yathādhippetatthābhāvato’’ti.

2-7. By way of a single, simple word means by way of a single word unmixed with another in pairs of terms such as “the body is a formation.” Because of the absence of meaning means because of the absence of the intended meaning. Otherwise, there is indeed a meaning such as “a collection of dust.” For that reason he said: “the analysis of the terms… because it cannot be stated.” Now, to show that very absence of meaning by way of contrast, he said: “Just as…,” and so on. But why, when the state of being a compound term is the same in both cases, is a meaning obtained there but not obtained here? Because their characteristics are different. For there, terms such as “the aggregate of form” are in apposition, so a single meaning based on the two terms is obtained. But here, terms such as “bodily formation” have different referents, so such a meaning is not obtained. Therefore, he said: “because of the absence of the intended meaning.”

Visuṃ adīpetvāti ‘‘kāyasaṅkhāro’’tiādinā saha vuccamānopi kāyasaṅkhārasaddo visuṃ visuṃ attano atthaṃ ajotetvā ekaṃ atthaṃ yadi dīpetīti parikappavasena vadati. Tena kāyasaṅkhārasaddānaṃ samānādhikaraṇataṃ ulliṅgeti. ‘‘Kāyasaṅkhārasaddo kāyasaṅkhāratthe vattamāno’’ti kasmā vuttaṃ, ‘‘saṅkhārasaddo saṅkhārattheva vattamāno’’ti pana vattabbaṃ siyā. Evañhi sati khandhatthe vattamāno khandhasaddo viya rūpasaddena kāyasaddena visesitabboti idaṃ vacanaṃ yujjeyya, kāyasaṅkhārasaddānaṃ pana samānādhikaraṇatte na kevalaṃ saṅkhārasaddoyeva saṅkhāratthe [Pg.192] vattati, atha kho kāyasaddopīti imamatthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘kāyasaṅkhārasaddo kāyasaṅkhāratthe vattamāno’’ti vuttaṃ siyā, kāyasaddena samānādhikaraṇenāti adhippāyo. Byadhikaraṇena pana saṅkhārassa visesitabbatā atthevāti.

Without illuminating separately: He speaks by way of hypothesis, considering if the term 'bodily formation', even when spoken together with the phrase beginning 'bodily formation', illuminates a single meaning without separately illuminating its own meaning. By this, he points to the apposition of the terms 'body' and 'formation.' Why was it said, 'The term ‘bodily formation’ occurring in the sense of bodily formation,' when it should have been said, 'The term ‘formation’ occurring in the sense of formation itself'? For if this were so, this statement would be correct: just as the term 'aggregate' occurring in the sense of aggregate is to be qualified by the word 'form,' so this should be qualified by the word 'body.' But since the terms 'body' and 'formation' are in apposition, not only does the term 'formation' occur in the sense of formation, but the term 'body' does too. To show this meaning, it might be said, 'The term ‘bodily formation’ occurring in the sense of bodily formation.' The intention is: 'being in apposition with the word ‘body’.' But there is indeed the need to qualify 'formation' by a term with a different referent.

Imassa vārassāti suddhasaṅkhāravārassa. Padasodhanena dassitānanti ettakeva vuccamāne tattha dassitabhāvasāmaññena suddhakāyādīnampi gahaṇaṃ āpajjeyyāti taṃnivāraṇatthaṃ ‘‘yathādhippetānamevā’’ti āha. Kāyādipadehi aggahitattāti suddhakāyādipadehi aggahitattā. Idha panāti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ. Suddhasaṅkhāravāraṃ sandhāya vuttampi suddhasaṅkhāravāramevettha ananujānanto sakalasaṅkhārayamakavisayanti āha ‘‘idha pana saṅkhārayamake’’ti. Adhippetatthapariccāgoti assāsapassāsādikassa adhippetatthassa aggahaṇaṃ cetanākāyaabhisaṅkharaṇasaṅkhārādi anadhippetatthapariggaho. Yadi ‘‘kāyo saṅkhāro’’tiādinā suddhasaṅkhārataṃmūlacakkavārā atthābhāvato idha na gahetabbā, atha kasmā pavattivārameva anārabhitvā aññathā desanā āraddhāti āha ‘‘padasodhanavārataṃmūlacakkavārehī’’tiādi. Saṃsayo hoti saṅkhārasaddavacanīyatāsāmaññato kāyasaṅkhārādipadānaṃ byadhikaraṇabhāvato ca. Tenevāha ‘‘asamānādhikaraṇehi…pe… dassitāyā’’ti.

‘Of this section’ means of the section on simple formations. In the phrase ‘shown by the analysis of terms,’ if only this much were said, the inclusion of ‘simple body,’ etc., would follow from the commonality of being shown there. To prevent that, he said, ‘only of what is intended.’ ‘Because they are not taken by the terms “body,” etc.’ means because they are not taken by the terms ‘simple body,’ etc. ‘But here’ means in the commentary. Although what is said refers to the section on simple formations, not authorizing that very section on simple formations here, he says, ‘but here in the Yamaka on Formations,’ making the entire Yamaka on Formations its domain. ‘Abandonment of the intended meaning’ is the non-grasping of the intended meaning, such as in-breathing and out-breathing, and the grasping of an unintended meaning, such as the formation that is the volitional formation of the body of volition, etc. If, by such phrases as ‘the body is a formation,’ the sections of the cycle rooted in simple formations are not to be taken here because of an absence of meaning, then why was the teaching started in another way without beginning with the occurrence section? He said, ‘by the sections of the cycle rooted in the analysis of terms,’ etc. Doubt arises from the commonality of what is expressed by the word ‘formation’ and from the fact that the terms ‘bodily formation,’ etc., have different referents. For that reason he said, ‘by those with different referents… as was shown.’

Paṇṇattivāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Section on Designations is finished.

2. Pavattivāravaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Section on Occurrence

19. Saṅkhārānaṃ puggalānañca okāsattāti sampayuttānaṃ nissayapaccayatāya, saṅkhārānaṃ samāpajjitabbatāya puggalānaṃ jhānassa okāsatā veditabbā, bhūmi pana yadaggena puggalānaṃ okāso, tadaggena saṅkhārānampi okāso. ‘‘Dutiye jhāne tatiye jhāne’’tiādinā jhānaṃ, ‘‘kāmāvacare rūpāvacare’’tiādinā bhūmi ca visuṃ okāsabhāvena gahitā. Itīti hetuattho, yasmā jhānampi okāsabhāvena gahitaṃ, tasmāti attho. Puggalavāre ca okāsavasena puggalaggahaṇeti puggalavāre ca yadā puggalokāsasaṅkhārādīnaṃ okāsabhāvena gayhati, tadā [Pg.193] tesaṃ dvinnaṃ okāsānaṃ vasena gayhanaṃ hotīti yattha so puggalo, yañca tasmiṃ puggale jhānaṃ upalabbhati, tesaṃ dvinnaṃ bhūmijhānasaṅkhātānaṃ okāsānaṃ vasena yathārahaṃ kāyasaṅkhārādīnaṃ gahaṇaṃ kathanaṃ hotīti. Tasmāti yasmā etadeva, tasmā. Dutiyatatiyajjhānokāsavasenāti dutiyatatiyajjhānasaṅkhātaokāsavasena gahitā. Kathaṃ? ‘‘Vinā vitakkavicārehi assāsapassāsānaṃ uppādakkhaṇe’’ti evaṃ gahitā puggalā visesetvā dassitā. Kena? Teneva vitakkavicārarahitaassāsapassāsuppādakkhaṇenāti yojetabbaṃ.

19. ‘The opportunity for formations and for individuals’ should be understood as follows: for associated states, it is by way of the support condition; for individuals, the opportunity for jhāna is by way of the attainability of formations. Moreover, to the extent that individuals have an opportunity in a plane, to that same extent formations also have an opportunity. The jhāna is taken as an opportunity by such phrases as ‘in the second jhāna, in the third jhāna,’ and the plane by such phrases as ‘in the sense-sphere, in the form-sphere,’ each separately. ‘Iti’ here signifies a cause; the meaning is, because the jhāna is also taken as an opportunity, therefore. ‘And in the section on individuals, the grasping of individuals is by way of opportunity’ means: when, in the section on individuals, the opportunity for individuals, formations, and so on is grasped as an opportunity, then the grasping occurs by way of those two opportunities. That is, wherever that individual is, and whatever jhāna is found in that individual, the grasping and explanation of bodily formations and so on occurs appropriately by way of those two opportunities, designated as plane and jhāna. ‘Therefore’ means: for this very reason, therefore. ‘By way of the opportunity of the second and third jhānas’ means: taken by way of the opportunity designated as the second and third jhānas. How? Individuals are distinguished and shown as taken thus: ‘at the moment when in-breaths and out-breaths arise without initial thought and sustained thought.’ By what? It should be connected thus: by that very moment of the arising of in-breaths and out-breaths devoid of initial thought and sustained thought.

Paṭhamakoṭṭhāse jhānokāsavasena puggaladassanaṃ katanti vuttaṃ ‘‘puna…pe… dassetī’’ti. Bhūmiokāsavasena puggalaṃ dassetīti sambandho. Dvippakārānanti jhānabhūmiokāsabhedena duvidhānaṃ. Tesanti puggalānaṃ. ‘‘Paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ samāpannānaṃ kāmāvacarāna’’nti ca idaṃ nivattetabbagahetabbasādhāraṇavacanaṃ, tassa ca avacchedakaṃ ‘‘assāsapassāsānaṃ uppādakkhaṇe’’ti idanti vuttaṃ ‘‘visesa…pe… khaṇe’’ti. Tena visesanena. Kāmāvacarānampīti pi-saddo sampiṇḍanattho. Tena na kevalaṃ rūpārūpāvacaresu paṭhamajjhānaṃ samāpannānaṃ, atha kho kāmāvacarānampīti vuttamevatthaṃ sampiṇḍeti. Kīdisānaṃ kāmāvacarānanti āha ‘‘gabbhagatādīna’’nti. Ādi-saddena udakanimuggavisaññibhūtā saṅgahitā, na matacatutthajjhānasamāpannanirodhasamāpannā. Te hi akāmāvacaratāya viya rūpārūpabhavasamaṅgino vitakkavicāruppattiyāva nivattitā. Ekantikattāti assāsapassāsābhāvassa ekantikattā. Nidassitāti rūpārūpāvacarā nidassanabhāvena vuttā, na tabbirahitānaṃ aññesaṃ abhāvatoti adhippāyo. Paṭhamajjhānokāsā assāsapassāsavirahavisiṭṭhāti yojanā. Paṭhamañcettha paṭhamajjhānasamaṅgīnaṃ rūpārūpāvacarānaṃ gahaṇaṃ, dutiyaṃ yathāvuttagabbhagatādīnaṃ. Iminā nayenāti yvāyaṃ ‘‘saṅkhārānaṃ puggalānañcā’’tiādinā jhānokāsabhūmiokāsavasena puggalavibhāganayo vutto, iminā nayena upāyena. Sabbattha sabbapucchāsu.

‘In the first section, the showing of individuals by way of the opportunity for jhāna is done’ is stated in ‘Again… shows.’ The connection is: ‘one shows the individual by way of the opportunity of the plane.’ ‘Of two kinds’ means twofold, divided by the opportunity for jhāna and the plane. ‘Of them’ refers to the individuals. And the statement ‘of those who have attained the first jhāna and of those of the sense-sphere’ is a general statement concerning what is to be excluded and included, and its qualifier is ‘at the moment of the arising of in-breaths and out-breaths,’ as said in ‘by the distinction… at the moment.’ By that distinction. ‘Even of those of the sense-sphere’—the word ‘even’ serves the purpose of inclusion. Thus, it includes the meaning that it is not only those in the form and formless spheres who have attained the first jhāna, but also those of the sense-sphere. What kind of sense-sphere beings? It is said: ‘of those in the womb, etc.’ The word ‘etc.’ includes those submerged in water or rendered unconscious, but not those who have died, attained the fourth jhāna, or attained cessation. For they, as if not belonging to the sense-sphere, like those endowed with form and formless existences, are excluded by the very arising of initial thought and sustained thought. ‘Being absolute’ refers to the absolute absence of in-breaths and out-breaths. ‘Shown’ means that those of the form and formless spheres are spoken of as examples, not that there is an absence of others who are without them—this is the intention. The construction is: ‘The opportunities for the first jhāna are distinguished by the absence of in-breaths and out-breaths.’ Here, first is the inclusion of those endowed with the first jhāna in the form and formless spheres; second, of those in the womb, etc., as stated. ‘By this method’ refers to the method of classifying individuals by way of the opportunity for jhāna and the plane, which was explained in ‘of formations and of individuals, etc.’—by this method, by this means. In all places, in all questions.

21. Etasmiṃ pana atthe satīti yvāyaṃ uppattibhūmiyā jhānaṃ visesetvā attho vutto, etasmiṃ atthe gayhamāne aññatthapi uppattibhūmiyā jhānaṃ visesitabbaṃ bhaveyya, tathā ca aniṭṭhaṃ āpajjatīti dassento ‘‘catutthajjhāne’’tiādimāha. Kiṃ pana taṃ aniṭṭhanti āha ‘‘bhūmīnaṃ [Pg.194] okāsabhāvasseva aggahitatāpattito’’ti. Yattha yattha hi jhānaṃ gayhati, tattha tattha taṃ uppattibhūmiyā visesitabbaṃ hoti. Tathā sati jhānokāsova gahito siyā, na bhūmiokāso guṇabhūtattā. Kiñca ‘‘catutthajjhāne rūpāvacare arūpāvacare’’ti ettha rūpārūpabhūmiyā catutthajjhāne visesiyamāne tadekadesova okāsavasena gahito siyā, na sabbaṃ catutthajjhānaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘sabbacatutthajjhānassa okāsavasena aggahitatāpattito cā’’ti. Jhānabhūmokāsānanti jhānokāsabhūmiokāsānaṃ.

21. ‘But if this meaning is taken’—that is, the meaning which is stated by distinguishing the jhāna by its plane of origin—if this meaning is taken, then elsewhere too the jhāna would have to be distinguished by its plane of origin. Showing that an undesirable consequence would thus arise, he says, ‘in the fourth jhāna,’ and so on. But what is that undesirable consequence? He says, ‘because it would result in the non-grasping of the state of being an opportunity for the planes themselves.’ For wherever the jhāna is taken, there it must be distinguished by its plane of origin. If that is the case, then only the opportunity for jhāna would be grasped, not the opportunity of the plane, since the latter is secondary. Moreover, in the statement ‘in the fourth jhāna, in the form-sphere, in the formless-sphere,’ when the fourth jhāna is distinguished by the form and formless planes, only a part of it would be taken by way of opportunity, not the entire fourth jhāna. Therefore, he says, ‘and because it would result in the non-grasping of the entire fourth jhāna as an opportunity.’ ‘Of the jhāna-plane-opportunities’ means of the jhāna-opportunities and the plane-opportunities.

Nanu ca jhānabhūmiokāse asaṅkarato yojiyamāne na sabbasmiṃ paṭhamajjhānokāse kāyasaṅkhāro vacīsaṅkhāro ca atthi, tathā sabbasmiṃ kāmāvacarokāseti codanuppattiṃ sandhāya tassa parihāraṃ vattuṃ ‘‘yadipī’’tiādimāha. Tatthāti paṭhamajjhānokāse kāmāvacarokāse ca. Taṃdvayuppattīti tassa kāyavacīsaṅkhāradvayassa uppatti. Okāsadvayassa asaṅkarato gahaṇe ayañca guṇo laddho hotīti āha ‘‘visuṃ…pe… na vattabbaṃ hotī’’ti. Tattha aṅgamattavasenāti vitakkādijhānaṅgamattavasena. Tattha vattabbaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttameva. Vitakkarahitopi vicāro vacīsaṅkhāroyevāti āha ‘‘avitakka…pe… gacchatī’’ti. Muddhabhūtaṃ dutiyajjhānanti catukkanaye dutiyajjhānamāha. Tañhi sakalakkhobhakaradhammavigamena vitakkekaṅgappahāyikato sātisayattā ‘‘muddhabhūta’’nti vattabbataṃ labhati. Asaññasattā viyāti idaṃ visadisudāharaṇaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ.

With regard to the arising of the objection, ‘Is it not the case that if the jhāna-plane-opportunities are applied without confusion, then bodily formation and verbal formation are not present in the entire opportunity of the first jhāna, nor in the entire opportunity of the sense-sphere?,’ in order to state its refutation, he says, ‘even if,’ and so on. ‘Therein’ means in the opportunity of the first jhāna and in the opportunity of the sense-sphere. ‘The arising of those two’ means the arising of those two, the bodily and verbal formations. By grasping the two opportunities without confusion, this benefit is also gained, as he says: ‘separately… it need not be said.’ Therein, ‘by way of the factors alone’ means by way of the jhāna factors of initial thought, etc., alone. What should be said there is exactly what is stated in the commentary. Even without initial thought, sustained thought is still a verbal formation, as he says: ‘without initial thought… it goes.’ ‘The second jhāna, which is the peak’ refers to the second jhāna in the fourfold system. For that, because of its superiority through the abandonment of the single factor of initial thought and the removal of all agitating states, it is able to be called ‘the peak.’ ‘Like the non-percipient beings’ should be seen as a dissimilar example.

37. Āvajjanato pubbe pavattaṃ sabbaṃ cittaṃ paṭisandhicittena samānagatikattā ekaṃ katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘paṭhamato’’ti. Tenāha ‘‘avitakkaavicārato’’tiādi. Cittasaṅkhārassa ādidassanatthanti suddhāvāse cittasaṅkhārassa ādidassanatthaṃ. Tathā ‘‘vacīsaṅkhārassa ādidassanattha’’nti etthāpi.

37. All the consciousness that has occurred before adverting is spoken of as one with the rebirth-linking consciousness because they have the same destination; thus it is said, 'from the first.' Therefore he says, 'from what is without initial thought and sustained thought,' and so on. 'To show the beginning of the mental formation' means to show the beginning of the mental formation in the Pure Abodes. Similarly here too, 'to show the beginning of the verbal formation.'

Pavattivāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section on Occurrence is finished.

Saṅkhārayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Yamaka of Formations is finished.

7. Anusayayamakaṃ

7. The Yamaka on Underlying Tendencies

Paricchedaparicchinnuddesavāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Section on the Summary of Delimitation and the Delimited

1. ‘‘Avijjāsamudayā [Pg.195] rūpasamudayo, taṇhāsamudayā rūpasamudayo, kammasamudayā rūpasamudayo. Lobho nidānaṃ kammānaṃ samudayāyā’’ti ca evamādinā kusalamūlakusalādīnaṃ paccayabhāvo vuttoti āha ‘‘paccayadīpakena mūlayamakenā’’ti. ‘‘So ‘aniccaṃ rūpaṃ, aniccaṃ rūpa’nti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti. Cakkhu aniccaṃ, rūpā aniccā’’ti ca ādinā bahulakhandhādimukhena aniccānupassanādayo vihitāti vuttaṃ ‘‘khandhādīsu tīraṇabāhullato’’ti. Kilesānaṃ samucchindanato paraṃ pahānakiccaṃ natthīti āha ‘‘anusayapahānantā pahānapariññā’’ti. Yadipi anusayehi sampayogato ārammaṇato vā pahānapariññā nappavattati, anusayābhāve pana tadārambho eva natthīti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘anusayehi pahānapariññaṃ vibhāvetu’’nti. Anusayabhāvena labbhamānānanti anusayabhāvena vijjamānānaṃ, anusayasabhāvānanti attho. Tīhākārehīti paricchedādīhi tīhi pakārehi. Anusayesu gaṇanasarūpappavattiṭṭhānato abodhitesu puggalokāsādivasena pavattiyamānā tabbisayā desanā na suviññeyyā hotīti dassento āha ‘‘tesu tathā…pe… duravabodhattā’’ti.

1. 'With the arising of ignorance, there is the arising of material form; with the arising of craving, there is the arising of material form; with the arising of kamma, there is the arising of material form. Greed is the source for the arising of kammas.' By such sayings, the conditional nature of wholesome roots, the wholesome, and so on, is stated; hence he says, 'by the Mūlayamaka that illuminates conditions.' 'He understands as it really is: “Material form is impermanent, material form is impermanent.” The eye is impermanent, forms are impermanent,' and so on. By this abundant method of the aggregates, etc., the contemplations of impermanence and so on are established; hence it is said, 'due to the abundance of investigation into the aggregates, etc.' Since after the cutting off of the defilements there is no further task of abandonment, he says, 'full understanding by abandoning ends with the abandoning of the underlying tendencies.' Although full understanding by abandoning does not proceed by way of association with the underlying tendencies or by taking them as object, still, since in the absence of the underlying tendencies there is no undertaking of it at all, it is said, 'to clarify the full understanding by abandoning in relation to the underlying tendencies.' 'Of those obtainable by way of being an underlying tendency' means of those existing by way of being an underlying tendency, that is, of those having the nature of an underlying tendency. 'In three ways' means by three modes, such as delimitation. He shows that when the underlying tendencies are not understood in terms of their enumeration, nature, occurrence, and station, the teaching concerning them, which proceeds by way of persons, opportunities, etc., is not easily intelligible, saying, 'since in regard to them thus... because of being difficult to understand.'

Ettha purimesūti paduddhāro anantarassa vidhi paṭisedho vāti katvā sānusayavārādiapekkho, na anusayavārādiapekkho anusayavāre pāḷivavatthānassa pageva katattāti dassento ‘‘etesu sānusayavārādīsu purimesūti attho’’ti āha. Sānusayavārādīsu hi tīsu purimesu okāsavāre yato tatoti desanā pavattā, na anusayavārādīsu. Atthavisesābhāvatoti ‘‘kāmadhātuyā cutassā’’tiādinā (yama. 2.anusayayamaka.302) pāḷiāgatapadassa, ‘‘kāmadhātuṃ vā pana upapajjantassā’’tiādinā yamakabhāvena aṭṭhakathāādigatapadassa ca atthavisesābhāvato. Kathamayaṃ yamakadesanā siyā dutiyassa padassa abhāvatoti attho. Yadi nāyaṃ yamakadesanā, atha kasmā idhāgatāti āha ‘‘purimavāre hī’’tiādi. Tattha anusayaṭṭhānaparicchedadassananti anusayaṭṭhānatāya [Pg.196] paricchedadassanaṃ. Evampi kathamidaṃ anusayayamakaṃ yamakadesanāsabbhāvatoti āha ‘‘yamakadesanā…pe… nāmaṃ daṭṭhabba’’nti. Atthavasenāti paṭilomatthavasena. Paṭhamapadena hi vuttassa viparivattanavasenapi yamakadesanā hoti ‘‘rūpaṃ rūpakkhandho, rūpakkhandho rūpa’’ntiādīsu (yama. 1.khandhayamaka.2), tattha pana atthaviseso atthi, idha natthi, tasmā na tathā desanā katāti dassento āha ‘‘atthavisesābhāvato pana na vuttā’’ti. Labbhamānatāvasenāti pucchāya labbhamānatāvasena.

Herein, the extraction of the term 'in the preceding' is with reference to the sections beginning with the Sānusayavāra, taken as either a rule for or a prohibition of what immediately follows; it is not with reference to the sections beginning with the Anusayavāra, because the analysis of the Pāli in the Anusayavāra has already been done. Showing this, he says, 'The meaning is “in the preceding of these sections beginning with the Sānusayavāra.”' For in the three preceding sections beginning with the Sānusayavāra, in the Okāsavāra, the teaching proceeds as 'whence, thence,' but not so in the sections beginning with the Anusayavāra. Because there is no difference in meaning between the phrase that has come down in the Pāli, 'of one who has passed away from the sense-sphere,' etc., and the phrase that has come down in the commentary, etc., in the form of a pair, 'or of one who is being reborn in the sense-sphere,' etc. The meaning is: how could this be a teaching in pairs, since the second term is absent? If this is not a teaching in pairs, then why has it come here? He says, 'For in the preceding section,' etc. Therein, 'the seeing of the delimitation of the station of the underlying tendencies' means the seeing of the delimitation by way of being the station of the underlying tendencies. Even so, how is this the Anusayayamaka, given the absence of a teaching in pairs? He says, 'the teaching in pairs... the name should be seen.' 'By way of meaning' means by way of the converse meaning. For a teaching in pairs also occurs by way of reversing what is stated in the first term, as in 'material form is the material form aggregate, the material form aggregate is material form,' etc., but there a difference in meaning exists, whereas here there is none. Therefore, showing that the teaching was not given in that way, he says, 'but because of the absence of a difference in meaning, it was not stated.' 'By way of what is obtainable' means by way of what is obtainable in the question.

Uppattiarahataṃ dassetīti iminā nippariyāyena anusayā anāgatāti dassitaṃ hoti yato te maggavajjhā, na ca atītapaccuppannā uppattirahāti vuccanti uppannattā. Yaṃsabhāvā pana dhammā anāgatā anusayāti vuccanti, taṃsabhāvā eva te atītapaccuppannā vuttā. Na hi dhammānaṃ addhābhedena sabhāvabhedo atthi, tasmā anusayānaṃ atītapaccuppannabhāvā pariyāyato labbhantīti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ (yama. aṭṭha. anusayayamaka 1) ‘‘atītopi hotī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Evaṃpakārāti anusayappakārā, kāraṇalābhe sati uppajjanārahāicceva attho. So evaṃpakāro uppajjanavāre uppajjati-saddena gahito uppajjanārahatāya avicchinnabhāvadīpanatthanti adhippāyo. Tenāha ‘‘na khandhayamakādīsu viya uppajjamānatā’’ti, paccuppannatāti attho. Tenevātiādinā yathāvuttamatthaṃ pākaṭataraṃ karoti. Tattha ninnānākaraṇoti nibbiseso. Uppajjanānusayānaṃ ninnānākaraṇattā eva hi ‘‘etthesā taṇhā uppajjamānā uppajjati, ettha nivisamānā nivisatī’’ti vibhaṅge (vibha. 203) āgataṃ. Anusayanañhi ettha nivisananti adhippetaṃ.

By this it is shown directly that 'he shows their fitness to arise' means that the underlying tendencies are future. Since they are to be abandoned by the path, those of the past and present are not called 'fit to arise' because they have arisen. But those states that are of a certain nature are called future underlying tendencies, and those of that very same nature are said to be past and present. For there is no difference in the intrinsic nature of states due to a difference in time. Therefore, since the past and present states of the underlying tendencies are obtained figuratively, it is said in the commentary (Yamaka Aṭṭhakathā, Anusaya Yamaka 1), 'it is also past,' and so on. 'Of such a kind' means of the kind of underlying tendencies; the meaning is just that they are fit to arise when a cause is obtained. The intention is that in the section on arising, that 'such a kind' is taken by the word 'arises' for the purpose of showing the uninterrupted state of being fit to arise. Therefore he says, 'it is not the state of arising as in the Khandhayamaka, etc.,' meaning, the state of being present. By 'Therefore,' etc., he makes the aforesaid meaning clearer. Therein, 'without making a difference' means without distinction. For it is just because of making no difference between arising and the underlying tendency that it comes in the Vibhaṅga (Vibh. 203): 'Here this craving, arising, arises; here, settling, it settles.' For 'settling' is intended here as the underlying tendency.

Idāni yena pariyāyena atītapaccuppannesu anusayavohāro, taṃ dassetukāmo anāgatampi tehi saddhiṃ ekajjhaṃ katvā dassento ‘‘anurūpaṃ kāraṇaṃ pana…pe… vuccantī’’ti āha. Etena bhūtapubbagatiyā atītapaccuppannesu uppattirahatā veditabbāti dasseti. Uppattiarahatā nāma kilesānaṃ maggena asamucchinnatāya veditabbā. Sā ca atītapaccuppannesupi atthevāti pakārantarenapi tesaṃ pariyāyatova anusayabhāvaṃ pakāseti. Tenevāha ‘‘maggassa panā’’tiādi. Tādisānanti ye maggabhāvanāya asati uppattirahā, tādisānaṃ. Dhammo eva ca uppajjati, na dhammākāroti adhippāyo. Na hi dhammākārā aniccatādayo [Pg.197] uppajjantīti vuccanti. Yadi pana te uppādādisamaṅgino siyuṃ, dhammā eva siyuṃ. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘appahīnākāro ca uppajjatīti vattuṃ na yujjatī’’ti.

Now, wishing to show the figurative sense in which the term 'underlying tendency' applies to the past and present, showing them together with the future, he says, 'But a suitable cause... they are called.' By this he shows that their fitness to arise in the past and present should be understood by way of a past course. Fitness to arise, it should be understood, is due to the defilements not having been cut off by the path. And since that exists also in the past and present, by another method too he clarifies that their being underlying tendencies is only figurative. Therefore he says, 'But of the path,' and so on. 'Of such' means of such as are fit to arise in the absence of the development of the path. The intention is that only a state arises, not the characteristic of a state. For characteristics of states such as impermanence, etc., are not said to arise. But if they were possessed of arising, etc., they would be states themselves. Therefore it is said, 'And it is not right to say that the unabandoned characteristic arises.'

Vuttampi thāmagamanaṃ aggahetvā appahīnaṭṭhamattameva gahetvā codako codetīti dassento āha ‘‘sattānusaya…pe… āpajjatīti ce’’ti. Na hi thāmagamane gahite codanāya okāso atthi. Tenāha ‘‘nāpajjatī’’tiādi. Vuttaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ, na kevalamaṭṭhakathāyameva pāṭhagatovāyamattho, tasmā evameva gahetabboti dassento ‘‘thāmagato…pe… yutta’’nti vatvā kiṃ pana taṃ thāmagamananti parāsaṅkaṃ nivattento ‘‘thāmagatanti ca…pe… vuttā’’ti āha. Tattha aññehi asādhāraṇoti kilesavatthuādīnaṃ kilesatādisabhāvo viya kāmarāgādito aññattha alabbhamāno tesaṃyeva āveṇiko sabhāvo, yato te bhavabījaṃ bhavamūlanti ca vuccanti. Yasmā ca thāmagamanaṃ tesaṃ anaññasādhāraṇo sabhāvo, tasmā anusayananti vuttaṃ hotīti dassento ‘‘thāmagatoti anusayasamaṅgīti attho’’ti āha.

Showing that the objector objects by taking only the meaning of 'unabandoned' without grasping the 'endurance' that has been mentioned, he says, 'the seven underlying tendencies... if one maintains.' For when 'endurance' is grasped, there is no opportunity for objection. Therefore he says, 'one does not maintain,' and so on. It is said in the commentary. Showing that this meaning is not only found in the commentary but has also come down in the text, and therefore should be taken in just this way, after saying, 'endowed with endurance... is proper,' he then dispels another's doubt, 'But what is that endurance?' by saying, 'And endowed with endurance... they are called.' Therein, 'unshared with others' means their own specific nature, which is not found elsewhere apart from sensual lust, etc., just as the nature of being a defilement, etc., belongs to the bases of the defilements, etc.; for which reason they are called 'the seed of existence' and 'the root of existence.' And showing that because 'endurance' is their nature unshared with others, they are therefore called 'underlying tendencies,' he says, ''Endowed with endurance' means endowed with the underlying tendency; this is the meaning.'

‘‘Yassa kāmarāgānusayo anuseti, tassa paṭighānusayo anusetīti? Āmantā’’tiādinā (yama. 2.anusayayamaka.3) anusayavāre vutto eva attho ‘‘yassa kāmarāgānusayo uppajjati, tassa paṭighānusayo uppajjatīti? Āmantā’’tiādinā (yama. 2.anusayayamaka.300) vuttoti anusayanākāro eva uppajjanavāre uppajjati-saddena gahitoti ‘‘uppajjanavāro anusayavārena ninnānākaraṇo vibhatto’’ti yaṃ vuttaṃ, tattha vicāraṃ ārabhati ‘‘anusayauppajjanavārānaṃ samānagatikattā’’tiādinā. ‘‘Uppajjatī’’ti vacanaṃ siyāti uppajjanavāre ‘‘uppajjatī’’ti vacanaṃ appahīnākāradīpakaṃ siyā. Tathā ca sati yathā ‘‘imassa uppādā’’ti ettha imassa anirodhāti ayamatthopi ñāyati, evaṃ ‘‘uppajjatī’’ti vutte atthato ‘‘na uppajjatī’’ti ayamattho vutto hoti appahīnākārassa uppattirahabhāvassa anuppajjamānasabhāvattāti codanaṃ dassento ‘‘uppajjatīti vacanassa avuttatā na sakkā vattunti ce’’ti āha. Vacanatthavisesena taṃdvayassa vuttattāti etena dhammanānattābhāvepi padatthanānatthena vārantaradesanā hoti yathā [Pg.198] sahajātasaṃsaṭṭhavāresūti dasseti. Anurūpaṃ kāraṇaṃ labhitvātiādi tameva vacanatthavisesaṃ vibhāvetuṃ āraddhaṃ. Uppattiyogganti uppattiyā yoggaṃ, uppajjanasabhāgatanti attho. Yato anusayā uppattirahāti vuccanti, ekantena cetadeva sampaṭicchitabbaṃ ‘‘yassa kāmarāgānusayo uppajjati, tassa paṭighānusayo uppajjatīti? Āmantā’’tiādivacanato (yama. 2.anusayayamaka.300). ‘‘Anusentīti anusayā’’ti ettake vutte sadā vijjamānā nu kho te aparinipphannānusayanaṭṭhena ‘‘anusayā’’ti vuccantīti ayamattho āpajjatīti taṃnisedhanatthaṃ ‘‘anurūpaṃ kāraṇaṃ labhitvā uppajjantī’’ti vuttaṃ. Uppattiarahabhāvena thāmagatatā anusayaṭṭhoti yaṃ tesaṃ uppattiyogavacanaṃ vuttaṃ, taṃ sammadeva vuttanti imamatthamāha ‘‘anusayasaddassā’’tiādinā. Tena vāradvayadesanuppādikā anusayasaddatthaniddhāraṇāti dasseti. Tampi suvuttameva iminā tantippamāṇenāti idampi ‘‘abhidhamme tāvā’’tiādinā āgataṃ tividhameva tantiṃ sandhāyāhāti dassento āha ‘‘tantittayenapi hi cittasampayuttatā dīpitā hotī’’ti.

‘For one in whom the underlying tendency to sensual lust lies dormant, does the underlying tendency to aversion lie dormant? Yes.’ (Yama 2.3). This meaning, stated in the section on underlying tendencies, is the same as that stated in the section on arising: ‘For one in whom the underlying tendency to sensual lust arises, does the underlying tendency to aversion arise? Yes.’ (Yama 2.300). Thus, in the section on arising, the mode of the underlying tendencies is taken up with the word ‘arises.’ Regarding the statement, ‘The section on arising is distinguished from the section on underlying tendencies without any difference in nature,’ an investigation is undertaken, beginning with: ‘Because the sections on underlying tendencies and on arising have the same course.’ The word ‘arises’ in the section on arising might indicate the unabandoned state. If that is so, just as from the words ‘with the arising of this,’ the meaning ‘with the non-cessation of this’ is also understood, so too, when ‘arises’ is said, the meaning ‘it does not [presently] arise’ is effectively stated, because the unabandoned state, being devoid of actual arising, has a non-arising nature. To show the objection, it is said: ‘But if [it is argued that] it cannot be said that the word “arises” is unstated.’ Because that pair is stated with a specific meaning of the word, by this it is shown that even when there is no difference in the dhammas, a teaching in different sections occurs because of a difference in the meaning of the words, as in the sections on co-nascent and associated states. ‘Having obtained a suitable condition,’ etc., is begun in order to clarify that very specific meaning of the words. ‘Fit for arising’ means suitable for arising, having the nature of arising. Since underlying tendencies are said to be devoid of arising, this must be accepted entirely on the basis of the statement: ‘For one in whom the underlying tendency to sensual lust arises, does the underlying tendency to aversion arise? Yes?’ (Yama 2.300). If it were only said, ‘They lie dormant, therefore they are underlying tendencies,’ the meaning would follow that they are always existent, with the characteristic of being unmanifested underlying tendencies. To negate this, it is said: ‘Having obtained a suitable condition, they arise.’ The statement that they are fit for arising is well said, because the meaning of ‘underlying tendency’ is the state of having strength through being fit for arising. This meaning is stated with the words ‘of the word “underlying tendency”,’ etc. Thus it is shown that the determination of the meaning of the word ‘underlying tendency’ gives rise to the teaching of the two sections. That too is well-stated by this textual authority. This also, which comes as ‘In the Abhidhamma, first,’ etc., refers to the threefold textual tradition. To show this, it is said: ‘For by the threefold textual tradition, association with consciousness is also explained.’

Paricchedaparicchinnuddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Chapter on the Exposition of Defined Sections is finished.

Uppattiṭṭhānavāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Chapter on the Place of Arising

2. Evaṃ satīti vedanānaṃ visesitabbabhāve kāmadhātuyā ca visesanabhāve sati. Kāmādhātuyā anusayanaṭṭhānatā na vuttā hoti appadhānabhāvato, padhānāppadhānesu padhāne kiccadassanato, visesanabhāvena caritabbatāya cāti adhippāyo. Hotu ko dosoti kadāci vadeyyāti āsaṅkamāno āha ‘‘dvīsu panā’’tiādi. Dvīsūti niddhāraṇe bhummaṃ, tathā ‘‘tīsu dhātūsū’’ti etthāpi. Tasmāti yasmā dhātuādibhedena tividhaṃ anusayaṭṭhānaṃ, tattha ca rūpārūpadhātūnaṃ bhavarāgassa anusayaṭṭhānatā vuttāti kāmadhātuyā kāmarāgassa anusayaṭṭhānatā ekantena vattabbā, tasmā. Tīsu dhātūsu tīsu vedanāsūti ca niddhāraṇe bhummaṃ, kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsūti ca ādhāre.

2. This being so: that is, when feelings are what is to be specified and the sense-sphere is what specifies. The sense-sphere is not stated as a place for underlying tendencies because of its lack of prominence; for among prominent and non-prominent things, the function is seen in the prominent one, and the intention is that it should function as a specifier. Anticipating that someone might occasionally say, ‘Let it be, what is the fault?’, he says, ‘But in two…,’ and so on. ‘In two’ is a locative of specification, as is ‘in the three elements’ here. Therefore: since the place of underlying tendencies is threefold by way of the elements, etc., and since in that context the form and formless elements are stated as the place for the underlying tendency to craving for existence, the sense-sphere must definitely be stated as the place for the underlying tendency to sensual lust; therefore. ‘In the three elements, in the three feelings’ is a locative of specification, and ‘in the sense-sphere, in two feelings’ is a locative of location.

Dvīsvevāti [Pg.199] dvīsu sukhopekkhāsu eva. Sabbāsu dvīsūti yāsu kāsuci dvīsu. Tenāti ‘‘kāmarāgo dvīsu vedanāsu anusetī’’ti vacanasāmatthiyaladdhena visesanicchayeneva. Bhavarāgānusayaṭṭhānaṃ rūpārūpadhātuyo tadanurūpā ca vedanā. Na hi dvīsu vedanāsu kāmarāgānusayova anusetīti avadhāraṇaṃ icchitaṃ, dvīsu eva pana vedanāsūti icchitaṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘dvīsveva anuseti, na tīsū’’ti. Aṭṭhānañca anusayānaṃ, kiṃ taṃ apariyāpannaṃ sakkāye? Sabbo lokuttaro dhammo. Ca-saddena paṭighānusayaṭṭhānaṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘yathā cā’’tiādi. Aññāti kāmarāgānusayaṭṭhānabhūtā dve vedanā.

‘In two only’ means in just the two, pleasant feeling and equanimity. ‘In all two’ means in any two whatsoever. By that is meant: by the determination of the specification obtained through the force of the statement, ‘The underlying tendency to sensual lust lies dormant in two feelings.’ The place of the underlying tendency to craving for existence is the form and formless elements and the feelings corresponding to them. For the emphasis is not intended to mean that only the underlying tendency to sensual lust lies dormant in two feelings, but rather that it lies dormant in two feelings only. Therefore he said, ‘It lies dormant in two only, not in three.’ And what is the non-place for underlying tendencies? That which is unincluded in personal existence? The entire supramundane Dhamma. By the word ‘ca’ (and), he includes the place for the underlying tendency to aversion. Therefore it is said, ‘just as,’ and so on. ‘Other’ means the two feelings that are the place for the underlying tendency to sensual lust.

Aññesu dvīhi vedanāhi vippayuttesu. Piyarūpasātarūpesūti piyāyitabbamadhurasabhāvesu. Visesanañcetaṃ rūpādīnaṃ sabbadvārasabbapurisesu iṭṭhabhāvassa aniyatatāya kataṃ. Sātasantasukhagiddhiyāti sātasukhe santasukhe ca gijjhanākārena abhikaṅkhanākārena. Tattha sātasukhaṃ kāyikaṃ, santasukhaṃ cetasikaṃ. Sātasukhaṃ vā kāyikasukhaṃ, santasukhaṃ upekkhāsukhaṃ. Tathā cāhu ‘‘upekkhā pana santattā, sukhamicceva bhāsitā’’ti (visuddhi. 2.644; mahāni. aṭṭha. 27). Parittaṃ vā oḷārikaṃ sukhaṃ sātasukhaṃ, anoḷārikaṃ santasukhaṃ. Parittaggahaṇañcettha kāmarāgānusayassa adhippetattā. Aññatthāti vedanāhi aññattha. Soti kāmarāgānusayo. Vedanāsu anugato hutvā setīti vedanāpekkho eva hutvā pavattati yathā puttāpekkhāya dhātiyā anuggaṇhanappavatti, sayanasaṅkhātā pavatti ca kāmarāgassa nikāmanameva. Tenāha ‘‘sukhamicceva abhilapatī’’ti. Yathā tassa, evaṃ paṭighānusayādīnampi vuttaniyāmena yathāsakaṃ kiccakaraṇameva dukkhavedanādīsu anusayanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘evaṃ paṭighānusayo cā’’tiādi. Tīsu vedanāsu anusayanavacanenāti tīsu vedanāsu yathārahaṃ anusayanavacanena. Iṭṭhādibhāvena gahitesūti iṭṭhādīsu ārammaṇapakatiyā vasena iṭṭhādibhāvena gahitesu viparītasaññāya vasena aniṭṭhādīsu iṭṭhādibhāvena gahitesūti yojanā. Na hi iṭṭhādibhāvena gahaṇaṃ viparītasaññā.

In other things, dissociated from the two feelings. In what is dear and agreeable: meaning in things that are to be cherished, having a sweet nature. And this is a specification for forms, etc., made because of the indeterminacy of what is desirable at all doors for all persons. Through greed for pleasant and peaceful happiness: meaning with the manner of craving and longing for pleasant happiness and peaceful happiness. Here, pleasant happiness is bodily, peaceful happiness is mental. Or, pleasant happiness is bodily happiness, peaceful happiness is equanimous happiness. Thus it was said: ‘But equanimity, because it is peaceful, is spoken of as happiness’ (Vism 16.139; Mahā-niddesa Commentary 27). Or, pleasant happiness is limited or gross happiness, peaceful happiness is non-gross happiness. And here the taking of ‘limited’ is because the underlying tendency to sensual lust is intended. ‘Elsewhere’ means elsewhere than in feelings. ‘It’ means the underlying tendency to sensual lust. ‘Having followed feelings, it lies dormant’ means it proceeds being dependent on feelings, just as a wet-nurse’s activity of caring proceeds in dependence on a child; and the occurrence called ‘lying dormant’ is simply the craving of sensual lust. Therefore he says: ‘It simply longs for happiness.’ Just as for that, so too for the underlying tendency to aversion, etc., according to the stated method, their lying dormant in painful feelings, etc., should be seen as the performance of their respective functions. Hence it is said: ‘So too the underlying tendency to aversion,’ etc. ‘By the statement about lying dormant in the three feelings’ means: by the statement about lying dormant appropriately in the three feelings. ‘In things taken as desirable, etc.’: the construction is: in things taken as desirable, etc., by way of their nature as desirable objects, and in things taken as desirable, etc., that are [in fact] undesirable, etc., by way of perverted perception. For the taking [of a naturally desirable thing] as desirable is not perverted perception.

Tatthāti iṭṭhārammaṇādīsu. Etthāti anusayane. Kāmassādādivatthubhūtānaṃ kāmabhavādīnanti kāmassādabhavassādavatthubhūtānaṃ [Pg.200] kāmarūpārūpabhavānaṃ gahaṇaṃ veditabbanti yojanā. Tatthāti vedanāttayadhātuttayesu. Niddhāraṇe cetaṃ bhummaṃ. Dukkhapaṭighāto dukkhe anabhirati. Yattha tatthāti dukkhavedanāya taṃsampayuttesu aniṭṭharūpādīsu vāti yattha tattha. Mahaggatā upādinnakkhandhā rūpārūpabhavā, anupādinnakkhandhā rūpārūpāvacaradhammā. Tatthāti yathāvuttesu mahaggatadhammesu bhavarāgoicceva veditabbo. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘rūpadhātuyā arūpadhātuyā ettha kāmarāgānusayo nānusetī’’ti. Diṭṭhānusayādīnanti ādi-saddena vicikicchānusayaavijjānusayādīnaṃ saṅgaho daṭṭhabbo.

‘Therein’ means in desirable objects, etc. ‘Here’ means in the lying dormant. The phrase ‘of sensual existence, etc.’ should be understood as the taking of the sensual, form, and formless existences, which are the basis for the gratification in sensuality and the gratification in existence. ‘Therein’ means in the triad of feelings and the triad of elements. And this is a locative of specification. Aversion towards suffering is non-delight in suffering. ‘Wherever’ means wherever there is painful feeling or in associated undesirable forms, etc. The exalted aggregates subject to clinging are the form and formless existences; the aggregates not subject to clinging are the phenomena pertaining to the form and formless spheres. ‘Therein,’ that is, in the aforementioned exalted states, it should be understood as precisely craving for existence. Hence it is said: ‘In the form element and the formless element, the underlying tendency to sensual lust does not lie dormant.’ ‘Of the underlying tendencies to views, etc.’: by the word ‘etc.,’ the inclusion of the underlying tendencies to doubt, ignorance, etc., should be understood.

Dhātuttayavedanāttayavinimuttaṃ diṭṭhānusayādīnaṃ anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ na vuttanti suvuttametaṃ diṭṭhānusayādīnaṃ uppattiṭṭhānapucchāyaṃ ‘‘sabbasakkāyapariyāpannesu dhammesu’’icceva vissajjitattā. Kāmarāgo pana yattha nānuseti, taṃ dukkhavedanārūpārūpadhātuvinimuttaṃ diṭṭhānusayādīnaṃ anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ atthīti dassetuṃ ‘‘nanu cā’’tiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha tadanusayanaṭṭhānatoti tassa kāmarāgānusayassa anusayanaṭṭhānato. Aññā nekkhammassitasomanassupekkhāsaṅkhātā. Ayamettha saṅkhepattho – nekkhammassitadomanasse viya paṭighānusayo nekkhammassitasomanassupekkhāsu kāmarāgānusayo nānusetīti ‘‘yattha kāmarāgānusayo nānuseti, tattha diṭṭhānusayo nānusetī’’ti sakkā vattunti tasmā taṃ uddharitvā na vuttanti. Hontūti tāsaṃ vedanānaṃ atthitaṃ paṭijānitvā uddharitvā avacanassa kāraṇaṃ dassento āha ‘‘na pana…pe… taṃ na vutta’’nti. Tadanusayanaṭṭhānanti tesaṃ diṭṭhānusayādīnaṃ anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ. Tasmāti yasmā satipi kāmarāgānusayanaṭṭhānato aññasmiṃ diṭṭhānusayādīnaṃ anusayanaṭṭhāne taṃ pana dhātuttayavedanāttayavinimuttaṃ natthi vedanādvayabhāvato, tasmā. Taṃ vedanādvayaṃ na vuttaṃ visuṃ na uddhaṭanti attho. Tasmāti yasmā ‘‘yattha kāmarāgādayo nānusenti, tattha diṭṭhivicikicchā nānusentī’’ti ayamattho ‘‘āmantā’’ti iminā paṭivacanavissajjanena avibhāgato vuttoti ‘‘yattha kāmarāgādayo anusenti, tattha diṭṭhivicikicchā anusentī’’ti ayampi attho avibhāgatova labbhati, tasmā. Avibhāgato ca dukkhaṃ paṭighassa anusayanaṭṭhānanti dīpitaṃ hoti. Tenāha ‘‘avisesena…pe… veditabba’’nti. Tattha avisesenāti gehassitaṃ nekkhammassitanti visesaṃ akatvā. Samudāyavasena [Pg.201] gahetvāti yathāvuttaavayavānaṃ samūhavasena dukkhantveva gahetvā. ‘‘Avisesena samudāyavasena gahetvā’’ti imamatthaṃ tathā-saddena anukaḍḍhati ‘‘dvīsu vedanāsū’’ti etthāpi gehassitādivibhāgassa anicchitattā.

It is well stated that the basis for the underlying tendencies of views and so on, which is free from the three elements and three feelings, is not mentioned, because in the question about the place of arising of the underlying tendencies of views and so on, it is answered simply as “in all phenomena included in personal existence.” However, to show that there is a basis for the underlying tendencies of views and so on where sensual lust does not lie dormant, which is free from painful feeling and the form and formless elements, the phrase “is it not so?” and so on is introduced. There, “from that basis of the underlying tendency” means from the basis of the underlying tendency of sensual lust. Others are feelings designated as joy and equanimity associated with renunciation. Here, the concise meaning is this: just as the underlying tendency of aversion does not lie dormant in renunciation-associated distress, so the underlying tendency of sensual lust does not lie dormant in renunciation-associated joy and equanimity. Therefore, it is possible to say, “where the underlying tendency of sensual lust does not lie dormant, there the underlying tendency of views does not lie dormant.” Hence, it is not mentioned after extracting that. “Let it be so”—having acknowledged the existence of those feelings, the reason for not mentioning it after extraction is stated: “but indeed… it is not said.” “That basis of the underlying tendencies” means the basis of the underlying tendencies of views and so on. Therefore, because even if there is another basis for the underlying tendencies of views and so on apart from the basis for the underlying tendency of sensual lust, that basis is not free from the three elements and three feelings, due to the presence of two feelings, therefore, the meaning is that those two feelings are not mentioned separately, nor are they extracted. Therefore, because the meaning “where sensual lust and others do not lie dormant, there views and doubt do not lie dormant” is stated without distinction by the answer “yes,” the meaning “where sensual lust and others lie dormant, there views and doubt lie dormant” is also obtained without distinction. And it is shown that suffering is the basis for the underlying tendency of aversion without distinction. Therefore, it is said: “without distinction… it should be understood.” There, “without distinction” means without making a distinction between household life and renunciation. “Taken as a whole” means taking the aforementioned components as a collection, simply as suffering. The word 'tathā' (so) draws this meaning, “without distinction, taken as a whole,” into “in two feelings,” because here too the distinction between household life and so on is not intended.

Yadi evaṃ ‘‘paṭighaṃ tena pajahati, na tattha paṭighānusayo anusetī’’ti idaṃ suttapadaṃ kathanti codanaṃ sandhāya ‘‘apicā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tatthāti tasmiṃ domanasse, taṃsampayutte vā paṭighe. Nekkhammassitaṃ domanassantiādinā neyyatthamidaṃ suttaṃ, na nītatthanti dasseti. Yathā pana suttaṃ udāhaṭaṃ, tathā idha kasmā na vuttanti āha ‘‘paṭighuppattirahaṭṭhānatāyā’’tiādi. Evampi suttābhidhammapāṭhānaṃ kathamavirodhoti āha nippariyāyadesanā hesā, sā pana pariyāyadesanāti. Evañca katvāti pariyāyadesanattā eva. Rāgānusayoti kāmarāgānusayo adhippeto. Yato ‘‘anāgāmimaggena samugghātanaṃ sandhāyā’’ti vuttaṃ, tasmā tassa na mahaggatadhammā anusayanaṭṭhānanti taṃ paṭhamajjhānañca anāmasitvā ‘‘na hi lokiyā…pe… nānusetīti sakkā vattu’’nti vuttaṃ. Avatthubhāvatoti sabhāveneva anuppattiṭṭhānattā. Idhāti imasmiṃ anusayayamake. Vuttanayenāti ‘‘nekkhammassitaṃ domanassaṃ uppādetvā’’tiādinā vuttena nayena. Taṃpaṭipakkhabhāvatoti tesaṃ paṭighādīnaṃ paṭipakkhassa maggassa sabbhāvato. Na kevalaṃ maggasabbhāvato, atha kho balavavipassanāsabbhāvatopīti dassento āha ‘‘taṃsamugghā…pe… bhāvato cā’’ti.

If so, referring to the objection 'how?' regarding the sutta passage 'he abandons aversion thereby, and no underlying tendency of aversion lies dormant therein,' it is said, 'moreover,' and so on. Therein: in that distress, or in the aversion associated with it. With 'renunciation-associated distress' and so on, this sutta is of interpretable meaning, not of definitive meaning—this is shown. But why is it not stated here as the sutta was cited? It is said, 'because it is a place devoid of the arising of aversion,' and so on. Thus, how is there no contradiction with the sutta and Abhidhamma passages? It is said: this is a direct teaching, but that is an indirect teaching. And having done thus: precisely because it is an indirect teaching. The underlying tendency of lust refers specifically to the underlying tendency of sensual lust. Since it is said, 'with reference to eradication by the path of the non-returner,' therefore, exalted states are not the basis for that underlying tendency. Thus, without touching upon the first jhāna, it is said, 'for worldly... it is possible to say that it does not lie dormant.' By way of being without a basis: because by its very nature it is a place of non-arising. Here: in this Yamaka on underlying tendencies. By the stated method: by the method stated as, 'having aroused renunciation-associated distress,' and so on. By way of being the opposite of that: by the presence of the path, which is the opposite of those states such as aversion. Not only by the presence of the path, but also by the presence of strong insight—showing this, it is said, 'and by the presence of that which is capable of its eradication.'

Idāni yadetaṃ tattha tattha ‘‘anusayanaṭṭhāna’’nti vuttaṃ, taṃ gahetabbadhammavasena vā siyā gahaṇavisesena vāti dve vikappā, tesu paṭhamaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘ārammaṇe anusayanaṭṭhāne satī’’ti. Rūpādiārammaṇe anusayānaṃ anusayanaṭṭhānanti gayhamāne yamatthaṃ sandhāya ‘‘na sakkā vattu’’nti vuttaṃ, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘dukkhāya hī’’tiādimāha. Yadi siyāti yadi kāmarāgānusayo siyā. Etassapīti diṭṭhānusayasampayuttalobhassapi ‘‘sabbasakkāyapariyāpannesu dhammesū’’ti kāmarāgassa ṭhānaṃ vattabbaṃ siyā, na ca vuttaṃ. Atha panātiādi dutiyavikappaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Ajjhāsayavasena taṃninnatāyāti asatipi ārammaṇakaraṇe yattha kāmarāgādayo ajjhāsayato ninnā, taṃ tesaṃ anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ. Tena [Pg.202] vuttaṃ ‘‘anugato hutvā setī’’ti. Atha pana vuttanti sambandho. Yathātiādi yathāvuttassa atthassa udāharaṇavasena nirūpanaṃ. Dukkhe paṭihaññanavaseneva pavattati, nārammaṇakaraṇavasenāti adhippāyo. Dukkhameva tassa anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ vuttanti ajjhāsayassa tattha ninnattā dukkhameva tassa paṭighassa anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ vuttaṃ, nālambitaṃ rūpādi sukhavedanā cāti adhippāyo. Evanti yathā aññārammaṇassapi paṭighassa ajjhāsayato dukkhaninnatāya dukkhameva anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ vuttaṃ, evaṃ. Dukkhādīsu…pe… vuttanti ‘‘dukkhena sukhaṃ adhigantabbaṃ. Natthi dinna’’nti ca ādinā kāyakilamanadukkhe dānānubhāvādike ca micchābhinivesanavasena uppajjamānena diṭṭhānusayena sampayutto aññārammaṇopi lobho ‘‘evaṃ sukhaṃ bhavissatī’’ti ajjhāsayato sukhābhisaṅgavaseneva pavattatīti sukhupekkhābhedaṃ sātasantasukhadvayameva assa lobhassa anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ vuttaṃ pāḷiyaṃ, na yathāvuttaṃ dukkhādi, tasmā bhavarāga…pe… na virujjhati. Ekasmiṃyeva cātiādi dutiyavikappaṃyeva upabrūhanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Tattha rāgassa sukhajjhāsayatā taṃsamaṅgino puggalassa vasena veditabbā, tanninnabhāvena vā cakkhussa visamajjhāsayatā viya. Esa nayo sesesupi. Tesaṃ rāgapaṭighānaṃ nānānusayaṭṭhānatā hoti ekasmimpi ārammaṇeti attho.

Now, regarding what is said here and there as 'the basis for underlying tendencies,' there are two alternatives: it may be by way of the phenomena to be grasped or by way of the particular mode of grasping. With reference to the first, it is said: 'When there is a basis for underlying tendencies in the object.' When 'the basis for underlying tendencies' is taken as the object for the underlying tendencies in the case of form, etc., to show the meaning with reference to which 'it cannot be said' was stated, he says 'for suffering,' etc. 'If it were so' means if the underlying tendency of sensual desire were so. Even for this, that is, for greed associated with the underlying tendency of views, it should be said that the basis of sensual desire is 'among all phenomena encompassed by identity,' but it is not said. Then, 'But then...' etc. was stated with reference to the second alternative. 'By way of inclination, by way of leaning towards it' means that even when there is no taking of an object, wherever sensual desire and so forth are inclined by way of disposition, that is their basis for underlying tendencies. Therefore it is said: 'having followed, it lies dormant.' The connection is with the phrase 'But then it is said...'. 'Just as...' etc. is an explanation of the meaning stated previously by way of example. The intention is that it occurs only by way of aversion towards suffering, not by way of taking an object. 'Suffering alone is said to be its basis for underlying tendencies' means that because the inclination leans towards it, suffering alone is said to be the basis of that resentment, not form, etc., or pleasant feeling which are taken as objects—this is the intention. Thus: just as for resentment, even when having another object, due to its inclination towards suffering by way of disposition, suffering alone is said to be its basis, so too... In suffering, etc.... it is said: 'Happiness is to be attained through suffering,' and 'There is no fruit of what is given,' etc. Greed associated with the underlying tendency of views, arising by way of wrong adherence concerning bodily fatigue, suffering, the power of giving, etc., and having another object, occurs by way of clinging to pleasure out of the disposition 'thus there will be happiness.' Therefore, the two feelings, pleasure and equanimity, are declared in the Pāli to be the basis for the underlying tendency of that greed, not suffering, etc., as stated previously. Therefore, craving for existence... does not conflict. And 'in one and the same...' etc. was stated only to elaborate on the second alternative. There, the disposition of lust towards pleasure should be understood by way of the person endowed with it, or by way of its leaning, like the uneven disposition of the eye. This method applies to the rest as well. The meaning is that lust and resentment have different bases for underlying tendencies even in one and the same object.

Evañca katvāti asatipi gahetabbabhede gahaṇavisesena anusayanaṭṭhānassa bhinnattā eva. ‘‘Yattha…pe… no’’ti vuttaṃ, aññathā virujjheyya. Gahetabbabhedena hi rāgapaṭighānaṃ anusayanaṭṭhānabhede gayhamāne vipākamatte ṭhātabbaṃ siyā, na ca taṃ yuttaṃ, napi sabbesaṃ purisadvārānaṃ iṭṭhāniṭṭhaṃ niyatanti. Yadipi yathāvuttalobhassa vuttanayena kāmarāgānusayatā sambhavati, yathā pana sukhupekkhāsu iṭṭhārammaṇe ca uppajjantena domanassena saha pavatto doso dubbalabhāvena paṭighānusayo na hoti, evaṃ yathāvuttalobhopi kāmarāgānusayo na hotīti imamatthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘aṭṭhakathāyaṃ panā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Na paṭighānusayoti ettha na-kāro paṭisedhanattho, na aññattho, itarattha pana sambhavo eva natthīti dassento ‘‘yaṃ paneta’’ntiādimāha. Tattha ‘‘na hi domanassassa paṭighānusayabhāvāsaṅkā atthī’’ti iminā na-kārassa aññatthatābhāvadassanamukhena abhāvatthataṃ samattheti.

This being so: because the basis for underlying tendencies is differentiated by the particular mode of grasping even when there is no differentiation in what is to be grasped, it was said, 'Where... not'; otherwise, it would be a contradiction. For if the different bases for the underlying tendencies of lust and resentment were taken as being differentiated by what is to be grasped, they would have to be established in mere resultants, but that is not appropriate, nor is it fixed that objects are pleasant and unpleasant for all the doors of all persons. And although the underlying tendency of sensual desire is possible for the aforementioned greed in the manner stated, just as the aversion that arises together with displeasure towards a pleasant object in the context of pleasant and equanimous feelings is not the underlying tendency of aversion due to its weakness, so too, the aforementioned greed is not the underlying tendency of sensual desire. To show this meaning, it was said, 'But in the commentary...' and so forth. In 'it is not the underlying tendency of aversion,' the particle 'na' has the meaning of negation, not any other meaning. To show that there is no other possibility, he says, 'But this...' etc. There, with the words 'for there is no doubt of displeasure being the underlying tendency of aversion,' by showing that the particle 'na' has no other meaning, he establishes its meaning as absence.

Desanā [Pg.203] saṃkiṇṇā viya bhaveyyāti ettha desanāsaṅkaraṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘bhavarāgassapi…pe… bhaveyyā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tassattho – yathā kāmarāgassa kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsu ārammaṇakaraṇavasena uppatti vuttā ‘‘kāmarāgo kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsu anusetī’’ti, evaṃ yadi ‘‘bhavarāgo kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsu anusetī’’ti vucceyya, bhavarāgassapi…pe… bhaveyya. Tato ca kāmarāgena saddhiṃ bhavarāgassa desanā saṃkiṇṇā bhaveyya, kāmarāgato ca bhavarāgassa viseso dassetabbo. So ca sahajātānusayavasena na sakkā dassetunti ārammaṇakaraṇavasena dassetabbo. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘tasmā ārammaṇa…pe… adhippāyo’’ti. Tattha ārammaṇavisesenāti rūpārūpadhātusaṅkhātaārammaṇavisesena. Visesadassanatthanti kāmarāgato bhavarāgassa visesadassanatthaṃ. Evaṃ desanā katāti ‘‘rūpadhātuyā arūpadhātuyā ettha bhavarāgānusayo anusetī’’ti evaṃ visaye bhummaṃ katvā desanā katā. Tenāha ‘‘sahajātavedanāvisesābhāvato’’ti.

Here, to show the confusion in the teaching, it is said: 'The teaching might become confused,' and 'even for craving for existence... it might be.' Its meaning is this: just as the arising of sensual desire in the two feelings of the sense-desire realm was stated by way of taking an object—'sensual desire lies dormant in the two feelings of the sense-desire realm'—so too, if it were said, 'craving for existence lies dormant in the two feelings of the sense-desire realm,' then even for craving for existence... it might be. And then, the teaching about craving for existence would become confused with that of sensual desire, and the distinction between craving for existence and sensual desire would have to be shown. And that cannot be shown by way of the co-arisen underlying tendency, so it must be shown by way of taking an object. Therefore it is said: 'Thus, by way of the object... this is the intention.' There, 'by way of the distinction in the object' means by way of the distinction in the object designated as the fine-material and immaterial realms. 'For the purpose of showing the distinction' means for the purpose of showing the distinction of craving for existence from sensual desire. Thus the teaching was given: 'The underlying tendency of craving for existence lies dormant in the fine-material realm and the immaterial realm'—thus the teaching was given by using the locative case to indicate the sphere. Therefore he says: 'due to the absence of a distinction in the co-arisen feeling.'

Uppattiṭṭhānavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the section concerning the basis of arising is concluded.

Mahāvāro

The Great Section

1. Anusayavāravaṇṇanā

1. The Commentary on the Section concerning Underlying Tendencies

3. Pavattāvirāmavasenāti anusayappavattiyā avirāmavasena, avicchedavasenāti attho. Kathaṃ pana kusalābyākatacittakkhaṇe anusayānaṃ pavattīti āha ‘‘maggeneva…pe… pubbe’’ti.

3. 'By way of non-cessation of occurrence' means by way of the non-cessation of the occurrence of underlying tendencies; the meaning is by way of continuity. But how does the occurrence of underlying tendencies take place during moments of wholesome and indeterminate consciousness? It is said, 'Only by the path... previously.'

20. Cittacetasikānañca ṭhānaṃ nāma cittuppādoti āha ‘‘ekasmiṃ cittuppāde’’ti. Tesaṃ tesaṃ puggalānanti puthujjanādīnaṃ puggalānaṃ. Pakatiyā sabhāvena. Sabhāvasiddhā hi dukkhāya vedanāya kāmarāgassa ananusayanaṭṭhānatā. Evaṃ sesesupi yathārahaṃ vattabbaṃ. Vakkhati hi ‘‘pakatiyā dukkhādīnaṃ kāmarāgādīnaṃ ananusayanaṭṭhānataṃ sandhāya vutta’’nti. Pahānenāti tassa tassa anusayassa samucchindanena. Tiṇṇaṃ puggalānanti puthujjanasotāpannasakadāgāmīnaṃ. Dvinnaṃ puggalānanti anāgāmiarahantānaṃ. Etthāti etasmiṃ puggalokāsavāre. Purimanayeti ‘‘tiṇṇaṃ puggalāna’’ntiādike purimasmiṃ vissajjananaye. Okāsanti uppattiṭṭhānaṃ, idha pana dukkhavedanā [Pg.204] veditabbā. Pacchimanayeti ‘‘dvinnaṃ puggalāna’’ntiādike vissajjananaye. Anokāsatā ananusayanaṭṭhānatā.

20. 'And the basis of consciousness and mental factors is a mind-moment'; thus it is said, 'in one mind-moment.' 'For those various individuals' means for individuals such as worldlings, etc. 'By nature' means by its own inherent state. For it is established by its inherent state that painful feeling is not a basis for the underlying tendency of sensual desire. Similarly, this should be stated accordingly in the remaining cases. For it will be stated: 'This is said with reference to the fact that by nature, painful feeling, etc., are not a basis for the underlying tendencies of sensual desire, etc.' 'By abandoning' means by the eradication of that particular underlying tendency. 'For three types of individuals' means for worldlings, stream-enterers, and once-returners. 'For two types of individuals' means for non-returners and arahants. 'Here' means in this section on individuals and opportunity. 'By the previous method' means in the earlier method of exposition, such as in 'for three types of individuals.' 'Opportunity' means the basis of arising; here, however, painful feeling should be understood. 'By the latter method' means in the later method of exposition, such as in 'for two types of individuals.' 'Lack of opportunity' means the state of not being a basis for an underlying tendency.

Anusayavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Section concerning Underlying Tendencies is concluded.

2. Sānusayavāravaṇṇanā

2. The Commentary on the Section concerning what is with Underlying Tendencies

66-131. ‘‘Sānusayo, pajahati, parijānātī’’ti puggalo vuttoti ‘‘kāmarāgena sānusayo, kāmarāgaṃ pajahati, kāmarāgaṃ parijānātī’’tiādīsu anusayasamaṅgibhāvena pahānapariññākiriyāya kattubhāvena ca puggalo vutto, na dhammo. Bhavavisesena vāti kevalena bhavavisesena vā. Itaresūti paṭighānusayādīsu. Bhavānusayavisesena vāti kāmabhavādibhavavisiṭṭhānusayavisesena vā. Sānusayatāniranusayatādikāti ettha ādi-saddena pahānāpahānapariññāpariññā saṅgayhanti. Nanu ca bhavavisese kesañci anusayānaṃ appahānanti? Na taṃ anusayakataṃ, atha kho paccayavekallato anokāsatāya cāti nāyaṃ virodho. Dvīsu vedanāsūti sukhaupekkhāsu vedanāsu dukkhāya vedanāya kāmarāgānusayena niranusayoti yojetabbaṃ. Idampi natthi puggalavasena vuccamānattā. Tenāha ‘‘na hi puggalassa…pe… anusayāna’’nti. Yadipi puggalassa anusayanokāso anokāso, tassa pana sānusayatādihetu hotīti dassento ‘‘anusayassa panā’’tiādimāha. Niranusayatādīnanti ādi-saddena appahānāpariññā saṅgaṇhāti. Parijānanaṃ samatikkamananti pariññāvārepi ‘‘apādāne nissakkavacana’’nti vuttaṃ.

66-131. 'A person is said to be "with underlying tendencies, abandons, fully understands"'—this refers to a person who, in contexts like 'with the underlying tendency of sensual desire, abandons sensual desire, fully understands sensual desire,' etc., is spoken of as being endowed with underlying tendencies and as the agent of the act of abandoning and full understanding, and not as a phenomenon. 'Or, by a specific existence' means solely by a specific kind of existence. 'In the others' refers to the underlying tendencies of aversion, etc. 'Or, by a distinction in the underlying tendency of existence' means by a distinction in the underlying tendencies specific to sensual existence, etc. In 'being with underlying tendencies, being without underlying tendencies, etc.,' here the term 'etc.' includes abandoning and non-abandoning, full understanding and non-full understanding. But is it not the case that in some specific existences, certain underlying tendencies are not abandoned? That is not due to the underlying tendencies themselves, but rather because of a deficiency of conditions or lack of opportunity—thus, there is no contradiction. 'In the two feelings' means in pleasant and neutral feelings; it should be connected thus: with regard to painful feeling, one is without the underlying tendency of sensual desire. This, too, is not the case, because it is spoken of in terms of a person. Therefore, it is said: 'For it is not the case that a person... (etc.)... the underlying tendencies.' To show that although for a person there is opportunity or lack of opportunity for an underlying tendency, this is the cause for his being with underlying tendencies, etc., it is said, 'But of the underlying tendency...' etc. In 'without underlying tendencies, etc.,' here the term 'etc.' includes non-abandoning and non-full understanding. 'Fully understanding is transcending'—in the section on full understanding, it is also said, 'the expression of relinquishing in the ablative case.'

Anusayanaṭṭhānatoti anusayanaṭṭhānahetu. ‘‘Ananusayanaṭṭhānato’’ti etthāpi eseva nayo. Nimittāpādānabhāvadassanatthanti sānusayavāre nimittabhāvadassanatthaṃ, pajahanapariññāvāresu apādānabhāvadassanatthañcāti yojetabbaṃ. Pajahatīti ettha ‘‘rūpadhātuyā arūpadhātuyā tato mānānusayaṃ pajahatī’’ti pāḷipadaṃ āharitvā yojetabbaṃ, na pajahatīti ettha pana ‘‘dukkhāya vedanāya tato kāmarāgānusayaṃ nappajahatī’’ti. Evamādīsūti ādi-saddena pariññāvārampi saṅgaṇhāti. Bhummaniddeseneva hetuattheneva niddiṭṭhāti attho.

'From the basis for underlying tendencies' means 'due to the basis for underlying tendencies.' In 'from a non-basis for underlying tendencies,' here too, the same principle applies. For the purpose of showing the nature of a sign and the nature of the ablative: it should be connected thus: in the section on being with underlying tendencies, it is for the purpose of showing the nature of a sign, and in the sections on abandoning and full understanding, it is for the purpose of showing the nature of the ablative. Regarding 'abandons,' the Pāli phrase 'from the form realm and the formless realm, he abandons the underlying tendency of conceit' should be brought in and connected. But regarding 'does not abandon,' the phrase is 'from painful feeling, he does not abandon the underlying tendency of sensual desire.' 'And so on'—by the word 'etc.,' the section on full understanding is also included. The meaning is that it is indicated with a causal sense simply by the exposition in the locative case.

Catutthapañhavissajjanenāti [Pg.205] ‘‘yato vā pana mānānusayena sānusayo, tato kāmarāgānusayena sānusayo’’ti etassa pañhassa vissajjanena. Tattha hi ‘‘rūpadhātuyā arūpadhātuyā’’tiādinā sarūpato anusayanaṭṭhānāni dassitāni. Tadattheti taṃ anusayanaṭṭhānadassanaṃ attho etassāti tadattho, tasmiṃ tadatthe. ‘‘Anusayassa uppattiṭṭhānadassanatthaṃ ayaṃ vāro āraddho’’tiādinā ‘‘yato’’ti etena anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ vuttanti imamatthaṃ vibhāvetvā. Pamādalikhitaṃ viya dissati uppanna-saddena vattamānuppanne vuccamāne. Yathā pana uppajjanavāre uppajjati-saddena uppattiyogadīpakattā uppattirahā vuccanti, evamidhāpi uppattiarahe vuccamāne na koci virodho. Yaṃ pana vakkhati ‘‘na hi apariyāpannānaṃ anusayuppattirahaṭṭhānatā’’ti, sopi na doso. Yattha yattha hi anusayā uppattirahā, tadeva ekajjhaṃ gahetvā ‘‘sabbatthā’’ti vuttanti. Tatheva dissatīti taṃ pamādalikhitaṃ viya dissatīti attho.

'By the answer to the fourth question' means by the answer to this question: 'From wherever one is with the underlying tendency of conceit, from there is one with the underlying tendency of sensual desire?' For there, the bases for the underlying tendencies are shown in their own nature by 'in the form realm, in the formless realm,' etc. 'In that meaning' means: that showing of the basis for the underlying tendency is its meaning, thus 'having that meaning'; in that meaning. Having explained this meaning: that 'this section is commenced for the purpose of showing the place of arising of the underlying tendency,' etc., and that by 'from wherever' the basis for the underlying tendency is stated. It appears as if written carelessly, with the word 'arisen' being used when 'arising in the present' should be stated. However, just as in the section on arising, by the word 'arises'—because it indicates suitability for arising—things suitable for arising are spoken of, so too here, when things suitable for arising are spoken of, there is no contradiction. As for what will be said, 'For there is no suitability as a place of arising for underlying tendencies in what is not included in the round,' that too is not a fault. For wherever the underlying tendencies are suitable for arising, taking just that together, it is said 'everywhere.' 'It appears just so' means it appears as if written carelessly.

Yato uppannena bhavitabbanti yato anusayanaṭṭhānato kāmagārānusayena uppannena bhavitabbaṃ, tena kāmarāgānusayena uppattirahaṭṭhāne nissakkavacanaṃ kataṃ ‘‘yato’’ti. Tathāti ettha tathā-saddo yathā ‘‘yato uppannenā’’ti ettha uppattirahaṭṭhānato anusayassa uppattirahatā vuttā, tathā ‘‘uppajjanakenā’’ti etthāpi sā eva vuccatīti dīpetīti āha ‘‘sabbadhammesu…pe… āpannenā’’ti. Tattha ‘‘uppajjanako’’ti vutte anuppajjanako na hotīti ayamattho viññāyati, tathā ca sati tena anuppatti nicchitāti uppannasabhāvatā ca pakāsitā hotīti. Tenāha ‘‘sabbadhammesu…pe… apanetī’’ti. ‘‘Yo yato kāmarāgānusayena niranusayo, so tato mānānusayena niranusayo’’ti pucchāya ‘‘yato tato’’ti āgatattā vissajjane ‘‘sabbatthā’’ti padassa nissakkavaseneva sakkā yojetunti dassento ‘‘sabbatthāti…pe… na na sambhavatī’’ti āha. Bhummato aññatthāpi saddavidū icchanti, yato sabbesaṃ pādakaṃ ‘‘sabbatthapādaka’’nti vuccati, idha pana nissakkavasena veditabbaṃ.

'It must be by what has arisen from wherever' means it must be by the underlying tendency of sensual desire that has arisen from that basis for the underlying tendency. Therefore, the ablative expression 'from wherever' is used for a place suitable for the arising of the underlying tendency of sensual desire. 'Similarly'—here the word 'similarly' indicates that just as in 'by what has arisen from wherever,' the suitability for arising of the underlying tendency from a place suitable for arising is stated, so too in 'by what is arising,' the very same is stated. Thus, it is said: 'in all phenomena... (etc.)... being subject to.' There, when 'what is arising' is said, the meaning 'it is not what is not arising' is understood; and that being so, by that, non-arising is determined, and the nature of what has arisen is also revealed. Therefore, it is said: 'in all phenomena... (etc.)... removes.' To show that since 'from wherever, from there' occurs in the question 'Whoever is without the underlying tendency of sensual desire from wherever, is he without the underlying tendency of conceit from there?,' the word 'everywhere' in the answer can be connected only in the sense of the ablative, it is said: 'everywhere... (etc.)... does not not occur.' Grammarians also accept it in senses other than the locative, since the 'footing of all' is called `sabbatthapādaka`. Here, however, it should be understood in the sense of the ablative.

Sānusayavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the section on being with underlying tendencies is completed.

3. Pajahanavāravaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of the Section on Abandoning

132-197. Appajahanasabbhāvāti [Pg.206] appahānassa, appahīyamānassa vā sabbhāvā. Tasmāti yasmā yo kāmarāgānusayaṃ pajahati, na so mānānusayaṃ niravasesato pajahati, yo ca mānānusayaṃ niravasesato pajahati, na so kāmarāgānusayaṃ pajahati pageva pahīnattā, tasmā ‘‘yo vā pana mānānusayaṃ pajahati, so kāmarāgānusayaṃ pajahatīti? No’’ti vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Yadi evaṃ paṭhamapucchāyaṃ kathanti āha ‘‘yasmā pana…pe… vutta’’nti. Tattha pahānakaraṇamattamevāti pahānakiriyāsambhavamattameva, na niravasesappahānanti adhippāyo. Te ṭhapetvāti diṭṭhivicikicchānusayādīnaṃ niravasesapajahanake aṭṭhamakādike ṭhapetvā. Avasesāti tassa tassa anusayassa niravasesappajahanakehi avasiṭṭhā. Tesu yesaṃ ekacce anusayā pahīnā, tepi appajahanasabbhāveneva nappajahantīti vuttā. Na ca yathāvijjamānenāti maggakiccabhāvena vijjamānappakārena pahānena vajjitā rahitā eva vuttāti yojanā.

132-197. 'Because of the nature of non-abandonment' means because of the nature of non-abandonment, or of not being abandoned. Therefore, since whoever abandons the underlying tendency of sensual desire does not completely abandon the underlying tendency of conceit, and whoever completely abandons the underlying tendency of conceit does not abandon the underlying tendency of sensual desire, since it has already been abandoned, it should be understood that the statement 'Does one who abandons the underlying tendency of conceit also abandon the underlying tendency of sensual desire? No' is made. If this is so, how is it in the first question? He says, 'Since... (etc.)... is said.' There, 'merely the doing of abandoning' means only the possibility of the act of abandoning, not complete abandonment, is the intention. 'Setting them aside' means setting aside the eighth person and others who completely abandon the underlying tendencies of wrong view and doubt, etc. 'The remaining ones' refers to those remaining from the complete abandoners of each respective underlying tendency. Among them, even those who have abandoned some underlying tendencies are said not to abandon them precisely because of the nature of non-abandonment. 'And not as it actually is'—the connection is: they are said to be excluded from, devoid of, the kind of abandonment that exists as the function of the path.

Kesañcīti sotāpannasakadāgāmimaggasamaṅgisakadāgāmīnaṃ. Puna kesañcīti anāgāmiaggamaggasamaṅgiarahantānaṃ. Ubhayanti kāmarāgavicikicchānusayadvayaṃ. Sesānanti ‘‘sesā’’ti vuttānaṃ yathāvuttapuggalānaṃ. Tesanti vuttappakārānaṃ dvinnaṃ anusayānaṃ. Ubhayāppajahanassāti kāmarāgavicikicchānusayāppajahanassa. Kāraṇaṃ na hotīti yesaṃ vicikicchānusayo pahīno, tesaṃ tassa pahīnatā, yesaṃ yathāvuttaṃ ubhayappahīnaṃ, tesaṃ tadappajahanassa kāraṇaṃ na hotīti attho. Tenāha ‘‘tesaṃ pahīnattā ‘nappajahantī’ti na sakkā vattu’’nti. Atha pana na tattha kāraṇaṃ vuttaṃ, yena kāraṇavacanena yathāvuttadosāpatti siyā, kevalaṃ pana sanniṭṭhānena tesaṃ puggalānaṃ gahitatādassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘kāmarāgānusayañca nappajahantī’’ti, evampi pucchitassa saṃsayatthassa kāraṇaṃ vattabbaṃ. Tathā ca sati ‘‘sesapuggalā tassa anusayassa pahīnattā nappajahantī’’ti kāraṇaṃ vattabbamevāti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘na vattabba’’ntiādi. Tattha na vattabbanti vuttanayena kāraṇaṃ na vattabbaṃ kāraṇabhāvasseva abhāvato. ‘‘Ubhayāppajahanassa kāraṇaṃ na hotī’’ti vuttaṃ, yathā pana vattabbaṃ, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘yo kāmarāgānusayaṃ…pe… vattabbattā’’ti āha. Tena pahīnāppahīnavasena [Pg.207] kāraṇaṃ na vattabbaṃ, pahīnānaṃyeva pana vasena vattabbanti dasseti. Saṃsayatthasaṅgahiteti saṃsayatthena padena saṅgahite. Sanniṭṭhānapadasaṅgahitaṃ pana pahīyamānattā ‘‘nappajahatī’’ti na sakkā vattunti.

‘For some’ means for those endowed with the path of stream-entry, those endowed with the path of once-return, and once-returners. ‘Again, for some’ means for those endowed with the path of non-return, those endowed with the highest path, and arahants. ‘Both’ means the pair of latent tendencies of sensual desire and doubt. ‘The rest’ means the remaining individuals as stated. ‘Of them’ means of the two kinds of latent tendencies mentioned. ‘For the non-abandonment of both’ means for the non-abandonment of the latent tendencies of sensual desire and doubt. ‘There is no reason’ means: for those for whom the latent tendency of doubt is abandoned, for them there is its abandonment; for those for whom both are abandoned as stated, for them there is no reason for their non-abandonment—this is the meaning. Therefore, it is said: “Because they are abandoned for them, it cannot be said, ‘they do not abandon.’” However, no reason is stated there, by which statement of a reason the aforesaid fault would occur. Rather, it is stated merely to show the inclusion of those persons by the thesis: “and they do not abandon the latent tendency of sensual desire.” Even so, a reason should be stated for the matter of doubt that was asked. And that being the case, in reference to the objection that the reason, “The remaining persons do not abandon that latent tendency because it has been abandoned for them,” should indeed be stated, it is said, “it should not be said,” and so on. Therein, ‘it should not be said’ means that a reason should not be stated in the way mentioned, because there is no state of being a reason. It was said, “there is no reason for the non-abandonment of both.” But to show how it should be stated, it is said: “One who abandons the latent tendency of sensual desire… should be said.” Thereby it shows that a reason should not be stated on the basis of what is abandoned and not abandoned, but should be stated solely on the basis of what has been abandoned. ‘Included by the matter of doubt’ means included by the term with the meaning of doubt. But what is included by the term of the thesis, because it is being abandoned, cannot be said to be ‘not abandoning.’

Pajahanavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Section on Abandoning is concluded.

5. Pahīnavāravaṇṇanā

5. Commentary on the Section of the Abandoned

264-274. Phalaṭṭhavaseneva desanā āraddhā, na maggaṭṭhavasena, kuto puthujjanavasena. Kasmā? Phalakkhaṇe hi anusayā pahīnāti vuccanti, maggakkhaṇe pana pahīyantīti. Tenevāha ‘‘maggasamaṅgīnaṃ aggahitataṃ dīpetī’’ti. Paṭilome hi puthujjanavasenapi desanā gahitā ‘‘yassa diṭṭhānusayo appahīno, tassa vicikicchānusayo appahīnoti? Āmantā’’tiādinā. Anusayaccantapaṭipakkhekacittakkhaṇikānanti anusayānaṃ accantaṃ paṭipakkhabhūtaekacittakkhaṇikānaṃ. Maggasamaṅgīnanti maggaṭṭhānaṃ. Ettha ca anusayānaṃ accantapaṭipakkhatāggahaṇena uppattirahataṃ paṭikkhipati. Na hi te accantapaṭipakkhasamuppattito parato uppattirahā honti. Maggasamaṅgitāggahaṇena anuppattirahatāpāditataṃ paṭikkhipati. Na hi maggakkhaṇe te anuppattirahataṃ āpāditā nāma honti, atha kho āpādīyantīti. Ekacittakkhaṇikatāggahaṇena santānabyāpāraṃ. Tenāha ‘‘na kocī’’tiādi. Tattha teti maggasamaṅgino. Na kevalaṃ pahīnavāreyeva, atha kho aññesupīti dassento ‘‘anusaya…pe… gahitā’’ti āha.

264-274. The teaching is initiated on the basis of those standing in the fruit, not on the basis of those standing in the path, how much less on the basis of an ordinary person. Why? Because it is in the moment of the fruit that the latent tendencies are said to be abandoned, whereas in the moment of the path they are being abandoned. Therefore, it is said: “It shows the non-inclusion of those endowed with the path.” For in the converse, the teaching is taken even on the basis of an ordinary person, with the words: “For one for whom the latent tendency of views is not abandoned, is the latent tendency of doubt not abandoned? Yes,” and so on. ‘Of those that last for a single mind-moment and are the utter opposite of the latent tendencies’ means of those that last for a single mind-moment and are the utter opposite of the latent tendencies. ‘Of those endowed with the path’ means of those standing in the path. And here, by the taking up of the utter opposition to the latent tendencies, it rejects their being devoid of arising. For they are not devoid of arising after the arising of that which is their utter opposite. By the taking up of the endowment with the path, it rejects that the state of being devoid of future arising has been brought about. For in the moment of the path, they are not what is called ‘brought to a state of being devoid of future arising,’ but rather they are being brought to it. By the taking up of their lasting for a single mind-moment, it rejects the operation of the continuum. Therefore, it is said: “there is no one,” and so on. Therein, ‘they’ means those endowed with the path. Showing that this is not only in the section on the abandoned, but also in others, it is said: “the latent tendencies… are taken up.”

275-296. Yattha anusayo uppattiraho, tatthevassa anuppattirahatāpādananti ‘‘attano attano okāse eva anuppattidhammataṃ āpādito’’ti āha. Tathā hi vuttaṃ ‘‘cakkhuṃ loke piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ, etthesā taṇhā uppajjamānā uppajjati, ettha nivisamānā nivisatī’’ti (vibha. 203) vatvā puna vuttaṃ ‘‘cakkhuṃ loke piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ, etthesā taṇhā pahīyamānā pahīyati, ettha nirujjhamānā nirujjhatī’’ti (vibha. 204). Tasmāti yasmā tadokāsattameva kāmadhātuādiokāsattameva anusayānaṃ dīpenti pahīnāppahīnavacanāni, tasmā. Anokāse tadubhayāvattabbatā vuttāti yasmā kāmarāgapaṭighānusayānaṃ dvinnaṃ uppattiṭṭhānaṃ, so eva pahānokāsoti [Pg.208] svāyaṃ tesaṃ aññamaññaṃ anokāso, tasmiṃ anokāse tadubhayassa pahānāppahānassa navattabbatā vuttā. Kāmarāgānusayokāse hi paṭighānusayassa appahīnattā so ‘‘tattha pahīno’’ti na vattabbo, aṭṭhitattā pana ‘‘tattha appahīno’’ti ca, tasmā anokāse tadubhayāvattabbatā vuttāti. Tena saddhiṃ samānokāseti tena kāmarāgena saddhiṃ samānokāse. ‘‘Sādhāraṇaṭṭhāne’’ti vutte kāmadhātuyaṃ sukhupekkhāsu pahīno nāma hoti, na samānakāle pahīno tatiyacatutthamaggavajjhattā kāmarāgamānānusayānaṃ.

275-296. Where a latent tendency is fit to arise, right there its being brought to a state of non-arising occurs—thus it is said: “it is brought to the nature of non-arising in its own respective sphere.” For so it has been said: “The eye in the world is a dear and pleasant form; it is here that this craving, when arising, arises; it is here that, when settling, it settles” (Vibh 203). And again it is said: “The eye in the world is a dear and pleasant form; it is here that this craving, when being abandoned, is abandoned; it is here that, when ceasing, it ceases” (Vibh 204). ‘Therefore’ means: because the statements about what is abandoned and not abandoned indicate that the very sphere of the latent tendencies is the sphere of the desire realm and so on, therefore. ‘The un-speakability of both in an unsuitable sphere is stated’ means: because the place of arising for the two latent tendencies of sensual desire and aversion is the very same as the sphere of their abandonment, this is mutually an unsuitable sphere for them. In that unsuitable sphere, the un-speakability of both abandonment and non-abandonment is stated. For in the sphere of the latent tendency of sensual desire, because the latent tendency of aversion is not abandoned, it cannot be said of it, “it is abandoned there”; but because it is not present, it also cannot be said, “it is not abandoned there.” Therefore, the un-speakability of both in an unsuitable sphere is stated. ‘In a sphere common with it’ means in a sphere common with that sensual desire. When it is said “in a common place,” in the desire realm it is called abandoned in relation to pleasant and neutral feelings, but it is not abandoned at the same time, because the latent tendencies of sensual desire and conceit are to be abandoned by the third and fourth paths respectively.

Pahīnavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Section of the Abandoned is concluded.

7. Dhātuvāravaṇṇanā

7. Commentary on the Section on the Elements

332-340. Appahīnuppattirahabhāvā idha anugamanasayanānīti dassento ‘‘yasmiṃ …pe… attho’’ti āha. Idhāpi yuttāti pubbe vuttamevatthaṃ parāmasati. Tathā hi vuttaṃ ‘‘kāraṇalābhe uppattiarahataṃ dassetī’’ti (yama. mūlaṭī. anusayayamaka 1). Cha paṭisedhavacanānīti tissannaṃ dhātūnaṃ cutūpapātavisiṭṭhānaṃ paṭisedhanavasena vuttavacanāni, tato eva dhātuvisesaniddhāraṇāni na honti. Paṭisedhoti hi idha sattāpaṭisedho vuttoti adhippāyena vadati. Aññatthe pana na-kāre nāyaṃ doso. Imaṃ nāma dhātuṃ. Taṃmūlikāsūti paṭisedhamūlikāsu. Evañhīti ‘‘na kāmadhātuyā cutassa kāmadhātuṃ upapajjantassā’’tiādinā paṭhamayojanāya sati. Nakāmadhātuādīsu upapattikittaneneva nakāmadhātuādiggahaṇenapi dhātuvisesasseva gahitatāya atthato viññāyamānattā. Tenāha ‘‘na kāmadhātu…pe… viññāyatī’’ti. Bhañjitabbāti vibhajitabbā. Vibhāgo panettha duvidho icchitoti āha ‘‘dvidhā kātabbāti attho’’ti. Pucchā ca vissajjanāni ca pucchāvissajjanāni. Yathā avutte bhaṅgābhāvassa aviññātattā ‘‘anusayā bhaṅgā natthī’’ti vattabbaṃ, tathā tayidaṃ ‘‘kati anusayā bhaṅgā’’ti etadapekkhanti tadapi vattabbaṃ. Pucchāpekkhañhi vissajjananti.

332-340. Showing that here they are ‘following’ and ‘lying dormant’ because of their state of being unabandoned and fit to arise, he said: “in which …pe… the meaning.” ‘Here too it is proper’ refers to the very same meaning stated previously. For so it was said: “When a cause is obtained, it shows the fitness to arise” (Yamaka Mūlaṭīkā, Anusayayamaka 1). The six prohibitive statements are statements spoken by way of prohibiting the three realms specified by passing away and rebirth; for that very reason, they are not determinations of a specific realm. For he speaks with the intention that here ‘prohibition’ means a prohibition of a being. But elsewhere, with the particle ‘na,’ this is not a fault. This very realm. ‘Rooted in that’ means rooted in the prohibitions. For thus, when there is the first construction, such as “Not of one who, having passed away from the desire realm, is being reborn into the desire realm,” the specific realm is understood in meaning by the very mention of rebirth in the non-desire realms, etc., and by the taking up of the non-desire realms, etc. Therefore he said: “not the desire realm …pe… is understood.” ‘Should be broken down’ means should be analyzed. Here the division is intended to be twofold, thus he said: “‘It should be done in two ways,’ this is the meaning.” A question and answers are a question-and-answers. Just as, when it is unstated, because the absence of a breakdown is not known, it should be said, “There are no breakdowns of the latent tendencies,” so too, since this question, “How many breakdowns of the latent tendencies are there?” expects that, that too should be stated. For an answer is dependent on the question.

Dhātuvāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Section on the Elements is concluded.

Anusayayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Anusayayamaka is concluded.

8. Cittayamakaṃ

8. The Cittayamaka

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Exposition Section

1-62. Sarāgādīti [Pg.209] ettha ādi-saddena ‘‘yassa sarāgaṃ cittaṃ uppajjati, na nirujjhatī’’ti ārabhitvā yāva ‘‘yassa avimuttaṃ citta’’nti vāro, tāva saṅgaṇhāti. Kusalādīti pana ādi-saddena ‘‘yassa kusalaṃ cittaṃ uppajjati, na nirujjhatī’’ti ārabhitvā yāva ‘‘yassa saraṇaṃ cittaṃ uppajjati, na nirujjhatī’’ti vāro, tāva saṅgaṇhāti, tasmā sarāgādikusalādīhīti sarāgādīhi avimuttantehi, kusalādīhi araṇantehi padehi missakā vārā. Suddhikāti kevalā yathāvuttasarāgādīhi kusalādīhi ca amissakā. Tayo tayoti puggaladhammavasena tayo tayo mahāvārā. Yadi evaṃ kathaṃ soḷasa puggalavārāti āha ‘‘tattha tattha pana vutte sampiṇḍetvā’’ti. Tattha tattha soḷasavidhe sarāgādimissakacitte vutte puggale eva ekajjhaṃ sampiṇḍetvā saṅgahetvā ‘‘soḷasa puggalavārā’’ti vuttaṃ. ‘‘Dhammapuggaladhammavārā’’ti etthāpi eseva nayo. Na nirantaraṃ vutteti dhamme puggaladhamme ca anāmasitvā soḷasasupi ṭhānesu nirantaraṃ puggale eva vutte sampiṇḍetvā soḷasa puggalavārā na vuttāti attho.

1-62. Here, by the word ‘ādi’ in ‘sarāgādi,’ it includes the sections from “for whom a mind with lust arises and does not cease” up to “for whom a mind is unliberated.” But by the word ‘ādi’ in ‘kusalādi,’ it includes the sections from “for whom a wholesome mind arises and does not cease” up to “for whom a mind with refuge arises and does not cease.” Therefore, by ‘sarāgādi-kusalādi’ are meant the mixed sections with terms beginning with ‘sarāga’ and ending with ‘unliberated,’ and with terms beginning with ‘kusala’ and ending with ‘without conflict.’ ‘Pure’ means only those unmixed with the aforesaid terms beginning with ‘sarāga’ and ‘kusala.’ ‘Three by three’ means three great sections each, by way of persons and by way of phenomena. If so, how are there sixteen sections on persons? He said: “But having combined what is said in the various places.” When the sixteen kinds of mixed consciousness beginning with ‘sarāga’ are spoken of in the various places, having combined and collected them together only for the person, it is called ‘the sixteen sections on persons.’ Here too in ‘sections on phenomena, persons, and phenomena-and-persons,’ this is the method. The meaning is that the sixteen sections on persons are not stated by combining what is said consecutively about the person alone in all sixteen places, without touching upon phenomena and phenomena-and-persons.

Saṃsaggavasenāti saṃsajjanavasena desanāya vimissanavasena. Aññathā hi uppādanirodhā paccuppannānāgatakālā ca kathaṃ saṃsajjīyanti. Sesānampi vārānanti uppāduppannavārādīnaṃ. Taṃtaṃnāmatāti yathā ‘‘yassa cittaṃ uppajjati, tassa cittaṃ uppanna’’ntiādinā uppādauppannabhāvāmasanato uppādauppannavāroti nāmaṃ pāḷito eva viññāyati, evaṃ sesavārānampīti āha ‘‘taṃtaṃnāmatā pāḷianusārena veditabbā’’ti.

‘By way of association’ means by way of connection, by way of being mixed in the teaching. For otherwise, how could arising and cessation, and the present and future times, be associated? Of the remaining sections also, that is, of the sections on arising-and-arisen, etc. The respective names: just as the name ‘section on arising-and-arisen’ is understood from the Pāli itself by its touching upon the state of arising and having arisen, with such as ‘for whom a mind arises, for him a mind has arisen,’ so too for the remaining sections. Thus he said: ‘their respective names should be known in accordance with the Pāli’.

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Summary Section is concluded.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Exposition Section

63. Tathārūpassevāti pacchimacittasamaṅgino eva. Tañca cittanti tañca yathāvuttakkhaṇaṃ pacchimacittaṃ. ‘‘Evaṃpakāra’’nti imassa atthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘bhaṅgakkhaṇasamaṅgimevā’’ti vuttaṃ nirujjhamānākārassa ‘‘evaṃpakāra’’nti vuttattā.

63. ‘Of one of such a form’ means of one endowed with the final consciousness only. ‘And that consciousness’ means that final consciousness of the aforesaid moment. To show the meaning of ‘of such a kind,’ it is said ‘endowed with the moment of dissolution only,’ because ‘of such a kind’ is said of the mode of ceasing.

65-82. Dvayametanti [Pg.210] yaṃ ‘‘khaṇapaccuppannameva cittaṃ uppādakkhaṇāpagamena uppajjittha nāma, tadeva uppādakkhaṇe uppādaṃ pattattā uppajjittha, anatītattā uppajjati nāmā’’ti vuttaṃ, etaṃ ubhayampi. Evaṃ na sakkā vattunti iminā vuttappakārena na sakkā vattuṃ, pakārantarena pana sakkā vattunti adhippāyo. Tattha ‘‘na hī’’tiādinā paṭhamapakkhaṃ vibhāveti. Vibhajitabbaṃ siyāti ‘‘bhaṅgakkhaṇe taṃ cittaṃ uppajjittha, no ca uppajjati, uppādakkhaṇe taṃ cittaṃ uppajjittha ceva uppajjati cā’’ti vibhajitabbaṃ siyā, na ca vibhattaṃ. ‘‘Āmantā’’ti vattabbaṃ siyā khaṇapaccuppanne citte vuttanayena ubhayassapi labbhamānattā, na ca vuttaṃ. Idāni yena pakārena sakkā vattuṃ, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe’’tiādimāha. Puggalo vutto, puggalavāro hesoti adhippāyo. Tassāti puggalassa. Na ca kiñci cittaṃ uppajjati cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇasamaṅgibhāvato. Taṃ pana cittaṃ uppajjati, yaṃ cittasamaṅgī so puggaloti evamettha attho daṭṭhabbo. Yadi anekacittavasenāyaṃ yamakadesanā pavattāti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘cittanti hi…pe… tiṭṭhatī’’ti. Sanniṭṭhānavasena niyamo veditabbo, aññathā ‘‘no ca tesaṃ cittaṃ uppajjatī’’tiādinā paṭisedho na yujjeyyāti adhippāyo. Tādisanti tathārūpaṃ, yadavattho uppannauppajjamānatādipariyāyehi vattabbo hoti, tadavatthanti attho.

65-82. ‘This is a pair’ means both this which was said: “The momentarily present mind itself, by the departure of the arising-moment, has arisen; that same mind, because it has reached arising at the arising-moment, has arisen, and because it is not past, it arises.” ‘Thus it cannot be said’ means it cannot be said in this stated manner, but the intention is that it can be said in another manner. There, with ‘for not…’ etc., he clarifies the first alternative. ‘It should be analyzed’ means it should be analyzed as: “At the moment of dissolution, that mind has arisen but does not arise; at the moment of arising, that mind both has arisen and arises,” but it has not been so analyzed. ‘Yes’ should be said, because in the case of a momentarily present mind, both are obtainable in the stated way, but it has not been said. Now, to show the manner in which it can be said, he said ‘at the moment of the mind’s dissolution,’ etc. The person is spoken of; the intention is that this is the section on the person. ‘Of him’ means of the person. And no mind arises because he is endowed with the mind’s moment of dissolution. But that mind arises with which that person is endowed. Thus the meaning should be seen here. Referring to the objection, ‘If this Yamaka teaching proceeds by way of many minds,’ he says ‘For the mind… pe… remains.’ The restriction should be understood by way of the conclusion; otherwise, the intention is, the prohibition with ‘but their mind does not arise,’ etc., would not be proper. ‘Such’ means of such a form; the meaning is, that state which is to be spoken of by the terms ‘arisen and arising,’ etc.

83-113. Imassa puggalavārattāti ‘‘yassa cittaṃ uppajjamāna’’ntiādinayappavattassa imassa atikkantakālavārassa puggalavārattā. Puggalo pucchitoti ‘‘yassa cittaṃ uppajjamānaṃ…pe… tassa citta’’nti cittasamaṅgipuggalo pucchitoti puggalasseva vissajjanena bhavitabbaṃ, itarathā aññaṃ pucchitaṃ aññaṃ vissajjitaṃ siyā. Na koci puggalo na gahito sabbasattānaṃ anibbattacittatābhāvato. Te ca pana sabbe puggalā. Nirujjhamānakkhaṇātītacittāti nirujjhamānakkhaṇā hutvā atītacittā. Tathā dutiyatatiyāti yathā paṭhamapañho anavasesapuggalavisayattā paṭivacanena vissajjetabbo siyā, tathā tato eva dutiyatatiyapañhā ‘‘āmantā’’icceva vissajjetabbā siyunti attho. Catuttho pana pañho evaṃ vibhajitvā puggalavaseneva vissajjetabboti dassento ‘‘pacchimacittassā’’tiādiṃ vatvā tathā avacane kāraṇaṃ dassento ‘‘cittavasena puggalavavatthānato’’tiādimāha. ‘‘Bhaṅgakkhaṇe cittaṃ uppādakkhaṇaṃ [Pg.211] vītikkanta’’nti iminā vattamānassa cittassa vasena puggalo uppādakkhaṇātītacitto, ‘‘atītaṃ cittaṃ uppādakkhaṇañca vītikkantanti bhaṅgakkhaṇañca vītikkanta’’nti iminā pana atītassa cittassa vasena puggalo uppādakkhaṇātītacitto vutto.

83-113. ‘Because this is the section on the person’ means because this past-time section, which proceeds by the method of “for whom a mind is arising,” etc., is the section on the person. ‘The person is asked’ means the person endowed with mind is asked with “for whom a mind is arising… pe… for him a mind…,” so the answer must be about the person. Otherwise, one thing would be asked and another answered. No person is excluded, because for all beings there is no state of a mind not having arisen. And all those are persons. ‘Minds past the ceasing-moment’ means minds that are past, having been at the ceasing-moment. ‘Similarly the second and third’ means: just as the first question, since its scope is all persons without remainder, should be answered with a direct reply, so too for that very reason the second and third questions should be answered with just ‘Yes.’ But showing that the fourth question should be answered by analyzing it by way of the person, he said ‘of the final consciousness,’ etc., and then, showing the reason for not speaking thus, he said ‘because the determination of the person is by way of the mind,’ etc. By this, “at the moment of dissolution, the mind has passed the moment of arising,” the person is said to have a mind that is past the arising-moment by way of the present mind. But by this, “the past mind has passed both the moment of arising and the moment of dissolution,” the person is said to have a mind that is past the arising-moment by way of the past mind.

Tatthāti tesu dvīsu puggalesu. Purimassāti paṭhamaṃ vuttassa sanniṭṭhānapadasaṅgahitassa cittaṃ na bhaṅgakkhaṇaṃ vītikkantaṃ. ‘‘No ca bhaṅgakkhaṇaṃ vītikkanta’’nti hi vuttaṃ. Pacchimassa vītikkantaṃ cittaṃ bhaṅgakkhaṇanti sambandho. ‘‘Bhaṅgakkhaṇañca vītikkanta’’nti hi vuttaṃ. Evamādiko puggalavibhāgoti dutiyapañhādīsu vuttaṃ sandhāyāha. Tassa cittassa taṃtaṃkhaṇavītikkamāvītikkamadassanavasenāti tassa tassa uppādakkhaṇassa bhaṅgakkhaṇassa ca yathārahaṃ vītikkamassa avītikkamassa ca dassanavasena dassito hoti puggalavibhāgoti yojanā. Idhāti imasmiṃ atikkantakālavāre. Puggalavisiṭṭhaṃ cittaṃ pucchitaṃ ‘‘yassa cittaṃ tassa citta’’nti vuttattā. Yadipi puggalappadhānā pucchā puggalavārattā. Athāpi cittappadhānā puggalaṃ visesanabhāvena gahetvā cittassa visesitattā. Ubhayathāpi dutiyapucchāya ‘‘āmantā’’ti vattabbaṃ siyā anavasesapuggalavisayattā. Tathā pana avatvā ‘‘atītaṃ citta’’nti vuttaṃ, kasmā nirodhakkhaṇa…pe… dassanatthanti daṭṭhabbanti yojanā. Esa nayo ‘‘na nirujjhamāna’’nti etthāpīti nirujjhamānaṃ khaṇaṃ nirodhakkhaṇaṃ khaṇaṃ vītikkantakālaṃ kiṃ tassa cittaṃ na hotīti attho.

"Therein" refers to those two individuals. "Of the former" means the mind of the first-mentioned person, included in the term 'conclusion,' has not passed the moment of dissolution. For it is said, "and the moment of dissolution has not passed." The latter's mind has passed the moment of dissolution—this is the connection. For it is said, "and the moment of dissolution has passed." This is the kind of distinction among individuals, referring to what is said in the second question and so on. The distinction among individuals is shown by means of seeing the passing or not-passing of its respective moments, that is, by means of seeing the passing or not-passing, as is appropriate, of the arising moment and the dissolution moment—this is the construction. "Here" refers to this section on past time. The question is about the mind as distinguished by the individual, as it is said, "Whose mind, that mind." Although the question is primarily about the individual, as it is the section on individuals, it is also primarily about the mind, as the mind is qualified by taking the individual as a qualifier. In either case, the second question should be answered with "Yes," because it pertains to all individuals without remainder. However, instead of saying that, it is said, "The past mind." Why? It should be understood that this is for the purpose of showing the moment of cessation... This same method applies also to "not ceasing." The meaning is: the ceasing moment, the moment of cessation, the moment that has passed in time—is that not his mind?

114-116. Sarāgapacchimacittassāti sarāgacittesu pacchimassa cittassa, ekassa puggalassa rāgasampayuttacittesu yaṃ sabbapacchimaṃ cittaṃ, tassa. So pana puggalo anāgāmī veditabbo. Na nirujjhati nirodhāsamaṅgitāya. Nirujjhissati idāni nirodhaṃ pāpuṇissati. Appaṭisandhikattā pana tato aññaṃ nuppajjissati. Itaresanti yathāvuttasarāgapacchimacittasamaṅgiṃ vītarāgacittasamaṅgiñca ṭhapetvā avasesānaṃ itarasekkhānañceva puthujjanānañca.

114-116. "Of the last mind with lust" means of the last mind among minds with lust; that is, of the very last mind among minds associated with lust belonging to a single person. And that person should be understood as a non-returner. It does not cease because it is not endowed with cessation. It will cease; it will now attain cessation. But due to having no further relinking, another will not arise after that. "Of the others" refers to the remaining ones, excluding one who possesses the last mind with lust as stated and one who possesses a mind free from lust—namely, the remaining trainees and ordinary people.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Exposition Section is concluded.

Cittayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Cittayamaka is concluded.

9. Dhammayamakaṃ

9. The Pairs on Phenomena

1. Paṇṇattivāro

1. The Section on Designations

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Summary Section

1-16. Yathā [Pg.212] mūlayamake kusalādidhammā desitāti kusalākusalābyākatā dhammā kusalakusalamūlādivibhāgato mūlayamake yamakavasena yathā desitā. Aññathāti kusalakusalamūlādivibhāgato aññathā, khandhādivasenāti attho.

1-16. Just as in the Root Pair wholesome and other states were taught—that is, just as wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate states were taught in the Root Pair in the form of pairs according to the division of wholesome roots, unwholesome roots, and so on. “Otherwise” means differently from the division of wholesome roots, unwholesome roots, and so on; the meaning is in terms of aggregates and so forth.

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Summary Section is concluded.

2. Pavattivāravaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Section on Occurrence

33-34. Taṃ pana kammasamuṭṭhānādirūpaṃ aggahetvā. Kecīti dhammasirittheraṃ sandhāyāha. So hi ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhānarūpavasena vutta’’nti aṭṭhakathaṃ āharitvā ‘‘imasmiṃ pañhe kammasamuṭṭhānādirūpañca labbhatī’’ti avoca. Tathā ca vatvā paṭilomapāḷiṃ dassetvā ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhānarūpameva idhādhippetaṃ. Kammasamuṭṭhānādirūpe na vidhānaṃ, nāpi paṭisedho’’ti āha. Tathāti yathā vuttappakāre pāṭhe cittasamuṭṭhānarūpameva adhippetaṃ, tathā etthāpīti attho. Noti vuttanti vadantīti sambandho. Taṃ panetanti yathā uddhaṭassa pāṭhassa atthavacanaṃ, evaṃ na sakkā vattuṃ. Kasmāti āha ‘‘cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe…pe… paṭisedhasiddhito’’ti. Svāyaṃ paṭisedho heṭṭhā dassitoyevāti adhippāyo.

33-34. But this is without including kamma-originated form, etc. “Some” refers to the elder Dhammasiri. For he, citing the commentary which states, “it is spoken of in terms of mind-originated form,” declared, “In this question, kamma-originated form, etc., is also obtainable.” Having said so, he then presented the reverse reading and said, “Only mind-originated form is intended here. There is neither an injunction nor a prohibition regarding kamma-originated form, etc.” “Thus” means that just as in the aforementioned passage only mind-originated form is intended, so too here—this is the meaning. The connection is with the phrase 'they say that "not" is stated.' But it is not possible to state the meaning of the extracted passage in that way. Why? He says, “Because at the moment of the mind’s dissolution… the prohibition is established.” The intention is that this prohibition has already been shown below.

Ye ca vadantīti ettha ye cāti vajirabuddhittheraṃ sandhāyāha. So hi ‘‘sotāpattimaggakkhaṇe’’tiādinā paṭisambhidāmaggapāḷiṃ āharitvā ‘‘yathā tattha satipi kammajādirūpe ṭhapetvā cittasamuṭṭhānarūpanti cittapaṭibaddhattā cittajarūpameva ṭhapetabbabhāvena uddhaṭaṃ, evamidhāpi cittajarūpameva kathita’’nti vadati. Tañca nesaṃ vacanaṃ tathā na hoti, yathā tehi udāhaṭaṃ, visamoyaṃ upaññāsoti attho. Yathā ca taṃ tathā na hoti, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘yesañhī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tesanti kammajādīnaṃ. Tassāti maggassa. Teti abyākatā, ye uppādanirodhavanto. Avijjamānesu ca uppādanirodhesu nibbānassa viya.

Here, 'and those who' in 'and those who say' refers to the elder Vajirabuddhi. For he, citing the Paṭisambhidāmagga passage beginning with 'at the moment of the stream-entry path,' states: 'Just as there, although kamma-originated form and other types exist, only mind-originated form is singled out to be established because it is dependent on the mind, so here too, only mind-originated form is spoken of.' But their statement is not as they have cited it; the meaning is, this comparison is flawed. To show how it is not so, the passage beginning with 'For of which' is stated. 'Of them' refers to kamma-originated and other forms. 'Of that' refers to the path. 'They' refers to the indeterminate states, those that have arising and cessation, unlike Nibbāna, where arising and cessation are absent.

Sanniṭṭhānena [Pg.213] gahitesu puggalesu. Tesu hi keci akusalābyākatacittānaṃ uppādakkhaṇasamaṅgino, keci abyākatacittassa, keci kusalābyākatacittassa, tesu purimā dve paṭhamakoṭṭhāsena saṅgahitā tassa kusaluppattipaṭisedhaparattā, te pana bhavavasena vibhajitvā vattabbāti dassento ‘‘pañcavokāre’’tiādimāha. Evanti yathāvuttanayena. Sabbatthāti sabbapañhesu.

Among the individuals grasped by the determination, some are endowed with the moment of arising of unwholesome or indeterminate consciousness, some with indeterminate consciousness alone, and some with wholesome or indeterminate consciousness. Among them, the first two are included in the initial category because it is concerned with the exclusion of the arising of wholesome states. However, to show that they should be discussed by distinguishing them according to the mode of existence, he says, “In the five-constituent existence,” and so on. “Thus” means in the manner explained. “Everywhere” means in all questions.

79. Tatoti ekāvajjanavīthito. Purimatarajavanavīthi yāya vuṭṭhānagāminī saṅgahitā, tattha uppannassapi cittassa. Kusalānāgatabhāvapariyosānenāti kusaladhammānaṃ anāgatabhāvassa pariyosānabhūtena aggamaggānantarapaccayattena dīpitaṃ hoti samānalakkhaṇaṃ sabbaṃ. Kena? Tāya eva samānalakkhaṇatāya. Esa nayoti yathā kusalānuppādo kusalānāgatabhāvassa pariyosānabhūtato vuttaparicchedato orampi labbhatīti so yathāvuttaparicchedo lakkhaṇamattanti svāyaṃ nayo dassito. Esa nayo akusalātītabhāvassa ādimhi ‘‘dutiye akusale’’ti vuttaṭṭhāne, abyākatātītabhāvassa ādimhi ‘‘dutiye citte’’ti vuttaṭṭhānepīti yojanā. Idāni ‘‘esa nayo’’ti yathāvuttamatidesaṃ ‘‘yathā hī’’tiādinā pākaṭataraṃ karoti. Bhāvanāpahānāni dassitāni honti ‘‘aggamaggasamaṅgī kusalañca dhammaṃ bhāveti, akusalañca pajahatī’’ti. Idhāti imasmiṃ pavattivāre. Taṃ tanti akusalātītatādi kusalānāgatatādi ca. Tena tenāti ‘‘dutiye akusale aggamaggasamaṅgī’’ti evamādinā antena ca.

79. “From that” means from the single advertence process. It refers to the mind that has arisen there, in the earlier javana process by which the path leading to emergence is included. By “the conclusion of the future state of the wholesome” is meant that all that has the same characteristic is shown by being the conclusion of the future state of wholesome states, by being the immediately preceding condition for the highest path. By what? By that very sameness of characteristic. “This is the method”: just as the non-arising of the wholesome is obtained even prior to the stated definition because it is the conclusion of the future state of the wholesome, so that stated definition is merely a characteristic—this is the method shown. This method also applies at the beginning of the past state of the unwholesome, in the place stated as “at the second unwholesome,” and at the beginning of the past state of the indeterminate, in the place stated as “at the second mind”—this is the construction. Now, by means of the phrase beginning 'For just as,' he makes the aforementioned application, 'this is the method,' clearer. Development and abandonment are shown thus: “One endowed with the highest path develops wholesome states and abandons unwholesome states.” “Here” means in this section on occurrence. “That” refers to the past state of the unwholesome, etc., and the future state of the wholesome, etc. “By this and that” refers to the passage beginning with 'At the second unwholesome moment, one endowed with the highest path...' and so on to the end.

100. Paṭisandhicittatoti idaṃ mariyādaggahaṇaṃ, na abhividhiggahaṇaṃ, yato ‘‘soḷasama’’nti āha. Abhividhiggahaṇameva vā soḷasacittakkhaṇāyukameva rūpanti imasmiṃ pakkhe adhippete paṭikkhittovāyaṃ vādoti dassento ‘‘tato parampi vā’’ti āha. Ayañca vicāro heṭṭhā dassito eva. Na tato oranti viññāyati tato oraṃ akusalanirodhasamakālaṃ abyākatanirodhassa asambhavato.

100. “From the relinking consciousness”: this is a restrictive definition, not an extensive definition, since he says, “sixteenth.” Or, if it is an extensive definition, meaning that form whose lifespan is exactly sixteen mind-moments is intended in this case, then this view is rejected. Showing this, he says, “or even beyond that.” And this consideration has already been shown below. “Not before that” is understood, because the cessation of the indeterminate cannot occur simultaneously with the cessation of the unwholesome before that.

Pavattivāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section on Occurrence is concluded.

Dhammayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Dhammayamaka is concluded.

10. Indriyayamakaṃ

10. The Pairs on the Faculties

1. Paṇṇattivāro

1. The Section on Designations

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Summary Section

1. Indriyayamake [Pg.214] vibhaṅge viyāti yathā indriyavibhaṅge purisindriyānantaraṃ jīvitindriyaṃ uddiṭṭhaṃ, na manindriyānantaraṃ, evaṃ imasmiṃ indriyayamake. Tañca suttadesanānurodhenāti dassento ‘‘tīṇimāni…pe… sutte desitakkamenā’’ti āha. Soyaṃ yadatthaṃ tassa sutte desitakkamena uddeso, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘pavattivārehī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha yathā ‘‘jīvitindriya’’nti idaṃ rūpajīvitindriyassa arūpajīvitindriyassa ca sāmaññato gahaṇaṃ, evaṃ upādinnassa anupādinnassa cāti āha ‘‘kammajānaṃ akammajānañca anupālaka’’nti. Atha vā sahajadhammānupālakampi jīvitindriyaṃ na kevalaṃ khaṇaṭṭhitiyā eva kāraṇaṃ, atha kho pabandhānupacchedassapi kāraṇameva. Aññathā āyukkhayamaraṇaṃ na sambhaveyya, tasmā ‘‘kammajānañca anupālaka’’nti avisesato vuttaṃ, cutipaṭisandhīsu ca pavattamānānaṃ kammajānaṃ anupālakaṃ. Itīti tasmā. Taṃmūlakānīti jīvitindriyamūlakāni. Cutipaṭisandhipavattivasenāti cutipaṭisandhivasena pavattivasena ca. Tattha yaṃ upādinnaṃ, taṃ cutipaṭisandhivaseneva, itaraṃ itaravasenapi vattabbaṃ. Yasmā cakkhundriyādīsu purisindriyāvasānesu ekantaupādinnesu ataṃsabhāvattā yaṃ manindriyaṃ mūlameva na hoti, tasmā taṃ ṭhapetvā avasesamūlakāni cakkhundriyādimūlakāni. Āyatanayamake viyāti yathā āyatanayamake paṭisandhivasenāyatanānaṃ uppādo, maraṇavasena ca nirodho vutto, evamidhāpi cutiupapattivaseneva vattabbāni, tasmā ataṃsabhāvattā jīvitindriyaṃ tesaṃ cakkhundriyādīnaṃ majjhe anuddisitvā ante purisindriyānantaraṃ uddiṭṭhaṃ. Yaṃ pana cakkhundriyādimūlakesu manindriyaṃ sabbapacchā eva gahitaṃ, tattha kāraṇaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttameva.

1. In the Yamaka on the Faculties, it is as in the Vibhaṅga: just as in the Analysis of the Faculties the life faculty is stated after the masculinity faculty, not after the mind faculty, so too in this Yamaka on the Faculties. To show that this is in accordance with the Sutta teaching, it is said: ‘These three…pe… in the order taught in the Sutta.’ To show for what purpose its enumeration follows the order taught in the Sutta, the words ‘in the chapters on process,’ etc., are stated. Therein, just as the term ‘life faculty’ is a general term for both the material life faculty and the immaterial life faculty, so too for what is produced by clinging and what is not produced by clinging, it is said: ‘the preserver of what is born of kamma and what is not born of kamma.’ Alternatively, the life faculty is also the preserver of co-nascent states; it is a cause not only for momentary duration but also for the non-interruption of the continuum. Otherwise, death due to the exhaustion of the life-span would not be possible. Therefore, ‘the preserver of what is born of kamma’ is said without distinction, and it is the preserver of what is born of kamma occurring during death and rebirth-linking. Iti means ‘therefore.’ ‘Rooted in that’ means rooted in the life faculty. ‘By way of death, rebirth-linking, and process’ means by way of death and rebirth-linking, and by way of process. Therein, what is produced by clinging occurs only by way of death and rebirth-linking; the other must be spoken of as occurring also by way of process. Because among the faculties from the eye faculty to the masculinity faculty, which are exclusively produced by clinging, the mind faculty is not a root at all since it does not have that nature, therefore, excluding it, the remaining roots are the eye faculty and so on. As in the Yamaka on the Bases: just as in the Yamaka on the Bases the arising of the bases is spoken of by way of rebirth-linking and their cessation by way of death, so too here they must be spoken of only by way of death and rebirth. Therefore, because it does not have that nature, the life faculty is not stated among the eye faculty and so on, but is stated at the end after the masculinity faculty. As to why the mind faculty is taken last of all among those rooted in the eye faculty, etc., the reason for this has already been stated in the commentary.

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Summary Section is finished.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Exposition Section

94. Koci sabhāvo natthīti koci sabhāvadhammo natthi. Yadi evaṃ ‘‘natthī’’ti paṭikkhepo eva yuttoti āha ‘‘na ca rūpādī’’tiādi. ‘‘Sukhā dukkhā [Pg.215] adukkhamasukhā’’tiādīsu sukhadukkhasaddānaṃ sāmaññavacanabhāvepi indriyadesanāyaṃ te visiṭṭhavisayā evāti dassento ‘‘sukhassa…pe… gahitoyevā’’ti āha. Dukkhassa ca bhedaṃ katvā.

94. ‘There is no particular nature’ means there is no state that has a particular nature. If so, the simple denial ‘it is not’ would be appropriate; thus he says: ‘and not form, etc.’ To show that although in such phrases as ‘pleasant, painful, neither-painful-nor-pleasant,’ the words for pleasure and pain are general expressions, in the teaching on the faculties they refer to specific objects, he says: ‘of pleasure…pe… is indeed taken.’ And having made a distinction concerning the painful.

140. Paññindriyāni hontīti āmantāti vuttanti pajānanaṭṭhena adhipateyyaṭṭhena ca paññindriyāni honti, dassanaṭṭhena pana cakkhūni cāti cakkhu, indriyanti pucchāya ‘‘āmantā’’ti vuttanti adhippāyo. ‘‘Taṇhāsotamevāhā’’ti vuttaṃ, ‘‘yassa chattiṃsati sotā’’tiādīsu (dha. pa. 339) pana diṭṭhiādīnampi sotabhāvo āgato.

140. ‘Are they wisdom faculties?’ ‘Yes.’ This is said because they are wisdom faculties in the sense of understanding and in the sense of sovereignty. But in the sense of seeing, they are eyes. Thus, the meaning is that to the question ‘Is the eye a faculty?’ the answer ‘Yes’ is given. It is said: ‘He speaks only of the stream of craving,’ but in passages such as ‘for whom there are thirty-six streams’ (Dhp 339), the status of a stream is also ascribed to views and so on.

Paṇṇattiniddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Exposition Section on Designations is finished.

2. Pavattivāravaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Process Section

186. Aññadhammanissayenāti ‘‘yo tesaṃ rūpīnaṃ dhammānaṃ āyu ṭhitī’’tiādinā (dha. sa. 634) aññadhammanissayena gahetabbaṃ. Pavattiñca gahetvā gatesu vissajjanesu, cutipaṭisandhiyo gahetvā gatesu yojanā na labbhatīti adhippāyo. Alabbhamānā ca sukhadukkhadomanassindriyeheva na labbhati. Taṃmūlakā ca nayāti sukhindriyādimūlakā ca nayā. Tehīti sukhindriyādīhi. Yojanāti ‘‘pavatte sukhindriyavippayuttacittassa uppādakkhaṇe’’tiādinā uppajjamānehi yojanā. Taṃmūlakā ca tathāyojanāmūlabhūtā ca nayā jīvitindriyādimūlakā ca nayā. Pākaṭāyevāti pāḷigatiyā eva viññāyamānayojanattā suviññeyyā eva.

186. ‘By dependence on another state’: this should be taken as dependence on another state in the sense of ‘the life, the duration… of those material states’ (Dhs §634). The meaning is that when one considers the answers given in terms of process, and when one considers those given in terms of death and rebirth-linking, an application is not found. And when it is not found, it is not found only with the faculties of pleasure, pain, and displeasure. ‘And the methods rooted in them’ means the methods rooted in the faculty of pleasure, etc. ‘By them’ means by the faculty of pleasure, etc. ‘Application’ means the application to what is arising, as in ‘at the moment of arising of a consciousness dissociated from the faculty of pleasure in the course of process.’ And the methods rooted in them, and the methods that are the root of such an application, and the methods rooted in the life faculty, etc., are quite clear. ‘Are quite clear’ means: because their application is knowable from the very flow of the Pāli text, they are very easy to understand.

Taṃ vacanaṃ. Somanassavirahitasacakkhukapaṭisandhinidassanavasenāti somanassavirahitasacakkhukapaṭisandhiyeva nidassananti yojetabbaṃ. Kathaṃ panetaṃ jānitabbaṃ ‘‘nidassanamattametaṃ, na pana gaṇanaparicchindana’’nti āha ‘‘na hi catunnaṃyevāti niyamo kato’’ti. Taṃsamānalakkhaṇāti tāya sacakkhukapaṭisandhitāya samānalakkhaṇāti parittavipākaggahaṇaṃ. Tattha sasomanassapaṭisandhiyo sandhāya upekkhāpaṭisandhiyo nidassanabhāvena vuttāti keci. Parittavipākapaṭisandhi ca kusalavipākāhetukapaṭisandhi veditabbā. Sāpi hi sacakkhukā siyā. Taṃsamānalakkhaṇāti vā tāya [Pg.216] upekkhāsahagatāya samānalakkhaṇā yathāvuttaahetukapaṭisandhi ca pañcamajjhānapaṭisandhi ca. Yadi evaṃ ‘‘catunna’’nti kasmā gaṇanaparicchedoti āha ‘‘kāmāvacare…pe… nidassanaṃ kata’’nti. Tenāti upekkhāsahagatamahāvipākanidassanena, yehi samānatāya ime nidassanabhāvena vuttā, te ekaṃsena taṃsabhāvā evāti ayamettha adhippāyo. Tenāha ‘‘yathā sasomanassa…pe… to hotī’’ti.

That statement. ‘By way of showing rebirth-linking with eyes but devoid of joy’: this should be construed as ‘rebirth-linking with eyes but devoid of joy is itself the illustration.’ But how is it to be known that ‘this is merely an illustration, not a numerical determination’? He says: ‘For no rule is made that there are only four.’ ‘Having a similar characteristic’: having a similar characteristic to that rebirth-linking with eyes means the taking of a minor resultant. Herein, some say that rebirth-linkings with equanimity are stated as an illustration with reference to rebirth-linkings with joy. And rebirth-linking with minor resultant should be understood as rootless wholesome-resultant rebirth-linking. For that too can be with eyes. Or, ‘having a similar characteristic’: having a similar characteristic to that which is accompanied by equanimity are the aforesaid rootless rebirth-linking and the fifth-jhāna rebirth-linking. If so, why is the numerical determination ‘four’ made? He says: ‘In the sense sphere…pe… an illustration is made.’ ‘By that’ means by the illustration of the great-resultant accompanied by equanimity. The meaning here is this: those which are stated as an illustration because of their similarity are exclusively of that same nature. Therefore he says: ‘Just as with joy…pe… it is.’

Nanu ca gabbhaseyyakesu ayamattho ekaṃsato na labbhatīti āsaṅkaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘gabbhaseyyakānañca…pe… dassitā hotī’’ti. Tenāha ‘‘sacakkhukāna’’ntiādi. Tattha yadi sahetukapaṭisandhikānaṃ kāmāvacarānaṃ niyamato sacakkhukādibhāvadassanaṃ gabbhaseyyakavasena labbheyya, yuttametaṃ siyāti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘gabbhaseyyakepi hī’’tiādi. Tathā āyatanayamake dassitanti idaṃ āyatanayamakavaṇṇanāyaṃ attanā vuttaṃ ‘‘evañca katvā indriyayamake’’tiādivacanaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tattha hi somanassindriyuppādakakammassa ekantena cakkhundriyuppādanato gabbhepi yāva cakkhundriyuppatti, tāva uppajjamānatāya ‘‘abhinanditabbattā’’ti vuttaṃ. Sanniṭṭhānena saṅgahitānanti ‘‘yassa vā pana somanassindriyaṃ uppajjatī’’ti etena sanniṭṭhānena saṅgahitānaṃ. Itthīnaṃ aghānakānaṃ upapajjantīnanti ādīsūti ādi-saddena ‘‘itthīnaṃ acakkhukānaṃ upapajjantīna’’ntiādiṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Te evāti gabbhaseyyakā eva.

With reference to the doubt, ‘But surely, in the case of womb-born beings this meaning is not absolutely obtained?’ he says: ‘And for the womb-born…pe… is shown.’ Therefore he says: ‘Of those with eyes,’ etc. Therein, with reference to the objection, ‘If for sense-sphere beings with rooted rebirth-linking the definite appearance of having eyes, etc., could be obtained by way of being womb-born, this would be correct,’ he says: ‘For even among the womb-born,’ etc. ‘Similarly, it is shown in the Āyatanayamaka’: this is said with reference to the statement he himself made in the commentary to the Āyatanayamaka, ‘And having done so, in the Indriyayamaka,’ etc. For there, because kamma that produces the joy faculty exclusively produces the eye faculty, it is said, ‘because it is to be delighted in,’ since it arises in the womb up until the arising of the eye faculty. ‘Included by the thesis’: of those included by this thesis, ‘Or for one for whom the joy faculty is arising.’ In ‘For women without a nose who are being reborn,’ etc., the word ‘etc.’ includes ‘For women without eyes who are being reborn,’ etc. ‘They are just’: just the womb-born.

Taṃsamānalakkhaṇanti sopekkhaacakkhukapaṭisandhibhāvena samānalakkhaṇaṃ. Tatthāti ahetukapaṭisandhicitte. Samādhileso dubbalasamādhi yo cittaṭṭhitimatto. Tasmāti yasmā cittaṭṭhiti viya dubbalaṃ vīriyaṃ natthi, yo ‘‘vīriyaleso’’ti vattabbo, tasmā, lesamattassapi vīriyassa abhāvāti attho. Aññesūti ahetukapaṭisandhicittato aññesu. Kesucīti ekaccesu. Ubhayenapi manodvārāvajjanahasituppādacittaṃ vadati. Idhāti ahetukapaṭisandhicitte. Samādhivīriyāni indriyappattāni ca na hontīti samādhikiccaṃ paṭikkhipati, na samādhimattaṃ, na vīriyalesassa sabbhāvatoti yojetabbaṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘visesanañhi visesitabbe pavattatī’’ti. Yasmiṃ vīriye sati indriyuppatti siyā, tadeva tattha natthīti attho.

‘Having a similar characteristic’: having a similar characteristic by being a rebirth-linking with equanimity and with the eye. ‘Therein’: in the rootless rebirth-linking consciousness. ‘A trace of concentration’ is weak concentration, which is mere mental stability. ‘Therefore’: because there is no weak effort like mental stability that could be designated ‘a trace of effort,’ the meaning is ‘because of the absence of even a mere trace of effort.’ ‘In others’: in others than the rootless rebirth-linking consciousness. ‘In some’: in certain ones. By both he speaks of the mind-door-adverting consciousness and the smile-producing consciousness. ‘Here’: in the rootless rebirth-linking consciousness. ‘Concentration and effort do not become faculties’: this rejects the function of concentration, not mere concentration, and it should be construed that this is not because of the existence of a trace of effort. Therefore he says: ‘For a qualification applies to what is to be qualified.’ The meaning is: that very effort, in the presence of which the arising of a faculty would occur, is absent there.

Apāye [Pg.217] opapātikavasenāti idaṃ sugatiyaṃ opapātiko vikalindriyo na hotīti katvā vuttaṃ, ‘‘labbhanteva ñāṇavippayuttāna’’nti pana vuttattā ‘‘duhetukapaṭisandhikānaṃ vasenā’’ti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaṃ. Tesanti itthipurisindriyasantānānaṃ. Itthipurisindriyānaṃ pana uppādanirodhā abhiṇhasova hontīti. Paṭhamakappikādīnanti ettha ādi-saddena gahitānaṃ parivattamānaliṅgānaṃ vasena uppādanirodhaggahaṇaṃ veditabbaṃ. Paṭhamakappikānaṃ pana vasena uppādo eva labbhati. ‘‘Cutiupapattivaseneva dutiyapucchāsupi sanniṭṭhānehi gahaṇaṃ veditabba’’nti idaṃ upādinnaindriyehi niyamitattā vuttaṃ.

‘In the plane of misery by way of spontaneous birth’: this is said on the grounds that in a happy destination a spontaneously born being is not one with defective faculties. But since it is said, ‘they are indeed found for those dissociated from knowledge,’ it is said in the commentary: ‘by way of those with two-rooted rebirth-linking.’ ‘Of them’: of the continuities of the female and male faculties. But the arising and ceasing of the female and male faculties occur very frequently. ‘Of the first-aeon beings, etc.’: here, by the word ‘etc.’ the taking of arising and ceasing should be understood by way of those whose sex changes. But for the first-aeon beings, only arising is found. ‘The taking by the theses in the second questions too should be understood only by way of death and rebirth’: this is said because it is determined by the clung-to faculties.

190. Santānuppattinirodhadassanatoti santānavasena uppādanirodhānaṃ dissamānattā. Etena rūpajīvitindriyassa cakkhundriyādisamānagatikataṃ yuttito sādheti. Āgamato pana ‘‘vinā somanassenā’’tiādinā parato sādhessati. Chedoti nāmaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ sarūpadassaneneva saṃsayachedanato.

190. ‘The seeing of the arising and cessation of continuity’: because arising and cessation are seen by way of continuity. By this, he logically establishes that the material life faculty has a similar course to the eye faculty, etc. But scripturally, he will establish it later by means of ‘without gladness,’ etc. The name ‘severing’ should be understood as such because it severs doubt by the very seeing of its intrinsic nature.

Tassāti rūpajīvitindriyassa. Te ca asaññasattā. Nanu ca uppādova jīvitindriyassa cutiupapattivasena vattabbo, na anuppādoti āha ‘‘anuppādo…pe… na pavatte’’ti. Ayañca nayo na kevalaṃ purimakoṭṭhāse eva, atha kho itarakoṭṭhāsepi gahito evāti dassento ‘‘pacchimakoṭṭhāsepī’’tiādimāha.

‘Of that’: of the material life faculty. And those are the non-percipient beings. But should not the arising of the life faculty be spoken of in terms of decease and rebirth, not non-arising? He says: ‘Non-arising... does not occur in the course of existence.’ And to show that this method is not adopted only in the former section but is also adopted in the other section, he says, ‘in the latter section as well,’ etc.

‘‘Upapatticittassa uppādakkhaṇe’’ti kasmā vuttanti yenādhippāyena codanā katā, tamadhippāyaṃ vivarituṃ ‘‘nanu suddhāvāsa’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. Na vattabbanti ‘‘upapajjantāna’’nti na vattabbaṃ, ‘‘upapatticittassa uppādakkhaṇe’’icceva vattabbanti attho. Idāni yathā ‘‘upapajjantāna’’nti na vattabbaṃ, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘yathā hī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Somanassamanindriyānanti somanassindriyamanindriyānaṃ, ayameva vā pāṭho. Tadāti paṭhamassa rūpajīvitindriyassa dharamānakāle. Tasmāti yasmā rūpārūpajīvitindriyānaṃ attheva kālabhedo, ubhayañcettha jīvitindriyabhāvasāmaññena ekajjhaṃ katvā gayhati, tasmā. Ubhayanti somanassindriyajīvitindriyanti idaṃ ubhayaṃ. Uppādakkhaṇena nidassitanti etena ‘‘upapatticittassa uppādakkhaṇe’’ti idaṃ nidassanamattanti dasseti. Idāni tamevatthaṃ udāharaṇena pākaṭataraṃ kātuṃ ‘‘yathā hī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha [Pg.218] yathā tādisānaṃ anekesaṃ cittānaṃ bhaṅgakkhaṇe labbhamānaṃ tadekadesena sabbapaṭhamassa upapatticittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇena nidassitaṃ, evamidhāpi khaṇadvaye labbhamānaṃ tadekadesena uppādakkhaṇena nidassitanti evaṃ nidassanattho veditabbo.

To clarify the intention with which the objection, ‘Why is it said, “At the arising moment of the rebirth-linking consciousness?”’, was raised, it is stated, ‘But in the Pure Abodes,’ etc. The meaning is that it should not be said, ‘of those being reborn,’ but rather, ‘at the arising moment of the rebirth-linking consciousness.’ Now, to show why it should not be said, ‘of those being reborn,’ the phrase ‘For just as...’ etc., is used. ‘Somanassamanindriyānaṃ’ means the faculty of gladness and the non-faculties; or this is the reading itself. ‘At that time’ means during the time when the first material life faculty is present. ‘Therefore’ means: because there is indeed a difference in time between the material and immaterial life faculties, and here both are taken together under the general characteristic of being the life faculty. ‘Both’ refers to these two: the faculty of gladness and the life faculty. ‘Indicated by the arising moment’: by this he shows that the phrase ‘at the arising moment of the rebirth-linking consciousness’ is a mere indication. Now, to make this meaning clearer with an example, the phrase ‘For just as...’ etc., is used. Herein, just as what is obtainable at the dissolution moment of many such consciousnesses is indicated by a part of it, namely, the dissolution moment of the very first rebirth-linking consciousness, so too here, what is obtainable in two moments is indicated by a part of it, namely, the arising moment. This is how the meaning of the indication should be understood.

Tesanti jīvitindriyādīnaṃ. Aññatthāti pavatte. Idhāti anāgatakālabhede. Na na sambhavati upapattikkhaṇassa viya tato paraṃ pavattikkhaṇassapi anāgatakālabhāvato. Tasmāti upapattito aññatthāpi yathādhippetauppādasambhavato. Ayañca attho vārantarepi dissatīti dassento āha ‘‘evañca katvā’’tiādi. Na hītiādinā tamevatthaṃ samattheti. Tattha api pacchima…pe… sandhikassāti api-saddena ‘‘ko pana vādo apacchimabhavikassa somanassasahagatapaṭisandhikassā’’ti dasseti. Apacchimabhavikassa cutito pacchā ‘‘somanassindriyaṃ nirujjhissatī’’ti vattabbameva natthīti āha ‘‘cutito pubbevā’’ti. Ettha hi paṭhamapucchāsu sanniṭṭhānatthotiādīsu ayaṃ saṅkhepattho – ettha ‘‘yassa cakkhundriyaṃ uppajjissatī’’ti evamādīsu yamakesu yā paṭhamapucchā, tāsu sanniṭṭhānapadasaṅgahito attho. Pucchitabbatthanissayoti ‘‘tassa somanassindriyaṃ uppajjissatī’’tiādikassa pucchitabbassa atthassa nissayabhūto mādisova mayā sadiso eva attho upapattiuppādindriyavā upapattikkhaṇe uppādāvatthaindriyasahito, ubhayuppādindriyavā paṭisandhipavattīsu uppādāvatthaindriyasahito vā. Paṭinivattitvāpi pucchitabbatthassa nissayoti ‘‘yassa vā panā’’tiādinā paṭinivattitvā pucchitabbassapi saṃsayatthassa nissayoti evaṃ iminā viya ajjhāsayena ‘‘yassa vā pana somanassindriyaṃ uppajjissatī’’tiādīsu dutiyapucchāsu sanniṭṭhānatthameva sanniṭṭhānapadasaṅgahitameva atthaṃ niyameti. Tattheva tāsu eva pubbe vuttapaṭhamapucchāsu eva. Pucchitabbaṃ ‘‘tassa somanassindriyaṃ uppajjissatī’’tiādīsu anāgatabhāvamattena sarūpato gahitaṃ uppādaṃ uppādasaṅkhātaṃ, ‘‘tassa somanassindriyaṃ nirujjhissatī’’tiādīsu anāgatabhāvamattena sarūpato gahitaṃ nirodhaṃ vā nirodhasaṅkhātaṃ vā saṃsayatthaṃ na niyametīti. Evanti vuttappakārena sanniṭṭhānatthassa niyamo hoti, na saṃsayatthassa, tasmā ‘‘yassa vā pana…pe… āmantā’’ti vuttaṃ. Esa nayoti yvāyaṃ uppādavāre vicāro vutto, nirodhavārepi eseva nayo. Tathā hi ‘‘yassa [Pg.219] vā pana somanassindriyaṃ nirujjhissati, tassa cakkhundriyaṃ nirujjhissatīti? Āmantā’’ti vuttaṃ.

‘Of them’ means of the life faculty, etc. ‘Elsewhere’ means in the course of existence. ‘Here’ means in the division of future time. It is not that it is impossible, because just like the rebirth moment, the subsequent moment of the course of existence is also future time. ‘Therefore’ means: because arising is possible elsewhere than at rebirth, as intended. And to show that this meaning is also seen in another section, he says, ‘And having done so,’ etc. He supports that same meaning with ‘For not...,’ etc. Therein, by the word api (also), with ‘also for one with a last... rebirth-linking,’ he shows: ‘What then needs to be said of one not in their final existence who has a rebirth-linking accompanied by gladness?’ For one not in their final existence, after death it is not at all fit to be said, ‘the faculty of gladness will cease’; thus he says, ‘even before death.’ Here, in the first questions, regarding ‘the meaning of the determination term,’ etc., this is the summary meaning: Here, in the Yamakas such as, ‘For whom the eye faculty will arise,’ the meaning is that which is included in the determination term. ‘The basis of the matter to be questioned’ means it is the basis for the meaning of what is to be questioned, such as ‘for him the faculty of gladness will arise.’ The meaning is ‘one like me,’ that is, ‘one similar to me’: either one with a faculty arising at rebirth, that is, accompanied by a faculty in the state of arising at the rebirth moment; or one with a faculty of double arising, that is, accompanied by a faculty in the state of arising at rebirth-linking and in the course of existence. ‘The basis of the matter to be questioned even when turning back’ means that even for what is to be questioned when turning back with ‘Or for whom...,’ etc., it is the basis for the meaning of the doubt term. Thus, with an intention like this, in the second questions, such as ‘Or for whom the faculty of gladness will arise,’ etc., he restricts the meaning of the determination term itself, that is, the meaning included in the determination term. Therein, that is, in those very same first questions mentioned before, he does not restrict the meaning of the doubt term—that is, the arising, designated as ‘arising,’ which is taken in its own nature simply as a future state in questions such as ‘for him the faculty of gladness will arise’; or the cessation, designated as ‘cessation,’ which is taken in its own nature simply as a future state in questions such as ‘for him the faculty of gladness will cease.’ Thus, in the way stated, there is a restriction of the meaning of the determination term, not of the meaning of the doubt term. Therefore it is said, ‘Or for whom... Yes.’ This is the method: this investigation that was stated in the arising section, this same method applies in the cessation section as well. For it is said: ‘Or for whom the faculty of gladness will cease, for him will the eye faculty cease? Yes.’

Evaṃ avuttattāti uppādanirodhānaṃ anāgatānaṃ sarūpena avuttattā. Na hi tattha te sarūpena vuttā, atha kho ‘‘nuppajjissatī’’ti paṭikkhepamukhena vuttā. Tatthāti anulome. Na evaṃ yojetabbā paṭilome. Tameva ayojetabbataṃ ‘‘yathā hī’’tiādinā vivarati. Uppādanirodhe atikkamitvā uppādanirodhā sambhavanti yojetuṃ, tathā uppādanirodhe appatvā uppādanirodhā sambhavanti yojetunti yojanā. Idañca dvayaṃ yathānulome sambhavati, na evaṃ paṭilome. Tenāha ‘‘na evaṃ…pe… sambhavantī’’ti. Tattha kāraṇamāha ‘‘abhūtābhāvassa…pe… sambhavānupapattito’’ti. Abhūtābhāvassāti abhūtassa abhāvassa, abhūtassa uppādassa nirodhassa ca abhāvassāti adhippāyo. Tenāha ‘‘abhūtuppādanirodhābhāvo ca paṭilome pucchito’’ti, tasmā ‘‘āmantā’’ti ca vuttaṃ, na vuttaṃ vissajjananti sambandho. Assa visesarahitassa abhūtābhāvassāti imassa yathāvuttassa yathā rūpābhāvo vedanābhāvoti koci abhāvopi visesasahito, na evamayanti visesarahitassa abhūtābhāvassa.

Because it was not stated thus means because the future arising and cessation were not stated in their own nature. For there they were not stated in their own nature, but rather were stated by way of negation as 'will not arise.' Therein means in the positive method. It should not be construed thus in the negative method. He clarifies that very inapplicability with 'For just as…' etc. The construal is: having transcended arising and cessation, it is possible to connect arising and cessation; similarly, without having reached arising and cessation, it is possible to connect arising and cessation. And this pair is possible in the positive method, but not so in the negative method. Therefore he says, 'not thus… are possible.' Therein he states the reason: 'because of the impossibility of the non-existence of what has not come to be…' Of the non-existence of what has not come to be means the absence of what has not come to be; the intention is the absence of arising and cessation that have not come to be. Therefore he says, 'and the absence of the arising and cessation that have not come to be is questioned in the negative method'; therefore 'Yes' was said, and an analytical answer was not given. This is the connection. Regarding 'of this undifferentiated non-existence of what has not come to be': just as some absence, such as the absence of form or the absence of feeling, is accompanied by a distinction, this is not so; this is the meaning of 'of the undifferentiated non-existence of what has not come to be.'

Kālantarayogābhāvatoti kālavisesayogābhāvato. Yādisānanti yāni bhūtāni na vattamānāni sati paccaye uppajjanārahāni, tesaṃ anāgatānanti attho. Uppādanirodhābhāvena pucchitabbassāti ‘‘nuppajjissati na nirujjhissatī’’ti evaṃ uppādassa nirodhassa ca abhāvena pucchitabbassa atthassa. Sannissayo nissayabhūto sanniṭṭhānena sannicchito sanniṭṭhānapadasaṅgahito. So yathāvutto attho nissayo etesanti tannissayā. Tādisānaṃyeva anāgatānaṃyeva upapatticutiuppādanirodhānaṃ upapatticutisaṅkhātauppādanirodhānaṃ anuppādānirodhānaṃ paṭikkhepavasena. Jīvitādīnampi jīvitamanindriyādīnampi. Anuppādānirodhā saṃsayapadena pucchitā honti ‘‘yassa somanassindriyaṃ nuppajjissati, tassa somanassindriyaṃ na nirujjhissatī’’ti. ‘‘Āmantā’’ti vuttaṃ vibhajitvā vattabbassa abhāvato. Tenāha ‘‘na vuttaṃ…pe… vissajjana’’nti.

Because of the absence of connection with another time means because of the absence of connection with a specific time. Of such as means: of those beings that are not present but are fit to arise when there is a condition; this is the meaning of 'of future ones.' Of the matter to be questioned by way of the absence of arising and cessation means: of the matter to be questioned by way of the absence of arising and cessation thus, 'will not arise, will not cease.' Having a good basis, being a basis, determined by the determination term, included in the determination term. Those that have that aforesaid meaning as their basis are 'those based on it.' By way of negating the non-arising and non-cessation of the arising and cessation designated as rebirth and death, of just such future ones. Also of life, etc., and of life, non-faculties, etc. Non-arising and non-cessation are questioned by the doubt term thus: 'For whom the faculty of gladness will not arise, for him the faculty of gladness will not cease?' 'Yes' is said because there is nothing to be stated analytically. Therefore he says, 'an analytical answer… was not given.'

Ye [Pg.220] sopekkhapaṭisandhikā bhavissanti rūpaloke, te saṅgahitāti yojanā. Taṃsamānalakkhaṇatāyāti tena sopekkhapaṭisandhikabhāvena samānalakkhaṇatāya. Taṃ pamādalikhitaṃ dhammayamake tādisasseva vacanassa abhāvato. Tatthapi yaṃ vattabbaṃ, taṃ cittayamake vuttaṃ ‘‘na hi khaṇapaccuppanne uppajjitthāti atītavohāro atthī’’tiādinā.

The construal is: those who will have a rebirth-linking with expectation in the form world are included. Because of having a similar characteristic to that means because of having a similar characteristic by way of that state of having a rebirth-linking with expectation. That was written through negligence in the Dhammayamaka, because of the absence of just such a statement. What should be said about that has also been stated in the Cittayamaka with the words: 'For in regard to the momentary present, there is no conventional expression of the past, "it has arisen,"' etc.

Pavattivāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the section on the course of existence is finished.

3. Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā

3. The Explanation of the Section on Full Understanding

435-482. Lokiyaabyākatehīti phaladhammanibbānavinimuttehi abyākatehi. Tāni upādāyāti tāni lokiyaabyākatāni upādāya. Taṃsamānagatikānaṃ manindriyādīnaṃ ‘‘so vedanākkhandhaṃ parijānātīti? Āmantā’’tiādinā (yama. 1.khandhayamaka.206) vedanākkhandhādīnaṃ viya pariññeyyatā vuttā. Yañhi parijānitabbaṃ, tadeva parijānātītiādinā vuttaṃ. Evamaviparīte atthe siddhepi codako ‘‘missakattā’’ti ettha labbhamānaṃ lesaṃ gahetvā codeti ‘‘yadi pariññeyyamissakattā’’tiādinā. Tassattho – yathā idha pariññeyyamissakānaṃ pariññeyyatā vuttā, evamaññatthāpi sā tesaṃ vattabbā, tathā bhāvetabbamissakānaṃ bhāvetabbatāti. Tenāha ‘‘kasmā dhammayamake’’tiādi. Kusalākusalesu bhāvanāpahānābhiniveso hoti, yena vuttaṃ ‘‘so taṃ akusalaṃ pajahati, kusalaṃ bhāvetī’’tiādi. Na abyākatabhāvanti ekena yathā phassadvārato viya viññāṇadvārato kusalādīnaṃ uppattipariyāyo, evaṃ vedanākkhandhādīnaṃ viya na abyākatādīnaṃ pariññeyyatāpariyāyoti dasseti.

435-482. "With the mundane indeterminate" refers to those indeterminate states that are devoid of resultant states and Nibbāna. "Depending on those" means depending on those mundane indeterminate states. For faculties like the mind faculty, which have the same course, the fact that the feeling aggregate and others are to be fully understood is stated by way of the passage beginning: "Does he fully understand the feeling aggregate? Yes" (Yamaka 1, Khandhayamaka, 206). For what is to be fully understood, it is said, "he fully understands," and so on. Even though the meaning is thus established without contradiction, the questioner, seizing on a pretext found in the word "mixed," objects with the passage beginning: "If because of being mixed with what is to be fully understood…." The meaning is: just as here the fact that things mixed with what is to be fully understood are to be fully understood is stated, so elsewhere too this should be stated for them, and likewise the fact that things mixed with what is to be developed are to be developed should be stated. Hence it is said, "Why in the Dhammayamaka?" and so on. In wholesome and unwholesome states, there is an inclination toward development and abandonment, as stated: "He abandons that unwholesome state and develops the wholesome," and so on. This shows that it is not so for indeterminate states: just as there is a mode of arising for wholesome states, etc., by way of the contact door or the consciousness door, there is no similar mode of being fully understandable for indeterminate states, etc., as there is for the feeling aggregate and others.

Kusalākusalabhāvena aggahitāti samudayasabhāvena aggahitāti attho. Kusalākusalāpīti kusalākusalabhāvāpi samānā. Bhāvetabbapahātabbabhāvehi [Pg.221] vināpi hoti, yo na maggasamudayasaccapakkhiyo. Yathā ‘‘aniccaṃ rūpa’’nti ettha ‘‘aniccameva rūpaṃ, na nicca’’nti paṭiyogivinivattanameva eva-kārena karīyati, na tassa dukkhānattatādayo nivāritā honti, evaṃ ‘‘pahātabbamevā’’ti ettha eva-saddena paṭiyogibhūtaṃ appahātabbameva nivattīyati, na tato aññavisesāti dassento āha ‘‘etena pahātabbamevā’’tiādi. Bhāvetabbabhāvo eva tassa aññindriyassa gahito ukkaṃsagativijānanato. ‘‘Parato likhitabbaṃ uppaṭipāṭiyā likhita’’nti kasmā vuttaṃ. Dve puggalāti hi ādi anulome āgataṃ uddhaṭaṃ, cakkhundriyaṃ na parijānātītiādi pana paṭilome. Domanassindriyaṃ na pajahanti nāmāti idaṃ ‘‘no ca domanassindriyaṃ pajahantī’’ti pāḷipadassa atthavacanaṃ. Yaṃ pana ‘‘cakkhundriyamūlakaṃ atikkamitvā domanassindriyamūlake idaṃ vutta’’nti vuttaṃ, paṭilome āgataṃ sandhāya vuttattā taṃ na yuttaṃ, na taṃ aṭṭhakathācariyā paṭhamaṃ āgataṃ padaṃ laṅghitvā tādisasseva pacchā āgatapadassa atthavaṇṇanaṃ karonti. Padānukkamato eva hi aṭṭhakathāyaṃ atthavaṇṇanā āraddhā, pariyosāpitā ca, tasmā anupaṭipāṭiyāva likhitaṃ, na uppaṭipāṭiyāti daṭṭhabbaṃ ‘‘dve puggalā’’tiādikassa anulome āgatassa uddhaṭattā.

"Not grasped by way of being wholesome and unwholesome" means not grasped by way of its nature as origin. "Even the wholesome and unwholesome" means: even while being wholesome or unwholesome states. It exists even without the states to be developed or abandoned, when not on the side of the path or the truth of the origin of suffering. Just as in "form is impermanent," the word `eva` ("only") serves to negate the opposite, meaning "form is only impermanent, not permanent," without excluding its nature as suffering, non-self, and so forth. Similarly, showing that here in "only what should be abandoned," the word `eva` negates the opposite, that is, what should not be abandoned, and not any other distinction, he says, "by this, only what should be abandoned," etc. The state of what should be developed is grasped by that other faculty because of knowing the excellence of its progress. Why is it said, "What should be written later has been written out of order"? For the passage beginning "Two persons" is extracted from what comes in the forward order, but the passage beginning "does not fully understand the eye faculty" is in the reverse order. "Indeed, they do not abandon the grief faculty" is an explanation of the meaning of the Pāli phrase, "nor do they abandon the grief faculty." The statement, "having gone beyond what is rooted in the eye faculty, this is said regarding what is rooted in the grief faculty," is not appropriate, as it refers to what comes in the reverse order; the commentary teachers do not skip a word that appears first and then explain the meaning of a similar word that comes later. Indeed, in the commentary the explanation of meaning is begun and completed following the order of the words. Therefore, it should be seen that it is written in sequence, not out of order, because the passage beginning with "two persons" is extracted from what comes in the forward order.

Etthāti etasmiṃ pariññāvāre. Cha puggalāti puthujjanena saddhiṃ yāva anāgāmimaggaṭṭhā cha puggalā. Abhinditvā gahito tattha bhabbābhabbānaṃ kiccavisesassa aggahitattā. Yattha pana sati puthujjanaggahaṇasāmaññe bhabbānaṃ kiccaṃ gahitaṃ, yattha ca abhabbānaṃ, tattha te eva bhinditvā vuttā hontīti dassento ‘‘ye ca puthujjanā maggaṃ paṭilabhissanti, ye ca puthujjanā maggaṃ na paṭilabhissantī’’ti ca ādimāha. Arahāti ariyo, ayameva vā pāṭho. Paṭhamamaggaphalasamaṅgīti purimamaggaphalasamaṅgī. Itaroti arahā. Evaṃ puggalabhedaṃ ñatvāti idha puthujjano so ca abhabboti gahito, idha bhabbo idha ariyā, ye ca paṭhamamaggaphalasamaṅgino yāva aggamaggaphalasamaṅginoti evaṃ yathāvuttaṃ puggalavibhāgaṃ ñatvā. Tattha tatthāti tesaṃ dve puthujjanā aṭṭha ariyāti imesaṃ yathāvuttapuggalānaṃ bhedato abhedato ca gahaṇavasena āgate tasmiṃ tasmiṃ pāṭhapadese. Sanniṭṭhānenāti sanniṭṭhānapadavasena, nicchayavaseneva vā. Niddhāretvāti [Pg.222] nīharitvā. Vissajjanaṃ yojetabbanti vissajjanavasena pavattapāḷiyā yathāvuttaatthadassanena sambandhato vibhāvetabboti.

“Here” means in this section on full understanding. “Six persons” means the six persons from the worldling up to one established in the path of non-returning. It is taken without distinction, because the specific task of the capable and the incapable is not grasped there. But where, though there is a general inclusion of worldlings, the task of the capable is grasped, and where it is the task of the incapable, there they are stated with a distinction. Showing this, he states the passage beginning: “those worldlings who will attain the path and those who will not attain the path....” “Arahant” means a noble one, or this is the reading itself. “One endowed with the first path and fruit” means one endowed with a prior path and fruit. “The other” means the arahant. “Thus, having known the distinction among persons” means: having known the classification of persons as stated—that is, here the worldling, who is incapable, is taken; here the capable one; here the noble ones, from those endowed with the first path and fruit up to those endowed with the highest path and fruit. “There, in each case” refers to each textual passage that occurs by way of taking these aforesaid persons—the two worldlings and eight noble ones—either with or without distinction. “By determination” means by way of the concluding term, or simply by way of decision. “Having extracted” means having drawn out. “The reply should be connected” means that the connection should be clarified by showing the aforesaid meaning in the Pāli text that constitutes the reply.

Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section on Full Understanding is finished.

Indriyayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Indriya-Yamaka is completed.

Yamakapakaraṇa-anuṭīkā samattā.

The Subcommentary on the Yamaka Treatise is complete.

Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa

Homage to the Blessed One, the Arahant, the Perfectly Enlightened One.

Paṭṭhānapakaraṇa-anuṭīkā

The Subcommentary to the Book of Conditional Relations

Ganthārambhavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Beginning of the Text

Kāmaguṇādīhīti [Pg.223] kāmaguṇajhānābhiññācittissariyādīhi. Laḷantīti laḷitānubhavanavasena ramanti. Tesūti kāmaguṇādīsu. Viharantīti iriyāpathaparivattanādinā vattanti. Paccatthiketi bāhirabbhantarabhede amitte. Issariyaṃ tattha tattha ādhipateyyaṃ. Ṭhānaṃ seṭṭhisenāpatiyuvarājādiṭṭhānantaraṃ. Ādi-saddena parivāraparicchedādi saṅgayhati. Puññayogānubhāvappattāyāti dānamayādipuññānubhāvādhigatāya samathavipassanābhāvanāsaṅkhātayogānubhāvādhigatāya ca. Jutiyāti sarīrappabhāya ceva ñāṇappabhāya ca. Ettha ca deva-saddo yathā kīḷāvijigisāvohārajutigatiattho, evaṃ sattiabhitthavakamanatthopi hoti dhātusaddānaṃ anekatthabhāvatoti ‘‘yadicchitanipphādane sakkontīti vā’’tiādi vuttaṃ.

“By sensual pleasures, etc.” means by sensual pleasures, jhānas, supernormal powers, mastery over the mind, and so on. “They delight” (laḷanti) means they enjoy by way of experiencing delight. “In them” (tesu) refers to those objects of sensual pleasure, and so on. “They dwell” (viharanti) means they conduct themselves by way of changing postures and so on. “Enemies” (paccatthike) means enemies distinguished as external and internal. “Sovereignty” (issariyaṃ) means sovereignty or lordship in this and that place. “Position” (ṭhānaṃ) means a position immediately after that of a guild-master, general, crown prince, and so on. The word “etc.” (ādi) includes retinue, domain, and the like. “Attained through the power of merit and practice” (puññayogānubhāvappattāya) means attained through the power of merit consisting of generosity and so on, and attained through the power of the practice consisting of the development of serenity and insight. “By radiance” (jutiyā) refers to both bodily radiance and the radiance of wisdom. And here, just as the word “deva” has the meaning of play, victory, convention, radiance, and destination, so it also has the meaning of power, praise, and desire, because verbal roots have multiple meanings. Thus it is said: “They are able to accomplish whatever they desire,” and so on.

Iddhividhāditāmattena bhagavato abhiññādīnaṃ sāvakehi sādhāraṇatāvacanaṃ, sabhāvato pana sabbepi buddhaguṇā anaññasādhāraṇāyevāti dassento ‘‘niratisayāya abhiññākīḷāya, uttamehi dibbabrahmaariyavihārehī’’ti āha. Cittissariyasattadhanādīnaṃ dānasaṅkhātena sammāpaṭipattiaveccappasādasakkārānaṃ gahaṇasaṅkhātenāti yojanā. Gahaṇañcettha tesu upalabbhamānasammāpaṭipattiaveccappasādānaṃ tehi upanīyamānasakkārassa ca abhinandanaṃ anumodanaṃ sampaṭicchanañca veditabbaṃ. Dhammasabhāvānurūpānusāsanīvacaneneva ca pana sikkhāpadapaññattipi saṅgahitāti daṭṭhabbā vītikkamadhammānurūpā anusāsanīti katvā. Ñāṇagati ñāṇena gantabbassa ñeyyassa avabodho. Samannāgatattāti idaṃ ‘‘abhiññākīḷāyā’’tiādīsu paccekaṃ yojetabbaṃ, tathā sadevakena lokenāti idaṃ ‘‘gamanīyato’’tiādīsu. Te deveti sammutidevādike deve. Tehi guṇehīti abhiññādiguṇehi. Pūjanīyataro devoti [Pg.224] idaṃ pūjanīyapariyāyo ayaṃ ati-saddoti katvā vuttaṃ. Atirekataroti adhikataro. Upapattidevānanti idaṃ tabbahulatāya vuttaṃ. Visuddhidevāpi hi tattha vijjanteva, tesupi vā labbhamānaṃ upapattidevabhāvamattameva gahetvā tathā vuttaṃ. Paṭipakkhānaṃ dussīlyamuṭṭhassaccavikkhepānaṃ, sīlavipattiabhijjhādomanassaavasiṭṭhanīvaraṇānaṃ vā.

By the mere measure of the kinds of supernormal power, the statement that qualities such as supernormal knowledge are common to the disciples of the Blessed One is made. But showing that by nature all the virtues of the Buddha are indeed incomparable, it is said: “with unsurpassed delight in supernormal knowledge, with the supreme divine, brahma, and noble abidings.” The terms “mastery of mind,” “the seven treasures,” and the like are connected with what is designated as giving, while “right practice,” “unwavering confidence,” and “honor” are connected with what is designated as acquisition. Here, “acquisition” should be understood as the approval, rejoicing, and acceptance of the right practice and unwavering confidence found in them, as well as the honor brought by them. Moreover, the laying down of training rules should be seen as included in the teaching that accords with the nature of the Dhamma, as it is a teaching suited to the nature of transgressions. “Comprehension by knowledge” is the understanding of what is to be known, which should be comprehended by knowledge. The phrase “because of being endowed with” should be applied individually to expressions like “delight in supernormal knowledge,” and similarly, “by the world with its gods” should be applied to phrases like “because it is to be gone to.” “Those gods” refers to conventional gods and the like. “By those virtues” means by the virtues such as supernormal knowledge. “More worthy of honor than the gods” is said by way of explaining the word “ati,” meaning ‘surpassing’ in the sense of honor. “More excellent” means superior. “Of devas by rebirth”—this is said due to their abundance. For devas by purification also exist there; or it is said thus having taken only the state of a deva by rebirth that is attainable even for them. “Of the opponents”: of bad morality, forgetfulness, and distraction; or of failure in virtue, covetousness, dejection, and the remaining hindrances.

Isīnaṃ sattamo, isīsu sattamoti duvidhampi atthaṃ yojetvā dassento ‘‘catusaccāvabodhagatiyā…pe… vutto’’ti āha. Saparasantānesu sīlādiguṇānaṃ esanaṭṭhena vā isayo, buddhādayo ariyā. Isi ca so sattamo cāti isisattamoti evamettha attho daṭṭhabbo. ‘‘Nāmarūpanirodha’’nti ettha yaṃ nāmarūpaṃ nirodhetabbaṃ, taṃ dassento ‘‘yato viññāṇaṃ paccudāvattatī’’ti āha. Vaṭṭapariyāpannañhi nāmarūpaṃ nirodhetabbaṃ. Tasmiñhi nirodhite sabbaso nāmarūpaṃ nirodhitameva hoti. Yathāha ‘‘sotāpattimaggañāṇena abhisaṅkhāraviññāṇassa nirodhena satta bhave ṭhapetvā anamatagge saṃsāre ye uppajjeyyuṃ nāmañca rūpañca, etthete nirujjhanti…pe… arahato anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyantassa carimaviññāṇassa nirodhena paññā ca sati ca nāmañca rūpañca, etthete nirujjhanti vūpasamanti atthaṃ gacchanti paṭippassambhantī’’ti (cūḷani. ajitamāṇavapucchāniddesa 6). Atigambhīranayamaṇḍitadesanaṃ sātisayaṃ paccayākārassa vibhāvanato. Sabhāvato ca paccayākāro gambhīro. Yathāha ‘‘adhigato kho myāyaṃ dhammo gambhīro’’tiādi (dī. ni. 2.67; ma. ni. 1.281; 2.337; saṃ. ni. 1.172; mahāva. 7, 8), ‘‘gambhīro cāyaṃ, ānanda, paṭiccasamuppādo gambhīrāvabhāso’’ti (dī. ni. 2.95; saṃ. ni. 2.60) ca ādi. Tassa cāyaṃ anantanayapaṭṭhānadesanā atigambhīrāva.

“The seventh of seers,” “the seventh among seers”—connecting and showing the meaning in both ways, he says, “by the path to the realization of the four truths… it is said.” Or, the noble ones, Buddhas and so on, are “seers” (isayo) because they seek qualities such as virtue in their own and others' continuums. And “he is a seer and he is the seventh,” thus “the seventh seer” (isisattamo): in this way the meaning should be understood here. Regarding “the cessation of name-and-form,” to show what name-and-form should cease, he says, “from where consciousness turns back.” For the name-and-form included in the round of existence must cease. When that has ceased, all name-and-form entirely ceases. As it is said: “Through the knowledge of the path of stream-entry, with the cessation of the consciousness of karmic formations, except for seven existences, whatever name and form might arise in beginningless saṃsāra—there, these cease… With the cessation of the final consciousness of an arahant who is attaining final Nibbāna without residue, wisdom, mindfulness, name, and form—there, these cease, subside, come to an end, and are stilled.” (Cūḷaniddesa, Ajitamāṇavapucchāniddesa 6) The teaching adorned with exceedingly profound methods is especially excellent because of its analysis of the conditional structure. And the conditional structure is profound by its nature. As it is said: “This Dhamma I have attained is profound…” (Dīgha Nikāya 2.67; Majjhima Nikāya 1.281; 2.337; Saṃyutta Nikāya 1.172; Mahāvagga 7, 8), and “This dependent origination, Ānanda, is profound and appears profound.” (Dīgha Nikāya 2.95; Saṃyutta Nikāya 2.60), and so on. And this teaching of the Paṭṭhāna with its infinite methods is exceedingly profound.

Ganthārambhavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Beginning of the Text is finished.

Paccayuddesavaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Enumeration of Conditions

Samānaneti samānanayane, samāharaṇe, samānakaraṇe vā aṭṭhakathādhippāyaṃ. Tattha ‘‘dve anulomāni dhammānulomañca paccayānulomañcā’’tiādinā parato vaṇṇayissanti.

The commentary's intention is to explain 'samānaneti' as leading together, collecting, or making similar. In this regard, they will explain later, beginning with 'two conformities—conformity with the Dhamma and conformity with conditions,' and so on.

Paṭṭhānanāmatthoti [Pg.225] ‘‘paṭṭhāna’’nti imassa nāmassa attho, taṃ pana yasmā avayavadvārena samudāye niruḷhaṃ, tasmā yathā avayavesu patiṭṭhitaṃ, tameva tāva dassetuṃ ‘‘tikapaṭṭhānādīnaṃ tikapaṭṭhānādināmattho’’ti vuttaṃ. Atha vā avayavānameva paṭṭhānanāmattho niddhāretabbo taṃsamudāyamattattā pakaraṇassa. Na hi samudāyo nāma koci attho atthīti dassetuṃ ‘‘paṭṭhānaṃ…pe… nāmattho’’ti vuttaṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘imassa pakaraṇassa…pe… samodhānatā cettha vattabbā’’ti. Vacanasamudāyatthavijānanena viditapaṭṭhānasāmaññatthassa vitthārato paṭṭhānakathā vuccamānā sukhaggahaṇā hotīti dassento āha ‘‘evañhi…pe… hotī’’ti. Tatthāti tāsu nāmatthayathāvuttasamodhānatāsu. Sabbasādhāraṇassāti sabbesaṃ avayavabhūtānaṃ tikapaṭṭhānādīnaṃ samudāyassa ca sādhāraṇassa. Atthato āpannaṃ nānāvidhabhāvanti pakāraggahaṇeneva pakārānaṃ anekavidhatā ca gahitāva hontīti vuttaṃ. Pakārehi ṭhānanti hi paṭṭhānaṃ, nānāvidho paccayo, taṃ ettha vibhajanavasena atthīti paṭṭhānaṃ, pakaraṇaṃ, tadavayavo ca. Etasmiñca atthanaye saddatopi nānāvidhabhāvasiddhi dassitāti veditabbā. Tattha nānappakārā paccayatā, nānappakārānaṃ paccayatā ca nānappakārapaccayatāti ubhayampi sāmaññaniddesena ekasesanayena vā ekajjhaṃ gahitanti dassento ‘‘ekassapi…pe… veditabbā’’ti āha. Anekadhammabhāvatoti aneke dhammā etassāti anekadhammo, tabbhāvatoti yojetabbaṃ. Nānappakārapaccayatāti nānappakārapaccayabhāvo, yo aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘nānappakārapaccayaṭṭho’’ti vutto.

The meaning of the name 'Paṭṭhāna' is the meaning of this term 'Paṭṭhāna.' However, because it is established in the whole through its parts, to show first that it is based on the parts, it is said: 'The meaning of the name of the Tikapaṭṭhāna, etc., is the Tikapaṭṭhāna, etc.' Alternatively, the meaning of the name 'Paṭṭhāna' should be determined from the parts themselves, since the treatise is merely a collection of them. To show that there is no such thing as a meaning of the whole, it is said: 'Paṭṭhāna... the meaning of the name.' For this reason, he said: 'In this treatise... the complete arrangement must be stated here.' When the discourse on Paṭṭhāna is explained in detail after its general meaning has been understood by knowing the meaning of the collection of words, it becomes easy to grasp. To show this, he said: 'For thus... it becomes.' Therein refers to those meanings of the name and the arrangement as stated. 'Common to all' means common to all the constituent parts, such as the Tikapaṭṭhāna, etc., and to their collective whole. 'Attained to meaning in various ways' means that by grasping the mode, the diversity of modes is already grasped, it is said. For 'Paṭṭhāna' means a station (ṭhāna) with modes (pakārehi); the condition is of various kinds. Here, by means of analysis, there is 'Paṭṭhāna'—the treatise and its parts. And in this method of meaning, the establishment of the diversity of states from the word itself should also be understood. Here, 'conditionality of various kinds,' 'the conditionality of various kinds of things,' and 'various-kinds-conditionality' are all included together either by a general designation or by the single-remainder method. To show this, he said: 'Even of one... it should be understood.' 'Having the nature of multiple phenomena' means 'many phenomena are in it,' which should be connected as 'having that nature.' 'Conditionality of various kinds' means the state of being a condition of various kinds, which in the commentary is called 'the meaning of diverse conditions.'

Kāmaṃ dhammasaṅgahādīsupi attheva paccayadhammavibhāgo, so pana tattha paccayabhāvo na tathā tapparabhāvena vibhatto yathā paṭṭhāneti dassento ‘‘etena…pe… dassetī’’ti āha. Sātisayavibhāgataṃ imassa pakaraṇassa tathā tadavayavānaṃ.

Indeed, even in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī and so on, there is an analysis of conditional phenomena, but there the state of being a condition is not distinguished with such focus as it is in the Paṭṭhāna. To show this, he said: 'By this... he shows...' This shows the superior distinction of this treatise and likewise of its parts.

Sabbaññutaññāṇassa yathāvuttagamanaṃ yadadhikaraṇaṃ, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘etthāti vacanaseso’’ti. Gamanadesabhāvatoti pavattiṭṭhānabhāvato. Aññehi gatimantehīti tīsu kālesu appaṭihatañāṇādīhi. Tassa sabbaññutaññāṇassa.

To show the sphere for the proceeding-as-stated of the knowledge of omniscience, it is said: 'The word 'here' is the remainder of the statement.' 'From the state of being the place of going' means from the state of being the place of occurrence. 'By others who possess movement' means by those with unobstructed knowledge and so on in the three times. Of that knowledge of omniscience.

Tividhena [Pg.226] paricchedena desitesu dhammesu tikavohāroti āha ‘‘tikānanti tikavasena vuttadhammāna’’nti. Tīṇi parimāṇāni etesanti hi tikā. Samantāti samantato sabbabhāgatoti vuttaṃ hotīti āha ‘‘anulomādīhi sabbappakārehipī’’ti. Gatānīti pavattāni. Samantacatuvīsatipaṭṭhānānīti samantato anulomādisabbabhāgato samodhānavasena catuvīsati paṭṭhānāni. Anulomādisabbakoṭṭhāsatoti anulomādicatukoṭṭhāsato. Tikādichachabhāvanti tikādidukadukapariyosānehi chachabhāvaṃ. Tenāti yathāvuttadassanena. Dhammānulomādisabbakoṭṭhāsatoti paccanīkādidukādisahajātavārādipaccayapaccanīyādiārammaṇamūlādīnaṃ gahaṇaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yathāvuttato aññassa pakārassa asambhavato ‘‘anūnehi nayehi pavattānīti vuttaṃ hotī’’ti āha. Tāni pana yathāvuttāni samantapaṭṭhānāni. Ayañca atthavaṇṇanā aṭṭhakathāvacanena aññadatthu saṃsandatīti dassento āha ‘‘tenevāha…pe… vasenā’’ti.

The designation 'triad' applies to the dhammas taught with a threefold division, he said, explaining: 'of the triads' means 'of the dhammas spoken of by way of triads.' For 'triads' are those that have three measures. 'Samantā (all-round)' means 'from all sides, in every part,' as it is said: 'by all modes, such as the positive, etc.' 'Gatāni' means 'occurred.' 'The twenty-four all-round Paṭṭhānas' means the twenty-four Paṭṭhānas by way of combination from all parts, such as the positive. 'From all sections, such as the positive' means from the four sections, such as the positive. 'The sixfold state beginning with the triads' means the sixfold state that begins with the triads and ends with the pairs of pairs. 'By that' means by the view as stated. 'From all sections, such as the Dhamma-positive' should be understood as the inclusion of the negative, pairs, co-nascent occasion, condition-negative, object-root, and so on. Because no other mode than what has been stated is possible, it is said: 'they proceed by methods without deficiency.' Furthermore, those all-round Paṭṭhānas are as stated. And showing that this explanation of meaning indeed corresponds with the word of the commentary, he said: 'For that very reason he said... by way of...'

Hetunoti hetusabhāvassa dhammassa. Satipi hetusabhāvassa ārammaṇapaccayādibhāve savisese tāva paccaye dassentena ‘‘adhipatipaccayādibhūtassa cā’’ti vuttaṃ. ‘‘Hetu hutvā paccayo’’ti vutte dhammassa hetusabhāvatā niddhāritā, na paccayavisesoti tassa adhipatipaccayādibhāvo na nivāritoti āha ‘‘etenapi so eva doso āpajjatī’’ti. Tenāti hetubhāvaggahaṇena. Idhāti ‘‘hetupaccayo’’ti ettha. Dhammaggahaṇanti alobhādidhammaggahaṇaṃ. Sattiviseso attano balaṃ sattikāraṇabhāvo, yo rasotipi vuccati, svāyaṃ anaññasādhāraṇatāya dhammato anaññopi paccayantarasamavāyeyeva labbhamānattā añño viya katvā vutto. Tassāti hetubhāvasaṅkhātassa sāmatthiyassa. Hetu hutvāti etthāpi hetubhāvavācako hetusaddo, na hetusabhāvadhammavācakoti āha ‘‘hetu hutvā paccayoti ca vutta’’nti.

'By a cause' means of a dhamma that has the nature of a cause. Even when that which has the nature of a cause can be an object-condition, etc., in showing a condition with a distinction it is said: 'and of that which has become a dominance-condition, etc.' When it is said, 'being a cause, it is a condition,' the dhamma's nature as a cause is determined, not a specific condition. Therefore, its state as a dominance-condition, etc., is not precluded, he says: 'by this too, that same fault arises.' 'By that' means by grasping the state of being a cause. 'Here' means in the phrase 'cause-condition.' 'Grasping the dhamma' means grasping dhammas such as non-greed. A specific power is its own strength, the state of being the actual reason, which is also called 'essence.' This, being unique to itself, although not other than the dhamma, is spoken of as if it were other because it is obtained only in combination with other conditions. 'Of that' means of the capacity designated as the state of being a cause. In 'being a cause,' here too the word 'cause' is indicative of the state of being a cause, not of a dhamma that has the nature of a cause; so he says: 'and it is said, "being a cause, it is a condition."'

Evañca katvātiādinā yathāvuttamatthaṃ pāḷiyā samattheti. Yadi evaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ dhammasseva paccayatāvacanaṃ kathanti āha ‘‘aṭṭhakathāyaṃ panā’’tiādi[Pg.227]. Teneva cettha amhehipi ‘‘dhammato anaññopi añño viya katvā’’ti ca vuttaṃ. Yadi aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘yo hi dhammo, mūlaṭṭhena upakārako dhammo’’ti ca ādīsu dhammena dhammasattivibhāvanaṃ kataṃ, atha kasmā idha hetubhāvena paccayoti dhammasattiyeva vibhāvitāti codanaṃ manasi katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘idhāpi vā…pe… dassetī’’ti. Dhammasattivibhāvanaṃ panettha na sakkā paṭikkhipitunti dassento ‘‘na hī’’tiādimāha. Attho etassa atthīti attho, atthābhidhāyivacananti vuttaṃ ‘‘etīti etassa attho vattatī’’ti, tasmā atthoti atthavacananti vuttaṃ hoti. Tenāha ‘‘tañca uppattiṭṭhitīnaṃ sādhāraṇavacana’’nti. Tañcāti hi ‘‘vattatī’’ti vacanaṃ paccāmaṭṭhaṃ. Atha vā etīti etassa atthoti ‘‘etī’’ti etassa padassa attho ‘‘vattatī’’ti ettha vattanakiriyā. Tañcāti tañca vattanaṃ. Etasmiṃ panatthe sādhāraṇavacananti ettha vacana-saddo atthapariyāyo veditabbo ‘‘vuccatī’’ti katvā. Yadaggena uppattiyā paccayo, tadaggena ṭhitiyāpi paccayoti koci āsaṅkeyyāti tadāsaṅkānivattanatthaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘koci hi…pe… hetuādayo’’ti. Ettha ca yathā uppajjanārahānaṃ uppattiyā paccaye satiyeva uppādo, nāsati, evaṃ tiṭṭhantānampi ṭhitipaccayavaseneva ṭhānaṃ yathā jīvitindriyavasena sahajātadhammānanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Ye pana arūpadhammānaṃ ṭhitiṃ paṭikkhipanti, yaṃ vattabbaṃ, taṃ heṭṭhā vuttameva.

By 'And having done thus,' etc., he supports the aforesaid meaning with the Pāḷi text. If so, why does the commentary speak of conditionality only of the dhamma? He says: 'But in the commentary...' etc. For that reason, we too have said here: 'though not other than the dhamma, it is treated as if it were other.' Having considered the objection: 'If in the commentary, in such passages as, "For whatever dhamma is helpful in the sense of a root," the dhamma's power is explained by means of the dhamma, then why here is the dhamma's power alone explained as 'a condition by way of being a cause'?', it was said: 'Here too... he shows...' Showing that the explanation of the dhamma's power cannot be rejected here, he said: 'For not...' etc. 'Meaning' (attho) is that which this has; it is said to be a word denoting meaning. 'It goes towards' (eti), its meaning is 'it occurs' (vattati); therefore 'meaning' (attho) is said to be a word for meaning. Hence he said: 'And that is a common expression for arising and duration.' 'And that' refers back to the word 'occurs' (vattati). Alternatively, the meaning of the word 'eti' is the action of occurring (vattana) in the expression 'vattati.' 'And that' refers to that occurring. In this meaning, in the phrase 'a common expression,' the word 'expression' (vacana) should be understood as a synonym for meaning, on the grounds that it is 'said' (vuccati). Lest someone should suspect that in the same way that it is a condition for arising, it is also a condition for duration, to dispel that suspicion it was said: 'For someone... such as roots, etc.' Here it should be seen that just as for things liable to arise, arising occurs only when a condition for arising is present, not when it is absent, so too for things that endure, their duration is due to a condition for duration, as in the case of co-nascent dhammas dependent on the life faculty. As for those who reject the duration of immaterial dhammas, what is to be said about that has already been said below.

Yathā adhikaraṇasādhano patiṭṭhattho hetu-saddo, evaṃ karaṇasādhano pavattiatthopi yujjatīti dassento ‘‘hinotī’’tiādimāha. ‘‘Lobho nidānaṃ kammānaṃ samudayāyā’’tiādivacanato hetūnaṃ kammanidānabhāvo veditabbo.

To show that just as the word 'hetu' has the meaning of 'basis' when derived in the locative sense, so too it is suitable with the meaning of 'impelling' when derived in the instrumental sense, he said: 'It impels (hinoti)...' etc. From such statements as 'Greed is the source for the arising of kamma,' the state of causes as the source of kamma should be understood.

Etenāti hetupaccayato aññeneva kusalabhāvasiddhivacanena. Eke ācariyā. Sabhāvatovāti etena yathā aññesaṃ rūpagataṃ obhāsentassa padīpassa rūpagatobhāsakena aññena payojanaṃ natthi sayaṃ obhāsanasabhāvattā, evaṃ aññesaṃ kusalādibhāvasādhakānaṃ hetūnaṃ aññena kusalādibhāvasādhakena payojanaṃ natthi sayameva kusalādisabhāvattāti dasseti. Na sabhāvasiddho alobhādīnaṃ kusalādibhāvo ubhayasabhāvattā taṃsampayuttaphassādīnaṃ viyāti [Pg.228] imamatthaṃ dasseti ‘‘yasmā panā’’tiādinā. Sā pana aññapaṭibaddhā kusalāditā.

'By this' means by the statement that the establishment of the wholesome state is by something other than the cause-condition itself. Some teachers say: By the phrase 'from its own nature,' it is shown that just as a lamp, which illuminates forms, has no need of another illuminator, due to its own nature of illuminating, so too, causes that establish wholesome states and so forth have no need of another establisher, because they themselves have a wholesome nature, etc. He shows this meaning—that the wholesome nature of non-greed and so on is not established by its own nature, since it has a dual nature like contact and other associated factors—by the passage beginning, 'But because...' But that wholesomeness, etc., is dependent on another.

Na koci dhammo na hotīti rūpādibhedena chabbidhesu saṅkhatāsaṅkhatapaññattidhammesu kocipi dhammo ārammaṇapaccayo na na hoti, svāyaṃ ārammaṇapaccayabhāvo heṭṭhā dhātuvibhaṅgavaṇṇanāyaṃ vuttoyeva.

No phenomenon fails to become an object condition: among the six kinds of phenomena distinguished by form and so forth—conditioned, unconditioned, and conceptual phenomena—no phenomenon whatsoever fails to become an object condition. This very state of being an object condition was indeed explained earlier in the commentary on the Analysis of Elements.

Purimābhisaṅkhārūpanissayanti ‘‘chandavato’’tiādinā vuttākārena purimasiddhaṃ cittābhisaṅkhārakasaṅkhātaṃ upanissayaṃ. Citteti cittasīsenāyaṃ niddeso daṭṭhabbo. Na hi cittameva tathābhisaṅkharīyati, atha kho taṃsampayuttadhammāpi. Sādhayamānāti vase vattayamānā. Vasavattanañcettha tadākārānuvidhānaṃ. Chandādīsu hi hīnesu majjhimesu paṇītesu taṃtaṃsampayuttāpi tathā tathā pavattanti. Tenāha ‘‘hīnādibhāvena tadanuvattanato’’ti. Tenāti attano vase vattāpanena, tesaṃ vā vase vattanena. Tehi chandādayo. Adhipatipaccayā honti attādhīnānaṃ patibhāvena pavattanato. Garukātabbaṃ ārammaṇaṃ mahaggatadhammalobhanīyadhammādi.

“It has a previously arisen volitional formation as decisive support”: this refers to the previously established support, reckoned as a mental volitional formation, in the way stated by “one with desire,” and so on. “Herein, ‘mind’”: this designation should be understood as having mind as the chief term. For it is not the mind alone that is thus formed, but also the mental factors associated with it. “Bringing to accomplishment” means bringing under control. And here, being brought under control is conforming to that mode. For when desire and other factors are inferior, middling, or superior, the states associated with them also proceed accordingly. Hence it is said: “due to conformity to them in their inferior, middling, or superior nature.” “By that” means either by bringing them under one's own control or by being under their control. “By them”: by desire and so on. They become dominance conditions because they proceed with mastery over what is dependent on oneself. “An object that should be regarded as weighty”: an object such as exalted states or states that are objects of greed, etc.

Tadanantaruppādaniyamoti tassa tasseva cittassa anantaraṃ uppajjamānataṃ. Taṃtaṃsahakārīpaccayavisiṭṭhassāti tena tena ārammaṇādinā sahakārīkāraṇena taduppādanasamatthatāsaṅkhātaṃ visesaṃ pattassa. Tāyayevāti yā vekhādāne pupphanasamatthatā vekhāpagame laddhokāsā, tāyameva.

“The rule of arising immediately after that” means the state of arising immediately after that very mind. “Of that which is distinguished by its particular cooperating condition” means of that which has attained the distinction, reckoned as the capacity for its production, by means of this or that cooperating cause, such as an object. “Just by that”: just by that very capacity to produce flowers which is in the stalk and which has obtained its opportunity with the removal of the sheath.

Upasaggavasenapi atthaviseso hotīti vuttaṃ ‘‘saddatthamattato nānākaraṇa’’nti. Vacanīyatthatoti bhāvatthato. Bhāvatthopi hi vacanaggahaṇānusārena viññeyyattā ‘‘vacanīyo’’ti vuccati. Nirodhuppādantarābhāvatoti purimanirodhassa pacchimuppādassa ca byavadhāyakābhāvato. Nirantaruppādanasamatthatāti etena nirodhānaṃ nirodhasamakāluppādavādaṃ nivāreti. Sati hi samakālatte byavadhānāsaṅkā eva na siyā saṇṭhānābhāvato. Idamito heṭṭhā uddhaṃ tiriyanti vibhāgābhāvā attanā ekattamiva upanetvāti yojanā. Saṇṭhānābhāvena hi appaṭighabhāvūpalakkhaṇena vibhāgābhāvaṃ, tena ekattamivūpanayanaṃ suṭṭhu anantarabhāvaṃ sādheti, sahāvaṭṭhānābhāvena pana anantarameva uppādanaṃ.

It is said that a special meaning arises even by the force of a prefix, as in “a differentiation from the mere meaning of the word.” “From the meaning to be expressed” means from the meaning of the state. For the meaning of the state is called “to be expressed” because it is to be understood in accordance with the word that is grasped. “The absence of an interval between cessation and arising” means the absence of anything intervening between the preceding cessation and the succeeding arising. “The capacity for uninterrupted arising”: by this, he refutes the doctrine that arising is simultaneous with cessation. For if there were simultaneity, there would be no suspicion of an interval at all, due to the absence of shape. The construction is: because of the absence of division as “this is below, above, or across from that,” it leads it, as it were, to a unity with itself. For by the absence of shape, which is characterized by non-impingement, it establishes the absence of division, and by that, the leading to a state as if of unity well establishes the state of immediacy. But by the absence of co-existence, the arising is immediate.

Vibhāgato [Pg.229] ñāṇena ākarīyatīti ākāro, dhammānaṃ pavattibhedo. Nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaphalasamāpattīnaṃ nirodhuppādānantaratāyāti yojanā. Purimacutīti asaññasattuppattito purimacuti. Yadi kālantaratā natthi, kathamidaṃ ‘‘sattāhaṃ nirodhaṃ samāpajjitvā pañca kappasatāni atikkamitvā’’ti vacananti āha ‘‘na hi tesaṃ…pe… vucceyyā’’ti. Nanu tesaṃ antarā rūpasantāno pavattatevāti anuyogaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘na ca…pe… aññasantānattā’’ti. Yadi evaṃ tesaṃ aññabhinnasantānaṃ viya aññamaññūpakārenapi bhavitabbanti codanāya vuttaṃ ‘‘rūpārūpa…pe… hontī’’ti. Tenetaṃ dasseti – yadipi rūpārūpadhammā ekasmiṃ puggale vattamānā visesato aññamaññūpakārakabhāvena vattanti, aññamaññaṃ pana visadisasabhāvatāya visuṃyeva santānabhāvena pavattanato byavadhāyakā na honti santativasena mithu apariyāpannattā, yato ‘‘aññamaññaṃ vippayuttā, visaṃsaṭṭhā’’ti ca vuttanti. Upakārako ca nāma accantaṃ bhinnasantānānampi hotiyevāti na tāvatā santānābhedoti bhiyyopi nesaṃ byavadhāyakatābhāvo veditabbo. Yathā samānajātikānaṃ cittuppādānaṃ nirantaratā suṭṭhu anantarabhāvena pākaṭā, na tathā asamānajātikānanti adhippāyena ‘‘javanānantarassa javanassa viya bhavaṅgānantarassa bhavaṅgassa viyā’’ti vuttaṃ.

“Mode (ākāro)”: it is brought out by knowledge in a differentiated way, thus it is a mode; a differentiation in the occurrence of phenomena. The construction is: with the immediacy of the cessation and arising of the attainment of the fruition of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. “Preceding death” means the death preceding birth as a non-percipient being. If there is no time interval, how is this said: “Having attained cessation for seven days, having passed five hundred eons...”? He says: “For it should not be said of them...” But anticipating the objection, “Doesn't a material continuum proceed for them in the interim?” he says: “And not... because it is another continuum.” In response to the charge, “If so, then just as with other, different continuums, there should also be mutual assistance for them,” it is said: “Material and immaterial phenomena... exist.” By this he shows: although material and immaterial phenomena, occurring in one individual, proceed specifically by way of mutually assisting each other, still, because they proceed as quite separate continuums due to their dissimilar natures, they are not obstructors, since in terms of continuity they are not included in each other; for which reason it is said: “They are mutually dissociated and disjoined.” And assistance indeed occurs even for entirely different continuums, but that does not mean there is no difference in the continuums; thus their lack of being an obstruction should be further understood. With the intention that just as the uninterruptedness of mental arisings of the same kind is clearly manifest as immediate, it is not so for those of dissimilar kinds, it is said: “like an impulsion immediately after an impulsion, or like a life-continuum immediately after a life-continuum.”

Paccayabhāvo cetthāti ettha ca-saddo byatireko. So yena visesenettha uppādakkhaṇaṃ, taṃ visesaṃ joteti. Anantarapaccayādīnanti ādi-saddena samanantarapaccayaṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Purepacchābhāvā, tadupādikā vā uppādanirodhā pubbantāparantaparicchedo, tena gahitānaṃ khaṇattayapariyāpannānanti attho. Tenāha ‘‘uppajjatīti vacanaṃ alabhantāna’’nti. Uppādakkhaṇasamaṅgī hi ‘‘uppajjatī’’ti vuccati. Tathā hi vuttaṃ ‘‘uppādakkhaṇe uppajjamānaṃ, no ca uppannaṃ, bhaṅgakkhaṇe uppannaṃ no ca uppajjamāna’’nti (yama. 2.cittayamaka.81). Soti anantarādipaccayabhāvo. Aparicchedanti kālavasena paricchedarahitaṃ. Yatoti pubbantāparantavasena paricchedābhāvato. Tenevāti kālavasena paricchijja eva dhammānaṃ gahaṇato.

Herein, in “paccayabhāvo ca,” the word “ca” has the sense of distinction. It illuminates that distinction by which there is here a moment of arising. “Anantarapaccayādīnaṃ”: by the word “ādi” (etc.), he includes the proximity condition. The state of being before and after, or the arising and ceasing based on that, is the delimitation of the past and future ends; the meaning is “of those that are included in the three moments, which are grasped by that delimitation.” Hence he says: “of those that do not obtain the expression ‘it arises.’” For what is endowed with the moment of arising is called “that which is arising.” For so it is said: “At the moment of arising it is arising, but it has not arisen; at the moment of dissolution it has arisen, but it is not arising” (Yama. 2.81). “So”: the state of being the contiguity condition, etc. “Aparicchedanti”: devoid of delimitation by way of time. “Yatoti”: because of the absence of delimitation by way of past and future ends. “Tenevāti”: because phenomena are grasped only after having been delimited by way of time.

Uppattiyā paccayabhāvena pākaṭenāti idaṃ tassa nidassanabhāvanidassanaṃ. Siddhañhi nidassanaṃ. Paccayuppannānanti paccayanibbattānaṃ, attano phalabhūtānanti [Pg.230] adhippāyo. Sahajātabhāvenāti saha uppannabhāvena. Attanā sahuppannadhammānañhi sahuppannabhāvena upakārakatā sahajātapaccayatā. Tena ṭhitikkhaṇepi nesaṃ upakārakatā veditabbā. Evañhi ‘‘pakāsassa padīpo viyā’’ti nidassanampi suṭṭhu yujjati. Padīpo hi pakāsassa ṭhitiyāpi paccayoti.

“By being manifest as a condition for arising”: this is an illustration of its being an illustration. For an illustration is something established. “Of the conditionally arisen” means of those produced by a condition; the intention is “of those that are its own fruit.” “By way of co-nascence” means by way of having arisen together. For the assistance to phenomena that have arisen together with oneself by way of having arisen together is the co-nascence condition. Therefore their assistance should be understood even at the moment of presence. For thus the illustration “like a lamp for light” is quite fitting. For a lamp is a condition also for the presence of light.

Aññamaññatāvasenevāti iminā sahajātādibhāvena attano upakārakassa upakārakatāmattaṃ na aññamaññapaccayatā, atha kho aññamaññapaccayabhāvavasenāti lakkhaṇasaṅkarābhāvaṃ dasseti, na sahajātādipaccayehi vinā aññamaññapaccayassa pavatti. Tenevāha ‘‘na sahajātatādivasenā’’ti. Yadipi aññamaññapaccayo sahajātādipaccayehi vinā na hoti, sahajātādipaccayā pana tena vināpi hontīti sahajātatādividhureneva pakārena aññamaññapaccayassa pavattīti dassento ‘‘sahajātādi…pe… na hotī’’ti vatvā tamevatthaṃ pākaṭataraṃ kātuṃ ‘‘na ca purejāta…pe… hontī’’ti āha. Sahajātatādīti ca ādi-saddena nissayaatthiavigatādīnaṃ gahaṇaṃ veditabbaṃ.

By “just by way of mutuality,” he shows the absence of a confusion of characteristics, indicating that the mere fact of being helpful to that which is helpful to oneself by way of co-nascence, etc., is not the mutuality condition, but rather it is by way of the state of being a mutuality condition; and he shows that the mutuality condition does not occur without the co-nascence and other conditions. Hence he says: “not by way of co-nascence, etc.” Although the mutuality condition does not exist without the co-nascence and other conditions, yet since the co-nascence and other conditions can exist even without it, he shows that the mutuality condition occurs precisely by a mode devoid of co-nascence, etc. After saying “co-nascence, etc.… does not exist,” to make that same meaning clearer he says: “and not pre-nascence… exist.” And by “co-nascence, etc.,” the inclusion of dependence, presence, non-disappearance, etc., should be understood.

Pathavīdhātuyaṃ patiṭṭhāya eva sesadhātuyo upādārūpāni viya yathāsakakiccaṃ karontīti vuttaṃ ‘‘adhiṭṭhānākārena pathavīdhātu sesadhātūna’’nti. Ettha adhiṭṭhānākārenāti ādhārākārena. Ādhārākāro cettha nesaṃ sātisayaṃ tadadhīnavuttitāya veditabbo, yato bhūtāni aniddisitabbaṭṭhānāni vuccanti. Evañca katvā cakkhādīnampi adhiṭṭhānākārena upakārakatā suṭṭhu yujjati. Na hi yathāvuttaṃ tadadhīnavuttiyā visesaṃ muñcitvā añño cakkhādīsu adesakānaṃ arūpadhammānaṃ adhiṭṭhānākāro sambhavati. Yadipi yaṃ yaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca ye ye dhammā pavattanti, tesaṃ sabbesaṃ tadadhīnavuttibhāvo, yena pana paccayabhāvavisesena cakkhādīnaṃ paṭumandabhāvesu cakkhuviññāṇādayo tadanuvidhānākāreneva pavattanti, svāyamidaṃ tesaṃ tadadhīnavuttiyā siddho visesoti vutto. Evañhi paccayabhāvasāmaññe satipi ārammaṇapaccayato nissayapaccayassa viseso siddhoti veditabbo. Svāyaṃ dhātuvibhaṅge vibhāvitoyeva. Khandhādayo taṃtaṃnissayānaṃ khandhādīnanti ‘‘upakārakā’’ti ānetvā sambandhitabbaṃ.

Because the remaining elements, like derived materiality, perform their respective functions only when established on the earth element, it is said: “the earth element is for the other elements by way of foundation.” Herein, “by way of foundation” means by way of support. And here the mode of support should be understood as their pre-eminent dependence on it, since the primary elements are said to be things whose place cannot be pointed out. And having taken it thus, the assistance of the eye, etc., by way of foundation is quite fitting. For apart from the aforesaid distinction of dependence on that, no other mode of foundation is possible for the eye, etc., which are immaterial phenomena without a location. Although for whatever phenomena that proceed in dependence on whatever phenomena, there is for all of them a state of dependence on that, yet that particular conditionality by which eye-consciousness, etc., proceed in conformity with the eye, etc., when these are keen or dull—this is said to be the distinction established by their dependence on that. For thus, even when there is a general state of conditionality, the distinction of the dependence condition from the object condition is established. This has been explained in the Analysis of the Elements. The phrase “The aggregates, etc., for the aggregates, etc., that are their respective supports” should be connected by supplying “are helpful.”

Yaṃ [Pg.231] kiñci kāraṇaṃ nissayoti vadati, na vuttalakkhaṇūpapannameva. Etena paccayaṭṭho idha nissayaṭṭhoti dasseti. Tatthāti niddhāraṇe bhummaṃ. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘niddhāretī’’ti.

Whatever cause he calls a 'support,' it is not only that which possesses the stated characteristic. By this he shows that here the meaning of “condition” is the meaning of “support.” “Tattha”: this is a locative of specification. Hence it is said, “it specifies.”

Suṭṭhukatataṃ dīpeti, kassa? ‘‘Attano’’ti vuttassa pakatasaddena visesiyamānassa paccayassa. Kena katanti? Attano kāraṇehīti siddhovāyamattho. Tathāti phalassa uppādanasamatthabhāvena. Atha vā tathāti nipphādanavasena upasevanavasena ca. Tattha nipphādanaṃ hetupaccayasamodhānena phalassa nibbattanaṃ, taṃ suviññeyyanti anāmasitvā upasevanameva vibhāvento ‘‘upasevito vā’’ti āha. Tattha allīyāpanaṃ paribhogavasena veditabbaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘upabhogūpasevana’’nti. Vijānanādivasenāti vijānanasañjānanānubhavanādivasena. Tenāti yathāvuttaupasevitassa pakatabhāvena. Anāgatānampi…pe… vuttā hoti, pageva atītānaṃ paccuppannānañcāti adhippāyo. Paccuppannassapi hi ‘‘paccuppannaṃ utu bhojanaṃ senāsanaṃ upanissāya jhānaṃ uppādentī’’tiādivacanato (paṭṭhā. 2.18.8) pakatūpanissayabhāve labbhatīti.

It explains 'well-done-ness.' Of what? Of the condition referred to as 'one's own,' which is specified by the word 'pakata.' By what is it done? By one's own causes—this meaning is established. 'Thus' means by way of being capable of producing the result. Or, 'thus' means by way of accomplishment and by way of cultivation. Therein, accomplishment is the production of the result through the conjunction of causal conditions. Since this is easily understood, without touching upon it, he explains only cultivation, saying, 'or cultivated.' Therein, 'adhering' should be understood by way of enjoyment. Hence, he says 'enjoyment-cultivation.' 'By way of knowing, etc.' means by way of knowing, recognizing, experiencing, etc. 'By that' means by the natural state of what has been cultivated as described. 'For future ones too...' is said; the intention is, how much more so for past and present ones. For even in the case of the present, from statements like, 'relying on present season, food, and lodging, one arouses jhāna' (Paṭṭhāna 2.18.8), it is obtained in the state of natural decisive support.

Yathā ye dhammā yesaṃ dhammānaṃ pacchājātapaccayā honti, te tesaṃ ekaṃsena vippayuttaatthiavigatapaccayāpi honti, tathā ye dhammā yesaṃ dhammānaṃ purejātapaccayā honti, te tesaṃ nissayārammaṇapaccayāpi hontīti ubhayesu ubhayesaṃ paccayākārānaṃ lakkhaṇato saṅkarābhāvaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘vippayuttākārādīhi visiṭṭhā, nissayārammaṇākārādīhi visiṭṭhā’’ti ca vuttaṃ. Yathā hi pacchājātapurejātākārā aññamaññavisiṭṭhā, evaṃ pacchājātavippayuttākārādayo purejātanissayākārādayo ca aññamaññavibhattasabhāvā evāti.

Just as those phenomena which are conditions for other phenomena by way of post-nascence are also, without exception, conditions for them by way of dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance, so too those phenomena which are conditions for other phenomena by way of pre-nascence are also conditions for them by way of dependence and object. Thus, to show the absence of intermingling of characteristics between the modes of conditions in both sets, it is said: 'distinguished by the modes of dissociation, etc., and distinguished by the modes of dependence and object, etc.' For just as the modes of post-nascence and pre-nascence are distinct from each other, so too the modes of post-nascence-dissociation, etc., and the modes of pre-nascence-dependence, etc., are distinctly characterized by their own natures.

Manosañcetanāhāravasena pavattamānehīti iminā cetanāya sampayuttadhammānampi tadanuguṇaṃ attano paccayuppannesu pavattimāha. Tenevāti cetanāhāravasena upakārakattā eva.

By 'by those proceeding by way of mental volition as nutriment,' he states that even the phenomena associated with volition proceed in accordance with it among their own conditionally arisen phenomena. 'Precisely by that' means precisely because of being helpful by way of volition as nutriment.

Payogena karaṇīyassāti etena bhinnajāti yaṃ tādisaṃ payogena kātuṃ na sakkā, taṃ nivatteti. Anekavāraṃ pavattiyā āsevanaṭṭhassa pākaṭabhāvoti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘punappunaṃ karaṇa’’nti. Ekassa pana [Pg.232] paccayadhammassa ekavārameva pavatti. Attasadisassāti arūpadhammasārammaṇatāsukkakaṇhādibhāvehi attanā sadisassa. Idaṃ paccayuppannavisesanaṃ, ‘‘attasadisasabhāvatāpādana’’nti idaṃ pana paccayabhāvavisesanaṃ, tañca bhinnajātiyatādimeva visadisasabhāvataṃ nivatteti, na bhūmantaratādi. Na hi parittā dhammā mahaggataappamāṇānaṃ dhammānaṃ āsevanapaccayā na hontīti. Vāsanaṃ vāsaṃ gāhāpanaṃ, idha pana vāsanaṃ viya vāsanaṃ, bhāvananti attho. Ganthādīsūti ganthasippādīsu. Visaye cetaṃ bhummaṃ, na niddhāraṇe. Tena ganthasippādivisayā purimasiddhā ajjhayanādikiriyā ‘‘ganthādīsu purimā purimā’’ti vuttā, sā pana āsevanākārā idha udāharaṇabhāvena adhippetāti āha ‘‘purimā purimā āsevanā viyāti adhippāyo’’ti. Niddhāraṇe eva vā etaṃ bhummaṃ. Ganthādivisayā hi āsevanā ganthādīti vuttā yathā rūpavisayajjhānaṃ rūpanti vuttaṃ ‘‘rūpī rūpāni passatī’’tiādīsu (ma. ni. 2.248; 3.312; paṭi. ma. 1.209; dha. sa. 248).

By 'of what is to be done by application,' he excludes what is of a different kind, which cannot be accomplished by such application. Because it makes plain the meaning of repetition in occurring many times, it is said, 'doing again and again.' However, a single conditioning phenomenon has only a single occurrence. 'Of one similar to itself' means similar to itself by way of having an immaterial phenomenon as object, or by being white, dark, etc. This is a qualification of the conditionally arisen phenomenon, while 'producing a nature similar to itself' is a qualification of the state of being a condition. And this excludes only a dissimilar nature such as being of a different kind, not being of a different plane, etc. For it is not the case that limited phenomena are not conditions by way of repetition for sublime and immeasurable phenomena. 'Perfuming' (vāsana) means causing to take up a dwelling. Here, however, 'perfuming' is used figuratively; the meaning is 'development' (bhāvanā). 'In books, etc.' means in the craft of books, etc. And this locative is in the sense of domain, not in the sense of specification. Therefore, previously accomplished activities such as study, etc., in the domain of the craft of books, etc., are called 'the preceding, preceding in books, etc.' But that, being the mode of repetition, is intended here as an example; thus he says, 'the meaning is "like the preceding, preceding repetition."' Or this locative is indeed in the sense of specification. For repetition concerning books, etc., is called 'books, etc.,' just as the jhāna with form as its object is called 'form' in passages like 'one with form sees forms' (MN 2.248; 3.312; Paṭis I 209; Dhs 248).

Attano viya sampayuttadhammānampi kiccasādhikā cetanā cittassa byāpārabhāvena lakkhīyatīti āha ‘‘cittapayogo cetanā’’ti. Tāyāti tāya cetanāya. Uppannakiriyatāvisiṭṭheti cittapayogasaṅkhātāya cetanākiriyāya uppattiyā visiṭṭhe visesaṃ āpanne. Yasmiñhi santāne kusalākusalacetanā uppajjati, tattha yathābalaṃ tādisaṃ visesādhānaṃ katvā nirujjhati, yato tattheva avasesapaccayasamavāye tassā phalabhūtāni vipākakaṭattārūpāni nibbattissanti. Tenāha ‘‘sesapaccaya…pe… na aññathā’’ti. Tesanti vipākakaṭattārūpānaṃ. Tenāti cittakiriyabhāvena. Kiṃ vattabbanti asahajātānampi bhāvīnaṃ upakārikā cetanā sahajātānaṃ upakārikāti vattabbameva natthīti attho.

Volition, which accomplishes the function of its associated phenomena as well as its own, is characterized as the mind's activity—hence he says, 'mental application is volition.' 'By that' means by that volition. 'Distinguished by the possession of arisen activity' means distinguished, having attained distinction, through the arising of the activity of volition, known as mental application. For in whatever mental continuum wholesome or unwholesome volition arises, there, according to its strength, having established such a distinction, it ceases, whence, when the remaining conditions are complete, its resultant fruits—kamma-produced material phenomena—will arise in that very place. Therefore, he says, 'the remaining conditions... not otherwise.' 'Of those' means of the resultant kamma-produced material phenomena. 'By that' means by the nature of mental activity. 'What is to be said?' The meaning is that since volition is helpful even to future states that are not co-nascent, it goes without saying that it is helpful to co-nascent states.

Nirussāhasantabhāvenāti ussāhanaṃ ussāho, natthi etassa ussāhoti nirussāho, so eva santabhāvoti nirussāhasantabhāvo, tena. Ussāhoti ca kiriyamayacittuppādassa pavattiākāro veditabbo, yo byāpāroti ca vuccati, na vīriyussāho. Svāyaṃ yathā asamugghātitānusayānaṃ kiriyamayacittuppādesu sātisayo [Pg.233] labbhati, na tathā niranusayānaṃ. Tato eva te santasabhāvā vipākuppādanabyāpārarahitāva honti, kiriyamayacittuppādatāya pana saussāhā evāti tatopi visesanatthaṃ ‘‘nirussāhasantabhāvenā’’ti vuttaṃ. Etenāti nirussāhasantabhāvaggahaṇena. Sārammaṇādibhāvenāti sārammaṇaarūpadhammacittacetasikaphassādibhāvena. Visadisavipākabhāvaṃ dasseti yathāvuttaussāhamattarahitasantabhāvassa vipakkabhāvamāpannesu arūpadhammesu eva labbhanato. Soti vipākabhāvo. Vipākānaṃ payogena asādhetabbatāyāti ‘‘chandavato kiṃ nāmana sijjhatī’’tiādinā cittābhisaṅkhārapayogena yathā kusalākusalā nipphādīyanti, evaṃ vipākānaṃ payogena anipphādetabbattā. Payogenāti kammaphaluppattimūlahetubhūtena purimapayogena. Yaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ ‘‘payogasampattiṃ āgamma vipaccantī’’tiādi. Aññathāti payogena vinā. Sesapaccayesūti kammassa vipākuppādane sahakārīkāraṇesu. Kammassa kaṭattāyeva payoge sati asatipīti vuttamevatthaṃ avadhāraṇena dassento vipākānaṃ nirussāhataṃ pākaṭaṃ karoti. Na kilesavūpasamasantabhāvo yathā taṃ santānesu jhānasamāpattīsūti adhippāyo. Ayañca vipākānaṃ santabhāvo nānumāniko, atha kho paccakkhasiddhoti dassento ‘‘santabhāvatoyevā’’tiādimāha. Tattha abhinipātaggahaṇena kiccato pañcaviññāṇāni dasseti. Tenevāha ‘‘pañcahi viññāṇehi na kiñci dhammaṃ paṭijānāti aññatra abhinipātamattā’’ti. Tappaccayavatanti vipākapaccayavantānaṃ, vipākapaccayena upakattabbānanti attho. Avipākānaṃ rūpadhammānaṃ. Vipākānukulaṃ pavattinti santasabhāvaṃ paccayabhāvamāha.

'By the nature of being calm and without exertion': Exertion is effort; there is no effort for this, thus it is 'without effort'; that very state is calmness, thus 'the nature of being calm and without effort'; by that. And 'effort' should be understood as the mode of proceeding of an arising of functional consciousness, which is also called 'activity,' not the effort of energy. This effort is found with excess in the arisings of functional consciousness of those whose underlying tendencies have not been uprooted, but not so for those without underlying tendencies. Therefore, they are of a calm nature, devoid of the activity of producing a resultant, but because they are arisings of functional consciousness, they are indeed with effort. To distinguish from that, it is said, 'by the nature of being calm and without exertion.' 'By this' means by grasping the nature of being calm and without exertion. 'By having an object, etc.' means by being an immaterial phenomenon with an object—namely, consciousness, mental factors, contact, etc. It shows the nature of a dissimilar resultant, because the calm nature devoid of the aforesaid effort is found only in immaterial phenomena that have become the opposite of a cause. 'That' is the state of being a resultant. 'Because resultants are not to be accomplished by application' means that just as wholesome and unwholesome states are produced by the application of mental formation, as in 'What does not succeed for one with will?', so resultants are not to be produced by application. 'By application' means by the prior application that is the root cause for the arising of kamma's fruit, in reference to which it is said, 'they ripen, having come to the success of application,' etc. 'Otherwise' means without application. 'In the remaining conditions' means in the auxiliary causes for the production of the resultant of kamma. Showing with emphasis this very meaning that has been stated—'because of kamma's having been done, whether application is present or absent'—he makes plain the non-exertional nature of resultants. The intention is: it is not the calm nature of the pacification of defilements, as in the jhāna-attainments in continuums. And showing that this calm nature of resultants is not inferential but established by direct experience, he says, 'from the very nature of being calm,' etc. Therein, by the term 'impingement,' he indicates the five sense-consciousnesses in terms of function. Hence he says, 'with the five consciousnesses one does not cognize any phenomenon other than mere impingement.' 'Dependent on that condition' means 'of those having a resultant as condition'; the meaning is 'to be assisted by the resultant condition.' This refers to the material phenomena that are not resultants. 'Proceeding in conformity with the resultant' states the calm nature to be the nature of the condition.

Yathāsakaṃ paccayehi nibbattānaṃ paccayuppannānaṃ anubalappadānaṃ upatthambhakattaṃ, tayidaṃ āhāresu na niyataṃ tato aññathāpi pavattanato. Tathā sati tadeva tattha kasmā gahitanti codanaṃ manasi katvā āha ‘‘satipi…pe… upatthambhakattenā’’ti. Tena padhānāppadhānesu padhānena niddeso ñāyagatoti dasseti. Kāmañcettha ‘‘rūpārūpānaṃ upatthambhakattenā’’ti avisesato vuttaṃ, sāmaññajotanā pana visese avatiṭṭhatīti yathārahaṃ paccayabhāvo niddhāretabbo. Svāyaṃ tesaṃ upatthambhakattassa padhānabhāvavibhāvaneneva āvi bhavatīti tameva dassento [Pg.234] ‘‘upatthambhakattañhī’’tiādimāha. Phassamanosañcetanāviññāṇāni attanā sahajātadhammānaṃ sahuppādanabhāvena paccayā hontīti āha ‘‘satipi janakatte arūpīnaṃ āhārāna’’nti. Upatthambhakattaṃ hoti uppādato parampi nesaṃ paccayabhāvato. Asatipi janakatte upatthambhiyamānassa rūpassa aññehi yathāsakaṃ paccayehi janitattā. Tenāha ‘‘catusamuṭṭhānikarūpūpatthambhakarūpāhārassā’’ti. Yadaggena rūpārūpāhārā attano phalassa uppattiyā paccayā honti, tadaggena ṭhitiyāpi paccayā hontiyevāti upatthambhakattaṃ janakattaṃ na byabhicarati, tasmā anupatthambhakassa āhārassa kuto janakatā. Tenāha ‘‘asati pana…pe… natthīti upatthambhakattaṃ padhāna’’nti. Yasmā janako ajanakopi hutvā āhāro upatthambhako hoti, anupatthambhako pana hutvā janako na hotiyeva, tasmāssa upatthambhakattaṃ padhānanti attho. Idāni janakattampi āhārānaṃ upatthambhanavaseneva hotīti dassento ‘‘janayamānopi hī’’tiādimāha. Avicchedavasenāti santatiyā ghaṭṭanavasena.

The state of being a support, which gives strength to conditionally arisen phenomena produced by their respective conditions, is not fixed in regard to nutriments, for it occurs otherwise as well. This being so, considering the objection, 'Why then is it taken up here?' he says: 'Even though... because of its supporting role.' Thereby he shows that among primary and secondary things, the designation by the primary is in accord with the method. And although it is stated here non-specifically as 'by supporting material and immaterial phenomena,' a general indication stands for the specific, so the conditional relation should be determined as is appropriate. This becomes evident precisely through the elucidation of the primary nature of their supporting role. To demonstrate this, he says: 'For the supporting role....' Contact, mental volition, and consciousness are conditions for their co-nascent states by way of co-production. Hence he says: 'Even though there is a generative role for the immaterial nutriments....' The supporting role exists because their nature as a condition continues even after arising. Even when there is no generative role, this is because the material phenomenon being supported is generated by other conditions according to their respective nature. Therefore he says: 'of the material nutriment that supports material phenomena originating from the four sources....' To the extent that material and immaterial nutriments are conditions for the arising of their own fruit, to that same extent they are also conditions for its stability. Thus the supporting role does not deviate from the generative role. Therefore, for a nutriment that does not support, whence a generative role? Therefore he says: 'But in the absence... there is not... so the supporting role is primary.' The meaning is: since nutriment is a support whether it is generative or non-generative, but it is never generative when it is non-supportive, therefore its supporting role is primary. Now, to show that the generative role of nutriments also occurs by way of supporting, he says: 'For even while generating....' 'By way of non-interruption' means by way of impinging on the continuity.

Yadi adhipatiyaṭṭho indriyapaccayatā, evaṃ sante adhipatipaccayato indriyapaccayassa kiṃ nānākaraṇanti codanaṃ manasi katvā taṃ tesaṃ nānākaraṇaṃ dassento ‘‘na adhipatipaccayadhammānaṃ viyā’’tiādimāha. Tattha pavattinivāraketi attano adhipatipaccayapavattiyā nivārake aññe adhipatipaccayadhamme. Abhibhavitvā pavattanenāti purimābhisaṅkhārasiddhena dhoreyyabhāvena abhibhuyya pavattiyā. Garubhāvoti jeṭṭhakabhāvo. Ayañhettha saṅkhepattho – yena jeṭṭhakabhāvena chandādayo attano pavattivibandhake tulyayogīdhamme tadaññadhamme viya abhibhuyya pavattanti, na so indriyapaccayatāya adhipatiyaṭṭhoti adhippetoti. Atha ko carahīti āha ‘‘atha kho’’tiādi. Dassanādikiccesu nimittabhūtesu cakkhuviññāṇādīhi cakkhādīhi paccayehi cakkhādīnaṃ anuvattanīyatāti sambandho. Jīvane anupālane jīvantehi sahajātadhammehi jīvitassa, sukhitādīhi sukhitadukkhitasomanassitadomanassitupekkhitehi sahajātadhammehi sukhādīnaṃ anuvattanīyatāti yojanā. Taṃtaṃkiccesūti vuttameva dassanādikiccaṃ paccāmasati. Cakkhādayo [Pg.235] paccayā etesanti cakkhādipaccayā, cakkhuviññāṇādayo. Tehi cakkhādipaccayehi. Cakkhādīnanti cakkhādijīvitasukhādisaddhādīnaṃ.

If the meaning of dominance is faculty conditionality, this being so, what is the difference between the dominance condition and the faculty condition? Keeping this objection in mind, to show their difference, he says: 'Not like the phenomena of dominance condition....' Therein, 'obstructing the occurrence' means: other phenomena of dominance condition that obstruct the occurrence of one's own dominance condition. 'By overpowering and occurring' means: by occurring having overpowered through the state of being a driving force accomplished by a previous formation. 'State of gravity' means the state of being the chief. The concise meaning here is this: that state of being chief by which desire, etc., occur, having overpowered phenomena yoked together with them that obstruct their occurrence, just as they overpower other phenomena—that is not what is meant by 'the meaning of dominance' in faculty conditionality. Then what is it? he says: 'But....' The connection is this: in the functions of seeing, etc., which have become the sign, the eye, etc., must be followed by the eye-consciousness, etc., which have the eye, etc., as their conditions. The construction is: in life, in sustenance, the life faculty must be followed by the living co-nascent states; and pleasure, etc., must be followed by the co-nascent states that are happy, unhappy, mentally pleased, mentally displeased, or equanimous. 'In their respective functions' refers back to the aforesaid functions of seeing, etc. 'Those for which the eye, etc., are conditions' are the 'eye-conditioned,' i.e., eye-consciousness, etc. 'By those eye-conditioned.' 'Of the eye, etc.' means of the eye, life, pleasure, faith, etc., faculties.

Tesu kiccesūti dassanādikiccesu. Cakkhādīnaṃ issariyaṃ adhipatiyaṭṭho, sā indriyapaccayatāti attho. Tappaccayānaṃ cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ tadanuvattanena tesaṃ cakkhādīnaṃ anuvattanena. Tattha dassanādikicce. Pavattīti ca idaṃ tassa adhipatiyaṭṭhassa pākaṭakaraṇaṃ. Anuvattakena hi anuvattanīyo adhipatiyaṭṭho pākaṭo hoti. Yathā cakkhādīnaṃ kiccavasena adhipatiyaṭṭho, na evaṃ bhāvadvayassa. Tassa pana tādisena kāraṇatāmattenāti dassento ‘‘itthipurisindriyānaṃ panā’’tiādimāha. Paccayehīti kammādipaccayehi. Tatoti itthādiggahaṇapaccayabhāvato. Taṃsahitasantāneti itthindriyādisahitasantāne. ‘‘Sukhindriyadukkhindriyānipi cakkhādiggahaṇena gahitānī’’ti idaṃ indriyapaccayameva sandhāya vuttaṃ, pacchājātādīhi pana tāni rūpadhammānampi paccayā hontiyeva.

'In those functions' means in the functions of seeing, etc. The meaning is: the lordship of the eye, etc., is the meaning of dominance; that is the faculty condition. This is by the following of them—of the eye, etc.—by the eye-consciousness, etc., which are conditioned by them. Therein, in the function of seeing, etc. And 'occurrence' is the manifestation of that meaning of dominance. For by the follower, the meaning of dominance of the one to be followed becomes manifest. Just as there is a meaning of dominance for the eye, etc., by way of function, it is not so for the twofold sex. But to show that for them it is merely a state of being a cause of that kind, he says: 'As for the faculties of femininity and masculinity....' 'By conditions' means by conditions such as kamma, etc. 'From that' means from being a condition for grasping femininity, etc. 'In the continuity accompanied by that' means in the continuity accompanied by the faculty of femininity, etc. 'The faculties of pleasure and pain are also included by the taking up of the eye, etc.'—this is said referring only to the faculty condition; but by postnascence condition, etc., they are indeed also conditions for material phenomena.

Lakkhaṇārammaṇūpanijjhānabhūtānanti aniccatādilakkhaṇassa pathavīkasiṇādiārammaṇassa ca upanijjhānavasena pavattānaṃ. Vitakkādīnanti vitakkavicārapītivedanācittekaggatānaṃ. Upagantvā nijjhānanti upanikacca nijjhānajjhānārammaṇassa jhānacakkhunā byattataraṃ olokanaṃ atthato cintanameva hotīti vuttaṃ ‘‘pekkhanaṃ cintanañcā’’ti. Tenevāha ‘‘vitakkanādivasenā’’ti. Vitakkādīnaṃyeva sādhāraṇo, yena teyeva ‘‘jhānaṅgānī’’ti vuccanti. Sukhadukkhavedanādvayanti sāmaññavacanampi upanijjhāyanaṭṭhassa adhikatattā anupanijjhānasabhāvameva taṃ bodhetīti āha ‘‘sukhindriyadukkhindriyadvaya’’nti. Tañhi idhādhippetabbaṃ, na somanassadomanassindriyaṃ. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘adhippāyo’’ti. Ajhānaṅgā upekkhācittekaggatā pañcaviññāṇasahagatā daṭṭhabbā vitakkapacchimakattā jhānaṅgānaṃ. Yadi evanti jhānaṅgavacaneneva ajhānaṅgānaṃ nivattanaṃ kataṃ, evaṃ sante. Ekantena na upekkhāya viya anekantena. Anekantikañhi upekkhāya ajhānaṅgattaṃ. Yadi ekantena ajhānaṅgaṃ sukhadukkhindriyaṃ, atha kathaṃ pasaṅgoti āha ‘‘jhānaṅgaṭṭhāne niddiṭṭhattā’’ti. Atha vā yadi ekantena ajhānaṅgataṃ vedanādvayaṃ, kathaṃ jhānaṅgavohāroti āha ‘‘jhānaṅgaṭṭhāne niddiṭṭhattā’’ti. Satipi…pe… dassanatthaṃ ‘‘ṭhapetvā sukhadukkhindriyadvaya’’nti vuttanti yojanā[Pg.236]. Yadi evaṃ yathāvuttavedanādvayena saddhiṃ tādisā upekkhācittekaggatā kasmā na ṭhapitāti āha ‘‘upekkhā…pe… atthī’’ti, pañcaviññāṇasahagatānaṃ jhānapaccayabhāvo pana natthi, na itaresanti adhippāyo. Gahaṇaṃ kataṃ upekkhācittekaggatānanti ānetvā yojanā.

'Of those that have become contemplation of characteristics and objects' means of those occurring by way of contemplation of the characteristics of impermanence, etc., and of objects such as the earth kasiṇa. 'Of initial thought, etc.' means of initial thought, sustained thought, rapture, feeling, and one-pointedness of mind. 'Contemplation, having approached' means having drawn near and contemplated; the more distinct observation of the jhāna object with the jhāna-eye is in meaning just thinking, thus it is said: 'observing and thinking.' Therefore he says: 'by way of initial thought, etc.' It is common to initial thought, etc., which is why they are called 'jhāna factors.' 'The pair of pleasant and painful feelings'—although this is a general expression, because the meaning of contemplation is predominant, it indicates that which by nature is non-contemplation. Thus he says: 'the pair of the faculty of pleasure and the faculty of pain.' For that is what should be intended here, not the faculty of joy and the faculty of sorrow. Therefore it is said: 'the intention.' The non-jhāna factors, equanimity and one-pointedness of mind, accompanied by the five sense-consciousnesses, should be seen as such because initial thought is the last of the jhāna factors in that context. If so, the exclusion of non-jhāna factors is made by the very term 'jhāna factors.' This being so, it is not absolute, just as with equanimity, which is not absolute. For the state of equanimity as a non-jhāna factor is not absolute. If the faculty of pleasure and the faculty of pain are absolutely non-jhāna factors, then how does the issue arise? He says: 'because they are designated in the place of jhāna factors.' Or, if the pair of feelings is absolutely a non-jhāna factor, how can it be spoken of as a jhāna factor? He says: 'because it is designated in the place of jhāna factors.' The construction is: 'Even though... for the purpose of showing... it is said: "excluding the pair of the faculty of pleasure and the faculty of pain."' If so, why are such equanimity and one-pointedness of mind not excluded along with the aforesaid pair of feelings? He says: 'Equanimity... exists.' The intended meaning is: but for those accompanied by the five sense-consciousnesses there is no state of being a jhāna condition, not so for the others. The construction is: 'The inclusion of equanimity and one-pointedness of mind is made....'

Yato tato vāti duggatito vā sugatito vā saṃkilesato vā vodānato vā niyyānaṭṭho, svāyaṃ yathākkamaṃ sammā micchā vā hotīti āha ‘‘sammā vā micchā vāti attho’’ti. Ahetukacittesu na labbhantīti ettha ahetukacittesu eva na labbhantīti evamavadhāraṇaṃ gahetabbaṃ, na ahetukacittesu na labbhanti evāti. Tasmā purimasmiñhi avadhāraṇe ahetukacittesu alābho niyatoti so patiyogīsu nivattito hoti. Tenāha ‘‘sahetukacittesu alābhābhāvadassanatthaṃ vutta’’nti. Dutiye pana ahetukacittāni alābhe niyatānīti tesu anavasesato alābhena bhavitabbaṃ. Tathā sati yo kesuci ahetukacittesu jhānapaccayo labbhati, sopi nivārito siyā. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘na ahetukacittesū’’tiādi. Tattha lābhābhāvadassanatthanti lābhābhāvasseva dassanatthaṃ na vuttanti attho. Tena ekaccālābho apaṭikkhitto hoti. Tenevāha ‘‘katthaci kassaci lābho na nivārito’’ti. Evaṃ atthe gayhamāneti evaṃ vuttanayena paṭhamapadāvadhāraṇavasena atthe viññāyamāne. Ettakameva viññāyeyyāti ahetukacittesu kesuci cittesu jhānamaggapaccayesu kassaci paccayassa lābho na nivāritoti ettakameva viññāyeyya avisesena vuttattā. Kiṃ panettha upari kātabbanti āha ‘‘na savitakka…pe… kata’’nti. Yadipi na kataṃ, atthato pana taṃ katamevāti veditabbaṃ.

'From here or there' means from a bad destination or a good destination, from defilement or from purification; the meaning of leading out is, respectively, either right or wrong. Thus he says: 'The meaning is either right or wrong.' Regarding 'They are not found in rootless consciousnesses,' here the emphasis should be taken thus: 'It is in rootless consciousnesses that they are not found,' not 'In rootless consciousnesses, they are definitely not found.' Therefore, in the first emphasis, the non-obtainment in rootless consciousnesses is determined, so its opposite is established for the counterparts. Therefore he says: 'It is said for the purpose of showing the absence of non-obtainment in rooted consciousnesses.' But in the second reading, rootless consciousnesses are determined in non-obtainment, so there must be non-obtainment in them without remainder. This being so, whatever jhāna condition is obtained in some rootless consciousnesses, that too would be precluded. Therefore it is said: 'not in rootless consciousnesses....' Therein, 'for the purpose of showing the non-obtainment'—the meaning is that it is not said for the purpose of showing only the non-obtainment. Thereby, obtainment in some cases is not rejected. Therefore he says: 'In some cases, for some, obtainment is not precluded.' When the meaning is grasped thus—that is, when the meaning is understood according to the stated method by way of the emphasis on the first word—only this much would be understood: that because it is stated without specification, the obtainment of some condition among the jhāna and path conditions in some rootless consciousnesses is not precluded. What more is to be done here? He says: 'Not with initial thought... etc., is done.' Although it is not done explicitly, it should be understood as having been done in meaning.

Ahetukacittesu vā lābhābhāvadassanatthetiādi pacchimapadāvadhāraṇavasena atthadassanaṃ. Tasmāti yasmā ahetukacittesu na labbhanti evāti evaṃ niyame kariyamāne yathāvutto attho sambhavati, tasmā. Ayañca attho pāṭhantarenapi saṃsandatīti dassetuṃ ‘‘yena alābhenā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Taṃ alābhanti taṃ dhammasaṅgaṇiyaṃ pakāsitaṃ alābhaṃ. Esāti esa idha paṭṭhānavaṇṇanāyaṃ ‘‘ahetukacittesu na labbhantī’’ti [Pg.237] alābho vutto. Kīdiso pana alābhoti taṃ dassento ‘‘yathā hī’’tiādimāha. Tattha sahetukesūti sahetukacittesu. Saṅkaḍḍhitvāti avisaṭe katvā. Ekattagatabhāvakaraṇanti ekabhāvāpādanaṃ. Imasmiṃ pana pakaraṇe jhānapaccayo vuttova yathālābhapaccayākāravibhāvane desanāya tapparabhāvato.

'In rootless consciousnesses, or to show the absence of obtainment,' etc., is the discernment of the meaning by way of emphasizing the final word. Therefore—because when the restriction is made, 'they are definitely not found in rootless consciousnesses,' the aforesaid meaning is possible—therefore... And to show that this meaning also corresponds with another reading, 'by which non-obtainment,' etc., is said. That non-obtainment—that is the non-obtainment explained in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī. This—this non-obtainment mentioned here in the commentary on the Paṭṭhāna is that 'they are not found in rootless consciousnesses.' But what kind of non-obtainment is that? To show this, 'just as,' etc., is said. Therein, 'in the rooted' means in rooted consciousnesses. 'Having drawn together' means having made them unscattered. 'Making them attain a unified state' means causing them to become a single state. In this treatise, however, the jhāna-condition has already been stated, since the teaching is intent on explaining the mode of the condition according to its availability.

Samanti avisamaṃ, sammā, saha vā. Pakārehīti ekavatthukatādippakārehi. Yuttatāyāti saṃsaṭṭhatāya. Sā pana saṃsaṭṭhatā yasmā sabhāvato anekesampi sataṃ ekattagamanaṃ viya hoti, tasmā vuttaṃ ‘‘ekībhāvopagamanena viya upakārakatā’’ti. Evaṃ upakārakatā ca tesaṃ bahūnaṃ sahacca ekattakāritāya nidassetabbā.

'Samaṃ' means evenly (i.e., not unevenly), rightly, or together. 'By modes' means by modes such as having a single object as their basis. 'By suitability' means by connectedness. But since that connectedness is, by its own nature, like the coming to oneness of even many things, it is therefore said: 'helpfulness as if by approaching unification.' And this helpfulness should be shown by the unified action of those many things acting together.

Yuttānampi satanti vuttappakārena saṃsaṭṭhatāya aññamaññasambandhatāya yuttānampi samānānaṃ. Ayañca yuttatā na sampayuttapaccayatāya viya paccayadhammesu paccayuppannadhammesu ca veditabbā, kevalaṃ tattha arūpasabhāvattā ubhayaṃ samadhuraṃ, idha rūpārūpasabhāvattā vidhuranti ayaṃ viseso. Vippayuttabhāvenāti visaṃsaṭṭhabhāvena. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘nānattūpagamenā’’ti. Idañhettha vippayuttatāya visesanaṃ yā nānattūpagamanasaṅkhātā vippayuttatā, na sā ‘‘ñāṇavippayutta’’ntiādīsu viya abhāvamattanti, ayañca upakārakatā vinā saṃsaggena sahāvaṭṭhāyitāya kiccakāritādīhi nidassetabbā. Na hītiādi ‘‘yuttāna’’nti vuttassa atthassa samatthanaṃ ‘‘tādise yoge satiyeva vippayuttapaccayatā’’ti. Tenāha ‘‘na hī’’tiādi. Tassattho – yathā ‘‘vatthu khandhānaṃ, sahajātā kusalā khandhā cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ rūpānaṃ, pacchājātā kusalā khandhā purejātassa imassa kāyassa vippayuttapaccayena paccayo’’tiādivacanato (paṭṭhā. 1.1.434) vatthusahajātapacchājātavasena yuttānaṃ atthi vippayuttapaccayatā, na evaṃ ayuttānaṃ vatthusahajāta…pe… atthīti. Yadi evaṃ rūpānaṃ rūpehi kasmā vippayuttapaccayo na vuttoti āha ‘‘rūpānaṃ panā’’tiādi. Vippayogoyeva natthi sampayogāsaṅkāya abhāvato. Sampayujjamānānañhi arūpānaṃ rūpehi, rūpānañca tehi siyā sampayogāsaṅkā, sampayogalakkhaṇaṃ pana natthīti tesaṃ vippayogo vutto. Tenāha ‘‘catūhi sampayogo catūhi vippayogo’’ti.

“Even of those that are suitable” means even of those that are similar, connected in the manner described by being intertwined and mutually related. And this suitability should not be understood like the association-condition between conditioning phenomena and conditioned phenomena, for there, because of their formless nature, both are equally yoked, whereas here, because of their material and immaterial nature, they are unequally yoked—this is the distinction. “By the state of dissociation” means by the state of being unentangled. Therefore, it is said: “by approaching diversity.” And here this is a qualification of dissociation: the dissociation designated as “approaching diversity” is not mere absence, as in such cases as “dissociated from knowledge”; and this helpfulness should be shown by the performance of functions, etc., through co-presence without intermixture. The passage beginning “For not...” is a support for the meaning of what was said as “of those that are suitable,” namely: “only when such a connection exists is there dissociation-condition.” Therefore, he says, “For not...,” etc. The meaning is this: Just as from statements like “the base for the aggregates, the co-nascent wholesome aggregates for mind-originated matter, the post-nascent wholesome aggregates for this pre-nascent body are a condition by way of dissociation-condition,” there is dissociation-condition for those that are connected by way of base, co-nascence, post-nascence, etc., but not so for those that are unconnected by way of base, co-nascence... and so on. If so, why is dissociation-condition not stated for material phenomena with respect to material phenomena? He says, “But for material phenomena...,” etc. There is no dissociation at all because there is no possibility of association. For with immaterial phenomena that are being associated with material phenomena, and with material phenomena with them, there might be the possibility of association, but since the characteristic of association is absent, their dissociation is stated. Therefore, he says, “Association in four ways, dissociation in four ways.”

Atthi [Pg.238] me pāpakammaṃ katanti katabhāvavisiṭṭhā atthitā vuccamānā kiriyāya siddhabhāvameva dīpeti, na sijjhamānatanti āha ‘‘nibbattatālakkhaṇaṃ atthibhāva’’nti. Atthato pana kammassa anibbattaphalatāya evamettha atthitā veditabbā. Atthi puggaloti panettha tassā paññattiyā gahetabbatā, tadupādānassa vā pabandhāvicchedo labbhatevāti vuttaṃ ‘‘upalabbhamānatālakkhaṇaṃ atthibhāva’’nti. Paccayadhammassa yadipi uppādato paṭṭhāya yāva bhaṅgā labbhamānatā atthibhāvo, tathāpi tassa yathā uppādakkhaṇato ṭhitikkhaṇe sātisayo byāpāro, evaṃ paccayuppannepīti vuttaṃ ‘‘satipi janakatte upatthambhakappaṭṭhānā atthibhāvena upakārakatā’’ti. Vatthārammaṇasahajātādīnanti ādi-saddena purejātapacchājātādīni saṅgaṇhāti. Atthibhāveneva na nissayādibhāvenāti ‘‘sādhāraṇa’’nti vuttaṃ upakārakattaṃ vibhāveti.

When it is said, “I have done an evil deed,” the existence spoken of, qualified by the state of having been done, indicates the accomplished nature of the action, not its being in the process of being accomplished. Thus, it is said, “the state of having been produced is the characteristic of existence.” In terms of meaning, however, since the kamma has not yet produced its fruit, its existence here should be understood in this way. As for the statement, “There is a person,” here its being taken as a designation, or the uninterrupted continuity of its basis of clinging, is obtained—thus it is said, “the state of being found is the characteristic of existence.” Regarding a conditioning phenomenon, although its existence is found from the moment of arising until dissolution, just as its activity is more prominent in the moment of presence than in the moment of arising, so too in regard to the conditioned phenomenon it is said: “Even when there is a generative function, there is helpfulness by means of existence as supporting and establishing.” In “Of base, object, co-nascence, etc.,” the word “etc.” includes pre-nascence, post-nascence, etc. The word “common” clarifies that the helpfulness is rendered by the state of existence itself, and not by the state of dependence, etc.

Phassādīnaṃ anekesaṃ sahabhāvo natthīti idaṃ na ekacittuppādapariyāpanne sandhāya, atha kho nānācittuppādapariyāpanneti dassento ‘‘ekasmiṃ phassādisamudāye sati dutiyo na hotī’’ti āha. Svāyamattho ‘‘sahabhāvo natthī’’ti sahabhāvapaṭikkhepeneva viññāyati. Ettāvatā pana anavabujjhantānaṃ vasena vivaritvā vutto. Tenāti anekesaṃ phassādīnaṃ sahabhāvābhāvena. Yadi natthitāmattena upakārakatā natthipaccayatā, anānantarātītavasenapi siyāti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘satipī’’tiādi. Tānīti purimataracittāni. Dadamānaṃ viyāti kasmā vuttaṃ, nanu okāsaṃ detiyeva. Tathā hi vuttaṃ ‘‘pavattiokāsadānena upakārakatā’’ti? Saccametaṃ, evamajjhāsayā viya paccayadhammā abhāvaṃ gacchantīti dassanatthaṃ viya-saddaggahaṇaṃ.

The statement that contact and other factors do not coexist in multiplicity is not made with reference to what is included in a single mind-moment, but rather to show that it refers to what is included in different mind-moments; thus, it is said: “When one group of contact and other factors exists, a second does not.” This very meaning is understood simply by the negation of coexistence in the phrase “there is no coexistence.” However, this is explained thus for the sake of those who do not understand. “Therefore” means because of the absence of coexistence of many instances of contact and other factors. To address the objection that “if helpfulness as absence-condition were by mere non-existence, it could also be by way of the not-immediately-preceding past,” he says the passage beginning “Even when there is....” “Those” refers to the preceding consciousnesses. Why is it said, “as if giving”? Does it not in fact give an opportunity? For is it not said, “helpfulness is by giving an opportunity for occurrence”? This is true. The word “as if” is used to show that the conditioning phenomena go to absence as if with such an intention.

Natthitāvigamānaṃ satipi paccayassa dhammassa anupaladdhitāsāmaññe natthivigatapaccayesu labbhamānaṃ visesamatthaṃ vibhāvetuṃ ‘‘ettha cā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Abhāvamattenāti hutvā abhāvamattena. Tenettha nirodhānantaraṃ paccayadhammassa upakārakattaṃ āha, yathā taṃ ‘‘okāsadāna’’nti vuttaṃ. Sabhāvavigamenāti etena nirodhato parampi yato ‘‘vigatatā nirodhappattatā’’ti vuttaṃ. Paccayadhamme yāsaṃ natthitāvigatatānaṃ vasena natthivigatapaccayā vuttā, tāsaṃ visese dassite natthivigatapaccayānaṃ viseso [Pg.239] dassito hotīti ‘‘natthitā ca nirodhānantarasuññatā vigatatā nirodhappattatā’’ti vuttaṃ, tattha nirodhānantarā na nirodhasamakālāti adhippāyo. Tathāti iminā yathā paccayadhammāvisesepi natthivigatapaccayabhāvaviseso niddhārito, tathā atthiavigatapaccayabhāvavisesoti imamatthaṃ upasaṃharati. Yathā hi nirodhānantaranirodhappattīhi natthivigatatānaṃ bhedo lakkhito, evaṃ paccayadhammassa dharamānatānirodhānupagamehi atthiavigatatānanti. Kathaṃ panāyaṃ dhammāvisese paccayabhāvaviseso duviññeyyarūpena ṭhito sammā vibhāvissatīti āha ‘‘dhammānañhī’’tiādi. Tadabhisamayāya tesaṃ paccayavisesānaṃ adhigamatthaṃ.

To clarify the specific meaning obtainable in absence- and disappearance-conditions, even when there is the common factor of the non-finding of the conditioning phenomenon for both absence and disappearance, the passage beginning “And here...” is stated. “By mere absence” means by the mere absence after having been. Thereby he states the helpfulness of the conditioning phenomenon immediately after its cessation, as was said: “giving of opportunity.” “By the disappearance of its own-nature”: by this is meant even after cessation, since it is said, “disappearance is the attainment of cessation.” When the distinction between absence and disappearance—on the basis of which absence- and disappearance-conditions are spoken of in relation to a conditioning phenomenon—is shown, the distinction between absence- and disappearance-conditions is thereby shown. Thus it is said: “Absence is the emptiness immediately after cessation; disappearance is the attainment of cessation.” Here, the meaning is that “immediately after cessation” is not “simultaneous with cessation.” “Thus”: by this he summarizes this meaning: just as a specific state of absence- and disappearance-conditions is determined even when there is no distinction in the conditioning phenomenon, so too is there a specific state of presence- and non-disappearance-conditions. For just as the distinction between absence and disappearance is marked by “immediately after cessation” and “attainment of cessation,” so too is the distinction between presence and non-disappearance marked by the conditioning phenomenon's “continuing” and “not having reached cessation.” But how will this specific conditionality, which stands in a form difficult to discern when there is no distinction in the phenomenon, be properly explained? He says, “For of phenomena...,” etc. For the full understanding of that, for the purpose of comprehending those specific conditions.

Catūsu khandhesu ekassapi asaṅgahitattābhāvato anantarādīhīti vibhattiṃ pariṇāmetvā yojanā. Aññanti sukhumarūpaṃ. Na hi taṃ purejātapaccayo hoti. Nanu ca rūparūpampi purejātapaccayabhāvena kusalattike nāgatanti āha ‘‘rūparūpaṃ panā’’tiādi. Aññattha āgatamevāti yadipi kusalattike nāgataṃ, sanidassanattikādīsu pana āgatattā na sakkā rūparūpassa purejātapaccayataṃ paṭikkhipitunti attho.

Because of the absence of the state of not being included in even one of the four aggregates, the construction is by changing the case ending of “contiguity, etc.” “Other” refers to subtle matter. For that is not a pre-nascence condition. But is it not the case that material form itself is not included in the wholesome triad by way of pre-nascence condition? He says, “But material form...,” etc. “It is indeed included elsewhere” means: although it is not included in the wholesome triad, since it is included in the triads beginning with the visible, it is not possible to reject the pre-nascence conditionality of material form. This is the meaning.

Paccayuddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Enumeration of Conditions is concluded.

Paccayaniddeso

The Exposition of Conditions

1. Hetupaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Exposition of the Root Condition

1. Hetupaccayena paccayabhāvo hetupaccayoti uddiṭṭho, na hetupaccayadhammoti attho. Soti hetubhāvena paccayo. Ettha ca paṭhamavikappe yo hetupaccayena paccayabhāvo vutto, yo ca dutiyavikappe hetubhāvena paccayo vutto, so yasmā atthato yathāvuttassa paccayadhammassa yathāvuttānaṃ paccayuppannānaṃ hetupaccayabhāvoyeva, tasmā vuttaṃ ‘‘ubhayathāpi hetubhāvena upakārakatā hetupaccayoti uddiṭṭhoti dassitaṃ hotī’’ti. Yathā cettha, evaṃ ‘‘ārammaṇapaccayena paccayabhāvo, ārammaṇabhāvena vā paccayo ārammaṇapaccayo’’tiādinā ārammaṇapaccayādīsu attho netabboti dassento [Pg.240] ‘‘esa nayo sesapaccayesupī’’ti āha. Dhammasabhāvo eva, na dhammato aññā dhammasatti nāma atthīti. Upakārakaṃ dhammanti paccayadhammaṃ āha. Upakārakatanti paccayataṃ.

1. The state of being a condition by way of root condition is designated as 'root condition'; the meaning is not 'the phenomena of the root condition.' Thus it is a condition by way of being a root. Here, what is stated in the first alternative as the state of being a condition by way of root condition, and what is stated in the second alternative as a condition by way of being a root—since this, in terms of meaning, is precisely the state of being a root condition of the aforesaid conditioning phenomenon for the aforesaid conditioned phenomena—therefore it is said: 'It is shown that in both ways helpfulness by way of being a root is designated as root condition.' Just as here, so too, showing that the meaning should be understood in the case of the object condition and others by such statements as, 'the state of being a condition by way of object condition, or a condition by way of being an object, is object condition,' he says: 'This method applies to the remaining conditions as well.' It is just the intrinsic nature of phenomena; there is no power of phenomena apart from the phenomena themselves. He calls the helpful phenomenon the 'conditioning phenomenon.' Helpfulness is the state of being a condition.

Paccattaniddiṭṭhoti paccattavasena niddiṭṭho, paṭhamāya vibhattiyā niddiṭṭhoti attho. Tenāti paccayadhammaniddesabhūtena paccattaniddiṭṭhena paṭhamena hetusaddena. Etassāti hetusaddābhidheyyamatthamāha. So hi chabbidho navavidho dvādasavidhoti anekabhedena bhinnopi hetubhāvasāmaññena ekajjhaṃ katvā ekavacanena vutto. Dutiyo hetusaddoti ānetvā yojanā. Hetunā sampayuttānanti adhikatattā vuttaṃ ‘‘hetu sampayuttānaṃ paccayo honto hetunā sampayuttānameva paccayo hoti, na vippayuttāna’’nti evaṃ padametaṃ. Na hi sabbena sabbaṃ hetuvippayuttadhammānaṃ hetupaccayo na hotīti. Sampayuttasaddassa sambandhīsaddattā ‘‘sampayuttasaddassa sāpekkhattā’’ti vuttaṃ. Sampayuttoti hi vutte kena sampayuttoti ekantato sambandhiantaraṃ apekkhitabbaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘aññassa…pe… viññāyatī’’ti. Nāyaṃ ekantoti yvāyaṃ ‘‘dutiye hetusadde avijjamāne’’tiādinā vutto attho, ayamekanto na hoti, aññāpekkhopi saddo aññassa visesanaṃ hotīti idaṃ na sabbattheva sambhavatīti attho. ‘‘Paccattaniddiṭṭho’’ti iminā paṭhamassa hetusaddassa sampayuttasaddānapekkhataṃ āha. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘hehupaccayena paccayoti ettheva byāvaṭo’’ti. Avisiṭṭhāti na visesitā. Evanti yathā hetusaddena aññattha byāvaṭena sampayuttā na visesiyanti kiccantarapasutattā, evaṃ sampayuttasaddena hetusaddavisesanarahitena tadatthamattabyāvaṭattā avisesato sampayuttānaṃ gahaṇaṃ siyā. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘sampayuttasaddenā’’tiādi. Āhārindriyāsampayuttassa abhāvatoti āhārehi indriyehi ca nasampayuttassa dhammassa abhāvato. Na hi phassacetanāviññāṇavedanājīvitavirahito cittuppādo atthi. Tenāha ‘‘vajjetabbā…pe… taṃ na kata’’nti. Vajjetabbaṃ hetuvippayuttaṃ.

'Individually designated' means designated on its own, designated by the first case—this is the meaning. 'By that' refers to the first word 'root,' which is individually designated and serves to designate the conditioning phenomenon. 'Of this' explains the meaning denoted by the word 'root.' For although it is divided into many kinds—sixfold, ninefold, and twelvefold—it is spoken of in the singular, having been unified by the commonality of being a root. The connection is made by supplying 'the second word "root."' The phrase 'for states associated with a root' is stated because of its governing role: 'A root, being a condition for associated states, is a condition only for states associated with a root, not for dissociated states.' For it is not the case that a root is in every way not a condition for phenomena dissociated from a root. Because the word 'associated' is a relative term, it is said, 'because the word "associated" is dependent.' For when 'associated' is said, one must necessarily look for another related term, asking, 'associated with what?' Hence he says: 'of another... is understood.' This is not absolute: the meaning stated by the words 'when the second word "root" is absent,' etc., is not absolute. The meaning is that even a dependent word can be a qualifier of another, but this is not possible everywhere. By 'individually designated,' he states the non-dependence of the first word 'root' on the word 'associated.' Therefore it is said: 'It is occupied only with "a condition by means of the root condition."' 'Unqualified' means not qualified. 'Thus': just as associated states are not qualified by the word 'root' because it is occupied with another function, so too, by the word 'associated,' which lacks qualification by the word 'root' and is occupied only with its own meaning, there would be an unqualified inclusion of associated states. Therefore it is said: 'by the word "associated",' etc. 'Due to the absence of what is not associated with nutriment and faculty' means: due to the absence of a phenomenon not associated with nutriment and the faculties. For there is no mind-moment devoid of contact, volition, consciousness, feeling, and the life faculty. Hence he says: 'what should be excluded... that was not done.' What should be excluded is what is dissociated from a root.

Evampīti dutiyena hetusaddena gayhamānepi nāpajjati. Yadipi hetavo bahavo, sāmaññaniddeso cāyaṃ, tathāpi sāmaññajotanāya visesaniddiṭṭhattāti [Pg.241] adhippāyo. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘paccatta…pe… vuttattā’’ti. Vināpi dutiyena hetusaddena hetusampayuttabhāve siddhepīti iminā yaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘nāyamekanto’’ti, tameva ulliṅgeti. Na pana hetūnanti idaṃ hetussa paccayabhāvena gahitattā paccayuppannabhāvena gahaṇaṃ na yujjeyyāti āsaṅkamānaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘evampi gahaṇaṃ siyā’’ti. Soti dutiyo hetusaddo. Apare pana ‘‘hetusampayuttakāna’’nti ettha hetūnañca sampayuttakānañcāti samāsaṃ vikappenti. Patiṭṭhāmattādibhāvena nirapekkhāti hetujhānamaggadhammā patiṭṭhānaupanijjhānaniyyānamattena aññadhammanirapekkhā hetujhānamaggapaccayakiccaṃ karonti. Sāpekkhā evāti aññasāpekkhā eva. Āharitabbaisitabbā āhārindriyapaccayehi upakattabbadhammā. Tasmāti yasmā yehi sāpekkhā, te attano paccayuppannadhamme paccayabhāveneva paricchinditvā tiṭṭhanti, tasmā. Tenāha ‘‘te vināpi…pe… na kata’’nti. Paricchindanti visesenti. Tanti dutiyaṃ āhārindriyaggahaṇaṃ. Tatthāti āhārindriyapaccayaniddese. Na kevalañca tattheva, idha ca hetupaccayaniddese dutiyena hetuggahaṇena paccayuppannānaṃ puna visesanakiccaṃ natthi, kasmā? Paccayabhūteneva hetunā sampayuttānaṃ aññesañca hetūnaṃ avicchinnattā.

'Even so': no fault is incurred even when they are included by the second word 'root.' Although there are many roots, this is a general designation; nevertheless, the intention is that it is designated with a qualification in order to illumine the general meaning. Therefore it is said: 'individually... because it is stated.' By this, he alludes to the statement 'this is not absolute,' meaning that the state of being associated with a root is established even without the second word 'root.' But the phrase 'not of the roots' is said in consideration of one who might suspect that since a root is taken as a condition, it would not be proper to take it as a conditioned phenomenon. For that very reason he says: 'even so, an inclusion may occur.' 'That' refers to the second word 'root.' Others, however, construe the compound 'hetusampayuttakānaṃ' as 'of the roots and of the associated states.' 'Independent by way of being a mere foundation, etc.': the phenomena of root, jhāna, and path, being independent of other phenomena merely by being a foundation, an object of close contemplation, and a means of deliverance, perform the function of a condition for root, jhāna, and path. 'Dependent' means dependent on others. 'To be brought and to be sought' are phenomena to be assisted by the nutriment and faculty conditions. 'Therefore': because those things on which they are dependent stand having delimited their own conditioned phenomena precisely as conditions, therefore... Hence he says: 'they, even without... not done.' 'They delimit' means they qualify. 'That' refers to the second inclusion of 'nutriment' and 'faculty.' 'There' means in the exposition of the nutriment and faculty conditions. And not only there, but here too, in the exposition of the root condition, there is no further function of qualifying the conditioned phenomena by the second inclusion of 'root.' Why? Because the roots that are themselves conditions are inseparable from the associated states and the other roots.

Purimavacanāpekkho vuttasseva niddesoti taṃ-saddassa paṭiniddesabhāvamāha. Pākaṭībhūte eva atthe pavattati, pākaṭībhāvo ca aññānapekkhena saddena pakāsitattā veditabbo. Anapekkhanīyo atthantarabyāvaṭattā. Aññoti hetusaddato añño. Niddisitabbapakāsako vutto natthi, yo taṃ-saddena paṭiniddesaṃ labheyya.

He states that the word 'that' (taṃ) is an anaphoric reference, meaning it is a designation of what has already been said, dependent on a previous utterance. It functions only in regard to a meaning that has become manifest, and its manifestation is to be understood as having been revealed by an independent word. It is not dependent because it is occupied with another meaning. 'Another' means other than the word 'root.' No indicator of what is to be designated has been stated that could receive the anaphoric reference by the word 'that.'

Yadi evaṃ ‘‘taṃsamuṭṭhānāna’’nti ettha kathanti āha ‘‘hetusampayuttakānanti iminā panā’’tiādi. Tattha pana-saddo satipi hetū hetusampayuttakānaṃ niddesabhāve hetusampayuttakasadde labbhamānānaṃ niddisitabbānaṃ pākaṭīkaraṇasaṅkhātaṃ hetusaddato visesaṃ joteti. ‘‘Hetusampayuttakāna’’nti imassa samāsapadassa uttarapadatthappadhānattamāha ‘‘paccayuppannavacanenā’’ti. Tena ca yathādhippetassa atthassa ekadesova vuccati dhammānaṃ visesanabhāvatoti āha ‘‘asamattenā’’ti. Visesanaṃ nāma visesitabbāpekkhanti āha ‘‘paccayuppannavacanantarāpekkhenā’’ti. Vuttatāya vinā paṭiniddesatā natthīti ‘‘pubbe vuttenā’’ti vuttaṃ.

If so, he asks how it is in the case of 'of those arisen from that' (taṃsamuṭṭhānānaṃ), and answers, 'But by this "of states associated with a root"...' etc. There, the word 'but' (pana), although there is a designation of roots and associated states, illumines a distinction from the word 'root,' which consists in making manifest what is to be designated, which is obtainable in the word 'root-associated states.' He states that the meaning of the final member is predominant in this compound word 'of root-associated states' with the words 'by the term for the conditioned phenomenon.' And by that, only a part of the intended meaning is expressed, because it is a qualifier of phenomena; therefore, he says, 'incompletely.' A qualifier, by nature, is dependent on what is to be qualified; therefore, he says, 'by dependence on another term for a conditioned phenomenon.' Because there is no anaphoric reference without something having been stated, it is said, 'by what was previously stated.'

Taṃ-saddena [Pg.242] niddisitabbanti ‘‘taṃsamuṭṭhānāna’’nti ettha taṃ-saddena niddisitabbaṃ hetusampayuttakasadde pākaṭībhūtaṃ kiṃ panāti pucchati. Te hetū ceva…pe… hetusampayuttakā ca taṃ-saddena niddisitabbā hetusampayuttakasadde pākaṭībhūtāti sambandho. Aññathāti ‘‘yehi hetūhī’’tiādinā vuttappakārato aññathā aññena pakārena. Taṃ aññaṃ pakāraṃ dassento ‘‘te hetū…pe… sambandhe satī’’ti āha. Idhāti anantaraṃ vuttasambandhanaṃ bhummaniddesena parāmasati. Tenevāti paṭhameneva hetusaddena. Taṃ-saddena niddisitabbāti ‘‘taṃsamuṭṭhānāna’’nti ettha taṃ-saddena niddisitabbā yathā pākaṭā, evaṃ pubbe ‘‘taṃsampayuttakāna’’nti vuttacodanāyampi evameva teneva taṃ-saddena niddisitabbā pākaṭā bhavituṃ arahanti. Tathā ca sati niddisitabbassa…pe… na yujjeyya. Duvidhampi vā hetuggahaṇaṃ apanetvāti ‘‘hetū hetusampayuttakāna’’nti ettha kataṃ dvippakārahetuggahaṇaṃ avicāretvā ‘‘taṃsampayuttakānanti avatvā’’tiādinā taṃ-saddavacanīyataṃ codeti, ‘‘niddisitabbassa apākaṭattā’’tiādinā pariharati ca. Hetū hi paccayāti idaṃ ayaṃ hetupaccayakathāti katvā vuttaṃ.

“To be designated by the word ‘that’”: he asks, “In the phrase ‘of those arisen from that,’ what is it, manifest in the word ‘root-associated,’ that is to be designated by the word ‘that’?” The connection is: those roots... and... the root-associated states are to be designated by the word ‘that’ and are manifest in the word ‘root-associated.’ “Otherwise” means in another way, a way different from the way stated by “by which roots,” etc. Showing that other way, he says: “those roots... when there is a connection.” “Here” refers to the connection just stated by a locative designation. “By that very” means by the first word ‘root’ itself. “To be designated by the word ‘that’”: just as what is to be designated by the word ‘that’ is manifest here in “of those arisen from that,” so too in the previously stated objection concerning “of those associated with that,” what is to be designated by that same word ‘that’ should become manifest. And that being so, of what is to be designated... would not be proper. Or, having dismissed the twofold taking up of ‘root’—that is, without considering the twofold taking up of ‘root’ made in “roots and root-associated states”—he raises an objection to the use of the word ‘that’ by saying “without saying ‘of those associated with that’,” etc., and he refutes it by saying “because what is to be designated is not manifest,” etc. “For roots are conditions” is said on the grounds that this is the discourse on the root condition.

Taṃ na vuttanti cittasamuṭṭhānavacanaṃ na vuttaṃ. Tassāti sahajātapaccayassa. Kaṭattārūpassa paccayabhāvo na vutto bhaveyya, vuttova so ‘‘vipākābyākato eko khandho tiṇṇannaṃ khandhānaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpānaṃ sahajātapaccayena paccayo, tayo khandhā ekassa khandhassa kaṭattā ca rūpāna’’ntiādinā, tasmā cittacetasikānaṃ kaṭattārūpapaccayabhāvo na sakkā nivāretuṃ. Tatthāti sahajātapaccayaniddese. Tattha hi ‘‘cittacetasikā dhammā cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ rūpānaṃ sahajātapaccayena paccayo’’ti cittasamuṭṭhānarūpāni eva niddiṭṭhāni. Idhāpīti imasmiṃ hetupaccayaniddesepi. Evaṃ bhavitabbanti ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhānāna’’nti niddesena bhavitabbaṃ. Yadi evaṃ kasmā tathā na vuttanti āha ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhānānanti panā’’tiādi. Visesitaṃ hoti sabbacittacetasikāsamuṭṭhānabhāvena. Vacanenāti yathādassitena sahajātapaccayaniddesavacanena. Cittacetasikānaṃ paccayabhāvo eva hi tattha paccayaniddese vutto, na cittacetasikānaṃ samuṭṭhānabhāvoti adhippāyo.

“That is not stated” means the term ‘mind-originated’ is not stated. “Of that” means of the co-nascence condition. The conditionality for kamma-originated matter would not have been stated. But it is indeed stated thus: “One resultant indeterminate aggregate is a condition for the three aggregates and for kamma-originated matter by way of co-nascence condition; three aggregates are a condition for the one aggregate and for kamma-originated matter,” and so on. Therefore, the conditionality of mind and mental states for kamma-originated matter cannot be prevented. “There” means in the exposition of the co-nascence condition. For there it is said: “Mind and mental states are a condition for mind-originated matter by way of co-nascence condition.” Thus, only mind-originated matter is indicated. “Here too” means in this exposition of the root condition as well. “It should be thus” means it should be by the designation ‘mind-originated.’ If so, why was it not stated thus? He says: “But as for ‘mind-originated,’” etc. It is specified by its being originated by all mind and mental states. “By the term” means by the term shown in the exposition of the co-nascence condition. For there, in the exposition of the condition, only the conditionality of mind and mental states is stated, not their state of being an origin—this is the intention.

Hetuādipaṭibaddhatañca dasseti yadaggena tāni cittapaṭibaddhavuttīni, tadaggena taṃsampayuttadhammapaṭibaddhavuttīnipi hontīti. Ārammaṇametaṃ hotīti [Pg.243] yadetaṃ kusalākusalacetanāvasena manodvāre cetanaṃ sesadvāresu kāyavacīpayogavasena saṅkappanaṃ, yañca kāmarāgādīnaṃ santāne anusayanaṃ, etaṃ ārammaṇaṃ eso paccayo kammaviññāṇassa ṭhitiyā patiṭṭhānāya. Patiṭṭhiteti kammaṃ javāpetvā paṭisandhiākaḍḍhanasamatthatāpatiṭṭhāpatte kammaviññāṇe viruḷheti tato eva kammaviññāṇato paṭisandhiviññāṇabīje viruḷhe viruhanteti attho. Atha vā patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hotīti kilesābhisaṅkhārasaṅkhāte kammaviññāṇassa ṭhitiyā pavattiyā ārammaṇe paccaye paṭisiddhe āyatipaṭisandhiviññāṇassa patiṭṭhā hoti, tasmiṃ paṭisandhiviññāṇe punabbhavābhinibbattivasena patiṭṭhite patiṭṭhahante viruḷhe bījabhāvena viruhante nāmarūpassa avakkanti hotīti evamettha attho veditabbo. Tenāha ‘‘paṭisandhināmarūpassa viññāṇapaccayatā vuttā’’ti.

It shows the connection with the root, etc.: insofar as those states have a mode of occurrence connected to the mind, to that extent they also have a mode of occurrence connected to the states associated with it. This is the object: that which, through wholesome or unwholesome volition, is volition at the mind door and intention at the remaining doors through bodily and verbal application, and also the underlying tendency to sensual lust, etc., in one's continuity. This object is the condition for the kamma-consciousness to be stable and established. “It is established” means: having impelled the kamma, when the kamma-consciousness has become established in its capacity to draw forth rebirth-linking, “it grows” means that when the seed of rebirth-linking consciousness has grown from that very kamma-consciousness, it sprouts; this is the meaning. Alternatively, “consciousness has a foundation” means: when the object-condition for the stability and occurrence of kamma-consciousness—designated as the ‘defilement-formation’—is prevented, a foundation for future rebirth-linking consciousness arises. When that rebirth-linking consciousness is established—is being established, has grown, is sprouting in the manner of a seed—through the production of a new existence, the descent of name-and-form occurs. This is how the meaning should be understood here. Therefore, it is said: “The conditionality of consciousness for rebirth-linking name-and-form has been stated.”

Purimatarasiddhāyāti khettabhāvanibbattiyā puretarameva siddhāya pathaviyā. Attalābhoyeva cettha patiṭṭhānaṃ, na paṭiladdhattabhāvānaṃ avaṭṭhānanti dassento ‘‘patiṭṭhānaṃ kammassa kaṭattā uppattīti vuttaṃ hotī’’ti āha.

“Established even earlier” means of the earth element, which was established even before the production of the field-state. Showing that here the foundation is solely the acquisition of an individual existence, not the persistence of those who have acquired an individual existence, he says: “The foundation, because of kamma having been done, is said to be ‘arising.’”

Sesarūpānanti paṭisandhikkhaṇe pathavīdhātuādīnaṃ sesarūpānaṃ, pavatte pana tisantatirūpānampi. Sahabhavanamattaṃ vā dasseti. Sahabhāvenapi hi atthi kāci visesamattā. Katthaci katthacīti pakatikālabhavavisesādike. Tatiyapakatiyañhi paṭhamakappikakāle ca bhāvakalāpo natthi, rūpabhave kāyakalāpopi. Ādi-saddena tattheva ghānajivhākalāpā, kāmabhave ca andhādīnaṃ cakkhādikalāpā saṅgayhanti. Katthaci abhāvābhāvatoti nāmarūpokāse katthacipi abhāvābhāvato.

“Of the remaining kinds of matter” means of the remaining kinds of matter at the moment of rebirth-linking, such as the earth element, etc., and during the course of existence, also of the matter of the three continuities. Or it shows mere co-existence. For even in co-existence, there is some measure of distinction. “In some cases” refers to distinctions of normal time, particular states of existence, and so on. For in the third natural state and at the time of the first aeon-inhabitants, the vitality decade does not exist, nor does the body decade in the form realm. By the word ‘etc.’ are included, in that same context, the nose-decade and tongue-decade, and in the sense-sphere realm, the eye-decade, etc., of the blind and so on. “Because of its non-existence in some cases” means because of its non-existence in some places within the domain of name-and-form.

Tesanti pavattiyaṃ kaṭattārūpādīnaṃ. Na hi hetu pavattiyaṃ kaṭattārūpassa paccayo hoti, utuāhārajānaṃ pana sambhavoyeva natthi. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘paccayabhāvappasaṅgoyeva natthī’’ti. Na pana labbhati paccayapaccanīye tādisassa vārassa anuddhaṭattā. Idanti ‘‘pavattiyaṃ kaṭattārūpādīnaṃ paccayabhāvapaṭibāhanato’’ti idaṃ ‘‘hetū sahajātāna’’nti adesanāya parihāravacanaṃ, īdisī pana codanā anokāsā evāti dassetuṃ ‘‘bhagavā panā’’tiādi [Pg.244] vuttaṃ. Yo hi dhammo yathā bhagavatā desito, so tatheva gahetabboti.

“Of them” means of kamma-originated matter, etc., during the course of existence. For a root is not a condition for kamma-originated matter during the course of existence, and for matter born of temperature and nutriment, there is no possibility of its being a condition at all. Therefore it is said: “There is no occasion for its being a condition.” But this is not found, because such a section has not been included in the Conditional Negative. “This”—that is, “because of the preclusion of conditionality for kamma-originated matter, etc., during the course of existence”—is a statement of justification for not teaching “roots for co-nascent things.” But to show that such an objection is entirely groundless, the passage beginning “But the Blessed One...” was stated. For whatever Dhamma was taught by the Blessed One, that should be accepted just as it is.

Hetupaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the exposition of the root condition is concluded.

2. Ārammaṇapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Exposition of the Object Condition

2. Uppajjanakkhaṇeyevāti ettha uppādato paṭṭhāya yāva bhaṅgā uddhaṃ pajjanaṃ gamanaṃ pavattanaṃ uppajjanaṃ, tassa khaṇo, tasmiṃ uppajjanakkhaṇeti evaṃ vā attho daṭṭhabbo. Evañhi sati uppajjanasaddena uppannasaddena viya sabbe pavattamānabhāvā saṅgahitā honti, na uppādamattaṃ. Tenāti cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ vattamānakkhaṇeyeva rūpādīnaṃ ārammaṇapaccayattena. Anālambiyamānānanti sabbena sabbaṃ nālambiyamānānanti attho. Aññathā hi yathāvuttānaṃ rūpādīnaṃ yadā ārammaṇapaccayattābhāvo, tadā anālambiyamānatāvāti. Sabbarūpānīti sabbāni rūpāyatanāni, yattakāni tāni āpāthagatāni yogyadese ṭhitāni, tāni sabbānīti attho. Saha na hontīti ekajjhaṃ ārammaṇaṃ na honti. Satipi hi anekesaṃ ekajjhaṃ āpāthagamane yattha yattha pubbābhogo, taṃ taṃyeva ārammaṇaṃ hoti, na sabbaṃ. Nīlādisaṅghātavasena cetaṃ vuttaṃ, na paccekaṃ nīlādirūpāyatanamattavasena. Samuditāniyeva hi rūpāyatanāni cakkhuviññāṇassa ārammaṇaṃ, na visuṃ visunti dhātuvibhaṅgavaṇṇanāyaṃ dassitoyaṃ nayo. Yaṃ pana aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘te te visuṃ visuṃ ārammaṇapaccayo hontī’’tipi vuttaṃ, tampi yathāvuttamevatthaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Aññathā rūpāyatanaṃ manindriyagocaraṃ nāma na siyā. Saddādīsupi eseva nayo. Tenevāha ‘‘tathā saddādayopī’’ti. ‘‘Saha na hontī’’ti vuttamatthaṃ pāḷiyā vibhāvetuṃ ‘‘yaṃ yanti hi vacanaṃ rūpādīni bhindatī’’ti āha.

2. “At the very moment of arising”—here, from the moment of arising until dissolution, the process of emerging, proceeding, and coming into existence is called “arising.” Its moment is the “moment of arising,” and thus the meaning should be understood. In this way, by the term “arising,” all ongoing states are included, just as by the term “arisen,” not merely the act of arising itself. Therefore—because visible forms, etc., serve as object condition for eye-consciousness, etc., only at the moment they are occurring. “Not being taken as objects”—means not being taken as objects in any way at all. Otherwise, when the aforementioned forms, etc., lack the nature of an object condition, they are not taken as objects. “All forms”—means all form bases, as many as have come into the range of perception and are situated in a suitable location. “They do not occur together”—means they do not become an object simultaneously. Even when many forms come into range at once, only that which was previously attended to becomes the object, not all of them. This is stated with reference to a collection of blue, etc., not to individual blue, etc., form bases. For it is the assembled form bases that serve as the object for eye-consciousness, not each one separately—as explained in the Commentary on the Analysis of the Elements. However, in the Commentary, it is also said, “Each one separately serves as an object condition,” but this too is stated with reference to the same meaning as above. Otherwise, the form base would not be an object for the mind faculty. The same principle applies to sounds, etc. Hence, it is said, “Similarly for sounds, etc.” To clarify the meaning of “they do not occur together” as stated in the Pāḷi, it is said, “The word ‘which’ differentiates the forms, etc.”

‘‘Ye ete’’tiādiko purimo attho, ‘‘na ekato hontī’’tiādiko pana pacchimo, ‘‘sabbārammaṇatādivasena vā idhāpi attho gahetabbo’’ti kasmā vuttaṃ. Na hi ‘‘yaṃ yaṃ vā panārabbhā’’ti imissā pāḷiyā viya ‘‘yaṃ yaṃ dhammaṃ ārabbhā’’ti imassa pāṭhassa purato manoviññāṇassa sabbārammaṇatā nāgatā. Vuttañhi ‘‘sabbe dhammā manoviññāṇadhātuyā taṃsampayuttakānañca dhammānaṃ ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti. Na [Pg.245] hi anantarameva pāḷiyaṃ sarūpato āgatamatthaṃ gahetvā padantaraṃ saṃvaṇṇetabbaṃ. Tattha hi ‘‘rūpārammaṇaṃ vā’’tiādinā niyamavasena cha ārammaṇāni vatvā ‘‘yaṃ yaṃ vā panārabbhā’’ti vacanaṃ sabbārammaṇatādidassananti yuttamevetanti, idha pana sabbārammaṇataṃ vatvā puna ‘‘yaṃ yaṃ dhammaṃ ārabbhā’’ti vuccamānaṃ sabbārammaṇatādassananti kathamidaṃ yujjeyya? Kamābhāvopi ‘‘sabbe dhammā’’ti avisesavacaneneva siddho ārammaṇānupubbiyāva aggahitattā. Na hi manodhātuyā viya manoviññāṇadhātuyā idha ārammaṇāni anupubbato gahitāni, tattha viya vā eteneva niyamābhāvopi saṃvaṇṇitoti veditabbo. Tasmā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttanayenevettha attho gahetabbo.

The former meaning is that of ‘those which…,’ etc., while the latter is that of ‘they are not together…,’ etc. Why is it said, ‘the meaning here should also be taken in terms of all-objectivity and so on’? For the all-objectivity of mind-consciousness is not introduced before this text, ‘depending on whatever phenomenon,’ as it is in the case of the Pāḷi phrase ‘or whatever one depends on.’ For it has been stated: ‘All phenomena are a condition for the mind-consciousness element and its associated phenomena by way of the object condition.’ Indeed, one should not explain another term by taking a meaning that is present in its explicit form in the immediately preceding Pāḷi. There, by specifying with phrases like ‘or a form object,’ six objects are mentioned by way of a restriction, and the statement ‘or whatever one depends on’ is rightly understood as indicating all-objectivity and so on. But here, after all-objectivity has been stated, how can it be justified that the phrase ‘depending on whatever phenomenon,’ being stated again, indicates all-objectivity? Moreover, the absence of sequence is already established by the non-specific statement ‘all phenomena,’ since an order of objects has not been taken. Unlike for the mind-element, here the objects for the mind-consciousness element are not grasped in sequence, nor is the absence of restriction explained in this way as it is there. Therefore, the meaning here should be taken precisely as explained in the commentary.

Pavattanti pavattanaṃ. Nadiyā sandanaṃ pabbatassa ṭhānanti hi vuttā aviratamavicchedanāyaṃ tathāpavattikiriyāva. Tenāha ‘‘avirataṃ avicchinnaṃ sandantī’’ti. Evanti yathā ‘‘sandantī’’ti vattamānavacanaṃ vuttaṃ, evaṃ ‘‘ye ye dhammā uppajjantī’’ti sabbasaṅgahavasena uppajjanassa gahitattā ārammaṇapavaggato ‘‘uppajjantī’’ti vattamānavacanaṃ vuttanti attho. Tenāha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘sabbakālasaṅgahavasenā’’tiādi. Tathā ca vuttaṃ ‘‘atītānāgata…pe… adhippāyo’’ti, atītānāgatapaccuppannānaṃ cittacetasikānanti attho. Samudāyavasenāti cittena rāsīkaraṇavasena. Adhippāyoti iminā vattamānupacārena vināva ‘‘ye ye dhammā uppajjantī’’ti ettha vattamānatthaṃ sakkā yojetunti imamatthaṃ ulliṅgeti. Tenāha ‘‘ime panā’’tiādi. Yadipi paccayadhammā keci atītā anāgatāpi honti, paccayuppannadhammo pana paccuppanno evāti āha ‘‘atītānāgatānaṃ na hontī’’ti. Uppāde vā hi paccayuppannassa paccayena bhavitabbaṃ ṭhitiyaṃ vāti. Tasmāti yasmā atītānāgatā paramatthato natthi, tasmā. Tesūti paccayuppannesu. Taṃtaṃpaccayāti taṃ taṃ rūpādiārammaṇaṃ paccayo etesanti taṃtaṃpaccayā. Ayamattho dassito hoti samānasabhāvattā. Na hi atthābhedena sabhāvabhedo atthi. Na pana taṃtaṃpaccayavantatā dassitā hoti atītānāgatesu nippariyāyena tadabhāvato. Yasmā paccayavanto paccayuppannāyeva, te ca paccuppannāyevāti.

To proceed is proceeding. As it is said, “The flowing of a river, the standing of a mountain”—this refers to the uninterrupted, continuous nature of such proceeding activity. Hence it is said, “unceasingly, uninterruptedly, they flow.” Thus, just as the present-tense word “they flow” is used, so too in the phrase “whatever phenomena arise,” because arising is taken as comprehensively including everything, the present-tense word “arise” is used with reference to the category of objects. Therefore, the commentary states, “by way of including all time,” and so on. Similarly, it is said, “past, future… the intention is…”—meaning, of past, future, and present mind and mental factors. “By way of aggregation”—that is, by way of massing them together with the mind. “The intention”—this indicates that even without a figurative use of the present tense, the present-tense meaning can be applied to “whatever phenomena arise.” Hence, it is said, “but these…” and so on. Although some conditioning phenomena may be past or future, the conditioned phenomenon itself is only present. Therefore, it is said, “they are not of the past or future.” For a conditioned phenomenon must be with its condition either at its arising or during its persistence. Therefore—because past and future do not ultimately exist—for this reason. “Among them”—that is, among the conditioned phenomena. “Conditioned by this or that”—this or that visible form, etc., as object is the condition for them; thus, they are “conditioned by this or that.” This meaning is shown because of their shared nature, for there is no difference in nature where there is no difference in meaning. However, the state of possessing this or that condition is not shown in the past or future, because of its unqualified absence in them. Because only conditioned phenomena possess conditions, and these are only present.

Yaṃ [Pg.246] yaṃ dhammaṃ te te dhammāti yaṃnimittāyaṃvacanabhedo, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘ettha cā’’tiādi āraddhaṃ. Rūpārūpadhammā hi kalāpato pavattamānāpi cittacetasikānaṃ kadāci visuṃ visuṃ ārammaṇaṃ honti, kadāci ekajjhaṃ, na ettha niyamo atthi, purimābhogoyeva pana tathāgahaṇe kāraṇaṃ. Tayimaṃ dīpetuṃ bhagavatā yaṃvacanabhedo katoti ca sakkā vattuṃ, yasmā pana ekakalāpapariyāpannānampi dhammānaṃ ekajjhaṃ gahaṇe na samudāyo gayhati tadābhogābhāvato, atha kho samuditā dhammā evāti sahaggahaṇampi visuṃgahaṇagatikaṃ, tasmā visuṃgahaṇasabbhāvadīpanatthaṃ ‘‘yaṃ ya’’nti vatvā satipi visuṃgahaṇe te sabbe ekajjhaṃ ārammaṇapaccayo hontīti dassanatthaṃ ‘‘te te’’ti vuttanti imamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘cattāro hi khandhā’’tiādimāha. Tattha vedanādīsūti vedanādīsu catūsu khandhesu abhinditvā gahaṇavasena, bhinditvā pana gahaṇavasena phassādīsu. Yo ca rūpādikoti idaṃ viññāṇantarassa sādhāraṇārammaṇavasena vuttaṃ, ye ca aneke phassādayoti idaṃ asādhāraṇārammaṇavasena. Te sabbeti te sādhāraṇāsādhāraṇappabhede sabbepi ārammaṇadhamme. Ekekameva ārabbha uppajjantīti ettha yaṃ vattabbaṃ, taṃ heṭṭhā vuttameva. Rūpārammaṇadhammā ca aneke nīlādibhedato. Tathāti aneke. Tena bherisaddādike, mūlagandhādike, mūlarasādike, kathinasamphassādike, vedanādike ca saṅgaṇhāti. Aneketi hi iminā anekakalāpagatānaṃyeva vaṇṇādīnaṃ indriyaviññāṇārammaṇabhāvamāha. Sāmaññato hi vuttaṃ yathārahaṃ bhinditvā nidassitabbaṃ hotīti.

To show the reason for the distinction in wording ‘whatever phenomenon… those phenomena…,’ the section beginning ‘And here…’ is introduced. For material and immaterial phenomena, even when occurring in groups, sometimes become individual objects for mind and mental factors, and sometimes a collective object; there is no fixed rule here, but previous attention is the reason for such grasping. And it can be said that the Blessed One made this distinction in wording to explain this. Since, however, in the collective grasping of phenomena included in a single group, the aggregate is not grasped because of the absence of attention to it, but rather the assembled phenomena are grasped, even collective grasping has the nature of individual grasping. Therefore, to show the existence of individual grasping, ‘whatever’ is said; and to show that even with individual grasping, all of them collectively become an object condition, ‘those’ is said. Explaining this meaning, it is said: ‘For the four aggregates…’ Herein, ‘in feeling, etc.’ refers to grasping the four aggregates beginning with feeling without dividing them; but ‘in contact, etc.’ refers to grasping them by dividing them. ‘And what pertains to form, etc.’—this is said with reference to a common object for another consciousness. ‘And those many contacts, etc.’—this is said with reference to an uncommon object. ‘All those’—all the object-phenomena, whether of the common or uncommon types. Regarding ‘each arises depending on a single object’—what should be said here has already been stated above. And phenomena that are form-objects are many, due to the distinctions of blue, etc. ‘Likewise’ means many. Thus, it includes the sound of a drum, etc., root smells, etc., root tastes, etc., harsh contacts, etc., and feeling, etc. By this word ‘many,’ it is said that colors, etc., belonging to many groups become objects for sense-consciousness. For what is stated generally should be shown by dividing it up as is appropriate.

Kusalavipākassāti kusalassa vipākassa ca. Na hi nibbānaṃ pubbe nivutthanti idaṃ ‘‘diṭṭhanibbānoyevā’’tiādinā vakkhamānameva atthaṃ hadaye ṭhapetvā vuttaṃ. Pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇena hi nibbānavibhāvanaṃ adiṭṭhasaccassa vā siyā diṭṭhasaccassapi vā. Tattha adiṭṭhasaccena tāva taṃ vibhāvetumeva na sakkā appaṭividdhattā, itarassa pana pageva vibhūtamevāti taṃ tena vibhāvitaṃ nāma hotīti adhippāyo. Ettha ca ‘‘na ca taṃ vutta’’nti iminā pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇassa nibbānārammaṇakaraṇābhāvaṃ āgamato dassetvā ‘‘na hi nibbāna’’ntiādinā yuttito dasseti. Tattha ‘‘na pubbe nivutthaṃ asaṅkhatattā’’ti kasmā vuttaṃ? Gocarāsevanāya āsevitassapi nivutthanti icchitattā. Diṭṭhasaccoyeva hi pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇena [Pg.247] nibbānaṃ vibhāveti, na adiṭṭhasacco. Taṃ pana ñāṇaṃ khandhe viya khandhapaṭibaddhepi vibhāvetīti nibbānārammaṇakhandhavibhāvane nibbānampi vibhāvetīti sakkā viññātuṃ. Etena payojanābhāvacodanā paṭikkhittāti daṭṭhabbā. Evaṃ anāgataṃsañāṇepi yojetabbanti yathā pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇassa nibbānārammaṇatā dassitā, evaṃ anāgataṃsañāṇepi yathārahaṃ yojetabbaṃ. Tattha pana ‘‘khandhapaṭibaddhavibhāvanakāle’’tiādinā yojanā veditabbā. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘yathāraha’’nti. Kassaci abhiññāppattassapi rūpāvacarassa, pageva itarassa.

'Of the result of the wholesome' (kusalavipākassa) means of the wholesome and of the result. Indeed, Nibbāna is not 'previously dwelt in' (pubbe nivutthaṃ); this is said having established in the heart the meaning that will be explained with the words 'one for whom Nibbāna is seen,' etc. For the clarification of Nibbāna by means of the knowledge of recollection of past lives may be for one who has not seen the truth or for one who has seen the truth. In this regard, one who has not seen the truth is unable to clarify it because it has not been penetrated. But for the other, it is already manifest; this is the intention when it is said that it is clarified by that knowledge. And here, by the words 'and that is not stated,' he shows from scripture that the knowledge of recollection of past lives does not take Nibbāna as its object, and by the words 'for Nibbāna is not,' etc., he shows this from reasoning. Why is it said, 'not previously dwelt in because it is unconditioned'? Because it is wished to be called 'dwelt in' even when it has been frequented by the cultivation of its domain. For it is only one who has seen the truth who clarifies Nibbāna with the knowledge of recollection of past lives, not one who has not seen the truth. But since that knowledge clarifies what is connected to the aggregates just as it does the aggregates themselves, it can be understood that when clarifying the aggregates that have Nibbāna as their object, it clarifies Nibbāna as well. By this, the objection concerning the lack of purpose should be seen as refuted. In the same way, this should be applied to the knowledge of the future. Just as it was shown that the knowledge of recollection of past lives takes Nibbāna as its object, so too this should be applied to the knowledge of the future as is fit. In that case, the application should be understood by way of the phrase 'at the time of clarifying what is connected to the aggregates,' etc. Therefore it is said, 'as is fit.' This is for someone of the form realm who has attained the higher knowledges, let alone another.

Ārammaṇapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Object-Condition is finished.

3. Adhipatipaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

3. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Dominance-Condition

3. Dhurasahacariyato dhoreyyo ‘‘dhura’’nti vuttoti āha ‘‘dhuranti dhuraggāha’’nti. Chandassa pubbaṅgamatāsiddhaṃ pāsaṃsabhāvaṃ upādāya aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘jeṭṭhaka’’nti vuttanti tamevatthaṃ dīpento ‘‘seṭṭha’’nti āha. Tathā hi vuttaṃ aṭṭhasāliniyaṃ ‘‘chandaṃ pubbaṅgamaṃ katvā āyūhita’’nti. Purimachandassāti ‘‘chandādhipatī’’ti purimasmiṃ pade niddesavasena vuttassa chandasaddassa samānarūpena sadisākārena. Tadanantaraṃ niddiṭṭhenāti tassa purimassa chandasaddassa anantaraṃ niddesavasena vuttena. Tato eva ca taṃsamānatthatāya ca taṃsambandhena ‘‘chandasampayuttakāna’’nti ettha chandasaddeneva adhipatisaddarahitenāti attho. Paccayabhūtassāti adhipatipaccayabhūtassa. Sampayuttakavisesanabhāvoti attanā sampayuttadhammānaṃ so eva adhipatipaccayatāsaṅkhāto visesanabhāvo. Esa nayoti iminā ‘‘vīriyādhipati vīriyasampayuttakānantiādīsu purimavīriyassa samānarūpenā’’tiādinā vattabbaṃ atthavacanaṃ atidisati.

3. Because it is a yoke-fellow from its association with the burden, it is called 'dhura' (burden); thus he says: ''Dhura' means taking up the burden.' Because of zeal's established nature of being a forerunner and praiseworthy, it is called 'chief' (jeṭṭhaka) in the commentary; explaining this same meaning, he says 'excellent' (seṭṭha). For so it is said in the Aṭṭhasālinī: 'Having made zeal the forerunner, one strives.' 'Of the preceding zeal' (purimachandassa): this refers to the zeal mentioned in the preceding phrase 'zeal as dominance' (chandādhipati), with a similar form and like appearance. 'By that which is explained immediately after' (tadanantaraṃ niddiṭṭhena): by that which is stated by way of explanation immediately after that preceding zeal. And precisely from that, and because of the sameness of meaning, and by connection with that, here in the phrase 'of things associated with zeal' (chandasampayuttakānaṃ), the meaning is conveyed by the word 'zeal' alone, without the word 'dominance'. 'Of that which has become a condition' (paccayabhūtassa) means of that which has become a dominance-condition. 'The state of being a qualifier of associated things' (sampayuttakavisesanabhāvo) is that very state of being a qualifier, designated as dominance-condition, for the states associated with oneself. 'This is the method' (esa nayo): by this he applies by extension the statement of meaning that should be stated in such cases as 'energy as dominance, of things associated with energy,' etc., beginning with 'with a similar form to the preceding energy.'

Kusalābyākatānaṃ pavattinti kusalābyākatānaṃ adhipatīnaṃ pavattanākāraṃ. Aladdhaṃ ārammaṇaṃ laddhabbaṃ labbhanīyaṃ, laddhuṃ vā sakkuṇeyyaṃ, dutiye pana atthe lābhamarahatīti laddhabbaṃ. Avaññātanti pageva anavaññātanti attho.

'The occurrence of the wholesome and indeterminate' means the mode of occurrence of the dominances of the wholesome and indeterminate. An object not yet obtained is 'to be obtained,' 'obtainable,' or 'one that could be obtained.' But in the second sense, 'to be obtained' means 'deserving of acquisition.' 'Not despised' means simply 'not despised.'

Appanāppattā kusalakiriyadhammā mahābalā sādhipatikā eva honti, tathā micchattaniyatāpīti āha ‘‘appanāsadisā…pe… nuppajjantī’’ti. Appanāsadisāti [Pg.248] appanāppattasadisā. Kammakilesāvaraṇabhūtā ca teti te micchattaniyatadhammā kammāvaraṇabhūtā, ye ānantariyappakārā kilesāvaraṇabhūtā, ye niyatamicchādiṭṭhidhammā, sampayuttacetanāya panettha kilesāvaraṇapakkhikatā daṭṭhabbā ānantariyacetanāsampayuttassa paṭighassa kammāvaraṇapakkhikatā viya. Paccakkhagati anantaratāya vinā bhāvinīti vuttaṃ ‘‘paccakkhasaggānaṃ kāmāvacaradevānampī’’ti. Tena tesu ānantariyā viya asambhāvino ahetukābhinivesādayopīti dasseti.

Wholesome and functional states that have reached absorption are very powerful and are always with a dominance condition; similarly those fixed in wrongness. Thus he says: 'similar to absorption... do not arise.' 'Similar to absorption' means similar to having reached absorption. And those states fixed in wrongness have become obstructions of kamma and defilements. Those that are types of actions with immediate results have become obstructions of kamma; those that are states of fixed wrong view have become obstructions of defilements. Here, through the associated volition, their inclusion on the side of the obstructions of defilements should be seen, just like the inclusion on the side of the obstructions of kamma of the aversion associated with the volition of an action with immediate result. Because a directly visible destiny occurs without an interval, it is said: 'even for the sense-sphere devas of the directly visible heavens.' By this he shows that for them, impossible things such as adherence to a no-cause view and so on are just like actions with immediate results.

Tividhopi kiriyārammaṇādhipatīti ettha ayaṃ kiriyārammaṇādhipatīti ajjhattārammaṇo adhippeto, udāhu bahiddhārammaṇoti ubhayathāpi na sambhavo evāti dassento ‘‘kāmāvacarādibhedato panā’’tiādimāha. Tattha parasantānagatānaṃ sārammaṇadhammānaṃ adhipatipaccayatā natthīti sambandho. Abhāvatoti avacanato. Avacanañhi nāma yathādhammasāsane abhidhamme abhāvo evāti eteneva anuddhaṭatāpi avuttato veditabbā. Ajjhattārammaṇabahiddhārammaṇadvayavinimuttassa sārammaṇadhammassa abhāvato natthīti viññāyatīti vattabbe tameva viññāyamānataṃ sambhāvento ‘‘natthīti viññāyamānepī’’ti āha. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘bahiddhā khandhe’’tiādi. Rūpe eva bhavituṃ arahati edisesu ṭhānesu arūpe asambhavatoti adhippāyo. Asambhavato ca yathāvuttapāḷianusāratoti veditabbanti. ‘‘Vicārita’’nti kasmā vuttaṃ, nanu ‘‘atītārammaṇe anāgate khandhe garuṃ katvā assādetī’’tiādivacanato arūpepi edisesu ṭhānesu khandhasaddo pavattateva. Āvajjanakiriyasabbhāvato panāti idaṃ yathādassitapāḷiyā virodhapariharaṇādhippāyena vuttaṃ, avacanaṃ pana katthaci vineyyajjhāsayena, katthaci nayadassanena hotīti kuto virodhāvasaro.

'The functional object-dominance is also threefold.' Here, is this functional object-dominance intended as having an internal object or an external object? Showing that in either case it is impossible, he says: 'But from the distinction of the sense-sphere, etc.' The connection is that there is no dominance-condition for states with an object that have gone to another's continuity. 'Because of absence' means because of not being stated. For 'not being stated' in the teaching of the Dhamma, in the Abhidhamma, is indeed absence. By this itself, its not being extracted should be known from its not being stated. When it should be said, 'It is understood that it does not exist because of the absence of any state with an object that is free from both internal and external objects,' he says, 'even when it is understood that it does not exist,' thereby confirming that very understanding. Therefore it is said: 'external aggregates,' etc. The intention is that in such cases it is fit to be only in regard to form, because it is impossible in regard to the formless. And it should be known that this is because of its impossibility and in accordance with the Pāḷi as stated. Why is 'investigated' said? Surely, from statements such as 'having made past and future aggregates weighty, one delights,' the word 'aggregates' does occur in such cases even in regard to the formless. But this is said with the intention of resolving the contradiction with the Pāḷi as shown, because of the existence of the functional consciousness of adverting. And since non-statement is sometimes due to the disposition of the trainee and sometimes for showing a method, where is the occasion for contradiction?

Adhipatipaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Dominance-Condition is finished.

4. Anantarapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

4. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Proximity-Condition

4. Yathāvuttā nirodhānantarasuññatā nirodhappattatā okāsadānaviseso, attano anurūpacittuppādanasamatthatā cittaniyamahetutā, tattha [Pg.249] anantaruppādanasamatthatā ca saṇṭhānābhāvato suṭṭhutaraṃ nirantaruppādanasamatthatā ca cittaniyamahetuviseso daṭṭhabbo. Dhātuvasenāti viññāṇadhātumanodhātumanoviññāṇadhātuvasena. Ettakā eva hi dhātuyo bhinnasabhāvā anantarapaccayatāya niyametvā vattabbā, abhinnasabhāvā pana visesābhāvato purimatāmattaṃyeva visesaṃ purakkhatvā vattabbāti tā kusalādibhedena tathā vuttā. Tenāha ‘‘kusalādivasena cā’’ti. Yā pana manodhātumanoviññāṇadhātuvasena anantarapaccayatā vattabbā, tattha manoviññāṇadhātu manodhātuyā anantarapaccayena paccayoti vuccamāno sammoho siyā, pure manodhātuyā anantarapaccayabhāvena vuttā, idāni manoviññāṇadhātu manodhātuyāti paccayapaccayuppannavisesā na viññāyeyya, manodhātuyā pana cakkhuviññāṇādidhātūnaṃ anantarapaccayabhāve vuccamāne niyamo natthi. Tenāha ‘‘manodhātu cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyāti cā’’ti. Tathevāti niyamābhāvato evāti attho. Tasmāti yasmā ito aññathā desanāya paccayapaccayuppannānaṃ visesābhāvo cittavisesadassanavicchedo niyamābhāvo cāti ime dosā āpajjanti, tasmā. Nidassanenāti dhātuvasena nidassanena. Nayaṃ dassetvāti ‘‘manoviññāṇadhātu taṃsampayuttakā ca dhammā manodhātuyā taṃsampayuttakānañca dhammānaṃ anantarapaccayena paccayo’’ti evamādikassa anantarapaccayatāggahaṇassa nayaṃ dassetvā. Niravasesadassanatthanti niravasesassa anantarapaccayabhāvino cittuppādassa dassanatthaṃ.

4. As stated, the emptiness of what immediately follows cessation, the attainment of cessation, is a special granting of opportunity. It is the capacity for the arising of a mind in accordance with itself, the cause for the determination of mind. There, the capacity for immediate arising, and due to the absence of any interval, the very uninterrupted capacity for arising, should be seen as a special cause for the determination of mind. By way of the elements—that is, by way of the consciousness element, the mind element, and the mind-consciousness element. For only these elements, being distinct in nature, should be spoken of as having the condition of immediacy by way of regulating them. However, those of the same nature, due to the absence of distinction, should be spoken of merely by prioritizing the previous one. Thus, they are classified as wholesome, etc. Hence, it is said: “And by way of the wholesome, etc.” Now, regarding the condition of immediacy that should be spoken of by way of the mind element and the mind-consciousness element, there might be confusion when it is said that the mind-consciousness element is a condition for the mind element by way of immediacy. Earlier, the mind element was said to have the nature of an immediate condition, but now the mind-consciousness element is said to be a condition for the mind element—the distinctions between condition and conditioned would not be discerned. Moreover, when it is said that the mind element is an immediate condition for the eye-consciousness element, etc., there is no fixed rule. Hence, it is said: “And the mind element for the eye-consciousness element, etc.” Similarly, because there is no fixed rule, it is so. Therefore—because if the teaching were otherwise, the distinctions between conditions and conditioned things would be lost, the clear differentiation of mental states would be cut off, and the absence of a fixed rule would arise—these faults would occur. Therefore, by way of illustration—that is, by illustrating through the elements—having shown the method, such as: “The mind-consciousness element and the states associated with it are conditions for the mind element and the states associated with it by way of immediacy,” etc., for the purpose of showing the entirety of the mind-moments that have the nature of an immediate condition.

Sadisakusalānanti samānakusalānaṃ, samānatā cettha ekavīthipariyāpannatāya veditabbā. Tenevāha ‘‘bhūmibhinnānampi paccayabhāvo vutto hotī’’ti. Samānavīthitā ca yasmā samānavedanā samānahetukā ca honti, tasmā ‘‘vedanāya vā hetūhi vā sadisakusalāna’’nti āha. Vā-saddo cettha aniyamattho. Tena ñāṇasaṅkhārādibhedassapi vikappanavasena saṅgaho daṭṭhabbo. Cutipi gahitā taṃsabhāvattā. Bhavaṅgacittameva hi pariyosāne ‘‘cutī’’ti vuccati. Kusalākusalānantarañca kadāci sā uppajjatīti tadārammaṇampi gahitanti daṭṭhabbaṃ, kiriyajavanānantaraṃ tadārammaṇuppattiyanti adhippāyo.

“Similar wholesome states” means those that are alike in wholesomeness. Here, their similarity should be understood as being included in the same cognitive series. Therefore, it is said, “Even for those divided by planes, their conditionality is stated.” And because they share the same cognitive series, they also share the same feeling and the same root causes. Hence, it is said, “similar in feeling or in roots.” Here, the word “or” indicates non-restriction. Through this, the inclusion of distinctions such as knowledge and formations should also be seen as a mode of classification. Death-consciousness is also included because it has that nature. For at the end, the life-continuum consciousness itself is called “death-consciousness.” And because registering consciousness sometimes arises immediately following wholesome or unwholesome states, it is also to be understood as included; the intention is that registering consciousness arises after functional javanas.

Kāmāvacarakiriyāya [Pg.250] āvajjanassāti ayamettha attho adhippetoti dassento ‘‘āvajjanaggahaṇena kāmāvacarakiriyaṃ visesetī’’ti āha. Tameva hi atthaṃ pākaṭataraṃ kātuṃ ‘‘kāmāvacaravipāko’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Voṭṭhabbanampi gahitaṃ santīraṇānantarattāti adhippāyo.

Showing that this is the intended meaning here, namely, 'of the āvajjana for the sense-sphere functional consciousness,' he said: 'By the inclusion of āvajjana, he distinguishes the sense-sphere functional consciousness.' To make that meaning clearer, “sense-sphere resultant consciousness” and so on were stated. The inclusion of determining consciousness is also intended because it is immediately subsequent to investigating consciousness.

Anantarapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Proximity Condition is concluded.

6. Sahajātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Exposition of the Co-nascence Condition.

6. Porāṇapāṭhoti purātano aṭṭhakathāpāṭho. Imassāti imassa padassa. Avuttassāti pāḷiyaṃ avuttassa. Yadipi sahagatasaddassa atthasaṃvaṇṇanāyaṃ saṃsaṭṭhasaddassa viya samānatthassapi katthaci saddantarassa attho vuccati pariyāyavisesabodhanatthaṃ, tathāpi na mūlasaddassa attho vibhāvito hotīti dassento āha ‘‘na ca…pe… hotī’’ti. ‘‘Aññamañña’’nti ca ‘‘aññaañña’’nti vattabbe ma-kārāgamaṃ katvā niddeso, kammabyatihāre cetaṃ padaṃ, tasmā itaretaranti vuttaṃ hoti. Paccayapaccayuppannānaṃ ekasmiṃyeva khaṇe paccayuppannapaccayabhāvassa icchitattā yo hi yassa paccayo yasmiṃ khaṇe, tasmiṃyeva khaṇe sopi tassa paccayoti ayamettha aññamaññapaccayatā. Tathā hi aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘añño aññassā’’ti vatvā ‘‘iminā…pe… dīpetī’’ti vuttaṃ. Okkamanaṃ pavisananti attho. Āsanakkhaṇe hi dhammā purimabhavato imaṃ bhavaṃ pavisantā viya honti. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘paralokato imaṃ lokaṃ āgantvā pavisantaṃ viya uppajjatī’’ti. Tasmā avisesena paṭisandhi okkantisaddābhidheyyāti adhippāyena vuttaṃ ‘‘okkanti…pe… adhippāyenāhā’’ti. Taṃnivāraṇatthanti tassa khaṇantare rūpīnaṃ sahajātapaccayabhāvassa ‘‘kañci kāle na sahajātapaccayena paccayo’’ti nivāraṇatthaṃ. Tena padadvayena samānesu paccayapaccayuppannadhammesu purimato pacchimassa visesamatthaṃ dasseti.

6. “Porāṇapāṭho” means the ancient commentary text. “Imassāti” refers to this word. “Avuttassāti” means not stated in the canonical text. Even if, in the explanation of the meaning of the word ‘sahagata,’ the meaning of another word, even if it has the same meaning, is sometimes stated, as in the case of the word ‘saṃsaṭṭha,’ for the purpose of conveying a special nuance, nevertheless, showing that the meaning of the root word is not clarified, he said: ‘na ca…pe… hotī.’ And where “aññamañña” (mutual) should be said as “añño añña,” the explanation is given by adding the ‘m’ sound. This word is used in the sense of reciprocal action; hence it is said to mean “itaretara” (one another). Because it is desired that for a condition and its conditioned, the state of being mutually a condition and conditioned exists in the very same moment—for in whatever moment one is a condition for another, in that very same moment the other is also a condition for it—this here is mutual conditionality. Thus, in the commentary, it is said: “añño aññassa” (one for another), and then explained: “iminā…pe… dīpetī.” “Okkamanaṃ pavisananti” means entering. For at the moment of rebirth-linking, phenomena are as if entering this existence from the previous existence. Therefore, it is said: “as if coming from the other world and entering this world, it arises.” Thus, without distinction, rebirth-linking can be expressed by the word “okkanti” (descent). This is the intended meaning when it is said: “okkanti…pe… adhippāyenāhā.” “Taṃnivāraṇatthanti” means for the purpose of preventing that state of material phenomena being a co-nascent condition at another moment, as in the phrase “at some time it is not a condition by way of co-nascence.” By these two words, when conditions and conditioned phenomena are similar, it shows the special purpose of distinguishing the latter from the former.

Evañca ‘‘kañci kāle’’ti padassa ‘‘keci kāleti vā, kismiñci kāle’’ti vā vibhattivipallāsena attho gahetabboti adhippāyena paṭhamavikappaṃ dassetvā idāni pakārantarena dassetuṃ ‘‘kañci kāleti keci [Pg.251] kismiñci kāleti vā attho’’ti āha. Tena ‘‘kañcī’’ti ayaṃ sāmaññaniddesoti dasseti. Yo hi ayaṃ ‘‘kecī’’ti paccattabahuvacanābhidheyyo attho, yo ca ‘‘kismiñcī’’ti bhummekavacanābhidheyyo, tadubhayaṃ sati kālavantakālatāvibhāge kiṃ-saddassa vacanīyatāsāmaññena pana ekajjhaṃ katvā ‘‘kañcī’’ti pāḷiyaṃ vuttanti taṃ vibhajitvā dassetuṃ ‘‘keci kismiñcī’’ti vuttaṃ. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana ‘‘kismiñcī’’ti bhummavaseneva vuttaṃ. Tena yathāvuttaatthavibhāgena padena. Vatthubhūtāti vatthusabhāvā. Hadayarūpameva sandhāya vadati. Rūpantarānanti hadayavatthuto aññarūpānaṃ. Arūpīnaṃ sahajātapaccayataṃ pubbe ‘‘okkantikkhaṇe nāmarūpa’’nti ettha anivāritaṃ nivāretīti yojanā, tathā vatthussa ca kālantare paṭisandhikālato aññasmiṃ kāle arūpīnaṃ nivāretīti. Evañca katvātiādinā yathāvuttaatthavaṇṇanāya pāḷiyaṃ vibhattiniddesassa rūpakabhāvamāha. Punapi purimato pacchimassa upacayena visesaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘purimena cā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha purimenāti ‘‘okkantikkhaṇe nāmarūpa’’nti iminā paccayaniddesavacanena. ‘‘Eko khandho vatthu ca tiṇṇaṃ khandhāna’’ntiādinā paṭiccavārādipāṭhena. Atthavivaraṇañhi paccayaniddesapāḷiyā sabbepi satta mahāvārā. Vatthussa vattabbatte āpanne kinti paccayoti tassa nāmassāti yojanā. Etenāti ‘‘rūpino dhammā arūpīnaṃ dhammāna’’nti etena vacanena. Kevalassāti nāmarahitassa vatthussa. Tathāti nāmassa paccayabhāvena.

And thus, with the intention that the meaning of the phrase 'kañci kāle' should be taken by an exchange of case endings as 'keci kāle' or 'kismiñci kāle,' having first shown the initial alternative, now, to show it in another way, it is said, '“kañci kāle” means “keci” or “kismiñci kāle.”' By this, he shows that 'kañci' is a general designation. For the meaning expressed by 'keci,' which is in the individual plural, and the meaning expressed by 'kismiñci,' which is in the locative singular—both, while there is a distinction between the temporal entity and time itself, are brought together by the generality of what can be expressed by the word 'kiṃ' and are thus stated in the Pāḷi as 'kañci.' To show this by analyzing it, 'keci kismiñci' is stated. In the commentary, however, 'kismiñci' is stated only in the sense of the locative. Therefore, by the word with the meaning distinguished as stated. 'Vatthubhūtāti' means having the nature of a base. He speaks referring to the heart-form itself. 'Rūpantarānanti' means of other forms apart from the heart-base. The construction is: it restricts for the immaterial states the co-nascence conditionality which was not restricted previously in the passage 'at the moment of conception, name-and-form'; and similarly, it restricts for the immaterial states the conditionality of the base at another time, a time other than the time of rebirth-linking. By the explanation of the meaning as stated, beginning with 'And having done thus,' he states the figurative nature of the specification of the case-ending in the Pāḷi. Again, to show the distinction of the latter from the former by way of addition, 'and by the former,' etc., is said. Therein, 'by the former' means by this statement designating the condition, 'at the moment of conception, name-and-form.' By the text of the Dependent Origination section, etc., beginning with 'one aggregate and the base are a condition for three aggregates.' For the explanation of the meaning of the Pāḷi of the Exposition of Conditions comprises all seven great sections. When it comes to be stated of the base, 'How is it a condition?' the construction is: 'for that name.' 'By this' means by this statement, 'material phenomena are a condition for immaterial phenomena.' 'Of the mere' means of the base devoid of name. 'Thus' means as a condition for name.

Katthacīti ‘‘rūpino dhammā arūpīnaṃ dhammānaṃ kañci kālaṃ sahajātapaccayena paccayo’’ti etasmiṃ niddese. Ettha hi aññamaññasahajātapaccayabhāvo labbhati. Vacanenāti ‘‘aññamañña’’nti iminā vacanena pāḷiyaṃ sahajātapaccayabhāvassa asaṅgahitattā, atthato pana labbhatevāti. Tenāha ‘‘labbhamānepī’’ti. Tassāti aññamaññapaccayattassa. Evanti ‘‘na aññamaññavasenā’’ti iminā pakārena. Samudāyekadesavasena sāmivacananti avayavāvayavisambandhe avayavini sāmivacananti attho, niddhāraṇe vā ‘‘kaṇhā gāvīna’’ntiādīsu viya.

‘In some cases’ means in this exposition: “Material phenomena are a condition for immaterial phenomena for some time by way of the co-nascence condition.” Here, indeed, the state of being a mutually co-nascent condition is obtained. ‘By the word’ means: by this word “mutual”—because the state of being a mutual condition is not included in the Pāḷi by this word, but it is nevertheless obtained by meaning. Therefore, he said: “Although obtainable.” ‘Of that’ means of the state of being a mutual condition. ‘Thus’ means in this manner: “not by way of mutual dependence.” ‘The genitive case is used in the sense of a part of a collection’ means the genitive case is used in the relationship between the part and the whole, referring to the whole; or in determination, as in ‘the black one of the cows’ and so forth.

Sahajātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Co-nascence Condition is concluded.

8. Nissayapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

8. Commentary on the Exposition of the Support Condition

8. Kismiñci [Pg.252] kāleti idaṃ na labbhati sabbadāpi nissayapaccayatāya labbhamānattā. Sahajaṃ purejanti hi vibhāgaṃ anāmasitvā nissayatāmattameva nissayapaccayatā. Vatthurūpaṃ pañcavokārabhaveti vatthurūpaṃ pañcavokārabhave cāti ca-saddo luttaniddiṭṭho daṭṭhabbo. Tassāti āruppavipākaṭṭhapanassa. Pakāsetabbattāti iminā apākaṭaṃ pākaṭaṃ katvā vacanena codanā anokāsāti dasseti.

8. The phrase 'at a certain time' is not obtained here, because it is always obtained by way of support conditionality. For without considering the distinction between what is co-nascent and what is pre-nascent, the mere state of support is support conditionality. In the phrase 'the physical basis in the five-constituent existence,' the particle 'ca' (and) should be seen as indicated by elision. 'Of that' refers to the setting aside of the formless resultant. 'Because it should be explained': by this he shows that since the statement makes manifest what was unmanifest, there is no occasion for an objection.

Nissayapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the exposition of the support condition is concluded.

9. Upanissayapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Exposition of the Decisive Support Condition

9. Upanissaye tayoti anantarārammaṇapakatūpanissayappabhede tayo upanissaye. Anekasaṅgāhakatāyāti anekesaṃ paccayadhammānaṃ saṅgahaṇato. Ekanteneva honti cittaniyamahetubhāvena pavattiniyamato. Yesu padesūti yesu kusalādipadesu. Saṅgahitoti saṅgahaṃ gato, kusalādipadesu yesaṃ padānaṃyeva anantarūpanissayo labbhatīti attho. Tesu ‘‘kesañcī’’ti na vuttaṃ. Kasmā? Na sakkā vattuṃ ekanteneva upalabbhanato. Tesūti kusalākusalapadesu. Na hi kusalo akusalassa anantarūpanissayo hoti, akusalo vā kusalassa, ārammaṇapakatūpanissayā pana anekantikā, tasmā tattha ‘‘kesañcī’’ti vuttaṃ. Siddhānaṃ paccayadhammānanti paccayabhāvena purimanipphannānaṃ kusalādīnaṃ kusalassa akusalassa vāti attho. Akusalādīhīti yathāsaṅkhyaṃ akusalena kusalena vā. Avisesenāti yathāvuttavisese niyamaṃ aggahetvā akusalādīsu akusalakusalānaṃ ‘‘kesañcī’’tiādinā.

9. 'In the three decisive supports' means the three decisive supports with the divisions of proximity, object, and natural decisive support. 'Because of encompassing many' means because of gathering numerous conditioning phenomena. They are absolutely certain because of the fixed nature of their occurrence due to being the cause of the fixed order of cittas. 'In which cases' means in cases of the wholesome, etc. 'Included' means gone into inclusion; the meaning is that proximity decisive support is found only for those states in the cases of the wholesome, etc. In regard to them, 'for some' is not said. Why? Because it cannot be said, since it is obtained invariably. 'In those' means in the cases of the wholesome and unwholesome. For the wholesome is not a proximity decisive support for the unwholesome, nor the unwholesome for the wholesome. But object and natural decisive supports are not invariable; therefore 'for some' is said there. 'Of established conditioning phenomena' means of wholesome, etc., states that were previously produced as conditions, whether wholesome or unwholesome. 'By the unwholesome, etc.' means, respectively, by the unwholesome or by the wholesome. 'Without distinction' means without grasping the specific rule as stated, for the unwholesome and wholesome among the unwholesome, etc., by the words 'for some,' etc.

Anārammaṇattā ārammaṇūpanissayaṃ pubbāparaniyamena appavattito anantarūpanissayaṃ na labhatīti yojanā. Pakatassāti nipphāditassa, upasevitassa vā. Na hi rūpasantānassa saddhādinipphādanaṃ atthi, utubhojanādiupasevanaṃ vā sambhavati. Tenāha ‘‘yathā hi…pe… rūpasantānenā’’ti. Nanu ca rūpasantāne pubbenāparaṃ viseso labbhati[Pg.253], so ca na vinā samānajātiyena kāraṇenāti svāyaṃ pakatūpanissayalābhoti kadāci āsaṅkeyyāti āha ‘‘yasmiñcā’’tiādi. Tattha tanti utubījādikaṃ kammādi ca tena rūpena purimanipphannena. Uppādanaṃ sābhisandhikaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Adhipatīsu pubbābhisaṅkhāro viya pakappanaṃ saṃvidahanaṃ. Pakaraṇaṃ vuttalakkhaṇena kāraṇabhāvena avaṭṭhānaṃ, yato kāraṇaviseso ‘‘pakatī’’ti vuccati. Yadi evaṃ kasmā rūpasseva taṃ paṭikkhipīyatīti āha ‘‘yathā ca…pe… daṭṭhabbā’’ti. Evampi utubījādīnaṃ aṅkurādīsu kathaṃ paccayavisesabhāvoti āha ‘‘utubījādayo pana…pe… bhāvato’’ti. Upanissayoti ca yasmā balavatākāraṇaṃ adhippetaṃ, tasmā na ettha ekantena purimanipphatti icchitabbā. Yadi evaṃ pāḷiyaṃ kathaṃ purimaggahaṇanti āha ‘‘purimapurimānaṃyeva panā’’tiādi. Tepi vā parikappanavasena purimanipphannāyeva nāma honti. Na hi asaṃviditākāre vatthusmiṃ patthanāpavattīti. Tenāha ‘‘taṃsamānalakkhaṇatāyā’’ti.

The construction is that because it is not an object, it does not obtain object decisive support, and because it does not occur in a fixed sequence of before and after, it does not obtain proximity decisive support. 'Of the natural' means of what has been produced, or of what has been developed. For a material continuum does not have the production of faith, etc., nor is the development by means of climate, food, etc., possible for it. Hence it is said: 'Just as... by the material continuum.' But might one not sometimes suspect: 'Surely in the material continuum a later distinction is obtained from a prior one, and that is not without a cause of the same kind; thus this is the obtaining of natural decisive support'? To this, it is said: 'And in which...,' etc. Therein, 'tanti' means climate, seed, etc., and kamma, etc., by means of that previously produced material form. 'Production' should be seen as intentional. Among the dominance conditions, preliminary volition is like preparation and arrangement. 'Making' is the state of being a cause with the stated characteristic, from which a specific cause is called 'natural.' If so, why is it denied only for material form? It is said: 'And just as... should be seen.' Even so, how can climate, seed, etc., be a specific condition for sprouts, etc.? It is said: 'But climate, seed, etc., ... by way of their nature.' And since by 'decisive support' a strong cause is intended, prior production should not be insisted upon here absolutely. If so, how is the taking up of 'prior' in the Pāḷi to be understood? It is said: 'But of the prior and prior ones...,' etc. Or they are called 'previously produced' by way of consideration. For aspiration and action do not occur in regard to a thing whose nature is unknown. Hence it is said: 'Because of having a similar characteristic.'

Dhammeti puggalasenāsanapaññattīnaṃ upādānabhūte dhamme. Ayaṃ nayoti paññattimukhena paññapetabbā tadupādānabhūtā dhammā gayhantīti yathāvutto nayo. Etthevāti ‘‘senāsanampi upanissayapaccayena paccayo’’ti etasmiṃyeva vacane. Kathaṃ paccuppannassa pakatūpanissayabhāvoti codanāya ‘‘vakkhatī’’tiādinā āgamaṃ dassetvā yuttiṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘paccuppannānampica tādisānaṃ pubbe pakatattā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tādisānanti yādisā utuādayo paccupaṭṭhitā, tādisānaṃ tato pubbe puretaraṃ pakatattā pakatūpanissayayogyatāya āpāditattā.

'Phenomena' means the phenomena that are the basis for the concepts of person and lodging. 'This is the method' means the aforesaid method whereby the phenomena that are the basis for what is to be designated are grasped by way of the concept. 'Precisely here' means in this very statement: 'A lodging, too, is a condition by way of decisive support condition.' To the objection, 'How can a present thing be a natural decisive support?', having pointed to the scripture with 'it will be said,' etc., to show the reasoning, it was said: 'because even for such present things, they were previously made natural.' 'Of such' means: just as climate, etc., are present, so for such things, because they were made natural still earlier than that, because they were rendered fit for being a natural decisive support.

Kasiṇādīnampi ārammaṇūpanissayatā sambhavatīti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘iminā adhippāyena ‘ekaccāyā’ti āhā’’ti. Tathā hi ‘‘kasiṇamaṇḍalaṃ disvā’’tiādinā tassa upanissayabhāvo aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vutto.

Because object decisive support is also possible for the kasiṇas, etc., it was said: 'With this intention he said, "for some."' For its being a decisive support is stated in the commentary by the words 'having seen the kasiṇa disc,' etc.

Arūpāvacarakusalampi upanissayo hoti, pageva kāmāvacararūpāvacarakusalanti adhippāyo. Taṃ pana yathā upanissayo hoti, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘yasmiṃ kasiṇādimhī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Anuppannajhānuppādaneti rūpāvacarajjhānaṃ sandhāyāha, arūpāvacarajjhāne pana vattabbameva natthi. Taduppādakakusalānanti tassa rūpāvacaravipākassa uppādakakusalānaṃ, rūpāvacarakusalānanti [Pg.254] attho. Paṭisandhiniyāmakassāti rūpāvacarapaṭisandhiniyāmakassa. Cutitoti rūpāvacarapaṭisandhiyā anantarapaccayabhūtāya cutiyā. Purimajavanassa vasenāti cutiyā āsannajavanabhāvena. Rūpāvacarakusalaṃ arūpāvacaravipākassāti etthāpi ‘‘taduppādakakusalāna’’ntiādinā ānetvā yojetabbaṃ. Yathā ca ‘‘rūpāvacarakusalaṃ arūpāvacaravipākassa upanissayo’’ti vuttaṃ, evaṃ ‘‘kāmāvacarakusalampi taduppādakakusalāna’’ntiādinā yojetabbaṃ. Lokuttaravipākassa tebhūmakakusalānampi pādakādivasena upanissayabhāvo pākaṭoyeva, tathā taṃtaṃbhūmakakusalānaṃ taṃtaṃbhūmakakiriyānaṃ, kāmāvacarakusalassa rūpārūpāvacarakiriyānaṃ, rūpāvacarakusalassa arūpāvacarakiriyāya upanissayabhāvoti imamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘evaṃ paccekaṃ…pe… veditabbo’’ti āha. ‘‘Saddhaṃ upanissāya dānaṃ detī’’tiādinā pakatūpanissayo uddesavaseneva pāṭho āgato, na vibhajanavasenāti āha ‘‘pāḷiyampi…pe… vissajjito’’ti. Kusalattikādīsu anulomādibhedabhinnattā pañhāvāresūti bahuvacananiddeso.

The intention is that formless-sphere wholesome consciousness is also a decisive support, how much more so sense-sphere and fine-material-sphere wholesome consciousness. To show how it is a decisive support, it is said: 'in which kasiṇa...,' etc. 'For producing an unarisen jhāna' is said in reference to a fine-material-sphere jhāna; in the case of a formless-sphere jhāna, there is nothing to be said. 'Of the wholesome states that produce it' means of the wholesome states that produce that fine-material-sphere resultant, that is, the fine-material-sphere wholesome states. 'Of what determines rebirth-linking' means of what determines fine-material-sphere rebirth-linking. 'From the death' means from the death that is the proximity condition for fine-material-sphere rebirth-linking. 'By the power of the prior impulsion' means by being the impulsion proximate to death. In the phrase 'fine-material-sphere wholesome for a formless-sphere resultant,' the words 'of the wholesome states that produce it,' etc., should be brought in and connected. And just as it is said, 'fine-material-sphere wholesome is a decisive support for a formless-sphere resultant,' so too 'sense-sphere wholesome also for the wholesome states that produce it,' etc., should be connected. The fact that wholesome states of the three planes are a decisive support for supramundane resultant consciousness by way of being a foundation, etc., is evident. Similarly, to show that the wholesome states of each plane are a decisive support for the functional states of their respective planes, that sense-sphere wholesome is a decisive support for the functional states of the fine-material and formless spheres, and that fine-material-sphere wholesome is a decisive support for the functional states of the formless sphere, he says: 'Thus for each..., it should be understood.' The natural decisive support in 'Relying on faith, one gives a gift,' etc., has come down in the text only by way of enumeration, not by way of analysis; thus he says: 'In the Pāli too... it is answered.' In the wholesome triad, etc., because they are divided by the divisions of conformity, etc., the plural indicates the sections on questions.

Lokuttaranibbattanaṃ upanissāya parassa sinehuppādane lokuttaradhammā upanissayo viya hontīti ayamettha leso, bhāvino pana lokuttarassa akusalānaṃ upanissayatā sambhavatīti āha ‘‘na idaṃ sārato daṭṭhabbanti adhippāyo’’ti. Rūpāvacarādikusalānanti rūpārūpāvacaralokuttarakusalānaṃ uppādiyamānassa rūpāvacarakusalassāti yojanā. Rūpāvacarakiriyassa ca arūpāvacaravipāko upanissayo kathanti āha ‘‘pubbe nivutthādīsu…pe… arahato’’ti. Taṃ taṃ vipākaṃ patthento tassa tassa vipākassa hetubhūtaṃ kusalaṃ nibbattetīti vipākānaṃ kusalūpanissayatāti āha ‘‘catubhūmakā…pe… upanissayo’’ti. Lokiyakusalānaṃ pana lokuttaravipākā upanissayo na hontīti dassento ‘‘yadipī’’tiādimāha. Teneva hi ‘‘tathā tebhūmakavipāko’’ti tebhūmakaggahaṇaṃ kataṃ. Tattha tenāti anāgāminā. Tanti arahattaphalaṃ. Tasmāti adiṭṭhapubbattā. Tāni viyāti sotāpattiphalāni viya. Tesanti puthujjanādīnaṃ. Imassāti anāgāmino. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – yathā puthujjanādīnaṃ santāne jhānādīnaṃ sotāpattiphalādīnaṃ na upanissayapaccayo anupaladdhapubbattā, evaṃ anāgāmino jhānādīnaṃ [Pg.255] aggaphalaṃ upanissayapaccayo adiṭṭhapubbattā. Tenāha ‘‘upaladdhapubbasadisameva hi anāgatampi upanissayo’’ti. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana heṭṭhimaphalānaṃ kusalūpanissayatā vuttā eva.

This is the subtle point here: in the arising of affection for another by relying on the attainment of the supramundane, the supramundane states are like a decisive support. But since it is possible for unwholesome states to be a decisive support for a future supramundane state, he says: 'The intention is that this should not be seen as the essential point.' The construction of 'fine-material-sphere and other wholesome states' is: for the fine-material-sphere wholesome state that is being produced, the fine-material-sphere, formless-sphere, and supramundane wholesome states are a decisive support. And how is a formless-sphere resultant a decisive support for a fine-material-sphere functional state? He says: 'In those previously dwelt in... for an arahant.' Desiring this or that resultant, one generates the wholesome state that is the cause of that resultant; thus, the fact that resultants are a decisive support for wholesome states is stated with the words: 'The four-plane... is a decisive support.' To show that worldly wholesome states are not a decisive support for supramundane resultants, he says: 'Although...,' etc. For that very reason, the taking up of the three planes was done with 'so the three-plane resultant.' Therein, 'by him' means by the non-returner. 'That' means the fruit of arahantship. 'Therefore' means because it has not been seen before. 'Like those' means like the fruits of stream-entry. 'For them' means for worldlings, etc. 'For this one' means for the non-returner. This is what is said: Just as for worldlings, etc., in their continuities, the jhānas, etc., are not a decisive support condition for the fruits of stream-entry, etc., because these have not been experienced before, so for the non-returner, the jhānas, etc., are not a decisive support condition for the highest fruit because it has not been seen before. Therefore he says: 'For only something similar to what has been previously experienced is a decisive support for the future.' In the commentary, however, the decisive support of wholesome states for the lower fruits has indeed been stated.

Yathā vipākā kusalānaṃ, evaṃ kiriyāpi tesaṃ upanissayo hotīti taṃ nayaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘kiriyaṃ atthapaṭisambhidādi’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. Yonisomanasikāre vattabbameva natthīti catubhūmakakusalassapi yonisomanasikāro upanissayo hotīti ettha vattabbameva natthi, tadatthaṃ yonisomanasikāraṃ pavattentassāti attho. Tanti yonisomanasikāraṃ. Akusalassa ca catubhūmakavipākassa upanissayo yonisomanasikāroti yojanā. Evaṃ kiriyassapīti yathā kusalassa yonisomanasikārassa vasena upanissayo vutto, evaṃ kiriyassapi yonisomanasikārassa vasena yojetabbanti attho. So hi taṃ upanissāya rāgādiuppādane akusalassa vuttanayena kusalākusalūpanissayabhāvamukhena catubhūmakavipākassa upanissayo hotiyeva. Yadi kiriyasaṅkhāto…pe… hotiyeva, atha kasmā pakatūpanissayavibhajane kiriyā na gahitā, utubhojanasenāsanāniyeva gahitānīti āha ‘‘nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammesu…pe… nayadassanamattamevā’’ti. Evamādikanti ādi-saddena ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ sahajāto abyākato dhammo uppajjati na upanissayapaccayā’’ti evamādikaṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Upanissayapariyāyo upanisasaddoti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘viññāṇūpanisaṃ nāmarūpaṃ, nāmarūpūpanisañca saḷāyatanantiādikenā’’ti. Ettha hi viññāṇassa nāmarūpānaṃ phassarūpādīnaṃ cakkhāyatanādīnañca upanissayabhāvo vuttoti.

Just as resultants are a decisive support for wholesome states, so too are functional states a decisive support for them. To show this method, it is said: 'Functional, the discrimination of meaning, etc.' Regarding wise attention, there is nothing to be said, for it is a decisive support even for wholesome consciousness of the four planes; thus, there is nothing to be said here. The meaning is: for one who applies wise attention for that purpose. 'That' means wise attention. The connection is: wise attention is a decisive support for unwholesome consciousness and for the resultants of the four planes. Similarly for functional: just as a decisive support by way of wise attention has been stated for the wholesome, so it should be connected by way of wise attention for the functional too. For that wise attention, by being depended upon in the production of lust, etc., becomes a decisive support for the unwholesome; and by way of being a decisive support for wholesome and unwholesome in the manner stated, it is indeed a decisive support for the resultants of the four planes. If what is designated as functional… it is indeed so, then why in the analysis of natural decisive support is functional not included, but only climate, food, and lodging are included? He says: 'In regard to neither-resultant-nor-result-producing dhammas… it is merely an illustration of the method.' And so on: by the word 'etc.' it includes such things as: 'A neutral dhamma arises conascent with a wholesome dhamma, not by decisive support condition.' Because the word upanisa is a synonym for decisive support, it is said: 'Consciousness is the decisive support for name-and-form, and name-and-form is the decisive support for the sixfold sense base,' and so on. For here the state of being a decisive support is stated for consciousness, for name-and-form, for contact, form, etc., and for the eye base, etc.

Upanissayapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the exposition of the decisive support condition is finished.

10. Purejātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

10. Commentary on the Exposition of the Prenascence Condition

10. Dassitameva nayadassanavasenāti yojanā. Yadi dassitameva, kasmā vuttaṃ ‘‘sāvasesavasena desanā katā’’ti āha ‘‘sarūpena adassitattā’’ti. ‘‘Yaṃ yaṃ dhammaṃ purejātaṃ ārabbha ye ye dhammā uppajjanti cittacetasikā [Pg.256] dhammā, te te dhammā tesaṃ tesaṃ dhammānaṃ purejātapaccayena paccayo’’ti evaṃ sarūpena pāḷiyaṃ adassitattā. Iddhividhābhiññāya cāti ca-saddena cutūpapātañāṇassapi saṅgaho daṭṭhabbo. Tassapi hi rūpadhammārammaṇakāle aṭṭhārasasu yaṃ kiñci ārammaṇapurejātaṃ hoti paccuppannārammaṇattā. ‘‘Cavamāne upapajjamāne’’ti hi vuttaṃ. Dibbacakkhudibbasotañāṇesu ca vattabbameva natthi.

10. The connection is: by way of illustrating the method that has already been shown. If it has already been shown, why was it said, 'The teaching was given with something left over'? He says: 'Because it was not shown in its own nature.' Because it was not shown in the Pāli in its own nature thus: 'Whatever prenascent dhamma taking which as object whatever dhammas—mind and mental factors—arise, those dhammas are a condition for those dhammas by way of prenascence condition.' And by the knowledge of the kinds of supernormal power: by the word 'and,' the inclusion of the knowledge of the passing away and rebirth of beings should be seen. For in its case too, at the time when a material dhamma is the object, any one of the eighteen becomes an object-prenascence condition because its object is present. For it is said: 'When passing away, when being reborn.' And in the case of the divine eye and divine ear knowledges, there is nothing to be said.

Itarassapi abhāvāti ārammaṇapurejātassapi abhāvā aggahaṇaṃ paṭisandhibhāvinoti yojanā. Satipi kassaci paṭisandhibhāvino ārammaṇapurejāte vibhūtaṃ pana katvā ārammaṇakaraṇābhāvato avijjamānasadisanti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘itarassapi abhāvā’’ti. Tenevāha ‘‘paṭisandhiyā viya aparibyattassa ārammaṇassa ārammaṇamattabhāvato’’ti. Santīraṇabhāvino manoviññāṇadhātuyāpi ekanteneva purejātapaccayo rūpādīni pañcārammaṇānīti yojanā. Ettha ca ‘‘manodhātūnañcā’’tiādi ‘‘tadārammaṇabhāvino’’ti padassa purato vattabbo, uppaṭipāṭiyā likhitaṃ.

Because of the absence of the other as well: the connection is that because of the absence of object-prenascence as well, there is no taking of it for what has the nature of rebirth-linking. Although for some with the nature of rebirth-linking there is object-prenascence, since it is not made clear and there is an absence of taking it as object, it is like non-existent; thus it is said, 'because of the absence of the other as well.' For that reason he said: 'because the object, being unclear as at rebirth-linking, is merely an object.' The connection is: for the mind-consciousness-element that has the nature of investigating, too, the five sense objects—visible form, etc.—are exclusively the prenascence condition. And here, 'and for the mind-elements,' etc., should be placed before the phrase 'for that which has the nature of being that object,' but it was written out of order.

Purejātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the exposition of the prenascence condition is finished.

11. Pacchājātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

11. Commentary on the Exposition of the Postnascence Condition

11. Niravasesadassitapurejātadassanavasenāti ‘‘catusamuṭṭhānikatisamuṭṭhānikarūpakāyassā’’ti evaṃ niravasesato dassitassa purejātassa paccayuppannassa dassanavasena. Paccayā hi idha kāmāvacararūpāvacaravipākā, tesu kāmāvacaravipāko ca catusamuṭṭhānikarūpakāyassa paccayo, na itaro. Tenevāha ‘‘rūpāvacaravipāko pana āhārasamuṭṭhānassa na hotī’’ti, tasmā ‘‘tassevā’’ti vuttepi yathārahamattho veditabbo.

11. 'By way of seeing the prenascent shown without remainder' means by way of seeing the conditionally arisen prenascent that was shown without remainder thus: 'of the material body originated from four sources and three sources.' For here the conditions are the sense-sphere and fine-material-sphere resultants. Among them, the sense-sphere resultant is a condition for the material body originated from four sources, but the other is not. For that reason he said: 'But the fine-material-sphere resultant is not for that originated from nutriment.' Therefore, even when it is said 'of that very one,' the meaning should be understood as is appropriate.

Pacchājātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the exposition of the postnascence condition is finished.

12. Āsevanapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

12. Commentary on the Exposition of the Repetition Condition

12. Pakārehi [Pg.257] guṇitaṃ paguṇaṃ, bahukkhattuṃ pavattiyā bhāvitanti attho. Atisayena paguṇaṃ paguṇataraṃ, tatoyeva balavataraṃ. Tassa bhāvo, tena paguṇatarabalavatarabhāvena visiṭṭhaṃ visesappattaṃ. Svāyaṃ viseso vipāke natthīti āha ‘‘etena vipākābyākatato visesetī’’ti.

12. Strengthened by modes is 'proficient'; the meaning is 'developed by frequent occurrence.' Exceedingly proficient is 'more proficient'; for that very reason, 'stronger.' Its state is 'distinguished'; it has attained distinction through that state of being more proficient and stronger. Because this distinction is not in the resultant, he says: 'By this it is distinguished from the resultant and the indeterminate.'

Āsevanapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the exposition of the repetition condition is finished.

13. Kammapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

13. Commentary on the Exposition of the Kamma-Condition

13. Evaṃsabhāvāti kammapaccayena upakārakasabhāvā. Samatthatāti ānubhāvo. Tassāti vipākakkhandhakaṭattārūpasaṅkhātassa phalassa. Kammapaccayabhāvo vuttoti kammapaccayena paccayabhāvo vutto. Ekavokāre rūpampīti ekavokārepi rūpaṃ na janeti, pageva catuvokāreti attho.

13. “Such is its nature” means it has the nature of being an assister by means of the kamma-condition. “Capability” means power. “Of that” refers to the fruit, designated as the resultant aggregates and kamma-born materiality. “The state of being a kamma-condition is stated” means its state of being a condition by means of the kamma-condition is stated. “In the one-constituent existence, materiality too…” means that it does not generate materiality even in the one-constituent existence, still less in the four-constituent existence; this is the meaning.

Kammapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Kamma-Condition is finished.

14. Vipākapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

14. Commentary on the Exposition of the Resultant-Condition

14. Yathā hi rūpabhave saññīnaṃ taṃnibbattitapuññābhisaṅkhāreneva rūpuppatti, evaṃ asaññīnampīti tattha kāmāvacarakammunā yathā vipākānurūpānaṃ paccayo honto kesañciyeva hoti, na sabbesaṃ, katthaciyeva hoti, na sabbattha, na evaṃ vipākānanti āha ‘‘ekantenā’’ti. Tesaṃ vasenāti tesaṃ vipākapaccayalābhīnaṃ vipākakkhandhānaṃ vasena. Na hītiādinā ‘‘ekantenā’’ti vuttamatthaṃ byatirekato vibhāveti. Bhūmidvayavipākoti kāmāvacararūpāvacaravipāko āruppe rūpassa na hi paccayoti yojanā.

14. Just as in the form existence for beings with perception the arising of form occurs by means of the meritorious formations that produced it, and so too for non-percipient beings, so there, kamma of the sense-sphere, being a condition for what is in conformity with its result, is a condition for only some beings, not for all, and in only some places, not everywhere. But it is not so for resultants. Hence, he says 'exclusively.' 'By their power' means by the power of the resultant aggregates of those who obtain the resultant-condition. By means of 'Not indeed,' etc., he clarifies the meaning of what was said as 'exclusively' by way of contrast. 'The resultant of the two planes'—that is, the resultant of the sense-sphere and the form-sphere—is indeed not a condition for materiality in the formless realm; this is the connection.

Vipākapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Resultant-Condition is finished.

15. Āhārapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

15. Commentary on the Exposition of the Nutriment-Condition

15. Kevalāya [Pg.258] ojāya ajjhoharaṇassa abhāvā ‘‘asitapītādivatthūhi saha ajjhoharitovā’’ti vuttaṃ. Khādanīyabhojanīyappabhede asite tāva kabaḷīkāratā hotu, pātabbādike pana kathanti āha ‘‘pātabba…pe… hontī’’ti. Yebhuyyavasena vā evaṃ vuttanti veditabbaṃ.

15. Because of the absence of consuming mere nutritive essence, it is said: “or as consumed together with things such as what is eaten and drunk.” In the case of what is eaten, which is a subdivision of what is to be chewed and what is to be eaten, let there be the nature of being nutriment in morsels; but how is it in the case of drinkables and the like? He says: “Drinkable…(etc.)…they are.” Or it should be understood that this is said by way of generalization.

Anupālakoti upatthambhako. Cittasamuṭṭhānassa kāyassa āhārapaccayabhāvo kabaḷīkārāhārassa vicāretvā gahetabbo. Kasmāti ce? Ettha kāraṇamāha ‘‘na hī’’tiādinā. Sati hi paccayabhāve ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhāno kabaḷīkārāhāro cittasamuṭṭhānassa kāyassa āhārapaccayena paccayo’’tiādi vattabbaṃ siyā, na pana vuttaṃ, nocittasamuṭṭhānassa pana vuttaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘tividhopi…pe… vutto’’ti.

“Sustainer” means supporter. The state of physical nutriment as a nutriment-condition for the body arisen from consciousness should be investigated and understood. If it is asked, “Why?” Here he states the reason by means of “For not…” etc. For if the state of being a condition existed, it should have been said: “Physical nutriment arisen from consciousness is a condition by way of nutriment-condition for the body arisen from consciousness,” etc. But this was not said; rather, it was said for that not arisen from consciousness. Therefore he said: “All three kinds… (etc.)… are stated.”

Āhārapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Nutriment-Condition is finished.

16. Indriyapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

16. Commentary on the Exposition of the Faculty-Condition

16. ‘‘Missakattā’’ti idaṃ indriyatāya rūpārūpajīvitindriyānaṃ ekajjhaṃ katvā desitataṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, tasmā missakattāti rūpajīvitindriyamissakattāti attho. Jīvitindriyanti arūpajīvitindriyaṃ. Na sabbena sabbaṃ vajjitabbanti yathā pañhāpucchake arūpajīvitindriyaṃ missakattā na gahitaṃ, na evamidha arūpajīvitindriyaṃ aggahitanti attho.

16. “Because of being mixed”: this is said with reference to the teaching where the material and immaterial life faculties are taught having been combined together under the term “faculty.” Therefore, “because of being mixed” means because of being mixed with the material life faculty. “Life faculty” means the immaterial life faculty. “Not everything is to be excluded by everything” means that just as in the posing of the question the immaterial life faculty was not included because of being mixed, it is not the case here that the immaterial life faculty is not included; this is the meaning.

Arūpānaṃ cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ paccayantarāpekkhāni āvajjanārammaṇādiaññapaccayasāpekkhāni indriyapaccayā siyuṃ cakkhādīnaṃ rūpārūpānaṃ aññamaññaṃ kadācipi avinibbhuttabhāvassa abhāvato, paccayantarasamodhānāpekkhatāya ca. Yo pana nirapekkhoti yathā cakkhādīni paccayantaresu sāpekkhāni, evaṃ sāpekkho ahutvā yo tattha nirapekkho indriyapaccayo hoti avinibbhuttadhammānaṃ yathā duvidhampi jīvitindriyaṃ, so attano…pe… natthīti yojanā. Avinibbhuttānaṃ tesampi liṅgādīnaṃ siyuṃ vinibbhuttānaṃ paccayuppannānaṃ indriyapaccayatābhāvassa adiṭṭhattā. Nanu cakkhādīnaṃ vinibbhuttānaṃ [Pg.259] indriyapaccayabhāvo diṭṭhoti? Saccaṃ diṭṭho, na pana so samānajātiyāti dassento ‘‘na hī’’tiādimāha. Sati cevanti evaṃ vuttappakāre samānajātiyaṃyeva avinibbhuttassa indriyapaccayabhāve sati itthipurisindriyehi saddhiṃ. Sahayoge hi idaṃ karaṇavacanaṃ. Yadipi itthipurisindriyāni liṅgādīnaṃ kalalādikāle indriyapaccayataṃ na phareyyuṃ tesaṃ tadā abhāvato. Ye pana rūpadhammā tadā santi, tehi avinibbhuttāva, tesaṃ kasmā na pharantīti āha ‘‘aññesaṃ panā’’tiādi. Abījabhāvato animittabhāvato. Tadanurūpānanti kalalādiavatthānurūpānaṃ atthitaṃ icchanti, yato ‘‘itthī, puriso’’ti pakativibhāgo viññāyatīti tesaṃ adhippāyo.

The faculty-conditions for immaterial states such as eye-consciousness, etc., might be the eye faculty, etc., which are material and immaterial phenomena. These faculty-conditions are dependent on other conditions such as adverting and object. This is because of the absence of an inseparable state between the material and immaterial phenomena at any time, and because of the dependence on the conjunction of other conditions. But as to that which is independent: just as the eye, etc., are dependent on other conditions, that faculty-condition which is not dependent in that way but is independent for inseparable phenomena—like the twofold life faculty—that… (etc.)… does not exist; this is the connection. They might be conditions for those inseparable phenomena such as the sexual characteristics, etc., because the state of being a faculty-condition has not been seen for separable, conditionally arisen phenomena. But is it not seen that there is a state of faculty-condition for separable phenomena like the eye, etc.? True, it is seen, but showing that it is not of the same kind, he says “For not…” etc. When it exists—that is, in the stated manner, when there is an inseparable faculty-condition only of the same kind—along with the femininity and masculinity faculties. For this is the instrumental case in the sense of accompaniment. Although the femininity and masculinity faculties would not extend their faculty-conditionality to the sexual characteristics, etc., at the time of the embryo, because of their absence at that time, yet those material phenomena that exist then are inseparable from them. Why do they not extend their conditionality to them? He says, “But for others…” etc. Because of the absence of a seed, the absence of a sign. “Those that are suitable” means they wish for the existence of what is suitable for the stages of the embryo, etc., since the natural distinction “female, male” is discerned; this is their intention.

Kusalajātiyanti niddhāraṇe bhummaṃ. Ye pana ‘‘kusalajātika’’nti paṭhanti, tesaṃ paccattekavacanaṃ. Visuṃ ekajāti vā bhūmi vā na hoti tadekadesabhāvato. Hetuādīsupīti ādi-saddena ‘‘akusalāhāresupi eseva nayo’’ti evamādikaṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Esa nayoti yvāyaṃ ‘‘bhūmivasena vuttesū’’tiādinā arūpe alabbhamānassa indriyapaccayassa aṭṭhapane atthanayo vutto, esa nayo yojetabboti. Tathā apariyāpannakusalahetu, tathā akusalahetūti etthāpi paṭhamāpariyāpannakusalahetu domanassasahagatākusalahetu ca visuṃ ekajāti bhūmi vā na hontīti āruppe alabbhamānāpi visuṃ na ṭhapitāti yojetabbo. Esa nayo ‘‘akusalāhāresupi eseva nayo’’ti evamādīsu.

“Kusalajātiyaṃ” is the locative case in the sense of specification. But for those who read “kusalajātika,” it is the singular. Separately, it is not a single kind or plane, because it is a part of that. In “in the case of roots, etc.,” the word “etc.” includes such things as “this same method applies also to unwholesome nutriments.” “This is the method” means: the method of explanation stated by way of “in what was said by way of planes,” etc., regarding the non-establishment of the faculty-condition which is unobtainable in the formless realm—this method is to be applied. Similarly, with regard to “the wholesome root not included (in the paths and fruits), and the unwholesome root”: here too, the first wholesome root not included and the unwholesome root associated with displeasure do not exist as a separate single kind or plane, so although they are unobtainable in the formless realm, they are not established separately; this should be connected. This method applies in cases like “this same method applies also to unwholesome nutriments,” etc.

Sati sahajātapaccayatte uppādakkhaṇepi indriyapaccayatā siyāti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘sahajātapaccayattābhāvaṃ sandhāyā’’ti. Vuttañhi ‘‘uppajjamāno saha uppajjamānabhāvena upakārako dhammo sahajātapaccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. aṭṭha. paccayuddesavaṇṇanā). Tassa pana sahajātapaccayattābhāvo yadipi aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘sahajātapaccayatā pana tassa natthī’’ti sarūpeneva dassito, tathāpi taṃ ananujānanto ‘‘uppāda…pe… nivāretu’’nti vatvā ‘‘vakkhatī’’tiādinā tamatthaṃ samattheti. Kammapaccayasadisanti hi etena tassa uppādakkhaṇe paccayabhāvo pakāsito. Pavattecāti ca-saddena paṭisandhiyañca kaṭattārūpassa rūpajīvitindriyato añño indriyapaccayo na hi atthīti yojanā. Paṭiccavārādayo [Pg.260] sampayuttavārapariyosānā cha vārā uppādakkhaṇameva gahetvā pavattā ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjati hetupaccayā’’tiādinā, na ṭhitikkhaṇanti adhippāyo. Evañca katvāti uppādakkhaṇameva gahetvā pavattattā. Etesūti yathāvuttesu chasu vāresu. Keci pana ‘‘rūpajīvitindriyassa anupālanaṃ uppādakkhaṇe na pākaṭaṃ balavañca yathā ṭhitikkhaṇe pacchājātādipaccayalābhato thirabhāvappattiyāssa taṃ pākaṭaṃ balavañca, tasmā ‘ṭhitikkhaṇe’ti vutta’’nti vadanti.

It was said, “with reference to the absence of the state of conascence-condition,” on the reasoning that if there were a conascence-condition, there might be faculty-conditionality even at the moment of arising. For it is said: “A phenomenon that assists by its state of arising together with another is a conascence-condition.” However, although the absence of a state of conascence-condition for it is shown in the commentary simply as “but there is no conascence-conditionality for it,” still, not accepting that, after saying “to prevent arising… etc.,” he supports that meaning by “he will say,” etc. For by this, its state of being a condition at the moment of arising is revealed as being similar to the kamma-condition. And in “during the course of existence,” by the word “and,” it is connected that at rebirth-linking too, for kamma-born materiality there is indeed no other faculty-condition than the material life faculty. The six cycles, beginning with the Dependent Origination Cycle and ending with the Associated Cycle, proceed by taking only the moment of arising, as in “Dependent on a wholesome state, a wholesome state arises by way of root-condition,” etc., not the moment of presence; this is the intention. “And having done so” means because it proceeds by taking only the moment of arising. “Among these” means among the six cycles as stated. But some say: “The sustenance of the material life faculty is not manifest and strong at the moment of arising as it is at the moment of presence. Since it becomes manifest and strong at the moment of presence by obtaining postnascence condition, etc., and attaining a stable state, therefore ‘at the moment of presence’ was said.”

Indriyapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Faculty-Condition is finished.

17. Jhānapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

17. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Jhāna-Condition

17. Somanassadomanassasaṅkhātānīti somanassadomanassapariyāyena vuttāni, jhānaṅgabhāvavisesanato vā somanassadomanassabhūtāneva sukhadukkhāni jhānaṅgāni, na itarasukhadukkhānīti jhānaṅgabhūtānaṃyeva sukhadukkhānaṃ jhānaṅgabhāvadassanatthaṃ somanassadomanassaggahaṇaṃ kataṃ. Idāni yathāvuttameva ‘‘dvipañcaviññāṇesū’’tiādinā vitthārato vibhāveti, taṃ suviññeyyameva. Tenāti visesanabhūtena somanassadomanassaggahaṇena.

17. “Designated as joy and displeasure” means stated by way of the terms 'joy' and 'displeasure'. Or, due to their specific characteristic of being factors of absorption, the pleasure and pain that are themselves joy and displeasure are factors of absorption, not other pleasure and pain. The inclusion of 'joy' and 'displeasure' is done to show that only the pleasure and pain that are factors of absorption have the nature of a factor of absorption. Now, as stated, this is explained in detail by the passage beginning with “in the two sets of fivefold consciousness,” etc.; that is quite easily understood. “By that” means by the distinguishing inclusion of 'joy' and 'displeasure'.

Abhinipātamattattāti ārammaṇakaraṇamattabhāvato. Cintanāpavattiyā upanijjhāyanapavattiyā. Yathāvutteneva kāraṇenāti ‘‘upanijjhānākārassa abhāvato’’ti etena kāraṇena. Pubbetiādito. Cattāri aṅgāni vajjitānīti sattasu aṅgesu dassiyamānesu cattāri aṅgāni vajjitāni. Aṭṭhakathā hesāti lesena apakāsetabbatāya kāraṇamāha. Tīsupi ekameva vattabbaṃ siyā, taṃsamānalakkhaṇatāya itaresaṃ tiṇṇampi gahaṇaṃ hotīti. Tiṇṇaṃ pana vacanenāti upekkhāsukhadukkhānaṃ ajhānaṅgatādassanatthena vacanena. Tato upekkhādito aññassa dhammassa cittekaggatāya jhānaṅganti uddhaṭabhāvo āpajjati ajhānaṅgesu aggahitattā. Yathāvuttakāraṇatoti ‘‘upanijjhānākārassa abhāvato’’ti vuttakāraṇato aññena kāraṇena anuddhaṭabhāvo vā āpajjati anupanijjhāyanasabhāvehi saddhiṃ aggahitattā upanijjhāyanākārabhāvato aññeneva kāraṇena cittekaggatāya [Pg.261] pāḷiyaṃ anuddhaṭabhāvo āpajjati. Taṃdosapariharaṇatthanti yathāvuttadosavinimocanatthaṃ.

“Abhinipātamattattā” means merely due to the nature of taking an object. By the occurrence of thinking and the occurrence of sustained contemplation. “By the reason stated” means by the reason “due to the absence of the mode of sustained contemplation.” From “previously” and so forth. “Four factors are excluded” means that when the seven factors are shown, four factors are excluded. “For it is the commentary”—this states the reason for needing to be subtly revealed. In all three, only one should be stated, for due to their similar characteristic, the other three are also included. But “by the mention of the three” means by the statement showing the non-jhāna-factor nature of equanimity, pleasure, and pain. Then, if unification of mind, a phenomenon other than equanimity and so forth, were to be a factor of absorption, it would amount to an extraction, since it is not grasped among the non-factors of absorption. As for “by the reason stated,” it amounts to a non-extraction by a reason other than the stated reason “due to the absence of the mode of sustained contemplation,” or because it is not grasped along with the natures of non-sustained contemplation, or because unification of mind is not extracted in the Pāli due to a reason other than the nature of sustained contemplation. “To avoid that fault” means to be free from the fault stated.

Ye panātiādi padakāramattadassanaṃ. Somanassādīhīti somanassadomanassajhānaṅgupekkhāhi. Avibhūtabhāvo upekkhanaṃ. Upekkhā hi avibhūtakiccā vuttā. Samānānaṃ kesaṃ? Sukhādīnaṃ, kehi? Somanassādīhi, kathaṃ? Sukha…pe… yuttatāti yojanā. Na cittekaggatāyāti sukhādīhi, tadaññehi abhiniropanādīhi ca anindriyakiccatāya ca anupanijjhāyanakiccatāya ca asamānatāya pañcaviññāṇesu cittekaggatāya jhānaṅganti anuddhaṭabhāve kāraṇaṃ na vattabbanti. Sāti cittekaggatā. Etthāti ‘‘upekkhāsukhadukkhānī’’ti etasmiṃ aṭṭhakathāvacane na gahitā. Vicikicchāyuttamanodhātuādīsūti vicikicchāsampayuttacitte manodhātuyā sampaṭicchanādīsu ca. Tassāpi cittekaggatāyapi.

“Ye pana” and so forth is merely a showing of the wording. “By joy and so forth” means by joy, displeasure, and equanimity as factors of absorption. Non-manifestation is equanimity. For equanimity is said to have an unmanifest function. “Similar to what?” To pleasure and so on. “By what?” By joy and so on. “How?” The construction is “connected...etc. with pleasure.” “Not due to unification of mind” means that a reason should not be stated for unification of mind not being extracted as a factor of absorption in the five sense-consciousnesses, because it is dissimilar to pleasure and so on, and to other factors such as initial application, and because it does not function as a faculty, and because it does not function as sustained contemplation. That is unification of mind. “Here” means that in this commentary passage, “equanimity, pleasure, and pain,” these are not included. “In the mind-element associated with doubt and so forth” means in consciousness associated with doubt, in the mind-element, in receiving consciousness, and so on. Even in that, unification of mind is present.

Jhānapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Jhāna-Condition is finished.

18. Maggapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

18. Commentary on the Exposition of the Path Condition.

18. Duvidhampi saṅkappanti sammāsaṅkappo micchāsaṅkappoti ca evaṃ anavajjasāvajjabhedena duvidhampi. Vīriyaṃ samādhinti etthāpi eseva nayo. Saṅgaṇhitvā vitakkādibhāvasāmaññena saha gahetvā, ekekameva katvā gahetvāti attho. Tehi micchāvācākammantājīvehi. Idhāti imasmiṃ maggapaccayaniddese labbhamānāni ca maggapaccayabhāvato, ca-saddena alabbhamānāni ca maggapaccayattābhāvā. Yadi evaṃ kasmā vuttānīti āha ‘‘maggaṅgavacanasāmaññenā’’ti. Evaṃ pariyāyaniddeso idha kimatthiyoti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘evañhi suttavohāropi dassito hotī’’ti. Evaṃ pana dassentenāti paramatthato amaggaṅgānipi sutte maggaṅgavohārasiddhiyā idha maggaṅgehi saha dassentena. Uddharitvāti paduddhāraṃ katvā. Idāni micchāvācādīhi saddhiṃ dvādasaṅgāni na dassetabbāni, kasmāti ceti āha ‘‘na hi pāḷiyaṃ…pe… vattabbo’’ti. Tappaṭipakkhabhāvatoyeva micchāmaggaṅgāni, na micchādiṭṭhiādayo viya sabhāvatoti adhippāyo.

18. Intention is twofold: right intention and wrong intention; thus, it is twofold by way of the distinction between blameless and blameworthy. For energy and concentration, the same method applies here too. 'Having included them' means having taken them together by the common nature of being initial application and so on; the meaning is having taken them one by one. 'By those' means by wrong speech, wrong action, and wrong livelihood. 'Here' means in this exposition of the path condition, both those that are obtainable, due to their being a path condition, and, by the word 'ca' (and), those that are unobtainable, due to their not being a path condition. If so, why are they mentioned? He says, 'Due to the common usage of the term 'path factor'.' Referring to the question, 'What is the purpose here of this exposition by way of method?', he says, 'For in this way, the usage of the Sutta is also shown'. 'But by showing it thus' means by showing here, together with the path factors, even those which, in the ultimate sense, are not path factors, for the sake of establishing the usage of 'path factor' in the Sutta. 'Having extracted' means having extracted the term. Now, as to why the twelve factors should not be shown together with wrong speech and so on, he says, 'For in the Pāli... it should not be established'. The meaning is that they are wrong path factors only due to their being opposites of the right path factors, not due to their own inherent nature like wrong view and so on.

Pariyāyanippariyāyamaggaṅgadassanatthepi atthavacane evaṃ na vattabbamevāti dassento ‘‘pariyāya…pe… adhikaraṇānī’’ti āha. Tassattho – yathā [Pg.262] ‘‘aññabhāgiyassa adhikaraṇassā’’ti ettha pāḷigataadhikaraṇasaddapatirūpako añño adhikaraṇasaddo pāḷigatatadaññasādhāraṇatāya ubhayapadattho uddhaṭo ‘‘adhikaraṇaṃ nāma cattāri adhikaraṇānī’’ti, evamidhāpi nippariyāyaṃ itarañca maggaṅgaṃ dassetukāmena pāḷigatatadaññasādhāraṇo maggaṅgasaddo uddharitabbo siyā, tathā na katanti. Tasmāti yasmā pāḷigatoyeva maggaṅgasaddo uddhaṭo, na tadaññasādhāraṇo, na ca atthuddhāramukhena adhippetattho niyamito, tasmā. Tesūti ahetukacittuppādesu. ‘‘Sammādiṭṭhi…pe… samādhayo’’ti ettha saṅkappavāyāmasamādhayo sammāmicchāsaddehi visesetvā vuttāti āha ‘‘sammādiṭṭhiādayo yathāvuttā santī’’ti. Saṅkappavāyāmasamādhippattā pana tattha keci santiyevāti. Atha vā sammādiṭṭhiādayoti vuttappakāre sammādiṭṭhiādike anavasese sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘yathāvuttā’’ti. Uppattiṭṭhānaniyamanatthattā na visesanatthattāti adhippāyo.

To show that even for the purpose of showing the path factors figuratively and literally, it should not be stated thus in the explanation of the meaning, he says, 'Figurative... grounds'. Its meaning is: just as in the phrase 'for a matter of another party,' another term 'ground,' a counterpart to the Pāli term 'adhikaraṇa,' is extracted as having a meaning common to both the Pāli term and the other, with the words 'a ground means the four grounds'; so here too, by one wishing to show the literal and the other (figurative) path factor, a term 'path factor' common to the Pāli term and the other should have been extracted, but this was not done. 'Therefore' means: because only the term 'path factor' found in the Pāli was extracted, not one common to another, and the intended meaning was not specified by means of extracting the meaning, therefore. 'Among them' means in rootless consciousness-arisings. Regarding the passage 'Right view... concentrations,' because intention, effort, and concentration are stated as distinguished by the words 'right' and 'wrong,' he says, 'Right view and so on exist as stated'. But some intention, effort, and concentration are indeed attained there. Alternatively, 'right view and so on' is said referring to all of the aforementioned types of right view and so on, without remainder. Hence he says, 'as stated'. The meaning is that the purpose is to specify the place of arising, not to make a distinction.

Maggapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Path Condition is concluded.

20. Vippayuttapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

20. Commentary on the Exposition of the Dissociation Condition

20. Sampayogāsaṅkāvatthubhūtoti sampayogāsaṅkāya adhiṭṭhānabhūto. Tenāha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘arūpino hi khandhā cakkhādīnaṃ vatthūnaṃ abbhantarato nikkhamantā viya uppajjantī’’ti.

20. `Sampayogāsaṅkāvatthubhūto` means being the basis for the apprehension of association. Therefore, the commentary states: 'For the formless aggregates arise as if emerging from within the bases of the eye, etc.'

Vippayuttapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Dissociation Condition is concluded.

21. Atthipaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

21. Commentary on the Exposition of the Presence Condition

21. Yasmiṃ sati yaṃ hoti, asati ca na hoti, so tassa paccayoti yadidaṃ samāsato paccayalakkhaṇaṃ yaṃ sandhāya sutte vuttaṃ ‘‘imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hoti, imasmiṃ asati idaṃ na hotī’’ti, tayidaṃ atthipaccaye yojetvā dassento ‘‘yo hī’’tiādiṃ vatvā ayañca nayo nibbāne na labbhati, tasmā nibbānaṃ atthipaccayabhāvena na uddhaṭanti dassetuṃ ‘‘nibbānañca…pe… upakārakaṃ hotī’’ti āha. Tena paccayadhammānaṃ [Pg.263] paccayabhāvo visesato byatirekamukhena pākaṭo hotīti dasseti. Natthibhāvopakārakatāviruddhoti natthipaccayabhāvaviruddho. Vigatāvigatapaccayā viya hi aññamaññaṃ ujupaccanīkabhāvena ṭhitā natthiatthipaccayā. Na nibbānaṃ atthipaccayo natthibhāvopakārakatāavirodhato. Ye hi atthipaccayadhammā, te natthibhāvopakārakatāviruddhā eva diṭṭhāti adhippāyo.

21. 'That which being present, something else is, and being absent, is not, is the condition for that thing'—this, in brief, is the characteristic of a condition. Referring to this, it is said in the sutta: 'When this exists, this is; when this is absent, this is not.' Applying this to the presence condition, he shows it by saying, 'For when...' and so on. But this method is not found in regard to Nibbāna; therefore, to show that Nibbāna is not included by way of the presence condition, he says, 'Nibbāna...is helpful.' Thus, he shows that the nature of a condition among conditioning phenomena becomes especially clear by way of exclusion. 'Contrary to being helpful to the state of absence' means contrary to the state of an absence condition. For like the disappearance and non-disappearance conditions, the absence and presence conditions stand in direct opposition to each other. Nibbāna is not a presence condition because of its non-opposition to being helpful to the state of absence. For those phenomena that are presence conditions are indeed seen as contrary to being helpful to the state of absence—this is the intention.

Sati ca uppannatteti sambandho. Yesaṃ paccayā honti āhārindriyāti yojanā. Ekatoti saha. Sahajātādipaccayattābhāvatoti sahajātapurejātapacchājātapaccayattābhāvato. Tadabhāvoti sahajātādipaccayattābhāvo. Etesanti atthipaccayatāvasena pavattamānānaṃ āhārindriyānaṃ. Dhammasabhāvavasenāti dhammatāvasena. Dhammatā hesā, yadidaṃ paccayuppannehi saha puretaraṃ pacchā ca labbhamānā āhārindriyā tesaṃ atthipaccayā honti, na sahajātādipaccayāti. Yathā vā cakkhādidvārānaṃ rūpādiārammaṇānaṃ satipi niyatavuttitāya dvārārammaṇato viññāṇassa chabbidhabhāve ārammaṇamanāmasitvā, dvārato dvāramanāmasitvā ārammaṇato chabbidhatā vuccati, evamidhāpi āhārindriyānaṃ paccayuppannehi satipi sahajātādibhāve arūpakkhandhādivasena sahajātādibhedabhinnassa atthipaccayassa dassitattā pañhāvāre āhārindriyānaṃ vasena āgate catutthapañcamakoṭṭhāsabhūte atthipaccayavisese sahajātādibhedaṃ āmasituṃ na labbhatīti dassetuṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘āhāro indriyañca sahajātādibhedaṃ na labhatī’’ti vuttaṃ, na pana āhārindriyesu sahajātādibhāvassa abhāvato. Evampettha attho daṭṭhabbo.

The connection is 'because of having arisen while being present.' The construction is: 'The nutriment-faculties are conditions for them.' `Ekato` means `saha` (together). 'Because of the absence of the state of being a conascence, etc., condition' means because of the absence of the state of being a conascence, prenascence, or postnascence condition. 'That absence' is the absence of the state of being a conascence, etc., condition. 'Of these' means of the nutriment-faculties that are proceeding by way of the presence condition. 'By way of the nature of phenomena' means by way of natural law. For this is the natural law: the nutriment-faculties, which are obtainable before, together with, and after the conditioned effects, are a presence condition for them, not a conascence, etc., condition. Or, just as in the case of the eye-door, etc., and objects such as form, etc., although there is a fixed function, when consciousness is sixfold based on door and object, its sixfold nature is spoken of based on the door without considering the object, or based on the object without considering the door. So too here, although the nutriment-faculties have a state of conascence, etc., with the conditioned effects, because the presence condition, which is divided into conascence, etc., by way of the formless aggregates, etc., has been shown, in order to show that in the question section, in the specific presence condition that comes by way of the nutriment-faculties in the fourth and fifth sections, it is not possible to touch upon the division of conascence, etc., it is said in the commentary: 'Nutriment and faculty do not obtain the division of conascence, etc.' This is not, however, because of an absence of the state of conascence, etc., in the nutriment-faculties. Thus the meaning should be understood here.

Atthipaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Presence Condition is concluded.

22-23-24. Natthivigataavigatapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

22-23-24. Commentary on the Exposition of the Absence, Disappearance, and Non-disappearance Conditions

22-23. Etthāti natthipaccaye. Nānanti nānattaṃ. Etenāti anantarapaccayato natthipaccayassa visesamattadīpanena ‘‘paccayalakkhaṇameva hettha nāna’’nti iminā vacanena. Atthoti dhammo. Byañjanasaṅgahiteti ‘‘natthipaccayo [Pg.264] vigatapaccayo’’ti evamādibyañjanena saṅgahite. Paccayalakkhaṇamatteti ettha pavattiokāsadānena upakārakā arūpadhammā, vigatabhāvena upakārakāti evamādike paccayānaṃ lakkhaṇamatte.

`Ettha` means in the absence condition. `Nānaṃ` means diversity. `Etena` means by this statement, 'Here, only the characteristic of the condition is diverse,' which indicates the mere distinction of the absence condition from the contiguity condition. `Attho` means dhamma. `Byañjanasaṅgahite` means included by such phrasing as 'absence condition, disappearance condition.' `Paccayalakkhaṇamatte` means in the mere characteristics of the conditions, such as: 'here formless dhammas are helpful by giving an opportunity for occurrence,' and 'helpful by the state of disappearance,' and so on.

Natthivigataavigatapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Absence, Disappearance, and Non-disappearance Conditions is concluded.

Paccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of Conditions is concluded.

Paccayaniddesapakiṇṇakavinicchayakathāvaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Discourse on Miscellaneous Determinations of the Exposition of Conditions.

Ādimapāṭhoti purimapāṭho. Tathā ca satīti dosassapi sattarasahi paccayehi paccayabhāve sati. Adhipatipaccayabhāvopissa anuññāto hotīti āha ‘‘dosassapi garukaraṇaṃ pāḷiyaṃ vattabbaṃ siyā’’ti. ‘‘Sesāna’’nti vacaneneva nivāritoti kadāci āsaṅkeyyāti taṃnivattanatthamāha ‘‘na ca sesāna’’ntiādi. Purejātādīhīti purejātakammāhārajhānindriyamaggavipākapaccayehi. Tannivāraṇatthanti tassa yathāvuttadosassa nivāraṇatthaṃ. Visuñca aggahetvāti lobhamohā vipākapaccayāpi na honti, tathā dosoti evaṃ visuñca aggahetvā. Phoṭṭhabbāyatanaṃ kāyaviññāṇadhātuyā ārammaṇādipaccayo hontaṃyeva pathavīādisabhāvattā attanā sahajātānaṃ sahajātādipaccayā hontiyevāti vuttaṃ ‘‘phoṭṭhabbāyatanassa sahajātādipaccayabhāvaṃ dassetī’’ti. ‘‘Sabbadhammāna’’nti ‘‘sabbe dhammā manoviññāṇadhātuyā taṃsampayuttakānañca dhammānaṃ ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti ettha vutte sabbadhamme sandhāyāha ‘‘sabbadhammānaṃ yathāyogaṃ hetādipaccayabhāvaṃ dassetī’’ti. Na hi etaṃ…pe… bhāvadassanaṃ, atha kho ekadhammassa anekapaccayabhāvadassanaṃ, tasmā ‘‘etena phoṭṭhabbāyatanassā’’tiādi vuttanti adhippāyo. Rūpādīnanti rūpāyatanādīnaṃ.

`Ādimapāṭho` means the first reading. `Tathā ca sati` means: when this is so, that is, when hatred too has the state of a condition by way of seventeen conditions. He says that its state as a dominance condition would also be permitted, thus: 'For hatred too, giving it importance should be stated in the Pāli text.' Lest one might sometimes suspect that this is prevented by the very word 'of the remaining,' to refute that he says 'and not of the remaining,' etc. `Purejātādīhi` means by the prenascence, kamma, nutriment, jhāna, faculty, path, and result conditions. `Tannivāraṇatthaṃ` means for the purpose of preventing that aforesaid fault. `Visuṃ aggahetvā` means: without taking them up separately, thus: 'Greed and delusion are not result conditions, and likewise for hatred.' The tangible-object base, while being an object, etc., condition for the body-consciousness element, is, because of its nature as earth element, etc., also a conascence, etc., condition for its own conascent states; thus it is said: 'It shows the state of being a conascence, etc., condition of the tangible-object base.' Referring to 'all phenomena' stated in the passage 'All phenomena are a condition for the mind-consciousness element and for the phenomena associated with it by way of object condition,' he says: 'It shows, as appropriate, their state as a root, etc., condition for all phenomena.' For this is not... a demonstration of a state, but rather a demonstration of the state of being multiple conditions for a single phenomenon. Therefore, the intention is that it is said: 'By this, of the tangible-object base,' etc. `Rūpādīnaṃ` means of the form base, etc.

Bhedāti visesā. Bhedaṃ anāmasitvāti cakkhuviññāṇadhātuādivisesaṃ aggahetvā. Te evāti yathāvuttavisesānaṃ sāmaññabhūte khandhe eva. Yaṃ sandhāya ‘‘evaṃ na sakkā vattu’’nti vuttaṃ, taṃ vibhāvetuṃ ‘‘na hī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Paṭṭhānasaṃvaṇṇanā hesāti etena sutte vuttapariyāyamaggabhāvenettha na sakkā micchāvācādīnaṃ maggapaccayaṃ vattunti dasseti. Sesapaccayabhāvoti maggapaccayaṃ ṭhapetvā yathāvuttehi sesehi aṭṭhārasahi [Pg.265] paccayehi paccayabhāvo. Adhipatipaccayo na hotīti ārammaṇādhipatipaccayo na hoti. Tanti vicikicchaṃ. Tatthāti yathāvuttesu ahirikādīsu.

`Bhedā` means distinctions. `Bhedaṃ anāmasitvā` means without taking up the distinction, that is, of the eye-consciousness element, etc. `Te eva` means just the aggregates, which are the general aspect of the aforesaid distinctions. To explain that with reference to which it was said, 'Thus it cannot be said,' the phrase 'for not...' etc., was said. By 'For this is a commentary on the Paṭṭhāna,' he shows that here, because of the path's nature as a mode of expression stated in the suttas, it is not possible to speak of a path condition for wrong speech, etc. `Sesapaccayabhāvo` means the state of being a condition by way of the remaining eighteen aforesaid conditions, setting aside the path condition. `Adhipatipaccayo na hoti` means the object-dominance condition does not exist. `Taṃ` refers to doubt. `Tattha` means among the aforesaid shamelessness, etc.

Dasadhā paccayā honti, puna tathā hadayavatthunti idaṃ atthamattavacanaṃ. Pāṭho pana ‘‘hadayavatthu tesañceva vippayuttassa ca vasena dasadhā paccayo hotī’’ti veditabbo. Rūpasaddagandharasāyatanamattamevāti idaṃ rūpādīnaṃ sahajātapaccayatāya viya nissayapaccayatāya ca abhāvato, purejātapaccayatāya ca bhāvato vuttaṃ. Etānīti yathāvuttāni rūpasaddagandharasārammaṇāni. Sabbātikkantapaccayāpekkhāti ‘‘ekadhammassa anekapaccayabhāvato’’ti etasmiṃ vicāre hetuādiatikkantapaccayāpekkhā etesaṃ rūpādīnaṃ apubbatā natthi, atha kho ārammaṇaārammaṇādhipatiārammaṇūpanissayapaccayāpekkhā. Na hi rūpādīni hetusahajātādhipatiādivasena paccayā hontīti. Tassāti rūpajīvitindriyassa purejātapaccayabhāvato apubbatā, tasmā taṃ ekūnavīsatividho paccayo hotīti vuttaṃ hoti. Sattadhā paccayabhāvo yojetabbo, na hi ojā purejātapaccayo na hotīti.

'The conditions are tenfold, and again, the heart-base is likewise'—this is a statement of the meaning only. The reading, however, should be understood thus: 'The heart-base is a condition in ten ways by way of both the associated and the dissociated.' 'Only the form, sound, odor, and taste bases'—this is said because of the absence for form, etc., of the state of being a conascence condition and a support condition, and because of the presence of the state of being a prenascence condition. `Etāni` means the aforesaid objects of form, sound, odor, and taste. `Sabbātikkantapaccayāpekkhā` means: in this investigation 'because one phenomenon has the state of being many conditions,' there is no unprecedentedness for these forms, etc., with respect to conditions that transcend root, etc. Rather, there is dependence on object condition, object-dominance condition, and object-decisive-support condition. For form, etc., are not conditions by way of root, conascence, dominance, etc. `Tassa` means: because the material life faculty has the state of being a prenascence condition, there is an unprecedentedness; therefore, it is said to be a condition in nineteen ways. The state of being a condition in seven ways should be applied; for nutritive essence is indeed a prenascence condition.

Atthoti vā hetuādidhammānaṃ sabhāvo veditabbo. So hi attano paccayuppannehi araṇīyato upagantabbato, ñāṇena vā ñātabbato ‘‘attho’’ti vuccati. Ākāroti tasseva pavattiākāro, yena attano paccayuppannānaṃ paccayabhāvaṃ upagacchatīti evamettha attho daṭṭhabbo. Taṃ pana vippayuttaṃ. ‘‘Sattahākārehī’’ti paṭhānassa kāraṇamāha ‘‘ukkaṭṭhaparicchedo hī’’tiādinā.

Or, `attho` should be understood as the intrinsic nature of the root, etc., phenomena. For it is called `attho` because it is to be reached or approached by its own conditioned effects, or because it is to be known by knowledge. `Ākāro` is its mode of occurrence, by which it undertakes the state of being a condition for its own conditioned effects—thus the meaning should be seen here. But that is dissociated. By 'by seven modes,' he states the reason for the Paṭṭhāna with the words 'For the supreme determination...' etc.

Yaṃ kammapaccayo…pe… daṭṭhabbaṃ āsevanakammapaccayānaṃ paccayuppannassa anantaraṭṭhānatāya. Sahajātampi hi anantaramevāti. Koci panetthāti ettha etasmiṃ pakatūpanissayasamudāye koci tadekadesabhūto kammasabhāvo pakatūpanissayoti attho. Tatthāti ‘‘yadidaṃ ārammaṇapurejāte panettha indriyavippayuttapaccayatā na labbhatī’’ti vuttaṃ, tasmiṃ, tasmiṃ vā ārammaṇapurejātaggahaṇe. Vatthussa vippayuttapaccayatā labbhatīti na vattabbā. Na hi ārammaṇabhūtaṃ vatthu vippayuttapaccayo hoti, atha kho nissayabhūtamevāti. Ito uttarīti ettha ‘‘ito’’ti idaṃ paccāmasanaṃ purejātaṃ vā sandhāya ārammaṇapurejātaṃ vā. Tattha paṭhamanayaṃ apekkhitvā vuttaṃ [Pg.266] ‘‘purejātato paratopī’’ti. Tena kammādipaccayesupi vakkhamānesu labbhamānālabbhamānaṃ veditabbanti vuttaṃ hoti. Dutiyaṃ pana nayaṃ anapekkhitvā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ āgatavasena vuttaṃ ‘‘ito vā indriyavippayuttato’’ti, attanā vuttanayena pana ‘‘nissayindriyavippayuttato vā’’ti. Tattha vattabbaṃ sayamevāha ‘‘ārammaṇādhipatī’’tiādi. Kammādīsu labbhamānālabbhamānaṃ na vakkhati ‘‘ito uttarī’’tiādinā pageva atidesassa katattā, tasmā purimoyeva purejātatopīti vuttaatthoyeva adhippeto.

That which is the kamma condition... should be understood... due to the state of proximity of the resultant of repetition and kamma conditions. For even the conascent is indeed proximate. 'But here, some' means that in this collection of natural decisive support, some aspect of kamma-nature, being a part of it, is a natural decisive support. 'There' means in that statement, 'But here, the state of being a faculty-dissociation condition is not found in the case of the object and prenascence conditions,' or in that grasping of the object and prenascence conditions. It should not be stated that the state of being a dissociation condition for the base is found. For the base, being an object, is not a dissociation condition; rather, it is only a support condition. 'Beyond this'—here, 'this' refers either to the prenascence condition or to the object and prenascence conditions. There, with reference to the first method, it is stated, 'from the prenascence or beyond'. Therefore, it is stated that in the kamma and other conditions that will be spoken of, what is obtainable or unobtainable should be understood. But disregarding the second method, it is stated in the commentary as, 'or from the faculty-dissociation condition,' yet according to the method stated by oneself, it is, 'or from the support, faculty, and dissociation conditions'. What should be stated there, he himself says, 'the object-predominance,' etc. In the case of kamma and others, what is obtainable or unobtainable will not be stated, because the extension by 'beyond this,' etc., was already made. Therefore, only the meaning stated earlier—'from the prenascence or beyond'—is intended.

‘‘Maggapaccayataṃ avijahantovā’’ti iminā ca maggapaccayo vuttoti ‘‘maggavajjānaṃ navanna’’nti vuttaṃ pacchimapāṭhe, purimapāṭhe pana ‘‘maggapaccayataṃ avijahantovā’’ti vuttattā eva maggapaccayena saddhiṃ sahajātādipaccayā gahetabbāti ‘‘dasanna’’nti vuttaṃ. Tattha pacchimapāṭhe ‘‘ekādasahākārehī’’ti vattabbaṃ, purimapāṭhe ‘‘dvādasahī’’ti.

By 'while not abandoning the state of being a path condition,' the path condition is stated. Therefore, in the latter reading, 'of the nine, excluding the path condition' is said. But in the former reading, because it is said 'while not abandoning the state of being a path condition,' the conascence and other conditions should be taken along with the path condition. Hence, 'of ten' is said. There, in the latter reading, 'with eleven modes' should be stated, but in the former reading, 'with twelve'.

Samanantaraniruddhatāya ārammaṇabhāvena cāti vijjamānampi visesamanāmasitvā kevalaṃ samanantaraniruddhatāya ārammaṇabhāvena, na ca samanantaraniruddhatāārammaṇabhāvasāmaññenāti attho. ‘‘Iminā upāyenā’’ti paccayasabhāgatādassanena paccayavisabhāgatādassanena ca vuttaṃ padadvayaṃ ekajjhaṃ katvā paduddhāro katoti dassento ‘‘hetuādīnaṃ sahajātānaṃ…pe… yojetabbā’’ti āha. Hetuārammaṇādīnaṃ sahajātāsahajātabhāvena aññamaññavisabhāgatāti yojanā. Evamādināti ādi-saddena purejātānaṃ cakkhādīnaṃ rūpādīnañca purejātabhāvena sabhāgatā, pavattiyaṃ vatthukhandhādīnaṃ purejātapacchājātānaṃ purejātapacchājātabhāvena visabhāgatāti evamādīnampi saṅgaho daṭṭhabbo. Hetunahetuādibhāvatopi cettha yugaḷakato viññātabbo vinicchayo. Hetupaccayo hi hetubhāvena paccayo, itare tadaññabhāvena. Evamitaresupi yathārahaṃ yugaḷakato veditabbo.

Even though a distinction exists, without considering it, it is said to be merely by being an object due to immediately preceding cessation, and not by the generality of being an object due to immediately preceding cessation—this is the meaning. Showing that the extraction of the term is made by combining into one the two phrases mentioned by showing the similarity of conditions and the dissimilarity of conditions, he said: 'Among co-nascent factors such as roots, etc., … should be connected.' The connection is the mutual dissimilarity of root, object, and other conditions by way of their co-nascent and non-co-nascent states. By 'and so forth,' the inclusion should also be understood of such things as the similarity of pre-arisen eye, etc., and forms, etc., by way of their pre-arisen nature, and the dissimilarity of pre-arisen and post-arisen base, aggregates, etc., in the course of existence, by way of their pre-arisen and post-arisen nature. Here, the determination should also be understood as paired from the perspective of being a root or not a root, and so on. For the root condition is a condition by way of being a root, while the others are by way of being other than that. Similarly, among the others too, the pairing should be understood as appropriate.

Ubhayappadhānatāti jananopatthambhanappadhānatā. Ṭhānanti padassa atthavacanaṃ kāraṇabhāvoti vināpi bhāvapaccayaṃ bhāvapaccayassa attho ñāyatīti. Upanissayaṃ bhindantenāti anantarūpanissayapakatūpanissayavibhāgena vibhajantena. Tayopi upanissayā vattabbā upanissayavibhāgabhāvato. Upanissayaggahaṇameva kātabbaṃ sāmaññarūpena. Tatthāti evamavaṭṭhite anantarūpanissayapakatūpanissayoti [Pg.267] bhindanaṃ vibhāgakaraṇaṃ yadi pakatūpanissayassa rūpānaṃ paccayattābhāvadassanatthaṃ, nanu ārammaṇūpanissayaanantarūpanissayāpi rūpānaṃ paccayā na hontiyevāti? Saccaṃ na honti, te pana dassitanayāti tadekadesena itarampi dassitameva hotīti imamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘ārammaṇaṃ…pe… daṭṭhabba’’nti āha. Taṃsamānagatikattāti tehi anantarādīhi samānagatikattā arūpānaṃyeva paccayabhāvato. Tanti purejātapaccayaṃ. Tatthāti anantarādīsu paṭhitvā.

Predominance of both means the predominance of generating and sustaining. The explanation of the meaning of the word 'ṭhāna' is 'causal state'; thus, even without the 'bhāva' suffix, the meaning of the 'bhāva' suffix is understood. 'By one who analyzes dependence' means by one who distinguishes through the division into immediate dependence and natural dependence. All three types of dependence should be stated, as there is a division of dependence. Dependence should only be taken in its general form. In that case, this being established, if the analysis—the making of a distinction—into immediate dependence and natural dependence is for the purpose of showing the absence of conditionality for material phenomena in natural dependence, then would not object-dependence and immediate-dependence also not be conditions for material phenomena? Truly, they are not. But since they are shown by the established method, by one part of that the other is also shown. To explain this meaning, he said: 'The object… should be seen.' 'Due to having the same course' means that because they have a similar course to the immediate condition, etc., they are conditions only for immaterial phenomena. 'That' refers to the pre-arisen condition. 'There' means having been recited among the immediate condition, etc.

Paccayaniddesapakiṇṇakavinicchayakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Here ends the explanation of the discourse on the analysis of miscellaneous points regarding the exposition of conditions.

Pucchāvāro

The Chapter of Questions

1. Paccayānulomavaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Direct Order of Conditions

Ekekaṃ tikaṃ dukañcāti kusalattikādīsu bāvīsatiyā tikesu hetudukādīsu sataṃ dukesu ekekaṃ tikaṃ dukañca. Na tikadukanti tulyayogīnaṃ na tikadukanti attho. Tikavisiṭṭhaṃ pana dukaṃ, dukavisiṭṭhañca tikaṃ, tikavisiṭṭhatikadukavisiṭṭhadukesu viya nissāya upari desanā pavattā evāti.

Each triplet and dual: that is, each single triplet among the twenty-two triplets beginning with the wholesome triplet, and each single dual among the hundred duals beginning with the root-cause dual. 'Not a triplet-dual' means it is not a triplet-dual for those of equal application. However, the teaching proceeds by relying on a dual distinguished by a triplet and a triplet distinguished by a dual, just as it does in the cases of a triplet distinguished by a triplet and a dual distinguished by a dual.

Ye kusalādidhamme paṭiccāti vuttā ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjati hetupaccayā’’tiādīsu, te kusalādidhammā paṭiccatthaṃ pharantā hetuādipaccayaṭṭhaṃ sādhentā kusalādipaccayā cevāti attho. Tenevāhāti yasmā paccayadhammānaṃ paccayuppannesu paṭiccatthapharaṇaṃ ubhayesaṃ tesaṃ sahabhāve sati, nāññathā. Teneva kāraṇenāha ‘‘te ca kho sahajātāvā’’ti. Teti hetuādipaccayā. Tesu hi hetusahajātaaññamaññanissayādayo sahajātā, anantarasamanantarādayo asahajātā paccayā hontīti. Etehi dvīhi vārehi itaretaratthabodhanavasena pavattāya desanāya kiṃ sādhitaṃ hotīti āha ‘‘evañca niruttikosallaṃ janitaṃ hotī’’ti.

Those wholesome phenomena, etc., that are stated as 'conditioned by' in passages such as 'a wholesome phenomenon arises conditioned by a wholesome phenomenon due to root condition,' etc.—these wholesome phenomena, etc., pervading the meaning of 'conditioned by' and establishing the function of conditions like root, etc., are indeed wholesome conditions, etc.; this is the meaning. Therefore it is said: because the pervading of the meaning of 'conditioned by' in the conditioned phenomena by the conditioning phenomena occurs only when both are present together, not otherwise. For that very reason, it is said: 'And indeed they are co-arisen.' These are the root conditions, etc. Among them, root, co-arisen, mutual dependence, etc., are co-arisen conditions, while contiguous, immediately contiguous, etc., are non-co-arisen conditions. By these two turns of teaching, proceeding by way of making the meaning of each other understood, what is accomplished? He said: 'Thus, skill in etymology is produced.'

Te te pañhe uddharitvāti ‘‘siyā kusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo’’tiādayo ye ye pañhā vissajjanaṃ labhanti, te te pañhe uddharitvā. Pamādalekhā esāti idaṃ ‘‘kusalo hetu hetusampayuttakānaṃ dhammāna’’nti likhitaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Paṭiccasahajātavāresu sahajātapaccayo, paccayanissayavāresu nissayapaccayo, saṃsaṭṭhasampayuttavāresu [Pg.268] sampayuttapaccayo ekantikoti katvā vuttoti āha ‘‘purimavāresu…pe… niyametvā’’ti. Tatthāti tesu purimavāresu chasu. Na viññāyanti sarūpato anuddhaṭattā. Evamādīhi pañhehi. Hetādipaccayapaccayuppannesūti hetuādīsu paccayadhammesu sampayuttakkhandhādibhedesu tesaṃ paccayuppannesu. Niddhāraṇe cetaṃ bhummaṃ. Hetādipaccayānaṃ nicchayābhāvatoti ‘‘ime nāma te hetuādayo paccayadhammā’’ti nicchayābhāvato sarūpato aniddhāritattā. Yathā hi nāma nānājaṭājaṭitaṃ gumbantaragatañca taṃsadisaṃ sarūpato adissamānaṃ idaṃ tanti na vinicchinīyati, evaṃ ñātuṃ icchitopi attho sarūpato aniddhārito nijjaṭo nigumbo ca nāma na hoti nicchayābhāvato, sarūpato pana tasmiṃ niddhārite tabbisayassa nicchayassa vasena puggalassa asambuddhabhāvāppattiyā so pañho nijjaṭo nigumbo ca nāma hotīti āha ‘‘nicchayābhāvato te pañhā nijjaṭā nigumbā ca katvā na vibhattā’’ti, ‘‘na koci pucchāsaṅgahito…pe… vibhattā’’ti ca. Tanti pañhāvissajjanaṃ sandhāya nijjaṭatā na vuttā, atha kho nicchayuppādananti adhippāyo.

'By having extracted those very questions' means having extracted those questions that receive an answer, such as, 'Could a wholesome phenomenon be a condition for a wholesome phenomenon by way of root condition?' 'This is a careless writing': this is said with reference to what was written as 'a wholesome root for phenomena associated with the root.' Because in the sections on co-arisen conditionality, the co-arisen condition; in the sections on dependence condition, the dependence condition; and in the sections on association and conjunction, the associated condition, are said to be definitive, he said: 'In the earlier sections… having determined.' 'There' means in those six earlier sections. They are not understood because they are not extracted according to their nature. By such questions. 'In the conditions, such as root, and in the phenomena conditioned by them' means in the conditioning phenomena, such as root, etc., with their divisions like associated aggregates, and in the phenomena conditioned by them. And this is the locative case of specification. 'Due to the absence of certainty regarding the conditions, such as root, etc.' means due to the absence of certainty that 'These are indeed those conditioning phenomena called root, etc.,' because they are not determined according to their nature. Just as a thread, tangled in various knots and gone into a thicket, being similar to it and not seen in its true nature, is not determined as 'this is the thread'; so too, an intended meaning that is not determined in its true nature is not called 'untangled' and 'un-thicketed' due to the absence of certainty. But when it is determined in its true nature, by means of the certainty concerning that subject, since the state of its not being understood is not reached by the person, that question is called 'untangled' and 'un-thicketed.' Hence, he said: 'Due to the absence of certainty, those questions are not analyzed by being made untangled and un-thicketed,' and 'No question included… is analyzed.' The untangledness of the text is not spoken of with reference to the answering of the question; rather, the intention is the production of certainty.

Ṭhapanaṃ nāma idha vineyyasantāne patiṭṭhapanaṃ, taṃ pana tassa atthassa dīpanaṃ jotananti āha ‘‘pakāsitattā’’ti. Pakārehīti hetuādipaccayappakārehi, kusalādipaccayapaccayuppannappakārehi vā.

Here, 'establishment' means the settling down in the mental continuum of those to be trained. But that is the illumination, the shining forth, of its meaning. Therefore, he said: 'because it is made manifest.' By 'modes' is meant by modes of root conditions, etc., or by modes of wholesome conditions, etc., and their conditioned phenomena.

25-34. Parikappanaṃ vidahananti katvā āha ‘‘parikappapucchāti vidhipucchā’’ti. Siyāti bhaveyyāti attho. Eso vidhi kiṃ atthīti etena ‘‘siyā’’ti vidhimhi kiriyāpadaṃ. Pucchā pana vākyatthasiddhā veditabbā. Tameva hi vākyatthasiddhaṃ pucchaṃ dassetuṃ aṭṭhakathāyampi ‘‘kiṃ so kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca siyā’’ti vuttaṃ. Saṃpucchanaṃ parikappapucchāti tasmiṃ pakkhe hi kiriyāya padeneva pucchā vibhāvīyatīti vuttaṃ hotīti. ‘‘Siyā kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjeyya hetupaccayā’’ti ettha ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca hetupaccayā’’ti ubhayamidaṃ paccayavacanaṃ, ‘‘kusalo dhammo uppajjeyyā’’ti paccayuppannavacanaṃ. Tesu paccayadhammassa paccayabhāve vibhāvite paccayuppannassa uppatti atthato vibhāvitāyeva hotīti paccayadhammova pucchitabbo. Tattha ca paccayadhammavisiṭṭho paṭiccattho vā pucchitabbo siyā paccayavisiṭṭho vāti duvidhā pucchitabbāyeva atthavikappā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttā. Tesu paṭhamasmiṃ pucchā [Pg.269] sadosāti dassento ‘‘yo kusalo dhammo uppajjeyyā’’tiādimāha. Tattha sabbapucchānaṃ pavattitoti kusalamūlādīnaṃ sattasattapucchānaṃ pavattanato, uppajjamānaṃ kusalaṃ. Tehi paccayehīti pacchājātavipākapaccayehi uppatti anuññātāti āpajjati, na ca taṃ yuttanti adhippāyo. Taṃtaṃpaccayāti tato tato yonisomanasikārādipaccayato. Bhavanamatthitā ettha na ca pucchitāti ‘‘kiṃ siyā’’ti vuttayojanāya dosamāha. Evañca katvāti uppattiyā eva pucchitattā.

25-34. Having taken 'deliberation' to mean 'arrangement,' he said: 'A question of deliberation is a question of method.' 'Siyā' means 'it might be.' Regarding the question, 'Is there this method?', 'siyā' is the verb in the method. The question, however, should be understood as established by the meaning of the sentence. Indeed, to illustrate this very question established by the meaning of the sentence, it is also said in the commentary: 'Could it be that, conditioned by a wholesome phenomenon, that wholesome phenomenon might be?' 'A question of inquiry is a question of deliberation' means that in that case, the question is clarified by the very word of the action. In the phrase, 'Might a wholesome phenomenon arise, conditioned by a wholesome phenomenon, through the root condition?', the part 'conditioned by a wholesome phenomenon, through the root condition' is a twofold expression of the condition, and 'a wholesome phenomenon might arise' is the expression of the conditioned phenomenon. Among these, when the nature of the conditioning phenomenon as a condition is clarified, the arising of the conditioned phenomenon is thereby clarified in meaning. Therefore, only the conditioning phenomenon should be questioned. And there, either the meaning of 'conditioned by' as qualified by the conditioning phenomenon should be questioned, or the condition as qualified should be questioned—thus, two kinds of alternative meanings to be questioned are stated in the commentary. Among these, showing that the first question is flawed, he said: 'That wholesome phenomenon which might arise...' and so on. There, 'the proceeding of all questions' means: from the proceeding of the seven sets of seven questions on wholesome roots, etc., the wholesome phenomenon that is arising. 'By those conditions' means: by post-nascent and resultant conditions. It follows that arising is permitted, but that is not proper—this is the intention. 'By such and such conditions' means: from those various conditions, such as wise attention, etc. He states the fault in the given explanation of 'kiṃ siyā' ('what might be?'), saying that the fact of existence is not questioned here. And having done so, this is because only the arising itself is questioned.

Tatthāti ‘‘atha vā’’tiādinā vutte atthantare. Uppajjeyyāti uppattiṃ anujānitvāti ‘‘uppajjeyyā’’ti ettha vuttaṃ kusalapaccayaṃ uppattiṃ anujānitvā. Tassāti uppattiyā. Bhavanapucchananti hetupaccayā bhavanapucchanaṃ na yuttanti sambandho. Puna tassāti hetupaccayā uppattiyā. Bhavanapucchananti kevalaṃ bhavanapucchanaṃ. Tasmāti yasmā vuttanayena ubhayatthāpi uppattianujānanamukhena bhavanapucchanaṃ ayuttaṃ, tasmā. Anujānanañca aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vutte atthavikappadvaye atthato āpannaṃ, taṃ ananujānanto āha ‘‘ananujānitvāvā’’tiādi. Saṃpucchanamevāti iminā saṃpucchane ‘‘uppajjeyyā’’ti idaṃ kiriyāpadanti dasseti. Yadi evaṃ ‘‘siyā’’ti idaṃ kathanti āha ‘‘siyāti…pe… pucchatī’’ti. Ayaṃ nayoti ‘‘siyā’’tiādinā anantaravutto atthanayo. Na viññāyati anāmaṭṭhavisesattā. Dvepi pucchāti sambhavanapucchā tabbisesapucchā cāti duvidhāpi pucchā ekāyeva pucchā saṃpucchanabhāvato ekādhikaraṇabhāvato ca.

'Tattha' refers to the alternative meaning stated with 'or else,' and so on. 'Uppajjeyya' means 'having acknowledged the arising'; thus, 'uppajjeyya' here means having acknowledged the arising conditioned by a wholesome phenomenon. 'Tassa' refers to that arising. 'Bhavanapucchanaṃ' is the questioning of being; the connection is that questioning being through the root condition is not proper. Again, 'tassa' refers to the arising through the root condition. 'Bhavanapucchanaṃ' is merely the questioning of being. 'Tasmā' means: since, in the manner stated, questioning being by way of acknowledging arising is improper in both cases, therefore... And not acknowledging this act of acknowledging, which is entailed in meaning in the two alternative meanings stated in the commentary, he said, 'without acknowledging,' and so on. By 'saṃpucchanam eva,' he shows that in this inquiry, 'uppajjeyya' is the verb. If so, what is 'siyā'? He said: 'siyā... and so on... he asks.' 'This is the method' means the method of meaning stated immediately after 'siyā,' and so on. It is not understood because its specific quality has not been touched upon. 'Both questions' means the question of possibility and the question of its specific quality; both kinds of questions are a single question, due to being an inquiry and having a single topic.

Gamanussukkavacananti gamanassa ussukkavacanaṃ. Gamanakiriyāya yathā attano kattā upari kattabbakiriyāya yogyarūpo hoti, evameva ṭhānaṃ gamanussukkanaṃ tassa bodhanaṃ vacanaṃ. Evaṃbhūtā ca kiriyā yasmā atthato kiriyantarāpekkhā nāma hoti, tasmā vuttaṃ ‘‘gamanassa…pe… attho’’ti. Kathaṃ panetasmiṃ sahajātapaccayapaṭṭhāne paṭiccavāre paṭiccasaddassa pacchimakālakiriyāpekkhatāti codanaṃ manasi katvā āha ‘‘yadipī’’tiādi. Tenetaṃ dasseti ‘‘asatipi paṭiayanuppajjanānaṃ kālabhede aññatra hetuphalesu dissamānaṃ purimapacchimakālataṃ hetuphalatāsāmaññato idhāpi samāropetvā ruḷhīvasena purimapacchimakālavohāro kato’’ti. Tenāha ‘‘gahaṇappavattiākāravasena…pe… daṭṭhabbo’’ti. Tattha attapaṭilābho uppādoti attho.

'Gamanussukkavacanaṃ' means an expression urging one to go. Just as the agent of the action of going becomes fit for the action to be performed subsequently, so too, the urging to go is an expression that indicates this state. And since such an action is, in meaning, dependent on another action, therefore it is said, 'the meaning of going... and so on.' But how, in this section on dependent arising in the context of the co-nascent condition, does the word 'paṭicca' look forward to a subsequent action? Keeping this objection in mind, he said, 'Even if...' and so on. By this, he shows: 'Even though there is no temporal difference between the dependent arising and the co-arising, apart from what is seen in causes and effects, the state of being earlier and later is superimposed here also, due to the commonality of cause and effect, and thus the conventional expression of earlier and later time is made.' Therefore, he said: 'It should be understood... according to the mode of grasping and occurrence.' There, 'the acquisition of self' means arising.

Gamananti [Pg.270] ‘‘paṭiccā’’ti ettha labbhamānaṃ ayanakiriyaṃ pariyāyantarenāha. Sā panatthato pavatti, pavatti ca dhammānaṃ yathāpaccayaṃ uppattiyeva. Sabhāvadhammānañhi uppattiyaṃ loke sabbo kiriyākārakavohāro, tasmā ‘‘paṭiccā’’ti ettha labbhamānaṃ yaṃ paṭiayanaṃ paṭigamanaṃ atthato paṭiuppajjamānaṃ, tañca gacchantādiapekkhāya hotīti āha ‘‘gacchantassa paṭigamanaṃ, uppajjantassa paṭiuppajjana’’nti. Tayidaṃ gamanapaṭigamanaṃ, uppajjanapaṭiuppajjanaṃ samānakiriyā. Kathaṃ? Yasmā paṭikaraṇaṃ paṭisaddattho. Tasmāti yasmā sahajātapaccayabhūtassa uppajjantassa paṭiuppajjanaṃ ‘‘paṭicca uppajjatī’’ti ettha attho, tasmā. Tadāyattuppattiyāti sahayoge karaṇavacanaṃ, karaṇatthe, hetutthe vā, tasmiṃ uppajjamāne kusaladhamme āyattāya paṭibaddhāya uppattiyā saheva paṭigantvāti attho. Tena paṭiayanattalābhānaṃ samānakālataṃ dasseti. Tenevāha ‘‘sahajātapaccayaṃ katvāti vuttaṃ hotī’’tiādi. Nanu ca samānakālakiriyāyaṃ īdiso saddappayogo natthi, purimakālakiriyāyameva ca atthīti? Nāyamekanto samānakālakiriyāyampi kehici icchitattā. Tathā hi –

By 'going,' he states in other terms the action of movement obtained here in the word 'paṭiccā.' In meaning, this is occurrence, and occurrence is simply the arising of phenomena according to conditions. For in the world, all conventional usage of action and agent pertains to the arising of intrinsic phenomena. Therefore, what is obtained here in 'paṭiccā'—which is a dependent going or returning—is, in meaning, a co-arising. And since this occurs in relation to one who is going, etc., he said: 'For one who is going, there is a returning; for one who is arising, there is a co-arising.' This going and returning, arising and co-arising, are simultaneous actions. How so? Because the meaning of the prefix 'paṭi' is 'doing in return.' 'Therefore' means: since the co-arising of that which is arising, having become a co-nascent condition, is the meaning here in 'arises dependently,' therefore... 'By the arising dependent on that' is an instrumental expression in the sense of conjunction, either in the sense of instrument or in the sense of cause. The meaning is: 'having returned together with' the arising that is dependent on, or bound to, that wholesome phenomenon which is arising. By this, he shows the simultaneity of obtaining the state of dependent going. For that very reason, he said: 'It means "having made it a co-nascent condition,"' and so on. But is it not so that there is no such usage of a word for a simultaneous action, and that it exists only for a prior action? This is not an absolute rule, since it is also accepted by some for a simultaneous action. For example—

‘‘Nihantvā timiraṃ loke, udito sataraṃsami;

Lokekacakkhubhūtoya-matthameti divākaro.

“Having dispelled the darkness in the world, the hundred-rayed one has risen; this day-maker, having become the one eye of the world, sets.”

‘‘Sirīvilāsarūpena, sabbasobhāvibhāvinā;

Obhāsetvādito buddho, sataraṃsi yathā paro’’ti. –

“The Buddha, with a form of glorious grace that manifests all splendor, having illuminated all from the beginning, is like the other hundred-rayed one.”

Ca payogā dissanti.

And such usages are seen.

35-38. Tāsūti dukamūlakanaye hetārammaṇaduke ekūnapaññāsapucchā, tāsu. Hetārammaṇaduketi ‘‘hetupaccayā ārammaṇapaccayā’’ti evaṃ hetupaccayaārammaṇapaccayānaṃ vasena āgate paccayaduke. Dvinnaṃ pucchānaṃ dassitattāti yasmiṃ vācanāmagge kusalapadamūlā kusalapadāvasānā, kusalādipadattayamūlā kusalādipadattayāvasānā ca ekūnapaññāsāya pucchānaṃ ādipariyosānabhūtā dve eva pucchā dassitā, taṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Etthāti etasmiṃ paṇṇattivāre pucchānaṃ vutto na paccayānanti attho. Pucchāya hi vasena hetupaccaye hetupaccayasaṅkhātaṃ ekamūlaṃ etassāti ekamūlako, nayasaddāpekkhāya cāyaṃ pulliṅganiddeso. Evaṃ ārammaṇapaccayamūlakādīsu. Tathā hetuārammaṇapaccayasaṅkhātāni [Pg.271] dve mūlāni etassāti dvimūlakotiādinā yojetabbā. Paccayānaṃ pana vuccamāne paṭhamanayassa ekamūlakatā na siyā. Na hi tattha paccayantaraṃ atthi, yaṃ mūlabhāvena vattabbaṃ siyā. Tenāha ‘‘paccayānaṃ pana vasenā’’tiādi. Hetārammaṇadukādīnanti avayave sāmivacanaṃ, adhipatiādīnanti sambandho. Tato paraṃ mūlassa abhāvato sabbamūlakaṃ anavasesānaṃ paccayānaṃ mūlabhāvena gahitattā. Na hi mūlavantabhāvena gahitā paccayā mūlabhāvena gayhanti. Paccayagamanaṃ pāḷigamananti viññāyati abhidheyyānurūpaṃ liṅgavacanādīti katvā. Idhāti anulome. Ca-saddo upacayattho. So tevīsatimūlassa sabbamūlabhāvaṃ upacayena vuccamānaṃ joteti.

35-38. 'Tāsu' refers to this: in the method of dual roots, in the cause-object dyad, there are forty-nine questions. 'Hetārammaṇaduke' refers to the dyad of conditions that arises by way of the cause-condition and the object-condition, as in 'by cause-condition, by object-condition.' 'Since two questions are shown' is said with reference to that course of recitation where only two questions, which are the beginning and end of the forty-nine questions, are shown: those with the wholesome term as their root and the wholesome term as their conclusion, and those with the triad of terms beginning with 'wholesome' as their root and as their conclusion. 'Ettha' means that in this section on designation, the questions are stated, not the conditions. For by way of the question, the cause-condition has one root designated as the cause-condition, hence 'single-rooted'; this is a masculine designation with reference to the word 'method.' This applies similarly to the object-condition as a root, and so on. Likewise, that which has two roots designated as the cause and object conditions should be connected as 'double-rooted,' and so on. However, when the conditions themselves are spoken of, the first method would not be single-rooted, for there is no other condition there that could be stated as a root. Hence it is said, 'But by way of the conditions,' etc. 'Hetārammaṇadukādīnaṃ' is a genitive of the part, its connection is with 'adhipatiādīnaṃ' (dominance, etc.). Beyond that, due to the absence of a root, it is 'all-rooted' because all the remaining conditions are taken as the root. For conditions taken as possessing a root are not taken as the root. The progression of conditions is understood as the progression of the Pāli, because the gender, number, etc., are in conformity with what is to be expressed. 'Idha' (here) refers to the direct order. The word 'ca' has the meaning of augmentation. It illuminates that the all-rooted nature of the twenty-three roots is spoken of by way of accumulation.

39-40. Evaṃ satīti ‘‘ārammaṇapaccayā hetupaccayā’’ti ārabhitvā ‘‘ārammaṇapaccayā avigatapaccayā, ārammaṇapaccayā hetupaccayā’’ti evaṃ vācanāmagge sati. Cakkabandhanavasena pāḷigati āpajjatu, ko dosoti kadāci vadeyyāti āha ‘‘heṭṭhimasodhanavasena ca idha abhidhamme pāḷi gatā’’ti. Tathā hi khandhavibhaṅgādīsupi pāḷi heṭṭhimasodhanavasena pavattā. Gaṇanacārena tamatthaṃ sādhetuṃ ‘‘evañca katvā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Ārammaṇādīsūti ārammaṇamūlakādīsu nayesu. Tasmiṃ tasminti tasmiṃ tasmiṃ ārammaṇādipaccaye. Suddhikatoti suddhikanayato. Tasmāti ārammaṇamūlakādīsu suddhikanayassa alabbhamānattā. Ekamūlakanayo daṭṭhabbo ārammaṇamūlaketi adhippāyo. ‘‘Ārammaṇapaccayā…pe… avigatapaccayāti vā’’tiādi tādisaṃ vācanāmaggaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Yattha ‘‘ārammaṇapaccayā hetupaccayā, ārammaṇapaccayā adhipatipaccayā, ārammaṇapaccayā…pe… avigatapaccayā’’ti evaṃ ārammaṇamūlake anantarapaccayamūlabhūtā ārammaṇapaccayapariyosānameva ekamūlakaṃ dassetvā upari avasiṭṭhaekamūlakato paṭṭhāya yāva sabbamūlake vigatapaccayā, tāva saṃkhipitvā avigatapaccayova dassito. Tenāha ‘‘ekamūlakesū’’tiādi. Ito paresupi edisesu ṭhānesu eseva nayo. Mūlameva dassetvāti adhipatimūlake ekamūlakassa ādimeva dassetvā. Na suddhikadassananti na suddhikanayadassanaṃ. ‘‘Suddhikanayo hi visesābhāvato ārammaṇamūlakādīsu na labbhatī’’ti hi vuttaṃ. Nāpi sabbamūlake [Pg.272] katipayapaccayadassanaṃ upari sabbamūlake ekamūlakassa āgatattā.

39-40. 'Evaṃ sati' means when there is such a course of recitation, beginning with 'by object-condition, by cause-condition,' and continuing 'by object-condition, by non-disappearance condition; by object-condition, by cause-condition.' To the objection 'Let the progression of the Pāli proceed by way of wheel-binding, what is the fault?' which someone might say, he replies, 'Here in the Abhidhamma, the Pāli proceeds by way of the lower purification.' For indeed, even in the Khandhavibhaṅga and other texts, the Pāli proceeds by way of the lower purification. To establish that meaning by way of the course of calculation, 'and having done thus,' etc., is stated. 'Ārammaṇādīsu' means in the methods that have object as root, etc. 'Tasmiṃ tasmiṃ' refers to in each and every object-condition, etc. 'Suddhikatoti' means from the pure method. 'Tasmā' means because the pure method is not obtainable in the methods beginning with the object as root, etc. The single-root method should be seen; the intention is 'with object as root.' The phrase 'by object-condition... up to... or by non-disappearance condition,' etc., is said with reference to such a course of recitation. Where, in the object-rooted method, having shown only the single-rooted method that ends with the object-condition, which is the root for the proximity-condition—as in 'by object-condition, by cause-condition; by object-condition, by dominance-condition; by object-condition... up to... by non-disappearance condition'—then, having abbreviated from the remaining single-rooted methods above up to the disappearance-condition in the all-rooted method, only the non-disappearance condition is shown. Hence it is said, 'among the single-rooted,' etc. In other similar places beyond this, this same method applies. 'Having shown only the root' means having shown only the beginning of the single-rooted method in the dominance-rooted method. 'Not the showing of the pure' means not the showing of the pure method. For it is said, 'The pure method is not found in the object-rooted methods, etc., due to the absence of distinction.' Nor is there a showing of some conditions in the all-rooted method, since the single-rooted method has come above in the all-rooted method.

41. Ekasmiñcāti avigatamūlakādike ca naye. Saṅkhepantaragatoti saṅkhepassa saṅkhipitassa abbhantaragato, saṅkhipitabboti attho. Majjhimānaṃ dassananti majjhimānaṃ nayato dassanaṃ, aññathā saṅkhepo eva na siyā. Gatidassananti antadassanaṃ akatvā pāḷigatiyā dassanaṃ, tañca ādito paṭṭhāya katipayadassanameva. Tena vigatapaccayuddhāraṇena osānacatukkaṃ dasseti avigatamūlake vigatapaccayassa osānabhāvato. Sabbamūlakassa avasānena ‘‘vigatapaccayā’’ti padena.

41. 'Ekasmiñca' means and in the method with non-disappearance as root, etc. 'Saṅkhepantaragato' means gone inside what is summarized; the meaning is that it should be summarized. 'Majjhimānaṃ dassanaṃ' is the showing of the middle ones according to the method; otherwise, it would not be a summary at all. 'Gatidassanaṃ' means showing the progression of the Pāli without showing the end, and that is only the showing of a few from the beginning. Thereby, by the removal of the disappearance-condition, he shows the concluding tetrad, because in the non-disappearance-rooted method, the disappearance-condition is the end, with the word 'vigatapaccayā' as the conclusion of the all-rooted method.

Yathā hetuādīnaṃ paccayānaṃ uddesānupubbiyā dukatikādiyojanā katā, evaṃ tattha ārammaṇādipaccaye laṅghitvāpi sakkā yojanaṃ kātuṃ, tathā kasmā na katā? Yadipi anavasesato paccayānaṃ mūlabhāvena gahitattā kesañci kehici yojane atthaviseso natthi, ārammaṇamūlakādīsu pana ārammaṇādhipatidukādīnaṃ hetumūlake ca hetuadhipatianantaratikādīnaṃ taṃtaṃavasiṭṭhapaccayehi yojanāya attheva viseso, evaṃ santepi yasmā uppaṭipāṭiyā yojanā na sukhaggahaṇā, sakkā ca ñāṇuttarena puggalena yathādassitena nayena yojitunti uppaṭipāṭiyā paccaye aggahetvā paṭipāṭiyāva te yojetvā dassitāti imamatthamāha ‘‘ettha cā’’tiādinā.

Just as the connection of dyads, triads, etc., of the conditions beginning with the cause-condition was made according to the sequence of the summary, so too, even by skipping conditions such as the object, etc., it is possible to make such a connection. Why then was it not done? Although, since the conditions are taken as the root without remainder, there is no special meaning in the connection of some with certain others, yet in the object-rooted methods, etc., there is indeed a special meaning in connecting the object-dominance dyad, etc., and in the cause-rooted method, the cause-dominance-proximity triad, etc., with their respective remaining conditions. Even so, because a connection made out of order is not easy to grasp, and because it is possible for a person with superior knowledge to connect them by the method as shown, therefore, without taking the conditions out of order, they were shown connected only in order. This meaning is stated by the phrase beginning 'And here...'

Tañca gamanaṃ yuttanti yaṃ sabbehi tikehi ekekassa dukassa yojanāvasena pāḷigamanaṃ, taṃ yuttaṃ tikesu dukānaṃ pakkhepabhāvato. Tatthāti dukesu. Ekekasminti ekekasmiṃ dukatike. Nayāti anulomanayādayo vāre vāre cattāro nayā, pucchā pana sattavīsati. Yadi evaṃ kasmā hetudukena samānāti? Taṃ tikapadesu paccekaṃ hetudukassa labbhamānassa hetudukabhāvasāmaññato vuttaṃ.

And that progression is proper: the progression of the Pāli by way of connecting each single dyad with all the triads. That is proper because of the inclusion of dyads within the triads. 'Tattha' (therein) refers to the dyads. 'Ekekasmiṃ' (for each) means in each dyad-triad. 'Nayā' (method) refers to the four methods, such as the direct method, in each section; but the questions are twenty-seven. If so, why is it said 'equal to the cause-dyad'? That is stated because of the commonality of the nature of the cause-dyad, which is obtained individually in each of the terms of the triads.

Vuttanayenāti ‘‘na hī’’tiādinā dukatike vuttanayena. Tattha hi na dukassa yojanā atthi, atha kho dukānaṃ ekekena padena tikassa yojanā. Tenāha ‘‘ekeko tiko dukasatena yojito’’ti. Ekekasminti ekekasmiṃ tikaduke.

'By the method stated' refers to the method stated in the dyad-triad with 'na hi,' etc. For there, there is no connection of the dyad as such, but rather the connection of the triad with each term of the dyads. Therefore, he said, 'Each single triad is connected with a hundred dyads.' 'Ekekasmiṃ' (in each) means in each single triad-dyad.

Tikādayo [Pg.273] cha nayāti ‘‘tikañca paṭṭhānavara’’ntiādinā gāthāyaṃ vuttā tikapaṭṭhānādayo cha nayā. Sattavidhampīti vārabhedena sattadhā bhinditvā vuttampi. Anulomanti paccayānulomaṃ anulomabhāvasāmaññena saha gahetvā. Tathā catubbidhampi tikapaṭṭhānaṃ tikapaṭṭhānatāsāmaññena, dukapaṭṭhānādīni ca cattāri cattāri taṃsāmaññena saha gahetvā. Imamatthaṃ gahetvā ‘‘tikañca paṭṭhānavara’’nti gāthāya adhippāyavibhāvanavasena ‘‘anulomamhī’’tiādinā vuttaṃ imamatthaṃ gahetvā. Sattappabhedeti paṭiccavārādivasena sattappabhede. Chapi ete tikādibhedena catucatuppabhedā dhammānulomādivasena cha uddharitabbāti idaṃ dassetīti yojanā. Ayañhettha saṅkhepattho – dhammānulomādivibhāgabhinnāpi tikādibhāvasāmaññena ekajjhaṃ katvā vuttā tikapaṭṭhānādisaṅkhātā tikādayo cha dhammanayā paṭiccavārādivasena vibhajiyamānā tattha tattha niddhāriyamāne anulomatāsāmaññena anulomanti ekato gahite paccayānulome suṭṭhu ativiya gambhīrāti. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana ‘‘idha pana ayaṃ gāthā tasmiṃ dhammānulome paccayānulomaṃ sandhāya vuttā’’ti dhammānulomo paccayānulomassa visesanabhāvena niyametvā vutto. Esa nayo paccanīyagāthādīsupi. Tikapaṭṭhānassa dukapaṭṭhānassa ca pubbe attho vuttoti āha ‘‘dukatikapaṭṭhānādīsū’’ti. Tikehi paṭṭhānanti tikehi nānappakārato paccayavibhāvanaṃ, tikehi vā ñāṇassa pavattanaṭṭhānaṃ. Dukasambandhi tikapaṭṭhānaṃ, dukavisiṭṭhānaṃ vā tikānaṃ paṭṭhānaṃ dukatikapaṭṭhānanti imamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘dukāna’’ntiādimāha. Dukādivisesitassāti dukādipadavisesitassa dukādibhāvo daṭṭhabbo ‘‘hetuṃ kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca, nahetuṃ kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭiccā’’tiādivacanato.

The six methods beginning with the triplet means the six methods, such as the Triplet Paṭṭhāna, spoken of in the verse beginning 'tikañca paṭṭhānavara'. Also stated as sevenfold means having been divided into seven according to the variation of rounds. 'Anuloma' means the direct order of conditions, taken together with the general characteristic of directness. Similarly, the fourfold Triplet Paṭṭhāna is taken together with the general characteristic of being a Triplet Paṭṭhāna, and the four Dyad Paṭṭhānas, etc., are each taken together with their respective common characteristic. Having grasped this meaning, what is said beginning with 'anulomamhī' is by way of clarifying the intention of the verse 'tikañca paṭṭhānavara'. The sevenfold division means the seven kinds according to the Dependent Origination round, etc. The connection shows this: these six, each with four divisions according to the triplet, etc., should be extracted as six according to the direct order of phenomena, etc. Here is the concise meaning: although divided according to the divisions of the direct order of phenomena, etc., the six methods of the Dhamma, known as Triplet Paṭṭhāna, etc., which are the triplet and other methods, are spoken of collectively by their general characteristic of being triplets, etc. When analyzed according to the Dependent Origination round, etc., and determined in their respective places, they are taken together under the general characteristic of directness as 'anuloma.' Thus, in the direct order of conditions, they are exceedingly profound. In the commentary, however, it is said, 'Here, this verse is spoken with reference to the direct order of conditions within that direct order of phenomena,' thus the direct order of phenomena is defined as a qualifier of the direct order of conditions. This same method applies to the verses on the reverse order, etc. The meaning of the Triplet Paṭṭhāna and the Dyad Paṭṭhāna has been previously explained, hence it is said, 'in the Dyad-Triplet Paṭṭhāna, etc.' 'Paṭṭhāna by triplets' means the analysis of conditions in various ways by the triplets, or the basis for the arising of knowledge by the triplets. The Triplet Paṭṭhāna related to the Dyad, or the foundation of the triplets which are distinguished by the dyads, is called the Dyad-Triplet Paṭṭhāna. To show this meaning, it is said, 'of the dyads,' etc. Being qualified by 'dyad', etc., means the state of being a dyad, etc., qualified by the term. This should be understood from statements such as, 'Dependent on a wholesome phenomenon that is a root...; dependent on a wholesome phenomenon that is not a root...'

Paccayānulomavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the direct order of conditions is completed.

2. Paccayapaccanīyavaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Reverse Order of Conditions

42-44. Yāvāti pāḷipadassa atthavacanaṃ yattakoti āha ‘‘pabhedo’’ti. Atthi tevīsatimūlakassāti attho. Tāva tattakaṃ pabhedaṃ. Tatthāti anulome āgatanti attho. Nayadassanavasena dassitaṃ[Pg.274], kinti? Ekekassa padassa vitthāraṃ dasseti. Avasesassa paccayassa mūlavantabhāvena gahitassa.

42-44. The meaning of the Pāli term 'yāva' is 'yattako' (as much as); this is stated as 'pabhedo' (division). The meaning is: it belongs to that which has twenty-three roots. 'Tāva' means that much division. 'Tattha' (therein) means 'it has come in the direct order'. It is shown by way of exhibiting the method. How so? It shows the detailed meaning of each term. Of the remaining condition, taken as possessing a root.

Paccayapaccanīyavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the reverse order of conditions is completed.

3. Anulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of the Direct and Reverse Order

45-48. Puna tatthāti anulome. Paccayapadānīti paccayā eva padāni paccayapadāni. Idhāti anulomapaccanīye. Suddhikapaccayānanti paccayantarena avomissānaṃ paccayānaṃ, anulomapaccanīyadesanaṃ vakkhamānaṃ sandhāyāti attho.

45-48. Again, 'therein' means in the direct order. 'Condition-terms' means the conditions themselves are terms, hence 'condition-terms'. 'Here' means in the Direct-Reverse Order. 'Of pure conditions' means of conditions unmixed with other conditions; the meaning is with reference to the teaching on the Direct-Reverse Order that is about to be given.

Anulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Direct and Reverse Order is concluded.

Pucchāvāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Chapter on Questions is concluded.

1. Kusalattikaṃ

1. The Wholesome Triplet

1. Paṭiccavāravaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Dependent Origination Section

1. Paccayānulomaṃ

1. The Direct Order of Conditions

(1) Vibhaṅgavāravaṇṇanā

(1) Explanation of the Division Section

53. Tikapadānaṃ tikantarapadehi visadisatā pākaṭāyevāti vuttaṃ ‘‘tikapadanānattamattena vinā’’ti. Mūlāvasānavasenāti ‘‘ekamūlekāvasānaṃ navā’’tiādinā vuttamūlāvasānavasena. ‘‘Na tāyeva vedanāttikādīsū’’ti ettha yā sadisatā paṭikkhittā, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘sadisataṃ sandhāya ‘na tāyevā’ti vutta’’nti āha. Yāti yā pucchā. Sabbapucchāsamāharaṇanti sabbāsaṃ ekūnapaññāsāya pucchānaṃ samuccayanaṃ anavasesetvā kathanaṃ. Idha imasmiṃ paṭiccavāruddese kattabbaṃ. Ādito hi anavasesato vutte pacchā yathārahaṃ tadekadesavacanaṃ yuttaṃ. Na hi tattha ekūnapaññāsa pucchā vissajjanaṃ labhantīti tattha tasmiṃ dhammānulomapaccanīye pītittike ekūnapaññāsa pucchā vissajjanaṃ na hi labhanti, aṭṭhavīse pana labhantīti attho.

53. That the dissimilarity of the triplet terms with the terms of other triplets is indeed evident is stated by 'except for the mere difference in the triplet terms'. 'By way of root and ending' means by way of the root and ending stated in 'with one root and one ending, there are nine,' etc. Here, in the phrase 'not in that same way in the feeling triplet, etc.', to show which similarity was rejected, he says, 'with reference to similarity, "not in that same way" was said'. 'Yā' means 'which question'. 'Gathering all questions' means the collecting and stating of all forty-nine questions without omission. This should be done here in this exposition of the Dependent Origination section. For when it is stated completely from the beginning, it is then fitting to state a part of it as appropriate. 'For indeed, forty-nine questions do not obtain a reply there' means that there, in that Direct-Reverse Order of Phenomena, in the Rapture Triplet, forty-nine questions do not obtain a reply, but twenty-eight do.

Tena sahajātapaccayabhūtenāti tena vedanādibhedena ekena dhammena sahajātapaccayo hontena, sahajātapaccayataṃ vā pattena pāpuṇantenāti [Pg.275] attho. Anuññātaṃ viya hotīti yadipi aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘yāva nirodhagamanā’’tiādivacanehi khaṇattayasamaṅgī uppajjatīti anuññātaṃ viya hoti, uppādakkhaṇasamaṅgīyeva pana uppajjatīti vutto paṭiccavārādīnaṃ channaṃ vārānaṃ uppādameva gahetvā pavattattā. Tathā hi tesu pacchājātapaccayo anulomato na tiṭṭhati.

'By that which has become a conascence condition' means: by that one phenomenon, differentiated as feeling, etc., being a conascence condition, or having attained the state of a conascence condition. 'It is as if permitted' means: although in the commentary, with statements such as 'until the going to cessation', it is as if it is permitted that what is endowed with the three moments arises, yet it is said that only what is endowed with the arising-moment arises, because the six sections beginning with the Dependent Origination section proceed by taking only arising. For thus, in them, the postnascence condition does not stand in the direct order.

Idha kusalavacanena gahite khandhe sandhāya vuttanti imasmiṃ paṭiccavāre ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjatī’’ti kusalasaddena gahite khandhe sandhāya vuttaṃ catūsupi kusalakhandhesu ekato uppajjamānesu sāmaññato vuttesu sahajātādisādhāraṇapaccayavasena avisesato sabbe sabbesaṃ paccayāti ayameva imassa paccayo, imasseva ayaṃ paccayoti ca niyametvā vattuṃ na sakkā. Tena vuttaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘ekasseva dvinnaṃyeva vā’’tiādi. ‘‘Sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṃ dhammaṃ paṭiccā’’tiādīsu pana visesanabhāvena vedanādīnaṃ visuṃ gahitattā ‘‘ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭicca dve khandhā’’tiādi vattuṃ sakkā. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘vedanāttikādīsu panā’’tiādi. Tathāti iminā ‘‘ekekassapi dukādibhedānañcā’’ti imaṃ anukaḍḍhati.

That it is said with reference to the aggregates taken by the word 'wholesome' here means: it is said with reference to the aggregates taken by the word 'wholesome' in this Dependent Origination section in the phrase 'Dependent on a wholesome phenomenon, a wholesome phenomenon arises'. When the four wholesome aggregates arise together and are spoken of generally, then by way of common conditions such as conascence, all are indiscriminately conditions for all, and it is not possible to determine and say, 'This is the condition only for this,' or 'Only this is the condition for this.' Therefore, it is said in the commentary: 'of one only, or of two only,' etc. However, in cases like 'dependent on a phenomenon associated with pleasant feeling,' etc., because feeling and so on are taken separately as qualifiers, it is possible to say, 'dependent on one aggregate, two aggregates arise,' etc. Thus, it is said, 'But in the feeling triplet, etc.' 'Similarly' draws in this: 'and of each of the divisions into dyads, etc.'

Etasminti ‘‘vipākābyākataṃ kiriyābyākata’’nti evaṃ vipākakiriyābyākataggahaṇe. ‘‘Sabbasmiṃ na gahetabba’’nti vuttaṃ, kattha pana gahetabbanti āha ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhānañca rūpanti etthevā’’ti. Evaṃ paṭhame vākye atibyāpitaṃ pariharitvā dutiye abyāpitaṃ pariharituṃ ‘‘na kevala’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. Etthāti ‘‘vipākābyākataṃ kiriyābyākata’’nti ettha na gahetabbaṃ tassapi āruppe uppajjamānassa rūpena vinā uppattito. Ettha ca yathā hetupaccayaggahaṇeneva ahetukaṃ nivattitaṃ, evaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānañca rūpanti rūpaggahaṇeneva āruppe vipākopi tattha uppajjamānena cittuppādena saddhiṃ na gahito. Taṃ panetaṃ atthasiddhameva akatvā sarūpato pākaṭataraṃ katvā dassetuṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘vipākābyākata’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. Paṭisandhipacchimacittāni panettha satipi rūpassa anuppādane vavatthānābhāvato na gahitānīti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

'In this' refers to this inclusion of 'resultant-indeterminate and functional-indeterminate'. It was said, 'It should not be taken in every case.' But where, then, should it be taken? He says, 'Only here, in "and mind-originated matter".' Thus, having avoided over-extension in the first statement, 'not only,' etc., was said to avoid under-extension in the second. 'Here' means it should not be taken here in 'resultant-indeterminate and functional-indeterminate', because that too arises in the formless realm, and its arising is without matter. And here, just as the rootless is excluded by the inclusion of 'root-condition', so too, by the inclusion of 'and mind-originated matter', resultant-consciousness in the formless realm is also not taken together with the consciousness-arising that arises there. But this is established by the meaning itself; to show it not implicitly but by making it more evident in its own form, 'resultant-indeterminate,' etc., was said in the commentary. It should be understood that rebirth-linking and the final consciousnesses are not taken here because there is an absence of establishment, even with the non-production of matter.

Paccayabhūtassāti khandhānaṃ paccayabhūtassa vatthussa aggahitatāpattiṃ nivāretuṃ, kathaṃ? Paccayuppannabhāvena, kattha? ‘‘Kaṭattā ca rūpa’’nti etasmiṃ sāmaññavacane ‘‘khandhe paṭicca vatthū’’ti vuttaṃ, evañhissa paccayuppannatā dassitā [Pg.276] hotīti. Aññamaññāpekkhaṃ vacanadvayanti ‘‘khandhe paṭicca vatthu, vatthuṃ paṭicca khandhā’’ti padadvayaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Sāmaññena gahitanti ‘‘kaṭattā ca rūpa’’nti iminā sāmaññavacanena, kaṭattārūpasāmaññena vā gahitaṃ.

Regarding 'that which is a condition'—this is to prevent the fault of not grasping the basis that has become a condition for the aggregates. How? By its nature as conditionally arisen. Where? In the general statement, 'And kamma-originated form,' it is said, 'the basis dependent on the aggregates'; thus its nature as conditionally arisen is shown. 'The two statements having mutual dependence'—this is said with reference to the pair of phrases: 'the basis dependent on the aggregates, the aggregates dependent on the basis.' 'Grasped generally'—this is grasped by this general statement, 'And kamma-originated form,' or by the generality of kamma-originated form.

Upādārūpaggahaṇena vinā ‘‘upādārūpa’’nti aggahetvā kevalaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānarūpaṃ ‘‘kaṭattārūpaṃ’’icceva gahetvāti attho. Etasmiṃ pana dassaneti ‘‘mahābhūtepi paṭicca uppattidassanattha’’nti vutte etasmiṃ atthadassane. Khandhapaccayasahitanti paṭisandhiyaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ, pavattiyaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ vadati. Asahitanti pana pavattiyaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ āhārasamuṭṭhānaṃ utusamuṭṭhānaṃ anindriyabaddhaṃ asaññabhavasaṅgahitañca rūpaṃ. Paṭisandhiyampīti pi-saddena pavattiyampi kaṭattārūpaṃ aññañca tattha uppajjanakaṃ upādārūpanti attho daṭṭhabbo. Kathaṃ panettha bhūte paṭicca uppajjamānassa rūpassa hetupaccayā uppajjatīti? ‘‘Khandhe paṭicca hetupaccayā uppajjamānaṃ rūpaṃ bhūtepi paṭicca uppajjatī’’ti evaṃ padametaṃ, bhūtānaṃ vā hetupaccayato nibbattattā evaṃ vuttaṃ. Kāraṇakāraṇampi hi kāraṇantveva vuccati yathā ‘‘corehi gāmo daḍḍho’’ti.

The meaning is: without grasping derived form as 'derived form', but grasping only mind-originated form as 'kamma-originated form'. But in this explanation—that is, in this explanation of the meaning when it is said, 'for the purpose of showing the arising dependent also on the great elements'. 'Accompanied by the aggregate-condition' refers to kamma-originated form at rebirth-linking and mind-originated form during the course of existence. 'Not accompanied,' however, refers to kamma-originated form during the course of existence, as well as nutriment-originated form, temperature-originated form, form not bound to faculties, and form included in the non-percipient existence. Regarding 'even at rebirth-linking,' by the word 'pi' (even/also), the meaning should be understood that also during the course of existence, kamma-originated form and other derived form that arises there are included. How here does form arising dependent on the elements arise from a root condition? 'Form arising dependent on the aggregates from a root condition also arises dependent on the elements'—such is this phrase; or, because the elements are produced from a root condition, it is stated thus. For the cause of a cause is also called a cause, as in the example, 'the village was burned by thieves.'

Bhūte paṭicca upādārūpanti paduddhāro kato, ‘‘mahābhūte paṭicca upādārūpa’’nti pana pāṭhoti aṭṭhakathāyañca tameva vuttaṃ. Ayaṃ hetthattho – ‘‘mahābhūte paṭicca upādārūpa’’nti imasmiṃ pāṭhe vuttanayena upādārūpampi kusale khandhe mahābhūte ca paṭicca uppajjatīti. Ko pana so nayoti taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘mahābhūte…pe… sandhāyāhā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tattha atthato ayaṃ nayo vuttoti ‘‘mahābhūte paṭicca cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpa’’nti iminā abyākate khandhe mahābhūte ca paṭicca upādārūpānaṃ uppattivacanena kusale khandhe mahābhūte ca paṭicca upādārūpānaṃ uppatti atthato vutto hotīti attho.

The phrase 'derived form dependent on the elements' is an extraction, but the reading is 'derived form dependent on the great elements,' and this very thing is stated in the commentary. This is the meaning here: by the method stated in this reading, 'derived form dependent on the great elements,' derived form also arises dependent on the wholesome aggregates and the great elements. But what is that method? To show this, it is said, 'dependent on the great elements… with reference to…' Therein, this method is stated in terms of meaning: by the statement, 'dependent on the great elements: mind-originated form, kamma-originated form, derived form,' the arising of derived form dependent on the indeterminate aggregates and the great elements is mentioned. Thus, the arising of derived form dependent on the wholesome aggregates and the great elements is stated in terms of meaning—this is the meaning.

54. Rūpena vinā paccayuppannaṃ na labbhatīti etena yā pucchā arūpamissakāvasānā, tāpi idha na gayhanti, pageva rūpāvasānāti dasseti.

54. 'Without form, the conditionally arisen cannot be obtained'—by this it is shown that even questions concluding with a mixture of the formless are not taken up here, let alone those concluding with form.

57. Tāya samānalakkhaṇāti pañcakkhandhapaṭisandhitāya gabbhaseyyakapaṭisandhiyā samānalakkhaṇā. Paripuṇṇadhammānanti pariyattivibhāgānaṃ pañcakkhandhadhammānaṃ. Etthāti etasmiṃ sahajātapaccayaniddese.

57. 'Having the same characteristic as that' means having the same characteristic as the rebirth-linking of the five aggregates, the rebirth-linking in the womb. 'Of the complete phenomena' refers to the five-aggregate phenomena of the divisions of the scriptures. 'Here' means in this exposition of the conascence condition.

Cittakammasamuṭṭhānarūpanti [Pg.277] cittasamuṭṭhānarūpaṃ kammasamuṭṭhānarūpañca. Puna āhārasamuṭṭhānanti ettha punagahaṇaṃ utusamuṭṭhānāpekkhaṃ. Na hi taṃ pubbe bāhiraggahaṇena aggahitaṃ, āhārasamuṭṭhānaṃ pana aggahitameva, utusamuṭṭhānassa kasmā punagahaṇanti āha ‘‘etehī’’tiādi. Tatthāti asaññasattesu. Tassāti utusamuṭṭhānassa. Ādimhīti bāhiraāhārasamuṭṭhānautusamuṭṭhānaasaññasattavasena āgatavārehi paṭhamavāre. Avisesavacananti bāhirādivisesaṃ akatvā vuttavacanaṃ, arūpampi paccayaṃ labhantaṃ atthaṃ hetādike paccaye labhantaṃ saha saṅgaṇhitvāti yojanā. Tassāti, tatthāti ca padadvayena yathāvuttaṃ paṭhamavārameva paccāmasati. Taṃsamānagatikanti cittasamuṭṭhānagatikaṃ. Idhāpīti imasmiṃ sahajātapaccayaniddesepi. Kammapaccayavibhaṅge viyāti nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayaniddese viya. Tathā hi vuttaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘taṃsamuṭṭhānanti iminā paṭisandhikkhaṇe kaṭattārūpampi saṅgaṇhātī’’ti. Ayañca atthaviseso ettha ekaṃsena icchitabboti dassento ‘‘na hi…pe… atthī’’ti āha.

'Mind-and-kamma-originated form' means form originated from mind and form originated from kamma. Regarding 'again, nutriment-originated'—here, the re-taking is with reference to temperature-originated. For that was not ungrasped previously by the grasping of 'external', but nutriment-originated was indeed ungrasped. Why then is temperature-originated taken again? He says, 'by these,' and so on. 'There' means in non-percipient beings. 'Of that' means of the temperature-originated. 'In the beginning' means in the first instance among the instances that came by way of external, nutriment-originated, temperature-originated, and non-percipient beings. 'The statement without distinction' means a statement made without making a distinction such as 'external', etc.; the construction is: having included together even the immaterial that obtains a condition and the thing that obtains conditions such as root, etc. With the two words, 'of that' and 'there,' he refers back to the very first instance as stated. 'Having the same course as that' means having the course of mind-originated. 'Here too' means in this exposition of the conascence condition as well. 'Like in the analysis of kamma condition' means like in the exposition of the different-moment kamma condition. For so it is said in the commentary: 'By “originated from that,” this includes form produced by kamma at the moment of rebirth-linking.' And showing that this particular meaning should be definitely intended here, he says, 'for indeed… there is…'

Avisesetvāti ‘‘utusamuṭṭhāna’’ntiādinā visesaṃ akatvā. Upādārūpanti visesetvāva kasmā pana vuttānīti yojanā. Hetupaccayādīsūti ādi-saddena sahajātapaccayādiṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Sahāti cittasamuṭṭhānarūpaṃ kaṭattārūpanti evaṃ ekato. Visunti cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ kaṭattārūpato visesetvā. Tattha bāhiraggahaṇādīhi viyāti yathā ‘‘bāhiraṃ ekaṃ mahābhūta’’ntiādīsu bāhiraāhārasamuṭṭhānautusamuṭṭhānaggahaṇehi mahābhūtāni visesitāni, evaṃ ettha ‘‘mahābhūte paṭiccā’’ti etasmiṃ niddese mahābhūtānaṃ kenaci visesanena avisesitattā cittasamuṭṭhānarūpabhāvakaṭattārūpabhāvehi visesetvāva vuttānīti yojanā.

'Without distinguishing' means without making a distinction by means of 'temperature-originated,' and so on. The construction is: why then are derived materialities mentioned, having been specifically distinguished? 'In root-condition, etc.'—by the word 'etc.,' conascence condition, etc., are included. 'Together' means mind-originated form and kamma-originated form, thus as one. 'Separately' means distinguishing mind-originated form from kamma-originated form. There, 'as with the grasping of external, etc.'—just as in passages like 'one external great element,' etc., the great elements are distinguished by the grasping of external, nutriment-originated, and temperature-originated, so here, in the exposition 'dependent on the great elements,' because the great elements are not distinguished by any qualifier, they are mentioned, having been specifically distinguished as mind-originated form and kamma-originated form—this is the construction.

Idāni aññenapi kāraṇena tesaṃ visesitabbataṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘apicā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha na koci paccayoti idaṃ paṭṭhāne āgataniyāmena rūpaṃ upanissayapaccayaṃ na labhatīti katvā vuttaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘hetādīsū’’ti. Tadavinābhāvato pana tassa cittakammānaṃ kāraṇabhāvo veditabbo, yato iddhicittanibbattāni kammapaccayāni cāti vuttāni. Nanu cittaṃ āhārautusamuṭṭhānānaṃ paccayo hotīti? Saccaṃ hoti, so pana upatthambhakattena, na janakattenāti dassento āha ‘‘āhāra…pe… janaka’’nti[Pg.278]. Kiṃ pana tesaṃ janakanti āha ‘‘mahābhūtāneva…pe… janakānī’’ti. Cittena kammunā ca vinā abhāve yathākkamaṃ cittakammasamuṭṭhānaupādārūpānanti attho. Cittasamuṭṭhānarūpakaṭattārūpabhūtānevāti cittakammasamuṭṭhānamahābhūtanibbattāneva mahābhūtānaṃ tesaṃ āsannakāraṇattā. Aññānīti utuāhārasamuṭṭhānāni upādārūpāni vadati. Visesanaṃ kataṃ ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpa’’nti. Samānajātikena rūpena utunā āhārena cāti attho. Pākaṭavisesanānevāti idaṃ yehi mahābhūtehi tāni nibbattāni, tesaṃ ‘‘āhārasamuṭṭhānaṃ utusamuṭṭhāna’’nti visesitattā vuttaṃ. Na visesanaṃ arahanti na visesitabbāni kāraṇavisesaneneva visesassa siddhattā, ‘‘mahābhūte paṭicca upādārūpa’’ntveva vattabbanti attho. Etāni pana cittajakammajarūpāni.

Now, to show that they should be distinguished for another reason, 'furthermore,' etc., is said. Therein, 'no condition whatsoever' is said because, according to the method that has come down in the Paṭṭhāna, form does not obtain the support condition. Therefore, he says, 'in root-condition, etc.' However, because of its inseparability from them, the causal nature of mind and kamma should be understood, since things produced by psychic-power-mind and things conditioned by kamma are spoken of. Is it not that mind is a condition for nutriment-originated and temperature-originated things? It is true that it is, but showing that this is by way of support, not by way of generation, he says, 'nutriment… generator.' But what generates them? He says, 'the great elements themselves… are generators.' The meaning is: in the absence of mind and kamma respectively, there is an absence of mind-originated and kamma-originated derived forms. 'They are just the great elements that are mind-originated form and kamma-originated form' means they are produced just by the great elements that are mind-originated and kamma-originated, because those great elements are their proximate cause. 'Others' refers to the derived forms that are temperature-originated and nutriment-originated. The qualification is made: 'mind-originated form, kamma-originated form, derived form.' The meaning is: by form of the same kind, that is, by temperature and by nutriment. 'They are manifest qualifiers'—this is said because those great elements by which they are produced are qualified as 'nutriment-originated' and 'temperature-originated.' They do not merit qualification; they should not be qualified, since the distinction is established merely by the qualification of the cause. The meaning is that it should simply be said, 'derived form dependent on the great elements.' These, however, are the forms produced by mind and kamma.

Savisesenāti yena visesena visesitā, taṃ dassento cittaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘sahajātādipaccayabhāvato’’ti, itaraṃ pana sandhāya ‘‘mūlakāraṇabhāvato’’ti, kammūpanissayapaccayabhāvatoti attho. Itarānīti āhārautusamuṭṭhānānipi upādārūpāni. Mahābhūtavisesaneneva visesitānīti ‘‘āhārasamuṭṭhānaṃ ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ paṭicca utusamuṭṭhānaṃ ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ paṭiccā’’ti mahābhūtavisesaneneva janakapaccayena āhārena utunā ca visesitāni. Idhāti ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpa’’nti imasmiṃ vacane. Ettha hi upādārūpānaṃ cittakammasamuṭṭhānatāvacanena taṃnissayānampi tabbhāvo pakāsitoti. Aññataravisesanaṃ ubhayavisesanaṃ hoti ubhayesaṃ avinibbhogena pavattanato.

‘With distinction’ means showing that by which distinction they are distinguished. To show this, referring to the mind, he says, ‘due to being a co-nascence condition, etc.,’ while referring to the other, he says, ‘due to being a root cause,’ the meaning of which is, ‘due to being a kamma decisive support condition.’ ‘Others’ means the derived materialities that are also nutriment-originated and temperature-originated. ‘They are distinguished solely by the distinction of the great elements’ means that they are distinguished by nutriment and temperature as generative conditions, solely by the distinction of the great elements, as in: ‘Nutriment-originated, dependent on one great element; temperature-originated, dependent on one great element.’ ‘Here’ means in this statement: ‘mind-originated materiality, kamma-originated materiality, derived materiality.’ For here, by the statement that derived materialities are mind- and kamma-originated, their state of being dependent on them is also revealed. A distinction pertaining to one becomes a distinction pertaining to both, because they occur inseparably.

58. Pubbeti hetupaccayādīsu. Visuṃ paccayabhāvenāti ‘‘paṭisandhikkhaṇe vipākābyākataṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭicca tayo khandhā kaṭattā ca rūpa’’ntiādinā vatthussa visuṃ paccayabhāvena. Ettha ca visuṃyeva paccayabhāvena dassitānīti na sakkā vattuṃ, ‘‘khandhe paṭicca vatthu, vatthuṃ paṭicca khandhā’’ti paccayuppannabhāvo viya khandhānaṃ ekatopi paccayabhāvo dassito. Teneva hi tasmiṃ atthe attano aruciṃ vibhāvento āha ‘‘iminā adhippāyenāhā’’ti. Yo panattho attano ruccati, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘khandhe paṭicca vatthūti idaṃ panā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Khandhānaṃ paccayabhūtānaṃ paṭiccaṭṭhapharaṇatādassanaṃ[Pg.279], vatthussa paccayabhūtassa paṭiccaṭṭhapharaṇatādassanaṃ, na khandhānanti sambandho. Idhevāti imasmiṃ aññamaññapaccaye eva. Hetupaccayādīsupi ayameva nayo, tattha hi paṭiccaṭṭhapharaṇassa samānatā. Dassitāya paṭiccaṭṭhadvayapharaṇatāya. Khandhavatthūnañca dassitāyevāti khandhavatthūnañca ekato paṭiccaṭṭhapharaṇatā dassitāyeva.

58. ‘Previously’ means in the root condition, etc. ‘By way of distinct conditionality’ means by way of the basis being a distinct condition, as in: ‘at the moment of rebirth-linking, dependent on one resultant indeterminate aggregate, there are three aggregates and kamma-originated materiality,’ and so on. And here it cannot be said that they are shown only by way of a distinct condition, for just as the state of being conditionally arisen is shown in ‘the aggregates condition the basis, the basis conditions the aggregates,’ so too is the conditionality of the aggregates shown even collectively. Therefore, clarifying his own dislike for that meaning, he says, ‘it is said with this intention.’ But to show the meaning that he himself prefers, it is said, ‘“dependent on the aggregates, the basis”—this, however,’ and so on. The showing of the pervasion of the meaning of dependence by the aggregates which are conditions, and the showing of the pervasion of the meaning of dependence by the basis which is a condition—this is not of the aggregates alone; this is the connection. ‘Herein’ means precisely in this mutual condition. This same method applies also to the root condition, etc., for there the pervasion of the meaning of dependence is the same. By the shown pervasion of the twofold meaning of dependence. And ‘of the aggregates and the basis are likewise shown’ means: the collective pervasion of the meaning of dependence of both the aggregates and the basis is likewise shown.

Evamādīti ādi-saddena ‘‘akusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭiccā’’ti evamādi saṅgayhati. Nanu bhavitabbanti yojanā. Hetupaccayādīhi viyāti sadisūdāharaṇanti taṃ dassento ‘‘na hī’’tiādimāha. Yaṃ ‘‘ekaṃ, tayo, dve ca khandhe paṭiccā’’ti vuttaṃ paccayajātanti attho. Paccayaṭṭho hi paṭiccaṭṭho. Tenāha ‘‘te hetupaccayabhūtā eva na hontī’’ti. Etena na paṭiccaṭṭhapharaṇakassa ekantiko hetuādipaccayabhāvoti dasseti. Tenāha ‘‘esa nayo ārammaṇapaccayādīsū’’ti. Na hi ārammaṇapaccayabhūto dhammo paṭiccaṭṭhaṃ pharati. Vuttañca ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjati ārammaṇapaccayā’’ti.

‘And so on’ means that by the word ‘etc.,’ ‘dependent on an unwholesome phenomenon,’ and so on, is included. The connection is: ‘Should it not be?’ ‘Like the root condition, etc.’ means similar examples; showing that, he said, ‘for not indeed,’ etc. What was stated as ‘dependent on one, three, and two aggregates’ means the type of condition. For the meaning of condition is the meaning of dependence. Therefore, he said: ‘They are not merely of the nature of root conditions.’ By this, he shows that the state of being a root condition, etc., is not an absolute characteristic of that which pervades the meaning of dependence. Hence, he says: ‘This is the method regarding the object condition, etc.’ For a phenomenon that is an object condition does not pervade the meaning of dependence. And it has been said: ‘Dependent on a wholesome phenomenon, a wholesome phenomenon arises by way of object condition.’

Paccayantarenapi upakārakatāmattampi gahetvā paṭiccavāre vārantare ca hetuādipaccayā dassitāti upacayena yathāvuttaṃ vibhāvento ‘‘paccayavāre cā’’tiādimāha. Taṃpaccayāti vatthupaccayā, yathārahaṃ paccayabhūtaṃ vatthuṃ labhitvāti attho. Teti kusale khandhe paṭicca. Tesanti mahābhūtānaṃ khandhānaṃ. Paccayabhāvābhāvatoti idaṃ khandhānaṃ hetusahajātādipaccayabhāvassa mahābhūtesu diṭṭhattā vuttaṃ. Yadi evaṃ aññamaññapaccayāpi te tesaṃ bhaveyyunti parassa āsaṅkanirāsaṅkaṃ karonto ‘‘aññamaññasaddo hī’’tiādimāha. Nirapekkhoti aññanirapekkho. Na hi hetudhammo dhammantarāpekkho hutvā hetupaccayo hoti, saddasīsenettha attho vutto. Aññatarāpekkhoti attanā sahakārikāraṇabhūtaṃ, itaraṃ vā yaṃ kiñci aññataraṃ apekkhatīti aññatarāpekkho. Yathāvuttetaretarāpekkhoti arūpakkhandhādibhedaṃ pāḷiyaṃ vuttappakāraṃ itaretaraṃ mithu paccayabhūtaṃ apekkhatīti itaretarāpekkho. Paccayapaccayuppannā ca khandhā mahābhūtā idha yathāvuttā bhaveyyunti kasmā vuttaṃ. Na hi khandhā mahābhūtā aññamaññaṃ aññamaññapaccayabhāvena vuttā, atha khandhā ca mahābhūtā cāti visuṃ visuṃ gayheyyuṃ, evaṃ sati ‘‘mahābhūtā khandhānaṃ na koci paccayo’’ti na vattabbaṃ.

Explaining what has been stated figuratively—that the root and other conditions are shown in the section on dependence and in other sections by taking into account even the mere helpfulness through other conditions—he says, ‘and in the section on conditions,’ etc. ‘That condition’ means the basis-condition; the meaning is, having obtained a basis that is a condition, as is appropriate. ‘Those’ refers to ‘dependent on the wholesome aggregates.’ ‘Of them’ means of the aggregates and the great elements. ‘Due to the presence or absence of conditionality’—this is stated because the state of the aggregates being a root condition, co-nascence condition, etc., is seen in relation to the great elements. Dispelling another's doubt that ‘if so, they would also be mutual conditions for them,’ he says, ‘for the word “mutual”,’ etc. ‘Independent’ means independent of another. For a root phenomenon does not become a root condition by being dependent on another phenomenon; here the meaning is stated by the head of the word itself. ‘Dependent on another’ means it depends on something else, either a co-operating cause with itself or some other thing. ‘Mutually dependent as stated’ means it depends on the other which is a mutual condition, of the type stated in the Pāli, such as the formless aggregates. Why is it said, ‘Here the aggregates, which are both conditions and conditionally arisen, and the great elements should be as stated’? For the aggregates and the great elements are not stated as being mutual conditions for each other. Now, if the aggregates and the great elements were to be taken separately, in that case it should not be said, ‘The great elements are in no way a condition for the aggregates.’

Yassa [Pg.280] sayaṃ paccayo, tato tena tannissitena vāti yassa dhammassa sayaṃ attanā paccayo hoti, tato dhammato sayaṃ uppajjamānaṃ kathaṃ tena dhammena tannissitena vā aññamaññapaccayena evaṃbhūtaṃ taṃ dhammajātaṃ aññamaññapaccayā uppajjatīti vattabbataṃ arahatīti vuttamevatthaṃ udāharaṇena vibhāveti ‘‘yathā’’tiādinā. Tattha ‘‘khandhe paṭicca khandhā’’ti idaṃ ‘‘tena aññamaññapaccayena uppajjamāna’’nti imassa udāharaṇaṃ, ‘‘vatthuṃ paccayā khandhā’’ti idaṃ pana ‘‘tannissitena aññamaññapaccayena uppajjamāna’’nti etassa. Tasmāti vuttameva atthaṃ kāraṇabhāvena paccāmasati. Attano paccayassa paccayattābhāvatoti attano paccayabhūtassa arūpakkhandhassa paccayabhāvābhāvato. Na hi mahābhūtā yato khandhato uppannā, tesaṃ paccayā honti. Tadapekkhattāti itaretarapaccayabhāvāpekkhattā. Khandhe paṭicca paccayā cāti paṭiccavāre vuttaniyāmeneva khandhe paṭicca, paccayavāre vuttaniyāmena khandhe paccayā ca. Naaññamaññapaccayā ca vuttāti aññamaññapaccayato aññasmā nissayapaccayādito mahābhūtānaṃ uppatti vuttā cāti attho. Vatthuṃ paccayā uppajjamānāti vatthuṃ purejātapaccayaṃ katvā uppajjamānā. Tannissitena ca aññamaññapaccayenāti taṃ vatthuṃ nissitena khandhena aññamaññapaccayabhūtena uppajjanti, tasmā yathāvuttena kāraṇena vatthuṃ paccayā…pe… vuttā, iminā pariyāyena pana ujukaṃ pavattiyaṃ vatthussa aññamaññapaccayabhāvoti attho.

He clarifies the meaning already stated with an example, saying ‘just as,’ etc.: How can a class of phenomena, which is itself a condition for a certain phenomenon and which arises from that phenomenon, be fit to be called ‘arising by mutual condition’ with that phenomenon, or with what is dependent on it, as a mutual condition? Therein, ‘aggregates dependent on aggregates’ is an example for ‘arising by that mutual condition’; but ‘aggregates due to a basis’ is an example for ‘arising by a mutual condition dependent on that.’ ‘Therefore’ refers back to the meaning already stated as a reason. ‘Because its own condition is not a condition’ means because of the absence of conditionality towards the formless aggregate which is its own condition. For the great elements are not conditions for those aggregates from which they themselves have arisen. ‘Because of dependence on that’ means because of dependence on the state of being a reciprocal condition. ‘Dependent on the aggregates and as conditions’ means: dependent on the aggregates according to the rule stated in the section on dependence, and as conditions for the aggregates according to the rule stated in the section on conditions. And ‘the arising is stated not by mutual condition’ means: the arising of the great elements is also stated to be from another condition apart from mutual condition, such as dependence condition. ‘Arising due to a basis’ means arising having made the basis a pre-nascence condition. ‘And by a mutual condition dependent on that’ means they arise by an aggregate that is a mutual condition and is dependent on that basis. Therefore, for the reason stated, ‘due to a basis…,’ etc., has been said. But by this method, in a direct occurrence, the basis has the state of being a mutual condition—this is the meaning.

59. Sā na gahitāti yā ‘‘cakkhāyatanaṃ nissāyā’’tiādinā cakkhāyatanādīnaṃ nissayapaccayatā vuttā, sā idha paṭiccavāre na vuttāti attho sahajātattho paṭiccatthoti katvā. Tenāha ‘‘cakkhāyatanādīni…pe… adhippāyo’’ti. Yesaṃ pana arūpakkhandhamahābhūtanāmarūpacittacetasikamahābhūtarūpidhammānaṃ vasena chadhā nissayapaccayo icchito, tesaṃ vasena idha vibhatto eva. Kathaṃ rūpivasena vibhattoti ce? ‘‘Vatthuṃ paṭicca khandhā’’ti hadayavatthuvasena sarūpato dassito eva. Itaresampi vasena ‘‘abyākataṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca abyākato dhammo uppajjati nissayapaccayā’’ti ettha dassito. Yathā hi ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjati ārammaṇapaccayā’’tiādīsu rūpāyatanādīnaṃ asatipi paṭiccaṭṭhapharaṇe ārammaṇapaccayabhāvo dassito hoti, evamidhāpi cakkhāyatanādīnaṃ nissayapaccayabhāvo dassito hoti. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘nissaya…pe… na gahitānī’’ti.

59. 'That is not included' means that the dependence conditionality of the eye-base and so on, which is stated in terms like 'dependent on the eye-base,' is not stated here in the section on conditionality, taking the meaning of co-nascence to be the meaning of conditionality. Therefore, he says, 'the eye-base and so on... is the intended meaning.' However, for those for whom the dependence condition is desired in six ways—namely, in terms of the formless aggregates, the great elements, name-and-form, consciousness and mental factors, the great elements, and material phenomena—it is indeed analyzed here in terms of those. If it is asked, 'How is it analyzed in terms of materiality?', it is indeed shown in its own form by way of the heart-basis in 'aggregates dependent on the basis.' For the others too, it is shown here in 'an indeterminate phenomenon arises dependent on an indeterminate phenomenon by way of dependence condition.' Just as in statements like 'a wholesome phenomenon arises dependent on a wholesome phenomenon by way of object condition,' the state of being an object condition is shown for the form-base and so on even when there is no fulfillment of the function of conditionality, so too here the state of being a dependence condition for the eye-base and others is shown. Therefore, it is said, 'dependence... not included.'

60. Dvīsu [Pg.281] upanissayesūti anantarapakatūpanissayesu. Kusalāpi pana mahaggatāti pi-saddena abyākate mahaggate ākaḍḍhati ‘‘kusalāpi mahaggatā ārammaṇūpanissayaṃ na labhanti, pageva abyākatā’’ti. Kadāci na labhanti, yadā garuṃ katvā na pavattantīti attho.

60. 'In two powerful supports' means in the powerful supports just discussed. 'Moreover, even wholesome exalted states'—by the word 'even,' he draws in indeterminate exalted states, saying: 'Even wholesome exalted states do not obtain object powerful support, how much more so indeterminate ones.' They do not obtain it sometimes, meaning when they do not occur having made the object weighty.

61. Aññattha hetupaccayādīsu. Paccayaṃ aniddisitvāti paccayaṃ dhammaṃ sarūpato aniddisitvā. Na hi hetupaccayaniddesādīsu alobhādikusalādisarūpavisesato hetuādidhammā dassitā. Kusalādīsūti idaṃ alobhādivisesanaṃ. Tena yathā alobhādīsu ayameva paccayoti niyamo natthi, evaṃ tabbisesesu kusalādīsūti dasseti. Idha pana purejātapaccaye. Vatthunavatthudhammesūti niddhāraṇe bhummaṃ. Purejātapaccayā uppajjamānānanti iminā paṭisandhikkhaṇe, āruppe uppajjamāne ca khandhe nivatteti. Kasmā panettha vatthupurejātameva gahitaṃ, na ārammaṇapurejātanti codanaṃ manasi katvā āha ‘‘ārammaṇapurejātampi hi vatthupurejāte avijjamāne na labbhatī’’ti. Tassāti paṭisandhivipākassa. Na uddhaṭoti vuttamevatthaṃ pākaṭaṃ kātuṃ ‘‘nevavipāka…pe… tīṇīti vutta’’nti vuttaṃ. Alābhatoti yadi labbheyya, ‘‘cattārī’’ti vattabbaṃ siyāti dasseti. Tatthāti vipākattike. Tīṇīti ‘‘vipākaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca vipāko dhammo uppajjati purejātapaccayā, vipākadhammadhammaṃ, nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammaṃ paṭiccā’’ti imāni tīṇi.

61. In other places, such as in the root condition and so on. 'Without specifying the condition' means without specifying the condition-phenomenon in its own nature. For in the exposition of the root condition and so on, the root and other phenomena are not shown in terms of their specific nature, such as non-greed and other wholesome qualities. 'In the wholesome and so on'—this is a qualifier for non-greed and so on. Thus, just as there is no restriction that only this is the condition in non-greed and so on, so too he shows that it is the same regarding those specifics, such as the wholesome and so on. Here, however, in the pre-nascence condition. 'In the physical basis and phenomena that are not the basis' is a locative of determination. 'For phenomena arising by the pre-nascence condition'—with this, he excludes the aggregates at the moment of rebirth-linking and those arising in the immaterial realm. Considering the objection, 'But why is only the physical base as pre-nascence taken here, and not the object as pre-nascence?', he says: 'For even object as pre-nascence is not obtainable without the physical base as pre-nascence.' 'Of that' refers to the rebirth-linking resultant. 'Not extracted'—to make the meaning already stated clear, it is said, 'neither resultant... three are said.' 'From non-obtainment'—he shows that if it were obtainable, it would have to be said as 'four.' 'Therein' refers to the resultant triad. 'Three' refers to these three cases: 'A resultant phenomenon arises dependent on a resultant phenomenon by way of pre-nascence condition,' 'dependent on a resultant-associated phenomenon,' and 'dependent on a neither-resultant-nor-non-resultant-phenomenon.'

63. Tadupādārūpānanti te mahābhūte nissāya pavattaupādārūpānaṃ. Vadatīti ekakkhaṇikanānākkhaṇikakammapaccayaṃ vadati avinibbhogavasena pavattamānānaṃ tesaṃ paccayena visesābhāvato. Pavattiyaṃ kaṭattārūpānanti visesanaṃ paṭisandhikkhaṇe kaṭattārūpānaṃ ekakkhaṇikassapi kammapaccayassa icchitattā. Teneva hi aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘tathā paṭisandhikkhaṇe mahābhūtāna’’nti duvidhopi kammapaccayo vutto.

63. 'Of those derived material phenomena' refers to the derived material phenomena that occur dependent on those great elements. 'He states' means he speaks of the kamma condition as momentary and non-momentary, since there is no distinction by way of condition for them, as they occur inseparably. 'In the course of life, for kamma-originated material phenomena'—this is a qualification, because for kamma-originated material phenomena at the moment of rebirth-linking, even the momentary kamma condition is accepted. For this very reason, in the commentary, both types of kamma condition are mentioned in 'so too at the moment of rebirth-linking for the great elements.'

64. Yaṃ yaṃ paṭisandhiyaṃ labbhatīti cakkhundriyādīsu yaṃ yaṃ indriyarūpaṃ paṭisandhiyaṃ labbhati, tassa tassa vasena indriyarūpañca vatthurūpañca ‘‘kaṭattārūpa’’nti vuttaṃ.

64. 'Whatever is obtainable at rebirth-linking'—among the faculties such as the eye faculty, whatever faculty-materiality is obtainable at rebirth-linking, in terms of each of those, both the faculty-materiality and the base-materiality are called 'kamma-originated materiality.'

69. Kesañcīti pañcavokāre paṭisandhikkhandhādīnaṃ. Tesañhi vatthu niyamato vippayuttapaccayo hoti. Samānavippayuttapaccayāti sadisavippayuttapaccayā. Kusalākusalā hi khandhā ekacce ca abyākatā yassa [Pg.282] vippayuttapaccayā honti, na sayaṃ tato vippayuttapaccayaṃ labhanti cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ vippayuttapaccayābhāvato vatthunāva vippayuttapaccayena uppajjanato. Ekacce pana abyākatā yassa vippayuttapaccayā honti, sayampi tato vippayuttapaccayaṃ labhanti yathā paṭisandhikkhaṇe vatthukkhandhā. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘kesañci khandhā…pe… nānāvippayuttapaccayāpī’’ti. Paccayaṃ paccayaṃ karotīti paccayadhammaṃ vatthuṃ khandhe ca attano paccayabhūtaṃ karoti, yathāvuttaṃ paccayadhammaṃ paccayaṃ katvā pavattatīti attho. Taṃkiriyākaraṇatoti vippayuttapaccayakiccakaraṇato. Paṭicca uppatti natthīti paṭiccaṭṭhapharaṇaṃ natthi sahajātaṭṭho paṭiccaṭṭhoti katvā. ‘‘Paṭicca uppajjantī’’ti ettakamevāha, kiṃ paṭicca? Khandheti pākaṭoyamatthoti. Tenāha ‘‘kiṃ pana paṭiccā’’tiādi. Paccāsattiñāyena anantarassa vidhi paṭisedho vā hotīti gaṇheyyāti taṃ nivāretuṃ vuttanti dassento ‘‘anantarattā…pe… vuttaṃ hotī’’ti āha.

69. 'For some' refers to the aggregates of rebirth-linking, etc., in the five-constituent existence. For them, the physical basis is invariably a dissociated condition. 'Similar dissociated condition' means a like dissociated condition. For some wholesome and unwholesome aggregates, and some indeterminate aggregates, which are dissociated conditions for others, do not themselves receive a dissociated condition from them, because there is no dissociated condition for mind-originated phenomena, as they arise only by means of the dissociated condition of the physical basis. However, some indeterminate aggregates, which are dissociated conditions for others, do themselves receive a dissociated condition from them, as in the case of the physical basis and aggregates at the moment of rebirth-linking. Therefore, it is said: 'For some aggregates... even a dissimilar dissociated condition.' 'Making a condition a condition' means the condition-phenomenon makes the physical basis and the aggregates its own condition; the meaning is that it proceeds having made the aforesaid condition-phenomenon its condition. 'By performing that action' means by performing the function of a dissociated condition. 'There is no arising in dependence' means there is no fulfillment of the function of conditionality, having taken it that the meaning of co-nascence is the meaning of conditionality. He says only this much: 'They arise in dependence.' Dependent on what? On the aggregates. This meaning is clear. Therefore, he says: 'But what do they depend on?' etc. To prevent one from taking it that 'by the principle of proximity, there is an affirmation or a denial regarding what is immediately preceding,' he says, showing what is stated: 'Because of immediacy... it is said.'

71-72. Saṅkhipitvā dassitānaṃ vasenetaṃ vuttanti saṅkhipitvā dassitānaṃ paccayānaṃ vasena etaṃ ‘‘ime tevīsati paccayā’’tiādivacanaṃ vācanāmaggaṃ dassentehipi pāḷiyaṃ vuttanti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaṃ. Ekenapīti kusalādīsu ca padesu ekenapi padena, tasmiṃ tasmiṃ vā paccayaniddese vākyasaṅkhātena ekenapi padena. Tayo paccayāti hetuārammaṇādhipatipaccayā. Te cattāro pacchājātañca vajjetvāti ettha yathāvutte cattāro paccaye vitthāritattā ‘‘vajjetvā’’ti vuttaṃ, pacchājātaṃ pana sabbena sabbaṃ aggahitattā. Ettakā hi ekūnavīsati paccayā yathāvutte paccaye vajjetvā avasiṭṭhā. Ye panāti padakārake vadati. Saṅkhipitvāti padassa ‘‘pāḷiyaṃ vitthāritaṃ avitthāritañca sabbaṃ saṅgahetvā vutta’’nti atthaṃ vadanti. ‘‘Tevīsati paccayā’’ti pāṭhena bhavitabbaṃ ‘‘sabbaṃ saṅgahetvā’’ti vuttattā. Pacchājātapaccayoyeva hi vajjetabboti. Evaṃ vādantare vattabbaṃ vatvā idāni pāḷiyā aviparītaṃ atthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘ādimhi panā’’tiādi vuttaṃ.

71-72. This is said in terms of what has been shown in brief; that is, the statement 'these twenty-three conditions' and so forth, is said in the Pāli text even by those who indicate the path of recitation, as stated in the Commentary. 'Even by one' means even by one word in sections such as the wholesome, etc., or even by one word, termed a sentence, in each condition exposition. 'Three conditions' are the root, object, and dominance conditions. Regarding 'excluding those four and the post-nascence': here, 'excluding' is said because the four conditions as stated have been explained in detail, but the post-nascence condition is entirely unincluded. Indeed, this many—nineteen conditions—remain after excluding the conditions as stated. 'But those who' refers to the authors of the text. They say the meaning of the word 'saṅkhipitvā' is 'having gathered all that is detailed and undetailed in the Pāli, it is said.' The reading should be 'twenty-three conditions,' because it is said 'having gathered all.' Indeed, only the post-nascence condition should be excluded. Thus, having stated what should be said regarding another view, now to show the meaning not contrary to the Pāli, 'in the beginning, however' and so forth is said.

Vibhaṅgavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Division of Analysis is completed.

(2) Saṅkhyāvāravaṇṇanā

(2) The Exposition of the Numerical Section

73. Yathā [Pg.283] aññamaññapaccaye viseso vibhaṅge atthīti idaṃ hetupaccayādivibhaṅgato visesabhāvasāmaññena vuttaṃ. Na hi yādiso aññamaññapaccayavibhaṅge viseso, tādiso purejātapaccayavibhaṅge. Tathā hi aññamaññapaccaye paṭisandhi labbhati, na purejātapaccaye. ‘‘Vipākābyākataṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭiccā’’tiādike vibhaṅgeti iminā yasmiṃ paccaye vipākābyākataṃ uddhaṭaṃ, taṃ nidassanavasena dasseti. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – yathā hetupaccayādīsu ‘‘vipākābyākataṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭiccā’’tiādinā vibhaṅge vipākābyākataṃ uddhaṭaṃ atthi, evaṃ vipākābyākatābhāvaṃ āsevanapaccaye visesaṃ dassetīti.

73. Just as there is a distinction in the analysis of the mutual condition, this is stated in terms of the general nature of distinction from the analysis of the root condition, etc. For the distinction found in the analysis of the mutual condition is not the same as that in the analysis of the pre-nascence condition. Indeed, rebirth-linking is obtained in the mutual condition, but not in the pre-nascence condition. By 'in the analysis,' in passages such as, "Conditioning one resultant-indeterminate aggregate," he shows by way of example in which condition the resultant-indeterminate is extracted. This means: just as in the root condition, etc., the resultant-indeterminate is extracted in the analysis by statements like 'Conditioning one resultant-indeterminate aggregate,' so too, the absence of the resultant-indeterminate is shown as a distinction in the repetition condition.

74. Etasmiṃ anulometi imasmiṃ paṭiccavāre paccayānulome. Suddhikanayeti paṭhame naye. Dassitagaṇanatoti ‘‘nava, tīṇi, eka’’nti evaṃ saṅkhepato dassitagaṇanato. Tato paresu nayesūti tato paṭhamanayato paresu dutiyādinayesu. Aññissāti navādibhedato aññissā gaṇanāya. Abahugaṇanena yuttassa bahugaṇanassa paccayassa, tena abahugaṇanena. Samānagaṇanatā cāti ca-saddo byatireko. Tena paccanīyato anulome yo viseso vuccati, taṃ joteti. Tenāha ‘‘anulomeyeva daṭṭhabbā’’ti. Anulomeyevāti avadhāraṇena nivattitaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘paccanīye…pe… vakkhatī’’ti vuttaṃ.

74. 'In this forward order' means in this chapter on conditionality, in the forward order of conditions. 'Pure method' means the first method. 'As for the indicated count' means from the count shown concisely as 'nine, three, one.' 'Then, in the subsequent methods' means in the second and subsequent methods after the first method. 'Another' means by a different count from the ninefold division, etc. For a condition of a large count, when it is associated with a lesser count, it is by that lesser count. 'And sameness in count'—the word 'ca' is distinctive. It indicates the distinction that is said to exist in the positive order in contrast to the negative order. Therefore, it is said: 'only the forward order should be seen.' To show what has been excluded by the determination 'only in the forward order,' it is said: 'in the negative order... it will be stated.'

76-79. Te pana terasamūlakādike naye sāsevanasavipākesu dvīsu dvāvīsatimūlakesu sāsevanameva gahetvā itaraṃ pajahanto āha ‘‘pacchājātavipākānaṃ parihīnattā’’ti. Virodhābhāve satīti idaṃ ‘‘siyā kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca akusalo dhammo uppajjeyyā’’tiādīsu viya parikappavacanaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘pucchāya dassitanayenā’’ti. Tassa ca tevīsatimūlakassa. Nāmanti tevīsatimūlakanti nāmaṃ. Dvāvīsati…pe… vuttanti etena dvāvīsatimūlakova paramatthato labbhati, na tevīsatimūlakoti dasseti.

76-79. Now, in those methods beginning with the thirteen-rooted, in the two twenty-two-rooted ones that include the repetition and resultant conditions, taking only the repetition condition and abandoning the other, he says: 'because post-nascence and resultant conditions are excluded.' 'When there is no contradiction'—this is said with reference to hypothetical statements, such as, 'Could an unwholesome phenomenon arise dependent on a wholesome phenomenon?' Therefore, he says: 'by the method shown in the question.' And of that twenty-three-rooted one. The name is 'twenty-three-rooted.' By 'twenty-two... as stated,' it is shown that, in the ultimate sense, only the twenty-two-rooted is obtained, not the twenty-three-rooted.

Aññapadānīti [Pg.284] hetuadhipatipadādīni. Suddhikanayoti paṭhamanayo, yaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘ekamūla’’nti vuttaṃ. Ārammaṇamūlakādīsu na labbhatīti dumūlakādīsu taṃ na yojīyati. Heṭṭhimaṃ heṭṭhimaṃ sodhetvā eva hi abhidhammapāḷi pavattā, tasmā ‘‘ārammaṇe…pe… pañhā’’ti vuttanti sambandho. Tatthāti ‘‘tīṇiyeva pañhā’’ti pāṭhe. ‘‘Vattu adhippāyānuvidhāyī saddappayogo’’ti katvā adhippāyaṃ vibhāvento āha ‘‘tato uddhaṃ gaṇanaṃ nivāreti, na adho paṭikkhipatī’’ti. Gaṇanāya upanikkhittapaññattibhāvato heṭṭhāgaṇanaṃ amuñcitvāva uparigaṇanā sambhavatīti āha ‘‘tīsu ekassa antogadhatāya ca ‘tīṇiyevā’ti vutta’’nti. Attano vacananti ‘‘tatridaṃ lakkhaṇa’’ntiādinā vuttaṃ attano vacanaṃ.

'Other terms' are the terms for root condition, dominance condition, etc. 'Pure method' is the first method, which in the commentary is called 'single-rooted.' 'It is not found in the object-rooted, etc.' means it is not applicable to the double-rooted, etc. For the Abhidhamma Pāḷi proceeds by clarifying each lower level; therefore, the connection is stated as 'in object...question.' 'There' refers to the reading 'only three questions.' Having taken the position that 'the usage of words conforms to the speaker's intention,' and explaining the intention, he says: 'it prevents counting beyond that, but does not reject counting below.' Since counting is based on a designation that has been established, higher counting is possible only by not abandoning the lower counting. Hence, he says: 'because one is included within the three, it is said "only three".' 'One's own statement' refers to what was stated beginning with 'here, this is the characteristic,' etc.

80-85. Avigatā…pe… vuttepi vipallāsayojanaṃ akatvāti adhippāyo. Sā dassitā hotīti sā vipallāsayojanaṃ akatvā dassiyamānā yadipi dassitā hoti, na evaṃ āvikaraṇavasena dassitā hoti tādisassa liṅganassa abhāvato yathā vipallāsayojanāyanti adhippāyo. Tenāha ‘‘vipallāsa…pe… hotī’’ti. Evameva adhippāyo yojetabboti ‘‘ye…pe… taṃ dassetu’’nti ettha ‘‘yadipi avigatānantara’’ntiādinā yathā adhippāyo yojito, evameva ‘‘tenetaṃ āvikarotī’’ti etthāpi adhippāyo yojetabbo. Kiṃ vuttaṃ hoti? Yathā tattha ‘‘ūnataragaṇanehi samānagaṇanehi ca saddhiṃ saṃsandane ūnatarā samānā ca gaṇanā hotī’’ti ayamattho ñāpanavasena dassito, evamidhāpīti. Tena vuttaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘ārammaṇapaccayo yena yena bahutaragaṇanena vā samānagaṇanena vā paccayena saddhiṃ tikadukādibhedaṃ gacchati, sabbattha tīṇeva pañhavissajjanāni veditabbānī’’ti. Na kevalamatthavisesāvikaraṇatthamevettha tathā yojanā katā, atha kho desanākkamoyeva soti dassetuṃ ‘‘paccanīyādīsupi panā’’tiādimāha. Tattha mūlapadanti ārammaṇapaccayādikaṃ tasmiṃ tasmiṃ naye mūlabhūtaṃ padaṃ. Tatthāti paccanīyādīsu. Etaṃ lakkhaṇanti ‘‘tatridaṃ lakkhaṇa’’ntiādinā vuttalakkhaṇaṃ. Tasmāti yasmā pubbenāparaṃ pāḷi evameva pavattā, tasmā eva. Tena mūlapadaṃ ādimhiyeva ṭhapetvā desanā ñāyāgatāti dasseti. Yadi evaṃ liṅganena atthavisesāvikaraṇaṃ kathanti [Pg.285] āha ‘‘na ca viññāte atthe vacanena liṅgena ca payojanaṃ atthī’’ti.

80-85. The meaning is that even when 'non-disappearance'... is stated, no connection with perversion is made. 'It is shown'—thus, even when it is shown without making a connection with perversion, it is not revealed in such a way, because of the absence of such an indication as there is in the case of a connection with perversion. This is the meaning. Therefore, he says: 'perversion... is.' Similarly, the meaning should be applied thus: in 'those... to show that,' just as the meaning is applied with 'even if non-disappearance and contiguity,' etc., in the same way, here too, the meaning should be applied with 'thus it reveals.' What is meant? Just as there, the meaning 'in comparison with fewer or equal reckonings, the reckoning becomes fewer or equal' is shown by way of indication, so too here. Therefore, it is said in the commentary: 'Wherever the object condition combines with a more numerous or equal reckoning of conditions, everywhere only three questions and answers are to be known, according to the distinction of triads and dyads.' Not only is the application made here for the purpose of revealing the distinction in meaning, but also to show that it is the sequence of teaching itself; thus it is said, 'but in the case of the negative order, etc.' Herein, 'the root term' is the object condition, etc., the fundamental term in each method. 'Herein' refers to the negative order, etc. 'This characteristic' is the characteristic stated as 'herein, this is the characteristic,' etc. 'Therefore' means because the Pāḷi proceeds thus from the former to the latter, therefore it is so. Thus, it shows that the teaching proceeds according to the proper method by placing the root term at the very beginning. If so, how is the distinction in meaning revealed by an indication? He says: 'There is no need for both speech and an indication when the meaning is already understood.'

Paccayānulomavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Forward Order of Conditions is completed.

Paṭiccavāro

The Chapter on Conditionality

Paccayapaccanīyavaṇṇanā

The Exposition on the Negative Order of Conditions

86-87. Rūpasamuṭṭhāpakavaseneva veditabbanti idaṃ aṭṭhakathāvacanaṃ anantaraṃ ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhānañca rūpa’’nti pāḷiyaṃ āgatattā vuttaṃ, pañcaviññāṇānaṃ pana ahetukapaṭisandhicittānañca vasena yojanā sambhavatīti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘sabbasaṅgāhikavasena panetaṃ na na sakkā yojetu’’nti.

86-87. The commentary’s statement, 'It should be understood only by way of the originator of materiality,' was made because it comes in the Pāḷi immediately after 'and materiality originated by mind.' However, because an application is possible by way of the five sense-consciousnesses and the rootless rebirth-linking consciousnesses, it was said: 'But it is not that this cannot be applied in an all-inclusive way.'

93. Sahajātapurejātapaccayāti idaṃ paccayena paccayadhammopalakkhaṇanti dassetuṃ ‘‘sahajātā ca hetuādayo…pe… attho daṭṭhabbo’’ti vatvā ‘‘na hī’’tiādinā tamevatthaṃ samattheti.

93. Regarding 'co-nascence and pre-nascence conditions': this is to show the characterization of the conditioning state by means of the condition. Having said, 'The co-nascent conditions are the roots, etc.... the meaning should be understood,' he then supports that very meaning with the words 'For not...' etc.

94-97. So paccayoti so paṭiccaṭṭhapharaṇako paccayo.

94-97. 'That condition' means the condition that fulfills the function of conditionality.

99-102. Cittasamuṭṭhānādayoti ādi-saddena bāhirarūpaāhārasamuṭṭhānādayo rūpakoṭṭhāsā saṅgayhanti. Tassāti maggapaccayaṃ labhantassa rūpassa. Evameva panāti iminā yathā namaggapaccaye vuttaṃ, evameva nahetupaccayādīsu yaṃ hetupaccayaṃ labhati, tassa parihīnattāti imamatthaṃ upasaṃharati. Tenāha ‘‘ekaccarūpassa paccayuppannatā daṭṭhabbā’’ti.

99-102. Regarding 'originated by mind, etc.': by the word 'etc.' are included divisions of materiality such as external materiality, materiality originated by nutriment, and so on. 'Of that' means: of the materiality that obtains the path condition. By 'But just so,' he concludes this meaning: just as was said regarding the non-path condition, so too regarding the non-root condition, etc., the fact that something obtains the root condition is due to the exclusion of that other. Therefore he said: 'The state of being conditionally arisen should be seen for certain materiality.'

107-130. Sabbatthāti pannarasamūlakādīsu sabbesu nayesu. Kāmaṃ suddhikanayādīsu visadisavissajjanā, idhādhippetatthaṃ pana dassetuṃ ‘‘ekesū’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Idhāti etesu nāhāramūlakādinayesu. Gaṇanāyeva na sarūpadassananti suddhikanaye viya gaṇanāya eva na sarūpadassanaṃ adhippetanti attho.

107-130. 'In all cases' means: in all the methods, such as the fifteen-root method and so on. Although in methods such as the pure method the explanations are dissimilar, here, to show the intended meaning, 'in some...' etc., is said. 'Here' means: in these methods, such as the non-nutriment-root method and so on. 'Only a count, not a display of the nature' means: just as in the pure method, a mere enumeration is intended, not a display of the intrinsic nature.

Paccayapaccanīyavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Negative Order of Conditions is finished.

Paccayānulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanā

The Exposition on the Positive-Negative Order of Conditions

131-189. Tiṇṇanti [Pg.286] hetu adhipati maggoti imesaṃ tiṇṇaṃ paccayānaṃ. Sādhāraṇānanti ye tesaṃ tiṇṇaṃ sādhāraṇā paccayā paccanīkato na labbhanti, yasmā tesaṃ saṅgaṇhanavasena vuttaṃ, tasmā. Maggapaccayeti maggapaccaye anulomato ṭhite. Itarehīti hetuadhipatipaccayehi. Sādhāraṇā sattevāti maggapaccayavajje satteva. Hetupaccayopi paccanīyato na labbhatīti heturahitesu adhipatino abhāvā. So panāti hetupaccayo asādhāraṇoti katvā na vutto sādhāraṇānaṃ alabbhamānānaṃ vuccamānattā. Na hi hetupaccayo maggapaccayassa sādhāraṇo. Yehīti yehi paccayehi. Teti anantarapaccayādayo. Ekantikattāti avinābhāvato. Arūpaṭṭhānikāti arūpapaccayā arūpadhammānaṃyeva paccayabhūtā anantarapaccayādayo. Tenāti ‘‘ekantikānaṃ arūpaṭṭhānikā’’ti idhādhippetattā. Tehīti purejātāsevanapaccayehi. Tesaṃ vasenāti tesaṃ ūnataragaṇanānaṃ ekakādīnaṃ vasena. Tassa tassāti paccanīyato yojitassa tassa tassa dukādikassa bahugaṇanassa. Gaṇanāti ūnataragaṇanā. Anulomato ṭhitassapīti pi-saddena anulomato ṭhito vā hotu paccanīyato yojito vā, ūnataragaṇanāya samānanti dasseti. Nayidaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ ekantikanti iminā yathāvuttalakkhaṇaṃ yebhuyyavasena vuttanti dasseti.

131-189. 'Of the three' means: of these three conditions—root, dominance, and path. 'Of the common ones' means: because those conditions common to these three are not obtainable from the negative side, and since this is stated by way of including them, therefore... 'In the path condition' means: when the path condition is positively present. 'By the others' means: by the root and dominance conditions. 'Only seven common ones' means: only seven, excluding the path condition. 'The root condition, too, is not obtainable from the negative side' means: because in what is rootless there is an absence of dominance. 'But that one' means: the root condition is not mentioned because it is non-common, for it is the unobtainable common conditions that are being discussed. For the root condition is not common to the path condition. 'By which' means: by which conditions. 'They' means: the proximity condition, etc. 'Because of being invariable' means: because of inseparability. 'Having an immaterial basis' means: the proximity condition, etc., which are conditions only for immaterial phenomena. 'Therefore' means: because 'invariable and having an immaterial basis' is intended here. 'By them' means: by the pre-nascence and repetition conditions. 'By way of them' means: by way of their smaller counts, of one, etc. 'Of each of those' refers to each of the larger counts of the dyad, etc., to which it is applied from the negative side. 'The count' means: the smaller count. 'Even of that which is positively present': by the particle 'pi,' it is shown that whether it is positively present or applied from the negative side, it is the same as the smaller count. 'This characteristic is not invariable': by this it is shown that the aforesaid characteristic is stated as a general rule.

Paccayānulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Positive and Negative Applications of Conditions is finished.

Paccayapaccanīyānulomavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Negative and Positive Applications of Conditions

190. Sabbesupīti pacchājātaṃ ṭhapetvā sabbesupi paccayesu. So hi anulomato alabbhamānabhāvena gahito ‘‘sabbesū’’ti ettha saṅgahaṃ na labhati. Arūpāvacaravipākassa āruppe uppannalokuttaravipākassa ca purejātāsevanānaṃ alabbhanatoti ‘‘kiñci nidassanavasena dassento’’ti āha.

190. 'In all' means: in all conditions, having excluded the post-nascence condition. For that condition, being taken as unobtainable in the positive application, is not included here by the phrase 'in all.' Because the formless-sphere resultant consciousness and the supramundane resultant consciousness arisen in the formless realm do not obtain the pre-nascence and repetition conditions, it was said: 'showing something by way of example.'

Avasesānaṃ lābhamattanti avasesānaṃ ekaccānaṃ lābhaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘na sabbesaṃ avasesānaṃ lābha’’nti. Pacchājāte pasaṅgo natthīti pacchājāto [Pg.287] anulomato tiṭṭhatīti ayaṃ pasaṅgo eva natthi. Purejā…pe… labbhatīti iminā vippayutte paccanīyato ṭhite purejāto labbhatīti ayampi atthato āpanno hotīti taṃ niddhāretvā tattha yaṃ vattabbaṃ, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘purejāto pana vippayutte paccanīyato ṭhite anulomato labbhatīti idampī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha ‘‘avasesā sabbepīti atthe gayhamāne āpajjeyyā’’ti idaṃ tassā atthāpattiyā sabbhāvadassanamattaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ, attho pana tādiso na upalabbhatīti ayamettha adhippāyo. Tenāha ‘‘yampi kecī’’tiādi.

'Mere obtainment for the remainder' means: the obtainment by some of the remainder. Therefore it was said: 'Not all of the remainder obtain.' 'There is no contingency for post-nascence' means: there is no such contingency that the post-nascence condition is positively present. By 'Pre-nascence... is obtainable,' this too is implied: when the disassociation condition is negatively present, the pre-nascence condition is obtainable. Having determined that, to show what should be said on that point, it was said: 'But the pre-nascence condition, when the disassociation condition is negatively present, is obtainable positively—this too...' etc. Here, the statement 'a fault would arise if the meaning were taken as 'all of the remainder'' should be seen as merely showing the existence of that implication. But such a meaning is not found—this is the intention here. Therefore it was said: 'And what some...' etc.

Tattha kecīti padakāre sandhāyāha. Te hi ‘‘arūpadhātuyā cavitvā kāmadhātuṃ upapajjantassa gatinimittaṃ ārammaṇapurejātaṃ hotīti ñāpetuṃ ‘navippayuttapaccayā purejāte’ti ayamattho niddhārito’’ti vadanti, taṃ na yujjati āruppe rūpaṃ ārabbha cittuppādassa asambhavato. Tathā heke asaññabhavānantarassa viya āruppānantarassa kāmāvacarapaṭisandhiviññāṇassa purimānupaṭṭhitārammaṇaṃ icchanti. Tenevāha ‘‘tampi tesaṃ rucimattamevā’’tiādi. Yujjamānakapaccayuppannavasena vāti yasmiṃ yasmiṃ paccaye anulomato ṭhite yaṃ yaṃ paccayuppannaṃ bhavituṃ yujjati, tassa tassa vasenāti attho. Na vicāritaṃ suviññeyyattāti adhippāyo. Navāti ārammaṇaanantarasamanantarūpanissayapurejātāsevanasampayuttanatthivigatapaccayā. Tampi tesaṃ navannaṃ paccayānaṃ anulomato alabbhamānataṃ.

Here 'some' refers to the textual analysts. For they say: 'To show that for one who passes away from the formless realm and is reborn in the sense-sphere, the destination sign is a pre-nascent object, the meaning 'in pre-nascence by way of non-disassociation condition' is determined.' This is not valid, because the arising of consciousness taking a material object as its support is impossible in the formless realm. Similarly, some hold that for the sense-sphere rebirth-linking consciousness immediately following the formless realm, the object is one that has not been previously attended to, just as for that immediately following the non-percipient existence. Therefore it was said: 'That too is merely their preference,' etc. 'Or, by way of what is conditionally arisen in accordance with a suitable condition' means: by way of whatever conditionally arisen state can come to be when whatever condition is positively present. It is not analyzed because it is easily understood—this is the intention. 'Nine' means: the object, proximity, contiguity, decisive support, pre-nascence, repetition, association, absence, and disappearance conditions. That too is the unobtainability of those nine conditions in the positive application.

191-195. Na aññamaññena ghaṭitassa mūlassāti aññamaññapaccayena paccanīyato ṭhitena yojitassa sattamassa mūlassa vitthāritattā. Sabbaṃ sadisanti sabbapāḷigamanaṃ sadisaṃ.

191-195. 'Not of the root connected with mutuality' means: because the seventh root, which is applied when the mutuality condition is negatively present, has been explained in detail. 'All is similar' means: the entire course of the Pāli text is similar.

Imasmiṃ…pe… veditabboti ettha imasmiṃ etthāti dve bhummaniddesā. Tesu paṭhamassa visayo paccanīyānulometi aṭṭhakathāyameva dassitoti adassitassa visayaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘etesū’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Pi-saddenāti ‘‘imesampī’’ti ettha pi-saddena. Kismiñci paccaye. Kammapaccayaṃ labhantānipi cakkhādīni vipākaviññāṇādīni ca indriyaṃ na labhantīti katvā ‘‘yebhuyyenā’’ti vuttaṃ, katipayaṃ na labhatīti vuttaṃ hoti. Maggapaccayantiādīsupi eseva nayo. Yathāvuttānīti pañcavokārapavattiasaññabhavapariyāpannāni kaṭattārūpāneva vadati, na cittasamuṭṭhānarūpānīti [Pg.288] adhippāyo. Ye rūpadhammānaṃ paccayā hontīti ye hetuadhipatisahajātādipaccayā rūpadhammānaṃ paccayā honti, eteyeva hetuadhipatiādike cha paccaye na labhanti. Eteyevāti vacanena aññe katipaye labhantīti siddhaṃ hotīti taṃ dassento ‘‘pacchājātā…pe… labhatī’’ti āha. Ayañca paccayalābho na janakavasena veditabboti dassetuṃ ‘‘labbhamānā…pe… dassana’’nti vuttaṃ. Dhammavasenāti paccayuppannadhammavasena. Indriyanti indriyapaccayaṃ. Yadi evanti kaṭattārūpaṃ yaṃ yaṃ na labhati, taṃ taṃ yadi vattabbaṃ, evaṃ sante rūpadhammesu bhūtarūpāniyeva aññamaññapaccayaṃ labhantīti āha ‘‘upādārūpāni…pe… vattabba’’nti. Taṃ pana upādārūpānaṃ aññamaññapaccayālābhavacanaṃ. Arūpindriyālābhanti arūpīnaṃ indriyānaṃ vasena indriyapaccayālābhaṃ.

Regarding 'In this…pe… it should be understood': here 'in this' and 'here' are two locative indicators. The scope of the first, 'in the negative-positive section,' is shown in the commentary itself. To indicate the scope of what was not shown, 'among these,' etc., was stated. 'By the particle pi' refers to the particle pi in 'imesampi' (of these too). In some condition. Because the eye, etc., and the resultant consciousnesses, etc., although obtaining the kamma condition, do not obtain the faculty condition, 'as a general rule' was said, meaning that some do not obtain it. This same method applies to the path condition, etc. 'As stated' refers only to kamma-born materiality included in the course of existence in the five-constituent existence and in the non-percipient realm; it does not refer to mind-originated materiality—this is the intention. 'Those that are conditions for material phenomena' means: those conditions such as root, dominance, co-nascence, etc., that are conditions for material phenomena do not obtain these very six conditions—root, dominance, etc. By the words 'these very,' it is established that they obtain some others. Showing this, it was said: 'Post-nascence…pe… obtains.' To show that this obtainment of a condition should not be understood as being by way of generation, it was said: 'being obtained…pe… seeing.' 'By way of the state' means: by way of the conditionally arisen state. 'Faculty' means: the faculty condition. 'If so' means: if whatever kamma-born materiality does not obtain has to be stated, in that case, since among material phenomena only the primary elements obtain the mutuality condition, it was said: 'Derived materiality…pe… should be stated.' But that is a statement about the non-obtainment of the mutuality condition by derived materiality. 'Non-obtainment of immaterial faculty' means: the non-obtainment of the faculty condition by way of the immaterial faculties.

196-197. Bahugaṇanampi ūnataragaṇanena yojitaṃ ūnataragaṇameva hotīti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘yadipi tikādīsu ‘hetuyā pañcā’ti idaṃ natthī’’ti. Anuttānaṃ duviññeyyatāya gambhīraṃ. Yathā ca bhūtarūpāni nārammaṇapaccayā aññamaññapaccayā uppajjanti, evaṃ paṭisandhikkhaṇe vatthurūpanti āha ‘‘vatthupi pana labhatī’’ti. Yathā heṭṭhā ekamūlakaṃ ‘‘dumūlaka’’nti vuttaṃ, evaṃ idhāpi dumūlakaṃ ‘‘timūlaka’’nti vadanti.

196-197. Because even a larger count, when combined with a smaller count, becomes the smaller count, it was said: 'Although in the triads, etc., the statement 'five by way of the root condition' does not exist.' It is profound because it is not obvious and is difficult to understand. And just as the primary elements arise by way of the non-object condition and the mutuality condition, so too does the physical basis at the moment of rebirth-linking. Thus it was said: 'But the basis, too, obtains it.' Just as below what is one-rooted was called 'two-rooted,' so here too they call what is two-rooted 'three-rooted'.

203-233. Cetanāmattasaṅgāhaketi cetanāmattaṃyeva paccayuppannaṃ gahetvā ṭhite pañhe. Tattha hi ‘‘nakammapaccayā hetupaccayā’’ti vattuṃ sakkā. Evaṃpakāreti idaṃ ‘‘tīṇītiādīsū’’ti ettha ādi-saddassa atthavacananti dassento ‘‘ādi-saddo hi pakāratthova hotī’’ti āha. Rūpampi labbhati cetanāmattameva asaṅgaṇhanato.

203-233. 'In the case of taking up only volition' means: in a question established by taking only volition as the conditionally arisen phenomenon. For there it is possible to say, 'Not by kamma-condition, but by root-condition.' 'In this manner' means: showing that this is a term for the meaning of the word 'ādi' in 'in three, etc.', it is said: 'For the word ‘ādi’ indeed has the meaning of manner.' Material form is also obtained, because it is not a case of taking up only volition.

Paccayapaccanīyānulomavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Positive Concordance of the Conditional Negative is concluded.

Paṭiccavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Paṭicca Section is concluded.

2. Sahajātavāravaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Sahajāta Section

234-242. Sahajātapaccayakaraṇanti sahajātaṃ paccayadhammaṃ paccayaṃ katvā pavatti. Sahajātāyattabhāvagamananti sahajāte paccayadhamme āyattabhāvassa [Pg.289] gamanaṃ paccayuppannassa attanā sahajātapaccayāyattavuttitā. Ettha ca sahajātapaccayasaṅkhātaṃ sahajātaṃ karotīti sahajāto, tathāpavatto paccayuppannadhammo. Tattha pavattamāno sahajātasaddo yasmā tassa paccayuppannassa attanā sahajātaṃ paccayadhammaṃ paccayaṃ katvā pavattiṃ tadāyattabhāvūpagamanañca vadatīti vuccati, tasmā vuttaṃ ‘‘sahajātasaddena…pe… vutta’’nti. Tassa karaṇassa gamanassa vāti tassa yathāvuttassa sahajātapaccayakaraṇassa sahajātāyattabhāvūpagamanassa vā. ‘‘Kusalaṃ dhammaṃ sahajāto’’ti imassa kusalaṃ dhammaṃ sahajātaṃ taṃsahabhāvitañca paccayaṃ katvāti ayamatthoti āha ‘‘kusalādīnaṃ kammabhāvato’’ti. Sahajātapaccayasahabhāvīnaṃ paccayānaṃ saṅgaṇhatthañhettha ‘‘sahajātāyattabhāvagamanaṃ vā’’ti vuttaṃ.

234-242. “Acting as a conascence condition” means occurrence by making a conascent condition-dhamma a condition. “Going to a state of dependence on the conascent” means the going to a state of dependence on a conascent condition-dhamma; for the conditionally arisen phenomenon, this is a state of being dependent on a conascent condition. And here, the conditionally arisen phenomenon that occurs accordingly is called “conascent” because it brings about conascence with what is designated as the conascent condition. The word “conascent,” when used there, is said to be used because it speaks of that conditionally arisen phenomenon’s occurrence by making the conascent condition-dhamma a condition for itself, and its attainment of a state of dependence on that; therefore it is said: “by the word ‘conascent’… it is stated.” “Of its making or of its going” means of the aforesaid acting as a conascence condition or of the attainment of a state of dependence on the conascent. Regarding “[a phenomenon is] conascent with a wholesome phenomenon,” he says this is the meaning: “having made the wholesome phenomenon, which is conascent and co-existent with it, a condition,” because of “the nature of wholesome phenomena, etc., as action.” The phrase “or the going to a state of dependence on the conascent” is stated here in order to include conditions that are co-existent with the conascent condition.

Taṃkammabhāvatoti tesaṃ yathāvuttapaccayakaraṇatadāyattabhāvagamanānaṃ kammabhāvato. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ sahajātoti kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca tena sahajāto hutvā’’ti paṭiccasaddaṃ āharitvā attho vutto, taṃ ‘‘paṭiccattho sahajātattho’’ti katvā vuttaṃ. Sahajātasaddayoge kusalaṃ dhammanti upayogavacanassa yutti na vuttā, ‘‘tena sahajāto hutvā’’ti pana vuttattā karaṇatthe upayogavacananti dassitanti keci. Nissayavāre pana kusalaṃ dhammaṃ nissayatthena paccayaṃ katvāti vadantena idhāpi ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ sahajātatthena paccayaṃ katvā’’ti ayamattho vuttoyeva hoti, paṭiccasaddāharaṇampi imamevatthaṃ ñāpetīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Upādārūpaṃ kiñci bhūtarūpassa anupālakaṃ upatthambhakañca hontampi sahajātalakkhaṇena na hoti, tasmā paṭiccatthaṃ na pharatīti āha ‘‘paṭiccāti iminā vacanena dīpito paccayo na hotī’’ti. Nidassanavasena vuttanti udāharaṇavasena vuttaṃ, na anavasesatoti attho. Yathāvuttoti paṭiccatthapharaṇavasena vutto. Yathā ca upādārūpaṃ bhūtarūpassa upādārūpassa ca paccayo na hoti, evaṃ ṭhapetvā cha vatthūni sesarūpāni arūpadhammānaṃ paccayo na hotīti dassento ‘‘vatthuvajjāni rūpāni ca arūpāna’’nti āha.

“Because of being their action” means: because of being the action of those aforesaid makings of a condition and goings to a state of dependence on that. In the Commentary, however, the meaning is stated by bringing in the word “paṭicca”: “‘Conascent with a wholesome phenomenon’ means ‘having become conascent with it, in dependence on that wholesome phenomenon.’” This is stated by taking it that “the meaning of dependence is the meaning of conascence.” In connection with the word ‘conascent,’ the reason for the accusative case in “a wholesome phenomenon” is not stated; but since it is said “having become conascent with it,” some show that the accusative is in the sense of the instrumental. But in the Nissaya Section, by the one who says, “having made a wholesome phenomenon a condition in the sense of dependence,” this same meaning is stated here too: “having made a wholesome phenomenon a condition in the sense of conascence.” It should be seen that the adducing of the word “paṭicca” also makes known this same meaning. Although some derived material form is a preserver and supporter of primary material form, it is not so by the characteristic of conascence. Therefore, it does not fulfill the meaning of “dependence,” so he says: “the condition indicated by this word ‘paṭicca’ it is not.” “Stated by way of illustration” means stated by way of example; the meaning is “not exhaustively.” “As stated” means stated in the sense of fulfilling the meaning of dependence. And just as derived material form is not a condition for primary material form or for other derived material form, so too, to show that, apart from the six bases, the remaining material phenomena are not a condition for immaterial phenomena, he says: “and material phenomena apart from the bases for immaterial phenomena.”

Sahajātavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Sahajāta Section is concluded.

3. Paccayavāravaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of the Paccaya Section

243. Pati-saddo [Pg.290] patiṭṭhatthaṃ dīpeti ‘‘sāre patiṭṭhito’’tiādīsu, aya-saddo gatiṃ dīpeti ‘‘eti etthāti ayo’’ti.

243. The word “pati” illuminates the meaning of foundation, as in such phrases as “established in the essence”; the word “aya” illuminates motion, as in “one goes to it, thus it is ‘aya’.”

Bhūtupādārūpāni saha saṅgaṇhitvā vuttaṃ upādārūpānaṃ viya bhūtarūpāni nissayo hotīti katvā. Yadi evaṃ kasmā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘mahābhūte nissāya cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ upādārūpa’’nti upādārūpaṃyeva dassitanti āha ‘‘aṭṭhakathāyaṃ panā’’tiādi.

It is stated having taken primary and derived material form together, on the grounds that primary material forms are a support for derived material forms. If so, why in the Commentary is only derived material form shown, when it says, “derived material form arisen from consciousness in dependence on the great elements”? He replies, “But in the Commentary…,” etc.

255. Paṭiccavāre sahajāteti paṭiccavāre sahajātapaccayavaṇṇanāyaṃ, kammautujānanti kammajānaṃ utujānañca vasena attho vuttoti yojanā. Tathā hi tattha vuttaṃ ‘‘dvisantatisamuṭṭhānabhūtavasena vutta’’nti (paṭṭhā. aṭṭha. 1.57). Kamme cāti kamme janakakammapaccaye gahite. Ekantānekantakammajānanti ekantena kammajānaṃ na ekantakammajānañca. Tattha asaññabhave ekantakammajaṃ nāma jīvitindriyaṃ, itaraṃ upādārūpaṃ bhūtarūpañca na ekantakammajaṃ, tadubhayampi tattha ekajjhaṃ katvā vuttaṃ, ‘‘mahābhūte paṭicca kaṭattārūpa’’nti idaṃ pana kammasamuṭṭhānavaseneva vuttanti. So nādhippetoti yo yathādassito paṭiccavāre sahajātapaccaye attho vutto, so idha na adhippeto. Kasmāti ce, āha ‘‘kaṭattā…pe… gahitattā’’ti. Taṃ pahāyāti taṃ paṭiccavāre vuttamatthaṃ pahāya aggahetvā. Yathāgahitassāti ‘‘asañña…pe… kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpa’’nti pāḷiyaṃ eva gahitassa. Paṭicca paccayāti idaṃ dvinnaṃ vārānaṃ upalakkhaṇaṃ. Paṭiccavāre āgatanayena mahābhūte paṭicca, paccayavāre āgatanayena mahābhūte paccayā mahābhūtānaṃ uppatti na nivāretabbā, tasmā ‘‘upādārūpasaṅkhātaṃ kaṭattārūpa’’nti evaṃ upādārūpaggahaṇena kaṭattārūpaṃ avisesetvā upādārūpānaṃ nivattetabbānaṃ utucittāhārasamuṭṭhānānaṃ atthitāya kaṭattā…pe… visesanaṃ daṭṭhabbanti evamettha yojanā veditabbā.

255. “Conascent in the Paṭicca Section” means: in the explanation of conascence-condition in the Paṭicca Section, the construction is that the meaning is stated in terms of what is born of kamma and what is born of temperature. For thus it is stated there: “It is stated in terms of what has arisen from the two continuities.” “And in kamma” means: when generative kamma-condition is taken. “Exclusively and not exclusively kamma-born” means: what is exclusively kamma-born and what is not exclusively kamma-born. There, in the sphere of non-percipient beings, the life faculty is exclusively kamma-born; the other, derived material form and primary material form, is not exclusively kamma-born. Both are stated there having been made one. But this, “kamma-produced material form in dependence on the great elements,” is stated only in terms of kamma-origination. “That is not intended” means: that meaning stated in the Paṭicca Section in the way shown is not intended here. If asked why, he says: “because of being taken as kamma-produced…” “Abandoning that” means: abandoning, not grasping, that meaning stated in the Paṭicca Section. “Of what is taken as” means: of what is taken in the Pāḷi itself as “in the non-percipient… kamma-produced material form, derived material form.” “Dependent” and “condition”—this is a designation for the two sections. The arising of the great elements in dependence on the great elements according to the method that has come in the Paṭicca Section, or as a condition for the great elements according to the method that has come in the Paccaya Section, should not be prevented. Therefore, the construction here should be understood thus: without specifying the kamma-produced material form by the taking up of derived material form as “kamma-produced material form designated as derived material form,” the qualification “kamma-produced…” should be seen, on account of the existence of derived material forms that should be excluded, namely, those originated from temperature, consciousness, and nutriment.

286-287. Ekaccassa rūpassāti ahetukacittasamuṭṭhānassa. Ito paresupi ekaccarūpaggahaṇe eseva nayo. Cakkhādidhammavasenāti cakkhāyatanādirūpadhammavasena. Cittasamuṭṭhānādikoṭṭhāsavasenāti cittajādirūpadhammabhāgavasena. Sabbaṃ labbhatīti satipi imassa nayassa nahetumūlakatte [Pg.291] nonatthinovigatesu ekanti gaṇanaṃ sabbaṃ rūpaṃ sabbassa rūpassa vasena gaṇanā labbhati catusantativasena vattamānesu pañcavīsatiyā rūpadhammesu vajjitabbassa abhāvā.

286-287. “Of some material form” means: of that which has arisen from rootless consciousness. In other instances of taking “some material form” after this, this is the method. “In terms of eye-phenomena, etc.” means: in terms of material phenomena such as the eye-base, etc. “In terms of divisions such as mind-originated, etc.” means: in terms of portions of material phenomena such as mind-born, etc. “All is obtained” means: although this method is not rooted in a root-condition, the counting as one in the cases of non-presence and non-disappearance—the counting of all material form in terms of all material form—is obtained because, among the twenty-five material phenomena occurring by way of the four continuities, there is nothing to be excluded.

Paccayavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Paccaya Section is concluded.

4. Nissayavāravaṇṇanā

4. Explanation of the Support Section

329-337. Nissayapaccayabhāvanti nissayavāre vuttassa sahajātapurejātassa ca nissayaṭṭhassa dhammassa paccayabhāvaṃ paccayavārena niyametunti yojanā. Tathā paccayavāre ‘‘paccayā’’ti vuttassa paccayadhammassa sahajātapurejātabhāvaṃ nissayavārena niyametunti yojanā. Niyamanañcettha paccayaṭṭhanissayaṭṭhānaṃ pariyāyantarena pakāsitattā atthato bhedābhāvadassananti veditabbo. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘paccayattaṃ nāma nissayattaṃ, nissayattaṃ nāma paccayatta’’nti.

329-337. The state of being a support-condition means that one determines by the Condition Section the condition-state of a conascent and prenascent phenomenon that has the function of support, as stated in the Support Section. Similarly, one determines by the Support Section the conascent and prenascent state of a conditioning phenomenon spoken of as ‘conditions’ in the Condition Section. And this determination should be understood as showing that there is no difference in meaning, because the function of a condition and the function of a support are explained by way of a different term. Therefore it is said: ‘Condition-ness is support-ness, and support-ness is condition-ness.’

Nissayavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Support Section is concluded.

5. Saṃsaṭṭhavāravaṇṇanā

5. Explanation of the Associated Section

351-368. Sāti savatthukā paṭisandhi. Idhāpīti imasmiṃ saṃsaṭṭhavārepi. Adhipatipurejātāsevanesu anulomato nakammanavipākanajhānanavippayuttesu paccanīyato ṭhitesu na labbhati, aññesu sahajātādīsu anulomato hetuādīsu paccanīyato ca anulomato ca ṭhitesu labbhatīti. Tenāha ‘‘labbhamānapaccayesū’’ti. Imassa visesassāti imassa yathāvuttassa visesassa dassanatthaṃ uddhaṭā, tasmā tādisassa visesassa dassetabbassa abhāvato vatthuvirahitā paṭisandhi anuddhaṭā, na vippayutte paccanīyato ṭhite abhāvatoti attho. Hetupaccayavirahitamattadassanatthanti iminā bhūtakathanaṃ ahetukaggahaṇaṃ na byabhicāranivattananti dasseti. ‘‘Ahetukavipākakiriyavasenā’’ti bhavitabbaṃ hetupariyantattā maggassa.

351-368. There is rebirth-linking with a basis. 'Here too' means in this Associated Section too. In the case of dominance, prenascence, and repetition conditions, it is not obtained in the positive application; nor is it obtained when the `not-kamma`, `not-resultant`, `not-jhāna`, and `not-dissociated` terms stand in the negative application. But in other conditions such as conascence, etc., it is obtained in the positive application; and in the case of root condition, etc., it is obtained in both the negative and positive applications. Therefore he said, 'among the obtainable conditions.' To show this distinction—that is, for the purpose of showing this specific distinction as described—rebirth-linking with a basis is not mentioned, because there is no such distinction to be shown, and because in the dissociation condition it is not established in the negative application, due to its absence. By this, 'for the purpose of showing merely the absence of the root condition,' he shows that the statement of what is and the taking up of the rootless is not for warding off deviation. It should be 'by way of rootless resultant and functional,' because the path is limited by the root condition.

369-391. ‘‘Hetumhi anulomato ṭhite jhānamaggā paccanīyato na labbhantī’’tiādi yaṃ idha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaṃ, taṃ hetupaccayādivasena uppajjamāno [Pg.292] dhammo cattāro sabbaṭṭhānikā āhārindriyajhānamaggā cāti ime aṭṭha paccaye alabhanto nāma natthīti iminā paṭiccavāre anulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanāyaṃ vuttena nayena vedituṃ sakkāti āha ‘‘paṭiccavāre…pe… nayenā’’ti. Sesesūti ahetukamohavajjāhetukesu pañcaviññāṇā…pe… jhānapaccayaṃ labhanti, tasmā ‘‘ahetukamohova jhānamaggapaccayaṃ labhatī’’ti na sakkā vattuṃ, kiñca paccanīyānulome dvinnaṃ paccayānaṃ anulomena anulomavasena saha yojanā natthi ekekasseva yojanāya āgatattā, tasmā ahetukamohova maggapaccayaṃ labhatīti evamettha yojanā veditabbā.

369-391. 'When the root condition is established in the positive application, jhāna and path are not obtained in the negative application,' and so on—what is said here in the commentary can be understood by the method stated in the commentary on the positive and negative applications in the Dependent Origination Section, namely, that it is not the case that a phenomenon arising by way of the root condition, etc., does not obtain these eight conditions: the four universals, nutriment, faculty, jhāna, and path. Thus he says, 'in the Dependent Origination Section... by the method.' 'As for the rest' means: in the rootless states apart from rootless delusion, the five sense-consciousnesses... obtain the jhāna condition. Therefore, it cannot be said that 'only rootless delusion obtains the jhāna and path conditions.' Moreover, in the negative-positive application, there is no connection of two conditions together with the positive application, because the connection is stated for each one individually. Therefore, the connection here should be understood thus: 'only rootless delusion obtains the path condition.'

Saṃsaṭṭhavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Associated Section is concluded.

6. Sampayuttavāravaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Conjoined Section

392-400. Sadisaṃ sampayuttanti ‘‘yaṃ sadisaṃ, taṃ saṃsaṭṭha’’nti vuccamānaṃ sampayuttaṃ na hoti ‘‘saṃsaṭṭhā yojitā hayā’’tiādīsu. Asaṃsaṭṭhaṃ vokiṇṇanti yaṃ na saṃsaṭṭhaṃ antarantarā uppajjamānena vokiṇṇampi vimissatāya sampayuttanti vuccamānaṃ, taṃ saṃsaṭṭhaṃ na hoti ‘‘yā sā vīmaṃsā…pe… kosajjasampayuttā’’tiādīsu. Evaṃ asampayuttassapi saṃsaṭṭhapariyāyo asaṃsaṭṭhassa ca sampayuttapariyāyo atthīti tadubhayaṃ itaretaraṃ niyametīti dassanatthaṃ vāradvayadesanāti dassento āha ‘‘ubhayaṃ…pe… niyāmakaṃ hotī’’ti, saṃsaṭṭhasaddo hi vokiṇṇaṭṭho natthi, sampayuttasaddo ca sadisattho, tasmā yathā saṃsaṭṭhasaddo sampayuttasaddāpekkho sadisatthato vinivattitvā ekuppādādisabhāvameva atthaṃ bodheti, evaṃ sampayuttasaddopi saṃsaṭṭhasaddāpekkho vokiṇṇaṭṭhato vinivattitvāti aññamaññāpekkhassa saddadvayassa aññamaññaniyāmakatā veditabbā.

392-400. What is similar, when called 'mixed' (saṃsaṭṭha) as in 'what is similar is mixed,' is not 'conjoined' (sampayutta), for example in 'mixed, yoked horses.' What is unmixed, even though interspersed by arising intermittently, when called 'conjoined' because of its commingling, is not 'mixed,' as in 'that investigation... conjoined with laziness.' Thus, there is a usage of 'mixed' for what is not conjoined, and a usage of 'conjoined' for what is not mixed. To show that these two mutually determine each other, he indicates that the teaching of the two sections serves this purpose, saying: 'Both... serve as determinants.' For the word 'mixed' does not have the meaning 'interspersed,' and the word 'conjoined' does not have the meaning 'similar.' Therefore, just as the word 'mixed,' in relation to the word 'conjoined,' is diverted from the meaning 'similar' and conveys only the meaning of the state of co-arising, etc., so too the word 'conjoined,' in relation to the word 'mixed,' is diverted from the meaning 'interspersed.' Thus the mutual determination of the two words, which are dependent on each other, should be understood.

Sampayuttavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Conjoined Section is concluded.

7. Pañhāvāravibhaṅgavaṇṇanā

7. Commentary on the Exposition of the Question Section

401-403. Te [Pg.293] paccayeti te hetuādike paccaye. Paṭipāṭiyāti ettha paccayapaṭipāṭiyā kusalādipadapaṭipāṭiyā vāti āsaṅkāyaṃ ubhayavasenapi attho yujjatīti dassento paṭhamaṃ tāva sandhāyāha ‘‘yathākkamenā’’tiādi. Tassattho – ‘‘hetupaccayo ārammaṇapaccayo’’tiādinā nayena desanākkamena yāya paṭipāṭiyā paṭiccavāre paccayā āgatā, tadanurūpaṃ te dassetunti. Dutiyaṃ pana dassetuṃ ‘‘kusalo kusalassā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Sā panāyaṃ padapaṭipāṭi yasmā na kusalapadadassanamattena dassitā hoti, tasmā taṃ ekadesena sakalaṃ nayato dassento āha ‘‘kusalo kusalassāti…pe… hotī’’ti. Tenāti nidassanamattena ‘‘kusalo kusalassā’’ti padena. Sabbo pabhedoti yaṃ tattha tattha paccaye ‘‘kusalo kusalassā’’tiādiko yattako pabhedo vissajjanaṃ labhati, so sabbo pabhedoti attho. Te paccaye paṭipāṭiyā dassetunti te hetuādipaccaye kusalādipadapaṭipāṭiyā dassetuṃ.

401-403. 'Those conditions' means those conditions such as the root condition, etc. Regarding 'in sequence,' when the doubt arises whether this means by the sequence of conditions or by the sequence of terms such as 'wholesome,' to show that the meaning is suitable in both ways, he first speaks with reference to the former, saying 'in their order,' etc. The meaning of this is: he will show them in conformity with the sequence in which the conditions were presented in the Dependent Origination Section, that is, by the method 'root condition, object condition,' etc., which is the order of the teaching. Then, to show the second, 'a wholesome state for a wholesome state,' etc., is said. But since this sequence of terms is not shown merely by showing the term 'wholesome,' he shows the entire method by way of a partial illustration, saying: 'a wholesome state for a wholesome state... it is,' etc. 'By this' means by the phrase 'a wholesome state for a wholesome state' as an illustration. 'The entire classification' means whatever classification obtains an answer under 'a wholesome state for a wholesome state,' etc., in each respective condition, that is the entire classification. 'To show those conditions in sequence' means to show those conditions, such as the root condition, etc., in the sequence of the terms such as 'wholesome.'

404. Phalavisesaṃ ākaṅkhantā paṭiggāhakato viya dāyakatopi yathā dakkhiṇā visujjhati, evaṃ dānaṃ dentīti āha ‘‘visuddhaṃ katvā’’ti. Tesanti vattabbatārahanti iminā vodānassa sakadāgāmiādīnaṃ āveṇikataṃ dasseti. Kāmaṃ aggamaggapurecārikampi vodānameva, asekkho pana hutvā taṃ paccavekkhatīti na taṃ idha gahitaṃ. Tanti vodānaṃ. Gotrabhucittanti aṭṭhamakassa uppajjanakāle ‘‘gotrabhū’’ti vattabbatārahaṃ cittaṃ. Gotrabhusadisanti vā sotāpannādigotrābhibhāvīti vā gotrabhucittanti evamettha attho veditabbo. Paccayuppannaṃ bhūmito vavatthapeti, ‘‘tebhūmakakusalamevā’’ti ettha viya na paccayadhammanti attho. Desanantarattāti ‘‘kusalacittasamaṅgissā’’tiādinā puggalāmasanadesanato aññattā, aññathā gahitaṃ puna na gaṇheyyāti adhippāyo.

404. Desiring a special fruit, they give a gift in such a way that the offering is purified on the part of the donor just as on the part of the recipient; thus he says, 'having made it pure.' 'Of them' means 'of those worthy of being spoken of'; by this he shows the uniqueness of the purification for the once-returner and others. Indeed, purification is also a forerunner of the supreme path, but since one who is a non-trainee reflects on it after having become one, it is not taken here. 'That' means purification. 'Change-of-lineage-consciousness' means the consciousness that is fit to be called 'change-of-lineage' at the time of the arising of the eighth person. Or 'change-of-lineage-consciousness' means 'similar to change-of-lineage' or 'one who overcomes the lineage of the stream-enterer, etc.'—thus the meaning should be understood here. It defines the condition-arisen from the plane, not the conditioning phenomenon, as in 'only the wholesome of the three planes.' 'Because of the difference in teaching' means because it is different from the teaching that touches on the person, such as 'of one endowed with a wholesome mind'; the intention is that what was taken up in one way should not be taken up again in another.

405. Rāgarahitassa viya somanassarahitassa ca rāgassa na ārammaṇe assādanavasena pavatti ajjhupekkhanatoti vuttaṃ ‘‘assādanaṃ…pe… kicca’’nti. Sahasākārappavattāya uppilāvitasabhāvāya pītiyā āhitavisesāya taṇhāya taṃ taṇhābhinandananti vuccatīti taṃ sandhāyāha [Pg.294] ‘‘pītikiccasahitāya taṇhāya kicca’’nti. Yathā ca yathāvuttakiccavisesāya pītiyā āhitavisesā taṇhā taṇhābhinandanā, evaṃ diṭṭhābhinandanā veditabbā. Yasmā pana sā atthato paccayavisesavisiṭṭhā diṭṭhiyeva, tasmā vuttaṃ ‘‘diṭṭhābhinandanā diṭṭhiyevā’’ti. Ettha panāti ‘‘abhinandatī’’ti padassa taṇhādiṭṭhivasena vuttesu etesu pana dvīsu atthesu. Abhinandantassāti idaṃ diṭṭhābhinandanaṃyeva sandhāya vuttanti adhippāyena ‘‘pacchimatthameva gahetvā’’ti vuttaṃ. Abhinandantassāti pana avisesato vuttattā taṇhāvasena diṭṭhivasena abhinandantassāti ayamettha attho adhippeto, tasmā ‘‘abhinandanā…pe… na sakkā vattu’’nti idamidha vacanamanokāsaṃ. Kasmā? Diṭṭhirahitepi santāne abhinandanassa vuttattā. Taṇhāvasena nandatīti taṇhābhinandanavaseneva vutto attho purimo attho. Dvīsu pana somanassasahagatacittuppādesūti diṭṭhirahitāni somanassasahagatacittāni sandhāyāha. Yathāvuttenāti ‘‘sarāgassa somanassassā’’tiādinā vuttena somanassena assādentassa, rāgena ca tesuyeva yathāvuttesu dvīsu cittesu assādentassa, catūsupi somanassasahagatacittesu sappītikataṇhāya abhinandantassa, catūsupi diṭṭhisampayuttesu diṭṭhābhinandanāya abhinandantassa diṭṭhi uppajjatīti evamettha yojanā veditabbā. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘itipi sakkā yojetu’’nti. Yathā diṭṭhūpanissayato diṭṭhābhinandanā sambhavati, evaṃ taṇhūpanissayato taṇhābhinandanāpi sambhavatīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. ‘‘Abhinandati rāgo uppajjatī’’ti vacanato sappītikataṇhāya abhinandantassa rāguppattipi vattabbā, na vā vattabbā taṇhābhinandanāya eva rāguppattiyā vuttattā.

405. Just as for one devoid of lust there is no activity of lust by way of enjoying an object, so for one devoid of joy there is indifference; thus it is said: 'Enjoyment… is its function.' Craving, which is endowed with a distinction produced by rapture that has an exultant nature and arises impetuously, is called 'delighting in craving.' Referring to this, it is said: 'the function of craving accompanied by the function of rapture.' And just as craving, endowed with a distinction produced by rapture with its aforementioned specific function, is 'delighting in craving,' so 'delighting in view' should be understood. But since this, in essence, is simply view qualified by a specific condition, it is said: 'Delighting in view is just view.' Here, regarding the word 'delights,' among these two meanings stated in terms of craving and view, it is said, 'taking only the latter meaning,' with the intention that the word 'delighting' is stated referring only to 'delighting in view.' However, since 'delighting' is stated without specification, the meaning intended here is 'delighting by way of craving or by way of view.' Therefore, this statement, 'delighting… cannot be said,' has no place here. Why? Because delighting is stated even in a mental continuum devoid of view. 'One delights by way of craving' means the former meaning, stated in terms of 'delighting in craving.' 'In the two kinds of consciousness-arisings accompanied by joy' refers to states of consciousness accompanied by joy but devoid of view. The connection here should be understood thus: for one who enjoys with joy as stated in the passage beginning 'for one with lust and joy,' and for one who enjoys with lust in those same two kinds of consciousness as stated, and for one who delights with craving accompanied by rapture in all four kinds of consciousness accompanied by joy, and for one who delights with 'delighting in view' in all four kinds of consciousness associated with view, a view arises. Therefore it is said: 'it can be connected thus.' It should be seen that just as 'delighting in view' can arise from view as its support, so 'delighting in craving' can arise from craving as its support. Based on the statement, 'One delights, lust arises,' it should be said that lust arises for one who delights with craving accompanied by rapture; or it need not be said, since the arising of lust is already stated by 'delighting in craving' itself.

406. ‘‘Tadārammaṇatāyā’’ti vattabbe ‘‘tadārammaṇatā’’ti vuttanti āha ‘‘vibhattilopo hettha kato’’ti. Tadārammaṇatāti ettha tā-saddābhidheyyo attho bhāvo nāma, so pana tadārammaṇasaddābhidheyyato añño natthīti dassento āha ‘‘bhāvavantato vā añño bhāvo nāma natthī’’ti. Etena sakatthe ayaṃ tā-saddoti dasseti. Tenāha ‘‘vipāko tadārammaṇabhāvabhūtoti attho’’ti. Etasmiñcatthe ‘‘tadārammaṇatā’’ti paccattekavacanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Viññāṇañcāyatana…pe… na vuttanti yadipi kāmāvacaravipākānampi kammaṃ [Pg.295] ārammaṇaṃ labbhati, taṃ pana viññāṇañcāyatananevasaññānāsaññāyatanavipākānaṃ viya na ekantena imassa vipākacittassa idaṃ kammaṃ ārammaṇanti vavatthitaṃ kāmāvacaravipākacittānaṃ bahubhedattā, tasmā taṃ labbhamānampi na vuttanti attho. Yadi evaṃ kiṃ taṃ labbhamānampi na dassitamevāti āsaṅkāyaṃ āha ‘‘tadārammaṇena panā’’tiādi. Anulomato samāpajjane yebhuyyena āsannasamāpattiyā ārammaṇabhāvo dassito, aññathā ‘‘paṭilomato vā ekantarikavasena vā’’ti vacanaṃ niratthakaṃ siyāti adhippāyo. Bhaveyyāti anāsannāpi samāpatti ārammaṇaṃ bhaveyya, na sakkā paṭikkhipitunti attho. Teneva hi ‘‘yebhuyyenā’’ti vuttaṃ. Evaṃ satīti yadi āvajjanāya eva ārammaṇabhāvena kusalānaṃ khandhānaṃ abyākatārammaṇatā adhippetā, evaṃ sante. Vattabbaṃ siyāti ‘‘iddhividhañāṇassā’’ti ca pāḷiyaṃ vattabbaṃ siyā tassāpi āvajjanāya ārammaṇabhāvato. Taṃ na vuttanti taṃ abyākataṃ iddhividhañāṇaṃ ‘‘kusalā khandhā iddhividhañāṇassā’’ti na vuttaṃ. Hontīti ārammaṇaṃ honti. Tānīti cetopariyañāṇādīni. Yāya kāyacīti cetopariyañāṇādīnaṃ aññesañca kusalānaṃ ārammaṇakaraṇavasena āvajjantiyā.

406. When 'tadārammaṇatāyā' should be said, 'tadārammaṇatā' is stated. He says: 'Here a case ending has been elided.' In 'tadārammaṇatā,' the meaning denoted by the word '-tā' is 'state' (bhāva). Showing that this is not different from what is denoted by the word 'tadārammaṇa,' he says: 'There is no state called bhāva different from that which possesses the state.' By this he shows that this word '-tā' is used in its own meaning. Therefore he says: 'The meaning is that the resultant is what has the nature of having that as object.' In this sense, 'tadārammaṇatā' should be seen as a singular nominative. 'The sphere of infinite consciousness… and so on… is not stated': Although kamma is obtained as an object even for sense-sphere resultants, it is not absolutely established for the resultants of the sphere of infinite consciousness and the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception that 'this kamma is the object of this resultant consciousness,' because of the great variety of sense-sphere resultant consciousnesses. Therefore, the meaning is that although it is obtainable, it is not stated. If so, why is it not shown even though it is obtainable? In response to this doubt, he says: 'But by having that as object…' and so on. In attaining in forward order, the objecthood of the proximate attainment is shown for the most part; otherwise, the statement 'or in reverse order or by way of skipping one' would be meaningless. This is the intention. 'It could be' means that even a non-proximate attainment could be an object; it cannot be rejected. This is the meaning. For this very reason, 'for the most part' was said. If this is so: if the status of having an indeterminate object for the wholesome aggregates is intended by the objecthood of adverting alone, this being the case, it would have to be said in the Pāli 'for the knowledge of the kinds of supernormal power,' because that too has objecthood through adverting. That is not stated: that indeterminate knowledge of the kinds of supernormal power is not stated as 'the wholesome aggregates are for the knowledge of the kinds of supernormal power.' 'They are' means they become objects. 'Those' means the knowledge of others' minds, etc. 'By whichever' means by the adverting that takes as object the knowledge of others' minds and other wholesome states.

407-409. Ādīnavadassanena sabhāvato ca aniṭṭhatāmattavasena ca domanassassa uppatti veditabbāti yojetabbaṃ. Āghātavatthuādibhedena akkhantibhedā veditabbā.

It should be construed that the arising of displeasure is to be understood as due to seeing the danger, and by way of its intrinsic nature, and by way of its mere undesirability. The varieties of intolerance are to be understood according to the different grounds for resentment and so on.

410. Sabbassāti pakaraṇaparicchinne gayhamāne sabbassa abyākatassa, atthantaravasena pana gayhamāne sabbassa ñeyyassāti attho. Asakkuṇeyyattāti idaṃ vattabbassa anantāparimeyyatāya vuttaṃ, na aññāṇapaṭighātato.

410. When 'all' is taken as limited by the scope of the topic, it refers to all that is indeterminate. But when taken in the sense of a different meaning, it refers to all that is knowable. The phrase 'because it cannot be fully grasped' is said because of the infinite and immeasurable nature of what is to be stated, not because of an obstruction by ignorance.

417. Vodānasaṅkhātaṃ vuṭṭhānaṃ apubbato na hotīti vuttaṃ ‘‘apubbato cittasantānato vuṭṭhānaṃ bhavaṅgamevā’’ti. Tañhi yathāladdhassa visesassa vodāpanaṃ paguṇabhāvāpādanaṃ apubbaṃ nāma na hoti. Tathā hi vuttaṃ ‘‘heṭṭhimaṃ heṭṭhimañhi paguṇajjhānaṃ uparimassa uparimassa padaṭṭhānaṃ hoti, tasmā vodānampi vuṭṭhānanti vutta’’nti. Avajjetabbattā vattabbaṃ natthīti kusalabhāvena [Pg.296] samānattā vajjetabbatāya abhāvato vibhajitvā vattabbaṃ natthi, tasmā yadettha visesanaṃ labbhati, taṃ dassento ‘‘nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ…pe… samāpattiyā’’ti āha. Cittuppādakaṇḍe vuttamevāti paṭṭhāne pana ‘‘kusale niruddhe vipāko tadārammaṇatā uppajjatī’’tiādinā ‘‘kiriyānantaraṃ tadārammaṇabhāve’’ti yaṃ vattabbaṃ, taṃ cittuppādakaṇḍavaṇṇanāyaṃ vuttameva.

417. It is said that emergence, called purification, is not from an unprecedented state: 'Emergence from an unprecedented mental continuum is only the life-continuum.' For that purification of a special state as it has been attained, that production of proficiency, is not called 'unprecedented.' For so it is said: 'Each lower proficient jhāna is the proximate cause for each higher one; therefore purification is also called emergence.' Because there is nothing to be avoided, there is nothing to be said: due to its similarity to the wholesome state, there is an absence of anything to be avoided, so there is nothing to be said by way of analysis. Therefore, showing whatever distinction is found here, he says: 'The sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception… up to the attainment.' It has already been stated in the Chapter on the Arising of Consciousness. But in the Paṭṭhāna, what should be said, beginning with 'When the wholesome has ceased, a resultant having that as object arises,' up to 'in the state of having that as object immediately after a functional state,' was already stated in the commentary on the Chapter on the Arising of Consciousness.

Tā ubhopīti yā ‘‘kusalavipākāhetukasomanassasahagatā upekkhāsahagatā cā’’ti dve manoviññāṇadhātuyo vuttā, tā ubhopi somanassasahagatamanoviññāṇadhātuvasena vuttā. Kasmā? Dasannaṃ kāmāvacarabhavaṅgānaṃ attano tadārammaṇakāle santīraṇakāle ca voṭṭhabbanassa anantarapaccayabhāvato. Upekkhāsahagatā pana yathāvuttānaṃ dasannaṃ vipākānaṃ manoviññāṇadhātūnaṃ attano tadārammaṇādikāle voṭṭhabbanakiriyassa santīraṇakāle manodhātukiriyassa bhavaṅgakāleti yojetabbaṃ.

'Both': the two mind-consciousness elements that were stated as 'wholesome-resultant, rootless, accompanied by joy, and accompanied by equanimity'—both are stated by way of the mind-consciousness element accompanied by joy. Why? Because for the ten sense-sphere life-continuum consciousnesses, at the time of their registration and at the time of investigating, determining is the immediate condition. But the one accompanied by equanimity, among the ten resultant mind-consciousness elements as stated, should be connected thus: at the time of its own registration, etc., to the functional determining consciousness; at the time of investigating, to the functional mind-element; and at the time of the life-continuum.

423. Paṭivijjhitvāti jānitvā. Daḷhaṃ na gahetabbanti daḷhaggāhaṃ na gahetabbaṃ. Balavato…pe… vipaccanatoti etena balavatā dubbalatā ca appamāṇaṃ, katokāsatā pamāṇanti dasseti. Katokāsatā ca avasesapaccayasamavāye vipākābhimukhatāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yaṃ kiñcīti ca balavaṃ dubbalaṃ vāti attho. Vipākajanakampi kiñci kammaṃ upanissayapaccayo na hotīti sakkā vattuṃ. Sati hi kammaupanissayapaccayānaṃ avinābhāve vipākattike upanissayapaccaye gahite kammapaccayo visuṃ na uddharitabbo siyā, vedanāttike ca upanissaye paccanīyato ṭhite kammapaccayena saddhiṃ aṭṭhāti na vattabbaṃ siyāti adhippāyo. Paccayadvayassa pana labbhamānatapparāya desanāya upanissaye gahitepi kammapaccayo uddharitabboyevāti sakkā vattuṃ. Labbhamānassa hi uddharaṇaṃ ñāyāgataṃ, tathā upanissaye paccanīyato ṭhitepi kammapaccayo vattabbova upanissayassa anekabhedattā, vipākaṃ janentaṃ kammaṃ vipākassa upanissayo na hotīti na vattabbamevāti veditabbaṃ.

423. `Paṭivijjhitvā` means having known. `Daḷhaṃ na gahetabbaṃ` means it should not be grasped with a firm grasp. By the words `Balavato…pe… vipaccanato` (from the ripening of a strong one), he shows that strength and weakness are immeasurable, while the opportunity that has been created is the measure. The opportunity that has been created should be seen as being directed towards ripening in the conjunction of the remaining conditions. `Yaṃ kiñci` means 'whatever, whether strong or weak.' It can be said that some kamma that generates a result is not a decisive support condition. For if the kamma condition and the decisive support condition were inseparable, when the decisive support condition is taken in the resultant triad, the kamma condition should not be extracted separately. And in the feeling triad, when the decisive support stands in opposition, it should not be said that there are eight together with the kamma condition. This is the intention. But it can be said that because the teaching is concerned with what is obtainable of the two conditions, even when the decisive support condition is taken, the kamma condition must still be extracted. For the extraction of what is obtainable is proper. Similarly, even when the decisive support stands in opposition, the kamma condition must still be stated because decisive support is of many kinds. It should be understood that it must not be said that a kamma generating a result is not a decisive support for its result.

Parassa [Pg.297] pavattaṃ omānanti parasantāne attānaṃ uddissa pavattaṃ avamānaṃ. Tesūti yo anena pubbe hato, tassa ñātimittesu. Mātughātanatthaṃ pavattitatāya purimacetanāya mātughātakammena sadisatā, yathā ca āṇattiyaṃ pahārepi eseva nayo. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘esa nayo dvīhi pakārehīti etthāpī’’ti.

`Parassa pavattaṃ omānanti` means disparagement occurring in another, that is, contempt occurring in another's continuum directed at oneself. `Tesūti` refers to the relatives and friends of the one previously killed by him. Because of the prior volition that occurred for the purpose of killing his mother, there is a similarity with the kamma of matricide. And just as in the case of striking on command, this is the same method. Therefore it was said: 'This is the method in two ways,' and this applies here as well.

Vaṭṭanissito dānādivasena saddhaṃ uppādento rāgaṃ upanissāya dānādivasena saddhaṃ uppādeti nāma, na vivaṭṭanissito avisesena vuttattāti āha ‘‘iminā adhippāyena vadatī’’ti. Etesanti kāyikasukhadukkhānaṃ. Ekatopīti idaṃ yadipi ekasmiṃ santāne sukhadukkhānaṃ ekasmiṃ khaṇe uppatti natthi, paccayasamāyogo pana tesaṃ ekajjhampi hotīti katvā vuttaṃ.

`Vaṭṭanissito`: One who is dependent on the round of rebirths, generating faith by way of giving and so on, is said to generate faith by relying on lust by way of giving and so on; not one who is dependent on what is dissociated from the round, because it has been stated without distinction. Thus he says: 'He speaks with this intention.' `Etesan`ti: of bodily pleasure and pain. `Ekato'pī`ti: This is said because, although in a single continuum the arising of pleasure and pain does not occur in a single moment, the confluence of their conditions can occur together.

425. Purimavāresu viyāti paṭiccavārādīsu purimesu viya. Imasminti pañhāvāre. Paccayena uppatti vuccatīti hetuādinā tena tena paccayena taṃtaṃpaccayuppannassa uppatti na vuccati. Tesaṃ tesaṃ dhammānanti hetuādīnaṃ tesaṃ tesaṃ paccayadhammānaṃ. Taṃtaṃpaccayabhāvoti hetuādīnaṃ taṃtaṃpaccayabhāvo vuccati. Teneva purimesu chasu vāresu ‘‘kusalo dhammo uppajjatī’’tiādinā tattha tattha uppādaggahaṇaṃ kataṃ, idha pana ‘‘kusalassa dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo’’tiādinā paccayabhāvo gahito. Tenāti upatthambhakattena paccayabhāvena. Idhāti pañhāvāre.

425. `Purimavāresu viyā`ti: As in the previous sections, such as the Conditional Relations Section and so on. `Imasmin`ti: In this Question Section. When it is said 'origination by a condition,' this does not mean that the origination of what is conditioned by this or that condition—such as root, etc.—is spoken of. `Tesaṃ tesaṃ dhammānan`ti: Of those various conditioning phenomena, such as root, etc. `Taṃtaṃpaccayabhāvo`ti: The state of being this or that condition—such as root, etc.—is spoken of. For that reason, in the previous six sections, the grasping of origination was done in each case by such phrases as 'a wholesome phenomenon arises,' but here the state of being a condition is grasped by such phrases as 'is a condition for a wholesome phenomenon by way of root condition.' `Tenā`ti: By the state of being a condition in its capacity as a support. `Idhā`ti: Here, in the Question Section.

427. Patiṭṭhābhūtassāti nissayabhūtassa. Kammapaccayoti sahajātakammapaccayo. Dukamūlakadukāvasānāti ‘‘kusalo ca abyākato ca dhammā kusalassa ca abyākatassa ca dhammassā’’ti evaṃ dukamūlakadukāvasānā katvā vuttapañhā. Tatthāti paccayavāre. Kusalo ca abyākato ca dhammāti kusalābyākatappabhedā paccayuppannā dhammā. Yato tato vāti paccayadhammaniyamaṃ akatvā yato tato vā kusalābyākatavasena ubhayapaccayato uppattimattameva tattha paccayavāre adhippetaṃ, ubhayassa yathāvuttassa paccayuppannassa ubhinnaṃ yathāvuttānaṃyeva paccayadhammānaṃ paccayabhāvo na adhippeto uppādapadhānattā tassā desanāyāti adhippāyo. Nissayādibhūtāti nissayaatthiavigatabhūtā paccayadhammā na labbhanti, tasmā kusalo ca…pe… na vuttanti yojanā.

427. `Patiṭṭhābhūtassā`ti: Of what has become a foundation, meaning, of what has become a support. `Kammapaccayo`ti: The conascence-kamma condition. `Dukamūlakadukāvasānā`ti: The questions are stated by making them begin with a dyad and end with a dyad, thus: 'Wholesome and indeterminate phenomena are a condition for a wholesome and an indeterminate phenomenon...' `Tatthā`ti: There, in the Conditional Relations Section. `Kusalo ca abyākato ca dhammā`ti: The conditioned phenomena classified as wholesome and indeterminate. `Yato tato vā`ti: Without laying down a rule for the conditioning phenomena, from wherever, that is, by way of wholesome and indeterminate, the mere origination from both conditions is intended there in the Conditional Relations Section. The state of being a condition of both the aforesaid conditioning phenomena for both the aforesaid conditioned phenomena is not intended, because that teaching has origination as its principal feature—this is the intention. `Nissayādibhūtā`ti: The conditioning phenomena that have become support, presence, and non-disappearance are not found; therefore, 'a wholesome phenomenon and...' and so on is not stated. This is the connection.

Pañhāvāravibhaṅgavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Analysis of the Question Section is finished.

Pañhāvārassa ghaṭane anulomagaṇanā

The Forward Enumeration in the Structuring of the Question Section

439. Etthāti [Pg.298] abyākatamūlake. Yadi evanti yadi kusalākusalamūlehi alabbhamānampi labbhati, evaṃ sante. Gaṇanamattasāmaññato, na paccayasāmaññatoti adhippāyo.

439. `Etthā`ti: Here, in the indeterminate root. `Yadi evan`ti: If, this being the case, what is unobtainable by means of wholesome and unwholesome roots is obtained. The intention is that this is from a generality of mere enumeration, not from a generality of conditions.

440. Nidassanavasena daṭṭhabbo yebhuyyena indriyamaggapaccayānañca hetupaccayassa visabhāgattā. Indriyamaggapaccayā ca visabhāgāti visesanena yo tattha sabhāgabhāvo, taṃ nivatteti. Tathā bhāvābhāvatoti tasmiṃ hetupaccayākāre sati bhāvato, hetudhammānaṃ hetupaccayabhāve sati sahajātādipaccayabhāvatoti attho. Adhipatipaccayādīnanti adhipatindriyamaggapaccayānaṃ. Visabhāgatā hetupaccayassa. Kusalādihetūnanti kusalākusalakiriyābyākatahetūnaṃ. Hetupaccayabhāveti hetupaccayatte hetubhāvena upakārakatte. Vipākapaccayabhāvābhāvatoti vipākapaccayabhāvassa abhāvato. Na hi vipākānaṃ vipākapaccayatā atthi. Vipākahetūnaṃ itarahetūhi hetupaccayatāya atthi sabhāgatāti āha ‘‘hetuvajjāna’’nti. Vipākānaṃ visabhāgatāya bhavitabbaṃ, na hi vipākadhammadhammanevavipākanavipākadhammadhammānaṃ vipākehi sabhāgatā atthi rāsantarabhāvatoti adhippāyo. Ubhayapaccayasahiteti hetuvipākapaccayasahite. Hetupaccayabhāve vipākamhīti hetupaccayabhāvena vattamāne vipākadhamme. Vipākapaccayattābhāvābhāvatoti vipākapaccayabhāvābhāvassa abhāvato. Na hi vipāko vipākassa vipākapaccayo na hoti, tasmā natthi hetuvipākapaccayānaṃ visabhāgatāti adhippāyo.

440. This should be seen as an illustration because for the most part the faculty and path conditions are dissimilar to the root condition. `The faculty and path conditions are dissimilar`—by this qualification, he excludes whatever similarity is there. `Tathā bhāvābhāvato`ti: This means because of its existence when that mode of root condition is present, and because of the existence of conascence condition, etc., when root-phenomena have the state of being a root condition. `Adhipatipaccayādīnan`ti: Of the predominance, faculty, and path conditions. The dissimilarity is of the root condition. `Kusalādihetūnan`ti: Of the wholesome, unwholesome, and functional-indeterminate roots. `Hetupaccayabhāve`ti: In the state of being a root condition, meaning, in the state of being helpful by way of being a root. `Vipākapaccayabhāvābhāvato`ti: Because of the absence of the state of being a result condition. For there is no state of being a result condition for results. He says `hetuvajjānan`ti because for resultant roots there is similarity with other roots in terms of the state of being a root condition. There must be dissimilarity for results, for there is no similarity for results with resultant-dhammas and neither-resultant-nor-resultant-dhammas, because they belong to a different category—this is the intention. `Ubhayapaccayasahite`ti: When accompanied by both conditions, the root and result conditions. `Hetupaccayabhāve vipākamhī`ti: In a resultant phenomenon that is occurring with the state of being a root condition. `Vipākapaccayattābhāvābhāvato`ti: Because of the absence of the non-existence of the state of being a result condition. For it is not the case that a result is not a result condition for a result. Therefore, there is no dissimilarity between the root and result conditions—this is the intention.

Idāni vuttamevatthaṃ udāharaṇena samatthento ‘‘yathā hī’’tiādimāha. Hetusahajātapaccayasahiteti hetupaccayasahajātapaccayasahite, ubhayapaccayayutteti attho. Hetūnanti idaṃ ‘‘sahajātapaccayattābhāvo’’ti imināpi sambandhitabbaṃ. Hetūnañhi hetupaccayasahite rāsimhi hetupaccayabhāvo viya sahajātapaccayabhāvopi atthīti. Tattha hetuvajjānaṃ sahajātadhammānaṃ hetudhammassa ca na sabhāgatā vuccati sahajātapaccayena sabhāgabhāvato. Evamidhāpīti yathā hetusahajātapaccayesu vuttappakārena natthi visabhāgatā, evamidhāpi [Pg.299] hetuvipākapaccayesu natthi visabhāgatāti attho. Esa nayo vippayuttapaccayepīti yvāyaṃ nayo hetusahajātapaccayesu visabhāgatābhāvo vutto, esa nayo hetusahite vippayuttapaccayepīti attho. Tatthāpi hi ‘‘hetuvippayuttapaccayasahite rāsimhī’’tiādi sakkā yojetunti. Paccuppanno eva paccayuppanno, paccayo pana atītopi anāgatopi kālavinimuttopi hotīti paccuppannakkhaṇe hetupaccayabhāve sahajātādipaccayabhāvaṃ sandhāya tathābhāvābhāvavasena sabhāgatāya vuccamānāya nānākkhaṇikānaṃ kusalādīnaṃ hetūnaṃ vipākānañca vasena visabhāgatā tasseva hetussa na vattabbāti imamatthaṃ dasseti ‘‘apicā’’tiādinā.

Now, supporting the meaning just stated with an example, he says, "yathā hī," etc. "Hetusahajātapaccayasahite"ti means: accompanied by the root condition and the conascence condition; the meaning is "endowed with both conditions." "Hetūnan"ti: This should also be connected with "sahajātapaccayattābhāvo." For in the aggregate of phenomena accompanied by the root condition, just as there is the state of being a root condition for the roots, so too there is the state of being a conascence condition. There, similarity is not spoken of between the root phenomenon and the conascent phenomena other than the root, because of their state of similarity by way of conascence condition. "Evamidhā'pī"ti: The meaning is that just as there is no dissimilarity in the manner stated in the case of the root and conascence conditions, so too here in the case of the root and result conditions there is no dissimilarity. "Esa nayo vippayuttapaccayepī"ti: The meaning is that this method that was stated regarding the absence of dissimilarity in the case of the root and conascence conditions, this same method applies in the case of the dissociated condition accompanied by root. For there too, such phrases as "in the aggregate accompanied by the root and dissociated conditions" can be connected. He shows this meaning by the passage beginning with "apicā"ti: The conditionally arisen phenomenon is only a present phenomenon, but the condition can be past, future, or timeless. Thus, when similarity is spoken of in terms of presence and absence with reference to the state of being a conascence condition, etc., at the present moment when the state of being a root condition exists, dissimilarity should not be ascribed to that same root in relation to wholesome roots, etc., and their results, which are of different moments.

Aggahitavisesato sāmaññato viseso na suviññeyyo hotīti adhippāyenāha ‘‘kusalā vīmaṃsādhipatīti evaṃ vattabba’’nti.

With the intention that because the specific has not been grasped, the distinction from the general is not easily knowable, he said: "'Kusalā vīmaṃsādhipatī'ti evaṃ vattabbaṃ" ("Wholesome investigation is the dominant factor," thus it should be stated).

441-443. ‘‘Itarāni dve labhatī’’ti evaṃ vattuṃ na sakkā, hetādhipatidukehi dassitāni yāni ‘‘kusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassa, kusalo dhammo abyākatassa, kusalo dhammo kusalassa ca abyākatassa ca, abyākato dhammo abyākatassā’’ti cattāri vissajjanāni, tesu hetusahajātanissayaatthiavigataindriyamaggapaccayesu sampayuttapaccaye paviṭṭhe ‘‘kusalo dhammo kusalassa, abyākato dhammo abyākatassā’’ti imāni dve labhati. Yaṃ sandhāya aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘sace tehi saddhiṃ…pe… tāneva dve labhatī’’ti, tehi pana itarāni nāma ‘‘kusalo dhammo abyākatassa, kusalo dhammo kusalassa ca abyākatassa cā’’ti imāni dvepi siyuṃ. Na hi kusalo dhammo kusalassa vippayuttapaccayena paccayo hoti. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘itarāni dve labhatīti purimapāṭho’’tiādi. Itarāni dveti vā aññāni dve, yāni sampayuttapaccayavasena dve vissajjanāni, vippayuttapavese pana tato aññāni aññathābhūtāni dve vissajjanāni. Yāni sandhāya vuttaṃ ‘‘kusalo abyākatassa, abyākato abyākatassāti dve labhatīti paṭhantī’’ti. Tesūti ūnataragaṇanāhetūsu vipākaaññamaññādīsu.

441-443. It is not possible to say, "One obtains the other two." For of the four answers shown by the root and dominance dyads—"a wholesome phenomenon for a wholesome phenomenon, a wholesome phenomenon for an indeterminate one, a wholesome phenomenon for a wholesome and an indeterminate one, and an indeterminate phenomenon for an indeterminate one"—when the associated condition is included with the root, conascence, dependence, presence, non-disappearance, faculty, and path conditions, one obtains these two: "a wholesome phenomenon for a wholesome one" and "an indeterminate phenomenon for an indeterminate one." In reference to this it is said in the Commentary: "If with those... one obtains those same two." But by "the others," these two could also be meant: "a wholesome phenomenon for an indeterminate one" and "a wholesome phenomenon for a wholesome and an indeterminate one." For a wholesome phenomenon is not a condition for a wholesome phenomenon by way of dissociated condition. Therefore it is said: "'One obtains the other two'—this is the earlier reading," and so on. Or, "the other two" means two others; that is, the two answers that are by way of associated condition. But on the inclusion of the dissociated condition, two other, different answers are obtained. In reference to this it is said: "They read, 'One obtains two: a wholesome one for an indeterminate one, and an indeterminate one for an indeterminate one.'" "Tesū"ti: Among the reasons for the smaller count, such as result, mutuality, etc.

Anāmaṭṭhavipākānīti [Pg.300] aggahitavipākapaccayāni, ghaṭanaṃ apekkhitvā ayaṃ napuṃsakaniddeso. Na vipākaheturahitāni sādhāraṇavasena vuttattā. Tena vuttaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘sāmaññato navannampi hetūnaṃ vasena vuttānī’’ti, ‘‘vipākahetupi labbhatī’’ti ca.

"Anāmaṭṭhavipākānī"ti: Those for which result-condition has not been grasped. This neuter designation is with reference to the structuring. They are not devoid of resultant roots, because they are stated in a general way. Therefore it is said in the Commentary: "They are stated generally by way of all nine roots," and "A resultant root is also obtained."

Tatthāti pañcamaghaṭanato paṭṭhāya pañcasu ghaṭanesu. Tena vipākena saha, samaṃ vā uṭṭhānaṃ etassāti samuṭṭhānanti ayampi attho sambhavatīti vuttaṃ ‘‘paṭisandhiyaṃ kaṭattārūpampi taṃsamuṭṭhānaggahaṇeneva saṅgaṇhātī’’ti. Eseva nayoti iminā kaṭattārūpampi taṃsamuṭṭhānaggahaṇeneva saṅgaṇhātīti imamevatthaṃ atidisati.

Therein: that is, from the fifth combination onward, in the five combinations. 'With that resultant, or arising simultaneously with it, it is therefore called 'co-arisen'—this meaning is also possible,' thus it was said: 'At rebirth-linking, even kamma-produced materiality is included by the taking of it as co-arisen with that.' This is the same method: by this, it extends this very meaning, that 'even kamma-produced materiality is included by the taking of it as co-arisen with that.'

Evampīti ‘‘etesu panā’’tiādinā saṅkhepato vuttappakārepīti attho. Tenāha ‘‘etesu pana…pe… vuttanayenapī’’ti. Yo yo paccayoti yo yo hetuādipaccayo mūlabhāvena ṭhito paresaṃ paccayānaṃ. Tappaccayadhammānanti tehi hetuādipaccayehi paccayabhūtānaṃ hetuādidhammānaṃ. Niravasesaūnaūnataraūnatamalābhakkamenāti te dhammā yesu vissajjanesu yathārahaṃ niravasesā labbhanti, yesu ūnā ūnatarā ūnatamā ca labbhanti, tena kamena ghaṭanāvacanato paccayuppannāpi yathākkamaṃ niravasesādikkameneva labbhanti. Tenāha ‘‘niravasesalābhe ca…pe… veditabbo’’ti.

Even so: this means, 'even in the ways stated in brief beginning with 'But in these...'' Therefore he said: 'But in these...pe... even in the way mentioned.' Whatever condition: whatever condition, such as root condition, that stands as the fundamental basis for other conditions. Of phenomena conditioned thereby: of the phenomena, such as root, that are conditioned by those conditions, such as the root condition. By the order of obtaining them without remainder, less, still less, and least: since the combinations are stated in that order, those phenomena that are obtained without remainder in the answers where this is appropriate, and those that are obtained as less, still less, and least, are obtained in that order. Thus the conditionally arisen phenomena, too, are obtained in the same order of 'without remainder,' etc. Therefore he said: 'And in the case of obtaining them without remainder...pe... it should be understood.'

Hetumūlakaṃ niṭṭhitaṃ.

The section based on the root condition is concluded.

445. Pañcame ekanti sanissayato abyākatamūlaṃ akusalanti idaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘vatthuvasena sanissayaṃ vakkhatī’’ti. Na idanti idaṃ catutthaṃ ghaṭanaṃ labbhamānassapi vatthussa vasena ghaṭanaṃ na hoti tassa vakkhamānattā, tasmā ‘‘ārammaṇavasenevā’’ti ekaṃso gahitoti atthayojanā.

445. In the fifth, one [case]: with reference to the unwholesome rooted in the indeterminate by way of dependence, he says: 'He will speak of dependence by way of the physical basis.' Not this: this fourth combination does not occur by way of the physical basis, even when a physical basis is obtainable, because that will be spoken of later. Therefore, 'by way of object alone' is taken as one part—this is the explanation of the meaning.

446. Sahajātapurejātā eko nissayapaccayoti iminā satipi paccayadhammabhede paccayabhāvabhedo natthīti dasseti, tathā ‘‘atthipaccayo’’ti imināpi. Avigatapaccayopettha atthipaccayeneva saṅgahitoti daṭṭhabbo. ‘‘Atthiavigatapaccayo’’ti pāṭho. Sahajātārammaṇādhipati pana na kevalaṃ paccayadhammappabhedova, atha kho paccayabhāvabhedopi atthevāti āha ‘‘evaṃ…pe… abhāvato’’ti. Vuttamevatthaṃ pākaṭataraṃ [Pg.301] kātuṃ ‘‘nissayabhāvo hī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha sahajātapurejātanissayādīnanti sahajātanissayapurejātanissayādīnaṃ. Ādi-saddena sahajātapurejātaatthiavigatabhāve saṅgaṇhāti. Na panevantiādinā vuttamevatthaṃ vivaranto ‘‘sahajāto hī’’tiādimāha. Bhinnasabhāvāti samānepi adhipatisaddavacanīyabhāve paccayabhāvavisiṭṭhena sabhāvena bhinnasabhāvā, na hetupaccayādayo viya sabhāvamattena. Tenevāti bhinnasabhāvattā eva. Aññathā ‘‘kusalo kusalassa sahajātavasena, abyākato ārammaṇavasena adhipatipaccayena paccayo hotī’’ti tadubhayaṃ ekajjhaṃ katvā vattabbaṃ siyā, na ca vuttanti dassento āha ‘‘pañhāvāravibhaṅge…pe… na vutta’’nti.

446. By 'Co-nascence and pre-nascence are one dependence condition,' it is shown that even when there is a difference in the conditioning phenomena, there is no difference in the state of being a condition. Similarly, this is also indicated by the phrase 'presence condition.' Here, the non-disappearance condition should be understood as included under the presence condition itself. The reading is 'presence-nondisappearance condition.' However, co-nascence, object, and dominance are not merely a classification of conditioning phenomena, but also involve a distinction in the state of being a condition itself. Hence, it is stated, 'thus...pe... due to absence.' To make the meaning clearer, it is said, 'For the state of dependence is...' etc. Here, 'of co-nascence, pre-nascence, dependence, etc.' refers to co-nascence dependence, pre-nascence dependence, and so on. The term 'etc.' includes the states of co-nascence, pre-nascence, presence, and non-disappearance. But by 'not so...' etc., elaborating on the meaning already stated, it is said, 'for co-nascence...' and so on. 'Of different natures': though sharing the state expressed by the term 'dominance,' they are of distinct natures due to the specific state of being a condition, not merely differing in intrinsic nature like the root condition and others. Therefore: precisely because of their distinct natures. Otherwise, one would have to state by combining both, such as: 'a wholesome state is a condition for a wholesome state by way of co-nascence, and an indeterminate state is a condition by way of object through dominance condition.' But this is not stated. To show this, it is said, 'in the Analysis of the Question Section...pe... it is not stated.'

447-452. Sādhāraṇavasenāti adhipatindriyabhāvasāmaññena. Tathā ceva cha ghaṭanāni yojetvā dasseti ‘‘adhipatī’’tiādinā. Dve paccayadhammāti vīriyavīmaṃsānaṃ vasena dve paccayadhammā, ekoyeva cittādhipativasena. Samaggakāni pubbe vattabbāni siyuṃ adhipatipaṭipāṭiyāti adhippāyo. Paṭhamañhi vīriyādhipati pacchā cittādhipatīti. Tesaṃ āhāramaggapaccayānaṃ pacchā vuttāni samaggakāni. Sadisattāti idaṃ parato ‘‘hetuvasena vuttaghaṭanehi sadisattā’’tiādivacanaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ.

447-452. By way of being common: by the commonality of the state of dominance and faculty. Similarly, he shows six combinations by connecting them, beginning with 'dominance,' etc. Two conditioning phenomena: two conditioning phenomena by way of energy and investigation, and only one by way of mind as dominance. The concordant factors should be stated before, in the sequence of dominance—this is the intention. For first comes energy as dominance, then mind as dominance. Their concordant factors are stated after the nutriment and path conditions. Because of similarity: this is said with reference to the statement further on: 'because of similarity to the combinations stated by way of root condition,' etc.

457-460. Dumūlakanti kusalābyākatamūlakaṃ. Taṃ kusalamūlakesu kasmā vuttanti codanāyaṃ āha ‘‘abyākatasahitassa kusalassa paccayabhāvadassanavasenā’’ti. Etthāti anulomagaṇane. Yathāvuttesūti ‘‘sahajātaaññamaññanissayavipākasampayuttavippayuttaatthiavigatamūlakesū’’ti evaṃ vuttesu sahajātādimūlakesu. Atthiavigatamūlakavajjesūti atthiavigatamūlakāni ṭhapetvā avasesesu āhārena āhārapaccayena ghaṭanāni na yojitānīti sambandho. Adhipatindriyehi ca nissayādivajjesu sahajātādīsu ghaṭanāni na yojitānīti yojanā. Tesūti hetukammajhānamaggesu āhāre adhipatindriyesu ca taṃtaṃghaṭanavasena yathāvuttesu yojiyamānesu. Tenāti hetuādiarūpadhammānaṃyeva labbhanato. Tehi ghaṭanānīti hetuādīhi yojiyamānāni ghaṭanāni. Rūpamissakattābhāvenāti idaṃ vuttasadisatāya kāraṇavacanaṃ. Kasmā panettha atthiavigatamūlakāni nissayavippayuttaatthiavigatāni [Pg.302] tehi vajjitānīti āha ‘‘atthiavigatehi panā’’tiādi. Nissayādīhi yojiyamānāni adhipatindriyāni rūpamissakāni hontīti na vuttānīti sambandho. Yadi evaṃ kasmā atthiavigatamūlakesu āhārena, nissayādimūlakesu ca adhipatindriyehi yojanā katāti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘adhipatāhārindriyamūlakesū’’tiādi.

457-460. Rooted in two: rooted in the wholesome and the indeterminate. In response to the objection, 'Why is that stated among those rooted in the wholesome?' he said: 'By way of showing the state of being a condition of the wholesome together with the indeterminate.' Here: in the forward enumeration. In the as-stated: in the roots such as co-nascence, etc., stated as 'in the roots of co-nascence, mutuality, dependence, resultant, association, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance.' Excluding the roots of presence and non-disappearance: the connection is that in the remaining cases, having excluded the roots of presence and non-disappearance, the combinations are not connected with nutriment by way of nutriment condition. And the connection is that the combinations are not connected with dominance and faculty in the cases of co-nascence, etc., excluding dependence, etc. In them: when they are connected as stated in the respective combinations in root, kamma, jhāna, path, nutriment, dominance, and faculty. Therefore: because only immaterial phenomena such as root, etc., are obtainable. The combinations with them: the combinations connected with root, etc. Because of the absence of being mixed with materiality: this states the reason for the aforementioned similarity. Why here are the roots of presence and non-disappearance, and dependence, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance excluded by them? He says: 'But by presence and non-disappearance,' etc. The connection is that dominance and faculty, when connected with dependence, etc., are mixed with materiality, so they are not stated. If so, in response to the objection, 'Why is the connection made with nutriment in the roots of presence and non-disappearance, and with dominance and faculty in the roots of dependence, etc.?' he says: 'In the roots of dominance, nutriment, and faculty,' etc.

473-477. Edisesu ṭhānesu khandha-saddo arūpesveva niruḷhoti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘na pavatte viya khandhāyeva paccayuppannabhāvena gahetabbā’’ti. Kaṭattārūpampi pana labbhatīti iminā ‘‘ekakkhaṇikakammavasena vuttānī’’ti vacanaṃ paṭikkhipati. Yamatthaṃ sandhāya ‘‘kasmā na vutta’’nti vuttaṃ, taṃ pākaṭataraṃ karonto ‘‘nanū’’tiādiṃ vatvā puna taṃ udāharaṇena vibhāvetuṃ ‘‘yathācā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Ārammaṇanissayapaccayabhāvenāti ārammaṇapaccayabhāvena nissayapaccayabhāvena ca. Kammassa ca paccayabhāvo pākaṭoyevāti āha ‘‘kammampi ārammaṇapaccayabhāvena vattabba’’nti. Dvinnaṃ paccayabhāvānanti kammārammaṇapaccayabhāvānaṃ. Aññamaññapaṭikkhepatoti iminā dvinnaṃ paccayabhāvānaṃ bhinnattā pavattiākārassa ekakkhaṇe ekasmiṃ paccayadhamme ayujjamānataṃ dasseti. Yathādassitassa nidassitabbena asamānataṃ dassento ‘‘paccuppannañhi…pe… yuttaṃ vattu’’nti āha. Kammaṃ panātiādinā kammārammaṇapaccayānaṃ pavattiākārassa bhinnattā ekajjhaṃ hutvā appavattimeva vibhāveti. Yato te aññamaññaṃ paṭikkhepakā vuttā, kasmā pana taṃyeva vatthu ārammaṇapaccayo hoti nissayapaccayo ca, na taṃyeva kammaṃ ārammaṇapaccayo ca kammapaccayo cāti? Na codetabbametaṃ, dhammasabhāvo esoti dassento ‘‘esa ca sabhāvo’’tiādimāha. Tattha vattamānānanti paccuppannānaṃ. Yanti idaṃ ‘‘vattabbatā’’ti iminā sambandhiyamānaṃ ‘‘yā’’ti itthiliṅgavasena vipariṇāmetabbaṃ. Yathātiādinā tamevatthaṃ udāharaṇadassanena vibhāveti.

473-477. In such places, because the word 'aggregate' is established as referring only to the immaterial aggregates, it was said: 'The aggregates alone should not be taken as conditionally arisen as they are in the course of existence.' But by 'kamma-produced materiality is also obtainable,' he refutes the statement 'they are spoken of by way of momentary kamma.' Making clearer the point with reference to which it was asked, 'Why was it not stated?', he said 'Surely...' etc., and then to clarify that with an example, he said 'And just as...' etc. By the state of being an object-dependence condition: by the state of being an object condition and by the state of being a dependence condition. Since the state of kamma as a condition is also evident, he says: 'Kamma, too, should be spoken of by way of object condition.' Of the two states of being a condition: of the states of being a kamma condition and an object condition. By 'mutually exclusive': by this he shows that because the two states of being a condition are different, their mode of occurrence is incompatible in a single conditioning phenomenon at a single moment. Showing the dissimilarity of what was shown with what should be shown, he says: 'For the present...pe... it is fitting to say.' But by 'Kamma, however...' etc., he clarifies that because the modes of occurrence of kamma condition and object condition are different, they do not occur together. Since they are said to be mutually exclusive, why is it that the same physical basis can be an object condition and a dependence condition, but the same kamma cannot be an object condition and a kamma condition? This should not be questioned. Showing that 'this is the nature of things,' he says: 'And this is the nature...' etc. Here, of the occurring: of the present ones. This word 'yaṃ', being connected with 'vattabbatā' (what should be said), should be changed to the feminine 'yā'. By 'Just as...' etc., he clarifies that very meaning by showing an example.

478-483. Yaṃ viññāṇaṃ adhipatipaccayo na hoti, taṃ anāmaṭṭhādhipatibhāvaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Vatthussa vasenāti hāpetabbassa vatthussa vasena.

478-483. Whatever consciousness is not a dominance condition, that should be understood as having the state of an unexercised dominance. By way of the physical basis: by way of the physical basis that is to be excluded.

484-495. Arūpindriyāni [Pg.303] rūpānaṃ paccayattena labbhantīti yojanā. Yadipi evaṃ vuttaṃ rūpindriyānaṃ arūpānaṃ paccayattañca labbhatīti āha ‘‘cakkhādīni ca pana cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ labbhantī’’ti. Taṃsamānagatikāti vīriyena samānagatikā maggapaccayatāya.

484-495. The connection is that immaterial faculties are obtainable as conditions for material phenomena. Although it is stated thus, he says that the conditionality of material faculties for immaterial phenomena is also obtainable: 'But the eye faculty, etc., are also obtainable for eye-consciousness, etc.' Having the same course as that: having the same course as energy, by way of path condition.

511-514. Vippayuttamūlake ‘‘dasame kusalādayo cittasamuṭṭhānāna’’nti idaṃ pavattivasena aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttanti āha ‘‘paṭisandhiyaṃ pana ‘khandhā kaṭattārūpānaṃ vatthu ca khandhāna’nti idampi labbhatī’’ti. Tassa dassanavasenāti tassa vatthussa dassanavasena, na anavasesato paccayadhammassa dassanavasena. Tenāha ‘‘khandhā ca vatthussāti idampi pana labbhatevā’’ti. Na vajjetabbānīti tesampi paccayuppannabhāvena yojetabbattā.

511-514. In the section rooted in dissociation, he says that the statement in the commentary, 'In the tenth, the wholesome states, etc., are for the mind-originated phenomena,' is said with respect to the course of existence, and he adds, 'But at rebirth-linking, this too is obtainable: "The aggregates are for kamma-produced materiality, and the physical basis is for the aggregates."' By way of showing that: by way of showing that physical basis, not by way of showing the conditioning phenomenon without remainder. Therefore he said: 'And the aggregates for the physical basis—this too is indeed obtainable.' They should not be excluded: because they too should be connected by way of being conditionally arisen.

515-518. Arūpavatthārammaṇamahābhūtaindriyāhārānaṃ paccayadhammānanti attho. ‘‘Āhārindriyapaccayā cā’’tipi pana vattabbaṃ. Kasmā? Na hi indriyāhārānaṃ vasena sahajātādayo labbhanti, indriyāhārānaṃ pana vasena indriyāhārapaccayāva labbhanti. ‘‘Sahajātaṃ purejātaṃ pacchājātaṃ āhāraṃ indriya’’nti hi uddisitvā atthipaccayo vibhattoti. Keci panettha ‘‘āhāraggahaṇena kabaḷīkāro āhārova gahito, indriyaggahaṇena ca rūpajīvitindriyameva, sesāhārindriyāni sahajātādīsveva antogadhāni katāni. Yāni tadantogadhāni, te sandhāya aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘arūpavatthārammaṇamahābhūtaindriyāhārānaṃ vasenā’ti ettha indriyāhāraggahaṇaṃ katanti ‘sahajātapurejātapacchājātapaccayā labbhantī’ti vutta’’nti vadanti.

515-518. The meaning is: of the conditioning phenomena, which are the immaterial states, the base, the object, the great elements, the faculties, and the nutriments. However, it should also be said: 'And by nutriment-condition and faculty-condition.' Why? For by means of faculties and nutriments, co-nascence and so on are not obtained; but by means of faculties and nutriments, only the faculty-condition and nutriment-condition are obtained. For having pointed out, 'Co-nascence, pre-nascence, post-nascence, nutriment, faculty,' the presence condition is analyzed. Herein, some say: 'By the term "nutriment," only physical nutriment is taken, and by the term "faculty," only the material life-faculty. The remaining nutriments and faculties are included within co-nascence and so on. In reference to those included therein, in the commentary, where it says, "by way of the immaterial states, the base, the object, the great elements, the faculties, and the nutriments," the terms "faculty" and "nutriment" are taken up, and thus it is said, "co-nascence, pre-nascence, and post-nascence conditions are obtained."'

Tattha arūpānaṃ sahajātapacchājātāhārindriyapaccayabhāvo yathārahaṃ veditabbo. Vatthu sahajātaṃ purejātañca, ārammaṇaṃ purejātameva, abhiññāñāṇassa pana kadāci sahajātampi ārammaṇapaccayo hotiyeva. Sahajātaggahaṇena panettha sahajātapaccayabhūtova gayhati, so ca ekuppādādilakkhaṇayuttovāti yo dhammo sahajāto hutvā ārammaṇaṃ hoti, na so idha adhippeto. Yadi sahajātopi ārammaṇaṃ hoti, kasmā pāḷiyaṃ tathā na vibhattanti? Ekakalāpapariyāpannassa ekuppādādilakkhaṇayuttassa bhinnakalāpapariyāpannato saṅkaramocanatthaṃ. Apica appacurabhāvato apākaṭabhāvato ca taṃ na gahitaṃ[Pg.304]. Tatoti navamatoti attho, na dasamatoti adhippāyo. Na hi ekādasame adhipati atthīti. Tathā cuddasameti ettha tathā-saddena vatthuggahaṇena cakkhādivatthūnipi gahitānīti imamatthaṃ upasaṃharati. Tadevāti ārammaṇameva.

Therein, the state of being a condition by way of co-nascence, post-nascence, nutriment, and faculty for immaterial states should be understood as is appropriate. The base is both co-nascent and pre-nascent; the object is only pre-nascent. But for the knowledge of supernormal powers, a co-nascent phenomenon is indeed sometimes also an object-condition. Here, by the term 'co-nascence,' only that which has become the co-nascence condition is taken, and that is endowed with the characteristics of simultaneous arising, etc. Therefore, a phenomenon that, having become co-nascent, is an object, is not intended here. If a co-nascent phenomenon can also be an object, why is it not analyzed as such in the Pāli text? To avoid confusion between that which is included in a single group and endowed with the characteristics of simultaneous arising, etc., and that which is included in a different group. Moreover, it is not taken up because it is uncommon and not evident. By 'from that' (`tato`) is meant the ninth; the tenth is not intended. For in the eleventh there is no dominance. Similarly, in 'the fourteenth,' by the word 'thus' (`tathā`), he concludes this meaning: that by the taking up of 'base,' the eye-base and other bases are also taken. By 'that very thing' (`tadeva`) is meant 'the object only'.

519. Sahajātāni viyāti sahajātapaccayasahitāni viya ghaṭanāni. Sahajātenāti sahajātapaccayena. Tānīti ‘‘pakiṇṇakaghaṭanānī’’ti vuttaghaṭanāni. Yāni hi sahajātapaccayena na yojitāni, tānettha pakiṇṇakaghaṭanānīti vuttāni. Purejāta…pe… vasenāti ettha ayaṃ yojanā – purejātassa pacchājātassa āhārassa indriyassa ca sahajātena aññamaññañca sāmaññavasena, tesaṃyeva sahajātena aññamaññañca asāmaññavasena cāti vuttaṃ hoti. Yathā purejātassa pacchājātassa ca sahajātena asāmaññaṃ bhinnasabhāvattā, tato eva āhārindriyānampi tena asāmaññaṃ, evaṃ purejātādīnaṃ catunnampi aññamaññaṃ asāmaññaṃ bhinnasabhāvattā. Evaṃ asāmaññavasena asamānatāvasena yathāvuttāni ghaṭanāni vippakiṇṇāni. Yathā pana sahajātapaccayadhammā arūpakkhandhādayo teneva sahajātapaccayatāsaṅkhātena mithūnaṃ samānabhāvena aññehi asaṃkiṇṇā attano paccayuppannānaṃ paccayo hontīti asāmaññavasena tesaṃ pavatti, evaṃ purejātādipaccayadhammāpīti tesaṃ sahajātena aññamaññañca yathāvuttassa sāmaññassa asāmaññassa ca vasena tāni ghaṭanāni vippakiṇṇānīti pakiṇṇakāni vuttāni. Evaṃ sante sahajātānampi ghaṭanānaṃ pakiṇṇakabhāvo āpajjatīti? Nāpajjati, tesaṃ sahajātatāya eva avippakiṇṇabhāvasiddhito. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘sahajātaṃ aggahetvā vuttāni pakiṇṇakāni nāmā’’ti.

519. `Sahajātāni viya` means 'like combinations accompanied by the co-nascence condition.' `Sahajātena` means 'by the co-nascence condition.' `Tāni` means the combinations called 'miscellaneous combinations.' For those that are not connected by the co-nascence condition are here called 'miscellaneous combinations.' Regarding 'by way of pre-nascence... etc.,' here the construction is this: it is said to be by way of similarity with the co-nascent and with each other for pre-nascence, post-nascence, nutriment, and faculty; and by way of dissimilarity with the co-nascent and with each other for those very same things. Just as there is dissimilarity of pre-nascence and post-nascence with the co-nascent because of their different natures, and thus also dissimilarity of nutriment and faculty with it, so there is mutual dissimilarity among the four—pre-nascence and so on—because of their different natures. Thus, by way of dissimilarity and inequality, the aforesaid combinations are scattered. But just as the phenomena of the co-nascence condition, such as the immaterial aggregates, are a condition for their own condition-dependents, being unmixed with others due to their mutual sameness designated as 'co-nascence conditionality'—thus their occurrence is by way of this uncommonality—so too are the phenomena of the pre-nascence condition, etc. Therefore, by way of the aforesaid similarity and dissimilarity of these with the co-nascent and with each other, those combinations are scattered and thus called 'miscellaneous.' This being so, do the co-nascent combinations also become miscellaneous? They do not, because their non-scattered state is established by their very co-nascence. Therefore it was said: 'Those spoken of without taking the co-nascent are called miscellaneous.'

Tānīti pakiṇṇakaghaṭanāni. Kusalavipākāti kusalā ca vipākā ca, ye abhinnalakkhaṇā hutvā kusalasabhāvā vipākasabhāvā cāti attho. Evaṃsabhāvañca ekaṃ aññindriyamevāti āha ‘‘idaṃ…pe… labbhatī’’ti. Nanu ca saddhindriyādivasenapi ayamattho labbhatīti? Tesaṃ kiriyasabhāvatāpi atthevāti. Dukkhanti cetasikadukkhaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘akusalamevā’’ti. Vipākassa dukkhassāti yojanā. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘ajhānaṅgattā’’ti. Akusalavipākakiriyāti vicikicchācittapañcaviññāṇakiriyāmanodhātūsu pavattanato akusalavipākakiriyāva hoti cittaṭṭhitīti [Pg.305] attho. Yasmā akusalavipākāti evamatthe gayhamāne dukkhassa cittaṭṭhitiyā ca vasena yathā jhānesu, evaṃ aññesaṃ vasena aññesu ca na labbhati, tasmā akusalassa vipākāti evamatthe gayhamāne dukkhindriyassa vasena indriyesu labbhatīti dassento āha ‘‘akusalassa…pe… labbheyyā’’ti. Imasmiṃ kusalattike vipāko vipākābyākatamicceva gayhati, na akusalādipadehi visesetvāti imamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘kusalavipākā…pe… natthī’’ti āha.

`Tāni` means the miscellaneous combinations. `Kusalavipākā` means both wholesome and resultant, that is, those which, having an inseparable characteristic, are of a wholesome nature and a resultant nature. And showing that there is only one such nature, the faculty of final knowledge (`aññindriya`), he says, 'This... is obtained.' But is it not the case that this meaning is also obtained by way of the faith faculty and so on? Because they also have a functional nature. `Dukkha` means mental pain. Therefore he says, 'only unwholesome.' The construction is 'of resultant suffering.' Therefore it is said, 'because it is not a jhāna factor.' `Akusalavipākakiriyā`: the meaning is that because it occurs in consciousness accompanied by doubt, in the five sense-consciousnesses, and in the functional mind-element, the stability of consciousness is indeed unwholesome, resultant, and functional. Because, when the meaning is taken as 'unwholesome-and-resultant,' it is not obtained by way of suffering and stability of consciousness as in the jhānas, nor by way of others in other cases; therefore, showing that when the meaning is taken as 'resultant of the unwholesome,' it would be obtained among the faculties by way of the pain faculty, he says, 'of the unwholesome... would be obtained.' Showing this meaning—that in this wholesome triad, 'resultant' is taken only as 'resultant-indeterminate,' not specified by terms such as 'unwholesome'—he says, 'wholesome-and-resultant... does not exist.'

Pañhāvārassa ghaṭane anulomagaṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The forward enumeration in the application of the Question Section is concluded.

Paccanīyuddhāravaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Summary of the Opposing Factors

527. Nahetupaccayenāti ettha na-kāro aññatthoti dassento ‘‘hetupaccayato aññena paccayenā’’ti āha. Aggahitaggahaṇenāhi sahajātādisaṅgahavasena aggahitānaṃ gahaṇena. Aṭṭha hontīti imissā pāḷiyā āgatā ārammaṇādayo aṭṭha paccayā honti. Tesūti aṭṭhasu paccayesu. Tīhīti ārammaṇasahajātaupanissayapaccayehi. Dvīhīti ārammaṇapaccayaupanissayapaccayehi. Tasmiṃ tasmiṃ paccayeti tasmiṃ tasmiṃ hetuādike paccaye. Tato hetuādipaccayato. Yathāyogaṃ yojetabbāti yasmiṃ paccaye paccanīyato ṭhite ye paccayā anulomato yojanaṃ labhanti, te yojetabbāti attho.

527. In `Nahetupaccayena`, showing that the particle 'na' has another meaning, he says, 'by a condition other than the root condition.' By `aggahitaggahaṇena` is meant the taking up of what was not taken, by way of including co-nascence and so forth. `Aṭṭha hontīti` means: the eight conditions, beginning with object, that come in this Pāli passage. `Tesūti` means among those eight conditions. `Tīhīti` means by the three conditions: object, co-nascence, and decisive support. `Dvīhīti` means by the two conditions: object and decisive support. `Tasmiṃ tasmiṃ paccayeti` means in each of those conditions, such as the root condition, etc. `Tato` means from that condition, beginning with the root condition. `Yathāyogaṃ yojetabbāti` means 'it should be connected appropriately'; the meaning is that when the opposing factor is present in a certain condition, those conditions which obtain connection in the direct method should be connected.

Dvinnanti anantarūpanissayassa pakatūpanissayassāti imesaṃ dvinnaṃ. Vatthupurejātassa vasena purejātaṃ ārammaṇapurejātassa ārammaṇena saṅgahitattā. Aññissā cetanāyāti nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayabhāveneva pavattāya cetanāya. Arūpāhārā apariccattasahajātabhāvā eva āhārapaccayo honti, rūpāhāro ṭhitippattoyevāti vuttaṃ ‘‘sahajātato aññassa kabaḷīkārāhārassa vasena āhāro’’ti. Sahajātato aññassāti ca idaṃ arūpāhāranivattanatthaṃ vuttaṃ, na kabaḷīkārāhāravisesanivattanatthaṃ tādisasseva tassa abhāvato. Na hi rūpāhāro sahajātapaccayo hoti, nāpi purejātapaccayo hoti[Pg.306]. Yathā sahajātānaṃ sahajātapaccayo na hoti, evaṃ purejātānaṃ pacchājātapaccayo na hoti, pacchājātānañca purejātapaccayo na hoti. Kasmā? Tādisassa paccayalakkhaṇassa abhāvato. Yesañhi yo janako, na tehi tassa sahajātatā atthi, nāpi purejātatā purejātapaccayalakkhaṇayuttā, pacchājātapaccayatāya pana vattabbameva natthi rūpadhammattā. Upatthambhakattepi eseva nayo, tasmā sahajātādividhuro eva tassa paccayabhāvo veditabbo. Teneva hi ‘‘sahajātaṃ purejātaṃ pacchājātaṃ āhāraṃ indriya’’nti ettha rūpajīvitindriyaṃ viya rūpāhāro visuṃ gahito. Tathā cāha ‘‘rūpāhāro…pe… āhārapaccayova hotī’’ti. Sahajātato purejātato ca aññassa rūpajīvitindriyassāti ettha rūpāhāre vuttanayeneva attho veditabbo.

`Dvinnanti` refers to these two: the immediately proximate decisive support and the natural decisive support. The pre-nascent condition is taken by way of the base pre-nascent, because object pre-nascence is included under the object condition. `Aññissā cetanāyāti` means by a volition occurring precisely by way of being a kamma condition of different moments. Immaterial nutriment becomes a nutriment condition precisely through unabandoned co-nascent states, while material nutriment is merely one that has attained stability; thus it was said, 'Nutriment is by way of material food, which is other than co-nascent.' And this, 'other than co-nascent,' is said for the purpose of excluding immaterial nutriment, not for the purpose of excluding a specific type of material nutriment, since there is no such kind. For material nutriment is neither a co-nascence condition nor a pre-nascence condition. Just as co-nascent phenomena are not a co-nascence condition for themselves, so pre-nascent phenomena are not a post-nascence condition, and post-nascent phenomena are not a pre-nascence condition. Why? Because of the absence of such a characteristic of a condition. For that which is the generator is not co-nascent with those things it generates, nor is it pre-nascent endowed with the characteristic of a pre-nascence condition; and as for post-nascence conditionality, there is nothing to be said, because they are material phenomena. Even in the case of supporting, this same principle applies. Therefore, its conditionality should be understood as devoid of co-nascence and so forth. For this reason, in 'Co-nascence, pre-nascence, post-nascence, nutriment, faculty,' material nutriment is taken separately, just like the material life faculty. Thus he says: 'Material nutriment... is only a nutriment condition.' The meaning of 'for the material life faculty which is other than co-nascent and pre-nascent' should be understood in the same way as explained for material nutriment.

Evañca katvāti purimapurimehi asaṅgahitasaṅgaṇhanavasena pacchimapacchimānaṃ gahitattā tathā rūpāhārassa jīvitindriyassa ca vasena idha āhārindriyapaccayānaṃ gahitattāti attho, aññathā ‘‘āhārapaccayena paccayo, indriyapaccayena paccayo’’ti vattabbaṃ siyāti adhippāyo. Tenevāha ‘‘ārammaṇa…pe… icceva vutta’’nti. Tadaññābhāvāti tato ārammaṇādipaccayato aññassa idhādhippetakammādipaccayassa kusale abhāvā. Tasmāti yasmā ārammaṇato aññesaṃ dvinnaṃ vasena upanissayo vutto, tasmā ‘‘ārammaṇādhipati ārammaṇapaccaye saṅgahaṃ gacchatī’’ti vattabbaṃ, na ārammaṇūpanissayeti adhippāyo. Yadi evaṃ kasmā parittattikapañhāvārapaccanīye ārammaṇaṃ na vuttaṃ. Upanissayena hi asaṅgahitatte taṃ vattabbameva siyāti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘yaṃ panā’’tiādi. Tattha purimehi asaṅgahitavasena vuttānanti purimehi paccayehi asaṅgahitavasena vuttānaṃ pacchimānaṃ paccayānaṃ. Saṅgahitavivajjanābhāvatoti attanā samānalakkhaṇatāya saṅgahitassa paccayassa vivajjanābhāvato, vivajjane kāraṇaṃ natthīti attho. Upanissayato aññārammaṇābhāvatoti appamāṇo dhammo appamāṇassa dhammassa ārammaṇaṃ honto ārammaṇūpanissayova hoti ārammaṇādhipatibhāvatoti attho. Yathā ārammaṇe gahite ārammaṇūpanissayo gahitova hoti balavārammaṇabhāvato[Pg.307], evaṃ ārammaṇūpanissaye gahite ārammaṇaṃ gahitameva hoti taṃsabhāvattāti tattha taṃ visuṃ na uddhaṭanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘na pana ārammaṇūpanissayassa ārammaṇe asaṅgahitattā’’ti.

“Evañca katvāti” means that because the later ones are included by way of including what was not included by the earlier ones, and similarly, the nutriment and faculty conditions are included here by way of material nutriment and the life faculty; otherwise, the intention is that it would have to be stated as “it is a condition by the nutriment condition, it is a condition by the faculty condition.” Therefore he said, “The object… etc., is thus stated.” “Tadaññābhāvāti” means because of the absence of another than that; because in wholesome states, there is no other condition intended here, such as kamma, etc., apart from the object condition, etc. “Tasmāti” means that since decisive support is stated by way of the two others than the object, therefore, the intention is that it should be said that “object predominance is included in the object condition,” not “object decisive support.” If so, why is the object not stated in the negative section of the questions on the minor triads? Since it is not included by decisive support, it should indeed be stated. Referring to this objection, he said: “But what…” and so on. There, “of those stated by way of not being included by the earlier ones” means of the later conditions that are stated by way of not being included by the earlier conditions. “Saṅgahitavivajjanābhāvatoti” means because there is no exclusion of what is included due to sharing the same characteristic; the meaning is, there is no reason to exclude it. “Upanissayato aññārammaṇābhāvatoti” means because of the absence of an object other than decisive support; the meaning is that an immeasurable dhamma, being an object for an immeasurable dhamma, is only an object decisive support, by way of being an object predominance. Just as when the object is taken, the object decisive support is also taken because of being a strong object, so too when the object decisive support is taken, the object is also taken because of having that same nature. Therefore, it should be seen that it is not extracted separately there. Therefore he said: “But not because the object decisive support is not included in the object.”

Pacchājātaāhārānanti attano paccayuppannato purejātakāyato pacchājātānaṃ arūpāhārānaṃ. Te hi attanā sahajātaarūpadhammānaṃ taṃsamuṭṭhānarūpadhammānampi sahajātaatthipaccayā honti, purejātānaṃ pana vatthūnaṃ pacchājātaatthipaccayo. Pacchājātindriyānanti pacchājātānaṃ arūpindriyānaṃ. Sesaṃ āhāre vuttanayena yojetabbaṃ. Yasmā ete āhārindriyā yasmiṃ khaṇe purejātaatthipaccayaṃ labhanti, tasmiṃyeva khaṇe taṃtaṃpaccayuppannānaṃ sahajātaatthipaccayo pacchājātaatthipaccayo ca honti, tasmā vuttaṃ ‘‘sahāpi atthiavigatapaccayabhāvo hotī’’ti. Tiṇṇanti sahajātādīnaṃ tiṇṇaṃ. Chahi bhedehīti visuṃ gahitehi sahajātādīhi pañcahi yathārahaṃ ekajjhaṃ gahitabhedena cāti chahi atthipaccayabhedehi. Ekekaṃ saṅgahetvāti atthipaccayalakkhaṇaṃ avigatapaccayalakkhaṇañca visuṃ visuṃ chahi bhedehi saṅgahetvā vuttaṃ.

“Pacchājātaāhārānanti” means of the formless nutriments that are post-nascent to the pre-nascent body, which is their conditioned phenomenon. For they serve as the co-nascent presence condition for the formless phenomena co-nascent with themselves and also for the material phenomena arisen from them, but for the pre-nascent bases, they are a post-nascent presence condition. “Pacchājātindriyānanti” means of the post-nascent formless faculties. The rest should be applied in the same way as explained regarding nutriment. Because these nutriments and faculties, at the very moment they obtain the pre-nascent presence condition, also serve as the co-nascent presence condition and post-nascent presence condition for those phenomena arisen from those respective conditions, therefore it is said, “there is also the state of being a presence and non-disappearance condition together.” “Tiṇṇanti” means of the three—co-nascence and so forth. “Chahi bhedehīti” means by the six divisions; that is, by the five, such as co-nascence, taken separately, and by the division of them taken together as appropriate, thus by the six divisions of the presence condition. “Ekekaṃ saṅgahetvāti” means that the characteristic of the presence condition and the characteristic of the non-disappearance condition are each stated, having been included by the six divisions separately.

Ajjhattikabāhirabhedatoti vattabbaṃ cakkhādīnaṃ jīvitindriyassa ca adhippetattā, saparasantānikānañca indriyānaṃ anadhippetattā. Nissayapurejātavippayuttaatthiavigatānaṃ purejātabhūtānanti adhippāyo. Tesañhi purejāte saṅgaho. Tadekadesassāti ārammaṇekadesassa, ārammaṇādhipatiārammaṇūpanissayānanti attho. Tesanti nissayādīnaṃ. Upanissayādīsūti upanissayapurejātapaccayādīsu. Taṃ pana purejātabhūtaṃ ārammaṇaṃ. Tatthāti upanissayapaccayasaṅgahe. Yathāvuttanayo cettha ekantena gahetabboti dassetuṃ ‘‘atha panā’’tiādi vuttaṃ.

It should be stated as the distinction between internal and external, because the eye, and so forth, and the life faculty are intended, while the faculties belonging to one's own and others' continua are not intended. The intention is that support, pre-nascence, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance are of things that are pre-nascent. For these are included in the pre-nascent. “Tadekadesassāti” means of a part of that, i.e., of a part of the object; the meaning is of object predominance and object decisive support. “Tesanti” means of them, i.e., of support and so forth. “Upanissayādīsūti” means in the decisive support condition, the pre-nascent condition, and so on. But that pre-nascent thing is an object. “Tatthāti” means in the inclusion of the decisive support condition. To show that the method as stated should be entirely adopted here, “But now,” etc., is said.

Eva-saddo ānetvā yojetabbo, aññathā tesu pañhesu ekasabhāvatova paccayassa āgamanaṃ vuttaṃ siyā. Tenāti ‘‘ekovā’’ti avadhāraṇena aggahitena. Tesūti sahajātapurejātapaccayesu. Ukkaṭṭhavasenāti ‘‘eko dve’’tiādinā vuttaukkaṃsavasena. Te te paccaye saṅgahetvāti te hetuādipaccaye sahajātādipaccayehi saṅgahetvā. Dassitapaccayaparicchedoti soḷasādibhedena saṅgahetvā dassitapaccayaparicchedo.

The word “eva” should be brought and applied; otherwise, in those questions, the arising of the condition would be stated as being from a single nature only. “Tenāti” means by that which is not grasped by the specification “or one.” “Tesūti” means in the co-nascent and pre-nascent conditions. “Ukkaṭṭhavasenāti” means by way of the highest degree stated by “one, two,” etc. “Te te paccaye saṅgahetvāti” means having included those respective conditions, i.e., the root conditions, etc., by the co-nascent conditions, etc. “Dassitapaccayaparicchedoti” means the demonstrated delimitation of conditions, having been included by the sixteenfold division, etc.

Pabhedaparihānīsūti [Pg.308] sahajātapaccayādīhi saṅgahitapaccayappabhede taṃtaṃpaccayapaṭikkhepe pañhāparihāniyañcāti attho. Nahetupaccayāti iminā hetupaccayato aññe paccayā gahitāti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘nahetupaccayāti ettha labbhamānapaccaye sandhāya vutta’’nti. Evañca katvāti sabbapaccanīyasādhāraṇalakkhaṇavasena vuttattā eva na vattabbaṃ siyā, na hi hetupaccaye paccanīyato ṭhite hetudhammo hetussa dhammassa sahajātapaccayena paccayoti sakkā vattuṃ. Vīsati paccayāti hetupaccayena saddhiṃ vīsati paccayā. Parihānīyaṃ vitthārakathaṃ dassentoti yojanā.

“Pabhedaparihānīsūti” means in the divisions of conditions included by the co-nascent condition, etc., in the rejection of those respective conditions, and in the omission of questions. By this “not by root condition,” other conditions than the root condition are taken; thus it is said, “The phrase ‘not by root condition’ is stated here with reference to the obtainable conditions.” “Evañca katvāti” means it should not be said thus, because it is stated by way of a characteristic common to all negative instances; for when the root condition stands as a negative instance, it cannot be said that a root-phenomenon is a condition for a root-phenomenon by the co-nascence condition. “Vīsati paccayāti” means twenty conditions, i.e., twenty conditions together with the root condition. The connection is that it shows the detailed explanation of what is to be omitted.

528. Tehi tehi paccayehīti sahajātapaccayādīhi tehi tehi saṅgāhakabhūtehi paccayehi. Te te paccayāti saṅgahetabbā aññamaññapaccayādayo hetupaccayādayo vā te te paccayā. Aññesaṃ abhāvaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, na tesaṃ sabbesaṃ sambhavanti adhippāyo. Tenāha ‘‘na hī’’tiādi. Tattha dveyevāti ārammaṇādhipatiṃ apanetvā āha. Abyākatassapīti pi-saddena na kevalaṃ kusalasseva, atha kho abyākatassapīti kusalaṃ sampiṇḍeti.

528. “Tehi tehi paccayehīti” means by those respective conditions, i.e., by those respective conditions such as the co-nascent condition, etc., which are inclusive. “Te te paccayāti” means those respective conditions to be included, such as the mutuality condition, etc., or the root condition, etc. This is stated with reference to the absence of the others; the intention is not that all of them are possible. Therefore, he said, “For indeed…” etc. “Tattha dveyevāti” means he said this, having excluded object predominance. “Abyākatassapīti” means by the particle ‘pi,’ it is not only of the wholesome, but also of the indeterminate; thus it includes the wholesome.

530. Tena saddhinti vatthunā saddhiṃ. Suddhānanti kevalānaṃ vatthunā vinā ca gahitānaṃ kusalakkhandhānaṃ. Yadipi vatthunā saddhiṃ sahajātaṭṭho natthi, nissayādibhāvo pana atthevāti dassento ‘‘vatthunā panā’’tiādimāha.

530. “Tena saddhin”ti means together with the basis. “Suddhānan”ti means of the mere wholesome aggregates that are taken without a basis. Although there is no co-nascent state with the basis, there is indeed a state of support, etc. Showing this, he says, “but with the basis,” etc.

Sahajātapurejātapacchājātaāhārindriyānaṃ atthipaccayena saṅgahetabbattā sahajātādīhi saṅgahetabbānaṃ taṃsaṅgaho sukaroti dassetuṃ upanissayena saṅgahetabbānaṃ saṅgaho vuttanayo evāti vuttaṃ ‘‘catūsu sabbapaccaye saṅgaṇhitvā’’ti. Kammaṃ pana sahajātūpanissayehi asaṅgahetabbatāpi atthīti sarūpato gahitaṃ, aññathā ‘‘tīsu paccayesū’’ti vattabbaṃ siyā. Missakāmissakassāti sahajātapurejātādibhāvehi missakassa tathā amissakassa ca. Vuttamevatthaṃ vitthārato dassetuṃ ‘‘na hī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tenāti atthipaccayavibhāgasaṅgāhakānaṃ sahajātādīnaṃ gahaṇena. Sabbapaccayānaṃ…pe… hotīti iminā ‘‘imasmiṃ pana paccayuddhāre’’tiādinā vuttopi paccayasaṅgaho idha atthato dassitoyevāti imamatthaṃ dasseti.

Since the co-nascent, pre-nascent, post-nascent, nutriment, and faculty conditions are to be included by the presence condition, to show that their inclusion by co-nascence, etc., is easy, it is said that the inclusion of those to be included by the decisive support condition is just as stated; thus it is said, “having included all conditions in the four.” But kamma, since it is also not to be included by the co-nascent and decisive support conditions, is taken according to its own nature; otherwise, it would have to be said, “in three conditions.” “Missakāmissakassā”ti means of that which is mixed by way of co-nascence, pre-nascence, etc., and also of that which is unmixed. To show this same meaning in detail, “for indeed…” etc., was said. “Tenā”ti means by the taking of co-nascence, etc., which are inclusive of the divisions of the presence condition. By this “All conditions… etc. …exist,” it shows this meaning: that the inclusion of conditions, although stated by “but in this enumeration of conditions,” etc., is here shown in its very meaning.

Nissayo [Pg.309] kasmā na vutto? Sahajātanissayo purejātanissayoti hi sakkā vibhajitunti adhippāyo. Vippayutto vā kasmā na vutto? Purejātavippayutto pacchājātavippayuttoti vibhajituṃ sakkāti attho. Yaṃ missakāmissakabhāvaṃ manasi katvā ‘‘avattabbattā’’ti vuttaṃ, taṃ dassento ‘‘nissayo tāvā’’tiādimāha. Visesitabbo ‘‘vippayuttapaccayena paccayo’’ti avisesena pāḷiyaṃ vuttattā. So viyāti atthipaccayo viya, nissayapaccayo viya vā atthipaccayavisesābhāvena vippayuttapaccayo na vattabbova. Dvinnaṃ paccayānaṃ viya pabhedasabbhāvatoti dassento ‘‘sahajātapurejātānañcā’’tiādimāha. Tathātiādinā vuttamatthaṃ pāḷiyā samatthetuṃ ‘‘vakkhatī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha maggaphaladhammānaṃ maggaphalataṃsamuṭṭhānarūpavasena sahajātaatthipaccayo tesaṃyeva purejātacatusantatirūpavasena pacchājātaatthipaccayo vutto, na pana vippayuttapaccayabhāvo vakkhatīti yojanā. Soti vippayuttapaccayo.

Why is dependence not stated? The intention is that it can indeed be divided into co-nascent dependence and pre-nascent dependence. Or why is dissociation not stated? The meaning is that it can be divided into pre-nascent dissociation and post-nascent dissociation. To show what was said as 'not to be stated,' having considered the mixed and unmixed nature, it is said, 'Dependence, for instance...' and so on. It should be specified as 'a condition by way of dissociation condition,' but it is not, because it is stated generally in the Pāḷi. Just as that, like the presence condition or the dependence condition, the dissociation condition should not be stated due to the absence of a specific distinction from the presence condition. To show that there is a real division into two conditions, it is said, 'For co-nascent and pre-nascent...' and so on. To support with the Pāḷi the meaning stated as 'similarly...' and so on, it is said, 'It will be said...' and so on. Therein, for the states of path and fruit, the co-nascent presence condition is stated by way of the form co-arisen with them, and the post-nascent presence condition is stated by way of the four continuities of pre-nascent form for those same states; the construction is that it will not be said that there is a dissociation condition. That is the dissociation condition.

Hetuādīnaṃ sahajātantogadhattā hetuādayo tabbisesā hontīti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘sahajātapaccayo ca hetuādīhi visesetabbo’’ti. Soti sahajātapaccayo. Viruddhapaccayehīti sahajātapurejātassa sahajātādibhāvena viruddhehi paccayehi. Tenāha ‘‘uppattikālaviruddhehi paccayehī’’ti.

Because root, and so on, are included within co-nascence, root, and so on, become its specific instances; having considered this, it is said, 'And the co-nascent condition should be specified by root, and so on.' That is the co-nascent condition. 'By opposing conditions' means by conditions that are opposed to the co-nascent and pre-nascent by way of being co-nascent, and so on. Therefore, it is said, 'by conditions that are opposing in the time of arising.'

Paccanīyuddhāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Extraction of the Negative is concluded.

Paccanīyagaṇanavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Enumeration of the Negative

Nahetumūlakavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Not-Root-Based

532. Adhipatipaccayādibhūto ārammaṇapaccayoti ārammaṇaārammaṇādhipatiārammaṇūpanissaye vadati. Te ca yasmā ārammaṇasabhāvā eva, tasmā vuttaṃ ‘‘parihāyatiyevā’’ti. Pannarasasūti dutiye sahajātapaccaye ‘‘hetupaccayo’’tiādinā vuttesu pannarasasu. Ekādasannaṃ vasenāti sahajātapaccayo, sahajātatāvisiṭṭhā adhipatinissayakammāhārindriyatthiavigatahetujhānamaggā cāti imesaṃ ekādasannaṃ [Pg.310] vasena. Sahajāte antogadhā hetuādayo. Tasmiṃ paṭikkhitteti tasmiṃ sahajāte paṭikkhitte paccanīyato ṭhite. Anantogadhā sahajāte, ke pana teti āha ‘‘ārammaṇādhipatipurejātanissayādayo’’ti. Ārammaṇādiākārenāti ārammaṇapurejātanissayanānākkhaṇikakammādiākārena.

532. The object condition, which is the basis for the predominance condition and so on, refers to the object, object-predominance, and object-decisive-support conditions. And since these are indeed of the nature of an object, it is therefore stated, 'It is indeed omitted.' 'In the fifteen' means in the fifteen stated in the second, the co-nascent condition, beginning with 'root condition,' and so on. 'By means of eleven' means by means of these eleven: the co-nascent condition, and predominance, dependence, kamma, nutriment, faculty, presence, non-disappearance, root, jhāna, and path, which are specified by co-nascence. Root, and so on, are included within the co-nascent. 'When that is rejected' means: when that co-nascent condition is rejected, it stands as a negative. 'Not included within the co-nascent': but what are they? He says, 'Object, predominance, pre-nascent, dependence, and so on.' 'In the manner of object, etc.' means: in the manner of object, pre-nascent, dependence, diverse-moment kamma, and so on.

Tasmiṃ paṭikkhitteti tasmiṃ sahajātapaccaye paṭikkhitte. Ime vārāti sahajātaṃ purejātanti vissajjitavārā. Ete nissayādayoti sahajātatāvisiṭṭhe nissayādike vadati, na itare. Tenāha ‘‘yasmā ca…pe… paṭikkhepena paṭikkhittā’’ti.

'When that is rejected' means: when that co-nascent condition is rejected. 'These turns' means the turns answered as 'co-nascent' and 'pre-nascent.' 'These dependence, etc.' refers to dependence and so on that are specified by co-nascence, not the others. Therefore, it is said, 'Because... and so on... they are rejected by the rejection.'

Nissayādibhūtañca sahajātapaccayaṃ ṭhapetvāti etena ‘‘ṭhapetvā sahajātapaccaya’’nti ettha antogadhanissayādibhāvoyeva sahajātapaccayo gahitoti dasseti. Nissayādīti ādi-saddena hetuādīnaṃ saṅgaho daṭṭhabbo. Aññamaññapaccayadhammavasena pavattisabbhāvatoti aññamaññapaccayadhammavasena sahajātādīhi pavattisabbhāvato aññamaññe paṭikkhitte ‘‘kusalo kusalābyākatassā’’ti vāro parihāyati. Tesaṃ tesaṃ paccayuppannānanti idaṃ sāmaññavacanampi ‘‘aññamaññapaccayasaṅgahaṃ gatā’’ti vacanato aññamaññapaccayalābhīnaṃyeva gahaṇaṃ siyāti āsaṅkaṃ nivattetuṃ ‘‘kusalo ca kusalassā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Samudāyabhūtoti catukkhandhasamudāyabhūto. Ekadesabhūtehīti tasseva ekadesabhūtehi. ‘‘Kusalo panā’’tiādi ‘‘naaññamaññapaccayena…pe… parihāyatī’’ti imassa aṭṭhakathāvacanassa samādhānavacanaṃ.

'Excluding the co-nascent condition which is dependence, and so on': by this, it is shown that here, in the phrase 'excluding the co-nascent condition,' the co-nascent condition is taken only as the state of being the included dependence, and so on. By 'dependence, etc.': by the word 'etc.,' the inclusion of root, and so on, should be understood. Because there is a real occurrence by way of mutually conditioning states, and because there is a real occurrence by way of co-nascent, and so on, with mutually conditioning states, when mutuality is rejected, the turn 'a wholesome state for a wholesome or indeterminate state' is omitted. 'Of those conditionally arisen': although this is a general statement, to dispel the doubt that it might be taken to refer only to those that receive the mutuality condition, according to the phrase 'included in the mutuality condition,' it is said, 'and a wholesome state for a wholesome state,' and so on. 'Being a composite' means being a composite of the four aggregates. 'By what are parts' means by what are parts of that very same thing. 'But a wholesome state,' and so on, is a statement resolving this commentarial phrase: 'not by mutuality condition... and so on... is omitted.'

Rūpakkhandhekadesova honti rūpāhārarūpindriyavasena, ‘‘ekantena vippayuttapaccayadhammehī’’ti vuttadhammā ‘‘te’’ti paccāmaṭṭhāti āha ‘‘teti te vippayuttapaccayadhammā’’ti.

They are indeed a part of the form aggregate, by way of material nutriment and material faculty. The states spoken of as 'by exclusively dissociated conditioning states' are referred back to by 'they'; therefore, he says, 'They: those are the dissociated conditioning states.'

533. Paccanīyagaṇanaṃ dassetunti vuttepi nanu paccayagaṇanameva dassitaṃ hotīti kassaci āsaṅkā siyāti taṃ nivattento āha ‘‘paccanīyavāragaṇanā hi dassitā’’ti. Balavakammaṃ vipākassa upanissayo hoti, itaraṃ kammapaccayo evāti āha ‘‘vipākassapi pana…pe… kammapaccayo hotī’’ti.

533. Although it is said 'to show the enumeration of the negative,' to dispel a possible doubt for someone that 'surely only the enumeration of conditions is shown,' he says, 'For the enumeration of negative turns is shown.' Strong kamma is a decisive support for the result, while other kamma is merely a kamma condition; therefore, it is said, 'But even for the result... and so on... it is a kamma condition.'

Nahetumūlakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Not-Root-Based is concluded.

534. Paricchinnagaṇanānīti [Pg.311] idaṃ na gaṇanāpekkhaṃ, atha kho vissajjanāpekkhanti āha ‘‘paricchinnagaṇanāni vissajjanānī’’ti. Paccanīyato ṭhitopi hetu nayānaṃ mūlabhāveneva ṭhitoti āha ‘‘hetumūlake’’ti, aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana ‘‘nahetumūlaka’’micceva vuttaṃ.

534. 'Limited enumerations': this does not refer to the enumeration, but rather refers to the answers. Therefore, he says, 'The answers are limited enumerations.' Even when standing as a negative, the root stands as the very basis of the methods; therefore, he says, 'in the root-based.' However, in the commentary, it is stated simply as 'not root-based.'

538. Mūlaṃ saṅkhipitvāti sattamūlakaṃ aṭṭhamūlakaṃ navamūlakañca saṅkhipitvā. Dvīsūti ‘‘tīṇī’’ti vuttesu tīsu vissajjanesu purimesu dvīsu ‘‘kusalo dhammo abyākatassa, akusalo dhammo abyākatassā’’ti imesu. Tenāha ‘‘vipāko paccayuppanno hotī’’ti. Tatiyeti ‘‘abyākato dhammo abyākatassā’’ti imasmiṃ. Tesamuṭṭhānikakāyoti utucittāhārānaṃ vasena tesamuṭṭhānikakāyo.

538. 'Having summarized the root' means having summarized the seven-rooted, eight-rooted, and nine-rooted. 'In two' means in these first two of the three answers where 'three' was stated: 'a wholesome state for an indeterminate state, an unwholesome state for an indeterminate state.' Therefore, it is said, 'The result is conditionally arisen.' 'In the third' means in this one: 'an indeterminate state for an indeterminate state.' 'The body originated from them' means the body originated from them by way of temperature, consciousness, and nutriment.

545. Etaṃ dvayaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, yathā arūpaṃ arūpassa, evaṃ rūpampi rūpassa vippayuttapaccayo na hotīti. Rūpābyākato arūpābyākatassāti idaṃ vatthukhandhe sandhāya vuttaṃ. Arūpābyākato rūpābyākatassāti idaṃ pana cittasamuṭṭhānarūpañcāti tesaṃ ekantiko vippayuttapaccayabhāvoti āha ‘‘sahajāta…pe… hotiyevā’’ti. Sahajātāhārindriyavasenāti sahajātaarūpāhārindriyavasena.

545. This pair is spoken of with reference to this: just as the immaterial is not a dissociated condition for the immaterial, so too the material is not a dissociated condition for the material. 'Material indeterminate for an immaterial indeterminate': this is said with reference to the basis-aggregates. 'Immaterial indeterminate for a material indeterminate': this, however, refers to consciousness-originated matter. And because their state of being a dissociated condition is absolute, he says, 'co-nascent... and so on... indeed exists.' 'By way of co-nascent nutriment and faculty' means by way of co-nascent immaterial nutriment and faculty.

546. Ekamūlakekāvasānā anantarapakatūpanissayavasena labbhantīti idaṃ yathārahavasena vuttanti taṃ yathārahaṃ paṭikkhepāpaṭikkhepavasenapi dassetabbanti ‘‘atthipaccaye panā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Purimesūti nārammaṇādīsu. Navāti ekamūlakāvasānā nava. Dveyevāti ‘‘kusalo dhammo abyākatassa, akusalo dhammo abyākatassā’’ti ime dveyeva.

546. 'The single-rooted and single-terminated are obtained by way of contiguity and natural decisive support': this is said according to what is applicable. And to show that applicability also by way of rejection and non-rejection, it is said, 'but in the presence condition,' and so on. 'In the former' means not in object, and so on. 'Nine' means nine single-rooted-single-terminated. 'Only two' means only these two: 'a wholesome state for an indeterminate state, an unwholesome state for an indeterminate state.'

Paccanīyavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Negative is concluded.

Anulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Positive and Negative

550. Imehevāti ‘‘kusalo kusalassa, akusalo akusalassā’’ti imehi eva samānā honti kusalāditāsāmaññena. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘atthābhāvato pana na anurūpā’’ti. ‘‘Kusalo kusalassā’’tiādinā [Pg.312] satipi uddesato sāmaññe yebhuyyena siyā vibhaṅge visesoti āha ‘‘yathāyogaṃ niddesato cā’’ti.

550. 'By these very' means they are similar to these—'a wholesome state for a wholesome state, an unwholesome state for an unwholesome state'—due to the commonality of being wholesome, and so on. Therefore, it was said, 'but because of the absence of meaning, they are not corresponding.' Although there is a commonality in the enumeration, as in 'a wholesome state for a wholesome state,' and so on, he says, 'and according to the designation as appropriate,' because there would generally be a distinction in the analysis.

551. Hetunāmanti hetu ca taṃ nāmañcāti hetunāmaṃ. Paccayanti tameva paccayabhūtaṃ sandhāyāti yojanā.

551. 'Root-name' means: it is a root and it is a name, thus 'root-name.' 'Condition' refers to that very thing which has become a condition; such is the construction.

552. Dvinnampi adhipatīnanti sahajātārammaṇādhipatīnaṃ vasena, taṃ ‘‘kusalaṃ kusalassa sahajātato ceva ārammaṇato cā’’tiādinā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Nārammaṇe sattāti sahajātādhipatissa vasena vuttaṃ, na sahajāte sattāti ārammaṇādhipatissa vasena vuttanti yojanā. Evanti yathā adhipatimhi vuttaṃ, evaṃ sabbattha sabbapaccayesu. ‘‘Tasmiṃ tasmiṃ…pe… uddharitabbā’’ti vatvā tassa gaṇanuddhārassa sukarataṃ upāyañca dassento ‘‘anulome…pe… viññātu’’nti āha.

552. "Of both dominants" refers to dominant conditions by way of co-nascence and object. This should be understood according to the method stated in the commentary: "a wholesome state is related to a wholesome state through co-nascence and object," etc. "Not seven in the object" is stated with reference to the co-nascent dominant; "not seven in the co-nascent" is stated with reference to the object-dominant. Such is the construction. "Thus" means as stated in the case of the dominant, so too everywhere in all conditions. Having said, "in each case...should be extracted," to show the ease and means of extracting that calculation, he said, "in the direct order...should be understood."

Anulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Direct and Reverse Order is concluded.

Paccanīyānulomavaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Reverse and Direct Order

631. Parihāpanagaṇanāyāti parihāpetabbagaṇanāya samānattañca na ekantikaṃ ūnatamabhāvassapi sambhavatoti adhippāyo. Tenāha ‘‘nahetunārammaṇadukassā’’tiādi. Tattha saddhiṃ yojiyamānena ūnataragaṇanena adhipatipaccayena parihīnāpīti yojanā. Saddhiṃ parihīnāpīti vā imasmiṃ pakkhe ‘‘adhipatipaccayenā’’ti itthambhūtalakkhaṇe karaṇavacanaṃ. Etanti lakkhaṇaṃ.

631. "By the reckoning of diminution" (parihāpanagaṇanāya) means by the reckoning of what is to be diminished; and equality is not absolute, since the possibility of deficiency, even non-existence, exists—such is the intention. Therefore, he said, "of the pair of non-root and non-object," and so on. Here, the construction is that even what is diminished is connected with a lesser reckoning by the predominant condition. Alternatively, in this interpretation, "even what is diminished" (saddhiṃ parihīnāpi) means that "by the predominant condition" (adhipatipaccayena) is an instrumental case indicating a characteristic of such a kind. "This" (etaṃ) refers to the characteristic.

Aṭṭhānanti anulomato aṭṭhānaṃ atiṭṭhanaṃ. Tiṭṭhantīti anulomatoti yojanā. Tesanti hetuādīnaṃ. Itaresūti yādisā adhippetā, te dassetuṃ ‘‘adhipatī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Imāni dveti ‘‘kusalābyākatā abyākatassa, akusalāabyākatā abyākatassā’’ti imāni ca dve.

"Impossible" (aṭṭhāna) means non-occurrence in the direct order, non-standing. "They stand" (tiṭṭhanti) is to be construed as "in the direct order." "Of them" (tesaṃ) refers to root and so on. "Among the others" (itaresu) means to show those intended; therefore, "predominance," and so on, is stated. These two are: "Wholesome and indeterminate for the indeterminate, unwholesome and indeterminate for the indeterminate"—these two.

Nahetumūlakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Non-Root-Based is concluded.

636. Hetuyā [Pg.313] vuttehi tīhīti hetupaccayā vuttehi tīhi vissajjanehi saddhiṃ. Vārasāmaññameva vadati, na atthasāmaññanti adhippāyo. Tathā kamme tīṇīti hetuyā vuttānevāti cāti ‘‘kamme tīṇī’’ti ettha ‘‘hetuyā vuttānevā’’ti imasmiṃ atthavacanepi tathā vārasāmaññameva sandhāya vadatīti attho.

636. "By root, three are spoken of" means together with the three replies spoken of by way of the root condition. It speaks only of a similarity of phrasing, not a similarity of meaning—this is the intention. Similarly, "in kamma, three" means "the same as spoken of in root." And so, regarding "in kamma, three," even in this statement of its meaning as "the same as spoken of in root," it is likewise said with reference to a mere similarity of phrasing—this is the meaning.

644. Ekekamevāti ekekameva vissajjanaṃ.

644. "Each one only" (ekekameva) means each reply.

650. Sakaṭṭhāneti attanā ṭhitaṭṭhāne. Tato paretarāti tato aggahitapaccayato paretarā paccanīyato. Nāhāre…pe… lābho hotīti āhārapaccaye paccanīyato ṭhite indriyapaccayaṃ, anulomato indriyapaccaye ca paccanīyato ṭhite āhārapaccayaṃ anulomato yojetvā yathā pañho labbhatīti attho. Tesūti āhārindriyesu. Dvidhā bhinnāni paccanīyato anulomato ca yojetabbabhāvena.

650. "In its own place" (sakaṭṭhāne) means in the place where it stands. "Beyond that" (tato paretarā) means beyond that, from the non-grasped condition, from the reverse. "In non-food... gain occurs" means that by combining the faculty condition in the direct order when the food condition stands in the reverse order, and the food condition in the direct order when the faculty condition stands in the reverse order, a question is obtained; this is the meaning. "In them" (tesu) refers to food and faculties. They are divided in two ways, by virtue of being combinable as reverse and direct.

Paccanīyānulomavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Reverse and Direct Order is concluded.

Kusalattikavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Wholesome Triad is concluded.

2. Vedanāttikavaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Triad of Feeling

1. Vedanāttike paṭiccādiniyamanti tikapadasambandhavasena paṭiccavārādīsu vattabbaṃ paṭiccasahajātaṭṭhādiniyamanaṃ na labhanti vedanārūpanibbānāni. Kasmā? Tikamuttakattā. Tathā paccayuppannavacanaṃ. Na hi sakkā vattuṃ vedanaṃ rūpaṃ nibbānañca sandhāya ‘‘sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca sukhāya vedanāya sampayutto uppajjatī’’ti. Tikadhammānanti vedanāttikadhammānaṃ. Tatthāti hetupaccayādīsu. Yathānurūpatoti vedanādīsu yo yassa vedanāya sampayuttadhammassa ārammaṇādipaccayo bhavituṃ yutto, tadanurūpato. Ārammaṇādīti ādi-saddena ārammaṇādhipatiārammaṇūpanissayādike saṅgaṇhāti.

1. In the feeling triad, feeling, form, and Nibbāna do not obtain the specification as condition, co-nascent, presence, etc., which should be stated in the sections on conditionality, etc., by way of connection with the terms of the triad. Why? Because they are excluded from the triad. Similarly, the expression "dependently arisen." For it is not possible to say, referring to feeling, form, and Nibbāna: "Dependent on a phenomenon associated with pleasant feeling, a phenomenon associated with pleasant feeling arises." "Of the triad phenomena" means of the phenomena of the feeling triad. "There" means in the root condition, etc. "According to suitability" means: in relation to feeling, etc., in accordance with that which is suitable to be an object condition, etc., for a phenomenon associated with that feeling. "Object, etc."—by the word "etc." it includes object-predominance, object-decisive-support, and so on.

10. Kusalattikepi parihīnanti idaṃ paccanīyaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Rūpārūpadhammapariggāhakattāti idaṃ anādibhūtassapi sahajātassa ādimhi ṭhapane [Pg.314] kāraṇavacanaṃ. Ādi-saddenāti ‘‘sahajātādayo’’ti ettha ādi-saddena. Yathārahaṃ ārabbha uppattivasena sabbe arūpadhammā ārammaṇādīnaṃ paccayuppannā hontīti vuttaṃ ‘‘paccayuppannavasena sabbārūpadhammapariggāhakānaṃ ārammaṇādīna’’nti. Ādi-saddena ārammaṇādhipatiārammaṇūpanissayādike saṅgaṇhāti. Tenāti ‘‘sabbārūpadhammapariggāhakā panā’’tiādivacanena. Sabbaṭṭhānikānaṃ…pe… dassitā hoti sahajātadassanenāti attho. Ekadesaparihānidassaneneva hi samudāyaparihāni dassitā hotīti. Sahajātādayoti vā ādi-saddena sabbaṭṭhānikā cattāropi dassitā hontīti. Sahajātamūlakāti sahajātapaccaye sati bhavantā na sahajātaṃ purato katvā pāḷiyaṃ āgatā. Tenāha ‘‘sahajātanibandhanā…pe… vuttaṃ hotī’’ti. So pacchājāto kasmā pana na parihāyatīti sambandho. Tatthāti yathāvuttāya parihāniyaṃ aparihāniyañca. Sahajātanibandhanehīti sahajātadhammanimittehi paccayabhāvehi idha paccayadhammahetuko vutto. Etthevāti parihāniyaṃyeva. Sā hi idha adhikatā. Sahajātanibandhanānameva parihānīti vutte ‘‘kiṃ sabbesaṃyeva nesaṃ parihānī’’ti āsaṅkāya āha ‘‘sahajāta…pe… dassitameta’’nti.

10. Regarding the phrase "diminished even in the wholesome triad," this is stated with reference to the reverse. The phrase "because it grasps both material and immaterial phenomena" is a reason given for placing co-nascence at the beginning, even if it is without a beginning. "By the word etc." means by the word "etc." in "co-nascent, etc." The statement "of the object conditions, etc., which comprehend all immaterial phenomena by way of being dependently arisen" is made because all immaterial phenomena, arising by taking an object as appropriate, are dependently arisen from object conditions, etc. By the word "etc." it includes object-predominance, object-decisive-support, and so on. Therefore, by the statement "but all comprehenders of immaterial phenomena," and so on, it is meant that all universally applicable conditions... are shown by the showing of co-nascence. For by showing the diminution of a part, the diminution of the whole is also indicated. Alternatively, by "co-nascent, etc.," with the word "etc.," all four universally applicable conditions are shown. "Rooted in the co-nascent" means those things arising when co-nascent conditions exist, but the co-nascent is not prioritized in the Pāli. Hence it is said: "Bound by the co-nascent... as stated." But why does that which is post-nascent not decline? This is the connection. "There" refers to the aforementioned diminution and non-diminution. "By those bound by the co-nascent" means that here it is stated as having co-nascent phenomena as its cause by way of being a condition. It is just in this diminution that it is mentioned, for it is emphasized here. If it were said that only what is bound by the co-nascent declines, one might doubt: "Does all of it decline?" To dispel this doubt, it is said: "Co-nascent... this is shown."

17. Nayadassanameva karotīti yathā ahetukakiriyacetanaṃ sandhāya ‘‘nahetupaccayā nakammapaccayā’’ti vattuṃ labbhā, evaṃ navipākapaccayātipi labbhā. Ahetukamohaṃ pana sandhāya ‘‘nahetupaccayā navipākapaccayā’’ti labbhā, na ‘‘nakammapaccayā’’ti. Tenāha ‘‘na ca paccayapaccayuppannadhammasāmaññadassana’’ntiādi.

17. It merely shows the method, meaning that concerning rootless functional volition, it can be said, "It is not a root-condition, nor a kamma-condition," and similarly, it can also be said that it is "not a result-condition." However, concerning rootless delusion, it can be said, "It is not a root-condition, nor a result-condition," but not "not a kamma-condition." Therefore, it is stated, "Nor is there a showing of the commonality of condition-phenomena and dependently-arisen-phenomena," and so on.

25-37. Yathā kusalattikaṃ, evaṃ gaṇetabbanti idaṃ yaṃ sandhāya pāḷiyaṃ nikkhittaṃ, taṃ dassetuṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘hetumūlakānaṃ…pe… nagaṇanasāmañña’’nti. Na hi kusalattike anulomapaccanīye gaṇanāhi vedanāttike tā samānā. Parivattetvāpi yojitāti ettha ‘‘nahetupaccayā napurejātapaccayā ārammaṇe eka’’nti ārammaṇaṃ paṭhamaṃ vatvā vattabbampi purejātaṃ parivattetvā paṭhamaṃ vuttanti vadanti. Tathā nahetupaccayā kamme tīṇīti idameva padaṃ parivattetvā ‘‘nakammapaccayā hetuyā tīṇīti vutta’’ntipi vadanti.

25-37. "Just as with the wholesome triad, so should it be enumerated"—this is said to show that with reference to which it was placed in the Pāli: "of those rooted in root... up to the generality of non-enumeration." For in the wholesome triad, the enumerations in the direct and reverse orders are not the same as those in the feeling triad. "Even when rearranged, they are applicable"—here, regarding "not a condition through root, not a condition through pre-nascence, one in the object," although the object should have been stated first, they say pre-nascence is rearranged and stated first. Similarly, "not a condition through root, three in kamma"—this very phrase is rearranged, and they say, "not a condition through kamma, three in root," is stated.

39. Taṃsampayutteti [Pg.315] tena domanassena sampayutte. Domanassasīsena sampayuttadhammā vuttā. Saddhāpañcakesūti saddhāsīlasutacāgapaññāsu. Kattabbanti vā yojanā kātabbāti attho. Avasesesūti rāgādīsu. Pāḷigatidassanatthanti ‘‘evaṃ pāḷi pavattā’’ti pāḷiyā pavattidassanatthaṃ. Rāgādīhi upanissayabhūtehi. Anuppattitoti na uppajjanato. Taṃ pāḷigatiṃ tikantarapāḷiyā dassento ‘‘kusalattikepihī’’tiādimāha. Idhāpīti imasmiṃ vedanāttikepi.

39. "Associated with it" (taṃsampayutte) means associated with that grief. Phenomena associated with grief are stated under the heading of grief. "In the fivefold faith" (saddhāpañcakesu) refers to faith, virtue, learning, generosity, and wisdom. "Or should be done" (kattabbaṃ vā) means the construction should be made; this is the meaning. "In the remainder" (avasesesu) refers to lust, etc. "To show the course of the Pāli" (pāḷigatidassanatthaṃ) means "thus the Pāli proceeds"—the purpose is to show the progression of the Pāli. With lust, etc., as decisive support. "From non-attainment" (anuppattito) means not from arising. Showing that course of the Pāli by the Pāli of the other triads, he said, "even in the wholesome triad," and so on. "Here too" (idhāpi) means in this feeling triad as well.

62. Anaññattanti abhedaṃ. Sukhavedanāsampayutto hi dhammo sukhavedanāsampayuttasseva dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo, na itaresaṃ. Esa nayo sesapadesu sesesu ca ‘‘tīṇī’’ti āgataṭṭhānesu. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘sabbāni tīṇi suddhānaṃ tiṇṇaṃ padānaṃ vasena veditabbānī’’ti. ‘‘Pacchājātā arūpadhammānaṃ paccayo na hontī’’ti yuttametaṃ, purejātā pana arūpadhammānaṃ paccayā na hontīti kathamidaṃ gahetabbanti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘purejātā’’tiādi, purejātā hutvā paccayo na hontīti attho. Purimataraṃ uppajjitvā ṭhitā hi rūpadhammā pacchā uppannānaṃ arūpadhammānaṃ purejātapaccayo honti, na cāyaṃ nayo arūpadhammesu labbhati. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘purejātattābhāvato’’ti. Tathā pacchājātattābhāvatoti yathā imasmiṃ tike kassaci dhammassa purejātattābhāvato purejātapaccayo na hontīti vuttaṃ, tathā pacchājātattābhāvato pacchājātā hutvā paccayo na honti, pacchājātapaccayo na hontīti attho. Na hi ekasmiṃ santāne kesuci arūpadhammesu paṭhamataraṃ uppajjitvā ṭhitesu pacchā keci arūpadhammā uppajjanti, yato te tesaṃ pacchājātapaccayo bhaveyyuṃ.

62. ‘Not different’ means non-distinction. Indeed, a phenomenon associated with pleasant feeling is a condition by way of root condition only for another phenomenon associated with pleasant feeling, not for others. This method applies to the remaining terms and to the remaining places where ‘three’ is mentioned. Therefore it is said: ‘All three should be understood in terms of the three pure terms.’ The statement, ‘Post-nascent phenomena are not conditions for immaterial phenomena,’ is correct. But how is the claim, ‘Pre-nascent phenomena are not conditions for immaterial phenomena,’ to be understood? Addressing this question, he says, ‘pre-nascent,’ meaning that having arisen earlier, they are not a condition. Indeed, material phenomena that arise earlier and persist can serve as pre-nascence conditions for subsequently arisen immaterial phenomena, but this principle is not found among immaterial phenomena themselves. Hence it is said: ‘due to the absence of pre-nascence.’ Similarly, ‘due to the absence of post-nascence’ means that just as in this triad it is said that some phenomenon does not serve as a pre-nascence condition because of the absence of pre-nascence, so too, because of the absence of post-nascence, they do not become post-nascence conditions; they are not post-nascence conditions. For in a single continuum, no immaterial phenomena arise later, after some immaterial phenomena have arisen earlier and persisted, such that they would become post-nascence conditions for them.

83-87. Avasesesu aṭṭhasūti ‘‘sukhāya vedanāya sampayutto dhammo’’tiādinā ekamūlakekāvasānā ye nava nava vārā ārammaṇapaccayādīsu labbhanti, tesu yathāvuttamekaṃ vajjetvā sesesu aṭṭhasu. Tīsvevāti suddhesu tīsveva sahajātakammapaccayo labbhati.

‘In the remaining eight’ means in the remaining eight of those nine instances, which begin with ‘a phenomenon associated with pleasant feeling’ and have one root and one culmination, and which are obtained in the object condition, etc., excluding the one already mentioned. ‘Only in the three’ means that the co-nascence kamma condition is obtained only in the three pure terms.

Vedanāttikavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Triad of Feeling is concluded.

3. Vipākattikavaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of the Triad of Result

1-23. Soyevāti [Pg.316] akatasamāsehi padehi yo attho vuccati, soyeva attho vutto hoti.

‘That very same’ means that the meaning which is conveyed by the uncompounded terms is the very same meaning that has been stated.

24-52. Tanti taṃ vacanaṃ, taṃ vā kaṭattārūpaṃ. Yasmā cittasamuṭṭhānassa upādārūpassa yathā khandhe paṭicca uppatti, tathā mahābhūte ca paṭicca uppatti. Na hi tassa tadubhayaṃ vinā uppatti atthi, na evaṃ kaṭattārūpassa. Tañhi kammassa kaṭattā uppajjamānaṃ mahābhūte paṭicca uppajjati, tasmā cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ upādārūpassa taṃ visesaṃ dassetuṃ tadeva vuttaṃ, na kaṭattārūpaṃ vuttanti imamatthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘khandhe paṭiccā’’tiādimāha. Yadipi kaṭattārūpaṃ ‘‘mahābhūte paṭicca cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ upādārūpa’’nti ettha na gahitaṃ, vacanantarena pana gahitamevāti dassento ‘‘pavattiyaṃ panā’’tiādimāha. Evañca katvāti khandhe paṭicca uppattiyā abhāvatoyeva. Nāhārapaccayeti āhārapaccaye paccanīyato ṭhite. Tampīti kaṭattārūpampi. Ṭhitikkhaṇe kaṭattārūpassa āhāro upatthambhako hotīti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘uppādakkhaṇe’’ti.

‘That’ refers to that statement, or to that kamma-produced form. Because the dependent form arising from the mind arises dependent on the aggregates, just as it arises dependent on the great elements. Indeed, its arising is not without both of those, but this is not the case for kamma-produced form. For that, arising as a result of kamma, arises dependent on the great elements. Therefore, to show that distinction of the dependent form, the form arising from the mind is mentioned, and not kamma-produced form—to show this meaning, he says, ‘dependent on the aggregates,’ etc. Even though kamma-produced form is not included in the statement, ‘the form arising from the mind is dependent form dependent on the great elements,’ it is nevertheless included by another expression—this is shown by saying, ‘but in the course of existence,’ etc. ‘And having done so’ means precisely because there is no arising dependent on the aggregates. ‘Not by way of nutriment condition’ means when nutriment condition is excluded. ‘That too’ refers even to kamma-produced form. Because nutriment supports kamma-produced form at the moment of its duration, it is said, ‘at the moment of arising.’

Vipākattikavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Triad of Result is concluded.

4. Upādinnattikavaṇṇanā

4. Explanation of the Triad of Clung-to Phenomena

51. Adhipatidhammoyeva lokuttaradhammesu nādhipatipaccayā uppajjatīti āha ‘‘nādhipatipaccayāti sayaṃ adhipatibhūtattā’’ti. Nanu adhipatidhammopi ārammaṇādhipativasena adhipatipaccayena uppajjatīti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘avirahitā…pe… dassetī’’ti. Avirahitārammaṇādhipatīsūti lokuttare sandhāyāha. Te hi nibbānārammaṇattā evaṃ vuccati. Pi-saddena ko pana vādo virahitārammaṇādhipatianekantārammaṇādhipatīsūti dasseti.

51. He says that the dominant phenomenon itself does not arise in supramundane states by way of the dominance condition: ‘“Not by way of the dominance condition” means because they are themselves dominant.’ But does not the dominant phenomenon also arise by way of the dominance condition through object-dominance? Addressing this objection, he says, ‘not separated… to show.’ ‘Not separated from object-dominance’ refers to the supramundane. For since they have Nibbāna as their object, they are spoken of thus. By the particle ‘pi,’ he shows: ‘What then is to be said of object-dominance that is separated or object-dominance that is not exclusive?’

72. Anupālanupatthambhanavasenāti jīvitindriyaṃ viya kaṭattārūpānaṃ anupālanavasena ojā tasseva kammajakāyassa upatthambhanavasena paccayo hoti, na janakavasenāti yojanā. Etasmiṃ pana atthe satīti [Pg.317] kammajakalāpe ojā tasseva kammajakāyassa upatthambhakavasena paccayo hotīti etasmiṃ atthe labbhamāne. Āhārantipi vattabbanti yathā jīvitindriyavasena ‘‘upādinnupādāniyo dhammo upādinnupādāniyassa dhammassa atthipaccayena paccayo’’ti vuttaṃ, evaṃ yathāvuttaāhārassapi vasena vattabbanti attho. Ettha ca yasmiṃ kalāpe kammajā ojā kadāci tasseva upatthambhanapaccayo hotīti ayamattho aṭṭhakathāyaṃ dassito. Yadi kammajā ojā ekaṃsato sakalāparūpūpatthambhanavaseneva pavattati, tathā sati imāya pāḷiyā virodho siyāti dassento ‘‘yadi ca…pe… hotī’’ti aṭṭhakathāvacanaṃ uddharitvā tattha dosaṃ vibhāvento ‘‘evaṃ satī’’ti āha. Tattha tanti taṃ vacanaṃ. Anajjhohaṭāya attano paccayato nibbattāya, paccayo cettha kammaṃyeva. Tenāha ‘‘sasantānagatāya upādinnojāyā’’ti.

72. ‘By way of nourishing and supporting’ means that just as the life faculty is a condition by way of nourishing for kamma-produced material phenomena, so too nutriment is a condition by way of supporting for that same kamma-produced body, not by way of generating. This is the construction. ‘When this meaning exists’ means when this meaning is obtained, that nutriment within the kamma-produced aggregate is a condition by way of supporting for that same kamma-produced body. ‘It should also be stated as nutriment’ means that just as it is said regarding the life faculty, ‘A phenomenon that is clung-to and serves as a basis for clinging is a condition by presence for another phenomenon that is clung-to and serves as a basis for clinging,’ so too should it be stated in the case of the nutriment as explained. And here, the commentary has shown this meaning: that in whichever aggregate kamma-produced nutriment occasionally serves as a supporting condition for that same body. If kamma-produced nutriment were to function exclusively by way of supporting all other material phenomena, then there would be a contradiction with this Pāli text. To show this, he cites the commentary’s passage, ‘But if… it occurs,’ and then, explaining the fault therein, he says, ‘Thus, if…’ There, ‘that’ refers to that statement. ‘Not ingested’ means arising from its own condition, and here the condition is indeed kamma. Therefore he says: ‘for nutriment that is clung-to and has entered one’s own continuum.’

Ayampi pañho, na kevalaṃ pubbe vuttaāhāroyevāti adhippāyo. Uddharitabbo siyā, na ca uddhaṭo. Tasmāti etassa ‘‘vādo balavataro’’ti etena sambandho. Kasmā pana yathāvuttesu dvīsu pañhesu āhāro na uddhaṭoti āha ‘‘ajjhohaṭassā’’tiādi. Tattha dutiyapañhoti dukamūlake dutiyapañhoti yojanā. Dutiyapañho ca na uddhaṭoti etthāpi ‘‘ajjhohaṭassa…pe… abhāvato’’ti idaṃ ānetvā sambandhitabbaṃ. Itarassāti anajjhohaṭassa. Ajjhohaṭameva na anajjhohaṭaṃ, yathāvuttojanti adhippāyo. ‘‘Balavataro’’ti vatvā tassa balavatarabhāvaṃ dassento ‘‘na hī’’tiādimāha. Katipayālope ajjhoharitvā vasitvā ṭhitassa viya ajjhohaṭamattāhi maṇḍūkādīhi ajjhohārakassa sarīre visesādhānaṃ veditabbaṃ.

This too is a question; the intention is that it is not merely the aforementioned nutriment. It should be taken up, but it has not been taken up. ‘Therefore’ is connected with ‘the argument is stronger.’ But why is nutriment not taken up in the two questions as stated? He says, ‘because of what is ingested,’ etc. There, ‘the second question’ is to be construed as the second question rooted in the dyad. And in the phrase, ‘the second question is not taken up,’ this too should be connected by bringing in ‘…because of what is ingested… up to… absence.’ ‘As for the other’ refers to what is not ingested. Only what is ingested, not what is not ingested; this is the intended meaning of ‘nutriment as stated.’ Having said ‘stronger,’ to show its being stronger, he says, ‘for indeed,’ etc. Like one who has stayed settled after ingesting a few morsels, a special condition in the body of the ingester should be understood by the mere ingestion of frogs, etc.

Idha vuttehīti imasmiṃ upādinnattike vuttehi. Ekamūlakadukatikāvasānapañhavissajjanehīti ekapadamūlakehi dukāvasānehi tikāvasānehi ca pañhavissajjanehi. Te pana ‘‘anupādinnupādāniyo dhammo upādinnupādāniyassa anupādinnupādāniyassa ca dhammassa atthipaccayena paccayo, anupādinnaanupādāniyo dhammo upādinnupādāniyassa anupādinnupādāniyassa anupādinnaanupādāniyassa ca dhammassa atthipaccayena paccayo’’ti evaṃ veditabbo. Idhāti imasmiṃ upādinnattike. Dutiyadukāvasāne viyāti dutiyadukāvasāne pañhavissajjane viya, ‘‘anupādinnupādāniyo [Pg.318] dhammo upādinnupādāniyassa anupādinnupādāniyassa ca dhammassa atthipaccayena paccayo, sahajātaṃ pacchājāta’’nti etassa vissajjane viyāti attho. Ayañca attho tatiyapadamūlakesu dukatikāvasānapañhesupi labbhateva. Yadi pana te pañhā kusalattikepi labbhanti, atha kasmā tattha na uddhaṭāti āha ‘‘sukhāvabodhanatthaṃ pana tattha sahajātavaseneva vissajjanaṃ kata’’nti. Sahajātavasenevāti sahajātaatthipaccayavaseneva. Ekamūlakadukāvasānāti ‘‘kusalo dhammo kusalassa ca abyākatassa cā’’ti evaṃpakārā pañhā. Tattha kusalattike uddhaṭā. Idha pana imasmiṃ upādinnattike. Etehi yathāvuttehi vissajjanehi. Eko dhammoti eko vedanādiko paccayadhammo. Anekehīti sahajātapacchājātādīhi anekehi atthipaccayavisesehi. Anekesaṃ dhammānanti anekesaṃ paccayuppannadhammānaṃ. Eko atthipaccayoti idaṃ atthipaccayatāsāmaññato vuttaṃ.

‘By what is stated here’ means by what is stated in this Triad of Clung-to Phenomena. ‘By the answers to questions ending in single-rooted pairs and triplets’ means by the answers to questions rooted in a single term and ending in pairs and triplets. These, however, should be understood thus: ‘A phenomenon that is not clung-to but is an object of clinging is a condition by way of presence for a phenomenon that is clung-to and an object of clinging, and for a phenomenon that is not clung-to but is an object of clinging. A phenomenon that is neither clung-to nor an object of clinging is a condition by way of presence for a phenomenon that is clung-to and an object of clinging, for a phenomenon that is not clung-to but is an object of clinging, and for a phenomenon that is neither clung-to nor an object of clinging.’ ‘Here’ refers to this Triad of Clung-to Phenomena. ‘Like in the ending of the second pair’ means like in the answer to the question at the end of the second pair, that is, like in the answer to ‘A phenomenon that is not clung-to but is an object of clinging is a condition by way of presence for a phenomenon that is clung-to and an object of clinging, and for a phenomenon that is not clung-to but is an object of clinging—simultaneously arisen and subsequently arisen.’ And this meaning is indeed obtained even in the questions ending in pairs and triplets rooted in the third term. But if those questions can also be obtained in the wholesome triad, then why were they not taken up there? He says: ‘For the sake of easy comprehension, the answer there was given only in terms of the simultaneous condition.’ ‘Only in terms of the simultaneous condition’ means only in terms of the condition of presence as simultaneously arisen. ‘Single-rooted pairs at the end’ refers to questions of this type: ‘A wholesome phenomenon is a condition for a wholesome phenomenon and for an indeterminate phenomenon.’ There, they were taken up in the wholesome triad. Here, however, it is in this Triad of Clung-to Phenomena. By these answers as stated: ‘One phenomenon’ means one conditioning phenomenon, such as feeling, etc. ‘By many’ means by many specific conditions of presence, such as simultaneously arisen and subsequently arisen, etc. ‘For many phenomena’ means for many conditioned phenomena. ‘One condition of presence’ is said here generally with regard to the nature of the condition of presence.

Idāni yathāvuttaṃ avuttañca atthipaccaye labbhamānaṃ visesaṃ vitthārato dassento ‘‘eko hī’’tiādimāha. Tattha ekoti atthipaccayavisesesu eko. Ekassāti tādisasseva ekassa. Aññathā hi eko dhammo ekassa dhammassa paccayo nāma natthi. Ekenevāti sahajātaatthipaccayeneva yathā okkantikkhaṇe vatthu. Tañhi attanā sahajātassa nāmassa sahajātaatthipaccayeneva paccayo hoti, na purejātādinā. Eko sahajātaarūpakkhandho anekesaṃ attanā sahajātānaṃ arūpakkhandhānaṃ ekena sahajātaatthipaccayena, anekehi sahajātapacchājātaatthipaccayehi yathākkamaṃ attanā sahajātānaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānarūpānaṃ purejātānaṃ tesamuṭṭhānikarūpānaṃ. Aneko purejātavatthurūpañceva sahajātaarūpakkhandhā ca ekassa arūpakkhandhassa yathākkamaṃ purejātasahajātaatthipaccayehi. Aneko arūpadhammo anekesaṃ sahajātaarūpadhammānaṃ purejātarūpadhammānañca sahajātapacchājātaatthipaccayehi. Aneko vā āhārindriyappakāro anekesaṃ rūpadhammānaṃ yathārahaṃ sahajātapurejātapacchājātāhārindriyavasena atthipaccayena paccayo hoti. Evaṃ paccayuppannānaṃ asamānattepi ayamattho sambhavati, samānatte [Pg.319] pana vattabbameva natthi. Tenāha ‘‘samānatte paccayuppannadhammāna’’nti. Sahajātaṃ purejāteneva saha atthipaccayo hotīti sahajātaatthipaccayadhammo purejātaatthipaccayadhammena saheva atthipaccayo hoti. Yathā vatthunā purejātaatthipaccayaṃ labhantā eva kusalādidhammā sahajātānaṃ khandhānaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānānañca rūpānaṃ sahajātaatthipaccayo honti, tathā te purejātassa kāyassa pacchājātapaccayopi hontiyeva. Tenāha ‘‘pacchājātena cā’’ti. Atthipaccayo hotīti sambandho. Ayaṃ sahajātapacchājātānaṃ atthipaccayabhāvo paccayadhammānaṃ abhede eva icchito, na bhede. Tenāha ‘‘anaññadhammattena…pe… nānādhammatte’’ti.

Now, to show in detail the distinction obtainable in the presence condition, both stated and unstated, he says, “For one…,” etc. Herein, “one” means one among the distinctions of the presence condition. “Of one” means of just such a one. Otherwise, there is no such thing as one phenomenon being a condition for one phenomenon. “By one alone” means by the co-nascent presence condition alone, as the base is at the moment of conception. For it is a condition for co-nascent mentality by the co-nascent presence condition itself, not by pre-nascence, etc. One co-nascent immaterial aggregate is a condition for many of its co-nascent immaterial aggregates by one co-nascent presence condition; and for its co-nascent mind-originated matter and for pre-nascent matter originated from them by many co-nascent and post-nascent presence conditions respectively. Many—pre-nascent base-matter and co-nascent immaterial aggregates—are conditions for one immaterial aggregate by pre-nascent and co-nascent presence conditions respectively. Many immaterial phenomena are conditions for many co-nascent immaterial phenomena and pre-nascent material phenomena by co-nascent and post-nascent presence conditions. Or many kinds of nutriment and faculty are a condition for many material phenomena by presence condition, appropriately by way of co-nascent, pre-nascent, and post-nascent nutriment and faculty. Thus, this meaning is possible even when the conditioned phenomena are dissimilar; when they are similar, there is nothing to be said. Therefore he says: “when the conditioned phenomena are similar.” “Co-nascence is a presence condition only together with pre-nascence” means that a co-nascent presence condition phenomenon is a presence condition only together with a pre-nascent presence condition phenomenon. Just as wholesome and other phenomena, while obtaining the pre-nascent presence condition by means of the base, are a co-nascent presence condition for the co-nascent aggregates and for mind-originated matter, so too they are also a post-nascent condition for the pre-nascent body. Therefore he says: “and by post-nascence.” The connection is: “is a presence condition.” This state of being a presence condition for co-nascent and post-nascent is intended only when the conditioning phenomena are not different, not when they are different. Therefore he says: “by being not-another-phenomenon … by being different phenomena.”

Idāni tassa nānādhammatte abhāvaṃ pāḷiyā vibhāvento ‘‘yadi siyā’’tiādimāha. Tattha eko atthipaccayabhāvo natthīti ekasseva paccayadhammassa vasena labbhamāno eko atthipaccayabhāvo natthi. Kasmā? Virodhato. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘sahajāta…pe… na vutta’’nti. Evañca katvāti sahajātapacchājātānaṃ ekadhammavasena saha alābhato eva. Ekadhammavasenāti ekasseva paccayadhammassa vasena. Tenāha ‘‘nānādhammānaṃ viruddhasabhāvattā’’ti. Viruddhasabhāvatā ca sahajātapacchājātavasena veditabbā, idha pana lokiyalokuttarādibhāvatoti. Aññathāti tesaṃ sahajātapacchājātānaṃ ekajjhaṃ lābhe. Indriyapaṭikkhepepīti indriyapaccaye paccanīkato ṭhitepi. Tassa pañhassa lābhatoti ‘‘upādinnupādāniyo ca anupādinnupādāniyo ca dhammā upādinnupādāniyassa dhammassa atthipaccayena paccayo’’ti etassa pañhassa lābhato. Bāvīsāti ekamūlakāvasānā nava, ekamūlakadukāvasānā pañca, ekamūlakatikāvasānamekaṃ, dukamūlakekāvasānā cattāro, dukamūlakāvasānā dve, dukamūlakatikāvasānamekanti evaṃ bāvīsati. Yathā pubbe sahajātaṃ purejātena saheva atthipaccayo hotīti vuttaṃ, evaṃ purejātampi tenāti dassento āha ‘‘purejātaṃ sahajāteneva saha atthipaccayo hotī’’ti. Tattha sahajāteneva sahāti sahajātena saheva. Aṭṭhānappayutto hi ayaṃ eva-saddo, sahajātena na vinā purejātaatthipaccayoti attho. Itaresu pana atthipaccayadhammesu niyamo natthi tehi [Pg.320] sahāpi vināpi bhāvato. Tenāha ‘‘na itarehī’’ti. Tampi vatthu taṃsahitapurejātamevāti yaṃ ‘‘purejātaṃ sahajāteneva saha atthipaccayo hotī’’ti vuttaṃ, tampi vatthupurejātañceva taṃsahitārammaṇapurejātameva ca, na kevalaṃ ārammaṇapurejātaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘na itara’’nti.

Now, to explain with the Pāḷi the absence of this when they are different phenomena, he begins with, “If it were…,” etc. Herein, “a single state of being a presence condition does not exist” means that a single state of being a presence condition obtainable by way of a single conditioning phenomenon does not exist. Why? Because of opposition. Therefore it is said: “Co-nascence … is not stated.” “And thus” means: precisely because co-nascence and post-nascence are not obtained together by way of a single phenomenon. “By way of a single phenomenon” means by way of a single conditioning phenomenon. Therefore he says: “because of the opposing nature of different phenomena.” And the opposing nature should be understood by way of co-nascence and post-nascence, but here it is by way of being mundane, supramundane, etc. “Otherwise” means: if those co-nascence and post-nascence were obtained together. “Even in the rejection of faculty” means: even when the faculty condition is rejected. “Because of the obtainability of that question” means: because of the obtainability of this question: “Phenomena that are clung-to and an object of clinging, and phenomena that are not clung-to but an object of clinging, are a condition for a phenomenon that is clung-to and an object of clinging by presence condition.” “Twenty-two” means: nine with a single-root ending, five with a single-root couplet-ending, one with a single-root triplet-ending, four with a couplet-root single-ending, two with a couplet-root ending, and one with a couplet-root triplet-ending—thus twenty-two. Just as it was said before, “Co-nascence is a presence condition only together with pre-nascence,” to show that pre-nascence is also thus with that, he says: “Pre-nascence is a presence condition only together with co-nascence.” Herein, “only together with co-nascence” means together with co-nascence itself. For this word “only” (eva) is used in the sense of exclusion; the meaning is that the pre-nascent presence condition does not occur without co-nascence. But among the other presence condition phenomena there is no restriction, because they occur both with and without them. Therefore he says: “not with the others.” “That too is the base and the pre-nascence together with it” means: what was said, “Pre-nascence is a presence condition only together with co-nascence,” that too is the pre-nascence of the base and the pre-nascence of the object together with it, not merely the pre-nascence of the object. Therefore he says: “not the other.”

Idāni yathāvuttamatthaṃ pāṭhantarena vibhāvetuṃ ‘‘kusalattike hī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Yadi purejātaṃ taṃsahajātena vināpi atthipaccayo siyā, ‘‘navippayuttapaccayā atthiyā pañcā’’ti vattuṃ na sakkā, vuttañcetaṃ, tasmā viññāyati ‘‘purejātaṃ sahajātena saheva atthipaccayo hotī’’ti. Navippayutte bāvīsāti etthāpi eseva nayo. Tatthāti sanidassanattike. Atthivibhaṅgeti atthipaccayassa vibhajane. Tikamūlakekāvasānanti ‘‘sanidassanasappaṭigho ca anidassanasappaṭigho ca anidassanaappaṭigho ca dhammā anidassanasappaṭighassa dhammassa atthipaccayena paccayo’’ti evaṃ tikamūlako ekāvasāno pañho uddhaṭo. Paccayuddhāreti ca tattheva paccayuddhāre. Tathā ca so pañho uddhaṭo. Tayidaṃ kathaṃ, yadi purejātaṃ sahajāteneva saha atthipaccayo hotīti codanāyaṃ āha ‘‘taṃ vatthusahitassa…pe… paccayabhāvato’’ti. Tassattho – yadipi tattha sanidassanasappaṭighaggahaṇena ārammaṇapurejātassa atthipaccayabhāvo vutto, tathāpi anidassanaappaṭighaggahaṇato vatthumpi gahitanti vatthusahitassa ārammaṇapurejātassa sahajātena saheva atthipaccayabhāvo vuttoti. Pacchājātaṃ āhārindriyeheva saha atthipaccayo hoti, na purejātenāti adhippāyo. Anaññadhammatteti paccayadhammassa anaññatte. Sahajātena saha atthipaccayo hotīti yojanā. Sesapadadvayepi eseva nayo. Tatthāpi paṭiyogipurejātaṃyeva daṭṭhabbaṃ. ‘‘Atthipaccayavisesesu panā’’tiādinā attanā dassitaṃ vicāraṃ ‘‘evameta’’nti nigamanavasena paccāmasati.

Now, to clarify the aforesaid meaning with another reading of the text, it is said, “For in the wholesome triad…,” etc. If pre-nascence could be a presence condition even without its co-nascent, then it would not be possible to say, “There are five by non-dissociation condition in presence,” but this is said; therefore it is known that “pre-nascence becomes a presence condition only together with co-nascence.” In “twenty-two in non-dissociation,” this same method applies. “There” means in the triad of the visible-and-impingent. “In the analysis of presence” means in the analysis of the presence condition. “The single-ending with a triplet-root” means that a question with a single ending and a triplet root has been set forth thus: “Visible-and-impingent, invisible-and-impingent, and invisible-and-non-impingent dhammas are a condition for an invisible-and-impingent dhamma by presence condition.” And in the extraction of conditions, right there in the extraction of conditions. And that question has been set forth in that way. How is this so? In response to the objection, “If pre-nascence becomes a presence condition only together with co-nascence,” he says: “Because that is a condition … of what is accompanied by the base.” The meaning is this: although there, by the taking of the visible-and-impingent, the state of being a presence condition is stated for pre-nascent object, still, because the base is also taken by the taking of the invisible-and-non-impingent, the state of being a presence condition is stated for the pre-nascent object accompanied by the base only together with co-nascence. The intention is that post-nascence becomes a presence condition only together with nutriment and faculty, not with pre-nascence. “By being not-another-dhamma” means when the conditioning dhamma is not another. The construction is: “it becomes a presence condition together with co-nascence.” This same method applies to the remaining two clauses as well. There too, the counterpart pre-nascence should be seen. By “But in the distinctions of the presence condition,” etc., he reviews by way of a conclusion the investigation he himself has shown, with “Thus this is so.”

Upādinnattikavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Triad of the Clung-to is finished.

6. Vitakkattikavaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Triad of Applied Thought

22. Vitakkattike [Pg.321] sattasu mūlakesūti ‘‘savitakkasavicāraṃ dhammaṃ paṭiccā’’tiādinā āgatāni tīṇi ekakāni, tīṇi dukāni, ekaṃ tikanti evaṃ ekamūlakāni yāni sattamūlakāni, tesu. Yathākkamanti pāḷiyaṃ āgatānukkamena. Sattāti paṭhame ekake satta. Pañcāti dutiye pañca. Tānimāni hetupaccaye vuttanayena veditabbāni. Idha pana pavattivaseneva yojetabbaṃ. Tīṇītiādīsu tatiye tīṇi, catutthe ekaṃ, pañcame tīṇi, chaṭṭhepi tīṇi, sattame ekaṃ. Tāni pana yathākkamaṃ tatiyapadaṃ paṭicca tatiyapadadutiyapadatadubhayavasena, paṭhamapadatatiyapadāni paṭicca tatiyapadavasena, paṭhamapadadutiyapadāni paṭicca paṭhamapadatatiyapadatadubhayavasena, dutiyapadatatiyapadāni paṭicca paṭhamapadatatiyapadatadubhayavasena, paṭhamadutiyatatiyapadāni paṭicca tatiyapadavaseneva veditabbāni. Aññamaññe aṭṭhavīsātiādīsupi imināva nayena gaṇanā veditabbā. Evanti yathāvuttaṃ gaṇanaṃ paccāmasati. Dutiyatatiyamūlakesu ekaṃ ekanti dutiyamūlake ekaṃ, tatiyamūlake ekanti yojetabbaṃ. Tathā āsevaneti yathā purejāte ekādasa, tathā āsevaneti attho. Aññānīti adhipatiaññamaññapurejātāsevanato aññesu paccayesu gaṇanāni. Hetuārammaṇasadisānīti hetuārammaṇapaccayesu gaṇanāsadisāni.

22. In the seven roots of the Triad of Applied Thought: the three single factors, three double factors, and one triple factor that have come down beginning with 'dependent on a phenomenon with applied and sustained thought'—these are the single-rooted ones among the seven roots. 'In order' means according to the sequence that has come down in the Pāḷi. 'Seven' means seven in the first single factor. 'Five' means five in the second. These should be understood by the method stated in the section on root condition. Here, however, it should be connected only by way of occurrence. In 'three,' etc., in the third there are three; in the fourth, one; in the fifth, three; in the sixth, also three; and in the seventh, one. These, in order, should be understood as follows: the third term dependent on the third term, the second term, or both; the first and third terms dependent on the third term; the first and second terms dependent on the first term, the third term, or both; the second and third terms dependent on the first term, the third term, or both; and the first, second, and third terms dependent on the third term. In 'by mutuality, twenty-eight,' etc., too, the calculation should be understood by this same method. 'Thus' refers back to the calculation as stated. 'In the second and third roots, one each' should be connected as: one in the second root and one in the third root. 'Likewise in repetition' means: just as in prenascence there are eleven, so too in repetition. 'Others' means the calculations in the conditions other than dominance, mutuality, prenascence, and repetition. 'Similar to root and object' means the calculations are similar to those in root and object conditions.

31. Avisesenāti ‘‘vipāka’’nti visesanaṃ akatvā na pana vissajjanaṃ katanti yojanā. Tattha kāraṇaṃ vattuṃ ‘‘kasmā’’tiādimāha. Itaresanti lokiyavipākānaṃ. Te visuṃ niddhāretvā vuttāti te yathāvuttalokiyavipākā avitakkavicāramattasāmaññato visuṃ nīharitvā vuttā. ‘‘Avitakkavicāramatte khandhe paṭicca avitakkavicāramattā adhipatī’’ti vuttarāsi purimakoṭṭhāso.

31. 'Without specifying' means the connection is made without making the specification 'resultant,' but not that the answer is not given. To state the reason for this, he said 'Why?' etc. 'Of others' means of worldly resultants. 'They are stated having been separately determined' means that those worldly resultants as stated are stated having been extracted separately from the general category of what is merely without applied and sustained thought. The passage stated, 'Dependent on aggregates that are merely without applied and sustained thought, there are dominants that are merely without applied and sustained thought,' is the first portion.

38. Etanti ‘‘avitakkavicāramattaṃ avitakka…pe… saha gacchantenā’’ti āgatapāḷipadaṃ. Tassa atthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘mūlaṃ…pe… vuttaṃ hotī’’ti āha. Tattha avitakka…pe… yojentenāti avitakkehi avitakkapariyāyena vuttehi avitakkavicāramattaavitakkaavicārapadehi saha mūlapadaṃ[Pg.322], āsevanamūlakameva vā gacchantena yojentena napurejātasadisaṃ nāsevane pāḷigamanaṃ kātabbaṃ, paṭhitabbanti attho. Potthakesu pana ‘‘avitakkavicāramattaṃ vipākena saha gacchantenā’’ti dissati, vipākena visesanabhūtena saha yojentenāti attho. Tenevāha ‘‘vipākaṃ avitakkavicāramattantiādi yojetabba’’nti.

38. 'This' is the Pāḷi phrase that has come down: 'merely without applied and sustained thought, without applied thought ...pe... going along with.' To show its meaning, he said: 'the root ...pe... is said.' Here, 'by connecting ...pe... without applied thought' means that by connecting the root term with the terms 'merely without applied and sustained thought,' 'without applied thought,' and 'without sustained thought'—which are stated in the sense of 'without applied thought'—or by connecting it as going along with what is rooted only in repetition, the Pāḷi passage on repetition should not be treated as similar to prenascence; the meaning is that it should be recited. But in the books, it is seen as 'merely without applied and sustained thought ... going along with resultant'; the meaning is, 'by connecting it with resultant as a qualifier.' For that reason he said: 'Resultant should be connected with "merely without applied and sustained thought," etc.'

Ekamūlake pāḷiyaṃ yojitamevāti ‘‘dumūlakesu paṭhame’’ti vuttaṃ.

That it is already connected in the Pāḷi in the single-rooted section is stated by 'in the double-rooted, the first...'

49. Mūlapadameva avasānabhāvenāti ‘‘savitakkasavicāraṃ dhammaṃ paccayā savitakkasavicāro dhammo uppajjati nahetupaccayā’’tiādinā mūlapadameva avasānabhāvena yojitaṃ. Satta mohā uddharitabbāti idaṃ nahetupaccayaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Paṭiccavāre hi ahetukamoho tikkhattumeva āgato. Idha pana ‘‘vatthuṃ paccayā’’tiādinā catūsupi mūlakesu āgato, tasmā sattakkhattuṃ āgamanaṃ sandhāya ‘‘satta mohā’’ti vuttanti veditabbaṃ.

49. 'The root term itself as the conclusion' means that the root term itself is connected as the conclusion, as in 'Conditioned by a phenomenon with applied and sustained thought, a phenomenon with applied and sustained thought arises not by way of root condition,' etc. 'Seven delusions should be extracted'—this is said with reference to not-root condition. For in the section on conditionality, rootless delusion has come down only three times. Here, however, it has come down in all four roots, beginning with 'conditioned by a physical basis,' etc. Therefore, it should be understood that 'seven delusions' is said with reference to its occurrence seven times.

Upanissayena saṅgahitattāti upanissayapaccayeneva kammapaccayassa saṅgahitattā. Sabbassapi rūpārūpāvacarakammassa balavabhāvato upanissayattābhāvo natthi, yato taṃ ‘‘garū’’ti vuccati, kammakkhayakarassa pana kammassa balavabhāve vattabbameva natthīti imamatthaṃ pāḷiyā eva vibhāvetuṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘upādinnattikapañhāvārapaccanīye hi…pe… viññāyatī’’ti.

'Because it is included by decisive support' means because kamma condition is included by decisive support condition itself. Since all kamma pertaining to the fine-material and immaterial spheres is powerful, there is no absence of its being a decisive support, for which reason it is called 'weighty.' But concerning kamma that brings about the destruction of kamma, there is nothing to be said about its powerfulness. To clarify this meaning from the Pāḷi itself, it is said: 'For in the negative section of the question chapter on the triad of clung-to... ...pe... it is understood.'

Vitakkattikavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Triad of Applied Thought is concluded.

8. Dassanenapahātabbattikavaṇṇanā

8. Commentary on the Triad of [Dhammas] to be Abandoned by Seeing

Paṭiccasamuppādavibhaṅge vicāritanayena vicāretabbanti idaṃ ‘‘na ca puthujjanānaṃ dassanena pahātuṃ sakkuṇeyyo, itaresaṃ na kenaci paccayena paccayo na hontīti sakkā vattu’’ntiādinā attanā ānītaṃ [Pg.323] amataggapathavinicchayaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tattha yaṃ vattabbaṃ, tampi paṭiccasamuppādaṭīkāya atthavivaraṇe vuttameva, tasmā tattha vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ.

'It should be investigated by the method of investigation in the Analysis of Dependent Origination.' This is said with reference to the Amataggapathavinicchaya introduced by himself, beginning: 'And it is not possible for worldlings to abandon it by seeing, and for the others, it cannot be said that it is not a condition by any condition,' etc. Whatever should be said on this has already been said in the explanation of the meaning in the Subcommentary to the Analysis of Dependent Origination. Therefore, it should be understood by the method stated there.

Dassanenapahātabbattikavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Triad of [Dhammas] to be Abandoned by Seeing is concluded.

Paṭṭhānapakaraṇa-anuṭīkā samattā.

The Anuṭīkā to the Paṭṭhānapakaraṇa is complete.

Iti pañcapakaraṇamūlaṭīkāya līnatthavaṇṇanā

Thus ends the Līnatthavaṇṇanā, the subcommentary on the Root Commentary to the Five Treatises.

Anuṭīkā samattā.

The Anuṭīkā is complete.

Abhidhammassa anuṭīkā samattā.

The Anuṭīkā to the Abhidhamma is complete.