Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa

Homage to the Blessed One, the Arahant, the Perfectly Self-Enlightened One.

Abhidhammapiṭake

The Basket of the Higher Doctrine

Dhammasaṅgaṇī-anuṭīkā

Subcommentary to the Dhammasaṅgaṇī

Vīsatigāthāvaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Twenty Stanzas

1. Abhidhammasaṃvaṇṇanāya [Pg.1] atthaṃ saṃvaṇṇetukāmo tassā ādigāthāya tāva payojanasambandhābhidhānapubbaṅgamaṃ atthaṃ niddhārento uḷārajjhāsayānaṃ nisammakārīnaṃ paṭipatti paresaṃ vividhahitasukhanipphādanappayojanāti ācariyassāpi dhammasaṃvaṇṇanāya ādimhi satthari nipaccakārassa antarāyavisosanatthatā viya satthari dhamme ca paresaṃ accantasukhappaṭilābhasaṃvattaniyasaddhāratanuppādanatthatāpi siyāti dassetuṃ ‘‘dhammasaṃvaṇṇanāya’’ntiādimāha. Tattha yathānusiṭṭhaṃ paṭipajjamāne apāyesu apatamāne dhāretīti dhammoti sāmaññavacanopi dhamma-saddo saddantarasannidhānena idha pariyattivisesavisayo. Saṃvaṇṇīyati attho etāyāti saṃvaṇṇanā, aṭṭhakathā.

1. Desiring to explain the meaning of the commentary on the Abhidhamma, the author first determines the meaning of its introductory verse, preceded by a statement of its purpose and connection. The practice of those with lofty aspirations, who act with deliberation, has the purpose of bringing about various benefits and happiness for others. Similarly, at the beginning of the teacher's commentary on the Dhamma, just as paying homage to the Teacher serves to dispel obstacles, so too, it is to show that there can also be the purpose of generating in others the jewel of faith in the Teacher and the Dhamma, a faith conducive to the attainment of supreme happiness. Thus, he says, beginning with ‘for the commentary on the Dhamma.’ Here, the word ‘Dhamma,’ although generally signifying that which upholds those who practice as instructed and prevents them from falling into the woeful states, in this context, in conjunction with related terms, refers specifically to textual learning. ‘Commentary’ (saṃvaṇṇanā) means that by which the meaning is explained; that is, the Aṭṭhakathā.

Tividhayānamukhena vimuttidhammaṃ yathārahamanusāsatīti satthā. Paṇamanaṃ paṇāmo, kāyavācācittehi satthu guṇaninnatā. Kiriyā karaṇaṃ, paṇāmassa karaṇaṃ paṇāmakaraṇaṃ, vandanāpayogo. So ca kiñcāpi ‘‘idāni adhippetaṃ paṇāmaṃ karonto’’tiādinā ‘‘tassa pāde namassitvā’’tiādikassa adhippetapaṇāmabhāvaṃ dassessati, ‘‘karuṇā viyā’’tiādikassa pana sabbassa thomanāvasena vuttassapi vasena veditabbo. So hi satthu mahākaruṇādiguṇavisesakittanavasena pavatto mahākaruṇādiguṇavisesāvinābhāvinā saṃvaṇṇiyamānasaṃvaṇṇanādhammavibhāvitena dhammassa svākkhātabhāvena svākkhātadhamme satthari [Pg.2] anuppannasaddhānaṃ saddhājananāya, uppannasaddhānañca bhiyyobhāvāya hoti. Satthuno ca aviparītadhammadesanabhāvena avitathadesanābhūte dhammeti etena satthuno mahākaruṇādiguṇānaṃyeva ca phalavisesanipphādanasamatthatāya pasādāvahataṃ āha. Dhammena hi satthusiddhi, satthārā ca dhammasiddhi, dhammasampattiyāpi satthuguṇatāya satthuguṇavibhāvanena sampajjatīti.

The Teacher is one who, as is fitting, instructs in the Dhamma of liberation by means of the three vehicles. Homage is bowing down, the inclination of body, speech, and mind toward the virtues of the Teacher. Action (kiriyā) is doing (karaṇaṃ); the doing of homage is the act of homage (paṇāmakaraṇaṃ), the application of veneration. And although he will show the intended homage with such phrases as, ‘Now, making the intended homage,’ and ‘having paid homage at his feet,’ the entire passage beginning with ‘like compassion’ should be understood as stated by way of praise. For this praise, proceeding by way of proclaiming the Teacher’s great compassion and other special virtues, and made manifest by the well-proclaimed nature of the Dhamma which is inseparable from those special virtues, serves to generate faith in the Teacher and his well-proclaimed Dhamma in those who lack faith, and to increase it in those who have it. And by this praise—which shows that the Teacher's teaching is not distorted and the Dhamma is thus unfailing—he states that the Teacher's great compassion and other virtues inspire confidence through their capacity to produce special results. For by the Dhamma the Teacher's success is achieved, and by the Teacher the Dhamma's success is achieved. Since the excellence of the Dhamma is itself a virtue of the Teacher, fulfillment is attained by revealing the Teacher’s virtues.

Evaṃ satthari paṇāmakaraṇassa ekaṃ payojanaṃ dassetvā idāni sambandhaṃ vibhāveti ‘‘tadubhayappasādā hī’’tiādinā. Na hi satthari dhamme vā appasanno saṃvaṇṇiyamāne tadadhigantabbe ca dhamme sammā paṭipajjati, nāpi sīlādianupādāparinibbānantaṃ mahantaṃ atthaṃ sādheti, tasmā dhammasaṃvaṇṇanāsu paresaṃ sammāpaṭipattiākaṅkhāya tathārūpadhammapaṭiggāhakehi ca viniyojitena satthari dhamme ca pasāduppādanaṃ satthari paṇāmakaraṇaṃ vihitanti adhippāyo.

Having thus shown one purpose for making homage to the Teacher, he now clarifies the connection with the phrase beginning, ‘For confidence in both….’ Indeed, one who lacks confidence in the Teacher or the Dhamma does not practice correctly in regard to the Dhamma being explained and the Dhamma to be realized through it, nor does one accomplish the great goal that begins with virtue and ends in final Nibbāna without clinging. Therefore, the intention is that in commentaries on the Dhamma, the making of homage to the Teacher is prescribed in order to produce confidence in the Teacher and the Dhamma, being commissioned by those who desire right practice for others and who are receptive to such a Dhamma.

Bhagavato guṇasaṃkittanaṃ tassa dhammasaṅghānampi thomanā hotiyevāti vuttaṃ ‘‘ratanattayapaṇāmavacana’’nti. Tathā ca vakkhati ‘‘bhagavato thomanenevā’’tiādi (dha. sa. mūlaṭī. 6). Vakkhamānaṃ vā ‘‘saddhammañcassa pūjetvā’’tiādiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Viññāpanatthaṃ paresaṃ viññūnanti vā sambandhanīyaṃ. Aviññūnaṃ appamāṇatāya abhājanatāya ca viññūnaṃ gahaṇaṃ. Te hi buddhādīsu sagāravassa pamāṇabhūtataṃ jānantā tassa vacanaṃ sotabbaṃ saddhātabbaṃ maññanti, sammadeva ca naṃ anutiṭṭhantā tadadhippāyaṃ pūrenti. Idhāpi purimanayeneva sambandho veditabbo pasādaviññāpanādimukhenapi sammāpaṭipattiākaṅkhāya paveditattā.

The proclamation of the Blessed One's virtues is indeed also a praise of his Dhamma and Sangha; thus it is called ‘an expression of homage to the Triple Gem.’ And so it will be said, ‘by praising the Blessed One…,’ etc. Alternatively, this is said with reference to the future statement, ‘and having honored his Good Dhamma….’ Or it should be connected as: ‘for the purpose of informing others, the wise.’ The wise are mentioned because the unwise are immeasurable and are not suitable vessels. For they, knowing that the author is a standard of reverence towards the Buddha and others, consider that his word should be heard and trusted, and by following it correctly, they fulfill his intention. Here too, the connection should be understood in the same way as before, since it has been declared out of a desire for right practice, by way of inspiring confidence, making things known, and so on.

Ettha ca paṭhamo atthavikappo saddhānusārīnaṃ puggalānaṃ vasena vutto, dutiyo dhammānusārīnaṃ. Paṭhamo vā asaṃsiddhasatthudhammānaṃ vasena vutto, dutiyo saṃsiddhasatthudhammānaṃ. Tathā paṭhamo paṭhame ratane paṇāmakiriyādassanaparo, dutiyo itaresupīti ayaṃ viseso veditabbo.

Here the first alternative meaning is stated with reference to individuals who are faith-followers, the second with reference to Dhamma-followers. Alternatively, the first is stated with reference to those for whom the Teacher and Dhamma are not yet established, while the second refers to those for whom they are established. Similarly, the first is concerned with showing the act of reverence towards the first Gem, while the second extends to the others as well—this distinction should be understood.

Paṇāmo karīyati etāyāti paṇāmakaraṇaṃ, paṇāmakiriyābhinipphādikā cetanā. Sā hi khettasampattiyā ācariyassa ca ajjhāsayasampattiyā diṭṭhadhammavedanīyabhūtā yathāladdhasampattinimittakassa kammassa [Pg.3] balānuppadānavasena purimakammanipphannassa vipākasantānassa antarā vemajjhe āyanti āpatantīti antarāyāti laddhanāmānaṃ rogādianatthānaṃ vidhāyakassa upapīḷakassa upacchedakassa vā kammassa viddhaṃsanasamattho puññātisayoti imamatthaṃ dasseti ‘‘ratanattayapaṇāma…pe… visesabhāvato’’ti. Evañca katvā rāgādipariyuṭṭhānābhāvavacanena antarāyassa kāraṇabhūtāya payogavipattiyā abhāvassa, atthalābhādivacanena anantarāyatāhetubhūtāya payogasampattiyā sabbhāvassa, ‘‘sabyāpajjhāya pajāya abyāpajjho viharatī’’ti (a. ni. 6.10; 11.11) vacanena diṭṭheva dhamme sukhavihāritāya ca pakāsanaṃ mahānāmasuttaṃyeva udāhaṭaṃ.

That by which homage is made is the ‘making of homage’; it is the volition that produces the act of homage. For that volition, through the excellence of the field of merit and the excellence of the teacher's disposition, becomes experienceable in this very life. By not giving strength to kamma whose sign is some chance attainment, it is a superior merit capable of destroying the kamma that produces, oppresses, or cuts off those things called ‘obstacles’ (antarāya)—so named because they come (āyanti) in between (antarā) the continuity of results produced by previous kamma, such as diseases and other misfortunes. This is the meaning he shows with the words, ‘homage to the Triple Gem… because of its special nature.’ And having done so, by speaking of the absence of the obsessions of lust and so on, he indicates the absence of failure in application, which is the cause of obstacles; and by speaking of the gain of benefits, etc., he indicates the presence of success in application, which is the cause of non-obstruction. And by the statement, ‘he dwells without ill will among a populace with ill will,’ he makes clear the pleasant abiding in this very life. The Mahānāma Sutta itself is cited as an example.

Guṇavisesadassanatthanti etena satipi kāyamanopaṇāmānaṃ antarāyavisosanasamatthabhāve tehi paṇāmavisayassa paṇāmārahabhāvavibhāvanena sātisayo vacīpaṇāmo vihitoti dasseti. Guṇavisesavā hītiādinā ācariyassa yuttapattakāritaṃ dasseti. Desanā vinayapiṭaketi ettha nanu vinayapiṭakassapi desanābhāvato desanāvinayapiṭakānaṃ bhedavacanaṃ na yuttanti? No na yuttaṃ ‘‘tīsupi cetesu ete dhammatthadesanāpaṭivedhā’’ti (dha. sa. aṭṭha. nidānakathā; dī. ni. aṭṭha. 1.paṭhamamahāsaṅgītikathā; pārā. aṭṭha. 1.paṭhamamahāsaṅgītikathā) ettha viya samudāyadesanāya avayavadesanānaṃ ādhārabhāvato. Desanākāle vā manasā vavatthāpitāya vinayatantiyā vinayapiṭakabhāvato tadatthapaññāpanassa ca desanābhāvato bhedavacanaṃ. Atha vā desīyati etenāti desanā, desanāsamuṭṭhāpako cittuppādo, tassa ca vinayapiṭakavisayo karuṇāpubbaṅgamo ca soti evamettha bhedavacanopapatti daṭṭhabbā. Suttantapiṭaketiādīsupi eseva nayo.

By the words ‘for the purpose of showing the special qualities,’ he shows that although bodily and mental homage are capable of dispelling obstacles, verbal homage is prescribed as superior because through it the worthiness of the object of homage is clarified. With the words beginning ‘For he has special qualities,’ he shows the teacher's appropriate action. Regarding ‘teaching and Vinaya Piṭaka,’ one might object: since the Vinaya Piṭaka is also a teaching, is it not inappropriate to state a distinction between ‘teaching’ and ‘Vinaya Piṭaka’? No, it is not inappropriate. Just as in the passage, ‘In all three of these there are these: the Dhamma, the meaning, the teaching, and the penetration,’ the teaching as a whole serves as the basis for the individual teachings. Alternatively, at the time of teaching, because the Vinaya tradition established in the mind becomes the Vinaya Piṭaka, and because the explanation of its meaning is a teaching, the distinction is stated. Or else, ‘teaching’ is that by which one teaches; it is the thought-process that originates the teaching. And since its object is the Vinaya Piṭaka and it is preceded by compassion, in this way the justification for the distinction should be seen. The same principle applies to ‘Sutta Piṭaka,’ etc.

Kathaṃ pana bhagavato desanā vinayapiṭake karuṇāppadhānā, suttābhidhammapiṭakesu ca paññākaruṇāpaññāppadhānāti viññāyatīti? Yato ukkaṃsapariyantagatahirottappopi bhagavā lokiyasādhujanehipi pariharitabbāni ‘‘sikharaṇī’’tiādīni vacanāni yathāparādhañca garahavacanāni vinayapiṭakadesanāyaṃ mahākaruṇāsañcoditamānaso mahāparisamajjhe abhāsi, taṃtaṃsikkhāpadapaññattikāraṇāpekkhāya verañjādīsu sārīrikañca [Pg.4] khedamanubhosi, tasmā kiñcāpi bhūmantarapaccayākārasamayantarakathānaṃ viya vinayapaññattiyāpi samuṭṭhāpikā paññā anaññasādhāraṇatāya atisayakiccavatī, tatopi karuṇāya kiccaṃ adhikanti adhippāyena vuttaṃ ‘‘vinayapiṭake karuṇāppadhānā’’ti. Karuṇābyāpārādhikatāya hi desanāya karuṇāppadhānatā, suttantadesanāya mahākaruṇāsamāpattibahulo veneyyasantānesu tadajjhāsayānulomena gambhīramatthapadaṃ patiṭṭhapesīti karuṇāpaññāppadhānatā, abhidhammadesanāya pana sabbaññutaññāṇassa visayabhāvappahonako rūpārūpaparicchedo dhammasabhāvānurodhena pavattitoti paññāppadhānatā. Teneva ca kāraṇenātiādinā desanānurūpataṃtaṃsaṃvaṇṇanāya thomanā ācariyassa pakatīti dasseti.

How, then, is it understood that the Blessed One’s teaching in the Vinaya Piṭaka is primarily of compassion, while in the Sutta and Abhidhamma Piṭakas it is primarily of compassion-and-wisdom and of wisdom respectively? Because the Blessed One, though he possessed moral shame and fear of wrongdoing to the highest degree, still, with a mind impelled by great compassion, spoke in the great assembly words such as ‘hermaphrodite,’ which even worldly good people should avoid, and words of rebuke according to the offense; and because, out of regard for the reason for laying down each training rule, he endured physical weariness in places like Verañjā. Therefore, although the wisdom that originates the Vinaya regulations has a unique and outstanding function—just as in discourses on other planes of existence, causal relations, and different time periods—the function of compassion is even greater. With this in mind, it was said, ‘in the Vinaya Piṭaka, compassion is primary.’ For a teaching is primary in compassion due to the predominance of the activity of compassion. In the Sutta teaching, abounding in the attainment of great compassion, he established profound meaning and text in the mental continuities of those to be trained in accordance with their dispositions; thus it is primary in compassion and wisdom. In the Abhidhamma teaching, however, the analysis of material and immaterial phenomena, which is the proper domain of omniscient knowledge, proceeds in accordance with the intrinsic nature of phenomena; thus it is primary in wisdom. And by the phrase beginning ‘And for this very reason,’ he shows that it is the teacher's custom to praise in the respective commentary in a way that is appropriate to the teaching.

Kusalā rūpaṃ cakkhumā dasa dāḷimādi samūhavasena atthānavabodhanattho viya atthāvabodhanattho hi saddappayogo attaparādhīno kevalo atthapadatthako, so padatthavipariyesakārinā iti-saddena saddapadatthako jāyatīti āha ‘‘karuṇā viyāti nidassanavacana’’nti. Nidassanañhi nāma nidassitabbadhamme tena ca sambandhe sati hoti, nāññathāti tassa nidassanabhāvaṃ vibhāvento āha ‘‘yassa yathā…pe… pavattitthāti attho’’ti.

The use of a word is for understanding the meaning, unlike such phrases as 'a skilled eye for form' or 'ten pomegranates,' which, as a collection, are as if for understanding a non-referent. For the use of a word is for understanding the meaning; it is dependent on another, its object being solely the meaning of the term. By means of the word 'iti,' which reverses the object of the term, it comes to have the word itself as its object. Thus he says: '“Like compassion” is a term of illustration.' For an illustration exists only when there is a connection with the phenomenon to be illustrated, not otherwise. Explaining its nature as an illustration, he says: 'For whom, in what way... and so forth... it proceeds—this is the meaning.'

‘‘Tattha karuṇā viyāti nidassanavacana’’ntiādinā nidassananidassitabbadhammānaṃ ādhāravisayabyāpārehi savisesanehi saha pakāsanavasena gāthāya atthatatvaṃ dassetvā avayavabhedavasena atthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘kiratīti karuṇā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha nicchandarāgānaṃ bhūtapubbagatiyā vā sattatā veditabbā. Ekassapi dhammassa anekasāmaññākāravantatāya ‘‘yathāsabhāvaṃ pakārehī’’ti vuttaṃ. Tathā hi vuttaṃ – ‘‘sabbe dhammā sabbākārenā’’ti (mahāni. 156; cūḷani. mogharājamāṇavapucchāniddesa 85; paṭi. ma. 3.5) dhammānaṃ aññeyyattaṃ paṭikkhipati ñātuṃ asakkuṇeyyattābhāvato. Etena tassā paññāya akicchavuttitaṃ āha. Yatheva hi ‘‘ñeyyesu sabbesu pavattitthā’’ti ettāvatā adhippetatthe siddhe tesaṃ attattaniyatāvirahasaṃsūcanatthaṃ paresaṃ sattādimicchāgāhapaṭisedhanena dhamma-saddena ñeyyā visesitabbā, evaṃ ‘‘dhammesu sabbesu pavattitthā’’ti ettāvatā [Pg.5] ca adhippetatthe siddhe dhammesu tassā paññāya ākaṅkhappaṭibaddhatāya akicchavuttitaṃ dassetuṃ aññeyyattapaṭisedhanena ñeyya-saddena dhammā visesitāti. Ñeyyadhamma-saddā nīluppalasaddā viya aññamaññaṃ bhedābhedayuttāti ‘‘ñeyyā ca te dhammā cā’’ti vuttaṃ. Yā yāti yathā-saddassatthaṃ dasseti. Byāpanicchāyañhi ayaṃ yathā-saddo, tappabhedā paññā pavattitthāti sambandhoti.

Having shown the true meaning of the verse by way of the passage beginning, 'Therein, “like compassion” is a term of illustration,' which clarifies the illustrative phenomena and the phenomena to be illustrated along with their qualified bases, objects, and functions, in order to show the meaning by way of an analysis of its components, the passage beginning, 'It scatters, thus it is compassion,' is stated. Therein, the state of being a 'being' should be understood as the former state of those who are now without desire and lust. Because even a single phenomenon possesses many general characteristics, it is said, 'by its various kinds according to its own nature.' For it is stated: 'All phenomena in all their aspects' (Mahāni. 156; Cūḷani. Mogharājamāṇavapucchāniddesa 85; Paṭi. Ma. 3.5). The word 'knowable' rejects the unknowability of phenomena, because they are not impossible to know. By this, he states the effortless functioning of that wisdom. For just as the intended meaning is established by the mere phrase, 'it proceeds among all knowable things,' so the 'knowable things' are qualified by the word 'phenomena' in order to indicate their lack of a fixed self-nature by rejecting the wrong grasp of others regarding beings, etc. Similarly, just as the intended meaning is established by the mere phrase, 'it proceeds among all phenomena,' so 'phenomena' are qualified by the word 'knowable' by rejecting their unknowability in order to show the effortless functioning of that wisdom, which is bound up with aspiration regarding those phenomena. The words 'knowable' and 'phenomena' are, like the words 'blue' and 'lotus,' connected with both difference and non-difference from each other. Thus it is said, 'And they are knowable, and they are phenomena.' The phrase 'yā yāti' shows the meaning of the word 'yathā.' For this word 'yathā' is in the sense of pervasion; the connection is that 'wisdom proceeds in its various divisions.'

Bhagavati pavattāvāti idaṃ yebhuyyena upamānopameyyatthānaṃ bhinnādhāratāya bhinnādhārassa ca upamānatthassa idha asambhavato vuttaṃ. Bhagavato karuṇāya aññehi asādhāraṇabhāvo satte saṃsāradukkhato uddharitvā accantasukhe nibbāne patiṭṭhapetuṃ attano sarīrajīvitapariccāgenapi ekantahitajjhāsayatāvasena veditabbo, yato vineyyānaṃ kosohitavatthaguyhapahūtajivhāvidaṃsanampi kataṃ, yañca yadime sattā jāneyyuṃ, bhagavato sāsanena rahadamiva sītalaṃ sampajjalitaṃ aggikkhandhampi samogāheyya. Aññesaṃ passantānanti sambandho. Uddhaṭāti padaṃ apekkhitvā mahoghapakkhandānaṃ sattānanti kammatthe sāmivacanaṃ. Ayañhettha saṅkhepattho – kāmādimahoghapakkhande satte tato uddhaṭā natthañño koci maṃ ṭhapetvāti passato yathā bhagavato karuṇāya āvisanaṃ hoti, na evaṃ aññesaṃ tathādassanasseva abhāvato. Atha vā aññesaṃ passantānanti yadipi pare passeyyuṃ, tathāpi na tesaṃ bhagavato viya karuṇokkamanaṃ atthi appaṭipattito attahitamattapaṭipattito cāti attho.

The phrase 'originating in the Blessed One' is stated because, while generally the simile and the object of simile have different bases, here a simile with a different basis is impossible. The uncommon nature of the Blessed One's compassion, not shared by others, is to be understood through his single-minded intention for their welfare, to the extent of sacrificing his own body and life in order to rescue beings from the suffering of saṃsāra and establish them in the ultimate bliss of Nibbāna. For this reason, for the sake of those to be trained, he even performed the feat of displaying his sheathed organ and his long, broad tongue. And if these beings were to understand, through the Blessed One's teaching they would plunge into a blazing mass of fire as if it were a cool lake. The connection is with 'of others who see.' In anticipation of the word 'rescuer,' the genitive case in 'of beings who have plunged into the great floods' is used in the sense of the accusative. Here, the concise meaning is this: Just as compassion arises in the Blessed One when he sees beings plunged into the great floods of sensual pleasures and so on, and thinks, 'There is no other rescuer for them but me,' so it does not arise in others, because they lack such vision. Or alternatively, 'of others who see' means that even if others were to see, they would not have a surge of compassion like the Blessed One, either because of their inability to act or because they act only for their own welfare. This is the meaning.

Anāvaraṇā tīsu kālesu sabbattha appaṭihatavuttitāya, asādhāraṇā sabbadhammānaṃ niravasesahetupaccayapariggahavasena tesañca sabhāvakiccādiavatthāvisesādiparijānanena āyūhanavelāyameva taṃtaṃkammānaṃ taṃtaṃphalavisesahīnamajjhimapaṇītādivibhāgassa indriyabaddhesu anindriyabaddhesu ca atisukhumatirohitavidūravuttiatītānāgatādibhedabhinnānaṃ rūpadhammānaṃ taṃtaṃkāraṇasamavāyavibhāvaneneva taṃtaṃphalesu vaṇṇasaṇṭhānagandharasaphassādivisesassa niravasesato paṭivijjhanena veditabbā. Ayañca attho bhagavato anekadhātunānādhātulokaṃ yathābhūtaṃ ñāṇādivasena veditabbo. Yathā ca passantassāti idaṃ rāgaggiādīhi [Pg.6] lokasannivāsassa ādittatādiākāradassanaṃ bhagavato mahākaruṇokkamanupāyaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Taṃ pana bahukehi ākārehi passantānaṃ buddhānaṃ bhagavantānaṃ sattesu mahākaruṇā okkamati. ‘‘Āditto lokasannivāso…pe… uyyutto…pe… payāto…pe… kummaggappaṭipanno…pe… upanīyati loko adhuvo…pe… atāṇo loko anabhissaro…pe… assako loko sabbaṃ pahāya gamanīyaṃ…pe… ūno loko atitto taṇhādāsoti passantānaṃ buddhānaṃ bhagavantānaṃ sattesu mahākaruṇā okkamatī’’tiādinā (paṭi. ma. 1.117) paṭisambhidāmagge parosataṃ ākārehi dassitanti ganthavitthāraṃ pariharituṃ saṃvaṇṇayituñca upāyaṃ dassetuṃ āha ‘‘taṃ sabbaṃ paṭisambhidāmagge mahākaruṇāñāṇavibhaṅgavasena jānitabba’’nti. Indriyaparopariyattaāsayānusaya yamakapāṭihāriya sabbaññutānāvaraṇañāṇāni sesāsādhāraṇañāṇāni. Tesampi hi vibhaṅgo ‘‘idha tathāgato satte passati apparajakkhe’’tiādinā (paṭi. ma. 1.111) paṭisambhidāmagge nānappakārena dassitoti purimanayeneva atidisati. Ādi-saddena tattha vibhattānaṃ paṭisambhidāsaccañāṇādīnaṃ saṅgaho katoti veditabbo.

It is unobstructed, because it functions unhindered in all situations in the three times. It is uncommon, because it is to be understood through its complete grasp of the causes and conditions of all phenomena without remainder; through its thorough understanding of their particular states such as their intrinsic nature and function; and through its penetration, without remainder, of the distinctions of inferior, middling, and superior results of those various kammas at the very moment of their accumulation, and of the distinctions in color, shape, smell, taste, touch, and so on, in their respective fruits, by analyzing the respective combinations of causes of material phenomena—whether bound to the sense faculties or not, and whether divided into such categories as the extremely subtle, the concealed, the remote, the past, and the future. This meaning should be understood by way of the Blessed One’s knowledge of the world with its many and diverse elements as it really is. The phrase 'of one who sees thus' is stated with reference to the arising of the Blessed One's great compassion as a means upon seeing that the world-abode is ablaze with the fire of lust and so on. For great compassion arises in the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, toward beings when they see in many ways. In the Paṭisambhidāmagga, this is shown in over a hundred ways, beginning: 'Great compassion arises in the Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, toward beings when they see that the world-abode is ablaze… agitated… rushing… has entered a wrong path… the world is being led on, it is impermanent… the world is without a shelter, without a master… the world is helpless, one must go on leaving all behind… the world is deficient, insatiable, a slave to craving' (Paṭi. Ma. i, 117). To avoid textual prolixity and to show the method for commenting, it is said: 'All this should be known by way of the analysis of the knowledge of great compassion in the Paṭisambhidāmagga.' The knowledges of the superior and inferior faculties of others, of their dispositions and latent tendencies, of the twin miracle, of omniscience, and of the unobstructed—these are the remaining uncommon knowledges. Their analysis, too, is shown in the Paṭisambhidāmagga in various ways, beginning: 'Here, the Tathāgata sees beings with little dust in their eyes' (Paṭi. Ma. i, 111). Thus an extension is made by the previous method. It should be understood that by the word 'etc.,' the knowledges of the discriminations, the truths, and so on, which are analyzed there, are included.

Nippadesasappadesavisayā karuṇā viya bhagavato paññāpi idha nippadesasappadesavisayā niravasesā adhippetāti tassā katipayabhedadassanena nayato tadavasiṭṭhabhedā gahetabbāti dassento ‘‘paññāggahaṇena cā’’tiādimāha. Te pana sīlasamādhi paññāvimuttivimuttiñāṇadassana, dvācattālīsasatadukadhamma, bāvīsatitikadhamma, catusatipaṭṭhāna sammappadhāna iddhipāda sāmaññaphala ariyavaṃsādi, pañcagati pañcapadhāniyaṅgapañcaṅgikasamādhi indriya bala nissāraṇīyadhātu vimuttāyatana vimuttiparipācanīyadhammasaññādi, chasāraṇīyadhamma anussatiṭṭhāna agāravagārava nissāraṇiyadhātu satatavihāra anuttariya nibbedhabhāgiyapaññādi, sattaaparihāniyadhamma ariyadhana bojjhaṅga sappurisadhammanijjaravatthu saññā dakkhiṇeyyapuggalakhīṇāsavabalādi, aṭṭhapaññāpaṭilābhahetu micchatta sammatta lokadhamma ariyānariyavohāra ārambhavatthu kusītavatthu akkhaṇa mahāpurisavitakka abhibhāyatana vimokkhādi, navayonisomanasikāramūladhammapārisuddhipadhāniyaṅga [Pg.7] sattāvāsa āghātavatthu āghātapaṭivinaya saññānānatta anupubbavihārādi, dasanāthakaradhamma kasiṇāyatana akusalakammapatha kusalakammapatha micchatta sammatta ariyavāsa dasabalañāṇa asekkhadhammādi, ekādasamettānisaṃsa sīlānisaṃsa dhammatā buddhihetu, dvādasāyatanapaṭiccasamuppāda dhammacakkākāra, terasadhutaguṇa, cuddasabuddhañāṇa, pañcadasacaraṇavimuttiparipācanīyadhamma, soḷasaānāpānassati saccākāra suttantapaṭṭhāna, aṭṭhārasa buddhadhammadhātu bhedakaravatthu, ekūnavīsatipaccavekkhaṇa, catuvīsatipaccaya, aṭṭhavīsatisuttantapaṭṭhāna, paṇṇāsaudayabbayadassana, paropaṇṇāsakusaladhamma, dvāsaṭṭhidiṭṭhigata, aṭṭhasatataṇhāvicaritādibhedānaṃ dhammānaṃ paṭivijjhanadesanākārappavattā, ye ca catuvīsatikoṭisatasahassasamāpattisañcārimahāvajirañāṇappabhedā, ye ca anantanayasamantapaṭṭhānapavicayadesanākārappavattā, ye ca anantāsu lokadhātūsu anantānaṃ sattānaṃ āsayānusayacaritādivibhāvanākārappavattāti evaṃpakārā bhagavato paññāpabhedā, sabbepi idha ādi-saddena nayato saṅgayhantīti veditabbaṃ. Ko hi samattho bhagavato paññāya pabhede anupadaṃ niravasesato dassetuṃ. Teneva bhagavantaṃ ṭhapetvā paññavantānaṃ aggabhūto dhammasenāpatisāriputtattheropi buddhaguṇaparicchedanaṃ patianuyutto ‘‘apica me, bhante, dhammanvayo vidito’’ti (dī. ni. 2.146) āhāti.

Just like compassion, which has both specific and general domains, so too the Blessed One's wisdom is here intended as having both specific and general domains, as being without remainder. To show that by seeing some of its divisions, the remaining divisions should be grasped by way of method, he states the passage beginning 'and by the grasp of wisdom.' These are: virtue, concentration, wisdom, liberation, and the knowledge and vision of liberation; the one hundred and forty-two twofold dhammas; the twenty-two threefold dhammas; the four establishments of mindfulness, the four right strivings, the four bases for spiritual power, the fruits of recluseship, the noble lineages, etc.; the five destinations, the five factors of striving, the five-factored concentration, the five spiritual faculties, the five powers, the five elements of escape, the five spheres of liberation, the five perceptions conducive to the ripening of liberation, etc.; the six qualities to be remembered, the six bases of recollection, respect and disrespect, the six elements of escape, the six constant abidings, the six unsurpassed things, the six kinds of wisdom that are part of penetration, etc.; the seven principles of non-decline, the seven treasures of the noble ones, the seven factors of enlightenment, the seven qualities of a superior person, the seven objects for purification, the seven kinds of perception, the seven kinds of persons worthy of offerings, the seven powers of one whose taints are destroyed, etc.; the eight causes for the attainment of wisdom, wrongness and rightness, the eight worldly conditions, the eight noble and ignoble usages, the eight grounds for initiative, the eight grounds for laziness, the eight inopportune moments, the eight thoughts of a great man, the eight bases of overcoming, the eight liberations, etc.; the nine things rooted in wise attention, the nine factors of purity, the nine factors of striving, the nine abodes of beings, the nine grounds for resentment, the nine ways of subduing resentment, the nine kinds of perception of diversity, the nine successive abidings, etc.; the ten protector-making qualities, the ten kasiṇa bases, the ten unwholesome and wholesome courses of action, wrongness and rightness, the ten noble abodes, the ten powers of a Tathāgata, the ten qualities of one beyond training, etc.; the eleven benefits of loving-kindness, the benefits of virtue, natural law, the cause for intelligence, etc.; the twelve sense bases, dependent origination, the twelve aspects of the Wheel of Dhamma, etc.; the thirteen ascetic practices; the fourteen kinds of Buddha-knowledge; the fifteen items of conduct, the dhammas that ripen for liberation, etc.; the sixteen aspects of mindfulness of breathing, the sixteen aspects of the truths, the sixteen Suttanta Paṭṭhānas, etc.; the eighteen elements of a Buddha's Dhamma, the eighteen grounds for causing schism, etc.; the nineteen kinds of reviewing knowledge; the twenty-four conditions; the twenty-eight Suttanta Paṭṭhānas; the fifty kinds of insight into rise and fall; the more than fifty wholesome dhammas; the sixty-two kinds of views; the one hundred and eight movements of craving, etc. These are the kinds of dhammas set in motion by way of penetration and teaching. And there are the various kinds of great diamond-like knowledge that traverse the twenty-four hundred thousand crores of meditative attainments; and those that proceed by way of teaching and investigating the endless methods of the Universal Paṭṭhāna; and those that proceed by way of clarifying the dispositions, latent tendencies, characters, etc., of endless beings in endless world-systems. Such are the divisions of the Blessed One's wisdom. It should be understood that all these are included here by way of method through the word 'etcetera.' For who is able to set forth the divisions of the Blessed One's wisdom term by term without remainder? For this reason, even the Elder Sāriputta, the General of the Dhamma, who is the foremost of the wise apart from the Blessed One, when engaged in delimiting the Buddha's qualities, said: 'Moreover, venerable sir, the causal sequence of the Dhamma is known to me' (DN 2.146).

Saṃsāramahoghapakkhandānaṃ sattānaṃ tato santāraṇatthaṃ paṭipanno tehi payojito nāma hoti asatipi tesaṃ tathāvidhe abhisandhiyanti vuttaṃ ‘‘sattā hi mahābodhiṃ payojentī’’ti. Etena sabbenāti mahābodhimūlādidassanena. Apagamanaṃ nirupakkilesanti yojetabbaṃ. Jātasaṃvaddhabhāvadassanena ‘‘anādi anidhano ca satto’’ti evaṃpakārā micchāvādā paṭisedhitā honti. Samaññā…pe… dasseti satte paramatthato asatipi sattapaññattivohārasūcanato. Karuṇā ādipaññā pariyosānanti idaṃ sambharaṇanipphattikālāpekkhāya vuttaṃ, na paricchedavantatāya. Tenevāha ‘‘tannidānabhāvato tato uttarikaraṇīyābhāvato’’ti. Sabbe buddhaguṇā dassitā honti nayato dassitattā. Eso eva hi anavasesato buddhaguṇadassanupāyo yadidaṃ nayaggāhaṇaṃ. Paradhanaharaṇāditopi virati paresaṃ anatthapariharaṇavasappavattiyā [Pg.8] siyā karuṇūpanissayāti karuṇānidānaṃ sīlaṃ. Tato eva ‘‘tato pāṇātipātādiviratippavattito’’ti vuttaṃ.

For the sake of ferrying across the beings who have plunged into the great flood of saṃsāra, he has entered upon the path. Thus he is said to be 'employed by them,' even in the absence of such an intention on their part, for it is said: 'Beings indeed employ the Great Bodhi.' By all this—that is, by the vision of the foot of the Great Bodhi tree, etc.—'departure' should be connected with 'free from defilements.' By seeing the state of having been born and having grown, wrong views of the type 'a being is without beginning and without end' are refuted. Conventional terms... he shows, indicating the conventional usage of the term 'being,' even though in an ultimate sense beings do not exist. 'Compassion at the beginning, wisdom at the end': this is said with reference to the time of fulfilling the accumulations, not with reference to limitation. Therefore it is said: 'Because it is the cause, and because there is nothing further to be done beyond that.' All the Buddha's qualities are shown, because they are shown by way of method. For this very grasping of the method is the means to see the Buddha’s qualities without remainder. Abstinence from taking others' property and so forth might occur by way of preventing harm to others, being supported by compassion; thus virtue has compassion as its cause. For that very reason it is said: 'From that, there arises abstinence from the destruction of life and so forth.'

2. Yassā saṃvaṇṇanantiādinā ‘‘dayāyā’’tiādithomanāya sambandhaṃ dasseti. Payojanaṃ pana vuttanayena veditabbaṃ. Abbhantaraṃ niyakajjhattaṃ, tato bahibhūtaṃ bāhiraṃ. Dayāti karuṇā adhippetāti dayā-saddassa mettākaruṇānaṃ vācakattā vakkhamānañca anuyogaṃ manasi katvā vuttaṃ. Tāya hi samussāhito, na mettāyāti adhippāyo. Pubbe vuttassa paṭiniddeso hotīti ta-saddassa atthaṃ āha. Tanti paññaṃ visesetvā upamābhāvena vinivattā caritatthatāya. Paṭiniddesaṃ nārahati padhānāpadhānesu padhāne kiccadassanato. Dvinnaṃ padānaṃ…pe… vatoti karuṇāvācinā dayā-saddena ekādhikaraṇabhāvena vuccamāno ta-saddo tato aññadhammavisayo bhavituṃ na yuttoti adhippāyo. Apariyāyasaddānaṃ samānādhikaraṇabhāvo visesanavisesitabbabhāve sati hoti, nāññathāti āha ‘‘samānā…pe… hotī’’ti. Samānādhikaraṇabhāvena hettha visesanavisesitabbabhāvo sādhīyati, sā ca samānādhikaraṇatā visiṭṭhavibhattikānaṃ na hotīti samānavibhattitāyapi tameva sādhīyatīti ‘‘dayā…pe… cida’’nti idaṃ dayāya visesitabbabhāve kāraṇavacanaṃ. Padhānatāya hi sāmaññatāya ca sā visesitabbā jātā. Tattha bhagavato tadaññesañca karuṇānaṃ vācakattā sāmaññatā veditabbā. Tassa cāti dayā-saddassa. ‘‘Padhānañca pañña’’ntiādinā kiñcāpi purimagāthāya paññāppadhānā, ‘‘tāyā’’ti pana kevalaṃ avatvā dayāvisesanabhāvena vuttattā appadhānāyapi karuṇāya paṭiniddeso yuttoti dasseti. Appadhānatā ca karuṇāya purimagāthāya vasena vuttā, idha pana padhānā eva. Tathā ca vuttaṃ ‘‘dayāsamussāhinīti padhānā’’ti (dha. sa. mūlaṭī. 2).

2. By the words 'whose praise,' etc., he shows the connection with the praise beginning 'of compassion.' The purpose, however, should be understood by the method stated. 'Internal' means one's own self; what is external to that is 'external.' By 'compassion' (dayā), 'compassion' (karuṇā) is intended. This is said because the word 'dayā' can denote both loving-kindness and compassion, and keeping in mind the subsequent inquiry. The meaning is that he was spurred on by that, i.e., compassion, not by loving-kindness. He states the meaning of the word 'that' (ta) as a reference to what was said before. It does not refer to wisdom, for wisdom, having been distinguished and its function as a simile fulfilled, has been set aside. It does not merit a reference back, because among primary and secondary things, the function is seen in the primary. Regarding the two words... it is said: The meaning is that since the word 'that' (ta) is spoken in the same grammatical case as the word 'dayā' which denotes compassion, it is not proper for it to have as its object a different dhamma from that. He says 'having the same case...' to show that non-synonymous words have the same grammatical case when there is a qualifier-qualified relationship, and not otherwise. Here, the relationship of qualifier and qualified is established by their having the same grammatical case. And since this apposition does not occur with words having different case endings, this very relationship is established also by their having the same case ending. Thus, the words 'compassion... this' are a statement of the reason why compassion is the thing to be qualified. For because of its prominence and its generality, it has become the thing to be qualified. In this context, its generality should be understood from its being a term for the compassion of the Blessed One and of others. And 'of that' means of the word 'dayā.' By the words 'and wisdom is primary,' etc., he shows that although in the previous verse wisdom is primary, since it is not simply said 'by that' (tāya) but is spoken of as a qualification of compassion, a reference back even to the non-primary compassion is proper. The non-primary nature of compassion was stated with reference to the previous verse, but here it is indeed primary. And so it is said: 'Spurred on by compassion, it is primary' (Dhs-mṭ 2).

Kathaṃ pana…pe… ñātabbāti vakkhamānaññeva atthaṃ hadaye ṭhapetvā codeti. Yadi evanti yadi aṭṭhakathāya adhippāyaṃ aggahetvā vacanamattameva gaṇhasi. Mettāti ca na yujjeyyāti yathā ‘‘mettacittataṃ āpanno’’ti etissā aṭṭhakathāya vasena na dayā karuṇā[Pg.9], evaṃ ‘‘nikkaruṇataṃ āpanno’’ti etissā aṭṭhakathāya vasena na dayā mettāti vacanamattaggahaṇe aṭṭhakathānampi virodhaṃ dasseti. ‘‘Adhippāyavasena yojetabbo’’ti vatvā tameva adhippāyaṃ dayā-saddo hītiādinā vivarati. Akkharacintakā hi dayā-saddaṃ dānagatirakkhaṇesu paṭhanti. Anurakkhaṇañca mettākaruṇānaṃ hitūpasaṃhāradukkhāpanayanākāravuttīnaṃ samānakiccaṃ, tasmā ubhayattha dayā-saddo pavattatīti vuttaṃ. Antonītanti antogadhaṃ, rukkhattho viya dhavakhadirādīnaṃ anurakkhaṇattho mettākaruṇānaṃ sāmaññanti attho, adhippāyo pana ‘‘dayāpanno’’ti ettha sabbapāṇabhūtahitānukampīti anantaraṃ karuṇāya vuttattā dayā-saddo mettāpariyāyoti viññāyati. Mettāpi hi karuṇā viya pāṇātipātaviratiyā kāraṇanti. ‘‘Adayāpanno’’ti ettha pana kāruṇiko avihiṃ sajjhāsayattā paresaṃ vihesāmattampi na karoti, ko pana vādo pāṇātipātaneti nikkaruṇatāya pāṇātipātitā dassitāti veditabbā. Etamevatthaṃ sandhāya ‘‘evañhi aṭṭhakathānaṃ avirodho hotī’’ti āha. Yadi dayā-saddo mettākaruṇānaṃ vācako, evampikathaṃ pana karuṇā ‘‘dayā’’ti jānitabbāti anuyogo tadavattho evāti codanaṃ manasi katvā karuṇā ca desanāyātiādinā karuṇāya eva gahaṇe kāraṇamāha.

Keeping in mind the meaning about to be stated, one raises the objection: 'But how... is it to be known?' 'If so' means: if you do not grasp the intention of the commentary and take only the mere words. He shows that by grasping only the words, there is a contradiction even with the commentaries: just as, according to the commentary on 'he has attained a mind of loving-kindness,' 'dayā' is not compassion, so, according to the commentary on 'he has fallen into cruelty,' 'dayā' would not be loving-kindness. Having said, 'It should be construed according to the intention,' he explains that very intention with the words beginning 'For the word dayā...' For etymologists read the word 'dayā' in the senses of giving, going, and protecting. And protecting is the common function of loving-kindness and compassion, which have the respective characteristics of bestowing welfare and removing suffering. Therefore, it is said that the word 'dayā' is used in both cases. 'Implicit' means included within. The meaning is that just as the meaning 'tree' is common to dhava, khadira, etc., so the meaning 'protecting' is common to loving-kindness and compassion. But the specific intention is that in the phrase 'endowed with dayā,' the word 'dayā' is understood as a synonym for loving-kindness because it is explained as 'sympathizing with the welfare of all living beings,' and because compassion is mentioned immediately after. For loving-kindness, like compassion, is a cause for abstinence from the destruction of life. But in the phrase 'devoid of dayā,' it should be understood that because a compassionate person has a non-violent disposition, he does not cause even the slightest vexation to others, to say nothing of destroying life; thus the destruction of life is shown by the lack of compassion. Referring to this very meaning, he said: 'For in this way there is no contradiction with the commentaries.' Keeping in mind the objection, 'If the word 'dayā' denotes both loving-kindness and compassion, the question "But how is compassion to be known as 'dayā'?” still remains,' he states the reason for taking it as compassion only with the words beginning 'And compassion in the teaching...'

Nanu tāyātiādinā sāmatthiyatopi pakaraṇaṃ balavanti pakaraṇavaseneva karuṇāvisayassa ñātataṃ dasseti. Yathāruci pavattitthāti etaṃ purimagāthāya sappadesanippadesasattavisayāya karuṇāya gahitabhāvassa kāraṇavacanaṃ. Yathārucipavatti hi ekasmiṃ anekesu ca icchānurūpappavattīti. ‘‘Idha pana nippadesasattavisayataṃ gahetu’’nti etena siddhe sati ārambho ñāpakattho hotīti puna ‘‘sattesū’’ti vacanaṃ imamatthavisesaṃ bodhetīti dasseti. Na devesuyevātiādināpi dayāsādhanassa samussāhanassa sattavisayabhāve sāmatthiyaladdhepi ‘‘sattesū’’ti vacanaṃ tassa nippadesasattavisayabhāvo adhippetoti imaṃ visesaṃ ñāpetīti dasseti.

By the words beginning 'Is it not by that,' he shows that the context is stronger than mere capacity, and that by the force of the context the object of compassion is known. The phrase 'it proceeds as one wishes' is a statement of the reason for the taking up of compassion, mentioned in the previous verse, which has as its object beings both specified and unspecified. For 'proceeding as one wishes' means proceeding according to one's wish in regard to one or many. By the words, 'Here, however, taking its object to be beings without specification,' he shows that since this is already established, the new statement serves an indicative purpose; thus the word 'sattesu' (towards beings) again makes known this specific meaning. By the words beginning 'Not only towards devas,' he also shows that even though it is established by capacity that the cultivation of compassion has beings as its sphere, the word 'sattesu' indicates that its intended object is beings without specification, thus making known this distinction.

Kāladesadesakaparisādiparidīpanaṃ bāhiranidānanti kālādīni niddhārento ‘‘yasmiṃ kāle’’tiādimāha. Avasānamhi vasanto tidasālayeti vacanatoti etena tassa pāṭihāriyassa saddantarasannidhānena [Pg.10] avacchinnataṃ dasseti. Tattha pavattavohārena ca na sakkāti puthujjanasantānepi rāgādipaṭipakkhaharaṇassa abhāvato nicchandarāgesu sattavohāro viya puthujjanasantāne rāgādipaṭipakkhaharaṇavasena pavattaṃ tadabhāvepi bhagavato santāne ruḷhīvasena pāṭihāriyantveva vuccatīti na sakkā vattunti adhippāyo. Diṭṭhiharaṇavasena ye sammādiṭṭhikā jātā acelakakassapādayo viya, diṭṭhippakāsane asamatthabhāvena appaṭibhānabhāvādippattiyā saccakādayo viya.

The elucidation of time, place, teacher, assembly, and so forth is the external introduction. Determining the time and other factors, he begins with the words 'at which time.' By the statement 'residing at the end in the abode of the Tidasas,' he shows that that miracle was defined by the proximity of other words. The intention is that one cannot argue from conventional usage. For, since there is no removal of the counterparts to lust and so on in the mental continuum of a worldling, it is not possible to say that what occurs in a worldling's continuum by way of removing the counterparts to lust, etc., is called a 'miracle'—a term established by convention for the Blessed One's continuum—even in the absence of that true removal, just as the term 'being' is conventionally used for those without desire and lust. By way of removing wrong views, there are those who came to have right view, like the naked ascetic Kassapa and others; and by way of being unable to expound their views and thus reaching a state of speechlessness and the like, there are those like Saccaka and others.

3 . Sītapabbatā nāma ‘‘sineruṃ parivāretvā ṭhitā yugandharo…pe… giri brahā’’ti (visuddhi. 1.137; pārā. aṭṭha. 1.1 verañjakaṇḍavaṇṇanā) evaṃ vuttapabbatā.

3. The Sīta mountains are the mountains described in the passage beginning: 'The Yugandhara ...pe... great mountains standing surrounding Sineru' (Vism. I.204; Sp. I.119).

4-5. Sabbaso cakkavāḷasahassehi sabbaso āgamma sabbaso sannisinnenāti sambandhavasena tayo vikappā yuttā, sabbaso cakkavāḷasahassehi dasahi dasahīti pana aniṭṭhasādhanato paṭisedhito. Vajjitabbeti ye vajjetuṃ sakkā ‘‘atisammukhā atisamīpaṃ unnatappadeso’’ti, ete. Itare pana tassā parisāya mahantabhāvena na sakkā pariharituṃ.

4-5. 'From all the thousand-world-systems,' 'having come from all sides,' 'having assembled from all sides'—these three alternatives are suitable by way of their connection. But the reading 'from all the ten thousand-world-systems' is rejected because it leads to an undesirable conclusion. As to 'should be avoided': these are those who can be avoided, namely, 'those too directly in front, too close, or in an elevated place.' But the others cannot be avoided because of the great size of that assembly.

‘‘Sabbañeyya…pe… samatthā’’ti vatvā tesaṃ desetabbappakārajānanasamatthāti vacanaṃ attanā paṭividdhākārassa dhammasāmināpi paresaṃ desetuṃ asakkuṇeyyattā vuttaṃ. Aññathā sabbepi sattā diṭṭhasaccā eva bhaveyyuṃ. Sabbañeyyadhammānaṃ yathāsabhāvajānanasamatthatādiyeva yathāvuttabalaṃ. Tesaṃ gahaṇasamatthataṃ dīpeti, adhikavacanamaññamatthaṃ bodhetīti adhippāyo.

Having said, 'capable of ... all that is knowable,' the statement 'capable of knowing the way things should be taught to them' is made because even the Lord of the Dhamma would be unable to teach to others the state that he himself has penetrated. Otherwise, all beings would have seen the truth. The aforesaid power is precisely the ability to know all knowable phenomena as they really are, and so on. The intention is that this indicates their capacity to grasp it, and that the additional words make known another meaning.

6. Tathāgato vandanīyotiādinā ‘‘namassitvā’’tiādikiriyāvisesānaṃ taṃtaṃsuttānurodhena pavattitamāha. Sarīrasobhaggādīti ādi-saddena kalyāṇavākkaraṇatāādhipaccaparivārasampattiādi saṅgayhati.

6. By the words beginning 'The Tathāgata is worthy of homage,' he speaks of how the specific actions, such as 'having paid homage,' occurred in accordance with the respective suttas. Regarding 'the beauty of the body, etc.': by the word 'etc.' are included such qualities as beautiful speech, sovereignty, the accomplishment of a retinue, and so on.

7. Antaradhāpetvāti nirodhetvā. Nirodhanañcettha uppādakahetupariharaṇavasena tesaṃ anuppattikaraṇanti veditabbaṃ. Atthaṃ pakāsayissāmīti sambandhoti ‘‘sosetvā’’ti pubbakālakiriyāya aparakālakiriyāpekkhatāya vuttaṃ.

7. 'Having made disappear' means 'having suppressed.' And here the suppression should be understood as preventing their arising by way of avoiding their producing causes. The connection is with 'I will explain the meaning.' The word 'sosetvā' (having dried up) is an absolutive, which is used because a prior action requires a subsequent action.

8. Dukkarabhāvaṃ [Pg.11] dīpetunti adukkarassa tathāabhiyācetabbatābhāvatoti adhippāyo. Pārājikasaṅghādisesānaṃ sīlavipattibhāvato thullaccayādīnañca yebhuyyena ācāravipattibhāvato ācārasīlānaṃ tathā yojanā katā, tathā cārittasīlassa ācārasabhāvattā itaraṃ sabhāveneva gahetvā dutiyā. Asakkuṇeyyanti visuddhācārādiguṇasamannāgatena sabrahmacārinā saddhammaciraṭṭhitatthaṃ sādaraṃ abhiyācitena tena ca abhidhammatthappakāsane samatthoti yāthāvato pamāṇitena tabbimukhabhāvo na sukaroti adhippāyo.

8. The intention of 'illuminates the difficulty' is that what is not difficult would not be requested in such a way. Because Pārājika and Saṅghādisesa offenses are a corruption of virtue, and Thullaccaya offenses and so on are for the most part a corruption of conduct, the application to 'conduct' and 'virtue' is made thus. Similarly, since the virtue of conduct has the nature of conduct, the other is taken by its own nature as the second. The intention of 'not by one who is unable' is that it is not easy for one who has been respectfully requested for the sake of the long duration of the good Dhamma by a fellow monk endowed with such qualities as pure conduct, and who has been correctly assessed as being capable of explaining the meaning of the Abhidhamma, to turn away from that request.

9. Devadeva-saddassa attho paṭṭhānasaṃvaṇṇanāṭīkāyaṃ vipañcitoti na vitthārayimha.

9. The meaning of the term 'Devadeva' has been explained in detail in the subcommentary to the Paṭṭhāna commentary; therefore, we have not elaborated on it here.

13. Paṭhamasaṅgītiyaṃ yā aṭṭhakathā saṅgītāti vacanena sā bhagavato dharamānakālepi aṭṭhakathā saṃvijjati, tena pāṭho viya bhagavaṃmūlikāvāti viññāyati. ‘‘Abhidhammassā’’ti padaṃ ‘‘atthaṃ pakāsayissāmī’’ti etadapekkhanti ‘‘kassa pana sā aṭṭhakathā’’ti pucchitvā adhikāravasena tameva abhidhammapadaṃ ākaḍḍhati. Āvuttiādivasena vā ayamattho vibhāvetabbo.

13. By the statement that 'the commentary was recited at the First Council,' it is known that a commentary existed even while the Blessed One was alive, and that therefore, like the canonical text, it is rooted in the Blessed One. The word 'Abhidhammassa' (of the Abhidhamma) anticipates 'I will explain the meaning'; having asked, 'But whose commentary is it?', it draws in that very word 'Abhidhamma' by force of the topic. Alternatively, this meaning should be explained by way of repetition and so on.

16. Ariyamaggassa bojjhaṅgamaggaṅgajhānaṅgavisesaṃ pādakajjhānameva niyametītiādinayappavatto tipiṭakacūḷanāgattheravādo ādi-saddena vipassanāya ārammaṇabhūtā khandhā niyamenti, puggalajjhāsayo niyametīti evamādayo moravāpivāsimahādattattheratipiṭakacūḷābhayattheravādādayo saṅgayhanti. Tappakāsanenevāti abhidhammassa atthappakāsaneneva. Soti mahāvihāravāsīnaṃ vinicchayo. Tathāti asammissānākulabhāvena. Asammissānākulabhūto vā vinicchayo mahāvihāravāsīnaṃ santakabhāvena, etena abhidhammassa atthappakāsaneneva mahāvihāravāsīnaṃ vinicchayo idha abhinipphādīyatīti dasseti. Atha vā tappakāsanenevāti asammissānākulabhāvappakāsaneneva. Soti pakāsiyamāno abhidhammattho. Tathāti mahāvihāravāsīnaṃ vinicchayabhāvena. Imasmiṃ atthavikappe ‘‘asammissaṃ anākulaṃ atthaṃ pakāsayissāmī’’ti sambandhanīyaṃ.

16. By the word 'ādi' (etc.) are included the view of the elder Tipiṭaka Cūḷanāga, which proceeds according to the method beginning, 'The preliminary jhāna itself determines the specific enlightenment factors, path factors, and jhāna factors of the noble path'; and the views of such elders as Moravāpivāsi Mahādatta and Tipiṭaka Cūḷābhaya, which hold that 'the aggregates that have become the object of insight determine it,' and 'the disposition of the person determines it.' 'By its explanation alone' means solely by the explanation of the meaning of the Abhidhamma. 'So' refers to the decision of the Mahāvihāra residents. 'Thus' means in an unmixed and unconfused way. Or, the decision, being unmixed and unconfused, belongs to the Mahāvihāra residents; by this he shows that here the decision of the Mahāvihāra residents is accomplished solely by the explanation of the meaning of the Abhidhamma. Alternatively, 'by its explanation alone' means by an explanation that is unmixed and unconfused. 'So' refers to the meaning of the Abhidhamma that is being explained. 'Thus' means as the decision of the Mahāvihāra residents. In this alternative meaning, the connection should be made with 'I will explain the meaning unmixed and unconfused.'

17. Aññañca [Pg.12] sabbaṃ atthappakāsanaṃ hotīti tosanaṃ hotīti attho. Tenevāha ‘‘sabbena tena tosanaṃ kataṃ hotī’’ti. Yuttarūpā yojanā.

17. The meaning of 'And whatever else is an explanation of the meaning' is 'it is a satisfaction.' Therefore he said: 'By all that, satisfaction is produced.' The construction is suitable.

Vīsatigāthāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Twenty Verses is concluded.

Nidānakathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Nidānakathā

Paricchedo sattappakaraṇabhāvo. Sanniveso sattannaṃ pakaraṇānaṃ tadavayavānañca vavatthānaṃ. Sāgarehi tathā cintāti ‘‘imassa abhidhammassa gambhīrabhāvavijānanatthaṃ cattāro sāgarā veditabbā’’tiādinā nayena jalasāgarādīhi saha nayasāgaravicāro. ‘‘Satabhāgena sahassabhāgena dhammantarā dhammantaraṃ saṅkamitvā saṅkamitvā desesī’’tiādinā desanābhedehi abhidhammassa gambhīrabhāvakathā desanāhi gambhīratā.

The division is its nature as seven treatises. The arrangement is the organization of the seven treatises and their parts. 'The thought regarding the oceans is thus': by the method beginning with the passage, 'For the sake of understanding the profound nature of this Abhidhamma, four oceans should be known,' there is an investigation of the ocean of method along with the water-ocean and so on. 'Profundity through the teachings': by means of the distinctions in the teaching, beginning with the passage, 'Having passed over from one dhamma to another by a hundredfold part, by a thousandfold part, he taught,' the profound nature of the Abhidhamma is spoken of.

‘‘Evaṃ temāsaṃ nirantaraṃ desentassā’’tiādinā desanākāle bhagavato sarīrassa yāpitākāravicāro desanā…pe… gahaṇaṃ. Tathā therassa…pe…pi cāti ‘‘abhidhamme vācanāmaggo nāmā’’tiādinā abhidhamme vācanāmaggassa sāriputtattherasambandhitatā tassa ca teneva uppāditatā. Yo hi bhagavatā devatānaṃ desitākāro, so aparicchinnavāranayatantitāya ananto aparimāṇo na bhikkhūnaṃ vācanāyoggo, yo ca therassa desitākāro, so atisaṃkhittatāya. Nātisaṅkhepanātivitthārabhūto pana pāṭhanayo therappabhāvito vācanāmaggoti.

By the passage beginning, 'Thus, while he was teaching continuously for three months...,' is meant the investigation of the manner in which the Blessed One's body was sustained at the time of the teaching ... and its grasping. 'Likewise for the Elder ... and so on': and by the passage beginning, 'the path of recitation in the Abhidhamma is called...,' is meant the connection of the path of recitation in the Abhidhamma with the Elder Sāriputta, and that it was originated by him. For the manner of teaching employed by the Blessed One for the devas, being a system of unspecified turns and methods, is endless, immeasurable, and not suitable for recitation by the bhikkhus; while the manner of teaching employed by the Elder is so due to its extreme conciseness. However, the method of recitation that is neither too condensed nor too detailed, originated by the Elder, is the path of recitation.

Vacanatthavijānanenātiādinā kusalā dhammātiādipadānaññeva atthavaṇṇanaṃ akatvā abhidhamma-saddavicārassa sambandhamāha. ‘‘Ye te mayā dhammā abhiññā desitā. Seyyathidaṃ – cattāro satipaṭṭhānā…pe… sikkhitaṃ sikkhiṃsu dve bhikkhū abhidhamme nānāvādā’’tiādisuttavasena kiñcāpi bodhipakkhiyadhammā ‘‘abhidhammo’’ti vuccanti, dhamma-saddo ca samādhiādīsu diṭṭhappayogo, pariyattidhammo eva pana idha adhippetoti dassento ‘‘suttantādhikā pāḷīti attho’’ti āha. Tattha dhammabyabhicārabhāvena visesato abhidhammo viya suttantopi ‘‘dhammo’’ti vuccati. ‘‘Yo [Pg.13] vo, ānanda, mayā dhammo ca vinayo ca desito paññatto’’tiādīsu (dī. ni. 1.216) aññattha ca sambhavato abhi-saddena nivattetabbatthaṃ dīpetuṃ ‘‘suttantā’’ti vuttaṃ. Nanu ca atirekavisesaṭṭhā bhinnasabhāvā yato te yathākkamaṃ adhikavicittapariyāyehi bodhitā, tasmā ‘‘dhammātirekadhammavisesaṭṭhehī’’ti bahuvacanena bhavitabbaṃ, na ekavacanenāti anuyogaṃ manasi katvā āha ‘‘dvinnampi…pe… ekavacananiddeso kato’’ti.

By the passage beginning, 'By understanding the meaning of the words,' without explaining the meaning of just the terms beginning 'wholesome dhammas,' he states the connection with the investigation of the word 'Abhidhamma.' Although by way of suttas such as, 'Those dhammas taught by me through direct knowledge, that is, the four establishments of mindfulness...pe... two bhikkhus trained in the training had different opinions on the Abhidhamma,' the aids to enlightenment are called 'Abhidhamma,' and the word 'dhamma' is seen used for concentration and so on, he shows that here, however, it is the Dhamma of the scriptures that is intended, saying: 'The meaning is, the Pāli text that is superior to the Suttanta.' There, because of its not deviating from the Dhamma, the Suttanta too is called 'dhamma,' just like the Abhidhamma in particular. In passages such as, 'Ānanda, that Dhamma and Vinaya taught and laid down by me...' (DN 16.6.1) and elsewhere, since it is possible, in order to show what is to be excluded by the word 'abhi-,' 'Suttanta' was said. 'But since they have a surpassing and special meaning and a distinct nature, and since they are taught in sequence with superior and variegated methods, should it not be in the plural, as 'by reason of surpassing dhammas and special dhammas,' and not in the singular?' Keeping this objection in mind, he said: 'For both...pe... the specification in the singular was made.'

Payogameva nārahati upasagga-saddānaṃ dhātu-saddasseva purato payojanīyattā. Athāpi payujjeyya atimālādīsu ati-saddādayo viya. Evampi yathā ‘‘atimālā’’ti ettha samāsavasena anāvibhūtāya kamanakiriyāya visesako ati-saddo, na mālāya, evamidhāpi abhi-saddo na dhammavisesako yuttoti adhippāyo. Aññassapi hi upasaggassāti idaṃ ruḷhīvasena, atthe upasajjatīti vā upasaggassa anvatthasaññataṃ gahetvā vuttaṃ. Atichattādīsu hi ati-saddo idha upasaggoti adhippeto. Tattha yathā kalyāṇo pūjito vā puriso atipurisoti bhavati, evaṃ atirekavisesaṭṭhānampi kalyāṇapūjitatthabhāvasambhavato kalyāṇaṃ vā pūjitaṃ vā chattaṃ atichattanti saddanayo veditabbo. Kalyāṇapūjitabhāvā hi guṇavisesayogena icchitabbā. Guṇaviseso cesa yadidaṃ pamāṇātireko ca vicittarūpatā ca. Evañca pana katvā ‘‘akiriyāyapī’’ti vacanaṃ samatthitaṃ bhavati. Yathā ca atichattādīsu, evaṃ abhidhamma-saddepi daṭṭhabbaṃ. Anekatthā hi nipātāti. Tabbhāvadīpakattāti atirekavisesabhāvadīpakattā.

It is not right to use it at all, because prefixes should be used only before a root word. Or if it were used, it would be like the prefix 'ati-' and so on in words like 'atimālā.' Even so, just as in 'atimālā' the prefix 'ati-' qualifies the unmanifest action of going, by way of being a compound, and not the garland, so too here it is not proper for the prefix 'abhi-' to qualify 'dhamma.' This is the intention. The phrase 'of another prefix' is said based on convention, or taking the etymological sense of a prefix as 'it is attached to the meaning.' For in words like 'atichatta,' the word 'ati-' is intended here as a prefix. There, just as a good or honored person becomes an 'excellent person' (atipurisa), so the word-formation of 'atichatta' for a parasol that is excellent or honored should be understood, because of the possibility of the meaning of 'excellent and honored' even in the sense of 'surpassing and special.' For the states of being excellent and honored are desirable through connection with a special quality. And this special quality is this: exceeding the measure and having a variegated form. And having done so, the statement 'even when there is no action' is supported. And as in 'atichatta' and so on, so it should be seen also in the word 'abhidhamma.' For particles have many meanings. 'Because it illuminates that state' means: because it illuminates the state of being surpassing and special.

Ekato anāgatattāti idaṃ suttante ekato āgatānaṃ khandhāyatanādīnaṃ suttantabhājanīyassa diṭṭhattā ‘‘cha imāni, bhikkhave, indriyānī’’tiādinā (saṃ. ni. 5.495-496) cakkhādīnaṃ channaṃ itthindriyādīnaṃ tiṇṇaṃ sukhindriyādīnaṃ pañcannaṃ saddhindriyādīnaṃ pañcannaṃ anaññātaññassāmītindriyādīnañca tiṇṇaṃ vasena visuṃ visuṃ suttantabhāvena āgatattā ekasuttabhāvena anāgatānaṃ bāvīsatiyā indriyānaṃ suttantabhājanīyassa adiṭṭhattā ca vuttaṃ, na suttante ekato āgamanassa suttantabhājanīyassa kāraṇattā. Suttante ekato sabbena sabbañca anāgatā hi bhūmantaraparicchedapaṭisambhidā suttantabhājanīyavasena vibhattā dissanti, ekato āgatāni ca [Pg.14] sikkhāpadāni tathā na vibhattāni. Veramaṇīnaṃ viya pana sabhāvakiccādivibhāgavinimutto bāvīsatiyā indriyānaṃ samāno vibhajanappakāro natthi, yo suttantabhājanīyaṃ siyāti indriyavibhaṅge suttantabhājanīyaṃ natthīti yuttaṃ siyā.

The statement, 'Because they do not come together in one place,' is made because, while for the aggregates, bases, etc., which do come together in the Suttanta, a Sutta-style analysis is seen, the twenty-two faculties—which come separately as the six beginning with the eye faculty, the three beginning with the femininity faculty, the five beginning with the pleasure faculty, the five beginning with the faith faculty, and the three beginning with the faculty 'I shall know the unknown,' by way of the passage, 'Bhikkhus, there are these six faculties...' (SN 48.1)—do not come together as a single sutta, and thus a Sutta-style analysis for them is not seen. This is not said because their appearing together in the Suttanta is the cause for a Sutta-style analysis. For the discriminations of the sections on other planes, which do not come together in the Suttanta at all, are seen to be analyzed by way of a Sutta-style analysis, while the training rules, which do come together, are not so analyzed. But like the abstinences, there is no uniform method of analysis for the twenty-two faculties, free from division by nature, function, etc., that would constitute a Sutta-style analysis. Therefore, it would be proper to say that in the Analysis of the Faculties there is no Sutta-style analysis.

Yadipi paccayadhammavinimutto paccayabhāvo nāma natthi, yathā pana pavatto paccayadhammo paccayuppannadhammānaṃ paccayo hoti, so tassa pavattiākāraviseso hetuādibhāvo tato añño viya paccayadhammassa paccayabhāvoti vutto, so ca ‘‘avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā sambhavantī’’tiādīsu padhānabhāvena vutto. Tattha ca guṇībhūtā hetuhetuphalabhūtā avijjāsaṅkhārādayoti vuttaṃ ‘‘paccayabhāvo uddiṭṭho’’ti. Uddiṭṭhadhammānantiādi uddesena paricchinnānaṃyeva khandhādīnaṃ khandhavibhaṅgādīsu pañhapucchakanayo dassito, na ito aññathāti katvā vuttaṃ.

Although there is no such thing as a 'state of being a condition' apart from a conditioning phenomenon, still, as an occurring conditioning phenomenon is a condition for conditioned phenomena, that special mode of its occurrence—its being a cause, etc.—is called the 'state of being a condition' of the conditioning phenomenon, as if it were something other than it. And this is spoken of with prominence in passages such as, 'With ignorance as condition, volitional formations come to be.' There, by the words 'the state of being a condition is stated,' it is said that ignorance, volitional formations, etc.—which have become subordinate and are the cause and the fruit of the cause—are meant. The passage beginning 'Of the stated phenomena' is said because the method of questioning in the Analysis of Aggregates and so on is shown only for the aggregates and so on that have been defined by the summary, not otherwise.

Suttante saṅgītisuttantādike. Pañca sikkhāpadāni pāṇātipātā…pe… pamādaṭṭhānā veramaṇīti evaṃ uddiṭṭhāni. Añño pana veramaṇīnaṃ vibhajitabbappakāro natthīti idaṃ atītāniccādivibhāgo veramaṇīnaṃ khandhāyatanādīsu antogadhattā tabbaseneva vijānitabbo, tato pana añño abhidhammanayavidhuro veramaṇīnaṃ vibhajitabbappakāro natthīti adhippāyena vuttaṃ. Tathā ca paṭisambhidāmagge ‘‘cakkhuṃ aniccaṃ…pe… jarāmaraṇaṃ anicca’’nti anupadadhammasammasanakathāyaṃ na veramaṇiyo uddhaṭā.

In the Suttanta, in the Saṅgīti Sutta and so on. The five training rules are stated thus: 'abstinence from the destruction of life ... up to ... from intoxicants that are a basis for heedlessness.' As to the statement, 'But there is no other way of analyzing the abstinences,' this is said with the intention that since the analysis of the abstinences into past, impermanent, etc., is included within the aggregates, bases, and so on, it should be known by that means, and that apart from that there is no other way of analyzing the abstinences that is devoid of the Abhidhamma method. And so in the Paṭisambhidāmagga, in the discourse on the word-by-word contemplation of phenomena—'the eye is impermanent...pe... aging and death are impermanent'—the abstinences are not extracted.

Nanu dhammasaṅgaṇīdhātukathādīnampi vasena abhidhammapāḷiyā atirekavisesabhāvo dassetabboti? Saccametaṃ, so pana ekantaabhidhammanayanissito avuttopi siddhoti katvā na dassito. Etena vā nidassanena sopi sabbo netabbo. Abhidhammanayasāmaññena vā abhidhammabhājanīyapañhapucchakehi so vutto evāti na vuttoti daṭṭhabbo.

Should not the surpassing and special nature of the Abhidhamma Pāli also be shown by means of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, Dhātukathā, and so on? That is true, but this was not shown because it is considered to be established even unstated, since it is entirely based on the Abhidhamma method. Or by this example, all of it should be inferred. Or it should be seen that it was not stated because it is considered to have been stated already by the questions and answers of the Abhidhamma-style analysis, due to the generality of the Abhidhamma method.

Pañhavārāti pucchanavissajjanavasena pavattā pāḷinayā. Etthevāti dhammahadayavibhaṅge eva. Apekkhāvasikattā appamahantabhāvassa yato appamattikā mahādhātukathātanti dhammahadayavibhaṅgavacanavasena avasesā, taṃ dassanatthaṃ ‘‘dhammahadayavibhaṅge anāgantvā mahādhammahadaye āgatatantito’’ti vuttaṃ. Dhammahadaya…pe… āgatatantito rūpakaṇḍadhātuvibhaṅgādīsu anāgantvā mahādhātukathāyaṃ āgatatanti appamattikāvāti sambandho[Pg.15]. Atha dhātukathāya vitthārakathā mahādhātukathā dhammahadayavibhaṅge anāgantvā mahādhammahadaye āgatatantito dhātukathāyaṃ anāgantvā mahādhātukathāya āgatatanti appamattikāvāti yojetabbaṃ.

'The Question Section' means the Pāli methods that proceed by way of questions and answers. 'Herein' means in the Dhammahadayavibhaṅga itself. Because the state of being small or large is dependent on relation, since the Mahādhātukathā is of small measure, the rest are large. To show this, it is said, based on the statement in the Dhammahadayavibhaṅga: 'because it did not come in the Dhammahadayavibhaṅga but came in the Mahādhammahadaya text-lineage.' The connection is: 'The Dhammahadaya...pe... because it came in that text-lineage, not coming in the Rūpakaṇḍa, Dhātuvibhaṅga, etc., but coming in the Mahādhātukathā, it is of small measure.' Or, it should be construed thus: the Mahādhātukathā is the detailed discourse on the Dhātukathā; because it did not come in the Dhammahadayavibhaṅga but came in the Mahādhammahadaya text-lineage, and because it did not come in the Dhātukathā but came in the Mahādhātukathā, it is of small measure.

Upalabbhatīti anulomapaccanīyapañcakassa, nupalabbhatīti paccanīyānulomapañcakassa upalakkhaṇavasena vuttaṃ. Saccikaṭṭhaṃ nissayanti ‘‘sabbatthā’’tiādinā desādianāmasanena rūpādisattapaññāsadhammappabhedaṃ saccikaṭṭhameva nissayabhūtaṃ. Sabbatthāti etthāpi ‘‘upalabbhati nupalabbhatīti paṭiññāya gahitāya paṭikkhepaggahaṇattha’’nti ānetvā sambandhanīyaṃ, tathā sabbadā sabbesūti etthāpi. Yadi khandhāyatanādayo gahitā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ āgatanayena, atha pana vuttanti sambandho. Yo saccikaṭṭhoti saccikaṭṭhanissayaṃ upalakkheti. Etehīti etehi vacanehi. Saccikaṭṭhadesakālappadesehi kathaṃ saccikaṭṭhādīnaṃ padeso ekadesabhūto sabboti vuccati? Padesānaṃ puthuttā. ‘‘Sabbesu padesesū’’ti paccekaṃ bhedāmasanavasena cāyaṃ pañho pavattoti na purimehi avaseso.

“It is found” is said with regard to the fivefold method of direct and reverse order, and “It is not found” is said with regard to the fivefold method of reverse and direct order, by way of a distinguishing characteristic. Relying on the ultimate meaning: by the statement beginning with 'in all,' which is without reference to place and so on, the classification of the fifty-seven phenomena such as form, etc., is indicated, which has the ultimate meaning itself as its support. Here, in “in all,” it should be connected by bringing in “with the affirmation ‘it is found, it is not found,’ for the purpose of grasping the rejection.” Similarly, also in “always, in all cases.” If the aggregates, sense-bases, etc., are taken according to the method that comes in the commentary, then the connection is as stated. “That which is the ultimate meaning” indicates reliance on the ultimate meaning. “By these” means by these words. How, with regard to the place, time, and location of the ultimate meaning, is a portion of the ultimate meaning, etc., called the whole? Because of the distinctness of the portions. “In all portions”—this question proceeds by way of analyzing each individually, and it is not a remainder from the previous questions.

Upalabbhati…pe… micchāti ekanti upalabbhatīti paṭiññāggahaṇapaṭikkhepaggahaṇaniggaṇhanānaṃ anulomapaṭilomato paṭiññāṭhapananiggahapāpanāropanānañca vasena pavattā tanti paṭhamapañcakassa ekaṃ aṅgaṃ eko avayavoti attho. Evaṃ sesesupi netabbaṃ. Niggahassa suniggahabhāvaṃ icchato sakavādino ‘‘tvaṃ ce pana maññasi vattabbe kho puggalo nupalabbhatī’’tiādinā (kathā. 3) paṭiññāṭhapanena, tena ‘‘tava tattha hetāya paṭiññāya hevaṃ paṭijānanto hevaṃ niggahetabbe atha taṃ niggaṇhāma suniggahito ca hotī’’ti vatvā ‘‘hañci puggalo nupalabbhatī’’tiādinā (kathā. 2) paravādino attano paṭikammaṃ yathā sakavādī na nibbeṭheti, evaṃ karaṇaṃ paṭikammaveṭhanaṃ. Paravādino paṭikammassa duppaṭikammabhāvaṃ icchato sakavādino taṃnidassanena ‘‘eso ce dunniggahito heva’’nti paṭikammanidassanena, ‘‘vattabbe kho puggalo upalabbhati…pe… paramatthenāti (kathā. 1). No ca mayaṃ tayā tattha hetāya paṭiññāya hevaṃ paṭijānanto hevaṃ niggahetabbā. Atha amhe niggaṇhāsi dunniggahitā ca homā’’ti vatvā ‘‘hañci puggalo upalabbhatī’’tiādinā (kathā. 5) niggahassa dunniggahitabhāvadassanena [Pg.16] aniggahitabhāvakaraṇaṃ niggahanibbeṭhanaṃ. ‘‘Tena hi yaṃ niggaṇhāsi hañci puggalo upalabbhatī’’tiādiṃ vatvā ‘‘tena hi ye kate niggahe se niggahe dukkaṭe sukate paṭikamme sukatā paṭipādanā’’ti sakavādino niggahassa, aniggahabhāvāropanena attano paṭikammassa supaṭikammabhāvakaraṇena ca sakavādino niggahassa chedo vināsanaṃ puggalavādanisedhanavasena samuṭṭhitattā. Dhammatāya anulomanavasena uṭṭhahitvā tabbilomanavasena pavatto anulomapaccanīkapañcako vuttavipariyāyena dutiyapañcako veditabbo.

The sequence 'It is found... is wrong,' and 'It is certainly found' is one aspect, one part of the first fivefold set, a method that proceeds by way of accepting a claim, accepting a rejection, refutation in forward and reverse order, establishing a claim, bringing about a refutation, and making an imposition. The same method should be applied to the remaining cases. For the proponent who desires his refutation to be a good one, there is the 'wrapping of the counter-argument.' The proponent establishes his claim with statements like, 'But if you think, “The person is not found,”' etc., then says, 'By this very claim of yours, if you assert thus, you should be refuted thus. Therefore, we refute you—and you are well-refuted.' Then, with statements like, 'If the person is not found,' etc., he forestalls the opponent’s counter-argument. For the proponent who desires the opponent’s counter-argument to be a poor one, there is the 'unraveling of the refutation.' He demonstrates this by saying, 'This one is indeed poorly refuted,' showing the opponent’s counter-argument as flawed. Then, with statements like, 'It should be said, “The person is found…pe… ultimately,”' etc., and, 'But we, by this very claim of yours, if we assert thus, should not be refuted thus. Yet you refute us—and we are poorly refuted,' he renders the refutation ineffective by showing it to be poorly executed. Then, by saying, 'Therefore, what you refuted—“If the person is found,”' etc., and concluding, 'Therefore, in the refutation you made, the refutation is faulty, the counter-argument is well-made, and the presentation is well-executed,' the proponent’s refutation is cut off and destroyed. This arises from the denial of the personalist thesis. The fivefold set of forward and reverse, arising in accordance with the natural order but proceeding contrary to it, should be understood as the second fivefold set, the reverse of what has been stated.

Tadādhāroti te saccikaṭṭhaparamatthā rūpādayo ādhārā etassāti tadādhāro. Etena ‘‘rūpasmiṃ attā’’ti evaṃpakāro puggalavādo dassito hoti. Tesaṃ vā ādhārabhūtoti etena ‘‘attani rūpa’’nti evaṃpakāro. Aññatra vā tehīti tehi rūpādīhi vinā. Ādhārādheyyādibhāvena asaṃsaṭṭho visuṃyeva vinā. Tena sattādiguṇehi avokiṇṇo purisoti evamādiko. Taṃsāmibhūtatāya vā tadadhīnabhāvena ‘‘aññatra vā tehī’’ti vuttanti ‘‘rūpavā attā’’ti evaṃpakāro puggalavādo dassitoti veditabbo. Anaññoti etena ‘‘rūpaṃ attā’’ti evaṃpakāro. Ruppanādisabhāvo rūpakkhandhādīnaṃ visesalakkhaṇaṃ, sappaccayādisabhāvo sāmaññalakkhaṇaṃ. Rūpādito añño anañño vā aññatte ca tadādhārādibhūto upalabbhamāno āpajjatīti anuyuñjati sakavādī pakārantarassa asambhavato. Puggalavādī puggalassa rūpādīhi na aññattaṃ icchati rūpādi viya paccakkhato anumānato vā gāhayituṃ asakkuṇeyyattā tassa ca kārakavedakabhāvassa ayujjamānakattā. Nāpi anaññattaṃ ruppanasappaccayādisabhāvappasaṅgato puggalasseva abhāvappasaṅgato ca. Yatheva hi na vinā indhanena aggi paññāpiyati, na ca aññaṃ indhanato aggiṃ sakkā paṭijānituṃ, nāpi anaññaṃ. Yadi hi añño siyā, na uṇhaṃ indhanaṃ siyā. Atha anañño, niddahitabbaṃyeva dāhakaṃ siyā. Evameva na vinā rūpādīhi puggalo paññāpiyati, na ca tehi añño, nāpi anañño sassatucchedabhāvappasaṅgatoti laddhiyaṃ ṭhatvā puggalavādī ‘‘na hevā’’ti paṭikkhipati. Tattha aggindhanopamā tāva yadi lokavohārena vuttā, apaḷittaṃ kaṭṭhādiindhanaṃ niddahitabbañca, paḷittaṃ bhāsuruṇhaṃ aggi dāhakañca, tañca ojaṭṭhamakarūpaṃ purimapacchimakālikaṃ [Pg.17] aniccaṃ saṅkhataṃ paṭiccasamuppannaṃ, yadi evaṃ puggalo rūpādīhi añño anicco ca āpanno. Atha paramatthato, tasmiṃyeva kaṭṭhādike paḷitte yaṃ usumaṃ so aggi, taṃsahajātāni tīṇi bhūtāni indhanaṃ, evampi siddhaṃ lakkhaṇabhedato aggindhanānaṃ aññattanti aggi viya indhanato rūpādīhi añño puggalo anicco ca āpannoti byāhatāti veditabbaṃ.

‘Having that as its support’ (tadādhāra) means that those real and ultimate things, form and so on, are its support. By this is shown the personalist view that “the self is in form.” Alternatively, that they are its support indicates the view that “form is in the self.” Or, ‘apart from them’ means separate from form and so on, unmixed in the relationship of support and supported, existing entirely alone. By this is meant a person endowed with qualities such as being, etc. Alternatively, because the self is their master or dependent on them, the phrase “apart from them” is used, showing the personalist view that “the self possesses form.” This should be understood. ‘Not other’ (anañña) indicates the view that “form is the self.” The specific characteristic of the aggregate of form, etc., is its nature of being afflicted, while its general characteristic is its conditioned nature. The proponent questions the personalist, since no alternative explanation is possible, whether the self is found as other than form, not other, or as the support of form, etc. The personalist does not accept that the person is separate from form, etc., because the person cannot be grasped directly or by inference in the same way as form, etc., and because the notion of agency and experience would be untenable. Nor can they accept that the person is not separate, for that would entail attributing the nature of being afflicted and conditioned to the person, or even the implication that the person does not exist. Just as fire cannot be designated without fuel, nor can fire be claimed as something other than fuel, nor as non-other—for if it were other, the fuel would not be hot, and if non-other, that which is to be burnt would be the burner itself. Similarly, a person cannot be designated without form, etc., nor as other than them, nor as non-other, as this would lead to eternalism or annihilationism. Thus, the personalist, holding to this doctrine, rejects it by saying, “It is not so.” Here, first, the analogy of fire and fuel, if taken in terms of worldly convention, is as follows: unlit fuel like wood is what is to be burnt, while the lit, blazing, hot fire is the burner—and this, being form with nutriment as its eighth factor, existing at earlier and later times, is impermanent, conditioned, and dependently arisen. If so, the person, being other than form, etc., would also be impermanent. But in terms of ultimate reality, in the very burning wood, the heat is the fire, and the three coexisting great elements are the fuel. Thus, even in this case, it is established that fire and fuel are distinct by their characteristics. Thus the conclusion that the person, like fire from fuel, is other than form and therefore impermanent, is contradicted. This should be understood.

Puggalo upalabbhatīti paṭijānantassa pakārantarassa asambhavato vuttesu pakāresu ekena pakārena upalabbhamāno upalabbhatīti ‘‘āpanna’’nti vuttaṃ ‘‘paṭiññāya ekattāpanna’’nti. Ekattāpannattā eva appaṭikkhipitabbaṃ, puggale paṭisiddhe tadabhinivesopi ayāthāvato puggalavādino gahitākārasuññatāvibhāvanena sakaṭṭhānato cāvito paṭisedhito eva nāma hotīti vuttaṃ ‘‘puggaladiṭṭhiṃ paṭisedhento’’ti. Puggaloyeva vā tathā passitabbattā diṭṭhi. ‘‘Sāmī nivāsī kārako vedako nicco dhuvo’’ti abhinivesavisayabhūto hi parikappamattasiddho puggalo idha paṭikkhipīyati, ‘‘na cattārome, bhikkhave, puggalā’’tiādinā vuttavohārapuggaloti ananuyogo ākāsakusumassa rattanīlādibhāvavicāraṇā viyāti attho. Pubbe ‘‘nupalabbhatī’’ti paṭijānitvā visesacodanāya anāpajjanato puna ‘‘na hevā’’ti paṭikkhepo paṭiññāya āpajjanaleso. Vañjhāputtakassa dīgharassatānuyogassa viya sabbena sabbaṃ paramatthato anupalabbhamānassa puggalassa rūpādīhi aññānaññatānuyogassa ananuyogabhāvo eva idha aviparītattho.

For one who claims, 'A person is found,' since no other mode is possible among those mentioned, it is said that he has 'incurred' a position because the person is found in one of those modes; he has 'incurred oneness with his claim.' Because he has incurred oneness, it should not be rejected. When the person is refuted, that adherence to it is also shown to be incorrect. By revealing the emptiness of the characteristics grasped by the personalist, he is dislodged from his position and refuted; thus it is said, 'refuting the view of a person.' Or, it is called a 'view' because a person is to be seen in that way. The person who is the object of adherence—'owner, dweller, doer, experiencer, permanent, stable'—is established by mere imagination and is here rejected. The conventional person spoken of in such passages as, 'Monks, there are these four persons,' is not a proper subject for investigation, just like investigating the color, such as red or blue, of a sky-flower. Previously, having claimed 'is not found,' and then not incurring a refutation upon a specific charge, the subsequent rejection 'it is not so' is a slight concession from the claim. Like investigating the longness or shortness of a barren woman’s son, the very fact that the otherness or non-otherness of the person—who is entirely not found in the ultimate sense—is not a matter for investigation is the correct meaning here.

Yaṃkāraṇāti etena ‘‘yatonidāna’’nti ettha vibhattialopo daṭṭhabboti dasseti. Ajjhācarantīti abhibhavanti. Abhinandanādayo taṇhādīhi yathāsaṅkhyaṃ yojetabbā, taṇhādiṭṭhīhi vā abhinandanajjhosānāni, tīhipi abhivadanaṃ avisesena vā tīhipi tayo yojetabbā. Ettha ce natthi abhinanditabbantiādinā abhinandanādīnaṃ abhāvasūcanena phalūpacārato abhinandanādīnaṃ samucchedapaṭippassaddhibhūtaṃ maggaphalaṃ vuccati, taṃ paccāmasanañca esevāti idanti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘abhi…pe… phalaṃ vā’’ti.

By ‘for which reason’ (yaṃkāraṇā), it shows that here in the word ‘from which source’ (yatonidāna), an elision of a case ending should be understood. ‘They transgress’ (ajjhācaranti) means they overwhelm (abhibhavanti). ‘Delighting’ and so on should be connected respectively with craving and so on. Or, delighting and clinging should be connected with craving and views, and addressing with all three defilements; or, without distinction, the three actions may be connected with the three defilements. Here, by indicating the absence of delighting, etc., with the statement “if there is nothing to delight in,” the path and fruit, which are the cutting off and tranquillization of delighting and the like, are spoken of by way of a figurative reference to the fruit. And because this itself is the contemplation of that, it is said, “delighting…pe… or the fruit.”

‘‘Ñāyatīti jāna’’nti ukkaṃsagativijānanena niravasesaṃ ñeyyajātaṃ pariggayhatīti tabbisayāya jānātikiriyāya sabbaññutaññāṇameva karaṇaṃ bhavitumarahatīti [Pg.18] ‘‘sabbaññutaññāṇena jānitabbaṃ jānātī’’ti vuttaṃ. Atha vā pakaraṇavasena, ‘‘bhagavā’’ti saddantarasannidhānena vā ayaṃ attho vibhāvetabbo. Passaṃ passatīti etthāpi eseva nayo. Jānantāpi vipallāsavasena jānanti titthiyā paṭhamajjhānaarūpajjhānehi kāmarūpapariññāvādino. Jānanto jānātiyeva bhagavā anāgāmiarahattamaggehi taṃpariññāvāditāya. Ayañca attho dukkhakkhandhasuttavasena (ma. ni. 1.163, 175 ādayo) vibhāvetabbo. Paññācakkhunā uppannattā vā cakkhubhūto. Ñāṇabhūtotiādīsupi eseva nayo. Atha vā dibbacakkhuādikaṃ pañcavidhampi cakkhuṃ bhūto pattoti cakkhubhūto. Evaṃ ñāṇabhūtotiādīsupi daṭṭhabbaṃ. Sāmukkaṃsikāya dhammadesanāya sātisayo bhagavato vattuādibhāvoti vuttaṃ ‘‘catusaccadhamme vadatīti vattā’’tiādi. ‘‘Pavattā’’ti ettha pa-kārassa pakaṭṭhatthataṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘ciraṃ…pe… pavattā’’ti āha. Niddhāretvā netā ninnetā.

‘Because he knows, he is a knower’: through the excellence of his knowing, he comprehends all that is to be known without remainder. Therefore, for the activity of knowing in that domain, omniscient knowledge alone is fit to be the instrument. Thus it is said: ‘He knows what is to be known through omniscient knowledge.’ Alternatively, this meaning should be clarified by the context or by the proximity of the term ‘Blessed One.’ ‘Seeing, he sees’: here too, the same principle applies. Even those who know, such as adherents of other views who claim full understanding of the sense-sphere and form-sphere realms through the first jhāna or the formless attainments, do so with perversion. But the Blessed One truly knows, as he declares full understanding through the paths of the non-returner and of arahantship. This meaning should also be clarified by way of the Sutta on the Mass of Suffering (e.g., MN 13, MN 14). ‘He has become vision’ (cakkhubhūto), because he has arisen through the eye of wisdom. The same applies to ‘he has become knowledge’ (ñāṇabhūto) and so on. Alternatively, ‘he has become vision’ means he has attained the fivefold vision, including the divine eye. Similarly, ‘he has become knowledge’ and so on should be understood. Because of the Blessed One’s superiority as a speaker through his graduated discourse on the Dhamma, it is said: ‘Because he speaks the Dhamma of the four truths, he is the speaker,’ etc. In ‘the promulgator’ (pavattā), to show that the prefix pa- has the sense of pre-eminence, it is said: ‘for a long time…pe… promulgator.’ Having determined, he is a leader, one who guides.

‘‘Ekūnanavuti cittānī’’ti vuttā cittasahacariyāya yathā ‘‘kuntā pacarantī’’ti. Tesañca pāḷipadesānaṃ ekekaṃ padaṃ uddharitvāpi kiñcāpi kusalattikapadāniyeva uddharitvā cittuppādakaṇḍe cittāni vibhattāni, kusalattikena pana sabhāvadhammasaṅgahitānaṃ sesattikadukapadānaṃ asaṅgahitānaṃ abhāvato kusalattikapaduddhārena nayadassanabhūtena itarattikadukapadānipi uddhaṭānevāti vuttaṃ. Evañca katvā mātikāggahaṇaṃ samatthitaṃ bhavati.

‘The eighty-nine consciousnesses’ are mentioned by way of metonymy, just as when it is said, ‘The spears are advancing.’ And although the consciousnesses are classified in the Chapter on the Arising of Consciousness by extracting only the terms of the wholesome triad from those Pāli passages, it is said that by extracting the terms of the wholesome triad, which serves to show the method, the terms of the other triads and dyads are also extracted. This is because there are no terms of the remaining triads and dyads included among the states with an intrinsic nature that are not included by the wholesome triad. And by doing so, the taking up of the matrix becomes justified.

So ca dhammoti ‘‘tayo kusalahetū’’tiādīsu (dha. sa. 1060) purimāya purimāya pāḷiyā pacchimā pacchimā atthaniddesoti vuttaṃ. ‘‘Samānentī’’tisaddassa paṭapaṭāyati-saddassa viya saddanayo daṭṭhabboti dassetuṃ ‘‘samānaṃ karontī’’ti vuttaṃ. Samānakaraṇañca ūnapakkhipanena adhikāpanayanena vā hoti, idha ūnapakkhipanenāti dassetuṃ ‘‘pūrentī’’ti vuttaṃ. Samānetabbanti etthāpīti ‘‘paṭṭhānaṃ samānetabba’’nti ettha.

And that Dhamma: in such passages as ‘three wholesome roots,’ etc. (Dhs §1060), it is said that there is an explanation of the meaning of each latter Pāli phrase by each preceding Pāli phrase. To show that the etymology of the word samānentī (they equalize) should be seen like that of the onomatopoeic word paṭapaṭāyati (it crackles), it is said: ‘they make equal’ (samānaṃ karontī). And making equal occurs either by adding what is deficient or by removing what is excessive. Here, to show that it is done by adding what is deficient, it is said: ‘they fill’ (pūrentī). The word samānetabbaṃ (should be equalized) is also found here, in the phrase ‘the Paṭṭhāna should be equalized.’

Balavatā ñāṇavegena abhidhammapaccavekkhaṇavasappavattena. Balavato ñāṇavegassa sabbakilesakkhepanavasappavattassa. Gambhīrameva gambhīragataṃ diṭṭhigatantiādīsu viya. Niravasesenāti na kañci avasesetvā. Pañcakhīlarahitenāti pañcacetokhīlarahitena.

By the powerful impetus of knowledge that proceeds by way of reviewing the Abhidhamma. Of the powerful impetus of knowledge that proceeds by way of destroying all defilements. Gambhīragataṃ (gone to the deep) just means gambhīraṃ (deep), as in such expressions as diṭṭhigata (a view). Niravasesena (without remainder) means: not leaving anything behind. Pañcakhīlarahitena (free from the five stakes) means: free from the five mental barrennesses (pañcacetokhīla).

Ekādhikesu [Pg.19] aṭṭhasu kilesasatesūti ‘‘jātimado’’tiādinā ekakavasena āgatā tesattati, ‘‘kodho ca upanāho cā’’tiādinā dukavasena chattiṃsa, ‘‘tīṇi akusalamūlānī’’tiādinā tikavasena pañcādhikaṃ sataṃ, ‘‘cattāro āsavā’’tiādinā catukkavasena chappaññāsa, ‘‘pañcorambhāgiyāni saṃyojanānī’’tiādinā pañcakavasena pañcasattati, ‘‘cha vivādamūlānī’’tiādinā chakkavasena caturāsīti, ‘‘satta anusayā’’tiādinā sattakavasena ekūnapaññāsa, ‘‘aṭṭha kilesavatthūnī’’tiādinā aṭṭhakavasena catusaṭṭhi, ‘‘nava āghātavatthūnī’’tiādinā navakavasena ekāsīti, ‘‘dasa kilesavatthūnī’’tiādinā dasakavasena sattati, ‘‘ajjhattikassuppādāya aṭṭhārasa taṇhāvicaritānī’’tiādinā aṭṭhārasakavasena aṭṭhasatanti evaṃ ekādhikesu aṭṭhasu kilesasatesu. Sesā tenavutādhikaṃ chasataṃ kilesā. Te brahmajālasuttāgatāhi dvāsaṭṭhiyā diṭṭhīhi saha pañcapaññāsādhikaṃ sattasataṃ honti.

Regarding the eight hundred and one defilements: those that come singly, such as ‘pride of birth,’ etc., are seventy-three; those that come in pairs, such as ‘anger and resentment,’ etc., are thirty-six; those that come in triplets, such as ‘the three unwholesome roots,’ etc., are one hundred and five; those that come in quadruples, such as ‘the four taints,’ etc., are fifty-six; those that come in quintuples, such as ‘the five lower fetters,’ etc., are seventy-five; those that come in sextuples, such as ‘the six roots of dispute,’ etc., are eighty-four; those that come in septuples, such as ‘the seven underlying tendencies,’ etc., are forty-nine; those that come in octuples, such as ‘the eight bases of defilement,’ etc., are sixty-four; those that come in nonuples, such as ‘the nine grounds for resentment,’ etc., are eighty-one; those that come in decuples, such as ‘the ten bases of defilement,’ etc., are seventy; those that come in groups of eighteen, such as ‘the eighteen courses of craving arising internally,’ etc., are eight hundred. Thus in the eight hundred and one defilements. The remaining defilements are six hundred and ninety-three. These, together with the sixty-two views from the Brahmajāla Sutta, become seven hundred and fifty-five.

Atha vā cuddasekantākusalā, pañcavīsati kusalābyākatasādhāraṇā, cuddasa kusalattikasādhāraṇā, upacayādidvayaṃ ekaṃ katvā sattavīsati rūpāni cāti ime asīti dhammā, imesu bhāvadvaye ekaṃ ṭhapetvā ajjhattikā ekūnāsīti, bāhirā ekūnāsītīti sabbepi aṭṭhapaññāsādhikaṃ sataṃ honti. Imesu ekekasmiṃ dasannaṃ dasannaṃ kilesānaṃ uppajjanato asītiadhikaṃ diyaḍḍhakilesasahassaṃ honti.

Alternatively: fourteen are exclusively unwholesome; twenty-five are common to wholesome and indeterminate; fourteen are common to the wholesome triad; and twenty-seven material phenomena (counting the pair beginning with accumulation as one)—these are eighty phenomena. Among these, setting aside one of the two gender faculties, there are seventy-nine internal phenomena and seventy-nine external phenomena, making one hundred and fifty-eight in all. Since in regard to each of these the ten defilements arise, this makes one thousand five hundred and eighty defilements.

Atha vā tepaññāsa arūpadhammā, aṭṭhārasa rūparūpāni, ākāsadhātu, lakkhaṇarūpāni cāti pañcasattati dhammā ajjhattabahiddhābhedato paññāsasataṃ honti. Tattha ekekasmiṃ dasa dasa kilesātipi diyaḍḍhakilesasahassaṃ. Tathā ettha vedanaṃ sukhindriyādivasena pañcavidhaṃ katvā sattapaññāsa arūpadhammā, aṭṭhārasa rūparūpāni cāti pañcasattati vipassanūpagadhammā ajjhattabahiddhābhedato paññāsasataṃ honti. Etesu ekekasmiṃ dasa dasa kilesātipi diyaḍḍhakilesasahassaṃ.

Alternatively: the fifty-three immaterial phenomena, the eighteen produced material phenomena, the space element, and the characteristic material phenomena—these seventy-five phenomena, when distinguished as internal and external, become one hundred and fifty. Since ten defilements arise in regard to each of these, this amounts to one thousand five hundred defilements. Similarly, by taking feeling as fivefold by way of the faculty of pleasure, etc., there are fifty-seven immaterial phenomena and eighteen produced material phenomena. These seventy-five phenomena suitable for insight, when distinguished as internal and external, become one hundred and fifty. Since ten defilements arise in regard to each of these, this also amounts to one thousand five hundred defilements.

Aparo nayo – dvādasaakusalacittuppādesu paṭhame cha kilesā, dutiye satta, tatiye cha, catutthe satta, pañcame cha, chaṭṭhe satta, sattame cha, aṭṭhame satta, navame pañca, dasame cha, ekādasame pañca, dvādasame cattāroti sabbe dvāsattati, ime pañcadvārikā pañcasu rūpādīsu ārammaṇesu [Pg.20] ekekasmiṃ dvāsattatīti saṭṭhiadhikāni tīṇi satāni, manodvārikā pana chasu ārammaṇesu ekekasmiṃ dvāsattati dvāsattatīti katvā dvattiṃsādhikāni cattāri satāni, sabbānipi dvānavutiadhikāni sattasatāni, tāni ajjhattabahiddhāvisayatāya caturāsītiadhikaṃ diyaḍḍhakilesasahassaṃ hontīti veditabbaṃ.

Another method: in the twelve unwholesome arisings of consciousness, the first has six defilements, the second seven, the third six, the fourth seven, the fifth six, the sixth seven, the seventh six, the eighth seven, the ninth five, the tenth six, the eleventh five, and the twelfth four, making seventy-two in all. In five-door processes, these seventy-two defilements arise in regard to each of the five objects beginning with forms, making three hundred and sixty. In mind-door processes, these seventy-two defilements arise in regard to each of the six objects, making four hundred and thirty-two. Altogether, this is seven hundred and ninety-two. As these have internal and external objects, they become one thousand five hundred and eighty-four defilements. This should be understood.

Atha vā rūpārammaṇādīni pañca, avasesarūpavedanāsaññāsaṅkhāraviññāṇavasena pañca dhammārammaṇakā sesā cāti dasa, te ajjhattabahiddhābhedato vīsati, paññatti cāti ekavīsatiyā ārammaṇesu dvāsattati dvāsattati kilesāti dvādasādhikaṃ diyaḍḍhakilesasahassaṃ honti.

Alternatively: there are ten kinds of objects: the five beginning with the object of form, and five kinds of mental phenomena as objects, namely, the remaining material form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. These ten, distinguished as internal and external, become twenty. With concepts added, there are twenty-one objects. Since seventy-two defilements arise in regard to each of these twenty-one objects, this amounts to one thousand five hundred and twelve defilements.

Atha vā dvādasasu akusalacittuppādesu paṭhame vīsati dhammā, dutiye dvāvīsati, tatiye vīsati, catutthe dvāvīsati, pañcame ekūnavīsati, chaṭṭhe ekūnavīsati, sattame ekūnavīsati, aṭṭhame ekavīsati, navame ekūnavīsati, dasame ekavīsati, ekādasame soḷasa, dvādasame soḷasāti sabbe akusaladhammā chattiṃsādhikāni dve satāni, ime chasu ārammaṇesu paccekaṃ chattiṃ sādhikāni dve satāni, sabbe soḷasādhikāni cattāri satāni ca sahassaṃ hontīti evampi diyaḍḍhakilesasahassaṃ veditabbaṃ.

Alternatively: in the twelve unwholesome arisings of consciousness, the first has twenty states, the second twenty-two, the third twenty, the fourth twenty-two, the fifth nineteen, the sixth nineteen, the seventh nineteen, the eighth twenty-one, the ninth nineteen, the tenth twenty-one, the eleventh sixteen, and the twelfth sixteen. Thus, all the unwholesome states total two hundred and thirty-six. These, in regard to each of the six objects, are two hundred and thirty-six respectively. Altogether, they amount to one thousand four hundred and sixteen. In this way too, it should be understood that the defilements total one and a half thousand.

Itaresanti taṇhāvicaritānaṃ ‘‘atītāni chattiṃsā’’tiādinā atītādibhāvāmasanato. Khepaneti ariyamaggena samucchindane. ‘‘Diyaḍḍhakilesasahassaṃ khepetvā’’ti hi vuttaṃ. Paramatthato atītādīnaṃ maggena appahātabbattā ‘‘atītādibhāvāmasanā aggahaṇaṃ khepane’’ti vuttaṃ. Yaṃ pana paṭṭhāne ‘‘dassanena pahātabbo dhammo dassanena pahātabbassa dhammassa anantarapaccayena paccayo’’tiādinā tike, tathā dassanena pahātabbātītatikatike ‘‘atītā dassanena pahātabbā’’tiādinā ca tīsu [Pg.21] kālesu dassanādipahātabbavacanaṃ kataṃ, taṃ atītādīnaṃ saṃkiliṭṭhatāya apāyagamanīyatāya ca dassanapahātabbehi niratisayattā vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

Of the others: this is due to the reflection on the past, etc., state of the courses of craving, as in the passage beginning, ‘The thirty-six past….’ Khepane (in the eradication) means: in the eradication by the noble path. For it is said, ‘having eradicated one and a half thousand defilements.’ Since in the ultimate sense past states, etc., are not to be abandoned by the path, it is said: ‘The reflection on the past, etc., state is not included in “eradication.”’ As to the statement made in the Paṭṭhāna for the three times—in the triad beginning, ‘A state to be abandoned by vision is a condition for a state to be abandoned by vision by way of an immediate condition,’ and similarly in the past-triad of the triad of states to be abandoned by vision, beginning, ‘Past states to be abandoned by vision…’—this should be understood as having been said because past states, etc., are on a par with present states to be abandoned by vision, on account of their defiled nature and their leading to the plane of misery.

Na bhāsitatthavacananti idaṃ ‘‘hitapariyāyavacana’’nti etena nivattitassa ekadesakathanaṃ. Yathā hi ayaṃ attha-saddo na bhāsitatthavacanaṃ, evaṃ visayappayojanādivacanampi na hotīti. Yathāvuttassāti hitapariyāyassa. ‘‘Na haññadatthatthipasaṃsalābhā’’ti padassa niddese ‘‘attattho vā parattho vā’’tiādinā (mahāni. 69) kiñcāpi suttanirapekkhaṃ attatthādayo vuttā suttatthabhāvena aniddiṭṭhattā, tesu pana ekopi atthappabhedo suttena dīpetabbataṃ nātikkamatīti āha ‘‘te suttaṃ sūcetī’’ti. Imasmiṃ vikappe attha-saddo bhāsitatthavacanampi hoti. Purimakā hi pañca atthappabhedā hitapariyāyā, tato pare cha bhāsitatthappabhedā, pacchimakā pana ubhayasabhāvā. Tattha duradhigamatāya vibhāvane aladdhagādho gambhīro, na vivaṭo guḷho, mūludakādayo viya paṃsunā akkharasannivesādinā tirohito paṭicchanno, niddhāretvā ñāpetabbo neyyo, yathārutavaseneva veditabbo nīto. Anavajjanikkilesavodānā pariyāyavasena vuttā, kusalavipākakiriyadhammavasena vā. Paramattho nibbānaṃ, aviparītasabhāvo eva vā. Sātisayaṃ pakāsitāni tapparabhāvena pakāsitattā. ‘‘Ettakaṃ tassa bhagavato suttāgataṃ suttapariyāpanna’’nti (pāci. 1242), ‘‘sakavāde pañcasuttasatānī’’ti (dha. sa. aṭṭha. nidānakathā; kathā. aṭṭha. nidānakathā) ca evamādīsu sutta-saddo upacaritoti adhippāyenāha ‘‘idameva atthānaṃ sūcanato suttanti vutta’’nti. Ekantahitapaṭilābhasaṃvattanikā suttantadesanāti idampi vineyyānaṃ hitasampāpane suttantadesanāya tapparabhāvaṃyeva sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tapparabhāvo ca vineyyajjhāsayānulomato daṭṭhabbo, tathā attatthādippakāsanapadhānatāpi. Itarehīti vinayābhidhammehi.

‘Not an expression of the spoken meaning’: this is a partial statement of what is excluded by the term ‘expression of a beneficial discourse.’ For just as this word ‘attha’ is not an expression of the spoken meaning, so too it is not an expression of the object, purpose, etc. ‘Of what was stated,’ that is, of the beneficial discourse. In the exposition of the phrase ‘one should not strike for the sake of gain, praise, or profit,’ although ‘one's own welfare or the welfare of others,’ etc. (Mahāni. 69), are stated without reference to a sutta, since they are not designated as having the nature of a sutta's meaning, yet not a single one of these types of meaning goes beyond what is to be shown by a sutta. Thus he says: ‘They indicate the sutta.’ In this alternative, the word ‘attha’ is also an expression of the spoken meaning. For the first five types of meaning are beneficial discourses, the next six are types of spoken meaning, and the last ones have a dual nature. Therein, in the explanation of what is difficult to fathom: ‘profound’ (gambhīro) means one has not found a footing; ‘hidden’ (guḷho) means not revealed; ‘concealed’ (paṭicchanno) means obscured by the arrangement of letters, etc., like roots, water, etc., by dust; ‘inferable’ (neyyo) means what must be made known after determining it; ‘explicit’ (nīto) means what is to be understood just as it is heard. The faultless, the stainless, and the purified are stated by way of figurative expression, or by way of wholesome, resultant, and functional states. The ultimate meaning is Nibbāna, or just the undeviated nature. They are excellently explained because they are explained with dependence on that. In such cases as ‘This much of the Blessed One's teaching has come down in the suttas, is included in the suttas’ (Pāc. 1242), and ‘five hundred suttas in his own doctrine’ (Dhs-A. Nidānakathā; Kathā-A. Nidānakathā), the word ‘sutta’ is used metaphorically. With this in mind, it is said: ‘This itself is called a “sutta” because it indicates the meanings.’ That ‘the Suttanta teaching is exclusively conducive to the attainment of welfare’—this too is said in reference to the Suttanta teaching's very dependence on bringing about the welfare of trainees. And this dependence should be seen as being in accordance with the dispositions of the trainees, as is also the pre-eminence of explaining one's own welfare, etc. By ‘the others’ is meant the Vinaya and the Abhidhamma.

Rattiādīsūti rattirājavinayesu visayabhūtesu. Nanu ca ‘‘abhirattī’’ti avuttattā rattiggahaṇaṃ na kattabbaṃ, ‘‘abhiññātā abhilakkhitā’’ti ca ñāṇalakkhaṇakiriyāvisesako abhi-saddoti? Na, ‘‘abhiññātā abhilakkhitā’’ti abhi-saddavisiṭṭhānaṃ ñātalakkhitasaddānaṃ rattisaddena [Pg.22] samānādhikaraṇatāya rattivisayattā. Ettha ca vācakasaddasannidhāne nipātānaṃ tadatthajotakamattattā lakkhitasaddatthajotako abhi-saddo lakkhaṇe vattatīti vutto. Abhilakkhitasaddapariyāyo ca abhiññātasaddoti daṭṭhabbo, abhivinayasaddassa pana abhipurisassa viya samāsasiddhi daṭṭhabbā. Anekatthā hi nipātā, anekatthabhedo ca saddānaṃ payogavisayoti.

‘Regarding ratti, etc.’: this means when nights, kings, and discipline are the objects. Now, since ‘abhiratti’ is not said, should not the taking of ‘ratti’ be omitted? And is not the word abhi- a qualifier of the action of knowing and marking, as in ‘abhiññātā’ (fully known) and ‘abhilakkhitā’ (well-marked)? No, because the words ñāta and lakkhita, when distinguished by the word abhi- as in ‘abhiññātā’ and ‘abhilakkhitā,’ have the same grammatical case as the word ratti since their object is the night. And here, since particles in the presence of expressive words merely illuminate their meaning, the word abhi-, which illuminates the meaning of the word lakkhita, is said to occur in the sense of ‘marking.’ And it should be seen that the word abhiññāta is a synonym for the word abhilakkhita, while the formation of the compound abhivinaya should be seen to be like that of abhipurisa. For particles have many meanings, and the variety of meanings of words is a matter of usage.

Kiñcāpi desanādayo desetabbādinirapekkhā na santi, āṇādayo pana visesato desakādiadhīnāti taṃtaṃvisesayogavasena tesaṃ bhedo vutto. Yathā hi āṇāvidhānaṃ visesato āṇārahādhīnaṃ tattha kosallayogato, evaṃ vohāraparamatthavidhānāni ca vidhāyakādhīnānīti āṇādividhino desakāyattatā vuttā. Aparādhajjhāsayānurūpaṃ viya dhammānurūpampi sāsanaṃ visesato tathāvinetabbapuggalāpekkhanti vuttaṃ ‘‘sāsitabba…pe… tabbabhāvenā’’ti. Saṃvarāsaṃvaranāmarūpānaṃ viya viniveṭhetabbāya diṭṭhiyāpi kathanaṃ sati vācāvatthusmiṃ, nāsatīti visesato tadadhīnanti āha ‘‘kathetabbassa…pe… kathā’’ti. Upārambhādīti upārambhanissaraṇadhammakosarakkhaṇāni. Pariyāpuṇanādīti pariyāpuṇanasuppaṭipattiduppaṭipattiyo.

Although teachings, etc., do not exist independently of what is to be taught, etc., commands, etc., are especially dependent on the one who teaches, etc. Thus their distinction is stated according to their connection with specific particulars. For just as the issuing of a command is especially dependent on one who is worthy of commanding, because of skill therein, so too the establishments of conventional and ultimate truth are dependent on the one who establishes them. Thus the dependence of the issuing of commands, etc., on the speaker is stated. Just as the teaching is in accordance with the offense and disposition, so it is in accordance with the Dhamma, being especially dependent on the person to be trained in such a way. This is stated as: ‘to be instructed … by the nature of what is to be instructed.’ Just as with restraint and non-restraint regarding name-and-form, so too the discussion of a view that is to be disentangled exists when there is a topic of speech, but not when there is not. Thus it is especially dependent on that. It is said: ‘of what is to be discussed … the discussion.’ ‘Reproach, etc.’ means reproach, escape, the treasury of the Dhamma, and protection. ‘Mastery, etc.’ means mastery, good practice, and bad practice.

Tantisamudāyo avayavatantiyā ādhāro yathā ‘‘rukkhe sākhā’’ti. Na codetabbametaṃ samukhena, visayavisayimukhena vā vinayādīnaṃyeva gambhīrabhāvassa vuttattāti adhippāyo. Dhammo hi vinayādayo, tesañca visayo attho, dhammatthavisayā ca desanāpaṭivedhāti. ‘‘Paṭivedhassā’’tiādinā dhammatthānaṃ duppaṭividdhattā desanāya uppādetuṃ asakkuṇeyyattā paṭivedhassa uppādetuñca paṭivijjhituñca asakkuṇeyyattā dukkhogāhataṃ dasseti.

The collection of texts is the support for the individual texts, just as in ‘the branches are on the tree.’ This should not be censured directly or by way of subject and object, because the profundity of the Vinaya, etc., has already been stated—this is the intention. For the Dhamma is the Vinaya, etc.; their object is the meaning; and teaching and penetration have the Dhamma and the meaning as their object. With ‘of penetration,’ etc., he shows the difficulty of fathoming, which is due to the difficulty of penetrating the Dhamma and its meaning, the inability of the teaching to produce penetration, and the inability for penetration to be produced and to penetrate.

Dhammānurūpaṃ yathādhammanti ca attho yujjati. Desanāpi hi paṭivedho viya aviparītaṃ savisayavibhāvanato dhammānurūpaṃ pavattati yato ‘‘aviparītābhilāpo’’ti vuccati. Dhammaniruttiṃ dassetīti etena desanāsaddasabhāvāti dīpeti. Tathā hi niruttipaṭisambhidāya parittārammaṇādibhāvo pāḷiyaṃ vutto, aṭṭhakathāyañca ‘‘taṃtaṃsabhāvaniruttisaddaṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā’’tiādinā saddārammaṇatā. Imassa atthassa ayaṃ saddo vācakoti vacanavacanīyaṃ [Pg.23] vavatthapetvā taṃtaṃvacanīyavibhāvanavasena pavattito hi saddo desanāti. Nanu ca ‘‘dhammo tantī’’ti imasmiṃ pakkhe dhammassapi saddasabhāvattā dhammadesanānaṃ viseso na siyāti? Na, tesaṃ tesaṃ atthānaṃ bodhakabhāvena ñāto uggahitādivasena ca pubbe pavattito saddappabandho dhammo, pacchā paresaṃ avabodhanatthaṃ pavattito tadatthappakāsanako saddo desanāti. Atha vā yathāvuttasaddasamuṭṭhāpako cittuppādo desanā musāvādādayo viya. Vacanassa pavattananti ca yathāvuttacittuppādamāha. So hi vacanaṃ pavatteti, taṃ vā etena pavattīyatīti pavattanaṃ. Desīyati attho etenāti desanā. Pakārehi ñāpīyati etena, pakārato ñāpetīti vā paññattīti vuccatīti. Tenevāha ‘‘adhippāyo’’tiādi. Abhisameti, abhisamīyati vā etenāti abhisamayoti evampi abhisamayattho sambhavati. Abhisametabbato pana abhisamayoti dutiyavikappe paṭivedhoyevāti.

The meaning is also fitting as ‘in accordance with the Dhamma’ and ‘according to the Dhamma.’ For the teaching, like penetration, proceeds in accordance with the Dhamma by clarifying its own object without distortion, for which reason it is called ‘undistorted speech.’ ‘It shows the expression of the Dhamma’: by this he clarifies that the teaching has the nature of sound. For so it is that in the analytical knowledge of language, its having a limited object, etc., is stated in the Pāḷi, and in the commentary its having sound as its object is stated with the words, ‘having made the sound of the expression of each particular nature its object,’ etc. Having determined the expression and the expressed as ‘this sound is the designator of this meaning,’ the sound that proceeds by way of clarifying each particular thing to be expressed is the teaching. Now, in the alternative ‘the Dhamma is the text,’ since the Dhamma too has the nature of sound, would there be no distinction between the Dhamma and the teaching? No. The Dhamma is the stream of sound previously produced, known as that which makes those various meanings understood, by way of learning, etc. The teaching is the sound that clarifies that meaning, subsequently produced for the purpose of making others understand. Or else, the teaching is the mental state that produces the aforesaid sound, like false speech, etc. And ‘the production of speech’ refers to the aforesaid mental state. For it produces speech, or speech is produced by it; thus it is ‘production.’ The meaning is taught by this; hence, ‘teaching’ (desanā). It is made known by means of modes by this, or it makes known by way of a mode; thus it is called ‘designation’ (paññatti). Therefore he says ‘intention,’ etc. ‘One comprehends by this,’ or ‘it is comprehended by this’; thus ‘comprehension’ (abhisamayo). In this way too the meaning of comprehension is possible. But because it is what is to be comprehended, ‘comprehension’ in the second alternative is just penetration.

Vuttanayena veditabbāti avijjāsaṅkhārādīnaṃ dhammatthānaṃ duppaṭivijjhatāya dukkhogāhatā, tesaṃ paññāpanassa dukkarabhāvato taṃdesanāya paṭivedhanasaṅkhātassa paṭivedhassa uppādanavisayikaraṇānaṃ asakkuṇeyyatāya dukkhogāhatā veditabbā.

It should be understood in the manner stated: the difficulty of fathoming is due to the difficulty of penetrating the meanings of the phenomena, namely, ignorance, formations, etc.; and, because of the difficulty of making these known, the difficulty of fathoming should be understood as the inability to bring into the sphere of arising the penetration of that teaching, which is itself designated as penetration.

Kāraṇe phalavohārena te dhammā dukkhāya saṃvattantīti vuttanti āha ‘‘upārambha…pe… hetubhāvenā’’ti. Aññaṃ atthanti upārambhaṃ nissaraṇañca. Niṭṭhāpetvāti kathanavasena pariyosāpetvā. Tassa ‘‘āraddha’’nti etena sambandho. Uddānasaṅgahādibhedo saṅgītoti pāṭho yutto, ‘‘saṅgītiyā’’ti pana likhanti. Purimaṃ vā saṅgītiyāti bhāvena bhāvalakkhaṇe bhummaṃ, pacchimaṃ adhikaraṇe. Piṭakādīti piṭakanikāyaṅgadhammakkhandhāni.

Because it is said, ‘By a conventional usage of the effect for the cause, those states lead to suffering,’ he says: ‘Reproach … because of being a cause.’ ‘Another meaning’: this means reproach and escape. ‘Having concluded’: this means having brought to an end by way of recitation. Its connection is with ‘begun.’ The reading saṅgīti (the recital), which is divided into summaries, collections, etc., is correct, but some write saṅgītiyā. The former interpretation of this variant is as a locative absolute expressing a state, while the latter is as a locative of place. ‘Piṭaka, etc.’ means the Piṭakas, Nikāyas, Aṅgas, and Dhammakkhandhas.

Tattha aṅgesu suttaṅgameva na sambhavati ‘‘sagāthakaṃ suttaṃ geyyaṃ, niggāthakaṃ suttaṃ veyyākaraṇa’’nti (dī. ni. aṭṭha. 1.paṭhamamahāsaṅgītikathā; pārā. aṭṭha. 1.paṭhamamahāsaṅgītikathā; dha. sa. aṭṭha. nidānakathā) vuttattā, maṅgalasuttādīnañca suttaṅgasaṅgaho na siyā gāthābhāvato dhammapadādīnaṃ viya, geyyaṅgasaṅgaho vā siyā sagāthakattā sagāthāvaggassa viya, tathā ubhatovibhaṅgādīsu sagāthakapadesānanti? Vuccate –

Therein, among the limbs of the teaching, the Sutta-limb itself is not possible, because it is said: ‘A sutta with verses is Geyya; a sutta without verses is Veyyākaraṇa’ (D-A 1…; Vin-A 1…; Dhs-A…). And the inclusion of the Maṅgalasutta, etc., in the Sutta-limb would not be possible due to the presence of verses, like the Dhammapada, etc.; or their inclusion in the Geyya-limb would be possible because they contain verses, like the Sagāthāvagga; and likewise for the sections with verses in the two Vibhaṅgas, etc.? It is said:

Suttanti [Pg.24] sāmaññavidhi, visesavidhayo pare;

Sanimittā niruḷhattā, sahatāññena nāññato. (netti. aṭṭha. saṅgahavāravaṇṇanā);

The Sutta is the general rule, the others are specific rules; with a sign, from being established, together with another, not separately. (Netti. Aṭṭha. Saṅgahavāravaṇṇanā)

Sabbassapi hi buddhavacanassa suttanti ayaṃ sāmaññavidhi. Tenevāha āyasmā mahākaccāyano nettiyaṃ ‘‘navavidhasuttantapariyeṭṭhī’’ti (netti. saṅgahavāra). ‘‘Ettakaṃ tassa bhagavato suttāgataṃ suttapariyāpannaṃ (pāci. 1242) sakavāde pañca suttasatānī’’ti (dha. sa. aṭṭha. nidānakathā; kathā. aṭṭha. nidānakathā) evamādi ca etassa atthassa sādhakaṃ, tadekadesesu pana geyyādayo visesavidhayo tena tena nimittena patiṭṭhitattā. Tathā hi geyyassa sagāthakattaṃ tabbhāvanimittaṃ. Lokepi hi sasilokaṃ sagāthakaṃ vā cuṇṇiyaganthaṃ ‘‘geyya’’nti vadanti. Gāthāvirahe pana sati pucchaṃ katvā vissajjanabhāvo veyyākaraṇassa. Pucchāvissajjanañhi byākaraṇanti vuccati. Byākaraṇameva veyyākaraṇanti.

For indeed, the term 'sutta' is the general designation for all the Buddha's teaching. Thus the Venerable Mahākaccāyana stated in the Nettippakaraṇa: 'The ninefold investigation of the Suttanta.' And such statements as: 'This much of the Blessed One's teaching has come down in the suttas, is included in the suttas: in his own recitation, five hundred suttas,' are proof of this meaning. However, in some parts of it, the specific designations such as geyya are established because of this or that characteristic. For instance, being accompanied by verses is the characteristic of geyya. In the world, too, a prose work accompanied by stanzas or verses is called 'geyya.' But when there is an absence of verses, the state of asking a question and giving an answer is veyyākaraṇa. For questioning and answering is called 'byākaraṇa,' and byākaraṇa itself is veyyākaraṇa.

Evaṃ sante sagāthakānampi pañhavissajjanavasena pavattānaṃ veyyākaraṇabhāvo āpajjatīti? Nāpajjati veyyākaraṇādisaññānaṃ anokāsabhāvato ‘‘gāthāvirahe pana satī’’ti visesitattā ca. Tathā hi dhammapadādīsu kevalaṃ gāthābandhesu sagāthakattepi somanassañāṇamayikagāthāpaṭisaṃyuttesu ‘‘vuttañheta’’ntiādivacanasambandhesu abbhutadhammapaṭisaṃyuttesu ca suttavisesesu yathākkamaṃ gāthāudānaitivuttakaabbhutadhammasaññā patiṭṭhitā, tathā satipi gāthābandhabhāve bhagavato atītāsu jātīsu cariyānubhāvappakāsakesu jātakasaññā. Satipi pañhavissajjanabhāve sagāthakatte ca kesuci suttantesu vedassa labhāpanato vedallasaññā patiṭṭhitāti evaṃ tena tena sagāthakattādinā nimittena tesu tesu suttavisesesu geyyādisaññā patiṭṭhitāti visesavidhayo suttaṅgato pare geyyaṅgādayo. Yaṃ panettha geyyaṅgādinimittarahitaṃ, taṃ suttaṅgaṃ visesasaññāparihārena sāmaññasaññāya pavattanatoti.

If that is so, does it follow that the designation of 'explanation' (veyyākaraṇa) also applies to those texts with verses that proceed by way of question and answer? It does not, because there is no scope for designations such as veyyākaraṇa, and also because it has been specified by the phrase 'but when there is an absence of verses.' For just as in the Dhammapada and other works consisting only of verses, and in the special suttas that, though containing verses, are connected with verses of joy and knowledge, or are connected with sayings such as 'This was said…,' or are connected with marvelous phenomena, the designations Gāthā, Udāna, Itivuttaka, and Abbhutadhamma are respectively established; and just as, though it is a composition in verse, the designation Jātaka is established for those texts that declare the power of the Blessed One's conduct in past births; and just as, though there is question-and-answer and the presence of verses, in some suttantas the designation Vedalla is established because it brings about the attainment of joy and wisdom (veda); so too, it is because of this or that characteristic, such as being accompanied by verses, that in those particular suttas the designations such as Geyya are established. These specific designations—Geyya and so on—are other than the Sutta division. Whatever here is devoid of the characteristics of Geyya and so on, that is the Sutta division, which proceeds by a general designation due to the exclusion of a specific designation.

Nanu ca sagāthakaṃ suttaṃ geyyaṃ, niggāthakaṃ suttaṃ veyyākaraṇanti suttaṅgaṃ na sambhavatīti codanā tadavatthāti? Na, sodhitattā. Sodhitañhi pubbe gāthāvirahe sati pucchāvissajjanabhāvo veyyākaraṇabhāvassa nimittanti. Yañca vuttaṃ ‘‘gāthābhāvato maṅgalasuttādīnaṃ suttaṅgasaṅgaho na siyā’’ti, taṃ [Pg.25] na, niruḷhattā. Niruḷho hi maṅgalasuttādīsu suttabhāvo. Na hi tāni dhammapadabuddhavaṃsādayo viya gāthābhāvena paññātāni, kintu suttabhāveneva. Teneva hi aṭṭhakathāyaṃ suttanāmakanti nāmaggahaṇaṃ kataṃ. Yaṃ pana vuttaṃ ‘‘sagāthakattā geyyaṅgasaṅgaho vā siyā’’ti, tadapi natthi. Yasmā sahatāññena. Saha gāthāhīti sagāthakaṃ, sahabhāvo ca nāma attato aññena hoti, na ca maṅgalasuttādīsu gāthāvinimutto koci suttappadeso atthi, yo ‘‘saha gāthāhī’’ti vucceyya, na ca samudāyo nāma koci atthi. Yadapi vuttaṃ ‘‘ubhatovibhaṅgādīsu sagāthakappadesānaṃ geyyaṅgasaṅgaho siyā’’ti, tadapi na, aññato. Aññā eva hi tā gāthā jātakādipariyāpannattā. Ato na tāhi ubhatovibhaṅgādīnaṃ geyyaṅgabhāvoti evaṃ suttādīnaṃ aṅgānaṃ aññamaññasaṅkarābhāvo veditabbo.

Is not the charge still standing that since a sutta with verses is geyya and a sutta without verses is veyyākaraṇa, the Sutta division is not possible? No, because this has been cleared up. For it was cleared up before that the characteristic of veyyākaraṇa is the state of question-and-answer when there is an absence of verses. As for the statement, 'Because they consist of verses, the Maṅgala Sutta and others would not be included in the Sutta division,' that is not so, because of their conventional usage. For in the Maṅgala Sutta and others, their nature as suttas is well-established. They are not known by their being composed of verses, like the Dhammapada, Buddhavaṃsa, etc., but by their very nature as suttas. That is why in the commentary the name 'sutta' is explicitly mentioned. As for the statement, 'Because they are accompanied by verses, they might be included in the Geyya division,' that too is not the case. Because 'with' implies another. 'Sagāthaka' means 'with verses,' and the state of being 'with' occurs with something other than oneself. But in the Maṅgala Sutta and others, there is no portion of the sutta apart from the verses that could be said to be 'with verses,' nor is there any such composite. As for the statement, 'In the Ubhatovibhaṅga and so on, the portions with verses might be included in the Geyya division,' that too is not so, because they are other. For those verses are indeed other, as they are included in the Jātakas, etc. Therefore, because of them, the Ubhatovibhaṅga and so on do not have the nature of geyya. Thus it should be understood that there is no intermingling of the divisions such as Sutta.

Jinasāsanaṃ abhidhammo. Paṭividdhaṭṭhānaṃ paṭivedhabhūmi paṭivedhāvatthā, paṭivedhahetu vā. ‘‘So evaṃ pajānāmi sammādiṭṭhipaccayāpi vedayita’’nti (saṃ. ni. 5.11-12) vuttaṃ. Pāḷiyaṃ pana ‘‘so evaṃ pajānāmi micchādiṭṭhipaccayāpi vedayitaṃ. Sammādiṭṭhipaccayāpi vedayita’’nti āgataṃ (saṃ. ni. 5.11-12). Paccayādīhīti paccayasabhāvavūpasamatadupāyādīhi. Paravādicodanaṃ patvāti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ āgataṃ paravādicodanaṃ patvā. Adhiga…pe… rūpenāti adhigantabbo ca so desetabbo cāti adhigantabbadesetabbo, so eva dhammo, tadanurūpena. Ettha ca yathādhammasāsanattā yathādhigatadhammadesanābhāvato abhidhammassa abhisambodhi adhigamanidānaṃ. Desakālādiyeva desanānidānaṃ. Yaṃ pana aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘desanānidānaṃ yāva dhammacakkappavattanā’’ti vuttaṃ, taṃ abhidhammadesanāvisesena dhammacakkappavattananti katvā vuttaṃ. Dhammacakkappavattanasutte vā desitehi ariyasaccehi sakalābhidhammapadatthasaṅgahato, paramatthato abhidhammabhūtānaṃ vā sammādiṭṭhiādīnaṃ tattha desitattā vuttaṃ. Tattakānaṃyeva desanāruḷhatāya aḍḍhachakkesu jātakasatesu paripācanaṃ vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Na hi ettakāsu eva jātīsu puññādisambhārasambharaṇaṃ, kiṃ pana kāraṇaṃ ettakā eva jātiyo desitāti? Tadaññesaṃ aṭṭhuppattiyā abhāvato.

The teaching of the Victor is the Abhidhamma. The place of penetration, the ground of penetration, the state of penetration, or the cause of penetration. It is said: 'Thus I understand: "Feeling also arises from right view as condition."' But in the Pāḷi text it comes as: 'Thus I understand: "Feeling also arises from wrong view as condition; feeling also arises from right view as condition."' 'By conditions, etc.' means by the nature of conditions, their appeasement, the means to it, and so on. 'Having encountered the refutation of other debaters' refers to the passage with the same wording in the commentary. 'To be attained…in a way' means: it is to be attained and it is to be taught, thus 'to be attained and taught'; that very Dhamma, in a way conforming to it. And here, because the teaching is in accordance with the Dhamma, and because the Dhamma is taught as it has been attained, the full enlightenment of the Abhidhamma has attainment as its source. Time, place, etc., are the source of the teaching. As for what is said in the commentary, 'The source of the teaching extends up to the turning of the Wheel of Dhamma,' this was said by treating the turning of the Wheel of Dhamma as a special teaching of the Abhidhamma. Or it was said because the Noble Truths taught in the Discourse on the Turning of the Wheel of Dhamma encompass the entire meaning of the Abhidhamma topics, or because right view and so on, which are ultimately the Abhidhamma, were taught there. It should be understood that the maturation is mentioned in the five and a half hundred Jātakas because the teaching was established for just those beings. For the accumulation of the stores of merit and so on did not occur in only so many births. Then why were only so many births taught? Because for the others, there was no occasion for the story.

Sumedhakathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Story of Sumedha

Uppanne [Pg.26] buddhe tato attānaṃ seyyato vā sadisato vā dahanto jhānābhiññāhi parihāyati, na tathā sumedhapaṇḍito aṭṭhāsīti tassa jhānābhiññāhi aparihāni daṭṭhabbā. Tenevāha ‘‘tāpasehi asamo’’ti. Yathā nibbānaṃ, aññaṃ vā niccābhimataṃ aviparītavuttitāya sabbakālaṃ tathābhāvena ‘‘sassata’’nti vuccati, evaṃ buddhānaṃ vacananti tassa sassatatā vuttā. Tenevāha ‘‘aviparītamevā’’ti. Upapāramīādivibhāgena anekappakāratā. Samādānādhiṭṭhānanti samādānassa adhiṭṭhānaṃ pavattanaṃ karaṇanti attho. Ñāṇatejenāti pāramīpavicayañāṇappabhāvena. Mahānubhāvañhi taṃ ñāṇaṃ bodhisambhāresu anāvaraṇaṃ anācariyakaṃ mahābodhisamuppattiyā anurūpapubbanimittabhūtaṃ. Tathā hi taṃ manussapurisabhāvādiādhārameva jātaṃ. Kāyādīsu asubhasaññādibhāvena suddhagocarā. ‘‘Aññathā’’ti padassa pakaraṇaparicchinnaṃ atthaṃ dassento ‘‘līnatā’’ti āha. Līnatāti ca saṅkoco vīriyahāni vīriyārambhassa adhippetattā. Tenāha ‘‘esā me vīriyapāramī’’ti.

When a Buddha arises, one who regards himself as better than or equal to him declines from the jhānas and supernormal knowledges, but the wise Sumedha did not stand so; thus it should be seen that he did not decline from his jhānas and supernormal knowledges. Therefore it is said: 'Unequalled by ascetics.' Just as Nibbāna, or anything else considered permanent, is called 'eternal' because its nature remains undeviating at all times, so too is the word of the Buddhas; thus its eternality is stated. Therefore it is said: 'It is indeed undeviating.' It is of many kinds through the division into the higher perfections and so on. 'The undertaking and determination' means the determination, setting in motion, and making of the undertaking. 'By the power of knowledge' means by the radiance of the wisdom that investigates the perfections. For that knowledge is of great power, unobstructed regarding the requisites for enlightenment, without need for a teacher, serving as a suitable prior sign for the great enlightenment. Indeed, it arises based solely on the human male state. Its domain is pure through the perception of foulness in the body and so forth. Explaining the meaning of the word 'otherwise' as determined by the context, he says: 'indolence.' 'Indolence' here means contraction or a decline of energy, as the undertaking of energy is intended. Therefore, he says: 'This is my perfection of energy.'

Nidānakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Nidānakathā is finished.

1. Cittuppādakaṇḍaṃ

1. The Chapter on the Arising of the Aspiration

Tikamātikāpadavaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Terms of the Triad Matrix

1. Tenāti [Pg.27] vedanāsaddena. Sabbapadehīti tīhi padehi laddhanāmo hoti avayavadhammenāpi samudāyassa apadisitabbato yathā ‘‘samaṃ cuṇṇa’’nti. Codako yathādhippetamatthaṃ appaṭipajjamāno vibhattiantasseva padabhāvaṃ sallakkhetvā ‘‘nanu sukhāyā’’tiādinā codeti. Itaro ‘‘adhippetappakāratthagamakassā’’tiādinā attano adhippāyaṃ vivarati. Tena ‘‘vākyaṃ idha padanti vutta’’nti dasseti. Hetupadasahetukapadādīhīti ādi-saddena nahetupadaahetukapadahetusampayuttapadāni hetuvippayuttapadampi vā saṅgaṇhāti.

1. 'By that' means by the word 'feeling.' 'By all terms' means that it gets its name from all three terms, since the whole can be designated by a property of its parts, as in 'even powder.' The questioner, not grasping the intended meaning and considering a term to be what has a case ending, objects with 'Is it not for pleasure?' and so on. The other clarifies his own intention with 'for conveying the meaning in the intended way,' and so on. He thereby shows that 'here a phrase is called a term.' By 'the root-term, the with-root-term, etc.,' the word 'etc.' includes the not-root-term, the rootless-term, the root-associated-term, and also the root-dissociated-term.

Ubhayekapadavasenāti ubhayapadavasena hetudukasambandho, ekapadavasena sahetukadukasambandho. Tathāti ubhayekapadavasena. Ettha ca sahetukahetusampayuttadukātiādinā yathā hetugocchake paṭhamadukasambandhā dutiyatatiyadukā, paṭhamadukadutiyadukasambandhā catutthachaṭṭhadukā, paṭhamadukatatiyadukasambandho pañcamo duko, evaṃ āsavagocchakādīsupīti nayaṃ dasseti. Sakkā hi imināva nayena tesupi dukantarasambandho viññātuṃ, kevalaṃ pana āsavagocchakādīsu dutiyadukatatiyadukasambandho osānaduko, kilesagocchake ca dutiyacatutthadukasambandhoti. Dhammānaṃ sāvasesaniravasesabhāvena tikadukānaṃ sappadesanippadesatā vuttāti yehi tikadukā sāvasesāti padissanti apadissanti, te asaṅgahitadhammāpadeso. Evaṃ sati ‘‘asaṅgahito’’ti visesanaṃ kimatthiyanti? Etassevatthassa pākaṭakaraṇatthaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Atha vā padissati etena samudāyoti padeso, avayavo. ‘‘Sāmaññajotanā visese avatiṭṭhatī’’ti yathādhippetaṃ visesaṃ dassento ‘‘asaṅgahito’’ti āha.

'By way of both terms and one term' means: the connection of the root-dyad is by way of both terms, and the connection of the with-root-dyad is by way of one term. 'Thus' means by way of both terms and one term. Here, beginning with 'the with-root and root-associated dyad,' the method is shown as follows: in the root-group, the second and third dyads are related to the first dyad; the fourth and sixth dyads are related to the first and second dyads; the fifth dyad is related to the first and third dyads. Thus the method is shown also in the groups of taints and so on. For the connection between other dyads in those groups can be understood by this same method. However, in the groups of taints and so on, the final dyad is related to the second and third dyads, and in the group of defilements, it is related to the second and fourth dyads. The triads and dyads are said to be partial or complete in accordance with phenomena being with or without remainder. Those triads and dyads by which phenomena with remainder appear or do not appear are the indication of unincluded phenomena. This being so, for what purpose is the qualification 'unincluded'? It should be seen as for the purpose of making this very meaning clear. Or, 'that by which the whole is indicated' is a part, a component. 'A general indication is established in the particular'; showing the intended particular, he says 'unincluded.'

Anavajjattho avajjavirahattho. Nāmaṃ saññā, kiriyā karaṇaṃ, payojanaṃ ratharathaṅgavibhāvanena tesaṃ pakārato yojanaṃ. Kusena ñāṇena lātabbāti kusalāti ayamattho ñāṇasampayuttānaṃ tāva hotu, ñāṇavippayuttānaṃ kathanti āha ‘‘ñāṇavippayuttānampī’’tiādi. Ñāṇavippayuttāpi [Pg.28] hi ñāṇeneva pavattiyanti hitasukhahetubhūtāya pavattiyā paññavantānaṃ paṭipattibhāvato. Na hi antarena yonisomanasikāraṃ kusaluppatti atthīti. ‘‘Yadi kusalassa ubhayabhāgagataṃ saṃkilesalavanaṃ pākaṭaṃ siyā, kusā viya lunantīti kusalāti ayamattho yutto siyā’’ti koci vadeyyāti āsaṅkāya āha ‘‘sammappadhānadvayaṃ viyā’’ti.

'Blameless' means 'devoid of blame.' Name is perception; action is doing; purpose is their application in various ways, explained by the analogy of the chariot and its parts. 'To be grasped by wise knowledge'—this is the meaning of 'wholesome.' Let this meaning apply for now to things associated with knowledge. But what about things dissociated from knowledge? He says: 'Even for those dissociated from knowledge...' and so on. For even things dissociated from knowledge proceed by means of knowledge, because their proceeding is a cause of welfare and happiness, and because they are the practice of the wise. For without wise attention, there is no arising of the wholesome. Anticipating that someone might say, 'If the cutting of the defilements belonging to both parts of the wholesome were manifest, then the meaning "they cut like a blade of kusa-grass" would be fitting for "wholesome,"' he says, 'like the two right strivings.'

Na cātiādinā ‘‘sabhāvaṃ dhārentī’’ti ettha paramatthato kattukammassa ca bhedo natthi, kappanāsiddho eva pana bhedoti dasseti. Tattha nāmavasena viññātāviññāteti yesaṃ ‘‘dhammā’’ti iminā pariyāyena aviññātā sabhāvā, ‘‘sabhāvaṃ dhārentī’’ti iminā ca pariyāyena viññātā, tesaṃ vasena evaṃ vuttaṃ. Ettha ca paṭhamo attho saṅkhatāsaṅkhatadhammavasena vutto, dutiyo saṅkhatavasena, tatiyo saṅkhatāsaṅkhatapaññattidhammavasenāti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

By 'And not...,' etc., he shows that in the phrase 'they bear their own nature,' there is in an ultimate sense no difference between agent and object; the difference is established only by convention. Here, by way of name, 'known and unknown' refers to those things whose own natures are unknown through the expression 'dhammas,' but are known through the expression 'they bear their own nature'; it is stated in terms of these. And here it should be seen that the first meaning is stated in terms of conditioned and unconditioned phenomena; the second, in terms of conditioned phenomena alone; and the third, in terms of conditioned, unconditioned, and conceptual phenomena.

Kusalapaṭisedhanaṃ kusalābhāvo eva. Abhāvo hi sattāpaṭisedhoti. Dhammoti sabhāvadhammo. Akusalavacanena na koci attho sabhāvadhammassa abodhakattāti adhippāyo. Atha siyā akusalavacanena koci attho asabhāvadhammabodhakattepi ‘‘paññattidhammā’’tiādīsu viya, evaṃ sati ‘‘anabyākatā’’ti ca vattabbaṃ siyā, tato cāyaṃ catukko āpajjati, na tiko. Tasmāti yasmā dukacatukkabhāvo anabyākatavohāro ca natthi, so ca vuttanayena abhāvamattavacane āpajjati, tasmā. Sabhāvadhāraṇādīti ādi-saddena ‘‘dhārīyanti paccayehī’’ti ayamattho saṅgahito. Ñeyyapariyāyena pana dhamma-saddenāyaṃ dosoti nanu añeyyapariyāyepi dhamma-sadde na koci dosoti? Na, vuttadosānativattanato.

The negation of the wholesome is simply the absence of the wholesome. For absence is the negation of existence. 'Dhamma' means a phenomenon with its own nature. The intention is that the word 'unwholesome' has no meaning because it does not denote a phenomenon with its own nature. Now, there might be some meaning to the word 'unwholesome' even if it denotes something that is not a phenomenon with its own nature—as in cases like 'conceptual phenomena' and so on. If so, then 'indeterminate' would also have to be stated. Then this would become a fourfold classification, not a threefold one. 'Therefore': since there is no twofold or fourfold state and no usage of 'indeterminate'—and that would result from a mere statement of absence in the way explained—therefore... 'Bearing its own nature, etc.': by the word 'etc.' the meaning 'they are borne by conditions' is included. But is this fault in the word 'dhamma' only from the perspective of the knowable? Surely there is no fault in the word 'dhamma' even from the perspective of the unknowable? No, because the stated fault is not overcome.

Pārisesenāti ettha nanu ayamakāro na-atthattayasseva jotako, atha kho ‘‘ahetukā dhammā, abhikkhuko āvāso’’ti taṃyoganivattiyā, ‘‘appaccayā dhammā’’ti taṃsambandhibhāvanivattiyā. Paccayuppannañhi paccayasambandhīti appaccayuppannattā asambandhitā ettha jotīyati. ‘‘Anidassanā dhammā’’ti taṃsabhāvanivattiyā. Nidassanañhi daṭṭhabbatā. Atha cakkhuviññāṇaṃ nidassanaṃ, taggayhabhāvanivattiyā, tathā ‘‘anāsavā dhammā’’ti. ‘‘Appaṭighā dhammā anārammaṇā dhammā’’ti taṃkiccanivattiyā. ‘‘Arūpino dhammā acetasikā [Pg.29] dhammā’’ti tabbhāvanivattiyā. Tadaññatā hi ettha pakāsīyati. ‘‘Amanusso’’ti tabbhāvamattanivattiyā. Manussattamattaṃ natthi aññaṃ samānanti sadisatā hettha sūciyati. ‘‘Asamaṇo samaṇapaṭiñño aputto’’ti taṃsambhāvanaguṇanivattiyā. Garahā hi ettha ñāyati. ‘‘Kacci nu bhoto anāmayā, anudarā kaññā’’ti tadappabhāvanivattiyā. ‘‘Anuppannā dhammā’’ti taṃsadisabhāvanivattiyā. Atītānañhi uppannapubbattā upādidhammānañca paccayekadesanipphattiyā āraddhuppādabhāvato kālavinimuttassa ca vijjamānattā uppannānukūlatā, pageva paccuppannānanti tabbidhurabhāvo ettha viññāyati. ‘‘Asekkhā dhammā’’ti tadapariyosānanivattiyā. Taṃniṭṭhānañhettha pakāsīyatīti evamanekesaṃ atthānaṃ jotako, tattha kiṃ vuccate atthadvayameva vatvā pārisesenāti? Itaresaṃ ettha suvidūrabhāvato. Na hi kusalavippayuttādīnaṃ dhammānaṃ akusalabhāvo yujjati.

'By elimination': Surely this prefix 'a-' is not an indicator of only three meanings of 'not,' but rather: in 'causeless phenomena' and 'a monastery without bhikkhus,' it is for negating connection with that; in 'unconditioned phenomena,' it is for negating the state of being related to that. For what has arisen from a condition is related to a condition; thus, because they have not arisen from a condition, their non-relatedness is indicated here. In 'non-manifest phenomena,' it is for negating that nature. For 'manifest' means 'visible.' But eye-consciousness is manifest; here it is for negating the state of being graspable by that. Likewise in 'taintless phenomena.' In 'non-impinging phenomena' and 'objectless phenomena,' it is for negating their function. In 'formless phenomena' and 'non-mental phenomena,' it is for negating that state. For otherness is revealed here. In 'non-human,' it is for negating just that state; it is not merely the human state that is absent, but something else similar is meant, thus similarity is indicated here. In 'no recluse,' 'one who professes to be a recluse,' and 'sonless,' it is for negating a respected quality. For censure is understood here. In 'I hope you are not unwell' and 'a girl who is not pregnant,' it is for negating a low quality. In 'unarisen phenomena,' it is for negating a similar state. For past phenomena have previously arisen, and phenomena that are being clung to have begun to arise because they are produced from a part of their conditions, and what is timeless exists; thus they are conformable with the arisen—how much more so present phenomena! Their being devoid of that is understood here. In 'phenomena of a non-trainee,' it is for negating non-completion. For its completion is revealed here. Thus it is an indicator of many meanings. In that case, why is it said 'by elimination' after stating only two meanings? Because the others are very remote here. For it is not proper for phenomena dissociated from the wholesome, etc., to be unwholesome.

Akusalasaddassa uccāraṇānantaraṃ vineyyānaṃ kusalapaṭipakkhabhūte atthe paṭipattibhāvato tattha niruḷhatā daṭṭhabbā. ‘‘Viruddhasabhāvattā’’ti vuttaṃ kiccavirodhādīnampi tadantogadhattā, viruddhasabhāvattepi vināsakavināsitabbabhāvo kusalākusalesu niyatoti dassetuṃ ‘‘tappaheyyabhāvato’’ti āha. Itarathā kusalānampi akusalehi pahātabbabhāve accantaṃ samucchinnakusalamūlattā apāyapūrakā eva sattā siyuṃ. Yaṃ pana ‘‘dhammāpi vo, bhikkhave, pahātabbā’’ti (ma. ni. 1.240) vuttaṃ, taṃ ‘‘rūpaṃ, bhikkhave, na tumhākaṃ, taṃ pajahathā’’tiādīsu (saṃ. ni. 3.33) viya tadārammaṇasaṃkilesappahānavasena pariyāyena vuttaṃ. Yathāha ‘‘na hi kusalā akusalehi pahātabbā’’ti (dha. sa. mūlaṭī 1).

The establishment of the term 'unwholesome' should be understood from the fact that immediately after it is uttered, those to be trained engage in the practice concerning the meaning that is the opposite of the wholesome. The statement 'because of their opposing nature' is said because functional opposition and the like are also included within it. To show that even with an opposing nature, the relationship of destroyer and what is to be destroyed is fixed between the wholesome and the unwholesome, it is said, 'because they are to be abandoned by that.' Otherwise, if the wholesome could also be abandoned by the unwholesome, beings would just fill the planes of misery, their wholesome roots having been utterly cut off. But as to the statement, 'Bhikkhus, even dhammas are to be abandoned,' that is said figuratively, in the sense of abandoning the defilements that have those dhammas as their object, just as in such passages as, 'Bhikkhus, form is not yours; abandon it.' As it is said: 'For wholesome states are not to be abandoned by unwholesome states.'

Phassādivacanehi taṃniddesabhūtehi. Tabbacanīyabhāvenāti tehi ‘‘sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā dhammā’’tiādivacanehi abhidheyyabhāvena. Yathā anavajjasukhavipākādiatthā kusalādivacanehi, evaṃ avipākatthā abyākatavacanena bodhitā evāti āha ‘‘abyākatavacaneneva cā’’ti. Kāraṇaṃ avatvāti idha vuttabhāvena anuvattamānattāti kāraṇaṃ avatvā. Aññā…pe… nivāretabboti etena kusalākusalasaddā viya kusalākusalasabhāvānaṃ [Pg.30] tadubhayaviparītasabhāvānaṃ dhammānaṃ abyākatasaddo bodhakoti dasseti. Na hi avipākavacanaṃ vuttaṃ, akusalavacanañca avuttaṃ. Yato avipākavacanassa adhikatabhāvo akusalassa ca tabbacanīyabhāvena akathitabhāvo siyā, tasmā na akusalānaṃ abyākatatāti ayaṃ akusalānaṃ anabyākatabhāve yojanā.

By words such as 'contact,' which are its designation. 'By being expressible by that means' means: by being denotable by such words as 'dhammas associated with pleasant feeling.' Just as meanings such as 'blameless and pleasant-resultant' are made known by words such as 'wholesome,' so the meaning 'non-resultant' is made known by the word 'indeterminate.' Thus it is said, 'and by the word "indeterminate" alone.' 'Without stating the reason': because it follows from what has been said here, it is stated without giving the reason. 'Others... should be prevented': by this it is shown that just as the words 'wholesome' and 'unwholesome' make known the nature of wholesome and unwholesome states, so the word 'indeterminate' makes known the nature of dhammas that are the opposite of both. For it is not that the word 'non-resultant' is stated while the word 'unwholesome' is left unstated. Since, if it were so, there would be an over-extension of the term 'non-resultant' and the unwholesome would not be mentioned as being expressible by that term, therefore unwholesome states are not indeterminate. This is the application concerning the non-indeterminate nature of the unwholesome.

Taṃ pariharitunti abyākatanivattanamāha. Yadi evaṃ ‘‘sukhavipākānavajjā’’ti vattabbaṃ. Anavajjā hi byabhicāritāya visesitabbāti? Na, sukhavipākavacanassa visesanabhāvena aggahitattā. Sukhavipākavacanena hi kusalabhāve samatto viññāyati, anavajjavacanaṃ panettha kusalānaṃ agarahitabbatāsaṅkhātaṃ kañci visesamāha. Teneva ca tassa visesanabhāvena vuttassa pavattisukhatādidassanabhāvaṃ sayameva vakkhatīti. Manosamācāravisesabhūtā phaladhammā visesena paṭippassaddhāvajjā nāma hontīti samācārattayavasena tasmiṃ sutte anavajjadhammānaṃ vuttattā ca te anavasesato saṅgahetvā dassetuṃ ‘‘virahitāvajjamattā’’ti vuttaṃ. Avajjavināsanabhāvo dassito kaṇhasukkadhammānaṃ vajjhaghātakabhāvassa niyatattā. Savipākatā vipākadhammatā. Sukho vipāko etesanti sukhavipākāti iminā samāsena kusalānaṃ sukhavipākavantatā vuttā. Sā ca nesaṃ na taṃsamaṅgitāya asahavattanatoti taduppādanasamatthatāti viññāyatīti vuttaṃ ‘‘sukhavipākavipaccanasabhāvaṃ dassetī’’ti. Yuttametanti paramatthato bhedābhāvepi yathāvuttavacanavacanīyabhāvasaṅkhāto bhedo tasmiṃ abhidheyyatthabhūte vatthusmiṃ upacārena hotīti yuttamettha lakkhaṇalakkhitabbabhāvena bhedavacanaṃ. Bhavati hi saddatthavisesamattenapi abhinne vatthusmiṃ bhedavacanaṃ yathā ‘‘silāputtakassa sarīra’’nti.

To avoid that, he states the exclusion of the indeterminate. If so, it should be said, 'pleasant-resultant and blameless.' For should 'blameless' be qualified on account of deviation? No, because the term 'pleasant-resultant' is not taken as a qualifier. For by the term 'pleasant-resultant' the wholesome state is fully understood; the term 'blameless' here states a certain distinction, namely, that the wholesome is not to be censured. And for that very reason, he himself will state later that what is mentioned as its qualifier shows such things as the happiness of occurrence. And because resultant states, which are a special instance of mental conduct, are ones where faults are especially calmed, and because in that sutta blameless states are spoken of in terms of the threefold conduct, in order to include them all without remainder, it is said, 'the mere absence of fault.' The state of destroying fault is shown, because the nature of dark and bright states as slayer and slain is fixed. 'Being with result' is the nature of being a result. 'They have a pleasant result,' hence 'pleasant-resultant': by this compound, the fact that wholesome states possess a pleasant result is stated. And this is not for them a matter of being endowed with it and co-arising with it, but is understood as the capacity to produce it. Thus it is said, 'it shows the nature of ripening into a pleasant result.' This is proper: although in the ultimate sense there is no difference, a difference described as the relationship between the expression and the expressed comes to be by convention in the subject matter that is the object to be denoted. Thus a statement of difference is proper here in terms of the characteristic and the characterized. For a statement of difference can occur regarding an undivided object based on a mere distinction in the meaning of a word, as in 'the body of a stone doll.'

Vināpi bhāvābhidhāyinā saddena bhāvappadhāno niddeso hotīti vuttaṃ ‘‘anavajjavacanena anavajjattaṃ āhā’’ti. Evañcettha padaviggaho gahetabbo – na avajjaṃ anavajjaṃ, avajjapaṭipakkhatāya agarahitabbasabhāvo. Sukho vipāko assāti sukhavipākaṃ, sukhavipākavipaccanasamatthatā. Anavajjañca taṃ sukhavipākañcāti anavajjasukhavipākaṃ, taṃ lakkhaṇaṃ etesanti anavajjasukhavipākalakkhaṇā. Atha vā pubbe viya anavajjaṃ, vipaccanaṃ vipāko, sukhassa vipāko sukhavipāko, anavajjañca sukhavipāko [Pg.31] ca anavajjasukhavipākaṃ ekattavasena. Taṃ lakkhaṇaṃ etesanti anavajjasukhavipākalakkhaṇā. Kiṃ panettha kāraṇaṃ padadvayapariggahe, nanu ekeneva padena iṭṭhappasiddhi. Yadipi ‘‘avajjarahitaṃ anavajja’’nti imasmiṃ pana pakkhe abyākatanivattanatthaṃ sukhavipākaggahaṇaṃ kattabbaṃ siyā, sukhavipākaggahaṇe pana kate anavajjaggahaṇaṃ na kattabbameva. ‘‘Avajjapaṭipakkhā anavajjā’’ti etasmiṃ pana pakkhe sukhavipākaggahaṇañcāti codanaṃ manasi katvā āha ‘‘tattha anavajjavacanenā’’tiādi. Tena pavattisukhasukhavipākatāattasuddhivisuddhavipākatāakusalaabyākatasabhāvanivattirasapaccupaṭṭhānapadaṭṭhānavisesadīpanato evaṃ vipulappayojanattho padadvayapariggahoti dasseti. Sukha-saddassa iṭṭhapariyāyatā viya ‘‘nibbānaparamaṃ sukhaṃ (dha. pa. 203-204), sukhā virāgatā loke (udā. 11), tesaṃ vūpasamo sukho’’tiādīsu (dī. ni. 2.221, 272) saṅkhāradukkhūpasamapariyāyatāpi vijjati, taṃavipākatāya pana idha sukhavipākabhāvo na sakkā vattunti dassento āha ‘‘saṅkhā…pe… natthī’’ti. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – tebhūmakakusalānampi vivaṭṭasannissayabhāvena pavattisabhāvattā kiñcāpi sabbe kusalā saṅkhāradukkhūpasamasukhanipphādakā sambhavanti, yathāvuttasukhassa pana avipākabhāvato na etena padena kusalānaṃ sukhavipākatā sambhavatīti. Vipakkabhāvamāpannesu arūpadhammesu niruḷhattā vipāka-saddassa ‘‘yadi panā’’ti sāsaṅkaṃ vadati.

It is said, 'by the word "blameless" he states blamelessness,' because an exposition can be primarily about a state even without a word that directly expresses 'state-ness.' And here the analysis of the words should be taken thus: 'not blame' is 'blameless'; its nature is not to be censured because it is the opposite of blame. 'It has a pleasant result,' hence 'pleasant-resultant'; this is the capacity to ripen into a pleasant result. 'Blameless and pleasant-resultant' is that which is both blameless and pleasant-resultant; 'having the characteristic of being blameless and pleasant-resultant' are those states for which this is the characteristic. Alternatively, 'blameless' is as before; 'ripening' is 'result'; the result of happiness is 'pleasant result'; 'blameless and pleasant result' is taken as a unity. 'Having the characteristic of being blameless and pleasant-resultant' are those states for which this is the characteristic. What is the reason here for adopting two words? Surely the intended meaning is established by one word alone. Although in the position 'free from blame is blameless,' the term 'pleasant-resultant' would have to be included to exclude the indeterminate, when 'pleasant-resultant' is included, 'blameless' need not be included at all. Keeping in mind the objection that in the position 'blameless is the opposite of blame,' 'pleasant-resultant' should also be included, he says, 'Therein, by the word "blameless"…' and so on. He thereby shows that the adoption of two words has this extensive purpose because it illuminates specific aspects of the following: the happiness of occurrence and the happiness of the result; the purity of self and the purity of the result; the turning away from the nature of the unwholesome and the indeterminate; the function, manifestation, and proximate cause. Just as the word 'happiness' has the sense of 'desirable,' it also has the sense of 'the stilling of conditioned suffering,' as in 'Nibbāna is the supreme happiness,' 'Dispassion is happiness in the world,' and 'The stilling of them is happiness.' But to show that, because that stilling is not a result, the state of having a pleasant result cannot be spoken of here in that sense, he says, 'of formations… does not exist.' This is what is meant: although all wholesome states of the three planes, by being based on the turning away from saṃsāra, have a nature of occurrence and can possibly produce the happiness that is the stilling of conditioned suffering, because the aforesaid happiness is not a result, the fact that wholesome states are pleasant-resultant is not possible by means of this word in that sense. Because the word 'result' is established in relation to immaterial states that have reached the state of being ripened, he speaks with hesitation, saying, 'But if…'

Yathāsambhavanti saha avajjenāti sāvajjā, garahitabbabhāvayuttā. Tena nesaṃ garahitabbasabhāvaṃ dasseti. Aññepi atthi dukkhabhāvena garahitabbasabhāvā akusalavipākāti sāvajjavacanamattena tesampi akusalatāpattidosaṃ disvā taṃ pariharituṃ dukkhavipākavacanamāha. Avajja-saddo vā rāgādīsu ekantākusalesu niruḷhoti taṃsahavattidhammānaṃ eva sāvajjabhāve kusalābyākatehi akusalānaṃ viseso sāvajjavacaneneva dassito. Abyākatehi pana visiṭṭhaṃ kusalākusalānaṃ sādhāraṇaṃ savipākatālakkhaṇanti tasmiṃ lakkhaṇe visesadassanatthaṃ dukkhavipākalakkhaṇaṃ vuttaṃ. Ito paraṃ ‘‘dukkho vipāko etesanti dukkhavipākā’’tiādinā sukhavipākaanavajjakusalapadānaṃ ṭhāne dukkhavipākasāvajjaakusalapadāni ṭhapetvā yathāvuttanayena attho veditabbo[Pg.32]. Yojanā ca sāvajjavacanena akusalānaṃ pavattidukkhataṃ dasseti, dukkhavipākavacanena vipākadukkhataṃ. Purimañhi attano pavattisabhāvavasena lakkhaṇavacanaṃ, pacchimaṃ kālantare vipākuppādanasamatthatāyāti. Tathā purimena akusalānaṃ avisuddhasabhāvataṃ dasseti, pacchimena avisuddhavipākataṃ. Purimena ca akusale kusalasabhāvato nivatteti, pacchimena abyākatasabhāvato savipākattadīpakattā pacchimassa. Purimena vā avajjavantatādassanato kiccaṭṭhena rasena anatthajananarasataṃ dasseti, pacchimena sampattiatthena aniṭṭhavipākarasataṃ. Purimena ca upaṭṭhānākāraṭṭhena paccupaṭṭhānena saṃkilesapaccupaṭṭhānataṃ, pacchimena phalaṭṭhena dukkhavipākapaccupaṭṭhānataṃ. Purimena ca ayonisomanasikāraṃ akusalānaṃ padaṭṭhānaṃ pakāseti. Tato hi te sāvajjā jātāti. Pacchimena akusalānaṃ aññesaṃ padaṭṭhānabhāvaṃ vibhāveti. Te hi dukkhavipākassa kāraṇaṃ hotīti. Ettha ca dukkha-saddo aniṭṭhapariyāyavacananti veditabbaṃ. Aniṭṭhacatukkhandhavipākā hi akusalā, na dukkhavedanāvipākāva. Vipāka-saddassa phalapariyāyabhāve pana nissandavipākena aniṭṭharūpenapi dukkhavipākatā yojetabbā. Vipākadhammatāpaṭisedhavasena abyākatānaṃ avipākalakkhaṇāti lakkhaṇaṃ vuttanti tadatthaṃ dassento ‘‘avipākārahasabhāvā’’ti āha. Evaṃpakārānanti abhiññādike saṅgaṇhāti.

Because they occur together with what is blameworthy, they are 'blameworthy' (sāvajjā), that is, connected with a state that should be censured. Thereby it shows their nature as censurable. There are also other things—unwholesome results—that have a censurable nature because they are suffering. Seeing the fault that these too would be considered unwholesome merely by the term 'blameworthy,' to avoid this, the text states the term 'of painful result.' Or, the word 'blameworthy' (avajja) is established in relation to things that are exclusively unwholesome, such as lust. Thus, for the states that occur together with them, their blameworthy nature is shown by the term 'blameworthy' itself, and by this term the distinction of unwholesome states from wholesome and indeterminate ones is shown. However, the characteristic of being 'with result' is common to both wholesome and unwholesome states, distinguishing them from the indeterminate. To show the distinction within that characteristic, the characteristic 'of painful result' is stated. Henceforth, the meaning should be understood in the way already stated by substituting the terms 'of painful result,' 'blameworthy,' and 'unwholesome' in place of the terms 'of pleasant result,' 'blameless,' and 'wholesome.' And the application is as follows: The term 'blameworthy' shows the suffering in the process of unwholesome states, while the term 'of painful result' shows the suffering in the result. For the former is a term for the characteristic based on its own nature of occurrence, the latter based on its capacity to produce a result at a future time. Similarly, the former shows the impure nature of unwholesome states, the latter their impure result. And the former distinguishes the unwholesome from the nature of the wholesome, while the latter distinguishes it from the nature of the indeterminate, as the latter term indicates that they are with result. Or, the former, by showing their blameworthiness, indicates their function in the sense of an action, which is the function of generating what is not beneficial; the latter indicates their function in the sense of an accomplishment, which is the function of having an undesirable result. And the former indicates their manifestation in the sense of a mode of appearance, which is the manifestation of defilement; the latter indicates their manifestation in the sense of a fruit, which is the manifestation of a painful result. And the former reveals unwise attention as the proximate cause of unwholesome states, for from that they arise as blameworthy. The latter clarifies that unwholesome states are the proximate cause for other things, for they are the cause of a painful result. And here the word 'suffering' (dukkha) should be understood as a synonym for 'undesirable' (aniṭṭha). For unwholesome states result in the four undesirable aggregates, not only in a result of painful feeling. However, since the word 'result' (vipāka) is a synonym for 'fruit' (phala), the quality of having a painful result should also be connected with undesirable form as a karmic consequence. The characteristic of the indeterminate is stated as 'without result' (avipāka) by way of negating the property of being a result. Explaining this meaning, it says, 'having a nature that is not a result.' 'Of such a kind' includes direct knowledges and so on.

Chahi padehi tikesu, catūhi dukesu yathākkamaṃ cha cattāro atthā vuttā. Chakkabhāvo na bhavissatīti etena catukkabhāvābhāvo dassitanayattā coditoyevāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Atthabhedo upapajjatīti kasmā evaṃ vuttaṃ, nanu tīhi dhammasaddehi vuccamāno sabhāvadhāraṇādiatthena abhinno eva so atthoti? Na, jātiādibhedena bhedasabbhāvato. Bhedakā hi jātiādayo. Māsapadatthatāyāti māsa-saddābhidheyyabhāvena. Tabbacanīyabhinnatthānanti tehi kālasaddādīhi vattabbānaṃ visiṭṭhatthānaṃ. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – ‘‘yathā kālasaddādiabhidheyyānaṃ kālādiatthānaṃ bhinnasabhāvānampi māsa-saddābhidheyyabhāvena abhedo, evaṃ jātiādibhedena bhinnānampi tesaṃ tiṇṇaṃ dvinnañca atthānaṃ dhamma-saddābhidheyyabhāvena natthi bhedo’’ti. Vini…pe… mānāti dhamma-saddassa rūpābhedepi bhedakāraṇamāha. Bhinnajātiyatthavacanīyatāya hi tassevatthabhedoti.

In the triplets by six terms, and in the dyads by four terms, six and four meanings respectively are stated. By the statement, 'There will not be a sixfold nature,' it should be seen that the absence of a fourfold nature is also implied, as it is questioned by the method shown. Why is it said, 'A difference of meaning arises'? Is it not the case that the meaning expressed by the three 'dhamma' terms is identical, having the sense of 'bearing its own nature,' etc.? No, because there is a difference due to distinctions of category, etc. For it is categories and so on that create distinctions. 'Because of the meaning of the word 'month'' means: by being what is signified by the word 'month.' 'Of the distinct meanings to be expressed by them' means: of the specific meanings to be expressed by words such as 'time.' This is what is said: 'Just as for the meanings of time, etc., which are signified by words like 'time,' etc., although they have distinct natures, there is no difference in their being signified by the word 'month'; so too, although the meanings of those three and two are distinct due to distinctions of category, etc., there is no difference in their being signified by the word 'dhamma'.' Explaining... he states the reason for the difference even though the form of the word 'dhamma' is the same. For it is because of being expressive of meanings of different categories that there is a difference of meaning for that very word.

Sādhetunti [Pg.33] bodhetuṃ. Hotu asambandho, kā no hānīti kadāci vadeyyāti āsaṅkāya āha ‘‘pubbā…pe… nāma hontī’’ti. So cāti sabhāvadhāraṇapaccayadhariyamānatāsaṅkhāto attho na sakkā vattunti yathāvuttassa abhāvassa apekkhāvuttitāya vuttaṃ. Na hi apekkhāvuttino antarena apekkhitabbaṃ labhanti. Satipi sabhāvadhāraṇādiatthasāmaññe kusalajātiādivisiṭṭhasseva tassa idha adhippetattā ekatthatā na anuññātāti vuttaṃ, vacanasilesavasena vā. Atha vātiādinā tiṇṇaṃ dhammasaddānaṃ abhāvattaṃ asampaṭicchanto nānatthatābhāvadosaṃ pariharati.

'To establish' means to make understood. Anticipating that someone might say, 'Let there be no connection; what loss is it to us?' he says, 'Formerly... they are called.' And that meaning, designated as 'the state of being borne by a condition which is the bearing of its own nature,' cannot be stated—this is said because it is spoken in dependence on the aforesaid absence. For those who speak in dependence do not obtain what is depended upon without that on which they depend. Although there is a commonality of meaning such as 'bearing its own nature,' etc., it is said that a single meaning is not permitted here because what is intended is that very meaning as specified by the wholesome category, etc.; or, it is stated by way of a double-entendre in the wording. Or else, with the words 'Or,' etc., by not accepting that the three 'dhamma' terms are non-existent, he avoids the fault of there being no diversity of meaning.

Ñāpakahetubhāvato upapatti idha kāraṇanti vuttāti āha ‘‘kāraṇaṃ nāma yuttī’’ti. Punaruttītiādinā nanu ‘‘kusalādīnampi ekattaṃ āpajjatī’’ti vuttattā ekattāpattipi vattabbāti? Saccaṃ vattabbā, sā pana abhāvāpattiyaṃ eva antogadhā nānattābhāvacodanāsāmaññena. Bhedābhedanibandhanattā visesanavisesitabbabhāvassa so accantamabhinnesu niyamena natthīti visesanavisesitabbābhāvena accantābhedaṃ dasseti, na pana accantaṃ abhinnesuyeva visesanavisesitabbābhāvaṃ. Atha vā accantaṃ abhinnesu avivaṭasaddatthavivaraṇatthaṃ pavattā. Kasmā? Visesanavisesitabbābhāvatoti evaṃ yojanā kātabbā. Amittaṃ abhibhavituṃ sakkuṇātīti sakko, indatīti indo, purime dadātīti purindadoti evaṃ kiriyāguṇādipariggahavisesena.

Because it is an indicative reason, 'reasoning' (upapatti) is here called 'cause' (kāraṇa); thus he says, 'Cause means justification (yutti).' With the words 'repetition,' etc., is it not the case that since it is said, 'wholesome states, etc., also attain oneness,' the attainment of oneness should also be stated? True, it should be stated. But that is included within the attainment of absence, by the commonality of the objection to the absence of diversity. Because the relationship of qualifier and qualified is dependent on difference and non-difference, it is necessarily absent in things that are absolutely non-different. Thus, by the absence of a qualifier-qualified relationship, it shows absolute non-difference, but the absence of a qualifier-qualified relationship does not exist only in things that are absolutely non-different. Alternatively, in things that are absolutely non-different, it is employed to clarify the meaning of a word that is not explained. Why? 'Because of the absence of a qualifier-qualified relationship'—the connection should be made thus. ‘He is able to overcome his foe,’ thus he is Sakka; ‘he exercises lordship,’ thus he is Inda; ‘he formerly gave gifts,’ thus he is Purindada. Thus it is by the specific grasp of action, quality, etc.

Bhedābhedavantesūti visesasāmaññavantesu. Nīla-saddo hi uppalasaddasamāyogo rattuppalasetuppalādiuppalajātisāmaññato vinivattetvā nīlaguṇayuttameva uppalajātivisesaṃ joteti. Uppala-saddopi nīla-saddasamāyutto bhamaraṅgārakokilādigatanīlaguṇasāmaññato avacchinditvā uppalavatthugatameva nīlaguṇaṃ pakāsetīti visesatthasāmaññatthayuttatā padadvayassa daṭṭhabbā. Iminā nayena itaratrāpi bhedābhedavantatā yojetabbā. Tāya tāya anumatiyāti tena tena saṅketena. Te te vohārāti accantaṃ abhinne atthe pariyāyabhāvena accantaṃ bhinne yathāsakaṃ atthavivaraṇabhāvena bhedābhedavante visesanavisesitabbabhāvena tā tā samaññā paññattiyo siddhāti attho[Pg.34]. Samāneti ekasmiṃ. Kusalādibhāvanti kucchitasalanādibhāvaṃ. Abhidhānatthopi hi anavajjasukhavipākādiabhidheyyattho viya sabhāvadhāraṇādisāmaññatthaṃ visesetīti.

'In things possessing difference and non-difference' means: in things possessing particularity and generality. For the word 'blue' (nīla), in conjunction with the word 'water lily' (uppala), excludes the general category of water lilies such as red water lilies and white water lilies, and illuminates only the particular kind of water lily endowed with the quality of blueness. The word 'water lily' too, in conjunction with the word 'blue,' delimits it from the general quality of blueness found in bees, embers, cuckoos, etc., and reveals only the quality of blueness present in the water lily. Thus, the connection of the two words with a particular meaning and a general meaning should be understood. By this method, the possession of difference and non-difference should be applied in other cases as well. 'By this or that consent' means: by this or that convention. 'These and those expressions' means: in a meaning that is absolutely non-different, they are established as synonyms; in meanings that are absolutely different, they are established as explaining their respective meanings; in things possessing difference and non-difference, they are established as qualifier and qualified. Such are the various designations and concepts—this is the meaning. 'In the same' means: in one. 'The state of being wholesome, etc.' means: the state of being despicable, of shaking, etc. For the meaning of the term itself, just like the meaning to be designated as 'blameless, of pleasant result,' etc., specifies the general meaning of 'bearing its own nature,' etc.

Etthāha ‘‘kiṃ pana kāraṇaṃ tikā eva paṭhamaṃ vuttā, na dukā, tikesupi kusalattikova, na añño’’ti? Vuccate – sukhaggahaṇato appabhedato ca tikā eva paṭhamaṃ vuttā. Yasmā tikehi bodhite kusalādibhede tabbibhāgabhinnā hetuādayo vuccamānā suviññeyyā honti. Tathā hi ‘‘tayo kusalahetū’’tiādinā kusalādimukhena hetuādayo vibhattā, katipayabhedā ca tikā dvāvīsatiparimāṇattā.

Here it is asked: 'But for what reason are the triads stated first, not the dyads? And among the triads, why only the wholesome triad and not another?' It is said: The triads are stated first because they are easy to grasp and have few divisions. For when the distinctions of wholesome, etc., are made known by the triads, the causes, etc., which are divided according to those divisions, become easy to understand. Thus, with the words 'three wholesome roots,' etc., the causes and so on are analyzed by way of the wholesome, etc. And the triads have few divisions, being twenty-two in number.

Tesu pana sabbasaṅgahaasaṅkaraādikalyāṇabhāvena paṭhamaṃ kusalattikaṃ vuttaṃ. Niravasesā hi rūpārūpadhammā kusalattikena saṅgahitā, na tathā vedanāttikādīhi. Nanu vipākattikādīhipi niravasesā dhammā saṅgahitāti? Saccametaṃ, tesu pana anavajjasāvajjadhammā na asaṅkarato vuttā yathā kusalattike. Nanu ca saṃkiliṭṭhasaṃkilesikattikādīsupi te asaṅkarato vuttāti? Evametaṃ, te pana akalyāṇabhūte pāpadhamme ādiṃ katvā vuttā, na evamayaṃ. Ayaṃ pana kalyāṇabhūte pujjabhavaparinibbutinipphādake puññadhamme ādiṃ katvā vutto. Iti bhagavā saṇhasukhumaṃ rūpārūpadesanaṃ ārabhanto sabbasaṅgahaasaṅkaraādikalyāṇaguṇayogato paṭhamaṃ kusalattikaṃ deseti, kiñca tadaññattikānaṃ sukhaggahaṇato. Tathā hi kusalattikamukhena ‘‘kāmāvacarakusalato cattāro somanassasahagatacittuppādā’’tiādinā vedanāttikādayo vibhattāti.

Among them, however, the wholesome triad is stated first because of its good qualities, such as being all-inclusive and unmixed. For all phenomena, material and immaterial, are included without remainder by the wholesome triad, but not so by the feeling triad and others. But are not all phenomena included without remainder by the resultant triad and others too? That is true, but in those, blameless and blameworthy phenomena are not stated without intermixture as they are in the wholesome triad. But are they not stated without intermixture in the triad of the defiled and defiling, and others too? That is so, but those are stated beginning with evil phenomena, which are not good, unlike this one. This one, however, is stated beginning with meritorious phenomena, which are good, praiseworthy, and productive of becoming and final Nibbāna. Thus the Blessed One, when embarking upon the subtle and profound teaching on material and immaterial phenomena, teaches the wholesome triad first because of its connection with good qualities such as being all-inclusive and unmixed, and also because the other triads are easy to grasp through it. For by way of the wholesome triad, the feeling triad and others are analyzed, as in the statement: 'From the sense-sphere wholesome, there are four consciousness-arisings accompanied by joy,' and so on.

Kusalattikepi ca padhānapāsaṃsaubhayahitabhāvato kusalā dhammā paṭhamaṃ vuttā. Kusalā hi dhammā sukhavipākattā sabbasaṅkhatadhammānaṃ uttamā avajjavidhamanato viññuppasatthā idhalokaparalokesu atthāvahā nissaraṇāvahā ca, tasmā padhānādibhāvena paṭhamaṃ vuttā, tappaṭipakkhattā tadanantaraṃ akusalā, tadubhayaviparītasabhāvā tadanantaraṃ abyākatā vuttā. Kusalavasena vā assādo, akusalavasena ādīnavo, abyākatadhammesu nibbānavasena nissaraṇanti iminā assādādikkamena, kusalesu patiṭṭhāya paṇḍitā akusale pajahantā abyākatadhammabhūtamaggaphalaṃ nibbānañca sacchikarontīti iminā vā paṭipattikkamena ayamanupubbī ṭhapitāti veditabbā.

In the wholesome triad, wholesome states are mentioned first because they are primary, praiseworthy, and beneficial in both ways. For wholesome states, being pleasant in their results, are the highest of all conditioned phenomena; they are blameless, praised by the wise, bring benefit in this world and the next, and lead to escape. Therefore, they are mentioned first because they are primary, and so on. Because they are their opposite, unwholesome states are mentioned next. Because their nature is contrary to both, indeterminate states are mentioned after that. Alternatively, by way of the wholesome there is gratification; by way of the unwholesome, danger; and in the indeterminate states, by way of Nibbāna, there is escape. This sequence is by way of gratification, etc. Or, it should be understood that this order is established by way of the sequence of practice: having established themselves in the wholesome, the wise abandon the unwholesome and realize the path, fruit, and Nibbāna, which are indeterminate states.

Kasmā [Pg.35] panettha sekkhattikādīsu viya sarūpato purimapadadvayapaṭikkhepavasena tatiyapadaṃ na vuttaṃ ‘‘nevakusalā nākusalā’’ti? Visesadīpanatthaṃ. Yathā hi sekkhāsekkhasabhāvesu dhammesu kocipi dhammo tadubhayasabhāvena kenacipi pariyāyena kadāci abyākaraṇīyo nāma natthīti sekkhattike padadvayapaṭikkhepavasena ‘‘nevasekkhā nāsekkhā’’tveva vuttaṃ, na evaṃ idha. Idha pana kusalasabhāvā eva dhammā aggaphaluppattiyā tathā na byākaraṇīyā hontīti imassa visesassa dīpanatthaṃ ‘‘abyākatā’’ti vuttaṃ. Vacanamatte eva vā idaṃ nānākaraṇaṃ ‘‘abyākatā nevakusalā nākusalā’’ti byākata-saddena kusalākusalānaṃ bodhitattāti.

But why is the third term here not stated by way of negating the two preceding terms—as 'neither wholesome nor unwholesome'—just as in the triads of the trainee, etc.? To show a distinction. For in the trainee triad, the third term is stated as 'neither-trainee-nor-non-trainee' by way of negating the two preceding terms, because among states that are trainee-states and non-trainee-states, there is no state that is ever in any way undeclarable as having the nature of both. But it is not so here. Here, however, states that are by nature wholesome are not to be declared as such at the moment of the arising of the highest fruit. To show this distinction, the term 'indeterminate' is used. Or, this is merely a verbal difference, since the expression 'indeterminate, i.e., neither wholesome nor unwholesome' shows that the term 'indeterminate' refers to what is other than the wholesome and unwholesome.

Ettha ca akusalesu taṇhāya sabbākusalehi, tebhūmakakusalākusalehi vā samudayasaccaṃ, taṃtaṃavasiṭṭhatebhūmakadhammehi dukkhasaccaṃ, lokuttarakusalena maggasaccaṃ, avasiṭṭhaabyākatavisesena nirodhasaccaṃ dassitaṃ hoti. Tattha samudayena assādo, dukkhena ādīnavo, magganirodhehi nissaraṇaṃ. Kiñcāpi nāmarūpaparicchedabhāvato sabhāvadhammaniddhāraṇapadhānā abhidhammakathā, tesaṃ pana kusalādivisese niddhārite tassa upasampādetabbatādipi atthato vuttameva hoti. Akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ pahānāya kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ upasampadāya ‘‘sabbapāpassa akaraṇaṃ, kusalassa upasampadā’’ti (dha. pa. 183; dī. ni. 2.90) evamādivacanato hi kusalādīnaṃ upasampādanādidassanaparaṃ bhagavato sāsanaṃ, tasmā kusalānaṃ upasampādanaṃ akusalānaṃ pahānañca upāyo, abyākatavisesassa sacchikiriyā phalaṃ, kusalādīnaṃ upasampādanādiatthā desanā āṇattīti ayaṃ desanāhāro.

Herein, craving among the unwholesome states, along with all unwholesome states, or along with the wholesome and unwholesome states of the three planes, is shown as the truth of the origin. The remaining respective phenomena of the three planes are shown as the truth of suffering. The supramundane wholesome is shown as the truth of the path, and the remaining special indeterminate state is shown as the truth of cessation. Therein, with the origin there is gratification, with suffering there is danger, and with the path and cessation there is escape. Although the Abhidhamma discourse is primarily concerned with the determination of states in their own nature, since it is a determination of name-and-form, when their distinctions such as wholesome are determined, their purpose, such as their being attainable, is also stated in meaning. For the Buddha's teaching is concerned with showing the attainment of the wholesome, etc., for the sake of abandoning unwholesome states and attaining wholesome states, as in such sayings as: 'The non-doing of all evil, the undertaking of the wholesome' (Dhp 183; DN 2:49). Therefore, the attainment of the wholesome and the abandoning of the unwholesome is the means; the realization of the special indeterminate state is the fruit. The teaching for the purpose of attaining the wholesome, etc., is the instruction. This is the method of conveying the teaching.

Ārogyaṭṭhena anavajjaṭṭhena kosalyasambhūtaṭṭhena ca kusalā, tappaṭipakkhato akusalā, tadubhayaviparītato abyākatā, sabhāvadhāraṇādiatthena dhammāti anupadavicinanaṃ vicayo hāro.

States are 'wholesome' in the sense of health, in the sense of blamelessness, and in the sense of being produced by skill. They are 'unwholesome' by being the opposite of that. They are 'indeterminate' by being the opposite of both. They are 'phenomena' (dhammā) in the sense of bearing their own intrinsic nature, etc. Word-by-word investigation is the method of inquiry.

Pujjabhavaphalaparinibbutinipphatti kusalehīti yujjati sukhavipākattā, apāyadukkhasaṃsāradukkhuppatti akusalehīti yujjati aniṭṭhaphalattā, tadubhayaphalānaṃ anuppatti abyākatehīti yujjati avipākadhammattāti ayaṃ yutti hāro.

It is logical that the accomplishment of a worthy existence, of the fruit, and of final Nibbāna comes from wholesome states, because they have pleasant results. It is logical that the arising of suffering in the planes of misery and the suffering of saṃsāra comes from unwholesome states, because they have undesirable results. It is logical that the non-arising of the results of both comes from indeterminate states, because they are states that have no result. This is the method of reasoning.

Kusalā [Pg.36] dhammā sukhavipākassa padaṭṭhānaṃ, akusalā dukkhavipākassa, abyākatā kusalākusalābyākatadhammānanti ayaṃ padaṭṭhāno hāro.

Wholesome states are the proximate cause for pleasant results; unwholesome states, for painful results; and indeterminate states, for wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate states. This is the method of the proximate cause.

Kusalaggahaṇena ye anavajjasukhavipākā sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā vipākadhammadhammā anupādinnupādāniyā anupādinnaanupādāniyā…pe… araṇā dhammā, te bodhitā bhavanti kusalalakkhaṇena ekalakkhaṇattā. Tathā akusalaggahaṇena ye sāvajjadukkhavipākā sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttā adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā vipākadhammadhammā anupādinnupādāniyā saṃkiliṭṭhasaṃkilesikā…pe… saraṇā dhammā, te bodhitā bhavanti akusalalakkhaṇena ekalakkhaṇattā. Tathā abyākataggahaṇena ye avipākārahā sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttā adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā vipākā dhammā nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammā upādinnupādāniyā anupādinnupādāniyā anupādinnaanupādāniyā…pe… araṇā dhammā, te bodhitā bhavanti abyākatalakkhaṇena ekalakkhaṇattāti ayaṃ lakkhaṇo hāro.

By the term 'wholesome,' those states that are blameless, have pleasant results, are associated with pleasant feeling, are associated with neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, are conditions for resultant states, are not clung to but are objects of clinging, are not clung to and are not objects of clinging... non-contentious states—all these are indicated, because they share the single characteristic of being wholesome. Similarly, by the term 'unwholesome,' those states that are blameworthy, have painful results, are associated with pleasant feeling, are associated with painful feeling, are associated with neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, are conditions for resultant states, are not clung to but are objects of clinging, are defiled and defiling... contentious states—all these are indicated, because they share the single characteristic of being unwholesome. Likewise, by the term 'indeterminate,' those states that are not conditions for resultant states, are associated with pleasant feeling, are associated with painful feeling, are associated with neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, are resultant states, are neither resultant nor conditions for resultant states, are clung to and are objects of clinging, are not clung to but are objects of clinging, are not clung to and are not objects of clinging... non-contentious states—all these are indicated, because they share the single characteristic of being indeterminate. This is the method of the characteristic.

‘‘Kucchite pāpadhamme salayantī’’tiādinā nirutti veditabbā, kusalādimukhena rūpārūpadhamme pariggahetvā visuddhiparamparāya ‘‘kathaṃ nu kho sattā anupādisesanibbānabhāgino bhaveyyu’’nti ayamettha bhagavato adhippāyo, nidānaṃ asādhāraṇato kusalādibhedena bujjhanakasattā. Sādhāraṇato pana pākaṭameva. Paṭhamaṃ kusalattikassa desanā vicāritāyevāti ayaṃ catubyūho hāro.

The etymology should be understood beginning with: 'They shake off (salayanti) contemptible (kucchite) evil states (pāpadhamme).' Having encompassed form and formless states by way of the wholesome, etc., and following the sequence of purification, the Blessed One’s intention here is: 'How might beings become partakers of the Nibbāna-element with no residue remaining?' The particular occasion (nidāna) is for beings capable of understanding through the classification of wholesome, etc. The general occasion, however, is evident. The teaching of the first wholesome triad has already been examined. This is the method of the fourfold array.

Kusalaggahaṇena kalyāṇamittapariggaho yonisomanasikārapariggaho ca. Tattha paṭhamena sakalaṃ brahmacariyamāvattati, dutiyena ca yonisomanasikāramūlakā dhammā. Akusalaggahaṇena vuttavipariyāyena yojetabbaṃ. Abyākataggahaṇena pana sakalasaṃkilesavodānapakkho yathārahamāvattatīti ayaṃ āvatto hāro.

By the term 'wholesome,' the acquisition of admirable friends and the acquisition of wise attention are included. Therein, by the first, the entire holy life is encompassed; by the second, states rooted in wise attention are encompassed. By the term 'unwholesome,' the stated opposite should be applied. By the term 'indeterminate,' however, the entire side of defilement and purification is encompassed as is fitting. This is the method of revolving.

Tattha kusalā bhūmito catudhā vibhattā, sampayuttapavattiākārādito pana anekadhā. Akusalā bhūmito ekadhā vibhattā, sampayuttādito anekadhā. Abyākatā pana vipākakiriyarūpanibbānavasena catudhā bhūmisampayuttādito anekadhā ca vibhattāti ayaṃ vibhatti hāro.

Therein, wholesome states are divided fourfold by way of plane, but manifold by way of association, mode of occurrence, etc. Unwholesome states are divided onefold by way of plane, but manifold by way of association, etc. Indeterminate states, however, are divided fourfold as resultant, functional, material form, and Nibbāna, and also manifold by way of plane, association, etc. This is the method of division.

Kusalā [Pg.37] dhammā akusalānaṃ tadaṅgādippahānāya vītikkamādippahānāya ca saṃvattanti, akusalā dhammā kusalānaṃ anupasampajjanāya, abyākatesu asaṅkhatadhātu sabbasaṅkhatanissaraṇāyāti ayaṃ parivatto hāro.

Wholesome states conduce to the abandoning of unwholesome states by substitution of opposites, etc., and by abandoning transgression, etc. Unwholesome states conduce to the non-attainment of wholesome states. Among the indeterminate, the unconditioned element is for the escape from all conditioned things. This is the method of conversion.

Kusalā anavajjā puññānīti pariyāyavacanaṃ, akusalā sāvajjā apuññānīti pariyāya vacanaṃ, abyākatā avipākārahā nevaācayagāmī naapacayagāmīnoti pariyāyavacananti ayaṃ vevacano hāro.

'Wholesome,' 'blameless,' 'meritorious'—these are synonyms. 'Unwholesome,' 'blameworthy,' 'demeritorious'—these are synonyms. 'Indeterminate,' 'not yielding a result,' 'leading neither to accumulation nor to decrease'—these are synonyms. This is the method of synonyms.

Kusalādayo ‘‘yasmiṃ samaye’’tiādinā pabhavabhūmivevacanapaññattivasena yathāsambhavaṃ pariññādipaññattivasena ca paññattāti ayaṃ paññatti hāro.

The wholesome, etc., are designated by way of designation as synonym for source and ground through phrases like 'at what time...,' and also, as is possible, by way of designation as 'to be fully understood,' etc. This is the method of designation.

Akusalānaṃ kucchitānaṃ pāpadhammānaṃ salanaṃ kusānaṃ viya kusānaṃ vā rāgādīnaṃ lavanaṃ evaṃdhammatāti ayaṃ paṭiccasamuppādamukhena avataraṇaṃ, tathā kusena lātabbā kosallasambhūtā cāti paccayapaṭibaddhavuttitāya paṭiccasamuppāda…pe… avataraṇaṃ, paccayapaṭibaddhavuttitāya vā ādiantavantā aniccantikā cāti aniccatāmukhena avataraṇaṃ, aniccatā eva udayabbayapaṭipīḷitatāya dukkhāti dukkhatāmukhena avataraṇaṃ, nissattanijjīvaṭṭhena dhammāti abyāpārato suññatāmukhena avataraṇaṃ, evaṃ kusalāti cattāro khandhā dvāyatanāni dve dhātuyotiādinā khandhāyatanadhātādimukhenapi avataraṇaṃ veditabbaṃ. Iminā nayena akusalābyākatesupi avataraṇaṃ dassetabbanti ayaṃ avataraṇo hāro.

The entry by way of dependent origination is: (1) 'wholesome' (kusala) means the shaking (salana) of unwholesome, contemptible (kucchita) evil states (pāpadhammā); or (2) the cutting (lavana) of evil things (kusa) such as lust. (3) Similarly, it is 'wholesome' because it is to be obtained (lātabba) by means of wisdom (kusena) and is produced from skill (kosallasambhūtā). This is an entry by way of dependent origination because of its nature as being conditioned. The entry by way of impermanence is: because their existence is conditioned, they have a beginning and an end and are thus impermanent. The entry by way of suffering is: impermanence itself is suffering because it is oppressed by rise and fall. The entry by way of emptiness is: they are 'phenomena' because they are without a self or a soul, and thus void of agency. Thus, the entry should also be understood by way of the aggregates, bases, and elements, as in: 'wholesome' refers to the four aggregates, two bases, two elements, etc. In this way, the entry for the unwholesome and indeterminate should also be shown. This is the method of entry.

Kusalāti ārambho, dhammāti padasuddhi, no ārambhasuddhi. Tathā akusalā dhammā abyākatāti, dhammāti pana padasuddhi ārambhasuddhi cāti ayaṃ sodhano hāro.

'Wholesome' is the introduction. 'Phenomena' is a clarification of the term, not a clarification of the introduction. Similarly, in 'unwholesome phenomena' and 'indeterminate phenomena,' 'phenomena' is both a clarification of the term and a clarification of the introduction. This is the method of clarification.

Dhammāti sāmaññato adhiṭṭhānaṃ, taṃ avikappetvā visesavacanaṃ kusalākusalābyākatāti. Tathā kusalā dhammāti sāmaññato adhiṭṭhānaṃ, taṃ avikappetvā kāmāvacaraṃ somanassasahagatantiādi visesavacanaṃ. Akusalā dhammātiādīsupi eseva nayoti ayaṃ adhiṭṭhāno hāro.

'Phenomena' is the general topic. Without analyzing this, the specific terms are 'wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate.' Similarly, 'wholesome phenomena' is a general topic. Without analyzing this, the specific terms are 'of the sense sphere, accompanied by joy,' etc. The same method applies to 'unwholesome phenomena,' etc. This is the method of the topic.

Kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ navamo khaṇo cattāri ca sampatticakkāni yonisomanasikāro eva vā hetu, vuttavipariyāyena akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ hetu, kusalākusalā dhammā yathāsambhavaṃ abyākatānaṃ dhammānaṃ hetūti ayaṃ parikkhāro hāro.

For wholesome phenomena, the ninth moment and the four wheels of accomplishment are a cause, or wise attention itself is a cause. For unwholesome phenomena, the cause is the opposite of what has been stated. Wholesome and unwholesome phenomena are, as is possible, causes for indeterminate phenomena. This is the Requisite Mode.

Kusalāti [Pg.38] pariññeyyaggahaṇañceva bhāvetabbaggahaṇañca. Akusalāti pariññeyyaggahaṇañceva pahātabbaggahaṇañca. Abyākatāti pariññeyyaggahaṇañceva sacchikātabbaggahaṇañca. Dhammāti pariññādīnaṃ pavattanākāraggahaṇaṃ. Tena pariññeyyappahānabhāvanāsacchikaraṇāni dīpitānīti tadaṅgādivītikkamādippahānāni lokiyalokuttarā ca bhāvanā dassitāti ayaṃ samāropano hāro.

"Wholesome" means the grasping of what is to be fully understood and the grasping of what is to be developed. "Unwholesome" means the grasping of what is to be fully understood and the grasping of what is to be abandoned. "Indeterminate" means the grasping of what is to be fully understood and the grasping of what is to be realized. "Phenomena" means the grasping of the mode of operation of full understanding and so on. By this, what is to be fully understood, abandoning, development, and realization are indicated. Thus, the abandonings, such as the overcoming of their factors, and mundane and supramundane development are shown. This is the Superimposition Mode.

Kāmañcetaṃ avisesato sabhāvadhammakathanaṃ, visesavanto pana dhammā visesato niddhāritā. Tathā hi citteneva samayo niyamito, tasmā kusalaggahaṇena visesato sādhiṭṭhāno samatho vipassanā ca dassitāti. Tathā tappaṭipakkhato akusalaggahaṇena sādhiṭṭhānā taṇhā avijjā ca, abyākataggahaṇena saparivārā cetovimutti paññāvimutti cāti ayaṃ nandiyāvattassa nayassa bhūmi.

Granted, this is a general explanation of phenomena in their own-nature, but distinctive phenomena are specifically determined. For the occasion is determined by the mind itself; therefore, by grasping the wholesome, serenity and insight are shown as specifically grounded. Similarly, as its opposite, by grasping the unwholesome, craving and ignorance are shown as grounded. By grasping the indeterminate, liberation of mind and liberation by wisdom, along with their retinue, are shown. This is the ground for the Nandiyāvatta method.

Tathā kusalaggahaṇena mūlabhāvavisesato tīṇi kusalamūlāni, tesu ca adosena sīlakkhandho, alobhena samādhikkhandho, amohena paññākkhandho nīyati. Tathā akusalaggahaṇena tīṇi akusalamūlāni, tesu ca lobhena tadekaṭṭhā akusalā dhammā. Tathā dosamohehi taṃtadekaṭṭhā. Abyākataggahaṇena appaṇihitānimittasuññatā nīyantīti ayaṃ tipukkhalassa nayassa bhūmi.

Likewise, by grasping the wholesome, the three wholesome roots are inferred from the specific nature of being a root. And among them, by non-hatred the aggregate of virtue is inferred; by non-greed, the aggregate of concentration; by non-delusion, the aggregate of wisdom. Likewise, by grasping the unwholesome, the three unwholesome roots are inferred. And among them, by greed, the unwholesome phenomena that share its basis are inferred; likewise, by hatred and delusion, the phenomena that share their respective bases are inferred. By grasping the indeterminate, the desireless, the signless, and emptiness are inferred. This is the ground for the Tipukkhala method.

Tathā kusalaggahaṇena yato kosallato sambhūtā kusalā, taṃ paññindriyaṃ. Taṃsahajātā tadupanissayā ca saddahanussahanāpilāpāvikkhepā saddhindriyādīni. Tehi ca sabbe saddhammā bodhitā bhavanti. Akusalaggahaṇena akosallapaṭicchāditādīnavesu kāyavedanācittadhammesu subhasukhaniccaattābhinivesabhūtā cattāro vipallāsā. Abyākataggahaṇena yathāvuttaindriyapaccayāni yathāvuttavipallāsappahānabhūtāni ca cattāri sāmaññaphalāni bodhitānīti ayaṃ sīhavikkīḷitassa nayassa bhūmīti ime tayo atthanayā.

Likewise, by grasping the wholesome: that skillfulness from which wholesome states arise is the faculty of wisdom. Co-arisen with it and having it as decisive support are the faculties of faith and so on, which are faith, energy, mindfulness, and non-distraction. And through these, one awakens to all the true teachings. By grasping the unwholesome: the four distortions—which consist of adherence to the attractive, pleasure, permanence, and self with regard to body, feeling, mind, and phenomena—are inferred, these being among the disadvantages such as being concealed by unskillfulness. By grasping the indeterminate: the four fruits of recluseship—which are the faculties and conditions as stated above, and which consist of the abandonment of the distortions as stated above—are awakened to. This is the ground for the Sīhavikkīḷita method. These are the three methods of meaning.

Tehi ca siddhehi dve kammanayāpi siddhā hontīti. Ayaṃ tiko sabbadhammasaṅgahitasabbabhāgiyo veditabboti idaṃ sāsanapaṭṭhānaṃ.

And when these are established, the two methods of action are also established. This triad should be understood as comprising all phenomena and being all-inclusive. This is the foundation of the Teaching.

Ayaṃ tāva nettinayena kusalattikavaṇṇanā.

This, for now, is the exposition of the wholesome triad according to the Netti method.

Evaṃ [Pg.39] vedanāttikādīsupi yathāsambhavaṃ catusaccaniddhāraṇādividhinā soḷasa hārā pañca nayā niddisitabbā, ativitthārabhayena pana na vitthārayāma. Sakkā hi iminā nayena tesu tesu tikadukesu taṃtaṃhāranayayojanānurūpadhammaniddhāraṇavasena te te hāranayā viññunā niddisitunti.

In the same way, for the feeling triad and others, as may be possible, the sixteen modes and the five methods should be indicated by the procedure of determining the four truths, etc. But, fearing excessive detail, we do not elaborate. For by this method a wise person can indicate those respective modes and methods for those respective triads and dyads by way of determining the phenomena appropriate to the application of the respective modes and methods.

2. Tañca sukhindriyaṃ sukhavedanā eva hoti sāmaññassa bhedapariyādānato, bhedassa ca sāmaññapariccāgatoti adhippāyo. Yasmā pana visesasāmaññāni avayavasamudāyā viya aññamaññato bhinnāni, tasmā ‘‘na pana…pe… samānatthattā’’ti vuttaṃ. Idāni tameva nesaṃ bhinnatatvaṃ ‘‘ayañhī’’tiādinā vivarati. Tanti sukhahetūnaṃ kāraṇaṃ. Tena sukhassa kāraṇaṃ sukhahetu, sukhassa kāraṇakāraṇaṃ sukhamūlanti dasseti. Sukhahetūnanti ettha hetu-saddena kāraṇabhāvasāmaññato hetupaccayā saṅgahitāti āha ‘‘puññapassaddhiādīna’’nti. Ettha ca sukhamūlasukhahetūsu phalūpacārena, sukhārammaṇasukhapaccayaṭṭhānesu sukhasahacariyāya, abyāpajjanibbānesu dukkhāpagamabhāvena sukhapariyāyo vuttoti daṭṭhabbo. Iṭṭhāsūti sukhupekkhānaṃ vipariṇāmāññāṇasaṅkhāradukkhatāya aniṭṭhabhāvopi atthīti viseseti. Upekkhameva vā apekkhitvā visesanaṃ kataṃ. Sā hi akusalavipākabhūtā aniṭṭhāpi atthīti. Evamādīsūti ādi-saddena ‘‘sovaggikaṃ sukhavipāka’’nti (dī. ni. 1.163) evamādiṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Iṭṭhapariyāyo hi ettha sukha-saddoti.

2. And that faculty of pleasure is indeed pleasant feeling, because the particular takes up the general, and the meaning is that the general is relinquished by the particular. However, because the specific and the general are distinct from each other like parts and a whole, it is therefore said: 'But not... because of having the same meaning.' Now he explains that very distinctness of theirs with the words 'for this....' 'That' means the cause of the causes of pleasure. By this he shows that the cause of pleasure is the 'pleasure-cause,' and the cause of the cause of pleasure is the 'pleasure-root.' Regarding 'of pleasure-causes,' he says 'of merit, tranquility, etc.,' stating that here, by the word 'cause,' the root condition is included because of the generality of the state of being a cause. And here it should be seen that the term 'pleasure' is used figuratively for the result in the case of the pleasure-root and pleasure-causes; by association with pleasure in the case of a pleasure-object and a pleasure-condition; and as the removal of suffering in the case of non-ill will and Nibbāna. Regarding 'in desirable [objects]': he specifies that because of the suffering due to change, ignorance, and formations in pleasant and equanimous feelings, there is also an undesirable aspect. Or the qualification is made with reference to equanimity itself, for as an unwholesome resultant it can also be undesirable. Regarding 'and so on': by the word 'etc.' he includes such phrases as 'the pleasant result leading to heaven.' For here the word 'pleasure' is a synonym for 'desirable'.

Saṅkhāradukkhādīsūti ettha ādi-saddena ‘‘ṭhitisukhaṃ vipariṇāmadukkhaṃ, akusalaṃ kāyakammaṃ dukkhudrayaṃ dukkhavipāka’’ntiādike saṅgaṇhāti. Yathākkamaṃ sukhavedanā dukkhaaniṭṭhapariyāyo hi ettha dukkha-saddoti. Dukkhavedanādukkhavatthuādīsu dukkhasaddappavatti vuttanayeneva yojetabbā. Vipākāvipākabhedāya sabbāyapi sukhavedanāya vasena lakkhaṇassa vuttattā tadubhayānukūlamatthaṃ vivaranto ‘‘sabhāvato’’tiādimāha. Tattha vipākā sabhāvato iṭṭhassa anubhavanalakkhaṇā. Itarā sabhāvato saṅkappato ca iṭṭhassa iṭṭhākārassa vā anubhavanalakkhaṇāti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

Regarding 'suffering due to formations, etc.,' here by the word 'etc.' he includes such things as: 'the pleasure of duration is the suffering of change,' and 'unwholesome bodily action has a painful outcome and a painful result.' For here the word 'suffering' is a synonym for the undesirable, as applied respectively to pleasant feeling and to suffering. The application of the word 'suffering' in cases such as painful feeling, the basis of suffering, etc., should be connected in the way stated. Since the characteristic has been stated with reference to all pleasant feeling, in order to account for the distinction between resultant and non-resultant, he said 'by nature,' etc., clarifying a meaning that accords with both. Therein, the resultant ones are by nature characterized by the experience of the desirable. It should be seen that the others are characterized by the experience of the desirable, or of the desirable aspect, both by nature and by conception.

Asamānapaccayehi [Pg.40] ekajjhaṃ uppattito samānapaccayehi ekajjhaṃ uppatti sātisayāti ukkaṃsagativijānanavasena ‘‘samānapaccayehi sahuppattikāti attho’’ti vuttaṃ. Atha vā uppajjanaṃ uppādo, uppajjati etasmāti uppādoti duvidhopi uppādo ekuppādāti ettha ekasesanayena saṅgahitoti iminā adhippāyena ‘‘samā…pe… attho’’ti vuttaṃ siyā. Tena tāni ekavatthukānīti etassa ca ‘‘kappentassā’’tiādinā sambandho. Tattha purimavikappe ekaṃ vatthu nissayo etesanti yojanā, na ekaṃyeva vatthūti. Ekekabhūtassa bhūtattayanissitattā catubhūtanissitattā ca upādārūpānaṃ. Dutiyavikappe pana ekaṃyeva vatthu etesu nissitanti yojanā. Nissayanissitatāsaṅkhātaupakāropakattabbabhāvadīpanaṃ ekavatthukavacananti dutiyavikappe mahābhūtavasena yojanā katā. Itarathā ekaṃ vatthu etesūti samāsatthabhāvena upādārūpānampi pariggaho vattabbo siyā. Pañcaviññāṇasampaṭicchanānanti idaṃ nidassananti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Kiriyamanodhātucakkhuviññāṇādayopi hi ekārammaṇābhinnavatthukā cāti pākaṭoyamatthoti. Santīraṇādīnanti ādi-saddena voṭṭhabbanajavanatadārammaṇāni saṅgayhanti, etāni ca sampaṭicchanādīni cutiāsannāni idhādhippetānīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tāni hi taduddhaṃ kammajarūpassa anuppattito ekasmiṃyeva hadayavatthusmiṃ vattanti, itarāni pana purimapurimacittakkhaṇuppanne hadayavatthusmiṃ uttaruttarāni pavattantīti. Chasu vā vatthūsu ekaṃ hadayavatthuyeva vatthu etesanti evaṃ pana atthe sati cutiāsannato itaresaṃ sampaṭicchanādīnaṃ gahaṇaṃ siyāti ñātabbaṃ.

Because arising together from similar conditions is superior to arising together from dissimilar conditions, it is said, by way of understanding its superiority: 'The meaning is co-arising from similar conditions.' Or else, it might have been said 'co-... the meaning is...' with the intention that, since 'arising' (uppajjana) is 'production' (uppāda), and 'it is production (uppādo) because one arises (uppajjati) from it,' both kinds of production are included here as 'one production' by the principle of ellipsis. The connection of the statement 'Therefore they have a single physical basis' is with 'for one who construes,' etc. Therein, in the first alternative, the construction is: 'one physical basis is the support for these,' not 'one and the same physical basis,' because derived materiality is dependent on the three great primaries individually and on the four great primaries collectively. But in the second alternative, the construction is: 'one and the same physical basis is supported by these.' In the second alternative, the statement 'having a single physical basis' is construed in terms of the great primaries to show the state of being a support and what is supported, a condition and what is to be conditioned. Otherwise, if the meaning of the compound were 'one physical basis for these,' the inclusion of derived materiality would also have to be stated. It should be seen that 'the five sense consciousnesses and receiving' is an illustration. For it is a plain fact that the functional mind-element, eye-consciousness, etc., have a single object but different physical bases. By 'investigating, etc.,' are included determining, impulsion, and registration. And it should be seen that here what is intended are receiving, etc., that are near death. For after that, because new kamma-born matter does not arise, they occur in one and the same heart-basis; but other thought processes occur with the subsequent consciousnesses arising in a heart-basis produced in a prior mind-moment. Or else, it should be known that if the meaning is taken as 'among the six bases, the heart-basis alone is the physical basis for these,' then the taking of receiving, etc., would be of those near death, to the exclusion of others.

Etthāha – ‘‘kasmā panettha kusalattikānantaraṃ vedanāttikova vutto’’ti? Kismiṃ pana vuccamāne ayamanuyogo na siyā, apica avayavānaṃ anekabhedatādassanatthā tikantaradesanā. Sammāsambuddhena hi kusalattikena sabbadhammānaṃ tidhā vibhāgaṃ dassetvā puna tadavayavānaṃ kusalādīnampi anekabhedabhinnataṃ dassentena tesaṃ vedanāsampayogavibhāgavibhāvanatthaṃ ‘‘sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā’’ti vuttaṃ. Kusalā hi dhammā siyā sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā, siyā adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā. Akusalā dhammā siyā sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā, siyā dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttā, siyā adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā, tathā abyākatā sampayogārahāti. Evaṃ kusalādidhammānaṃ [Pg.41] paccekaṃ vedanābhedena vibhāgadassanatthaṃ kusalattikānantaraṃ vedanāttikaṃ vatvā idāni sukhasampayuttādīnaṃ paccekaṃ vipākādibhedabhinnataṃ dassetuṃ vedanāttikānantaraṃ vipākattiko vutto. Sukhasampayuttā hi dhammā siyā vipākā, siyā vipākadhammadhammā, siyā nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammā. Tathā adukkhamasukhasampayuttā, dukkhasampayuttā pana siyā vipākā, siyā vipākadhammadhammāti iminā nayena avasesattikānaṃ dukānañca tassa tassa anantaravacane payojanaṃ vibhāvetabbaṃ.

Here it is said: "But why, after the wholesome triad, is only the feeling triad mentioned?" Indeed, in discussing what, would this question not arise? Rather, the teaching of successive triads is to show the manifold distinctions of the constituents. For the Fully Enlightened One, having first shown the threefold division of all phenomena by means of the wholesome triad, then, to show the manifold distinctions of those very constituents—even the wholesome and so on—for the purpose of clarifying their classification by association with feeling, it is said: "associated with pleasant feeling." For wholesome phenomena may be associated with pleasant feeling, or with neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. Unwholesome phenomena may be associated with pleasant feeling, or with painful feeling, or with neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. Similarly, indeterminate phenomena are capable of such associations. Thus, to show the distinct classification of wholesome and other phenomena according to their individual feeling-related distinctions, the feeling triad was stated immediately after the wholesome triad. Now, to show the distinctions of those associated with pleasure, etc., individually divided into results and so forth, the resultant triad was stated immediately after the feeling triad. For phenomena associated with pleasure may be results, or result-producing, or neither results nor result-producing. Similarly, those associated with neither-pain-nor-pleasure; painful phenomena, however, may be results or result-producing. In this way, the purpose behind the successive teaching of the remaining triads and dyads should be understood according to each respective context.

3. Vipākaniruttiñca labhantīti tesu vipākasaddassa niruḷhataṃ dasseti. Sukkakaṇhādīti ādi-saddena akaṇhaasukkaphassādibhāvo pariggahito. Sati pana pāka-saddassa phalapariyāyabhāve rūpaṃ viya na nihīno pakkaṃ viya visiṭṭho pākoti vipākoti evaṃ vā ettha attho daṭṭhabbo. Sabyāpāratāti saussāhatā. Santāne sabyāpāratāti etena cittappayogasaṅkhātena kiriyābhāvena vipākadhammānaṃ santānavisesamāha ‘‘yato yasmiṃ cittuppāde kusalākusalā cetanā, taṃsantāne eva tassā vipākuppattī’’ti. Ettha ca ‘‘sabyāpāratā’’ti etena āvajjanadvayaṃ vipākañca nivatteti, ‘‘anupacchinnāvijjātaṇhāmāne’’ti iminā avasiṭṭhaṃ kiriyaṃ nivatteti. Ubhayenapi anusayasahāyasaussāhatālakkhaṇā vipākadhammadhammāti dasseti. Lokuttarakusalānampi hi anusayā upanissayā honti, yato ‘‘katame dhammā kusalā? Yasmiṃ samaye lokuttaraṃ…pe… tasmiṃ samaye avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā’’tiādinā (vibha. 342) ariyamaggacetanāya avijjāupanissayatā paṭiccasamuppādavibhaṅge pakāsitā. Nirussāhasantabhāvalakkhaṇā vipākā, ubhayaviparītalakkhaṇā nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammāti.

3. They also obtain the resultant expression, thus showing the established usage of the term "resultant" among them. By 'bright and dark, etc.,' the word 'etc.' includes the nature of contact that is neither dark nor bright. However, when the term 'pāka' (result) is used in the sense of 'fruit' (phala), its meaning here should be understood as 'vipāka' (resultant), which is not inferior like form (rūpa) but distinguished like ripened fruit (pakka). 'Being active' means being energetic. 'Being active in the continuum'—by this, he states the distinctive continuum of result-producing phenomena through their active nature, which is known as the application of consciousness: 'From whatever consciousness arises, whether wholesome or unwholesome volition, in that very continuum its resultant arises.' Here, the phrase 'being active' excludes both the two kinds of adverting and resultant states, while the phrase 'uninterrupted by ignorance, craving, and conceit' excludes the remaining functional states. Through both, he shows that result-producing phenomena have the characteristic of being energetic and accompanied by latent tendencies. For even the wholesome transcendent states have latent tendencies as their supporting condition, as stated in the Vibhaṅga: 'Which phenomena are wholesome? At the time when the transcendent... at that time, formations arise dependent on ignorance...'—thus, in the Analysis of Dependent Origination, the noble path volition is shown to have ignorance as its supporting condition. Resultants have the characteristic of being non-energetic and peaceful, while phenomena that are neither resultant nor result-producing have characteristics opposite to both.

Abhiññādikusalānanti ādi-saddena ‘‘ahosi kammaṃ nāhosi kammavipāko’’ti (paṭi. ma. 1.234) iminā tikena saṅgahitaṃ gatiupadhikālapayogābhāvena avipākaṃ diṭṭhadhammavedanīyaṃ upapajjavedanīyañca saṅgaṇhāti. Aparāpariyavedanīyaṃ pana saṃsārappavattiyaṃ ahosikammādibhāvaṃ na bhajati. Bhāvanāya pahātabbādīti ādi-saddena dassanena pahātabbaṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Ubhayampi ‘‘vipākānuppādane’’ti vacanato gatiupadhikālapayogābhāvena anuppannavipākameva adhippetaṃ bhāvanāya pahātabbassapi pavattivipākassa [Pg.42] anujānanato. Yesaṃ pana bhāvanāya pahātabbā avipākā, tesaṃ matena ādi-saddena dassanena pahātabbassa ahosikammanti evaṃpakārasseva pariggahoti veditabbaṃ.

By 'wholesome states such as supernormal knowledge,' the word 'etc.' includes what is encompassed by the triad 'there was kamma, there was no kammic result' (Paṭi. Ma. 1.234), namely, non-resultant kamma experienced in the present life or in the next life, due to the absence of conditions like destination, basis, time, and means. However, kamma that is experienced in subsequent lives does not adopt the nature of 'there was kamma' and so on, in the continuation of saṃsāra. By 'to be abandoned by development, etc.,' the word 'etc.' includes what is to be abandoned by insight. Both—those that do not produce results (vipākānuppādana) and those to be abandoned by development (bhāvanā)—are intended here as kamma whose results have not yet arisen due to the absence of destination, basis, time, and means, because resultant kamma that arises in the course of existence is acknowledged even for what is to be abandoned by development. However, according to those for whom the kammas to be abandoned by development are non-resultant, it should be understood that the word 'etc.' includes only those of the type to be abandoned by insight, such as 'there was kamma,' and so on.

4. ‘‘Kathamādinnā’’ti ayampi pañho labbhati. ‘‘Phalabhāvenā’’ti hi ādānappakāravacanaṃ. Kesañci gotrabhupaccavekkhaṇādīnaṃ upetakiriyabhūtānaṃ taṃkattubhūtānañca atthānaṃ upetabbasambandhabhāvato tadabhidhāyinopi saddā sambandhā evāti ‘‘upetasaddasambandhinā’’ti vuttaṃ. Upetanti hi upetabbatthe vuccamāne avassaṃ upetakiriyā upetā ca ñāyatīti. ‘‘Rūpadhātuyā kho pana, gahapati, yo chando yo rāgo yā nandī yā taṇhā ye upayupādānā, cetaso adhiṭṭhānā abhinivesā anusayā’’tiādīsu ‘‘upayo’’ti taṇhādiṭṭhiyo adhippetāti āha ‘‘upaya…pe… diṭṭhīhī’’ti. Yathāsambhavanti ‘‘ārammaṇakaraṇavasenā’’tiādinā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaatthesu yo yo sambhavati yojetuṃ, so soti attho. Na vacanānupubbenāti ‘‘kiṃ pana taṃ upeta’’ntiādinā vuttavacanānupubbena na yojetabbo. Sabbapaccayuppannānanti sabbatebhūmakapaccayuppannānaṃ. Nāpajjati sāmaññajotanāya visese avaṭṭhānato visesatthinā ca viseso anupayujjatīti taṃ pana visesaṃ vuttappakāraṃ niyametvā dassetuṃ ‘‘bodhaneyyā’’tiādi vuttaṃ.

4. 'How is it taken up?' This question also arises. For 'by way of fruit' is a term referring to the manner of taking up. For some, terms like gotrabhu and reviewing, being actions to be approached and purposes for that agent, are connected with what is to be approached; hence, even the words denoting them are connected. Thus, it is said 'connected with words related to what is to be approached.' For when 'to be approached' is said regarding what is to be achieved, inevitably the action of approaching and the one who approaches are also understood. In passages such as 'In the form realm, householder, whatever desire, whatever passion, whatever delight, whatever craving, whatever attachments and clingings, mental resolves, adherences, underlying tendencies,' the term 'upaya' is intended to mean craving and views. Thus, it is said 'upaya... views.' 'According to what is possible' means that among the meanings stated in the commentary, such as 'by way of object and cause,' whatever can be connected should be connected. 'Not by the sequence of words' means it should not be connected by the sequence of words stated, as in 'but what is that which is approached?' etc. 'All phenomena arisen from conditions' means those arisen from conditions in all three realms. It is not fitting for a general indication to establish a specific; and for one who seeks a specific, that specific is not unsuitable. Therefore, to show that specific in the prescribed manner, having defined it, 'to be awakened' etc., is stated.

Upetaṃ dīpetīti yathā ‘‘pācariyo’’ti ettha pagato ācariyo pācariyoti pa-saddo pagataṃ dīpeti, evaṃ upa-saddo upetaṃ dīpeti eva, na cettha gatādiatthānaṃ ekantena paccattavacanayogo icchitoti. Atisaddo viyāti ca idaṃ sasādhanakiriyādīpanasāmaññena vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Paccayabhāvenāti etena purimanibbattiṃ viseseti. Tena sahajātassapi upādānassa saṅgaho kato hoti. Sahajātopi hi dhammo paccayabhūto purimanipphanno viya voharīyati yathā ‘‘ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ paṭicca tayo mahābhūtā’’ti, ‘‘ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭicca tayo khandhā’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.53) ca. Dhātukathāyaṃ pakāsitanti ‘‘upapattibhavo pañcahi khandhehi ekādasahāyatanehi sattarasahi dhātūhi saṅgahito. Katihi asaṅgahito. Na kehici khandhehi ekenāyatanena ekāya dhātuyā asaṅgahito’’ti (dhātu. 67) evamādiṃ [Pg.43] sandhāyāha. Tasmā evāti upādinnasaddānapekkhattā eva. Avisesetvāti upādinnānupādinnavisesaṃ akatvā. Upādānānaṃ ārammaṇabhāvānativattanato upādānehi upādātabbāti vā upādāniyā, upādātuṃ vā arahantīti upādāniyā, upādāne niyuttāti vā upādāniyā ka-kārassa ya-kāraṃ katvāti evamettha attho daṭṭhabboti.

'Upetaṃ dīpetīti' (it indicates what is approached/acquired) means that just as in the word 'pācariyo' (pre-eminent teacher), the prefix 'pa-' indicates 'pagato' (pre-eminent), so too the prefix 'upa-' indicates 'upetaṃ' (approached/acquired); and here, the application of meanings like 'going' (gata) is not exclusively desired as its own particular meaning. And 'like the word ati' should be understood as stated in common with indicating actions with their means. 'By way of condition'—by this, it specifies the previous arising. By this, even the simultaneous arising of clinging is included. For even a simultaneously arisen phenomenon is spoken of as a condition as if previously arisen, such as 'one great element conditions the other three great elements' or 'one aggregate conditions the other three aggregates' (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.53). 'As explained in the Dhātukathā' refers to passages such as: 'The state of rebirth is included by the five aggregates, eleven bases, and seventeen elements. By how many is it not included? It is not included by any aggregate, one base, or one element' (Dhātu. 67). 'Therefore, indeed' means precisely because it does not depend on the term 'upādinnā' (clung-to). 'Without distinguishing' means without making a distinction between clung-to and not-clung-to. Because they do not transcend being objects of clinging, or because they are to be clung to by clinging, they are called 'upādāniyā' (fit to be clung to). Alternatively, 'upādāniyā' means 'suitable to be clung to,' or 'connected to clinging,' where the 'ka' sound is changed to 'ya.' This is how the meaning should be understood here.

5. Vibādhanaṃ pīḷanaṃ kilamanaṃ upatāpo pariḷāho appassaddhibhāvo. Vidūsitā malīnā ca yato keci akilesasabhāvāpi aniṭṭhaphalā gārayhā ca jātā.

5. Harassment, oppression, weariness, distress, feverishness, lack of tranquility. They are corrupted and stained because some, even though not of the nature of defilements, have arisen as undesirable results and are blameworthy.

6. ‘‘Sīlamattakaṃ, paraṃ viya mattāyā’’tiādīsu mattā-saddassa pamāṇavācakatā daṭṭhabbā. Mariyādavācako vā mattā-saddo. Vicāro hettha jhānaṅgesu heṭṭhimamariyādo, na paṭhamajjhānaupacārajjhānesu viya vitakko. Sā pana vicāramariyādatā vitakkābhāvena etesaṃ jātāti avitakkaggahaṇaṃ kataṃ. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – avitakkā hutvā vicāramariyādajhānaṅgesu vicāraheṭṭhimakoṭikāti. Atha vā īsadattho mattā-saddo ‘‘mattāsukhapariccāgā’’tiādīsu (dha. pa. 290) viya. Ayañhettha attho – vitakkarahitā bhāvanāya atisukhumabhūtavicārattā īsaṃ vicārā ca avitakkavicāramattāti. Na hi ito paraṃ vicāro atthīti. Yadi vitakkavisesarahitā vicāramattā, evaṃ sante avitakkavacanaṃ kimatthiyanti āha ‘‘vicāramattavacanenā’’tiādi. Yadi vicāramattato aññesampi avitakkānaṃ atthibhāvajotanatthaṃ avitakkavacanaṃ, avitakkā ca vicāramattā avicārāti nivattetabbā gahetabbā ca, evaṃ sati vicāramattā visesanaṃ, avitakkā visesitabbāti vicāramattāvitakkāti vattabbanti codanaṃ manasi katvā āha ‘‘visesanavisesitabbabhāvo’’tiādi. Yathākāmanti vattuicchānurūpaṃ. Yena yena hi pakārena dhammesu nivattetabbagahetabbabhāvā labbhanti, tena tena pakārena visesanavisesitabbabhāvo sambhavatīti. Padānaṃ anukkamo padānukkamo.

6. In phrases like “merely virtue, like a measure for others,” the word mattā should be understood as denoting quantity. Alternatively, the word mattā signifies a limit. Here, reflection (vicāra) is the lower limit among the jhāna factors, not like initial application (vitakka) in the access and first jhānas. Because this state of having reflection as the limit arises for them through the absence of initial application, the term ‘without initial application’ (avitakka) is used. This means: being without initial application, they have reflection as the lower limit among the jhāna factors. Or, the word mattā conveys a slight sense, as in phrases like ‘giving up a slight pleasure’ (Dhp 290). Here, the meaning is this: due to the absence of initial application in meditation and the extreme subtlety of reflection, there is only a slight reflection—thus ‘without initial application and with a trace of reflection.’ For beyond this, there is no reflection. If they are merely with reflection, devoid of the specific quality of initial application, then what is the purpose of the term ‘without initial application’? To this, it is said: ‘by the expression “a trace of reflection,”’ etc. If the term ‘without initial application’ is used to indicate the existence of other things that are without initial application beyond just a trace of reflection, and if those without reflection are to be excluded while those without initial application and with a trace of reflection are to be accepted, then in that case ‘a trace of reflection’ is the qualifier and ‘without initial application’ is what is qualified. Hence, it should be stated as ‘vicāramattāvitakkā.’ Considering this objection, it is said: ‘the relation of qualifier and qualified,’ etc. ‘As one wishes’ means according to the speaker’s intention. For in whatever way the states of exclusion and inclusion are found in phenomena, in that way the relation of qualifier and qualified is possible. The sequence of words is the ‘word sequence’ (padānukkamo).

Avitakkā savitakkā ca savicārā avicārā cāti avitakkāsavicārā savitakkā avicārāti yojetabbaṃ. Ubhayekadesadassanampi ubhayadassananti adhippāyena ‘‘yadi savitakkasavicārā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Itarampi pakāsetunti [Pg.44] idaṃ yathā savitakkasavicāresu cittuppādesu vitakko avitakkasavicāratāya ‘‘avitakkavicāramatto’’ti vutto, evaṃ yathāvuttacittuppādesu vicāro ‘‘savitakkaavicāro’’ti sakkā viññātunti imamatthaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Vitakkābhāvena ete vicāramattāti ayampi attho visesanivattiatthaṃyeva mattā-saddaṃ gahetvā vutto. Vicāramattāti hi vicāramattavantoti viññāyamānattā tadaññavisesavirahasāmaññato nivattetvā vitakkavisesavirahasaṅkhāte avitakka-saddo sannidhāpito viseseti dutiyajjhānadhammeti. Yathāha ‘‘na vicārato’’tiādi.

Without initial application, with initial application, with reflection, without reflection—thus, it should be connected as ‘without initial application but with reflection’ and ‘with initial application but without reflection.’ Even seeing a part of both is with the intention of seeing both. Hence, ‘if with initial application and reflection,’ etc., was stated. The remainder should also be explained. Just as in the case of initial-application-accompanied and reflection-accompanied states of mind, initial application, due to being without initial application and with reflection, is called ‘merely with reflection,’ so too in the aforementioned states of mind, it is possible to understand reflection as ‘with initial application but without reflection.’ This was stated with this meaning in mind. ‘These are merely with reflection due to the absence of initial application’—this meaning too is stated, taking the word ‘merely’ in the sense of excluding a distinction. For ‘merely with reflection’ means having merely reflection, since it is understood as such. Having excluded a general state without any other distinction, the term ‘without initial application’ is applied to distinguish it, namely, the characteristic of the absence of the distinction of initial application. This specifies the second jhāna states. As it is said: ‘Not from reflection,’ etc.

7. Vedayamānāti anubhavamānā. Sukhākāreti iṭṭhākāre, iṭṭhānubhavanākāre vā. Udāsināti natiapanatirahitā. Sukhadukkhānaṃ aviruddhā tesaṃ byavadhāyikābhāvato. Sukhadukkhāni viya hi sukhadukkhānaṃ anantaraṃ pavattanato byavadhāyikābhūtā na tehi virujjhati, na pana sukhadukkhāni anantarāpavattito. ‘‘Upapattito ikkhatīti upekkhā’’ti ayaṃ panattho idha upekkhā-saddassa sabbupekkhāpariyādānato na vutto. Na hi lobhasampayuttādiupekkhā upapattito ikkhatīti. Tasmāti yasmā pītisahagatāyeva na sukhasahagatā, sukhasahagatāpi na pītisahagatā evāti pītisahagatā sukhasahagatā ca aññamaññaṃ bhinnā, tasmā. Satipi sukhasahagatānaṃ yebhuyyena pītisahagatabhāve yena sukhena samannāgatā sukhasahagatā eva honti, na pītisahagatā, taṃ sukhaṃ nippītikasukhanti ayaṃ viseso iminā tikena dassitoti imamatthaṃ vibhāvento ‘‘pītisahagatāti vatvā’’tiādimāha.

7. 'Vedayamānā' means experiencing. 'Sukhākāra' refers to a pleasant form, or the experience of pleasantness. 'Udāsina' means devoid of inclination or disinclination. It is not opposed to pleasure and pain because it does not obstruct them. For, since it arises immediately after pleasure and pain, it is not an obstruction and does not conflict with them; pleasure and pain, however, do not arise immediately after it. The explanation, ‘Upapattito ikkhatīti upekkhā’ (equanimity is seeing impartially what arises), is not given here as the meaning of the word upekkhā, because it does not apply to all forms of equanimity. For equanimity associated with greed, etc., is not seeing impartially what arises. Therefore, because joy-accompanied states are not always pleasure-accompanied, and pleasure-accompanied states are not always joy-accompanied, joy-accompanied and pleasure-accompanied states are distinct from each other. Even though pleasure-accompanied states are often joy-accompanied, the pleasure with which one is endowed and which is only pleasure-accompanied, and not joy-accompanied, that pleasure is termed ‘nippītikasukha’ (pleasure without joy). This distinction is shown by this threefold classification. Expounding this meaning, it is said, ‘Having stated “pītisahagatā” (joy-accompanied),’ etc.

Siddhoti sāvasesaṃ niravasesañca sukhapītiyo saṅgahetvā pavattehi paṭhamadutiyapadehi yo pītisahagato dhammaviseso, taṃ sukhaṃ, yo ca sukhasahagato dhammaviseso, sā pītīti satipi aññamaññaṃ saṃsaṭṭhabhāve padantarasaṅgahitabhāvadīpanatosiddho ñāto viditoti attho. ‘‘Catutthajjhānasukhaṃ atipaṇītasukhanti oḷārikaṅgato nīharitvā tassa paṇītabhāvaṃ dassetuṃ ayaṃ tiko vutto’’ti keci vadanti, tadetaṃ sabbesaṃ sukhavedanāsampayuttadhammānaṃ idha ‘‘sukhasahagatā’’ti vuttattā vicāretabbaṃ. Tathā hi ‘‘sukhabhūmiyaṃ kāmāvacare’’tiādinā (dha. sa. 1283) ‘‘kāmāvacarakusalato [Pg.45] cattāro somanassasahagatacittuppādā’’tiādinā (dha. sa. 1598) ca niddeso pavattoti.

The meaning is established (siddho) that, having included joy and happiness, both with and without residue, the distinctive phenomenon accompanied by joy, which arises in the first and second terms, is happiness, and the distinctive phenomenon accompanied by happiness is joy; this is known and understood through the elucidation of what is included in other terms, even though there is mutual intermingling. Some say: ‘This triad is stated to demonstrate the refined nature of the happiness of the fourth jhāna, which is an extremely refined happiness, by extracting it from its grosser factors.’ However, this should be examined, for here all states associated with pleasant feeling are termed ‘accompanied by happiness.’ Indeed, as explained in passages such as ‘In the realm of happiness, in the sense sphere’ (Dhs 1283) and ‘From wholesome sense-sphere consciousness, four types of consciousness arise accompanied by gladness’ (Dhs 1598), the exposition proceeds accordingly.

8. Nibbānārammaṇataṃ sandhāyāha, na nibbānapaṭivijjhanaṃ, itarathā gotrabhussa dassanabhāvāpatti acodanīyā siyāti adhippāyo. Nanu ca disvā kattabbakiccakaraṇena sotāpattimaggova dassananti ukkaṃsagativijānanena nibbānassa paṭivijjhanameva dassananti gotrabhussa dassanabhāvāpatti na codetabbāvāti? Na, dassanasāmaññasseva suyyamānattā dassanakattabbakiccakaraṇānañca bhedena vuttattā. Tattha yadipi ‘‘paññāya cassa disvā āsavā parikkhīṇā hontī’’tiādīsu (ma. ni. 2.182) viya abhinnakālassapi bhinnakālassa viya bhedopacāradassanato bhedavacanaṃ yuttaṃ, dassanavisese pana adhippete dassanasāmaññavacanaṃ na kattabbanti dassanasāmaññamattaṃ gahetvā codanā katāti ‘‘nibbānārammaṇataṃ sandhāyāhā’’ti vuttaṃ. Dutiyatatiyamaggānampi dhammacakkhupariyāyasabbhāvato ‘‘bhāvanābhāvaṃ appatta’’nti vuttaṃ. Tattha bhāvanā vaḍḍhanā. Sā ca bahulaṃ uppattiyā hotīti āha ‘‘punappunaṃ nibbattanenā’’ti. Tathā hi satīti ‘‘ubhayapaṭikkhepavasenā’’ti padassa dassanabhāvanāpaṭikkhepavasenāti atthe sati. Nanu lokiyasamathavipassanāpi yathābalaṃ kāmacchandādīnaṃ pahāyakā, tatra kathamidaṃ vuttaṃ, na ca añño pahāyako atthīti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘aññehī’’tiādi.

8. He says this with reference to Nibbāna as an object, not to the penetration of Nibbāna. Otherwise, the implication that the gotrabhū (change-of-lineage) state involves seeing would be unassailable; this is the intention. But is it not the case that the path of stream-entry is called ‘seeing’ because it fulfills the duty to be done by seeing, and thus, by knowing the supreme course, the penetration of Nibbāna itself is what is meant by ‘seeing’? Therefore, should the implication that the gotrabhū state involves seeing not be criticized? No, because ‘seeing’ is heard of only in a general sense, and because seeing and the duty to be done are spoken of separately. In this context, although in passages like ‘having seen with wisdom, his taints are destroyed’ (MN II 182), a separate statement is appropriate due to the figurative use of a distinction, as if referring to different times even when it is the same time, yet when a specific kind of seeing is intended, a general term for seeing should not be used. Thus, the objection is made by taking the mere generality of ‘seeing,’ hence the statement: ‘He says this with reference to Nibbāna as an object.’ Regarding the second and third paths also, because the term ‘Dhamma-eye’ exists for them, it is said that ‘they have not attained the state of development.’ Here, ‘development’ means growth, and that occurs mostly through arising—hence the statement: ‘through repeated arising.’ This being so, the phrase ‘by way of rejecting both’ has the meaning ‘by way of rejecting both seeing and development.’ But worldly serenity and insight also, according to their strength, abandon sensual desire and other defilements. How, then, is this statement made? And with reference to the objection that there is no other abandoner, he says: ‘by others,’ etc.

9. Appahātabbahetumattesūti appahātabbahetukamattesu. Sabbo kusalābyākatadhammo yathādhippetattho. Samāso na upapajjati asamatthabhāvato. Yesanti ye tatiyarāsibhāvena vuttā dhammā, attho tesaṃ. Ubhinnanti visuṃ visuṃ yojetabbatāya dve pahātabbahetusaddāti katvā vuttaṃ. Etanti ‘‘nevadassanena nabhāvanāya pahātabbo hetu etesaṃ atthī’’ti etaṃ vacanaṃ. Tehi dassanabhāvanāpadehi yuttena pahātabbahetukapadena. Evañca katvāti evaṃ dassanabhāvanāpadehi pahātabbahetukapadassa visuṃ visuṃ yojanato. Evañhi purimapadadvaya…pe… dassanametaṃ hotīti. Evanti dassanabhāvanāhi napahātabbo hetu etesanti evaṃ atthe sati. ‘‘Hetu…pe… siyā’’ti [Pg.46] etassa ‘‘purimasmiñhi atthe’’tiādinā ahetukānaṃ aggahitabhāvadassanavasena atthaṃ vatvā idāni ‘‘atha vā’’tiādinā dutiyasseva atthassa yuttabhāvaṃ vibhāvento ‘‘gahetabbatthassevā’’tiādimāha. So hi ‘‘evamattho gahetabbo’’ti vuttattā gahetabbattho.

9. 'Appahātabbahetumattesūti' means 'in mere states having a cause that is not to be abandoned'. All wholesome and indeterminate phenomena are to be understood according to their intended meaning. A compound is not formed due to incapability of combination. ‘Yesaṃ’ refers to those phenomena mentioned as the third category; the meaning applies to them. ‘Ubhinnanti’ is stated because the two words ‘pahātabbahetu’ should be connected separately. ‘Etaṃ’ means this statement: ‘For these, there is a cause to be abandoned neither by seeing nor by development.’ By the phrase ‘pahātabbahetuka’ connected with those terms ‘dassana’ (seeing) and ‘bhāvanā’ (development). ‘Evañca katvāti’ means: thus, from the separate connection of the phrase ‘pahātabbahetuka’ with the terms ‘dassana’ and ‘bhāvanā.’ For in this way, the first two phrases...pe...this is seen. ‘Evaṃ’ means: when the meaning is thus—for these, the cause is not to be abandoned by seeing or development. Having explained the meaning of ‘Hetu...pe... siyā’ by stating, ‘in the first case,’ etc., by way of showing the non-inclusion of causeless phenomena, now, with ‘atha vā,’ etc., he elaborates the suitability of the second meaning by saying, ‘only the meaning to be taken is this,’ etc. For since it is said, ‘this meaning should be taken,’ it is the meaning to be taken.

10. Aññathāti ārammaṇakaraṇamatte adhippete. Kathaṃ panetaṃ jānitabbaṃ ‘‘ārammaṇaṃ katvāti etena catukiccasādhakaṃ ārammaṇakaraṇaṃ vuccatī’’ti? Sāmaññajotanāya visese avaṭṭhānato ariyamaggadhammānaṃyeva ca apacayagāmibhāvato. ‘‘Cattāro maggā apariyāpannā apacayagāmino’’ti (dha. sa. 1021) hi vuttaṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘ariyamaggānaṃ etaṃ adhivacana’’nti. Eteneva vā visesupalakkhaṇahetubhūtena vacanena yathāvutto ārammaṇakaraṇaviseso viññāyati. Ukkaṃsagativijānanena vā ayamattho veditabbo. Paccavekkhaṇādīnanti vodānādayo saṅgaṇhāti. Hetubhāvenāti sampāpakahetubhāvena. Ñāpako kārako sampāpakoti tividho hi hetu, tathā ñāpetabbādibhāvena phalaṃ. Yathā nirayādimanussabhāvādigāmipaṭipadābhāvato akusalalokiyakusalacittuppādā ‘‘ācayagāmino dhammā’’ti vuttā, na micchādiṭṭhiādilokiyasammādiṭṭhiādidhammā eva, evaṃ nibbānagāmipaṭipadābhāvato lokuttarakusalacittuppādā ‘‘apacayagāmino’’ti daṭṭhabbā, na ariyamaggadhammā evāti imamatthaṃ dassento āha ‘‘purimapacchimāna’’ntiādi. Tattha ariyamaggasseva nibbānagāmipaṭipadābhāvo paribyattoti tasseva apacayagāmibhāvo yutto, tadanuvattakattā pana sesadhamme saṅgahetvā vuttaṃ. Apacaye dukkhaparijānanādinā sātisayaṃ gamanaṃ yesante apacayagāminoti ‘‘maggā eva apacayagāmino’’ti vuttaṃ. Purimapacchimānanti ca imasmiṃ tike paṭhamapadadutiyapadasaṅgahitānaṃ atthānanti attho. ‘‘Jayaṃ veraṃ pasavati (dha. pa. 201), caraṃ vā yadi vā tiṭṭha’’ntiādīsu (itivu. 86, 110; su. ni. 195) viya sānunāsiko ācaya-saddoti ‘‘anunāsikalopo kato’’ti vuttaṃ. Ettha ca ‘‘ācina’’nti vattabbe ‘‘ācaya’’nti byattayavasena vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Ācayā hutvā gacchantīti etena apacinantīti apacayā, apacayā hutvā gacchanti pavattantīti ayamattho nayato dassitoti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

10. By 'otherwise' is meant when merely making something an object is intended. But how is it to be known that by 'having made it an object,' the making of an object that accomplishes the four functions is meant? From the establishment in the specific by means of a general indication, and because only the dhammas of the noble path have the nature of leading to diminution. For it is said: 'The four paths are unincluded, leading to diminution' (Dhs 1021). Therefore he said: 'This is a designation for the noble paths.' Or, by this very statement, which is a cause for indicating the specific, the specific making of an object as described is understood. Or this meaning is to be understood by knowing the excellent course. By 'reflection, etc.' he includes purification and so on. By 'by way of cause' is meant by way of being an accomplishing cause. For a cause is threefold: indicative, agentive, and accomplishing; similarly the fruit, by way of what is to be indicated, etc. Just as unwholesome and mundane wholesome citta-arisings are called 'dhammas leading to accumulation' because of the nature of the practice leading to hell, etc., and to the human state, and not only wrong view, etc., and mundane right view, etc., so too, because of the nature of the practice leading to Nibbāna, supramundane wholesome citta-arisings should be seen as 'leading to diminution,' and not only the dhammas of the noble path. To show this meaning, he said 'of the former and the latter,' etc. Herein, since the nature of the practice leading to Nibbāna is manifest only for the noble path, it is proper that the nature of leading to diminution belongs only to it; but because the other dhammas follow it, they are included when this is said. Those for whom there is an excellent going in diminution by means of the full understanding of suffering, etc., are 'those who lead to diminution'; thus it is said, 'the paths alone lead to diminution.' And 'of the former and the latter' means of the meanings included in the first and second terms in this triad. Just as in 'Victory begets enmity' (Dhp 201), and 'Whether walking or standing' (Iti 86, 110; Snp 195), etc., the word 'ācaya' is nasalized; thus it is said, 'the elision of the nasal has been made.' And here it should be seen that 'ācaya' is said by way of transposition when 'ācina' should be said. By 'having become accumulations, they proceed,' it should be understood that this meaning is shown by the method: 'they do not accumulate' (apacinanti), hence they are 'diminutions' (apacayā); 'having become diminutions, they proceed,' that is, they occur.

11. Lokiyesu [Pg.47] asekkhabhāvānāpatti daṭṭhabbāti kasmā evaṃ vuttaṃ, nanu –

11. Why is it said that in regard to mundane states, the state of a non-trainee is not attained? Is it not that—

‘‘Sikkhatīti kho bhikkhu tasmā sekkhoti vuccati. Kiñca sikkhati, adhisīlampi sikkhati adhicittampi sikkhati adhipaññampi sikkhati. Sikkhatīti kho bhikkhu tasmā sekkhoti vuccati (a. ni. 3.86). Yopi kalyāṇaputhujjano anulomapaṭipadāya paripūrakārī sīlasampanno indriyesu guttadvāro bhojane mattaññū jāgariyānuyogamanuyutto pubbarattāpararattaṃ bodhipakkhiyānaṃ dhammānaṃ bhāvanānuyogamanuyutto viharati ‘ajja vā sve vā aññataraṃ sāmaññaphalaṃ adhigamissāmī’ti, sopi sikkhatīti sekkho’’ti –

‘A bhikkhu is called a “trainee” because he trains. And what does he train in? He trains in the higher virtue, he trains in the higher mind, and he trains in the higher wisdom. A bhikkhu is called a “trainee” because he trains (AN 3.86). Even a virtuous worldling who is fulfilling the conformity-practice, who is accomplished in virtue, with guarded sense faculties, moderate in eating, devoted to wakefulness, and who dwells committed to the development of the qualities pertaining to enlightenment in the first and last watches of the night, thinking, ‘Today or tomorrow I will attain one or another fruit of asceticism’—he too trains, thus he is a trainee.’

Vacanato yathāvuttakalyāṇaputhujjanassapi sīlādidhammā sekkhāti vuccantīti? Na, pariyāyabhāvato. Nippariyāyena hi sekkhāsekkhabhāvo yathāsambhavaṃ maggaphaladhammesu evāti lokiyesu sekkhabhāvāsaṅkābhāvato asekkhabhāvānāpatti vuttā. Tenevāha ‘‘sīlasamādhī’’tiādi. Arahattaphaladhammāpi sikkhāphalabhāvena pavattanato heṭṭhimaphaladhammā viya sikkhāsu jātātiādiatthehi sekkhā siyuṃ, heṭṭhimaphaladhammāpi vā sikkhāphalabhāvena pavattanato arahattaphaladhammā viya asekkhāti codanaṃ manasikatvā ‘‘pariniṭṭhitasikkhākiccattā’’ti vuttaṃ, tathā ‘‘heṭṭhimaphalesu panā’’tiādi. ‘‘Taṃ eva sāliṃ bhuñjāmi, sā eva tittirī, tāni eva osadhānī’’tiādīsu taṃsadisesu tabbohāro daṭṭhabbo. Etena ca sekkhasadisā asekkhā yathā ‘‘amanusso’’ti vuttaṃ hotīti aññe. Aññattha ‘‘ariṭṭha’’ntiādīsu vuddhiatthepi a-kāro dissatīti vuddhippattā sekkhā asekkhāti ayampi attho vutto.

In accordance with that statement, are the dhammas such as virtue, etc., of the aforesaid virtuous worldling also called 'trainee' dhammas? No, because this is a figurative expression. For in the direct sense, the state of being a trainee or a non-trainee exists only in the dhammas of the path and fruit, as may be the case. Thus, because there is no possibility of mundane states being the state of a trainee, it is said that the state of a non-trainee is not applicable to them. Therefore he said 'virtue and concentration,' etc. The dhammas of the fruit of arahantship, too, since they occur as the fruit of the training, might be trainees, like the lower fruit-dhammas, in the sense of being 'born in the training,' etc. Or, the lower fruit-dhammas, since they occur as the fruit of the training, might be non-trainees, like the dhammas of the fruit of arahantship. Having considered this objection, it is said, 'because the task of training is completed,' and similarly, 'but in the lower fruits,' etc. In examples like, 'I eat that very rice, that very partridge, those very herbs,' etc., the usage of the pronoun 'that' should be seen as denoting similarity. And by this, others hold that non-trainees are similar to trainees, just as it is said 'a non-human.' Elsewhere, in cases like 'ariṭṭha,' etc., the prefix 'a-' is also seen in the sense of growth. Thus this meaning is also stated: trainees who have reached growth are non-trainees (a-sekha).

12. Kilesavikkhambhanasamatthatāyāti idaṃ nidassanamattaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Vitakkādivikkhambhanasamatthatāpi hettha labbhatīti. Akusalaviddhaṃsanarasattā vā kusalānaṃ tattha sātisayakiccayuttataṃ parittadhammehi mahaggatānaṃ pakāsetuṃ ‘‘kilesavikkhambhanasamatthatāyā’’ti vuttaṃ. Vipākakiriyesu dīghasantānatāva, na kilesavikkhambhanasamatthatā vipulaphalatā cāti [Pg.48] attho. ‘‘Vipulaṃ phalaṃ vipulaphala’’nti evaṃ pana atthe gayhamāne vipākesupi vipulaphalatā labbhateva. Sopi ekasesanayena aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttoti veditabbo. Mahantehi gatā paṭipannāti ayaṃ panattho tiṇṇampi sādhāraṇoti. Guṇato ayaṃ ettakoti sattānaṃ pamāṇaṃ karontā viya pavattantīti oḷārikā kilesā ‘‘pamāṇakarā’’ti vuttā. Tehi parito khaṇḍitā paricchinnāti parittā. Satipi kehici paricchinnatte mahāpamāṇabhāvena gatā pavattāti mahaggatā. Paricchedakarānaṃ kilesānaṃ sukhumānampi agocarabhāvato tehi na kathañcipi paricchinnā vītikkantāti aparicchinnā appamāṇā, yato te ‘‘apariyāpannā’’tipi vuccanti.

12. The phrase 'by being capable of suppressing the defilements' should be seen as an illustration. The capability of suppressing thoughts, etc., is also obtained here. Or, because wholesome states have the function of destroying the unwholesome, the phrase 'by being capable of suppressing the defilements' is said in order to show the superior function of the sublime states over the limited dhammas. In resultant and functional states, there is only long continuity, not the capability of suppressing defilements and abundant fruitfulness; this is the meaning. However, if the meaning is taken as 'abundant fruit is abundant-fruited,' then abundant fruitfulness is indeed obtained even in resultant states. This too should be understood as stated in the commentary by the method of partial inclusion. But this meaning, 'gone to or entered upon great things,' is common to all three. The gross defilements are called 'measurers' because they occur as if making a measure of beings, saying, 'This one is of such a quality.' Fragmented and delimited all around by them, they are 'limited.' Although delimited by certain things, they have gone to and occur with a great measure, thus they are 'sublime.' Because they are beyond the range of even the subtle defilements that do the delimiting, they are in no way delimited by them but have transcended them; thus they are 'undelimited,' 'immeasurable,' for which reason they are also called 'unincluded.'

14. Tittiṃ na janenti santataratāya asecanakabhāvato. Ettha ca ‘‘pamāṇakarehī’’tiādiko atthavikappo ‘‘atappakatthenā’’tiādikāya hīnattikapadavaṇṇanāya parato bahūsu potthakesu likhīyati, yathāṭhāne eva pana ānetvā vattabbo.

14. They do not generate satiety because of continuous delight, due to their insatiable nature. And here, the alternative meaning beginning 'by the measurers,' along with the explanation of the terms of the inferior triad beginning 'by the characteristic of not satisfying,' is written later in many books; but it should be brought to its proper place and stated.

15. Lokiyasādhujanehipi atijigucchanīyesu ānantariyakammanatthikavādādīsu pavatti vinā vipallāsabalavabhāvena na hotīti ‘‘vipariyāsadaḷhatāyā’’ti vuttaṃ. Etenāti ‘‘vipākadāne satī’’tiādinā satipi kālaniyame vipākuppādane sāsaṅkavacanena. Tasmāti yasmā yathāvuttanayena niyatatāya atippasaṅgo dunnivāro, tasmā. Balavatā…pe… pavattīti etena asamānajātikena anivattanīyavipākataṃ, samānajātikena ca vipākānuppādanepi anantaraṃ vipākuppādanasamatthatāya avihantabbataṃ anantarikānaṃ dasseti. Yato tesaṃ vipākadhammatā viya sabhāvasiddhā niyatānantariyatā. Aññassa…pe… dānatoti imināpi asamānajātikādīhi anivattanīyaphalataṃ eva vibhāveti.

15. Since engagement in extremely detestable things such as the immediately resultant kamma, nihilism, etc., does not occur even for good worldlings without the strength of perversion, it is said, 'because of the firmness of perversion.' By this: by the statement expressing doubt about the production of the result even when there is a fixed time, beginning 'when there is the giving of the result...' Therefore: because, due to the fixed nature in the way described, the over-extension is difficult to prevent, therefore... By 'by a strong... occurrence,' he shows, for the immediately resultant kammas, the unpreventable nature of their result by what is of a dissimilar class, and their unassailability by what is of a similar class in being capable of producing a result immediately after, even when not producing a result itself. Since for them, the fixed immediateness is established by their own nature, like the nature of their result. By this too, 'of another... giving,' he clarifies the unpreventable nature of the fruit by what is of a dissimilar class, etc.

Codako adhippāyaṃ ajānanto ‘‘nanū’’tiādinā atippasaṅgameva codeti. Itaro ‘‘nāpajjatī’’tiādinā attano adhippāyaṃ vivarati. Ekanteti avassambhāvini. Sanniyatattāti sampādane janane niyatabhāvato. Uparatā avipaccanasabhāvāsaṅkā yesu tāni uparatāvipacca…pe… saṅkāni, tabbhāvo upa…pe… saṅkattaṃ, tasmā. ‘‘Na samatthatāvighātattāti [Pg.49] balavatāpi ānantariyena anupahantabbataṃ āha. Upatthambhakāni anubalappadāyakāni honti uppattiyā santānassa visesitattā. Tena nesaṃ vipākānuppādanepi amoghavuttitaṃ āha.

The questioner, not knowing the intention, raises an objection of over-extension with 'Is it not that...?' etc. The other clarifies his own intention with 'it does not apply,' etc. 'Absolutely': in the inevitable. 'Because of being fixed': because of being fixed in accomplishing, in generating. Those in whom doubt about the non-opposing nature has ceased are 'those in whom doubt... has ceased'; their state is 'the state of doubt... having ceased,' therefore... By 'because of the non-destruction of the capacity,' he states their unassailability even by a powerful immediately resultant kamma. Supporting factors are givers of additional strength, because the continuity of arising is distinguished. Thereby he states their non-futile nature even when they do not produce a result.

16. Maggakiccaṃ pariññādi. Aṭṭhaṅgikamaggasammādiṭṭhimaggasampayuttālobhādosasaṅkhātehi maggahetūhi maggasampayuttakhandhasesamaggaṅgasammādiṭṭhīnaṃ sahetukabhāvadassanato tiṇṇaṃ nayānaṃ asaṅgahitasaṅgaṇhanavasenāti vuttaṃ. Hetubahutāvasenāti bahuhetukassa paṭhamanayassa anantaraṃ bahuhetukatāsāmaññena nikkhepakaṇḍapāḷiyaṃ tatiyaṃ vuttanayo idha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ dutiyaṃ vutto. Yathāsakaṃ paccayehi pavattamānesu nirīhakesu dhammesu kesañci anuvattanīyabhāvo na kevalaṃ dhammasabhāvatoyeva, atha kho purimadhammānaṃ pavattivisesenapi hotīti āha ‘‘pubbābhisaṅkhāravasenā’’ti. Pavattiviseso hi purimapurimānaṃ cittacetasikānaṃ uttaruttaresu visesādhānaṃ bhāvanāpubbābhisaṅkhāroti. Anuvattayamānoti garukārayamāno. Udāharaṇavasenāti nidassanavasena, na niravasesadassanavasena. Yasmā panātiādinā yathāvuttaṃ atthaṃ pāṭhantarena sādheti. Tattha hi adhipatipaccayassa paccanīye ṭhitattā maggo adhipati maggādhipatīti ayamattho labbhatīti. Samānasaddatthavasenāti satipi aññapadatthasamānādhikaraṇasamāsatthabhede maggādhipatisaddatthabhedābhāvaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ.

16. The function of the path is full understanding, etc. This is stated by way of the inclusion of what is not included, according to the three methods, from the perspective of seeing the causal nature of right view and the remaining path-factors and aggregates associated with the path, by means of the path-causes, namely non-greed and non-aversion, which are associated with the eightfold path and right view. By 'hetubahutāvasena' (by way of abundance of causes) is meant that the method stated as the third in the Nikkhepakaṇḍapāḷi, which is of many causes, is here stated as the second in the commentary, following the generality of having many causes. When phenomena arise according to their respective conditions, being effortless, their compliance is not merely due to their inherent nature, but also due to the distinctive arising of prior phenomena. Therefore, it is said, 'by way of previous formations (pubbābhisaṅkhāravasena).' For the distinctive arising is the developmental previous formation, which is the placing of distinctions in successive mental and mental factors from the preceding ones. 'Anuvattayamāno' means honoring. 'Udāharaṇavasena' is by way of example, not by way of exhaustive demonstration. By 'yasmā pana' and so on, the meaning stated previously is established by another passage. For there, because the path stands in opposition to the dominating condition, the path is the dominating condition—hence, 'maggādhipati.' This meaning is obtained. By 'samānasaddatthavasena' (by way of identity of meaning of terms) is meant that this is stated with reference to the absence of distinction in meaning of the term 'maggādhipati,' even though there are differences in the meaning of compound words in apposition with different referents.

17. Uppanna-saddo uppādādiṃ paṭipajjamāno, patvā vigato cāti duvidhesu atthesu ubhayesampi vācako, na purimānaṃyevāti tamatthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘anuppannā’’tiādimāha. Tattha uppannabhāvo uppādādippattatā. Tena atītāpi saṅgahitā honti. Tenevāha ‘‘sabbo uppannabhāvo’’ti. Uppannadhammabhāvo ‘‘uppannā dhammā’’ti padena gahitadhammabhāvo, vattamānadhammabhāvoti attho. Yo vā uppādādippatto attano ca sabhāvaṃ dhāreti paccayehi ca dhārīyati, so uppannadhammoti paccuppannabhāvo uppannadhammabhāvoti evamettha attho daṭṭhabbo. Uppannadhamme vatvā ‘‘anuppannā’’ti vacanaṃ na yathādhigatapaṭisedhananti kathamidaṃ paccetabbanti āha ‘‘yadi hī’’tiādi. Keci panettha ‘‘uppannāti padena atītāpi saṅgahitā. Yadi na saṅgahitā, nibbānaṃ viya tepi navattabbāti vattabbaṃ siyā[Pg.50], na ca tathā vutta’’nti vadanti, taṃ pana tesaṃ matimattameva. Ayaṃ pana tiko dvinnaṃ addhānaṃ vasena pūretvā dassitoti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vakkhatīti. Evaṃ sante kasmā atītā navattabbāti na vuttāti? Dhammavasena asaṅgahitattābhāvato. Dhammavasena hi asaṅgahitaṃ nibbānaṃ tattha navattabbaṃ jātaṃ, na ca niyogato atītā nāma dhammā keci atthi, ye idha asaṅgahitattā navattabbā siyunti. Phalanibbattito kāraṇassa puretaraṃ nibbatti idha pariniṭṭhitasaddena vuccati, na tassa hutvā vigatabhāvoti āha ‘‘anāgate vā’’ti. Yato metteyyassa bhagavato uppajjanakaphalampi ‘‘uppādī’’ti vuccati.

17. The term 'uppanna' (arisen) refers to two meanings: proceeding toward arising, etc., and having reached and ceased. It conveys both meanings, not just the former. To clarify this, the text states 'anuppannā' (unarisen), etc. Here, the state of being arisen is the attainment of arising, etc. Thus, even past phenomena are included. Hence, it is said, 'All that is of the nature of being arisen.' The state of being an arisen phenomenon is what is meant by the term 'uppannā dhammā' (arisen phenomena)—the meaning is the nature of presently existing phenomena. Alternatively, that which has attained arising, etc., maintains its own intrinsic nature and is sustained by conditions—this is an arisen phenomenon. Thus, the present state is to be understood as the nature of arisen phenomena. After speaking of arisen phenomena, the statement 'anuppannā' (unarisen) is not a negation of what has been attained. How then should this be understood? The text explains, 'If indeed...' Some, however, argue here that the term 'uppannā' includes even the past. If it did not include the past, then like Nibbāna, those too would have to be declared unarisen—but this is not stated. Yet this is merely their opinion. This triad is shown to be complete by way of two periods of time, as will be explained in the commentary. If this is so, why is it not stated that past phenomena are unarisen? Because they are not un-included by way of phenomena. For Nibbāna, being un-included by way of phenomena, is declared unarisen there, but there are not necessarily any phenomena called 'past' that, being un-included here, would have to be declared unarisen. The arising of a cause prior to the production of its fruit is here termed 'pariniṭṭhita' (completed), not its state of having ceased after arising. Hence, the text states, 'or in the future.' For even the fruit that is the arising of the Blessed One Metteyya is called 'uppādī' (arisen).

20. Yassa jhānā vuṭṭhahitvātiādinā ‘‘tenānandā’’tiādipāḷiyā heṭṭhāpāḷiṃ atthavasena dasseti. Ayañhi tattha pāḷi –

20. By the words 'having arisen from jhāna,' etc., the meaning of the Pāli text preceding the passage 'therefore, Ānanda,' etc., is shown. For this is the passage there:

‘‘Kathañcānanda, bhikkhu ajjhattameva cittaṃ saṇṭhapeti sannisādeti ekodiṃ karoti samādahati. Idhānanda, bhikkhu vivicceva…pe… catutthaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati. Evaṃ kho…pe… samādahati. So ajjhattaṃ suññataṃ manasi karoti, tassa ajjhattaṃ suññataṃ manasikaroto suññatāya cittaṃ na pakkhandati…pe… muccati. Evaṃ santametaṃ, ānanda, bhikkhu evaṃ sampajānāti ajjhattaṃ kho me suññataṃ manasikaroto ajjhattaṃ suññatāya cittaṃ na pakkhandati…pe… muccatīti, itiha tattha sampajāno hoti. So bahiddhā suññataṃ…pe… ajjhattabahiddhā suññataṃ…pe… so āneñjaṃ manasi karoti, tassa āneñjaṃ manasikaroto āneñjāya cittaṃ na pakkhandati…pe… muccatīti, itiha tattha sampajāno hoti. Tenānanda, bhikkhunā’’ti (ma. ni. 3.188).

“And how, Ānanda, does a bhikkhu steady the mind internally, settle it, unify it, and concentrate it? Here, Ānanda, a bhikkhu, quite secluded from sensual pleasures… enters and dwells in the fourth jhāna. Thus… he concentrates it. He attends to internal voidness, and as he attends to internal voidness, his mind does not leap forward… he is freed. Thus, Ānanda, a bhikkhu understands: ‘As I attend to internal voidness, my mind does not leap forward… I am freed.’ Thus, he is clearly comprehending there. He attends to external voidness… to internal and external voidness… He attends to the imperturbable, and as he attends to the imperturbable, his mind does not leap forward… he is freed. Thus, he is clearly comprehending there. Therefore, Ānanda, a bhikkhu...” (MN 3.188).

Tattha ajjhattasuññatādīsūti ajjhattaṃ bahiddhā ajjhattabahiddhā ca suññatāya āneñje ca. Paṭhamajjhānādisamādhinimitteti pādakabhūtapaṭhamajjhānādisamādhinimitte. Apaguṇapādakajjhānato vuṭṭhitassa hi ajjhattaṃ suññataṃ manasikaroto tattha cittaṃ na pakkhandati. Tato ‘‘parassa santāne nu kho katha’’nti bahiddhā manasi karoti, tatthapi na pakkhandati. Tato ‘‘kālena attano santāne, kālena parassa santāne nu kho katha’’nti [Pg.51] ajjhattabahiddhā manasi karoti, tatthapi na pakkhandati. Tato ubhatobhāgavimutto hotukāmo ‘‘arūpasamāpattiyaṃ nu kho katha’’nti āneñjaṃ manasi karoti, tatthapi na pakkhandati. ‘‘Idāni me cittaṃ na pakkhandatī’’ti vissaṭṭhavīriyena na bhavitabbaṃ, pādakajjhānameva pana sādhukaṃ punappunaṃ manasi kātabbaṃ, evamassa rukkhaṃ chindato pharasumhi avahante punappunaṃ nisitanisitaṃ kāretvā chindantassa chijje pharasu viya kammaṭṭhāne manasikāro vahatīti dassetuṃ ‘‘tasmiṃyevā’’tiādi vuttanti.

Here, 'in internal voidness, etc.' (ajjhattasuññatādīsu) refers to voidness internally, externally, and both internally and externally, as well as to the imperturbable. 'In the sign of concentration such as the first jhāna, etc.' (paṭhamajjhānādisamādhinimitte) refers to the foundational sign of concentration such as the first jhāna. For one who has emerged from a defective foundational jhāna, when attending to internal voidness, the mind does not leap forward toward that. Then, thinking, 'What about in another's continuum?' one attends externally, but the mind does not leap forward there either. Then, thinking, 'At times in one's own continuum, at times in another's continuum—what about that?' one attends both internally and externally, but the mind does not leap forward there either. Then, desiring to be liberated in both ways, one thinks, 'What about in the formless attainment?' and attends to the imperturbable, but the mind does not leap forward there either. One should not become lax in effort, thinking, 'Now my mind does not leap forward.' Instead, one should repeatedly and thoroughly attend to the foundational jhāna. To show that, just as for one cutting a tree, when the axe does not take hold, after having it sharpened again and again, the axe of the one cutting does cut, so too for this person the attention to the meditation subject proceeds, it is said, 'in that very,' etc.

Atthato ca asamānattāti idaṃ kasmā vuttaṃ. Nanu yesu atthesu ajjhatta-saddo vattati, te sabbe dassetvā idhādhippetatthaniddhāraṇatthaṃ atthuddhāravasenetaṃ vuttaṃ. Cakkhādīsu ca ajjhattika-saddo ajjhattānaṃ abbhantaratāvisesamupādāya pavattati, yato te ajjhattaajjhattāti vuccanti. Apica ‘‘cha ajjhattikānī’’ti idaṃ ajjhattika-saddassa cakkhādīnaṃ ajjhattabhāvavibhāvanasabbhāvato idha udāharaṇavasena vuttaṃ. Teneva hi aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ajjhattikaduke ‘‘ajjhattāva ajjhattikā’’ti vuttaṃ. Evañca sati na ettha saddato asamānatāpi siyā, tasmāyeva yathāvuttacodanaṃ visodhento ‘‘ayaṃ panetthā’’tiādimāha. Tenāti tasmā. Taṃvācakassāti ajjhattajjhattavācakassa sakkā vattuṃ tadatthassa ajjhattabhāvasabbhāvato.

Why is it said, 'and there is no identity of meaning'? Is it not the case that, having shown all the meanings in which the word 'ajjhatta' functions, this is stated here by way of extracting the meaning in order to determine the intended meaning? Moreover, the word 'ajjhattika' functions in relation to the eye, etc., by referring to the particularity of the inwardness of what is internal, because they are called 'internal-of-the-internal.' Furthermore, the phrase 'six internal bases' is stated here as an example, because the word 'ajjhattika' itself serves to distinguish the internal nature of the eye, etc. For that very reason, in the commentary on the Duka on the Internal, it is said, 'The internal itself is internal (ajjhattika).' This being so, there would be no dissimilarity even in the word itself; therefore, to refute the objection stated above, he says, 'But here...' and so on. 'Tena' means 'therefore'. 'Taṃvācakassa' (of its word) means: of the word expressing 'internal-of-the-internal'; it is possible to say this because its meaning has an inherently internal nature.

‘‘Na kho, ānanda, bhikkhu sobhati saṅgaṇikārāmo saṅgaṇikārato saṅgaṇikārāmataṃ anuyutto’’tiādinā (ma. ni. 3.186) pabbajitāsāruppassa nekkhammasukhādinikāmalābhitāya abhāvassa ca dassanena saṅgaṇikārāmatāya, ‘‘nāhaṃ, ānanda, ekaṃ rūpampi samanupassāmi, yattha rattassa yathābhiratassa rūpassa vipariṇāmaññathābhāvā na uppajjeyyuṃ sokapari…pe… upāyāsā’’ti (ma. ni. 3.186) evaṃ rūpādiratiyā ca ādīnavaṃ vatvā sace koci duppaññajātiko pabbajito vadeyya ‘‘sammāsambuddho khette paviṭṭhā gāviyo viya amheyeva gaṇato nīharati, ekībhāve niyojeti, sayaṃ pana rājarājamahāmattādīhi parivuto viharatī’’ti, tassa vacanokāsupacchedanatthaṃ cakkavāḷapariyantāya parisāya majjhe nisinnopi tathāgato ekakovāti dassanatthaṃ ‘‘ayaṃ kho panā’’ti desanā āraddhāti āha ‘‘tappaṭipakkhavihāradassanattha’’nti. Tattha sabbanimittānanti rūpādīnaṃ saṅkhatanimittānaṃ[Pg.52]. Ajjhattanti visayajjhattaṃ. Suññatanti anattānupassanānubhāvanibbattaphalasamāpattiṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘ajjhatta’’ntiādi. Tattha dutiye vikappe ṭhāna-saddo kāraṇapariyāyo daṭṭhabbo. Saccakasuttenāti mahāsaccakasuttena. Tattha hi –

By 'Truly, Ānanda, a bhikkhu does not shine by delighting in company, by taking pleasure in company, by being devoted to delight in company' (MN 3.186) and so on, the delight in company is shown, along with the absence of what is proper for one gone forth and of the gain of the desire for such things as the happiness of renunciation. And by saying, 'And I, Ānanda, do not perceive even a single form in which change and alteration of that form would not give rise to sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair in one who is attached and delighted in it' (MN 3.186), thus speaking of the danger in delighting in forms and so on, if some foolish person gone forth were to say, 'The Perfectly Self-Enlightened One, like cows that have entered a field, drives us out from the group and enjoins us to solitude, while he himself lives surrounded by kings, great ministers, and so on,' then to cut off the occasion for such speech, the teaching beginning with 'But this...' is undertaken to show that the Tathāgata, even while seated in the midst of an assembly extending to the boundaries of the world-sphere, is alone. It is said, 'For the purpose of showing the dwelling that is the opposite of that.' Here, 'of all signs' (sabbanimittānaṃ) refers to the conditioned signs of forms and so on. 'Internally' (ajjhattaṃ) means the internal object. 'Voidness' (suññataṃ) refers to the attainment of fruition produced by the power of insight into non-self. Therefore, it is said, 'internally,' and so on. Here, in the second alternative, the word 'ṭhāna' (place) should be understood as a synonym for 'reason.' 'By the Saccaka Sutta' means by the Mahāsaccaka Sutta. For there—

‘‘Abhijānāmi kho panāhaṃ, aggivessana, anekasatāya parisāya dhammaṃ desetā, apissu maṃ ekameko evaṃ maññati ‘mamevārabbha samaṇo gotamo dhammaṃ desetī’ti. Na kho panetaṃ, aggivessana, evaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yāvadeva viññāpanatthāya tathāgato paresaṃ dhammaṃ desetīti. So kho ahaṃ, aggivessana, tassāyeva kathāya pariyosāne tasmiṃyeva purimasmiṃ samādhinimitte ajjhattameva cittaṃ saṇṭhapemi sannisādemi, ekodiṃ karomi, samādahāmi ‘yena sudaṃ niccakappaṃ viharāmī’’ti (ma. ni. 1.387) –

Moreover, Aggivessana, I recall teaching the Dhamma to assemblies of many hundreds, yet each individual thought, ‘The ascetic Gotama is teaching the Dhamma especially for me.’ But, Aggivessana, this should not be seen in such a way. The Tathāgata teaches the Dhamma to others merely for the purpose of conveying understanding. Then, Aggivessana, at the conclusion of that very talk, in that same original focus of concentration, I steady my mind internally, settle it, unify it, and concentrate it, by which I dwell constantly.

Āgatanti.

Thus it is stated.

22. Aññehi anidassanehi aññaṃ viya katvā yathā ‘‘silāputtakassa sarīra’’nti. Dhammasabhāvasāmaññenātiādinā kiñcāpi rūpāyatanato añño nidassanabhāvo nāma natthi, dhammasabhāvo pana atthi. Tato ca rūpāyatanassa viseso nidassanabhāvena katoti tadaññadhammavisesakaro nidassanabhāvo rūpāyatanato anaññopi añño viya katvā upacaritoti dasseti. Atthaviseso sāmaññavisesatthabhedo. Sayaṃ sampattānaṃ phoṭṭhabbadhammānaṃ, nissayavasena sampattānaṃ ghānajivhākāyānaṃ gandharasānañca, itaresaṃ asampattānaṃ. Aññamaññapatanaṃ aññamaññassa yogyadese avaṭṭhānaṃ, yena paṭihananabhāvena. Byāpārādīti cittakiriyāvāyodhātuvipphāravasena akkhipaṭalādīnaṃ heṭṭhā upari ca saṃsīdanalaṅghanādippavattimāha. Vikāruppatti visadisuppatti, visayassa iṭṭhāniṭṭhabhāvena anuggaho upaghāto cāti attho.

22. By making it as if distinct from other non-manifest phenomena, as in the phrase 'the body of a stone doll.' By the phrase beginning 'by the commonality of the intrinsic nature of phenomena': although there is no manifest nature separate from the visible form base, there is indeed the intrinsic nature of phenomena. Therefore, the distinctiveness of the visible form is achieved by its manifest aspect, which, while not separate from the visible form, is treated as if distinct to illustrate that it causes a specific quality different from other phenomena. The distinction of meaning is the difference between the general and the particular. Of tangible phenomena that are directly encountered; of smells and tastes that are encountered through dependence on the nose, tongue, and body; and of others that are not encountered. Mutual striking is the positioning of each in a suitable place, by which the state of resistance occurs. 'Through activity, etc.' refers to the movement of the eyelid and other parts up and down due to the functioning of the mind and the expansion of the wind element. The arising of an alteration is dissimilar production, meaning the support or harm of an object based on its desirable or undesirable nature.

Tikamātikāpadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Tika-mātikāpada is completed.

Dukamātikāpadavaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Dyad Matrix Headings

1-6. Samānadesaggahaṇānaṃ [Pg.53] ekasmiṃyeva vatthusmiṃ gahetabbānaṃ, ekavatthuvisayānaṃ vā. Atha vā samānadesānaṃ ekavatthukattā samānagahetabbabhāvānaṃ ekuppāditoti attho. Ye dhammā hetusahagatā, te hetūhi saha saṅgayhanti. Yo ca tesaṃ sahetukabhāvo, so sahajātādīhi hetūhi katoti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘samā…pe… sabbhāva’’nti. Ādi-saddena cettha suppatiṭṭhitabhāvasādhanādihetubyāpāre pariggaṇhāti. Ekībhāvūpagamananti ekakalāpabhāvena pavattamānānaṃ cittacetasikānaṃ saṃsaṭṭhatāya samūhaghanabhāvena duviññeyyanānākaraṇataṃyeva sandhāya vuttaṃ. Dhammanānattābhāvepīti sabhāvatthabhedābhāvepi. Padatthanānattenāti nānāpadābhidheyyatābhedena. Etena pakārantarāpekkhaṃ dukantaravacananti dasseti. Anekappakārā hi dhammā. Teneva ‘‘sabbe dhammā sabbākārena buddhassa bhagavato ñāṇamukhe āpāthaṃ āgacchantī’’ti (mahāni. 156; cūḷani. mogharājamāṇavapucchāniddesa 85) vuttaṃ. Ayañca attho tikesupi daṭṭhabbo. Yesaṃ vineyyānaṃ yehi pakāravisesehi dhammānaṃ vibhāvane kate paṭivedho hoti, tesaṃ tappakārabhedehi dhammānaṃ vibhāvanaṃ. Yesaṃ pana yena ekeneva pakārena vibhāvane paṭivedho hoti, tesampi taṃ vatvā dhammissarattā tadaññaniravasesappakāravibhāvanañca desanāvilāsoti āha ‘‘desetabbappakārajānana’’ntiādi. Nanu ekena pakārena jānantassa tadaññappakāravibhāvanaṃ aphalaṃ hotīti? Na hoti paṭisambhidāppabhedassa upanissayattā. Te pakārā etesanti tappakārā, tabbhāvo tappakāratā. Iminā dhammānaṃ vijjamānasseva pakāravisesassa vibhāvanaṃ desanāvilāsoti dasseti.

1-6. For those things that are to be taken together because they share the same location or pertain to a single subject, they should be grasped in a single instance. Alternatively, because things in the same location have a single basis, they are to be taken together as arising from a single source. Those phenomena that are associated with a cause are grouped together with their causes. And the fact that they are with cause is established by causes that arise simultaneously with them, etc.; therefore it is said: 'samā...pe... sabbhāva.' Here, the term 'ādi' includes the function of causes that establish firmness and other supporting conditions. 'Coming together into unity' refers to the fact that mind and mental factors, though operating as a single cluster, are so closely intermingled that they appear as a single mass, making their individual distinctions difficult to discern. Even in the absence of diversity in phenomena—that is, even if there is no difference in their intrinsic nature—there is still diversity in terms of words, due to the distinctions in what the words refer to. This indicates that the statement of another dyad is relative to a different aspect. For phenomena are of many kinds. Therefore, it is said: 'All phenomena in all their aspects enter the range of the Buddha’s knowledge' (Mahāni. 156; Cūḷani. Mogharājamāṇavapucchāniddesa 85). This principle should also be seen in the case of the triads. For those trainees for whom understanding arises when phenomena are explained through specific aspects, the explanation of phenomena should be through those specific aspects. But for those who gain understanding through just one mode of exposition, even for them, due to the Teacher’s mastery of the Dhamma, the exposition of all aspects without omission is a display of teaching skill—hence it is said: 'knowing the manner in which it should be taught,' etc. But does not explaining other aspects to one who understands through just one mode become fruitless? No, because it serves as a foundation for the distinctions of analytical knowledge. Those modes belong to them, thus they are 'of those modes'; that state is their modality. This shows that the exposition of the existing specific diversities in phenomena is a display of teaching skill.

Aññatthāpīti ‘‘ahetukā ceva dhammā na ca hetū’’tiādīsu. Yathā paṭhamadukekadese gahetvā dutiyatatiyadukehi saddhiṃ chaṭṭhadukanaye yojanā ‘‘hetū dhammā sahetukāpi ahetukāpī’’tiādayo tayo dukā labbhanti, evaṃ dutiyatatiyadukekadese gahetvā paṭhamadukena saddhiṃ yojanāya ‘‘sahetukā dhammā hetūpi na hetūpi, ahetukā dhammā hetūpi na hetūpi, hetusampayuttā dhammā hetūpi na hetūpi, hetuvippayuttā dhammā hetūpi na hetūpī’’ti cattāro dukā [Pg.54] labbhanti, te pana vuttanayeneva sakkā dassetunti na dassitāti daṭṭhabbā. Atha vā pāḷiyaṃ vuttehi catutthapañcamehi aṭṭhakathāyaṃ dassitehi purimehi dvīhi ninnānākaraṇato ete na vuttā. Sannivesavisesamattameva hettha visesoti. Teneva hi ninnānatthattā pāḷiyaṃ āgatadukesu yathāniddhāritadukānaṃ yathāsambhavaṃ avarodhanena avuttataṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘etesu panā’’tiādimāha.

'Also elsewhere,' as in the phrases 'rootless phenomena and not roots,' etc. Just as, by taking a portion from the first dyad and combining it with the second and third dyads according to the method of the sixth dyad, three dyads are obtained—such as 'roots are both with a root and without a root,' etc.—so too, by taking a portion from the second and third dyads and combining it with the first dyad, four dyads are obtained: 'phenomena with a root are both roots and not roots; phenomena without a root are both roots and not roots; phenomena associated with a root are both roots and not roots; phenomena dissociated from a root are both roots and not roots.' However, these should be understood as not being shown because they can be shown by the method already stated. Alternatively, these are not stated because they are not made distinct from the first two shown in the commentary and the fourth and fifth stated in the Pāli. Here, the distinction is merely a matter of arrangement. For this very reason, due to their non-distinctness, in order to show what is unstated by including the specified dyads as is possible among the dyads that come in the Pāli text, the author says, 'But in these,' etc.

Atha vā ‘‘etena vā gatidassanenā’’tiādinā vakkhamānanayena ‘‘hetū ceva dhammā ahetukā cā’’tiādīnaṃ sambhavantānaṃ dukānaṃ saṅgahe sati etesampi saṅgaho siyā. Yato vā dukato padaṃ niddhāretvā dukantaraṃ vuccati, tena sati ca nānatte dukantaraṃ labbhati, na cettha koci viseso yathāvuttadukehīti saṃvaṇṇanāsu na dassitanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Ettha ca yathā sahetukadukato hetusampayuttadukassa, hetusahetukadukato ca hetuhetusampayuttadukassa padatthamattato nānattaṃ, na sabhāvatthato. Evaṃ santepi sahetukahetusahetukaduke vatvā itarepi vuttā, evaṃ hetusampayuttahetuhetusampayuttadukādīhi sabhāvatthanānattābhāvepi padatthanānattasambhavato dhammanānattābhāvepi padatthanānattena dukantaraṃ vuccatīti vuttattā ‘‘hetusahagatā dhammā, na hetusahagatā dhammā, hetusahajātā dhammā, na hetusahajātā dhammā. Hetusaṃsaṭṭhā dhammā, hetuvisaṃsaṭṭhā dhammā. Hetusamuṭṭhānā dhammā, na hetusamuṭṭhānā dhammā. Hetusahabhuno dhammā, na hetusahabhuno dhammā’’tiādīnaṃ, tathā ‘‘hetū ceva dhammā hetusahagatā cā’’tiādīnaṃ, ‘‘na hetū kho pana dhammā hetusahagatāpi, na hetusahagatāpī’’tiādīnañca sambhavantānaṃ anekesaṃ dukānaṃ saṅgaho anuññāto viya dissati. Tathā hi vakkhati ‘‘etena vā gatidassanenā’’tiādi. Evaṃ āsavagocchakādīsupi ayamattho yathāsambhavaṃ vattabbo. Dhammānaṃ vā sabhāvakiccādiṃ bodhetabbākārañca yāthāvato jānantena dhammasāminā yattakā dukā vuttā, tattakesu ṭhātabbaṃ. Addhā hi te dukā na vattabbā, ye bhagavatā na vuttāti veditabbaṃ. Na hetuhetusampayuttaduko chaṭṭhadukena ninnānatthoti adhippāyo. Tesūti paṭhamadukatatiyadukesu. Yadi dukantarehi dukantarapadehi ca samānatthattā etesaṃ dukānaṃ dukantarapadānañca avacanaṃ[Pg.55], evaṃ sati chaṭṭhaduke paṭhamapadampi na vattabbaṃ catutthaduke dutiyapadena samānatthattā. Tathā ca chaṭṭhadukoyeva na hotīti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘catutthaduke’’tiādi. Dukapūraṇatthanti idaṃ samānatthataṃyeva sandhāya vuttaṃ, desanāviseso pana vijjatiyeva. Atthantaratābhāvepi pakārabhedahetukaṃ dukantaravacananti dassito hi ayamatthoti. Etena gatidassanenāti atthavisesābhāvepi chaṭṭhadukapūraṇasaṅkhātena nayadassanena. Paṭhamaduke…pe… dassito pāḷiyaṃ vuttehi catutthapañcamehi, aṭṭhakathāyaṃ dassitehi purimehi dvīhi, idha dassitehi catūhi. Tesūti dutiyatatiyadukesu. Paṭhamadukapakkhepena dassito pāḷiyaṃ chaṭṭhadukena itaratra ca itaradukehīti veditabbaṃ.

Or, by the method to be stated as, 'or by this demonstration of the way,' when there is an inclusion of possible couplets such as, 'phenomena that are roots and phenomena that are rootless,' etc., the inclusion of these also would be possible. Or, since having determined a term from a couplet, another couplet is stated, and because of this diversity another couplet is obtained, yet there is no distinction here from the couplets already mentioned—it should be understood that this is not shown in the commentaries. And here, just as for the 'root-associated couplet' from the 'with-root couplet', and for the 'root and root-associated couplet' from the 'root and with-root couplet', the difference is merely in the meaning of the term, not in the essential nature. Even so, having stated the 'with-root' and 'root and with-root' couplets, the others are also stated. Thus, even though there is no difference in essential nature with the 'root-associated', 'root and root-associated' couplets, etc., because of the possibility of a difference in the meaning of the term, and even though there is no difference in the nature of the phenomena, another couplet is stated due to the difference in the meaning of the term. Because it is said: 'Phenomena accompanied by a root, phenomena not accompanied by a root; phenomena co-arisen with a root, phenomena not co-arisen with a root; phenomena conjoined with a root, phenomena disjoined from a root; phenomena originated from a root, phenomena not originated from a root; phenomena co-existent with a root, phenomena not co-existent with a root,' etc. And likewise, 'phenomena that are roots and are accompanied by a root,' etc., and 'phenomena that are not roots but are accompanied by a root, or are not accompanied by a root,' etc.—the inclusion of many such possible couplets seems to be permitted. For it will be said, 'or by this demonstration of the way,' etc. In this way, this meaning should be applied as is possible in the sections on the cankers, etc. Or, one should abide by as many couplets as have been stated by the Master of the Dhamma, who knows as they really are the nature, function, etc., of phenomena and the manner in which they are to be understood. For certainly, those couplets that were not spoken by the Blessed One should not be spoken—this should be understood. The meaning is that the 'root and root-associated' couplet is not different in meaning from the sixth couplet. 'Among these' means in the first and third couplets. If, because of the sameness of meaning with other couplets and with the terms of other couplets, these couplets and the terms of other couplets are not stated, then in the sixth couplet the first term also should not be stated, because of its sameness of meaning with the second term in the fourth couplet. And thus, the sixth couplet itself would not exist. Referring to this objection, he says, 'in the fourth couplet,' etc. 'For the purpose of completing the couplet'—this is said with reference to the sameness of meaning, but there is indeed a distinction in the teaching. For it has been shown that this is the meaning: even in the absence of a difference in meaning, the statement of another couplet is due to a difference in mode. 'By this demonstration of the way' means by the demonstration of the method designated as 'the completion of the sixth couplet', even in the absence of a difference in meaning. In the first couplet… shown in the Pāli by the fourth and fifth stated therein, in the commentary by the preceding two, and here by the four. 'Among these' means in the second and third couplets. It should be understood that it is shown in the Pāli by the sixth couplet with the inclusion of the first couplet, and elsewhere by other couplets.

7-13. Paccayabhāvamattena…pe… atthitanti etena na paṭiladdhattatāsaṅkhātā sasabhāvatāva atthitā, atha kho paṭipakkhena anirodho appahīnatā anipphāditaphalatā kāraṇāsamugghātena phalanibbattanārahatā cāti imamatthaṃ dasseti. Tathā hi ‘‘imasmiṃ sati idaṃ hotī’’ti ettha ‘‘satī’’ti iminā vacanena yena vinā yaṃ na hoti, taṃ atītādipi kāraṇaṃ saṅgahitamevāti. Tenevāha ‘‘na sahetu…pe… kālānamevā’’ti. Same…pe… dīpeti samecca sambhūya paccayehi katanti saṅkhatanti. Ayametesaṃ visesoti ayaṃ paccayanibbattānaṃ paccayavantatā anekapaccayanipphāditatā ca dukadvaye purimapadatthānaṃ bhedo, itaresaṃ pana purimapadasaṅgahitadhammavidhurasabhāvatāyāti. Avini…pe… ṭhapanatoti ‘‘ettakā’’ti pabhedaparicchedaniddhāraṇavasena abhidhammamātikāyaṃ dhammānaṃ avuttattā vuttaṃ. Suttantamātikāyaṃ pana niddhāritasarūpasaṅkhāvisesattā vinicchitatthaparicchedāyeva avijjādayo vuttāti. ‘‘Pathavīādi rūpa’’nti etasmiṃ atthavikappe anekahetukesu cittuppādesu hetūnaṃ sahetukabhāvo viya sabbesaṃ pathavīādīnaṃ rūpibhāvo siddhoti āha ‘‘purima…pe… pajjatī’’ti. Na hi tesu niyato katthaci saṃsāmibhāvoti. Aniccānupassanāya vā lujjati chijjati vinassatīti gahetabbo lokoti taṃgahaṇarahitānaṃ lokuttarānaṃ natthi lokatā. Tenevāti dukkhasaccabhāvena pariññeyyabhāvenāti attho.

7-13. By the mere presence of a condition… and so on… 'it exists'—by this it is shown that existence is not its own nature reckoned as 'having attained selfhood', but rather, by way of the opposite, it shows this meaning: non-cessation, non-abandonment, the state of not having produced its fruit, and the suitability for producing a fruit through the non-eradication of the cause. For in the statement, 'When this exists, that comes to be,' by this word 'exists,' that cause, even a past one, without which something does not come to be, is included. Therefore it is said: 'Not with a cause…pe… only of times.' …coming together…pe… it explains: 'made by conditions that have come together and assembled' means 'conditioned.' This is the distinction among them: for things produced by conditions, their possessing conditions and their being produced by multiple conditions is the difference in meaning of the first terms in the two couplets. For the others, however, it is due to their nature being deficient in the phenomena included in the first term. …not defined…pe… establishing—this is said because in the Abhidhamma Mātikā the phenomena are not stated by way of determining their divisions and limits with 'so many.' In the Suttanta Mātikā, however, because their specific nature and number have been determined, ignorance and so on are stated with their meaning and scope already decided. In this alternative meaning of 'earth, etc., is form,' just as the state of being with a cause is established for the causes in mind-arisings that have multiple causes, so too the state of being material of all things such as earth is established. It is said: 'the former…pe… it is afflicted.' For among them there is no fixed state of ownership anywhere. Or, by contemplation of impermanence, 'the world' should be understood as that which 'is afflicted,' 'is broken,' and 'perishes.' For the supramundane, which are devoid of that grasping, there is no 'worldliness.' 'Therefore' means: by way of being the truth of suffering, by way of being what is to be fully understood.

Dukabahutā āpajjatīti kasmā vuttaṃ, nanu vīsati dukā vibhattā, ‘‘avuttopi yathālābhavasena veditabbo’’ti ca vakkhatīti dukabahutā [Pg.56] icchitā evāti? Saccametaṃ, taṃyeva pana dukabahutaṃ anicchanto evamāha. Apica dukabahutā āpajjati, sā ca kho viññāṇabhedānusārinī, tatrāpi kāmāvacarakusalato ñāṇasampayuttāni, tathā mahākiriyato manodvārāvajjananti evaṃpakārānaṃ sabbadhammārammaṇaviññāṇānaṃ anāmasanato na byāpinīti dasseti ‘‘dukabahutā’’tiādinā. Abyāpibhāve pana dosaṃ dassento ‘‘tathā ca…pe… siyā’’ti āha. Niddesena ca viruddhanti ‘‘ye te dhammā cakkhuviññeyyā, na te dhammā sotaviññeyyā’’tiādinā rūpāyatanādīnaṃ paccekacakkhuviññāṇādinā kenaci viññeyyataṃ, sotaviññāṇādinā kenaci naviññeyyatañca dassentena nikkheparāsiniddesena ‘‘dvinnampi padānaṃ atthanānattato duko hotī’’ti idaṃ vacanaṃ viruddhaṃ, tathā atthuddhāraniddesenapi atthato na sametīti attho. Tatthāti tassaṃ nikkheparāsisaṃvaṇṇanāyaṃ. Yo ca paṭisedho kato atthanānattato dukaṃ dassetunti adhippāyo. Na hi sama…pe… sedhetunti etena ‘‘ye te dhammā cakkhuviññeyyā, na te dhammā sotaviññeyyā’’ti ettakesu niddesapadesu dukapadadvayappavatti pāḷito eva viññāyatīti dasseti.

Why is it said, 'a multiplicity of couplets would result'? Are not twenty couplets analyzed? And since it will be said, 'Even what is not stated should be understood according to what is obtained,' is not a multiplicity of couplets in fact intended? This is true. However, not wishing for that multiplicity of couplets, one says this. Moreover, a multiplicity of couplets would result, and this would follow the divisions of consciousness. Therein, it is not comprehensive because of the non-consideration of consciousnesses that have all dhammas as object—such as those associated with knowledge from the sense-sphere wholesome consciousness, and likewise mind-door adverting from the great functional consciousness. This is what is shown by 'a multiplicity of couplets,' etc. Then, showing the fault in its not being comprehensive, one says: 'And so…pe… it would be.' And it contradicts the exposition. By the exposition of the summary section, which shows that the form-base, etc., are cognizable by some, namely the respective eye-consciousness, etc., and not cognizable by some, namely ear-consciousness, etc., with the words 'Those phenomena cognizable by the eye are not cognizable by the ear,' etc., this statement, 'a couplet exists because of the difference in meaning of the two terms,' is contradicted. Similarly, the meaning is that it does not accord in meaning even with the exposition that extracts the meaning. 'Therein' means: in that commentary on the summary section. The intention is that the refutation that was made was to show a couplet based on a difference in meaning. For not the same…pe… to prove. By this it is shown that in such exposition passages as 'Those phenomena cognizable by the eye are not cognizable by the ear,' the application of the two terms of the couplet is understood directly from the Pāli text itself.

Tathevāti ubhinnaṃ kecina-saddānaṃ aniyamato cakkhusotādinissayavohārena cakkhusotaviññāṇādiko bhinnasabhāvoyeva dhammo atthoti dassanavasena. Rūpāyatanameva hi cakkhusotaviññāṇehi viññeyyāviññeyyabhāvato ‘‘kenaci viññeyyaṃ kenaci naviññeyya’’nti ca vuccatīti. Yadi evaṃ imasmimpi pakkhe dukabahutā āpajjatīti codanaṃ manasi katvā āha ‘‘na cetthā’’tiādi. Viññātabbabhedenāti viññātabbavisesena, viññeyyekadesenāti attho. Dukabhedoti dukaviseso, kenaci viññeyyaduko, tappabhedoyeva vā. Samatto pariyatto paripuṇṇoti attho. Yattakā viññātabbā tattakā dukāti dukabhedāpajjanappakāradassanaṃ. Evañca satītiādinā imissā saṃvaṇṇanāya laddhaguṇaṃ dasseti. ‘‘Ye te dhammā cakkhuviññeyyā, na te dhammā sotaviññeyyā’’ti rūpāyatanasseva vuttattā atthabhedābhāvato kathamayaṃ duko hotīti āha ‘‘viññāṇanānattenā’’tiādi. Yadi pana sabbaviññātabbasaṅgahe dukosamatto hoti, nikkheparāsiniddeso kathaṃ nīyatīti āha ‘‘etassa panā’’tiādi.

'Similarly' means: by way of showing that, because of the indeterminacy of the two words 'some' (`keci`), by the convention of dependence on the eye, ear, etc., there is a phenomenon, namely eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, etc., which has a distinct nature. For it is the form-base itself that, because of its state of being cognizable and non-cognizable by eye-consciousness and ear-consciousness respectively, is said to be 'cognizable by some, not cognizable by some.' Having kept in mind the objection, 'If so, in this position too a multiplicity of couplets would result,' one says, 'Not here,' etc. 'By the distinction of what is to be cognized' means by the specific thing to be cognized, that is, by a portion of what is cognizable. 'The division of the couplet' means a specific couplet, or the couplet 'cognizable by some,' or just its division. 'Completed, finished, perfected' is the meaning. 'As many as are to be cognized, so many couplets'—this shows the way in which the arising of a division of couplets occurs. And with 'This being so,' etc., it shows the advantage gained from this explanation. Since it is said of the form-base alone, 'Those phenomena that are cognizable by the eye are not cognizable by the ear,' how can this be a couplet, since there is no difference in meaning? To this, it is said, 'Due to the diversity of consciousness,' etc. But if the couplet is completed by the inclusion of all that is cognizable, how is the exposition of the summary section to be interpreted? To this, it is said, 'But of this,' etc.

Ettha [Pg.57] pana yathā viññāṇanānattena viññātabbaṃ bhinditvā duke vuccamāne satipi viññātabbānaṃ bahubhāve yattakā viññātabbā, tattakā dukāti natthi dukabahutā dukasaṅgahitadhammekadesesu dukapadadvayappavattidassanabhāvato. Evaṃ dvinnampi padānaṃ atthanānattena duke vuccamānepi yattakāni viññāṇāni, tattakā dukāti natthi dukabahutā dukasaṅga…pe… bhāvato eva. Na hi ekaṃyeva viññāṇaṃ ‘‘kenaci kenacī’’ti vuttaṃ, kintu aparampīti sabbaviññāṇasaṅgahe duko samatto hoti, na ca katthaci dukassa pacchedo atthi indriyaviññāṇānaṃ viya manoviññāṇassapi visayassa bhinnattā. Na hi atītārammaṇaṃ viññāṇaṃ anāgatādiārammaṇaṃ hoti, anāgatārammaṇaṃ vā atītādiārammaṇaṃ, tasmā yathāladdhavisesena visiṭṭhesu manoviññāṇabhedesu tassa tassa visayassa ālambanānālambanavasena dukapadadvayappavatti na sakkā nivāretuṃ. Teneva ca aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘manoviññāṇena pana kenaci viññeyyañceva aviññeyyañcāti ayamattho atthi, tasmā so avuttopi yathālābhavasena veditabbo’’ti bhūmibhedavasena yathālābhaṃ dassessati. ‘‘Vavatthānābhāvato’’ti idampi anāmaṭṭhavisesaṃ manoviññāṇasāmaññameva gahetvā vuttaṃ. Pāḷi pana indriyaviññāṇehi nayadassanavasena āgatāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Evañca katvā imissāpi atthavaṇṇanāya ‘‘kenacī’’ti padaṃ aniyamena sabbaviññāṇasaṅgāhakanti siddhaṃ hoti, niddesena ca na koci virodho. Cakkhuviññeyyanasotaviññeyyabhāvehi dukapadadvayappavatti dassitā, na pana cakkhuviññeyyācakkhuviññeyyabhāvehi visesakāraṇābhāvato. Kiñca ‘‘ye vā panā’’ti padantarasampiṇḍanatopi ‘‘ye te dhammā cakkhuviññeyyā…pe… na te dhammā cakkhuviññeyyā’’ti (dha. sa. 1101) ettāvatā dukapadadvayappavatti dassitāti viññāyati. Padantarabhāvadassanattho hi yevāpana-saddo yathā ‘‘ye keci kusalā dhammā, sabbe te kusalamūlā. Ye vā pana kusalamūlā, sabbe te dhammā kusalā’’tiādīsu (yama. 1.mūlayamaka.1). Aññathā ‘‘ye te dhammā cakkhuviññeyyā, na te dhammā sotaviññeyyā. Ye te dhammā sotaviññeyyā, na te dhammā cakkhuviññeyyā’’ti pāḷi abhavissa. Yaṃ pana vadanti ‘‘ye te dhammā cakkhuviññeyyā…pe… na te dhammā cakkhuviññeyyāti iminā atthato dve [Pg.58] dukā vuttā hontī’’ti, tadapi cakkhuviññeyyācakkhuviññeyyataṃ sotaviññeyyāsotaviññeyyatañca sandhāya vuttaṃ, na pana ‘‘cakkhuviññeyyanasotaviññeyyataṃ sotaviññeyyanacakkhuviññeyyatañcā’’ti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Etena pāḷipaṭisedhanañca nivāritaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ paṭisedhanasseva abhāvato. Tathā yassa ārammaṇassa vijānanabhāvena yo attho vuccamāno aniyamadassanatthaṃ ‘‘kenacī’’ti vutto, soyeva tato aññassa avijānanabhāvena vuccamāno aniyamadassanatthaṃ puna ‘‘kenacī’’ti vuttoti tadatthadassane tenevāti ayaṃ padattho na sambhavatīti na sakkā vattunti. Evamettha yathā aṭṭhakathā avaṭṭhitā, tathā attho yujjatīti veditabbaṃ.

Here, however, just as when a couplet is spoken of by dividing what is cognizable according to the diversity of consciousness, even though there is an abundance of things to be cognized, there is no multiplicity of couplets with 'as many as are cognizable, so many couplets,' because the application of the two terms of the couplet is seen only in a portion of the phenomena included in the couplet. Similarly, even when a couplet is spoken of based on the difference in meaning of the two terms, there is no multiplicity of couplets with 'as many consciousnesses, so many couplets,' because…pe… of the state. For it is not a single consciousness that is spoken of as 'by some, by some,' but another as well. Thus, the couplet is completed by the inclusion of all consciousnesses, and there is no break in the couplet anywhere, since the object of mind-consciousness is also distinct, like that of the sense-consciousnesses. Indeed, a consciousness with a past object does not have a future or other object, nor does a consciousness with a future object have a past or other object. Therefore, in the distinct divisions of mind-consciousness, distinguished by their respective characteristics, the application of the two terms of the couplet cannot be prevented based on whether an object is taken up or not. For that very reason, the commentary will show what is obtained according to the divisions of planes, stating: 'But with mind-consciousness, there is this meaning: cognizable by some and non-cognizable. Therefore, even though unstated, it should be understood according to what is obtained.' The phrase 'due to the absence of determination' is also said having taken just the generality of mind-consciousness, without touching upon specifics. The Pāli, however, should be seen as having come by way of illustrating a principle with the sense-consciousnesses. Having done so, in this explanation of meaning too, it is established that the word 'by some' encompasses all consciousnesses without restriction, and there is no contradiction with the exposition. The application of the two terms of the couplet is shown by the states of being cognizable by the eye and not cognizable by the ear, but not by the states of being cognizable by the eye and not cognizable by the eye, because there is no specific reason for distinction. Moreover, from the summarizing of the other term 'or whatever,' it is understood that the application of the two terms of the couplet is shown by the passage: 'Those phenomena that are cognizable by the eye…pe… are not those phenomena cognizable by the ear' (Dhs. 1101). For the words 'or whatever' (`ye vā pana`) have the meaning of showing the presence of another term, as in: 'Whatever wholesome phenomena there are, all those are wholesome roots. Or whatever are wholesome roots, all those phenomena are wholesome' (Yama. 1. Mūlayamaka. 1). Otherwise, the Pāli would have been: 'Those phenomena that are cognizable by the eye are not cognizable by the ear. Those phenomena that are cognizable by the ear are not cognizable by the eye.' But as to what some say: 'By this, "Those phenomena that are cognizable by the eye…pe… are not those phenomena cognizable by the ear," two couplets are stated in meaning'—that too should be seen as said with reference to being cognizable/non-cognizable by the eye and being cognizable/non-cognizable by the ear, and not with reference to 'being cognizable by the eye and not by the ear, and being cognizable by the ear and not by the eye.' By this, the refutation of the Pāli should be seen as averted, since there is no refutation at all. Similarly, the meaning which is stated as the knowing of a certain object, and which is expressed as 'by some' to show indeterminacy, is the very same meaning which, when stated as the non-knowing of another object, is again expressed as 'by some' to show indeterminacy. Therefore, it cannot be said that in showing that meaning, the meaning of the word 'by that' is not possible. Thus it should be understood that here the meaning is consistent with how the commentary is established.

14-19. Santānassa ajaññamalīnabhāvakaraṇato kaṇhakammavipākahetuto ca aparisuddhattā ‘‘asucibhāvena sandantī’’ti vuttaṃ. Tatthāti vaṇe. Paggharaṇaka…pe… saddoti etena āsavo viya āsavoti ayampi attho dassitoti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Gotrabhu…pe… vuttānīti etena gotrabhuggahaṇaṃ upalakkhaṇaṃ yathā ‘‘kākehi sappi rakkhitabba’’nti dasseti. Gotrabhusadisā gotrabhūti pana atthe sati guṇappadhānatthānaṃ ekena saddena avacanīyattā vodānādayova vuttā bhaveyyuṃ. Atha vā gotrabhūti ekasesena sāmaññena vā ayaṃ niddesoti veditabbaṃ. Abhividhivisayaṃ avadhinti vibhattiṃ pariṇāmetvā vattabbaṃ.

14-19. It is said to 'flow as impurity' because it causes a state of ignobility and defilement for the continuity of consciousness, because it is the cause of the result of dark kamma, and because of its impurity. 'Therein' means 'in a wound.' By 'oozing... sound,' it should be understood that the meaning 'a taint, like an outflow' is also shown. By 'gotrabhu... as stated,' it is shown that the mention of 'gotrabhu' is an indication, just as the example 'ghee should be guarded from crows' shows. However, if there were a meaning of 'gotrabhu' as 'similar to gotrabhu,' then since the primary meanings, which are qualities, cannot be expressed by a single word, only purification and so forth would have been stated. Alternatively, 'gotrabhu' should be understood as a designation by way of ekasesa or common characteristic. One should speak by transforming the case ending to indicate the limit as the scope of 'abhividhi'.

Sampayuttehi āsavehi taṃsahitatā āsavasahitatā. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – yathā sahetukānaṃ sampayuttehi hetūhi sahetukatā, na evaṃ sāsavāti vuttadhammānaṃ sampayuttehi āsavehi sāsavatā, atha kho vippayuttehīti. Dukantare avuttapadabhāvoyevettha dukayojanāya ñāyāgatatā. Yadi evaṃ hetugocchake kathanti āha ‘‘hetugocchake panā’’tiādi. Paṭhame duke dutiyassa pakkhepe ekoti catutthadukamāha. Paṭhame duke tatiyassa pakkhepe dveti ‘‘āsavā ceva dhammā āsavavippayuttā ca, āsavavippayuttā ceva dhammā no ca āsavā’’ti iminā saddhiṃ pañcamadukamāha. Paṭhamassa dutiye duke pakkhepe ekoti ‘‘no āsavā dhammā sāsavāpi anāsavāpī’’ti ayameko. Tatiye paṭhamassa pakkhepe dveti ‘‘āsavā dhammā āsavasampayuttāpi [Pg.59] āsavavippayuttāpi, no āsavādhammā āsavasampayuttāpi āsavavippayuttāpī’’ti ime dve. Tatiye dutiyassa pakkhepe ekoti ‘‘sāsavā dhammā āsavasampayuttāpi āsavavippayuttāpī’’ti eko. Dutiye tatiyassa pakkhepe ekoti chaṭṭhadukamāha. Tīhīti catutthapañcamachaṭṭhehi. Itareti tadavasiṭṭhā pañca. Te pana paṭhame tatiyadukadutiyapadapakkhepe eko, dutiye paṭhamadukadutiyapadapakkhepe eko, tatiye paṭhamassa ekekapadapakkhepe dve, tatiye dutiyadukapaṭhamapadapakkhepe ekoti evaṃ veditabbā. ‘‘Sāsavā dhammā āsavāpi no āsavāpi. Āsavasampayuttā dhammā āsavāpi no āsavāpi. Āsavavippayuttā dhammā āsavāpi no āsavāpī’’ti etesampi, ‘‘āsavasahagatā dhammā no āsavasahagatā dhammā’’ti evamādīnañca aggahaṇe kāraṇaṃ gahaṇanayo ca pubbe vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ.

The state of being accompanied by the taints, by means of the associated taints, is 'taint-accompaniment.' This is what is meant: just as for phenomena with roots, their state of having roots is due to their associated roots, it is not so that for phenomena called 'tainted,' their state of being tainted is due to their associated taints, but rather due to their dissociated ones. Here, in the intermediate dyads, the absence of unstated terms is simply a consequence of the method for combining the dyads. If this is so, how is it in the root cluster? He says, 'But in the root cluster,' and so forth. In the first dyad, the inclusion of the second is one—this refers to the fourth dyad. In the first dyad, the inclusion of the third is two—this, along with 'states that are taints and states that are dissociated from taints, and states that are dissociated from taints but are not taints,' refers to the fifth dyad. The inclusion of the first dyad in the second dyad is one—this is 'states that are not taints, whether tainted or untainted.' In the third, the inclusion of the first is two—these are 'states that are taints, whether associated with taints or dissociated from taints, and states that are not taints, whether associated with taints or dissociated from taints.' In the third, the inclusion of the second is one—this is 'states that are tainted, whether associated with taints or dissociated from taints.' In the second, the inclusion of the third is one—this refers to the sixth dyad. By 'three' is meant the fourth, fifth, and sixth. 'The others' are the remaining five. They, in turn, should be understood thus: in the first, the inclusion of the second term of the third dyad is one; in the second, the inclusion of the second term of the first dyad is one; in the third, the inclusion of each term of the first is two; in the third, the inclusion of the first term of the second dyad is one. For these also—'states that are tainted are both taints and not taints; states associated with taints are both taints and not taints; states dissociated from taints are both taints and not taints'—and for 'states accompanied by taints and states not accompanied by taints,' and so forth, the reason for their non-inclusion and the method of inclusion should be understood in the manner previously explained.

Esa nayoti yo esa paṭhamaduke dutiyadukapakkhepādiko upāyo idha āsavagocchake vutto, esa nayo saṃyojanagocchakādīsu dukantaraniddhāraṇeti attho. Tattha pāḷiyaṃ anāgatadukā saṃyojanagocchake tāva ‘‘saṃyojanā ceva dhammā saṃyojanavippayuttā ca, saṃyojanavippayuttā ceva dhammā no ca saṃyojanā, saṃyojanā dhammā saṃyojanasampayuttāpi saṃyojanavippayuttāpi, no saṃyojanā dhammā saṃyojanasampayuttāpi saṃyojanavippayuttāpi, no saṃyojanā dhammā saṃyojaniyāpi asaṃyojaniyāpi, saṃyojaniyā dhammā saṃyojanasampayuttāpi saṃyojanavippayuttāpī’’ti pañca. Evaṃ ganthaoghayogaupādānagocchakesu paccekaṃ pañca. Nīvaraṇagocchake pana nīvaraṇānaṃ nīvaraṇavippayuttabhāvābhāvato ‘‘no nīvaraṇā dhammā nīvaraṇiyāpi anīvaraṇiyāpi, no nīvaraṇā dhammā nīvaraṇasampayuttāpi nīvaraṇavippayuttāpi, nīvaraṇiyā dhammā nīvaraṇasampayuttāpi nīvaraṇavippayuttāpī’’ti tayo. Tathā parāmāsagocchake ‘‘no parāmāsā dhammā parāmaṭṭhāpi aparāmaṭṭhāpi, no parāmāsā dhammā parāmāsasampayuttāpi parāmāsavippayuttāpi, parāmaṭṭhā dhammā parāmāsasampayuttāpi parāmāsavippayuttāpī’’ti. Kilesagocchake ‘‘no kilesā dhammā saṃkilesikāpi asaṃkilesikāpi, no kilesā dhammā saṃkiliṭṭhāpi asaṃkiliṭṭhāpi, no kilesā dhammā kilesasampayuttāpi kilesavippayuttāpi, saṃkilesikā dhammā [Pg.60] saṃkiliṭṭhāpi asaṃkiliṭṭhāpi, saṃkilesikā dhammā kilesasampayuttāpi kilesavippayuttāpi, asaṃkiliṭṭhā dhammā saṃkilesikāpi asaṃkilesikāpī’’ti cha dukāti evaṃ veditabbā. Sesaṃ vuttanayameva.

This is the method: the method of including the second dyad in the first dyad, and so forth, which has been stated here in the taint cluster, is the method for determining the intermediate dyads in the fetter cluster and so forth; this is the meaning. In the Pāli text, the dyads not yet mentioned in the fetter cluster are as follows: 'states that are fetters and states that are dissociated from fetters; states that are dissociated from fetters but are not fetters; states that are fetters are both associated with fetters and dissociated from fetters; states that are not fetters are both associated with fetters and dissociated from fetters; states that are not fetters are both liable to fetters and not liable to fetters; states that are liable to fetters are both associated with fetters and dissociated from fetters'—these five. Similarly, in the clusters of bonds, floods, yokes, and clingings, there are five each. However, in the hindrance cluster, because hindrances do not have a state of being dissociated from hindrances, there are three: 'states that are not hindrances are both liable to be hindrances and not liable to be hindrances; states that are not hindrances are both associated with hindrances and dissociated from hindrances; states that are liable to be hindrances are both associated with hindrances and dissociated from hindrances.' Likewise, in the misapprehension cluster: 'states that are not misapprehensions are both misapprehended and not misapprehended; states that are not misapprehensions are both associated with misapprehensions and dissociated from misapprehensions; states that are misapprehended are both associated with misapprehensions and dissociated from misapprehensions.' In the defilement cluster: 'states that are not defilements are both defiling and undefiling; states that are not defilements are both defiled and undefiled; states that are not defilements are both associated with defilements and dissociated from defilements; states that are defiling are both defiled and undefiled; states that are defiling are both associated with defilements and dissociated from defilements; states that are undefiled are both defiling and undefiling'—these six dyads should be understood in this way. The rest is as previously explained.

20-25. Paccayabhāvenāti saṃyojanatthaṃ dasseti. Yathāsakaṃ paccayabhāvo eva hi kāmarāgādīnaṃ vaṭṭasaṃyojananti. Yadi evaṃ kathaṃ kāmarāgādīnaṃyeva saṃyojanabhāvoti āha ‘‘satipī’’tiādi. Aññesanti saṃyojanehi aññesaṃ kilesābhisaṅkhārādīnaṃ. Tappaccayabhāveti tesaṃ kilesakammavipākavaṭṭānaṃ paccayabhāve. Orambhāgiyuddhaṃbhāgiyabhāvena saṅgahitā paricchinnā ora…pe… saṅgahitā, tehi kāmarāgādīhi visesapaccayabhūtehi. Kāmakammabhavādīnaṃ kāmūpapattibhavādinipphādanepi niyamoti katvā āha ‘‘taṃtaṃ…pe… hotī’’ti. Tena saṃyojanānaṃ bhāve yathāvuttaniyamānaṃ kammūpapattibhavānaṃ bhāvaṃ dassetvā tadabhāve abhāvaṃ dassento ‘‘na cā’’tiādimāha. Bandhanaṃ aseribhāvakaraṇaṃ andubandhanādayo viya. Ganthakaraṇaṃ avacchinnatākaraṇaṃ. Cakkalakaṃ pādapuñchanarajjumaṇḍalaṃ. Na codetabbanti paññācakkhunā pacurajanassa passituṃ asakkuṇeyyattā yathāvuttavisesassa saddheyyataṃ āha. Tividho hi attho koci paccakkhasiddho yo rūpādidhammānaṃ paccattavedanīyo aniddisitabbākāro, sabbadhammānaṃ sabhāvalakkhaṇanti vuttaṃ hoti. Koci anumānasiddho yo ghaṭādīsu paṭādīsu ca pasiddhena paccayāyattabhāvena ghaṭapaṭa-saddādīnaṃ aniccatādiākāro, koci okappanasiddho yo pacurajanassa accantamadiṭṭho saddhāvisayo sagganibbānādi. Tattha yassa satthuno vacanaṃ paccakkhasiddhe anumānasiddhe ca atthe na visaṃvādeti aviparītappavattiyā, tassa vacanena saddheyyatthasiddhīti tathārūpo ca bhagavāti ‘‘dhammānaṃ sabhāva…pe… na codetabba’’nti vuttaṃ. Esa nayo ito paresupi evarūpesu.

'By way of being a condition' shows the meaning of fetter. For their respective conditionality is indeed the fetter of the round for sensual desire and so forth. If so, how can sensual desire and so forth alone have the nature of a fetter? He says, 'even when there are,' and so forth. 'Others' refers to defilements, volitional formations, and so forth, other than the fetters. 'In their conditionality' means in the conditionality for those rounds of defilements, kamma, and results. Encompassed and defined by being lower and higher fetters, they are encompassed... by those sensual desires and so forth, which are specific conditions. Stating that there is a fixed rule even in the production of sensual-plane existence, rebirth-existence, and so forth, from sensual kamma and so forth, he says, 'such and such... it is,' and so forth. Thus, having shown the existence of kamma and rebirth-existence according to the stated rule when the fetters exist, and showing their absence when they are absent, he says, 'and not,' and so forth. Bondage is the act of making one unfree, like chains and so forth. Knotting is the act of making something continuous. A 'cakkalaka' is a circular foot-wiping rope. 'It should not be challenged'—he says this because ordinary people cannot see the stated distinction with the eye of wisdom, thus its trustworthiness. For the meaning is threefold: some is established by direct evidence, which is the personally experienced, indescribable aspect of phenomena such as form; it is said to be the inherent characteristic of all phenomena. Some is established by inference, such as the impermanence of pots, cloth, sounds, and so forth, established through their well-known dependence on conditions. Some is established by faith, such as heaven, Nibbāna, and so forth, which are entirely unseen by ordinary people and are objects of faith. In this regard, the words of a teacher who, due to his unerring conduct, does not deceive in matters established by direct evidence and inference, are trustworthy for establishing matters of faith. And the Blessed One is such a teacher. Therefore, it is said, 'the inherent nature of phenomena... should not be challenged.' This is the method in other similar cases that follow.

26-37. Yathā sarabhehi atikkamitabbā pabbatarāji sarabhaniyā, evaṃ oghaniyāti saddasiddhīti āha ‘‘tenā’’tiādi.

Just as a mountain range that is to be crossed by deer is called 'sarabhaniyā,' so too is 'oghaniyā.' Thus, the derivation is from the word itself, he says, 'therefore,' and so forth.

50-54. Vipariyesaggāho parāmasananti ‘‘parato’’ti ettha na dhammasabhāvato aññathāmattaṃ paranti adhippetaṃ, atha kho tabbipariyāyoti āha ‘‘paratoti niccādito’’ti.

The grasping of what is distorted is 'misapprehension.' Here, by 'from another,' what is meant by 'another' is not merely something different from the inherent nature of phenomena, but rather its opposite. Thus, he says, ''from another' means from permanence, and so forth'.

55-68. Yadi [Pg.61] sabhāvato avijjamānaṃ, kathamārammaṇabhāvoti āha ‘‘vicittasaññāya saññita’’nti, parikappanāmattasiddhanti attho. Duviññeyyanānattatāya nirantarabhāvūpagamanaṃ saṃsaṭṭhabhāvoti ‘‘suviññeyyanānattattā na saṃsaṭṭhatā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tesaṃ arūpakkhandhānaṃ. Itarehi rūpanibbānehi. Kiṃ pana kāraṇaṃ samānuppādanirodhānaṃ ekakalāpabhūtānaṃ arūpadhammānameva aññamaññaṃ saṃsaṭṭhatā vuccati, na pana tathābhūtānampi rūpadhammānanti āha ‘‘esa hi tesaṃ sabhāvo’’ti. Tena yadipi keci arūpadhammā visuṃ ārammaṇaṃ honti, dandhappavattikattā pana rūpadhammānaṃyeva suviññeyyanānattaṃ, na arūpadhammānanti tesaṃ saṃsaṭṭhabhāvo tadabhāvo ca itaresaṃ sabhāvasiddhoti dasseti. Samūhaghanatāya vā dubbibhāgatarattā natthi arūpadhammānaṃ visuṃ ārammaṇabhāvoti duviññeyyanānattattā tesaṃyeva saṃsaṭṭhatā. Amuñcitvā tadadhīnavuttitāya gahetabbato buddhiyā.

55-68. If it does not exist by its own nature, how can it be an object? He says, 'it is perceived by diverse perception,' meaning it is established merely by conceptualization. Because of the diversity that is difficult to discern, their uninterrupted occurrence is considered an 'intermingled state.' Therefore, it is stated, 'because of the easily discernible diversity, there is no intermingling.' This applies to the formless aggregates. 'With the others' means with material form and Nibbāna. What then is the reason that formless phenomena, arising and ceasing simultaneously and existing as a single group, are said to be intermingled with one another, but not so for material phenomena that are likewise? He says, 'this is indeed their nature.' Thus, even if certain formless phenomena become objects separately, due to their slow progression, material phenomena alone have easily discernible diversity, not formless phenomena. Therefore, their intermingled state and the absence thereof in others are shown to be established by nature. Alternatively, because of their compact mass and being more difficult to divide, formless phenomena have no separate object-state. Therefore, because of the difficulty in discerning their diversity, their intermingled state is affirmed. They should be understood as being grasped by the intellect without releasing them, due to their dependent occurrence.

83-100. Kāmataṇhā kāmo uttarapadalopena yathā rūpabhavo rūpaṃ. Evaṃ sesesupi. Ārammaṇakaraṇavasenāti etena kāmarūpārūpataṇhānaṃ visayabhāvo yathākkamaṃ kāmarūpārūpāvacaratāya kāraṇanti dasseti. Avassañcetamevaṃ sampaṭicchitabbaṃ, aññathā kāmāvacarādibhāvo aparipuṇṇavisayo siyā. Yadi hi ālambitabbadhammavasena bhūmiparicchedo, evaṃ sati anārammaṇānaṃ saṅgaho na siyā. Atha vipākadānavasena, evampi avipākānaṃ saṅgaho na siyā, tasmā ārammaṇakaraṇavasena pariyāpannānaṃ bhūmiparicchedo kātabbo. Evañhi sati kāmāvacarādibhāvo paripuṇṇavisayo siyā. Tenevāha ‘‘evañhi satī’’tiādi. Apariyāpannānaṃ pana lokato uttiṇṇabhāvena anuttarabhūmitā. Akāmāvacarāditā nāpajjatīti abyāpitadosaṃ pariharati, kāmāvacarāditā nāpajjatīti atibyāpitadosaṃ. Nanu ca imasmiṃ pakkhe kāmataṇhā katamā, kāmāvacaradhammārammaṇā taṇhā, kāmāvacaradhammā katame, kāmataṇhāvisayāti itarītaranissayatā dosoti? Na, avīciādiekādasokāsaninnatāya kiñci taṇhaṃ kāmataṇhābhāvena gahetvā taṃsabhāvāya visayabhāvena kāmāvacaradhammānaṃ upalakkhetabbattā.

83-100. Craving for sensual pleasures (kāmataṇhā) is desire (kāmo) by the elision of the latter word, just as form-existence (rūpabhavo) is form (rūpaṃ). The same applies to the rest. By saying “by way of making them objects,” it is shown that the object-nature of sensual, form, and formless cravings is, in order, the reason for their belonging respectively to the sensual, form, and formless spheres. This must necessarily be accepted as such; otherwise, the classification as belonging to the sensual sphere, etc., would be incomplete in scope. For if the delimitation of spheres were based solely on phenomena to be apprehended, then what is without an object could not be included. Or if it were based on the giving of results, then what does not produce results could not be included. Therefore, the delimitation of spheres should be made for those included by way of making them objects. For in this way, the classification as belonging to the sensual sphere, etc., would be complete in scope. Hence, it is said: “For in this way…” etc. As for what is not included, due to its transcending the world, it is the unsurpassed sphere. It avoids the fault of under-inclusion by not being classified as non-sensual-sphere, etc., and the fault of over-inclusion by not being classified as sensual-sphere, etc. Now, in this view, which is the craving for sensual pleasures? Is it craving that takes phenomena of the sensual sphere as its object? What are the phenomena of the sensual sphere? The objects of sensual craving. Is this not the fault of reciprocal dependence? No, because a certain craving can be taken as sensual craving due to its inclination towards the eleven abodes beginning with Avīci, and the phenomena of the sensual sphere are then to be recognized by their nature as objects of that craving.

Idāni yathāvuttamatthaṃ pāṭhena samatthento ‘‘nikkhepakaṇḍepī’’tiādimāha. Tattha hi kāmataṇhāya ālambitabbattā kāmadhātupariyāpannadhammā ca kāmabhavasaṅkhāte [Pg.62] kāme ogāḷhā hutvā caranti, nāññatthāti etthāvacarāti vuttanti. Visesatthinā viseso anupayujjatīti imamatthaṃ dassento āha ‘‘lokassa vasena pariyāpannanicchayato’’ti. Tena lokiyadhammesu pariyāpanna-saddassa niruḷhataṃ dasseti bhagavato taduccāraṇānantaraṃ vineyyānaṃ tadatthapaṭipattito. Paricchedakāpekkhā paricchinnatāti ‘‘paricchedakārikāya taṇhāyā’’ti vuttaṃ. Sā hi dhammānaṃ kāmāvacarādibhāvaṃ paricchindati. Pari-saddo cettha ‘‘upādinnā’’tiādīsu upa-saddo viya sasādhanaṃ kiriyaṃ dīpetīti ayamattho vuttoti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

Now, confirming the meaning as stated through the text, he says, beginning with “in the Nikkhepakaṇḍa also,” etc. For there, because the phenomena included in the sensual element are to be apprehended by sensual craving, and they wander immersed in sensual pleasures, which are designated as sensual existence, not elsewhere—thus, they are called “moving in this sphere.” To show that for one seeking a special meaning, no special meaning is applicable, it is said: “from the determination of inclusion by way of worldly convention.” Thereby, the established usage of the term “included” regarding worldly phenomena is demonstrated, from the disciples' understanding of that meaning immediately following the Blessed One’s utterance. Because being delimited is dependent on a delimitor, it is stated: “by craving, which is the delimitor.” For it delimits the nature of phenomena as belonging to the sensual sphere, etc. Here, the prefix “pari-” (as in “pariccheda”)—like the prefix “upa-” in terms such as “upādinnā” (clung to)—indicates the action together with its instrument. This meaning should be understood as stated.

Niyyānakaraṇasīlā niyyānikā yathā ‘‘apūpabhakkhanasīlo āpūpiko’’ti, niyyānasīlā eva vā. Rāgadosamohāva gahitāti ñāyati, itarathā pahānekaṭṭhatāvacanaṃ nippayojanaṃ siyā. ‘‘Raṇohatā na jotanti, candasūriyā satārakā’’tiādīsu raṇa-saddassa reṇupariyāyatā daṭṭhabbā. Sampahārapariyāyattā yuddha-saddassa sampahāro ca paharitabbādhāroti akusalasenāva ‘‘saraṇā’’ti vuttā. Dukkhādīnanti phalabhūtānaṃ dukkhavighātaupāyāsapariḷāhānaṃ sabhāgabhūtāya ca micchāpaṭipadāya. Tannibbattakasabhāvānaṃ akusalānanti etena sabbesampi akusalānaṃ saraṇataṃ dasseti.

“Niyyānikā” (leading to liberation) is that which has the nature of causing liberation, just as “āpūpiko” (a cake-eater) is one who has the habit of eating cakes; or it is simply that which has the nature of liberation. It is understood that greed, hatred, and delusion are meant; otherwise, the statement about having the single function of abandonment would be useless. In phrases like “Struck by dust, the moon, sun, and stars do not shine,” the word “raṇa” should be seen as a synonym for dust. Because the word “yuddha” (battle) is a synonym for striking, and striking implies a target to be struck, the unwholesome army itself is called “saraṇā” (that which has battle). “Of suffering, etc.” refers to the resultant effects of pain, distress, affliction, and torment, and of the wrong path that shares their nature. By this, “of the unwholesome states whose nature is to produce them,” it shows the battle-nature of all unwholesome states.

Abhidhammadukamātikāpadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the terms of the Abhidhamma Matrix of Pairs is completed.

Suttantikadukamātikāpadavaṇṇanā

The explanation of the terms of the Suttanta Matrix of Pairs

101-108. Vijjāsabhāgatāya, na saṅkappādayo viya vijjāya upakārakabhāvato. ‘‘Abhejjaṃ…pe… ruhatī’’ti ubhayampi anavasesappahānameva sandhāya vuttaṃ. Kiñcāpi hi heṭṭhimamaggehipi pahīyamānā kilesā tena tena odhinā anavasesameva pahīyanti, ye pana avasiṭṭhā bhinditabbā, te lobhādikilesabhāvasāmaññato puna viruḷhā viya honti. Arahattamagge pana uppanne na evaṃ avasiṭṭhābhāvato. Tadupacārena nissayavohārena. Kusalehi tāpetabbāti vā tapaniyā, tadaṅgādivasena bādhitabbā pahātabbāti attho. Samānatthāni adhivacanādīnaṃ saṅkhādibhāvato. ‘‘Sabbeva dhammā adhivacanapathā’’tiādinā adhivacanādīnaṃ visayabhāve na koci dhammo vajjito, vacanabhāvo eva ca [Pg.63] adhivacanādīnaṃ vakkhamānena nayena yujjatīti adhippāyenāha ‘‘sabbañca vacanaṃ adhivacanādibhāvaṃ bhajatī’’ti.

101-108. By reason of sharing the nature of wisdom, it is not merely a support for wisdom, unlike thought and so forth. Both “unbreakable… grows” are said with reference to abandonment without remainder. Although the defilements abandoned by the lower paths are indeed abandoned entirely at those stages by that particular limit, those remaining to be broken, because of their common nature as defilements such as greed, are as if grown again. However, when the path of arahantship arises, it is not so, because of the absence of a remainder. By that metaphorical usage, by the conventional expression of dependence. “To be afflicted by wholesome states,” or they are “to be afflicted” (tapaniyā); the meaning is that they are to be oppressed and abandoned by way of its factors and so forth. “Designation” and the others are synonymous because of their nature as concepts and so on. In the statement, “All phenomena are paths of designation,” etc., no phenomenon is excluded from being the object of designation and so forth; and indeed, the state of being speech itself is suitable for designation and so forth in the manner that will be explained. With this intention, he said, “All speech partakes of the nature of designation and so forth.”

109-118. Aññaṃ anapekkhitvā sayameva attano nāmakaraṇasabhāvo nāmakaraṇaṭṭhoti, tena arūpadhammānaṃ viya opapātikanāmatāya pathavīādīnampi nāmabhāvo siyāti āsaṅkāya nivattanatthaṃ ‘‘nāmantarānāpajjanato’’ti āha. Na hi vinā pathavīādināmenapi rūpadhammā viya kesādināmehi vinā vedanādināmehi aññena nāmena arūpadhammā piṇḍākārato voharīyantīti. Yaṃ pana parassa nāmaṃ karoti, tassa aññāpekkhaṃ nāmakaraṇanti nāmakaraṇasabhāvatā natthīti sāmaññanāmādikaraṇānaṃ nāmabhāvo nāpajjati. Yassa caññehi nāmaṃ karīyati, tassa nāmakaraṇasabhāvatāya abhāvoyevāti natthi nāmabhāvo. Ye pana anāpannanāmantarā sabhāvasiddhanāmā ca, te vedanādayova nāmaṃ nāmāti dassento ‘‘attanāvā’’tiādimāha. Phassādīnaṃ ārammaṇābhimukhatā taṃ aggahetvā appavattiyevāti dassetuṃ ‘‘avinābhāvato’’ti vuttaṃ. Adhivacanasamphasso manosamphasso, so nāmamantarena gahetuṃ asakkuṇeyyatāya pākaṭoti nidassanabhāvena vutto. Ruppanasabhāvenāti nidassanamattaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Pakāsakapakāsitabbabhāvenapi hi vināpi nāmena rūpadhammā pākaṭā hontīti. Atha vā pakāsakapakāsitabbabhāvo visayivisayabhāvo cakkhurūpādīnaṃ sabhāvo, so ruppanasabhāve sāmaññe antogadhoti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

109-118. Without relying on another, the intrinsic nature of naming by itself is the meaning of naming. To avert the doubt that even earth and so forth might have name-status, like formless phenomena through their spontaneously arisen name-status, it is said: “because no other name arises.” For indeed, formless phenomena are not referred to collectively by another name without names like 'feeling,' etc., just as form phenomena are not referred to by names like 'hair,' etc., without the name 'earth,' etc. But when one gives a name to another, that naming is dependent on another—thus, there is no intrinsic nature of naming. Therefore, the name-status of conventional names and the like does not arise. And for that which is named by others, there is indeed an absence of the intrinsic nature of naming—hence, there is no name-status. But those phenomena that are naturally established names without another name arising, such as feeling and so forth, are themselves 'name.' Showing this, he says, beginning with “by themselves,” etc. To show that the orientation of contact and so forth towards their objects does not occur without apprehending them, it is said: “due to inseparability.” Designation-contact is mind-contact; it is evident because it cannot be grasped without a name—this is stated as an example. By “the nature of being affected” (ruppana), it should be understood as a mere indication. For indeed, even without a name, form phenomena are evident through the nature of revealer and revealed. Alternatively, the nature of revealer and revealed—the subject-object relationship—is the intrinsic nature of eye, form, etc., and this should be understood as included within the general nature of being affected.

119-123. Ito pubbe parikammantiādinā samāpattivuṭṭhānakusalatā viya samāpattikusalatāpi jhānalābhīnaṃyeva hotīti vuttaṃ viya dissati. ‘‘Itaresampi anussavavasena samāpattīnaṃ appanāparicchedapaññā labbhatī’’ti vadanti. ‘‘Evaṃ sīlavisodhanādinā samāpattiṃ appetīti jānanakapaññā saha parikammena appanāparicchedajānanakapaññā’’ti keci. Vuṭṭhāne kusalabhāvo vuṭṭhānavasitā. Pubbeti samāpajjanato pubbe.

119-123. Before this, by “preparatory work,” etc., it seems to have been said that skill in attainment, like skill in emerging from attainment, belongs only to those who have attained jhāna. Some say: “Even for others, the wisdom that discerns the delimitation of absorption can be acquired through oral tradition.” Others say: “The wisdom that knows, ‘Thus one attains absorption through purification of virtue, etc.,’ is the wisdom that knows the delimitation of absorption, together with preparatory work.” Skillfulness in emerging is mastery in emerging. “Before” means before attaining absorption.

124-134. Sobhane rato surato, tassa bhāvo soraccanti āha ‘‘sobhanakammaratatā’’ti. Suṭṭhu vā orato virato sorato[Pg.64], tassa bhāvo soraccanti. Ayaṃ panattho aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vutto eva. Appaṭisaṅkhānaṃ moho. Kusalabhāvanā bodhipakkhiyadhammānaṃ vaḍḍhanā. Saññāṇaṃ upalakkhaṇaṃ. Saviggahaṃ sabimbakaṃ. Upalakkhetabbākāraṃ dhammajātaṃ, ārammaṇaṃ vā. Avikkhepoti cittavikkhepapaṭipakkho. Ujuvipaccanīkatāya hi pahānavuṭṭhānena ca avikkhepo vikkhepaṃ paṭikkhipati, pavattituṃ na detīti.

124-134. He says `soracca` (gentleness) is 'delighting in beautiful actions' (`sobhanakammaratatā`), explaining that `surato` (well-disposed) is 'one who delights in the beautiful' (`sobhane rato`), and `soracca` is its state. Alternatively, `sorato` (well-behaved) is one who is thoroughly abstained (`suṭṭhu virato`) from what is low (`orato`), and `soracca` is its state. This meaning, however, is indeed stated in the commentary. 'Non-reflection' is delusion. 'Cultivation of the wholesome' is the development of the factors of enlightenment. `Saññāṇaṃ` is noting. `Saviggahaṃ` means 'with an image.' The class of phenomena to be noted by its characteristic, or the object. 'Non-distraction' is the opponent of mental distraction. For through direct opposition and through abandonment and emergence, non-distraction rejects distraction, not allowing it to arise.

135-142. Kāraṇasīlaṃ lokiyaṃ. Phalasīlaṃ lokuttaraṃ tena sijjhatīti katvā, lokiyassapi vā sīlassa kāraṇaphalabhāvo pubbāparabhāvena daṭṭhabbo. Sampannasamudāyassa paripuṇṇasamūhassa. Akusalā sīlā akusalā samācārā. Sīlasampadā sīlasampatti sīlaguṇāti attho. Sahottappaṃ ñāṇanti ottappassa ñāṇappadhānataṃ āha, na pana ñāṇassa ottappasahitatāmattaṃ. Na hi ottapparahitaṃ ñāṇaṃ atthīti. Adhimuttatā abhirativasena nirāsaṅkāpavatti. Nissaṭatā visaṃyuttatā. Ettha ca adhimuttatānissaṭatāvacanehi tadubhayapariyāyā dve vimuttiyo ekasesanayena idha ‘‘vimuttī’’ti vuttāti dasseti. Tathā hi vuttaṃ ‘‘cittassa ca adhimutti nibbānañcā’’ti. Uppajjati etenāti uppādo, na uppādoti anuppādo, tabbhūte anuppādapariyosāne vimokkhante anuppādassa ariyamaggassa kilesānaṃ vā anuppajjanassa pariyosāneti ṭhānaphalehi ariyaphalameva upalakkhīyatīti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

135-142. 'Virtue as cause' is mundane. 'Virtue as result' is supramundane, since it is accomplished thereby. Alternatively, even for mundane virtue, the state of cause and result should be understood in terms of sequence. 'Of the complete assemblage' means 'of the full collection.' 'Unwholesome virtues' are unwholesome conduct. 'Perfection of virtue' means 'accomplishment of virtue' or 'quality of virtue.' By 'knowledge with moral dread,' he states the predominance of moral dread in knowledge, not merely that knowledge is accompanied by moral dread, for there is no knowledge devoid of moral dread. 'Resolution' is proceeding without doubt by way of strong inclination. 'Freedom' is disconnection. And here, by the words 'resolution' and 'freedom,' he shows that two liberations, which are synonyms for both, are stated here as 'liberation' by the `ekasesa` method. For so it is said: “The mind’s resolution and Nibbāna.” That by which one arises is 'arising' (`uppāda`); not arising is 'non-arising' (`anuppāda`). At the culmination of that non-arising, at the moment of liberation—which is the culmination of the non-arising of the noble path or the non-arising of the defilements—it should be understood that by the stages and fruits, the noble fruit itself is indicated.

Mātikāpadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the matrix section is concluded.

Kāmāvacarakusalapadabhājanīyavaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Analysis of the Term concerning Wholesome States of the Sense-Sphere

1. Appetunti nigametuṃ. ‘‘Padabhājanīyaṃ na vutta’’nti padabhājanīyāvacanena appanāvarodhaṃ sādhetvā padabhājanīyāvacanassa kāraṇaṃ vadanto ‘‘sarūpenā’’tiādimāha. Tattha ‘‘phasso hotī’’tiādīsu hoti-saddo atthi-saddena anānatthoti adhippāyena vuttaṃ ‘‘dutiyena hoti-saddenā’’ti. Pubbe aṭṭhakathādhippāyena vatvā yathāvuttassa pāḷippadesassa appanāvarodho samatthitoti attano adhippāyaṃ dassento ‘‘saṅkhepenā’’tiādimāha.

1. 'To apply' means to conclude. Having established the prevention of absorption by the non-statement of the analysis of terms—'The analysis of terms was not stated'—and stating the reason for this non-statement, he said, 'by way of its own nature,' and so on. There, concerning 'contact is' and so forth, with the intention that the word `hoti` (is) is not different in meaning from the word `atthi` (there is), it was said, 'by the second word `hoti`.' Having spoken earlier according to the intention of the commentary, and now showing his own intention that the prevention of absorption is established by the aforesaid Pāḷi passage, he said, 'in brief,' and so on.

Ñātuṃ [Pg.65] icchitoti lakkhaṇassa pucchāvisayataṃ dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Yena kenacīti dassanādivisesayuttena, itarena vā. Avatthāviseso hi ñāṇassa dassanatulanatīraṇāni. ‘‘Adiṭṭhata’’ntiādīsu āhāti yojetabbaṃ, sabbattha ca lakkhaṇassāti. Tañhettha adhikatanti. Adiṭṭhaṃ jotīyati etāyāti etena diṭṭhaṃ saṃsandati etāyāti diṭṭhasaṃsandanā. Vimatiṃ chindati etāyāti vimaticchedanāti etāsampi saddattho nayato dassito, atthato pana sabbāpi tathāpavattaṃ vacanaṃ, taduppādako vā cittuppādoti veditabbaṃ.

'Because one desires to know': this is said to show that the characteristic is the object of inquiry. 'By whatever means': whether endowed with special qualities such as seeing, or by another. For the particular states of knowledge are seeing, comparing, and examining. In 'unseen-ness,' etc., the verb `āha` should be supplied, and everywhere 'of the characteristic.' That is additional here. 'By this the unseen is illuminated'; 'by this the seen is connected,' hence `diṭṭhasaṃsandanā` (connection of the seen); 'by this doubt is cut off,' hence `vimaticchedanā` (cutting off of doubt). The literal meaning of these words is thus shown according to the method; but in terms of meaning, all such expressions should be understood as speech occurring in that way, or as the mind-moment that produces it.

Aññamaññato pabhijjatīti pabhedo, viseso, tena pabhedena. Dhammānaṃ desananti kiñcāpi samayabhūmijātiārammaṇasabhāvādivasena anavasesappabhedapariggahato niddesadesanāva vattuṃ yuttā, tathāpi kusalādimātikāpadasaṅgahitavisesoyeva idha pabhedoti adhippetoti vuttaṃ ‘‘pabheda…pe… desanaṃ āhā’’ti. Tenevāha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘kusala…pe… dīpetvāti phasso hoti…pe… avikkhepo hotī’’ti (dha. sa. aṭṭha. dhammuddesavāra phassapañcamakarāsivaṇṇanā). ‘‘Phasso phusanā’’tiādinā ca pabhedavantova sātisayaṃ niddiṭṭhā, na pana mātikāyaṃ vuttappabhedoti pabhedavantadassanaṃ niddeso. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hotītiādinā ‘‘pabhede…pe… dassanattha’’nti imassa vākyassa piṇḍatthamāha. Yadi dhammā eva pucchitabbā vissajjetabbā ca, kasmā kusalāti pabhedavacananti āha ‘‘te panā’’tiādi. Na hi pabhedehi vinā pabhedavanto atthīti. ‘‘Ime dhammā kusalā’’ti etena ‘‘phasso hotī’’ti, ‘‘phasso phusanā’’ti ca ādinā uddiṭṭhaniddiṭṭhānaṃ dhammānaṃ kusalabhāvo vissajjito hotīti iminā adhippāyena ‘‘ime dhammā kusalāti vissajjanepī’’ti āha. Imasmiñhīti hi-saddo kāraṇattho. Tena yasmā dhammāva desetabbā, te ca kusalā…pe… bhedā desetabbā, tasmāti evaṃ vā yojanā. Dhammānamevāti avadhāraṇaphalaṃ dasseti ‘‘avohāradesanāto’’ti. Atthānañcāti ca-saddena ‘‘phasso phusanā’’ti evamādisabhāvaniruttiṃ yathāvuttadhammādiñāṇañca saṅgaṇhāti. ‘‘Iti evaṃ ayaṃ pavattetabbo nivattetabbo cā’’ti tathā tathā vidhetabbabhāvo itikattabbatā, tāya yutto iti…pe… yutto[Pg.66], tassa vidhetabbassāti attho, visesanattā pabhedassāti adhippāyo.

"Because they are mutually divided (pabhijjati), there is division (pabheda), a distinction; it is by that division. Regarding the teaching of phenomena, although it is appropriate to speak of an exposition of designation (niddesadesanā), since all divisions are encompassed without remainder by way of time, plane, birth, object, intrinsic nature, etc., nevertheless, here 'division' is intended to refer only to the distinctions encompassed by the matrix-headings of wholesome, etc. Thus, it is said, 'he taught the teaching of divisions…' Therefore, the commentary states: 'Having illuminated wholesome… contact occurs… non-distraction occurs.' And with phrases like 'contact is touching,' those possessing divisions are specified in detail, but it is not the divisions mentioned in the matrix; thus, the showing of those possessing divisions is the exposition. Beginning with 'this is said,' he states the condensed meaning of the sentence 'for the purpose of showing divisions…'. If phenomena themselves are to be questioned and answered, why is the term 'wholesome' (which is a division) used? He says, 'But these…' For without divisions, there are no things that have divisions. By stating 'these phenomena are wholesome,' the wholesomeness of the phenomena enumerated and specified—such as 'contact occurs' and 'contact is touching'—is thereby answered. With this intention, it is said, 'even in the answer, "these phenomena are wholesome".' Here, the word 'hi' (for) has the sense of a reason. Therefore, because phenomena themselves are to be taught, and they are to be taught with the divisions of wholesome, etc., therefore… or the construction may be so. 'Of phenomena themselves'—this shows the result of the emphasis, as in 'from the teaching of non-convention.' And 'of meanings'—by the word 'and,' it includes both the expressions of intrinsic nature like 'contact is touching' and the knowledge of phenomena, etc., as stated. 'Thus, this is to be undertaken and avoided'—the state of being arrangeable in such and such a way is itikattabbatā (what ought to be done thus). Being endowed with that... endowed, the meaning is 'of that which is to be arranged.' The intention is that this is due to the distinguishing nature of the division.

Itikattabbatāyuttassa visesitabbattā uddeso dhammappadhāno, tasmā tattha dhammassa visesitabbattā ‘‘kusalā dhammā’’ti ayaṃ padānukkamo kato. Pucchā saṃsayitappadhānā anicchitanicchayanāya pavattetabbattā. Tena sabbadhammesu samugghāṭitavicikicchānusayānampi pucchā desetabbapuggalagatasaṃsayāpattiṃ attani āropetvā saṃsayāpannehi viya pavattīyatīti dasseti. Kāmāvacarādibhedo viya kusalādibhāvena kusalādibhedo dhammabhāvena niyatoti dhammāti vutte nicchayābhāvato ‘‘kusalā nu kho akusalā nu kho’’tiādinā saṃsayo hotīti āha ‘‘kusalādibhedo pana saṃsayito’’ti. Dhammabhāvo pana kusalādīsu ekantikattā nicchitoyevāti vuttaṃ ‘‘na ca dhammabhāvo saṃsayito’’ti. Tena saṃsayito nicchetabbabhāvena padhāno ettha kusalabhāvo, na tathā dhammabhāvoti dhammā kusalāti vuttanti dasseti.

Because the exposition is prominent in terms of phenomena, being connected with what ought to be done thus and requiring distinction, the word order 'wholesome phenomena' is therefore adopted, since phenomena are what is to be distinguished therein. The question is prominent in terms of doubt, as it is put forward to bring about a decision where there is indecision. Thus, it shows that the question proceeds as if from those afflicted by doubt—even for those who have uprooted the underlying tendency of doubt regarding all phenomena—by attributing to themselves the liability to doubt that belongs to the person to be taught. Just as the division into sense-sphere, etc., is a fixed division of phenomena, so too is the division into wholesome, etc. Therefore, when 'phenomena' is said, because there is no certainty, doubt arises: 'Are they wholesome, or are they unwholesome?' Hence it is said, 'But the division into wholesome, etc., is subject to doubt.' The state of being a phenomenon, however, is certain with regard to wholesome states, etc., because it is absolute. Hence it is said, 'And the state of being a phenomenon is not subject to doubt.' Therefore, it shows that here the state of being wholesome is prominent as that which is to be decided, whereas the state of being a phenomenon is not so; thus, 'wholesome phenomena' is said.

Cittuppādasamayeti cittassa uppajjanasamaye. ‘‘Atha vijjamāne’’ti ettha atha-saddassa atthamāha ‘‘pacchā’’ti. Bhojanagamanādīhi samayekadesanānattaṃ dassetvā avasesanānattaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘samavāyādī’’ti vuttaṃ. Visesitāti etena ‘‘niyamitā’’ti padassa atthaṃ vivarati, tasmā yathāvuttacittavisesitabbato samayatoti attho. Yathādhippetānanti kāmāvacarādivisesayuttānaṃ. ‘‘Tasmiṃ samaye’’ti cittuppattiyā visesitabbopi samayo yena cittena uppajjamānena visesīyati, tasseva cittassa ‘‘yasmiṃ samaye’’ti ettha sayaṃ visesanabhāvaṃ āpajjati. Tathā ‘‘tasmiṃ samaye’’ti ettha visesanabhūtaṃ cittaṃ attanā visesitabbasamayassa upakāratthaṃ ‘‘yasmiṃ samaye…pe… citta’’nti visesitabbabhāvaṃ āpajjati. Upakāroti ca aññamaññaṃ avacchedakāvacchinditabbabhāvoti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Purimadhammānaṃ bhaṅgasamakālaṃ, bhaṅgānantarameva vā pacchimadhammānaṃ uppatti purimapacchimānaṃ nirantaratā kenaci anantaritatā. Yāya bhāvapakkhassa balavabhāvena paṭicchādito viya hutvā abhāvapakkho na paññāyatīti tadevetanti gahaṇavasena pacurajano vipariyesito, soyamattho [Pg.67] alātacakkena supākaṭo hoti. Tenevāha ‘‘ekībhūtānamivā’’ti. Ekasamūhavasena ekībhūtānamiva pavatti samūhaghanatā, dubbiññeyyakiccabhedavasena ekībhūtānamiva pavatti kiccaghanatāti yojanā. Ettha ca paccayapaccayuppannabhāvena pavattamānānaṃ anekesaṃ dhammānaṃ kālasabhāvabyāpārārammaṇehi dubbiññeyyabhedatāya ekībhūtānamiva gahetabbatā yathākkamaṃ santatighanatādayoti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

'At the time of the arising of consciousness' means at the moment when consciousness arises. Here, concerning 'atha vijjamāne' (then, when it exists), he states the meaning of the word 'atha' as 'afterwards.' Having shown the diversity of time in one respect through eating, going, etc., in order to show the remaining diversity, 'by combination, etc.' is said. By the word 'visesitā' (specified), he clarifies the meaning of the word 'niyamitā' (determined); therefore, the meaning is that time is to be specified by the aforementioned consciousness. 'Yathādhippetānaṃ' means 'of those endowed with the intended distinctions, such as belonging to the sense-sphere, etc.' The time that is to be specified by the arising of consciousness in the phrase 'at that time' is itself specified by the arising consciousness, and that very consciousness assumes the role of specifier in the phrase 'at which time.' Similarly, the consciousness that is the specifier in 'at that time' assumes the role of that which is to be specified in 'at which time... consciousness' for the benefit of the time it specifies. This benefit should be understood as the mutual state of being the delimiter and the delimited. The arising of subsequent phenomena simultaneous with the dissolution of preceding phenomena, or immediately after their dissolution, constitutes the uninterruptedness of the preceding and subsequent, their not being separated by any interval. Because of this, due to the strength of the aspect of existence, the aspect of non-existence is as if concealed and is not discerned; thus many people are mistaken, grasping it as 'the very same thing.' This meaning is made very clear by the simile of the circle made by a firebrand. Therefore he said, 'as if unified.' The occurrence as if unified by way of a single group is the 'mass of aggregation.' The occurrence as if unified because the difference in their functions is difficult to discern is the 'mass of function'—this is the construction. And here it should be understood that the fact that many phenomena, occurring as conditions and conditioned things, are grasped as if unified is due to the difficulty of discerning their distinctions in terms of time, nature, activity, and object; these are, respectively, the mass of continuity and so on.

Sahakārīkāraṇasannijjhaṃ sametīti samayo, samavetīti atthoti samaya-saddassa samavāyatthataṃ dassento ‘‘paccayasāmaggi’’nti āha. Sameti samāgacchati ettha maggabrahmacariyaṃ tadādhārapuggalehīti samayo, khaṇo. Samenti ettha, etena vā, samāgacchanti dhammā sahajātadhammehi uppādādīhi vāti samayo, kālo. Dhammappavattimattatāya atthato abhūtopi hi kālo dhammappavattiyā adhikaraṇaṃ karaṇaṃ viya ca parikappanāmattasiddhena rūpena voharīyatīti. Samaṃ, saha vā avayavānaṃ ayanaṃ pavatti avaṭṭhānanti samayo, samūho yathā ‘‘samudāyo’’ti. Avayavasahāvaṭṭhānameva hi samūho. Paccayantarasamāgame eti phalaṃ etasmā uppajjati pavattati cāti samayo, hetu yathā ‘‘samudayo’’ti. Sameti sambandho eti savisaye pavattati, sambandhā vā ayanti etenāti samayo, diṭṭhi. Diṭṭhisaṃyojanena hi sattā ativiya bajjhantīti. Samayanaṃ saṅgati samodhānanti samayo, paṭilābho. Samassa nirodhassa yānaṃ, sammā vā yānaṃ apagamo appavattīti samayo, pahānaṃ. Abhimukhabhāvena sammā etabbo abhisametabbo adhigantabboti aviparīto sabhāvo abhisamayo. Abhimukhabhāvena sammā vā eti gacchati bujjhatīti abhisamayo, avirādhetvā dhammānaṃ aviparītasabhāvāvabodho. Ettha ca upasaggānaṃ jotakamattattā tassa tassa atthassa vācako samaya-saddo evāti saupasaggopi vutto. Tānevāti pīḷanādīneva. Vipphārikatā seribhāvena kiriyāsu ussāhanaparinipphanno.

Because it comes together (sameti) in the presence of cooperative causes, it is a 'samaya'; this means it combines (samaveti). Showing that the word 'samaya' has the meaning of combination (samavāya), he says it is a 'confluence of conditions.' Because the path and the holy life come together (sameti) here in the persons who are their support, 'samaya' means a moment or opportunity (khaṇa). Because phenomena come together (samenti) here, or by this, or because they converge with co-nascent phenomena through arising, etc., 'samaya' means time (kāla). For although time is ultimately non-existent, being merely the process of phenomena, it is spoken of by a form established only by convention, as if it were the locus or instrument for the process of phenomena. Because there is an even (samaṃ) or joint (saha) going (ayanaṃ), a process or state of the components, 'samaya' means a collection (samūha), as in 'aggregate' (samudāya). For a collection is just the co-existence of components. Because upon the convergence of other conditions a fruit comes (eti) from this, arises and proceeds, 'samaya' means a cause (hetu), as in 'origin' (samudaya). A connection comes together (sameti), or it proceeds (eti) and continues in its own domain, or connections proceed (ayanti) by means of it; thus 'samaya' means a view (diṭṭhi). For beings are exceedingly bound by the fetter of views. A coming together, a meeting, a convergence (samayanaṃ saṅgati samodhānaṃ) is 'samaya' in the sense of attainment (paṭilābha). The going (yānaṃ) to calm (samassa), to cessation (nirodhassa), or the right (sammā) going (yānaṃ), which is departure and non-occurrence, is 'samaya' in the sense of relinquishment (pahānaṃ). Because it is to be rightly approached (sammā etabbo), directly known (abhisametabbo), and realized (adhigantabbo) in a direct way, the undeviating intrinsic nature is 'direct understanding' (abhisamaya). Or, because one directly (abhimukhabhāvena) and rightly (sammā) goes (eti), proceeds, and understands, 'abhisamaya' is the non-deviating comprehension of the undeviating intrinsic nature of phenomena. And here, because prefixes are mere illuminators, the word 'samaya' itself is the designator of these various meanings; thus it is mentioned even with a prefix. Those very meanings—such as oppression, etc.—are indeed intended. Pervasiveness, accomplished through exertion in activities by way of its independent nature.

Kesucīti akusalavipākādīsu. Khaṇassa asambhavo tena vinābhāvoti āha ‘‘nanū’’tiādi. Dhammenevāti visesantararahitena. Taṃyeva hi avadhāraṇena nivattitaṃ visesaṃ dasseti ‘‘na tassa pavattitthā’’tiādinā. Yathā vā tathā vāti kālena loko pavattati nivattatīti vā kālo nāma bhāvo vattanalakkhaṇo bhāvānaṃ pavattiokāsadāyakoti [Pg.68] vā yena tena pakārena. Idha uttamahetuno sambhavo eva natthīti hetuhetusādhāraṇahetūyeva paṭisedheti. Tappaccayataṃ anekapaccayataṃ.

‘In some’ (kesuci) refers to unwholesome results and so forth. The impossibility of a moment without it is stated by ‘Is it not?’ and so forth. ‘By the very nature’ (dhammeneva) means devoid of other distinguishing features. Indeed, by that very emphasis, it shows the absence of a distinction with ‘not for its occurrence’ and so forth. ‘Whether thus or otherwise’ (yathā vā tathā vā) means either that the world proceeds and ceases in time, or that time is a state whose characteristic is continuation, providing the opportunity for the arising of phenomena—in whatever way. Here, the existence of the ultimate cause is completely absent; thus, it denies both the specific cause and the common cause. Its conditionality (tappaccayataṃ) means the multiplicity of conditions.

Pakatissaravādaggahaṇaṃ nidassanamattaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Pajāpatipurisakālavādādayopi ‘‘ekakāraṇavādo’’ti. Vā-saddena vā tesampi saṅgaho daṭṭhabbo. Avayava…pe… dāyo vutto avayavadhammena samudāyassa apadisitabbattā, yathā ‘‘samaṃ cuṇṇaṃ, alaṅkato devadatto’’ti ca. Anipphādanaṃ nipphādanābhāvo ahetubhāvo. Nipphādetuṃ asamatthassa pana paccayantarānaṃ sahassepi samāgate nattheva samatthatāti āha ‘‘nipphādanasamatthassā’’ti. Ettha ca sahakārīkāraṇāyattā phaluppādanā paccayadhammānaṃ aññamaññāpekkhāti vuttāti apekkhā viyāti apekkhā daṭṭhabbā.

The acceptance of the doctrine of Pakati and Isvara should be regarded as merely illustrative. The doctrines of Pajāpati, Purisa, Kāla, and others are also included under ‘single-cause doctrines’ (ekakāraṇavādo). Or, their inclusion should be understood through the word ‘or’ (vā). ‘Part’ (avayava)... and so forth... the term ‘dāya’ is stated because the aggregate should be indicated by the nature of its parts, just as ‘fine powder’ and ‘Devadatta is adorned’. Non-production (anipphādanaṃ) is the non-existence of production, the state of being without a cause. But for one incapable of producing, even if a thousand other conditions were assembled, there is truly no capability. Therefore, it is said: ‘for one capable of producing’. Here, since the production of the effect is dependent on cooperating causes, it is said that conditional phenomena are mutually dependent; thus, dependence (apekkhā) should be understood as mutual dependence.

Nibyāpāresu abyāvaṭesu. Ekekasminti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ āmeḍitavacanassa luttaniddiṭṭhataṃ dasseti. Sati ca āmeḍite siddho bahubhāvoti. Andhasataṃ passatīti ca paccattavacanaṃ niddhāraṇe bhummavasena pariṇāmetvā ‘‘andhasate’’ti āha. Tathā ekekasminti iminā visuṃ asamatthatā jotitāti andhasataṃ passatīti samuditaṃ passatīti atthato ayamattho āpannoti āha ‘‘andhasataṃ sahitaṃ passatīti adhippāyo’’ti. Aññathāti yathārutavasena atthe gayhamāne. Yasmā asā…pe… siddho sivikubbahanādīsu, tasmā nāyamattho sādhetabbo. Idāni tassatthassa supākaṭabhāvena asādhetabbataṃ dassento ‘‘visu’’ntiādimāha.

‘In the uninvolved’ (nibyāpāresu) means ‘in the unoccupied’ (abyāvaṭesu). In the commentary, regarding ‘in each individual’ (ekekasmiṃ), it shows the elided explanation of the repeated statement. And when there is repetition, plurality is established. And the accusative statement ‘a hundred blind people see’ (andhasataṃ passati), having been transformed into the locative case in the sense of determination, is said as ‘in a hundred blind people’ (andhasate). Likewise, by ‘in each individual’ (ekekasmiṃ), their separate incapacity is illuminated. Thus, ‘a hundred blind people see’ means ‘they see collectively.’ In meaning, this is the intended point: ‘The intention is that a hundred blind people see together.’ ‘Otherwise’ (aññathā)—if the meaning is taken according to the literal statement—since this principle is established in cases like carrying a palanquin and so forth, this meaning need not be proven. Now, to show that this meaning need not be proven due to its very clear nature, he says ‘distinctly’ (visuṃ) and so forth.

Etenupāyenāti yoyaṃ khaṇasaṅkhāto samayo kusaluppattiyā dullabhabhāvaṃ dīpeti. Attano dullabhatāyāti ettha khaṇattho vā samaya-saddo khaṇasaṅkhāto samayoti attho vutto. Etena upāyabhūtena nayabhūtena. Yojanā kātabbāti etthāyaṃ yojanā – samavāya…pe… vuttiṃ dīpeti sayaṃ paccayasāmaggibhāvato, samavāyattho vā samaya-saddo samavāyasaṅkhāto samayo. So yāya paccayasāmaggiyā satīti imassa atthassa pakāsanavasena dhammānaṃ anekahetuto vuttiṃ dīpeti. Kāla…pe… parittataṃ dīpeti attano atiparittatāya. Samūha…pe… sahuppattiṃ dīpeti sayaṃ dhammānaṃ samudāyabhāvato. Hetu…pe… vuttitaṃ dīpeti sati eva attani attano phalānaṃ [Pg.69] sambhavatoti. Atthapakkhe ca saddapakkhe ca yasmiṃ atiparitte kāle yasmiṃ dhammasamudāye yamhi hetumhi satīti etassa atthassa ñāpanavasena tadādhārāya tadadhīnāya ca kusaladhammappavattiyā duppaṭivijjhataṃ anekesaṃ sahuppattiṃ parādhīnappattiñca dīpetīti.

‘By this means’ (etenupāyena) means that the moment (samaya) designated as ‘opportunity’ (khaṇa) reveals the rarity of the arising of wholesome states. Here, in ‘due to its own rarity’ (attano dullabhatāya), the word ‘samaya’ has the meaning of ‘moment’ (khaṇa), meaning ‘the moment designated as opportunity’. By this means (upāya) which serves as a method (naya). ‘The connection should be made’ (yojanā kātabbā): here, this is the connection—‘co-presence’ (samavāya)... and so forth... reveals the occurrence due to its being a concurrence of conditions itself; or the word ‘samaya’ has the meaning of ‘co-presence’ (samavāya), meaning ‘the moment designated as co-presence’. That, by clarifying the meaning of ‘when that concurrence of conditions exists,’ reveals the occurrence of phenomena from multiple causes. ‘Time’ (kāla)... and so forth... reveals its limitedness due to its own extreme limitedness. ‘Aggregate’ (samūha)... and so forth... reveals simultaneous arising, due to its being a collection of phenomena itself. ‘Cause’ (hetu)... and so forth... reveals its occurrence, because when it itself exists, its own results can arise. And in terms of meaning and in terms of language, by making known the meaning of ‘in that extremely limited time, in that collection of phenomena, in that cause where it exists,’ it reveals the difficulty of penetrating the occurrence of wholesome states which depends on and relies on that, and thus reveals both the simultaneous arising of many and their dependent attainment.

Daḷhadhammā dhanuggahāti daḷhadhanuno issāsā. Daḷhadhanu nāma dvisahassathāmaṃ vuccati. Dvisahassathāmanti ca yassa āropitassa jiyābaddho lohasīsādīnaṃ bhāro daṇḍe gahetvā yāva kaṇḍappamāṇā ukkhittassa pathavito muccati. Sikkhitāti dasadvādasavassāni ācariyakule uggahitasippā. Katahatthāti dhanusmiṃ ciṇṇavasībhāvā. Koci sippameva uggaṇhāti, katahattho na hoti, ime pana na tathāti dasseti. Katupāsanāti rājakulādīsu dassitasippā. Catuddisā ṭhitā assūti ekasmiṃyeva padese thambhaṃ vā rukkhaṃ vā yaṃ kiñci ekaṃyeva nissāya catuddisābhimukhā ṭhitā siyunti attho. Evaṃ vuttajavanapurisassāti na evarūpo puriso koci bhūtapubbo aññatra bodhisattena. So hi javanahaṃsakāle evarūpamakāsi. Sutte pana abhūtaparikappanavasena upamāmattaṃ āhaṭaṃ. Tapparabhāvāti tapparabhāvato hetusaṅkhātassa samayassa parāyattavuttidīpane ekantabyāvaṭasabhāvatoti attho. Ye pana ‘‘tapparabhāvo’’ti paṭhanti, tesaṃ paccayāyattavuttidīpanato tapparabhāvo hetusaṅkhātassa samayassa, tasmā tassa parāyattavuttidīpanatā vuttāti yojanā. Samudāyāyattatādīpane tapparo, tadekadesāyattatādīpane tapparo na hotīti āha ‘‘atapparabhāvato’’ti.

‘Archers with firm bows’ (daḷhadhammā dhanuggahā) means archers with strong bows. A strong bow (daḷhadhanu) is said to have a draw weight of two thousand. ‘Two thousand draw weight’ (dvisahassathāmaṃ) means that for a strung bow, when a weight of an iron head and so forth, bound to the bowstring, is lifted by the shaft up to the length of an arrow, it is released from the ground. ‘Skilled’ (sikkhitā) means having learned the craft in the teacher’s house for ten or twelve years. ‘Accomplished’ (katahatthā) means being proficient in handling the bow. Some may learn the craft but are not accomplished; these, however, are not like that, as is shown. ‘Proven in practice’ (katupāsanā) means having demonstrated skill in royal courts and such. ‘Standing in the four directions’ (catuddisā ṭhitā assu) means that they should stand facing all four directions while relying on a single post, tree, or any single support in one place. ‘Of such a swift man as described’ (evaṃ vuttajavanapurisassa)—no man like this has ever existed except the Bodhisatta. For he alone performed such feats in the time of the swift goose. In the Sutta, however, it is given merely as a simile by way of an imagined comparison. ‘From being dependent on that’ (tapparabhāvā): the meaning is that it is so called because of its nature of being entirely engaged in explaining the dependent occurrence of the moment designated as a cause. As for those who read ‘tapparabhāvo,’ their connection is as follows: because it explains the occurrence dependent on conditions, the moment designated as a cause is ‘dependent on that’ (tapparabhāvo); therefore, its function of explaining the dependent occurrence is stated. In explaining dependence on the aggregate, it is ‘dependent on that’ (tapparo), but in explaining dependence on a single part of that, it is not ‘dependent on that.’ Hence, it is said, ‘because of not being dependent on that’ (atapparabhāvato).

Nanu ca taṃ taṃ upādāya paññatto kālo vohāramattako, so kathaṃ ādhāro tattha vuttadhammānanti āha ‘‘kālopi hī’’tiādi. Yadi kiriyāya kiriyantaralakkhaṇaṃ bhāvenabhāvalakkhaṇaṃ, kā panettha lakkhaṇakiriyāti āha ‘‘ihāpī’’tiādi. Lakkhaṇabhūtabhāvayuttoti iti-saddo hetuattho. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – yasmā sattāsaṅkhātāya lakkhaṇakiriyāya yutto samayo, tasmā tattha bhūminiddesoti.

‘But isn’t time, designated in dependence on this and that, merely a conventional designation? How then can it be a support for the phenomena described there?’ To this, it is said: ‘For time indeed…’ (kālopi hi) and so forth. If the characteristic of one action is another action, and a state is characterized by a state, then what is the characteristic action here? It is said: ‘Here too…’ (ihāpi) and so forth. ‘Connected with a state that has become a characteristic’ (lakkhaṇabhūtabhāvayutto)—the word ‘thus’ (iti) has the meaning of a reason. This is what is said: because time is connected with the characteristic action designated as existence, therefore it is specified in the locative case.

Uddānatoti yadi saṅkhepatoti attho. Nanu ca avasiṭṭhakilesādayo viya kilesakāmopi assādetabbatāya vatthukāme samavaruddho ñāṇaṃ viya ñeyyeti saṅkhepato ekoyeva kāmo [Pg.70] siyāti anuyogaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘kilesakāmo’’tiādi. Sahitassāti visayavisayibhāvena avaṭṭhitassa. ‘‘Uddānato dve kāmā’’ti kiñcāpi sabbe kāmā uddiṭṭhā, ‘‘catunnaṃ apāyāna’’ntiādinā pana visayassa visesitattā orambhāgiyakilesabhūto kāmarāgo idha kilesakāmoti gahitoti ‘‘tenā’’tiādimāha. Codako tassa adhippāyaṃ ajānanto ‘‘nanu cā’’tiādinā anuyuñjati. Itaro pana ‘‘bahalakilesassā’’tiādinā attano adhippāyaṃ vivarati.

‘By way of summary’ (uddānato) means ‘if in brief’ (saṅkhepato). ‘But just as the remaining defilements and so forth, or even defilement-desire (kilesakāmo), are included under object-desire (vatthukāme) because they are to be savored, or as knowledge is included under the knowable, so in brief, desire could be just one’—keeping this objection in mind, he said, ‘defilement-desire’ and so forth. ‘Of one who is associated’ (sahitassa) means of one who is established in the relationship of subject and object. Although in the phrase ‘according to the summary, there are two desires’ (uddānato dve kāmā) all desires have been mentioned, because the object is distinguished by ‘of the four states of woe’ (catunnaṃ apāyānaṃ) and so forth, sensual lust (kāmarāga), which is a defilement pertaining to the lower fetters, is here taken as defilement-desire (kilesakāmo); therefore, he said, ‘by that’ (tena) and so forth. The questioner, not understanding his intention, objects with ‘But is it not?’ (nanu ca) and so forth. The other, however, explains his own intention with ‘of one with gross defilements’ (bahalakilesassa) and so forth.

Kāmāvacaradhammesu vimānakapparukkhādippakāresu parittakusalādīsu vā. Nanu ca ‘‘catunnaṃ apāyāna’’nti visayassa visesitattā rūpārūpadhātuggahaṇassa asambhavoyevāti? Na, ‘‘uddānato dve kāmā’’ti niravasesato kāmānaṃ uddiṭṭhattā. Uddiṭṭhepi hi kāmasamudāye yathā tadekadesova gayhati, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘duvidho’’tiādimāha. Kāmarāgo pañcakāmaguṇiko rāgo. Kāmataṇhā kāmāvacaradhammavisayā taṇhā. Nirodhataṇhā ucchedadiṭṭhisahagato rāgo. Idhāti ekādasavidhe padese. Yadi anavasesappavatti adhippetā, ‘‘duvidhopeso’’ti na vattabbaṃ vatthukāmekadesassa idha appavattanatoti anuyogena yebhuyyabhāvato anavaseso viya anavasesoti vā attho gahetabboti dassento ‘‘vatthukāmopī’’tiādimāha. Anavasesasadisatā cettha sabhāvabhinnassa kassaci anavasesato. Evañca katvāti kilesakāmavatthukāmānaṃ anavasesaparipuṇṇabhāvena abhilakkhitattāti attho. Cāsaddassa rassattaṃ katanti kāmāvacarasadde hetukattuattho antonītoti dasseti.

‘In phenomena pertaining to the sensual realm’ (kāmāvacaradhammesu) refers to celestial mansions, wish-fulfilling trees, and so forth, or to minor wholesome deeds and so forth. ‘But is it not said, “for the four states of deprivation” (catunnaṃ apāyānaṃ), that due to the specificity of the object, the inclusion of the form and formless realms is impossible?’ ‘No, because it is stated, “from the summary, two are sensual pleasures” (uddānato dve kāmā), referring to sensual pleasures without omission.’ Indeed, even in the mentioned aggregate of sensual pleasures, just as only a part of it is taken, to show this, he says, ‘of two kinds’ (duvidho) and so forth. Sensual lust (kāmarāgo) is the lust connected with the five strands of sensual pleasure. Sensual craving (kāmataṇhā) is the craving with objects in the sensual realm. Craving for annihilation (nirodhataṇhā) is the lust accompanied by the view of annihilation. ‘Here’ (idha) refers to the elevenfold section. If an occurrence without omission is intended, it should not be said, ‘this is twofold’ (duvidhopeso), because a part of the material basis of sensual pleasure does not occur here. To show that, by this reasoning, due to its predominance, it should be understood as being almost without omission, or that the meaning is to be taken as without omission, he says, ‘the material basis of sensual pleasure too’ (vatthukāmopi) and so forth. And the similarity to non-omission here is due to the non-omission of something distinct in its intrinsic nature. ‘And having done so’ (evaṃ ca katvā)—this means that the defilements of sensual pleasure and the material basis of sensual pleasure are characterized by their complete fullness without omission. The shortening of the word ‘ca’ indicates that the meaning of causal agent is included within the word ‘kāmāvacara’.

Visayeti vatthusmiṃ abhidheyyattheti attho. Nimittaviraheti etena ruḷhīsu kiriyā vibhāgakaraṇāya, na attakiriyāyāti dasseti. Kusalabhāvanti jātakabāhitikasuttaabhidhammapariyāyena kathitaṃ kusalattaṃ. Tassāti sukhavipākabhāvassa. Tassa paccupaṭṭhānataṃ vattukāmatāyāti etena ‘‘anavajjasukhavipākalakkhaṇa’’nti ettha sukhasaddo iṭṭhapariyāyo vuttoti dasseti. Saññāpaññākiccaṃ saññāṇakaraṇapaṭivijjhanāni, tadubhayavidhurā ārammaṇūpaladdhi ‘‘vijānātī’’ti iminā vuccatīti āha ‘‘saññā…pe… gahaṇa’’nti. Nanu ca phassādikiccatopi visiṭṭhakiccaṃ cittanti? Saccametaṃ, so pana viseso na tathā duravabodho, yathā [Pg.71] saññāpaññāviññāṇānanti saññāpaññākiccavisiṭṭhalakkhaṇatāya viññāṇalakkhaṇamāha. Anantaradhammānaṃ paguṇabalavabhāvassa kāraṇabhāvena pavattamāno santānaṃ cinoti nāma. Tathāpavatti ca āsevanapaccayabhāvoti āha ‘‘āsevanapaccayabhāvena cinotī’’ti.

‘In the object’ (visaye) means in the matter, in the sense of what is to be expressed. ‘By the absence of a sign’ (nimittavirahe) shows that in established usages, an action is for the purpose of making a division, not for its own action. ‘The wholesome state’ (kusalabhāvaṃ) refers to the wholesomeness spoken of by way of the Jātaka, the Bāhitika Sutta, and the Abhidhamma. ‘Of that’ (tassā) means of the state of pleasant result. By the wish to state its manifestation, it is shown that in the phrase “characterized by blameless, pleasant result,” the word ‘pleasant’ is used as a synonym for ‘desirable.’ The function of perception and wisdom consists of recognizing and penetrating. The apprehension of an object, devoid of both of these, is what is meant by ‘knows’ (vijānāti); hence he said, “perception… grasping.” But is not the mind also distinguished by functions other than those of contact and so forth? This is true, but that distinction is not as difficult to understand as that between perception, wisdom, and consciousness; therefore, he states the characteristic of consciousness by way of its characteristic as distinguished from the functions of perception and wisdom. Occurring as the cause of the proficient and powerful state of immediately preceding phenomena, it is said to accumulate continuity. And such an occurrence is the state of being a repetition condition; hence he said, “it accumulates by way of the repetition condition.”

Cittakatamevāti abhisaṅkhāraviññāṇakatameva. Nānattādīnaṃ vavatthānanti ettha vavatthānaṃ paccekaṃ yojetabbaṃ. Vavatthānaṃ paricchedo asaṅkarabhāvo. Tena ca dhammo nicchito nāma hotīti āha ‘‘nicchitatā’’ti. Liṅganānattādīnīti ettha itthipurisasaṇṭhānavasena liṅganānattaṃ. Devamanussatiracchānādivasena itthiliṅgassa puthuttaṃ, tathā purisaliṅgassa. Devādibhede itthiliṅge paccekaṃ nānattakāyatāsaṅkhātassa aññamaññavisadisasabhāvassa desādibhedabhinnassa ca visesassa vasena pabhedo veditabbo. Tathā purisaliṅge. Liṅganibbattakassa vā kammassa yathāvuttanānattādivasena liṅgassa nānattādīni yojetabbāni. Liṅganānattādīsu pavattattā saññādīnaṃ nānattādīni. Tenevāha ‘‘kammanānattādīhi nibbattāni hi tānī’’ti. Apadādinānākaraṇadassanena liṅganānattaṃ dassitaṃ. Tasmiñca dassite saññānānattādayo dassitā evāti āvattati bhavacakkanti dassento āha ‘‘anāga…pe… ghaṭento’’ti. Itthiliṅgapurisaliṅgādi viññāṇādhiṭṭhitassa rūpakkhandhassa sannivesaviseso. Saññāsīsena cattāro khandhā vuttā. Vohāravacanena ca pañcannaṃ khandhānaṃ voharitabbabhāvena pavatti dīpitā, yā sā taṇhādiṭṭhiabhinivesahetūti imamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘liṅgādi…pe… yosānānī’’ti āha.

‘Only what is made by the mind’ (cittakatameva) means only what is made by consciousness that is a volitional formation. Regarding ‘the determination of diversity, etc.’ (nānattādīnaṃ vavatthānaṃ), here ‘determination’ should be applied to each individually. Determination is delimitation, a state of being unmixed. By that, a phenomenon is said to be ‘ascertained’; hence it is said, ‘ascertainment’ (nicchitatā). Regarding ‘gender diversity, etc.’ (liṅganānattādīni), here gender diversity is based on the forms of female and male. There is the variety (puthuttaṃ) of the female gender among gods, humans, animals, etc., and similarly of the male gender. In the divisions of gods, etc., among the female gender, the distinction (pabhedo) should be understood by way of the particular difference which is designated as the diversity of bodies, which has a nature dissimilar to one another, and which is differentiated by distinctions of region, etc. Similarly for the male gender. Or, the diversity of gender, etc., should be applied based on the aforementioned diversity, etc., of the kamma that produces gender. Because perception, etc., occur in relation to gender diversity, etc., there is also diversity of perception, etc. For that reason, he said, “For they are produced by the diversity of kamma, etc.” Gender diversity is shown by seeing the various kinds, such as the footless. And when that is shown, the diversity of perception, etc., is also shown. Thus, indicating that the wheel of existence revolves, he said, “future… arranging.” The female gender, male gender, etc., are a particular arrangement of the form aggregate, which is established by consciousness. With perception as the heading, the four aggregates are mentioned. And by the term ‘conventional expression’ (vohāravacanena), the occurrence of the five aggregates as that which can be expressed conventionally is shown, which is caused by craving, views, and clinging. To show this meaning, he said, “gender, etc.… wombs.”

‘‘Ye keci, bhikkhave, dhammā akusalā akusalabhāgiyā, sabbete manopubbaṅgamā’’ti (a. ni. 1.56-57), ‘‘manopubbaṅgamā dhammā’’ti (dha. pa. 1, 2) ca evamādivacanato cittahetukaṃ kammanti āha ‘‘kammañhi cittato nibbatta’’nti. Yathāsaṅkhyanti kammato liṅgaṃ liṅgato saññāti attho. Na purimavikappe viya kammato liṅgasaññā liṅgato liṅgasaññāti ubhayato ubhayappavattidassanavasena. ‘‘Bhedaṃ gacchanti itthāyaṃ purisoti vā’’ti bhedassa visesitattā itthādibhāvena voharitabbabhāvo idha bhedoti ‘‘itthipurisādivohāraṃ gacchantī’’ti vuttaṃ. Addhadvayavasenāti atītapaccuppannaddhadvayavasena. Guṇābhibyāpanaṃ [Pg.72] kittīti āha ‘‘patthaṭayasata’’nti. Kammanānākaraṇena vinā kammanibbattanānākāraṇābhāvato ‘‘kammajehi…pe… nānākaraṇa’’nti vuttaṃ. Avipaccanokāso aṭṭhānabhūtā, gatikālopi vā. Kāmāvacaraṃ abhisaṅkhāraviññāṇaṃ rūpadhātuyā cakkhuviññāṇādiṃ janetvā anokāsatāya tadārammaṇaṃ ajanentaṃ ettha nidassetabbaṃ. Ekaccacittakaraṇassa adhippetattā cakkhādivekallena cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ ajanakaṃ kammaviññāṇaṃ avasesapaccayavikale anogadhaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tadapi kālagatipayogādīti ādi-saddena saṅgahitanti. Ettha ca ‘‘sahakārīkāraṇavikalaṃ vipākassa accantaṃ okāsameva na labhati, itaraṃ vipākekadesassa laddhokāsanti, idametesaṃ nānatta’’nti vadanti, taṃ vipākassa okāsalābhe sati sahāyakāraṇavikalatāva natthīti adhippāyena vuttaṃ.

“Whatever unwholesome qualities, monks, partake of unwholesomeness, all of them have mind as their forerunner” (AN 1.56-57), and “Qualities have mind as their forerunner” (Dhp 1, 2)—from such statements, it is said that kamma is caused by mind: “for kamma is born from mind.” ‘According to sequence’ (yathāsaṅkhyaṃ) means: from kamma, the sign; from the sign, perception. This is not like the previous alternative, which shows a reciprocal occurrence, where from kamma arise sign and perception, and from the sign arise sign and perception. “They go to division as ‘female’ or ‘male’”—because the division is specified, the state of being designated by way of ‘female,’ etc., is here the division; hence it is said, “they go to the designation of ‘female, male,’ etc.” ‘By way of two time-periods’ (addhadvayavasena) means by way of the two time-periods of the past and present. The spreading of virtue is fame (kitti); thus he said, ‘widespread fame’ (patthaṭayasataṃ). Without the diversification of kamma, there is an absence of diversity in what is produced by kamma; hence it is said, “born of kamma... diverse.” An opportunity for non-ripening is a state that is a non-basis, or it is the time of one’s destiny. The sense-sphere’s volitional consciousness, having generated eye-consciousness, etc., in the form realm, but not generating a registering consciousness (tadārammaṇa) due to lack of opportunity, should be shown here. Because the production of a certain thought is intended, the kamma-consciousness which, due to the lack of the eye faculty, etc., does not generate eye-consciousness, etc., should be seen as unestablished when the remaining conditions are lacking. That too—the proper time, application, etc.—is included by the word “etc.” And here, some say: “That which lacks supporting causes absolutely does not find an opportunity for its result; the other obtains an opportunity for a part of its result—this is their difference.” This, however, is said with the intention that when the result obtains an opportunity, there is no lack of supporting causes.

Bhavatu tāva bhavitvā apagataṃ bhūtāpagataṃ, anubhavitvā apagataṃ pana kathanti āha ‘‘anubhūtabhūtā’’tiādi. Tena anubhūta-saddena yo attho vuccati, tassa bhūta-saddoyeva vācako, na anu-saddo, anu-saddo pana jotakoti dasseti. Sākhābhaṅgasadisā hi nipātopasaggāti. Kiriyāvisesakattañca upasaggānaṃ anekatthattā dhātusaddānaṃ tehi vattabbavisesassa jotanabhāveneva avacchindananti yattakā dhātusaddena abhidhātabbā atthavisesā, tesaṃ yaṃ sāmaññaṃ aviseso, tassa visese avaṭṭhāpanaṃ tassa tassa visesassa jotanamevāti āha ‘‘sāmañña…pe… visesīyatī’’ti. Anubhūta-saddo bahulaṃ kammatthe eva dissatīti tassa idha kattuatthavācitaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘anubhūtasaddo cā’’tiādimāha. Satipi sabbesaṃ cittuppādānaṃ savedayitabhāvato ārammaṇānubhavane, savipallāse pana santāne cittābhisaṅkhāravasena pavattito abyākatehi visiṭṭho kusalākusalānaṃ sātisayo visayānubhavanākāroti ayamattho idhādhippetoti dassento ‘‘vattuṃ adhippāyavasenā’’ti āha. Bhūtāpagatabhāvābhidhānādhippāyenāti kusalākusalassa ākaḍḍhanupāyamāha.

Let it be that “having been, it has passed away” is “bhūtāpagata” (passed away after being). But as to “having experienced, it has passed away,” he said, “anubhūtabhūtā,” and so on. By this, he shows that for the meaning conveyed by the word ‘anubhūta,’ the word ‘bhūta’ alone is the designator, not the prefix ‘anu’; the prefix ‘anu’ merely serves to illuminate. For particles and prefixes are like a broken branch. And because prefixes specify actions and verbal roots have multiple meanings, they delimit the specific meaning to be expressed by them by way of illuminating that specific quality. Thus, whatever specific meanings are to be expressed by a verbal root, the general, undifferentiated aspect of those is established in a specific way by illuminating that particular distinction; hence he said, “the general... becomes specific.” The word ‘anubhūta’ is mostly seen in the objective sense; to show that here it conveys the agentive sense, he stated, “the word ‘anubhūta’ also...” Although all arisings of consciousness involve experiencing their objects by way of feeling, in a perverted continuum, arising through the force of mental formations, the wholesome and unwholesome are distinguished from the indeterminate by their particularly intense mode of experiencing objects; to show that this is the intended meaning here, he said, “to express according to intention.” By the intention of expressing the state of having passed away after being, he states the method for including the wholesome and unwholesome.

Uppatitakiccanipphādanato uppatitasadisattā ‘‘uppatita’’nti vuttaṃ. Uppajjituṃ āraddhoti anāgatassapi tasseva uppanna-saddena vuttatāya kāraṇamāha. Ettha ca rajjanādivasena ārammaṇarasānubhavanaṃ sātisayanti akusalañca kusalañca uppajjitvā niruddhatāsāmaññena ‘‘sabbasaṅkhataṃ bhūtāpagata’’nti [Pg.73] vuttaṃ. Sammohavinodaniyaṃ pana ‘‘vipākānubhavanavasena tadārammaṇaṃ. Avipakkavipākassa sabbathā avigatattā bhavitvā vigatatāmattavasenakammañca bhūtāpagata’’nti vuttaṃ. Teneva tattha okāsakatuppannanti vipākamevāha. Idha pana kammampīti. Ārammaṇakaraṇavasena bhavati ettha kilesajātanti bhūmīti vuttā upādānakkhandhā. Aggiāhito viyāti bhūmiladdhanti vattabbatāya upāyaṃ dasseti. Etenāti kammaṃ. Etassāti vipāko vuttoti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

It is called 'uppatita' (arisen) because it accomplishes the function of arising and is similar to what has arisen. He states the reason why even what is yet to arise, when it has begun to arise, is referred to by the word 'uppanna' (arisen). Here, both the unwholesome, which is the excessive experiencing of the taste of an object through lust and so on, and the wholesome, are said to be 'all conditioned things that have passed away after being' by way of their common characteristic of having arisen and ceased. However, in the Sammohavinodanī, it is said: 'That object is experienced by way of the result (vipāka). Since the unripened result has in no way passed away, kamma is also said to be "passed away after being" merely in the sense of having existed and then passed away.' Therefore, there it refers only to the result (vipāka) as 'what has arisen providing an opportunity.' Here, however, it includes kamma as well. The aggregates of clinging are called 'ground' because a class of defilements arises here by way of being an object-condition. 'Like a fire that has been ignited'—this shows the means by which it is to be said that it is established on the ground. By 'etena' (by this), kamma is meant. By 'etassa' (of this), the result is said to be meant. This should be understood.

Avikkhambhitattāti avinoditattā. Sabhūmiyanti sakabhūmiyaṃ. Vicchinditvāti puna uppajjituṃ adatvā. Khaṇattayekadesagataṃ khaṇattayagatanti vuttanti yathāvuttassa udāharaṇassa upacārabhāvamāha. Tena uppannā dhammā paccuppannā dhammāti idamettha udāharaṇaṃ yuttanti dasseti. Padhānenāti padhānabhāvena. Desanāya cittaṃ pubbaṅgamanti lokiyadhamme desetabbe cittaṃ pubbaṅgamaṃ katvā desanā bhagavatā ucitāti dasseti. Dhammasabhāvaṃ vā sandhāyāti lokiyadhammānaṃ ayaṃ sabhāvo yadidaṃ te cittajeṭṭhakā cittapubbaṅgamā pavattantīti dasseti. Tena tesaṃ tathādesanāya kāraṇamāha, sabbe akusalā dhammā cittavajjāti attho. Kecīti padakārā. Phassādayopīti pi-saddena rāgādayo sampiṇḍeti. Kālabhedābhāvepi paccayabhāvena apekkhito dhammo purimanipphanno viya voharīyatīti āha ‘‘paṭhamaṃ uppanno viyā’’ti. Anupacaritamevassa pubbaṅgamabhāvaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘anantarapaccayamana’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. ‘‘Khīṇā bhavanettī’’tiādivacanato (dī. ni. 2.155; netti. 114) nettibhūtāya taṇhāya yuttaṃ cittaṃ nāyakanti āha ‘‘taṇhāsampayuttaṃ vā’’ti.

'Avikkhambhitattā' means 'because of being unsuppressed' or 'undispelled'. 'Sabhūmiyanti' means 'in one's own sphere'. 'Vicchinditvā' means 'having cut off', not allowing it to arise again. He states the metaphorical nature of the aforementioned example by saying that what belongs to one part of the three moments is called 'belonging to the three moments'. By this, he shows that the example, 'arisen phenomena are present phenomena,' is appropriate here. 'Padhānena' means 'by way of prominence'. 'Desanāya cittaṃ pubbaṅgamaṃ' indicates that the Blessed One's teaching is suitable because, when teaching worldly phenomena, the mind is made the forerunner. Or, with reference to the nature of phenomena, it shows that this is the nature of worldly phenomena: that they proceed with mind as chief and forerunner. By this, he states the reason for teaching in such a way; the meaning is: all unwholesome phenomena with the exception of mind. 'Keci' refers to the lexicographers. By 'phassādayopi', with the particle 'pi', he also includes contact and others, such as greed and the like. He says, 'like what has arisen first,' stating that even in the absence of a temporal difference, a phenomenon that is required as a condition is spoken of as if it were produced earlier. To show its non-figurative status as a forerunner, 'the mind as the immediately contiguous condition' and so forth is said. From statements such as 'the craving that is the conduit of existence is destroyed' (Dī. Ni. 2.155; Netti. 114), he says that the mind associated with craving, which is the conduit, is the leader; hence, 'or associated with craving.'

‘‘Yaṃ tasmiṃ samaye cetasikaṃ sāta’’nti niddiṭṭhattā somanassavedanā sātasabhāvāti āha ‘‘sabhāvavasena vutta’’nti. Nippariyāyena madhura-saddo rasavisesapariyāyo, iṭṭhabhāvasāmaññena idha upacārena vuttotiāha ‘‘madhuraṃ viyā’’ti. Paramatthato taṇhāvinimutto nandirāgo nandirāgabhāvo vā natthīti ‘‘na ettha sampayogavasena sahagatabhāvo atthī’’ti, ‘‘nandirāgasahagatā’’ti ca vuccati. Tena viññāyati ‘‘sahagatasaddo taṇhāya nandirāgabhāvaṃ jotetī’’ti. Avatthāvisesavācako vā [Pg.74] saha-saddo ‘‘sanidassanā’’tiādīsu viya, sabbāsupi avatthāsu nandirāgasabhāvāvijahanadīpanavasena nandirāgabhāvaṃ gatā nandirāgasahagatāti taṇhā vuttā. Gata-saddassa vā ‘‘diṭṭhigata’’ntiādīsu viya atthantarābhāvato nandirāgasabhāvā taṇhā ‘‘nandirāgasahagatā’’ti vuttā, nandirāgasabhāvāti attho. Idhāpīti imissaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ. Imasmimpi padeti ‘‘somanassasahagata’’nti etasmimpi pade. Ayamevatthoti saṃsaṭṭho eva. Yathādassitasaṃsaṭṭhasaddoti atthuddhārappasaṅgena pāḷito aṭṭhakathāya āgatasaṃsaṭṭhasaddo. Sahajāteti sahajātatthe.

Because it is specified, 'whatever mental thing is pleasant at that time,' he says, 'it is stated by way of its inherent nature,' meaning that the feeling of joy has a pleasant nature. Directly, the word 'sweet' is a synonym for a specific taste, but here it is used figuratively for the general quality of desirability; hence he says 'like sweetness.' In the ultimate sense, there is no delight-and-lust, or state of delight-and-lust, that is separate from craving; therefore, there is no state of being 'accompanied' here by way of association, yet it is called 'accompanied by delight-and-lust.' From this it is understood that the word 'accompanied' illuminates the fact that delight-and-lust is the nature of craving. Alternatively, the word 'saha' is a term indicating a specific state, as in 'sanidassana' and so on; craving is called 'accompanied by delight-and-lust' because it illuminates the non-abandonment of the nature of delight-and-lust in all states, having attained the state of delight-and-lust. Or, as with the word 'gata' in 'diṭṭhigata' (gone to a view) and so on, since it has no other meaning, craving, which has the nature of delight-and-lust, is called 'accompanied by delight-and-lust'; the meaning is 'having the nature of delight-and-lust'. Here too—that is, in this commentary. And in this phrase—that is, in this phrase 'accompanied by joy'. This is the very meaning—that is, simply 'associated'. The word 'saṃsaṭṭha' as shown—this is the word 'saṃsaṭṭha' that has come from the Pāli into the commentary in the context of extracting the meaning. 'Sahajāte' means in the sense of co-arisen.

Kālavisesānapekkho kammasādhano ābhaṭṭha-saddo bhāsitapariyāyoti dassento āha ‘‘abhāsitabbatā anābhaṭṭhatā’’ti. Pāḷiyanti imissā paṭhamacittuppādapāḷiyaṃ. Abhāsitattā evāti asaṅkhārikabhāvassa avuttattā eva. Kāraṇapariyāyattā vatthusaddassa paccayabhāvasāmaññato dvārabhūtadhammānampi siyā vatthupariyāyoti āha ‘‘dvāraṃ vatthūti vutta’’nti. Tena vatthu viya vatthūti dasseti. Manodvārabhūtā dhammā yebhuyyena hadayavatthunā saha carantīti dvārena…pe… hadayavatthu vuttanti āha yathā ‘‘kuntā pacarantī’’ti. Sakiccabhāvenāti attano kiccabhāvena, kiccasahitatāya vā. Aññāsādhāraṇoti sa-saddassa atthamāha. Sako hi raso sarasoti.

Showing that the word 'ābhaṭṭha', which is formed in the objective sense and is indifferent to specific times, is a synonym for 'spoken', he says, ''un-ābhaṭṭha-ness' is 'unspoken-ness'.' 'Pāḷiyaṃ' means in the Pāli text of this first arising of consciousness. 'Precisely because it is unspoken' means precisely because the state of being unprompted is unuttered. Because the word 'vatthu' is a synonym for cause, he says, 'the door is called the basis,' meaning that due to the commonality of being a condition, the term 'vatthu' may also be a synonym for the phenomena that are the doors. By this, he shows that 'vatthu' here means 'like a basis'. Because the phenomena that are the mind-door for the most part proceed together with the heart-basis, he says that by the word 'door'... the heart-basis is meant, as in the phrase 'the spears are advancing'. 'Sakiccabhāvena' means by the state of its own function, or by being together with its function. He states the meaning of the prefix 'sa-' as 'not common to others'. For 'sarasa' means its own (`saka`) essence (`rasa`).

Anantaracittahetukattā cittassa ekasamuṭṭhānatā vuttā, sahajātacittaphassahetukattā cetasikānaṃ dvisamuṭṭhānatā. ‘‘Cittasamuṭṭhānā dhammā, phuṭṭho bhikkhave vedeti, phuṭṭho sañjānāti, phuṭṭho cetetī’’ti (saṃ. ni. 4.93) hi vuttaṃ.

Because consciousness has the immediately preceding consciousness as its cause, it is said to have a single origin. Because mental factors have co-arisen consciousness and contact as their cause, they are said to have a dual origin. For it is said: 'Phenomena originate from consciousness. Touched, O monks, one feels; touched, one perceives; touched, one intends' (Saṃyutta Nikāya 4.93).

Sukhumarajādirūpanti aṇutajjārirūpamāha. Paramāṇurūpe pana vattabbameva natthi. Vatthuparittatāyāti etena anekakalāpagatāni bahūniyeva rūpāyatanāni samuditāni saṃhaccakāritāya sivikubbahanañāyena cakkhuviññāṇassa ārammaṇapaccayo, na ekaṃ katipayāni vāti dasseti. Nanu ca evaṃ sante cakkhuviññāṇaṃ samudāyārammaṇaṃ āpajjatīti? Nāpajjati samudāyasseva abhāvato. Na hi paramatthato samudāyo nāma koci atthi. Vaṇṇāyatanameva hi yattakaṃ yogyadese avaṭṭhitaṃ, sati [Pg.75] paccayantarasamāyoge tattakaṃ yathāvuttena ñāyena cakkhuviññāṇassa ārammaṇapaccayo hoti avikappakattā tassa. Tadabhinihaṭaṃ pana manoviññāṇaṃ anekakkhattuṃ uppajjamānaṃ purimasiddhakappanāvasena samūhākārena saṇṭhānādiākārena ca pavattatīti kiṃ cakkhuviññāṇassa ekaṃ vaṇṇāyatanaṃ ārammaṇaṃ, udāhu anekānīti na codetabbametaṃ. Na hi paccakkhavisaye yuttimagganā yuttā. Kiñca bhiyyo accharāsaṅghātakkhaṇena anekakoṭisaṅkhāya cittuppattiyā pavattanato cittassa lahuparivattitāya samānepi ghaṭasarāvādivaṇṇānaṃ yogyadesāvaṭṭhāne purimamanasikārānurūpaṃ ‘‘ghaṭo’’ti vā ‘‘sarāvo’’ti vā paṭhamaṃ tāva eko manoviññāṇasantānena paricchijjati, pacchā itaro cakkhuviññāṇavīthiyā byavahitenāti avisesavidutāya pana ghaṭasarāvādibuddhiyā abhedāpattiparikappanāti. Īdisīpettha codanā acodanāti daṭṭhabbā. Khaṇaparittatāyāti pabandhakkhaṇassa ittaratāya. Pabandhavasena hi paccekaṃ rūpārūpadhammā virodhiavirodhipaccayasamāyoge lahuṃ dandhañca nirujjhanato parittakālā dīghakālā ca honti, sabhāvalakkhaṇavasena pana ekaparicchedā evāti. Yathā ca rūpāyatanaṃ, evaṃ itarānipi. Saddādayopi hi vatthuparittatādibhāvena labbhantīti. Accāsannāditāyāti ādi-saddena anāvajjanaṃ kenaci paṭicchannatāti evamādiṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Visayidhammaṃ visesato sinoti bandhatīti visayoti anaññatthabhāvāpekkho visayoti āha ‘‘visayo anaññatthabhāvenā’’ti. Na hi cakkhuviññāṇādayo rūpāyatanādito aññasmiṃ ārammaṇe pavattantīti. Gāvo caranti etthāti gocaro, gocaro viyāti gocaroti sambahulacāritāpekkho gocaroti āha ‘‘gocaro tattha caraṇenā’’ti. Bahulañhi cakkhuviññāṇādīhi rūpādayo gayhanti, na tathā manoviññāṇenāti. Tesanti manoviññāṇena gayhamānānaṃ rūpāyatanādīnaṃ. ‘‘Vacanassa anupapattito’’ti kasmā vuttaṃ, nanu pañcadvāre pavattamanoviññāṇadhātuṃ sandhāya tesaṃ gocaravisayaṃ paccanubhotīti vacanaṃ upapajjatiyevāti? Na, niyamābhāvato. Na hi pañcadvārābhinihaṭaṃyeva mano idha ‘‘mano’’ti vuttanti niyamahetu atthīti, etaṃyeva vā codanaṃ manasi katvā dibbacakkhuñāṇādiggahaṇaṃ kataṃ. Evaṃvaṇṇotiādivacanato pubbenivāsaatītānāgataṃsañāṇādayopi idha sambhavanti. Itarathāti rūpaṃ saddantiādinā.

He speaks of the form of subtle dust, etc., as the form of minute particles. However, there is nothing to be said about the form of atoms. By 'due to the limited nature of the base,' he shows that many sense-objects belonging to multiple clusters, gathered and acting collectively by the analogy of carrying a palanquin, serve as the object condition for eye-consciousness, not just one or a few. But wouldn’t this mean that eye-consciousness takes a collective object? No, it does not, because of the non-existence of a collective itself. For in the ultimate sense, there is no such thing as a collective. Only the visible form, as much as is situated in a suitable location, when there is a conjunction of other conditions, becomes the object condition for eye-consciousness in the manner described, without conceptualization. However, the mind-consciousness, repeatedly arising and focusing on it, proceeds in a collective manner, with shapes and other features, based on prior established conceptions. Thus, whether eye-consciousness takes one visible form or many should not be questioned. For in the sphere of direct perception, seeking logical reasoning is not appropriate. Moreover, due to the rapid succession of mind-moments—countless in the blink of an eye—and the swift change of consciousness, even though the colors of a pot or bowl are situated in a suitable location, the first mind-consciousness stream apprehends them as 'pot' or 'bowl' in accordance with prior attention. Later, other eye-consciousness processes are separated by the intervening mind-consciousness stream. But because of the indistinct perception, there arises the assumption of an undivided pot or bowl. Such questioning here should be seen as baseless. By 'brevity of the moment' is meant the transience of the continuity-moment. For in terms of continuity, individual material and immaterial phenomena, depending on opposing or non-opposing conditions, quickly or slowly cease, being momentary or lasting. But by their intrinsic nature, they are of a single measure. Just as with the visible form, so too with the others—sound, etc.—they are obtained through the limited nature of the base and other factors. By 'extreme proximity, etc.', the term 'etc.' includes inattention or being concealed by something, and so forth. An object (visaya) is so called because it specifically binds (sinoti) the subjective phenomenon. With regard to its state of not being for another, he says, 'An object is by its not being for another.' For eye-consciousness and the like do not operate on any object other than the visible form, etc. 'Cows graze (caranti) there'—thus, it is a pasture (gocaro). Like a pasture, it is a range (gocaro). With regard to frequenting, he says, 'A range is by ranging (caraṇena) there.' For eye-consciousness and the like frequently apprehend forms, etc., but not so mind-consciousness. 'Of those'—referring to the visible forms, etc., apprehended by mind-consciousness. Why was it said, 'Because the statement is untenable'? Doesn’t the statement hold, since mind-consciousness operating in the five sense-doors experiences their range and objects? No, because there is no restriction. For here, there is no reason to restrict 'mind' to only that which is directed from the five sense-doors. Or, considering this very objection, the inclusion of divine eye-knowledge, etc., is made. From statements like 'of such form,' etc., knowledge of past lives, knowledge of the future, etc., are also possible here. Otherwise—such as form, sound, etc.

Bhojana [Pg.76]…pe… ussāhādīhīti idaṃ yāya kammaññatāya rūpakāyassa kallatā hoti, tassā paccayanidassanaṃ. Bhojane hi sammāpariṇate sappāye ca utubhojane sammupayutte sammāpayogasaṅkhāte kāyikacetasikavīriye ca samāraddhe lahutādisabbhāvena kāyo kammakkhamo hoti sabbakiriyānukūloti. Atha vā bhojana…pe… ussāhādīhīti idaṃ kāyassa kalyatāya viya upaddutatāyapi kāraṇavacanaṃ. Visamabhojanāpariṇāmādito hi kāyassa upaddavakarā vātādayo uppajjantīti. Anuvattantassāti padaṃ ‘‘jayaṃ veraṃ pasavatī’’tiādīsu (dha. pa. 201) viya hetuatthavasena veditabbaṃ. Jāgaraṇanimittañhi idha anuvattanaṃ adhippetanti. Atha vā anuvattantassāti idaṃ pakatiyā diṭṭhādivasena āpāthagamanupanissayānaṃ kalyatādinibbattānaṃ kāyikasukhādīnaṃ sambhavadassanaṃ. Kāyakalyatādiṃ ananuvattantassa hi yathāvuttaupanissayābhogābhāvena vuttappakāraṃ āpāthagamanaṃ na siyāti. Yathānubhūte rūpādivisaye cittassa ṭhapanaṃ āvajjanaṃ cittapaṇidahanaṃ. Yathānubhūtena rūpādinā sadisaṃ asadisaṃ sambandhañca sadisāsadisasambandhaṃ, tassa dassanādi sadisāsadisasambandhadassanādi, cittapaṇidahanañca sadisāsadisa…pe… dassanādi ca citta…pe… dassanādayo te paccayāti yojetabbaṃ. Dhātukkhobhādīti ādi-saddena devatūpasaṃhārādiṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Taṃsadisatā diṭṭhasutasadisatā. Taṃsampayuttatā diṭṭhasutapaṭibaddhatā. Kenaci vutteti iminā saddhāya anussavanibbattataṃ āha. Ākāravicāraṇanti tesaṃ tesaṃ atthānaṃ upaṭṭhānākāravicāraṇaṃ. Katthaci atthe.

Food... etc... effort, etc. This is the indication of the cause for the fitness of the physical body, by which it becomes workable. For when food is properly digested, is suitable for the season, and is properly utilized, and when physical and mental energy, which is called proper application, is properly applied, by the presence of lightness and so forth, the body becomes capable of action and suitable for all activities. Alternatively, food... etc... effort, etc. This is a statement of the cause for both the fitness and the affliction of the body. For due to improper digestion of food and the like, harmful elements such as wind arise, causing affliction to the body. The word 'anuvattantassa' (of one who continues) should be understood in the sense of a reason, as in the phrase 'victory breeds enmity' (Dhammapada 201). Here, 'continuation' is intended as a sign of wakefulness. Alternatively, 'anuvattantassa' means the manifestation of bodily comfort, etc., arising from the suitability of naturally seen and heard supports, and so on, which are the underlying conditions. For one who does not maintain bodily fitness, etc., the aforementioned occurrence would not happen in the described way due to the absence of the utilization of the underlying conditions mentioned. The placing of the mind, adverting, and applying of the mind to the experienced object of form, etc. The seeing, etc., of similarity, dissimilarity, and connection with the experienced form, etc., and the application of mind to similarity, dissimilarity, and connection, and so forth—these are to be connected as the conditions. 'Dhātukkhobhādi' (disturbance of the elements, etc.)—by the word 'etc.,' he includes divine intervention and the like. 'Taṃsadisatā' (similarity to that) means similarity to what is seen and heard. 'Taṃsampayuttatā' (association with that) means being connected with what is seen and heard. 'Kenaci vutta' (said by someone)—by this, he indicates what arises from faith and hearsay. 'Ākāravicāraṇa' (investigation of aspects) is the examination of the manner in which those various meanings arise. In some context.

Niyamitassāti kusalameva mayā uppādetabbanti evaṃ niyamitassa. Pasādasinehābhāvo dosabahulatāya hotīti lūkhapuggalā dosabahulāti āha.

'Of one who is determined' means, 'Only what is wholesome should be produced by me'—thus one is determined. Lack of confidence and affection arises due to an abundance of aversion; thus he says that coarse individuals abound in aversion.

Āyatanabhāvatoti kāraṇabhāvato.

The state of being a sense-base is the state of being a cause.

Vijjamānavatthusminti etena ‘‘vināpi deyyadhammapariccāgena cittuppādamatteneva dānamayaṃ kusalaṃ upacitaṃ hotī’’ti kesañci atidhāvanaṃ nivattitaṃ hotīti.

By 'vijjamānavatthusmiṃ' (in an existing object), the overreaching of some who think, 'Even without relinquishing an object of generosity, merely by the arising of a thought, meritorious giving is accumulated,' is turned back.

Dhammasavanassa [Pg.77] ghosanaṃ dhammasavanaghosanaṃ. Tassāti ‘‘saddadānaṃ dassāmī’’ti saddavatthūnaṃ ṭhānakaraṇabheriādīnaṃ sasaddappavattikaraṇassa. Cintanaṃ tathā tathā cittuppādanaṃ. Aññatthāti suttesu. Aparatthāti abhidhammapadesu. Apariyāpannāti padassa atthavaṇṇanā ‘‘paribhogaraso’’tiādikāya atthavaṇṇanāya parato bahūsu potthakesu likhīyati, yathāṭhāneyeva pana ānetvā vattabbā. Tattha paramatthato avijjamānattā lakkhaṇapaññattiyo aññāyatanattā cha ajjhattikāyatanāni asaṅgahitā dhammāyatanenāti yojetabbaṃ.

The proclamation for hearing the Dhamma is dhammasavanaghosanaṃ. 'Of that' refers to the making of sound from sound-objects, such as drums and other instruments for the occasion, with the thought, 'I will give a gift of sound.' Reflection is the arising of thought in that way, in that way. 'In another place' refers to the Suttas. 'In another instance' refers to the Abhidhamma passages. The explanation of the meaning of the word 'apariyāpanna' (not included), with the explanation of meaning like 'the taste of use,' is written in many books elsewhere; however, it should be brought and stated in its proper place. There, it should be connected thus: because characteristic designations do not exist in the ultimate sense, and because the six internal sense bases are other bases, they are not included in the mind-base.

‘‘Ekadvārikakammaṃ aññasmiṃ dvāre uppajjatī’’ti kasmā vuttaṃ, nanu rūpādīsu ekārammaṇaṃ cittaṃ yathā na aññārammaṇaṃ hoti cittavisesassa adhippetattā, evaṃ kammavisese adhippete kāyadvārādīsu ekadvārikakammaṃ aññasmiṃ dvāre na uppajjati tattheva pariyositattā, atha kammasāmaññaṃ adhippetaṃ, rūpādīsu ekārammaṇanti idaṃ udāharaṇaṃ na siyāti? Na, asadisabhāvavibhāvanavasena udāhaṭattā, itarathā manoviññāṇabhūtaṃ idaṃ cittaṃ chasupi visayesu pavattanato anibaddhārammaṇanti ārammaṇaṃ sadisūdāharaṇabhāvena vucceyya ārammaṇaṃ viya dvārampi anibaddhanti. Yasmā pana satipi kammānaṃ dvārantaracaraṇe yebhuyyena vuttiyā tabbahulavuttiyā ca dvārakammānaṃ aññamaññaṃ vavatthānaṃ vakkhati, tasmā pāṇātipātādibhāvasāmaññena kammaṃ ekattanayavasena gahetvā tassa vacīdvārādīsu pavattisabbhāvato kammassa anibaddhattāti vuttanti āha ‘‘kāyadvārādīsu ekadvārikakammaṃ aññasmiṃ dvāre na nuppajjatī’’ti. Rūpādīsu pana ekārammaṇaṃ cittaṃ tenevārammaṇena paricchinnanti visiṭṭhameva gahitanti ārammaṇameva nibaddhanti vuttanti cittaviseso eva gahito, na cittasāmaññaṃ. ‘‘Nanu ca rūpārammaṇaṃ vā…pe… dhammārammaṇaṃ vā yaṃ yaṃ vā panā’’ti ārammaṇampi aniyameneva vuttanti? Saccametaṃ, tattha pana yaṃ rūpādīsu ekārammaṇaṃ cittaṃ, taṃ tena vinā nappavattati, kammaṃ pana kāyadvārikādibhedaṃ vacīdvārādīsu na nappavattatīti imassa visesassa jotanatthaṃ pāḷiyaṃ ārammaṇameva gahitaṃ, dvāraṃ na gahitanti imamatthaṃ dasseti ‘‘ārammaṇameva nibaddha’’ntiādinā. Vacīdvāre uppajjamānampi pāṇātipātādīti attho.

Why is it said, 'An action of one door arises in another door'? Surely, just as a mind with a single object, such as form, does not take another object—since a specific mind is intended—so too, when a specific action is intended, an action of one door, such as the body-door, does not arise in another door, as it is completed right there. Or, if the generality of action is intended, this example, 'a mind with a single object like a form,' would not be appropriate, would it? No, for it is cited to illustrate a dissimilar nature. Otherwise, this mind, being mind-consciousness, since it proceeds in all six sense-objects, is unrestricted in its object; the object would be spoken of as a similar example, implying that just as the object, the door too is unrestricted. However, since even though actions may occur through other doors, they are established in relation to one another by way of their predominant and frequent occurrence, it will be said that door-actions are distinct. Therefore, having taken action in a unitary sense by way of the general nature of killing and so on, and because of the existence of its occurrence in the speech-door and so on, it is said that kamma is unrestricted. He says, 'An action of one door, such as the body-door, does not arise in another door.' But regarding a mind with a single object like a form, it is defined precisely by that object—it is grasped as specific. The object itself is said to be bound. Here, a specific mind is grasped, not the generality of mind. 'But is it not said that with a form-object... or... a dhamma-object... or whatever object, the object is also spoken of without restriction?' This is true. However, in that case, a mind with a single object, such as form, does not proceed without it, whereas an action differentiated as of the body-door and so on does indeed proceed in the speech-door and so on. To illuminate this distinction, in the Pāli text the object alone is taken as bound, not the door. This meaning is shown by 'the object itself is bound,' and so on. The meaning is that even when arising in the speech-door, it is still killing and so on.

Kāmāvacarakusalaṃ

Sensuous-Sphere Wholesome.

Kāyakammadvārakathāvaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Door of Bodily Action.

Kammadvārānantiādinā [Pg.78] pakāsetabbassa sarūpaṃ pakāsanupāyañca dasseti. Niyatarūparūpavasenāti dhammasaṅgahe niddiṭṭhaniyatarūparūpavasena. Aññathā kammasamuṭṭhānikakāye hadayavatthupi gahetabbaṃ siyā. Ekasantatipariyāpanno upādinnakakāyo idha gahitoti cakkhāyatanādīti vuttesu eko bhāvo hadayavatthu ca gahitanti na sakkā vattuṃ ‘‘cakkhāyatanādīni jīvitapariyantānī’’ti sannivesassa vibhāvitattā.

By 'Kammadvārānanti' and so forth, it shows the nature of what is to be explained and the method of explanation. By 'by way of fixed and unfixed form' is meant by way of fixed and unfixed form as designated in the Dhammasaṅgaha. Otherwise, in the case of the body arisen from kamma, the heart-basis might also have to be included. The clung-to body, comprised within a single continuity, is taken here. It cannot be said that a single entity, the heart-basis, is included in the statements like 'the eye-base, etc.,' because the arrangement is clarified as 'the eye-base, etc., up to the life-faculty.'

Vipphandamānavaṇṇaggahaṇānantaraṃ viññattiggahaṇassa icchitattā calanākārāva vāyodhātu viññattivikārasahitāti kadāci āsaṅkeyyāti tannivattanatthaṃ ‘‘paṭhamajavanasamuṭṭhitā’’ti āha. Desantaruppattihetubhāvena cāletunti etena desantaruppatti calanaṃ, taṃnimitte ca kattubhāvo upacaritoti dasseti, aññathā khaṇikatā abyāpāratā ca dhammānaṃ na sambhaveyyāti. Tadabhimukhabhāvavikāravatīti taṃdisamabhimukho tadabhimukho, tassa bhāvo tadabhimukhabhāvo, so eva vikāro, taṃsamaṅginī vāyodhātu tadabhimukhabhāvavikāravatī. Idāni tadabhimukhabhāvavikā rassa viññattibhāvaṃ dassento āha ‘‘adhippāyasahabhāvī’’tiādi. Evañca katvātiādinā imissā atthavaṇṇanāya laddhaguṇaṃ dasseti. Tattha āvajjanassāti manodvārāvajjanassa. Yato bāttiṃsātiādinā tassa viññattisamuṭṭhāpakatā na sakkā paṭisedhetunti dasseti.

Since the grasping of intimation is desired after the grasping of the appearance of agitation, the air element, being accompanied by the alteration of intimation, might sometimes be suspected to have the nature of movement. To refute this, he says, 'arising with the first impulsion.' By 'causing movement by being the cause of arising in a different location,' it shows that movement is the arising in a different location, and the agent's role is metaphorically attributed to its cause; otherwise, the momentary nature and non-agency of phenomena would not be possible. By 'possessing an alteration of being directed toward that' is meant: 'directed toward that direction' is 'directed toward that'; the state of that is 'being directed toward that'; that itself is the alteration. The air element possessing that is 'possessing an alteration of being directed toward that.' Now, showing that the alteration of being directed toward that is intimation, he says, 'accompanied by intention,' etc. By 'having done so' and so forth, he shows the benefit obtained from this explanation of meaning. Here, 'of the adverting' refers to the mind-door adverting. From 'since thirty-two' and so forth, it shows that its role in producing intimation cannot be denied.

Paccayo bhavituṃ samatthoti etena yathāvuttavāyodhātuyā thambhanacalanasaṅkhātakiccanipphādane tassa ākāravisesassa sahakārīkāraṇabhāvamāha. Anidassanasappaṭighatādayo viya mahābhūtānaṃ avatthāvisesamattaṃ so ākāravisesoti paramatthato na kiñci hotīti ‘‘paramatthato abhāvaṃ dassetī’’ti āha. Paramatthato cittasamuṭṭhānabhāvo paṭisedhito. Kammasamuṭṭhānādibhāvassa pana sambhavoyeva natthīti yathāvuttavikārassa paramatthato sabbhāve nakutocisamuṭṭhitattā appaccayattaṃ āpannaṃ. Na hi rūpaṃ appaccayaṃ atthi, appaccayatte ca sati niccabhāvo āpajjati, na ca nibbānavajjo attho sabhāvadhammo [Pg.79] nicco atthi. Cittasamuṭṭhānabhāvo viyāti viññattiyā cittasamuṭṭhānaupādārūpabhāvo upacārasiddhoti dasseti.

By 'capable of being a condition,' he states that the particular mode of the air element, as previously described, is a cooperative cause in accomplishing the function of stiffening and moving. Just as invisibility and resistance, etc., are merely particular states of the great elements, so too is that particular mode; ultimately, it is nothing. Thus, he says, 'showing its absence in the ultimate sense.' Its arising from mind is denied in the ultimate sense. However, the possibility of its arising from kamma, etc., does not exist. If the previously stated alteration were to have an intrinsic nature in the ultimate sense, it would be without a cause, since it would not have arisen from anywhere. For no material form exists without a cause, and if it were without a cause, it would become permanent. And no real phenomenon is permanent, except for Nibbāna. By 'like the arising from mind,' it shows that the derived material form of intimation, arising from mind, is established conventionally.

Viññattiyā karaṇabhūtāya. Yaṃ karaṇanti yaṃ cittakiriyaṃ cittabyāpāraṃ. Viññattiyā viññātattanti idamesa kāretīti yadetaṃ adhippāyavibhāvanaṃ, etaṃ viññattivikārarahitesu rukkhacalanādīsu na diṭṭhaṃ, hatthacalanādīsu pana diṭṭhaṃ, tasmā vipphandamānavaṇṇavinimutto koci vikāro atthi kāyikakaraṇasaṅkhātassa adhippāyassa ñāpakoti viññāyati. Ñāpako ca hetu ñāpetabbamatthaṃ sayaṃ ñātoyeva ñāpeti, na sabbhāvamattenāti vaṇṇaggahaṇānantaraṃ vikāraggahaṇampi viññāyati. Tathā hi visayabhāvamāpanno eva saddo atthaṃ pakāseti, netaro. Tenevāha ‘‘na hi viññattī’’tiādi. Yadi pana cittajarūpānaṃ calanākāro viññatti, cakkhuviññāṇassa vipphandamānavaṇṇārammaṇattā tenapi sā gahitā siyāti āsaṅkāya nivattanatthaṃ āha ‘‘cakkhuviññāṇassā’’tiādi.

By means of intimation, which is an instrument. By 'that which is an instrument' is meant the activity of the mind, the function of the mind. By 'by intimation it is known' is meant this revealing of intention, which is 'this causes this to be done.' This is not seen in things devoid of the alteration of intimation, such as the movement of trees, but it is seen in the movement of hands, and so on. Therefore, some alteration, distinct from agitated appearance, is understood as indicating the intention known as bodily action. An indicator, being a cause, makes known the meaning that is to be known only when it is itself known, not merely by its existence. Thus, after grasping the appearance, the grasping of the alteration is also understood. For example, sound reveals meaning only when it has become an object, and not otherwise. Therefore, he says, 'For intimation is not…' and so on. But if the manner of movement of mind-produced forms is intimation, then because the object of eye-consciousness is agitated appearance, it might be grasped by that consciousness as well. To dispel this doubt, he says, 'For eye-consciousness…' and so on.

Tālapaṇṇādirūpānītiādināpi viññattiyā viññātabbataṃ manoviññāṇeneva ca viññātabbataṃ dasseti. Sañjānāti etenāti saññāṇaṃ, tassa udakādino saññāṇaṃ taṃsaññāṇaṃ, tassa ākāro taṃsaññāṇākāro, udakādisahacārippakāro ca so taṃsaññāṇākāro cāti udakā…pe… kāro, taṃ gahetvā jānitvā. Tadākārassāti udakādiñāpanākārassa. Yadi yathāvuttavikāraggahaṇaṃyeva kāraṇaṃ adhippāyaggahaṇassa, atha kasmā aggahitasaṅketassa adhippāyaggahaṇaṃ na hotīti? Na kevalaṃ vikāraggahaṇameva adhippāyaggahaṇassa kāraṇaṃ, kiñcarahīti āha ‘‘etassa panā’’tiādi.

By 'forms such as palm leaves' and so forth, he shows that intimation is to be known and that it is to be known only by mind-consciousness. By 'that by which one perceives' (sañjānāti etenāti) is meant 'perception' (saññāṇaṃ). The perception of water and so on is 'that perception' (taṃsaññāṇaṃ). Its characteristic is 'the characteristic of that perception' (taṃsaññāṇākāro). And that which is the manner of accompanying water and so on is also 'the characteristic of that perception' (taṃsaññāṇākāro) – thus 'water... etc. ...characteristic.' Having grasped and known that. By 'of that characteristic' (tadākārassa) is meant the characteristic of making known water and so on. If merely grasping the previously stated alteration is the reason for grasping the intention, then why is grasping the intention not possible for one who has not grasped the convention? It is not only grasping the alteration that is the reason for grasping the intention. What else is there? Thus, he says, 'But of this...' and so on.

Atha panātiādinā viññattiyā anumānena gahetabbataṃ dasseti. Sādhippāya…pe… nantaranti adhippāyasahitavikārena sahajātavaṇṇāyatanaggahaṇasaṅkhātassa cakkhudvārikaviññāṇasantānassa anantaraṃ. Adhippāyaggahaṇassāti adhippāyavavatthāpakassa tatiyavāre javanassa. Adhippāyasahabhū vikārābhāve abhāvatoti etena yathāvuttavikāraṃ adhippāyaggahaṇena anuminoti. Evaṃ satītiādinā yathānumitamatthaṃ nigamanavasena dasseti. Tattha udakādiggahaṇenevāti tālapaṇṇādīnaṃ vaṇṇaggahaṇānantarena purimasiddhasambandhānuggahitena udakādīnaṃ tattha atthibhāvavijānaneneva. Yathā tālapaṇṇādīnaṃ udakādisahacārippakārataṃ [Pg.80] saññāṇākāro viññātoyeva hoti nānantariyakattā, evaṃ vipphandamānavaṇṇaggahaṇānantarena purimasiddhasambandhānuggahitena gantukāmatādiadhippāyavijānaneneva viññatti viññātā hoti tadabhāve abhāvatoti upamāyojanā.

Then, by 'atha pana' and so forth, he shows that intimation is to be grasped by inference. By 'sādhippāya... etc. ...nantaraṃ' is meant immediately after the continuum of eye-door consciousness, which is the grasping of the visible-form base that has arisen simultaneously with the alteration accompanied by intention. By 'of the grasping of intention' (adhippāyaggahaṇassa) is meant of the impulsion in the third instance that ascertains the intention. By 'in the absence of an alteration co-occurring with intention, there is absence,' he infers the aforesaid alteration by the grasping of intention. By 'evaṃ sati' and so forth, he shows the inferred meaning by way of conclusion. There, by 'merely by the grasping of water, etc.' is meant merely by knowing the existence of water, etc., there, supported by the previously established connection, immediately after grasping the color of palm leaves, etc. Just as the mode of perception of the manner in which water, etc., accompanies palm leaves, etc., is known by itself, not by immediate contiguity, so too, intimation is known merely by knowing the intention, such as the desire to go, supported by the previously established connection, immediately after grasping the agitated appearance; in the absence of that, there is absence. This is the application of the simile.

Sabhāvabhūtanti anvatthabhūtaṃ. Dvidhāti viññāpanato viññeyyato ca. Kāyaviññattiyā tathāpavattamānāya cetanāsaṅkhātassa kammassa kāyakammabhāvo nipphajjati tāya upalakkhitabbattā, na pana catuvīsatiyā paccayesu kenaci paccayabhāvatoti dassento ‘‘tasmiṃ dvāre siddhā’’tiādimāha. Tena vacīdvāruppannāpi pāṇātipātādayo saṅgahitāti tesaṃ saṅgahitabhāvaṃ dasseti. Atha vā kāyadvāruppannāya kāyakammabhūtāya cetanāya vasena ‘‘tena dvārena viññātabbabhāvato’’ti vuttaṃ, tassāyeva dvārantaruppannāya vasena ‘‘tena dvārena nāmalābhato’’ti. Manodvārāvajjanassapi viññattisamuṭṭhāpakabhāvo nicchitoti ‘‘ekādasannaṃ kiriyacittāna’’nti āha.

By 'existing by nature' (sabhāvabhūtaṃ) is meant 'existing in accordance with its meaning' (anvatthabhūtaṃ). By 'twofold' (dvidhā) is meant in terms of making known and being knowable. When bodily intimation thus occurs, the state of being a bodily action arises for the kamma termed volition, because it is to be characterized by that intimation; but it is not a condition by any of the twenty-four conditions. Showing this, he said, 'established at that door,' etc. Thus, even offenses such as killing living beings, which arise at the verbal door, are included, showing their inclusiveness. Or alternatively, with regard to the volition that arises at the bodily door and is bodily action, it is said 'because it is to be known through that door'; and with regard to that same volition arising at another door, it is said 'because it obtains its name through that door.' The capacity of mind-door adverting to generate intimation is settled, hence he said, 'of the eleven functional consciousnesses.'

Dvārantaracārinoti dvārantarabhāvena pavattanakā. Dvārasambhedāti dvārānaṃ saṅkaraṇato. Dvārānañhi dvārantarabhāvappattiyā sati kāyadvārassa vacīdvārādibhāvo, vacīdvārassa ca kāyadvārādibhāvo āpajjatīti taṃtaṃdvāruppannakammānampi saṅkaro siyā. Tenāha ‘‘kammasambhedopī’’ti. Evaṃ sati kāyakammaṃ…pe… vavatthānaṃ na siyā. Yadi kammāni kammantaracārīni honti, kāyakammādikassa vacīkammādikabhāvāpattito ‘‘kammasambhedā dvārasambhedopī’’ti kāyakammaṃ kāyakammadvāranti aññamaññavavatthānaṃ na siyāti imamatthamāha ‘‘kammānampi kammantaracaraṇe eseva nayo’’ti. Kammantaracaraṇaṃ kammantarūpalakkhaṇatā. Tenevāha ‘‘dvārabhāvenā’’ti. Dvārantaracaraṇaṃ dvārantaruppatti. Dvāreti attano dvāre. Aññasminti dvārantare. Kammānīti taṃtaṃdvārikakammāni. Aññānīti aññadvārikakammāni. Dvāre dvārāni na carantīti dvārantarabhāvena nappavattanti, dvārantaraṃ vā na saṅkamanti. Kiñcāpi viññattiyā catuvīsatiyā paccayesu yena kenaci paccayena cetanāya paccayabhāvo natthi, tathā pana viññattiyā pavattamānāya eva pāṇātipātādi hoti, nāññathāti siyā viññattiyā hetubhāvo cetanāyāti vuttaṃ ‘‘dvārehi kāraṇabhūtehī’’ti. Kāyakammaṃ vacīkammanti kammavavatthānasseva vā [Pg.81] kāraṇabhāvaṃ sandhāya ‘‘dvārehi kāraṇabhūtehī’’ti vuttaṃ. Yadipi ‘‘dvārehi kammānī’’ti vuttaṃ, ‘‘aññamaññaṃ vavatthitā’’ti pana vuttattā kammehipi dvārāni vavatthitānīti ayamatthopi siddhoyevāti dassetuṃ ‘‘na kevala’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. Advāracārīhīti dvārānaṃ sayaṃ vavatthitabhāvamāha, na pana avavatthānaṃ, vavatthānamevāti adhippāyo. Idāni taṃ vavatthānaṃ vibhāveti kammānapekkhātiādinā. Tattha samayaniyamitena cittena samayo viya dvāraniyamitehi kammehi dvārāni niyamitānīti ayaṃ saṅkhepattho.

‘Those who move between doors’ refers to those that proceed by way of another door. ‘Mixing of doors’ refers to the intermingling of doors. For when the state of being another door occurs, the bodily door may take on the nature of the verbal door and so forth, and the verbal door may take on the nature of the bodily door and so forth. Thus, the actions arising from those respective doors may become intermingled. Hence it is said, “There is also a mixing of actions.” In such a case, bodily action … the distinction would not exist. If actions move to other actions, due to bodily action and so forth taking on the nature of verbal action and so forth, then with ‘a mixing of actions and also a mixing of doors,’ the mutual distinction between bodily action and the bodily door would not exist. This is the meaning of the statement, “The same principle applies to actions moving to other actions.” ‘Moving to another action’ means being characterized by another action. Therefore, it is said, “by way of the door.” ‘Moving between doors’ means arising at another door. ‘At the door’ means at its own door. ‘In another’ means in another door. ‘Actions’ are the actions pertaining to their respective doors. ‘Others’ are actions pertaining to other doors. ‘Doors do not move in the doors’ means they do not proceed by way of another door, or they do not pass over to another door. Although intimation is not a condition for volition by any of the twenty-four conditional modes, nevertheless, when intimation occurs, killing and so forth takes place—not otherwise. Thus, intimation may be a cause for volition. Hence, it is stated, “by means of the doors as causal.” Or, referring to the causal nature of the distinction of actions themselves—bodily action, verbal action—it is said, “by means of the doors as causal.” Even though it is said, “by means of the doors, actions,” since it is also stated, “mutually distinguished,” the doors are also distinguished by the actions. To show that this meaning is also established, the phrase “not only” and so forth is stated. By “those that do not move between doors,” it states the self-distinguished nature of the doors, not their non-distinction; the intention is that they are indeed distinguished. Now, that distinction is elucidated by “irrespective of actions” and so forth. There, just as time is determined by a mind regulated by time, so too are the doors regulated by actions regulated by the doors—this is the condensed meaning.

Evaṃsabhāvattāti dvārabhūtehi kāyādīhi upalakkhaṇīyasabhāvattā. Āṇatti…pe… mānassāti kāyavacīkammānaṃ vacīkāyaviññattīhi pakāsetabbataṃ āha. Kāyādīhīti kāyavacīviññattīhi. Tasmāti yasmā dvārantare carantānipi kammāni sakena dvārena upalakkhitāneva caranti, tasmā. Nāpi kammaṃ dvārassāti yasmiṃ dvārantare kammaṃ carati, tassa dvārassa anattaniyassa. Taṃtaṃdvāramevāti sakadvārameva. Kammassāti sakasakakammassa. Yadi kammehi dvārāni vavatthitāni, ‘‘kammassa anibaddhattā’’ti idaṃ kathaṃ nīyatīti āha ‘‘pubbe panā’’tiādi.

‘Because of its being of such a nature’ means because it is of a nature to be characterized by the body and so forth, which are doors. ‘Command … of the mind’ refers to the fact that bodily and verbal actions are to be manifested by verbal and bodily intimations. ‘By the body and so forth’ means by bodily and verbal intimations. ‘Therefore’ means: because even actions that proceed in another door proceed only as characterized by their own door, therefore. ‘Nor is the action of the door’ means that the action that proceeds in another door is not the property of that door. ‘That respective door’ means only its own door. ‘Of the action’ means of each respective action. If the doors are distinguished by the actions, how is this statement “because of the action's not being bound” to be interpreted? He says, “but previously” and so forth.

Sāti viññatti. Tassāti kammassa. Kenaci pakārenāti catuvīsatiyā paccayappakāresu kenaci pakārena. Taṃsahajātāti etena kāyaviññattiyā sabbhāveyeva kāyakammassa sabbhāvo, nāññathāti pariyāyena viññattiyā kammassa kāraṇabhāvaṃ vibhāveti. Tenevāha ‘‘uppattiṭṭhānabhāvena vuttā’’ti. Yathāvuttaniyamenātiādinā kammassa uppattiṭṭhānabhāve byabhicārābhāvamāha. Tattha yathāvuttaniyamenāti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttappakārena vavatthānayuttisaṅkhātena niyamena. Dvāracaraṇeti aññadvāracaraṇe.

‘Sā’ means intimation. ‘Tassa’ means of the action. ‘By any means’ means by any means among the twenty-four modes of conditionality. ‘Co-arisen’—by this, he elucidates indirectly the causal nature of intimation for action, for the existence of bodily action occurs only when there is the existence of bodily intimation, not otherwise. Therefore, he said, “it is stated by way of being the place of origin.” By “by the stated rule” and so forth, he states the absence of deviation regarding the action's being the place of origin. There, “by the stated rule” means by the rule, called the principle of distinction, explained in the commentary. ‘Proceeding in a door’ means proceeding in another door.

Kāyakammadvārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Bodily Action Door is concluded.

Vacīkammadvārakathāvaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Verbal Action Door

Catūhi aṅgehīti ettha ‘‘subhāsitaṃyeva bhāsati, no dubbhāsitaṃ. Dhammaṃyeva, piyaṃyeva, saccaṃyeva bhāsati, no alika’’nti (saṃ. ni. 1.213; su. ni. subhāsitasutta) yāni aṅgāni sutte [Pg.82] vuttāni, tesaṃ cetanāsabhāvaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘subhāsitabhāsanā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tathāpavattāti subhāsitabhāsanādibhāvena pavattā. Saha sambhūtattāti saheva uppannattā. Na hi vacīviññatti saddarahitā atthi. Tathā hi ‘‘yā tāya vācāya viññattī’’ti vuttaṃ. ‘‘Vācāgirā byapatho’’tiādinā (dha. sa. 636) nātisukhumaṃyeva saddavācaṃ vatvā ‘‘yā tāya vācāya viññattī’’ti, tāya saddhiṃ yojetvā vacīviññattiyā vuttattā rūpāyatanaṃ viya vatthuparittatādinā saddāyatanampi anindriyagocaro atthīti ca adhippāyena ‘‘yā tāya…pe… viññāyatī’’ti āha.

By 'with four factors,' here, to show the volitional nature of those factors mentioned in the Sutta—'one speaks only what is well-spoken, not what is ill-spoken; one speaks only the Dhamma, what is pleasing, what is true, not what is false' (Saṃyutta Nikāya 1.213; Sutta Nipāta, Subhāsita Sutta)—the phrase 'speaking what is well-spoken' and so forth is stated. 'Occurring in that way' means occurring in the manner of speaking what is well-spoken and so forth. 'Because of arising together' means because it arises simultaneously. For there is no verbal intimation without sound. Thus, it is said, 'the intimation by that speech.' By 'speech, utterance, path of speech' and so forth (Dhammasaṅgaṇī 636), having stated that sound-speech is not overly subtle, and because verbal intimation is stated in conjunction with that speech by saying 'the intimation by that speech,' and with the intention that the sound-base also exists as an object not cognizable by the sense faculties, like the form-base, due to its being a subtle object and so forth, he said, 'by that … it is cognized.'

Idāni avisesena cittasamuṭṭhānasaddassa sotaviññāṇārammaṇatā pāḷiyaṃ vuttāti vitakkavipphārasaddo na sotaviññeyyoti mahāaṭṭhakathāvādassa pāḷiyā virodhaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhāna’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. Evaṃ saṅgahakārassa adhippāye ṭhatvā mahāaṭṭhakathāvādassa paṭisedhetabbataṃ dassetvā idāni attano adhippāye ṭhatvā taṃ pariharituṃ ‘‘mahāaṭṭhakathāyaṃ panā’’tiādimāha. Saṅghaṭṭanākārena pavattānaṃ bhūtānaṃ saddassa nissayabhāvato saṅghaṭṭanena saheva saddo uppajjati. Tappaccayabhāvoti upādinnakaghaṭṭanassa paccayabhāvo. Cittajapathavīdhātuyā upādinnakaghaṭṭane paccayo bhavituṃ samattho cittasamuṭṭhānamahābhūtānaṃ eko ākāraviseso atthi. Tadākārattā hi tesaṃ pathavīdhātu upādinnakaṃ ghaṭṭetīti imamatthaṃ vuttānusārena veditabbattā ‘‘vuttanayeneva veditabbo’’ti vatvā tameva vuttanayaṃ ‘‘tabbikārāna’’ntiādinā vibhāveti. Tattha aññamaññassa paccayabhāvo tappaccayabhāvo vuttoti attho. Aññampi sabbaṃ vidhānanti ‘‘na cittasamuṭṭhānāti etena paramatthato abhāvaṃ dassetī’’tiādinā attanā vuttavidhānaṃ. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana vuttavidhānaṃ ‘‘heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabba’’nti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttamevāti.

Now, to show the contradiction of the Great Commentary's view—that the sound of mental diffusion is not an object of ear-consciousness—with the Pāḷi, which states that sound originating from the mind is, without distinction, an object of ear-consciousness, the phrase “originating from the mind,” and so forth, is stated. Thus, having stood upon the compiler's intention and shown that the Great Commentary's view is to be refuted, now, to resolve this by standing upon his own intention, he states, “But in the Great Commentary,” and so forth. Because sound has as its support the primary elements that proceed by way of collision, sound arises simultaneously with the collision. “The conditionality of that” means the conditionality of the collision of appropriated matter. There is a particular characteristic of the mind-originated great elements whereby the mind-born earth element is capable of being a condition for the collision of appropriated matter. Indeed, because of that characteristic, their earth element causes appropriated matter to collide. Because this meaning should be understood according to what has been stated, having said, “it should be understood in the way explained,” he then elucidates that same explained way with “of their modifications,” and so forth. There, “that conditionality” means the stated mutual conditionality. And “all other methods” refers to the method stated by himself with “by this, ‘not originating from the mind’ indicates its absence in an ultimate sense,” and so forth. However, the method stated in the Commentary is “it should be understood in the way explained below,” meaning it is just what has been stated in the Commentary.

Attano attano paccayuppannassa desantare pārampariyena uppādanaṃ desantaruppādanaparamparatā. Laddhāsevanenāti laddhapubbābhisaṅkhārena. Cittenevāti paṭhamacitteneva. ‘‘Satta javanāni satta akkharāni nibbattentīti vādaṃ paṭikkhipitvā ekajavanavārapariyāpannāni cittāni ekamakkharaṃ nibbattentī’’ti vadanti. Kiñcāpi paṭhamacittenapi ghaṭṭanā nipphajjati, ekasseva pana bahuso pavattanena [Pg.83] atthi koci visesoti purimajavanasamuṭṭhitāhi ghaṭṭanāhi paṭiladdhāsevanena sattamajavanena samuṭṭhitā ghaṭṭanā paribyattamakkharaṃ nibbattetīti upatthambhanaṃ natthīti na sakkā vattuṃ. Laddhābhisaṅkhārena pana paṭhamacittenapi ghaṭṭanā balavatī hotīti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘upatthambhanakiccaṃ natthī’’ti vuttaṃ siyā, sabbametaṃ vīmaṃsitvā gahetabbaṃ.

The production in another place, in succession, of that which has arisen from its own respective condition is the succession of production in another place. “By acquired practice” means by a previously acquired formation. “By the mind alone” means by the very first mind-moment. Rejecting the view that “seven impulsions produce seven letters,” they say, “the mind-moments comprised within a single impulsion process produce one letter.” Although a collision is also produced by the first mind-moment, there is some distinction due to the repeated occurrence of that one. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is no supporting function, whereby the collision produced by the seventh impulsion, having gained reinforcement through the collisions produced by the preceding impulsions, produces a distinct letter. However, it may have been said in the commentary that “there is no supporting function” because the collision produced even by the first mind-moment is strong due to an acquired formation. All this should be investigated and understood.

Vacīkammadvārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Door of Verbal Action is concluded.

Manokammadvārakathāvaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Discourse on the Door of Mental Action

‘‘Sabbāyapi kāyavacīviññattiyā kāyavacīdvārabhāvo viya sabbassapi cittassa manodvārabhāvo sambhavatī’’ti dassanatthaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘ayaṃ nāma mano manodvāraṃ na hotīti na vattabbo’’ti vatvā taṃdvāravantadhammadassanatthaṃ ‘‘ayaṃ nāma cetanā’’tiādi vuttanti āha ‘‘yassa dvāraṃ mano, taṃ dassanatthaṃ vutta’’nti. Yathā pana tividhacatubbidhakāyavacīkammānaṃ dvārabhāvato kāyakammadvāravacīkammadvārāni vuttāni, evaṃ manokammanti vuttaabhijjhādīnaṃ dvārabhāvato vaṭṭahetubhūtalokiyakusalākusalasampayuttamano eva manokammadvāranti sanniṭṭhānaṃ katanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Cetanāya attano kiccaṃ āraddhāya sampayuttāpi taṃ taṃ sakiccaṃ ārabhantīti sā ne sakicce pavatteti nāma, tathā pavattentī ca sampayutte ekasmiṃ ārammaṇe avippakiṇṇe karoti byāpāreti cāti vuccati, tathā sampayuttānaṃ yathāvuttaṃ avippakiṇṇakaraṇaṃ sampiṇḍanaṃ āyūhanaṃ byāpārāpādanaṃ byāpāraṇaṃ cetayananti āyūhanacetayanānaṃ nānattaṃ dassento ‘‘phassādidhammehī’’tiādimāha. Tathākaraṇanti yathā phassādayo sakasakakicce pasutā bhavanti, tathā karaṇaṃ. Teneva yathāvuttena avippakiṇṇabyāpāraṇākārena sampayuttānaṃ karaṇaṃ pavattananti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Kammakkhayakarattāti kammakkhayakaramanassa kammadvārabhāvo na yujjatīti adhippāyo. Yato ‘‘kammapathakathā lokiyā evā’’ti vadanti.

To show that “just as all bodily and verbal intimation has the nature of being a body-door and speech-door, so too is it possible for all consciousness to have the nature of being a mind-door,” the commentary, having said, “It should not be said that ‘this mind is not the mind-door,’” and to show the phenomena that possess that door, states, “This is volition,” and so forth. He says, “That which has the mind as its door is stated for the purpose of showing it.” Just as the threefold and fourfold bodily and verbal actions are spoken of as the door of bodily action and the door of verbal action due to their being doors, so too, it should be understood that the conclusion is made that only the mundane wholesome and unwholesome mind—which is a cause for the round of existence and is associated with covetousness and so forth, called mental actions—is the door of mental action, due to its being a door. When volition has commenced its own function, its associated states also commence their respective functions. Thus, it is said that volition causes them to proceed in their own functions. And while causing them to proceed thus, it is said that it makes the associated states undivided in a single object and engages them. To show the difference between accumulation (āyūhana) and volition (cetayanā)—which are the aforementioned making undivided, gathering, accumulating, causing to be engaged, and engaging of the associated states—he states, “through contact and other phenomena,” and so forth. “Acting in such a way” means acting in such a way that contact and other phenomena become engaged in their respective functions. By that, it should be understood that the acting of the associated states is their proceeding in the manner of the aforementioned undivided engagement. “Because it brings about the destruction of kamma”—this is the intention: the nature of being a kamma-door is not suitable for a mind that brings about the destruction of kamma. For they say, “The discourse on the paths of kamma pertains only to the mundane.”

Manokammadvārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Door of Mental Action is concluded.

Kammakathāvaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Discourse on Kamma

Samānakālāpi [Pg.84] kāraṇaphalakiriyā pubbāparakālā viya vattuṃ yuttāyeva. Seyyathāpi paṭiccasamuppāde ‘‘cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati cakkhuviññāṇa’’nti dassetuṃ ‘‘atha vā’’tiādimāha. Copanakiriyanti viññattidvayaṃ āha. Tassā hi cittasamuṭṭhānakāyasaddavācāhi kāyavacīviññattīhi eva vā purimapurimāhi pavattetabbattā ‘‘kāyavācāhi copanakiriyaṃ karotī’’ti vuttaṃ tabbikārānaṃ bhūtānaṃ tathāpavattanato. Atha vā kāyavācāhīti kāyavacīviññattīhi. Copanakiriyanti rūpakāyassa thambhanacalanakiriyaṃ upādinnakaghaṭṭanakiriyañca. Esā hi kiriyā ‘‘rūpakāyaṃ thambhetuṃ cāletuṃ paccayo bhavituṃ samattho’’ti, ‘‘upādinnakaghaṭṭanassa paccayabhūto’’ti ca vuttattā kāyavacīviññattīhi nipphajjatīti. Evañca katvā ‘‘copanakiriyānissayabhūtā kāyavācā’’ti, ‘‘kāyādīhi karaṇabhūtehi copanābhijjhādikiriyaṃ karonti vāsiādīhi viya chedanādi’’nti ca idampi vacanaṃ samatthitaṃ bhavati. Na kevalaṃ dharamānatāva sabbhāvo, atha kho maggena asamucchinnatāpīti dassento ‘‘anirodhitevā’’ti āha. Asamucchinnatā ca kāyādīnaṃ tadupanissayakilesāsamucchedenevāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. ‘‘Kāyādīhi karaṇabhūtehi copanābhijjhādikiriyaṃ karontī’’ti etena copanābhijjhādikiriyānibbattidvārena cetanānibbattiyeva vuttāti iminā adhippāyena ‘‘evañca…pe… yujjantī’’ti āha. Evañca katvā kāye sati vācāya satītiādivacanaṃ anulomitaṃ hoti. Yāya cetanāyāti karaṇaniddeso pana kāyādīnaṃ copanābhijjhādikiriyāya ca cetanāhetukattadassanatthaṃ vuttoti.

Even actions of cause and effect that are simultaneous are indeed suitable to be spoken of as if occurring at preceding and subsequent times. Just as in dependent origination, to show that ‘dependent on the eye and on forms, eye-consciousness arises,’ he says, “or else,” and so forth. He says that “prompting action” means the two intimations. For it is said that “one performs the prompting action by means of body and speech” because it must be made to proceed by means of the preceding bodily and verbal intimations, which are the mind-originated body, sound, and speech, or because the primary elements, which are their modifications, proceed in that way. Alternatively, “by means of body and speech” means by means of bodily and verbal intimations. “Prompting action” means the action of stiffening and moving the material body, and the action of striking appropriated matter. For this action is accomplished by bodily and verbal intimations, because it is said to be “capable of being a condition for stiffening and moving the material body,” and “a condition for the striking of appropriated matter.” And this being so, this statement also becomes supported: “body and speech are the basis for the prompting action,” and “they perform the action of prompting, covetousness, and so forth, with the body and so on as instruments, like cutting with an axe and so on.” To show that existence is not merely presence, but also non-eradication by the path, he says, “as long as it is not ceased.” And the non-eradication of the body and so on should be understood as being due to the non-eradication of the defilements that are their decisive support condition. By the phrase “they perform the action of prompting, covetousness, and so forth, with the body and so on as instruments,” it is stated that the production of volition itself occurs through the production of the action of prompting, covetousness, and so forth. With this intention, he says, “and thus… it is suitable.” And this being so, the statement “when there is the body, when there is speech,” and so forth, becomes consistent. The instrumental designation “by which volition” is stated to show that the body and so on, and the action of prompting, covetousness, and so forth, have volition as their cause.

Sabhāvato upakārakato magge sati sabbhāvato ca bojjhaṅgā magge antogadhāti āha ‘‘na ca na sakkā’’tiādi.

Because they are helpful by nature, and because of their existence when the path exists, the enlightenment factors are included in the path. Thus, he says, “And it is not impossible,” and so forth.

Kammapathaṃ appattānampi taṃtaṃdvāre saṃsandananti yathā kammapathaṃ pattānaṃ, evaṃ kammapathaṃ appattānampi satipi dvārantaruppattiyaṃ yathāsakaṃ dvāreheva nāmaggahaṇanti vadanti, evaṃ sati aṭṭhakathāya virodho. Dutiyatthassa ca abhāvo siyā, tasmā taṃtaṃdvāre saṃsandananti yasmiṃ yasmiṃ dvāre kammapathaṃ appattā akusalacetanādayo pavattā, tāsaṃ tena teneva dvārena nāmaggahaṇaṃ. Taṃ pana taṃtaṃdvārapakkhikabhāvakaraṇato tattha avarodhananti [Pg.85] vuttaṃ. Yathā hi kammapathaṃ pattā kāyakammādisaṅkhātā cetanā dvārantare uppannāpi kāyakammādināmameva labhanti, na evaṃ kammapathaṃ appattā. Tā pana yattha yattha dvāre uppajjanti, tena teneva dvārena kāyaduccaritaṃ vacīduccaritantiādināmaṃ labhanti. Evaṃ nāmaggahaṇameva hi tesaṃ taṃtaṃdvārapakkhikakaraṇaṃ vuttaṃ. Teneva hi aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘kiñcāpi vacīdvāre copanappattaṃ kammapathaṃ, appattatāya pana kāyakammaṃ na hoti, kevalaṃ vacīduccaritaṃ nāma hotī’’ti vuttaṃ.

Some say that even for those that have not reached a course of action, they are connected through their respective doors, just as for those that have reached a course of action. Thus, even for those that have not reached a course of action, despite arising at another door, the naming occurs through their own respective doors. If this were so, there would be a contradiction with the commentary, and the second meaning would be absent. Therefore, 'they are connected through their respective doors' means that in whatever door unwholesome volitions and so on that have not reached a course of action have occurred, their naming is through that very door. This, however, is called 'inclusion' therein because it makes them belong to that particular door. For just as volitions designated as bodily action and so on, which have reached a course of action, receive the name 'bodily action' and so on even when they arise at another door, it is not so for those that have not reached a course of action. Rather, in whatever door they arise, through that very door they receive a name such as 'bodily misconduct' or 'verbal misconduct.' Thus, this very naming is said to be what makes them belong to that particular door. For this reason, it is stated in the commentary: 'Although it has reached the agitation of a course of action at the verbal door, due to its non-attainment, it is not bodily action; it is merely called verbal misconduct.'

Satipi pāṇātipātādicetanāya vacīdvārādīsu pavattiyaṃ yathāvuttayebhuyyatabbahulavuttiyā kāyakammādibhāvavavatthāpanaṃ kāyādikassa taṃtaṃdvārabhāvavavatthāpanañca kammadvārābhedanaṃ. Tañhi kammadvārānaṃ asaṃkiṇṇabhāvena patiṭṭhāpanaṃ. Yaṃ sandhāya ‘‘āṇattisamuṭṭhitesū’’ti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vakkhati. Keci pana ‘‘ekekasmiṃ dvāre anekesaṃ kammānaṃ pavattidassanampi dvārasaṃsandana’’nti vadanti. Yathā pavatto byāpādo kammapatho hoti, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘ime sattā haññantū’’ti pavatti byāpādassa dassitā. Kāyadvārikacetanāya sahakārīkāraṇabhāvato kāyakammavohāralābhā, abhijjhādīnaṃ parasantakassa attano pariṇāmanavasena ‘‘ime sattā haññantū’’tiādinā ca appavattattā manokammavohāravirahā, acetanāsabhāvato vā pāṇātipātādivasena abbohārikā, pāṇātipātādibhāvena na vattabbāti attho. Etthāti abbohārikabhāve.

Even when a volition for killing living beings and so on occurs through the speech door and so on, the determination of its nature as bodily kamma and so on, and the determination of the respective doors for the body and so on, is due to the aforesaid predominance and frequent occurrence; this is the non-breaching of the doors of kamma. For that is the establishment of the doors of kamma as unmixed. It is with reference to this that the commentary will state, 'in the case of those arisen by command.' Some, however, say that 'the seeing of the occurrence of many kammas in a single door is also the connecting of doors.' To show how arisen ill will becomes a course of action, the occurrence of ill will is shown as 'May these beings be killed.' Because it is a cooperative cause for a volition at the body door, it obtains the designation 'bodily kamma'; and because covetousness and so on do not occur by way of 'May these beings be killed,' which is a matter of transforming what belongs to another into one's own, there is an absence of the designation 'mental kamma.' Or, because they are not volition by nature, they are not designated as killing living beings and so on, meaning they are not to be called such. 'Herein' means in the state of being without designation.

Dasavidhā iddhi…pe… tabbā vitthārenāti adhippāyo.

Ten kinds of psychic power... and so on... The intention is that this should be explained in detail.

Tenādhippetanti ‘‘akusalaṃ vacīkammaṃ manodvāre samuṭṭhātī’’ti vadantena adhippetaṃ. ‘‘Na uposathakkhandhake vutta’’nti kasmā vuttaṃ, nanu tena uposathakkhandhakato suttaṃ āhaṭanti? Kiñcāpi āhaṭaṃ, tattha avuttoyeva pana so tena vuttoti gahitoti dassento ‘‘tattha avuttamevā’’tiādimāha.

By 'that is intended,' it is meant what is intended by the one who says, 'Unwholesome verbal kamma arises at the mind door.' Why was it said, 'It is not stated in the Uposathakkhandhaka'? Was not the sutta brought by him from the Uposathakkhandhaka? To show that although it was brought, it was taken by him as stated, though it was not actually stated there, he says, 'It was not stated there,' and so on.

‘‘Sugatiduggatīsu upapajjanaṃ sukatadukkaṭakammato na hoti, khandhasivādīhi pana hotīti gahetvā ‘natthi dinna’ntiādinā parāmasantassa vasena ‘micchādiṭṭhi…pe… paribhaṇḍādīni karotī’ti vutta’’nti vadanti. Abhijjhādipadhānattāti etena vijjamānesupi byāpādādīsu yadā kāyavacīdvāresu cetanā [Pg.86] balavatī hoti, na tathā itare, tadā padhānabhāvato cetanā kāyakammaṃ vacīkammanti ca vohāraṃ labhati. So kho panassā padhānabhāvo pāṇātipātādisiddhiyā viññāyati. Yadā pana tesuyeva dvāresu abhijjhādayo balavanto honti, na tathā cetanā, tadā tattha vijjamānāpi cetanā apadhānabhāvato kāyakammaṃ vacīkammanti ca vohāraṃ na labhati. Abhijjhādayo pana padhānabhāvato satipi kāyaṅgavācaṅgacopane sakena vavatthānena manokammantveva vuccantīti dasseti. Ye pana ‘‘tīsupi dvāresu kammapathabhāvena appattiyā dvārattayepi kammapathappattamanokammena saha pavattiyā ca cetanā ettha kammanti na vuccatī’’ti vadanti, tehi abhijjhādīnaṃ padhānasabhāvaṃyeva sandhāya vuttaṃ siyā. Atha vā cetanāya nippariyāyakammabhāvato pariyāyakamme anavarodhetabbattā ‘‘abbohārikā’’ti vuttaṃ. Attano sabhāveneva pana sā etthāpi kammanti vuccati. Yathāha ‘‘cetanāhaṃ, bhikkhave, kammaṃ vadāmī’’tiādi (kathā. 539). Aṭṭhakathāyañca ‘‘tasmiṃ dvāre siddhā cetanā’’tiādinā cetanāyeva padhānaṃ katvā vuttaṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘sabhāveneva sā manokamma’’ntiādi. Atha vā kammapathappattaabhijjhādīhi kāyavacīdvāre sahajātā cetanā kāyavacīkammavasena abbohārikā cetanāsaṅkhātamanokammattāti. Yadi abhijjhādayo padhānā, na cetanā, evaṃ sati abhijjhādayo cettha kammaṃ, na cetanā, abhijjhādipakkhikā vā sā siyāti anuyogaṃ manasi katvā āha ‘‘tividhā, bhikkhave’’tiādi. ‘‘Cetanāpi…pe… manodvāre eva samuṭṭhahantī’’ti idaṃ manodvāre cetanāya abhijjhādīhi manokammabhāve nibbisesabhāvadassananti katvā ‘‘cetanā…pe… adhippāyo’’ti āha. Cetanā cetanākammaṃ, abhijjhādayo cetanāsampayuttakammanti ettakameva hi ettha visesoti. Ettha ca cetanāya kāyavacīkammabhāvo siyāti āsaṅkāya abhāvato manodvāre akusalakāyavacīkammānaṃ anuppattito ca abbohārikāti na vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

Some say: 'It is stated that rebirth in good and bad destinations does not happen from well-done and badly-done kamma, but from the aggregates and so on, holding the view 'There is nothing given,' etc., and thus one with wrong view... and so on... engages in abuse and so on.' By 'because covetousness and so on are predominant,' this is shown: even when ill will and so on are present, when volition is strong at the body and speech doors and the others are not, then due to its predominance, volition obtains the designation 'bodily kamma' and 'verbal kamma.' And its predominance is known through the accomplishment of killing living beings and so on. But when covetousness and so on are strong at those same doors and volition is not, then the volition present there, due to its non-predominance, does not obtain the designation 'bodily kamma' or 'verbal kamma.' Covetousness and so on, however, due to their predominance, are called only 'mental kamma' by their own classification, even when there is agitation of the limbs of the body and speech. As for those who say, 'Because it does not reach the state of a course of action in the three doors, and because it occurs together with mental kamma that has reached a course of action in the three doors, volition is not called kamma here,' this may have been said by them with reference to the predominant nature of covetousness and so on. Or, because volition is kamma in the primary sense, it should not be included under kamma in a secondary sense, and for this reason it is called 'not designated.' But by its own nature, it is called kamma here too. As it is said: 'Volition, monks, I call kamma,' and so on. And in the commentary, it is stated making volition itself the predominant factor, saying, 'the volition accomplished at that door,' and so on. Therefore, it is said, 'by its very nature, it is mental kamma,' and so on. Or, volition co-arisen at the body and speech doors with covetousness and so on that have reached a course of action is 'not designated' as bodily or verbal kamma because it is mental kamma reckoned as volition. If covetousness and so on are predominant, not volition, then in that case covetousness and so on would be the kamma here, not volition, or volition would be on the side of covetousness and so on. Bearing this objection in mind, he said, 'Threefold, monks,' and so on. The statement 'Volition too... arises only at the mind door' is made to show the non-difference of volition from covetousness and so on in being mental kamma at the mind door; thus he said, 'Volition... is the intention.' For the only difference here is that volition is the kamma of volition, while covetousness and so on are kamma associated with volition. And here it should be understood that it is not called 'not designated' because of the absence of the possibility that volition might be bodily or verbal kamma, and because unwholesome bodily and verbal kammas do not arise at the mind door.

Virativisiṭṭhāti viratito cetanāya padhānabhāvamāha. Tattha ‘‘tividhā, bhikkhave, kāyasañcetanā’’tiādinā (kathā. 539) āgamamhi ‘‘pāṇātipātādipaṭipakkhabhūtā’’ti yuttiṃ dasseti. Yasmā ca paṭṭhāne cetanāva ‘‘kammapaccayo’’ti [Pg.87] vuttā, na virati, abhijjhādayo vā, tasmā nippariyāyena kammaṃ ‘‘cetanā’’ti anabhijjhādayo ‘‘cetanāpakkhikā vā’’ti vuttāti veditabbaṃ. Asaṅkarato kammadvārāni vavatthapento ‘‘rakkhatī’’ti, vipariyāyena ‘‘bhindatī’’ti vuttoti rakkhaṇabhindanāni anāsetvā nāsetvā ca kathananti vuttānīti.

By 'distinguished by abstinence,' he states the predominance of volition over abstinence. Herein, in the scripture, by way of 'Monks, there are three kinds of bodily volition,' and so on, he shows the reason for its being 'the counterpart to killing living beings, etc.' And since in the Paṭṭhāna, only volition is stated as the 'kamma condition,' not abstinence or covetousness and so on, it should be understood that kamma in the primary sense is 'volition,' and non-covetousness and so on are said to be 'on the side of volition.' Establishing the doors of kamma without confusion, he speaks of 'protects,' and conversely, 'breaches.' Thus, protecting and breaching are said to be the speaking of not practicing and of destroying.

Kammakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the discourse on kamma is finished.

Tatiyo vikappo paṭhamacatutthaviññāṇadvāresuyeva labbhati, na itarattha ‘‘sotaṃ ghāna’’ntiādinā avuttattā, itarathāpi vā avibhattike niddese labbhati. Yato saṃvaravasena pātimokkhasīlaṃ pavattati, taṃ dussīlyanti āha ‘‘dussīlyaṃ pāṇātipātādicetanā’’ti. Itarā saṃvaravinimuttā abhijjhādomanassayuttā tappadhānā vā akusaladhammā satipaṭipakkhā akusalā dhammā. Ārammaṇe cittavossaggavasena pavatto akusalacittuppādo pamādo. Vīriyapanodanabhāvato thinamiddhaṃ ‘‘kosajja’’nti vuttaṃ, thinamiddhappadhāno vā cittuppādo.

The third alternative is obtained only in the first and fourth consciousness-doors, not elsewhere, because it is not stated as 'ear, nose,' etc.; or alternatively, it is also obtained in the undifferentiated exposition. Since the Pātimokkha virtue proceeds by way of restraint, he speaks of immorality, saying: 'Immorality is the volition for killing living beings, etc.' Other unwholesome states, free from restraint, associated with covetousness and displeasure, or those in which these are predominant, are unwholesome states opposed to mindfulness. The arising of an unwholesome consciousness that proceeds by way of abandoning the mind to its object is negligence. Because it is the state of dispelling energy, sloth and torpor are called 'laziness'; or it is the arising of consciousness in which sloth and torpor are predominant.

Asuddhatāti akevalatā aññena sammissatā. Dvārañhi dvārantarikakammassa dvāraṃ hontaṃ tena missitaṃ viya hoti. Tenevāha ‘‘musāvādādinopi kāyadvāre pavattisabbhāvā’’ti. Keci pana ‘‘aviññeyyamānantarānaṃ dvārantaracittānaṃ antarantarā appavattito suddhanti vutta’’nti vadanti, taṃ anekassapi javanavārassa kāyakammādibhāvena pabandhanavasena pavatti atthīti katvā vuttaṃ. Aviruddhaṃ hotīti akusalakāyakammādibhāvena avadhāretvā asaṃvaraṃ vatvā puna tasseva vācāasaṃvaradvārādīsu uppattivacanaṃ kāyadvārūpalakkhito asaṃvaro dvārantare pavattopi kāyadvāriko evāti evaṃ saṃvaṇṇanāya sati na virujjhatīti attho. Idāni taṃ avirujjhanākāraṃ ‘‘asaṃvaro hī’’tiādinā vibhāveti. Sadvāreti attano dvāre. Asaṃvaro dvārantare uppajjamānopi sadvāravasena uppannoti vuccatīti etena vācāasaṃvaradvāre uppannopi kāyiko asaṃvaro copanakāyaasaṃvaradvāravasena uppannotveva vuttoti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Esa nayo itaratthāpi. Kammaṃ aññadvāreti kammassa dvārantaracaraṇaṃ pākaṭanti katvā vuttaṃ.

Impurity means not being exclusive, being mixed with another. For a door, being a door for an action of an intermediate door, is as if mixed with it. Therefore he said: 'Even false speech, etc., exist due to their occurrence at the body-door.' Some, however, say: 'It is called pure because of the intermittent non-arising of imperceptible, immediately succeeding consciousnesses of an intermediate door.' This is said because there is the occurrence of even many a course of impulsion by way of connection as bodily action, etc. 'It is not contradictory' means this: having defined non-restraint as unwholesome bodily action, etc., the subsequent statement of its arising in the doors of verbal non-restraint, etc., is not contradictory when there is the explanation that the non-restraint characterized by the body-door, even if occurring at an intermediate door, is still of the body-door. Now, he clarifies that manner of non-contradiction with 'For non-restraint...' etc. 'Through its own door' means through its own door. Even if non-restraint arises in an intermediate door, it is said to arise by way of its own door. By this it should be understood that even bodily non-restraint, if it arises in the door of verbal non-restraint, is said to have arisen precisely by way of the door of bodily non-restraint which is agitation. This method applies elsewhere too. 'Action through another door' is said because the traversing of an intermediate door by kamma is evident.

Evaṃ [Pg.88] satīti copanasaṅkhāte kāyaasaṃvaradvāre asaṃvaroti ettake eva gahite. Kammapathabhāvappattasseva kammabhāvo aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttoti āha ‘‘kammapathabhāvappattatāya vacīmanokamma’’nti. Sesanti dvārantarānupalakkhitaṃ. Tathā na vuccatīti kāyakammanti na vuccatīti attho. Tattheva vakkhāmāti kammapathasaṃsandane vakkhāma. ‘‘So hi kāyadvāre copanappatto akusalaṃ kāyakammaṃ hotī’’tiādinā (dha. sa. aṭṭha. kammapathasaṃsandanakathā) ‘‘copanakāyaasaṃvaradvāravasena uppanno akusalaṃ kāyakammameva hotī’’tiādinā ca vacīkammādīnañca kammapathappattānaṃ asaṃvarabhūtānaṃ kāyakammādibhāve āpanne ‘‘catubbidhaṃ vacīduccaritaṃ akusalaṃ vacīkammameva hotī’’tiādinā apavādena nivatti daṭṭhabbāti evaṃ vakkhamānataṃ sandhāyāha. Antogadhatā daṭṭhabbā paccayasannissitaājīvapārisuddhisīlānaṃ ñāṇavīriyehi sādhetabbattāti adhippāyo.

'This being so' means: if it is taken that non-restraint is only that which is at the door of bodily non-restraint, called agitation. He says, 'Because of reaching the state of a path of action, they are verbal and mental actions,' because it is stated in the commentary that only what has reached the state of a path of action becomes kamma. 'The rest' means that which is not characterized by an intermediate door. 'Thus, it is not referred to' means it is not called bodily action. 'There, we will explain' means we will explain in the section on the Correlation of the Paths of Action. He says this with reference to what will be explained as follows: regarding verbal and other actions that have attained the path of action and are in a state of non-restraint, when they attain the state of bodily action, etc., as in 'That which, having reached agitation through the body-door, becomes unwholesome bodily action' (Dhammasaṅgaṇī Aṭṭhakathā, Kammapathasaṅsandanakathā) and 'What arises by way of the door of bodily non-restraint which is agitation is unwholesome bodily action itself,' their cessation by way of exception should be understood, as stated: 'The fourfold verbal misconduct is unwholesome verbal action itself,' and so on. The intention is that their inclusion should be understood, because the virtue of purity of livelihood dependent on requisites is to be accomplished by means of knowledge and energy.

Akusalakammapathakathāvaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Discourse on the Unwholesome Paths of Action

Sarasena attano sabhāvena. Yāya cetanāya pavattamānassa jīvitindriyassa paccayabhūtesu mahābhūtesu upakkamakaraṇahetu taṃmahābhūtapaccayā uppajjanakamahābhūtā nuppajjissanti, sā tādisapayogasamuṭṭhāpikā cetanā pāṇātipāto nāma. Laddhupakkamāni hi bhūtāni na purimabhūtāni viya visadānīti samānajātiyānaṃ bhūtānaṃ kāraṇaṃ na hontīti. Ekassapi payogassa sahasā nipphādanavasena kiccasādhikāya bahukkhattuṃ pavattajavanehi laddhāsevanāya ca sanniṭṭhāpakacetanāya vasena payogassa mahantabhāvo. Satipi kadāci khuddake ceva mahante ca pāṇe payogassa samabhāve mahantaṃ hanantassa cetanā tibbatarā uppajjatīti vatthussa mahantabhāvoti tadubhayaṃ cetanāya balavabhāveneva hotīti āha ‘‘payoga…pe… bhāvato’’ti. Yathāvuttapaccayavipariyāyepīti payogavatthuādipaccayānaṃ amahattepi. Taṃtaṃpaccayehīti guṇavantatādipaccayehi. Ettha ca hantabbassa guṇavantatāya mahāsāvajjatā vatthumahantatāya viya daṭṭhabbā. Kilesānaṃ upakkamānaṃ dvinnañca mudutāya tibbatāya ca appasāvajjatā mahāsāvajjatā ca yojetabbā. Pāṇo pāṇasaññitā vadhakacittañca pubbabhāgasambhārā, upakkamo [Pg.89] vadhakacetanāsamuṭṭhāpito, pañcasambhāravatī pāṇātipātacetanāti sā pañcasambhāravinimuttā daṭṭhabbā. Esa nayo adinnādānādīsupi.

By its own essence, by its own nature. The volition that instigates an attack, by which, due to causing injury to the great elements that are the conditions for the proceeding life-faculty, the great elements that would arise conditioned by those great elements do not arise—that volition is called the destruction of life. For the elements that have been attacked are not as pure as the previous elements; thus, they do not serve as a cause for elements of the same kind. The greatness of an effort is due to the concluding volition, which accomplishes its task through sudden execution and has gained practice through many-times-occurring impulsion. Even when the effort is sometimes the same towards small and large beings, the volition of one killing a large being arises more intensely, thus there is greatness of the object. He says that both these are due to the strength of the volition: 'due to the greatness of the effort... etc.' 'Even when the aforesaid conditions are reversed' means even when the conditions such as the effort and the object are not great. 'By those respective conditions' means by conditions such as the victim's virtuous qualities. Here, the great blameworthiness due to the virtuous qualities of the one to be killed should be seen as similar to the greatness of the object. Lesser and greater blameworthiness should be connected with the mildness and intensity of both the defilements and the attack. A living being, the perception of it as a living being, and the thought of killing are the preliminary components; the attack is instigated by the volition to kill. The volition to destroy life has five components; it should be understood as distinct from those five components. This method also applies to taking what is not given, and so on.

Mantaparijappanena parassa santakaharaṇaṃ vijjāmayo, vinā mantena parasantakassa kāyavacīpayogehi ākaḍḍhanaṃ tādisaiddhiyogena iddhimayo payogoti adinnādānassapi cha payogā sāhatthikādayo veditabbā.

Taking another's belongings by muttering spells is the method based on knowledge. Without spells, drawing another's belongings through bodily or verbal application by means of such psychic power is the application based on psychic power. Thus, for taking what is not given, too, the six methods of application, beginning with that by one's own hand, should be understood.

Abhibhavitvā vītikkamane micchācāro mahāsāvajjo, na tathā ubhinnaṃ samānacchandabhāve. ‘‘Cattāro sambhārāti vuttattā abhibhavitvā vītikkamane satipi maggenamaggapaṭipattiadhivāsane purimuppannasevanābhisandhipayogābhāvato micchācāro na hoti abhibhuyyamānassā’’ti vadanti. Sevanacitte sati payogābhāvo na pamāṇaṃ itthiyā sevanappayogassa yebhuyyena abhāvato. Purisasseva hi yebhuyyena sevanappayogo hotīti itthiyā puretaraṃ sevanacittaṃ upaṭṭhāpetvā nipannāyapi micchācāro na siyāti āpajjati, tasmā purisassa vasena ukkaṃsato cattāro sambhārā vuttāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Aññathā itthiyā purisakiccakaraṇakāle purisassapi sevanappayogābhāvato micchācāro na siyāti. Keci pana ‘‘attano ruciyā pavattitassa tīṇi aṅgāni, balakkārena pavattitassa tīṇīti sabbāni aggahitaggahaṇena cattārī’’ti vadanti, vīmaṃsitvā gahetabbaṃ.

In transgressing by overpowering, sexual misconduct is greatly blameworthy; not so when both have equal desire. They say: 'Because the four components are mentioned, even when there is transgression by overpowering and the enduring of the act, sexual misconduct does not occur for the one being overpowered due to the absence of a previously arisen intention and effort to engage.' When there is the thought to engage, the absence of effort is not the standard, because for a woman, the effort to engage is generally absent. Indeed, it is generally the man who makes the effort to engage. Therefore, it would follow that even for a woman who, having first established the thought to engage, lies down, there would be no sexual misconduct. Hence, it should be understood that the four components are stated primarily from the man's perspective. Otherwise, when a woman performs the man's role, there would be no sexual misconduct for the man either, due to the absence of his effort to engage. Some, however, say: 'There are three factors for one acting from one's own inclination, and three for one acting under force; thus, all are included by taking what is not stated, making four.' This should be examined and accepted.

Duṭṭhacittassa amaraṇādhippāyassa pharusakāyavacīpayogasamuṭṭhāpikā pharusacetanā pharusavācā. Maraṇādhippāye pana sati atthasiddhitadabhāvesu pāṇātipātā byāpādā ca hontīti. Yaṃ pati pharusavācā payujjati, tassa sammukhāva sīsaṃ eti. ‘‘Parammukhepi pharusavācā hotī’’ti vadanti.

Harsh speech is the harsh volition arising from the bodily and verbal application of one with a hateful mind, whose intention is not death. But when there is an intention to kill, whether the aim succeeds or fails, there is both the destruction of life and ill will. Whatever harsh speech is uttered, it goes straight to the face of the person to whom it is addressed. They say, 'Harsh speech can occur even behind one's back.'

Yadi cetanāya sabbadā kammapathabhāvābhāvato aniyato kammapathabhāvoti kammapatharāsimhi avacanaṃ, nanu abhijjhādīnampi kammapathaṃ appattānaṃ atthitāya aniyato kammapathabhāvoti tesampi kammapatharāsiyaṃ avacanaṃ āpajjatīti? Nāpajjati, kammapathatātaṃsabhāgatāhi tesaṃ tattha vuttattā. Yadi evaṃ cetanāpi tattha vattabbā siyāti? Saccametaṃ, sā pana pāṇātipātādikāti pākaṭo tassā [Pg.90] kammapathabhāvoti na vuttaṃ siyā. Cetanāya hi ‘‘cetanāhaṃ, bhikkhave, kammaṃ vadāmi,’’‘‘tividhā, bhikkhave, kāyasañcetanā akusalaṃ kāyakamma’’ntiādivacanehi kammabhāvo dīpito. Kammaṃyeva ca sugatiduggatīnaṃ taduppajjanasukhadukkhānañca pathabhāvena pavattaṃ kammapathoti vuccatīti pākaṭo tassā kammapathabhāvo. Abhijjhādīnaṃ pana cetanāsamīhanabhāvena sucaritaduccaritabhāvo, cetanājanitataṃbandhatibhāvena sugatiduggatitaduppajjanasukhadukkhānaṃ pathabhāvo cāti na tathā pākaṭo kammapathabhāvoti te eva kammapatharāsibhāvena vuttā. Atathājātiyattā vā cetanā tehi saddhiṃ na vuttā siyā. Vicāretvā gahetabbaṃ.

If it is said that volition is not mentioned in the collection of courses of action because its nature as a course of action is unfixed—due to the presence and absence of this nature in it at all times—then would it not follow that for covetousness and so on as well, since there exist instances of them that have not attained the status of a course of action, their nature as a course of action is unfixed, and thus they too should not be mentioned in the collection of courses of action? It does not follow, because they are stated there due to their being partial constituents of the nature of a course of action. If so, should not volition also be mentioned there? This is true. However, since its nature as a course of action is manifest as the destruction of life and so on, it might not have been stated. For the nature of volition as kamma is illuminated by statements such as, 'Monks, I say that volition is kamma,' and 'Threefold, monks, is bodily volition—unwholesome bodily kamma,' and so on. And kamma itself, proceeding as the path to good and bad destinations and to the happiness and suffering that arise there, is called a course of action. Thus, its nature as a course of action is manifest. For covetousness and so on, however, their nature as good and bad conduct is due to being sought by volition, and their nature as the path to good and bad destinations and the happiness and suffering that arise there is due to their connection with what is generated by volition. Thus, their nature as a course of action is not so manifest. Therefore, they alone are stated as the collection of courses of action. Alternatively, volition might not have been stated together with them because it is not of the same kind. This should be understood after investigation.

Pāṇātipātādīnaṃ ārammaṇāneva tabbiratiārammaṇānīti pañca sikkhāpadā parittārammaṇā evāti vacanena adinnādānādīnaṃ sattārammaṇatāvacanassa virodhaṃ codeti. Tathā hi vakkhati ‘‘vītikkamitabbatoyeva hi veramaṇī nāma hotī’’ti. Sayameva pariharissatīti sikkhāpadavibhaṅge pañhapucchakavaṇṇanaṃ sandhāya vadati. Tattha hi ‘‘yasmā sattoti saṅkhyaṃ gate saṅkhāreyeva ārammaṇaṃ karoti, tasmā parittārammaṇāti vuccantī’’ti vuttaṃ.

He raises an objection concerning the contradiction between the statement that the five training rules have only limited objects—since their objects are precisely the objects of abstention from the destruction of life and so on—and the statement that the objects of taking what is not given and so on are beings. For it will be said, 'Abstinence is indeed only from that which is to be transgressed.' He says this with reference to the questioner's explanation in the Analysis of the Training Rules, which he himself will resolve. There it is said: 'Because one takes as object only a conditioned thing that has come to be designated as "a being," therefore they are called "having limited objects."'

Duggatatādīnīti ādi-saddena ‘‘aladdhālābho laddhavināso icchitānaṃ bhogānaṃ kicchapaṭilābho rājādīhi sādhāraṇabhogatā dukkhavihāro sāsaṅkavihāro’’ti evamādayo saṅgahitā. Keci pana ‘‘diṭṭheva dhamme bhogajāniādayo nissandaphala’’nti vadanti.

By 'states of misfortune, etc.,' the word 'etc.' includes such things as: 'failure to gain what has not been gained, loss of what has been gained, obtaining desired wealth with difficulty, possessions being common to kings and others, dwelling in suffering, dwelling with anxiety.' Some, however, say, 'Loss of wealth and so on are resultant fruits in this very life.'

Kusalakammapathakathāvaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Exposition of Wholesome Courses of Action

Tāsañca viratīnaṃ cetanāsampayuttattā cetanādvārena sugatiduggatitaduppajjanasukhadukkhānaṃ pathabhāvo yuttoti adhippāyo.

The intention is that, because these abstinences are associated with volition, it is fitting that through the channel of volition they become the path for good and bad destinations and the happiness and suffering arising therefrom.

Kammapathasaṃsandanakathāvaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Exposition of the Connection of the Courses of Action

Tathāti kammapathappattānaṃ. Kecīti dhammasirittheraṃ sandhāyāha. So hi kammapathappattānameva dussīlyādīnaṃ susīlyādīnañca kammapathehi atthato nānattābhāvadassanaṃ, tesaṃ vā phassadvārādīhi avirodhabhāvena dīpanaṃ kammapathasaṃsandananti vadati. Kammapathatā natthīti etena yathāvuttānaṃ asaṃvarasaṃvarānaṃ [Pg.91] tesaṃ vāde kammapathasaṃsandane asaṅgahitataṃ dasseti. Ye pana saṅgahaṃ labhanti, tesaṃ gahaṇe payojanābhāvaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘tividha…pe… dassanenā’’ti vuttaṃ. Evaṃ purimapakkhe saṅkhepato dosaṃ vatvā dutiyapakkhepi vattuṃ ‘‘na ca duccaritāna’’ntiādimāha. Tena ye duccaritasucaritaasaṃvarasaṃvarā anucarīyanti, tesaṃ kāyakammāditā vidhīyatīti dasseti. ‘‘Pañcaphassadvāravasena uppanno asaṃvaro akusalaṃ manokammameva hotī’’tiādinā hi vuttanti. Yadi cātiādinā anavasesapariyādānābhāvamāha. Uppatti na vattabbāti kammapatha…pe… vadantehi ‘‘manokammaṃ chaphassadvāravasena uppajjatī’’ti na vattabbanti attho. Atha vā yadi kammapathappattāneva dussīlyādīni kāyakammādināmehi aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttānīti evaṃ vadantehi aṭṭhakathācariyehi manokammassa chaphassadvāravasena uppatti na vattabbāti attho. Taṃtaṃkammabhāvassa vuttattāti ‘‘tividhaṃ kāyaduccaritaṃ akusalaṃ kāyakammameva hotī’’tiādiṃ (vibha. 913) sandhāyāha.

'Thus' means of those that have attained the status of a course of action. 'Some' is said with reference to the Elder Dhammasiri. For he says that the 'connection of the courses of action' is the showing of the absence of a difference in meaning from the courses of action for immoralities, etc., and moralities, etc., that have attained the status of a course of action, or the illumination of their non-opposition by way of the doors of contact, etc. By this, 'there is no nature as a course of action,' he shows that in their theory, the aforementioned states of non-restraint and restraint are not included in the connection of the courses of action. But to show that there is no purpose in the inclusion of those that do obtain inclusion, it is said, 'threefold... by the showing.' Thus, having briefly stated the fault in the first position, in order to speak on the second position as well, he says, 'and not of misconduct,' etc. By this he shows that for those states of misconduct, good conduct, non-restraint, and restraint that are practiced, their nature as bodily action, etc., is laid down. For it is said, 'Non-restraint that has arisen by way of the five doors of contact is just unwholesome mental action,' etc. By 'And if,' etc., he states the absence of an all-inclusive grasp. The meaning of 'Arising should not be stated' is that those who say... should not state that 'mental action arises by way of the six doors of contact.' Alternatively, if the commentary teachers state that immoralities, etc., that have attained the status of a course of action are indeed spoken of in the commentary by names such as 'bodily action,' etc., then the meaning is that the arising of mental action by way of the six doors of contact should not be stated by them. 'Because the nature of each respective kamma has been stated' refers to 'Threefold bodily misconduct is just unwholesome bodily action,' etc. (Vibh 913).

Kammantarampi taṃdvārikakammameva siyāti pāṇātipātādikassa vacīkammādibhāvamāsaṅkati. Tasmāti yasmā kesañci asaṃvarānaṃ saṃvarānañca kammapathatā natthi, kāyaduccaritādīnañca kammapathehi nānattābhāvadassanena payojanaṃ natthi, na ca duccaritādīnaṃ phassadvārānaṃ vasena uppatti dīpitā, na cāyaṃ vidhi niravasesasaṅgāhikā, kammānañca saṅkaro āpajjati, aṭṭhakathāyañca pubbāparavirodho, tasmāti attho. Samānanāmatā kāyakammāditā. Sāmaññanāmāvijahanaṃ kāyakammādibhāvāvijahanaṃ. Ubhayesanti kammapathākammapathānaṃ. Uppattipariyāyavacanābhāvatoti etena phassadvāraasaṃvaradvārādīnaṃ taṃdvārikakammānañca atthato nānattābhāvepi tathā tathā pavattadesanāvasena te vicāritāti dasseti. ‘‘Akusalaṃ kāyakammaṃ pañcaphassadvāravasena na uppajjatī’’tiādiko dutiyavinicchayo.

He raises the doubt that another kamma might also be just a kamma of that door, implying that the destruction of life, etc., might have the nature of verbal kamma, etc. The meaning of 'Therefore' is: since for some states of non-restraint and restraint there is no nature as a course of action; and since there is no purpose in showing the absence of a difference from the courses of action for bodily misconduct, etc.; and the arising of misconduct, etc., by way of the sense-doors is not explained; and this method is not all-inclusive; and a confusion of kammas would result; and there is a before-and-after contradiction in the commentary; therefore... Sameness of name is the nature of bodily kamma, etc. Non-abandonment of the common name is non-abandonment of the nature of bodily kamma, etc. 'Of both' means of courses of action and non-courses of action. By 'due to the absence of a statement on the mode of arising,' he shows that although there is no difference in meaning between the sense-doors, the doors of non-restraint, etc., and the kammas of those respective doors, they are investigated in various ways according to the teaching that has proceeded in each case. 'Unwholesome bodily kamma does not arise by way of the five sense-doors,' etc., is the second determination.

Kāye vācāya ca…pe… siddhitoti etena copanappattaṃ akusalaṃ manokammaṃ copanaṃ appattato visesetvā dassetuṃ ‘‘kāyavacīkamma’’nti vuttaṃ, na pana kāyavacīkammabhāvatoti dasseti. Tena kāyavacīgahaṇaṃ yathāvuttacopanappattaṃ eva vibhāvetīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tenevāha – ‘‘copanappattaṃ akusalaṃ kāyadvāre vacīdvāre ca manokammaṃ hotī’’ti. Taṃ-sadde [Pg.92] vutte yaṃ-saddo abyabhicāritasambandhatāya vuttoyeva hotīti katvā ‘‘yaṃ uppajjatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Uppādamattaparicchinnenāti chaphassadvārikakammenāti attho. Matta-saddena visesanivattiatthena manokammatāvisesaṃ nivatteti. Niyamassa eva-saddassa akatattā ‘‘kāyavacīkammameva hotī’’ti avuttattā. Idāni niyamākaraṇena laddhaguṇaṃ dassento ‘‘na pana sabbampī’’tiādimāha.

By 'In body and speech... by accomplishment,' he shows that 'bodily and verbal kamma' is stated in order to distinguish unwholesome mental kamma that has reached instigation from that which has not reached instigation, but not because it has the nature of bodily and verbal kamma. Therefore, it should be understood that the mention of 'bodily and verbal' clarifies only that which has reached instigation, as stated. For that reason he says: 'Unwholesome mental kamma that has reached instigation occurs at the body-door and the speech-door.' When the word 'that' is stated, the word 'which' is also stated because of the invariable connection; having considered this, it is said, 'which arises.' 'Limited by mere arising' means by kamma of the six sense-doors. By the word 'mere,' which has the meaning of precluding a specific quality, he precludes a specific quality of mental kamma. Because the word 'eva,' which indicates a restriction, is not used, it is not said, 'it is just bodily and verbal kamma.' Now, showing the advantage gained by not making a restriction, he says, 'but not all,' etc.

‘‘Niyamassa akatattā’’tiādi purimanayoti adhippeto. Vattuadhippāyānurodhinī saddappavattīti samāsapade ekadesopi ākaḍḍhīyati adhikāravasenāti adhippāyena ‘‘kamma-saddamattena sambandhaṃ katvā’’ti vuttaṃ. Yaṃ pana vadantītiādinā ettha padakāramatassa ayuttataṃ dasseti. Tattha cetanāpakkhikānanti kāyavacīkammabhūtacetanāpakkhikānaṃ. Satanti samānānaṃ. Taṃtaṃdvārakammapathānañcāti idaṃ imassa cittassa kammapathabhāvena pavattaṃ kālaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, na sabbadā, kammapathabhāveneva pavattanato. Ca-saddena vā akammapathasaṅgaho daṭṭhabbo. Atha vā taṃtaṃdvārā ca taṃtaṃdvārakammapathā ca taṃtaṃdvārakammapathāti ‘‘taṃtaṃdvārā’’ti padena akammapathānaṃ saṃvarānaṃ saṅgaho daṭṭhabbo. Tena sabhāvenāti manokammassa dvārabhāvena, na attanoti adhippāyo. Evamidhāpīti cittajanito cittasampayuttassa kammassa dvārabhāvo cittepi upacaritoti attho. Vattabbameva natthi anantarapaccayabhūtamanorahitassa cittassa abhāvatoti.

'Because a rule has not been made,' etc.—the previous method is intended. The occurrence of a word follows the speaker's intention; thus, with the intention that even a part of a compound word is drawn in by the force of the context, it is said, 'having made a connection with the mere word 'kamma'.' But by 'What they say,' etc., he shows the inappropriateness of the grammarian's opinion here. Therein, 'of those on the side of volition' means of those on the side of volition that has become bodily and verbal action. 'Of beings' means of similar ones. 'And of the respective door-courses of action'—this is said referring to the time when this mind occurs as a course of action, not always, because it occurs only as a course of action. Or, by the word 'ca,' the inclusion of non-courses of action should be understood. Alternatively, 'the respective doors and the respective door-courses of action' are 'the respective door-courses of action'; thus, by the term 'the respective doors,' the inclusion of the non-courses of action, that is, the restraints, should be understood. 'By that nature' means by being the door for mental action, not by itself—this is the intention. 'Similarly here too' means that the state of being a door for the action associated with the mind, which is generated by the mind, is figuratively attributed even to the mind. There is nothing at all to be stated, because of the absence of a mind that is devoid of the mind-element which is the proximity condition.

Dvārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the discussion on the doors is finished.

Kamābhāvaniyamābhāve sabbārammaṇatādīti ādi-saddena saṅgaṇhāti. Na hi…pe… atthīti padhāne asambhavato appadhānaṃ adhikarīyatīti dasseti.

By the word 'ādi' (etc.), he includes 'having all as its object' in the absence of a sequence and the absence of a rule. He shows that with the words 'Indeed... there is not,' because it is impossible in the principal case, the non-principal is taken as the governing topic.

Dhammuddesavārakathā

The Discussion on the Section of the Enumeration of Phenomena

Phassapañcamakarāsivaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Aggregate Having Contact as the Fifth

‘‘Tasmiṃ samaye phasso hotī’’tiādikāya pāḷiyā phassādīnaṃ kāmāvacaratādidassane na tapparabhāvo, sabhāvadassane eva pana tapparabhāvoti dasseti ‘‘na hi phassādīna’’ntiādinā.

In the passage beginning ‘At that time, contact exists,’ the showing of contact and other factors is not about their belonging to the sense-sphere realm and so on; rather, it is about showing their own nature. This is indicated by the phrase beginning ‘for contact and other factors’.

Cittakiriyābhāvenāti [Pg.93] cittabyāpārabhāvena. Phassassa sampajjanamuppajjanameva. Sannipatitappavattiyā paccayo hotīti etena cittārammaṇasannipātakāraṇaṃ phasso cittārammaṇasannipātoti vuttoti dasseti. Phasso hi cittassa ārammaṇe phusanākāreneva pavattito tassa ārammaṇe sannipatitappavattiyā paccayoti ca vuccati. Sā cassa phusanākārappavatti sākhagge ṭhitaṃ disvā bhūmisaṇṭhitassa avīrakapurisassa jaṅghacalanaṃ, ambilaambapakkādiṃ khādantaṃ disvā mukhe kheḷuppatti, dayālukassa paraṃ haññamānaṃ disvā sarīrakampananti evamādīsu paribyattā hoti. Tabbisesabhūtā rūpadhammāti yathā paṭihananavasena aññamaññaṃ āsannataraṃ uppajjamānesu rūpadhammavisesesu saṅghaṭṭanapariyāyo, evaṃ cittārammaṇānaṃ visayakaraṇavisayabhāvappatti paṭihananākārena hoti. So ca cittanissito dhammaviseso saṅghaṭṭanapariyāyena vutto, yadāha ‘‘eva’’ntiādi. Keci pana ‘‘saṅghaṭṭanaraso phasso pañcadvārikova, na itaro vatthārammaṇasaṅghaṭṭanābhāvato’’ti vadanti, taṃ na yujjati upacārasiddhattā saṅghaṭṭanassa. Itarathā pañcadvārikassapi taṃ na sambhaveyyāti. Indriyamanasikāresu yathāpavattamānesu taṃtaṃārammaṇe viññāṇaṃ uppajjati, tesaṃ tathāpavattiyeva viññāṇassa visayabhāvakaraṇaṃ.

'By the absence of mental action' means by the absence of mental engagement. The accomplishment of contact is simply its arising. 'It serves as a condition for the occurrence of what has come together'—by this he shows that it is said, “contact is the coming together of the mind and its object,” because contact is the cause of the coming together of the mind and its object. For contact occurs only in the mode of touching the mind’s object, and thus it is said to be a condition for the occurrence of what has come together in that object. This mode of contact’s occurrence is evident in examples such as: seeing a branch on a treetop and the legs of a timid man standing on the ground moving; seeing someone eating a sour ripe mango and so on, and saliva arising in the mouth; or seeing another being harmed and bodily trembling arising in a compassionate person. Regarding distinct material phenomena: just as there is a kind of collision when distinct material phenomena arise in very close proximity to each other by way of impingement, so too, for the mind and its objects, the attainment of the subject-object relationship occurs in the manner of impingement. And that distinct phenomenon dependent on the mind is described by way of a kind of collision, as he said: “Thus,” etc. Some, however, argue: “Contact whose characteristic is collision belongs only to the five doors, not to the other, because there is no collision between the physical basis and the object.” That is not appropriate, for collision is established figuratively. Otherwise, it would not be possible even for that of the five doors. When the faculties and attention are occurring as they should, consciousness arises in relation to each respective object. Their functioning in that way is precisely what makes it an object for consciousness.

‘‘Yaṃ kho, bhikkhave, ime pañca kāmaguṇe paṭicca uppajjati sukhaṃ somanassaṃ, ayaṃ vuccati kāmānaṃ assādo’’tiādivacanato (a. ni. 9.34) sukhavedanāva assādoti āha ‘‘assādabhāvato’’ti. Phusanādibhāvena ārammaṇaggahaṇaṃ ekadesānubhavananti anupacaritameva phassādīnaṃ anubhavanakiccamāha.

“Monks, whatever pleasure and joy arise in dependence on these five cords of sensual pleasure, this is called the allure of sensual pleasures.” From this statement (Aṅguttara Nikāya 9.34), he says that pleasant feeling itself is the allure, with the words “because of its nature as allure.” The grasping of the object through contact and so on is a partial experience. Thus, he speaks of the function of experiencing of contact and so on as being literal.

Nimittenāti nīlādinā dīghādinā ca nimittena. Etenupāyenāti yathā ñāṇappadhāne cittuppāde saññā ñāṇamanuvattati, evaṃ samādhippadhāne samādhinti dasseti.

“By the sign” means by the sign of blue, etc., and by the sign of long, etc. “By this method” means: he shows that just as in a mind-arising where knowledge is predominant, perception follows knowledge, so too does it follow concentration in a mind-arising where concentration is predominant.

Pabandhatīti paṭṭhapeti sampayuttadhamme sakasakakicce paṭṭhapeti. Teneva hi tadatthaṃ vivaranto ‘‘pavattetī’’ti āha.

‘It binds’ means ‘it establishes’; that is, it establishes associated states in their respective functions. Indeed, for that very reason, explaining its meaning, he said ‘it sets in motion’.

Vijjamānatāvācī hoti-saddo, vijjamānatā ca saṅkhatadhammānaṃ uppajjanena vinā natthīti ‘‘cittaṃ na tathā atthato nuppajjatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Tena yasmā cittaṃ [Pg.94] na nuppajjati uppajjati eva, tasmā cittaṃ hotīti vuttanti ayamettha aṭṭhakathāya attho. Evamavaṭṭhite hoti-uppajjati-saddānaṃ samānatthattena na kiñci payojanaṃ dissati. Atha vā bhavanaṃ nāma sattā, sattā ca uppādādinā samaṅgitāti phassādīnaṃ khaṇattayapariyāpannatā ‘‘phasso hotī’’tiādīsu hoti-saddena vuttā. Tattha yo bhāvo uppādasamaṅgī, na so na hoti nāma, tasmā uppajjati-saddena vuccamānassa atthassa hoti-saddavacanīyatā na na sambhavati. Uppannaṃ hotīti ettha pana kiñcāpi uppanna-saddeneva uppādādisamaṅgitā vuccati, tabbhāvānativatti pana hoti-saddena vuttā khaṇattayavītivattepi uppanna-saddassa vattanato, tasmā na ettha uppajjati-saddena samānatthatāsabbhāvadassanaṃ viya uppajjatidassanampi virujjhati pākaṭakaraṇabhāvato. Itarathā ‘‘cittaṃ uppannaṃ hotī’’ti imināva cittassa vijjamānabhāvo dassitoti kiṃ puna vijjamānabhāvadassanenāti na na sakkā vattuṃ, samayavavatthānavasena savisesaṃ vuttampi cittaṃ phassādīhi sahuppattiyā suṭṭhutaraṃ nibbisesanti dassetuṃ cittassa puna vacanaṃ. Uddiṭṭhadhammānaṃyeva cettha niddesavāre vibhajanaṃ, na vibhaṅge viya pāḷiyā āruḷhasabbapadānanti ‘‘uddesavāre saṅgaṇhanatthaṃ niddesavāre vibhajanattha’’nti ayampi attho niccalo. Tathā hi ‘‘yasmiṃ samaye rūpūpapattiyā maggaṃ bhāvetī’’tiādīsu maggādayo na vibhattā. Apica adhipatibhāvena indriyesu viya phassavedanāsaññācetanāhi saha sabbacittuppādasādhāraṇarāsiyaṃ gahetabbattā samayavavatthāne vuttampi cittaṃ phassapañcamake vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

The term ‘hoti’ signifies existence, and since existence for conditioned phenomena is not without arising, it is said, ‘the mind does not fail to arise in such a way as to exist.’ Therefore, because the mind does not not arise but indeed arises, it is stated that ‘the mind exists.’ This is the meaning given in the commentary here. When established in this way, no purpose is seen in the terms ‘hoti’ and ‘uppajjati’ having the same meaning. Alternatively, ‘being’ is called ‘existence,’ and existence is endowed with arising and so on. Therefore, the inclusion of contact and so on within the three moments is expressed by the term ‘hoti’ in phrases like ‘contact exists.’ Here, that state which is endowed with arising is not non-existent. Therefore, it is not impossible that the meaning expressed by the term ‘uppajjati’ can be expressed by the term ‘hoti.’ However, regarding ‘uppannaṃ hoti’ (has arisen), although the state endowed with arising etc. is expressed by the term ‘uppanna’ itself, the non-transgression of that state is expressed by the term ‘hoti,’ because the term ‘uppanna’ applies even when the three moments have passed. Therefore, here, just as showing the existence of a shared meaning with the term ‘uppajjati’ is not contradicted, so too showing the arising is not contradicted, because it is a making-manifest. Otherwise, it can indeed be said, ‘If the existence of the mind is shown by “the mind has arisen,” then what is the purpose of showing its existence again?’ The mind is mentioned again to show that even though it is described with distinctions in terms of a specific time, it is much more undifferentiated when co-arising with contact and so on. Here, only the enumerated phenomena are analyzed in the exposition section, not all terms that have entered the Pāli text as in the Vibhaṅga. This meaning is also firm: ‘In the enumeration section, it is for the purpose of grouping; in the exposition section, it is for the purpose of analysis.’ Thus, in phrases like ‘at which time one develops the path to rebirth in the fine-material realm,’ the path and so on are not analyzed. Moreover, just as in the case of the faculties by way of predominance, because contact, feeling, perception, and volition are to be taken in the group common to all mind-arisings, even the mind, though mentioned with a temporal distinction, should be understood as mentioned in the group of five with contact.

Jhānaṅgarāsivaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Aggregate of Jhāna Factors

Vitakkananti vitakkanakiriyā, sā ca vitakkassa attano paccayehi pavattimattamevāti bhāvaniddeso vasavattibhāvanivāraṇāya hoti. Yasmiṃ ārammaṇe cittaṃ abhiniropeti, taṃ tassa gahaṇayogyaṃ karonto vitakko ākoṭento viya parivattento viya ca hotīti tassa ākoṭanalakkhaṇatā pariyāhananarasatā ca vuttā. Idañca lakkhaṇaṃ kiccasannissitaṃ katvā vuttaṃ. Dhammānañhi sabhāvavinimuttā kāci kiriyā nāma natthi, tathā gahetabbākāro. Bodhaneyyajanānurodhena pana paramatthato ekasabhāvopi sabhāvadhammo pariyāyavacanehi viya samāropitarūpehi bahūhi pakārehi pakāsīyati. Evañhi so suṭṭhu pakāsito hotīti.

Applied thought is the act of applying thought; and that, being the mere occurrence of applied thought due to its own conditions, is an exposition in terms of process, for the prevention of the idea of mastery over its development. When the mind directs itself to an object, applied thought, making that object suitable for grasping, acts as if striking or turning it over. Thus, its characteristic is described as striking, and its function as rubbing against. This characteristic is stated with reference to its function. For, indeed, there is no activity of phenomena apart from their own nature, nor is there a manner of being grasped as such. However, in accordance with those who are to be taught, even a phenomenon with its own nature—though ultimately of one nature—is revealed in many ways through figurative expressions, as if with superimposed forms. Thus, indeed, it is well-explained.

Vipphāro [Pg.95] nāma vitakkassa thinamiddhapaṭipakkho ārammaṇe anolīnatā asaṅkoco, so pana abhiniropanabhāvato calanaṃ viya hotīti adhippāyena ‘‘vipphāravāti vicalanayutto’’ti vuttaṃ. Upacārappanāsu santānena pavattiyanti etena yathā apubbārammaṇe paṭhamābhinipātabhūto vitakko vipphāravā hoti, na tathā ekasmiṃyeva ārammaṇe nirantaraṃ anuppabandhavasena pavattiyaṃ, nātivipphāravā pana tattha hoti sannisinnabhāvatoti dasseti. Tenevāha ‘‘niccalo hutvā’’tiādi.

Vibrancy, the opponent of sloth and torpor, is the non-sluggishness and non-contraction of applied thought in relation to the object. However, due to its nature of application, it is like a movement; with this meaning, it is said to be 'vibrant,' that is, 'endowed with movement.' By its occurrence as a continuum in access and absorption, this is shown: just as applied thought is vibrant when it first alights upon a new object, it is not so when occurring as an uninterrupted sequence upon a single object. There, due to its settled nature, it is not excessively vibrant. Therefore, it is said, 'having become unmoving,' and so on.

‘‘Pītisukhena abhisandetī’’tiādivacanato (dī. ni. 1.226; ma. ni. 1.427) pītiyā pharaṇaṃ kāyavisayanti yathā taṃ hoti, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘paṇītarūpehī’’ti vuttaṃ.

From statements such as, 'He suffuses it with rapture and pleasure' (Dī. Ni. 1.226; Ma. Ni. 1.427), it is understood that the pervasion of rapture has the body as its domain. To show how that is so, it is said, 'with sublime forms.'

Visārassa byaggabhāvassa paṭipakkho sabhāvo avisāro, na visārābhāvamattaṃ. Avisārāvikkhepānaṃ samādhānabhāvato atthato visesābhāvepi samukhena sampayuttamukhena ca ubhayaṃ vuttanti dassetuṃ ‘‘avisā…pe… vikkhepo’’ti vuttaṃ. Visesatoti atisayenāti vā attho gahetabbo. Sukhañhi samādhissa visesakāraṇaṃ ‘‘sukhino cittaṃ samādhiyatī’’ti (dī. ni. 3.359; a. ni. 3.96; 6.10; 11.12) vacanato.

The nature which is the opposite of scatteredness and agitation is non-scatteredness, not merely the absence of scatteredness. Although there is no distinction in meaning between non-scatteredness and non-distraction, as they both have the nature of concentration, to show that both are mentioned—directly and by way of association—it is stated, 'non-scatteredness... non-distraction.' Or the meaning of 'especially' should be taken as 'exceedingly.' For happiness is a special cause of concentration, according to the saying, 'The mind of one who is happy becomes concentrated' (Dī. Ni. 3.359; A. Ni. 3.96; 6.10; 11.12).

Indriyarāsivaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Aggregate of Faculties

Tatthāti saddahanasaṅkhāte adhimokkhalakkhaṇe. Puggalo saddahatīti imināpi saddhāya āhitavisesānaṃ taṃsampayuttadhammānaṃ saddahanakiriyāya kattubhāvameva vibhāveti. Avayavabyāpāro hi samudāye voharīyatīti. Na kevalaṃ pasādanīyavatthusmiṃ appasādanākārappavattameva akusalaṃ assaddhiyaṃ, atha kho appasādanīyavatthusmiṃ pasādanākārappavattampīti dassetuṃ ‘‘micchādhimokkho’’ti vuttaṃ. Tena pūraṇādīsu pasādassa assaddhiyatamāha. Pasādabhūtoti etena appasādabhūtaṃ assaddhiyaṃ nivatteti. Vatthugatoti iminā micchādhimokkhaṃ. ‘‘Pasādabhūto nicchayo’’ti iminā pana vibhāvitamevatthaṃ pākaṭaṃ karonto ‘‘na yevāpanakādhimokkho’’ti āha. Akālussiyaṃ pasādo, taṃ pana asaṅkhobhabhāvato ‘‘anāvilabhāvo’’ti vuttaṃ. Tañhi sampayuttesu vidahantī saddhā akālussiyapaccupaṭṭhānā. Evametanti adhimuccanākārena pana gahetabbattā [Pg.96] adhimuttipaccupaṭṭhānā. Buddhādivatthūnīti ettha idhalokaparalokakammaphalasambandhāpi saṅgahitāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. ‘‘Saddhāhattho, mahānāma, ariyasāvako’’ti, ‘‘saddhīdha vittaṃ purisassa seṭṭha’’nti (saṃ. ni. 1.246; su. ni. 184), ‘‘saddhā bījaṃ tapo vuṭṭhī’’ti (saṃ. ni. 1.197; su. ni. 77) evamādivacanato kusaladhammānaṃ ādānādīsu hatthādayo viya saddhā daṭṭhabbā.

Therein means: in that which has the characteristic of resolution, termed believing. By 'a person believes,' it also clarifies that faith is the agent in the act of believing for those associated mental states to which faith imparts a special quality. For the activity of a part is spoken of as belonging to the whole. To show that not only is the unwholesome lack of faith the occurrence of a non-lucid attitude towards a lucid object, but also the occurrence of a lucid attitude towards a non-lucid object, it is called 'wrong resolution.' Thereby, it speaks of the utmost lack of faith in the confidence towards Pūraṇa and others. By 'being lucid,' it wards off the lack of faith which is non-lucid. By 'based on an object,' it wards off wrong resolution. Then, by 'a lucid conviction,' making the already clarified meaning evident, it says, 'it is not a merely temporary resolution.' Lucidity is non-turbidity; and that, due to being an unagitated state, is called 'an unclouded state.' For faith, arranging this in its associated states, has non-turbidity as its manifestation. As 'it is so,' since it is to be grasped in the manner of resolving, it has resolution as its manifestation. In 'objects such as the Buddha,' it should be understood that the connections to this world, the next world, and the results of kamma are also included. From such sayings as, 'The noble disciple, Mahānāma, has faith as his hand,' 'Faith here is a person's best wealth' (Saṃ. Ni. 1.246; Su. Ni. 184), and 'Faith is the seed, austerity the rain' (Saṃ. Ni. 1.197; Su. Ni. 77), faith should be seen as being like hands and so on in the taking up of wholesome qualities.

‘‘Idha bhikkhunā kammaṃ kattabbaṃ hoti. Tassa evaṃ hoti ‘kammaṃ kho me kattabbaṃ bhavissati, kammaṃ kho pana me karontassa na sukaraṃ buddhānaṃ sāsanaṃ manasi kātuṃ, handāhaṃ vīriyaṃ ārabhāmi appattassa pattiyā anadhigatassa adhigamāya asacchikatassa sacchikiriyāyā’’’ti (dī. ni. 3.335) –

Here, a monk has work to do. He thinks, 'I will have work to do, and while doing work, it will not be easy for me to attend to the teaching of the Buddhas. Well then, let me arouse energy for the attainment of the unattained, for the achievement of the unachieved, for the realization of the unrealized' (Dī. Ni. 3.335) –

Ādikā anurūpapaccavekkhaṇā.

Beginning with appropriate reflection.

Taṃmūlakānīti gantabbamaggādimūlakāni. Ettha ca maggo gantabbo hotītiādayo aṭṭhakathāyaṃ dassanavaseneva vuttā, na pāḷiyaṃ āgatānukkamenāti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

'Having that as their root' means having the path to be travelled and so on as their root. And here, it should be understood that such phrases as 'the path is to be travelled' are stated in the commentary merely by way of example, not in the sequence that has come down in the Pāḷi text.

Karaṇādikāle viya cirakatādiārammaṇaṃ vibhūtaṃ katvā pavattantī sati taṃ upagantvā tiṭṭhantī anissajjantī ca hoti. Yaṃ ārammaṇaṃ sammuṭṭhaṃ, taṃ pilavitvā gataṃ viya calitaṃ viya ca hoti, tappaṭipakkhabhāvena pana asammuṭṭhanti imamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘udake alābu viyā’’tiādimāha. Tattha sāraṇanti etena ‘‘saranti tāyā’’ti imamevatthaṃ vibhāveti. Saraṇakiriyāya hi pavattamānānaṃ dhammānaṃ tattha ādhipaccabhāvena sati paccayo. Tassā hi tathā paccayabhāve sati te dhammā sāritā asammuṭṭhakatā apilāvitāhontīti. ‘‘Imehi nāma hetūhi paccayehi ca ete dhammā sambhavantī’’ti sambhavato. ‘‘Imaṃ nāma phalaṃ nibbattentī’’ti phalato dhammā uppajjanena vipaccanena ca nipphannā nāma hontīti. Vatthubhūtāti ārammaṇabhūtā.

Mindfulness, occurring by making a long-past object distinct, as at the time of performing an action, approaches it, stays with it, and does not let it go. An object that is forgotten is like something that has floated away or moved; but to show this meaning, that due to its opposite nature it is not forgotten, he says, 'like a gourd on water,' and so on. Here, by 'remembering,' he clarifies this very meaning: 'they remember by means of it.' For mindfulness is a condition for phenomena that are occurring through the act of remembering, by way of its dominance there. For when it is a condition in that way, those phenomena are brought to mind, are not forgotten, and do not float away. 'These phenomena arise due to these causes and conditions'—thus from their arising. 'They produce this result'—thus from the result, phenomena are said to be accomplished through arising and maturing. 'Being the basis' means being the object.

Satipi sabbesaṃ sārammaṇadhammānaṃ ārammaṇaggahaṇe na cittaṃ viya pare paricchijjagāhinoti ‘‘paricchinnopaladdhivasena jānātī’’ti cittaṃ vuttaṃ. Cetasikesu hi keci visayaṃ paricchijja gahetuṃ na sakkonti, keci pana paricchedamatteyeva [Pg.97] tiṭṭhanti, na viññāṇaṃ viya visayaṃ gaṇhantīti ye āsaṅkitabbā, tesu tadabhāvaṃ dassento ‘‘na saññā…pe… vijjhanavasenā’’ti āha.

Although all states with an object grasp an object, others are not like the mind, which grasps by delimiting; therefore, it is said that the mind 'knows by way of clearly defined apprehension.' For among mental factors, some are unable to grasp an object by delimiting it, while others stop at mere delimitation and do not apprehend the object like consciousness. To show the absence of this in those factors that might be suspected, it is said, 'Not perception... by way of piercing.'

Pītiyā ca somanassabhāvo āpajjatīti idaṃ pīti ca somanassañca pītisomanassanti pītisomanassānaṃ tulyayogaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Somanassasseva pana ‘‘ājaññaratho’’ti viya pītiyuttaṃ somanassaṃ pītisomanassanti padhānabhāvo icchitoti na pītiyā somanassabhāvappatti. Na hi padhāne vijjamāne appadhānaṃ upayujjati, pītiggahaṇañcettha pītiyuttassa somanassassa yebhuyyena bhāvato paribyattakiccato ca kataṃ, na ca nippītikasomanassassa asaṅgaho. Ruḷhīsaddesu kiriyāya anaccantikabhāvato. Pītiyā pana upalakkhaṇabhāvena ayamattho suṭṭhu yujjatīti dassento āha ‘‘pītiupalakkhitaṃ vā’’tiādi.

And as to the statement that a state of gladness is attained from rapture, the term 'rapture-gladness' is said with reference to the equal yoking of rapture and gladness. However, just as with 'a thoroughbred chariot,' 'rapture-gladness' means gladness conjoined with rapture, where the predominance of gladness is intended; therefore, it is not the attainment of a state of gladness from rapture. For when the principal exists, the subordinate is not employed. The inclusion of 'rapture' here is made because gladness associated with rapture is generally present and because of its manifest function; this does not exclude gladness without rapture, because in conventional terms, the action is not constant. But, showing that this meaning is quite suitable by way of rapture being a characteristic mark, he said, 'or characterized by rapture,' and so on.

Pavattaṃ upādinnakkhandhaṃ. Ciraṭṭhitikaṃ hotīti etena na kevalaṃ anupāletabbadhammānaṃ khaṇaṭṭhitiyāyeva, atha kho pabandhānupacchedassapi jīvitaṃ kāraṇanti dasseti. Aññathā hi āyukkhayamaraṇaṃ na yujjeyyāti. Avisesenāti kāraṇavisesānapekkhena jīvitindriyatāsāmaññena. Yadipi arūpāsaññabhavesu rūpārūpadhammā nappavattanti, tehi pana purimapacchimabhavesu carimapaṭhamadhammā samānajātiyena abyavahitatāya nirantarāyeva nāma hontīti ‘‘yāva parinibbānaṃ avicchinnaṃ pavattatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Anupālanādikassāti anupālanapavattanaṭṭhapanāniyeva vadati. Jīvamānavisesappaccayabhāvatoti sahajātānaṃ jīvamānatāvisesassa paccayabhāvato. Indriyabaddhassa hi matarūpato kammajassa ca utujādito viseso jīvitindriyakatoti.

The appropriated aggregates continue. It is long-lasting—this shows that life is a condition not merely for the momentary existence of things that need to be maintained, but also for the non-interruption of the continuity. Otherwise, death due to the exhaustion of the lifespan would not be tenable. Without distinction—this refers to the general nature of the life faculty, without regard to specific causes. Even though in the formless and non-percipient existences material and immaterial phenomena do not occur, in the preceding and subsequent existences the last and first phenomena, being of the same nature and without interval, are indeed continuous. Thus, it is said, 'It continues unbroken until final Nibbāna.' As for maintenance and so on—this refers only to sustaining, continuing, and establishing. Because it is a condition for the distinctive state of being alive among co-arisen phenomena. For the distinction of the material form bound by a faculty from dead matter, and of kamma-born matter from that produced by temperature and so on, is made by the life faculty.

Maggaṅgarāsivaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Aggregate of Path Factors

Aviparītaniyyānikabhāvenāti idaṃ sammā-saddassa diṭṭhi-ādisaddānañca samānādhikaraṇatāvasena diṭṭhiādīnaṃ avisesabhūtassa niyyānikabhāvassa sammā-saddena visesitabbattā vuttaṃ. Aviparītattho hi sammā-saddo, na niyyānikatthoti. Aviparītaniyyānikattho eva vā sammā-saddo. Anekatthā hi nipātāti. Evamevāti aviparītaniyyānikabhāvena.

By way of its nature as an unperverted leading-out—this is said because, due to the appositional relationship of the word “right” with “view” and the like, the leading-out nature of view and the like, being undifferentiated, must be qualified by the word “right.” For the word “right” means “unperverted,” not “leading-out.” Or, the word “right” itself means “unperverted leading-out,” for particles indeed have multiple meanings. In this very way—that is, by way of its nature as an unperverted leading-out.

Balarāsivaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Aggregate of Powers

Patissavo [Pg.98] vacanasampaṭiggahoti adhippāyena ‘‘sappatissavaṃ patissavabhūtaṃ taṃsabhāgañca yaṃ kiñci gārava’’nti āha. Tattha tattha pākaṭabhāvenāti ajjhattabhūtesu jātiyādīsu bahiddhābhūtesu bhikkhuādīsu hirottappānaṃ anurūpapaccavekkhaṇavasena sasambhārapathavīādīsu pathavīdhātuādīnaṃ viya vibhūtakiccabhāvenāti attho.

The statement, 'with respectful hearing, being respectful hearing, and whatever respect is of a similar nature,' is made with the intention that `patissava` means 'the acceptance of a word.' The meaning of 'by its manifestation here and there' is that, through appropriate reflection on shame and moral dread regarding internal things such as birth and so on, and external things such as monks and so on, its function becomes manifest, like that of the earth element and so on in the case of the earth with its constituents and so on.

Mūlarāsivaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Aggregate of Roots

Evañhi upamāya sametīti yathā asucimhi patitapurisassa satipi kāyena allīyane bhāvo anallīno, evaṃ alobhopi ārammaṇakaraṇavasena gahitepi ārammaṇe alaggabhāvena anallīnabhāvo anallīnākāro eva pavattati. Evaṃsabhāvo hi so dhammoti. Kiñci dussīlyaṃ dosasamuṭṭhānaṃ sabbampi dussīlyaṃ dosūpanissayanti ‘‘dosasamuṭṭhānataṃ dosūpanissayatañcā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tena adoso dosasseva ujuvipaccanīko, taṃmukhena dussīlyassāti dasseti.

Thus it corresponds with the simile: just as a man fallen into filth, even when his body is in contact, maintains a state of non-adherence, so too non-greed, even when an object is grasped as an object, proceeds with a state of non-clinging, a characteristic of non-adherence. Such indeed is the nature of that phenomenon. Since whatever immorality arises from aversion, and all such immorality is dependent on aversion, it is said, 'having aversion as its origin and aversion as its support.' By this it is shown that non-aversion is the direct opposite of aversion, and through that, of immorality.

Tattha jātānaṃ dhammānaṃ anativattanaṭṭhena…pe… āsevanaṭṭhena bhāvanāti yo so ekattupagato paṭhamajjhānādiappanācittuppādo āsannūpacārāhitaviseso nīvaraṇādiparipanthavisuddhiyā visuddho, tadāvaraṇavisayavirahena ca samappavattaappanāsamādhisaṅkhātaṃ majjhimaṃ samathanimittaṃ paṭipanno, evaṃ paṭipannattā eva tatthupagamanena tattha ca pakkhando, visodhetabbassa vikkhepassa kilesasaṃsaggassa ca abhāvato visodhanasamādhānaekattupaṭṭhānabyāpāravirahena visuddhisamathapaṭipattiekattupaṭṭhānākāre ajjhupekkhanto abhibyattarūpāya sahajātatatramajjhattupekkhāya kiccavasena upekkhānubrūhito, tasmiṃyeva jātā samādhipaññāsaṅkhātā yuganaddhadhammā. Te yathā aññaṃ anativattamānā hutvā pavattanti, evaṃ bhāvanā brūhanā. Tathā yāni tattha saddhādīni indriyāni nānākilesehi vimuttattā vimuttirasena ekarasāni hutvā pavattāni. Yañca tattha tadupagaṃ, tesaṃ anativattanaekarasabhāvānaṃ anucchavikaṃ vīriyaṃ vāhīyati pavattīyati, yā cassa tasmiṃ khaṇe pavattā paguṇabalavabhāvāpattisaṅkhātā āsevanā. Sabbesaṃ etesaṃ ākārānaṃ bhāvanā uppādanā vaḍḍhanā, ayaṃ tattha jātānaṃ…pe… āsevanaṭṭhena bhāvanā nāma.

Therein, development by way of non-transgression of the states that have arisen… and by way of repeated practice is as follows. There is that unified arising of absorption consciousness in the first jhāna and so on, which is distinguished by the access concentration that has been brought about, purified by the purification from hindrances and other obstructions, and which, due to the absence of its obstructive objects, has attained the intermediate serenity sign known as evenly proceeding absorption concentration. Because of having so attained, by approaching it and inclining towards it, and due to the absence of disturbance to be purified and of association with defilements, one is devoid of the activity of purifying, concentrating, and establishing unification, and looks on with equanimity at the mode of the single establishment of the practice of purification and serenity, augmented by the functionally manifest, co-arisen equanimity of neutrality towards that. In that very state arise the paired states known as concentration and wisdom. The development and cultivation of these is how they proceed without transgressing one another. Similarly, the faculties of faith and so on, being liberated from various defilements, proceed with the single taste of liberation. And whatever is conducive to that, the appropriate effort for their non-transgressive, single-taste nature is carried on and proceeds, as does the repeated practice occurring at that moment, known as the attainment of a proficient and strong state. The development of all these modes is their production and increase. This is called development by way of the non-transgression of what has arisen therein… and by way of repeated practice.

Yasmā [Pg.99] panāyaṃ bhāvanākāro ‘‘paṭhamassa jhānassa paṭipadāvisuddhi ādī’’tiādināpi (paṭi. ma. 1.158) pāḷiyaṃ āgato eva, ñāṇena ca saṃkilesavodānesu taṃ taṃ ādīnavaṃ ānisaṃsañca disvā tathā tathā nipphādetabbo, tasmā ‘‘evaṃ vuttāya paññāsādhanāya bhāvanāyā’’ti vuttaṃ. Appavattīti yasmiṃ dhamme sati yathāvuttā bhāvanā nappavattati, so dhammo paṭipakkhabhāvanāparāmasanena abhāvanāti vuttoti adhippāyo. Na hi abhāvamattassa amoho paṭipakkhoti yujjatīti. Tappaṭipakkhabhūtā akusalā kāmacchandādayo daṭṭhabbā. Pamādaviseso vā abhāvanā. So hi ‘‘kusalānaṃ vā dhammānaṃ anāsevanā abhāvanā abahulīkamma’’ntiādinā niddiṭṭhoti.

Moreover, since this mode of cultivation is also found in the Pāli canon, as in the passage beginning, “the purification of the practice of the first jhāna…” (Paṭisambhidāmagga 1.158), and since it should be brought about accordingly through wisdom, having seen the respective drawbacks and benefits in defilements and purifications, therefore it is said, “Thus, for the cultivation described as the accomplishment of wisdom.” The meaning is that “non-occurrence” refers to the state in which, when it is present, the aforementioned cultivation does not occur; that state is called “non-cultivation” by way of reflecting on the counteracting cultivation. For it is not tenable that non-delusion is the opposite of mere absence. Rather, the unwholesome states such as sensual desire, which are its opposites, should be understood. Or, non-cultivation is a particular form of negligence, for it is specified as “non-pursuit, non-cultivation, and non-development of wholesome states,” and so on.

Ekantena alabbhaneyyadassanatthaṃ ‘‘jarādhammo’’ti vuttaṃ. Tathā hi pāḷiyaṃ ‘‘jātidhammānaṃ, bhikkhave, sattānaṃ evaṃ icchā uppajjatī’’tiādinā (ma. ni. 3.373) icchitālābho vibhatto. Alobhānubhāvena kāyānupassanāya, amohānubhāvena cittadhammānupassanāya siddhi pākaṭāyevāti apākaṭaṃ adosānubhāvena vedanānupassanāsiddhiṃ vibhāvento ‘‘sukhavipariṇāme’’tiādimāha. Ayañca yojanā alobhādīnaṃ visesapaccayataṃ sandhāya katā, avisesena pana sabbe sabbesaṃ paccayā. Sabhāvato saṅkappato ca uppannassa dukkhassa asahanavaseneva uppajjatīti doso taṃdassanassa āsannapaṭipakkho, na rāgo viya dūrapaṭipakkho.

To show that it is utterly unattainable, it is said, “subject to aging.” Indeed, in the Pāli texts, the non-attainment of what is desired is explained with phrases like, “Monks, for beings subject to birth, such a wish arises” (MN 3.373). The success of body contemplation through the power of non-greed, and the success of mind and mental phenomena contemplation through the power of non-delusion, are both evident. However, to clarify the less evident success of feeling contemplation through the power of non-hatred, it is stated, “with the change of pleasure,” and so on. This explanation is given with reference to the specific conditionality of non-greed and the others, but in a general sense, all are conditions for each other. Hatred, which arises by way of not enduring suffering that has arisen by nature and by intention, is the immediate opponent to that perception of suffering, unlike lust, which is a distant opponent.

Kammapatharāsivaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Aggregate of Kamma-paths

Abhijjhādayo viya anabhijjhādayopi na ekantaṃ kammapathabhūtāyevāti āha ‘‘kammapathatātaṃsabhāgatāhī’’ti. Manokammapathabhāvena pavattanakammabhāvato hi etesaṃ kammapatharāsibhāvena saṅgaho, na sabbadā kammapathāyevāti. Tena yo aññopi dhammo aniyato kammapathabhāvena pākaṭo ca, tassapi kammapathatāvacanaṃ na virujjhatīti dasseti.

Just as covetousness and the like, so too non-covetousness and the like are not exclusively kamma-paths—thus it is said: 'by partaking of the characteristic of kamma-paths.' For these are included in the aggregate of kamma-paths due to their nature as mental kamma-paths and their occurrence as generating kamma, but they are not always actual kamma-paths. By this it is shown that for any other phenomenon that is not invariably a kamma-path but is manifest as one, the designation 'kamma-path' is not contradicted.

Passaddhādiyugalavaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Pair Beginning with Tranquility

Samanti [Pg.100] sammā. Cetiyavandanādiatthanti cetiyavandanādihetu. Samathacatusaccakammaṭṭhānavasena tabbhedavasena ca sabbakammaṭṭhānabhāvanābhiyuttānaṃ mudumajjhimatikkhindriyatādibhedavasena sabbayogīnaṃ cittassa līnuddhaccādikālavasena sabbadā hitāhitadhammūpalakkhaṇabhāvato yathāsabhāvaṃ paṭivedhabhāvato ca satisampajaññānaṃ pāribandhakaharaṇabhāvanāvaḍḍhanāni avisesato daṭṭhabbāni. Yathā appanākosallena vinā samatho samathamantarena yathābhūtāvabodho ca natthīti nānākkhaṇikā samādhipaññā aññamaññassa visesakāraṇaṃ, evaṃ paṭivedhe ekakkhaṇikāpīti dassento āha ‘‘aññamaññaṃ nimittabhāvenā’’ti. Paññāya hi sātisayaṃ avabhāsiyamāne visaye samādhi ekattavasena appetuṃ sakkoti, samādhimhi ca majjhimaṃ samathanimittaṃ paṭipanne paññā ārammaṇesu visadā vahatīti. Samaṃ pavattāti aññamaññānativattanena samaṃ avisamaṃ ekarasabhāvena pavattā. Aññamaññasahāyabhāvūpagamanena yogino manorathadhurākaḍḍhane rathadhurākaḍḍhane viya ājāneyyayugo yugalako hutvā aññamaññānativattamānena naddhā baddhā viyāti vā yuganaddhā. Adhicittamanuyuttehi vīriyasamādhayo samaṃ yojetabbāti imassa visesassa dassanatthaṃ pubbe gahitāpi te puna gahitāti dassetuṃ vīriyasamādhiyojanatthāyāti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaṃ. Taṃ pana samādhivīriyayogassa vibhāvanaṃ hotīti ‘‘yogavacanatthāyāti attho’’ti āha.

“Samanti” means “rightly.” “For the purpose of worshipping shrines, etc.” means for the sake of worshipping shrines and the like. For all meditators engaged in the development of all meditation subjects by way of the meditation subjects of serenity and the four truths, as well as by way of their subdivisions, and for all yogis distinguished by having weak, medium, or sharp faculties, at all times, in accordance with the occasions of the mind’s sinking or restlessness, the removal of what is obstructive and the enhancement of the development of mindfulness and clear comprehension should be seen without exception, owing to their observing beneficial and harmful states and penetrating them according to their intrinsic nature. Just as serenity cannot be attained without skill in absorption, nor true understanding without serenity, and just as concentration and wisdom arising at different moments are a special cause for one another, so too in penetration, even in a single moment—to show this, it is said, “by way of being a sign for one another.” For when wisdom illuminates an object with surpassing clarity, concentration is able to fix upon it by way of unification. And when concentration has attained the middle sign of serenity, wisdom flows clearly among its objects. “They proceed evenly” means they proceed evenly, without surpassing one another, without imbalance, with a single harmonious nature. “Yoked together” (yuganaddhā) means that by attaining a state of mutual assistance, like a yoked pair of thoroughbreds pulling the yoke of a chariot, they pull the yoke of the yogi’s aspiration, not surpassing one another, as if bound and tied. To illustrate this distinction—“For those devoted to the higher mind, energy and concentration should be evenly yoked”—though previously mentioned, energy and concentration are mentioned again here for the purpose of yoking them, as stated in the commentary. That, however, is an elucidation of the yoking of concentration and energy; thus, it is said, “This is for the purpose of explaining the meaning of the term ‘yoke.’”

Yevāpanakavaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Yevāpanaka

Yathā tathā vāti sammā micchā vā. Anadhimuccantoti ‘‘idaṃ karissāmi, etaṃ karissāmī’’ti evaṃ pavattapubbabhāgasanniṭṭhānahetukena payogakālasanniṭṭhānena anicchinanto. Yattha hi anicchayo, tattha appaṭipatti evāti. Saṃsappanaṃ saṃsayo. So hi ‘‘āsappanā parisappanā’’ti vutto. Asatipi byāpāre tatramajjhattatāya sati taṃsampayuttadhammā sakasakakiccavasena anūnānadhikatāya alīnaanuddhatatāya ca saṃvattantīti sā tesaṃ tathāpavattiyā paccayabhūtā ūnādhikabhāvaṃ nivāreti viyāti ūnādhikanivāraṇarasā vuttā. Tathā pavattipaccayattāyeva tesu dhammesu majjhattatāti ca vuttā.

“Yathā tathā vā” means “in whatever way,” that is, “rightly or wrongly.” “Not resolving” means not being decided, not wishing with the kind of resolve at the time of application—which is caused by a resolve in the preliminary stage that has occurred thus: “I will do this, I will do that.” For where there is no decision, there is no practice. Vacillation is doubt, for it is said to be “wavering, complete wavering.” Even when there is no exertion, when there is neutrality, the states associated with it proceed according to their respective functions without deficiency or excess, and without being either lax or agitated. Thus, because it is a condition for their proceeding in such a way, it is as if it prevents a state of deficiency and excess, and so it is said to have the characteristic of preventing deficiency and excess. And precisely because it is a condition for their proceeding thus, it is also called neutrality towards those states.

Jhānapadassāti [Pg.101] jhānasaddassa. Tesūti pañcasu. Pañca hi aṅgāni jhānapadassa atthoti idaṃ saṃvaṇṇiyamānattāyeva imaṃ cittuppādaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Na hi sabbasmiṃ cittuppāde pañceva jhānaṅgāni. Padasamūho vākyaṃ, padakoṭṭhāso vā phassapañcamakādi dhammarāsi. Vuttaṃ pūritanti chapaṇṇāsāditāya pūraṇavasena. Phassapaccayā vedanā ‘‘phuṭṭho vedeti, phuṭṭho sañjānātī’’tiādivacanato (saṃ. ni. 4.93) phasso vedanādīnaṃ paccayo. Yadipi chandādayo yathāvuttarāsikiccābhāvato tesu na vattabbā, visuṃ rāsiantarabhāvena pana sarūpato vattabbāti codanaṃ manasi katvā ‘‘vuttānampī’’tiādimāha.

“Of the term ‘jhāna’” means of the word ‘jhāna.’ “In those” means in the five. For it is because there are five factors that are the meaning of the word ‘jhāna’ that this is stated with reference to this arising of consciousness, precisely because it is being explained. For not in every arising of consciousness are there only five jhāna factors. A collection of terms is a sentence, or a division of a term is a collection of phenomena, such as the pentad with contact as the fifth. “Stated is fulfilled” means in the sense of completion, by way of completing to fifty-six, etc. Contact is the condition for feeling; from the statement, “Having been touched, one feels; having been touched, one perceives,” etc. (SN 4.93), contact is the condition for feeling and the like. Although desire and the like are not to be stated among those groups, due to the absence of the function of the group as stated, still, keeping in mind the objection that they are to be stated according to their own nature as a different group separately, he says, “Even of those stated,” etc.

Dhammuddesavārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse of the Dhammuddesa Section is concluded.

Kāmāvacarakusalaṃ

Wholesome [Consciousness] of the Sensuous Sphere

Niddesavārakathāvaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Discourse of the Niddesa Section

2. Santeti sabhāvato vijjamāne. Phassassa visayavisayīnaṃ sannipatanākārena gahetabbattā phusanaṃ visaye cittassa sannipatanaṃ vuttaṃ. ‘‘Cintanaṭṭhena cittaṃ, mananaṭṭhena mano’’tiādinā cittādisaddā cintanādibyāpāramukhena attano atthaṃ vibhāventīti āha ‘‘cittaṃ manotiādīsu viya kiccavisesaṃ anapekkhitvā’’ti. Yathā loke vikatameva vekataṃ, visayo eva vesayanti vuccati, evaṃ mano eva mānasanti saddamattaviseso. Nīlādi-saddā viya vatthādīsu cittesu parisuddhabhāvanibandhanā paṇḍarasaddassa pavattīti tassa guṇavisesāpekkhatā vuttā. Yathā kāyikaṃ sātanti ettha kāyappasādanissitanti attho, evaṃ cetasikaṃ sātanti ettha cetonissitaṃ sātanti nissayavisesāpekkhatā vuttā. Ekakkhaṇikā nānākkhaṇikā ca cittassa ṭhiti nāma, tassa avatthāvisesoti avatthāvisesāpekkho cittassa ṭhitīti evaṃpakāro niddeso. ‘‘Na lubbhatī’’ti vuttassa cittassa, puggalassa vā pavattiākārabhāvena alubbhanāti alobho vuttoti aññassa kiriyābhāvavisesāpekkho alubbhanāti niddeso. Vuttanayeneva alubbhitassa bhāvo alubbhitattanti ayaṃ niddeso aññassa bhāvabhūtatāvisesāpekkho vutto. Kattukaraṇabhāvādayo sabhāvadhammānaṃ ajjhāropanavaseneva sijjhanti[Pg.102], bhāvaniddeso pana ajjhāropanānapekkho, tatoyeva ca visesantaravinimutto vinivatto visesato nijjīvabhāvagibhāvato sabhāvaniddeso nāma hotīti phassoti idaṃ phusanaṭṭhena ‘‘dhammamattadīpanaṃ sabhāvapada’’nti vuttaṃ. Ārammaṇaṃ phusantassa cittassa pavattiākāro phusanabyāpāro hotīti ‘‘phusanakiriyā phusanākāro’’ti vuttaṃ. Samphusanāti saṃ-saddo ‘‘samudayo’’tiādīsu viya samāgamatthadīpakoti āha ‘‘samāgamaphusanā’’ti. ‘‘Phusāmi nekkhammasukha’’ntiādīsu (dha. pa. 272) paṭilābhopi phusanā samphusanāti ca vuccatīti āha ‘‘na paṭilābhasamphusanā’’ti.

2. “Sante” means “existing by nature.” Because contact (phassa) is to be understood as the mode of the meeting of object and subject, “touching” (phusana) is said to be the mind's meeting with the object. Because words like “citta,” “mano,” etc., by means of the statement, “Mind (citta) in the sense of thinking, intellect (mano) in the sense of pondering,” etc., clarify their own meaning primarily through their function of thinking, etc., he says, “without regard to a specific function, as in the case of ‘citta,’ ‘mano,’ etc.” Just as in the world, what is distorted (vikata) is called “vekata,” and an object (visaya) is called “vesaya,” so too mind (mano) is called “mental” (mānasa)—this is merely a difference in sound. Just as words like “blue,” etc., are used for objects, etc., so the word “bright” (paṇḍara) is used for minds based on their state of purity; thus, its dependence on a special quality is stated. Just as “bodily pleasure” here means pleasure dependent on bodily sensitivity, so “mental pleasure” means pleasure dependent on the mind; thus, a dependence on a specific basis is stated. The stability (ṭhiti) of the mind, whether momentary or lasting, is a specific condition of it; thus, the stability of the mind is an explanation that is dependent on a specific condition. With regard to the mind or person of whom it is said, “one does not cling,” non-greed (alobha) is called non-clinging (alubbhanā) by way of its mode of occurrence; thus, non-clinging is an explanation that is dependent on the specific absence of another’s action. In the same way, the state of one who does not cling is called “the state of not having clung” (alubbhitatta); this explanation is said to be dependent on the specific state of being of another. The state of being an agent, an instrument, etc., is established for intrinsic phenomena only by way of superimposition, but the explanation of their state is independent of superimposition. Therefore, because it is freed from and turned away from other distinctions, and especially because it is a lifeless part, it is called an explanation of intrinsic nature. Thus, “contact” (phassa), in the sense of touching, is said to be “a term for intrinsic nature, a mere indicator of a phenomenon.” The mode of occurrence of the mind touching an object is the activity of touching; thus, it is called “the action of touching, the mode of touching.” In “contact” (samphusanā), the prefix “sam-,” as in “arising” (samudaya), etc., indicates the meaning of “coming together”; thus, he says, “contact as coming together.” Because in statements like “I touch the bliss of renunciation” (Dhammapada 272), attainment is also called “touching” and “contact,” he says, “not contact as attainment.”

Aparena vevacanena. Bahussutabhāvasampādikāya paññāya paṇḍiccapariyāyo. Sippāyatanādīsu dakkhatābhūtāya kosallapariyāyo, yattha katthaci tikkhasukhumāya nepuññapariyāyo, sammā dhamme paññapentiyā vebhabyāpariyāyoti evamādinā tesu tesu paññāvisesesu te te pariyāyavisesā visesena pavattāti tesaṃ paññāvisesānaṃ nānākāle labbhamānatā vuttā, itarepi anugatā honti yebhuyyenāti adhippāyo. Atthanānattena paññādiatthavisesena. Kodho kujjhanā kujjhitattanti evaṃpakārā niddesā sabhāvākārabhāvadīpanavasena byañjanavaseneva vibhāgavacanaṃ. Paṇḍiccantiādayo paññāvisesanibandhanattā atthavasena vibhāgavacananti imamatthamāha ‘‘atha vā’’tiādinā. Evamākāro panāti purimākārato viseso atthato vibhattigamanassa kāraṇaṃ vuttaṃ.

By another expression. For wisdom that accomplishes the state of being very learned, it is an expression for erudition (paṇḍicca). For wisdom that is adeptness in crafts and other fields, it is an expression for skillfulness. For wisdom that is sharp and subtle in any matter whatsoever, it is an expression for sagacity. For wisdom that rightly makes known the Dhamma, it is an expression for proficiency. Thus, and so on, for these various distinctions of wisdom, those specific expressions are especially used. The attainability of those distinctions of wisdom at various times is stated, and the intention is that the others also generally follow. By the diversity of meaning, there are distinctions by way of specific meanings like wisdom and so on. “Anger, irascibility, the state of being angry”—such definitions are analytical statements based solely on expression, by way of clarifying nature, mode, and state. Terms like “erudition” (paṇḍicca) and others, being based on distinctions of wisdom, are analytical statements based on meaning—this meaning is stated by “or else,” and so on. Now, as for this mode, the difference from the previous mode is stated as the reason for the grammatical distinction in meaning.

Paṭikkhipanaṃ paṭisedhanaṃ paṭikkhepo, tassa nānattaṃ viseso paṭikkhepanānattaṃ, saddhammagarutāya paṭikkhepo saddhammagarutāpaṭikkhepo, tena saddhammagarutāpaṭikkhepena nānattaṃ saddhammagarutāpaṭikkhepanānattaṃ. Taṃ saddhammagarutāpaṭikkhepanānattaṃ pana kodhagarutādibhedabhinnanti ‘‘kodhagarutādivisiṭṭhenā’’ti vuttaṃ. Kodhādīhi visiṭṭho bhinno saddhammagarutāya paṭikkhepo paṭisedhanaṃ kodhādivisiṭṭhapaṭikkhepo. Kodhagarutādiyeva, tassa nānattena saddhammagarutāpaṭipakkhanānattenāti kodhagarutā saddhammagarutāya paṭipakkho. Makkhalābhasakkāragarutā saddhammagarutāya paṭipakkhoti saddhammagarutāya paṭipakkhabhāvavisesena asaddhammagarutā tabbhāvena [Pg.103] ekībhūtāpi nānattaṃ gatā. Yasmā pana kodho atthato dosoyeva. Makkho dosappadhānā paraguṇaviddhaṃsanākārappavattā akusalā khandhā. Taggarutā ca tesaṃ sādaraabhisaṅkharaṇavasena pavattanameva. Lābhagarutā catunnaṃ paccayānaṃ sakkāragarutā, tesaṃyeva susaṅkhatānaṃ laddhakāmatā. Tadubhayesu ca ādarakiriyā tathāpavattā icchāyeva, tasmā ‘‘saddhammagarutāpaṭipakkhanānattena asaddhammā nānattaṃ gatā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tathā hi cattāro asaddhammā icceva uddiṭṭhā. Asaddhammagarutāti ettha ca purimasmiṃ vikappe ‘‘na saddhammagarutā’’ti saddhammagarutā na hotīti attho. Dutiyasmiṃ saddhammagarutāya paṭipakkhoti saddhammagarutā eva vā paṭipakkho, tassa nānattena saddhammagarutāpaṭipakkhanānattenāti evamettha attho daṭṭhabbo. Kodhamakkhagarutānañhi saddhammavisesā pavattibhedabhinnā mettā paṭipakkho. Lābhasakkāragarutānaṃ appicchatā santosā. Tena kodhagarutā na saddhammagarutāti kodhagarutā kāyaci saddhammagarutāya paṭipakkhoti ayamattho vutto hoti. Tathā makkhagarutādīsupi. Evañca katvā ‘‘cattāro saddhammā saddhammagarutā na kodhagarutā…pe… saddhammagarutā na sakkāragarutā’’ti (a. ni. 4.44) āgatatantipi samatthitā bhavati. Lobho na hotīti alobho lubbhanā na hotīti alubbhanāti evamādiko alobhotiādīnaṃ lobhādivisiṭṭho paṭikkhepo ‘‘phasso phusanā’’tiādikehi visadisabhāvato ‘‘phassādīhi nānatta’’nti vutto. Phassādīhīti cettha alubbhanādayopi ādi-saddena saṅgahitāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Lobhādipaṭipakkhenāti ‘‘lobhapaṭipakkho alobho’’tiādinā yojetabbaṃ. Sesaṃ purimasadisameva. Alobhādosāmohānaṃ vidhuratāya paṭipakkhabhāvena ca labbhamāno aññamaññavisadiso lobhādivisiṭṭhapaṭikkhepabhāvena lobhādipaṭipakkhabhāvena ca viññāyatīti āha ‘‘alobhā…pe… yojetabba’’nti. Bahūhi pakārehi dīpetabbatthatā mahatthatā. Ādaravasena sotūnaṃ.

Rejection is refusal, repudiation; its diversity is the distinctiveness of repudiation. Repudiation of reverence for the true Dhamma; its diversity is the diversity of repudiation of reverence for the true Dhamma. That diversity of repudiation of reverence for the true Dhamma, however, is differentiated by divisions such as reverence for anger; therefore it is said, 'distinguished by reverence for anger, etc.' The repudiation or refusal of reverence for the true Dhamma, distinguished from it by anger and the like, is repudiation distinguished by anger and the like. It is reverence for anger and so on itself; by its diversity, that is, by the diversity of its opposition to reverence for the true Dhamma, reverence for anger is the opposite of reverence for the true Dhamma. Reverence for hypocrisy, gain, and honor are opposites of reverence for the true Dhamma; thus, through the specific quality of being the opposite of reverence for the true Dhamma, reverence for what is not the true Dhamma, though unified in that nature, becomes diverse. For anger is essentially aversion. Hypocrisy consists of unwholesome aggregates that are rooted in aversion and manifest as the destruction of others' virtues. And reverence for that is merely their cultivation through attentive formation. Reverence for gain pertains to the four requisites, and reverence for honor is the desire for obtaining these same requisites when they are well-prepared. And in both of these, the act of paying attention, occurring in that way, is simply desire. Therefore, it is said, 'Through the diversity of opposition to reverence for the true Dhamma, what is not the true Dhamma becomes diverse.' Thus, the four things that are not the true Dhamma are indeed enumerated. And here, in 'reverence for what is not the true Dhamma,' in the first alternative, 'not reverence for the true Dhamma' means that it is not reverence for the true Dhamma. In the second, it means 'the opposite of reverence for the true Dhamma.' Or, reverence for the true Dhamma itself is the opposite, and 'by its diversity' means 'by the diversity of opposition to reverence for the true Dhamma.' Thus, the meaning here should be understood. For loving-kindness, which is distinguished by a difference in its mode of activity—a special quality of the true Dhamma—is the opposite of reverence for anger and hypocrisy. For reverence for gain and honor, fewness of wishes and contentment are the opposites. Thus, it is stated that reverence for anger is not reverence for the true Dhamma; rather, reverence for anger is in some way the opposite of reverence for the true Dhamma. The same meaning is intended for reverence for hypocrisy and the like. And in this way, the scriptural passage, 'The four true Dhammas are: reverence for the true Dhamma, not reverence for anger... reverence for the true Dhamma, not reverence for honor' (Aṅguttara Nikāya 4.44), is also properly established. Non-greed is the absence of greed; non-coveting is the absence of coveting—thus, the repudiation of non-greed and so on, which is distinguished from greed and so on, because of its dissimilar nature from phrases such as 'contact is touching,' is said to be 'diverse from contact and other factors.' Here, 'contact and other factors' should be understood to include non-coveting and similar terms under the word 'etc.' 'Opposed to greed and the like' should be connected with phrases like 'non-greed is the opposite of greed.' The rest is similar to the previous explanation. Because non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion are distinct and oppositional in nature, what is obtained as mutually dissimilar is discerned as the repudiation distinguished from greed and the like, and as the opposite of greed and the like. Hence it is said, 'Non-greed... should be connected.' Greatness of meaning is the need for it to be explained in many ways, on account of the listeners' attentiveness.

3. Yadipi ekasmiṃ khaṇe ekaṃyeva ārammaṇaṃ hoti, chasupi pana ārammaṇesu uppattirahattā ‘‘tehi vā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tassāti sātassa sukhassa. Jātāti etassa atthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘kāraṇabhāvena phassatthaṃ pavattā’’ti vuttaṃ. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – yathā cetasikasātasaṅkhātā somanassavedanā [Pg.104] saheva uppajjati, evaṃ tadanurūpaphassasahitā hutvā pavattā tajjāti vuttā. Sādayatīti adhigamāsīsāya anaññaninnaṃ karoti.

3. Although in a single moment there is only one object, because of its capability of arising in relation to the six objects, it is said, 'by those, or,' etc. 'Of that' means of that pleasantness, of that happiness. To show the meaning of 'born,' it is said, 'it occurs for the sake of contact, in the manner of a cause.' This is what is said: just as the feeling of joy, known as mental pleasantness, arises simultaneously, so too, occurring together with contact appropriate to it, it is called 'born of that.' 'It delights' means it makes one incline towards the hope of attainment, and not towards anything else.

5. Na tassā tajjatāti tassā manoviññāṇadhātuyā tassāruppā ‘‘tassa jātā’’ti vā ubhayathāpi tajjatā na yujjati. Yadipi phasso viññāṇassa visesapaccayo na hoti, tathāpi so tassa paccayo hotiyevāti tassa tajjāmanoviññāṇadhātusamphassajatā vattabbāti codanaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘na ca tadevā’’tiādi. Tehi ārammaṇehi jātā tajjāti imināpi atthena tajjā manoviññāṇadhātusamphassajāti vattuṃ na sakkā. Viññāṇassa pana tajjatāpaññatti labbhateva. Tathā hi ‘‘kiṃ vā etenā’’tiādinā phassādīnaṃ tathā desetabbataṃ āha.

5. 'Not born of that' means that for that mind-consciousness element, its arising from that or being 'born of that'—in either way, the designation 'born of that' is not suitable. Although contact is not a specific condition for consciousness, it is still indeed a condition for it. Thus, referring to the objection that it should be said that the mind-consciousness element born of contact is 'born of that,' he says, 'nor is it that very thing,' etc. Even with this meaning, 'born of those objects,' it cannot be said that the mind-consciousness element born of contact is 'born of that.' For consciousness, however, the designation 'born of that' is indeed obtained. For thus, with 'what then of this?' etc., he stated how contact and the other factors should be taught.

7. Cittassa ārammaṇe ānayanākārappavatto vitakko atthato ārammaṇaṃ tattha ākaḍḍhanto viya hotīti ‘‘ārammaṇassa ākaḍḍhanaṃ vitakkana’’nti vuttaṃ.

7. Applied thought, which functions by way of bringing the mind to the object, is essentially like drawing the object there; thus it is said, 'Applied thought is the drawing of the object.'

8. Ārammaṇassa anumajjanākārappavatto vicāro tattha paribbhamanto viya samantato caranto viya ca hotīti ‘‘samantato caraṇaṃ vicaraṇa’’nti vuttaṃ.

8. Sustained thought, which functions by way of repeatedly applying itself to the object, is like wandering around there or moving all around; thus it is said, 'Sustained thought is moving all around.'

11. Tathā avaṭṭhānamattabhāvatoti pāṇavadhādisādhanaavaṭṭhānamattabhāvato, na balavabhāvatoti adhippāyo.

11. Similarly, 'in the sense of being merely established' means in the sense of merely being established for the accomplishment of killing living beings and so forth, not in the sense of being strong—this is the intended meaning.

14. Yena dhammena citte ārammaṇaṃ upatiṭṭhati jotati ca, so dhammo upaṭṭhānaṃ jotananti ca vuttoti āha ‘‘upaṭṭhānaṃ jotanañca satiyevā’’ti.

14. The state by which an object is present to the mind and illuminates it—that state is called 'presence' and 'illumination.' Thus it is said, 'Presence and illumination are indeed mindfulness.'

16. Saṇhaṭṭhenāti sukhumaṭṭhena.

16. 'By the subtle meaning' means by the subtle meaning.

30. Bhāvoti hiriyanaṃ vadati.

30. 'Nature' refers to moral shame.

33. Na byāpādetabboti abyāpajja-saddassa kammatthataṃ āha.

33. 'Not to be harmed' indicates the passive sense of the word 'non-ill-will.'

42-43. Yadi anavajjadhammānaṃ sīghasīghaparivattanasamatthatā lahutā, sāvajjadhammānaṃ kathanti āha ‘‘avijjānīvaraṇāna’’ntiādi. Tesaṃ bhāvo [Pg.105] garutāti etena satipi sabbesaṃ arūpadhammānaṃ samānakhaṇatte mohasampayuttānaṃ sātisayo dandho pavattiākāroti dasseti. So pana tesaṃ dandhākāro santāne pākaṭo hoti.

42-43. If the lightness of blameless states is their ability to change quickly, what about blameworthy states? It is said, 'obscured by ignorance,' etc. Their being heaviness—this shows that even though all immaterial states have the same moment of arising, those associated with delusion have a particularly slow mode of occurrence. And that slow mode becomes evident in the continuum.

44-45. Appaṭighāto avilomanaṃ.

44-45. Non-opposition is non-aversion.

46-47. Kilinnanti avassutaṃ.

46-47. 'Stained' means obsessed.

50-51. Paccosakkanaṃ māyā yā accasarātipi vuccati. Arumakkhanaṃ vaṇālepanaṃ. Veḷu eva dātabbabhāvena pariggahito veḷudānaṃ nāma.

50-51. Pretending is deception, which is also called extreme insincerity. Smearing a sore is covering up wounds. Bamboo, when appropriated with the intention of giving, is called 'bamboo donation.'

Niddesavārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Niddesa section is complete.

Koṭṭhāsavārakathāvaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Section on Constituents

58-120. Teti phassapañcamakādayo. Saṅgahagamanenevāti sādhāraṇatādinā kenaci sadisatālesena, na phassādayo viya visuṃ dhammabhāvenevāti attho. Tathā avippakiṇṇattāti phassādayo viya sarūpena visuṃ visuṃ avuttattā. Yadipi chandādayo saṅgahasuññatavāresupi sarūpena na vuttā, khandhāyatanadhāturāsīsu pana saṅgahitāyevāti dassetuṃ ‘‘yasmā panā’’tiādimāha. Taṃniddeseti saṅkhārakkhandhaniddese. Khandhānaṃ dhātāyatanabhāve byabhicārābhāvato akhandhabhāvanivāraṇena anāyatanādhātubhāvanivāraṇampi daṭṭhabbaṃ. Na yevāpanakā ṭhapetabbāti khandhādirāsiantogadhataṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Uddesādīsu pana ‘‘yevāpanātveva vuttānaṃ tesaṃ tathāyeva saṅgaho yutto’’ti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘ṭhapetvā yevāpanake’’ti vuttaṃ. Sarūpena avuttānampi cittuppādapariyāpannānaṃ khandhādibhāvo na vāretabboti na yevāpanakā ṭhapetabbāti vuttanti ubhayesampi adhippāyo veditabbo.

58-120. These are those beginning with the pentad of contact. 'By way of inclusion alone' means by some slight similarity, such as commonality, not by being separate phenomena like contact and so on; that is the meaning. Similarly, 'because they are not scattered' means because they are not stated separately in their own nature like contact and so on. Although factors like intention are not stated separately in their own nature even in the sections on what is void of inclusion, they are indeed included in the heaps of aggregates, sense bases, and elements. To show this, he says, 'But because...' etc. This is explained in the definition of the formations aggregate. Since there is no deviation of the aggregates in being elements and sense bases, the prevention of their non-aggregate nature should also be seen as the prevention of their non-sense-base and non-element nature. 'The merely-mentioned should not be excluded'—this is said with reference to their being included within the categories of aggregates, etc. However, in the enumerations, etc., it is said in the commentary, 'excluding the merely-mentioned,' because it is said, 'for those stated as merely-mentioned, their inclusion is appropriate just so.' Even for those not stated in their own nature, their being aggregates, etc., for factors included in a consciousness-arising should not be prevented—thus, it is said that 'the merely-mentioned should not be excluded.' The intention of both statements should be understood.

Āhārapaccayasaṅkhātenāti upatthambhakapaccayasaṅkhātena. So ca āhārānaṃ upatthambhakabhāvo pākaṭoti katvā vutto, na janakattābhāvato. Ojaṭṭhamakarūpassa hi vedanādīnañca āhāraṇato tesaṃ janakattaṃ labbhatīti. Yadi upatthambhako idha paccayoti adhippeto, kabaḷīkārāhārassa tāva hotu, itaresaṃ kathanti āha ‘‘yathā hī’’tiādi[Pg.106]. Sahajātādipaccayeti sahajātaaññamaññanissayasampayuttaatthiavigatapaccaye vadati, mahācatukkaṃ vā, ekenākārenāti rūpārūpānaṃ upatthambhakattena upakārakabhāvamāha. So eva ca nesaṃ āharaṇakiccaṃ. ‘‘Saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇa’’nti vacanato cetanāya viññāṇassa paccayabhāvo sātisayoti āha ‘‘viññāṇaṃ visesenā’’ti.

'By what is designated the nutriment condition' means by what is designated the supporting condition. And this supporting nature of nutriments is stated because it is evident, not because of an absence of generative power. For, their generative power is obtained from nourishing the material form with nutriment as the eighth, and feelings, etc. If 'supporter' is intended here as the condition, let it be so for physical edible food, but what about the others? Thus, he says, 'Just as...' etc. 'By conditions of co-nascence, etc.' refers to the conditions of co-nascence, mutuality, dependence, association, presence, and non-disappearance—or the great tetrad—stating the helpful nature of supporting material and immaterial phenomena in one aspect. This is indeed their function of nourishing. From the statement, 'Formations condition consciousness,' he says, 'Consciousness, especially,' meaning that the conditioning nature of volition for consciousness is exceptional.

Yathāgatamaggoti vutto kāraṇaphalānaṃ abhedūpacārenāti daṭṭhabbaṃ, nānākkhaṇiko aṭṭhaṅgikamaggo upanissayo etassāti aṭṭhaṅgikamaggūpanissayo. Ariyamaggassa yathāgatamaggapariyāyo vuccamāno tassa yā purimakālabhūtā abhedopacārasiddhā āgamanāvatthā tato nātivilakkhaṇāti imamatthaṃ vibhāvetīti āha ‘‘pubbabhāga…pe… dīpitā’’ti. Viññāṇassa cittavicittatā vijānanabhāvavisesā evāti āha ‘‘vijānanameva cittavicittatā’’ti. Vedanākkhandhādīnanti ādi-saddena ‘‘dvāyatanāni hontī’’tiādīsu vuttamanāyatanādayopi saṅgaṇhāti. Tappaṭikkhepoti tassa jātiniddesabhāvassa paṭikkhepo. Kato hotīti etena āhārindriyajhānamaggaphalahetuyo yattakā imasmiṃ citte labbhanti, te sabbepi ‘‘eko viññāṇāhāro hotī’’tiādinā avuttāpi atthato vuttāyevāti dasseti. Esa nayo aññatthāpi.

It should be understood that 'the path as it has come' is said by way of a figurative expression of non-difference between cause and effect. The eightfold path, which occurs at different moments, is a strong dependence condition for this; hence the compound 'having the eightfold path as strong dependence condition.' When the noble path is being described by the term 'path as it has come,' he elucidates this meaning by saying, 'the preliminary part... has been explained,' indicating that its prior state, which existed in a previous time and was established by a figurative expression of non-difference as the state of its arrival, is not fundamentally different from it. The variety of consciousness is simply the particular characteristics of the state of cognizing—thus he says, 'cognizing itself is the variety of mind.' 'The aggregate of feeling, etc.'—by the term 'etc.,' he also includes the mind-base and others mentioned in passages such as 'there are two sense-bases.' 'The rejection of that'—this refers to the rejection of that state of being a designation of a category. 'It is done'—with this, it is shown that however many factors of nutriment, faculty, jhāna, path, fruit, and cause are found in this consciousness, all of these, though not explicitly stated, are indeed stated in meaning by the phrase, 'there is one nutriment of consciousness,' etc. This is the method elsewhere as well.

Koṭṭhāsavārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Section on Constituents is concluded.

Suññatavārādivaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Section on Emptiness, etc.

121-145. Yathāvutte samayeti vuttappakārasamūhe.

121-145. 'In the stated context' refers to the groups of the kind described.

146. Ussāhanaṃ pesanaṃ niyojanaṃ.

146. Instigation, dispatching, application.

156-159. Nātisamāhitāyāti nānāvajjanūpacāraṃ sandhāya vadati. Yevāpanakehipi nibbisesataṃ dasseti karuṇāmuditānampi uppajjanato.

156-159. 'Not overly concentrated'—he says this with reference to the access concentration of various kinds of adverting. He shows non-distinction even with regard to the merely-mentioned, because of the arising of compassion and sympathetic joy even in them.

Kāyavacīkiriyā kāyavacīpavatti, viññatti eva vā. Asamattabhāvananti pubbabhāgabhāvanamāha.

Bodily and verbal action means bodily and verbal activity, or intimation. 'Incomplete development' refers to preliminary-part development.

Kāmāvacarakusalavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of Wholesome States Pertaining to the Sense-Sphere is concluded.

Rūpāvacarakusalaṃ

Wholesome States Pertaining to the Form-Sphere

Catukkanayo

The Fourfold Method

Paṭhamajjhānakathāvaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Discourse on the First Jhāna

160. Uttarapadalopaṃ [Pg.107] katvā ‘‘rūpabhavo rūpa’’nti vutto, ‘‘rūpī rūpāni passati (ma. ni. 2.248; 3.312; dha. sa. 248; paṭi. ma. 1.209), rūparāgo’’tiādīsu (dha. sa. 363) viyāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Payogasampāditassa rūpajjhānassa rūpabhavātikkamassapi upāyabhāvato yathā rūpūpapattiyā eva maggoti ayaṃ niyamo na yujjati, evaṃ paccayantaravikalatādīhi rūpūpapattiyā anabhinipphādakassapi atthibhāvato rūpūpapattiyā maggo evāti ayampi niyamo na yujjati. Evañca sati yadeva rūpūpapattiyā nipphādakaṃ, tasseva sampayuttassa rūpāvacarakusalabhāvo, na anabhinipphādakassāti ayamattho āpannoti codanaṃ samuṭṭhāpeti na sabbassa kusalajjhānassātiādinā. Tattha sāmaññasaddopi adhikāravasena visesaniddiṭṭho hotīti ‘‘kusalajjhānassa maggabhāvo’’ti vuttaṃ.

160. It should be understood that 'form-becoming is form' is said by eliding the latter word, just as in 'one with form sees forms' (MN 2.248; 3.312; DhS 248; Paṭi. Ma. 1.209), 'lust for form,' etc. (DhS 363). Just as the rule 'the path is only for rebirth in the form-sphere' is not correct, since the form jhāna accomplished through practice serves as a means even for transcending the form-becoming; similarly, this rule 'the path is only for rebirth in the form-sphere' is also not correct, since there also exists that which does not produce rebirth in the form-sphere due to a deficiency of other conditions, etc. And this being so, the meaning is arrived at that only that which produces rebirth in the form-sphere, and is associated with it, has the nature of a wholesome state pertaining to the form-sphere, and not that which does not produce it. Thus, he raises the objection beginning with 'not of all wholesome jhānas.' There, even a general word is indicated as specific by way of the context; hence it is said, 'the wholesome jhāna's nature as a path.'

Rūpūpapattijanakasabhāvo rūpabhavavipaccanasabhāvoti tassapi vipākadhammabhāve satipi sabbakusalākusalasādhāraṇaṃ vipākadhammabhāvasāmaññaṃ ‘‘vipākadhammabhāvo viyā’’ti udāharaṇabhāvena vuttaṃ. Sāmaññampi hi visesato bhinnaṃ katvā voharīyatīti. Sabbasamānoti rūpūpapattiyā nipphādakassa paccayantaravikalatādīhi anipphādakassa ca sabbassa yathādhigatassa jhānassa sādhāraṇo. Etena uttarapadāvadhāraṇassa pariggahitataṃ dasseti. ‘‘Ito añño maggo nāma natthī’’ti imināpi sajātiyā sādhāraṇo aññajātivinivattiyā anaññasādhāraṇo imassa jhānassa rūpūpapattiyā upāyabhāvo vuttoti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Itare dve saddhā hirī ca. Yadi paṭipadāya sādhetabbato puggalapubbaṅgamāya desanāya bhāventena samayavavatthānaṃ kataṃ. Paṭipadārahitesu kathanti āha ‘‘kesañcī’’tiādi. Tattha kesañcīti samathabhāvanāya katādhikārānaṃ. Tesañhi maggādhigamanato pubbe anadhigatajjhānānaṃ paṭisambhidādayo viya maggādhigameneva tāni samijjhanti.

The nature that generates rebirth in the form-sphere is the nature of ripening into form-existence. Although that too has the nature of a resultant phenomenon, the general nature of a resultant phenomenon, which is common to all wholesome and unwholesome states, is stated as an example with 'like the nature of a resultant phenomenon.' For a generality is spoken of by having distinguished it from a particularity. 'Common to all' means common to all jhāna as attained, both that which produces rebirth in the form-sphere and that which does not produce it due to a deficiency of other conditions, etc. By this, he shows the inclusion of the emphasis on the latter word. It should be understood that by this statement, 'There is no other path than this,' the nature of this jhāna as a means to rebirth in the form-sphere is stated as being common to its own kind, but not common to others by excluding other kinds. The other two are faith and moral shame. If the determination of the time is made by one who is developing—through a teaching that is person-oriented because it is to be accomplished by practice—how is it for those devoid of the practice? He says, 'for some,' etc. There, 'for some' refers to those who have made an aspiration for the development of serenity. For them, who have not attained the jhānas before the attainment of the path, those jhānas are accomplished only by the attainment of the path, just like the analytical knowledges, etc.

Aññānīti ariyamaggasiddhito aññāni. Tesupīti ariyamaggena siddhattā paṭipadārahitesupi. Nanu ca ariyamaggasiddhassapi āgamanavasena paṭipadā upalabbhatiyeva. Itarathā ‘‘na kāmāvacaraṃ viya vinā paṭipadāya uppajjatī’’ti[Pg.108], ‘‘bahutaraṃ lokiyajjhānampi na vinā paṭipadāya ijjhatī’’ti ca vacanaṃ virujjheyyāti? Na, yebhuyyena gahaṇato puggalavisesāpekkhattā ca. Ariyamaggasamijjhanakañhi jhānaṃ kassacideva hoti, tasmā itaraṃ bahutaraṃ lokiyajjhānaṃ puthujjanassa ariyassa ca akatādhikārassa na vinā paṭipadāya sijjhatīti tesaṃ vasena vuttaṃ. Ariyamaggasiddhassapi jhānassa vipākānaṃ viya kusalena ariyamaggena sadisattābhāvato atabbipākattā ca na maggāgamanavasena paṭipadā yujjati, evamassa paṭipadāviraho siddho. Evañca katvā suddhikanavakadesanāpi suṭṭhu nītā hoti. Tathā ca vakkhati lokuttarakathāyaṃ ‘‘lokiyajjhānampī’’tiādi (dha. sa. mūlaṭī. 277).

'Others' refers to those that are distinct from the jhānas that are fulfilled by the attainment of the noble path. 'Even in them' means even in those devoid of practice because they are accomplished by the noble path. But is it not the case that even for one established by the noble path, practice is still found by way of coming? Otherwise, statements like 'It does not arise without practice, as in the case of the sense-sphere,' and 'Most mundane meditative attainments also do not succeed without practice' would be contradicted. No, because it is understood by taking the majority and because of depending on individual distinctions. For the jhāna that is fulfilled by the noble path occurs only for some; therefore, it is said with reference to the ordinary person and to the noble one who has not yet undertaken the task, that the other, more numerous mundane jhānas do not succeed without practice. Even for one established by the noble path, practice is not applicable by way of the path's coming, because the jhāna, like results, is dissimilar to the wholesome noble path and is not its result; thus, his absence of practice is established. In this way, even the teaching of the pure ninefold is well explained. Similarly, he will say in the discussion of the supramundane: 'Even mundane meditative attainments,' etc. (Dhs. Mūlaṭī. 277).

Vaṭṭāsayassa visesapaccayabhūtāya taṇhāya tanukaraṇavasena vivaṭṭāsayassa vaḍḍhananti āha ‘‘taṇhāsaṃkilesasodhanena āsayaposana’’nti. Āsayaposananti ca jhānabhāvanāya paccayabhūtā pubbayogādivasena siddhā ajjhāsayasampadā. Sā pana taṇhupatāpavigamena hotīti āha ‘‘taṇhāsaṃkilesasodhanenā’’ti.

He says that the increase of the aspiration for the cessation of the round is by way of diminishing craving, which is a specific condition for the aspiration for the round, and this is 'the nurturing of aspiration by the purification of the defilement of craving.' And 'the nurturing of aspiration' refers to the accomplishment of inner resolve, achieved by way of preliminary practice etc., being a condition for the development of jhāna. But this occurs through the removal of the torment of craving; hence he says, 'Through the purification of the defilement of craving.'

Thinamiddhādīnanti thinamiddhauddhaccakukkuccavicikicchānaṃ. Pahānanti pahāyakaṃ.

'Sloth and torpor, etc.' means sloth, torpor, restlessness, worry, and doubt. 'Abandonment' means that which abandons.

Taṃsadisesūti mahaggatabhāvādinā paṭhamajjhānasamādhisadisesu.

'In those similar to that' means in those similar to the concentration of the first jhāna, by way of the nature of being exalted, etc.

Pītisukhavantaṃ jhānaṃ pītisukhanti vuttaṃ yathā arisasoti dassento ‘‘pītisukha…pe… akāro vutto’’ti āha. Maggassapi vā nibbānārammaṇato tathalakkhaṇūpanijjhānatā yojetabbā. Asammosadhammanti avināsabhāvaṃ.

The jhāna possessing joy and happiness is called 'joy and happiness,' just as 'rice-essence' is said for the essence of rice. To show this, he says, 'joy and happiness... the letter 'a' is spoken.' Alternatively, since the path has Nibbāna as its object, the contemplation of its true characteristic should be applied. 'The nature of non-confusion' means the state of non-destruction.

Dutiyajjhānakathāvaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Discourse on the Second Jhāna

161-162. Diṭṭhādīnavassa taṃtaṃjhānakkhaṇe anuppajjanadhammatāpādanaṃ vūpasamanaṃ virajjanaṃ pahānañcāti idhādhippetavitakkādayoyeva jhānaṅgabhūtā tathā karīyanti, na taṃsampayuttaphassādayoti vitakkādīnaṃyeva vūpasamādivacanaṃ ñāyāgataṃ. Yasmā pana vitakkādayo viya taṃsampayuttadhammāpi etena etaṃ oḷārikanti diṭṭhādīnavā eva, tasmā avisesena vitakkādīnaṃ taṃsahajātānañca vūpasamādike vattabbe vitakkavicārādīnaṃyeva vūpasamādikaṃ vuccamānaṃ ‘‘adhikavacanamaññamatthaṃ bodhetī’’ti kiñci visesaṃ dīpetīti taṃ dassento ‘‘yehi vitakkavicārehī’’tiādimāha. Visuṃ [Pg.109] visuṃ ṭhitānipi vitakkavicārasamatikkamavacanādīni paheyyaṅganiddesatāsāmaññena cittena samūhato gahetvā avayavena samudāyopalakkhaṇaṃ katanti dassento ‘‘tesaṃ…pe… taṃ dīpakanti vutta’’nti āha. Idāni avayavena samudāyopalakkhaṇaṃ vinā vitakkavicāravūpasamavacanena pītivirāgādivacanānaṃ savisaye samānabyāpārataṃ dassento ‘‘atha vā’’tiādimāha.

161-162. For one who has seen the drawbacks, bringing about the nature of non-arising at the moment of each respective jhāna is calming, dispassion, and abandonment. Here, only the applied thought and other factors intended, which are jhāna factors, are treated in this way, not the associated contact and other states. Thus, the statement of calming, etc., for only applied thought and so on is traditionally appropriate. But since the associated states, like applied thought and so on, are also seen as gross—'this is grosser than that'—by one who has seen the drawbacks, therefore, when the calming, etc., of applied thought and its concomitants should be stated without distinction, the statement of the calming, etc., of only applied thought, sustained thought, and so on indicates some distinction, as in 'an additional statement makes known another meaning.' To show this, he says, 'by which applied thought and sustained thought,' etc. To show that the statements about overcoming applied thought and sustained thought, etc., although they stand separately, are taken collectively by the mind due to the commonality of indicating the factors to be abandoned, and that a collective designation is made by way of the part, he says, 'of these... it is said to be the illuminator,' etc. Now, to show that the statements about the fading of rapture, etc., have the same function in their own sphere as the statement about the calming of applied thought and sustained thought, without a collective designation by way of the part, he says, 'or else,' etc.

Tasmiṃ dassiteti ‘‘yā saddhā saddahanā’’tiādinā jhānavibhaṅge sampasādane dassite. Samānādhikaraṇaniddesenevāti tattheva vibhaṅge uddesapaduddhārādīsu saddhājhānānaṃ ‘‘sampasādana’’nti ekādhikaraṇatāvacaneneva.

'In that, it is shown' means: when serenity is shown in the Jhāna Vibhaṅga with the words 'whatever faith, believing,' and so on. 'By the designation of apposition itself' means: right there in the Vibhaṅga, in the extraction of terms from the exposition, etc., by the very statement of a single locus for faith and the jhānas as 'serenity'.

Oḷārikaṅgamukhena ‘‘tadanudhammatā satī’’ti vuttāya taṃtaṃjhānanikantiyā vikkhambhanaṃ vitakkavicāravūpasamavacanādīhi pakāsitanti āha ‘‘taṇhāppahānaṃ etesaṃ vūpasamana’’nti (vibha. 799). Yato vitakkavicāresu virattabhāvadīpakaṃ vitakkavicāravūpasamavacananti tadubhayābhāvadīpanaṃ puna katanti dassetuṃ ‘‘ye cā’’tiādi vuttaṃ.

Through the gross factor, the suppression of attachment to each jhāna, which is called 'mindfulness in conformity with that,' is revealed by statements such as the calming of applied thought and sustained thought. Hence, it is stated, 'the abandoning of craving is their calming' (Vibh. 799). Since the phrase 'the calming of applied thought and sustained thought' indicates dispassion toward applied thought and sustained thought, to show that the indication of the absence of both is made again, it is said, 'and those,' etc.

Tatiyajjhānakathāvaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Discourse on the Third Jhāna

163. Vīriyaṃ upekkhāti vuttaṃ ‘‘paggahaniggahesu byāpārākaraṇena upekkhiyatī’’ti. Gahaṇe majjhattabhāvena saṅkhāre upekkhatīti saṅkhārupekkhā, tathāpavattā vipassanā paññā. Tassā pana visayato pabhedo ‘‘aṭṭha saṅkhārupekkhā’’tiādinā (paṭi. ma. 1.57) yassaṃ pāḷiyaṃ vutto, taṃ pāḷisesaṃ dassento ‘‘paṭhamajjhāna’’ntiādimāha. Tattha uppādanti purimakammapaccayā idha uppattiṃ. Pavattanti tathā uppannassa pavattiṃ. Nimittanti sabbampi saṅkhāragataṃ nimittabhāvena upaṭṭhānato. Āyūhananti āyatiṃ paṭisandhihetubhūtaṃ kammaṃ. Paṭisandhinti āyatiṃ upapattiṃ. Gatinti yāya gatiyā sā paṭisandhi hoti. Nibbattinti khandhānaṃ nibbattanaṃ. Upapattinti ‘‘samāpannassa vā upapannassa vā’’ti evaṃ vuttaṃ vipākappavattiṃ. Jātinti jarādīnaṃ paccayabhūtaṃ bhavapaccayā jātiṃ. Jarāmaraṇādayo pākaṭā eva. Ettha ca uppādādayo pañceva saṅkhārupekkhāñāṇassa visayavasena vuttā, sesā tesaṃ vevacanavasena. ‘‘Nibbatti [Pg.110] jātī’’ti idañhi dvayaṃ uppādassa ceva paṭisandhiyā ca vevacanaṃ. ‘‘Gati upapatti cā’’ti idaṃ dvayaṃ pavattassa. Jarādayo nimittassāti.

163. ‘Energy is equanimity’ is said because ‘one becomes equanimous by not engaging in exertion and restraint.’ Equanimity toward formations is to be equanimous toward formations with neutrality in grasping; such is the insight wisdom that proceeds thus. Its classification by object is explained in the Pāḷi with the phrase ‘eight kinds of equanimity toward formations’ (Paṭis. I.57), etc. To show the remaining portion of the Pāḷi text, he says, ‘first jhāna,’ etc. There, ‘arising’ means the arising here conditioned by past kamma. ‘Continuation’ means the continuation of what has thus arisen. ‘Sign’ means all that is formed, because of its appearing as a sign. ‘Striving’ means the kamma that is a cause for future rebirth-linking. ‘Rebirth-linking’ means future existence. ‘Destination’ means the destination in which that rebirth-linking occurs. ‘Production’ means the production of the aggregates. ‘Reappearance’ means the process of resultants, as stated: ‘of one who has attained or has reappeared.’ ‘Birth’ means birth conditioned by becoming, which is a condition for aging, etc. Aging and death are evident. And here, only the five beginning with ‘arising’ are stated as the object of the knowledge of equanimity toward formations; the rest are their synonyms. ‘Production and birth’—these two are synonyms for ‘arising’ and ‘rebirth-linking.’ ‘Destination and reappearance’—these two are synonyms for ‘continuation.’ Aging, etc., are synonyms for ‘sign.’

Bhūtassāti khandhapañcakassa. Etehīti jhānacittasamuṭṭhitarūpehi.

'Of what has come to be' means of the five aggregates. 'By these' means by the material forms produced by jhāna consciousness.

Catukkanayavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Fourfold Method is concluded.

Pañcakanayavaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Fivefold Method

167. Ākārabhedanti ākāravisesaṃ. Anekākārā hi dhammā, te ca niravasesaṃ yāthāvato bhagavatā abhisambuddhā. Yathāha – ‘‘sabbe dhammā sabbākārena buddhassa bhagavato ñāṇamukhe āpāthaṃ āgacchantī’’ti (mahāni. 156; cūḷani. mogharājamāṇavapucchāniddesa 85; paṭi. 3.5). Dutiyajjhānapakkhikaṃ na paṭhamajjhānapakkhikanti adhippāyo. Tenevāha ‘‘paṭhamajjhānameva hī’’tiādi. Atthato hi catukkapañcakanayā aññamaññānuppavesino. Pañcakanaye dutiyajjhānaṃ kiṃ savicāratāya paṭhamajjhānapakkhikaṃ udāhu avitakkatāya dutiyajjhānapakkhikanti siyā āsaṅkāti tadāsaṅkānivattanatthamidaṃ vuttaṃ. Kasmātiādinā tattha kāraṇamāha. Suttantadesanāsu ca dutiyajjhānameva bhajantīti sambandho. Ca-saddena na kevalaṃ idheva, atha kho suttantadesanāsupīti desanantarepi yathāvuttajjhānassa paṭhamajjhānapakkhikattābhāvaṃ dasseti. Idāni bhajanampi dassetuṃ ‘‘vitakkavūpasamā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tena suttantepi pañcakanayassa labbhamānataṃ dasseti.

167. “Ākārabheda” means a distinction of characteristics. For phenomena are of many characteristics, and they have been completely comprehended by the Blessed One just as they are. As it is said: “All phenomena in all their aspects enter the range of the Blessed One’s knowledge.” The meaning is that it belongs to the side of the second jhāna, not to the side of the first jhāna. Hence it is said, “Indeed, the first jhāna,” and so on. For in terms of meaning, the fourfold and fivefold methods interpenetrate. In the fivefold method, a doubt might arise whether the second jhāna belongs to the side of the first jhāna due to the presence of sustained thought, or to the side of the second jhāna due to the absence of applied thought. This has been stated to dispel that doubt. With “Why?” and so on, the reason for that is stated. And the connection is: “in the Sutta discourses, they treat it only as the second jhāna.” The word “ca” indicates that not only here, but also in other teachings, that is, in the Sutta discourses, the fact that the aforesaid jhāna does not belong to the side of the first jhāna is shown. Now, to show this classification as well, “With the subsiding of applied thought…” and so on is said. Thereby, it shows that the fivefold method is also found in the Suttas.

Nanu ca suttante cattāriyeva jhānāni vibhattānīti pañcakanayo natthiyevāti? Na, ‘‘savitakkasavicāro samādhī’’tiādinā samādhittayāpadesena pañcakanayassa labbhamānattā. Catukkanayanissito pana katvā pañcakanayo vibhattoti tatthāpi pañcakanayo niddhāretabbo. Vitakkavicārānaṃ vūpasamāti hi vitakkassa vicārassa vitakkavicārānañca vitakkavicārānanti sakkā vattuṃ. Tathā avitakkaavicārānanti ca vinā saha ca vicārena vitakkappahānena avitakkaṃ saha vinā ca vitakkena vicārappahānena avicāranti avitakkaṃ avicāraṃ avitakkaavicārañcāti vā tividhampi sakkā saṅgaṇhituṃ.

But is it not so that in the suttas only four jhānas are distinguished, and therefore the fivefold method does not exist at all? No, because the fivefold method is found through the designation of the threefold concentration, such as “concentration with applied and sustained thought,” and so on. However, the fivefold method is distinguished based on the fourfold method, so the fivefold method should be determined there as well. For “the stilling of applied and sustained thoughts” can indeed be expressed as: the stilling of applied thought, the stilling of sustained thought, and the stilling of both applied and sustained thoughts. Similarly, ‘without applied thought and without sustained thought’ can also be understood in three ways: (1) without applied thought (but with sustained thought), (2) without sustained thought (but with applied thought), and (3) without applied thought and without sustained thought.

Dutiyanti [Pg.111] ca vitakkarahite vitakkavicāradvayarahite ca ñāyāgatā desanā. Dutiyaṃ adhigantabbattā vicāramattarahitepi dvayappahānādhigatasamānadhammattā. Evañca katvā pañcakanayaniddese dutiye vūpasantopi vitakko taṃsahāyavicārāvūpasamena na sammāvūpasantoti vitakkavicāradvayarahite viya vicāravūpasameneva tadupasamaṃ sesadhammasamānatañca dassentena ‘‘vitakkavicārānaṃ vūpasamā ajjhattaṃ sampasādanaṃ cetaso ekodibhāvaṃ avitakkaṃ avicāraṃ samādhijaṃ pītisukhaṃ tatiyaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharatī’’ti tatiyaṃ catukkanaye dutiyena nibbisesaṃ vibhattaṃ. Duvidhassapi sahāyavirahena aññathā ca vitakkappahānena avitakkattaṃ samādhijaṃ pītisukhattañca samānanti samānadhammattāpi dutiyanti niddeso. Vicāramattampi hi vitakkavicāradvayarahitaṃ viya ‘‘yasmiṃ samaye rūpūpapattiyā maggaṃ bhāveti avitakkavicāramattaṃ samādhijaṃ pītisukhaṃ dutiyaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharatī’’ti avitakkaṃ samādhijaṃ pītisukhanti vibhattaṃ. Paṭhamajjhāne vā sahacārīsu vitakkavicāresu ekaṃ atikkamitvā dutiyampi tatraṭṭhameva dosato disvā ubhayampi sahātikkamantassa pañcakanaye tatiyaṃ vuttaṃ tatiyaṃ adhigantabbattā. Paṭhamato anantarabhāvena panassa dutiyabhāvo ca uppajjati. Kasmā panettha sarūpato pañcakanayo na vibhattoti? Vineyyajjhāsayato. Yathānulomadesanā hi suttantadesanāti.

And ‘second’ is a teaching that has come down in the system, referring to that which is without applied thought and that which is without both applied thought and sustained thought. Because it is to be attained as the second, even in the state with only sustained thought, it has a nature similar to that attained by the abandonment of both. And so, in the exposition of the fivefold method, although applied thought is stilled in the second jhāna, it is not completely stilled because its companion, sustained thought, has not been stilled. Thus, showing that its stilling and the similarity of the remaining states occurs only with the stilling of sustained thought—just as in the state without both applied and sustained thought—it is stated: “With the stilling of applied and sustained thoughts… with internal serenity, with unification of mind, without applied thought and without sustained thought, born of concentration, with bliss and joy, one enters and abides in the third jhāna.” Thus, the third jhāna [of the fivefold method] is distinguished as being non-different from the second [of the fourfold method]. For both kinds, being without applied thought, being born of concentration, and being bliss and joy are the same—due to the absence of a companion and otherwise due to the abandoning of applied thought. Therefore, it is designated as ‘second’ because of this similarity in nature. For even the state with only sustained thought, like the state without both applied and sustained thought, is distinguished as being without applied thought and born of concentration, with bliss and joy, as stated: “At the time when one develops the path for rebirth in the form realm, one enters and abides in the second jhāna, which is without applied thought but with only sustained thought, born of concentration, with bliss and joy.” Or, in the first jhāna, having overcome one of the co-arisen factors, applied and sustained thought, and seeing a fault even in the remaining one, for one who overcomes both together, the third jhāna in the fivefold method is spoken of, because it is to be attained as the third. Moreover, its being the second arises from its being immediately after the first. Why is the fivefold method not analyzed here in its own right? Due to the disposition of the person to be trained. For the teaching in the suttas is a teaching that proceeds in due order.

Paṭipadācatukkādivaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Tetrad of Practice and Others

176-180. Tadanurūpatāti tassa paṭhamādijjhānassa anurūpasabhāvā. Yathāladdhajjhānaṃ santato paṇītato disvā assādayamānā nikanti taṃsampayuttā khandhā vā tadārakkhabhūtā satiyeva vā tassa jhānassa anucchavikatāya ‘‘tadanudhammatā satī’’ti vuttāti. Kadācīti yadā paṭhamaṃ adhigantvā yathānisinnoyeva vinā payogantaraṃ dutiyādīni adhigacchati, īdise kāleti attho.

176-180. “Consistent with it” means having a nature that conforms to that first jhāna and so on. Seeing the attained jhāna as peaceful and sublime, the craving that delights in it, or the associated aggregates, or the very mindfulness that protects it, is called “mindfulness that follows that state” because of its suitability to that jhāna. “Sometimes” means: on an occasion when, having first attained it, one attains the second and subsequent jhānas without further effort, just as one is seated. This is the meaning.

186. Kusalajjhānassa adhigatattā ‘‘sekkhā’’ti vuttaṃ. Na hi te uppādenti nāmāti ariyamaggakkhaṇe rūpāvacarajjhānānaṃ anuppajjamānataṃ sandhāyāha.

186. Because they have attained wholesome jhāna, they are called “trainees” (sekha). He says, “They do not indeed produce it,” with reference to the non-arising of the form-sphere jhānas at the moment of the noble path.

Kasiṇakathāvaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Kasiṇa Discourse

203. Āruppapādakatā [Pg.112] ca dassitā vinā abhāvato. Na hi tesaṃ āruppapādakatāya vinā nirodhapādakatā atthīti. Nimminituṃ icchitassa vatthuno nimmānavasena khippaṃ nisanti nisāmanaṃ ālocanaṃ adhigamo etassāti khippanisanti. Tabbhāvo ‘‘khippanisantibhāvo’’ti āha ‘‘khippadassanaṃ khippābhiññatā’’ti.

203. And its being a basis for the formless attainments is shown, because without it, the higher attainment is absent. For without being a basis for the formless attainments, there is no being a basis for cessation for them. Khippanisanti (quick perception) is so called because for this person there is quick perception (nisanti), observing (nisāmanaṃ), considering (ālocanaṃ), and attainment (adhigamo) of the desired object by way of creation. He stated its nature, “the state of being a khippanisanti,” as “quick seeing, quick direct knowledge.”

Kasiṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Kasiṇa Discourse is concluded.

Abhibhāyatanakathāvaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Abhibhāyatanas

204. Paṭibhāganimittabhūtaṃ kasiṇārammaṇasaṅkhātaṃ āyatanaṃ kāraṇaṃ etassāti kasiṇāyatanaṃ, jhānaṃ. Atha vā ārammaṇassa anavasesapharaṇaṭṭhena kasiṇañca taṃ āyatanañca yogino sukhavisesānaṃ adhiṭṭhānabhāvato manāyatanadhammāyatanabhāvato cāti sasampayuttaṃ jhānaṃ kasiṇāyatanaṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘satipi abhibhāyatanānaṃ kasiṇāyatanatte’’ti. Bhāvanāya nimittaṃ bhāvanānimittaṃ, ārammaṇassa parittappamāṇatā suvisuddhanīlāditā ca, tadeva nānattaṃ. Bhāvanā eva vā pubbabhāgabhūtā bhāvanānimittaṃ, tassa nānattaṃ bhāvanānimittanānattaṃ. Pubbabhāgabhāvanā hi yathāvuttavisese ārammaṇe pavattiākāravisesato nānāsabhāvāti. Kasiṇanimittassa abhibhavanakabhāvanānimittanānattaṃ kasiṇa…pe… nānattaṃ, tatoti yojetabbaṃ.

204. Kasiṇāyatana (kasiṇa base) is so called because its cause is the base designated as the kasiṇa object, which has become the counterpart sign; this refers to jhāna. Alternatively, the associated jhāna is the kasiṇāyatana because it is kasiṇa (whole) in the sense of completely pervading the object, and it is an āyatana (base) because it is a foundation for the yogi's special happiness and because it is the mind-base and mental-object-base. Hence it is said: “although the abhibhāyatanas are also kasiṇāyatanas…” The sign of development (bhāvanānimitta) is the diversity of the development sign. This diversity consists of the limited extent of the object, its pure blue quality, and so on. Or, the preliminary development itself is the development sign, and its diversity is the diversity of the development sign. For the preliminary development is of a diverse nature due to the specific mode of its occurrence in an object with the aforesaid special qualities. The diversity of the kasiṇa sign, the diversity of the sign for the development of overcoming… and so on, should be connected with that.

Ettha ca purimāni cattāri abhibhāyatanāni bhūtakasiṇārammaṇāni, bhūtakasiṇesu ca yaṃ suvaṇṇaṃ dubbaṇṇanti ca na sakkā vattuṃ. Tattha pavattitāni sabbattha vā vaṇṇābhogarahitena pavattitāni paṭhamatatiyābhibhāyatanānīti dutiyacatutthāni vaṇṇakasiṇārammaṇāni. Yadi evaṃ dutiyacatutthehi pañcamādīnaṃ ko visesoti ‘‘pañcamādīni vaṇṇato ramaṇīyatarāni, na tathā itarānī’’ti vadanti. Purimānipi cattāri aṭṭha kasiṇārammaṇāneva, tasmā taṃ nesaṃ matimattaṃ ‘‘aṭṭhasu kasiṇesū’’ti vuttattā. Vimokkhesu ca paṭhamadutiyavimokkhā aṭṭha kasiṇārammaṇā. Tatiyo vaṇṇakasiṇārammaṇo. Paṭhamadutiyāpi vā vaṇṇakasiṇārammaṇā eva ‘‘bahiddhā nīlakasiṇādirūpāni [Pg.113] jhānacakkhunā passatī’’ti vuttattā. Ārammaṇamanuññatāya hi tattha aniggatitabhāvena tesaṃ pavattīti. Evaṃ sante tatiyassa itarehi ko visesoti? Subhākārābhogo. Tatiyo eva hi subhanti ābhujanavasena pavattati, na itareti.

Herein, the first four mastery bases have the elemental kasiṇas as their object, and regarding the elemental kasiṇas, it cannot be said that they are well-colored or ill-colored. Or, the first and third mastery bases, when they occur there, occur everywhere without attending to color; hence the second and fourth have the color kasiṇas as their object. If so, what is the difference between the second and fourth, and the fifth and following? They say, “The fifth and following are more pleasing in color, but not so the others.” The first four also have the eight kasiṇas as their objects; therefore, that is merely their opinion, since it is said, “in the eight kasiṇas.” And among the liberations, the first and second liberations have the eight kasiṇas as their objects. The third has a color kasiṇa as its object. Alternatively, the first and second also have the color kasiṇas as their object, as it is said, “one sees external forms such as the blue kasiṇa with the jhāna-eye.” For there, due to the agreeableness of the object, their occurrence is without being grasped. This being so, what is the difference between the third and the others? Attending to the aspect of beauty. For only the third occurs by way of attending to it as ‘beautiful,’ not the others.

Ñāṇaṃ appanāpaññā. Vijjamānepīti api-saddena avijjamānepīti dasseti. Parittappamāṇatā abhibhavanassa kāraṇaṃ imesu catūsu abhibhāyatanesūti adhippāyo. Nanu ca sabbattha ‘‘suvaṇṇadubbaṇṇānī’’ti vacanato vaṇṇābhogasahitāniyeva gahitānīti? Na gahitānīti dassento ‘‘tattha cā’’tiādimāha. Tatthāti āgamesu. Tathā appamāṇānīti vaṇṇābhogarahitāni ca sabbāni appamāṇāni suvaṇṇadubbaṇṇānīti attho. Yadi evaṃ kathaṃ visiṭṭhānaṃ vaṇṇābhogena rahitānaṃ sahitānañca ekajjhaṃ manasi karoti? Na ekajjhaṃ, visuṃyeva pana tesu manasikāro. Yadi visuṃ kathamekanti? Parittabhāvasāmaññato. Yadi evaṃ ‘‘suvaṇṇadubbaṇṇaggahaṇaṃ atiricchatī’’ti, nātiricchatīti dassento ‘‘atthi hi eso pariyāyo’’tiādimāha. Tattha yadidaṃ vaṇṇābhogajanitaṃ visesaṃ aggahetvā parittasāmaññena ekattaṃ netvā ‘‘parittāni abhibhuyyā’’ti vatvā puna tadantogadhadhammappabhedaṃ vineyyavasena dassetuṃ ‘‘tāni ce kadāci vaṇṇavasena ābhujitāni honti suvaṇṇadubbaṇṇāni abhibhuyyā’’ti vattabbatāya vaṇṇābhogarahitāni sahitāni ca visuṃ manasi katvā ubhayatthāpi vaṇṇābhogarahitaparittābhibhavane taṃ sahitaparittābhibhavane ca parittābhibhavanassa sāmaññaṃ gahetvā ekanti vacanaṃ, eso pariyāyo vijjatīti ayamadhippāyo.

Knowledge is the wisdom of absorption. By the word 'even' in 'even when existing,' it indicates 'even when not existing.' The intended meaning is that being limited and immeasurable is the cause of overcoming in these four mastery bases. But is it not so that, since it is said everywhere, 'well-colored and ill-colored,' they are taken only as accompanied by attention to color? To show that they are not so taken, he says, 'and there,' etc. 'There' means in the Āgamas. Likewise, 'immeasurable' means that all immeasurable objects, both those without and with attention to color, are 'well-colored and ill-colored.' If so, how does one attend together to the distinguished objects, those without attention to color and those with it? Not together, but the attention to them is separate. If separate, how are they one? By the commonality of being limited. If so, does the taking up of 'well-colored and ill-colored' become redundant? To show it is not redundant, he says, 'for there is this method,' etc. Here, the intended meaning is this: without grasping the distinction produced by attending to color, having brought them to oneness through the commonality of being limited, and having said, 'having overcome the limited,' then, in order to show the classification of the phenomena included therein for the sake of those to be trained, because it should be said, 'and if they are sometimes attended to by way of color, having overcome the well-colored and ill-colored,' one attends separately to those without and with attention to color. In both cases—in overcoming the limited without attention to color and in overcoming the limited with it—the statement is made as one by taking the commonality of overcoming the limited. This is the method that exists.

Evaṃ suttantābhidhammapāṭhavisesato aṭṭhakathāya virodhābhāvaṃ dassetvā idāni suttantābhidhammapāṭhānaṃ avirodhaṃ adhippāyavibhāvanena dassetuṃ ‘‘tatthacā’’tiādimāha. Evaṃ abhidhamme vaṇṇābhogarahitāni sahitāni ca visuṃ vuttāni. Suttante pana ‘‘ubhayāni ekajjha’’nti vuttaṃ, taṃ kathaṃ viññāyatīti āha ‘‘tadeta’’ntiādi. Tattha āgatassāti suttante āgatassa. Tattha hi ‘‘ajjhattaṃ rūpasaññī’’ti āgataṃ. Avacanatoti abhidhamme avacanato. Yadipi vimokkhā visuṃ desitā, kasiṇāyatanabhāvo viya pana abhibhāyatanānaṃ vimokkhakiccatāpi atthīti abhibhāyatanavimokkhānaṃ idhāpi saṅkaro dunnivāroti codanaṃ manasi katvā āha [Pg.114] ‘‘sabbavimokkhakiccasādhāraṇavacanabhāvato’’ti. Tena yathā abhibhāyatanadesanāyaṃ abhibhāyatanakiccāni niravasesato vuttāni, evaṃ vimokkhadesanāyaṃ vimokkhakiccānīti idha tesaṃ asaṅkaroyevāti dasseti.

Having thus shown, due to the distinctive features of the Suttanta and Abhidhamma texts, the absence of contradiction with the commentary, he now begins with 'and there,' etc., to demonstrate the non-contradiction of the Suttanta and Abhidhamma texts by clarifying their intended meaning. Thus, in the Abhidhamma, those without and with attention to color are described separately. But in the Suttanta, it is said, 'both together'—how is this to be understood? He explains with 'this,' etc. 'Of that which has come there' means 'of that which has come in the Suttanta.' For there it has come as 'perceiving form internally.' 'Due to not being stated' means due to not being stated in the Abhidhamma. Although the liberations are taught separately, just as there is the state of being a kasiṇa base, so too the mastery bases have the function of liberation. Therefore, bearing in mind the objection that a confusion of the mastery bases and liberations is here unavoidable, he says, 'due to its being a statement common to the function of all liberations.' By this he shows that just as in the exposition of the mastery bases, their functions are stated without remainder, so too in the exposition of the liberations, their functions are stated; therefore, there is no confusion of them here at all.

Ye ca yathāvuttaṃ vavatthānaṃ na sampaṭicchanti, tehi suttantābhidhammapāṭhabhede aññaṃ kāraṇaṃ vattabbaṃ siyā. Kimettha vattabbaṃ, nanu aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘kasmā pana yathā suttante’’tiādiṃ vatvā ‘‘ajjhattarūpānaṃ anabhibhavanīyato’’ti kāraṇaṃ vuttanti. Na taṃ tassa kāraṇavacananti dassento ‘‘ajjhattarūpāna’’ntiādimāha. Tattha yanti idha suttante ca ‘‘bahiddhā rūpāni passatī’’ti (a. ni. 8.65) vuttavacanaṃ sandhāyāha. Bahiddhā rūpāniyeva hi abhibhavanīyānīti. Aññahetukanti desanāvilāsato aññaṃ abhibhavanīyahetu etassāti aññahetukaṃ. Ajjhattaarūpasaññitāya eva, na suttante viya ajjhattarūpasaññitāya cāti attho. Avibhūtattāti idaṃ ñāṇuttarānaṃ saha nimittuppādanena appanānibbattanaṃ ārammaṇassa abhibhavo na suṭṭhu vibhūtabhāvamantarena sambhavatīti katvā vuttaṃ. Nanu ca aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pāṭhadvayavisesassa desanāvilāso kāraṇabhāvena vuttoti āha ‘‘desanāvilāso ca yathāvuttavavatthānavasena veditabbo’’ti. Desanāvilāso hi nāma vineyyajjhāsayānurūpaṃ vijjamānasseva pariyāyassa vibhāvanaṃ na yassa kassacīti. Tattha ca ‘‘pariyāyadesanattā’’tiādinā vuttappakāravavatthānaṃ desanāvilāsanibandhanamāha. Tathā ceva hi purato desanāvilāso vibhāvito.

And by those who do not accept the classification as stated, another reason would have to be given for the difference between the Suttanta and Abhidhamma texts. What is to be said here? Is it not so that in the commentary, after saying, 'But why as in the Suttanta?' etc., the reason is given as 'due to the internal forms being unable to be overcome'? To show that this is not the statement of the reason for that, he says, 'of internal forms,' etc. Here, he speaks in reference to the statement made in the Suttanta, 'one sees external forms.' For it is only external forms that are to be overcome. 'Having another cause' means that this has a cause for being overcome other than the elegance of the teaching. The meaning is that it is solely due to the perception of formlessness internally, and not, as in the Suttanta, also due to the perception of form internally. 'Due to its not being clearly manifested' is said because, for those who are superior in knowledge, the attainment of absorption along with the arising of the sign, which is the overcoming of the object, is not possible without a state of clear manifestation. But is it not stated in the commentary that the elegance of the teaching is given as the reason for the distinction between the two texts? He says, 'And the elegance of the teaching should be understood by way of the classification as stated.' For the elegance of the teaching is the clarification of an existing method in accordance with the disposition of those to be trained, not just any method. And there, he states that the classification of the type stated in 'due to the teaching by way of a method,' etc., is founded on the elegance of the teaching. For indeed, the elegance of the teaching was clarified previously in just that way.

Abhibhāyatanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of the Mastery Bases is concluded.

Vimokkhakathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Discussion of Liberation

248. Tanti ‘‘sasantatipariyāpannarūpa’’nti vuttakesādivaṇṇamāha. Taṃ pana yasmā khalamaṇḍalādi viya paramparāya jhānassa kāraṇaṃ, tasmā ‘‘jhānassa hetubhāvenā’’ti āha. Yenāti yathāvuttarūpavisesena. Visiṭṭhenāti atisayappattena ‘‘rūpūpapattiyā’’tiādīsu (dha. sa. 160 ādayo; vibha. 625) viya uttarapadalopena [Pg.115] ‘‘rūpa’’nti vuttena rūpajhānena. ‘‘Visiṭṭhenā’’ti iminā hi atisayarūpayutto rūpīti vuttoti dasseti. ‘‘Paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati pathavīkasiṇa’’ntiādinā (dha. sa. 499) jhānānameva kasiṇabhāvena pavattā. Sutte ārammaṇānaṃ kasiṇabhāvena pavattā ‘‘pathavīkasiṇameko sañjānātī’’tiādinā (dī. ni. 3.360; a. ni. 10.25).

248. The canonical text states the color of hair and so on, which is called 'form included in one's own continuum.' But because that, like a threshing floor and so forth, is an indirect condition for jhāna, it is therefore said, 'due to being a cause for jhāna.' 'By which' means by the particular form as stated. 'By the distinguished' means by the form-jhāna which has attained superiority and is called 'form' through the elision of the latter term, as in 'for the attainment of form,' etc. For by this 'by the distinguished,' it is shown that one endowed with superior form is called 'a being of form.' By 'having entered upon and abided in the first jhāna on the earth kasiṇa,' etc., the jhānas themselves occur as kasiṇas. In the Suttas, the occurrence of objects as kasiṇas is shown by 'one perceives the earth kasiṇa,' etc.

Vimokkhakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of Liberation is concluded.

Brahmavihārakathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Discussion of the Divine Abodes

251. Aññāṇasampayuttāpi vā upekkhāvedanā aññāṇupekkhā, upekkhāti aññāṇasampayuttā upekkhāvedanā, aññāṇupekkhātipi etāsaṃyeva nāmanti (vibha. aṭṭha. 947) hi sammohavinodaniyaṃ vakkhatīti. Appaṭibhāganimittattepi ekaṃ katipaye vā satte odissa pavattā paricchinnarūpādiupādānavisaye pavattattā kathamappamāṇagocarāti āha ‘‘na ca sammutisaccavasenā’’tiādi. Evampi yathā natthi sattā opapātikāti sattavasena pavattāyapi micchādiṭṭhiyā saṅkhārārammaṇatā vuccati upādānavasena, evaṃ sattavasena pavattānampi mettādīnaṃ saṅkhārārammaṇatāpi siyāti ce? Na, aparāmasanavasena pavattānaṃ mettādīnaṃ saupādānaggahaṇāsambhavatoti dassento āha ‘‘aparāmāsā’’tiādi.

251. Or, the feeling of equanimity associated with ignorance is 'ignorance-equanimity'; 'equanimity' is the feeling of equanimity associated with ignorance; and 'ignorance-equanimity' is also a name for these, for it will be said thus in the Sammohavinodanī (VibhA. 947). Regarding the objection, 'How can it have an immeasurable scope, since it arises directed towards one or a few beings and occurs in a limited sphere of clinging to form, etc., even though it has no counterpart sign?' the text states, 'And not by way of conventional truth,' etc. If it is asked: 'Even so, just as a wrong view that arises concerning beings (even though there are no spontaneously born beings) is said to have formations as its object by way of clinging, could loving-kindness, etc., which arise concerning beings, also have formations as their object?' No, because loving-kindness, etc., arise without grasping; hence, grasping with clinging is impossible. Showing this, the text states, 'without grasping,' etc.

Brahmavihārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of the discourse on the Divine Abodes is concluded.

Asubhakathāvaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Account of the Unattractive

263. ‘‘Ekāhamataṃ vā dvīhamataṃ vā’’tiādinā (dī. ni. 2.379; ma. ni. 1.112) vuttāsu navasu sivathikāsu vaṇṇavasena pavattajjhānaṃ sivathikāvaṇṇajjhānaṃ. Nanu cetassa vaṇṇakasiṇehi gahaṇaṃ yuttaṃ, na asubhehīti? Na, sivathikāvaṇṇaṃ upamaṃ katvā attano kāye paṭikūlattaṃ amuñcitvāva vaṇṇavasena pavattanato[Pg.116]. Tenevāha ‘‘paṭikūlamanasikārasāmaññenā’’ti. Ayamattho sivathikāvaṇṇajjhānassāti etthāpi yojetabboti vibhāvento ‘‘tampī’’tiādimāha.

263. The jhāna that arises by way of color in the nine charnel grounds spoken of in the passage beginning, "One day dead or two days dead," etc. (Dī. Ni. 2.379; Ma. Ni. 1.112), is called the charnel-ground-color-jhāna. Now, is it not proper for this to be grasped by means of the color kasiṇas, and not by means of the unattractive? No, because it arises by way of color, having made the color of the charnel ground an analogy, without abandoning the repulsiveness in one's own body. Therefore, it is said, 'due to the commonality with the contemplation of repulsiveness.' Explaining that this meaning should also be applied here to 'the charnel-ground-color-jhāna,' it is said, 'that too,' etc.

Asubhakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of the discourse on the unattractive is completed.

Rūpāvacarakusalavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of wholesome [states] pertaining to the form realm is concluded.

Arūpāvacarakusalakathāvaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Account of Wholesome Immaterial-Sphere [States]

265. Rūpanimittanti rūpahetu rūpādhikaraṇaṃ. Rūpārūpanimittesūti rūpadhammesu ca pathavīkasiṇādinimittesu ca. Tadārammaṇajjhānesūti ettha taṃ-saddena rūpanimittaṃ paccāmasati rūpampi vā rūpadhammārammaṇānampi rūpāvacarajjhānānaṃ sambhavato. Rūpādīsūti rūpārūpanimittatadārammaṇajjhānesu rūpapaṭibaddhadhammesu ca. Anāvajjitukāmatādināti ādi-saddena asamāpajjitukāmatādiṃ saṅgaṇhāti.

265. By 'rūpanimitta' (form-sign) is meant 'the cause of form' or 'the basis for form.' By 'rūpārūpanimittesu' (in form and formless signs) is meant 'in form phenomena and in the signs of the earth kasiṇa, etc.' By 'tadārammaṇajjhānesu' (in jhānas having that as object), here the word 'taṃ' (that) refers back to the form-sign or to form itself, because of the possibility of form-sphere jhānas also having form phenomena as their object. By 'rūpādīsu' (in form, etc.) is meant 'in form and formless signs, in jhānas having that as object, and in phenomena connected with form.' By 'anāvajjitukāmatādinā' (by the desire not to advert, etc.), the word 'ādi' (etc.) includes the desire not to attain absorption, etc.

Cutito uddhaṃ uppattirahānaṃ…pe… anuppattidhammatāpādanena samatikkamoti etena samatikkamitabbattena rūpāvacarakusalānaṃ rūpāvacaravipākakiriyehi visesābhāvaṃ dasseti anadhigatabhāvato. Yesañhi rūpasaññādīnaṃ arūpabhāvanāya samatikkamādiko labbhati, te dassetuṃ ‘‘arūpabhāvanāya abhāve cutito uddhaṃ uppattirahāna’’nti vuttanti. Yāti ekantarūpanissitā avasiṭṭhaparittavipākasaññādayo.

By the phrase 'transcendence by bringing about the nature of non-arising... non-arising above after passing away... etc.', it shows that, with respect to that which is to be transcended, there is no distinction between form-sphere wholesome states and form-sphere resultant and functional states, because they have not been attained. For, to show those for whom transcendence of form perceptions, etc., is obtained by the development of the formless, it is said: 'In the absence of the development of the formless, there is non-arising above after passing away.' By 'yā' (which) is meant 'the remaining limited resultant perceptions, etc., that depend on a single form.'

Āneñjasantasamāpattisukhānubhavanabhavavisesūpapajjanādayo āruppasamāpattīnaṃ atthāti āha ‘‘rūpasaññā…pe… na attho’’ti.

He says that the experience of the bliss of the imperturbable, peaceful attainment, being reborn in special existences, etc., are the purpose of the formless attainments, as stated: 'Perceptions of form... there is no purpose.'

Idha ugghāṭitakasiṇavasena parittānantatā hoti nippariyāyadesanattāti adhippāyo. Yadi evaṃ parittakasiṇugghāṭite kathamākāsānañcāyatanavacananti? Tatthāpi anantapharaṇasabbhāvato. Tenevāha ‘‘anantapharaṇatāsabbhāve’’ti. Yadi sabbattha anantapharaṇatā atthi, atha kasmā ‘‘ananto ākāso’’ti na vuttanti āha ‘‘samayavavatthāpanā’’tiādi. Tattha paṭipattīti jhānabhāvanākāramāha.

Here, the meaning is that by way of the opened-up kasiṇa, the limited becomes infinite, because the teaching is without a fixed order. If so, when a limited kasiṇa is opened up, how can there be a statement about the base of infinite space? There too, it is because of the existence of infinite pervasion. Therefore, it is said: 'Because of the existence of infinite pervasion.' If infinite pervasion exists everywhere, then why is it not said, 'space is infinite'? It is said: 'Because of the establishment of convention,' etc. There, by 'practice' (paṭipatti) is meant 'the mode of developing jhāna.'

266. Ugghāṭabhāvo ugghāṭimaṃ. Yathā pākimaṃ.

266. The state of being opened up is 'ugghāṭima' (that which is opened up), just as 'pākima' (that which is ripe).

268. Ākāse [Pg.117] pavattitaviññāṇātikkamato tatiyāti paduddhāraṃ katvā yuttito āgamato ca tadatthaṃ vibhāvetuṃ ‘‘tadatikkamato hī’’tiādimāha. Āruppasamāpattīnaṃ ārammaṇātikkamena pattabbattā visesato ārammaṇe dosadassanaṃ tadeva atikkamitabbanti ayaṃ yutti, ārammaṇe pana atikkante tadārammaṇaṃ jhānampi atikkantameva hoti. Bhāvanāya ārammaṇassa vigamanaṃ apanayanaṃ vibhāvanā. Pāḷiyanti vibhaṅge. Nanu ca pāḷiyaṃ ‘‘taññeva viññāṇa’’nti avisesena vuttaṃ ‘‘na ākāsānañcāyatanaviññāṇa’’nti. ‘‘Na taññevaviññāṇanti visesavacanena ayamattho siddho’’ti dassento ‘‘viññāṇañcāyatana’’ntiādimāha.

268. Having extracted the phrase 'the third' (tatiyā) as 'by transcending the consciousness that occurs in space,' and to clarify its meaning from reasoning and from scripture, it is said: 'For by transcending that,' etc. Because the formless attainments are to be attained by transcending the object, the reasoning is that the danger seen specifically in the object is what is to be transcended; but when the object is transcended, the jhāna that has that object as its object is also transcended. The explanation (vibhāvanā) is the departure (vigamana) or removal (apanayana) of the object by means of development. 'In the Pāli' means in the Vibhaṅga. But is it not said in the Pāli without specification, 'that very consciousness,' and not 'the consciousness of the base of infinite space'? To show that 'this meaning is established by the specific statement, "Not that very consciousness,"' it is said: 'the base of infinite consciousness,' etc.

Arūpāvacarakusalakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of the discourse on the immaterial-sphere wholesome states is concluded.

Tebhūmakakusalavaṇṇanā

The Exposition of Wholesome States in the Three Planes

269. Sattahi mahāvārehīti paṭiccasahajātapaccayanissayasaṃsaṭṭhasampayuttapañhāvārehi anulomapaccanīyaanulomapaccanīyapaccanīyānulomādinayā anulomādinayā. Bhāradvājagotamādayo aṭṭhacattālīsa loke gottāni mūlabhūtāni, tathā kaṭṭhakalāpādayo aṭṭhacattālīseva caraṇānīti āha ‘‘aṭṭhacattālīsa’’ntiādi. Tattha tesanti bhabbābhabbānaṃ. Dvārasīsena dvāravantāni gayhantīti adhippāyenāha ‘‘taṃtaṃdvārāni vā kāyādīnī’’ti. Acittīkārena vā kataṃ hīnaṃ, ajjhupekkhanena kataṃ majjhimaṃ, sakkaccakataṃ paṇītaṃ. Āmisakiñjakkhādihetu vā kataṃ hīnaṃ, puññaphalakāmatāya kataṃ majjhimaṃ, kattabbamicceva ariyabhāve ṭhitena kataṃ paṇītaṃ. Bhavasampattilobhena vā pavattitaṃ hīnaṃ, alobhajjhāsayena pavattitaṃ majjhimaṃ, parahitāya pavattitaṃ paṇītaṃ. Parittakataṃ vā hīnaṃ, mattaso kataṃ majjhimaṃ, adhimattaso kataṃ paṇītaṃ. Mahaggatesu pana paṭiladdhamattaṃ hīnaṃ, nātisubhāvitaṃ majjhimaṃ, subhāvitaṃ vasippattaṃ paṇītaṃ. Imesupi ekekassa hīnādikassa āyūhananānattādivasena hīnādibhedo labbhatiyevāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Sampayuttadhammānaṃ vasenāti yo cittappabhāvito cittasampayuttānaṃ cittādhipateyyabhāvo, so taṃnimitte citte upacaritoti evaṃ vā ettha attho.

269. “By seven great sections” refers to the sections on conditionality, conascence, condition, support, the conjoined, the associated, and questions, along with the modes of forward order, reverse order, forward-reverse order, reverse-forward order, and so on. The Bhāradvāja, Gotama, and other clans—forty-eight in total—are the root lineages in the world. Similarly, the Kaṭṭhakalāpa and other schools of conduct also constitute forty-eight. Hence, it is said, “forty-eight,” etc. Therein, “of them” refers to the capable and incapable. “By the sense-doors as their chief” is said with the intention that those possessing doors are grasped, or the doors themselves, such as the body, etc. An action done carelessly is inferior, done with indifference is middling, and done diligently is excellent. Or, an action done for the sake of some material gain is inferior; done with the desire for the fruit of merit is middling; and done by one established in the noble state simply because it ought to be done is excellent. Or, an action motivated by greed for success in existence is inferior; motivated by a disposition free from greed is middling; and undertaken for the welfare of others is excellent. Or, an action done to a small extent is inferior, done moderately is middling, and done exceedingly is excellent. In the case of the sublime states, however, what is merely attained is inferior, what is not fully developed is middling, and what is well-developed and mastered is excellent. It should be understood that even in each of these cases, distinctions of inferior, etc., can certainly be found based on the diversity of accumulation, etc. “By way of associated states” means that the mind’s dominance over its associated states, which are produced by the mind, is figuratively attributed to the mind as their cause; or this is the meaning here.

Tebhūmakakusalavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of wholesome states pertaining to the three planes is completed.

Lokuttarakusalavaṇṇanā

The Exposition of Supramundane Wholesome States

277. ‘‘Kenaṭṭhena [Pg.118] lokuttara’’ntiādi paṭisambhidāvacanaṃ (paṭi. ma. 2.43) aṭṭhakathāya ābhataṃ, tasmā tattha ‘‘tividhopi anuttaradhammo lokaṃ taratī’’tiādinā saṅgahitoti taṃ tīhi padehi yojetvā dassetuṃ ‘‘lokaṃ taratīti etenā’’tiādimāha. Ekekasmiṃ yojetabbo lokassa antagamanāditāya maggādīsupi labbhamānattā. Maggeyeva vā tividhopi attho yojetabboti sambandho. Anativattanādīti ādi-saddena indriyānaṃ ekarasatā tadupagavīriyavāhanaṃ āsevanāti ime tayo bhāvanāvisese saṅgaṇhāti. Yasmā cete bhāvanāvisesā saṃkilesavodānesu vaṭṭavivaṭṭesu ca taṃtaṃādīnavānisaṃsadassanabhūtāya pubbabhāgapaññāya sampāditena ñāṇavisesena nipphajjanti, tasmā vuttaṃ ‘‘aññamaññaṃ…pe… vaḍḍhetī’’ti.

277. “In what sense is it supramundane?”—this is a statement from the Paṭisambhidāmagga (Paṭi. Ma. 2.43), cited in the commentary. Therefore, it is summarized there as “the threefold unsurpassed Dhamma crosses over the world,” and so on. Thus, to show this by connecting it with the three terms, it is said: “It crosses over the world by this,” and so on. It should be connected with each one, because this is also found in the path and so forth, by way of the ending of the world and so forth. Alternatively, all three meanings should be connected specifically to the path; this is the connection. “Not transcending,” etc.—the word “etc.” includes these three distinctions in development: the faculties being of one taste, the application of energy that supports them, and cultivation. And because these distinctions in development are produced by a special knowledge accomplished by preliminary wisdom—which is the seeing of the respective disadvantages and advantages in defilements and purification, and in the round of existence and its cessation—therefore it is said: “They mutually… increase.”

Nissayo hotīti rukkho viya sākhāya ādhārabhāvena voharīyatīti attho. Phalañāṇaphalaṅgānaṃ nissayavacanaṃ nissayapaccayattā. Tatoyeva nissayabhāvato patiṭṭhābhāvato. Ariyaphalasannissayena hi ariyā katakiccā suṭṭhu nibbinnasabbabhavāpi cirataraṃ loke parahitāya tiṭṭhanti. Kilesānaṃ odhiso pajahanakāpi ariyamaggā avisesena sabbākusalānaṃ sabbakusalapaṭipakkhatāya aññamaggappahātabbesupi kenaci pahānākārena pavattantīti taṃ pahānākāraṃ dassento ‘‘itaresaṃ vijjutobhāsena viya tamassā’’ti āha. Yena pāḷiyaṃ heṭṭhimamaggañāṇānaṃ vijjūpamatā dassitā. Yadi evaṃ uparimaggavajjhā kilesā itareti idhādhippetā. Na tesaṃ samucchedavacanaṃ yuttaṃ. Na hi bhāvanāya pahātabbe dassanamaggo samucchindituṃ sakkoti. Tathā ca sati dassanena pahātabbā eva te siyuṃ. Atha tadaṅgappahānaṃ adhippetaṃ, yena ‘‘vijjutobhāsena viya tamassā’’ti vuttaṃ, taṃ pubbabhāgavipassanāya eva siddhaṃ na ca yuttaṃ lokuttaramaggo tadaṅgavasena kilese pajahatīti. Vikkhambhanepi eseva nayo, anulomañāṇeneva tassa sātisayaṃ sādhitattā. Atha pana paṭhamamaggavajjhā eva kilesā itareti adhippetā, evaṃ sante tesaṃ itarabhāvova na siyā, na ca anapāyagamanīyā [Pg.119] nāma kilesā dassanena pahātabbā atthi, nāpi paṭhamamaggavajjhā kilesā tena vijjutobhāsena viya tamo samucchinditabbāti vattuṃ yuttanti upaparikkhitabboyaṃ ‘‘itaresaṃ…pe… samucchedo’’ti. Lokiyajjhānampi na vinā paṭipadāya ijjhatīti idaṃ adhippāyavasena netabbaṃ neyyatthattāti taṃ adhippāyaṃ vibhāvento ‘‘akatādhikārassā’’ti āha. Tena yathāvuttavacanassa ca sappadesataṃ dasseti. Nanu ca katādhikārassa ariyassa maggena samijjhamānampi jhānaṃ maggapaṭipadāvasena paṭipadāsahitamevāti. Na vinā paṭipadāya ijjhatīti sakkā vattuṃ, tenetaṃ vacanaṃ nippadesamevāti anuyogaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘katādhikārassa panā’’tiādi. Idāni tassa vacanassa adhippāyavasena gahetabbatthatā pāḷitopi viññāyatīti dassento āha ‘‘yathāvutta…pe… katā’’ti.

“Being a support” means it is spoken of as a support, like a tree for its branches, in the sense of being a foundation. The term “support” is used with reference to fruit-knowledge and fruit-factors because they are support conditions. From that very nature of being a support and a foundation, noble ones, having fulfilled their duty and being thoroughly wearied of all existence, still remain in the world for a long time for the welfare of others, relying on the support of the noble fruits. Even though the noble paths abandon defilements only in part, they operate without distinction; because they are opposed to all unwholesome states, they also act in some manner of abandoning towards those things that are to be abandoned by other paths. To show this mode of abandoning, it is said, “like darkness by the flash of lightning.” In the Pāli texts, the knowledge of the lower paths is shown to be like lightning. If so, the defilements to be abandoned by the higher paths are meant here by “the others.” It is not appropriate to speak of their complete eradication, for the path of vision cannot completely eradicate what is to be abandoned by development. If that were the case, they would be only those defilements that are to be abandoned by vision. Alternatively, if temporary abandonment is intended here, as stated, “like darkness by the flash of lightning,” that is achieved only by preliminary insight, and it is not fitting that the supramundane path abandons defilements temporarily. The same principle applies to suppression, as that is supremely achieved by conformity knowledge. But if the defilements to be abandoned by the first path alone are meant here by “the others,” then they could not truly be called “others,” nor are there any defilements to be abandoned by vision that lead to the woeful states, nor is it proper to say that the defilements to be abandoned by the first path are to be completely eradicated like darkness by that flash of lightning. This statement, “the others… up to complete eradication,” should be examined. Even mundane jhānas do not succeed without a path of practice. This should be understood according to the intended meaning, as it is a passage requiring interpretation. To clarify this intention, it is said, “for one who has not made merit.” Thus, the contextual relevance of the aforementioned statement is shown. But surely, for a noble one who has made merit, would not the jhānas perfected by the path still involve the path of practice, by virtue of the path of practice itself, so that it could still be said that they do not succeed without a path of practice, and hence this statement is without exception? With reference to this objection, it is said, “but for one who has made merit…” Now, to indicate that the meaning of that statement should be understood from the Pāli itself, it is said, “as stated… up to made.”

‘‘Yo kocīti avisesavacana’’nti tassa apavādaṃ dassento ‘‘sakiṃ dvikkhattu’’nti ādimāha. Paricchinditvā gahaṇaṃ parijānanaṃ. Nāmarūpavavatthāpanādīnanti nāmarūpavavatthāpanapaccayapariggahalakkhaṇapaṭivedhanikantipariyādānānaṃ. Kicchasiddhitoti nāmarūpavavatthāpanādīnaṃ kesañci sabbesampi vā kicchasiddhito. Esa nayo dutiyavārādīsupi yathāsambhavaṃ. Sukhasiddhiyampīti nāmarūpavavatthāpanādīnaṃ kicchasiddhi maggapātubhāvadandhabhāvassa kāraṇabhāve anekantikā. Vipassanāsahagatindriyānaṃ pana mandatā tassa ekantakāraṇanti dasseti.

“’Whoever’ is an undifferentiated term.” Showing the exception to that, it is said, “once, twice,” and so on. Grasping by delimiting is full understanding. “Of the establishing of name-and-form, etc.” means of the establishing of name-and-form, the comprehension of conditions, the penetration of characteristics, delight, and exhaustion. “From difficult attainment” means from the difficult attainment of some or even all of these, such as the establishing of name-and-form. This same principle applies to the second repetition and so forth, as is appropriate. “Also in easy attainment”: the difficult attainment of the establishing of name-and-form, etc., is not an invariable cause for the slowness of the path’s arising. But it is shown that the weakness of the faculties associated with insight is the definitive cause for that.

Etadantattā paṭipadāyāti etena nippariyāyato paṭipadāñāṇadassanavisuddhisaṅkhātāya vipassanāpaññāya cirācirappavattivasena maggassa khippadandhābhiññatā vuttāti dasseti. Purimānanti purimavārānaṃ, lakkhaṇapaṭivedhādīnaṃyeva vā. Heṭṭhimakoṭiyā tikkhattuṃ kilesavikkhambhane sati dukkhāpaṭipadābhāvo, na tato heṭṭhāti nicchitattā āha ‘‘tikkhattuṃ vikkhambhanavāratāvasenā’’ti. Tassa sukhāpaṭipadā veditabbā ukkaṃsavasenāti adhippāyo.

“Because the practice has this as its end”: by this it is shown that the swift or slow direct knowledge of the path is spoken of directly in terms of the slow or quick progression of insight-wisdom, which is designated as the purification by knowledge and vision of the path of practice. “Of the previous ones” means of the previous rounds, or of just the penetration of characteristics and so forth. “At the lowest limit, when there is suppression of defilements three times, there is no painful practice; not below that.” Because this is determined, it is said, “in terms of a cycle of three instances of suppression.” The meaning is that his pleasant practice should be understood as being of the highest degree.

Yasmiṃ puggale visaṃvādanabhedanāniṭṭhānatthaniyojanānaṃ pavatti, tattha sinehaviraheneva tesaṃ pavatti, so ca puggalo asaṅgahito hotīti musāvādādīnaṃ visaṃvādanādikiccatāya lūkhatā ca apariggahatā ca vuttā. Tappaṭipakkhaviruddhasabhāvattā sammāvācāya siniddhabhāvatā pariggāhakasabhāvatā[Pg.120]. Saddhāvisesayogato vā tassā siniddhabhāvo daṭṭhabbo. Samuṭṭhāpetīti pavatteti. Jīvamāno vā satto, sampayuttadhammā vā vodāyanti etena sayaṃ vā vodāyatīti vodānaṃ.

In a person in whom there is the occurrence of deception, division, and assigning to an undesirable state, these occur only through a lack of affection, and that person is not included. Thus, due to the function of deception and so forth in false speech, etc., harshness and non-inclusion are spoken of. Because its nature is contrary to the opposite of that, right speech has a nature of affection and an embracing nature. Or, its affectionate nature should be understood as due to its connection with special faith. “Causes to arise” means sets in motion. Vodāna (cleansing) is so called because a living being or associated states are cleansed by it, or because it cleanses itself.

285. Taṇhādiṭṭhīhi patiṭṭhānaṃ. Avasesakilesābhisaṅkhārehi āyūhanā. Sassatadiṭṭhiyā patiṭṭhānaṃ. Ucchedadiṭṭhiyā āyūhanā. Līnavasena patiṭṭhānaṃ. Uddhaccavasena āyūhanā. Kāmasukhānuyogavasena patiṭṭhānaṃ. Attakilamathānuyogavasena āyūhanā. Sabbākusalābhisaṅkhāravasena patiṭṭhānaṃ. Sabbalokiyakusalābhisaṅkhāravasena āyūhanāti oghataraṇasuttavaṇṇanāyaṃ vuttesu pakārantaresu idha avuttānaṃ vasenapi patiṭṭhānāyūhanā veditabbā.

285. Grounding is by means of craving and views. Accumulation is by means of the remaining defilements and volitional formations. Grounding is by means of the eternalist view. Accumulation is by means of the annihilationist view. Grounding is by way of a state of sloth. Accumulation is by way of a state of restlessness. Grounding is by way of indulgence in sensual pleasure. Accumulation is by way of the practice of self-mortification. Grounding is by way of all unwholesome volitional formations. Accumulation is by way of all worldly wholesome volitional formations. Thus, grounding and accumulation should also be understood by way of other modes spoken of in the commentary on the Oghataraṇa Sutta which are not mentioned here.

Atha vā kilesaggahaṇena taṇhāsassatadiṭṭhisabbākusalābhisaṅkhārā gahitā taṃsabhāgatāya tadekaṭṭhatāya ca. Tathā abhisaṅkhāraggahaṇena avasesakilesaucchedadiṭṭhisabbalokiyakusalābhisaṅkhārā. Līnuddhaccakāmasukhattakilamathānuyogānaṃ visuṃ vuttattā tehi na yojetabbanti kilesābhisaṅkhāravasena patiṭṭhānāyūhane vatvā taṇhādiṭṭhīnaṃ tattha visesapaccayataṃ dīpetuṃ tadubhayavasenapi yojanā katā. Nayadassanaṃ vā etaṃ tattha daṭṭhabbaṃ. Evamitarepi pakārā yojetabbāti. ‘‘Catūhi, bhikkhave, aṅgehi samannāgato puggalo’’tiādīsu (ma. ni. 4.112, 114) aṅga-saddassa kāraṇatthatā daṭṭhabbā.

Alternatively, by the term “defilements,” craving, the eternalism view, and all unwholesome volitional formations are included, because of their similar nature and their single meaning. Similarly, by the term “volitional formations,” the remaining defilements, the annihilationist view, and all worldly wholesome volitional formations are included. Since sloth, restlessness, indulgence in sensual pleasure, and the practice of self-mortification are mentioned separately, they should not be connected with these. Having spoken of grounding and accumulation in terms of defilements and volitional formations, the connection is also made by way of both craving and views in order to show their specific conditionality therein. Or this should be seen there as the showing of a method. In this way, other modes should also be connected. In passages such as, “Bhikkhus, a person endowed with four factors,” the word ‘factor’ should be understood as having the meaning of ‘cause’.

299. Musāvādādīni bhāsamāno karoti nāma kiṃ vakkhamānaṃ kiriyaṃ, kā pana sāti? Musāvādādikiriyāti viditovāyamattho. Evaṃ vā ettha yojanā daṭṭhabbā.

299. When speaking falsehood and so forth, what is the action to be mentioned that one performs? And what is that? It is the action of falsehood and so forth; this meaning is indeed known. Or, the connection here should be understood thus.

301. Nipphāditapaccayānanti cīvarādipaccayānaṃ. Kuhanavatthūnīti pāpicchataṃ nissāya lūkhacīvarādisevanavasena ‘‘yo te vihāre vasati, so arahā’’tiādinā (pārā. 224) attānaṃ ariyaguṇasāmantaṃ katvā bhaṇanavasena visesalābhino viya attano pariharaṇavasena ca pavattā akusalacittuppādā paresaṃ vimhāpanakāraṇāni kuhanavatthūni.

301. “Of produced conditions” means of conditions such as robes and other requisites. “Deceptive means” are unwholesome arisings of mind that occur based on evil desires, manifesting by way of using rough robes and so forth, and by way of speaking—having presented oneself as possessing qualities approximate to noble ones by saying, “He who lives in your monastery is an arahant,” and so on (cf. Pārā. 224), as if for one who has special gains and for the sake of one's own protection—which are causes of astonishment for others.

343. Satipi [Pg.121] saguṇārammaṇehi maggassa animittanāmalābhe na nippariyāyena vipassanā animittanāmikāti āgamanato maggo animittanāmaṃ na labhatīti āha ‘‘na pana saguṇārammaṇehi…pe… siddhaṃ hotī’’ti. Yasmā pana āgamanato suññataṃ appaṇihitanti laddhanāmassa maggassa saguṇato ārammaṇato ca taṃnāmābhāvo na kadācipi atthi, tasmā nāmattayapāripūrihetuāgamanato nāmalābhoti adhippāyenāha ‘‘paripuṇṇanāmasiddhihetuttā’’ti. Sabbesanti sabbavimokkhamukhāgatānampi maggānaṃ. Nāmattayayogoti suññatāpaṇihitānimittanāmayogo. Vavatthānaṃ asaṅkaro.

343. Although the path obtains the name 'signless' through its own qualities and objects, since insight is not unconditionally named 'signless', he says that the path does not obtain the name 'signless' from tradition, stating: 'But not by means of its own qualities and objects... it is accomplished.' Because, for the path that has obtained the names 'emptiness' and 'desireless' from tradition, the absence of those names—due to its own quality and its object—never occurs, therefore, with the intention that obtaining the name from tradition is the cause for the completion of the three names, he says, 'because it is the cause for the perfect accomplishment of the names.' 'Of all' means of even all the paths that have arrived at the doors to liberation. 'Connection with the three names' is the connection with the names emptiness, desireless, and signlessness. 'Determination' is non-confusion.

350. Nimittadhammā saṅkhārā tehi sanimittā saviggahā viya upaṭṭhahantīti tesaṃ abhāvitabhāvanassa bhāvitabhāvanassa ca upaṭṭhahanākāraṃ dassento ‘‘samūhādī’’tiādimāha. Tena ca ‘‘vimokkhena saddhindriyaṃ adhimattaṃ hotī’’ti (dha. sa. aṭṭha. 350) vuttaṃ, na ‘‘tasmiṃ vimokkhe’’ti, tasmā ‘‘animittavimokkhoti aniccānupassanaṃ āhā’’ti vuttaṃ. Itaratthāpi eseva nayo. Animittassa animittabhāvābhāvo natthīti kasmā vuttaṃ, nanu ca aniccānupassanāya animittavimokkhabhāvo pariyāyenāti nippariyāyadesanāya tassā animittabhāvābhāvo atthi eva, evañca sati ‘‘animittassa animittanāmadānābhāvo’’ti ca na na sakkā vattunti upamāsaṃsandanaṃ suṭṭhutaraṃ yujjati, tathā animittena maggassa animittabhāvo na yujjatiyeva. Tenāha ‘‘paramatthato nāmaṃ dātuṃ na sakkotī’’ti? Saccametaṃ, pariyāyasiddhaṃyeva pana aniccānupassanāya animittabhāvaṃ gahetvā maggasodhanavasenāyamanuyogo kato ‘‘animittavimokkhassa animittabhāvābhāvo natthītiviruddhaṃ viya hotī’’ti. Evañca katvā ‘‘animittaṃ…pe… dīpito hotī’’ti sayameva vakkhatīti. Sāmaññanti upamopamitabbānaṃ sambandhamāha. Na maggādhipatīti maggo adhipati maggādhipatīti chandacittānaṃ ayaṃ samaññā natthīti attho. Na ca tehi maggassāti chandacittehi maggo adhipati etassāti maggādhipatīti ayaṃ samaññā maggassa natthi. Kasmā? Tesaṃ chandacittānaṃ amaggaṅgattā.

350. Formations are phenomena with signs; they appear as if with signs and substance. To show their mode of appearance to one whose development is undeveloped and to one whose development is developed, it says, 'from the aggregate,' and so on. And by that it is said, 'through liberation, the faculty of faith becomes predominant' (Dhs-A. 350), not 'in that liberation.' Therefore, it is said, 'by "signless liberation" he meant the contemplation of impermanence.' This same method applies in the other cases. Why is it said, 'For the signless, there is no absence of the signless state'? Is it not that for the contemplation of impermanence, the state of signless liberation exists by implication, so in the direct teaching, there is indeed an absence of its signless state? This being so, it is not impossible to say, 'there is an absence of giving the name "signless" to the signless,' and thus the comparison with the simile fits very well. Likewise, the signless state of the path by means of the signless is not fitting at all. Is it for this reason that it is said, 'In an ultimate sense, it cannot give the name'? This is true. But having taken the signless state of the contemplation of impermanence, which is established by implication, this investigation was made by way of clarifying the path, as it would seem contradictory to say, 'for the signless liberation, there is no absence of the signless state.' And having done so, it will say by itself, 'the signless... is illuminated.' 'Commonality' refers to the connection between the simile and the thing to be compared. 'Not path-mastery' means that this designation 'path-mastery' (where the path is master) does not apply to desire and consciousness. Nor does this designation 'path-mastery' (where the path has them as its master) apply to the path by means of them, that is, by desire and consciousness. Why? Because that desire and consciousness are not factors of the path.

Jhānassa suññatādināmakattāti etena indriyabalādīnampi maggasampayogato suññatādināmakatā dassitāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Satipi paccanīkāmasane [Pg.122] na tassa maggassa taṃ paribyattaṃ yathā sarasatāti āha ‘‘sarasappadhāno’’ti. Dvīhīti sarasapaccanīkehi. Aññanirapekkhehīti āgamananirapekkhehi. Tasmāti yasmā sarasatova nāmalābhe avavatthānāpatti sabbassa maggassa sabbanāmabhāvāpatti hoti, tasmā. Attābhi…pe… maggāti tena āgamanato nāmalābhassa paccanīkato nāmalābhabhāvaṃ dasseti. Sarasantareti animittabhāvādike. Paccanīkasahitena sarasenāti suññatāppaṇihitabhāvehi tadāgamanehi. Nimittaggahaṇānivāraṇāti saṅkhāranimittaggāhassa anisedhanato. Suññatāppaṇihitasseva maggassa vuttattā aniccato vuṭṭhahantassa maggo idha asaṅgahito siyāti āsaṅkitvā āha ‘‘aniccānupassanā’’tiādi. Saṅkhārehi vuṭṭhānaṃ na siyā, lakkhaṇehi eva vuṭṭhānaṃ siyāti adhippāyo, lakkhaṇapaṭivedho na siyā atadārammaṇattāti attho. Saṅkhārānañhi hutvā abhāvaudayabbayapaṭipīḷanāvasavattanākāresu aniccatādilakkhaṇavohāro.

By the fact that jhāna is named emptiness and so forth, it should be understood that it is thereby shown that the faculties, powers, and so on are also named emptiness and so forth due to their association with the path. Even when there is opposition, that is not as clear for that path as is its essential nature; thus he says, 'predominantly of that nature.' 'By two' means by the two things opposed to that nature. 'Independent of others' means independent of tradition. 'Therefore' means: because if the name were obtained only from its essential nature, the fault of non-determination would occur, the fault that the entire path would have every name; therefore... 'By oneself... the path'—by this he shows that obtaining the name from tradition is equivalent to obtaining the name from the opposition. 'Between the essential natures' means the state of being signless, and so on. 'By the essential nature together with the opposition' means by the states of emptiness and desirelessness and by the traditions for them. 'Not preventing the grasping of the sign' means because of not prohibiting the grasping of the sign of formations. Suspecting that, since only the path of emptiness and desirelessness is spoken of, the path of one emerging from impermanence might not be included here, he says, 'contemplation of impermanence,' and so on. The intention is that emergence should not be from formations, but emergence should be from the characteristics; the meaning is that there would be no penetration of the characteristics because of not having them as object. For of formations, the designation 'characteristics of impermanence, etc.' applies in the modes of having been and then ceasing to be, arising and passing away, oppression, and being without control.

Ākāravantesu gahitesu tadākāropi gahitoyeva hotīti āha ‘‘lakkhaṇānipi paṭividdhāni honti tadākārasaṅkhāraggahaṇato’’ti. Yathāvuttādhippāyenāti ‘‘anicca’’ntiādinā ‘‘saṅkhāresū’’tiādināva vuttappakārādhippāyena. Visunti saṅkhārehi vinivattetvā.

When those possessing aspects are grasped, that very aspect is also grasped. Hence it is said: “The characteristics are also penetrated because of grasping formations as that aspect.” “According to the intended meaning as stated” refers to the meaning expressed as aforementioned by “impermanent” and so on, or by “in the formations” and so on. “Distinctly” means by turning away from formations.

Lokuttarakusalaṃ

Supramundane Wholesome

Pakiṇṇakakathāvaṇṇanā

Explanation of Miscellaneous Topics

Pañcadhā uddisati pañcupādānakkhandhe ajjhattadukavasena rūpadukavasena ca bhinditvā abhinditvā ca nimittavacaneneva uddisati pavattassapi saṅkhāranimittabhāvānativattanato vuṭṭhātabbatāsāmaññato ca. Teneva upādinnānupādinnavasena pavattaṃ dvidhā katvā niddisitvāpi ‘‘ayaṃ tāva nimitte vinicchayo’’ti nimittavaseneva nigameti. Ettha ca nimittaṃ ajjhattabahiddhā, pavattaṃ pana ajjhattamevāti ayametesaṃ viseso. Bojjhaṅgādivisesanti bojjhaṅgajhānaṅgamaggaṅgānaṃ asadisataṃ. Asamāpajjitukāmatāsaṅkhātā vitakkādivirāgabhāvanā asamāpajjitukāmatāvirāgabhāvanā. Itarassāti pādakajjhānādikassa. Atabbhāvatoti yathāvuttavirāgabhāvanābhāvassa abhāvato. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – yathā maggāsannāya vipassanāya somanassasahagatatte maggassa paṭhamādijjhānikatā ca upekkhāsahagatatte [Pg.123] pañcamajjhānikatā eva ca tabbasena ca bojjhaṅgādīnaṃ visesoti tesaṃ niyame āsannakāraṇaṃ padhānakāraṇañca vuṭṭhānagāminivipassanā, na evaṃ pādakajjhānādayoti.

It is taught in five ways: he indicates the five aggregates of clinging—having divided them and not divided them by way of the internal dyad and the form dyad—precisely by the word 'sign', because even what has occurred does not transcend the state of being a sign of formations, and because of the commonality of being something to be emerged from. For that very reason, having pointed out the process by making it twofold—by way of what is clung to and not clung to—he concludes precisely by way of the sign, saying, 'This, for now, is the determination on the sign.' And here the sign is internal and external, but the process is only internal; this is the difference between them. 'The distinction of the enlightenment factors, etc.' means the dissimilarity of the enlightenment factors, jhāna factors, and path factors. The development of dispassion for thought and so forth, which is reckoned as the desire not to attain, is the development of dispassion from the desire not to attain. 'Of the other' means of the basic jhāna and so forth. 'From not being that state' means because of the absence of the state of the aforesaid development of dispassion. This is what is said: just as when insight near the path is accompanied by joy, the path has the nature of the first jhāna and so on, and when accompanied by equanimity, it has the nature of the fifth jhāna, and by that means there is a distinction of the enlightenment factors and so on—so for their determination, the proximate cause and the principal cause is insight leading to emergence, but this is not so for the basic jhānas and so on.

Idāni apādakapaṭhamajjhānapādakānaṃ pakiṇṇakasaṅkhārapaṭhamajjhānāni sammasitvā nibbattitānañca maggānaṃ ekantena paṭhamajjhānikabhāvato vipassanāniyamoyevettha ekantiko padhānañcāti imamatthaṃ vibhāvento ‘‘vipassanāniyamenevā’’tiādimāha. Tattha itareti dutiyajjhānikādimaggā. Pādakajjhānātikkantānaṃ aṅgānaṃ asamāpajjitukāmatāvirāgabhāvanābhūtā vuṭṭhānagāminivipassanā adhiṭṭhānabhūtena pādakajjhānena āhitavisesā maggassa jhānaṅgādivisesaniyāmikā hotīti ‘‘pādakajjhānavipassanāniyamehī’’ti vuttaṃ. Yathā ca adhiṭṭhānabhūtena pādakajjhānena, evaṃ ārammaṇabhūtena sammasitajjhānena ubhayasabbhāve ajjhāsayavasena āhitavisesā vipassanā niyametīti āha ‘‘evaṃ sesavādesupi…pe… yojetabbo’’ti.

Now, having contemplated the first jhānas which are miscellaneous formations and the basis for the path without a basis, and the paths that have arisen from them, because of their exclusively first-jhāna nature, the determination by insight here is indeed exclusive and predominant. To explain this meaning, he said, 'by the determination of insight alone,' and so on. Therein, 'the others' are the paths of the second jhāna and so forth. For the factors that have transcended the base jhāna, the insight leading to emergence—which is the development of dispassion through the desire not to attain—having a special quality imparted by the base jhāna that serves as the foundation, becomes the determiner of the special qualities of the path, such as the jhāna factors. Thus, it is said, 'by the determinations of the base jhāna and insight.' And just as by the base jhāna which is the foundation, so also by the contemplated jhāna which is the object, insight, having a special quality imparted through the disposition in the presence of both, determines. Thus he said, 'in the same way, in the remaining cases... it should be applied.'

Pādakajjhānasaṅkhāresūti paṭhamajjhānasaṅkhāresu. ‘‘Paṭhamajjhānaṃ pādakaṃ katvā’’ti (dha. sa. aṭṭha. 350) hi vuttaṃ. Taṃtaṃvirāgāvirāgabhāvanābhāvenāti vitakkādīnaṃ virajjanāvirajjanabhāvanābhāvena. Tena ārammaṇajjhānassapi vipassanāya visesādhānaṃ upanissayatamāha.

'In the formations of the base jhāna' means in the formations of the first jhāna. For it is said, 'Having made the first jhāna the base' (Dhs.A. 350). 'By the state of developing dispassion and non-dispassion for this and that' means by the state of developing detachment from or non-detachment from initial thought and so on. By that, he states the supporting condition for insight to impart a special quality even to the jhāna as object.

Pādakajjhānasammasitajjhānāniyeva bojjhaṅgādivisesānaṃ upanissayo kāraṇanti pādakajjhānasammasitajjhānupanissayo, tassa sabbhāve. Tadabhāvābhāvatoti tassa ajjhāsayassa abhāvābhāvato.

The base jhānas and the contemplated jhānas themselves are the supporting condition and cause for the special qualities of the enlightenment factors and so on; thus, 'the supporting condition of the base jhānas and contemplated jhānas,' in their presence. 'Because of the absence of their absence' means because of the presence of that disposition.

Catutthajjhānikassa maggassa āruppe arūpajjhānameva pādakaṃ siyāti āha ‘‘catutthajjhānikavajjāna’’nti. Ariyamaggassa oḷārikaṅgātikkamanūpanissayā vipassanāya adhiṭṭhānārammaṇabhūtā dutiyajjhānādayo. Pañcahi aṅgehīti pañcahi jhānaṅgehi. ‘‘Taṃtaṃvādehi paññāpiyamānāni pādakajjhānādīni vādasahacāritāya ‘vādā’ti vuccantī’’ti adhippāyena ‘‘tayopete vāde’’ti āha. Vadanti etehīti vā vādakaraṇabhūtāni pādakajjhānādīni vādā.

For the path of the fourth jhāna, in the formless realm, the formless jhāna itself would be the basis; thus he said, 'excluding those of the fourth jhāna.' The second jhāna and so on are the supporting condition for the noble path's transcending of coarse factors, and are the foundation and object for insight. 'With five factors' means with the five jhāna factors. With the intention, 'The base jhānas and so on, which are made known by this and that teaching, are called 'teachings' because of their association with teachings,' he said, 'these three teachings.' Or, because they speak with these, the base jhānas and so on, which are the instruments for teaching, are 'teachings'.

Vipākasantānassa…pe… [Pg.124] susaṅkhatattāti etena yasmiṃ santāne kammaṃ uppajjati, tattha uppajjamānameva kiñci visesādhānaṃ karotīti dīpeti. Yato tasmiṃyeva santāne tassa vipāko, nāññattha.

Of the resultant continuity... due to being well-conditioned—by this he indicates that in whatever continuity kamma arises, it produces some special quality right there as it arises. Because its result is in that very continuity, and not elsewhere.

Purimānulomaṃ viya tanti yathā gotrabhuṭṭhāne uppannānulomato purimaanulomañāṇaṃ taṃ gotrabhuṭṭhāne uppannānulomaṃ anubandhati, evaṃ. Tadapīti gotrabhuṭṭhāne uppannānulomañāṇampi aññaṃ anulomañāṇameva anubandheyya, tassa anantaraṃ uppajjeyya. Sā bhūmīti sā pañcupādānakkhandhasaṅkhātā kilesānaṃ uppattiṭṭhānatāya bhūmi. Eko bhavoti gahetvā vuttanti etena satta bhave dve bhaveti idampi adhippāyavasena netabbatthaṃ, na yathārutavasenāti dasseti. Tatthāyaṃ adhippāyo – ekavāraṃ kāmāvacaradevesu ekavāraṃ manussesūti evampi missitūpapattivasena tesu ekissā eva upapattiyā ayaṃ paricchedo. Yaṃ pana ‘‘na te bhavaṃ aṭṭhamamādiyantī’’ti (khu. pā. 6.9; su. ni. 232) vuttaṃ, tampi kāmāvacarabhavaṃyeva sandhāyāha. Mahaggatabhavānaṃ paricchedo natthīti vadanti. Tathā ‘‘ṭhapetvā dve bhave’’ti etthāpi kāmāvacaradevamanussabhavānaṃ missakavaseneva, tasmā kāmadhātuyaṃ ye dve bhavāti kāmāvacaradevamanussavasena ye dve bhavāti attho. Purimavikappesu puggalabhedena paṭipadā bhinditvā kassaci calatīti, kassaci na calatīti katvā ‘‘calati evā’’ti avadhāraṇamantarena attho vutto. Yasmā pana aṭṭhakathāyaṃ (dha. sa. aṭṭha. 350 lokuttarakusalapakiṇṇakakathā) ‘‘yathā ca paṭipadā, evaṃ adhipatipi calati evā’’ti vuttaṃ, tasmā sabbesampi paṭipadāsu abhedena gahitāsu ekantena calanaṃ sambhavatīti ‘‘calaticceva vuttaṃ, na na calatī’’ti tatiyavikappo calanāvadhāraṇo vutto.

Like the preceding conformity: just as the conformity-knowledge arisen at the moment of change-of-lineage follows the preceding conformity-knowledge, so... That too means: even the conformity-knowledge arisen at the moment of change-of-lineage should follow another conformity-knowledge; it should arise immediately after it. That plane: that plane called the five aggregates of clinging, because it is the place for the arising of defilements. 'One existence' is said by way of inclusion: by this he shows that 'seven existences' and 'two existences' should also be understood according to the intended meaning, not according to the literal reading. Herein, this is the intended meaning: even if there is one rebirth among the sense-sphere devas and one among humans, this limitation applies by way of mixed rebirths, with one single rebirth among them. As for what was said, 'They do not take up an eighth existence' (Khp. 6.9; Snp. 232), that too he says referring only to sense-sphere existence. They say there is no limitation for the sublime existences. Likewise, in 'excluding two existences,' it is also by way of combining the sense-sphere deva and human existences. Therefore, 'the two existences in the sense-sphere' means the two existences as sense-sphere devas and humans. In the previous alternatives, the path was divided according to the difference in persons, and since for some it wavers and for some it does not, the meaning was stated without the emphasis 'it wavers indeed.' But since in the commentary (Dhs.A. 350) it is said, 'And just as the path, so too the predominance wavers indeed,' therefore, when all paths are taken without distinction, wavering is certainly possible. Thus, the third alternative, which emphasizes wavering, was stated as 'it wavers indeed,' not 'it does not waver.'

Lokuttarakusalapakiṇṇakakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Miscellaneous Discourse on Supramundane Wholesome States is concluded.

Paṭhamamaggavīsatimahānayavaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Twenty Great Methods of the First Path

357. Jhānamaggādipariyāyehi kathite bojjhanakāti adhippetā, visesato pubbabhāge ‘‘jhānaṃ bhāvemi maggaṃ bhāvemī’’ti pavattajjhāsayā hontīti adhippāyena ‘‘yassa pubbabhāge’’tiādimāha.

357. The enlightenment factors, which were explained in the sections on jhāna, the path, and so forth, are intended. With the intention that, especially in the preliminary stage, they have the disposition that proceeds as, 'I will develop jhāna, I will develop the path,' he said, 'for whom in the preliminary stage,' and so on.

358. Upanissayavasenāti [Pg.125] tathā cittappavattisaṅkhātena pubbabhāgābhisaṅkhārena. Tenevāha ‘‘yassa hī’’tiādi. Tadanurūpabalāti adhipatipaccayalābhena sattivisesayogamāha. Yadi pubbabhāgābhisaṅkhāravasena chandādīnaṃ adhipatibhāvo, kimatthameteyeva evaṃ vuttā, nanu saddhādīnampi pubbabhāgābhisaṅkhāro labbhatīti āha ‘‘sesadhammāna’’ntiādi. Ataṃsabhāvattāti sampayuttehi sātisayamanuvattitabbabhāvarahitattā. Kiñcāpi hi saddhādayopi indriyapaccayatāya sampayuttehi anuvattayanti, ekasmiṃ pana cittuppāde samadhurena aññena vinā sampayuttehi anuvattanīyabhāvo na tesaṃ yathā chandādīnanti teyeva adhipatibhāvena vuttā. Evañca katvā indriyasahajātādhipatipaccayānaṃ viseso paribyatto hoti.

358. 'By way of supporting condition' means by the preliminary preparation which is designated as such an occurrence of mind. Therefore, he said, 'For whom indeed,' and so on. 'With strength corresponding to that' refers to the connection with a special power through the obtaining of the predominance condition. If the predominance of desire and so on is by way of the preliminary preparation, why are these alone spoken of thus? Is not the preliminary preparation obtained for faith and so on too? He said, 'For the remaining states,' and so on. 'Because of not having that nature' means because of being without the nature of being followed exceedingly by associated states. For although faith and so on also follow associated states through being the faculty condition, yet in a single mind-moment, the state of being followed by associated states without another of equal weight is not theirs as it is for desire and so on. Therefore, only they are spoken of as having the nature of predominance. And having done so, the distinction between the faculty condition and the conascence-predominance condition becomes manifest.

Catumagganayasahassavaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Thousand Methods of the Four Paths

362. Mānassa diṭṭhisadisā pavatti. Tathā hi so adhipati viya aññādhipatinā diṭṭhiyā saha nappavattatīti. Ekadesa…pe… upamā hoti, na sabbasāmaññena, itarathā sūriyatthaṅgamane andhakārāvattharaṇaṃ viya aggamaggatirodhāne saccapaṭicchādakatamappavatti āpajjeyyāti adhippāyo. Aññamaññanti aññe aññe. ‘‘Ānītaṃ idaṃ sutta’’nti vibhatti pariṇāmetabbā. Yathāvuttanayenāti imissā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttanayena. Na upamāya vuttattāti imasmiṃ sutte na upamāya vuttabhāvato. Yathāvuttanayenāti vā etasmiṃ sutte vuttappakārena nayena imissā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ upamāya na vuttattā. Avayavā viya honti, yena te cetasi niyuttā, cittassa eteti ca cetasikātiādinā vuccanti, na pana ‘‘phassikā’’tiādināti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

362. The occurrence of conceit is similar to that of view. For it, like a sovereign, does not occur together with another sovereign, namely view. The simile holds in one respect..., not in every respect; otherwise, just as darkness spreads when the sun sets, the result would be the non-occurrence of the darkness that conceals the truth when the supreme path is obstructed—this is the intention. 'Mutually' means one another. 'This sutta was brought'—the case ending should be changed. 'According to the method stated' means according to the method stated in this commentary. 'Because it is not stated by way of simile' means because in this sutta it is not stated by way of simile. Or, 'according to the method stated' means by the method of the kind stated in this sutta, because in this commentary it is not stated by way of simile. They are like parts, by which they are yoked to the mind, and because they are 'of the mind' (cittassa ete), they are called 'mental' (cetasika), and so on; but it should be understood that they are not called 'contact-ual' (phassikā), and so on.

Kusalakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Wholesome is concluded.

Akusalapadaṃ

The Section on the Unwholesome

Dhammuddesavāro

The Chapter on the Exposition of Dhammas

Paṭhamacittavaṇṇanā

Explanation of the First Consciousness

365. Khaṇattayassa akusalesu asambhavato samavāyakālahetusamūhattho samaya-saddo. Lobhābhibhūtāya eva iṭṭhārammaṇasmiṃ itaratra [Pg.126] ca iṭṭhākāraggahaṇavasena somanassasahagatabhāvoti evamādiṃ sandhāya ‘‘yathānurūpa’’nti vuttaṃ. ‘‘Kilesāturatāya anārogyaṭṭhena kilesavajjasabbhāvato sāvajjaṭṭhena avijjāsambhūtatāya akosalyasambhūtaṭṭhena akusala’’nti ca ‘‘sāvajjadukkhavipākalakkhaṇaṃ, anatthajananarasaṃ, saṃkilesapaccupaṭṭhānaṃ, ayonisomanasikārapadaṭṭhānaṃ, gārayhabhāvato vā sāvajjalakkhaṇaṃ, saṃkilesabhāvarasaṃ, aniṭṭhavipākapaccupaṭṭhānaṃ, yathāvuttapadaṭṭhānamevā’’ti ca evamādinā vuttanayena anugantabbatāya vuttaṃ ‘‘vuttanayaṃ anugantvā’’ti.

365. The word 'samaya' has the meaning of a collection of causes coinciding in time, because of the non-occurrence of unwholesome states apart from the three moments. The phrase 'yathānurūpa' (as is appropriate) is said with reference to such things as the fact that, for one overwhelmed by greed, a state accompanied by joy arises by way of grasping the pleasing aspect in a desirable object or elsewhere. And 'unwholesome' is so called because it is afflicted by defilements, thus having the meaning of being unhealthy; because of the presence of the fault of defilements, thus having the meaning of being blameworthy; because it is produced from ignorance, thus having the meaning of being produced from unskillfulness. It should be understood by following the stated method, as in the passages: 'It has the characteristic of being blameworthy and having painful results, the function of generating what is not beneficial, it manifests as defilement, and its proximate cause is unwise attention'; or 'It has the characteristic of being blameworthy due to its reprehensible nature, the function of being of a defiled nature, it manifests as undesirable results, and its proximate cause is indeed as stated.' Because it should be followed in accordance with the method stated, it is said 'following the stated method'.

Gataṃ gamanaṃ pavattīti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘gatamattaṃ gatimattaṃ gahaṇamatta’’nti. Diṭṭhiyā hi gati pavatti evāti. Āsannakāraṇattāti padaṭṭhānatāya, yonisomanasikāro viya hi kusalassa ayonisomanasikāro akusalassa accāsannahetu. Tathā hi satipi asaddhammasavanādikāraṇe ayoniso anāvajjite avavatthāpite ca natthi akusalappavatti. Tathā ca vakkhati aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘ayoniso akusala’’nti. Etena ekantakāraṇatā ca vuttatthā hoti. Paṭisaṅkhā sītādikhamanaṃ appamādavihāroti vuttaṃ ‘‘appamajjanaṃ khamana’’nti. Tena satisaṃvaroti idha khantisaṃvaro vuttoti adhippāyo indriyasaṃvarassa vuttattā. Pahānasaṃvaroti vīriyasaṃvaro. So hi ‘‘uppannaṃ kāmavitakkaṃ nādhivāseti pajahatī’’tiādinā (ma. ni. 1.26; a. ni. 4.14; 6.58) vuttoti.

Having taken 'gone' (gataṃ) to mean 'going' (gamanaṃ), that is, 'occurrence' (pavattī), it is said: 'mere going, mere movement, mere grasping.' For the movement (gati) of a view is indeed its occurrence (pavatti). 'Due to being a proximate cause' means by being a basis. For just as wise attention is for the wholesome, unwise attention is the most proximate cause for the unwholesome. Indeed, even when causes such as listening to the false Dhamma are present, if there is no unwise adverting and determining, there is no occurrence of the unwholesome. And so it will be said in the commentary: 'Unwisely, the unwholesome.' By this, its being the decisive cause is also expressed. Regarding 'heedfulness, endurance,' this means reflection, enduring cold and so forth, and dwelling with heedfulness. By this, the meaning is that here 'restraint by mindfulness' is spoken of as 'restraint by patience,' since 'restraint of the faculties' has already been mentioned. 'Restraint by abandoning' is restraint by effort. For that is spoken of in the passage beginning: 'One does not tolerate an arisen sensual thought, but abandons it...'

Sammāpaṭipattiyā paṭipakkhabhāvena gahetabbatākāro moho sammāpaṭipattipaṭipakkhabhāvaggahaṇākāro. Tena hi nivutā na sammā paṭipajjanti. Abhijjhāya visesayogo kammapathappatti.

Delusion is the mode to be grasped as being the opponent to right practice; it is the mode of grasping the state of being the opponent to right practice. For because of it, those who are hindered do not practice rightly. The special application of covetousness is its reaching a course of action.

Anupaparikkhā moho. So cettha diṭṭhirahito veditabbo. Diṭṭhisahitassa pana diṭṭhiyā anuvidhāyakattā taggahaṇeneva gahaṇanti. Avatthusminti asaddahanīye vatthusmiṃ. Sānunayo adhimokkhoti mohadiṭṭhīnaṃ saddhāpatirūpatamāha. Ahirikānottappamohādīhi pamajjanato ahirikādīhi kāraṇehi. Ārakkharahitacitteti cittassa sativirahataṃyeva dasseti. Ārakkhapaccupaṭṭhānā hi satīti. Etena ‘‘assaddhiyacitte andhabālacitte’’ti padadvayaṃ vuttatthaṃ hoti. Upanāhādīti ādi-saddena [Pg.127] rāgādayo saṅgayhanti. Rāgādīnaṃ pariyuṭṭhānādisabhāvatāya ‘‘avisesenā’’ti vuttaṃ visesassa ekaccassa asambhavato. Idhāti, imasmiṃ citte. Nipphādetabbe payojane bhummaṃ ‘‘cammasmiṃ dīpinaṃ hantī’’ti (vajira. ṭī. 17-18 verañjakaṇḍavaṇṇanā) viya ārammaṇaṃ vā avūpasamo phalūpacārena ‘‘semho guḷo’’ti viya.

Not investigating is delusion. Here it should be understood as being devoid of views. But in the case of one with views, because it is subservient to the view, it is included by the grasping of that very view. 'In an unfounded matter' means in a matter not to be believed. 'Resolution with inclination' states the counterfeit of faith that delusion and wrong view are. 'Due to negligence by means of shamelessness, lack of fear of wrongdoing, delusion, and so forth' means by causes such as shamelessness. 'A mind lacking protection' shows the very absence of mindfulness in the mind, for mindfulness has protection as its manifestation. By this, the meaning of the two phrases 'a faithless mind' and 'a blind, foolish mind' is expressed. 'Resentment, and so forth': by the word 'and so forth,' lust and other defilements are included. Because the nature of lust and so forth is to be an obsession, it is said 'without distinction,' since a particular distinction is impossible. 'Here' means in this mind. The locative case is used with regard to the purpose to be accomplished, as in 'one kills a leopard for its skin'; or 'non-pacification' is the object, by a metaphorical use of the result, as in 'phlegm is molasses'.

Dhammuddesavārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section on the Exposition of the Dhamma is concluded.

Niddesavārakathāvaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Section on Exposition

390. Sabhāvapaṭicchādavasena pakatiattādiasantaggahaṇassa nissayattā nimittattā asantaṃ bujjhati, niccādivisamaggahaṇassa saññādivipariyesassa nissayattā asamaṃ bujjhatīti moho vutto nimittassa kattubhāvena upacāritattā, ayañca attho diṭṭhisahitamohavasena daṭṭhabbo. Ettha ca pakatīti kāpilānaṃ padhānaṃ.

390. Because it conceals true nature, and because it is a basis and a sign for grasping what is non-existent—such as a primal nature or a self—one understands what is non-existent. Because it is a basis for the perversion of perception and so forth, and for the wrong grasping of permanence and so forth, one understands wrongly. Thus it is called 'delusion,' due to the figurative use of 'sign' in the role of agent. And this meaning should be understood in terms of delusion accompanied by wrong view. Here, 'primal nature' refers to the 'padhāna' of the followers of Kapila.

Tatiyacittavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Third Consciousness

400. Apaṇṇakapadaṃ viya avirajjhanakapadampi kadāci niyatabhāvaṃ dīpeyyāti aniyatataṃ dīpetuṃ ‘‘uppattiarahaṅgānī’’ti vuttaṃ mānassa aniyatattā. Yadi hi māno niyato siyā, kāmarāgassa mānarahitā pavatti na siyā, tathā bhavarāgassa. Evaṃ sati paṭṭhāne catukkhattuṃ kāmarāgena yojanā na siyā, tikkhattuṃyeva siyā, bhavarāgamūlikā ca na siyā, evañca saṃyojanānaṃ saṃyojanehi aṭṭhavidhena yojanā siyā, na dasavidhā dassitāti yathāvuttāhi yojanāhi mānassa aniyatabhāvo pakāsito. Atha vā mānena saddhiṃ pañca honti yathāvuttāni apaṇṇakaṅgāni, kiṃ pana hontīti apekkhāyaṃ yevāpanakāti viditovāyamattho. Yevāpanakānañhi pañcabhāvo idha vidhīyati, na apaṇṇakaṅgānanti so yathā hoti, tathā yojetabbaṃ. Kilesaduke paṭiccavārādīsu ‘‘kilesaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kileso dhammo uppajjati hetupaccayā’’tiādīsu ‘‘lobhaṃ paṭicca moho māno thinaṃ uddhaccaṃ ahirikaṃ anottappaṃ. Lobhaṃ paṭicca moho māno uddhaccaṃ [Pg.128] ahirikaṃ anottappaṃ. Lobhaṃ paṭicca moho thinaṃ uddhaccaṃ ahirikaṃ anottappaṃ. Lobhaṃ paṭicca moho uddhaccaṃ ahirikaṃ anottappa’’nti vibhattattā ‘‘tathā kilesadukepī’’ti vuttaṃ. Diṭṭhivippayuttasasaṅkhārikāsaṅkhārikacittavasena hi ayaṃ pāṭhabhedoti.

400. Lest the term 'unfailing,' like the term 'certain,' should sometimes indicate a fixed nature, in order to show its unfixed nature, it is said 'factors suitable for arising,' because of the unfixed nature of conceit. For if conceit were fixed, there would be no occurrence of sensual lust without conceit, and likewise for the craving for existence. This being so, in the Paṭṭhāna, the connection with sensual lust would not be fourfold but only threefold, and there would be none rooted in the craving for existence. Thus, the connection of fetters with fetters would be eightfold, not the tenfold that is shown. Therefore, by the connections as stated, the unfixed nature of conceit is made clear. Alternatively: with conceit, there are five certain factors as stated. In anticipation of the question, 'But what are they?', the term 'optional' is used; this meaning is known. For here a fivefold nature is prescribed for the optional factors, not for the certain factors; therefore, it should be connected in such a way that this is so. Because in the Duka on Defilements, in the Conditional Relations section and so on, in passages such as 'Dependent on a defiled state, a defiled state arises by way of root condition,' it is analyzed as: 'Dependent on greed arise delusion, conceit, sloth, restlessness, shamelessness, and lack of fear of wrongdoing. Dependent on greed arise delusion, conceit, restlessness, shamelessness, and lack of fear of wrongdoing. Dependent on greed arise delusion, sloth, restlessness, shamelessness, and lack of fear of wrongdoing. Dependent on greed arise delusion, restlessness, shamelessness, and lack of fear of wrongdoing,' it is therefore said, 'likewise in the Duka on Defilements.' For this textual variation is due to consciousness dissociated from views, prompted and unprompted.

‘‘Kāmarāgo catudhā ekato uppajjati, paṭigho tidhā, māno ekadhā, tathā vicikicchā bhavarāgoti uddisitvā kāmarāgo mānasaṃyojanaavijjāsaṃyojanehi ceva avijjāsaṃyojanamatteneva ca saddhiṃ māno bhavarāgāvijjāsaṃyojanehi saddhiṃ bhavarāgo avijjāsaṃyojanena saddhi’’nti aṭṭhakathākaṇḍavaṇṇanāyaṃ (dha. sa. aṭṭha. 1485) vakkhamānattā ‘‘idha ca vakkhatī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattheva ‘‘lobho chadhā ekato uppajjati, paṭigho dvedhā, tathā moho’’ti uddisitvā ‘‘lobho asaṅkhāriko diṭṭhivippayutto mohauddhaccaahirikānottappehi, sasaṅkhāriko mohathinauddhaccaahirikānottappehi, asaṅkhāriko eva mohamānauddhaccaahirikaanottappehi, sasaṅkhāriko eva ca mohamānathinauddhaccaahirikaanottappehī’’ti vakkhamānattā ‘‘tathādasavidhā kilesāna’’nti vuttaṃ. ‘‘Aha’’nti gahaṇatāya avaṃkatvā gahaṇampi ‘‘sampaggaho’’ti vuttaṃ.

Because it will be said in the explanation of the commentary section: 'Having stated, “Sensual lust arises together in four ways, aversion in three, conceit in one, and likewise doubt and craving for existence,” it is explained that sensual lust arises together with the fetters of conceit and ignorance, and also with just the fetter of ignorance; conceit arises together with the fetters of craving for existence and ignorance; and craving for existence arises together with the fetter of ignorance,' the phrase 'and here it will be explained' and so on is said. Because it will be said in that very place: 'Having stated, “Greed arises together in six ways, aversion in two, and likewise delusion,” it is explained that unprompted greed dissociated from views arises with delusion, restlessness, shamelessness, and lack of fear of wrongdoing; prompted greed arises with delusion, sloth, restlessness, shamelessness, and lack of fear of wrongdoing; unprompted greed also arises with delusion, conceit, restlessness, shamelessness, and lack of fear of wrongdoing; and prompted greed also arises with delusion, conceit, sloth, restlessness, shamelessness, and lack of fear of wrongdoing,' the phrase 'thus, the tenfold classification of defilements' is said. The grasping by way of 'I,' a distorted grasping, is also called 'thorough grasping'.

Catutthacittavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Fourth Consciousness

402. Ussāhaṃ janentāti ettha cittapayogasaṅkhāto saṅkhāro eva ussāho, na vīriyussāhoti.

402. In the phrase 'they generate exertion,' here 'exertion' is the volitional formation reckoned as mental application, not the exertion that is energy.

Navamacittavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Ninth Consciousness

413. Visappanāniṭṭharūpasamuṭṭhānaṃ yena kupitassa sakalasarīraṃ kampati, kupitākāro paññāyati. Etena sampattiattho raso dassito hoti, pavattiākāravasena vā visappanaraso. Tathā hi yassa kuppati, tassa amittassa sampatti yebhuyyena paṭighuppattihetu hotīti. Etena kiccattho raso vutto hotīti.

413. Its manifestation is the spreading of an undesirable form, by which the entire body of an angry person trembles and an angry appearance becomes manifest. By this, its function as accomplishment is shown, or its function is spreading by way of its mode of occurrence. For indeed, for one who is angry, the prosperity of their enemy mostly becomes a cause for the arising of repugnance. By this, its function as a specific task is stated.

418. Vacanatthameva vacanapariyāyameva.

418. Merely the meaning of the expression, merely a way of speaking.

Ekādasamacittavaṇṇanā

The Eleventh Explanation of Consciousness

424. Nicchayābhāvāti [Pg.129] adhimokkhābhāvā. Asaṇṭhahanatoti santānavasena ekasmiṃ ārammaṇe anavaṭṭhānato.

424. ‘Because of the absence of certainty’ means because of the absence of decision. ‘Because of not being established’ means because of not remaining on a single object by way of the mental continuity.

Dvādasamacittavaṇṇanā

The Twelfth Explanation of Consciousness

429. Sahajātādhipati natthi ‘‘chandavato ce vicikicchā uppajjati, sā mayhaṃ uppajjeyyā’’tiādippavattiyā abhāvā. Anuddhaṭattā paṭisiddhatā, yathādhammasāsane avacanampi abhāvaṃ dīpeti.

429. There is no co-nascent dominance because there is no occurrence of such thoughts as, ‘If doubt arises in one with desire, it might arise in me.’ Because it is not mentioned, it is prohibited, just as in the teaching of the Dhamma, even not mentioning something indicates its absence.

Avacanatoti a-kārassa tadaññavacanataṃ dasseti. Etena ca dassanena pahātabbesu abhāvavacanena kāraṇasiddhiyā phalasiddhīti tattha abhāvassa kāraṇameva tāva dassetuṃ ‘‘paṭisandhianākaḍḍhanato’’ti vuttaṃ. Tena taṃsabhāvatā tassa cittuppādassa vuttā hoti. Tato ca ‘‘balavaṃ paṭisandhiṃ ākaḍḍhati, dubbalaṃ nākaḍḍhatī’’ti idaṃ paṭisandhidānasabhāvesu. Yassa pana paṭisandhidānasabhāvo eva natthi, na tassa balavabhāvo paṭisandhiākaḍḍhane kāraṇanti ayamattho dassito hoti. Anākaḍḍhanaṃ sādheti ‘‘yadi hi ākaḍḍheyyā’’tiādinā. Yasmā ca nāgataṃ, tasmā nākaḍḍhatīti adhippāyo. ‘‘Yasmā pana taṃ paṭisandhidānaṃ natthi, tasmā nāgata’’nti vuttattā ‘‘anākaḍḍhanato anāgamanaṃ sādhetu’’nti vuttaṃ.

‘Because of not being mentioned’ shows that the prefix ‘a-’ indicates it is spoken of as other than that. And by this demonstration, since for things to be abandoned the result is established by the establishment of the cause through the statement of absence, it is said, ‘because of not drawing rebirth-linking,’ in order to first show the cause of absence there. By that, the nature of that arising of consciousness is stated. And from that, this statement, ‘It draws a strong rebirth-linking, but does not draw a weak one,’ applies to things that have the nature of giving rebirth-linking. But for that which has no nature of giving rebirth-linking at all, its being strong is not a cause for drawing rebirth-linking—this meaning is shown. It establishes the non-drawing with the phrase beginning, ‘If it were to draw…’ The meaning is: because it has not come, therefore it does not draw. Because it was said, ‘But because that giving of rebirth-linking does not exist, therefore it has not come,’ it is said, ‘in order to prove non-arrival from non-drawing.’

Apāyagamanīyassāti apāyaṃ gametīti apāyagamanīyaṃ, taṃsabhāvanti attho. Paṭisandhiākaḍḍhane sati uddhaccasahagataṃ ekantena apāyagamanīyaṃ siyā. Tena vuttaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ (dha. sa. aṭṭha. 429) ‘‘itarassāpi ettheva paṭisandhidānaṃ bhaveyyā’’ti. Na hi akusalapaṭisandhi sugatiyaṃ sambhavatīti. ‘‘Catūhi apāyehi ca vippamutto (khu. pā. 6.11; su. ni. 234) avinipātadhammo’’ti (sa. ni. 2.41; 5.998, 1004) vacanato apāyagamanīyañca dassanena pahātabbaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘apāyagamanīyassa dassanena pahātabbattā’’ti. Na cetaṃ dassanena pahātabbaṃ, na so tassa apāyagamanīyo rāgo doso moho tadekaṭṭhā ca kilesāti etena saṅgahoti sakkā vattuṃ niyogato bhāvanāya pahātabbabhāvena vuttattā. Vuttañhetaṃ ‘‘katame dhammā bhāvanāya pahātabbā, uddhaccasahagato cittuppādo’’ti (dha. sa. 1406).

‘Of that which leads to a state of loss’ means: it leads to a state of loss, therefore it is ‘leading to a state of loss’; the meaning is ‘having that nature.’ If there were the drawing of rebirth-linking, that which is accompanied by restlessness would definitely lead to a state of loss. Therefore, it is said in the commentary (DhsA. 429): ‘For the other, too, the giving of rebirth-linking would be right here.’ For an unwholesome rebirth-linking does not arise in a happy destination. From the statements, ‘Freed from the four states of loss’ (Khp. 6.11; Sn. 234) and ‘of a nature not to fall into a state of loss’ (SN 2.41; 5.998, 1004), that which leads to a state of loss is to be abandoned by seeing. Therefore, he says, ‘because that which leads to a state of loss is to be abandoned by seeing.’ And it cannot be said that this is to be abandoned by seeing, nor can it be said that for it, that lust, hatred, delusion, and the defilements co-existing with them which lead to a state of loss are included by this, because it has been stated that they must necessarily be abandoned by cultivation. For it has been said: ‘Which states are to be abandoned by cultivation? The arising of consciousness accompanied by restlessness’ (Dhs. 1406).

‘‘Kusalākusalaṃ [Pg.130] kammaṃ vipākānaṃ khandhānaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpānaṃ kammapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.427) vuttakammapaccayabhāvo nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayabhāvo. So ca yadi uddhaccasahagataṃ paṭisandhiṃ ākaḍḍheyya, tassāpi siyā. Tathā ca sati uddhaccasahagataṃ dassanena pahātabbaṃ siyā dassanena pahātabbānaṃyeva nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayabhāvassa vuttattā. Na cetaṃ dassenena pahātabbanti sabbaṃ pubbe viya āvattati.

The state of kamma-condition spoken of in the statement, ‘Wholesome and unwholesome kamma is a condition for the resultant aggregates and for materiality produced by kamma, by way of kamma-condition’ (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.427), is the state of different-moment kamma-condition. And if that which is accompanied by restlessness were to draw rebirth-linking, this would also apply to it. That being the case, that which is accompanied by restlessness would have to be abandoned by seeing, because the state of different-moment kamma-condition is stated only for things to be abandoned by seeing. But this is not to be abandoned by seeing, so everything reverts as before.

Sahajātameva vibhattanti yathā dassanena pahātabbavibhaṅge ‘‘dassanena pahātabbo dhammo neva dassanena na bhāvanāya pahātabbassa dhammassa kammapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.8.86) sahajātaṃ nānākkhaṇikanti uddisitvā ‘‘sahajātā dassanena pahātabbā cetanā cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ rūpānaṃ kammapaccayena paccayo, nānākkhaṇikā dassanena pahātabbā cetanā vipākānaṃ khandhānaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpānaṃ kammapaccayena paccayo’’ti vibhattaṃ, evaṃ avibhajitvā ‘‘bhāvanāya pahātabbā cetanā cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ rūpānaṃ kammapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.8.89) ettakameva vuttaṃ, na vuttaṃ ‘‘nānākkhaṇikā cetanā vipākānaṃ khandhānaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpānaṃ kammapaccayena paccayo’’ti. Tena na bhāvanāya pahātabbassa nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayabhāvoti viññāyati. Paccanīyepi yathāsambhavaṃ saṅgāhakapaccayānaṃ vasena paccayuddhāre kariyamāne. Itarattha cāti dassanenapahātabbapade. Tattha hi ‘‘dassanena pahātabbo dhammo neva dassanena na bhāvanāya pahātabbassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo, sahajātaupanissayapacchājātakammapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.8.71) kammapaccayopi vuttoti.

Only the co-nascent is classified. Just as in the analysis of what is to be abandoned by seeing, having set forth the co-nascent and the different-moment conditions with the words, ‘A state to be abandoned by seeing is a condition for a state to be abandoned neither by seeing nor by cultivation by way of kamma-condition’ (Paṭṭhāna 2.8.86), it is analyzed thus: ‘Co-nascent volition to be abandoned by seeing is a condition for consciousness-originated materiality by way of kamma-condition; different-moment volition to be abandoned by seeing is a condition for the resultant aggregates and for materiality produced by kamma by way of kamma-condition.’ In this way, without making such an analysis, only this much is said: ‘Volition to be abandoned by cultivation is a condition for consciousness-originated materiality by way of kamma-condition’ (Paṭṭhāna 2.8.89). It is not said: ‘Different-moment volition is a condition for the resultant aggregates and for materiality produced by kamma by way of kamma-condition.’ Therefore, it is understood that for what is to be abandoned by cultivation, there is no state of different-moment kamma-condition. Also in the negative section, when the enumeration of conditions is made according to the inclusive conditions as is possible. ‘And in the other case’ means in the section on what is to be abandoned by seeing. For there it is said: ‘A state to be abandoned by seeing is a condition for a state to be abandoned neither by seeing nor by cultivation by way of object condition, co-nascence, decisive support, post-nascence, and kamma-condition’ (Paṭṭhāna 2.8.71), so kamma-condition is also mentioned.

Tadabhāvāti nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayattābhāvā. Na ca nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayaṃ vinā paṭisandhiākaḍḍhanaṃ atthīti ‘‘paṭisandhianākaḍḍhanato tattha anāgatā’’ti vuttaṃ. Etthāti ‘‘ṭhapetvā uddhaccasahagataṃ sesāni ekādaseva paṭisandhiṃ ākaḍḍhantī’’ti ettha. Pavattivipākassāti pavattiyaṃ vipāko pavattiekadesatāya pavattibhūto vā vipāko etassāti pavattivipākaṃ, kammaṃ, tassa. Atha vā pavattiyaṃ vipāko pavattivipāko. Imasmiṃ pana atthe nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayo etassāti nānā…pe… yo, tabbhāvo…pe… tāti evaṃ padacchedo daṭṭhabbo. Na sakkā nivāretuṃ nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayaṃ vinā vipākassa anuppajjanato.

‘Because of the absence of that’ means because of the absence of the state of being a different-moment kamma-condition. And since there is no drawing of rebirth-linking without a different-moment kamma-condition, it is said, ‘because of not drawing rebirth-linking, it has not come there.’ ‘Here’ means here in the statement, ‘Excluding that which is accompanied by restlessness, only the remaining eleven draw rebirth-linking.’ ‘Of the course-of-life result’ means: the result in the course of life, or the result that has become the course of life by being a part of the course of life, is a ‘course-of-life result’; this refers to kamma, and the genitive is ‘of that.’ Or, the result in the course of life is a ‘course-of-life result.’ But in this sense, the word division should be understood thus: ‘the different-moment kamma-condition is of this…,’ ‘the state of that is….’ It cannot be prevented, because a result does not arise without a different-moment kamma-condition.

Idāni [Pg.131] pavattivipākānaṃ nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayalābhitāya āhaccabhāsitataṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘vuttañcā’’tiādimāha. Vipākadānaṃ paṭisandhivipākadhammatāti maññamāno ‘‘yadi bhāvanā’’tiādimāha. Itaro vipākadānābhāvepi siddho vipākadhammabhāvo tādisānaṃ aññesampi labbhamānattāti āha ‘‘abhiññācittādīna’’nti. Ādi-saddena attano kālamatikkantaṃ diṭṭhadhammavedanīyaṃ upapajjavedanīyañca saṅgaṇhāti. Vuttaṃ siyāti idaṃ sahāyapaccayalābhato puthujjanasantānavuttino uddhaccasahagatassa vipākuppādanaṃ, tadabhāvā sekkhasantatiyaṃ tassa vipākānuppādanañca yuttaṃ siyāti vuttaṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘idaṃ pana ṭhānaṃ suṭṭhu vicāretabba’’ntiādi. Tathā ca vakkhati ‘‘puthujjanesu uppajjamānānaṃ sakabhaṇḍe chandarāgādīnaṃ uddhaccasahagatacittuppādassa ca saṃyojanattayatadekaṭṭhakilesānaṃ anupacchinnatāya aparikkhīṇasahāyānaṃ vipākuppādanaṃ na sakkā paṭikkhipitunti uddhaccasahagatadhammānaṃ vipāko vibhaṅge vutto’’ti. Tassa tādisasseva sati sahāye vipākuppādanavacanaṃ, asati vipākānuppādanavacanaṃ virujjhatīti ca pavattivipākadāyikaṃ vā uddhaccasahagatassa manasi katvā ‘‘vuttaṃ siyā’’ti vuttaṃ. ‘‘Pavattivipākañhi sandhāya ‘tesaṃ vipāke ñāṇa’nti paṭisambhidāvibhaṅge (vibha. 725-726) vutta’’nti eke vaṇṇayanti. Evaṃ uddhaccacetanāpi na hoti, sāpi viññāṇapaccayabhāve apanetabbāti idampi paṭisandhiviññāṇameva sandhāya vuttanti.

Now, to show that this was spoken incidentally because fruition-results are obtained through the condition of kamma of various moments, he says, 'And it has been said,' etc. Thinking that the giving of results is a property of rebirth-linking resultant dhammas, he says, 'If through meditation,' etc. The other says that even in the absence of the giving of a result, the state of being a resultant dhamma is established because it is obtainable for other such states; thus he says, 'regarding the minds of higher knowledge, etc.' By the word 'etc.,' he includes both immediately effective kamma and subsequently effective kamma that has passed its time. It might be said: this refers to the production of a result of that which is associated with restlessness occurring in the mental continuum of a worldling due to obtaining a supporting condition, and the non-production of its result in the continuum of a trainee due to the absence of that condition; this would be appropriate, it is said. Therefore, he says, 'But this point should be carefully considered,' etc. And so he will say: 'For worldlings, because the three fetters and the defilements that have the same object are not cut off, and because their supporting conditions are not exhausted, the production of a result for the arising of a mind associated with restlessness, such as desire and lust for their own belongings, cannot be denied; thus the result of dhammas associated with restlessness is mentioned in the Vibhaṅga.' And because the statement about the production of a result for such a one when a supporting condition is present, and the statement about the non-production of a result when it is absent, would be contradictory, it was said, 'it might be said,' having considered that which is associated with restlessness as a giver of fruition-results. Some explain: 'For it is with reference to fruition-results that it is said in the Paṭisambhidāvibhaṅga (Vibh. 725–726), "knowledge in their results".' Thus, there is also no volition associated with restlessness; that too should be removed from being a condition for consciousness. This too is said with reference only to rebirth-linking consciousness.

Akusalapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the unwholesome section is completed.

Abyākatapadaṃ

The Indeterminate Section

Ahetukakusalavipākavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of Rootless Wholesome Resultants

431. Kāmāvacara…pe… ādi vuttanti ettha ādi-saddena ‘‘upacitattā’’ti padaṃ saṅgayhati ‘‘asādhāraṇakammapaccayavasenā’’ti vuttattā. ‘‘Upacitattāti laddhāsevanattā’’ti keci vadanti, taṃ paṭhamajavanassa na yujjati anāsevanattā. Tathā ca sati tassa vipākadānameva na siyāti tato aññathā atthaṃ dassento ‘‘yathā’’tiādimāha. Tattha vipākābhimukhanti vipākadānābhimukhaṃ katokāsaṃ. Katokāsatā ca anādimhi saṃsāre anekesaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ atthitāya parassa paṭibāhanena hotīti ‘‘aññassa vipākaṃ paṭibāhitvā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Vaḍḍhitatā [Pg.132] ca sakammassa baladānasamatthatāvasena attano kāraṇehi abhisaṅkhatatā. Asādhāraṇena nāmaṃ uddhaṭaṃ ‘‘bherīsaddo yavaṅkuro’’ti yathā. Viññāṇānanti cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ. Visesapaccayattāti adhikapaccayattā.

431. In the passage beginning 'Sense-sphere... etc.,' here, by the word 'etc.,' the term 'due to accumulation' is included, because it is said, 'by way of the uncommon kamma-condition.' Some say, '"Due to accumulation" means due to having obtained repetition,' but this is not applicable to the first impulsion, as it is not repeated. And if that were so, there would be no giving of a result for it at all. Therefore, to show the meaning differently, he says, 'just as,' etc. Here, 'facing the result' means facing the giving of a result, having made an opportunity. And the making of an opportunity occurs by obstructing another, due to the existence of many kammas that have been done in beginningless saṃsāra; hence it is said, 'by obstructing the result of another,' etc. And 'strengthened' is the state of being conditioned by its own causes, by way of the capacity of one's own kamma to give strength. The term 'uncommon' is illustrated by examples such as 'the sound of a drum' or 'a sprout of barley.' 'Of consciousnesses' means of eye-consciousness and so on. 'Because of being a special condition' means because of being a predominant condition.

Cakkhusannissitañca taṃ rūpavijānanañcāti etena samānādhikaraṇataṃ samāsassa dassento tattha ca ‘‘cakkhusannissita’’ntiādipadadvayassa nīluppalasaddādīnaṃ viya aññamaññavisesanavisesitabbabhāvamāha. Aññaviññāṇanti rūpārammaṇaṃ manoviññāṇaṃ. Rūpaṃyevārammaṇanti pana atthe dibbacakkhuviññāṇaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ taṃsadisānaṃ tadupacāraṃ katvā yathā ‘‘sā eva tittirī tāni eva osadhānī’’ti. Jhānapaccayattābhāve na jhānaṅgatā natthīti pañcaviññāṇesu upekkhādīnaṃ upacaritajhānaṅgataṃ sādheti. Na hi jhānaṅgānaṃ jhānapaccayataṃ vatvā tesaṃ jhānapaccayabhāvo paṭikkhittoti. Yadi evaṃ pañcaviññāṇesu upekkhādayo jhānarāsiṭṭhāne na vattabbā siyunti āha ‘‘jhānapaccayattābhāve’’tiādi. Upekkhādibhāvatoti upekkhāsukhadukkhekaggatābhāvato. Aññaṭṭhānābhāvatoti cittaṭṭhitiṃ eva sandhāya vuttaṃ.

By this, 'and eye-dependent and that consciousness of form,' he shows the co-referentiality of the compound, and in that context, he states that the two terms 'eye-dependent,' etc., have a mutual relationship of qualifier and qualified, like the words 'blue lotus,' etc. 'Other consciousness' means mind-consciousness with form as its object. But in the sense 'form alone is the object,' divine-eye consciousness should be understood, by making a figurative application to those similar to it, as in the phrase 'that very partridge, those very herbs.' It is not that in the absence of the jhāna condition, there is no state of being a jhāna factor; thus, he establishes that equanimity and so on in the five consciousnesses are figurative jhāna factors. For it is not that by stating that jhāna factors are conditioned by jhāna, their state of being a jhāna condition is denied. If it were so, then equanimity and so on in the five consciousnesses could not be said to be in the category of jhāna; thus, he says, 'in the absence of the jhāna condition,' etc. 'From the state of equanimity, etc.' is explained as 'from the absence of equanimity, pleasure, pain, and one-pointedness.' 'Due to the absence of another state' is said with reference only to the stability of the mind.

436. Akusalaṃ bhavaṅganissandena ‘‘paṇḍara’’nti vuccati, bhavaṅge apaṇḍare taṃmūlikā kuto akusalassa paṇḍaratāti ‘‘akusalassa cā’’ti vuttaṃ. Paṇḍaratāya kāraṇaṃ vattabbaṃ, yadi aññakāraṇā paṇḍaratā, sabhāvovāyanti cittassa akilesasabhāvatāya vuttaṃ, na cettha phassādīnampi paṇḍaratāpatti. Yato dhammānaṃ sabhāvakiccavisesaññunā bhagavatā viññāṇaṃyeva tathā niddiṭṭhanti.

436. The unwholesome is called 'bright' because of its outflow from the life-continuum (bhavaṅga). But since the life-continuum is not bright, how can the unwholesome, which is rooted in it, be bright? Thus, it is said, 'and of the unwholesome.' The reason for the brightness should be stated. If the brightness is from another cause, or is it its own nature? It is said to be due to the undefiled nature of the mind itself. And in this case, there is no consequence of brightness for contact and other factors. This is because consciousness alone has been designated as such by the Blessed One, who knows the specific nature and function of phenomena.

439. Anatikkamanena bhāvanāya. Pasādaghaṭṭanaṃ visayassa yogyadese avaṭṭhānanti ‘‘pasādaṃ ghaṭṭetvā āpāthaṃ gantvā’’ti vuttaṃ. Mahābhūtesu paṭihaññatīti ettha na sayaṃ kiñci paṭihaññati, nāpi kenaci paṭihaññīyati aphoṭṭhabbasabhāvattā. Visayavisayībhūtaṃ pana abhimukhabhāvappattiyā viññāṇuppattiyā hetutāya visiṭṭhabhāvappattaṃ paṭihatapaṭighātakabhāvena voharīyati, tasmā tesu sappaṭighavohāro. ‘‘Upādārūpaṃ ghaṭṭetīti evamādi ca upacāravaseneva veditabbaṃ. Mahābhūtārammaṇena pana [Pg.133] kāyappasādanissayabhūtesu mahābhūtesu ghaṭṭiyamānesu pasādopi ghaṭṭito eva nāma hotīti vatvā vīmaṃsitabba’’nti vadanti. Yathādhippetena ekadesasāmaññena upamāvacanato nissitanissayaghaṭṭanānaṃ satipi pubbāparabhāve upamatte upamābhāvena gahetabbabhāvaṃ dassento ‘‘ubhayaghaṭṭanadassanattha’’nti āha.

439. By non-transgression; by development. The striking of the sensitive faculty is the standing of the object in a suitable place; thus it is said, 'having struck the sensitive faculty and having come into range.' Regarding 'it is struck among the great elements,' here it does not strike anything itself, nor is it struck by anything, because its nature is intangible. However, that which has become object and subject, having attained a state of confrontation and a special state by being a cause for the arising of consciousness, is conventionally referred to as the struck and the striker. Therefore, for them there is the conventional usage of 'with impingement.' 'Derived form strikes,' and so on, should be understood only by way of figurative usage. Some say: 'However, when the great elements which are the support of the bodily sensitive faculty are struck by the great elements which are the object, the sensitive faculty is also said to be struck indeed; this should be investigated.' To show that, from the statement of a simile with a partial similarity according to what is intended, even though there is a sequence in the striking of the supported and the support, in the simile it should be taken in the manner of a simile, he said, 'for the purpose of showing the striking of both.'

455. Dassanādippavattibhāvatoti manodhātumanoviññāṇadhātūnaṃ adassanāditāya sā etesaṃ eva viseso. Anaññanissayamanopubbaṅgamatāyāti aññanissayamanopubbaṅgamattābhāvato. Aññanissayaviññāṇassa anantarapaccayattābhāvenāti iminā kiriyāmanodhātutopi visesassa vuttattā ‘‘manodvāraniggamanamukhabhāvābhāvato’’ti vuttaṃ, na vuttaṃ ‘‘niggamanapavesamukhabhāvābhāvato’’ti. Tividhenapi hi manodhātuviññāṇadhātūhi manoviññāṇadhātuyā viseso dassitoti. Tato eva vijānanavisesavirahatoyeva. Yadi manodhātu ‘‘manoviññāṇa’’nti na vuccati, chaviññāṇakāyāti kathaṃ manodhātuyā tattha saṅgaho hotīti? Saṅgaho eva pariyāyadesanattā. Atthi hi esa pariyāyo ‘‘mananamattaṃ viññāṇaṃ manoviññāṇa’’nti yathā ‘‘mananamattā dhātu manodhātū’’ti. Apica vatthukiccehi manoviññāṇasabhāgattā tassa uparamuppādabhāvato antādibhāvato ca manoviññāṇakāyasaṅgahitā manodhātu, na sesaviññāṇakāyasaṅgahitā ataṃsabhāgattā, idha pana nippariyāyakatattā manaso sambhūya visiṭṭhamanokiccayuttaṃ manoviññāṇanti tadabhāvato ‘‘manoviññāṇantipi na vuccatī’’ti imamevatthaṃ sādhetuṃ ‘‘na hi taṃ viññāṇaṃ manato’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tena manodhātuyā nippariyāyato manoviññāṇakiccavirahaṃyeva dasseti. Dassanādīnaṃ panātiādinā aññaviññāṇavidhuraṃ manodhātuyā ca sabhāvaṃ dasseti.

455. Because of its nature of occurring through seeing and so forth, this is its distinction from the mind-element, which is characterized by not occurring through seeing and so forth. The phrase 'not being dependent on another or preceded by mind' means the absence of dependence on another or of being preceded by mind. By 'the absence of being an immediately preceding condition for consciousness dependent on another,' the distinction even from the functional mind-element is stated. Therefore, it is said, 'due to the absence of being the doorway for exiting through the mind-door,' but it is not said, 'due to the absence of being the doorway for entering or exiting.' Indeed, the distinction of the mind-consciousness-element from the mind-element and the other consciousness elements is shown in three ways. From this very lack of a distinguishing characteristic of cognition. If the mind-element is not called 'mind-consciousness,' how then is the mind-element included in the group of six consciousnesses? The inclusion is due to the teaching by way of figurative expression. For there is this figurative expression: 'Mere cognizing is consciousness, mind-consciousness,' just as 'the mere element of cognizing is the mind-element.' Moreover, because the mind-element shares the same nature as mind-consciousness in terms of its basis and function, and because it has the state of ceasing and arising, and the state of beginning and end, the mind-element is included in the group of mind-consciousness, not in the group of the remaining consciousnesses, due to their dissimilar nature. Here, however, because it is taken in a non-figurative sense, and because it lacks the distinctive mental function connected with the mind that has arisen in combination, it is said, 'it is not called mind-consciousness.' To establish this very meaning, it is said, 'For that consciousness is not from the mind,' etc. Thus, it shows the absence of the function of mind-consciousness in the mind-element in a non-figurative sense. By the phrase 'of seeing, etc.,' it further shows the natural state of the mind-element as being devoid of other consciousnesses.

Yadi janakasadisatā nāma mahāvipākesu vitakkādīnaṃ sammāsaṅkappāditā, tihetukato nibbattānaṃ tihetukānaṃ, duhetukato nibbattānaṃ duhetukānañca bhavatu sammāsaṅkappāditā, tihetukato pana nibbattaduhetukānaṃ kathanti āha ‘‘tattha hī’’tiādi. Taṃsotapatitatā na siyā tassā anānantarattā. Tato eva hītiādinā vuttasotapatitaṃ evānantarena vacanena samatthayati. Yadi vijjamānānampi [Pg.134] manodhātuādīsu vitakkādīnaṃ pañcaviññāṇesu viya agaṇanūpagabhāvo, evaṃ sante paṭṭhāne kathaṃ tesaṃ jhānapaccayatāvacanaṃ. ‘‘Abyākato dhammo abyākatassa dhammassa jhānapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.431), ‘‘vipākābyākatāni kiriyābyākatāni jhānaṅgāni sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānānañca rūpānaṃ jhānapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.431) hi vuttaṃ. Paccanīyepi ‘‘abyākataṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca abyākato dhammo uppajjati na jhānapaccayā, pañcaviññāṇasahitaṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭicca tayo khandhā’’tiādinā (paṭṭhā. 1.1.98) pañcaviññāṇāni eva uddhaṭāni, na manodhātuādīnīti āha ‘‘jhānapaccayakiccamattato’’tiādi. Na hettha jhānaṅgānaṃ balavadubbalabhāvo adhikato, atha kho jhānapaccayabhāvamattanti adhippāyo.

If 'similarity to the generating cause' means the state of being right thought and so forth for initial application and so on in great resultants, then let the state of being right thought and so forth be for the three-rooted resultants produced from three-rooted kamma, and for the two-rooted resultants produced from two-rooted kamma. But how is it for the two-rooted resultants produced from three-rooted kamma? To this, he says, 'For there...' and so on. It would not fall into that stream, because it is not immediately subsequent. By the phrase 'From that very reason...', he supports the aforementioned falling into the stream with the immediately following statement. If, even when present in the mind-element and so forth, initial application and so on are not taken into account, as in the case of the five sense-consciousnesses, then how is their being stated as jhāna-factors in the Paṭṭhāna to be understood? For it is said, 'An indeterminate phenomenon is a condition for an indeterminate phenomenon by way of the jhāna condition' (Paṭṭh. 1.1.431), and 'Resultant-indeterminate and functional-indeterminate jhāna-factors are conditions for the associated aggregates and for mind-originated matter by way of the jhāna condition' (Paṭṭh. 1.1.431). Even in the negative section, it is said, 'Dependent on an indeterminate phenomenon, an indeterminate phenomenon arises, not by way of the jhāna condition; dependent on one aggregate together with the five sense-consciousnesses, three aggregates arise,' etc. (Paṭṭh. 1.1.98), where only the five sense-consciousnesses are singled out, not the mind-element and so forth. To this, he says, 'Merely from the function of the jhāna condition,' etc. The meaning is that here the strength or weakness of the jhāna-factors is not the main point, but rather merely their state of being a jhāna condition.

469. Samānavatthukaṃ anantarapaccayaṃ labhitvāti dassanādito manodhātuyā ca balavabhāve kāraṇavacanaṃ. Yathārammaṇanti ārammaṇānurūpaṃ. Yadi samānanissayatāya manodhātuto balavatarattaṃ vipākamanoviññāṇadhātuyā somanassasahagatāya, voṭṭhabbanaṃ kathaṃ majjhattavedananti anuyogaṃ manasi katvā tassa balavabhāvaṃ sampaṭicchitvā santatipariṇāmanabyāpāravisesā na somanassavedananti parihāraṃ vadanto ‘‘voṭṭhabbana’’ntiādimāha. Vipāko viya anubhavanameva na hotīti sati samatthatāya vipākānaṃ ekantena ārammaṇarasānubhavanatāya vuttaṃ.

469. Having obtained the immediately preceding condition with a common basis—this is a statement of the reason for the strength of the mind-element from seeing and so forth onwards. 'According to the object' means corresponding to the object. Keeping in mind the question, 'If, due to having the same support, the resultant mind-consciousness-element accompanied by joy is stronger than the mind-element, how can determining have neutral feeling?', and having accepted its strength, he gives the answer, saying 'determining' and so on, because the specific function of transforming the continuity is not joyful feeling. 'It is not an experiencing in the way a resultant is'—this is said because, there being the capacity, resultants are exclusively for experiencing the flavour of the object.

Ahetukakusalavipākavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of rootless wholesome resultants is concluded.

Aṭṭhamahāvipākacittavaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Eight Great Resultant Consciousnesses

498. Vipākadhammānaṃ kammadvāraṃ vuttaṃ dvārakathāyaṃ ‘‘tebhūmakakusalākusalo ekūnatiṃsavidho mano’’ti (dha. sa. aṭṭha. manokammadvārakathā). Payogenāti attanā parehi vā katena ussāhanapayogena. Kusalākusalāni viya yesaṃ taṃ tadārammaṇaṃ anubandhabhūtaṃ. Paṭhamapañcamacittānaṃ aññamaññabalavadubbalabhāvavicārena dutiyachaṭṭhādīnampi so vicārito hotīti ‘‘etesu balavaṃ dubbalañca vicāretu’’nti vuttaṃ. Yathā sāliādīnaṃ thaddhamudubhūmivasena tiṇādīnaṃ [Pg.135] anīharaṇanīharaṇavasena utuādiavasesapaccayānaṃ vipattisampattivasena ca phalavisesayogo, evaṃ kammassa sugatiduggativasena avisuddhavisuddhapayogavasena upapattiyā vipattisampattivasena ca visiṭṭhaphalatāya pariṇamanaṃ, evameva gimhavassakālādīsu bījānaṃ phalavisesayogo viya taṃtaṃkālavisesena kammassa phalavisesayogo hotīti āha ‘‘kālavasena pariṇamatī’’ti. Sukkasoṇitapaccayānanti kammavisesaparibhāvitasantānuppannatāya sukkasoṇitānaṃ āyuvisesahetubhāvamāha sukkasoṇitavasenapi vaṇṇādivisesadassanato, yena ‘‘pitūnaṃ ākāraṃ putto anuvidahatī’’ti vuccati. Taṃmūlakānanti appāyukasaṃvattaniyakammamūlakānaṃ. Āhārādīti ādi-saddena visamūpakkamādayo pariggaṇhāti.

498. The kamma-door for resultant states is stated in the discussion on doors: 'The wholesome and unwholesome of the three planes, twenty-ninefold, is the mind' (Dhammasaṅgaṇi Aṭṭhakathā, Manokammadvārakathā). 'By application' means by the application of exertion made by oneself or by others. That registration which is their consequence is like the wholesome and unwholesome actions. By examining the strength and weakness of the first and fifth consciousnesses in relation to each other, that of the second, sixth, and others is also examined; thus, it is said: 'In these, one should examine the strong and the weak.' Just as a particular yield of rice and other crops is connected with the hardness or softness of the soil, with the non-removal or removal of weeds, and with the failure or success of the remaining conditions such as the season, so too kamma matures into a distinctive result due to a good or bad destination, due to impure or pure application, and due to the failure or success of the rebirth. Similarly, just as there is a particular yield for seeds in the summer and rainy seasons, so too there is a particular yield for kamma due to a particular time; thus, he says, 'it matures due to time.' 'Through semen and blood as conditions'—he states that semen and blood are a cause for distinctions in lifespan because they are produced in a continuity conditioned by a particular kamma, and also because distinctions in complexion and so forth are seen due to semen and blood, whereby it is said: 'A son resembles his father.' 'Rooted in that' means rooted in kamma that leads to a short life. 'Food, etc.'—by the word 'etc.', he includes improper treatment and so on.

Vipākuddhārakathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Discussion of the Drawing Out of Results

Yato tihetukādikammato. Yasmiñca ṭhāneti paṭisandhiādiṭṭhāne, sugatiduggatiyaṃ vā. Tihetukato duhetukaṃ anicchanto paṭisandhinti adhippāyo. Pavattivipākaṃ pana tihetukato duhetukampi icchati eva. Tathā hi vakkhati aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘yaṃ purimāya hetukittanaladdhiyā na yujjatī’’ti (dha. sa. aṭṭha. 498).

From which, that is, from three-rooted kamma and so on. 'And in which place' means at the time of rebirth-linking and so on, or in a happy or unhappy destiny. The intention is that one does not wish for a two-rooted rebirth-linking from a three-rooted kamma. However, one does indeed accept a two-rooted resultant effect during the course of existence even from a three-rooted kamma. Thus, the commentary will state: 'Which is not consistent with the view based on the previous enumeration of roots' (Dhs.A. 498).

Ye ‘‘tasseva kammassa vipākāvasesenā’’ti, ‘‘ekapupphaṃ yajitvāna, asīti kappakoṭiyo (theragā. 96). Duggatiṃ nābhijānāmī’’ti (apa. thera 2.46.64) ca evamādivacanassa adhippāyaṃ ajānantā ‘‘kiṃ nu kho ekenapi kammena anekā paṭisandhi hotī’’ti, ‘‘disvā kumāraṃ satapuññalakkhaṇa’’ntiādivacanassa (dī. ni. 3.205) atthaṃ asallakkhetvā ‘‘kinnu kho nānākammehi ekā paṭisandhi hotī’’ti saṃsayapakkhandā, tesaṃ bījaṅkuropamāya ‘‘ekasmā ekā, anekasmā ca anekā paṭisandhi hotī’’ti vinicchitattā kammapaṭisandhivavatthānato sāketapañhe vipākuddhārakathāya ussadakittanagahaṇassa sambandhaṃ āha ‘‘kammavasena…pe… dassetu’’nti. Paṭisandhijanakakammavasena paṭisandhivipāko eva alobhalobhādiguṇadosātirekabhāvahetūti attho daṭṭhabbo. Tathā hi vuttaṃ ‘‘so tena kammena dinnapaṭisandhivasena nibbatto luddho hotī’’tiādi. Ettha ca lobhavasena, dosa, moha[Pg.136], lobhadosa, lobhamoha, dosamoha, lobhadosamohavasenāti tayo ekakā, tayo dvikā, eko tikoti lobhādidassanavasena akusalapakkheyeva satta vārā. Tathā kusalapakkhe alobhādidassanavasenāti cuddasa vārā labbhanti.

Those who, not understanding the meaning of statements such as, "by the remaining result of that very kamma," and "having offered a single flower, for eighty koṭis of kappas, I do not recall any bad destination," wonder, "Can multiple rebirths arise from a single kamma?" And, not grasping the meaning of passages like, "having seen the prince endowed with the marks of a hundred merits," fall into doubt, asking, "Can a single rebirth arise from multiple kammas?" For them, by the simile of the seed and the sprout, it is decided: "From one, one rebirth arises; and from many, many rebirths arise." Thus, regarding the determination of kamma for rebirth-linking, to show the connection of the mention of predominance in the exposition of results in the Sāketa question, the commentary says, "Through kamma... to show." The meaning should be understood that the rebirth-linking result is indeed due to the predominance of qualities or faults such as non-greed, greed, etc., by way of the rebirth-generating kamma. For it is said, "Through that kamma, reborn by way of the given rebirth-linking, he becomes greedy," and so on. And here, by way of the appearance of greed, hatred, delusion, greed-hatred, greed-delusion, hatred-delusion, and greed-hatred-delusion, there are three single, three double, and one triple factors—thus seven instances on the unwholesome side. Similarly, on the wholesome side, by way of the appearance of non-greed and so forth, fourteen instances are obtained.

Tattha ‘‘alobhadosāmohā, alobhādosamohā, alobhadosāmohā balavanto’’ti āgatehi kusalapakkhe tatiyadutiyapaṭhamavārehi dosussadamohussadadosamohussadavārā gahitā. Tathā akusalapakkhe ‘‘lobhādosamohā, lobhadosāmohā, lobhādosāmohā balavanto’’ti āgatehi tatiyadutiyapaṭhamavārehi adosussadaamohussadaadosāmohussadavārā gahitāyevāti akusalakusalapakkhe tayo tayo vāre antogadhe katvā aṭṭheva vārā dassitā. Ye pana ubhayesaṃ vomissatāvaseneva lobhālobhussadavārādayo apare ekūnapaññāsa vārā dassetabbā, te asambhavato eva na dassitā. Na hi ekasmiṃ santāne antarena avatthantaraṃ lobho balavā alobho cāti yujjati. Paṭipakkhatoyeva hi etesaṃ balavadubbalabhāvo, sahajātadhammato vā. Tesu lobhassa tāva paṭipakkhato alobhena anabhibhūtatāya balavabhāvo, tathā dosamohānaṃ adosāmohehi. Alobhādīnaṃ pana lobhādiabhibhavanato sabbesañca samānajātiyaṃ samabhibhūya pavattivaseneva sahajātadhammato balavabhāvo. Tena vuttaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘lobho balavā, alobho mando, adosāmohā balavanto, dosamohā mandā’’ti. So ca tesaṃ mandabalavabhāvo purimūpanissayato āsayassa paribhāvitatāya veditabbo. Ettha ca paṭhamadutiyehi, sattamapaṭhamehi vā vārehi tihetukakammato paṭisandhipavattivasena tihetukavipāko, itarehi tihetukaduhetukakammato yathāsambhavaṃ paṭisandhipavattivasena duhetukāhetukavipākā dassitāti ayampi viseso veditabbo.

Here, on the wholesome side, with the occurrences of 'non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion are strong' in the third, second, and first instances, the cases where hatred is prominent, delusion is prominent, and hatred-and-delusion are prominent are taken. Similarly, on the unwholesome side, with the occurrences of 'greed, non-hatred, and delusion are strong' in the third, second, and first instances, the cases where non-hatred is prominent, non-delusion is prominent, and non-hatred-and-non-delusion are prominent are indeed taken. Thus, having included three instances each within the unwholesome and wholesome sides, only eight instances are shown. However, the remaining forty-nine instances that could be shown merely through the commingling of both, such as instances with prominent greed and non-greed, are not shown because they are impossible. For it is not fitting that, within a single continuum, greed should be strong and non-greed also, without an intervening change of state. Indeed, their strength or weakness is due to their opposing nature or to the nature of co-arisen phenomena. Among these, greed is strong due to not being overcome by non-greed, because of their opposing nature; similarly with hatred and delusion due to not being overcome by non-hatred and non-delusion. But non-greed and the others are strong by the nature of co-arisen phenomena, only by way of overpowering greed and the like, and when all are of the same class, by way of prevailing by overpowering. Therefore, it is said in the commentary: "Greed is strong, non-greed is weak; non-hatred and non-delusion are strong, hatred and delusion are weak." And that weakness and strength of theirs should be understood as due to preceding decisive support and the developed nature of one's disposition. And here, by the first and second, or seventh and first instances, there is a three-rooted result by way of rebirth-linking and occurrence from three-rooted kamma; with the other instances, there are two-rooted or rootless results by way of rebirth-linking and occurrence, according to possibility, from three-rooted or two-rooted kamma. This distinction, too, should be understood.

Idhāti vipākuddhāramātikāyaṃ. Tena hetukittanaṃ viseseti. Jaccandhādivipattinimittaṃ moho, sabbākusalaṃ vā. Yaṃ pana vuttanti sambandho. Tena paṭisambhidāmaggavacanena. Gatisampattiyā sati ñāṇasampayutte paṭisandhimhi [Pg.137] nipphādetabbe. Aññatthāti nikantipaṭisandhikkhaṇesu. Kammasarikkhakoti idha sātisayo sarikkhabhāvo adhippetoti daṭṭhabbo. Itarathā tihetukaduhetukāpi aññamaññaṃ sarikkhāyevāti dassitametanti. Cakkhuviññāṇādīnīti ettha pañcaviññāṇāni viya apubbanissayapavattinī vijānanavisesarahitā ca manodhātu iṭṭhādibhāgaggahaṇe na samatthāti ‘‘pākaṭāyevā’’ti na vuttā, ādi-saddena vā saṅgahitā. Tadārammaṇapaccayasabbajavanavatāti tadārammaṇassa paccayabhūtasakalajavanappavattisahitena. Yaṃ sandhāya ‘‘idha paripakkattā āyatanāna’’nti vuttaṃ. Aññakāleti abuddhipavattikāle.

'Here' (idha) refers to the matrix on the exposition of results (vipākuddhāramātikā). By that, the mention of causes is distinguished. The cause of defects such as congenital blindness is delusion, or all unwholesome states. The connection is with 'what was said' (yaṃ pana vuttaṃ), by that statement in the Paṭisambhidāmagga. When there is attainment of a fortunate destiny, it should be produced at the rebirth-linking accompanied by knowledge. 'Elsewhere' (aññattha) refers to moments of rebirth-linking with craving. 'Similar in kamma' (kammasarikkhako) here means that an exceptional similarity is intended—this should be understood. Otherwise, it is shown that even those with three roots and two roots would be similar to each other. 'Eye-consciousness, etc.' (cakkhuviññāṇādīni)—here, the five sense-consciousnesses, and the mind-element (manodhātu) which arises without a preceding basis and lacks distinct cognition, are not called 'evident' (pākaṭā) because they are incapable of grasping desirable and other portions—or they are included by the term 'etc.' (ādi-saddena). 'With the object as condition and all impulsions' (tadārammaṇapaccayasabbajavanavatā) means: together with the occurrence of all impulsions that are the condition for the registering consciousness. This is what is meant by the statement, 'Here, due to the maturity of the sense bases.' 'At another time' (aññakāle) refers to a time of non-intelligent occurrence.

Anulometi dhammānulome. Āsevanapaccayāti āsevanabhūtā paccayā. Na magge amaggapaccaye. Sopi moghavāro labbheyyāti yadi voṭṭhabbanampi āsevanapaccayo siyā, yathā ‘‘sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca sukhāya vedanāya sampayutto dhammo uppajjati āsevanapaccayā na (paṭṭhā. 1.2.3) maggapaccayā’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.2.14) anulomapaccanīye, paccanīyānulome ca ‘‘sukhā…pe… na maggapaccayā āsevanapaccayā’’ti ca vuttaṃ hasituppādacittavasena, evaṃ voṭṭhabbanavasena ‘‘adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṃ dhammaṃ paṭiccā’’tiādinā pubbe vuttanayena pāṭho siyā, tathā ca sati vāradvayavasena gaṇanāyaṃ ‘‘āsevanapaccayā na magge dve. Na maggapaccayā āsevane dve’’ti ca vattabbaṃ siyā, na pana vuttaṃ, tasmā na labbheyyāyaṃ moghavāroti adhippāyo.

'It follows in sequence' (anulometi) means in conformity with the Dhamma. 'Condition of repetition' (āsevanapaccayā) means conditions that are of the nature of repetition. Not in the Path Triad, in the not-path condition. That futile section might also be obtained—if even the determining consciousness (voṭṭhabbana) were a condition of repetition, just as it is said: 'A phenomenon associated with pleasant feeling arises dependent on a phenomenon associated with pleasant feeling by the condition of repetition, not by the path condition' in the direct-reverse and reverse-direct sections, and 'pleasant... not by the path condition, but by the condition of repetition' is said by way of the smile-producing consciousness. Similarly, by way of the determining consciousness, the passage could be stated as previously mentioned: 'dependent on a phenomenon associated with neutral feeling,' etc. And if that were the case, then in the enumeration by way of the two sections, it should be said: 'By the condition of repetition, not in the Path Triad, two. Not by the path condition, in repetition, two.' But it is not stated thus, therefore this futile section would not be obtained—this is the meaning.

Voṭṭhabbanampi yadi āsevanapaccayo siyā, dutiyamoghavāre attano viya tatiyacatutthavāresupi siyā, tathā sati attanāpi kusalākusalānaṃ siyā. Na hi…pe… avutto atthi ‘‘purimā purimā kusalā dhammā’’tiādinā anavasesato vuttattā. Voṭṭhabbanassa…pe… avutto ‘‘abyākato dhammo kusalassa dhammassa āsevanapaccayena paccayo. Akusalassa…pe… paccayo’’ti vacanābhāvato. Na kevalaṃ avutto, atha kho kusalaṃ…pe… paṭikkhittova. Athāpi siyātiādi maggasodhanatthameva vuccati. Samānavedanānaṃ eva āsevanapaccayabhāvassa dassanato ‘‘asamānavedanānaṃ vasenā’’ti vuttaṃ. Evaṃ ‘‘āsevana paccayena [Pg.138] paccayo’’tipi vattabbaṃ siyā, samānavedanāvasenāti adhippāyo. Abhinnajātikassa cāti ca-saddo abhinnavedanassa cāti sampiṇḍanattho. Vedanāttikepi voṭṭhabbanassa āsevanapaccayattassa abhāvāti yojanā. Kusalattikādīsu yathādassitapāḷippadesesupīti sampiṇḍanattho pi-saddo. Gaṇanāya kāraṇabhūtāya gaṇanāya niddhāriyamānāya sati gaṇanāya vā abbhantare. Dutiyo moghavāro vīmaṃsitabboti āsevanapaccayattābhāvā javanaṭṭhāne ṭhātuṃ na yujjati. Na hi vinā āsevanaṃ javanappavatti atthīti adhippāyo.

If the determining consciousness were also a condition by way of repetition, then as in its own case in the second futile instance, it might also be so in the third and fourth instances. If so, it might by itself also be a condition for wholesome and unwholesome states. For it is not unstated, as it is stated completely by 'the preceding wholesome states,' etc. Regarding the determining consciousness... it is unstated that 'an indeterminate state is a condition for a wholesome state by way of repetition. For an unwholesome state... it is a condition,' due to the absence of such a statement. Not only is it not stated, but rather the wholesome... is indeed rejected. 'And yet it might be so,' etc., is said merely for the purpose of clarifying the path. Because it is seen that the state of being a repetition condition belongs only to states with similar feeling, it is said 'by way of dissimilar feeling.' Thus, it might also be said, 'it is a condition by way of repetition condition,' the meaning being 'by way of similar feeling.' 'And for one of the same kind'—the word 'and' combines the meaning 'and for one of similar feeling.' The explanation is that the determining consciousness does not have the state of being a repetition condition even in the triad of feelings. The word 'also' combines the meaning that this applies 'also in the sections of the Pāli text shown in the triads of the wholesome, etc.' When counting is the cause, or when it is being determined by counting, or within the counting. 'The second futile instance should be examined'—because of the absence of the state of being a repetition condition, it is not fit to stand in the place of impulsion. The meaning is that without repetition, the occurrence of impulsion is not possible.

Apicettha ‘‘yaṃ javanabhāvappattaṃ, taṃ chinnamūlakarukkhapupphaṃ viyā’’ti (dha. sa. aṭṭha. 566) vakkhamānattā anupacchinnabhavamūlānaṃ pavattamānassa voṭṭhabbanassa kiriyabhāvo na siyā, vutto ca ‘‘yasmiṃ samaye manoviññāṇadhātu uppannā hoti kiriyā neva kusalā nākusalā na ca kammavipākā upekkhāsahagatā’’ti, tasmā ‘‘javanaṭṭhāne ṭhatvāti javanassa uppajjanaṭṭhāne dvikkhattuṃ pavattitvā, na javanabhāvenā’’ti, ‘‘āsevanaṃ labhitvāti ca āsevanaṃ viya āsevana’’nti vuccamāne na koci virodho, vipphārikassa pana sato dvikkhattuṃ pavattiyevettha āsevanasadisatā. Vipphārikatāya hi viññattisamuṭṭhāpakattañcassa vuccati. Vipphārikampi javanaṃ viya anekakkhattuṃ appavattiyā dubbalattā na nippariyāyato āsevanapaccayabhāvena pavatteyyāti na imassa pāṭhe āsevanatthaṃ vuttaṃ, aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana pariyāyato vuttaṃ yathā ‘‘phalacittesu maggaṅgaṃ maggapariyāpanna’’nti. Ayamettha attanomati. Ayampi porāṇakehi asaṃvaṇṇitattā sādhukaṃ upaparikkhitabbo.

Here, since it will be said, 'That which has reached the state of impulsion is like a flower of a tree whose roots have been cut' (DhsA. 566), for those whose roots of becoming have not been severed, there would be no functional state of the determining consciousness as it arises. And it is said, 'At the time when the mind-consciousness element arises, it is functional—neither wholesome nor unwholesome, nor the result of kamma—and accompanied by equanimity.' Therefore, 'standing in the place of impulsion' means arising in the place of impulsion twice, but not in the manner of impulsion. And when it is said, 'having obtained āsevana, it is like āsevana,' there is no contradiction. For that which is expansive, occurring twice here, has a similarity to āsevana. Indeed, because of its expansive nature, it is said to be the producer of bodily and verbal intimation. That which is expansive, like impulsion, due to not occurring many times and its weakness, would not arise as an āsevana condition in a direct sense. Therefore, in this text, the meaning of āsevana is not stated. However, in the commentary, it is stated figuratively, just as 'In the fruition consciousnesses, the path factors are included in the path.' This is my own opinion here. This too, as it has not been commented upon by the ancients, should be carefully examined.

Evañca katvāti voṭṭhabbanāvajjanānaṃ anatthantarabhāvato ‘‘āvajjanā’’icceva vuttaṃ, voṭṭhabbanaṭṭhānepīti adhippāyo. Tasmāti yasmā voṭṭhabbanaṃ āvajjanāyeva atthato upekkhāsahagatāhetukakiriyamanoviññāṇadhātubhāvato, tasmā. Taṃ āvajjanā viya sati uppattiyaṃ kāmāvacarakusalākusalakiriyajavanānaṃ ekantato anantarapaccayabhāveneva vatteyya, no aññathāti adhippāyena ‘‘voṭṭhabbanato’’tiādimāha. Catunnanti muñchāmaraṇāsannavelādīsu mandībhūtavegatāya cattāripi javanāni uppajjeyyunti adhippāyena vuttaṃ. Ayametassa sabhāvoti [Pg.139] ārammaṇamukhenapi cittaniyāmaṃyeva dasseti. Yadipi ‘‘javanāpāripūriyā…pe… yutto’’ti vuttaṃ, ‘‘āvajjanādīnaṃ paccayo bhavituṃ na sakkotī’’ti pana vuttattā cittappavattivasena paṭhamamoghavārato etassa na koci viseso. Tenevāha ‘‘ayampi…pe… retabbo’’ti. Paṭisandhicitteyeva pavattiyaṃ ‘‘bhavaṅga’’nti vuccamāne na tassa hetuvasena bhedoti ‘‘sahetukaṃ bhavaṅgaṃ ahetukassa bhavaṅgassa anantarapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 3.1.102) na sakkā vattuṃ, vuttañca, tasmā sahetukaṃ bhavaṅganti tadārammaṇaṃ vuttanti viññāyati.

This being the case, because the determining consciousness (voṭṭhabbana) and adverting consciousness (āvajjanā) are not different in meaning, it is said simply as 'adverting,' with the intention that this is also in the place of the determining consciousness. Therefore, since the determining consciousness is essentially the adverting consciousness—being a functional, rootless mind-consciousness element accompanied by equanimity—it, like adverting, upon its arising, would invariably serve only as an immediately contiguous condition for wholesome, unwholesome, or functional impulsions of the sense sphere, and not otherwise. With this intention, it is said 'from the determining consciousness,' and so on. 'Of four' is said with the intention that even four impulsions may arise due to weakened momentum in cases such as fainting or near-death. This is its nature—thus it shows the fixed order of consciousness even through the aspect of the object. Although it is said, 'Due to the non-completion of impulsions... it is fitting,' since it is also stated that 'it cannot be a condition for adverting, etc.,' there is no difference for this from the first futile section (moghavāra) in terms of the process of consciousness. For that reason, it is said, 'This too... should be examined.' When the rebirth-linking consciousness itself, in its occurrence, is called 'bhavaṅga', there is no distinction for it by way of roots. Therefore, it cannot be said that 'a bhavaṅga with roots is a condition by immediately contiguous condition for a bhavaṅga without roots' (Paṭṭhāna 3.1.102), and yet it is said. Thus, it is understood that by 'bhavaṅga with roots,' tadārammaṇa is meant.

Sabhāvakiccehi attano phalassa paccayabhāvo, sabhāvakiccānaṃ vā phalabhūtānaṃ paccayabhāvo sabhāvakiccapaccayabhāvo. Appaṭisiddhaṃ daṭṭhabbanti ‘‘duhetukasomanassasahagataasaṅkhārikajavanāvasāne evā’’ti imassa atthassa anadhippetattā. Yathā ca ahetukaduhetukapaṭisandhikānaṃ tihetukajavanāvasāne ahetukaduhetukatadārammaṇaṃ appaṭisiddhaṃ, evaṃ tihetukapaṭisandhikassa tihetukajavanānantaraṃ duhetukatadārammaṇaṃ, duhetukapaṭisandhikassa ca duhetukānantaraṃ ahetukatadārammaṇaṃ appaṭisiddhaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. ‘‘Tihetukakammaṃ tihetukampi duhetukampi ahetukampi vipākaṃ detī’’ti (dha. sa. aṭṭha. 498) hi vuttaṃ. Paripuṇṇavipākassāti imināpi tihetukajavanato yathāvuttatadārammaṇassa appaṭisiddhaṃyeva sādheti. Na hi paccayantarasāmaggiyā asati tadārammaṇaṃ sabbaṃ avipaccantaṃ kammaṃ paripuṇṇavipākaṃ hotīti. Mukhanidassanamattameva yathāvuttatadārammaṇappavattiyā avibhāvitattā. Tihetukādikammassa hi ukkaṭṭhassa tihetukakammassa soḷasa, itarassa dvādasa, ukkaṭṭhasseva duhetukakammassa dvādasa, itarassa aṭṭhāti evaṃ soḷasavipākacittādīni yojetabbāni. Tasmāti yasmā paripuṇṇavipākassa paṭisandhijanakakammassa vasena vipākavibhāvanāya mukhanidassanamattamevetaṃ, tasmā.

The conditionality of one's own result by way of natural functions, or the conditionality of natural functions that are results, is the natural function condition. It should be understood as not precluded, since the meaning of 'only at the end of a joyful, two-rooted, unprompted impulsion' is not intended here. Just as for those with rootless and two-rooted rebirths, rootless and two-rooted tadārammaṇa following a three-rooted impulsion are not precluded, so too, it should be understood that for one with a three-rooted rebirth, a two-rooted tadārammaṇa following a three-rooted impulsion, and for one with a two-rooted rebirth, a rootless tadārammaṇa following a two-rooted impulsion are not precluded. For it is said, 'Three-rooted kamma gives three-rooted, two-rooted, and rootless results' (DhsA. 498). By 'of complete result,' it also establishes that the tadārammaṇa as stated previously after a three-rooted impulsion is indeed not precluded. For it is not the case that in the absence of a collection of other conditions for tadārammaṇa, all kamma that has not yet ripened becomes a complete result. The aforementioned occurrence of tadārammaṇa is only a presentation of a basic example, as it has not been fully explained. For the strongest three-rooted kamma, sixteen resultant cittas should be assigned; for the other, twelve. For the strongest two-rooted kamma, twelve; for the other, eight. Therefore, since this is only a presentation of a basic example to illustrate results based on kamma that generates rebirth with a complete result, therefore...

Evañca katvāti nānākammato tadārammaṇuppattiyaṃ ito aññathāpi sambhavatoti attho. ‘‘Upekkhā…pe… uppajjatī’’ti ettha kena kiccena uppajjatīti? Tadārammaṇakiccaṃ tāva na hoti javanārammaṇassa anālambaṇato, nāpi santīraṇakiccaṃ tathā appavattanato, paṭisandhicutīsu vattabbameva [Pg.140] natthi, pārisesato bhavaṅgakiccanti yuttaṃ siyā. Na hi paṭisandhibhūtaṃyeva cittaṃ ‘‘bhavaṅga’’nti vuccatīti.

'This being the case' means that in the arising of tadārammaṇa from various kammas, it can also occur otherwise than this. Here, regarding 'equanimity... arises,' by what function does it arise? First, the function of registration does not occur, because it does not take the object of the impulsion. Nor does the function of investigating occur, because it does not arise in that way. In rebirth-linking and death, there is nothing at all to be said. By elimination, it would be fitting that it has the function of bhavaṅga. For it is not the rebirth-linking consciousness itself that is called 'bhavaṅga'.

Tanninnanti āpāthagatavisayaninnaṃ āvajjananti sambandho. Aññassa viya paṭhamajjhānādikassa viya. Etassapi sāvajjanatāya bhavitabbanti adhippāyo. Atadatthāti ettha taṃ-saddena nirodhaṃ paccāmasati. Uppattiyāti uppattito. Tanti nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ. Tassa nirodhassa. Tathā ca uppajjatīti ‘‘anantarapaccayo hotī’’ti padassa atthaṃ vivarati. Yathāvuttā vuttappakārā. Vodānaṃ dutiyamaggādīnaṃ purecārikañāṇaṃ. Etesanti ariyamaggacittamaggānantaraphalacittānaṃ. Etassāti yathāvuttavipākacittassa.

‘Tanninnaṃ’ means ‘inclined towards an object that has come into range’; ‘āvajjanā’ (adverting) is the connection. As with another, such as the first jhāna and so on. The intention is that this too should be with adverting. In ‘atadattha’, the word ‘taṃ’ refers to cessation. ‘Uppattiyā’ means ‘from the arising’. ‘Taṃ’ refers to the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. Of that cessation. ‘And so it arises’ clarifies the meaning of the phrase ‘it is an immediately contiguous condition.’ ‘Yathāvuttā’ means ‘as stated,’ that is, ‘of the stated kind.’ ‘Vodānaṃ’ is the preliminary knowledge for the second path and so on. ‘Etesaṃ’ refers to the noble path consciousness and the fruition consciousness immediately following the path. ‘Etassa’ pertains to the resultant consciousness as described.

Upanissayato tasseva cakkhuviññāṇādivipākassa dassanatthaṃ cakkhādīnaṃ dassanādiatthato dassanādiphalato, dassanādippayojanato vā. Purimacittāni āvajjanādīni. Vatthantararahitatte dassetabbe vatthantare viya ārammaṇantarepi na vattatīti ‘‘vatthārammaṇantararahita’’nti vuttaṃ.

By way of strong dependence, for the purpose of showing that very resultant eye-consciousness and so on; from the meaning of seeing and so on of the eye and so on, from the fruit of seeing and so on, or from the purpose of seeing and so on. The preceding consciousnesses are adverting and so on. When its being devoid of another base is to be shown, since it does not function in another object just as it does not in another base, it is called 'devoid of another base and object'.

Yadi vipākena kammasarikkheneva bhavitabbaṃ, evaṃ sati imasmiṃ vāre ahetukavipākānaṃ asambhavo eva siyā tesaṃ akammasarikkhakattāti imamatthaṃ manasi katvā āha ‘‘ahetukānaṃ panā’’ti. Abhinipātamattanti pañcannaṃ viññāṇānaṃ kiccamāha. Te hi āpāthagatesu rūpādīsu abhinipātanamatteneva vattanti. Ādi-saddena sampaṭicchanādīni saṅgaṇhāti. Kusalesu kusalākusalakiriyesupi vā vijjamānā sasaṅkhārikāsaṅkhārikatā aññamaññaṃ asarikkhattā pahānāvaṭṭhānato ca viruddhā viyāti vipākesu sā tadanukūlā siyā, sā pana mūlābhāvena na suppatiṭṭhitānaṃ savisayābhinipatanamattādivuttīnaṃ natthīti vuttaṃ ‘‘na sasaṅkhārikaviruddho’’tiādi. Ubhayenapi tesaṃ nibbattiṃ anujānāti yathā ‘‘kaṭattārūpāna’’nti adhippāyo. ‘‘Vipākadhammadhammo vipākassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo. Vipākadhammadhamme khandhe aniccato dukkhato anattato vipassati, assādeti abhinandati, taṃ ārabbha rāgo uppajjati, domanassaṃ uppajjati, kusalākusale niruddhe’’tiādinā (paṭṭhā. 1.3.93) vipākattike viya siyā kusalattikepi pāḷīti katvā ‘‘kusalattike cā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha hi ‘‘kusalo dhammo abyākatassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti uddisitvā ‘‘sekkhā vā puthujjanā vā kusalaṃ aniccato [Pg.141] dukkhato anattato vipassanti, kusale niruddhe vipāko tadārammaṇatā uppajjati, kusalaṃ assādeti abhinandati, taṃ ārabbha rāgo uppajjati, diṭṭhi, vicikicchā, uddhaccaṃ, domanassaṃ uppajjati, akusale niruddhe vipāko tadārammaṇatā uppajjatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Avijjamānattā eva avacananti adhippāyena tattha yuttiṃ dasseti ‘‘vipphārikañhī’’tiādinā.

If a resultant must be similar to its kamma, then in this case, rootless resultants would be impossible because they are not similar to kamma. Considering this meaning, it is said, "But for the rootless..." "Mere impingement" describes the function of the five sense consciousnesses. For when forms and so forth come into range, they function by merely impinging. The word "etc." includes receiving and so forth. Even among wholesome, unwholesome, and functional states, the presence of prompted and unprompted natures, due to their mutual dissimilarity and their opposition from the standpoint of abandonment, are as if contradictory. However, in resultants, that nature might be favorable to them. But that nature is not firmly established for them due to the absence of roots, and it is said not to exist for those whose function is merely impinging upon their respective objects, and so on. Hence, it is stated, 'not opposed to being prompted,' etc. By both means, their arising is acknowledged, as intended by the phrase "as in the case of 'kamma-born matter.'" "A resultant phenomenon is a condition for another resultant phenomenon by way of object condition. One contemplates resultant phenomena—the aggregates—as impermanent, suffering, and non-self. One delights in them, takes pleasure in them, and based on that, lust arises. Displeasure arises. When wholesome or unwholesome states cease..." and so on. Just as in the resultant triads, so too in the wholesome triads, the Pāli is composed. Therefore, it is said, "And in the wholesome triads," etc. There, it is stated: "A wholesome phenomenon is a condition for an indeterminate phenomenon by way of object condition. Trainees or ordinary people contemplate the wholesome as impermanent, suffering, and non-self. When the wholesome ceases, a resultant arises as registration taking that as its object. One delights in the wholesome, takes pleasure in it, and based on that, lust arises. Views, doubt, restlessness, and displeasure arise. When the unwholesome ceases, a resultant arises as registration taking that as its object." Because it does not exist, it is not stated. Thus, the appropriateness is shown there by the phrase "since indeed it is vibrant," etc.

Ettha keci ‘‘chaḷaṅgupekkhāvatopi kiriyamayacittatāya kiriyajavanassa vipphārikakiriyabhāvo na sakkā nisedhetunti nidassanabhāvena paṇṇapuṭamupanītaṃ asamānaṃ. Kiriyajavanānantaraṃ tadārammaṇābhāvassa pāḷiyaṃ avacanampi akāraṇaṃ labbhamānassapi katthaci kenaci adhippāyena avacanato. Tathā hi dhammasaṅgahe akusalaniddese labbhamānopi adhipati na vutto, tasmā kiriyajavanānantaraṃ tadārammaṇābhāvo vīmaṃsitabbo’’ti vadanti. Satipi kiriyamayatte sabbattha tādibhāvappattānaṃ khīṇāsavānaṃ javanacittaṃ na itaresaṃ viya vipphārikaṃ, santasabhāvatāya pana sannisinnarasaṃ siyāti tassa paṇṇapuṭaṃ dassitaṃ. Dhammasaṅgahe akusalaniddese adhipatino viya paṭṭhāne kiriyajavanānantaraṃ tadārammaṇassa labbhamānassa avacane na kiñci kāraṇaṃ dissati. Tathā hi vuttaṃ tattha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘heṭṭhā dassitanayattā’’ti (dha. sa. aṭṭha. 429). Na cettha dassitanayattāti sakkā vattuṃ vipākadhammadhammehi kusalākusalehi ataṃsabhāvānaṃ nayadassanassa ayujjamānakattā. Apica tattha vīmaṃsāya kesuci sabbesañca adhipatīnaṃ abhāvato ekarasaṃ desanaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘uddhaṭo’’ti ca sakkā vattuṃ, idha pana na tādisaṃ avacane kāraṇaṃ labbhatīti ‘‘avacane kāraṇaṃ natthī’’ti vuttaṃ.

Here, some say: "Even for one with sixfold equanimity, due to the nature of the functional mind, the state of being a vibrant action of the functional javana cannot be denied, and the leaf-basket presented as an example is unsuitable. The non-mention in the Pāli of the absence of registration after functional javana is also no reason, since even what is available is sometimes not mentioned due to some intention. For instance, in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi’s exposition on unwholesome states, though predominance is available, it is not stated. Therefore, the absence of registration after functional javana should be examined." However, even with a functional nature, the javana-mind of Arahants, who have attained such a state everywhere, is not as vibrant as that of others. But due to its peaceful nature, it might have a settled flavor; for this reason, the leaf-basket is shown. In the Paṭṭhāna, no reason is seen for the non-mention of obtainable registration after a functional javana, as there is for predominance in the Dhammasaṅgaṇi's exposition of the unwholesome. As stated in the commentary there: "Because the method has been shown below." Here, it cannot be said that the method has been shown, because the presentation of a method concerning things that are not of that nature—that is, not resultant, wholesome, or unwholesome phenomena—is inappropriate. Furthermore, there, it can be said that it is 'removed' in order to show a uniform teaching, due to the absence of some and all predominances for the purpose of analysis. But here, no such reason is found for the non-mention; hence, it is said, "There is no reason for the non-mention."

Adhippāyenāti akusalānantaraṃ sahetukatadārammaṇaṃ natthīti tassa therassa matimattanti dasseti. ‘‘Kusalākusale niruddhe sahetuko vipāko tadārammaṇatā uppajjatī’’ti (paṭṭhā. 3.1.98) vacanato pana akusalānantaraṃ sahetukatadārammaṇampi vijjatiyevāti uppattiṃ vadantassa yuttaggahaṇavasenāti adhippāyo.

By "intention," it is meant to show the mere opinion of that elder that there is no rooted registration immediately following unwholesome consciousness. However, according to the statement, "When wholesome and unwholesome states cease, a rooted resultant arises as registration" (Paṭṭhāna 3.1.98), there indeed exists a rooted registration immediately following unwholesome consciousness. Thus, the intention of one who speaks of its arising is by way of accepting what is appropriate.

Na ettha kāraṇaṃ dissatīti etena tihetukajavanānantaraṃ tividhampi tadārammaṇaṃ yuttanti dasseti. Yena adhippāyenāti paṭhamatherena tāva ekena [Pg.142] kammunā anekatadārammaṇaṃ nibbattamānaṃ kammavisesābhāvā taṃtaṃjavanasaṅkhātapaccayavisesena visiṭṭhaṃ hotīti iminā adhippāyena javanavasena tadārammaṇassa sasaṅkhārādividhānaṃ vuttaṃ, vipākena nāma kammasarikkhena bhavitabbaṃ, na kammaviruddhasabhāvena. Aññathā aniṭṭhappasaṅgo siyāti evamadhippāyena dutiyatthero kammavaseneva tadārammaṇavisesaṃ āha. Ñāṇassa jaccandhādiduggativipattinimittapaṭipakkhatā viya sugativipattinimittapaṭipakkhatāpi siyāti maññamāno tatiyatthero ‘‘tihetukakammato duhetukapaṭisandhimpi nānujānātī’’ti iminā nayena tesu vādesu adhippāyāvirodhavasena yuttaṃ gahetabbaṃ. Mahāpakaraṇe āgatapāḷiyāti ‘‘sahetuko dhammo ahetukassa dhammassa anantarapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 3.1.102) imassa vibhaṅge ‘‘sahetukaṃ bhavaṅgaṃ ahetukassa bhavaṅgassa anantarapaccayena paccayo, sahetukā khandhā vuṭṭhānassa anantarapaccayena paccayo’’ti evamādinā paṭṭhāne sahetukadukādīsu āgatapāḷiyāti attho.

By the words, "No cause is seen here," it is shown that the threefold registration is appropriate immediately after the three-rooted javana. As for the intended meaning: first, the elder explains that when many registrations are produced by one kamma, they become distinct through the particular condition designated as the respective javana, due to the absence of a specific kamma for each. With this intention, the various kinds of registration, such as prompted, etc., are described according to the javana. A resultant must be kamma-similar, not of a nature contrary to the kamma. Otherwise, an undesirable consequence might follow. With this intention, the second elder explains the distinction of registration solely through kamma. Thinking that just as knowledge counteracts the signs of misfortune in a bad destination, such as being born blind, so also it might counteract the signs of misfortune in a good destination, the third elder "does not even approve of a two-rooted rebirth-linking from a three-rooted kamma." In these debates, what is appropriate should be understood in a way that does not contradict their respective intentions. Regarding the passage from the great treatise—the phrase "a phenomenon with roots is a condition for a rootless phenomenon by way of the immediately proximate condition" is explained in its analysis: "a rooted life-continuum is a condition for a rootless life-continuum by way of the immediately proximate condition; the rooted aggregates are a condition for emergence by way of the immediately proximate condition," and so on. This refers to the passages found in the Paṭṭhāna under the sections on the dyads beginning with the root category, etc.

Kāmāvacarakusalavipākavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of wholesome resultants pertaining to the sense-sphere is completed.

Rūpāvacarārūpāvacaravipākakathāvaṇṇanā

The Elucidation of the Discourse on the Resultants of the Form and Formless Spheres

499. Tasmiṃ khaṇe vijjamānānaṃ chandādīnanti etena vipākajjhāne dukkhāpaṭipadādibhāvassa avijjamānataṃ dasseti. Na hi kusalajjhānaṃ viya vipākajjhānaṃ parikammavasena nibbattatīti. Na cettha paṭipadābhedo viya kusalānurūpo vipākassa ārammaṇabhedopi na paramatthiko siyāti sakkā vattuṃ ekantena sārammaṇattā arūpadhammānaṃ vipākassa ca kammanimittārammaṇatāya aññatrāpi vijjamānattā. Nānākkhaṇesu nānādhipateyyanti ‘‘yasmiṃ khaṇe yaṃ jhānaṃ yadadhipatikaṃ, tato aññasmiṃ khaṇe taṃ jhānaṃ ekantena tadadhipatikaṃ na hotī’’ti katvā vuttaṃ. Catutthajjhānassevāti ca paṭipadā viya adhipatayo na ekantikāti imamevatthaṃ dasseti.

499. By mentioning "factors like zeal, etc., existing at that moment," it shows the absence of the state of painful practice, etc., in resultant jhāna. For, unlike wholesome jhāna, resultant jhāna does not arise through preparatory work. And it cannot be said here that, just as there is a difference in practice corresponding to the wholesome, so too the difference in the object of the resultant is not ultimately real, because formless phenomena are necessarily with an object, and the resultant also has the kamma-sign as its object, which exists elsewhere too. "At different moments, under different dominants" is said by taking it that, "at one moment a certain jhāna arises under a certain dominant, but at another moment that same jhāna is not exclusively under that same dominant." And 'only of the fourth jhāna' conveys this very meaning: just as the practices, so too the dominants are not absolute.

Rūpāvacarārūpāvacaravipākakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Elucidation of the Discourse on the Resultants of the Form and Formless Spheres is concluded.

Lokuttaravipākakathāvaṇṇanā

The Elucidation of the Discourse on Supramundane Resultants

505. Taṇhāvijjādīhi [Pg.143] āhitavisesaṃ lokiyakammaṃ vipākuppādanasamatthaṃ hoti, na aññathāti vuttaṃ ‘‘taṇhādīhi abhisaṅkhata’’nti. Itarassāti suññatāppaṇihitanāmarahitassa. Yo suddhikapaṭipadāya vibhāvito, yo ca suttantapariyāyena animittoti vuccati. Tenevāha ‘‘aniccānupassanānantarassapi maggassā’’tiādi. Vaḷañjana…pe… bhedo hoti maggāgamanavasenāti adhippāyo. ‘‘Maggānantaraphalacittasmiṃ yevā’’ti vacanaṃ apekkhitvā ‘‘suññatādināmalābhe satī’’ti sāsaṅkaṃ āha. Animittanāmañca labhati maggāgamanato phalassa nāmalābhe visesābhāvatoti adhippāyo. Tādisāya evāti yādisā magge saddhā, tādisāya eva phale saddhāya.

505. Worldly kamma, having special qualities established by craving, ignorance, and so on, is capable of producing results, not otherwise—this is stated as 'conditioned by craving, etc.' The other—devoid of the names 'emptiness' and 'undirectedness'—refers to that which is developed through the path of purity and is called 'signless' in the Suttanta method. Hence it is said, 'Even of the path immediately following the contemplation of impermanence,' etc. Practice...pe...a distinction occurs according to the approach of the path; this is the intention. Considering the statement, 'In the fruition-consciousness immediately following the path,' he says with hesitation, 'when there is the attainment of the name “emptiness,” etc.' The name 'signless' is also obtained from the approach of the path; the intention is that there is no distinction in the fruition's attainment of a name. It is just of that kind: just as is the faith in the path, so too is the faith in the fruition.

555. ‘‘Katame dhammā niyyānikā? Cattāro maggā’’ti vacanato (dha. sa. 1295, 1609) aniyyānikapadaniddese ca ‘‘catūsu bhūmīsu vipāko’’ti (dha. sa. 1610) vuttattā na nippariyāyena phalaṃ niyyānasabhāvaṃ, niyyānasabhāvassa pana vipāko kilesānaṃ paṭippassaddhippahānavasena pavattamāno pariyāyato tathā vuccatīti āha ‘‘niyyānikasabhāvassā’’tiādi. Pañcaṅgiko cāti etena maggavibhaṅge sabbavāresupi phalassa maggapariyāyo āgatoti dasseti. Tattha hi ariyamaggakkhaṇe vijjamānāsupi viratīsu tadavasiṭṭhānaṃ pañcannaṃ kārāpakaṅgānaṃ atirekakiccatādassanatthaṃ pāḷiyaṃ pañcaṅgikopi maggo uddhaṭoti. Evaṃ bojjhaṅgāpīti yathā maggo, evaṃ maggabojjhaṅgavibhaṅgesu phalesu ca bojjhaṅgā uddhaṭāti attho.

555. "Which states lead to liberation? The four paths"—from this statement (Dhs. 1295, 1609) and in the explanation of the term 'non-leading to liberation,' it is said, 'The resultant in the four planes' (Dhs. 1610), therefore the fruit is not of the nature of leading to liberation in an ultimate sense. However, the resultant of what is of the nature of leading to liberation—arising by way of the calming and abandoning of defilements—is called so figuratively. Hence it is stated, 'Of the nature of leading to liberation,' etc. And 'five-factored'—by this it is shown that in the analysis of the path, in all instances, the method pertaining to the path is applied to the fruit. For, though the abstinences exist at the moment of the noble path, the five-factored path is also extracted in the Pāli text to show the additional function of the five remaining operative factors. Similarly with the enlightenment factors—just as with the path, so too in the analyses of the path and the enlightenment factors, and in the fruits, the enlightenment factors are extracted. This is the meaning.

Lokuttaravipākakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Elucidation of the Discourse on Supramundane Resultants is concluded.

Kiriyābyākatakathāvaṇṇanā

The Elucidation of the Discourse on Functional Indeterminate States

568. Purimā pavattīti mahākiriyacittappavattiṃ āha. Tāya hi khīṇāsavo evaṃ paccavekkhati. Tenevāha ‘‘idaṃ pana cittaṃ vicāraṇapaññārahita’’nti. Evanti yathā sotadvāre, evaṃ ghānadvārādīsupi mahākiriyacittehi tasmiṃ tasmiṃ visaye idamatthikatāya paricchinnāya idaṃ cittaṃ vattatīti [Pg.144] dasseti. Pañcadvārānugataṃ hutvā labbhamānanti pañcadvāre pavattamahākiriyacittānaṃ piṭṭhivaṭṭakabhāvena imassa cittassa pavattiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, pañcadvāre eva vā idameva pavattanti sambandho. ‘‘Loluppa…pe… bhūta’’nti vuttattā pañcadvāre paṭhamaṃ iminā cittena somanassito hutvā pacchā mahākiriyacittehi taṃ taṃ atthaṃ vicinotīti ayamattho vutto viya dissati. Pubbeyeva pana manodvārikacittena padhānasāruppaṭṭhānādiṃ paricchindantassa pañcadvāre tādisasseva tādisesu rūpādīsu idaṃ cittaṃ pavattatīti vadanti. Ayampi attho pañcadvāre eva pavattaṃ loluppataṇhāpahānādipaccavekkhaṇāhetu yathāvuttakāraṇabhūtaṃ jātanti evaṃ yojetvā sakkā vattuṃ. Evañca sati imassa cittassa paccayabhūtā purimā pavattīti idampi vacanaṃ samatthitaṃ hoti.

568. 'The previous occurrence' refers to the occurrence of the great functional consciousness. For through it, the one whose taints are destroyed reflects thus. Therefore, it is said, 'But this consciousness is devoid of investigation and wisdom.' 'Thus' shows that just as in the ear-door, so too in the nose-door and other doors, this consciousness occurs in each respective sphere when the significance is determined by the great functional consciousnesses. 'Being obtained in connection with the five doors' is said with reference to the occurrence of this consciousness as a subsequent round of the great functional consciousnesses occurring in the five doors. Alternatively, the connection is that this very consciousness occurs in the five doors. Because it is said, 'greedy...pe...become,' it seems to convey the meaning that first, with this consciousness, one becomes joyful, and afterward, with the great functional consciousnesses, one investigates each particular meaning. However, they say that even earlier, when the mind-door consciousness determines the appropriate basis for exertion, etc., this consciousness occurs in the five doors regarding such objects. This meaning too can be stated by connecting it thus: that which occurs in the five doors has arisen for the reason of reflecting on the abandonment of greedy craving, etc., which is the cause as stated. And when this is so, the statement that 'the previous occurrence is the condition for this consciousness' also becomes justified.

Ettha ca pañcadvāre iminā cittena somanassuppādanamattaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ, na hāsuppādanaṃ pañcadvārikacittānaṃ aviññattijanakattā, manodvāre pana hāsuppādanaṃ hoti. Teneva hi aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pañcadvāre ‘‘somanassito hotī’’ti ettakameva vuttaṃ, manodvāre ca ‘‘hāsayamāna’’nti. Iminā hasituppādacittena pavattiyamānampi bhagavato sitakaraṇaṃ pubbenivāsaanāgataṃsasabbaññutaññāṇānaṃ anuvattakattā ñāṇānuparivattiyevāti. Evaṃ pana ñāṇānuparivattibhāve sati na koci pāḷiaṭṭhakathānaṃ virodho, evañca katvā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘tesaṃ ñāṇānaṃ ciṇṇapariyante idaṃ cittaṃ uppajjatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Avassañca etaṃ evaṃ icchitabbaṃ, aññathā āvajjanacittassapi bhagavato pavatti na yujjeyya. Tassapi hi viññattisamuṭṭhāpakabhāvassa nicchitattā, na ca viññattisamuṭṭhāpakatte taṃsamuṭṭhitāya viññattiyā kāyakammādibhāvaṃ āvajjanabhāvo vibandhatīti.

Here, in the case of the five sense-doors, only the mere production of joy by this consciousness should be noted, not the production of laughter, because the five sense-door consciousnesses do not generate intimation. At the mind-door, however, laughter is produced. For this reason, in the commentary, regarding the five sense-doors, only 'he becomes joyful' is stated; and regarding the mind-door, 'causing to laugh.' Even when the Blessed One's making a smile occurs, being prompted by this laughter-producing consciousness, it is truly only revolving in accordance with knowledge, since it follows upon the knowledges of past lives, future events, and omniscience. Thus, when there is this state of revolving in accordance with knowledge, there is no contradiction between the Pāli and the commentaries. And for this reason, the commentary states, 'This consciousness arises at the culmination of the practice of those knowledges.' This must certainly be accepted in this way; otherwise, even the occurrence of the Blessed One's adverting consciousness would not be justified. For it is certain that it too has the nature of producing intimation, and its being an adverting consciousness does not prevent the intimation produced by it from becoming bodily action and so on.

Tato evāti mūlābhāvena na suppatiṭṭhitattā eva. ‘‘Ahetukānaṃ jhānaṅgāni balāni cā’’ti sampiṇḍanattho jhānaṅgāni cāti ca-saddo. Yadi aparipuṇṇattā balabhāvassa imasmiṃ ahetukadvaye balāni anuddiṭṭhāni asaṅgahitāni ca, atha kasmā niddiṭṭhānīti āha ‘‘yasmā panā’’tiādi. Sammā niyyānikasabhāvānaṃ kusalānaṃ paṭibhāgabhūto vipākopi phalaṃ viya taṃsabhāvo siyāti sahetukavipākacittāni aggahetvā kiriyacittakatattā vā ‘‘mahākiriyacittesū’’ti vuttaṃ. Atha vā mahākiriyacittesucāti ca-saddena sahetukavipākacittānipi gahitānīti veditabbāni.

Therefore, precisely because of the absence of roots, it is not well-established. In 'The jhāna factors and strengths of rootless states,' the word 'ca' (and) has the meaning of grouping, implying 'the jhāna factors also.' If the strengths are not specified and not included in this rootless pair because the state of strength is incomplete, then why are they specified? To this, he says, 'But because...' etc. The phrase 'in the great functional consciousnesses' is used either because it refers to what is functional, not including the rooted resultant consciousnesses, or so that the resultant—being a counterpart to wholesome states that are truly of the nature of leading out—might be of that same nature, like fruition. Alternatively, it should be understood that by the word 'ca' in 'in the great functional consciousnesses and...,' the rooted resultant consciousnesses are also included.

574. ‘‘Indriya [Pg.145]…pe… imassānantaraṃ uppajjamānānī’’ti vuttaṃ tesaṃ ñāṇānaṃ kāmāvacarattā. Itaresaṃ mahaggatattā ‘‘parikammānantarānī’’ti vuttaṃ.

574. 'Faculties...pe...arising immediately after this'—this is said regarding those knowledges because they belong to the sense-sphere. For the others, due to their exalted nature, it is said, 'immediately following the preliminary work.'

577. Āhito ahaṃ māno etthāti attā, so eva bhavati uppajjati, na paraparikappito viya niccoti attabhāvo. Attāti vā diṭṭhigatikehi gahetabbākārena bhavati pavattatīti attabhāvo.

577. 'Self' (attā) is so called because the conceit 'I am' is established (āhito) therein. 'Self-existence' (attabhāvo) is that which itself comes to be (bhavati) and arises, not something eternal as imagined by others. Or, 'self-existence' is that which comes to be and proceeds in a manner to be grasped by those holding wrong views.

Kiriyābyākatakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Elucidation of the Discourse on Functional Indeterminate States is concluded.

Cittuppādakaṇḍavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Elucidation of the Section on the Arising of Consciousness is concluded.

2. Rūpakaṇḍaṃ

2. The Section on Form

Uddesavaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Summary

Kenacīti [Pg.146] rūpena vā arūpena vā. Cittuppādena tāva rūpassa samayavavatthānaṃ na sakkā kātuṃ abyāpitāya anekantikatāya cāti imamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘acittasamuṭṭhānasabbhāvato’’tiādimāha. Tattha acittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ cittassa tīsu khaṇesu uppajjatīti imasmiṃ tāva vāde cittuppattisamayena rūpūpapattisamayassa vavatthānaṃ mā hotu, cittassa uppādakkhaṇeyeva sabbampi rūpaṃ uppajjatīti imasmiṃ pana vāde kathanti? Etthāpi acittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ cittena sahuppādepi anindriyabaddharūpaṃ viya acittapaṭi bandhuppādatāya na cittena vavatthāpetabbasamayanti vuttaṃ ‘‘acittasamuṭṭhānasabbhāvato’’ti. Tena cittuppādena rūpassa samayavavatthānaṃ na byāpīti dasseti. Anekacittasamuṭṭhānatāya vavatthānābhāvatoti sambandho. Niyate hi samuṭṭhāpakacitte cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa siyā vavatthānanti.

'By something'—whether by form or by non-form. First, the determination of the time of form by the arising of consciousness cannot be made, due to non-pervasiveness and indeterminacy. To show this meaning, he says, 'because of the existence of that which is not mind-originated,' and so on. Therein, in the view that form not originated by mind arises in the three moments of consciousness, let there not be a determination of the time of form's arising by the time of consciousness's arising. But in this other view, that all form arises only at the moment of the arising of consciousness, how is it? Here too, even if form not originated by mind arises simultaneously with consciousness, like form not bound to faculties, its time is not to be determined by consciousness, because its arising is dependent on what is not consciousness. This is what is meant by 'because of the existence of that which is not mind-originated.' Thus, he shows that the determination of the time of form by the arising of consciousness is not pervasive. The connection is that there is an absence of determination because it originates from various kinds of consciousness. For, when the originating consciousness is definite, there could be a determination for mind-originated form.

Kesañcīti kāmāvacarakusalādīnaṃ. Katthacīti āruppe. Kesañcīti vā kesañci pañcavokāravipākānaṃ. Katthacīti paṭisandhikkhaṇe carimakkhaṇe ca. ‘‘Tasmiṃ samaye phasso hotī’’tiādinā (dha. sa. 1) cittasahabhāvinaṃ eva cittena samayavavatthānaṃ katanti vuttaṃ ‘‘acittasahabhubhāvato’’ti. Tesanti upādārūpānaṃ. Yo yassa sahabhāvena upakārako, so eva tassa samayavavatthāpakabhāvena vuttoti āha ‘‘sahajāta…pe… ttanato’’ti. Nāpi mahābhūtehītiādinā vavatthānābhāvameva dasseti. Kesañcīti akammajādīnaṃ. Kehicīti kammajādīhi. Pavattitoti pavattanato. Sahāti ekasmiṃ kāle. Abhāvāti niyogato abhāvā.

By ‘of some’ (kesañci) is meant of sense-sphere wholesome states, and so on. By ‘in some cases’ (katthaci) is meant in the formless realm. Or, by ‘of some’ (kesañci) is meant of some five-constituent resultant states. By ‘in some cases’ (katthaci) is meant at the moment of rebirth-linking and at the final moment. By ‘At that time, contact exists,’ and so on (Dhs. 1), it is said that the determination of the time of what coexists with consciousness is made by consciousness itself, and therefore ‘because they do not coexist with consciousness.’ By ‘of these’ (tesaṃ) is meant of the derived forms. Whatever assists another by coexisting with it, that alone is said to determine the moment for it. Thus it is said: ‘co-nascent... etc., from that nature.’ By ‘Nor by the great elements,’ and so on, it shows the absence of determination itself. By ‘of some’ (kesañci) is meant of those not born of kamma, and so on. By ‘by some’ (kehici) is meant by those born of kamma, and so on. By ‘arises’ (pavattati) is meant from arising. By ‘simultaneously’ (saha) is meant at one time. By ‘absence’ (abhāva) is meant absence by necessity.

Viññatti …pe… na sakkā vattuṃ mahābhūtehi samayavavatthāne kariyamāne tehi ayāvabhāvitatāyāti adhippāyo. Ekasmiṃ kāletiādināpi mahābhūtehi samayaniyamane vavatthānābhāvameva vibhāveti. ‘‘Tathā vibhajanattha’’nti, ‘‘avibhattaṃ abyākataṃ atthīti dassetu’’nti ca imesaṃ padānaṃ ‘‘vibhattaṃ avibhattañca sabbaṃ saṅgaṇhanto āhā’’ti iminā sambandho. Samayavavatthānaṃ katvā niddisiyamānassa nippadesatāya asambhavato [Pg.147] ekadesaṃ niddisitvā sāmaññena nigamanaṃ yuttaṃ, akatvā pana samayavavatthānaṃ sarūpato niddisanena tathāti imamatthaṃ āha ‘‘samayavavatthānenā’’tiādinā. Avibhatteti vipākakiriyābyākataṃ viya na pubbe vibhatte. Vibhajitabbeti bhedavantatāya vibhajanārahe. Dassiteti uddisanavasena dassite. Vuttamevatthaṃ vitthāratarena dassetuṃ ‘‘ettha panā’’tiādimāha.

Communication... etc. ... The meaning is that it cannot be said that a temporal determination is made by the great elements, because of its inseparability from them. By ‘at one time,’ and so on, it also elucidates the absence of determination when a temporal regulation is made by the great elements. The connection of these phrases, ‘for the purpose of such division’ and ‘to show that the undivided and indeterminate exists,’ is with ‘embracing all, both the divided and the undivided, he said.’ Since it is impossible for something without parts to be indicated after establishing a temporal determination, it is fitting to indicate a part and then conclude generally. However, without establishing a temporal determination, the description is given in its own form; this meaning is stated with ‘by establishing a temporal determination,’ and so on. By ‘undivided’ (avibhatta) is meant not previously divided, like the resultant and functional indeterminate. By ‘to be divided’ (vibhajitabba) is meant worthy of division due to its divisible nature. By ‘shown’ (dassita) is meant shown by way of enumeration. To show the meaning that has already been stated in greater detail, ‘here, however,’ and so on, is stated.

Vipākādidhammānaṃ nayanaṃ nayo, sova dassananti nayadassanaṃ. ‘‘Desanā’’ti vuttaṃ heṭṭhā gahaṇameva nayadassananti. Dutiyavikappe pana kāmāvacarādibhāvena nīyatīti nayo, kiriyābyākataṃ. Tassa dassanaṃ nayadassananti yojetabbaṃ. Dukādīsu niddesavāre ca hadayavatthuno anāgatattā taṃ aggahetvā paṭhamavikappo vutto, ekake pana vatthupi gahitanti ‘‘hadayavatthuñcā’’ti dutiyavikappe vuttaṃ. Kiṃ pana kāraṇaṃ dukādīsu niddesavāre ca hadayavatthu na gahitanti? Itaravatthūhi asamānagatikattā desanābhedato ca. Yathā hi cakkhuviññāṇādīni ekantato cakkhādinissayāni, na evaṃ manoviññāṇaṃ ekantato hadayavatthunissayaṃ, nissitamukhena ca vatthudukādidesanā pavattā. Yampi ekantato hadayavatthunissayaṃ, tassa vasena ‘‘atthi rūpaṃ manoviññāṇassa vatthū’’tiādinā dukādīsu vuccamānesupi tadanukūlaārammaṇadukādayo na sambhavanti. Na hi ‘‘atthi rūpaṃ manoviññāṇassa ārammaṇaṃ, atthi rūpaṃ na manoviññāṇassa ārammaṇa’’ntiādinā sakkā vattunti vatthārammaṇadukadesanā bhinnagatikā siyuṃ, samānagatikā ca tā desetuṃ bhagavato ajjhāsayo. Esā hi bhagavato desanā pakati. Teneva hi nikkhepakaṇḍe cittuppādavibhāgena avuccamānattā avitakkāvicārapadavissajjane vicāroti vattuṃ na sakkāti avitakkavicāramattapadavissajjane labbhamānopi vitakko na uddhaṭo, aññathā vitakko cāti vattabbaṃ siyāti. Evaṃ itaravatthūhi asamānagatikattā desanābhedato ca dukādīsu uddese na gahitaṃ. Uddiṭṭhasseva hi niddisanato niddesepi na gahitaṃ hadayavatthūti vadanti.

The leading (nayana) of resultant phenomena, and so on, is naya; that very seeing is nayadassana. The ‘teaching’ (desanā) mentioned below is simply the comprehension of naya, which is nayadassana. In the second alternative, however, it is called naya because it leads by way of the sense-sphere realm, and so on, and it is functionally indeterminate. Its seeing is to be interpreted as nayadassana. In the sections on dyads, and so on, and in the exposition, the first alternative was stated without including the heart-basis because it had not yet been introduced. But in the section on singles, where a basis is taken, as in ‘and the heart-basis,’ the second alternative is mentioned. But what is the reason the heart-basis is not included in the exposition of dyads, and so on? Because it does not share the same range as the other bases, and because the teaching differs. For instance, eye-consciousness, and so on, depend entirely on the eye, and so on, but mind-consciousness does not depend entirely on the heart-basis. Moreover, the teaching of dyads, and so on, concerning bases proceeds by way of dependence. Even though something depends entirely on the heart-basis, when it is said in the dyads, and so on, ‘there is form that is a basis for mind-consciousness,’ and so on, dyads such as those pertaining to suitable objects do not arise in relation to it. For it is not possible to say, ‘there is form that is an object of mind-consciousness, and there is form that is not an object of mind-consciousness,’ and so on; therefore, the teaching of dyads concerning basis and object would have divergent ranges, but the Blessed One’s intention was to teach them with a unified range. This is indeed the Blessed One’s natural way of teaching. For this reason, in the section on classification, because it is not mentioned by way of the division of consciousness-arising, one cannot say ‘investigation’ in the response to the term ‘without initial thought but with sustained thought.’ Even though initial thought is obtainable in the response to ‘without initial thought but with sustained thought alone,’ initial thought is not extracted; otherwise, one might have to say ‘and initial thought.’ Thus, because the heart-basis does not share the same range as the other bases and because the teaching differs, it is not included in the enumeration of dyads, and so on. Some say that since what has been enumerated is what is to be expounded, the heart-basis is not included even in the exposition.

Cakkhādidasakā sattāti cakkhusotaghānajivhākāyaitthibhāvapurisabhāvadasakā satta, ekasantānavasena vā cakkhusotaghānajivhākāyabhāvavatthudasakā satta. Nibbānassa asatipi paramatthato bhede parikappitabhedopi [Pg.148] bhedoyeva vohāravisayeti katvā sopādisesādibhedo vutto.

By ‘seven decades beginning with the eye’ (cakkhādidasakā satta) are meant the seven decades of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, femininity, and masculinity. Or, as a single continuum, the seven decades of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, sex, and basis. Even though Nibbāna has no ultimate distinction, even a conceptualized distinction is still a distinction within the realm of convention. Therefore, distinctions such as ‘with residue’ and so on are mentioned.

584. Kiñcāpi aññattha kukkuṭaṇḍasaṇṭhāne parimaṇḍala-saddo dissati, cakkasaṇṭhānatā pana vaṭṭasaṇṭhāne cakkavāḷe vuccamāno parimaṇḍala-saddo vaṭṭapariyāyo siyā. Anekatthā hi saddāti adhippāyenāha ‘‘vaṭṭaṃ parimaṇḍala’’nti. Ettha ca sineruyugandharādīnaṃ samuddato upariadhobhāgānaṃ vasena ubbedho vutto, āyāmavitthārehipi sineru caturāsītiyojanasahassaparimāṇova. Yathāha ‘‘sineru, bhikkhave, pabbatarājā caturāsīti yojanasahassāni āyāmena, caturāsīti yojanasahassāni vitthārenā’’ti (a. ni. 7.66). Sineruṃ pākāraparikkhepavasena parikkhipitvā ṭhitā yugandharādayo, sineruyugandharādīnaṃ antarepi sītasamuddā nāma. ‘‘Te visālato yathākkamaṃ sineruādīnaṃ accuggamanasamānaparimāṇā’’ti vadanti.

584. Although the word ‘parimaṇḍala’ is seen elsewhere in the sense of a hen’s egg shape, when the word ‘parimaṇḍala’ is used in reference to the circular form of a wheel or the round shape of the world-sphere (cakkavāḷa), it can be synonymous with ‘vaṭṭa’ (round). Because words have various meanings, it is said with this intention, ‘vaṭṭaṃ parimaṇḍalaṃ’ (round is parimaṇḍala). Here, the height of Mount Sineru, Yugandhara, and so on, is stated in terms of their upper and lower parts relative to the ocean; Mount Sineru’s length and breadth are also of the measure of eighty-four thousand yojanas. As it is said: ‘Monks, Mount Sineru, the king of mountains, is eighty-four thousand yojanas in length and eighty-four thousand yojanas in breadth’ (AN 7.66). The Yugandhara mountains and others stand encircling Sineru like a rampart. Between Sineru, Yugandhara, and so on, are what are called the Sītasamuddā (Cold Oceans). They say, ‘These are as extensive in width as the equivalent heights of Sineru and the others, in due order.’

Koṭisatasahassacakkavāḷasseva āṇākhettabhāvo dasasahassacakkavāḷassa jātikhettabhāvo viya dhammatāvaseneva veditabbo. Vikappasamānasamuccayavibhāvanesu viya avadhāraṇe aniyame ca vā-saddo vattatīti tathā yojanā katā. Anekatthā hi nipātāti. Tattha anekantikattho aniyamattho.

The state of being the domain of authority of a hundred thousand koṭis of world-spheres is to be understood just by way of its inherent nature, like the state of being the field of birth of the ten-thousandfold world-sphere. The particle ‘vā’ functions here to indicate emphasis or non-determination, as in cases of alternative, similarity, aggregation, or distinction; thus is the connection made. Indeed, particles have various meanings. Therein, ‘anekantikattho’ means ‘aniyamattho’ (meaning of non-exclusivity or non-determination).

Sīlādivisuddhisampādanena, catudhātuvavatthānavaseneva vā mahākiccatāya mahantena vāyāmena. Satipi lakkhaṇādibhede ekasmiṃ eva kāle ekasmiṃ santāne anekasatasahassakalāpavuttito mahantāni bahūni bhūtāni paramatthato vijjamānānīti vā mahābhūtāni yathā ‘‘mahājano’’ti. Evanti ‘‘upādāya pavatta’’nti atthe sati paṭiccasamuppannatā vuttā hoti paccayasambhūtatādīpanato. Upādāyatīti upādāyati evāti adhippāyo. Tenevāha ‘‘ekantanissitassā’’ti. ‘‘Bhavati hi nissayarūpānaṃ sāmibhāvo’’ti ādhārādheyyasambandhavacanicchāya abhāve ādhārabhūtopi attho saṃsāmisambandhavacanicchāya sāmibhāvena vuccati yathā ‘‘rukkhassa sākhā’’ti adhippāyo.

Through the accomplishment of the purification of virtue, and so on, or by way of the analysis of the four elements, or due to the greatness of the task, by great effort. Even though there are distinctions of characteristics, and so on, at a single moment in a single continuum, because hundreds of thousands of kalāpas arise, or because many great elements are ultimately real and existent—hence they are called ‘mahābhūtāni’ (great elements), just as the term ‘mahājano’ (great multitude) is used. Thus, when the meaning ‘originated relying upon’ is present, dependent origination is stated, indicating arising from conditions, and so on. The meaning is that it originates relying upon, it originates in reliance upon. Therefore he said, ‘of that which is utterly dependent.’ ‘For there is a possessive relationship with dependent forms,’ meaning that even when there is no desire to state a basis-dependent relationship, that which is the basis is spoken of in terms of ownership out of a desire to state a possessive relationship, as in the phrase ‘the branch of a tree.’

Tividharūpasaṅgahavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Threefold Compilation of Form

585. Viññattiduko [Pg.149] cāti ca-saddena cittasahabhucittānuparivattidukāpi saṅgahitāti veditabbā. Sakkā hi etena nayena…pe… viññātunti ettha pañcavīsāya tāva vatthudukesu paṭhamadukapañcakādayo cuddasahipi pakiṇṇakadukehi avasiṭṭhehi vatthudukehi pañcavīsāya ārammaṇadukehi pañcahi bāhirāyatanadukehi rūpadhātudukādīhi pañcahi dhātudukehi pacchimakehi tīhi indriyadukehi dvādasahipi sukhumarūpadukehi paṭhamādivajjehi avasiṭṭhehi āyatanadhātuindriyadukehi ca yojanaṃ gacchanti. Pañcavīsāya pana ārammaṇadukesu purimako dukapañcako upādinnaupādinnupādāniyasanidassanacittasamuṭṭhānacittasahabhucittānuparivattidukavajjehi pakiṇṇakadukehi sabbehipi vatthudukehi rūpāyatanarūpadhātudukavajjehi āyatanadhātudukehi sabbehipi indriyadukasukhumarūpadukehi yojanaṃ gacchati. Dutiyadukapañcakādīsu yathākkamaṃ saddāyatanasaddadhātudukādayo yojanaṃ na gacchanti, rūpāyatanarūpadhātudukādayo gacchanti. Pakiṇṇakadukesu sanidassanadukañcāti ayameva viseso. Yathā ca vatthudukesu, evaṃ cakkhāyatanacakkhudhātucakkhundriyādidukapañcakesu. Yathā ca ārammaṇadukesu, evaṃ rūpāyatanarūpadhātuādidukapañcakesu tikayojanā. Itthindriyapurisindriyajīvitindriyadukā sukhumarūpadukā ca sabbehipi dukehi yojanaṃ gacchantīti evaṃ tāva tikayojanā veditabbā. Nanu cāyampi yojanā bhagavatā na desitāti na kātabbāti? Nayidaṃ ekantikaṃ. Kasmā? Bhagavatā dinnanayena yojanāpi bhagavatoyeva desanā. Tathā hi vuttaṃ mātikāvaṇṇanāyaṃ (dha. sa. aṭṭha. 1-6) ‘‘hetū ceva dhammā ahetukā cāti idampi sambhavatī’’tiādi. Sambhavo hi gahaṇassa kāraṇanti ca.

585. The term 'viññatti duka' (the dyad of intimation) should be understood to include, by the word 'ca' (and), the dyads of consciousness-concomitant and consciousness-following. Indeed, by this method... it is to be known. Here, first, among the twenty-five base-dyads, the first pentad of dyads and so on are connected with the fourteen miscellaneous dyads, the remaining base-dyads, the twenty-five object-dyads, the five external sense-sphere dyads, the five element-dyads such as the form-element dyad, the last three faculty-dyads, the twelve subtle-form dyads, and also with the remaining sense-sphere, element, and faculty dyads, excluding the first and so on. However, in the twenty-five object-dyads, the first pentad of dyads is connected with all the base-dyads; with the miscellaneous dyads, excluding the dyads of clung-to and clingable, visible, mind-originated, mind-concomitant, and mind-following; with the sense-sphere and element dyads, excluding the form sense-sphere and form-element dyads; and with all the faculty and subtle-form dyads. In the second pentad of dyads and so on, in sequence, the sound sense-sphere dyad, sound-element dyad, and so on are not connected, whereas the form sense-sphere dyad, form-element dyad, and so on are connected. Among the miscellaneous dyads, this is the only distinction regarding the visible dyad. And just as in the base-dyads, so it is in the pentads of dyads of the eye sense-sphere, eye-element, eye-faculty, and so on. And just as in the object-dyads, so it is in the pentads of dyads of the form sense-sphere, form-element, and so on, that the threefold connection applies. The dyads of the femininity faculty, masculinity faculty, and life faculty, and the subtle-form dyads are connected with all the dyads. Thus, the threefold connection should be understood. But should this connection not be made, since it was not taught by the Blessed One? This is not an absolute rule. Why? Because a connection made according to the method given by the Blessed One is itself the teaching of the Blessed One. For so it is said in the commentary on the Mātikā: 'There are dhammas that are roots and dhammas that are not roots; this too is possible,' and so on. For possibility is the reason for its inclusion.

Tividharūpasaṅgahavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Threefold Compilation of Form is concluded.

Catubbidhādirūpasaṅgahavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Compilation of Fourfold and Other Kinds of Form

586. Cittato eva samuṭṭhātīti cittasamuṭṭhānanti imameva atthaṃ gahetvā ‘‘viññattidukādīhi samānagatiko cittasamuṭṭhānaduko’’ti vuttaṃ[Pg.150]. Vinivattite hi sāmaññe yaṃ rūpaṃ janakapaccayesu cittato samuṭṭhāti, taṃ cittato eva samuṭṭhātīti. Viññattidukādīhīti ādi-saddena cittasahabhucittānuparivattiduke saṅgaṇhāti. Labbhamānoti yaṃ taṃ rūpaṃ upādā, taṃ atthi cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ, atthi na cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ. Yaṃ taṃ rūpaṃ nupādā, taṃ atthi cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ, atthi na cittasamuṭṭhānanti evaṃ labbhamāno. Sanidassanadukādīnanti ādi-saddena sappaṭighamahābhūtadukādayo saṅgaṇhāti. Tenāti cittasamuṭṭhānadukena. Tassāti cittasamuṭṭhānadukasseva. Aññe panāti viññatticittasamuṭṭhānacittasahabhucittānuparivattidukehi aññepi pakiṇṇakadukā.

586. 'It arises from the mind only' means 'mind-originated.' Taking this meaning, it is said: 'The dyad of intimation, etc., shares the same course as the mind-originated dyad.' For when the generality is withdrawn, whatever materiality arises from the mind among the generative conditions, that arises from the mind only. 'By the dyad of intimation, etc.'—with the word 'etc.,' it includes the dyads of mind-concomitant and mind-following. 'Being obtainable'—whatever materiality is clung to, that is either mind-originated or not mind-originated. Whatever materiality is not clung to, that is either mind-originated or not mind-originated—thus it is being obtainable. 'By the dyad of visible, etc.'—with the word 'etc.,' it includes the dyads of great elements with resistance, etc. 'By that'—by the mind-originated dyad. 'Of that'—specifically of the mind-originated dyad. 'Others, however'—other miscellaneous dyads apart from the dyads of intimation, mind-originated, mind-concomitant, and mind-following.

Saddāyatanassa ekantato anupādinnattā ‘‘sotasamphassārammaṇadukādayo vajjetvā’’ti vuttaṃ. Catukkā labbhantīti yaṃ taṃ rūpaṃ upādinnaṃ, taṃ atthi cakkhusamphassassa ārammaṇaṃ, atthi cakkhusamphassassa nārammaṇaṃ. Yaṃ taṃ rūpaṃ anupādinnaṃ, taṃ atthi cakkhusamphassassa ārammaṇaṃ, atthi cakkhusamphassassa nārammaṇanti evamādayo sabbārammaṇabāhirāyatanādilabbhamānadukehi yojanāyaṃ catukkā labbhantīti sambandho. Avasesehīti ārammaṇabāhirāyatanarūpadhātudukādito labbhamānadukehīti vuttadukarāsito avasesehi. Tesanti upādinnaupādinnupādāniyacittasamuṭṭhānadukānaṃ. Aññesanti upādinnadukādito aññesaṃ upādādukādīnaṃ. Vatthudukādīhīti ādi-saddena cakkhāyatanadukādayo saṅgaṇhāti. Etthāpi avasesehi tesaṃ aññesañca yojanāya catukkā na labbhantīti sambandho.

Because the sound-sphere is entirely unappropriated, it is said, 'excluding the dyads beginning with ear-contact and its object.' As for the statement that fourfold classifications are obtained: that form which is appropriated is sometimes the object of eye-contact and sometimes not the object of eye-contact. That form which is unappropriated is sometimes the object of eye-contact and sometimes not the object of eye-contact. In this way, by combination with the dyads obtainable from all objects, external sense-spheres, etc., fourfold classifications are obtained—this is the connection. 'With the rest' means with the remaining dyads from the already mentioned collection of dyads, such as those obtainable from the object, external sense-spheres, and the form-element dyad. 'Of those' refers to the dyads of clung-to and clingable, and mind-originated. 'Others' means those dyads other than the appropriated dyad, etc., up to the dyad of clinging, etc. 'With the dyads of bases, etc.'—here, the term 'etc.' includes dyads such as the eye sense-sphere dyad. In this case too, by combination with the rest, those, and others, fourfold classifications are not obtained—this is the connection.

Catubbidhādirūpasaṅgahavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Compilation of Fourfold and Other Kinds of Form is concluded.

Uddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Summary is concluded.

Rūpavibhatti

The Analysis of Form

Ekakaniddesavaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Exposition of the Single Items

594. Pathavīādīnaṃ dhammānaṃ ruppanasabhāvo viya na hetuādibhāvopi sādhāraṇoti na hetūsu vibhajitabboti vuttaṃ ‘‘avijjamānavibhāgassā’’ti. Tassa pana vibhāgābhāvadassanasarūpadassanameva niddeso. Evañca katvā nibbānassapi vibhāgarahitattā ‘‘asaṅkhatā dhātū’’ti ettakameva niddesavasena vuttaṃ.

594. Just as the characteristic of affliction of states such as earth is not common to their being causes, etc., so it is said, 'it should not be divided among causes,' referring to that 'which has no division.' However, the exposition is merely a presentation of the nature of showing the absence of division. And having done so, because Nibbāna is without division, only this much is stated by way of exposition: 'the unconditioned element.'

Yadipi [Pg.151] hinoti etena patiṭṭhāti kusalādiko dhammoti alobhādayo kevalaṃ hetupadavacanīyā, kāraṇabhāvasāmaññato pana mahābhūtādayopi hetu-saddābhidheyyāti mūlaṭṭhavācinā dutiyena hetu-saddena visesetvā āha ‘‘hetuhetū’’ti. Suppatiṭṭhitabhāvasādhanato kusalādidhammānaṃ mūlatthena upakārakadhammā ‘‘tayo kusalahetū’’tiādinā (dha. sa. 1059-1060) paṭṭhāne ca teyeva ‘‘hetupaccayo’’ti vuttāti āha ‘‘mūlahetu paccayahetūti vā ayamattho’’ti. Hinoti etena, etasmā vā phalaṃ pavattatīti hetu, paṭicca etasmā eti pavattatīti paccayoti evaṃ hetupaccaya-saddānaṃ anānatthataṃ sandhāya hetusaddapariyāyabhāvena paccaya-saddo vuttoti āha ‘‘hetupaccayasaddānaṃ samānatthattā’’ti. Bhūtattayanissitāni ca mahābhūtāni catumahābhūtanissitaṃ upādārūpanti sabbampi rūpaṃ sabbadā sabbattha sabbākāraṃ catumahābhūtahetukaṃ mahābhūtāni ca anāmaṭṭhabhedāni sāmaññato gahitānīti vuttaṃ ‘‘rūpakkhandhassa hetū’’ti.

Even though, because wholesome and other states are established by this, non-greed and so on are designated solely by the term 'hetu,' yet, due to the general similarity of causality, the great elements and others can also be referred to by the term 'hetu.' Thus, distinguishing with the second 'hetu' word, which conveys the meaning of 'root,' it says 'hetuhetū.' Because they assist in firmly establishing wholesome and other states by being of the nature of roots, the supporting factors are called 'three wholesome roots,' etc., and in the Paṭṭhāna, these very same are referred to as 'root condition.' Hence, it is said: 'This is the meaning: root-cause or condition-cause.' It is called 'cause' (hetu) because the result arises from it, or because, depending on it, the result comes into being—this is 'condition' (paccaya). Thus, to indicate the non-difference in meaning between the terms 'hetu' and 'paccaya,' the term 'paccaya' is used as a synonym for the term 'hetu.' Therefore, it is said: 'Because the terms "hetu" and "paccaya" have the same meaning.' And the great elements depend on the other three great elements, while derived matter depends on the four great elements. Thus, all material form, always, everywhere, and in every way, has the four great elements as its cause. And the great elements are taken generally, without specific analysis; hence it is said: 'The causes of the form aggregate.'

Kammasamādānānanti samādānānaṃ kammānaṃ, samādiyitvā katakammānaṃ vā. Aññesu paccayesu vipākassa taṇhāvijjādīsu.

'Of the undertaking of kammas' means of the kammas that are undertaken, or of the kammas that have been done after undertaking them.

‘‘Aṭṭhānametaṃ, bhikkhave, anavakāso, yaṃ kāyaduccaritassa iṭṭho kanto manāpo vipāko nibbatteyya, netaṃ ṭhānaṃ vijjati. Ṭhānañca kho etaṃ, bhikkhave, vijjati, yaṃ kāyaduccaritassa aniṭṭho akanto amanāpo vipāko nibbatteyya. Ṭhānametaṃ vijjati. Vacī…pe… mano…pe… vijjati…pe… aṭṭhānametaṃ, bhikkhave, anavakāso, yaṃ kāyasucaritassa aniṭṭho akanto amanāpo vipāko nibbatteyyā’’ti (ma. ni. 3.131; vibha. 809),

“Monks, this is impossible, there is no chance, that the result of bodily misconduct would be agreeable, pleasing, and desirable—that possibility does not exist. But it is possible, monks, that the result of bodily misconduct would be disagreeable, displeasing, and undesirable—that possibility exists. The same applies to verbal misconduct... mental misconduct... It is impossible, monks, there is no chance, that the result of bodily good conduct would be disagreeable, displeasing, and undesirable.”

‘‘Kammaṃ satte vibhajati, yadidaṃ hīnapaṇītatāyā’’ti (ma. ni. 3.289) – evamādivacanato kammaṃ vipākassa iṭṭhāniṭṭhataṃ niyametīti āha ‘‘iṭṭhāniṭṭhavipākaniyāmakattā’’ti. Gatiupadhikālapayogasampattivipattiyoyeva ṭhānaṃ vipākassa okāsabhāvato. Na hi tehi vinā koci vipāko nibbattatīti. Yathāvuttaṭṭhāne sati adhigantabbaṃ iṭṭhāniṭṭhārammaṇaṃ ‘‘gati…pe… nipphādita’’nti vuttaṃ. Vipākassa ārammaṇena vinā abhāvato ārammaṇampi [Pg.152] tassa padhānaṃ kāraṇaṃ. Anaññasabhāvatoti hetuādisabhāvābhāvato.

“‘Action divides beings, that is, according to inferiority and superiority’ (MN 135)—from such statements, it is said that action determines the desirability or undesirability of the result; hence the phrase ‘because it is the determiner of desirable and undesirable results.’ Destination, substratum, time, and effort, along with their success or failure, are the very ground for the result, because they constitute the opportunity for it. For without them, no result arises. When the aforementioned ground exists, the desirable or undesirable object to be attained is said to be ‘produced by destination… and so on.’ Since a result is impossible without an object, the object is also a principal cause of it. ‘Because it is not of another nature’ means due to the absence of the nature of a cause and so forth.

Ruppanaṃ rūpaṃ. Taṃ assa atthīti ettha ‘‘assā’’ti vuccamāno pathavīādiatthoyeva ruppatītipi vuccatīti āha ‘‘ruppanalakkhaṇayuttasseva rūpīrūpabhāvato’’ti. Etaṃ sabhāvanti etaṃ uppannabhāve sati chahi viññāṇehi viññeyyasabhāvaṃ rūpe niyameti rūpasseva taṃsabhāvattā. Na rūpaṃ etasminti kālabhedavasena ataṃsabhāvassapi rūpassa atthitāya na rūpaṃ tattha niyantabbanti dasseti. Atthi hītiādinā tattha rūpasseva niyantabbatābhāvaṃyeva vivarati. Etamevātiādinā uddesena niddesaṃ saṃsandeti. Ettha etameva rūpe yathāvuttasabhāvaṃ niyametabbaṃ niddese eva-saddena niyameti avadhāretīti attho. Yathāvutto niyamoti uppannabhāve sati chahi viññāṇehi viññeyyabhāvo niyantabbatāya ‘‘niyamo’’ti vutto, so rūpe atthi eva rūpasseva taṃsabhāvattā. Visiṭṭhakālassa vuttappakāraṃ avadhāraṇaṃyeva vā yathāvutto niyamo, so rūpe atthiyeva sambhavatiyeva, na arūpe viya na sambhavatīti attho daṭṭhabbo. Kālabhedanti kālavisesaṃ. Anāmasitvāti aggahetvā. Taṃ sabbanti anāmaṭṭhakālabhedaṃ tatoyeva arūpehi samānaviññeyyasabhāvaṃ sabbaṃ rūpaṃ. Uppannanti etena kālabhedāmasanena viseseti ‘‘uppannaṃ…pe… mevā’’ti.

‘Affliction’ is form. When it is said ‘that exists for it,’ the thing referred to as ‘it,’ namely, earth and so on, is also said to be afflicted; thus it is said: ‘because only that which is endowed with the characteristic of affliction has the state of being form.’ This nature—that is, the nature of being cognizable by the six consciousnesses when it has arisen—is determined in form, because only form has that nature. It shows that form is not determined in this way, because, due to the division of time, there exists form that does not have that nature, so form is not to be determined there. By ‘it exists,’ and so on, it clarifies the very absence of the need to determine form there. By ‘this very,’ and so on, it connects the summary with the detailed explanation. Here, the meaning is that this very nature of form, as described, is to be determined; in the detailed explanation, it determines or specifies this with the word ‘eva’ (only). The stated determination is this: the state of being cognizable by the six consciousnesses when it has arisen is called ‘determination’ because it is what is to be determined. That exists only in form, because only form has that nature. Or, the stated determination is the aforesaid specification regarding a specific time; that determination exists only in form, it occurs only in form; it should be understood that it does not occur in the immaterial, as it were. ‘Division of time’ means a specific time. ‘Without taking into account’ means without grasping. By ‘all that’ is meant all form, when the division of time is not taken into account; for that very reason, it has a nature of being cognizable similar to that of immaterial things. By the word ‘arisen,’ it specifies by way of taking the division of time into account, hence ‘arisen… only.’

Vattamānakālikaṃ sabbaṃ rūpaṃ diṭṭhasutamutaviññātasabhāvaṃ, taṃ yathāsakaṃ chahi viññāṇehi viññeyyasabhāvameva, na tehi aviññeyyaṃ. Nāpi uppannameva chahi viññāṇehi viññeyyasabhāvaṃ ekantalakkhaṇaniyamābhāvāpattitoti evaṃ aviparīte atthe vibhāvitepi codako adhippāyaṃ ajānanto ‘‘nanu eva’’ntiādinā sabbassa sabbārammaṇatāpattiṃ codeti. Itaro ‘‘rūpaṃ sabbaṃ sampiṇḍetvā’’tiādinā attano adhippāyaṃ vibhāveti. Ettha ekībhāvena gahetvāti idaṃ ‘‘sampiṇḍetvā’’ti etassa atthavacanaṃ. Ekantalakkhaṇaṃ chahi viññāṇehi viññeyyasabhāvoyeva. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – kiñcāpi pañcannaṃ viññāṇānaṃ visayantare appavattanato na sabbassa sabbārammaṇatā, sabbassapi pana rūpassa chaviññāṇārammaṇabhāvato yathāsakaṃ chahi viññāṇehi viññeyyatāya chahi viññāṇehi viññeyyatāva atthi, taṃ ekato saṅgahaṇavasena gahetvā ‘‘uppannaṃ sabbaṃ rūpaṃ chahi viññāṇehi viññeyya’’nti [Pg.153] vuttaṃ yathā ‘‘abhiññāppattaṃ pañcamajjhānaṃ chaḷārammaṇaṃ hotī’’ti. Yathā hi dibbacakkhudibbasotādiabhiññāppattassa pañcamajjhānassa visuṃ asabbārammaṇattepi ekantalakkhaṇavasena ekībhāvena gahetvā ārammaṇavasena paṭhamajjhānādito visesaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘abhiññāppattaṃ pañcamajjhānaṃ chaḷārammaṇaṃ hotī’’ti vuccati, evaṃ arūpato rūpassa visayavasena visesaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘uppa …pe… viññeyya’’nti vuttanti. Chahi viññāṇehi viññeyyabhāvo rūpe niyametabbo, na pana rūpaṃ tasmiṃ niyametabbaṃ, aniyatadeso ca eva-saddoti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ (dha. sa. aṭṭa. 594) ‘‘paccuppannarūpameva cakkhuviññāṇādīhi chahi veditabba’’nti vuttaṃ. ‘‘Paccuppannarūpamevā’’tiādinā tattha dosamāha. Tasmāti yasmā pāḷiyaṃ viññeyyamevāti eva-saddo vutto, na ca tassa aṭṭhānayojanena kāci iṭṭhasiddhi, atha kho aniṭṭhasiddhiyeva sabbarūpassa ekantalakkhaṇaniyamādassanato, tasmā. Yathārutavaseneva niyame gayhamāne uppa…pe… patti natthi, tato ca sotapatitatāyapi payojanaṃ natthīti. Vuttanayenāti ‘‘arūpato vidhura’’ntiādinā vuttanayena.

All form existing in the present moment has the nature of being seen, heard, sensed, and cognized. It has the very nature of being cognizable by the six consciousnesses, each in its own sphere; it is not uncognizable by them. Nor is it that only arisen form has the nature of being cognizable by the six consciousnesses, for that would lead to the absence of a determination of an absolute characteristic. Thus, even when the correct meaning is explained, the questioner, not understanding the intention, raises the objection, beginning with ‘But surely…,’ that this would entail that everything is an object for everything. The other clarifies his own intention, beginning with ‘having lumped all form together.’ Here, ‘having taken as a single thing’ is the explanation of the meaning of ‘having lumped together.’ The absolute characteristic is the very nature of being cognizable by the six consciousnesses. This is what is meant: although the five consciousnesses do not operate in one another’s object-spheres, and thus not everything is an object for everything, still, since all form is an object for the six consciousnesses, each in its own sphere, the state of being cognizable by the six consciousnesses does exist. Taking this by way of a collective summary, it was said, ‘all arisen form is cognizable by the six consciousnesses.’ This is like the saying, ‘The fifth jhāna attained through direct knowledge has six objects.’ For just as the fifth jhāna of one who has attained direct knowledges such as the divine eye and divine ear, though individually not having all things as its object, is said to have six objects by taking it as a single thing based on its absolute characteristic, in order to show its distinction from the first jhāna and so on in terms of objects; so too, to show the distinction of form from the formless in terms of objects, it was said, ‘arisen… cognizable.’ The state of being cognizable by the six consciousnesses is to be determined in form, but form is not to be determined in that state, for the word ‘eva’ has an indeterminate application. Thus, in the commentary (DhsA. 594), it is said: ‘Only present form is to be known by the six consciousnesses beginning with eye-consciousness.’ With ‘Only present form,’ and so on, he points out the fault there. Therefore: because in the Pāli the word ‘eva’ is stated as ‘cognizable only,’ and by applying it in the wrong place no desired outcome is achieved—but rather an undesired outcome is achieved, namely, not seeing the determination of an absolute characteristic for all form—therefore, when the determination is taken according to the literal text, the consequence of ‘arisen…’ does not obtain, and from that there is no benefit even in what has been handed down by tradition. ‘By the stated method’ means by the method stated beginning with ‘distinct from the formless.’

Ñāṇassa vā uttarassa purimañāṇaṃ vatthukāraṇanti ñāṇavatthu. ‘‘Sajātī’’ti ettha sa-kāro samānasaddatthoti dassetuṃ ‘‘samānajātikāna’’nti vuttaṃ. Samānajātitā ca sammāvācādīnaṃ sīlanattho eva. Etena samānasabhāvatā sajātisaṅgahoti veditabbo. Ārammaṇe cetaso avikkhepappavattiyā upaṭṭhānussāhanāni viya tesaṃ avikkhepopi atisayena upakārakoti ‘‘aññamaññopakāravasenā’’ti vuttaṃ. Teneva vijjamānesupi aññesu sahajātadhammesu etesaṃyeva samādhikkhandhasaṅgaho dassito. Yaṃ pana saccavibhaṅgavaṇṇanāyaṃ (vibha. aṭṭha. 189) visuddhimaggādīsu (visuddhi. 2.568) ca ‘‘vāyāmasatiyo kiriyato saṅgahitā’’ti vuttaṃ, taṃ asamādhisabhāvataṃ tesaṃ samādhissa upakārakattañca sandhāya vuttaṃ. Teneva ca tattha ‘‘samādhiyevettha sajātito samādhikkhandhena saṅgahito’’ti (visuddhi. 2.568; vibha. aṭṭha. 189) vuttaṃ. Idha pana sajātisaṅgahoti samādhitadupakārakadhammānaṃ uppattidesavasena saṅgaho vuttoti. Avirādhetvā visayasabhāvāvaggahaṇaṃ paṭivedho, appanā ca ārammaṇe daḷhanipāto tadavagāhoyevāti ‘‘paṭivedhasadisaṃ kicca’’nti vuttaṃ. Atha vā ārammaṇapaṭivedhassa tadāhananapariyāhananamanuguṇatāya [Pg.154] samānanti paññāvitakkānaṃ kiccasarikkhatā vuttā.

Or, the preceding knowledge is the basis-cause for the succeeding knowledge; thus, it is a ‘basis of knowledge.’ Here, to show that the prefix ‘sa-’ in ‘sajāti’ has the meaning of the word ‘samāna’ (same), the word ‘samānajātikānaṃ’ (of those of the same kind) is stated. And the sameness of kind for right speech and so forth is precisely the ethical domain. By this, it should be understood that inclusion by same kind is by way of same nature. Just as mindfulness and effort are for the non-distracted proceeding of the mind regarding an object, their own non-distraction is also exceedingly helpful; hence, it is said, ‘by way of mutual support.’ For this reason, even though other co-arisen states exist, only these are shown to be included in the aggregate of concentration. However, what is stated in the commentary on the Saccavibhaṅga (VibhA. 189) and in the Visuddhimagga (Vism. 2.568) and so forth—that ‘effort and mindfulness are included by way of function’—is said with reference to their nature of not being concentration and their supportive role for concentration. For that reason, it is said there: ‘Here, concentration alone is included in the aggregate of concentration by way of same kind’ (Vism. 2.568; VibhA. 189). But here, inclusion by same kind is said to be the inclusion of concentration and the states that support it, by way of their place of arising. Penetration is the grasping of the object's essential nature without fail, and absorption is the firm impact upon the object, a very plunging into it; thus, it is said, ‘a function similar to penetration.’ Alternatively, the similarity of the functions of wisdom and initial thought is stated because they are alike in being conducive to the striking and thorough striking of that penetration of the object.

Ekakaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the exposition of the single item is concluded.

Dukaniddeso

The Exposition of the Dyad

Upādābhājanīyavaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Analysis of Clinging

596. Samantato sabbaso dassanaṭṭhena cakkhu samantacakkhūti imamatthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘sabbasaṅkhatāsaṅkhatadassana’’nti vuttaṃ. Evamādināti ettha ādi-saddo ‘‘dukkhaṃ pariññeyyaṃ pariññāta’’nti tīsupi padesu paccekaṃ yojetabbo. ‘‘Idaṃ dukkhanti me, bhikkhave, pubbe ananussutesu dhammesu cakkhuṃ udapādi, ñāṇaṃ udapādī’’tiādinā (mahāva. 15; paṭi. ma. 2.30) hi pāḷi pavattāti. Ākārenāti dvādasavidhena ākārena. Tampi kāmāvacaraṃ vipassanāpaccavekkhaṇañāṇabhāvato. ‘‘Ñāṇacakkhu sahaariyamaggaṃ vipassanāñāṇantipi yujjatī’’ti vadanti. Aggamaggena pana saha vipassanā paccavekkhaṇañāṇanti yuttaṃ viya dissati.

596. The eye is called 'all-seeing' (samantacakkhu) in the sense of seeing in every way, and to show this meaning, the phrase 'seeing all conditioned and unconditioned things' is stated. Here, in `evamādinā`, the word `ādi` should be applied separately to each of the three phrases, such as 'suffering is to be fully understood' and 'it has been fully understood'. For the Pāli text proceeds thus: 'Bhikkhus, with regard to things not heard before, the eye arose in me, knowledge arose—“This is suffering”' and so forth (Mv. 15; Paṭis. 2.30). The phrase 'by way' (ākārena) refers to the twelvefold manner. That, too, is due to its being insight and reviewing knowledge belonging to the sense-sphere. Some say, 'The eye of knowledge, together with the noble path, can also be construed as insight knowledge'. However, it seems appropriate that insight and reviewing knowledge are associated with the supreme path.

Yathāvutte maṃsapiṇḍe sasambhāre cakkhuvohāro santānavasena pavattamāne catusamuṭṭhānikarūpadhamme upādāya pavattoti ‘‘catu…pe… sambhārā’’ti vuttaṃ. Saṇṭhānanti vaṇṇāyatanamevāti tena tena ākārena sanniviṭṭhesu mahābhūtesu taṃtaṃsaṇṭhānavasena vaṇṇāyatanassa viññāyamānattā vuttaṃ, na vaṇṇāyatanasseva saṇṭhānapaññattiyā upādānattā. Tathā hi andhakāre phusitvāpi saṇṭhānaṃ viññāyatīti. Tathā ca vakkhati ‘‘dīghādīni phusitvāpi sakkā jānitu’’nti, (dha. sa. aṭṭa. 616) ‘‘dīghādisannivesaṃ bhūtasamudāyaṃ nissāyā’’ti (dha. sa. mūlaṭī. 616) ca. Tesaṃ sambhavasaṇṭhānānaṃ āpodhātuvaṇṇāyatanehi anatthantarabhāvepi tehi visuṃ vacanaṃ tathābhūtānaṃ sambhavabhūtānaṃ saṇṭhānabhūtānañca. Etena āpodhātuvaṇṇāyatanānaṃ vasena vattamānaavatthāviseso sambhavo saṇṭhānañcāti ayamattho dassito hoti. Tattha sambhavo catusamuṭṭhāniko soḷasavassakāle uppajjati. Tassa rāgavasena ṭhānā vacanaṃ hotīti vadanti. Atathābhūtānaṃ [Pg.155] tato aññathābhūtānaṃ. Yathāvutte sambhāravatthusaṅkhāte. Vijjamānattāti bhiyyovuttivasena vuttaṃ. Tathā hi khīṇāsavānaṃ brahmānañca sambhavo natthīti. Āpodhātuvisesattā sambhavo āpodhātusambandhī āpodhātutannissayanissitopi hotīti tassa catudhātunissitatāya avirodho vutto.

As stated regarding the lump of flesh with its components, the term 'eye' is used because it occurs dependent on the four-originated material phenomena, which proceed in a continuous stream; hence, it is said, 'four... components'. Shape is merely the visible-form base. Thus, it is stated that when the great elements are arranged in various configurations, the visible-form base is recognized according to those shapes, not because the visible-form base itself is the basis for the concept of shape. For thus, even in darkness, shape can be discerned by touch. And thus it will be said: 'Even by touching, one can know length and so forth' (Dhs.A. 616), and 'depending on the aggregate of elements arranged in terms of length and so forth' (Dhs.Mūlaṭī. 616). Even though this arising and these shapes are not different from the water element and the visible-form base, they are spoken of separately because they are such, being the arising and being the shapes. By this, the meaning is shown that arising and shape are specific states occurring by way of the water element and the visible-form base. In this context, arising is four-originated and appears at the age of sixteen. Some say that its remaining in place is mentioned due to desire. For those not of such nature, it is otherwise. As stated regarding the object designated as components. 'Because it exists' is said in the sense of being more evident. For instance, this arising does not exist in the case of the arahants and Brahmās. Because it is a specific kind of water element, arising is connected to the water element, and it is also dependent on and relying upon the water element; thus, its dependence on the four elements is stated without contradiction.

Utucittāhārehi upatthambhiyamānanti ettha ‘‘kalāpantaragatā utuāhārā adhippetā’’ti vadanti. Anekakalāpagatabhāvaṃ cakkhussa dasseti yato upaddutapaṭale nirākaraṇepi cakkhu vijjatīti. Paṭighaṭṭanaṃ visayābhimukhabhāvo nighaṃsapaccayattā. Nighaṃso nissayabhāvāpatti. Yato cakkhādinissitā saññā ‘‘paṭighasaññā’’ti vuccati.

Regarding the phrase 'supported by temperature, mind, and nutriment,' it is said here that 'temperature and nutriment included within other material groups are intended'. This shows the eye's state of being included in numerous material groups, because the eye still exists even when a damaged membrane is removed. Impingement (paṭighaṭṭana) is the facing towards the object, because it is conditioned by impact. Impact is the state of becoming a basis. Since perception is dependent on the eye and so on, it is called 'perception of sensory impact'.

Anekattāti idaṃ avacanassa kāraṇaṃ, na hetukiriyāya viññāyamānabhāvassa. So pana apekkhāsiddhito eva veditabbo. Hetukiriyāpekkhā hi phalakiriyāti. Cakkhuṃ saṅgaṇhātīti cakkhuviññāṇassa nissayabhāvānupagamanepi taṃsabhāvānativattanato tassā samaññāya tattha niruḷhabhāvaṃ dasseti. Dassanapariṇāyakaṭṭho cakkhussa indaṭṭhoyevāti ‘‘yathā hi issaro’’tiādinā issaropamā vuttā. Cakkhuviññāṇaṃ dassanakicce pariṇāyantaṃ cakkhu taṃsahajāte cakkhusamphassādayopi tattha pariṇāyatīti vuccatīti ‘‘te dhamme…pe… pariṇāyatī’’ti vuttaṃ, na pana cakkhusamphassādīnaṃ dassanakiccattā. Atha vā cakkhusamphassādīnaṃ indriyapaccayabhāvena upakārakaṃ cakkhuviññāṇaṃ dassanakicce pariṇāyantaṃ cakkhu tattha cakkhusamphassādayopi tadanuvattake pariṇāyatīti atthāyaṃ pariyāyoti dassento āha ‘‘te dhamme…pe… ṇāyatī’’ti. Anekatthattā dhātūnaṃ cakkhatīti imassa ‘‘pariṇāyati pakāsetī’’ti ca atthā vuttā. Saṇṭhānampi rūpāyatanamevāti ‘‘samavisamāni rūpāni cakkhatīti cakkhū’’ti vuttaṃ. Taṃdvārikānaṃ phassādīnaṃ upanissayapaccayabhāvo eva vaḷañjanattho.

The phrase 'multiplicity' (anekattā) is the reason for the non-statement, not for its being understood as a causal action. That, however, should be understood as established through dependence. For a resultant action is dependent on a causal action. The phrase 'it encompasses the eye' shows that even though eye-consciousness does not become a basis for the eye, this designation is established there because it does not transcend its own nature. The characteristic of the eye as the leader in seeing is indeed its faculty-meaning; thus, the simile of the ruler is stated with 'just as a ruler' and so forth. The eye leads eye-consciousness in the function of seeing, and it is said that it also leads eye-contact and other co-arisen phenomena in that function; hence, it is stated, 'those phenomena... it leads,' but not because eye-contact and the like have the function of seeing. Alternatively, to show that this is the intended meaning of the passage, he says 'those phenomena... it leads': since eye-contact and the like are helpful to eye-consciousness by serving as a faculty-condition, the eye, leading eye-consciousness in the function of seeing, also leads eye-contact and the like, which follow it. Due to the manifold meanings of the verbal roots, the meanings 'leads' and 'makes clear' are stated for 'cakkhati' (sees). Shape is also simply the visible-form base; thus, it is stated: 'The eye (cakkhu) is so called because it sees (cakkhati) even and uneven forms'. The intended meaning of its 'usage' is simply its being a decisive-support condition for contact and the like, which arise through that door.

599. Taṃdvārikā…pe… uppatti vuttāti cakkhuviññāṇe uppanne sampaṭicchanādīni balavārammaṇe javanaṃ ekantena uppajjatīti katvā vuttaṃ. Tathā ceva hi antarā cakkhuviññāṇe vā sampaṭicchane vā santīraṇe vā ṭhatvā nivattissatīti netaṃ ṭhānaṃ vijjatīti nicchitaṃ. Tena paccayenāti taṃpakārena paccayena. Taṃsadisānanti garuṃ katvā assādanādippavattivisesarahitatāya dassanasadisānaṃ manodhātusantīraṇavoṭṭhabbanānaṃ. Pañcadvārikajavanānaṃ [Pg.156] assādanādito aññathā garuṃ katvā pavatti natthi rūpadhammavisayattāti ‘‘assādanābhinandanabhūtānī’’ti ettakameva vuttaṃ. Manodvārikajavanapiṭṭhivaṭṭakānampi hi pañcadvārikajavanānaṃ assādanābhinandanabhāvena rūpaṃ garuṃ katvā pavatti natthīti na sakkā vattunti. Rūpaṃ ārammaṇādhipati akusalasseva hoti. Tathā hi paṭṭhāne ‘‘abyākato dhammo akusalassa dhammassa adhipatipaccayena paccayo. Ārammaṇādhipati cakkhuṃ garuṃ katvā assādeti abhinandatī’’tiādinā (paṭṭhā. 1.1.416) rūpadhammopi ārammaṇādhipati vibhatto. ‘‘Abyākato dhammo abyākatassa dhammassa abyākato dhammo kusalassā’’ti ettha pana phalanibbānāneva ārammaṇādhipatibhāvena vibhattānīti. Gaṇanāya ca ‘‘ārammaṇaārammaṇādhipatiupanissayapurejātaatthiavigatanti eka’’nti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.445) vuttaṃ. Yadi kusalassapi siyā, dveti vattabbaṃ siyāti. Tānīti yathāvuttajavanāni paṭiniddiṭṭhāni. Taṃsampayuttāni cāti javanasampayuttāni. Aññāni cakkhusamphassādīni. Yadi rūpassa ārammaṇapaccayabhāvamattaṃ adhippetaṃ, ‘‘taṃ rūpārammaṇeti eteneva sijjheyyā’’ti ettakameva vadeyya. Yasmā pana rūpaṃ taṃdvārikajavanānaṃ paccayavisesopi hoti, tasmā tassa visesassa dīpanatthaṃ ‘‘ārabbhā’’ti vacanaṃ vuttaṃ siyāti āha ‘‘ārammaṇapaccayato aññapaccayabhāvassapi dīpaka’’nti.

599. The arising of those dependent on that door... is stated. This is said because when eye-consciousness arises with a strong object, receiving and so forth, and impulsion, arise invariably. Indeed, it is certain that the process cannot turn back, having stopped in the interval of eye-consciousness, receiving, or investigating. 'By that condition' means 'by that kind of condition'. 'Those similar' refers to the mind-element, investigating-consciousness, and determining-consciousness, which are similar to seeing because they lack the specific characteristics of savoring and rejoicing when taking the object as important. For the impulsions of the five-door process, there is no occurrence of taking a material phenomenon as important in any other way than by savoring and so forth, because their object is a material phenomenon; thus, only 'savoring and rejoicing' is stated. For it is not possible to say that for the subsequent mind-door impulsions there is no occurrence of taking form as important by way of savoring and rejoicing, as there is for the five-door impulsions. A material phenomenon is an object-dominance condition only for the unwholesome. Indeed, in the Paṭṭhāna, a material phenomenon is also distinguished as an object-dominance condition, as stated: 'An indeterminate phenomenon is a condition for an unwholesome phenomenon by way of dominance condition. Taking the eye as important, one savors and rejoices in it' and so forth (Paṭṭh. 1.1.416). But in the passage, 'An indeterminate phenomenon is a condition for an indeterminate phenomenon; an indeterminate phenomenon is a condition for a wholesome one,' only fruition and Nibbāna are distinguished as having the nature of object-dominance. And in the enumeration, it is stated: 'Object, object-dominance, decisive support, pre-nascence, presence, non-departure—these are one' (Paṭṭh. 1.1.445). If it were also a condition for the wholesome, it should be stated as two. 'Those' refers to the impulsions as previously described. And 'those associated' means 'associated with impulsion'. 'Others' are eye-contact and so forth. If only the state of a material phenomenon as an object-condition were intended, then only this much would be said: 'That is a form object—by this alone it would be accomplished'. But because a material phenomenon is also a special condition for those door-process impulsions, therefore, to indicate that special feature, the word 'in dependence on' (ārabbha) might be stated; thus, he says: 'It also indicates the state of being another condition besides the object-condition'.

600. Sotaviññāṇappavattiyaṃ savanakiriyāvohāroti sotassa savanakiriyāya kattubhāvo sotaviññāṇassa paccayabhāvenāti vuttaṃ ‘‘sotaviññāṇassa nissayabhāvena suṇātī’’ti. Jīvitanimittamāhāraraso jīvitaṃ, tasmiṃ ninnatāya taṃ avhāyatīti jivhāti evaṃ siddhena jivhā-saddena pakāsiyamānā rasāvhāyanasaṅkhātā sāyanakiriyā labbhatīti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘jivhāsaddena viññāyamānā kiriyāsāyana’’nti. Tathā ca vakkhati ‘‘jīvitamavhāyatīti jivhā’’ti (vibha. aṭṭha. 154). Āyoti uppattideso. Pasādakāyassa kāyikānaṃ dukkhasukhānaṃ nissayabhāvato itaresaṃ upanissayabhāvato ‘‘dukkhadukkhavipariṇāmadukkhānaṃ āyo’’ti vuttaṃ. Byāpitāyāti byāpibhāve, byāpibhāvena vā. Kāyappasādabhāvoti kāyappasādasabbhāvo. Anuviddhattāti anuyuttabhāvato, saṃsaṭṭhabhāvatoti attho. Tasmāti yasmā yāvatā imasmiṃ [Pg.157] kāye upādinnakapavattaṃ nāma atthi, sabbattha kāyāyatanaṃ kappāsapaṭale sneho viyāti vuttaṃ, tasmā. Paṇḍarasabhāvā pasādā āpāthagataṃ visayaṃ viññāṇuppattihetubhāvena pakāsentā viya hontīti tesaṃ visayāvabhāsanakiccatā vuttā. Samānanissayānanti ekanissayānaṃ. Avinibbhuttesu hi rūparasādīsu yaṃnissayaṃ rūpaṃ, taṃnissayo eva rasādīti. Aññamaññasabhāvānupagamenāti lakkhaṇasaṅkarābhāvamāha.

600. In the arising of ear-consciousness, the expression 'the action of hearing' refers to the ear's role as the agent of the action of hearing, due to its being a condition for ear-consciousness. Thus it is said: 'One hears by means of the support for ear-consciousness.' Life (jīvita) is the nutrient essence (āhārarasa) for the sake of life. Because it inclines towards that and calls upon it, it is called 'tongue' (jivhā). Thus, since the action of tasting, which is designated as the calling upon of flavors, is revealed by the term 'tongue' established in this way, it is said: 'The action of tasting is understood by the term "tongue."' Similarly, it will be stated: 'Because it calls upon life, it is called "tongue"' (Vibhaṅga Aṭṭhakathā 154). 'Āyo' refers to the place of origin. Because the sensitive body serves as the basis for bodily pains and pleasures and as a strong support for others, it is said: 'It is the origin of suffering-as-pain and suffering-due-to-change.' 'Byāpitāya' means 'in a pervading state,' or 'through pervasion.' 'Kāyappasādabhāvo' means 'the existence of the sensitive body.' 'Anuviddhattā' means 'due to being connected' or 'because of association,' that is, 'due to being intermingled.' Therefore: because it is said that 'insofar as there is in this body what is called materiality produced by clinging, the body-base is everywhere like oil in a cotton cloth,' therefore... The sensitive elements, which are of a clear nature, are as if they illuminate an object that has come into range, by being a cause for the arising of consciousness; thus, their function of illuminating objects is stated. 'Samānanissayānaṃ' means 'having the same support.' For in inseparable material qualities like color and taste, whatever supports color also supports taste, and so on. 'Aññamaññasabhāvānupagamena' means 'by not taking on each other’s characteristic nature,' thus stating the absence of a confusion of their defining features.

Yasmā paccayantarasahitoyeva cakkhuppasādo rūpābhihananavasena pavattati, na paccayantararahito, tasmā rūpābhighāto hotu vā mā vā hotu, evaṃsabhāvo so rūpadhammoti dassetuṃ ‘‘rūpābhighātāraho’’ti vuttaṃ yathā ‘‘vipākārahasabhāvā kusalākusalā’’ti. Visayavisayīnaṃ aññamaññaṃ abhimukhabhāvo abhighāto viyāti abhighāto, so rūpe cakkhussa, cakkhumhi vā rūpassa hotīti vuttaṃ ‘‘rūpe, rūpassa vā abhighāto’’ti. Tenevāha ‘‘yamhi cakkhumhi anidassanamhi sappaṭighamhi rūpaṃ sanidassanaṃ sappaṭighaṃ paṭihaññi vā’’ti (dha. sa. 597), ‘‘cakkhu anidassanaṃ sappaṭighaṃ rūpamhi sanidassanamhi sappaṭighamhi paṭihaññi vā’’ti (dha. sa. 598) ca ādi. Ettha ca taṃtaṃbhavapatthanāvasena cakkhādīsu avigatarāgassa attabhāvanipphādakasādhāraṇakammavasena purimaṃ cakkhulakkhaṇaṃ vuttaṃ, sudūrasukhumādibhedassapi rūpassa gahaṇasamatthameva cakkhu hotūti evaṃ nibbattitaāveṇikakammavasena dutiyaṃ. Esa nayo sesesupi. Atha vā satipi pañcannaṃ pasādabhāvasāmaññe savisayāvabhāsanasaṅkhātassa pasādabyāpārassa dassanavasena purimaṃ vuttaṃ, pasādakāraṇassa satipi kammabhāvasāmaññe attano kāraṇabhedena bhedadassanavasena dutiyaṃ.

Because the eye-sensitivity, only when accompanied by other conditions, functions by way of striking visible form—not when devoid of other conditions—therefore, whether or not there is actual impact with visible form, to show that its nature is such as to be capable of impact with form, it is said, 'fit for impact with form,' just as it is said, 'wholesome and unwholesome states are of a nature suitable for result.' The mutual facing of object and subject is like an 'impact'; thus it is called 'impact'. It is said that this impact is of the eye on form, or of form on the eye. Hence it is said: 'In that eye, which is invisible and resistant, visible form, which is visible and resistant, strikes or is struck' (Dhs. 597), and 'the eye, which is invisible and resistant, strikes or is struck by visible form, which is visible and resistant' (Dhs. 598), and so on. Here, the first characteristic of the eye is stated with reference to the common kamma that produces an individual existence for one whose lust is not yet removed, in accordance with the aspiration for a particular existence. The second characteristic is stated with reference to the unique kamma that produces such an eye, so that the eye might be capable of apprehending even very distant and subtle forms. This same method applies to the remaining sense-bases as well. Alternatively, the first characteristic is stated by way of showing the function of sensitivity—which has the task of illuminating its own object—this being common to the nature of the five kinds of sensitivity. The second characteristic is stated by way of showing the distinctions according to the distinctions of its causes, although there is a commonality of kamma being the cause of sensitivity.

Kāmataṇhāti kāmabhave taṇhā. Tathā rūpataṇhā daṭṭhabbā. Tassa tassa bhavassa mūlakāraṇabhūtā taṇhā tasmiṃ tasmiṃ bhave uppajjanārahāyatanavisayāpi nāma hotīti kāmataṇhādīnaṃ daṭṭhukāmatādivohārārahatā vuttā. Daṭṭhukāmatāti hi daṭṭhumicchā rūpataṇhāti attho. Tathā sesāsupīti. Ettha ca daṭṭhukāmatādīnaṃ taṃtaṃattabhāvanibbattakakammāyūhanakkhaṇato sati purimanibbattiyaṃ vattabbaṃ natthi. Asatipi tassa maggena asamugghātitabhāveneva kāraṇanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yato [Pg.158] maggena asamucchinnaṃ kāraṇalābhe sati uppajjitvā attano phalassa kāraṇabhāvūpagamanato vijjamānamevāti uppannaatthitāpariyāyehi vuccati ‘‘ariyaṃ aṭṭhaṅgikaṃ maggaṃ bhāvento ariyaṃ aṭṭhaṅgikaṃ maggaṃ bahulīkaronto uppannuppanne pāpake akusale dhamme antarāyeva antaradhāpeti’’ (saṃ. ni. 5.157), ‘‘santaṃ vā ajjhattaṃ kāmacchandaṃ atthi me ajjhattaṃ kāmacchandoti pajānātī’’ti (dī. ni. 2.382; ma. ni. 1.115) ca evamādīsu.

Craving for sensual pleasures is craving for existence in the sensual realm. Similarly, craving for form should be understood. Craving, being the root cause for that particular existence, also has as its object the sense-bases suitable for arising in that very existence. Thus, the suitability of terms such as 'desire to see' for cravings such as sensual craving has been stated. For 'desire to see' means the wish to see, which is craving for form. The same applies to the rest. Here, concerning terms like 'desire to see,' if they arise prior to the moment of the karmic accumulation that produces that particular state of being, there is nothing to be said. Even if such a state does not exist at that moment, it should be understood that the cause remains because it has not been eradicated by the path. Since that cause, not cut off by the path, arises and becomes the cause for its own result when it obtains a condition, it is spoken of with terms implying arising and existence. Thus, it is said: 'Developing the Noble Eightfold Path, cultivating the Noble Eightfold Path, one causes evil, unwholesome states that have just arisen to disappear then and there.' (Saṃyutta Nikāya 5.157) And: 'When there is sensual desire within oneself, one understands: "There is sensual desire within me."' (Dīgha Nikāya 2.382; Majjhima Nikāya 1.115) and so forth.

Etthāha – cakkhādīnaṃ indriyānaṃ kiṃ ekakammunā uppatti, udāhu nānākammunāti? Ubhayathāpīti porāṇā. Tattha nānākammunā tāva uppattiyaṃ cakkhādīnaṃ visese vattabbaṃ natthi kāraṇassa bhinnattā. Ekakammunā pana uppattiyaṃ tesaṃ kathaṃ visesoti? Kāraṇassa bhinnattāyeva. Taṃtaṃbhavapatthanābhūtā hi taṇhā taṃtaṃbhavapariyāpannāyatanābhilāsatāya sayaṃ vicittarūpā upanissayabhāvena taṃtaṃbhavanibbattakakammassa vicittabhedataṃ vidahati. Yato tadāhitavisesaṃ taṃ tathārūpasamatthatāyogena anekarūpāpannaṃ viya anekaṃ visiṭṭhasabhāvaṃ phalaṃ nibbatteti. Tathā ca vakkhati ‘‘kammameva nesaṃ visesakāraṇa’’nti. Na cettha samatthatābhāvato aññaṃ veditabbaṃ kāraṇavisesenāhitavisesassa visiṭṭhaphalanipphādanayogyatābhāvato. Tathā hi sati ekassapi kammassa anekindriyahetutāvisesayogaṃ ekampi kammantiādinā yuttito āgamatopi parato sayameva vakkhati. Tathā ca ekasseva kusalacittassa soḷasādivipākacittanibbattihetubhāvo vuccati. Lokepi ekasseva sālibījassa paripuṇṇāparipuṇṇataṇḍulaphalanibbattihetutā dissati. Kiṃ vā etāya yutticintāya, na cintitabbamevetaṃ. Yato kammavipāko cakkhādīni kammavipāko ca sabbākārato buddhānaṃyeva kammavipākañāṇaphalayuttānaṃ visayo, na aññesaṃ atakkāvacaratāya. Teneva ca bhagavatā ‘‘kammavipāko acinteyyo na cintetabbo, yo cinteyya ummādassa vighātassa bhāgī assā’’ti (a. ni. 4.77) ādīnavaṃ dassetvā paṭikkhittaṃ. Āviñchanaṃ puggalassa viññāṇassa vā taṃninnabhāvappattiyā hetubhāvo.

Here it is said: 'Is the arising of faculties like the eye due to a single kamma or various kammas?' The ancients say it can be both. First, regarding arising from various kammas, there is nothing to be said about a distinction among the eye and other faculties, because the causes are different. But when arising from a single kamma, how then are their distinctions explained? Precisely because the causes differ. For the craving that has become the aspiration for a particular existence, due to its desire for the sense-bases associated with that existence, is itself of various forms. By serving as a supporting condition, it imparts a manifold distinction to the kamma that produces that existence. Wherefore that kamma, having a distinction imparted by craving and being endowed with such a capacity, produces many a result of a distinct nature, as if it had assumed many forms. And so it will be said: 'Kamma alone is the cause of their distinctions.' And here, nothing other than its capacity should be understood, because that which has a distinction imparted by a distinction of cause possesses the suitability for producing a distinct result. For this being so, the author himself will later state, with the words 'even one kamma,' etc., from both reasoning and scripture, that even a single kamma has the special capacity to be the cause of multiple faculties. And so, it is said that a single wholesome consciousness is the cause for the production of sixteen or more resultant consciousnesses. In the world, too, it is seen that a single rice seed is the cause for producing grains of varying fullness. But what is the use of this line of reasoning? This should not be pondered at all. For the result of kamma—the eye and other faculties—and the result of kamma in all its aspects are the domain only of the Buddhas, who are endowed with the fruit of the knowledge of the result of kamma, not of others, because it is beyond the range of logic. For that very reason, the Blessed One rejected it after showing the danger, saying: 'The result of kamma is inconceivable; it should not be pondered. One who ponders it would become a partaker of madness and distress' (A. Ni. 4.77). `Āviñchana` (attraction) is the cause for a person or a consciousness to attain a state of inclination towards that.

Sabbesanti padassa pakaraṇato pārisesato vā labbhamānaṃ atthavisesaṃ ajānanto yathārutavaseneva atthaṃ gahetvā ‘‘ko ettha viseso’’tiādinā [Pg.159] codeti. Itaro tejādīnaṃ paccekaṃ adhikabhāve viya dvinnaṃ tiṇṇaṃ vā adhikabhāvepi yathāvuttādhikabhāveneva ekakādivasena labbhamānāya omattatāyapi kāyappasādo na hotīti viññāyamānattā pakaraṇato pārisesato vā catunnampi bhūtānaṃ samabhāvena kāyo hotīti ayamattho siddhoti sabba-saddo idha samabhāvadīpakoti dassetuṃ ‘‘idaṃ panā’’tiādimāha. Imamatthaṃ dīpetīti ca yathāvuttena ñāyena ‘‘sabbesa’’nti vacanato ayamattho labbhati, na tassa vācakattāti dasseti. Tenevāha ‘‘anuvatta…pe… vasena vuttattā’’ti. Ekadesādhikabhāvanivāraṇeneva hi ekadesomattatānivāraṇampi viññāyatīti. Ekadeso avayavo. Catudhātusamudāyanissayassa hi pasādassa tadekadhātuadhikatā avayavādhikatā hotīti.

Not understanding the particular meaning of the word 'all,' which is obtained from the context or by elimination, one grasps the meaning merely based on what is heard and objects, saying, 'What is the distinction here?' The other commentator, to show that the word 'all' here indicates a state of balance, says, 'But this...' For it is understood that just as the sensitive body does not arise when there is a predominance of fire and other elements individually, or a predominance of two or three, so too it does not arise when there is a deficiency in one or more. Thus, from the context or by elimination, the meaning that the body consists of the four elements in a state of balance is established. And he shows that this meaning is clarified; this meaning is obtained from the statement 'of all' by the aforesaid method, not because it is its literal denotation. Therefore, he said, 'following... by way of what has been stated.' For by refuting the predominance of one part, the deficiency of one part is also understood. A part is a component. For, in the case of the sensitivity that is dependent on the aggregate of the four elements, the predominance of a single element is the predominance of a component.

‘‘Purimā cettha dvepi vādino nikāyantariyā’’ti vadanti. Ālokādisahakārīkāraṇasahitānaṃyeva cakkhādīnaṃ rūpādiavabhāsanasamatthatā vivarassa ca sotaviññāṇupanissayabhāvo guṇoti tesaṃ laddhīti adhippāyena ‘‘taṃtaṃbhūtaguṇehī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tejādīnaṃ viya vivarassa bhūtabhāvābhāvato ‘‘yathāyoga’’nti vuttaṃ. Atha vā rūpādayo viya vivarampi bhūtaguṇoti parādhippāyaṃ dassento ‘‘taṃtaṃbhūtaguṇehī’’ti āha. Tejassa pana ālokarūpena, ākāsasaṅkhātassa vivarassa saddena, vāyussa gandhena, udakassa rasena, pathaviyā phoṭṭhabbenāti imamatthaṃ sandhāya ‘‘yathāyogaṃ taṃtaṃbhūtaguṇehī’’ti vuttaṃ siyā. Rūpādiggahaṇeti rūpādivisaye cakkhuviññāṇādike nipphādetabbeti attho. Upakaritabbatoti sahakārīkāraṇabhūtehi yathāvuttabhūtaguṇehi cakkhādīnaṃ sakiccakaraṇe upakaritabbato. Sabhāvena suyyamānassāti kenaci anuccāriyamānasseva labbhamānattā vuttaṃ. Ghaṭṭanaṃ pana vinā vāyusaddopi natthīti. Atha vā vāyumhi saddo sabhāvena suyyatīti āpe raso madhuroti ca tassa laddhiyevāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Dutiyavādissapi niggaho hoti tassapi tejādiguṇā rūpādayoti evaṃladdhikattā.

They say, 'Here, the two former disputants are from other schools.' With the intention that their doctrine is that the capacity of the eye and other faculties—when accompanied by cooperative causes such as light—to illuminate form and so forth, and the aperture's being a support for ear-consciousness, is a quality, it is said, 'by the qualities of the respective elements,' etc. Unlike fire and other elements, 'as is appropriate' is said because of the aperture's lack of an elemental nature. Alternatively, showing the opinion of another that the aperture, like form and other objects, is also a quality of an element, he says, 'by the qualities of the respective elements.' Or, it might have been said, 'as is appropriate, by the qualities of the respective elements,' with reference to this meaning: of fire by the form of light, of the aperture called space by sound, of wind by smell, of water by taste, and of earth by the tangible. 'In the grasping of form, etc.' means that in the domain of form and other objects, eye-consciousness and the like are to be produced. 'Because they are to be assisted' means because the eye and other faculties are to be assisted in performing their function by the aforesaid qualities of the elements, which are cooperative causes. 'Of that which is heard by its own nature' is said because it is obtained without being uttered by anyone. But without impact, there is not even the sound of wind. Alternatively, it should be understood that it is simply their doctrine that sound is heard by its own nature in wind, and that taste in water is sweet. The second disputant is also refuted, because he too holds the doctrine that form, etc., are qualities of fire, etc.

Rūpādivisesaguṇehīti rūpādivisesaguṇayuttehi. Teja…pe… vāyūhīti sahākāsehi tejādiparamāṇūhi. Kappāsato visadisāyāti [Pg.160] kappāsapathavito visesayuttāya tato adhikasāmatthiyayuttāyāti adhippāyo. Tassāyevāti kappāsapathaviyāyeva. Yasmā sā vijjamānānipi avisesabhūtāni atthīti gahetuṃ asakkuṇeyyabhāvena abhibhavitvā ṭhitā, tasmā tassāyeva gandho adhikataro bhaveyyāti attho. Ayañca sabbo uttaro ‘‘tassa tassa bhūtassa adhikatāyā’’tiādinā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ (dha. sa. aṭṭha. 600) vuttattā tathāgatānaṃ vādaṃ sampaṭicchitvā vadantassa kaṇādassa vasena vutto. ‘‘Attano pana matena kaṇādakapilādayo kevalaṃ pathavādidrabyamevātiādi laddhi. Kaṇādasāsanāya adhimuttānaṃ sāsane anavagāḷhānaṃ kesañci ayaṃ vādo’’ti ca vadanti. Etassubhayassāti āsavagandhato kappāsagandho adhiko sītudakavaṇṇato uṇhodakavaṇṇo ca adhikoti etassa ubhayassa. Tejādiadhikesu ca sambhāresu rūpādīnaṃ visesassa adassanato na rūpādayo tejādīnaṃ visesaguṇoti siddhanti āha ‘‘tadabhā…pe… ttitā’’ti. Tena na rūpaṃ tejassa visesaguṇo ekantato tejādike sambhāre visesena adassanato, yo yassa visesaguṇo, na so tadadhike sambhāre ekantato visesena dissati yathā pathavīadhike sambhāre āpodhātūti dasseti. Evaṃ sesesupi yathāyogaṃ yojetabbaṃ. Ko pana vādo nānākalāpeti sabhāvato nānattābhāvepi mūlakāraṇanānattavasena atthi koci viseso asaṅghāteti dasseti, yato paramaraṇādikiriyāsamatthatā nesaṃ kesañciyeva dissatīti.

'By the special qualities of form, etc.' means by those endowed with the distinctive qualities of form, etc. 'By fire... wind' means by the ultimate particles of fire, etc., together with space. 'From that which is dissimilar to cotton' means from that which is endowed with a distinction from cotton-earth, endowed with a greater capacity than it—this is the intention. 'Of that very one' means of the cotton-earth itself. Because it stands having overpowered even existing things that are indistinct, due to their being ungraspable, therefore its own fragrance would be more intense—this is the meaning. And this entire subsequent passage is spoken from the perspective of Kaṇāda, who spoke accepting the doctrine of the Tathāgatas, as it is stated in the commentary (DhsA. 600) with 'due to the predominance of each element,' etc. And they say: 'But according to their own opinion, the doctrine of Kaṇāda, Kapila, and others is that there are only substances such as earth, etc. This is the view of some who are devoted to the teaching of Kaṇāda but have not penetrated the Dispensation.' 'Of these two' means: of these two, that the fragrance of cotton is greater than the smell of an outflow, and the color of hot water is greater than the color of cold water. And because the distinction of form, etc., is not seen in materials where fire, etc., are predominant, it is established that form, etc., are not the special qualities of fire, etc. He says, 'because of the absence... existence.' Thereby he shows: form is not absolutely a special quality of fire, because it is not seen with distinction in materials where fire, etc., are predominant. Whatever is a special quality of something is not seen with absolute distinction in a material where that thing is predominant, just as the water element is not seen with distinction in materials where earth is predominant. Thus it should be applied to the remaining cases as is appropriate. What to say of a diverse aggregate? He shows that even when there is no diversity in nature, there is some distinction due to the diversity of root causes, which is not a mere conglomeration, since the capacity for actions like dying is seen only in some of them.

Ekampīti pi-saddena anekasmiṃ vattabbameva natthīti dasseti. Pañcāyatanikattabhāve patthanā yā daṭṭhukāmatādibhāvena vuttā, tāya nipphannaṃ. Etena kāraṇavisesena phalavisesamāha. Na hītiādinā vuttamevatthaṃ samatthayati. Tanti kammaṃ. Visesenāti attano kāraṇena āhitātisayena. Teneva sotassa na hoti paccayo, tato aññeneva pana hotīti adhippāyo. Tena anekasabhāvena kāraṇena āhitavisesaṃ ekampi kammaṃ anekasabhāvaṃ phalaṃ nipphādetuṃ samatthaṃ hotīti dasseti. Idāni kammassa vuttappakāravisesābhāve [Pg.161] dosamāha ‘‘indriyantarābhāvappattito’’ti. Tassattho – kāraṇavisesābhāve phalavisesassa asambhavato yaṃ visesayuttaṃ kammaṃ cakkhussa kāraṇaṃ, tassa tato aññavisesābhāve tadaññindriyuppādakatāpi na siyāti sotindriyādīnaṃ tato anuppatti eva siyā. Evamitaratthāpi. Visesoti cettha kammassa taṃtaṃindriyuppādanasamatthatā adhippetā, sā ca pubbe dassitasabhāvova.

'Even one': by the particle 'pi,' he shows that there is nothing at all to be said in the case of many. It is produced by that aspiration for the state of having five sense-bases, which is spoken of as the desire to see, etc. By this specific cause, he states a specific result. By 'For not...,' etc., he supports the very meaning that has been stated. 'That' means kamma. 'Specifically' means by its own cause, by an instilled excellence. The intention is that by that very thing it is not a condition for the ear, but it is a condition only by something else. Thereby he shows that even a single kamma, which has been given a distinction by a cause of a diverse nature, is capable of producing a result of a diverse nature. Now, he states the fault in the absence of the aforesaid kind of distinction in kamma: 'because it would lead to the non-existence of other faculties.' Its meaning is this: since a specific result is impossible in the absence of a specific cause, if the specific kamma that is the cause of the eye lacks a distinction other than that, it would not be a producer of other faculties; thus, there would be only the non-arising of the ear faculty, etc., from it. So too in the other cases. And here, by 'distinction' is intended the capacity of kamma to produce the respective faculties, and that is of the nature already shown.

Anekāhi mahaggatacetanāhi ekāya vā parittacetanāsahitāya paṭisandhikkhaṇe kaṭattārūpānaṃ nibbattīti na sakkā viññātunti ‘‘sabbesaṃ…pe… viññāyatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Idāni tameva asakkuṇeyyataṃ vitthārato dassetuṃ ‘‘nānācetanāyā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tassāyaṃ saṅkhepattho – ‘‘paṭisa…pe… paccayo’’ti ettha yadi nānākammavasena indriyānaṃ uppatti adhippetā, evaṃ sati mahaggatakammena ca kāmāvacarakammena ca taṃtaṃpaṭisandhikkhaṇe kaṭattārūpaṃ uppannaṃ siyā, na cetaṃ yuttaṃ ‘‘mahaggatacetanā kammapaccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.12.78) vuttattā. Nāpi taṃtaṃbhavaniyatarūpindriyehi vikalindriyatā gatisampattiyā opapātikayoniyaṃ paṭisandhikkhaṇe yuttā. Atha mahaggatāhi eva nānācetanāhi nibbattaṃ, na cekā paṭisandhi anekakammanibbattā hoti. Nicchitañhetaṃ sāketapañhenāti. Evaṃ ekena mahaggatakammunā cakkhundriyasotindriyahadayavatthūnaṃ uppattiñāpakena iminā vacanena parittakammunāpi ekena yathārahaṃ anekesaṃ indriyānaṃ uppatti siddhāvāti vuttaṃ ‘‘siddhamekena kammena anekindriyuppatti hotī’’ti.

It cannot be understood how forms produced by kamma arise at the moment of rebirth-linking through many exalted volitions, or through one accompanied by a limited volition. Therefore, it is said, 'for all... it is understood.' Now, to elaborate on that very impossibility, the words 'by various volitions' and so on are stated. The condensed meaning here is this: in the phrase 'at rebirth-linking... as a condition,' if the arising of faculties is intended to be through various kammas, then at that very moment of rebirth-linking, form produced by kamma would arise through both exalted kamma and sense-sphere kamma. But this is not proper, as it is said, 'Exalted volition is a kamma-condition' (Paṭṭhāna 2.12.78). Nor, at the moment of rebirth-linking in a realm of spontaneous birth with a fortunate destination, is it fitting for there to be an incompleteness of faculties with respect to the material faculties determined for that particular existence. Furthermore, if it arises through many exalted volitions, still, a single rebirth-linking is not produced by multiple kammas. This is definitively established by the Sāketa question. Thus, by this statement, which indicates the arising of the eye faculty, ear faculty, and heart-base through a single exalted kamma, it is also established that a single limited kamma can, as is appropriate, give rise to many faculties. Therefore, it is said, 'It is established that the arising of many faculties occurs through a single kamma.'

Sampattoyeva nāma sampattikiccakaraṇatoti imamatthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘paṭi…pe… nakato’’ti vuttaṃ. Atisukhumabhāvato maṃsacakkhuagocarena rūpāyatanena samannāgatasaṅghātavuttitāya ca ‘‘vāyu viyā’’ti vuttaṃ. Cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ saddāyatanaṃ sotaviññāṇassa kadācipi ārammaṇapaccayo na siyā dhātuparamparāya ghaṭṭentassa utusamuṭṭhānattā. Tenāha ‘‘na hi…pe… pajjatī’’ti. Paṭṭhāne (paṭṭhā. 1.1.2) ca ‘‘saddāyatanaṃ sotaviññāṇassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti avisesena vuttaṃ.

To show this meaning—that 'attainment' (sampatti) is so called because it performs the function of attainment—it is stated: 'paṭi...pe... nakato.' It is said, 'like the wind,' because of its extreme subtlety and because it exists as an aggregate, endowed with a form-base, that is beyond the range of the physical eye. The sound-base arising from mind can never be an object-condition for ear-consciousness, because the sound that strikes in a succession of elements arises from temperature. Therefore, he says, 'For indeed...pe... it does not arise.' And in the Paṭṭhāna (Paṭṭh. 1.1.2), it is stated without distinction: 'The sound-base is a condition for ear-consciousness by way of object-condition.'

Nanu cirena suyyantīti dūre ṭhitānaṃ lahukaṃ savanaṃ natthi, tesampi vā lahukaṃ savanena dūrāsannabhāvānaṃ viseso na siyāti adhippāyo. Na[Pg.162], dū…pe… toti na dūre ṭhitehi rajakādisaddā cirena sotaviññāṇena suyyanti, sace savanūpacāre so saddo dūre āsanne ca ṭhitānaṃ yathābhūte āpāthagate sadde manoviññāṇasaṅkhātato gahaṇavisesato cirena suto sīghaṃ sutoti abhimānoti attho. Etamevatthaṃ vitthārato dassento ‘‘yathā hī’’tiādimāha. Nicchaya…pe… abhimāno hoti, sotaviññāṇappavatti pana ubhayatthāpi samānā, yasmā so pana saddo…pe… āgacchatīti. Yadi dhātuparamparāya saddo nappavattati, kathaṃ paṭighosādīnaṃ uppattīti āha ‘‘dūre…pe… paccayo hotī’’ti. Uppattivasena āgatānīti etena rūpadhammāpi yattha uppajjanti, tattheva bhijjanti, na desantaraṃ saṅkamantīti dasseti. Ghaṭṭanasabhāvānevāti tesaṃ bhūtānaṃ saddasamuppattihetubhāvamāha. Sotapadesassāti sotadesassa, sotadese ṭhitassāti attho.

The intended meaning is: Is it not heard after a long time? For those standing at a distance, there is no quick hearing; or, if there were quick hearing even for them, there would be no distinction between being far and near. No, it is not that sounds, such as those of a washerman, are heard slowly by the ear-consciousness of those standing at a distance. The meaning is that if that sound is within the range of hearing for those standing far or near, the misconception of 'heard slowly' or 'heard quickly' arises from a distinction in grasping by what is called mind-consciousness when the sound has come into focus as it really is. Elaborating on this very meaning in detail, he says: 'Just as...' and so on. The misconception is a determination...pe..., but the occurrence of ear-consciousness is the same in both cases, because that sound...pe... comes. If sound does not proceed through a succession of elements, how then do echoes and the like arise? He says: 'Distant...pe... it becomes a condition.' By 'those that come by way of arising,' this indicates that material phenomena, wherever they arise, also break apart there and do not travel to another place. By 'their nature is striking,' he states that those elements are the cause for the arising of sound. 'Of the ear-region' (Sotapadesassāti) means of the ear-location (sotadesassa); the meaning is, of that which is stationed in the ear-location.

Cakkhumato puggalassa ajjhāsayavasenāti citravicitrarūpāyatane yebhuyyena sattānaṃ cakkhudvārikajavanassa anukaḍḍhanavasena pavattiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Kaṇṇakūpacchiddeyeva pavattanatoti etena adhiṭṭhānato bahiddhā indriyaṃ pavattīti vādaṃ paṭisedheti. Adhiṭṭhānadese eva hi indriyaṃ vattati tattha kiccādippayogadassanato. Satipi panassa bahiddhā vuttiyaṃ na visayaggahaṇe samatthatā, aññathā adhiṭṭhānapidahanepi visayaggahaṇaṃ bhaveyyāti. Ārammaṇaggahaṇahetuto cāti kaṇṇakūpacchiddeyeva ṭhatvā ārammaṇakaraṇassa viññāṇassa vā hetubhāvato.

This is stated with reference to the general occurrence of the eye-door impulsion of beings, drawn towards variegated forms, due to the inclination of a person endowed with sight. The statement 'it occurs precisely at the ear-cavity aperture' refutes the view that the faculty functions externally from its base. For the faculty operates precisely at its base, as is evident from its function and application there. Moreover, even if it were to function externally, it would not be capable of grasping the object; otherwise, even if its base were covered, the object could still be grasped. And because it is the cause for grasping the object—this means that by remaining precisely at the ear-cavity aperture, it serves as the cause for the consciousness that takes the object.

Tabbohārenāti gandhagandhaggahaṇassa sahacaritāya gandhopi tathā vuttoti adhippāyo. Gandho paccayoti gandho sahakārīpaccayoti attho. Kheḷādiko paccayoti yojetabbaṃ. Tathā pathavīti sahakārīpaccayantarabhūtā ajjhattikabāhirā pathavī ārammaṇaggahaṇe paccayoti attho. Ādhārabhūtāti tejovāyodhātūnaṃ ādhārabhūtā. Nissayabhūtānanti nissayamahābhūtānaṃ āpotejovāyodhātūnaṃ. Sabbadāti uppīḷanakāle ca anuppīḷanakāle ca. Tatthāti caturāsītipabhede uparimakāyasaṅkhāte rūpasamūhe. Vinibbhujjituṃ asakkuṇeyyānanti idaṃ cakkhudasakaṃ idaṃ kāyadasakaṃ idaṃ bhāvadasakanti evaṃ kalāpatopi vinibbhujjituṃ asakkuṇeyyānaṃ.

The intention of 'By that usage' (Tabbohārenāti) is that 'scent' is also spoken of in that way because it is concomitant with the grasping of scent. 'Scent is a condition' (Gandho paccayoti) means that scent is a cooperative condition. 'Saliva, etc., is a condition' (Kheḷādiko paccayoti) should be connected. Similarly, 'earth' (pathavīti) means that the internal and external earth element, being another cooperative condition, is a condition for grasping objects. 'Being a foundation' (Ādhārabhūtāti) means being the foundation for the fire and air elements. 'Of the supporting' (Nissayabhūtānanti) refers to the supporting great elements, namely, the water, fire, and air elements. 'Always' (Sabbadāti) means both during times of pressure and times of non-pressure. 'There' (Tatthāti) refers to the aggregate of form called the upper body in the eighty-four-fold classification. 'Of those unable to analyze' (Vinibbhujjituṃ asakkuṇeyyānanti) means of those who are unable to analyze even by way of groups, saying, 'This is the eye-decad, this is the body-decad, this is the sex-decad.'

616. Dīghādīnaṃ [Pg.163] phusitvā jānitabbatoti idaṃ dīghādīnaṃ na kāyaviññāṇagocarattā vuttaṃ, dīghādivohārarūpādīnaṃ pana phoṭṭhabbaṃ phusitvā kāyaviññāṇavīthiyā parato pavattena manoviññāṇenapi jānitabbattā vuttaṃ. Dīghādisannivesanti dīghādisannivesavantaṃ. Ekasmiṃ itarassa abhāvāti chāyātapānaṃ ālokandhakārānañca asahaṭṭhāyitaṃ āha. Kathaṃ pana āloko andhakāraṃ vidhamatīti? ‘‘Ālokappavattisamānakālaṃ andhakārasabhāvena pavattamānaṃ vaṇṇāyatanaṃ bhijjati. Andhakārassa nissayo hutvā pavattamānāni bhūtāni kamena tathārūpassa vaṇṇāyatanassa nissayabhāvaṃ gacchantī’’ti keci. Saha andhakārena tannissayabhūtānaṃ nirodhasamanantaraṃ taṃsantatiyaṃ tādise paccayasannipāte ālokanissayabhūtānaṃ uppattīti veditabbaṃ. Na hi nissayamahābhūtehi vinā ālokappavatti atthi, nāpi andhakārasaṅkhātaṃ vaṇṇāyatanameva nirujjhati taṃnissayehi payujjamānakaekakalāpabhūtopādārūpānaṃ saheva nirujjhanato. Padīpasikhāmaṇiraṃsiyo viya pathavīpākārarukkhādīni muñcitvāpi andhakāro pavattatīti vadanti. Mandaṃ pana pākārādiādhārarahitaṃ na suṭṭhu paññāyati, bahalaṃ ādhāraṃ nissāya pavattatīti yuttanti ca vadanti.

616. The statement 'to be known by touching length, etc.' is not made because length and so on are objects of body-consciousness, but rather because conventional forms such as 'long,' which are tangible objects, are to be known by mind-consciousness arising after the body-consciousness process, having been touched. 'Arrangement of length, etc.' (Dīghādisannivesanti) means possessing the arrangement of length, etc. 'The absence of one in the other' (Ekasmiṃ itarassa abhāvāti) refers to the non-coexistence of shade and sunlight, and of light and darkness. How then does light dispel darkness? Some say: 'Simultaneously with the arising of light, the visible-form-base that exists with the nature of darkness is destroyed. The primary elements that were proceeding as the support for darkness gradually come to be the support for a visible-form-base of that kind (i.e., light).' It should be understood that immediately after the cessation of darkness together with its supporting primary elements, in that same continuum, when there is such a conjunction of conditions, the arising of primary elements that support light occurs. For without supporting great elements, the arising of light is not possible; nor does the visible-form-base called darkness cease alone, because the derived material forms, which constitute a single group produced depending on those supports, cease together with them. Some say that like the flame of a lamp or the radiance of a gem, darkness continues even when separated from the earth, walls, trees, and so on. However, others say that faint darkness without a support like a wall is not clearly perceived, and that it is reasonable that dense darkness proceeds depending on a solid foundation.

620. ‘‘Amanussasaddo’’ti ettha a-kāro na manussatāmattanivattiattho sadisabhāvadīpanatāya anadhippetattā, manussato pana anaññatānivattiatthoti dassetuṃ ‘‘amanussa…pe… ṭṭhādayopī’’ti āha. Tathā kittetabboti ‘‘vaṃsaphālanasaddo’’tiādinā vatthuvasena kittetabbo.

620. Here, in the word 'amanussasadda' (non-human sound), the prefix 'a-' does not have the meaning of merely negating 'human-ness,' because indicating similarity is not intended. Rather, to show that it has the meaning of negating identity with 'human,' he says: 'amanussa...pe...ṭṭhādayopi' (non-human...etc...and so forth). 'It should be described thus' means it should be described according to its basis, as in 'the sound of bamboo splitting,' and so on.

632. Kammacittādināti ādi-saddena utuāhāre saṅgaṇhāti. Taṃtadākārānīti itthiliṅgādiākārāni. Itthindriyaṃ paṭicca samuṭṭhahantīti aññamaññapaccayānipi itthiliṅgādīni yebhuyyena itthindriyasahite eva santāne sabbhāvā itarattha ca abhāvā indriyahetukāni vuttāni. Aññathāti itthiliṅgādiākārato aññathā, itthindriyābhāve vā. Itthiggahaṇassa cāti itthīti cittappavattiyā. Tesaṃ rūpānanti itthiliṅgādiākārarūpānaṃ. Yadi itthindriyaṃ itthiliṅgādiākārarūpānaṃ sahakārīkāraṇaṃ, atha kasmā tassa indriyādipaccayabhāvo tesaṃ na vuttoti? Neva taṃ sahakārīkāraṇaṃ, atha kho tesaṃ tabbhāvabhāvitāmattena taṃ kāraṇanti vuccatīti dassetuṃ āha ‘‘yasmā panā’’tiādi.

632. 'By kamma, mind, etc.' (Kammacittādināti)—here the word 'etc.' includes climate and nutriment. 'Those respective forms' (Taṃtadākārānīti) refers to forms such as feminine characteristics, etc. 'Arising dependent on the female faculty' (Itthindriyaṃ paṭicca samuṭṭhahantīti) means that even though feminine characteristics, etc., are mutually dependent conditions, they mostly arise in a continuum associated with the female faculty, and since they are present in the one and absent in the other, they are said to be rooted in the faculty. 'Otherwise' (Aññathāti) means other than feminine characteristics, etc., or in the absence of the female faculty. 'And as to the term 'woman'' (Itthiggahaṇassa cāti) refers to the activity of consciousness as 'woman'. 'Those forms' (Tesaṃ rūpānanti) refers to the forms of feminine characteristics, etc. If the female faculty is a cooperative cause for the forms of feminine characteristics, etc., then why is its conditionality as a faculty, etc., not stated for them? It is not a cooperative cause, but rather it is called a cause merely because of its effect on their being. To explain this, he says: 'But because...'

633. Liṅgaṃ [Pg.164] parivattamānaṃ purimaliṅgādhārajātianurūpameva hutvā parivattatīti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘paṭisandhiyaṃ viya pavattepī’’ti. Yassa…pe… noti ādivacanatoti ādi-saddena ‘‘yassa vā pana purisindriyaṃ uppajjati, tassa itthindriyaṃ uppajjatīti no’’ti (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.188) saṅgaṇhāti.

633. It is said, 'just as at rebirth, so also in the course of existence,' because a changing characteristic changes only in conformity with the nature that supported the previous characteristic. The initial statement 'for one...no' (Yassa...pe...no) includes, by the word 'etc.', the statement: 'Or for one in whom the male faculty arises, does the female faculty arise?'—No (Yam. 3, Indriyayamaka.188).

635. Dvārabhāvena kucchitānaṃ āsavadhammānaṃ pavattiṭṭhānatāya pasādavisese viya viññattivisesepi kāyavohārappavatti daṭṭhabbā. Vitthambhanasabhāvatāya vāyodhātuyā thambhanaṃ ‘‘vāyodhātukicca’’nti vuttaṃ. Kiccampi hi dhammānaṃ sabhāvoyevāti. Pathavīdhātuyā ākāro vacīviññattīti vattuṃ vaṭṭatīti yojanā.

635. The occurrence of bodily expression should be seen as a special form of communication, just as in the case of special sensitivity of the senses, due to its being a doorway and a place for the arising of contemptible, cankerous states. The supporting of the air element, due to its nature of distending, is called 'the function of the air element'. For function is indeed the nature of phenomena. The interpretation is that it is fitting to say that the characteristic of the earth element is verbal intimation.

636. Vitakka…pe… gahitāti yathādhippetatthābhibyañjikāya vācāya samuṭṭhāpanādhippāyappavattiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tadā hi sā tehi pariggahitā nāma hotīti. Ekassapi akkharassa anekehi javanehi nibbattetabbattā tathā nibbattiyamānatāya asamatthasabhāvattā na viññātavisesā na bhinnā evāti āha ‘‘sava…pe… bhinnā’’ti. Abbokiṇṇeti antarantarā uppajjamānehi asaṃsaṭṭhe. ‘‘Pacchimacitta’’nti avisesena cuticittaṃ vuttanti adhippāyena ‘‘aññesampi cuticittaṃ…pe… ñāyatī’’ti vuttaṃ.

636. 'Thought... grasped' (Vitakka…pe… gahitāti) is stated with reference to the occurrence of the intention to produce speech that expresses the intended meaning. For at that time, it is indeed said to be grasped by them. Since even a single letter must be produced by multiple impulsion moments, and due to its nature of being incapable of being produced thus, it is not distinctly perceived or separated. Hence it is said: 'Sound... not separate' (sava…pe… bhinnā). 'Uninterrupted' (Abbokiṇṇeti) means unmixed with what arises in the intervals. With the intention that 'the last consciousness' (Pacchimacitta) refers generally to the death consciousness, it is said: 'For others too, the death consciousness... is known' (aññesampi cuticittaṃ…pe… ñāyatī).

Atha vā ‘‘ye ca rūpāvacaraṃ arūpāvacaraṃ upapajjitvā parinibbāyissanti, tesaṃ cavantānaṃ tesaṃ vacīsaṅkhāro nirujjhissati, no ca tesaṃ kāyasaṅkhāro nirujjhissatī’’ti (yama. 2.saṅkhārayamaka.88) rūpārūpabhavūpapajjanakānaṃ kāmāvacaracuticittassapi kāyasaṅkhārāsamuṭṭhāpanavacanena khīṇāsavehi aññesampi…pe… ñāyatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Yasmā ca –

Alternatively, it is stated: 'For those who, having been reborn in the form realm and the formless realm, will attain final Nibbāna, for them, upon passing away, verbal formation will cease, but bodily formation will not cease' (Yam. 2. Saṅkhārayamaka.88). And because the non-origination of bodily formation is mentioned even for the sense-sphere death-consciousness of those who are reborn in the form and formless realms, it is said that 'it is known... also for others than the Arahants'. And because—

‘‘Yassa kāyasaṅkhāro nirujjhati, tassa vacīsaṅkhāro nirujjhissatīti āmantā’’ti (yama. 2.saṅkhārayamaka.108),

'For whom bodily formation is ceasing, for him will verbal formation cease?'—'Yes' (Yam. 2. Saṅkhārayamaka.108),

‘‘Yassa kāyasaṅkhāro nirujjhati, tassa cittasaṅkhāro nirujjhissatīti āmantā’’ti (yama. 2.saṅkhārayamaka.108) ca,

'For whom bodily formation is ceasing, for him will mental formation cease?'—'Yes' (Yam. 2. Saṅkhārayamaka.108), and

‘‘Pacchimacittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe tesaṃ kāyasaṅkhāro ca na nirujjhati cittasaṅkhāro ca na nirujjhissatī’’ti (yama. 2.saṅkhārayamaka.113) –

'At the moment of dissolution of the final consciousness, their bodily formation is not ceasing, nor will their mental formation cease' (Yam. 2. Saṅkhārayamaka.113)—

Ādivacanato [Pg.165] ca pacchimacittassa purato soḷasamena cittena tato orimena vā saddhiṃ assāsapassāsā na uppajjantīti siddhaṃ. Yadi uppajjeyyuṃ, ‘‘pacchimacittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe tesaṃ kāyasaṅkhāro na nirujjhatī’’ti na vadeyya, vuttañcetaṃ, tasmā heṭṭhimakoṭiyā cutito purimena sattarasamena uppannā assāsapassāsā cutiyā heṭṭhā dutiyena cittena saddhiṃ nirujjhanti. Tena ‘‘yassa cittassa anantarā kāmāvacarānaṃ pacchimacittaṃ uppajjissatī’’ti cuticittassānantarapaccayabhūtassapi cittassa kāyasaṅkhārāsamuṭṭhāpanatā vuttā.

And from the initial statement, it is established that in-breaths and out-breaths do not arise together with the sixteenth consciousness moment before the final consciousness, nor with any consciousness moment prior to that. If they did arise, it would not be said, 'At the moment of dissolution of the final consciousness, their bodily formation does not cease,' but this has been stated. Therefore, the in-breaths and out-breaths that arose with the seventeenth consciousness moment before the death-consciousness at the lower end cease together with the second consciousness moment below the death-consciousness. Thus, the non-origination of bodily formation is stated even for the consciousness that is the immediately preceding condition for the final consciousness of sense-sphere beings.

Atha vā yassa cittassāti yena cittena sabbapacchimo kāyasaṅkhāro uppajjati. Taṃ cittaṃ vuttanti gahetabbaṃ, na pacchimacittassa anantarapaccayabhūtaṃ. Anantarāti hi kāyasaṅkhāruppādanaṃ antaraṃ vinā, yato pacchā kāyasaṅkhāruppādanena anantaritaṃ hutvā pacchimacittaṃ uppajjissatīti attho. Kasmā? ‘‘Itaresaṃ vacīsaṅkhāro ca nirujjhissati kāyasaṅkhāro ca nirujjhissatī’’ti (yama. 2.saṅkhārayamaka.88) vuttattā. Aññathāpacchimacittato purimatatiyacittasamaṅgīnaṃ kāyasaṅkhāro uppajjatīti āpajjatīti. Evaṃ sabbesampi cuticittassa rūpajanakatābhāve āgamaṃ dassetvā idāni yuttiṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘na hī’’tiādimāha. Tattha gabbhagamanādīti ādi-saddena udakanimuggaasaññībhūtakālakatacatutthajjhānasamāpannarūpārūpabhavasamaṅgīnirodhasamāpannabhāve saṅgaṇhāti.

Alternatively, in the phrase 'whose mind,' the mind by which the very last bodily formation arises should be understood as what is meant—not the mind that is an immediately preceding condition for the final consciousness. For 'immediately' (anantara) means without an interval for the arising of bodily formation, in the sense that the final consciousness will arise thereafter without being interrupted by the arising of bodily formation. Why? Because it is said: 'For others, verbal formation will cease, and bodily formation will cease' (Yam. 2.Saṅkhārayamaka.88). Otherwise, it would follow that bodily formation arises for those at the third consciousness-moment prior to the final consciousness. Thus, having shown by way of scriptural authority the absence of the death-consciousness's capacity to generate form in all cases, the text now states 'for not...' and so on, to show the reasoning. Here, 'entering the womb, etc.'—the word 'etc.' includes states such as being submerged in water, having become unconscious, having died, having attained the fourth jhāna, being endowed with form or formless existence, and having attained cessation.

637. Anekesaṃ kalāpānaṃ ekato hutvā ekaghanapiṇḍabhāvena pavattanato kalāpantarabhūtānaṃ kalāpantarabhūtehi samphuṭṭhabhāvo vutto. Yato tesaṃ duviññeyyanānattaṃ, na pana avinibbhuttabhāvato. Taṃtaṃbhūtavivittatāti tesaṃ tesaṃ bhūtānaṃ vibhattabhāvo kalāpantarabhūtehi vibhattasabhāvatā asaṃkiṇṇatāti attho. Yasmā pana yathāvuttā vivittatā rūpānaṃ osānaṃ hoti, tasmā ‘‘rūpapariyanto’’ti vuttaṃ. Atha vā taṃtaṃbhūtasuññatā. Yesañhi paricchedo ākāso, tesaṃ pariyantatāya tehi suññabhāvoti lakkhitabbo. Tatoyeva ca so bhūtantarehi viya tehi asamphuṭṭhoti vuccatīti. Aññathāti paricchinditabbehi asamphuṭṭhabhāvābhāve.

637. Because many clusters, having come together and become a single dense mass, proceed, the state of being touched of the elements of one cluster by the elements of another cluster is stated. This is because their diversity is difficult to discern, not because they are inseparable. 'The distinctness of each element' means the distinct state of those respective elements, their distinct nature from the elements of other clusters, their unmixedness. Since the aforementioned distinctness is the limit of forms, it is therefore called 'the limit of form.' Alternatively, it is the emptiness of each element. For of those things for which space is the delimiter, their boundary should be understood as the state of being empty of them. And for that very reason, it is said that it (space) is untouched by them (the elements of the cluster) just as it is by other elements. 'Otherwise' means in the absence of the state of being untouched by what is to be delimited.

638. Taṃtaṃvikārādhikarūpehīti [Pg.166] ettha kathaṃ cammasuvaṇṇesu mudutākammaññatā labbhanti, nanu lahutādivikārā ekantato indriyabaddharūpe eva pavattanato anindriyabaddhe na labbhantīti? Saccametaṃ, idha pana taṃsadisesu tabbohāravasena vuttaṃ. Tathā hi tūlapicuādīsu garubhāvādihetūnaṃ bhūtānaṃ adhikabhāvābhāvato lahuādivohāro. Niddisitabbadhammanissayarūpe eva vā sandhāya ‘‘taṃtaṃvikārādhikarūpehī’’ti vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Sabbe sabbesaṃ paccayā lahutādīnaṃ aññamaññāvijahanatoti adhippāyo.

638. 'Through material forms in which specific transformations are predominant'—here, how are softness and workableness found in things like leather and gold? Surely, transformations like lightness, etc., occur exclusively in material form bound to the sense faculties and are not found in material form not bound to the sense faculties? This is true, but here it is stated by way of designation in similar instances. Thus, in cotton, kapok, etc., the designation of lightness, etc., arises due to the presence or absence of a predominance of elements that are the cause of heaviness, etc. Alternatively, it should be understood that 'through material forms in which specific transformations are predominant' is said referring only to material form that is the support for the qualities to be indicated. The intention is that all are conditions for all, because lightness, etc., are mutually inseparable.

641. Ācayasaddenevāti niddese vuttaācayasaddeneva. Yo āyatanānaṃ ādicayattā ācayo punappunaṃ nibbattamānānaṃ, sova rūpassa uparicayattā upacayoti adhippetaṃ atthaṃ pāḷiyaṃ yojetvā dassetuṃ ‘‘pāḷiyaṃ panā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Upa-saddo paṭhamattho ‘‘dānaṃ, bhikkhave, paṇḍitupaññatta’’ntiādīsu (a. ni. 3.45) viya. Upariatthoca ‘‘sammaṭṭhe upasitte ca, te nisīdiṃsu maṇḍape’’tiādīsu viya. Aññathāti upa-saddassa upariatthasseva gahaṇe.

641. "By the term 'accumulation' itself" means by the term 'accumulation' stated in the explanation. That accumulation (ācaya) which, because it is the initial accumulation of the sense bases that are repeatedly arising, is itself the 'upacaya' (growth) of matter because it is a further accumulation. To show this intended meaning by connecting it with the Pāli, it is said, "but in the Pāli..." and so on. The prefix 'upa-' has the primary meaning, as in "Giving, bhikkhus, is prescribed by the wise" (Aṅguttara Nikāya 3.45), and so on. And it has the meaning of 'upper,' as in "They sat in the pavilion, well-swept and sprinkled," and so on. "Otherwise" means if only the meaning of 'upper' for the prefix 'upa-' is taken.

643. Phalavipaccanapakatiyāti phalavipaccanasabhāvena. Phalameva vā pakatīti āyusaṃhānādinā phalasabhāvena jarāniddesoti attho. Tathā hi ‘‘phalūpacārena vuttā’’ti vuttaṃ. Supariṇatarūpaparipākakāle hānidasakādīsu.

643. "By the nature of fruit-ripening" means by its fruit-ripening nature. Or, "fruit itself is the nature" means that the description of aging is by way of the nature of fruit, such as the decline of the life-span, and so on. For thus it is said, "spoken of by a metaphor of fruit." At the time of the maturing of fully ripened matter, in the decades of decline, and so on.

645. Kattabbasabhāvatoti mūlaphalādīnaṃ idhādhippetaāhāravatthūnaṃ mukhena asanādikattabbasabhāvato. Visabhūte saṅghāte ojā mandā hotīti savisattābhāvato sukhumatā vuttā. Aṅgamaṅgānusārino rasassa sāroti rasaharaṇīdhamanijālānusārena sarīrāvayave anuppaviṭṭhassa āhārarasassa abbhantarāhārapaccayo sneho, yo loke rasadhātūti vuccati.

645. "By the nature of what is to be done" means by the nature of what is to be done, such as eating through the mouth, with regard to the food items intended here, such as roots, fruits, and so on. Because "in a disparate aggregate, the nutrient becomes weak," subtlety is spoken of due to the absence of poisonousness. "The essence of the juice that follows the major and minor limbs" is the moisture—the condition for internal nutriment—of the food-juice that has entered the bodily parts following the network of juice-carrying vessels, which is called the "juice element" in the world.

Upādābhājanīyakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discourse concerning what is subject to clinging is finished.

Noupādābhājanīyakathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Discourse Concerning What Is Not Subject to Clinging

646. ‘‘Ekaṃ [Pg.167] mahābhūtaṃ paṭicca tayo mahābhūtā tayo mahābhūte paṭicca ekaṃ mahābhūta’’ntiādivacanato (paṭṭhā. 1.1.53) ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ avasesamahābhūte nissayati, tehi upādārūpena ca nissīyatīti āha ‘‘nissayati ca nissīyati cā’’ti.

646. From the statement, "Depending on one great element, the three great elements; depending on the three great elements, one great element," and so on (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.53), one great element relies on the remaining great elements, and is relied upon by them and by derived matter; thus it is said, "It relies and is relied upon."

647. Mahābhūtānaṃ aññamaññāvijahanato ekasmimpi kalāpe anekaṃ phoṭṭhabbaṃ atthīti phoṭṭhabbasabhāvesuyeva anekesupi ārammaṇesu āpāthagatesu ābhogādivasena ekaṃyeva viññāṇuppattihetu hotīti ayaṃ vicāro dassito. Itaresupi pana yathāyogaṃ dassetabbo. Tattha rasārammaṇaṃ tāva indriyanissayaṃ allīyitvā viññāṇuppattihetubhāvato satipi anekesaṃ rasānaṃ āpāthagamane ekasmiṃ khaṇe ekappakāraṃyeva yathāvuttanayena jivhāviññāṇuppattihetu hoti, tathā gandhārammaṇaṃ. Rūpasaddārammaṇāni pana indriyanissayaṃ asampatvāva viññāṇuppattihetubhāvato yogyadese avaṭṭhitāni yattakāni sahakārīpaccayantaragataṃ upakāraṃ labhanti, tattakāni ekasmiṃ khaṇe ekajjhaṃ ārammaṇaṃ na hontīti na vattabbāni. Tathā hi saddo nigghosādiko anekakalāpagato tathā vaṇṇopi sivikubbahananiyāmena ekajjhaṃ ārammaṇaṃ hotīti. Etthāpi ca ābhujitavasena ārammaṇādhimattatāvasena anekakalāpasannipātepi katthaci viññāṇuppatti hotiyeva. Pasādādhimattatā pittādivibandhābhāvena pasādassa tikkhatā. Kathaṃ pana cittassāti cittasāmaññato ekattanayavasena pucchati.

647. Due to the mutual inseparability of the great elements, there are multiple tangible objects even in a single material group. Thus, this investigation is shown: even when many objects of a tangible nature come into range, only one becomes the cause for the arising of consciousness, by way of attention and so on. This should be shown for the others as is appropriate. There, regarding the taste-object, since it becomes a cause for the arising of consciousness by adhering to the faculty support, even when many tastes come into range, at a single moment only one kind becomes the cause for the arising of tongue-consciousness, in the manner described. The same applies to the smell-object. However, since visible form-objects and sound-objects are causes for the arising of consciousness without having reached the faculty support, it cannot be said that however many of them, being established in a suitable location, receive support included among other cooperative conditions, do not become a simultaneous object at one moment. For indeed, sound, such as a loud noise, which arises from many material groups, and likewise visible form, become a simultaneous object by the principle of carrying a palanquin. Here too, by way of attending or by way of the intensity of the object, consciousness certainly arises somewhere even in the conglomeration of many material groups. The intensity of the sensitivity is the sharpness of the sensitivity due to the absence of obstructions such as bile. "But how is it with the mind?"—this is asked by way of the principle of unity, from the perspective of mind in general.

651. Tādisāyāti yā pacurajanassa atthītipi na gahitā. Santī samānā. Evanti yathāsasambhārudakaṃ sasambhārapathaviyā ābandhakaṃ, evaṃ paramatthudakaṃ paramatthapathaviyāti dasseti. Tadanurūpapaccayehīti attano ābandhanānuguṇehi ābandhiyamānehi sandhāraṇādikiccehi purimehi ca pathavīādīhi. Aphusitvā patiṭṭhā hoti, aphusitvā ābandhatīti iminā phusitabbaphusanakabhāvo āpodhātuyaṃ natthīti phoṭṭhabbavasena ubhayadhammataṃ āha. Aññamaññaṃ nissayatā aññamaññanissayatā. Atha vā [Pg.168] aññamaññatā ca nissayatā ca aññamaññanissayatā. Yadi phoṭṭhabbāphoṭṭhabbadhātūnaṃ phoṭṭhabbabhāvena vinā aññamaññanissayatā, pathavīādīnaṃ kakkhaḷādisabhāvo eva phoṭṭhabbabhāvoti tabbirahena kathaṃ tesaṃ āpodhātuyā nissayādibhāvoti āha ‘‘avinibbhogavuttīsū’’tiādi. Aññamaññapaccayabhūtesūti etena upādārūpaṃ nivatteti. Atha vā pubbe aṭṭhakathādhippāye ṭhatvā phoṭṭhabbāphoṭṭhabbadhātūnaṃ visiṭṭhaṃ aññamaññanissayataṃ vatvā idāni attano adhippāye ṭhatvā avisesena taṃ dassento āha ‘‘avinibbhogavuttīsū’’tiādi. Taṃyeva avisiṭṭhaṃ aññamaññanissayataṃ daḷhaṃ katvā dassento ‘‘nāpi sahajātesū’’tiādimāha. Tattha aphusanaṃ tāva ekakalāpagatattā na vicāretabbaṃ, phusanaṃ pana kathanti? Ekakalāpagatattā eva. Visuṃ siddhānaṃyeva hi visayamahābhūtānaṃ kāyappasādanissayabhūtesu phusanaṃ dissati.

651. "Of such a kind" means that which is not even grasped by most people as existing. Existing, they are present. "Thus" shows that just as conventional water with its components binds conventional earth with its components, so ultimate water binds ultimate earth. "By conditions suitable for that" means by the preceding earth element and so on, which are being bound and are conducive to its own binding, and by functions such as cohesion, etc. By "it is established without touching, it binds without touching," it is said that in the water element there is no state of being touchable and touching; thus he states the dual nature in terms of what is tangible. "Mutual dependence" means the state of mutual dependence. Or, "mutuality and dependence" is mutual dependence. If tangible and intangible elements have mutual dependence without a tangible nature, and since the nature of hardness, etc., of the earth element, etc., is itself a tangible nature, how can they, in the absence of that, have the state of dependence, etc., on the water element? He says, "in those that have an inseparable occurrence," etc. By "in those that are mutual conditions," he excludes derived matter. Or, having previously, standing on the intention of the commentary, stated the specific mutual dependence of tangible and intangible elements, now, standing on his own intention, he shows it without distinction, saying, "in those that have an inseparable occurrence," etc. Showing that same non-specific mutual dependence to make it firm, he says, "nor in co-arisen things," etc. There, non-touching, for its part, should not be investigated, because they are in a single material group. But how is there touching? Precisely because they are in a single material group. For touching is indeed seen only of the great elements as objects that are separately established and are the support for the bodily sensitivity.

Jhāyatīti paripaccati. Na uṇhā hutvāti etassa uṇhasabhāvā hutvāti ayamatthoti katvā ‘‘tejosabhāvataṃyeva paṭikkhipatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Uṇhapaṭipakkhattā sītassa uṇhatāya paṭikkhepe sītatāsaṅkā siyāti āha ‘‘na sītattaṃ anujānātī’’ti. Tejosabhāgataṃyeva vā sītatāyapi dassetuṃ ‘‘na sītattaṃ anujānātī’’ti vuttaṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘tejo eva hi sīta’’nti. Mande hi uṇhabhāve sītabuddhīti tejo eva hi sītaṃ. Kathaṃ panetaṃ viññāyatīti? Sītabuddhiyā avavatthitabhāvato pārāpāraṃ viya. Tathā hi ātape ṭhatvā chāyaṃ paviṭṭhānaṃ sītabuddhi hoti, tattheva pathavīgabbhato niggatānaṃ uṇhabuddhīti. Yadi tejoyeva sītaṃ, uṇhabhāvena saddhiṃ sītabhāvopi ekasmiṃ kalāpe upalabbheyyāti āha ‘‘sītuṇhānañcā’’tiādi. Uṇhasītakalāpesu sītuṇhānaṃ appavatti. Dvinnaṃ…pe… yujjati, na āpodhātuvāyodhātūnaṃ sītabhāveti adhippāyo. Āpodhātuyā hi vāyodhātuyā sītabhāve uṇhabhāvena saddhiṃ ekasmiṃ kalāpe sītabhāvo labbheyya, na pana labbhati. Na cettha āpodhātuadhike vāyodhātuadhike vā kalāpe sītabhāvoti sakkā viññātuṃ tādisepi katthaci kalāpe alabbhamānattā sītabhāvassāti. Kharatādisabhāvādhikassa bhūtasaṅghātassa davatādisabhāvādhikatāpatti bhāvaññathattaṃ. Taṃ pana yathā hoti, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘pacca…pe… ppattī’’ti āha.

"It burns" means it ripens. "Not by becoming hot": taking this to mean "not by having the nature of heat," it is said, "It rejects only the nature of heat." Because cold is the opposite of heat, when heat is rejected, a suspicion of coldness might arise; therefore, it is said, "It does not permit coldness." Or, to show that even coldness is included in the fire element, it is said, "It does not permit coldness." For that reason, it is said, "For cold is indeed fire." For when the quality of heat is mild, there is the perception of cold; thus, cold is indeed fire. But how is this to be understood? Due to the unfixed nature of the perception of cold, like the near and far shores. For instance, for those who have stood in the sun and entered the shade, there is a perception of cold; but for those who have come out from inside the earth, there is a perception of heat in that very same place. If cold were indeed fire, then the nature of cold would be found together with the nature of heat in a single material group. Thus, it is said, "And of cold and heat..." etc. In hot and cold material groups, there is no co-occurrence of cold and heat. It is fitting for the two... but the intention is that it is not so for the water element and the air element to have a cold nature. For if the water element or the air element had a cold nature, a cold nature would be found together with a hot nature in a single material group, but it is not found. And it cannot be known that there is a cold nature here in a material group where the water element or the air element is dominant, because a cold nature is not found anywhere in such a material group. The attainment of a dominance of the nature of fluidity, etc., by a material aggregate dominated by the nature of hardness, etc., is an alteration of state. To show how that occurs, it is said, "due to... attainment."

652. Ekantanacittasamuṭṭhānādīti [Pg.169] ādi-saddena ekantaanupādinnupādāniyādiṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Purimānampīti ‘‘yaṃ vā panaññampī’’ti etasmā vacanato purimānaṃ anupādinnānaṃ saddāyatanakāyaviññattiādīnaṃ nacittasamuṭṭhānānañca cakkhāyatanasotāyatanādīnaṃ. Nakammassakatattābhāvādikanti nakammassakatattābhāvaṃ nacittasamuṭṭhānabhāvanti evamādikaṃ. Ekantākammajādīsūti ādi-saddena ekantācittajaṃ gayhati. Tā jaratāaniccatā. Anekantesu na gahitāti ekantato akammajesu saddāyatanādīsu acittajesu ca cakkhāyatanādīsu gahetvā catusamuṭṭhānikattā anekantesu rūpāyatanādīsu na gahitāti attho.

652. “Of what is solely not originated by mind, etc.” – by the word “etc.”, it includes what is entirely ungrasped and graspable, etc. “Of the former as well” – from the phrase “or whatever else,” this refers to the former ungrasped phenomena, such as the sound-base, bodily intimation, etc., and those not originated by mind, such as the eye-base, ear-base, etc. “Because they are not of the nature of being owned by kamma, etc.” – this means they are not of the nature of being owned by kamma, nor of the nature of being originated by mind, and so on. “In what is solely not produced by kamma, etc.” – by the word “etc.”, what is solely not produced by mind is included. Those are aging and impermanence. “Not included in the indefinite” – the meaning is that having included what is solely not produced by kamma, such as the sound-base, etc., and what is not produced by mind, such as the eye-base, etc., it is not included among the indefinite—such as the form-base, etc.—because they have four origins.

666. Anipphannattāti aññaṃ anapekkhitvā sabhāvato asiddhattaṃ. Tassāti viññattidvayassa.

666. “Due to not being produced” means the state of not being established by its own nature, without depending on another. “Of that” refers to the two kinds of intimation.

Noupādābhājanīyakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of the discourse on what is not suitable for clinging is concluded.

Dukaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Dyads is concluded.

Catukkaniddesavaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Tetrads

966. ‘‘Sabbaṃ rūpaṃ manasā viññāta’’nti vacanato yadi viññātato aññaṃ diṭṭhādi na hotīti ‘‘katamaṃ taṃ rūpaṃ diṭṭha’’ntiādinā pucchā na katā, evaṃ sante catukkabhāvo kathanti anuyogaṃ manasi katvā āha ‘‘dassanādiggahaṇavisesato’’ti. Dassanaṃ savanaṃ minitvā jānanaṃ vijānanañcāti etasmā dassanādiggahaṇavisesato. Etena gāhakabhedena gahetabbabhedoti dasseti. Idāni samukhenapi gahetabbabhedo labbhatīti dassetuṃ ‘‘diṭṭhā…pe… bhāvato’’ti vuttaṃ.

966. “All form is cognized by the mind”—if, according to this statement, nothing is seen, etc., apart from what is cognized, then the question “Which form is seen?” etc., would not have been asked. Having kept in mind the objection, “How then is there a fourfold nature?” it is said, “due to the distinction in the apprehension of seeing, etc.” Seeing, hearing, knowing by measuring, and discerning—from this comes the distinction in the apprehension of seeing, etc. By this, it shows the distinction in what is to be apprehended based on the difference in the apprehender. Now, to demonstrate that a distinction in what is to be apprehended can also be obtained directly, it is said, “seen… up to… the state of being.”

Pañcakaniddesavaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Pentads

969. Tadidaṃ nayakaraṇaṃ chabbidhādīsu tīsu saṅgahesu yojitaṃ.

969. This method of analysis is applied to the three collections, such as the sixfold, etc.

Pakiṇṇakakathāvaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Miscellaneous Discourse

975. Ekantato nīvaraṇattā middhassa ‘‘natthi nīvaraṇā’’ti vacanena gahaṇanti dassetuṃ ‘‘middhassapi nīvaraṇassā’’ti vuttaṃ. Na ca rūpaṃ pahātabbaṃ nippariyāyappahānassa idha [Pg.170] adhippetattā. Ettha keci ‘‘nāmakāyarūpakāyagelaññasabhāvato duvidhaṃ middhaṃ. Tattha purimaṃ ‘nīvaraṇā’ti vacanena vuttaṃ, itaraṃ rūpasabhāva’’nti vadanti. Tattha yaṃ taṃ arūpato aññaṃ middhaṃ parikappitaṃ, tampi nīvaraṇaṃ middhasabhāvato itaraṃ middhaṃ viyāti parikappitamiddhassapi na sakkā nīvaraṇabhāvaṃ nivattetunti tesaṃ vacanassa nīvaraṇappahānavacanena virodhaṃ dassento ‘‘na ca rūpakāya’’ntiādimāha. Atha vā khīṇāsavānaṃ soppanasabhāvato soppassa ca middhahetukattā atthi middharūpanti vādaṃ sandhāya uttaramāha ‘‘na ca rūpakāyagelañña’’ntiādinā. Tattha middhameva soppahetūti nāyaṃ avadhāraṇā icchitā, soppahetu eva middhanti pana icchitāti middhato aññopi soppahetu atthi, ko pana so? Rūpakāyagelaññaṃ. Na ca rūpa…pe… vacanatoti yojanā daṭṭhabbā.

975. To show that sloth, being entirely a hindrance, is included by the statement “there are no hindrances,” it is said, “sloth too is a hindrance.” And form is not to be abandoned, because absolute abandonment is intended here. On this, some say, “Sloth is of two kinds due to the nature of ailment in the mental and physical bodies. The former is spoken of by the word ‘hindrance,’ while the latter is of the nature of form.” Regarding this, even that sloth conceived as other than the formless is still a hindrance due to its nature of sloth, just like the other sloth. Thus, it is not possible to deny the nature of a hindrance for even the conceived sloth. Showing the contradiction of their statement with the statement on abandoning hindrances, it is said, “and not the physical body,” etc. Alternatively, with reference to the view that because the consummated ones have a nature of sleepiness, and because sleepiness has sloth as its cause, there is a ‘sloth-form,’ the reply is given: “and not the ailment of the physical body,” etc. Here, the exclusive determination ‘sloth alone is the cause of sleepiness’ is not intended, but rather ‘sleepiness has sloth as its cause’ is intended. Thus, there is another cause of sleepiness apart from sloth. What is it? The ailment of the physical body. The connection should be understood as: “And not form… up to the statement.”

Vacīghosādīti ādi-saddena huṃkārādisaddo saṅgayhati. Aṅguliphoṭādisaddo utusamuṭṭhānoyeva, cittapaccayo pana hoti. Rūpabhāvamattānīti jarāmaraṇasabhāvānaṃ rūpānaṃ taṃdhammamattāni, tato eva na jātiādidhammavantānīti āha ‘‘na sayaṃ sabhāvavantānī’’ti. Yathā jarā aniccatā ca rūpabhāvamattaṃ, evaṃ jātipīti jātiyā rūpabhāvamattatāya upasaṃharaṇattho tathā-saddo.

“Noise of speech,” etc.—here, the term “etc.” includes sounds like humming, etc. Sounds such as snapping the fingers arise solely from temperature, but they also have mind as a condition. “Merely the nature of form”—this refers to forms whose nature is aging and death, being merely of that nature, and therefore not possessing the nature of birth, etc. Hence, it is said, “not possessing a nature by themselves.” Just as aging and impermanence are merely the nature of form, so too is birth—the word “so” is used for the purpose of concluding that birth also has merely the nature of form.

Tesaṃ rūpadhammānaṃ. Saṅkhātādi-saddo viya abhinibbattita-saddopi vattamānakālikopi hotīti ‘‘abhinibbattiyamānadhammakkhaṇasmi’’nti vuttaṃ. Evamapīti yadipi jiraṇabhijjanabhāvā jiraṇādisabhāvānaṃ dhammānaṃ janakapaccayakiccānubhāvakkhaṇe abhāvato tappaccayabhāvavohāraṃ abhinibbattivohārañca na labhanti, evamapi tesaṃ upādinnatā vattabbāti sambandho. ‘‘Jarāmaraṇaṃ paṭiccasamuppanna’’nti vacanato tassa pariyāyataṃ vivarati ‘‘tesaṃ uppāde satī’’tiādinā.

Of those material phenomena. Just as the word ‘designated,’ etc., so too the word ‘produced’ also occurs in the present tense; hence it is said, “at the moment of a phenomenon being produced.” Even so—even though, because the states of aging and breaking are absent at the moment of experiencing the function of a generative condition for phenomena whose nature is aging, etc., they do not obtain the conventional designation of being a condition for that or the conventional designation of production—even so, their state of being clung-to must be stated. This is the connection. Because of the statement “aging-and-death is dependently arisen,” its indirect meaning is explained by “when there is their arising,” etc.

Yadi evanti yadi nissayapaṭibaddhavuttikā jātiādayo, evaṃ sati. ‘‘Mahābhūtānaṃ upādāyarūpa’’nti vacanato bhūtanissitesu kevalo upādāyavohāroti upādāye nissitāpi aparena upādāya-saddena visesetvā vattabbāti adhippāyena ‘‘upādāyupādāyabhāvo āpajjatī’’ti āha. Kāraṇakāraṇepi kāraṇe viya vohāro hoti [Pg.171] ‘‘corehi gāmo daḍḍho’’ti yathāti dassento ‘‘bhūta…pe… ttanato’’ti āha. Idāni paramparā vinā nippariyāyato uppādādīnaṃ bhūtapaṭibaddhabhāvaṃ saha nidassanena dassetuṃ ‘‘api cā’’tiādimavoca. Vikāraparicchedāpi upādāyarūpavikārādibhāve bhūtapaṭibaddhabhāvāvinivattito ekasmiṃ kalāpe ekekāva vikārādayoti jīvitindriyaṃ viya kalāpānupālakaṃ kalāpavikārādibhāvato ca ‘‘upādāyarūpāni’’icceva vuccantīti āha ‘‘evaṃ vikā…pe… yojetabbānī’’ti.

If it is so—if birth and so on have a dependent mode of occurrence, then it is so. From the statement “derived materiality of the great elements,” the conventional designation of “derived” applies only to what is dependent on the elements; therefore, with the intention that even what is dependent on the derived should be specified by another word ‘derived,’ it is said, “the state of being derived from the derived occurs.” To illustrate that even for the cause of a cause, the conventional designation is like that for a cause, as in “the village was burned by thieves,” it is said, “due to being elements… up to the extent.” Now, to show, along with an example, the connection of arising, etc., to the elements directly, without any intervening sequence, it was said, “furthermore,” etc. The alterations and delimitations also, since their connection to the elements is inseparable from their state as alterations, etc., of derived materiality, and since in a single group there is only one of each, such as alteration, etc., and because, like the life faculty which maintains the group, they are states of alteration, etc., of the group and are thus called “derived materiality”—it is said, “thus the alterations… should be connected.”

Asaṅkhatabhāvanivāraṇatthaṃ parinipphannatā vuttāti idaṃ aparinipphannasabhāvavato anupalabbhamānatāya sasavisāṇaṃ viya kenaci na saṅkhatanti asaṅkhataṃ nāma siyāti imissā āsaṅkāya nivattanavasena vuttaṃ. Atha vā rūpavikārādibhāvato rūpabhāvo viya rūpe sati santi, asati na santīti siddhāya paṭiccasamuppannatāya sādhitā parinipphannatā tesaṃ saṅkhatabhāvaṃ sādhentī asaṅkhatabhāvaṃ nivāraṇatthaṃ jāyatīti vuttaṃ ‘‘asaṅkhatabhāvanivāraṇatthaṃ parinipphannatā vuttā’’ti.

The nature of being fully formed is stated to prevent the notion of the unconditioned. This is said in order to dispel the doubt that, since what is not fully formed is unapprehensible in its nature, like a rabbit’s horn, something called unconditioned, not conditioned by anyone, might exist. Alternatively, just as the state of form exists when there are alterations of form, etc., and does not exist when there are none, so the fully formed nature, proven by their established dependent origination, proves their conditioned nature and thus serves to prevent the notion of the unconditioned. Hence it is said, “the nature of being fully formed is stated to prevent the notion of the unconditioned.”

Pakiṇṇakakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Miscellaneous Discourse is concluded.

Rūpakaṇḍavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Section on Form is concluded.

3. Nikkhepakaṇḍaṃ

3. The Section on Deposition

Tikanikkhepakathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Triple Deposition

985. Yathāvuttaphassapañcamakādirāsikiccarahitattā [Pg.172] keci dhamme visuṃ ṭhapetvā sovacassatādiavuttavisesasaṅgaṇhanatthañca, veneyyajjhāsayavasena vā chandādayo ‘‘yevāpanā’’ti vuttāti yevāpanakānaṃ paduddhārena niddesānarahatāya kāraṇaṃ vuttanti hadayavatthussa tathā niddesānarahatāya kāraṇaṃ vadanto ‘‘sukhumupā…pe… hitassā’’ti āha. Sukhumabhāvepi indriyādisabhāvāni upādāyarūpāni ādhipaccādivasena pākaṭāni honti, na ataṃsabhāvaṃ sukhumupādāyarūpanti hadayavatthussa paduddhārena kusalattikapadabhājane niddesānarahatā vuttā. Sukhumabhāvatoyeva hi taṃ mahāpakaraṇepi ‘‘yaṃ rūpaṃ nissāya manodhātu ca manoviññāṇadhātu ca vattantī’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.8) nissitadhammamukhena dassitanti. Veneyyajjhāsayavasena vā hadayavatthu paduddhārena na dassitanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yena pana adhippāyena rūpakaṇḍe hadayavatthu duvidhena rūpasaṅgahādīsu na vuttaṃ, so rūpakaṇḍavaṇṇanāya vibhāvito evāti. Nikkhipitvāti padassa pakkhipitvāti atthoti adhippāyena ‘‘vitthāradesanaṃ antogadhaṃ katvā’’ti vuttaṃ. Mūlādivasena hi desitā kusalādidhammā taṃtaṃcittuppādādivasenapi desitā eva nāma honti taṃsabhāvānativattanatoti.

985. Because certain phenomena, such as the group of five beginning with contact, are devoid of the function of a group as previously stated, and also to include special unmentioned qualities like amenability to admonition, or because desire and so forth are stated as ‘yevāpanā’ (supplementary) according to the disposition of the individuals to be trained—thus, the reason for the unsuitability of an exposition by enumeration of the ‘yevāpanaka’ terms is stated. Similarly, stating the reason for the unsuitability of such an exposition for the heart-base, it is said: “subtle derived… beneficial.” Even in their subtle state, derived material phenomena such as the faculties become evident through predominance and so on, but the heart-base is not a subtle derived material phenomenon of such a nature. Therefore, the unsuitability of an exposition by enumeration for the heart-base in the classification of terms of the wholesome triad is stated. Indeed, precisely because of its subtlety, even in the Great Treatise it is shown by way of the dependent phenomenon as: “that material form depending on which the mind-element and the mind-consciousness-element operate” (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.8). Alternatively, it should be understood that the heart-base is not shown by enumeration due to the disposition of the individuals to be trained. The intention with which the heart-base was not mentioned in the Rūpakaṇḍa in the twofold classification of material phenomena and so on has been clarified in the commentary on the Rūpakaṇḍa itself. The meaning of the term ‘nikkhipitvā’ (having set aside) is ‘pakkhipitvā’ (having included); with this intention, it is said: “having included the detailed exposition within.” For wholesome and other phenomena taught by way of roots and so on are also considered taught by way of the arising of their respective consciousnesses and so on, because they do not transcend that intrinsic nature.

Mūlavasenāti suppatiṭṭhitabhāvasādhanavasena. Etāni hetupadādīni hinoti phalaṃ etasmā pavattatīti hetu, paṭicca etasmā etīti paccayo, janetīti janako, nibbattetīti nibbattakoti sesānaṃ vacanattho. ‘‘Mūlaṭṭhassa…pe… vutta’’nti kasmā vuttaṃ, nanu ‘‘pīḷanaṭṭho’’tiādīsu viya mūlabhāvo mūlaṭṭho, tīṇi kusalamūlānīti ayañca mūlato nikkhepoti? Na, mūlassa attho mūlaṭṭho, so eva mūlaṭṭhoti suppatiṭṭhitabhāvasādhanaṭṭhena mūlasabhāvānaṃ alobhādidhammānaṃ kusaladhammesu kiccavisesassa adhippetattā. Tenevāha ‘‘atthoti dhammakicca’’nti. Atha vā atthavasenāti ‘‘tīṇi kusalamūlānī’’ti vuttānaṃ tesaṃ mūlānaṃ sabhāvasaṅkhātaatthavasena, na gāthāya vuttaatthavasena. Yasmā [Pg.173] pana so mūlaṭṭhoyeva ca hoti, tasmā vuttaṃ ‘‘alobhādīna’’ntiādi. Alobhādayo viya vedanākkhandhādayopi adhikatattā taṃ-saddena paṭiniddisitabbāti vuttaṃ ‘‘te kusalamūlā taṃsampayuttā’’ti. Tehi alobhādīhīti ettha ādi-saddena vā vedanākkhandhādayopi saṅgahitāti dassetuṃ ‘‘te kusalamūlā taṃsampayuttā’’ti vuttaṃ.

‘By way of root’ means by way of establishing a firm foundation. The meaning of the remaining terms, such as ‘cause’ (hetu), ‘condition’ (paccayo), ‘generator’ (janako), and ‘producer’ (nibbattako), is as follows: ‘cause’ because it impels, the result proceeds from it; ‘condition’ because dependent on it, it comes to be; ‘generator’ because it generates; and ‘producer’ because it brings forth. Why was it said, “The meaning of root… mentioned”? Is it not that, as in cases like “the meaning of oppression,” the state of being a root is the meaning of root? And is this not an exposition from the root regarding the ‘three wholesome roots’? No. The meaning of ‘root’ is the root-meaning, and it is the root-meaning because a specific function of the phenomena of non-greed and so on—which have the nature of roots—is intended within wholesome phenomena, in the sense of establishing a firm foundation. Therefore, it is said: “The meaning is the function of the phenomenon.” Alternatively, ‘by way of meaning’ means by way of the meaning which is the intrinsic nature of those roots mentioned as the “three wholesome roots,” not by way of the meaning stated in the verse. But since that is indeed the very meaning of root, it is said, “of non-greed and so on.” Just as non-greed and so on, the aggregates of feeling and so on are also under consideration; therefore, they should be referred to by the word ‘that’ (taṃ). Thus it is said, “those wholesome roots and what is associated with them.” Alternatively, to show that in the phrase ‘by those, non-greed and so on,’ the aggregates of feeling and so on are also included by the word ‘and so on’ (ādi), it is said: “those wholesome roots and what is associated with them.”

‘‘Katame dhammā kusalā’’ti pucchitvā phassādibhedato cattāro khandhe dassetvā ‘‘ime dhammā kusalā’’ti (dha. sa. 1) vuttatā khandhā ca kusalanti vuttaṃ ‘‘khandhehi sabhāvato kusale pariyādiyatī’’ti. Vedanākkhandho vāti kusalaṃ…pe… viññāṇakkhandho vāti. Aññassa attano phalassa. Mūlehi kusalānaṃ anavajjatāya hetuṃ dassetīti idaṃ na mūlānaṃ kusalassa anavajjabhāvasādhakattā vuttaṃ, atha kho tassa anavajjatāya suppatiṭṭhitabhāvasādhakattā. Yadi hi mūlehi kato kusalānaṃ anavajjabhāvo bhaveyya, taṃsamuṭṭhānarūpassapi so bhaveyya, mūlānaṃ vā tesaṃ paccayabhāvo na siyā, hoti ca so. Vuttañhetaṃ ‘‘hetū hetu…pe… paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.1.). Kiñca bhiyyo kusalānaṃ viya akusalābyākatānampi tabbhāvo mūlapaṭibaddho bhaveyya, tathā sati ahetukānaṃ akusalābyākatānaṃ tabbhāvo na siyā, tasmā kusalādīnaṃ yonisomanasikārādipaṭibaddho kusalādibhāvo, na mūlapaṭibaddho, mūlāni pana kusalādīnaṃ suppatiṭṭhitabhāvasādhanānīti veditabbaṃ. Sahetukā hi dhammā viruḷhamūlā viya pādapā suppatiṭṭhitā thirā honti, na tathā ahetukāti. Taṃsampayogakataṃ anavajjasabhāvanti idampi na anavajjasabhāvassa taṃsampayogena nipphāditattā vuttaṃ, anavajjasabhāvaṃ pana visesetvā dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Alobhādisampayogato hi kusalādīnaṃ khandhānaṃ anavajjabhāvo suppatiṭṭhito jāyati, na ahetukābyākatānaṃ viya na suppatiṭṭhitoti. Yadi evaṃ na tesaṃ khandhānaṃ kusalādibhāvo dassito siyā? Na, adhikārato kusalabhāvassa viññāyamānattā. Kamma-saddo viya vipākadhammatāvācino na mūlakkhandhasaddā, so ca idha avisesato vuttoti āha ‘‘kammehi sukhavipākataṃ dassetī’’ti. Ādikalyāṇataṃ kusalānaṃ [Pg.174] dassetīti yojanā. Anavajjahetusabhāvasukhavipākabhāvanidānādisampattiyo daṭṭhabbā, yonisomanasikāraavajjapaṭipakkhatāiṭṭhavipākatāvasenapi nidānādisampattiyo yojetabbā. Yonisomanasikārato hi kusalā alobhādimūlakā, alobhādisampayogato ca lobhādipaṭipakkhasukhavipākāva jātāti.

Having asked, “Which phenomena are wholesome?” and having shown the four aggregates, distinguished by contact and so forth, it is said, “These phenomena are wholesome” (Dhs. 1). Because this was said, it is stated that the aggregates are also wholesome: “the wholesome is encompassed by the aggregates in terms of their intrinsic nature.” Or, is the feeling aggregate wholesome?... or, is the consciousness aggregate wholesome? Of another, of oneself, of the fruit. To show the cause for the blamelessness of wholesome states by their roots—this is not said because the roots establish the blamelessness of the wholesome, but rather because they establish its firm foundation. For if the blamelessness of wholesome states were produced by the roots, then that would also apply to the material form arising from them, or the roots would not be their condition—but they are. As it is said, “Root is a condition…” (Paṭṭh. 1.1.1). Moreover, if the nature of unwholesome and indeterminate phenomena, like that of wholesome phenomena, were dependent on roots, then the rootless unwholesome and indeterminate phenomena would not have that nature. Therefore, the wholesome nature and so on is dependent on wise attention and the like, not on roots. However, the roots should be understood as establishing the firm foundation of the wholesome nature and so on. For phenomena with roots, like trees with established roots, are firmly founded and steady, but not so those without roots. “The blameless nature created by association with them”—this too is not said because the blameless nature is produced by that association, but to highlight the blameless nature. For through association with non-greed and the like, the blamelessness of the wholesome aggregates and so on arises as firmly established, not un-firmly established like that of the rootless indeterminate phenomena. If so, would the wholesome nature of those aggregates not be shown? No, because the wholesome nature is understood from the context. The words for ‘root’ and ‘aggregate’ are not denotative of the nature of resultant phenomena, unlike the word ‘kamma’. And that [kamma] is spoken of here without distinction, thus it is said: “It shows the pleasant result of kamma.” The connection is: it shows the initial excellence of the wholesome. The attainments of a blameless causal nature, a pleasant resultant nature, an origin, and so on should be seen. The attainments of origin and so on should also be connected by way of wise attention, being the opposite of what is blameworthy, and having a desirable result. For from wise attention, wholesome states are rooted in non-greed and so on, and from association with non-greed and so on, they are born as a pleasant result which is the opposite of greed and so on.

986. ‘‘Kasmā vutta’’nti anuyuñjitvā codako ‘‘nanū’’tiādinā attano adhippāyaṃ vivarati. Itaro yathāvuttamohassa idha sampayutta-saddena avuccamānataṃ ‘‘saccameta’’nti sampaṭicchitvā ‘‘tenā’’tiādinā parihāramāha. Tassattho – ‘‘taṃsampayuttā’’tipadena kiñcāpi yathāvuttamoho padhānabhāvena na gahito, nānantariyakatāya pana guṇabhāvena gahitoti. Aññattha abhāvāti yathāvuttasampayuttato aññattha abhāvā. Na hi vicikicchuddhaccasahagato moho vicikicchuddhaccādidhammehi vinā hotīti.

986. Having questioned, “Why is it said?” the questioner clarifies his own intention with “Is it not?” and so on. The other, acknowledging with “That is true” that the aforesaid delusion is not expressed here by the word “associated,” states the resolution with “Therefore,” and so on. The meaning is this: Although by the term “associated with that,” the aforesaid delusion is not taken in a primary sense, it is nevertheless taken in a secondary sense due to its inseparability. “Absence elsewhere” means its absence elsewhere apart from the aforesaid association. For delusion accompanied by doubt and agitation does not occur without the phenomena of doubt, agitation, and so on.

987. Uppādādisaṅkhatalakkhaṇavinivattanatthaṃ ‘‘aniccadukkhaanattatā’’ti vuttaṃ. Uppādādayo pana tadavatthadhammavikārabhāvato taṃtaṃdhammaggahaṇena gahitāyeva. Tathā hi vuttaṃ ‘‘jarāmaraṇaṃ dvīhi khandhehi saṅgahita’’nti (dhātu. 71), ‘‘rūpassa upacayo’’ti ca ādi. Kesakumbhādi sabbaṃ nāmaṃ nāmapaññatti, rūpavedanādiupādānā brahmavihārādigocarā upādāpaññatti sattapaññatti, taṃtaṃbhūtanimittaṃ bhāvanāvisesañca upādāya gahetabbo jhānagocaraviseso kasiṇapaññatti. Paramatthe amuñcitvā vohariyamānāti iminā vihāramañcādipaññattīnaṃ sattapaññattisadisataṃ dasseti, yato tā sattapaññattiggahaṇena gayhanti. Hutvā abhāvapaṭipīḷanaavasavattanākārabhāvato saṅkhatadhammānaṃ ākārabhāvato saṅkhatadhammānaṃ ākāravisesabhūtāni lakkhaṇāni viññattiādayo viya vattabbāni siyuṃ, tāni pana nissayānapekkhaṃ na labbhantīti paññattisabhāvāneva tajjāpaññattibhāvatoti na vuttāni, sattaghaṭādito visesadassanatthaṃ pana aṭṭhakathāyaṃ visuṃ vuttānīti. Na hi ko…pe… vattuṃ yuttaṃ kusalattikassa nippadesattā.

987. The terms 'impermanence, suffering, and non-self' are stated to signify the turning away from the conditioned characteristics, such as arising and so on. Arising and the like, however, are grasped through the apprehension of those particular phenomena, because they are an alteration of the state of those phenomena. Thus, it is said: 'Aging and death are included in two aggregates' (Dhātuk. 71), and 'the accumulation of form,' and so on. All names, such as hair and pots, are name-concepts (nāmapaññatti). The concept of a being (sattapaññatti) is a derivative concept (upādāpaññatti) based on clinging to form, feeling, and so on, and having the divine abodes and so on as its object. The kasiṇa-concept is a particular object of jhāna, to be grasped by depending on the respective elemental signs and distinctions in meditation. By the phrase 'being conventionally designated without abandoning the ultimate realities,' it is shown that concepts such as 'monastery' and 'bed' are similar to the concept of a being, since they are grasped through the grasping of the concept of a being. Because they are modes of being oppressed by non-existence after having come to be, and of not being under one's control, the characteristics of conditioned phenomena, being particular modes of conditioned phenomena, could be spoken of like intimation and so on. However, since they are not found independently of a basis, they are of a conceptual nature, and because they are concepts produced from those realities, they are not stated. But for the purpose of showing the distinction from beings, pots, and so on, they are stated separately in the commentary. For indeed, it is not proper to say... because the wholesome triad is without remainder.

988. Bhavati etthāti bhūmi, nissayapaccayabhāvato sukhassa bhūmi sukhabhūmi. Sukhavedanāsahitaṃ cittaṃ. Tassa bhūmibhedena niddhāraṇatthaṃ taṃnissayabhūtā [Pg.175] sampayuttadhammā ‘‘kāmāvacare’’ti vuttā. Tassa vā ekadesabhūtassa samudāyabhāvato ādhāraṇabhāvena apekkhitvā taṃsamānabhūmi ‘‘kāmāvacare’’ti vuttā. Tattha ‘‘sukhabhūmiyaṃ kāmāvacare’’ti dvepi bhummavacanāni bhinnādhikaraṇabhāvena aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttānīti ubhayesampi samānādhikaraṇabhāvena atthayogaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘sukhabhūmīti kāmāvacarādayopi yujjantī’’ti vuttaṃ. Yatheva hi cittaṃ, evaṃ sabbepi parittasukhena sampayuttā dhammā tassa nissayabhāvato bhūmi kāmāvacarāti. Aṭṭhakathāyampi vā ayamattho vuttoyevāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. ‘‘Citta’’nti hi cittuppādopi vuccati. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘cittaṃ uppannanti ettha cittameva aggahetvā paropaṇṇāsakusaladhammehi saddhiṃyeva cittaṃ gahita’’nti. Evañca katvāti sukhabhūmiyanti cittuppādassa viññāyamānattā. Vibhāgadassanaṃ visesadassanaṃ. Bhāsitabbaṃ bhāsitaṃ, tadeva atthoti bhāsitattho. Abhidheyyattho. Tadatthaviññāpanenāti tikadukānaṃ kucchitānaṃ salanādiatthadīpakena.

988. It exists therein, thus it is a plane (bhūmi); because it is the condition of support for happiness, the plane of happiness is the happy plane. It is the mind accompanied by pleasant feeling. To determine its distinction of planes, the associated states that are its basis are called 'of the sensuous sphere.' Or, considering it as a collective, being a part of it, and as a receptacle, that similar plane is called 'of the sensuous sphere.' Here, the two locative terms 'in the happy plane' and 'in the sensuous sphere' are stated in the commentary as having different referents. To show the connection of meaning by treating both as having the same referent, it is said, 'The happy plane is applicable even to the sensuous sphere and so on.' For just as the mind is, so too all states associated with limited happiness are, by virtue of being its basis, the sensuous sphere. Or, this meaning should be understood as already stated in the commentary. For 'mind' also refers to the arising of mind. Therefore it is said, 'When it is said "mind has arisen," here the mind is taken not by itself, but together with the fifty-five wholesome states.' And thus, because the arising of mind is understood by the phrase 'in the happy plane.' Showing division is showing distinction. What should be spoken is the spoken; that itself is the meaning, hence the spoken meaning. The denotative meaning. 'By making known that meaning' means: by being a lamp for the meaning of the contemptible triads and dyads, such as 'salana,' etc.

994. Ko pana vādo khandhārammaṇassāti pubbāparabhāvena vattamāne arahato khandhe ekattanayavasena santānato ‘‘amhākaṃ mātulatthero’’tiādinā ālambitvā pavattamānaṃ upādānaṃ tassa upādānakkhandheyeva gaṇhāti. Satipi taṃsantatipariyāpanne lokuttarakkhandhe tattha pavattituṃ asamatthabhāvato kā pana kathā khandhe ārabbha pavattamāne. Etena natthi maggo visuddhiyā, natthi nibbānanti evamādivasena pavattā micchādiṭṭhiādayo na maggādivisayā taṃtaṃpaññattivisayāti dīpitaṃ hoti.

994. What then is to be said of the aggregates as object? Clinging, which arises by taking as its object the aggregates of an Arahant that occur in sequence—apprehending them as a unity by way of continuity, as in 'our maternal uncle, the elder' and so on—grasps only the aggregates subject to clinging of that person himself. Even though there are supramundane aggregates included in that Arahant's continuum, since clinging is incapable of arising with respect to them, what need be said of it arising in relation to those aggregates? By this it is shown that wrong views and the like, which arise in such ways as 'there is no path to purification, there is no Nibbāna,' do not have the path and so on as their object, but have those particular concepts as their object.

998. Evaṃ saṃ…pe… lesikāti anupādāniyehi asaṃkilesikānaṃ bhedābhāvamāha.

998. Thus, ... 'non-defiling'—this states the absence of a distinction between that which is not subject to clinging and that which is non-defiling.

1006. Avijjamāno ca so niccādivipariyāsākāro cāti avi…pe… sākāroti padacchedo. Diṭṭhiyā niccādiavijjamānākārena gayhamānattepi na tadākāro viya paramatthato avijjamāno, atha kho vijjamāno [Pg.176] kāyo sakkāyoti avijjamānaniccādivipariyāsākārato visesananti lokuttarā na idaṃ visesanaṃ arahanti ‘‘santo vijjamāno kāyo sakkāyo’’ti. Vatthu avisesitaṃ hotīti idaṃ ‘‘satī kāye’’ti ettha kāya-saddo samūhatthatāya anāmasitavisesaṃ khandhapañcakaṃ vadatīti adhippāyena vuttaṃ. Pasādakāyo viya kucchitānaṃ rāgādīnaṃ uppattiṭṭhānatāya kāyoti vuccatīti evaṃ pana atthe sati diṭṭhiyā vatthu visesitameva hotīti lokuttarāpi apanītā. Na hi lokuttarā khandhā uppattiṭṭhānatāya ‘‘kāyo’’ti vuccantīti. Suddhiyā ahetubhūtenāti gosīlādinā, lokiyasīlena vā lokuttarasīlassa apadaṭṭhānena. ‘‘Avītikkamanīyatāsatataṃcaritabbatāhi vā sīlaṃ, tapocaraṇabhāvena samādinnatāya vataṃ. Attano gavādibhāvādhiṭṭhānaṃ sīlaṃ, gacchantoyeva bhakkhanādigavādikiriyākaraṇaṃ vataṃ. Akattabbābhimatato nivattanaṃ vā sīlaṃ, taṃsamādānavato vesabhojanakiccacaraṇādivisesapaṭipatti vata’’nti ca sīlabbatānaṃ visesaṃ vadanti.

1006. And that it is a non-existent mode, the perversion of permanence, and so on—this is the word division 'avi...sākāro.' Although it is grasped by wrong view as a non-existent mode of permanence and so on, it is not, like that mode, non-existent in an ultimate sense; rather, the existing body is the identity-body (sakkāya). This is a distinction from the non-existent mode of the perversion of permanence, and so on; hence, the supramundane states do not warrant this qualifier, 'the real, existing body is the identity-body.' 'The object is unspecified'—this is said with the intention that in the phrase 'when there is a body' (satī kāye), the word 'body,' by virtue of its meaning as a collection, refers to the five aggregates without specifying a particular one. However, when the meaning is that it is called 'body' because, like the sensitive body, it is a place for the arising of contemptible states such as passion, then the object for the wrong view is indeed specified, and thus the supramundane states are excluded. For the supramundane aggregates are not called 'body' in the sense of being a place of arising. 'By what is not a cause for purity' means: by the morality of a cow and so on, or by mundane morality, which is not a proximate cause for supramundane morality. They also state the distinction between morality (sīla) and observance (vata) thus: 'Morality is non-transgression and constant practice; an observance is undertaken as an ascetic practice. Morality is the resolution to be like a cow, etc.; observance is the performance of the actions of a cow, such as eating while walking. Or, morality is refraining from what is considered not to be done; observance is the special practice of one who has undertaken it, such as the duty of eating at the wrong time, and so on.'

1007. Imassuppādā idaṃ uppajjatīti uppādoti na jananamattaṃ adhippetaṃ, atha kho anirodhopīti ‘‘avighātaṃ janasaddo vadatī’’ti āha. Tatthāyaṃ jana-sadde nayo, janitāti janā, avihatāti attho. Puthū janā etesanti puthujjanāti puthusatthumānino sattā. Abhisaṅkharaṇādiattho vā jana-saddo anekatthattā dhātūnaṃ. Khandhāyatanādīnaṃ savanādhīnattā paññācakkhupaṭilābhassa tesaṃ savanābhāvadīpakaṃ ‘‘assutavā’’ti idaṃ padaṃ andhataṃ vadati.

1007. In the phrase 'With the arising of this, this arises,' 'arising' (uppāda) is not intended to mean merely generation, but also non-cessation. Thus, it is said: 'The word 'jana' signifies non-destruction.' Herein is the method regarding the word 'jana': 'janitā' means 'janā' (people), the meaning being 'unharmed.' They are 'puthujjanā' (ordinary people) because many people (puthū janā) are theirs, meaning beings who revere many different teachers. Or, the word 'jana' has the meaning of volitional formation and so on, due to the diverse meanings of roots. Because the attainment of the eye of wisdom is dependent on hearing about the aggregates, sense bases, and so on, the word 'assutavā' (uninstructed), by indicating their lack of hearing, speaks of their blindness.

Kataṃ jānantīti attanā parehi ca kataṃ kusalākusalaṃ tehi nipphāditaṃ sukhadukkhaṃ yāthāvato jānanti. Paresaṃ attanā, attano ca parehi kataṃ upakāraṃ yathāvuttākārena pākaṭaṃ karonti. Byādhiādīhi dukkhitassa upaṭṭhānādikātabbaṃ, saṃsāradukkhadukkhitasseva vā yathāvuttākārena kātabbaṃ karonti. Ariyakaradhammā ariyasaccānīti purimasaccadvayavasena vuttaṃ ‘‘vipassiyamānā aniccādayo’’ti. Pariññādivisesena vā passiyamānāti atthe sati aniccādayoti ādi-saddena niccampi nibbānaṃ gahitanti catusaccavasenapi yojetabbaṃ, aniccattādayo vā ‘‘aniccādayo’’ti vuttāti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

'They know what has been done' means they know accurately the wholesome and unwholesome deeds done by themselves and by others, and the happiness and suffering produced by them. They make manifest, in the manner described, the assistance done by themselves to others and by others to themselves. They do what ought to be done for one afflicted by illness and so on, or they do what ought to be done, in the manner described, for one afflicted by the suffering of saṃsāra. 'The qualities that make one noble are the noble truths'—this is said with reference to the first two truths, as 'being contemplated as impermanent and so on.' Or, when the meaning is 'being seen with distinctions such as full understanding,' then by the word 'and so on' in 'impermanent and so on,' even the permanent, Nibbāna, is included, and this should be connected with the four truths. Or, it should be understood that the characteristics of impermanence and so on are what is meant by 'impermanent and so on.'

Avasesakilesā kilesasotaṃ. Ñāṇanti yāthāvato jānanaṃ. Yathābhūtāvabodhena hi tassa tāni anuppattidhammataṃ āpāditatāya santāne [Pg.177] appavesārahāni ‘‘saṃvutāni pihitānī’’ti ca vuccanti. Tathāti sabbasaṅkhārānaṃ vippakārassa khamanākārena. Aviparītadhammā etāya nijjhāyaṃ khamantīti paññā khantīti. Aduṭṭhasseva titikkhābhāvato tathāpavattā khandhāti adosappadhānā khandhā vuttāti ‘‘adoso eva vā’’ti tatiyo vikappo vutto. Satipaṭipakkhattā abhijjhādomanassānaṃ ‘‘muṭṭhassacca’’nti vuttā. Akkhanti doso. Sassatādiantavinimuttā dhammaṭṭhitīti sassatucchedādigāho tappaṭilomabhāvo vutto. Diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādo nibbāne paṭilomabhāvo. Carimānulomañāṇavajjhataṇhādiko kilesoti vutto, paṭipadāñāṇadassanañāṇadassanāni viya gotrabhuñāṇaṃ kilesānaṃ appavattikaraṇabhāvena vattati, kilesavisayātilaṅghanabhāvena pana pavattatīti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘saṅkhāra…pe… pahāna’’nti.

The remaining defilements are the stream of defilements. Knowledge is knowing things as they really are. For by the realization of things as they really are, those defilements, having been brought to the state of non-arising, are said to be 'restrained, closed off' because they are no longer fit to enter the mental continuum. 'Thus' means in the manner of enduring the alteration of all conditioned phenomena. Wisdom is called patience because by this contemplation one endures phenomena without distortion. Because there is forbearance only from one who is not hateful, aggregates that arise in that way are said to be aggregates with non-aversion foremost—hence, 'non-aversion indeed' is stated as the third alternative. Due to being the opposite of mindfulness, covetousness and ill-will are called 'forgetfulness'. Impatience is aversion. The stability of phenomena, being free from the extremes of eternalism and so on, means that clinging to eternalism, annihilationism, and so on, is stated as its opposite. The doctrine of Nibbāna in this very life is the opposite of Nibbāna. Craving and the like are called defilements to be abandoned by the final knowledge of conformity. Change-of-lineage knowledge, like knowledge and vision of the path, functions by preventing the arising of defilements, and it also functions by transcending the sphere of defilements; therefore it is said, 'formations... abandonment'.

Diṭṭhiyādīnaṃ samudayasabhāgatā kammassa vikuppādane sahakārīkāraṇabhāvo, dassanādibyāpāraṃ vā attānañca dassanādikiccaṃ cakkhādīnanti evañhi yathātakkitaṃ attānaṃ rūpanti gaṇhāti. Yathādiṭṭhanti takkadassanena yathopaladdhanti adhippāyo. Na hi diṭṭhigatiko rūpāyatanameva attāti gaṇhātīti. Imissāpavattiyāti sāmaññena rūpaṃ attāti sabbasaṅgāhakabhūtāya pavattiyā. Rūpe…pe… mānanti cakkhādīsu taṃsabhāvo attāti pavattamānaṃ attaggahaṇaṃ. Anaññattādiggahaṇanti anaññattaṃ attaniyaattanissitaattādhāratāgahaṇaṃ. Vaṇṇādīnanti vaṇṇarukkhapupphamaṇīnaṃ. Nanu ca rukkhapupphamaṇiyo paramatthato na vijjanti? Saccaṃ na vijjanti, tadupādānaṃ pana vijjatīti taṃ samuditādippakāraṃ idha rukkhādipariyāyena vuttanti rukkhādinidassanepi na doso chāyārukkhādīnaṃ viya rūpassa attano ca saṃsāmibhāvādimattassa adhippetattā.

The nature of views and so on as a cause of arising is a contributing factor to the disturbance of kamma, or the function of seeing and so on, and the act of seeing and so on by oneself and by the eye and other faculties; for thus one grasps form as self in the way one has reasoned. 'According to what is seen' means according to what is perceived through reasoning and seeing. For one holding a view does not merely grasp the form base as self. 'In this occurrence' refers to the general occurrence where form is taken as self, encompassing all instances. 'Form... conceit' refers to the grasping of self that arises when one takes the eye and other faculties as being of the nature of self. 'Grasping non-otherness, etc.' refers to grasping non-otherness, belonging to self, dependent on self, or as the basis of self. 'Colors and so on' refers to colors, trees, flowers, and gems. But do trees, flowers, and gems not ultimately exist? Truly, they do not exist, yet the clinging to them does exist. Thus, their collective nature is described here in terms of trees and the like. Even when trees and such are used as examples, there is no fault, just as with shadows and trees, since only the relationship of form to oneself as owner, etc., is intended.

1008. Jātiādisabhāvanti jātibhavādīnaṃ nibbattinibbattanādisabhāvaṃ, uppādanasamatthatā paccayabhāvo.

1008. 'The nature of birth, etc.' means the nature of birth, becoming, and so on, which is the nature of being produced and producing. The ability to produce is the state of being a condition.

1009. Sāmaññena ‘‘tadekaṭṭhā kilesā’’ti (dha. sa. 1010), parato ‘‘avaseso lobho’’tiādivacanato (dha. sa. 1011) pārisesato sāmatthiyato vā labbhamānatāya satipi āgatatte sarūpena pabhedena vā diṭṭhiādayo viya anāgatattā lobhādayo ‘‘anāgatā’’ti vuttāti āha ‘‘idha [Pg.178]…pe… ssetu’’nti. Atthato viññāyati lobhādīhi sahajātā hutvā diṭṭhiyā eva pāḷiyaṃ vuttakilesabhāvato. Itipi attho yujjati saṃyojanakilesānampi paṭiniddesārahattā sampayuttasamuṭṭhānabhāvato ca. Saṃyojanarahitehīti saṃyojanabhāvarahitehi thinauddhaccaahirikānottappehi, thinaahirikānottappehi vā.

1009. Generally, it is said 'those defilements are of one location' (Dhs. 1010), and subsequently, from the statement 'the remainder is greed' (Dhs. 1011), because they are obtainable either as a residue or by capability, even though they are included, greed and the like are called 'not explicitly mentioned' because they are not present in their own form or division like views and so on. Thus, it is said: 'Here... let it be shown'. In meaning, it is understood from the fact that view itself, having arisen together with greed and the like, is stated in the Pāli to have the nature of a defilement. This meaning is also justified both because they are worthy of being particularly designated as fetters and defilements and because of the nature of arising in conjunction. 'Devoid of fetters' means by those devoid of the state of fetters—namely, sloth, restlessness, shamelessness, and recklessness; or by sloth, shamelessness, and recklessness.

1013. Ekade…pe… vadati avayavenapi samudāyo vuccatīti. Hetu etesaṃ atthīti vā hetukā. Aniyatoti na avadhārito. Purimapadāvadhāraṇavasena gahetabbatthattā vivaraṇīyatthavā. Atthato nikkhipitunti ‘‘tayo kusalahetū alobho adoso amoho’’tiādīsu (dha. sa. 1060) viya purimanayena dassitadhammeyeva hetupahātabbahetukabhedato atthadassanavasena niddisitunti attho.

1013. In part... it is said that an aggregate is also called by its constituent parts. They are called 'causal' because they have a cause. 'Indeterminate' means not determined. It should be taken according to the determination of the preceding term, or because it is something whose meaning is to be explained. The meaning is that it is set forth in terms of meaning—as in the phrase, "the three wholesome roots: non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion" (Dhammasaṅgaṇī 1060)—so, by the previous method, the phenomena to be shown are simply indicated by way of showing their meaning, distinguishing them as causes and those whose causes are to be abandoned.

1029. Abhiññāyuttavajjānaṃ mahaggatānaṃ parittārammaṇattābhāvā ‘‘mahaggatā vā iddhividhādayo’’ti vuttaṃ. Atītaṃsañāṇassa kāmāvacarattā ‘‘ceto…pe… ñāṇasampayuttā’’ti āha.

1029. Because developed states, except for those connected with the higher knowledges, do not have a limited object, it is said, 'the developed states, or psychic powers, etc.' Because the knowledge of past events belongs to the sense-sphere, it is stated, 'connected with consciousness... associated with knowledge.'

1035. Anantare niyuttānīti cutianantaraṃ phalaṃ anantaraṃ, tasmiṃ niyuttāni taṃ ekantena nipphādanato anatikkamanakānīti attho. Vuttappakārassa anantarassa karaṇaṃ anantaraṃ, taṃ sīlānīti yojetabbaṃ. Anekesu ānantariyesu katesu kiñcāpi balavatoyeva paṭisandhidānaṃ, na itaresaṃ, attanā pana kātabbakiccassa teneva katattā tassa vipākassa upatthambhanavasena pavattanato na itarāni tena nivāritaphalāni nāma honti, ko pana vādo paṭipakkhesu kusalesūti vuttaṃ ‘‘paṭipakkhena anivāraṇīyaphalattā’’ti. ‘‘Anekasmimpi…pe… natthī’’ti kasmā vuttaṃ, nanu anekesu ānantariyesu katesu balavaṃyeva paṭisandhidāyakanti tena itaresaṃ vipāko paṭibāhito hotīti āha ‘‘na ca tesa’’ntiādi. Tañca tesaṃ aññamaññaṃ appaṭibāhakattaṃ mātikāvaṇṇanāyaṃ vitthārena vicāritameva.

1035. The meaning of 'anantare niyuttāni' (assigned immediately) is that the fruit is immediate, without interval, after death; because they are assigned to that, they unfailingly produce it and cannot be transgressed. The immediate doing of the aforementioned kind is 'anantaraṃ'; this should be connected with 'sīlāni' (virtues). Even when multiple ānantariya kammas are performed, although rebirth-linking is given only by the stronger one, and not by the others, yet because the deed to be done has been done by it, and its result proceeds by way of supporting, the other kammas are not such that their results are prevented by it; what then to speak of opposing wholesome kammas! Hence, it is said, 'Because the result is not to be warded off by an opposing factor.' 'Why is it stated, "Even in many cases... it does not exist"?' If one asks, 'When multiple ānantariya kammas are performed, is it not the stronger one that gives rebirth-linking, so are the results of the others not obstructed by it?' To this, it is replied: 'But not for them...' and so on. That very non-obstruction among them has already been thoroughly examined in the commentary on the matrix (mātikāvaṇṇanā).

Atthato āpannaṃ aggahetvā yathārutavaseneva pāḷiyā atthaṃ gahetvā tesaṃ vādānaṃ tapparabhāvena pavattiṃ sandhāya ahetukavādādīnaṃ visesaṃ [Pg.179] dassetuṃ ‘‘purimavādo’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Aniyyānikaniyyānikabhedaṃ pana sambhārakammaṃ bandhamokkhahetūti bandhamokkhahetuṃ paṭisedhentopi kammaṃ paṭisedheti. Sumaṅgalavilāsiniyaṃ pana vipākassa kammakilesasamādhipaññānaṃ hetubhāvato vipākopi bandhamokkhahetūti ‘‘natthi hetūti vadanto ubhayaṃ paṭibāhatī’’ti (dī. ni. aṭṭha. 1.170-172) vuttaṃ. Tattha kammaṃ paṭisedhentenapi vipāko paṭisedhito hoti, vipākaṃ paṭisedhentenapi kammanti tayopi ete vādā atthato ubhayapaṭisedhakāti veditabbā. Niyatamicchādiṭṭhinti ahetukavādādipaṭisaṃyutte asaddhamme uggahaparipucchāvinicchayapasutassa ‘‘natthi hetū’’tiādinā raho nisīditvā cintentassa tasmiṃ ārammaṇe micchāsati santiṭṭhati, cittaṃ ekaggaṃ hoti, javanāni javanti. Paṭhamajavane satekiccho hoti, tathā dutiyādīsu. Sattame atekicchabhāvaṃ patto nāma hoti. Yā evaṃ pavattā diṭṭhi, taṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ ‘‘niyatamicchādiṭṭhi’’nti. Tato purimabhāvā aniyatā.

Not taking what is implied by meaning, but taking the meaning of the Pali merely as heard, and with reference to the arising of those theories due to their influence, in order to show the distinction of the causelessness theory, etc., it is said: 'the former theory,' etc. However, kamma, which is distinguished as non-liberating and liberating, is the cause of bondage and liberation; thus, one who denies the cause of bondage and liberation also denies kamma. But in the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī, because the result has the nature of a cause for kamma, defilements, concentration, and wisdom, the result is also the cause of bondage and liberation. Thus it is said: 'By saying there is no cause, one obstructs both' (Dī. Ni. Aṭṭha. 1.170-172). Here, by one who denies kamma, the result is denied; and by one who denies the result, kamma is denied. Thus, these three theories should be understood as denying both in meaning. 'Fixed wrong view' refers to one associated with the causelessness theory, etc., who is intent on grasping, questioning, and deciding about the false doctrine, and who, sitting alone and reflecting with thoughts like 'there is no cause,' etc., on that object, wrong mindfulness becomes established, the mind becomes one-pointed, and impulsions arise. In the first impulsion, one is still treatable; similarly in the second, etc. By the seventh, one attains the state of being untreatable. The view that arises in this way is what is referred to as 'fixed wrong view.' Before that state, it is unfixed.

1039. Sahajāta aññamañña nissaya atthi avigatādivisiṭṭhabhāvepi maggapaccayassa sampayogavisiṭṭhatādīpaneneva sahajātādivisiṭṭhatāpi viññāyatīti pāḷiyaṃ ‘‘sampayutto’’ti vuttanti ‘‘sampayogavisiṭṭhenā’’ti vuttaṃ. Magga…pe… dassetuṃ, na pana maggaṅgānaṃ aññamaññaṃ maggapaccayabhāvābhāvatoti adhippāyo. Evaṃ satīti yadi maggaṅgānaṃ maggapaccayalābhitāya pakāsano paṭhamanayo, evaṃ sante. Maggaṅgānipi vedanādayo viya maggahetukabhāvena vattabbattā amaggasabhāvānaṃ alobhādīnaṃ tadaññesaṃ tadubhayasabhāvānaṃ dhammānaṃ paccayabhāvadīpane tatiyanaye viya na ṭhapetabbānīti āha ‘‘ṭhapetvāti na vattabbaṃ siyā’’ti. Pubbeti purimanaye.

1039. Even though there is a distinctive state of co-nascence, mutuality, support, presence, non-disappearance, and so on, the distinctive nature of co-nascence and so on is also understood merely by indicating the distinctive nature of association of the path condition. Thus, in the Pāli it is said, 'associated,' and so it is said, 'by that which is distinguished by association.' The path... is to be shown, but the intention is not about whether or not the path factors are mutually a path condition for each other. This being so, if the first method is the clarification of how the path factors obtain the path condition, then so it is. Since the path factors, like feeling and so on, should be spoken of as having the nature of a path-cause, he says that, as in the third method of demonstrating the conditionality of states of a non-path nature like non-greed, etc., of other states, and of states of both natures, they should not be set aside. Hence, 'it should not be said "having set aside".' 'Previously' means in the previous method.

Dutiyanayepīti pi-saddena paṭhamanayaṃ sampiṇḍeti. Tena sammādiṭṭhiyā purimasmiṃ nayadvaye ṭhapitattā tassa sahetukabhāvadassano tatiyanayo āraddhoti dasseti. Tatiyanaye sammādiṭṭhiyā sahetukabhāvadassanaṃ anicchanto codako ‘‘kathaṃ dassito’’ti codetvā ‘‘nanū’’tiādinā attano adhippāyaṃ vivarati. Itaro ‘‘yathā hī’’tiādinā dassanena pahātabbahetubhāvena vuttānampi lobhādīnaṃ aññamaññaṃ sahajekaṭṭhasampayuttasaṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannato dassanena pahātabbahetukasaṅgaho [Pg.180] viya maggahetubhāvena vuttāyapi sammādiṭṭhiyā maggahetukabhāvopi yujjati maggahetusampayuttasaṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannabhāvatoti dasseti.

'In the second method also': by the particle 'pi' (also), he includes the first method. Thereby he shows that because right view has been established in the previous two methods, the third method is begun to show its causally conditioned nature. In the third method, an objector, not wishing for the demonstration of the causally conditioned nature of right view, challenges, 'How is it shown?' and then explains his own intention with 'nanū,' and so forth. The other, with 'Just as...,' and so on, shows that just as even greed and so on, which are said to be causes to be abandoned by vision, are included in the category of 'having a cause to be abandoned by vision' because they are mutually co-nascent, have a single basis, are associated, and are included in the aggregate of formations, so too, for right view, although it is said to have the nature of a path-cause, the state of having a path-cause is also fitting, because it is included in the aggregate of formations associated with a path-cause.

Tato aññassevāti tato sammādiṭṭhisaṅkhātahetuto aññassa alobhādosasseva. Aññenāti ‘‘maggo hetū’’ti ito aññena. Alobhādosānaṃyeva adhippetattā tesaṃyeva āveṇikena maggahetūti iminā pariyāyena. Sādhāraṇena pariyāyenāti tiṇṇampi hetūnaṃ adhippetattā maggāmaggasabhāvānaṃ sādhāraṇena maggahetumaggahetūti iminā pariyāyena. Tesanti hetūnaṃ. Aññesanti hetusampayuttānaṃ. Atthavisesavasenāti ‘‘maggahetukā’’ti pāḷiyā atthavisesavasena. Amohena alobhādosāmohehi ca sesadhammānaṃ sahetukabhāvadassanavasena pavattā dutiyatatiyanayā ‘‘sarūpato hetuhetumantadassana’’nti vuttā. Tathāadassanatoti sarūpena adassanato. Atthena…pe… gamanatoti ‘‘maggaṅgāni ṭhapetvā taṃsampayutto’’ti (dha. sa. 1039) vacanato maggasabhāvānaṃ dhammānaṃ maggapaccayatāsaṅkhāto sampayuttānaṃ hetubhāvo sarūpato dassito. Maggahetubhūtāya pana sammādiṭṭhiyā sampayuttānaṃ hetuhetubhāvo atthato ñāpito hotīti attho.

'Of another than that' means of another, namely non-greed and non-hatred, than that cause designated as right view. 'By another' means by another than this, 'the path is a cause.' Since only non-greed and non-hatred are intended, by this method, 'path-cause,' which is exclusive to them. 'By the common method' means: since all three causes are intended, by this method, 'path-cause, non-path-cause,' which is common to states of a path and non-path nature. 'Of them' means of the causes. 'Of others' means of those associated with the causes. 'By way of a specific meaning' means by way of the specific meaning of the Pāli 'having path-causes.' The second and third methods, which proceed by way of showing the causally conditioned nature of the remaining states by non-delusion, and by non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion, are called 'the demonstration of cause and effect by way of intrinsic nature.' 'Because of not showing thus' means because of not showing by way of intrinsic nature. 'By meaning... by implication' means: according to the statement, 'having set aside the path factors, that which is associated with them' (Dhs. 1039), the causal nature, designated as path-conditionality, of states of a path-nature that are associated is shown by way of intrinsic nature. However, the causal nature of those associated with right view, which has become a path-cause, is made known by meaning; this is the meaning.

1040. Asabhāvadhammo garukātabbo na hotīti ‘‘sabhāvadhammo’’ti vuttaṃ. Teneva paṭṭhānavaṇṇanāyaṃ (paṭṭhā. aṭṭha. 1.3) ‘‘ārammaṇādhipati jātibhedato kusalākusalavipākakiriyarūpanibbānavasena chabbidho’’ti vakkhati. Maggādīni ṭhapetvāti maggādīni pahāya. Aññesanti maggādito aññesaṃ. Adhi…pe… vassāti ārammaṇādhipatipaccayabhāvassa. Paññuttarattā kusalānaṃ lokuttarakathāya ca paññādhurattā vīmaṃsādhipatissa sesādhipatīnaṃ padhānatā veditabbā.

1040. It is said 'a real phenomenon' because an unreal phenomenon is not to be held in high esteem. For that reason, in the commentary on the Paṭṭhāna (Paṭṭhāna-aṭṭhakathā 1.3), it will be said: 'Object-predominance, by distinction of nature, is sixfold: wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, functional, material, and Nibbāna.' 'Having set aside the path, etc.' means having abandoned the path, etc. 'Of others' means of others than the path, etc. 'Adhi...vassā' refers to the state of being an object-predominance condition. The predominance of investigation should be understood as primary among the remaining predominances, because wholesome states are supreme in wisdom and because wisdom is foremost in the discussion of the supramundane.

1041. Padesasattavisayattā paṭhamavikappassa sakalasattavasena dassetuṃ ‘‘kappasahassātikkamepi vā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Laddhokāsaṃ yaṃ bhavissatīti laddhokāsaṃ yaṃ kammaṃ pāpuṇissati. Kappasahassātikkame avassaṃ uppajjanavipākattā tadapi…pe… vuccatīti. Aladdhattalābhatāya uppādādikkhaṇaṃ [Pg.181] appattassa vipākassa anuppannabhāvo natthibhāvo pākaṭabhāvābhāvatoti vuttaṃ ‘‘natthi nāma na hotīti anuppanno nāma na hotī’’ti. Tatthāti arūpabhavaṅge.

1041. Because the first alternative has as its scope beings in a particular region, in order to show it by way of all beings, 'or even after the passing of a thousand eons,' and so on, is said. 'Whatever will have gained an opportunity' means whatever kamma will obtain an opportunity. Because its result must necessarily arise even after the passing of a thousand eons, that too... is said. For the sake of gaining what has not been gained, the non-arisen state, the non-existent state, of a result that has not reached the moment of arising, etc., is due to the absence of a manifest state; thus it is said: 'what is called "non-existent" is not, what is called "non-arisen" is not.' 'There' means in the formless life-continuum.

Avipakkavipākaṃ kammaṃ sahakārīkāraṇasamavāyālābhena akatokāsaṃ vipākābhimukhabhāvābhāvato vipakkavipākakammasarikkhakanti vuttaṃ ‘‘aladdho…pe… deyyā’’ti. Kiccanipphattiyā asati uppannampi kammaṃ anuppannasamānanti ‘‘okāso na bhaveyyā’’ti etassa samatthatā na siyāti atthamāha. Tena apacayagāmikammakiccassa okāsābhāvo dassito. Pubbe niratthakattā uppattiyā okāso na bhaveyyāti payojanābhāvato kammuppattiyā okāsābhāvo vutto. ‘‘Vipākato aññassa pavattiokāso na bhaveyyā’’ti iminā asambhavatoti ayametesaṃ viseso. Dhuvavipākassa kammassa vipākena nidassanamattabhūtenāti adhippāyo. Ariyamaggaānantariyakammānaṃ viya mahaggatakammānaṃ niyatasabhāvatābhāvā aṭṭhasamāpattīnaṃ ‘‘balavavirahe’’tiādinā savisesanadhuvavipākatā vuttā. Ettha ca ‘‘pañca ānantariyakammānī’’ti nidassanamattaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ niyatamicchādiṭṭhiyāpi dhuvavipākattā. Yassa kammassa katattā yo vipāko niyogato uppajjissati, so tassa anāgatakālepi uppādivohāraṃ labhati. So ca uppādivohāro āyūhitakammavasena vuccamāno bhāvinā āyūhitabhāvena maggo anuppannoti ettha vuttoti dassetuṃ ‘‘yaṃ āyūhitaṃ bhavissatī’’tiādi vuttaṃ.

Kamma whose result has not ripened is said to be similar to kamma whose result has ripened, because, not having obtained a conjunction of cooperating causes, it has not been given an opportunity, and because of the absence of a state of facing its result, as stated in 'not having obtained... should be given.' When there is no accomplishment of its function, even kamma that has arisen is like kamma that has not arisen; thus he states the meaning that for this, 'there would be no opportunity' means its capacity would not exist. Thereby, the absence of opportunity for the function of kamma leading to accumulation is shown. Previously, because it was useless, 'there would be no opportunity for its arising' is said, meaning the absence of opportunity for the kamma's arising due to the absence of a purpose. By this, 'there would be no opportunity for the occurrence of anything other than the result,' its impossibility is meant; this is the distinction among these. The intention is that it is by the result of kamma with a fixed resultant, which has become a mere designation. Since sublime kammas do not have a fixed nature like the noble path and the immediately effective kammas, for the eight attainments, their fixed resultants are stated with a qualification by 'in the absence of a strong one,' and so on. Here, 'the five immediately effective kammas' should be seen as a mere designation, because wrong view with a fixed destiny also has a fixed resultant. The kamma which, having been done, has a result that will certainly arise, obtains the designation of 'arising' even in the future. And to show that this designation of 'arising,' when spoken of by way of accumulated kamma, is stated here as 'the path is non-arisen' with reference to a future state of accumulation, 'what will be accumulated,' and so on, is said.

1050. Upādānehi ādinnāti sambandho. Aññeti upādānārammaṇehi aññe anupādāniyāti attho. Ādikena gahaṇenāti ‘‘ahaṃ phalaṃ sacchākāsi’’nti evaṃ paccavekkhaṇañāṇasaṅkhātena gahaṇena. Idāni upetatthadīpakassa upa-saddassa vasena upādinna-saddassa atthaṃ vattuṃ ‘‘upādinnasaddena vā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha nibbānassa anajjhattabhāvato ‘‘amaggaphaladhammāyeva vuttā’’ti āha. Itarehīti ajjhattapadādīhi.

1050. The connection is: 'grasped by the clingings.' 'Others' means others than the objects of clinging, which are not subject to clinging; this is the meaning. 'By the initial grasping' means by the grasping designated as the knowledge of reviewing, as in 'I have realized the fruit.' Now, to state the meaning of the word 'upādinna' by way of the prefix 'upa-,' which illuminates the meaning of 'approached,' 'or by the word upādinna,' and so on, is said. There, because Nibbāna is not personal, he says, 'only phenomena that are not path and fruit are meant.' 'By others' means by terms such as 'internal,' and so on.

Tikanikkhepakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Exposition of the Triads is concluded.

Dukanikkhepakathāvaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Exposition of the Dyads

1062. Mettāya [Pg.182] ayanaṃ upagamanaṃ mettāyanaṃ, tañca attano santāne mettāya lābho uppādanaṃ sattānaṃ anupagamo atthato majjanamevāti ‘‘mettā, medana’’nti vatvā ‘‘sinehana’’nti āha.

1062. Mettāyana is the going, the approaching, of loving-kindness. And that is the acquisition and production of loving-kindness in one's own continuum, and the non-approaching of beings, which in meaning is simply moistening. Thus, having said 'mettā, medana,' he says 'sinehana'.

1065. Tasmiṃ tasmiṃ visaye cittaṃ saṃrañjatīti cittassa saṃrañjanaṃ. Taṇhāvicaritādīti ādi-saddena esanādayo saṅgahitā. Taṇhāya vipulatā visayavasena pavattivasena vā veditabbā. Aniccādisabhāvassa rūpādikassa niccādito gahaṇaṃ abhiniveso visesato taṇhāvasena hoti taṇhārahitāya diṭṭhiyā abhāvāti upacāravasena nimittassa kattubhāvamāha ‘‘niccādito gaṇhantī visaṃvādikā hotī’’ti. Pākaṭena saddena labbhamānattā yathārutaviññāyamānattā ca visattikāsaddassa visatasabhāvo ‘‘padhāno attho’’ti vutto. ‘‘Antalikkhacaro pāso, yvāyaṃ carati mānaso. Tena taṃ bādhayissāmī’’tiādivasena (saṃ. ni. 1.151; mahāva. 33) mārena gahitatāya.

1065. In whatever object the mind delights, that is the mind's delighting. By 'activity of craving, etc.,' seeking and the like are included by the word 'etc.' The pervasiveness of craving should be understood either in terms of its objects or its modes of occurrence. The grasping of form and so forth, which have the nature of impermanence and so forth, as permanent and so forth, is a strong adherence that occurs especially by way of craving, for a view devoid of craving does not exist. Thus, metaphorically, he states the agency of the sign: 'Grasping as permanent, etc., it is deceptive.' Because its meaning is obtained from a clear word and is understood just as it is heard, the pervasive nature of the word 'visattikā' is said to be 'the primary meaning.' Due to its being seized by Māra, as in the passage beginning: 'The snare that roams in the sky, this mental one that wanders; with that I will bind you,' etc.

1066. Anatthacaraṇādianabhisandhānakatāya aṭṭhānabhūtesu ca vassavātādisaṅkhāresu uppannakopo viya sattesu atthācaraṇādinā āropanādhippāyesuyeva tadajjhāropanavasena pavatto yadipi anāyatanuppattiyā aṭṭhānāghātoyeva hoti, sattavisayattā pana sati cittassa ekantabyāpattiyaṃ kammapathabhedo hotiyevāti sakkā viññātuṃ, aṭṭhānuppattiyaṃ panassa na siyā kammapathabhedoti āha ‘‘sattesu uppanno aṭṭhānakopo karotī’’ti. Paṭighādipadānaṃ ghaṭṭanāpurimayāmavikāruppattisamaññādīsupi dassanato ‘‘paṭivirodhādipadāni tesaṃ visesanatthānī’’ti vuttaṃ.

1066. Just as anger may arise towards groundless conditioned phenomena such as rain and wind, where there is no intention of acting to cause harm, so too it may occur towards beings, but only with the intention of imposing harm upon them. And although its arising is without proper cause and is merely groundless vexation, it can be understood that because its object is a being, when there is complete corruption of the mind, a breach of the path of action certainly occurs. But when it arises towards a groundless object, there would be no breach of the path of action. Thus, he says: 'Groundless anger that has arisen towards beings causes it.' Because terms like 'resentment' are also found in the sense of collision, the first watch of the night, alteration, arising, designation, and so on, it is said: 'Terms like "opposition" serve to specify them.'

1091. Dve dhammā tayo dhammāti saddantarasannidhānena paricchedavato bahuvacanassa dassanato ‘‘aparicchedena bahuvacanenā’’ti vuttaṃ. Uddeso katoti iti-saddo hetuattho. Tena bahuvacanena uddesakaraṇaṃ bahuvacanena pucchāya kāraṇanti dīpeti. Uddesānuvidhāyinī hi pucchāti. Tathā hi saṅkhāparicchinne uddese ‘‘katame vā tayo’’ti saṅkhāparicchinnāva pucchā [Pg.183] karīyatīti. Uddesena dhammānaṃ atthitāmattavacanicchāyaṃ sabhāvabhūmikāraṇaphalādiparicchedo viya saṅkhāparicchedopi na kātabboti adhippāyena ‘‘aniddhāritaparicchede’’tiādi vuttaṃ. ‘‘Apaccayā dhammā’’ti padato pana heṭṭhā anekabhedabhinnā dhammā aparicchedena bahuvacaneneva uddiṭṭhā, uddhañca tathā uddisīyantīti taṃ sotapatitatāya bhedābhāvepi paramatthato appaccayadhammassa asaṅkhatadhammassa ca sopādisesanirupādisesarāgakkhayādiasaṅkhatādivacanavacanīyabhāvena upacaritabhedegahite padadvayena atthi kāci bhedamattāti aparicchedena bahuvacanena uddeso katoti yuttaṃ siyā. Uddesānusārīni pucchānigamanānīti tānipi tathā pavattāni. Niddeso pana yathādhippetasabhāvādiparicchedavibhāvanavaseneva kātabboti asaṅkhatā dhātu icceva kato paramatthato bhedābhāvadīpanatthanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Kathetukāmatāvasena pucchanto yassa katheti, tena kātabbapucchāya karaṇato taggataṃ ajānanaṃ saṃsayaṃ vā anuvidhāyayeva pucchatīti ‘‘sabhāva…pe… ajānantassa vasena pucchā karīyatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Niddesato pubbetiādinā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaṃ pucchānusandhiṃyeva vibhāveti.

1091. Because the plural with a specific number is seen in proximity to other words, as in 'two phenomena, three phenomena,' the phrase 'by the plural without a specific number' is stated. The word 'iti' in 'the enumeration is made' has the meaning of cause. Thereby, he shows that making the enumeration with a plural term is the reason for asking the question with a plural term, for the question follows the enumeration. Thus, in an enumeration where the number is specified, the question is also framed with the number specified, as in 'which three?' With the intention that, in an enumeration where one merely wishes to state the existence of phenomena, a numerical distinction should not be made, just as a distinction of nature, basis, cause, result, etc., is not made, the phrase 'without a determined distinction,' etc., is stated. However, from the phrase 'unconditioned phenomena' onwards, phenomena divided into many kinds are enumerated below by a plural without a specific number, and above they are similarly enumerated. Thus, although there is no distinction in what is heard, since ultimately the unconditioned phenomenon and the unconditioned element—grasped with a conventional distinction by two terms expressible by words for the unconditioned such as 'with residue,' 'without residue,' 'destruction of lust,' etc.—do have some slight distinction, it is fitting that the enumeration is made by the plural without a specific number. The questions and conclusions follow the enumeration; thus, they too proceed in that manner. The exposition, however, should be made by way of clarifying the intended distinctions of nature, etc. Therefore, it should be understood that it is stated simply as 'the unconditioned element' in order to show the absence of ultimate distinction. One who asks, desiring to speak, asks in accordance with the ignorance or doubt of the one to whom he speaks, since the question is one that should be asked by that person. Thus, it is said: 'the question is asked on the basis of one who does not know the nature... etc.' By 'before the exposition,' etc., he clarifies the very connection of the question stated in the commentary.

1101. Bhinditvāti vibhajitvā. Rūpāva…pe… viññeyyāti kāmāvacarakusalamahākiriyaviññāṇena mahaggatadhammānaṃ sammasanavasena yathāyogaṃ mahaggatappamāṇadhammānaṃ paccavekkhaṇādivasena rūparāgārūparāgasampayuttena akusalamanoviññāṇena mahaggatadhammānaṃ abhinivesanaassādanavasena taṃtaṃpaññattiyañca taṃtaṃvohāravasena pavattena āvajjanena ca yathāvuttaviññāṇānaṃ purecārikena kāmāvacaradhammā na viññeyyā. Itarenāti parittārammaṇena. Kāmāvacarānameva ārammaṇānanti niddhāraṇe sāmivacanaṃ. Rūpārammaṇādīhi viññāṇehi tattha rūpārammaṇena viññāṇenapi saddādīnaṃ aviññeyyatā rūpassa ca viññeyyatā. Evaṃ sesesupi yojanā daṭṭhabbā. Cakkhudvārikena saddādīnaṃ aviññeyyatā rūpassa viññeyyatātiādinā dvārabhedavasena yojetabbaṃ. Itaranti iṭṭhamajjhattaṃ aniṭṭhamaniṭṭhamajjhattañca. Rūpāvacarādayo kāmāvacaravipākādīhīti rūpāvacarārūpāvacaralokuttarapaññattiyo kāmāvacaravipākehi lokuttarā kāmāvacarato ñāṇavippayuttakusalakiriyehi akusalehi ca aviññeyyāti yojetabbaṃ. Nibbānassa avijānanasabhāvo eva attasambhavo.

1101. 'Bhinditvāti' means having analyzed. By 'Rūpāvacara…pe… viññeyyā' (Form-realm... to be cognized) is meant that sense-sphere phenomena are not cognizable by sense-sphere wholesome and great functional consciousness (by way of contemplating exalted phenomena and reviewing exalted and immeasurable phenomena as appropriate), nor by unwholesome mind-consciousness associated with lust for form and the formless (by way of adhering to and relishing exalted phenomena), nor by the adverting that precedes the aforesaid consciousnesses and proceeds by way of this or that concept and this or that conventional expression. By 'by another' is meant 'by that with a limited object.' The phrase 'only of the sense-sphere objects' is a genitive of specification. Among consciousnesses with form as object, etc., by a consciousness with form as object, sound and so forth are not cognizable, while form is cognizable. The application should be understood similarly in the remaining cases. It should be applied according to the distinction of doors, as in: 'Through the eye-door, sound and so forth are not cognizable, while form is cognizable.' 'The other' refers to the agreeable-neutral and the disagreeable-neutral. Regarding 'Form-realm phenomena, etc., by sense-sphere resultants, etc.': it should be applied that form-realm, formless-realm, supramundane phenomena, and concepts are not cognizable by sense-sphere resultants, by supramundane consciousnesses, by sense-sphere wholesome and functional consciousnesses dissociated from knowledge, and by unwholesome consciousnesses. The nature of not knowing Nibbāna is indeed self-originated.

1102. Rūpārūpāvacarakammūpapattibhave [Pg.184] diṭṭhirahito lobho bhavāsavoti yathāvuttavisayo diṭṭhisahito sabbakāmāvacaradhammavisayo ca lobho kāmāsavo bhavituṃ yuttoti vuttaṃ ‘‘bhavāsavaṃ…pe… siyā’’ti. Kāmāsavabhavāsavavinimuttassa hi lobhassa abhāvaṃ sayameva vakkhatīti. Pāḷiyanti aṭṭhakathākaṇḍapāḷiyaṃ. Tattha yathā ‘‘kāmāsavo aṭṭhasu lobhasahagatacittuppādesu uppajjatī’’ti vuttaṃ, evaṃ ‘‘bhavāsavo aṭṭhasu lobhasahagatacittuppādesu uppajjatī’’ti avatvā ‘‘catūsudiṭṭhigatavippayuttalobhasahagatacittuppādesu uppajjatī’’ti (dha. sa. 1465) vuttattā ‘‘bhavāsavo…pe… yuttesu eva uppajjatī’’ti pāḷiyaṃ vuttoti sāvadhāraṇaṃ vuttaṃ. Tathā ca vakkhati ‘‘bhavāsavo catūsu diṭṭhigatavippayuttesu avijjāsavena saddhiṃ ekadhāva ekato uppajjatī’’ti (dha. sa. aṭṭha. 1473). Sopi rāgoti sassatadiṭṭhisahagato rāgo. Kāmabhavapatthanā viya kāmāsavoti yuttaṃ vattuṃ. Sassatadiṭṭhisahagatarāgakāmabhavapatthanānampi hi bhavāsavoti vattabbapariyāyo atthīti ‘‘sassatadiṭṭhisahagato rāgo bhavarāgavasena patthanā bhavāsavo nāmā’’ti vuttaṃ, na tesaṃ idha adhippetabhavāsavabhāvadassanatthanti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ adhippāyo daṭṭhabbo. Tathā hi ‘‘rūpārūpasaṅkhāte kammato ca upapattito ca duvidhepi bhave āsavo bhavāsavo’’ti vuttanti. Tattha kāmabhavapatthanāya tāva kāmāsavabhāvo hotu, rūpārūpabhavesu sassatābhinivesasahagatarāgassa kathanti? Sopi yathāvuttavisaye kāmanavasena pavattito kāmāsavoyeva nāma. Sabbepi hi tebhūmakā dhammā kamanīyaṭṭhena kāmāti. Na cettha aniṭṭhappasaṅgo diṭṭhivippayuttalobhassa bhavāsavabhāvena visuṃ uddhaṭattā. Avassañcetamevaṃ viññātabbaṃ, itarathā rūpārūpabhavesu ucchedadiṭṭhisahagatassapi lobhassa bhavāsavabhāvo āpajjeyyāti. Kāmāsavādayo eva diṭṭhadhammikasamparāyikāsavabhāvena dvidhā vuttā.

1102. Greed devoid of wrong view in the twofold existence—kamma-existence and rebirth-existence—in the form and formless spheres is the taint of existence; and greed whose scope is as stated, accompanied by wrong view, with all phenomena of the sense-sphere as its object, is appropriately termed the taint of sensual desire. Thus it is said, “The taint of existence… might be.” For it will itself explain the absence of greed that is free from the taint of sensual desire and the taint of existence. The term ‘Pāli’ here refers to the Pāli section of the commentary. There, just as it is said, “The taint of sensual desire arises in eight consciousnesses accompanied by greed,” it is not said, “The taint of existence arises in eight consciousnesses accompanied by greed.” Instead, because it is stated, “It arises in four consciousnesses accompanied by greed dissociated from wrong view” (Dhs. 1465), it is said with emphasis in the Pāli, “The taint of existence… arises only in those appropriate cases.” And thus it will be explained: “The taint of existence arises together with the taint of ignorance in four cases dissociated from wrong view, as one and together” (Dhs. Aṭṭha. 1473). That craving too is craving accompanied by eternalist view. It is appropriate to say that the taint of sensual desire is analogous to the longing for sensual existence. For there is also a way of speaking where the longing for sensual existence, which is craving accompanied by eternalist view, is called the taint of existence. Thus it is said, “Craving accompanied by eternalist view, as longing for existence, is called the taint of existence.” The intention in the commentary is that this is not meant here to show the nature of the taint of existence in those cases. For thus it is said: “The taint of existence is the taint in both kinds of existence, namely, existence reckoned as form and formless, due to kamma and rebirth.” Now, let the longing for sensual existence indeed be the taint of sensual desire. But what about craving accompanied by eternalist inclination in the form and formless existences? That too, when it operates in the aforementioned sphere by way of desire, is indeed called the taint of sensual desire. For all phenomena of the three planes are called ‘sensual’ in the sense of being desirable. Here, there is no undesirable consequence because greed dissociated from wrong view is separately singled out as the taint of existence. And this must necessarily be understood thus; otherwise, even greed accompanied by annihilationist view in the form and formless existences would also become the taint of existence. The taints of sensual desire and so on are thus stated in two ways, as having the nature of taints pertaining to this life and the next.

1103. Idha pāḷiyāpi bhavāsavavinimuttalobhassa kāmāsavabhāvo na na sakkā yojetunti dassetuṃ ‘‘kāmāsavaniddese cā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. ‘‘Dhammacchando saddhā’’ti keci.

1103. Here, in the Pāli text as well, to show that the nature of the taint of sensual desire can indeed be attributed to greed free from the taint of existence, it is said, “And in the exposition of the taint of sensual desire,” etc. Some say, “Desire for the Dhamma is faith.”

1105. Upādānakkhandhesveva [Pg.185] pavattati tabbinimuttassa dhammassa jīvaggahaṇavisayassa paramatthato abhāvā. Rūpe…pe… viññāṇe vā pana na patiṭṭhāti rūpādīnaṃ aviparītasabhāvamatte aṭṭhatvā sayaṃ samāropitassa tesu parikappanāmattasiddhassa kassaci ākārassa abhinivesanato. Tenevāha ‘‘tato aññaṃ katvā’’ti. Tato upādānakkhandhato. Vedanādayopi hi keci diṭṭhigatikā aniccāti passantīti. Tatoti vā sarīrasaṅkhātarūpakkhandhato. ‘‘Aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīra’’nti hi vuttaṃ. Hotīti bhavati sassataṃ attāti attho. Aññanti brahmaissarādito aññaṃ.

1105. It operates only within the aggregates of clinging, for ultimately, there is no phenomenon free from them that could be an object for grasping as a life-principle. Or it is not established in form… or in consciousness, because of clinging to some characteristic that is merely established by conceptualization about them, which is self-imposed, while form and the others merely stand in their unperverted nature. Therefore it is said, “making another from that.” “From that” means from the aggregates of clinging. For some who hold to views see even feeling and the rest as impermanent. Or, “from that” means from the form aggregate, which is reckoned as the body. For it is said, “The life-principle is one thing, the body another.” ‘Exists’ means the meaning is “an eternal self exists.” ‘Another’ means different from Brahma, the Lord, etc.

Arūpabhavo viya rūparāgappahānena rūpabhavo kāmarāgappahānena pattabbo. Rūpībrahmānañca pañcakāmaguṇiko rāgo pahīyati, na vimānādīsu rāgoti so akāmarāgoti katvā kāmāsavo na hotīti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ paṭikkhittaṃ. Ṭīkākārehi pana kāmāsavabhavāsavavinimuttalobhābhāvadassanena rūpībrahmānaṃ vimānādirāgassapi kāmacchandādibhāvato diṭṭhivippayuttarūpārūpabhavarāgavinimutto sabbo lobho kāmāsavoti dassito. Tattha yuttaṃ vicāretvā gahetabbaṃ. Siyā āsavasampayutto kāmarāgena bhavarāgena vā sahuppattiyaṃ, siyā āsavavippayutto tadaññarāgena sahuppattiyaṃ, ‘‘catūsu diṭṭhigatā’’tiādipāḷiyā abhāvadassanena kāmāsavabhavāsavavinimuttalobhābhāvaṃ dassetvā ‘‘kāmāsavo’’tiādipāḷidassanena diṭṭhirāgassa kāmāsavabhāvaṃ sādheti. Pahātabbadassanatthanti pahātabbatādassanatthaṃ. Pahāneti pahānanimittaṃ.

The form existence is to be attained by abandoning sensual desire, just as the formless existence is attained by abandoning desire for form. For the Brahmās of the form realm, desire for the five strands of sensual pleasure is abandoned, but not desire for celestial mansions and so on. Thus, the commentary refutes the idea that because that desire is not sensual desire, it is not the taint of sensual desire. However, the subcommentators, by showing the absence of greed free from the taints of sensual desire and existence, demonstrate that all greed free from desire for form and formless existence and dissociated from wrong view is the taint of sensual desire, because even the desire for celestial mansions and so on in the Brahmās of the form realm is of the nature of sensual desire and so on. One should examine this carefully and accept what is appropriate. It may be associated with the taints, arising together with sensual desire or desire for existence; or it may be dissociated from the taints, arising together with other desire. By showing the absence of greed free from the taints of sensual desire and existence through the Pāli passage beginning “in the four wrong views,” etc., and by citing the Pāli passage beginning “the taint of sensual desire,” etc., they establish that craving associated with wrong view is indeed the taint of sensual desire. ‘For the purpose of showing what should be abandoned’ means for the purpose of showing the nature of what should be abandoned. ‘In abandoning’ means the reason for abandoning.

1121. Jātiyāti khattiyasabhāvādijātisampattiyā. Gottenāti gotamagottādiukkaṭṭhagottena. Kolaputtiyenāti mahākulabhāvena. Vaṇṇapokkharatāyāti vaṇṇasampannasarīratāya. ‘‘Pokkhara’’nti hi sarīraṃ vuccatīti. Mānaṃ jappetīti mānaṃ pavatteti karoti. Pavatto māno pavattamāno. Puggalavisesanti seyyassa seyyotiādibhedaṃ puggalavisesaṃ. Seyyaṃ bhinditvā pavattamāno seyyamāno. Tiṇṇanti seyyassa seyyādīnaṃ tiṇṇaṃ ‘‘seyyohamasmī’’tiādinā aññaṃ puggalaṃ anissāya vuttānaṃ. Seyyādivasena attano mananaṃ paggaho māno, tassa karaṇaṃ seyyohamasmītiādipavattiyevāti vuttaṃ ‘‘seyyoti ādikiccakaraṇa’’nti.

1121. ‘By birth’ means by the excellence of birth, such as the nature of a khattiya. ‘By clan’ means by an esteemed clan, such as the Gotama clan. ‘By family’ means by being of a great family. ‘By beauty of complexion’ means by possessing a body endowed with beauty. For ‘pokkhara’ is indeed said to refer to the body. ‘He generates conceit’ means he produces conceit, he makes it. ‘Conceit that has arisen’ means ‘conceit that is arising.’ ‘Personal distinction’ means a personal distinction of the type beginning with ‘better than the better’. Conceit that arises by breaking down the ‘better’ is ‘seyyamāno’. ‘Of the three’ refers to the three, namely, “I am better” and so on, uttered without dependence on another person, which are of the type beginning with ‘better than the better’. Conceit is the thinking and grasping of oneself by way of ‘better’ and so on, and its making is simply the occurrence of “I am better,” etc. Thus it is said, “the initial function is the doing of ‘I am better,’ etc.”

1140. Sabbopi [Pg.186] lobho abhijjhāsabhāvoti abhijjhā āsavadvayasabhāvā, kāmarāgo kāmāsavasabhāvo evāti āsavadvayaekāsavabhāvo abhijjhākāmarāgānaṃ viseso vutto. Na abhijjhā ca dhammā ṭhapetvā diṭṭhiṃ avijjañca noāsavasabhāvā. Abhijjhā ca āsavadvayasabhāvā eva, naabhijjhāsabhāvo ca lobho natthīti adhippāyena ‘‘noāsavalobhassa sabbhāvo vicāretabbo’’ti āha. Gaṇanāya hetuyā sattāti vuttanti pañhāvārapāṭhaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tattha hi ‘‘āsavo dhammo āsavassa dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo. Āsavo dhammo noāsavassa dhammassa. Āsavo dhammo āsavassa ca noāsavassa ca. Noāsavo dhammo noāsavassa. Noāsavo dhammo āsavassa. Noāsavo dhammo āsavassa ca noāsavassa ca. Āsavo ca noāsavo ca dhammā noāsavassa hetupaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 3.3.16) imesaṃ vārānaṃ vasena ‘‘gaṇanāya sattā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tattha yadi noāsavasabhāvopi lobho siyā, diṭṭhisampayuttacittassa vasena ‘‘āsavo ca noāsavo ca dhammā mohayathāvuttalobhā āsavassa dhammassa diṭṭhiyā hetupaccayena paccayo’’ti sattamo, pāḷiyaṃ āgataṃ sattamaṃ aṭṭhamaṃ katvā ‘‘āsavo ca noāsavo ca dhammā āsavassa ca noāsavassa ca dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo’’ti navamo pañho vucceyya, na pana vuttoti. Evaṃ diṭṭhisampayuttalobhassa noāsavabhāvābhāvaṃ dassetvā itarassapi taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘diṭṭhivippayutte cā’’tiādi vuttaṃ.

1140. All greed is of the nature of covetousness. This means that covetousness has the nature of two taints, while sensual desire has the nature of only the taint of sensual desire. Thus, the distinction between covetousness and sensual desire is stated as having the nature of two taints and one taint. It is not the case that covetousness and other states—except for wrong view and ignorance—are of the nature of non-taints. And covetousness indeed has the nature of two taints, and there is no greed that is not of the nature of covetousness. With this intention, it is said, “The existence of greed that is a non-taint should be examined.” It is stated, “In terms of enumeration, there are seven by way of root condition,” referring to the passage in the Paṭṭhāna question-series. There, it is said, “A taint is a condition for a taint by way of root condition. A taint is a condition for a non-taint. A taint is a condition for both a taint and a non-taint. A non-taint is a condition for a non-taint. A non-taint is a condition for a taint. A non-taint is a condition for both a taint and a non-taint. Both a taint and a non-taint are conditions for a non-taint by way of root condition” (Paṭṭhāna 3.3.16). In terms of these modes, it is said, “there are seven by enumeration.” If greed were also of the nature of a non-taint, then in the case of a mind associated with wrong view, a seventh question, “Both a taint and a non-taint, namely delusion and the aforementioned greed, are conditions for a taint, namely wrong view, by way of root condition,” would be stated, which would make the seventh question found in the Pāli an eighth, and a ninth question, “Both a taint and a non-taint are conditions for both a taint and a non-taint by way of root condition,” would be stated. But it is not stated thus. Thus, having shown the absence of the nature of a non-taint in greed associated with wrong view, to show the same for the other, it is also said, “And in the case of being dissociated from wrong view,” etc.

1162. Yathārūpe rūpappabandhe vattamāne puggalo gacchati tiṭṭhati nisīdatīti vuccati, tathā visadarūpassa uppādakaṃ cittaṃ iriyāpathūpatthambhakaṃ. Taṃ pana kusalato kiriyato ca pañcamajjhānacittaṃ abhiññāppattaṃ appattañca bhinditvā sattapaññāsa javanāni voṭṭhabbanañcāti aṭṭhapaññāsavidhaṃ. Sahajātadhammānaṃ akammaññabhāvakarattā thinamiddhasahagatacittaṃ visadāni rūpāni na samuṭṭhapeti na upatthambheti cāti vuttaṃ ‘‘iriyāpathaṃ sandhāretuṃ asakkonta’’nti.

1162. Just as a person is said to walk, stand, or sit when a certain continuum of forms is occurring, so too, the mind that produces clear forms supports the bodily postures. That mind, however, is of fifty-eight kinds—fifty-seven impulsions and the determining consciousness—which are distinguished from among the wholesome, the functional, and the fifth jhāna consciousness, whether attained through higher knowledge or not. Because it renders co-arisen states unwieldy, the mind accompanied by sloth and torpor does not generate or support clear forms. Thus it is said, 'being unable to sustain the bodily postures.'

1163. Vipakkhepi bhāvato anekantikattā rūpattāsādhakattaṃ. Garubhāvappatti lahutāviraho daṭṭhabbo. Satipi aññesampi akusalādīnaṃ lahutāvirahe [Pg.187] thinamiddhānaṃ ekantato lahutāpaṭipakkhattā kāraṇānurūpattā ca phalassa ‘‘thinamiddhasamuṭṭhitarūpehī’’ti vuttaṃ. Na jāgara…pe… santatinti etena nāmakāye supanassa asiddhataṃ dasseti. Middhassa phalattāti ettha middhaṃyeva niddākāraṇanti nāyaṃ niyamo icchito, niddākāraṇameva pana middhanti niyamo icchitoti daṭṭhabbo. Tathā hi khīṇāsavānaṃ niddāya middhato aññaṃ kāraṇaṃ karajakāyassa dubbalabhāvo aṭṭhakathāyaṃ dassitoti.

1163. Because it also exists in the opposite case, it is inconclusive and thus not a proof of materiality. The absence of lightness should be understood as the attainment of heaviness. Although there is an absence of lightness in other unwholesome states as well, because sloth and torpor are entirely opposed to lightness and because the result is in accordance with the cause, it is stated, 'by form produced by sloth and torpor.' By 'Not waking... continuously,' he shows the non-establishment of sleep in the mental body. Regarding 'because torpor is the result,' here the rule 'torpor alone is the cause of sleep' is not intended; rather, it should be understood that the rule 'the cause of sleep is indeed torpor' is intended. For, in the case of the arahants, the commentary shows that the cause of sleep, other than torpor, is the weakness of the body born of kamma.

Chādanaṃ, avattharaṇaṃ vā onāho, so rūpasseva sabhāvoti parassa āsaṅkaṃ manasi katvā āha ‘‘tena saha vuttā onāhapariyonāhā cā’’ti. Asaṅkocavasena visadā pavatti vipphārikabhāvo. Āvaraṇabhāvo viyāti etena āvaraṇasabhāvattepi middhassa tabbidhuro anaññasādhāraṇattā onahanādibhāvoti dasseti. Sāmaññañhi pañcannampi kāmacchandādīnaṃ āvaraṇasabhāvoti āvaraṇabhāvasadisassa onahanādibhāvassa nāmakāye labbhamānassa gahitatāti etthādhippāyo.

Covering, or spreading over, is `onāha`. Having considered another's suspicion that this is the very nature of form itself, he said, 'Therefore, `onāha` and `pariyonāha` are spoken of together with it.' Pervasiveness is a clear occurrence by way of non-contraction. By 'like the nature of a hindrance,' he shows that although torpor has the nature of a hindrance, because it is devoid of that and is not common to others, it has the state of enveloping and so on. For the nature of a hindrance is common to all five hindrances, beginning with sensual desire; the intention here is that the state of enveloping and so on, which is similar to the nature of a hindrance and is found in the mental body, is what is meant.

Pānanti anuyogoti ca taṃkiriyāsādhikā cetanā adhippetāti surāpānassa surā…pe… yogassa ca akusalabhāvena upakkilesadubbalīkaraṇabhāvo yuttoti vutto. ‘‘Surāmerayassa ajjhoharaṇaṃ pānaṃ pamādaṭṭhānānuyogo cā’’ti parassa adhippāyo. Nīvaraṇaṃ hutvā vātiādinā idaṃ dasseti ‘‘nīvaraṇasabhāvānaṃ nīvaraṇasampayuttabhāvadassanaparāya codanāya nīvaraṇanti katthaci adiṭṭhapayogassa asampayuttassa rūpassa yathālābhato gahaṇaṃ ñāyoyeva na hoti, siddhanīvaraṇabhāvasampayuttasabhāvānaṃyeva pana gahaṇanti taṃsabhāvā arūpadhammāyeva dassitā, na rūpanti thinaṃ viya middhampi arūpamevāti viññāyatī’’ti. Yanti yena vacanena. Asambhavavacanatoti asambhavavacanabhāvato.

By 'drinking' and 'indulgence,' the volition that accomplishes that action is intended. It is said that due to the unwholesome nature of drinking liquor... and indulgence, it is fitting that it has the effect of weakening through defilements. 'The consumption of fermented and distilled liquors is drinking, and indulgence is a ground for heedlessness'—this is another's intended meaning. By 'becoming a hindrance,' etc., this is shown: 'In response to a challenge focused on demonstrating the nature of hindrances and the state of being associated with hindrances, it is by no means logical to take as a hindrance a form that is unassociated and for which no such usage is seen anywhere. Rather, one should only take those things whose nature is established as being associated with the nature of a hindrance. Thus, only immaterial phenomena of such a nature are shown, not form. Therefore, it is understood that torpor, like sloth, is also immaterial.' 'By which' means 'by which word.' 'From the statement of impossibility' means 'from the nature of being a statement of impossibility.'

Tenāti tena rūpārammaṇassa chandarāgassa pahānavacanena. Rūpappahānato aññoti katvā rūpe chandarāgappahānaṃ ‘‘añño kāro’’ti vuttaṃ. Yaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘aññathā’’ti vuttaṃ. Idantiādinā ‘‘taṃ pajahathā’’ti pāḷiyā na nippariyāyappahānaṃ adhippetanti dasseti. Arūpasseva yujjatīti [Pg.188] sududdasaṃ dūraṅgamādippavattakaṃ cittaṃ taṃsampayutto arūpadhammoyeva vibandhituṃ samatthoti dasseti. Cetaso pariyuṭṭhānanti kusalacittassa gahaṇaṃ. Nīvaraṇāni hi uppajjamānāni uppajjituṃ appadānena kusalavāraṃ gaṇhantīti vuccanti. Gahaṇañcettha pariyuṭṭhānaṃ ‘‘corā magge pariyuṭṭhiṃsū’’tiādīsu viya.

'By that' means by that statement about abandoning desire and lust for form as an object. Because it is distinct from abandoning form, the abandoning of desire and lust for form is called 'another way,' which in the commentary is stated as 'otherwise.' By 'this,' etc., he shows that the Pāli phrase 'abandon that' does not intend unqualified abandonment. By 'it is suitable only for the formless,' he shows that only the mind—which is described as 'extremely difficult to see, far-going,' etc.—and the formless phenomena associated with it are capable of obstructing. 'Obsession of the mind' means the seizing of wholesome consciousness. For hindrances, when arising, are said to seize the turn for the wholesome by not allowing it to arise. And here, seizing is obsession, as in such phrases as 'thieves beset the road.'

1176. Uddhaccaṃ kukkuccañca saha vuttanti uddesapucchānigamane sandhāya vuttaṃ. Yaṃ pana aṭṭhakathāyaṃ uddhaccassa kukkuccena vinābhāvakāraṇaṃ vatvā ‘‘bhinditvā vutta’’nti vuttaṃ, taṃ ‘‘nīvaraṇā ceva nīvaraṇasampayuttā cā’’ti padassa niddese uddhaccakukkuccānaṃ visuṃ niddiṭṭhataṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Kāmacchandassa ukkaṭṭhanīvaraṇatā orambhāgiyabhāvo. So hi rūparāgārūparāgappakārakāmacchandaṃ upādāya tato tibbakiccatāya ‘‘ukkaṭṭhanīvaraṇa’’nti vuccati. Kāmacchandanīvaraṇantveva lobho vutto, na bhinditvā. Kāmacchandanīvaraṇassa ca anavasesato anāgāmimaggena pahāne vuccamāne catutthamaggavajjho lobho anīvaraṇasabhāvo āpajjatīti āha ‘‘yadi…pe… siyā’’ti. Nonīvaraṇo rūparāgārūparāgappakāro lobhadhammo nīvaraṇassa avijjādikassa. Ādi-saddena ‘‘nonīvaraṇo dhammo nīvaraṇassa ca nonīvaraṇassa ca dhammassa. Nīvaraṇo ca nonīvaraṇo ca dhammā nīvaraṇassa dhammassa. Nīvaraṇo ca nonīvaraṇo ca dhammā nonīvaraṇassa dhammassa. Nīvaraṇo ca nonīvaraṇo ca dhammā nīvaraṇassa ca nonīvaraṇassa ca dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 3.8.25) ime pañhe saṅgaṇhāti. Cattārīti vuttaṃ nīvaraṇapadamūlakānaṃ tiṇṇaṃ nonīvaraṇamūlakassa ekassa vasena. Nīvaraṇanonīvaraṇatadubhayamūlakānaṃ pana tiṇṇaṃ tiṇṇaṃ vasena navāti vuttaṃ. Tasmāti yathādassitanayāya pāḷiyā abhāvā nonīvaraṇalobhābhāvā.

1176. 'Restlessness and remorse are mentioned together' is said with reference to the summary, questions, and conclusion. However, when it is said in the commentary, after giving the reason for restlessness being separate from remorse, that it is 'stated separately,' this is said with reference to the distinct specification of restlessness and remorse in the exposition of the phrase 'both hindrances and things associated with hindrances.' The status of sensual desire as a prominent hindrance is its nature as a lower fetter. For, in comparison to sensual desire of the type of lust for form and lust for the formless, it is called a 'prominent hindrance' because its function is more intense. Greed is stated simply as the hindrance of sensual desire, not separately. And when the complete abandonment of the hindrance of sensual desire by the path of the non-returner is spoken of, the greed to be abandoned by the fourth path would become of a non-hindrance nature; thus he says, 'if... it could be...' The phenomenon of greed of the type of lust for form and lust for the formless is a non-hindrance for the hindrance of ignorance, etc. By the word 'etc.,' he includes these questions: 'A non-hindrance phenomenon is related to a hindrance phenomenon and to a non-hindrance phenomenon... A hindrance phenomenon and a non-hindrance phenomenon are related to a hindrance phenomenon... A hindrance phenomenon and a non-hindrance phenomenon are related to a non-hindrance phenomenon... A hindrance phenomenon and a non-hindrance phenomenon are related to a hindrance phenomenon and to a non-hindrance phenomenon by way of root condition' (Paṭṭhāna 3.8.25). 'Four' is said on account of three rooted in the term 'hindrance' and one rooted in 'non-hindrance.' 'Nine' is said on account of three each rooted in hindrance, non-hindrance, and both. 'Therefore' means: because the method shown is absent from the Pāli, and because non-hindrance greed does not exist.

1219. Tenevāti purimadiṭṭhiākāreneva uppajjamānena. Diṭṭhigatikehi vuccamānānaṃ ‘‘niccaṃ subha’’nti evamādivacanānaṃ, diṭṭhirahitehi vuccamānānaṃ gaganakusumādilokavohāravacanānañca vatthūni vācāvatthumattānīti āha ‘‘vācā…pe… vā’’ti.

1219. 'By that very' means by that which arises in the very mode of a previous view. He says 'speech... or...' because the objects of statements such as 'permanent and pleasant,' spoken by those holding views, and of worldly expressions such as 'sky-flower,' spoken by those without views, are merely objects of speech.

1221. Cittena [Pg.189] paraloke ṭhitoti yasmiṃ loke nibbattivasena sayaṃ ṭhito, tato aññaṃ lokaṃ paralokoti cittena gahetvā ṭhito.

1221. ‘Established in the next world by mind’ means: being oneself established in a certain world by way of rebirth, one grasps with the mind another world than that as ‘the next world’ and is established there.

1236. Na hi purimehītiādinā paṭhamamaggādīhi samugghāṭitaapāyagamanīyabhāvādikā eva rāgādayo dutiyamaggādīhi pahīyantīti dasseti.

1236. By 'Not by the former,' etc., he shows that only those defilements such as greed—whose nature of leading to the woeful states, etc., has been uprooted by the first path, etc.—are abandoned by the second path, etc.

1287. Upaṭṭhitepi duggatinimittādike na tathā tibbo lobho uppajjati, yathā sugatinimittādiketi āha ‘‘balavanikantivirahenā’’ti.

1287. Even when a sign of a woeful destination and the like has appeared, intense greed does not arise as it does with a sign of a happy destination and the like. Hence, he says: 'due to the absence of strong desire.'

1301. Ekasmiṃ cittuppāde uppannānaṃ viya ekasmiṃ santāne uppannānampi sahapavattipariyāyo atthīti pahānekaṭṭhena rāgaraṇena vicikicchuddhaccasahagatamohassa saraṇatā vuttā. Uddhaccavicikicchāhi yo moho sahajāto bhave, sopi rāgena saraṇo pahānekaṭṭhabhāvatoti. Lobhadosamohatadekaṭṭhakilesataṃsampayuttakkhandhataṃsamuṭṭhānakammabhedato sabbassapi akusalassa saṅgahaṇavasena pavatto saraṇapadaniddeso araṇavibhaṅgasuttenapi aññadatthu saṃsandatīti dassetuṃ ‘‘araṇavibhaṅgasutte’’tiādimāha. Yaṃ pana aṭṭhakathāyaṃ sampayogappahānekaṭṭhabhāvadīpanena rāgādīnaṃ sabbesaṃ vā akusaladhammānaṃ saraṇabhāvadassanaṃ, taṃ pāḷiyā yathādassitadhammānaṃ aññamaññasaraṇabhāvadassanaparaṃ, tadaññadhammānaṃ saraṇabhāvapaṭisedhanaparanti araṇavibhaṅgasuttavirodhoti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Suttantadesanāya vā pariyāyakathābhāvato nippariyāyato saraṇabhāvo viya araṇabhāvopi akusaladhammānaṃyevāti tathāpavattāya aṭṭhakathāya na koci suttavirodhoti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

1301. Just as there is a mode of co-occurrence for states arising in a single thought-moment, so too for those arising in a single continuum. Therefore, due to the singleness of abandonment, the delusion accompanied by doubt and restlessness is said to be 'with defilement' by means of the defilement of greed. The delusion that arises together with restlessness and doubt is also 'with defilement' through greed, because of having the single nature of abandonment. To show that the explanation of the term 'saraṇa' (with defilement), which proceeds by way of including all unwholesome states—due to the distinctions of greed, hatred, delusion, the defilements of a single nature with them, the aggregates associated with them, and the kamma originating from them—certainly accords with the Araṇavibhaṅga Sutta, he said 'in the Araṇavibhaṅga Sutta' and so on. However, the commentary's showing of the state of being 'with defilement' for all defilements such as greed, or all unwholesome states, through the elucidation of the state of association and the single nature of abandonment, is intended to show the state of being 'with defilement' for the phenomena mentioned in the Pāḷi in relation to each other, and is intended to deny the state of being 'with defilement' for other phenomena; therefore, it should be seen as contradicting the Araṇavibhaṅga Sutta. Or, since the Suttanta teaching is a discourse with an indirect meaning, the state of being 'with defilement' in an absolute sense, like the state of being 'without defilement' (araṇa), belongs only to unwholesome states; therefore, for the commentary that proceeds in that way, there is no contradiction with the sutta; this should be seen.

Suttantikadukanikkhepakathāvaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Discourse on the Summary of Suttanta Dyads

1313. Ahaṃ-saddena hetubhūtena yo atthoti ettha ahaṃ-saddo atthoti adhippeto. Atthāvabodhanattho hi saddappayogo. Atthaparādhīno kevalo atthapadatthako, so padatthavipariyesakārinā pana iti-saddena parato payuttena saddapadatthako jāyati yathā gāvīti ayamāhāti go-saddaṃ āhāti viññāyati. Tena viññattivikārasahito saddo paññattīti dasseti. Tathā hi ‘‘buddhassa bhagavato [Pg.190] vohāro lokiyasote paṭihaññatī’’tiādinā (kathā. 347) paññattiyā vacanabhāvaṃ sādhayati. Aññathātiādinā paññattiyā asaddasabhāvatte dosamāha. Adhivacanāditā siyā, tathā ca adhivacanādīnaṃ adhivacanapathādito viseso na siyāti dukoyeva na sambhaveyyāti adhippāyo. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana sakasantatipariyāpanne rūpādayo dhamme samūhato santānato ca ekattavasena gahetvā ahanti vohariyamānā upādāpaññatti saṅkhāyati voharīyatīti saṅkhāti adhippetā. Tathā sesesu yathāsambhavaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘dattoti ettāvatā sattapaññattiṃ dassetvā aññampi upādāpaññattiṃ dassetu’’ntiādi. Padatthassāti ahaṃ-saddādipadābhidheyyassa, paramatthassa vā. Adhivacanaṃ saddoti adhippāyena ‘‘vadantenā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. So hi attanā ñāpetabbamatthaṃ sayaṃ ñāto eva ñāpetīti aggahitasambandhassa na saddo atthappakāsanasamatthoti vuttaṃ ‘‘pubbe gahitasaññenā’’ti. Visesena ñāyatīti samaññāti saṃ-saddassa visesatthataṃ āha.

1313. Here, regarding the phrase 'the meaning which is [conveyed] by the word 'I' as the cause', it is intended that the word 'I' itself is the meaning. For the use of a word is for the purpose of understanding the meaning. A mere word is dependent on its meaning and has that meaning as its content. But when the word 'iti' is used after it by one who reverses the content of the word, it comes to have the sound as its content, just as when one says 'gāvīti' (thus, 'cow'), it is understood as 'he says the word "go"'. Thus, he shows that a word, accompanied by the modification of communication, is a designation. Indeed, as stated in the phrase 'the speech of the Blessed Buddha is obstructed by the worldly ear,' etc., he establishes the nature of speech as designation. By 'if it were otherwise,' etc., he states the fault in designation being without the nature of a word. It would be a mere term, etc., and thus there would be no distinction between terms and the path of terms, etc., so that the dyad itself would not be possible—such is the intention. In the commentary, however, it is intended that the dependent designation is reckoned and spoken of as a concept—'I' being used with regard to phenomena such as form included within one's own continuity, having grasped them as a unity from the perspective of accumulation and continuity. The same should be seen in other cases as appropriate. Hence, he said, 'By saying "Dattoti" (thus, "Datta"), having shown the designation of a being, he shows another dependent designation,' etc. 'Of the word's meaning' means of that which is denoted by words like 'I', or of the ultimate reality. With the intention that a term is a word, 'by one speaking,' etc., is said. For a word makes known the meaning that is to be conveyed by it only when the word itself is known; thus it is said that for one who has not grasped the connection, a word is not capable of revealing the meaning: 'by a sign previously grasped.' 'It is known specifically (visesena ñāyati), therefore it is a common term (samaññā)'; thus he states the meaning of 'specifically' for the prefix 'saṃ-'.

Karīyatīti idaṃ imassatthassa adhivacananti evaṃ nikkhipīyati. Nāmabhūtaṃ vacanameva taṃ taṃ atthaṃ niddhāretvā sahetukaṃ katvā vadati byañjayati cāti āha ‘‘nāmamicceva vuttaṃ hotī’’ti. Tenevāha ‘‘na hi pathavī’’tiādi. Pathavīsaṅkhātanti pathavī-saddābhidheyyaṃ.

'It is made'—this is a term for this meaning; thus it is laid down. The utterance, being a name, having determined that particular meaning and made it causal, speaks and manifests it; thus he says, 'It is just a name that is spoken.' Therefore, he said, 'For it is not the earth,' and so on. 'That which is termed earth' means that which is denoted by the word 'earth'.

Ācariyāti aṭṭhakathāya saṃvaṇṇanakā ācariyā, na aṭṭhakathācariyāti adhippāyena vadati. Mātikāyanti mātikāvaṇṇanāyaṃ. Tenāti mātikāvaṇṇanāvacanena. Imissā pāḷiyā aṭṭhakathāya ca atthadassanassa etassa yathāvuttassa ācariyavādassa virodho siyā, tameva virodhaṃ ‘‘na hī’’tiādinā vivarati. Tattha adhivacanapathādibhāvena vuttānaṃ dhammānaṃ pakāsakassa sabhāvassa viññattivikārasahitasaddasseva vacanamattaṃ adhikāraṃ katvā pavattiādi yujjati, na asabhāvassāti adhippāyena ‘‘uppādavayakiccarahitassā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha aniddhāritasabhāvassāti paramatthato anupaladdhasabhāvassa.

'Teachers' means the teachers who are the expositors of the commentary, not the 'Commentary-Teachers' (Aṭṭhakathācariyas); this is the intended meaning with which he speaks. 'In the mātikā' means in the explanation of the mātikā. 'By that' means by the words of the mātikā's explanation. There might be a contradiction between the showing of the meaning of this Pāḷi text and its commentary, and this aforementioned view of the teachers; he explains that very contradiction with 'for it is not,' etc. Therein, for the phenomena spoken of in terms of the path of terms and so on, it is fitting that their occurrence, etc., takes as its basis only the mere utterance of a word—which is accompanied by the modification of communication and reveals its own nature—and not that which lacks intrinsic nature; with this intention, the phrase 'devoid of the function of arising and passing away,' etc., is stated. Therein, 'of undetermined intrinsic nature' means of a nature not found in an ultimate sense.

Duvidhāti paññāpanapaññāpitabbabhedato duvidhā. Yathāvuttappakārāti uppādavayakiccarahitātiādippakārā. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ puggalapaññattivaṇṇanāyaṃ. Nanu [Pg.191] ca tattha upanidhāpaññattiādayo aparāpi paññattiyo vuttā, atha kasmā ‘‘cha paññattiyova vuttā’’ti vuttaṃ? Saccaṃ vuttā, tā pana vijjamānapaññattiādīsu chasu eva antogadhāti ‘‘aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vijjamānapaññattiādayo cha paññattiyova vuttā’’ti vuttaṃ.

'Twofold' means twofold by the distinction between that which designates and that which is to be designated. 'Of the aforementioned kind' means of the kind that is 'devoid of the function of arising and passing away,' and so on. In the commentary, in the explanation of the Designation of Persons. Now, were not other designations mentioned there as well, such as the designation by way of comparison, and so on? So why is it said, 'Only six designations are mentioned'? It is true they were mentioned, but they are all included within the six, such as the existent designation, etc. Therefore, it is said in the commentary, 'Only six designations—the existent designation and so on—are mentioned'.

Tattha rūpādi viya avijjamānattā paññāpitabbattā ca avijjamānapaññatti, avijjamānassa ca sattarathādiatthassa paññāpanato avijjamānapaññattīti evaṃ avijjamānapaññattivacanena yathāvuttā duvidhāpi paññatti saṅgahitāti āha ‘‘avijjamāna…pe… vuttā’’ti. Itarehīti vijjamānapaññattiādīhi avasesehi pañcahi, rūpavedanādīnaṃ sattarathādīnañca atthānaṃ pakārehi ñāpanato taṃtaṃvācako saddoyeva visayabhedato vijjamānapaññattiādibhedā paññatti saṅkhādīhi dasahi padehi vuttāti ayaṃ purimo attho, so ca yathārutavaseneva pāḷiyā viññāyamānattā ‘‘pāḷianugato ujuko’’ti ca vutto. Yadi cātiādīsu sattādikā yathāvuttappakārā upādāpaññatti yadi avijjamānapaññatti, sā atthīti na vattabbā. Avijjamānā ca sā paññāpitabbato paññatti cāti tesaṃ ācariyānaṃ laddhīti adhippāyo. Idāni tassā laddhiyā vasena paññattipathāti vuttadhammānampi vijjamānapaññattibhāvāpatticodanena tattha dosaṃ dasseti ‘‘yathā cā’’tiādinā. Tatoti yasmā avijjamānattā paññāpitabbattā ca sattarathādīnaṃ avijjamānapaññattibhāvo viya vijjamānattā paññāpitabbattā ca sabbesaṃ sabhāvadhammānaṃ vijjamānapaññattibhāvo āpajjati, tasmāti attho.

Therein, unlike form and so on, because of its non-existence and because it is to be designated, it is a 'non-existent designation'; and because it is a designation of a non-existent meaning such as a being, a chariot, etc., it is a 'non-existent designation'. Thus, by the term 'non-existent designation,' both types of designations as mentioned are included, as he says: 'non-existent... etc. are spoken.' By 'the others' is meant the remaining five, beginning with 'existent designation'. Because it makes known in various ways the meanings of things like form and feeling, and of things like beings and chariots, the respective designating word itself, due to the difference in its object, is the designation which has divisions such as 'existent designation', and is spoken of by the ten terms beginning with 'concept'. This is the first meaning, and because it is understood from the Pāḷi just as it is written, it is called 'straightforward and in accordance with the Pāḷi.' Now, in the phrases 'if so,' etc., if the dependent designation of the aforementioned kind, such as 'being,' etc., is a non-existent designation, then it cannot be said that it exists. And because it is non-existent and is to be designated, it is a designation—this is the view held by those teachers. Now, based on that view, he points out a flaw there by charging that even the phenomena stated as 'path of designation' attain the state of existent designation, as shown by the phrase 'just as,' etc. 'Therefore' means: just as beings, chariots, etc., have the status of 'non-existent designations' because they are non-existent and are to be designated, so too all phenomena with intrinsic nature would attain the status of 'existent designations' because they exist and are to be designated.

‘‘Athā’’tiādinā paññattipathaniddesato visiṭṭhassa paññattidhammaniddesassa sayameva kāraṇamāsaṅkati. ‘‘Nāpī’’tiādinā tassa kāraṇassa asiddhataṃ dasseti. ‘‘Purisoti saṅkhā’’tiādīsu saṅkhādayopi nāmādīhi atthato avisiṭṭhā vuttāti āha ‘‘saṅkhādisaddānaṃ samānatthattā’’ti. Vacanaggahaṇaṃ vacanuccāraṇaṃ. Aññassāti nāmapaññattiṃ sandhāyāha. Tesanti saṅketaggahaṇavacanaggahaṇānaṃ. Asamatthatā na sambhavatīti yojanā. Tameva asambhavaṃ ‘‘yadi hī’’tiādinā vivarati. Paññattiyāti nāmapaññattiyā. Paññattipaññāpaneti yāya nāmapaññattiyā upādāyapaññatti rūpādayo ca paññāpīyanti, yā ca sotadvāraviññāṇasantānānantaramuppannena gahitapubbasaṅketena manodvāraviññāṇasantānena gayhati, sā ayaṃ nāmāti tassā [Pg.192] paññāpane asaṅkarato ṭhapane. Atha vā sotadvāraviññāṇasantānānantaramuppannena manodvāraviññāṇasantānena paññattiyā gāhāpane paricchindane. Tassā aññā paññatti vattabbā siyāti tassā nāmapaññattiyā ñāpane saṅketaggahaṇavacanaggahaṇānaṃ sahakārīkāraṇabhūtā aññā nāmapaññatti atthīti vattabbā anuññātabbā siyā. Tato atthavijānanameva na siyāti kevalāni saṅketaggahaṇavacanaggahaṇāni atthapaññāpane viya paññattiñāpanepi asamatthāni, paññatti ca ñātāyeva tesaṃ sahakārīkāraṇaṃ taṃjānanatthaṃ paññattianantaraparikappane ca anavatthānāpattīti atthādhigamassa sambhavo eva na bhaveyya.

By 'Then,' etc., he himself raises a doubt as to the reason for the distinct designation of conceptual phenomena from the designation of the path of concepts. By 'Nor,' etc., he shows that reason to be unestablished. In phrases like 'A person is a concept,' etc., it is said that even concepts, etc., are not distinct in meaning from names, etc., hence he says, 'because words like "concept" have the same meaning.' The grasping of speech is the utterance of a word. 'Of another' refers to name-designation. 'Of these' refers to the grasping of conventions and the grasping of speech. The construction is that incapability is not possible. That very impossibility is explained by 'if indeed,' etc. 'By designation' means by name-designation. 'In the designating of designation' means: in establishing without confusion that this is the name-designation by which dependent designation and forms, etc., are designated, and which is grasped by the stream of mind-door consciousness—which has previously grasped the convention—arising immediately after the stream of ear-door consciousness. Or, it means in causing the designation to be grasped and delimited by the stream of mind-door consciousness arising immediately after the stream of ear-door consciousness. If another designation were to be stated for it, then for making known that name-designation, another name-designation, serving as a supporting cause for the grasping of conventions and the grasping of speech, would have to be stated and acknowledged as existing. Then, the very understanding of meaning would not be possible. Just as the mere grasping of conventions and the grasping of speech are incapable of designating meaning, so too are they incapable of indicating designation; and since designation is their supporting cause only when it is known, and for the purpose of knowing it, in conceiving of a designation immediately after, there would be an infinite regress, the attainment of meaning would simply not be possible.

Saṅketo rūpādīsu na kiñci hoti, bhūtādinimittaṃ bhāvanāvisesañca upādāya vohariyamānā kasiṇādipaññatti viya taṃ taṃ saṅketitabbaṃ saṅketakaraṇañca upādāya vohāramatto, tassa ca paññāpikā nāmapaññattīti yathāvuttadosāpattiṃ dassento ‘‘nāpi saṅketaggahaṇa’’nti avoca. Nanu ca atthavijānanāsambhavacodaneneva saṅketaggahaṇābhavopi dassitoti? Saccametaṃ, saṅkete pana ācariyānaṃ matibhedo vijjati. Tattha ekapakkhiko ayaṃ dosoti dassanatthaṃ tassa visuṃ vacanaṃ vuccamānā rūpādayo dhammāvacanatthā paññāpitabbā ca, tadabhidhāyako saddo paññattīti. Ettāvatā sabbavohāro sijjhatīti adhippāyena ‘‘vacana…pe… janaṃ natthī’’ti āha. Paññattiyā vacanabhāvo siddho paṭihananasotabbatādīpakattā tesaṃ pāṭhānanti adhippāyo. Ādi-saddena ‘‘atthi keci buddhassa bhagavato vohāraṃ suṇanti, niruttipaṭisambhidā paccuppannārammaṇā’’ti evamādiṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Tasmāti yasmā ‘‘paññattidhammā’’ti padassa yathāvuttapaññattiyo atthoti etasmiṃ pakkhe mātikāvaṇṇanāya virodho, aṭṭhakathāyaṃ avuttatā, imissā pāḷiyā ananugamo, sabbe dhammā paññattīti niddisitabbatā, paññattipathapadassa navattabbatā, anavatthānāpattito atthavijānanāsambhavoti aneke dosā, viññattivikārasahitassa pana saddassa paññattibhāve yathāvuttadosābhāvo anekesaṃ pāṭhappadesānañca anulomanaṃ, tasmā. Tattha yuttaṃ gahetabbanti adhippāyenāha ‘‘pāḷi…pe… tabbo’’ti.

A convention is nothing in regard to forms and so on; it is merely a conventional usage based on this and that which is to be conventionally signified and the making of the convention, just like the kasiṇa-designation, etc., which is used based on the sign of the elements and a specific meditation. And showing that the previously stated fault would apply if the name-designation were what makes that convention known, he said, 'nor the grasping of convention.' But is not the absence of the grasping of convention also shown by the very objection that the understanding of meaning is impossible? This is true. However, regarding convention, there is a difference of opinion among the teachers. To show that this fault applies to one side, it is stated separately that forms and other phenomena are to be designated for the purpose of speaking of them, and the word that expresses them is a designation. With the intention that by this much all conventional usage is established, he said, 'speech... no person.' The intention is that the nature of designation as speech is established because their texts indicate impingement and audibility. By the word 'ādi' (and so on), he includes such things as, 'There are some who hear the conventional usage of the Blessed One, the Buddha, and for whom the analytical knowledge of language has a present object.' Therefore: since, in the position that the meaning of the term 'conceptual phenomena' is that the aforementioned designations exist, there are many faults—a contradiction with the commentary on the matrix, its not being stated in the commentary, non-conformity with this Pāli text, the necessity of indicating that all phenomena are designations, the term 'path of concepts' becoming unsayable, and the impossibility of understanding the meaning due to falling into an infinite regress—whereas, when sound accompanied by the modification of intimation is taken as designation, there is an absence of the aforementioned faults and a conformity with many textual passages, therefore... With the intention that what is suitable therein should be accepted, he said, 'the Pāli... should be accepted.'

Yadi [Pg.193] sattātiādinā saddassa paññattibhāve aṭṭhakathāya virodhamāha. Evaṃ paññattibhāve yadi saddassa paññattibhāvo, tassa paramatthato vijjamānattā rūpādiatthassa ca paññāpanato vijjamānapaññattibhāvo eva siyā, na avijjamānapaññattibhāvo. Na hi te sattādayo paññattīti. Evañca avijjamānapaññattiyā abhāvo eva siyā. Vuttā ca aṭṭhakathāyaṃ (pa. pa. aṭṭha. 1 mātikāvaṇṇanā) ‘‘avijjamānapaññattī’’ti. Itaro visayassa avijjamānattā tassa avijjamānapaññattibhāvoti yathāvuttavirodhābhāvaṃ dassento ‘‘avijjamānāna’’ntiādimāha. Idāni sattādivisayassa kenacipi pariyāyena atthitāya abhāvadassanena tabbisayāya paññattiyā avijjamānapaññattibhāvaṃyeva vavatthapeti ‘‘ayañca vādo’’ti. Vijjamānā eva sattādayo rūpādisabhāvābhāvavasena ‘‘avijjamānā’’ti vuccanti, na sabbathā abhāvato. Tathā hi tathā tathā paññāpiyamānabhāvena viññāyantīti yathāvuttarūpo vādo ‘‘rūpaṃ atthīti? Hevatthi heva natthīti. Sevatthi seva natthīti. Na hevaṃ vattabbe. Sevatthi seva natthīti. Āmantā. Atthaṭṭho natthaṭṭho’’ti (kathā. 306) evaṃ pavattāya hevatthikathāya. Tattha hi rūpādayo dhammā rūpādisabhāvena atthi, vedanādisabhāvena natthi, tasmā sabbamevidaṃ evaṃ atthi evaṃ natthīti evaṃladdhike sandhāya ‘‘rūpaṃ atthī’’ti pucchā sakavādissa. ‘‘Hevatthi heva natthī’’ti vissajjanaṃ paravādissa. Atha naṃ sakavādī yadi rūpameva evaṃ atthi evaṃ natthīti laddhi, evaṃ sante so eva atthi so eva natthi nāmāti pucchanto ‘‘sevatthī’’ti āha. Itaro teneva sabhāvena atthitaṃ, teneva natthitaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho sakabhāvena atthitaṃ, parabhāvena natthitaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Tato sakavādī ‘‘atthaṭṭho natthaṭṭho’’tiādinā atthitā vā natthitā vā aññamaññaviruddhā ekasmiṃ dhamme vinā kālabhedena asambhavattāti kiṃ ekattaṃ āpajjatīti dassento paravādiṃ niggaṇhātīti. Paṭisiddhoti ca ‘‘rūpaṃ ‘rūpa’nti hevatthi, rūpaṃ ‘vedanā’ti heva natthī’’tiādinā (kathā. 306) vuttāya rūpavedanāsaññāsaṅkhāraviññāṇānaṃ sakabhāvena atthitāya parabhāvena natthitāya ca paṭisedhanena sattādīnampi tathābhāvo paṭisedhito hotīti katvā vuttaṃ.

By 'If a being,' etc., he states the contradiction with the commentary regarding the word's being a designation. If, in this way, the word is a designation, then because of its existing in an ultimate sense and because of its making known the meaning of form, etc., it would indeed be a designation of what exists, not a designation of what does not exist. For those beings, etc., are not designations. And thus, there would indeed be an absence of the designation of what does not exist. But it is stated in the commentary (Pa. Pa. Aṭṭha. 1, Mātikāvaṇṇanā): 'a designation of what does not exist.' The other, showing that there is no contradiction as stated, says 'of non-existent things,' etc., meaning that because the object is non-existent, it is a designation of what does not exist. Now, with 'And this is the argument,' he establishes that the designation concerning the object, beings, etc., is indeed a designation of what does not exist, by showing the absence of its existence in any way whatsoever. Existent beings, etc., are called 'non-existent' on account of the absence of a self-nature as form, etc., not because of being altogether non-existent. For they are known as being designated in such and such a way. Thus, the argument is of the form stated in the Hevatthikathā: 'Does form exist? It exists in one way, it does not exist in another. Does that very thing exist and that very thing not exist? It should not be said thus. Does that very thing exist and that very thing not exist? Yes. The meaning of existence, the meaning of non-existence.' (Kathā. 306). Therein, the phenomena of form, etc., exist by the nature of form, etc., but do not exist by the nature of feeling, etc. Therefore, with reference to one who holds the view that all this exists in one way and does not exist in another, the question 'Does form exist?' is from the proponent of his own doctrine. The reply, 'It exists in one way, it does not exist in another,' is from the opponent. Then the proponent of his own doctrine, if the view is that form itself exists in one way and does not exist in another, this being so, asks, 'Does that very thing exist and that very thing not exist?', saying 'sevatthi...' The other rejects this, with reference to existence and non-existence by the very same nature. When questioned a second time, he admits, with reference to existence by its own nature and non-existence by another's nature. Then the proponent of his own doctrine, with 'the meaning of existence, the meaning of non-existence,' etc., defeats the opponent by showing that existence and non-existence, being mutually contradictory, are impossible in a single phenomenon without a distinction in time, asking if they attain unity. And 'is refuted' is said because, by the refutation of the existence of form, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness by their own nature and their non-existence by another's nature, as stated in 'Form exists as "form," it does not exist as "feeling,"' etc. (Kathā. 306), the similar state of beings, etc., is also considered to be refuted.

Rūpādayo [Pg.194] na hontīti rūpādisabhāvā na honti. Tathā tathāti samūhasantānādivasena. Vicittasaññā parikappavasena uppajjati. Yadi sattarathādisaññāvalambito vacanattho vijjamāno na hoti, nanu sattarathādiabhilāpā anariyavohārā jāyantīti āha ‘‘na ca te abhilāpā’’tiādi. Attano vasena kiñci ahontaṃ paññāpakassa vacanasseva vasena paññāpitabbattā paññattivohāraṃ labhati. Imināva adhippāyenātiādi ‘‘sayaṃ avijjamāno’’tiādinā vuttamevatthaṃ sandhāyāha. Tanti sattādiggahaṇaṃ. ‘‘Brahmavihāracatukkaṃ sattapaññattiṃ ārabbha pavattattā navattabbārammaṇaṃ nāma hotī’’tiādinā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ (dha. sa. aṭṭha. 1421) tattha tattha na vattabbanti vuttaṃ. Yadi parittādibhāvena na vattabbaṃ, kathaṃ avijjamānassa sattādikassa paccayabhāvoti āha ‘‘khandhasamūhasantāna’’ntiādi. Tanti khandhasamūhasantānaṃ. Tadupādānabhūtanti puggaloti gahaṇapaññattīnaṃ kāraṇabhūtaṃ. Yadi puggalasaññāya sevamānassa kusalādiuppatti hoti, kathaṃ puggaladassanaṃ micchādassananti paṭisiddhanti āha ‘‘yasmā panā’’tiādi. Pathavīdhātu upalabbhatīti puggalābhāve vipakkhavasena nidassanamāha. Idañhettha anumānaṃ. Na rūpādayo vivecetvā puggalo upalabbhati tesaṃ aggahaṇe tathārūpāya buddhiyā abhāvato sevanādayo viyāti. Puggalo upalabbhati sacchikaṭṭhaparamatthena yo chaviññāṇaviññeyyoti saṃsarati muccati cāti evaṃ diṭṭhiyā parikappitapuggalova paṭisedhito, na vohārapuggaloti dassento ‘‘paṭise…pe… diṭṭhī’’ti āha.

Forms and so on do not exist, meaning their intrinsic nature as forms and so on does not exist. 'In such and such ways' means by way of collection, continuity, and so on. Diverse perceptions arise based on conceptualization. If the meaning of speech relying on perceptions like 'seven chariots' does not exist, then would not expressions like 'seven chariots' become ignoble usage? Thus, it is said, 'and those expressions are not...' Since what does not exist in its own right is to be designated only by means of the speech of the one who designates, it obtains the usage of a designation. With this very intention, it was said, 'not existing by itself,' and so on, referring to the meaning already stated. 'That' refers to the grasping of 'being' and so on. 'The four divine abidings, because they operate based on the designation of beings, are called 'having an object that is not to be spoken of.'' This is explained in the commentary (DhsA. 1421), where it is said that in certain contexts, they should not be spoken of. If they should not be spoken of in terms of being limited, etc., how can non-existent beings and so on serve as conditions? Thus, it is said, 'the collection and continuity of the aggregates,' etc. 'That' refers to the collection and continuity of the aggregates. That which is its basis is the cause for the designations of grasping 'a person.' If wholesome states and so on arise for one who cultivates the perception of a person, how is the view of a person rejected as wrong view? It is explained: 'But because...' The earth element is found—this is stated as an example from the opposing side, given the absence of a person. Here is the inference: A person is not found separately from forms, etc., because without grasping them, there is no such cognition, just as with service and so on. The person who is found in the ultimate sense of realized truth, who is cognizable by the six sense-consciousnesses, who transmigrates and is liberated—the person conceptualized by such a view is refuted, not the conventional person. To show this, it is said, 'refuted... view.'

Gāthāya pañcasu khandhesu rūpaṃ vedanā saññā cetanā viññāṇanti etesu kaṃ nāma dhammaṃ sattoti jānāsi nu, etesu ekampi sattoti gaṇhituṃ nārahatīti dasseti. Atha etehi añño eko satto atthīti paccesi. Evampi māra diṭṭhigataṃ nu te. Nu-saddo diṭṭhigatameveti avadhāraṇattho. Kasmā? Yasmā suddhasaṅkhārapuñjoyaṃ. Tamevatthaṃ vivarati ‘‘nayidha sattūpalabbhatī’’ti. Yasmā paccakkhato vā anumānato vā anupaladdhito natthi ettha koci satto nāmāti adhippāyo. Yadi satto natthi, kathaṃ satto saṃsāramāpādītiādi nīyatīti. Kimettha netabbaṃ, sattoti vohārasatto adhippeto, yasmā satta-saddo vohāre [Pg.195] pavattatīti. Dutiyagāthāya sambandhaṃ dassento ‘‘satto panā’’tiādimāha. Aṅgasambhārāti aṅgasambhārato akkhacakkaīsādiaṅgasambhāramupādāyāti attho. Sattoti vohāro.

In the verse, regarding the five aggregates—form, feeling, perception, volition, and consciousness—it shows: 'Which phenomenon among these do you know as a being? Not even one of these is fit to be taken as a being.' 'Or do you believe that there is another being apart from these? Even so, Māra, is this your speculative view?' The word 'nu' here has the meaning of emphasis, indicating that this is indeed a speculative view. Why? Because this is merely a heap of pure conditioned phenomena. It clarifies that very meaning by saying, 'No being is found here.' The intention is that there is no such thing as a being here, whether by direct experience, inference, or non-apprehension. If there is no being, how then is it to be understood that 'a being enters saṃsāra,' and so forth? What is to be understood here is that 'being' refers to a conventional being, because the word 'being' functions in conventional speech. Connecting to the second verse, it states: 'But as for the being...' 'From the assemblage of parts' means 'on account of the assemblage of parts,' that is, depending on the assemblage of parts such as the axle, wheel, and pole. 'Being' is a conventional expression.

Avijjamānassāti accantaṃ avijjamānassa sasavisāṇādikassa. Yadi accantaṃ avijjamānaṃ, kathaṃ taṃ gayhatīti āha ‘‘parikappita’’nti. Lokasaññātaṃ ghaṭādi. Ettha pana yathā attānaṃ ārabbha uppajjamānakadhammānaṃ taṃsantatipatitānañca kilesupatāpābhāvena assatthabhāvapaccayatāya uppādādirahitampi nibbānaṃ ‘‘assāsanakarasa’’nti vuccati, evaṃ attānaṃ ārabbha pavattanakadhammavasena uppādādirahitāpi paññatti pavattāti vuttā. Hetuattho vā antonītoti pavattitā vohāritāti attho daṭṭhabbo. Tathā nāmapaññatti paññapetabbamatthaṃ gahitāyeva paññāpeti, viññatti viya adhippāyaṃ viññāpetīti sā gahetabbābhāvato vuccamānatthadvārena vuccamānāti vuttā. Paññāpitabbapaññattiyā pana vuccamānabhāve vattabbameva natthi. Tathā pakārato ñāpanabhāvena ñāpetabbañāpananti katvā gahetabbattāyeva ca tassā aniddhāritasabhāvatā paṭikkhittā daṭṭhabbā. Na hi sabhāvadhammānaṃ kakkhaḷaphusanādi sarūpato saddena vacanīyabhāvaṃ bhajati, apica kho nesaṃ kāladesādibhedabhinnānaṃ vinivattaaññajātiyako sajātiyasādhāraṇo pubbasaṅketānurūpaṃ ajjhāropasiddho sāmaññākāro vacanīyo. Tatthāpi na vinā kenaci pavattinimittena saddo pavattatīti tassa pavattinimittabhūto lokasaṅketasiddho taṃtaṃvacanatthaniyato sāmaññākāraviseso nāma paññattīti pubbācariyā. So hi tasmiṃ tasmiṃ atthe saddaṃ nāmeti, tassa tassa vā atthassa nāmasaññaṃ karotīti nāmaṃ, pakārehi ñāpanato paññatti cāti.

‘Of the non-existent’ means of what is absolutely non-existent, like a hare's horn and so forth. If it is absolutely non-existent, how is it grasped? It is said to be ‘conceptualized.’ What is known by the world is a pot and so forth. Here, just as Nibbāna, though devoid of arising and so forth, is called ‘the taste of relief’ because it is a condition for being at ease, due to the absence of the torment of defilements for the phenomena that arise in relation to oneself and those that fall into that continuum, so too, a designation, though devoid of arising and so forth, is said to function by way of the phenomena that proceed in relation to oneself. Or, the meaning of ‘cause’ is implied, so the meaning should be understood as ‘it functions’ or ‘it is expressed.’ Similarly, a name-designation, having grasped the meaning to be designated, makes it known, just as an intimation makes an intention known. Thus, because it is not something to be grasped, it is called ‘what is spoken of’ by way of the meaning being spoken. However, regarding the state of being spoken of by the designation that is to be designated, there is nothing further to be said. Similarly, by way of its nature of making known, it should be understood as ‘making known what is to be made known,’ and because it is to be grasped, its state of having an undetermined nature should be seen as rejected. For intrinsic phenomena, such as hardness, contact, etc., do not, in terms of their own nature, become expressible by sound. Rather, their common characteristic, which is distinct from other kinds, common to its own kind, and established through superimposition in accordance with prior convention, is expressible, even though they are differentiated by distinctions of time, place, and so forth. Even there, a sound does not function without some basis for its occurrence. Therefore, the ancient teachers say that that particular general form, which is established by worldly convention, determined as the meaning of specific words, and which is the basis for a sound’s function, is called a ‘name-designation.’ For it directs a sound to this or that meaning, or it creates the perception of a name for this or that meaning—thus, it is a ‘name’; and because it makes known through modes, it is a ‘designation.’

Kassa pana so ākāravisesoti? Paññāpetabbatthassāti veditabbaṃ. Anekākārā hi atthāti. Evañca katvā tassā paññattiyā gahetabbatāvacanañca samatthitaṃ bhavati, avassañca etamevaṃ sampaṭicchitabbaṃ. Aññathā vacanavacanīyabhedānaṃ saṅkaro siyā, sabbopi attho sabbassa saddassa vacanīyo, sabbo ca saddo sabbassa atthassa vācakoti na cettha saṅketaggahaṇeneva tesaṃ pavattāti sakkā vattuṃ vavatthitesu eva tesu saṅketaggahaṇassa pavattito.

‘But of what is that particular form?’ It should be understood as ‘of the meaning to be designated.’ For meanings are of many forms. And this being so, the statement about the graspability of that designation is also established, and certainly this alone should be accepted. Otherwise, there would be a confusion of the distinctions between the expression and the expressible. Every meaning would be expressible by every sound, and every sound would be the designator of every meaning—but here, it cannot be said that their functioning occurs merely through the grasping of convention, because the grasping of convention occurs only in regard to those things that are already determined.

Apare [Pg.196] pana ‘‘yathā dhūmato aggianumāne na kevalena dhūmeneva aggi viññāyati, dhūmassa pana agginā avinābhāvasaṅkhāto sambandho viññāyamāno dhūmena aggi viññāyati, evaṃ saddena atthavijānane na kevalena saddena tadattho viññāyati. Taṃtaṃsaddassa pana tena tena atthena avinābhāvasaṅkhāto sambandho viññāyamāno tena tena saddena atthaṃ ñāpetīti veditabbaṃ. Aññathā aggahitasambandhenapi saddasavanamattena tadattho viññāyeyyāti. Yo yamettha yathāvuttarūpo sambandho, so tassa tassa atthassa saññāpanabhāvena nāmanti paramatthato abhāvā lokasaṅketavasena lokasaṅketoti vā siddho ñātoti lokasaṅketasiddhoti, saddena pakāsiyamānānaṃ atthappakārānaṃ adhigamahetutāya pakārato ñāpanato paññattīti ca vutto’’ti vaṇṇayanti.

Others, however, explain: ‘Just as in inferring fire from smoke, fire is not known by smoke alone—rather, when the connection between smoke and fire, described as their inseparability, is recognized, fire is known by smoke—so too, in understanding meaning by sound, that meaning is not known by sound alone. Rather, it should be understood that when the connection between a particular sound and a particular meaning, described as their inseparability, is recognized, it makes the meaning known through that particular sound. Otherwise, the meaning would be known by merely hearing a sound, even by one who has not grasped its connection. That connection, of the nature described herein, is called ‘name’ because of its nature of making that particular meaning known. Because it does not exist in an ultimate sense, it is known as ‘worldly convention,’ or, being established in accordance with worldly convention, as ‘established by worldly convention.’ And because it is a cause for the comprehension of the types of meanings expressed through sound, and because it makes known through modes, it is also called ‘designation.’

Saṅkhatāsaṅkhatavinimuttassapi ñeyyavisesassa abhāve ghaṭādisaddābhidheyyā viya pathavīphassādisaddavacanīyopi na labbhatiyevāti sabbavohāralopo siyā. Yasmā ca rūpārūpadhammā pabandhasaṅkhātataṃtaṃvisesākāravaseneva pavattanti, na kevalā, tasmā tesaṃ te saṇṭhānasamūhaavatthāvisesākārā yadipi paramatthato kiñci na honti, paramatthato pana vijjamānānaṃ rūpādīnaṃ upādānānaṃ vasena vijjamānabhāvaṃ labhitvā taṃtaṃgahaṇānurūpaṃ taṃtaṃabhilāpādhikaraṇaṃ bhavati. Upādāyapaññatti hi upādānato yathā aññā anaññāti ca na vattabbā, evaṃ sabbathā atthi natthīti ca na vattabbā. Tayopi hi ete santāyevāti evaṃ tāva mātikāvaṇṇanāya na koci virodho. Saṅkhāyati saṃkathīyatīti saṅkhāti ayamattho kathetabbabhāvena vacanattheyeva niruḷho, na vacanasminti vacanapakkhassa ujukatā sambhavati. Vacanapakkhoyeva pāḷianugato, na paramparāgato yathāvutto atthoti kuto panetaṃ labbhā. Na hi anīto attho pāḷiananugato, nāpi sabbā pāḷinītatthā evāti yathāvuttā duvidhā paññattiyo aṭṭhakathāyaṃ chahi paññattīhi yathāsambhavaṃ vuttāyevāti siddhametaṃ atthīti na vattabbāti.

In the absence of a special knowable thing liberated from the conditioned and the unconditioned, just as what is denoted by words like ‘pot’ is not found to be expressible by words like ‘earth-contact’, so all conventional usage would be lost. And because material and immaterial phenomena occur only by way of the particular forms of their respective continuities, not independently, their particular forms of configuration, collection, and state—though ultimately they are nothing—having obtained an existing state by means of ultimately existing things like form and so forth, become the basis for conventional speech in accordance with their respective graspings. For a designation based on a basis of clinging, just as it cannot be said to be different or not different from its basis, so too it cannot be said to absolutely exist or not exist. These three, indeed, are merely existent. Thus, in this commentary on the matrix, there is no contradiction. ‘It is reckoned’ (saṅkhāyati) and ‘it is discussed’ (saṃkathīyati) mean ‘reckoning’ (saṅkhā). This meaning is established in the sense of the word by way of being what is to be spoken of, not in the word itself. Thus, the correctness of the position of the word is possible. The position of the word alone is in accordance with the Pāli, not the traditional interpretation as stated. From where, then, is this obtained? For a meaning that is not inferred is not in accordance with the Pāli, nor is all Pāli of inferred meaning. As previously stated, the two kinds of designations, those described in the commentary as sixfold as may be appropriate, are established. Thus this is settled: ‘It cannot be said that it exists.’

Yadi paramatthato atthitāpaṭisedho, iṭṭhametaṃ. Atha vohārato, sattarathaghaṭādīhi sattarathādivacanappayogoyeva na sambhaveyyāti. Na [Pg.197] hi vacanīyarahito vacanappayogo atthīti. Paramatthadhammānaṃ asabhāvadhammabhūtāya paññattiyā vibhāgadassanatthā adhivacanādidukattayadesanāti na paramatthadhammānaṃ rūpādīnaṃ paññattibhāvāpattīti. Na ca paññattipathapaññattidhammaniddesānaṃ avisesavacanaṃ yuttaṃ, saddasseva pana paññattibhāve siyā kāci tesaṃ visesamattā. Paññāpitabbassa aparamatthasabhāvasseva paññattibhāvo adhippetoti na sabbo paññattipatho paññattisaddena vutto, paññatti ca paññāpetabbabhāvena vuttāti paññattipathapadaṃ vattabbameva. Evañcetaṃ icchitabbaṃ. Itarathā saddassa ca paññāpitabbatāya paññattipathabhāvoti paññattipadaṃ na vattabbaṃ siyāti ca sakkā vattuṃ, nikkhepakaṇḍe vibhattāyeva paññatti ‘‘puriso māgaṇḍiyo’’ti etthāpi dassitāti na na sakkā vattuṃ. Tathāpi hi yathāvuttaupādāyapaññattināmapaññattīnaṃ sabhāvasambhavatoti saṅkhādisaddānaṃ samānatthatāpi tesaṃ matimattameva, viññatti viya adhippāyaṃ viññāpentā sayaṃ ñātāyeva nāmapaññatti paññāpetabbamatthaṃ paññāpeti gahitasarūpatāya padīpo viya rūpagatavidhaṃsaneti na paññattiantaraparikappanena payojanaṃ atthi paññāpetabbatthapaññāpane, nāmapaññattipaññāpane pana upādānabhedabhinnā upādāyapaññatti viya taṃtaṃvacanavacanatthabhedabhinnā nāmapaññattīti aññā paññatti icchitā eva. Na ca anavatthānadoso taṃtaṃvacanassa tadatthavibhāvane sahakārīkāraṇabhāvena paṭiniyatasarūpattā. Etena saṅketaggahaṇābhāvopi paṭisiddho daṭṭhabbo, tathā nāmapaññattiyā payojanābhāvo. Dassitappayojanā hi sā pubbeti.

If there is a denial of existence from the ultimate standpoint, that is acceptable. But from the conventional standpoint, the use of terms for a living being, a chariot, a pot, and so forth would not be possible. For there can be no use of terms without something to be designated. The teaching of the three pairs beginning with 'designation' is to show the distinction of a designation, which is a phenomenon without intrinsic nature, so there is no falling into the state of being a designation for ultimate realities like form and so forth. Nor is it appropriate to speak without distinction of the path of designation and the indication of designated phenomena. However, if sound itself were the designation, there might be some slight distinction between them. What is intended is that designation is the state of what is to be designated, which itself has a non-ultimate nature. Not every path of designation is spoken of by the word 'designation', and 'designation' is spoken of by way of being what is to be designated. Therefore, the term 'path of designation' should indeed be stated. And this is to be desired. Otherwise, since both the word and what is to be designated have the state of being a path of designation, it could be said that the term 'designation' should not be stated. Yet it can indeed be said, for in the chapter on classification, the designation is analyzed and also shown here: 'the person Māgaṇḍiya'. Even so, because of the arising of the nature of designations based on a basis and name-designations as stated, the synonymity of words like 'saṅkhā' is merely their opinion. Just as communication makes known an intention, a name-designation, being itself known, makes known the meaning to be designated. Because its own nature is grasped, like a lamp revealing form by dispelling darkness, there is no need for contriving another designation in making known the meaning to be designated. But in making known a name-designation, just as a designation based on a basis is differentiated by the different bases, so a name-designation is differentiated by the different words and meanings of those words; thus another designation is indeed desired. And there is no fault of infinite regress, because the nature of each word is fixed as a cooperative cause in clarifying its meaning. By this, the absence of grasping a convention is also to be seen as refuted, as is the absence of purpose in name-designations. For its purpose has already been shown earlier.

‘‘Vohāro lokiyasote paṭihaññatī’’tiādīsu sotabbassa saddassa vasena tabbisayabhūtā vohārādayo paṭihananasotabbatāpariyāyena vuttāti daṭṭhabbā. Saddoyeva vā tattha vohārādisahacāritāya tathā vutto. Na hi sakkā sabbattha ekarasā desanā pavattīti vattuṃ. Tathā hi katthaci sukhā dukkhā, sukhāpi vedanā dukkhāti vuccanti, dukkhā sukhā, dukkhāpi sukhāti, evaṃ yathāvuttā duvidhāpi paññatti adhivacanādipāṭhassa atthabhāvena aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttāyevāti. Ayaṃ saṅkhatāsaṅkhatavinimuttaṃ ñeyyavisesaṃ icchantānaṃ vasena vinicchayo.

In contexts such as, ‘Conventional speech impinges upon the worldly ear,’ it should be understood that conventional speech and so forth, which are the objects of audible sound, are spoken of by the figurative expression of impinging and being audible. Or, alternatively, sound itself is spoken of in that way because of its association with conventional speech and the like. For it is not possible to say that the teaching proceeds with a uniform flavor in every case. For example, in some places pleasant feelings are called painful, and even a pleasant feeling is called painful; while painful feelings are called pleasant, and even a painful feeling is called pleasant. Thus, both types of designation, as described above, are mentioned in the commentary as being the meaning of the text beginning with ‘designation’ and so on. This is the analysis from the perspective of those who wish for a special knowable thing liberated from the conditioned and the unconditioned.

1316. Satipi paresaṃ sāmaññādināmakārakānaṃ nāmakaraṇabhāve parānapekkhatāya tato ativiya yutto idha nāmakaraṇasabhāvo ukkaṃsaparicchedena [Pg.198] nāmakaraṇatthoti adhippetoti dassetuṃ ‘‘aññaṃ anapekkhitvā’’tiādimāha. Nāmakaraṇasabhāvatā na hoti asabhāvikatāya kadācideva pavattito cāti adhippāyo. Sabhāvasiddhattāti vedanādīnaṃ vedanādināmakaraṇadhammataṃ āha. Yadi vedanādīnaṃ kenaci akataṃ sakanāmaṃ ādāyayeva pavattanato opapātikanāmānaṃ nāmakaraṇaṭṭhena nāmabhāvo, evaṃ sati pathavīādīnampi nāmabhāvo āpajjati, aññathā pathavīādinidassanameva na siyāti anuyogaṃ manasi katvā āha ‘‘pathavīādinidassanenā’’tiādi. Ekadesasāmaññena hi yathādhippetena upamā hoti, na sabbasāmaññenāti. Evampi yadi sabhāvasiddhanāmattā vedanādayo nāmaṃ, pathavīādīnampi anivattanīyo nāmabhāvoti āha ‘‘niruḷhattā’’tiādi. Tena yaṃnimittaṃ vedanādīsu nāmasaddappavatti, satipi tadaññesaṃ taṃnimittayoge go-saddo viya kukkuṭādisattapiṇḍe niruḷhato vedanādīsu nāma-saddo pavattoti dasseti. Tathā hi anekesu suttapadesesu tesaṃyeva nāmavohāro dissati. Nāmatānāpatti vuttā kesakumbhādināmantarāpajjanato. Etamevatthaṃ nidassanabhāvena ‘‘na hī’’tiādinā vivarati. Yadipi samūhādighanavinibbhogābhāvato vedanādiarūpadhammesupi piṇḍākārena gahaṇaṃ pavattati, taṃ pana yebhuyyena atthātiparikappamukhena ekadhammavaseneva, na samūhavasenāti vuttaṃ ‘‘aññena…pe… natthī’’ti.

1316. To show that the intended meaning is that, although there is the act of naming by others who are general name-makers, the nature of naming here is extremely fitting because of its independence from others, for the purpose of naming by way of distinction and excellence, it is stated: 'without relying on another,' and so forth. The meaning is that it does not have the nature of naming because it is not intrinsic and occurs only sometimes. By 'because of their intrinsically established nature,' it states the property of feelings and the like being named 'feeling' and so on. If feelings and the like, not made by anyone, were to arise by taking their own names, then for these spontaneously arisen names, their state as a name would be for the purpose of naming. If this were so, even earth and the like would acquire the state of being a name; otherwise, the example of earth and so on would not be possible. Bearing this objection in mind, it says: 'by the example of earth and so forth.' For a comparison is made through partial similarity, as intended, not through complete similarity. Even so, if feelings and the like are a name because of their intrinsically established name, then for earth and the like also the state of being a name would be unavoidable; hence it is said: 'because of being established by usage,' and so forth. By this it shows that, whatever the reason for the currency of the word 'name' in regard to feelings and the like, even though that reason may exist for other things, the word 'name' is current for feelings and the like due to established usage, just as the word 'cow' is not for a collection of beings such as chickens. Indeed, in many sutta passages, the conventional usage of these very names is seen. The non-attainment of the state of being a name is stated because of the arising of another name, such as 'hair-pot' and so forth. This very meaning is clarified by way of example with the statement 'For it is not...' and so forth. Moreover, even in the case of formless phenomena like feelings, although grasping in terms of a mass occurs due to the absence of a breakdown of the mass from aggregation or compactness, this happens mostly through conceptual over-elaboration concerning the object, primarily by way of a single phenomenon, not by way of the group itself; hence it is said: 'by another... it does not exist,' and so forth.

Pakāsakapakāsitabbabhāvo visayivisayabhāvo eva. Adhivacanasamphasso manosamphasso. So nāmamantarena gahetuṃ asakkuṇeyyatāya pākaṭoti nidassanabhāvena vutto. ‘‘Adhivacanasamphasso viyā’’ti vacanena manosamphassatappakārānameva nāmabhāvo siyā, na paṭighasamphassatappakārānanti āsaṅkāya nivattanatthaṃ ‘‘paṭighasamphassopī’’tiādimāha. Tattha pañcaviññāṇasahagato phasso paṭighasamphasso. Pi-saddo sambhāvane. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – visayīvisayasaṅghaṭṭanasamuppattiyā aññaphassato oḷārikopi paṭighasamphasso na rūpadhammā viya vibhūtākāro, tato nāmāyattagahaṇiyabhāvo nāmassevāti. Arūpatāya vātiādinā sāmaññato visesato ca paṭighasamphassassa upacāravasena nāmabhāvamāha. Pacchimapurimānanti ‘‘nāmañca rūpañcā’’ti imaṃ anupubbiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Satipi rūpassātiādinā nāmavohārahetuṃ [Pg.199] anaññasādhāraṇaṃ nibbānassa adhipatipaccayabhāvaṃ eva vibhāveti, yato ariyānaṃ aññavisayavinissaṭaṃ ninnapoṇapabbhārabhāvena asaṅkhatadhātuyaṃ eva cittaṃ pavattatīti.

The nature of that which manifests and that which is to be manifested is indeed the nature of subject and object. Designation-contact is mental contact. Because it cannot be grasped without a name, it is stated as 'manifest' by way of example. To dispel the doubt that by the statement 'such as designation-contact,' the nature of name would apply only to mental contact and its kinds, and not to sensory-impact contact and its kinds, it is said: 'even sensory-impact contact,' and so forth. Herein, contact accompanied by the five sense-consciousnesses is sensory-impact contact. The particle 'pi' is in the sense of possibility. This is what is said: even though sensory-impact contact is gross, arising from the collision of subject and object, it does not have a distinct appearance like material phenomena; therefore, its state of being graspable is dependent on name itself. By 'due to its formless nature,' and so forth, he explains that sensory-impact contact has the nature of name by way of figurative usage, both generally and specifically. By 'the latter and the former,' it is said with reference to the sequence 'name and form.' By 'even though there is form,' and so forth, he clarifies the unique condition of Nibbāna as the dominant support, which is the cause for the conventional usage of 'name,' because the minds of the noble ones, released from other objects, proceed solely toward the unconditioned element with an inclination, tendency, and disposition towards it.

1318. Vaṭṭasmiṃ ādīnavapaṭicchādanato tadassādanābhinandanato ca vaṭṭassa mūlaṃ padhānakāraṇanti vaṭṭamūlaṃ.

1318. The root of the cycle (vaṭṭamūlaṃ) is the primary cause because it conceals the dangers in the cycle and because one delights in and rejoices in its gratification.

1320. Ekekasmiṃ rūpādike yathābhiniviṭṭhe vatthusmiṃ ahaṃmānādhāranimittataṃ kusalākusalatabbipākalokādhāratañca samāropetvā pavattaggahaṇaviseso. Yā kāci diṭṭhi nivisamānā dhammasabhāvaṃ aticcaparāmasanākāreneva nivisatīti vuttaṃ ‘‘parāmasantīti attho’’ti.

1320. It is a distinctive grasping that proceeds by imputing, in each object such as form to which one is attached, the characteristic of being a basis for the conceit 'I am,' a basis for wholesome and unwholesome states and their results, and a support for the world. Whatever view one adheres to, it adheres by way of overstepping and misapprehending the true nature of phenomena—thus it is said, 'It means they misapprehend.'

1332. Cetanāppadhāno saṅkhārakkhandhoti katvā ‘‘yāya cetanāyā’’tiādi vuttaṃ.

1332. Because the aggregate of formations has volition as its chief element, it is said: 'By whatever volition...' and so forth.

1333. Dunnāmaṃ gārayhanāmaṃ. Anupasaṅkamantassātiādinā sevanabhajanānaṃ visesamāha.

1333. A 'bad name' (dunnāma) is a name of reproach. By 'to one who does not approach,' and so forth, he speaks of the distinction between associating and attending.

1336. Āpattiāpattivuṭṭhānaparicchedajānanūpāyadassanaṃ saha vatthunā saha kammavācāyādivacananti imamatthaṃ dassento ‘‘vatthuvītikkamato’’tiādimāha. ‘‘Āpattikusalatā āpattivuṭṭhānakusalatā’’ti (dha. sa. dukamātikā 119) hi vuttanti. Kāraṇajānanena phalaṃ suṭṭhu ñātaṃ hotīti taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘āpattiyā vā’’tiādimāha.

1336. Showing this meaning—that is, showing the knowledge of the means to understand the classification of offenses and their rehabilitation, along with the basis, the formal act, and so forth—he says, 'by transgression of the basis,' and so on. For it is said: 'Skill in offenses, skill in rehabilitation from offenses' (Dhs. Dukamātikā §119). To show that by knowing the cause, the result is well understood, he says: 'by an offense or,' and so forth.

1342. Tassāti manasikārakusalatāya.

1342. By 'of that' is meant, of skillfulness in attention.

1344. Anuppajjamānāneva anuppajjantāneva.

1344. 'Anuppajjamānāneva' means simply 'not arising' (anuppajjantāneva).

1348. Akaraṇena anādaravasenāti adhippāyo.

1348. The intention is: by not doing, by way of disrespect.

1350. Pheggurukkhassa sigguādikassa.

1350. Of a softwood tree, such as the horseradish tree (siggu) and so forth.

1352. Cakkhundriyāsaṃvarassāti cakkhundriyāsaṃvaraṇassa. Asaṃvutacakkhundriyasseva hetūti cakkhudvārikassa abhijjhādianvāssavanassa taṃdvārikaviññāṇassa [Pg.200] viya cakkhundriyaṃ padhānakāraṇaṃ. Sati hi asaṃvutatte cakkhundriyassa te te anvāssavantīti asaṃvariyamānacakkhundriyahetuko so asaṃvaro tathāvuttoti aṭṭhakathāya adhippāyaṃ dasseti. Idāni yathāvutte adhippāye ṭhatvā ‘‘yatvādhikaraṇanti hī’’tiādinā pāḷiyā yojanaṃ dasseti. Kassa cāti pakāraṃ pucchati, kathaṃvidhassa kathaṃsaṇṭhitassāti attho. Na hi sarūpe vutte puna sarūpapucchāya payojanaṃ atthi. Anvāssavanti abhijjhādayo. Tadupalakkhitanti anvāssavūpalakkhitaṃ cakkhundriyaṃ asaṃvutanti yojanā.

1352. By 'non-restraint of the eye faculty,' it means the non-restraining of the eye faculty. By 'the cause is the unrestrained eye faculty itself,' it means that the eye faculty is the primary cause for the influx of covetousness and so on through the eye-door, just as it is for the consciousness arising through that door. For when the eye faculty is unrestrained, those defilements flow in. Thus, that non-restraint is said to be caused by the eye faculty that is not being restrained—this shows the intention of the commentary. Now, abiding by the intention as stated, he shows the construction of the Pāli text with 'because of which,' and so forth. By 'of what?' he asks about the mode, meaning, 'of what sort?' or 'how constituted?' For when its own nature has been stated, there is no purpose in asking again about its nature. Covetousness and so on flow in. By 'marked by that,' the construction is: the eye faculty, characterized by the influxes, is unrestrained.

Yathāsambhavanti dussīlyāsaṃvaro manodvāravasena, sesāsaṃvaro chadvāravasena yojetabbo. Muṭṭhassaccādīnaṃ satipaṭipakkhākusaladhammādibhāvato siyā pañcadvāre uppatti, na tveva kāyikavācasikavītikkamabhūtassa dussīlyassa tattha uppatti pañcadvārikajavanānaṃ aviññattijanakattāti tameva yathāsambhavaṃ ‘‘na hi pañcadvāre’’tiādinā vivarati.

By 'as is possible,' the non-restraint of immoral conduct should be connected with the mind-door, and the remaining non-restraints with the six doors. Because forgetfulness and other unwholesome states are opposed to mindfulness, their arising may occur at the five doors, but there is certainly no arising there of immoral conduct that constitutes a bodily or verbal transgression, since the five-door impulsions do not generate intimation. Thus, he explains that very 'as is possible' with 'For not at the five doors,' and so forth.

Yathā kinti yena pakārena javane uppajjamāno asaṃvaro ‘‘cakkhundriye asaṃvaro’’ti vuccati, taṃ nidassanaṃ kinti attho. Tatthāyaṃ pavattikkamo – pañcadvāre rūpādiārammaṇe āpāthagate niyamitādivasena kusalākusalajavane uppajjitvā bhavaṅgaṃ otiṇṇe manodvārikajavanaṃ taṃyevārammaṇaṃ katvā bhavaṅgaṃ otarati, puna tasmiṃyeva dvāre ‘‘itthipuriso’’tiādinā vavatthapetvā javanaṃ bhavaṅgaṃ otarati. Puna vāre pasādarajjanādivasena javanaṃ javati. Puna yadi taṃ ārammaṇaṃ āpāthaṃ āgacchati, taṃsadisameva pañcadvārādīsu javanaṃ tadā uppajjamānakaṃ sandhāya ‘‘evameva javane dussīlyādīsu uppannesu tasmiṃ asaṃvare sati dvārampi agutta’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. Ayaṃ pana ukkaṭṭhanayo paricitārammaṇaṃ sandhāya vutto, aparicite antarantarā pañcadvāre uppajjitvā tadanurūpaṃ manodvārepi uppajjatīti. Dvārabhavaṅgādīnaṃ javanena sambandho ekasantatipariyāpannato daṭṭhabbo.

By 'How?' the meaning is: in what manner is the non-restraint arising in the impulsion called 'non-restraint in the eye faculty'? What is that illustration? Herein, this is the process: when a visible form or other object has come into the range of the five doors, after wholesome or unwholesome impulsions have arisen in the fixed phase and so on and have subsided into the life-continuum, a mind-door impulsion takes that very object and subsides into the life-continuum. Again, at that same door, after determining it as 'a woman' or 'a man,' the impulsion subsides into the life-continuum. Again, on another occasion, impulsion runs on due to the staining of the sensitive organ, and so on. Again, if that object comes into range, with reference to a similar impulsion then arising in the five doors, it is said: 'In the same way, when immoral conduct and so on have arisen in the impulsion, when that non-restraint is present, the door is also unguarded,' and so forth. This, however, is the advanced method, stated with reference to a familiar object. In the case of an unfamiliar object, it arises intermittently at the five doors and correspondingly at the mind-door. The connection of the door, life-continuum, and so on with the impulsion should be seen as being included in a single continuity.

Sati dvārabhavaṅgādiketi paccayabhāvena purimanipphannaṃ javanakāle asantampi bhavaṅgādi cakkhādi viya phalanipphattiyā santaññeva nāmāti vuttaṃ. Na hi dharamānaṃyeva santanti vuccatīti. Bāhiraṃ viya katvāti paramatthato javanassa bāhirabhāve itarassa ca abbhantarabhāve asatipi ‘‘pabhassaramidaṃ[Pg.201], bhikkhave, cittaṃ, tañca kho āgantukehi upakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭha’’ntiādivacanato (a. ni. 1.49) āgantukabhūtassa kadāci kadāci uppajjamānassa javanassa bāhirabhāvo tabbidhurasabhāvassa itarassa abbhantarabhāvo pariyāyato vuttoti dasseti. Asaṃvarahetubhāvāpattitoti dvārādīnaṃ asaṃvarahetubhāvāpajjanassa pākaṭabhāvaṃ sandhāyāha. Uppanne hi asaṃvare dvārādīnaṃ tassa hetubhāvo paññāyatīti. Dvārabhavaṅgādimūsananti dvārabhavaṅgādīsu mūsanaṃ. Yasmiñhi dvāre asaṃvaro uppajjati, so tattha dvārādīnaṃ saṃvarūpanissayabhāvaṃ upacchindantoyeva pavattatīti. Tenevāha ‘‘kusalabhaṇḍavināsana’’nti.

By 'when there is the door, life-continuum, etc.,' it is said that even though the life-continuum, etc., which were produced previously as a condition, are not present at the time of the impulsion, they are called 'present' because of the production of the result, just like the eye, etc. For it is not the case that only what is currently existing is called 'present.' By 'having treated it as external,' he shows that although in an ultimate sense there is no externality of the impulsion and internality of the other, based on the statement, 'Luminous, monks, is this mind, but it is defiled by adventitious defilements' (AN 1.49), the externality of the impulsion, which arises only from time to time as something adventitious, and the internality of the other, which is devoid of that, are spoken of figuratively. By 'the liability to become a cause for non-restraint,' he speaks with reference to the manifestation of the doors, etc., becoming a cause for non-restraint. For when non-restraint has arisen, the fact that the doors, etc., are its cause is discerned. By 'the plundering of the door, life-continuum, etc.,' it means plundering in the door, life-continuum, etc. For at whatever door non-restraint arises, it proceeds by cutting off the nature of that door, etc., as a decisive support for restraint. Therefore, he said, 'the destruction of the wholesome goods.'

Ettha ca ‘‘cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā’’tiādipāḷiyaṃ saṃvaro, saṃvaritabbaṃ, saṃvaraṇupāyo, yato ca so saṃvaro, yattha ca so saṃvaroti imaṃ pabhedaṃ dassetvā yojetabbā. Kathaṃ? ‘‘Rakkhati…pe… saṃvaraṃ āpajjatī’’ti etena saṃvaro vutto. Satiṃ paccuṭṭhapetīti ayañhettha atthoti. Cakkhādi saṃvaritabbaṃ. Na nimittaggāhī hoti nānubyañjanaggāhīti saṃvaraṇupāyo. ‘‘Yatvādhikaraṇa’’ntiādinā saṃvaraṇāvadhi. Rūpādayo saṃvaravisayoti. Kiñca paṭisaṅkhābhāvanābalasaṅgahitabhāvena duvidhopi indriyasaṃvaro? Tattha purimena visayesu ādīnavadassanaṃ, itarena ādīnavappahānaṃ. Tathā purimena pariyuṭṭhānappahānaṃ, itarena anusayappahānaṃ. Tathā purimo lokiyamaggasaṅgahito, dutiyo lokuttaramaggasaṅgahitoti ayampi viseso veditabbo.

And here, in the Pāli text 'having seen a form with the eye,' etc., it should be applied by showing this division: restraint, what is to be restrained, the means of restraint, that from which there is restraint, and that wherein there is restraint. How? By 'He guards... he undertakes restraint,' restraint is stated. The meaning here is 'He establishes mindfulness.' The eye, etc., is what is to be restrained. 'He is not a grasper of signs, not a grasper of secondary characteristics' is the means of restraint. By 'Dependent on which,' etc., is the limit of restraint. Form, etc., are the domain of restraint. Furthermore, how is the twofold sense-restraint included by way of the power of reflection and cultivation? Therein, by the former there is the seeing of danger in the sense-objects; by the latter, the abandoning of danger. Likewise, by the former there is the abandoning of obsessions; by the latter, the abandoning of underlying tendencies. Likewise, the former is included in the mundane path, the second is included in the supramundane path—this distinction too should be known.

1353. Davatthādiabhilāsoti davo eva attho payojananti davattho, so ādi yesaṃ te davatthādayo. Tesu, tesaṃ vā abhilāso, davo vā attho etassāti davattho, tadādiko davatthādi, ko pana soti āha ‘‘abhilāso’’ti. Āhāraparibhoge asantussanāti āhāraparibhoge atitti. Bahuno uḷārassa ca patthanāvasena pavattā bhiyyokamyatā asantussanāti evamettha attho yujjati.

1353. The desire for jesting and the like (davatthādiabhilāso) means jesting itself is the purpose or aim—hence 'davattho' (having jesting as its purpose). Those things beginning with that are 'davatthādayo' (jesting and the like). It is the desire for them. Or, that which has jesting as its purpose is 'davattho'; that which begins with this is 'davatthādi'. But what is that? He says, 'desire.' Dissatisfaction with regard to the use of food means insatiability in consuming food. The excessive craving (bhiyyokamyatā) that arises from the wish for much and for excellent food is dissatisfaction. In this way, the meaning here is fitting.

1355. Majjanākārena pavatti mānassevāti katvā ‘‘mānova mānamado’’ti vuttaṃ. Tathā hi jātimadādayo ‘‘māno maññanā’’tiādinā mānabhāveneva [Pg.202] vibhattāti. Khudā nāma kammajatejo. Taṃ pana abhutte bhutte ca uppajjatīti yaṃ tattha āmāsayasaṅkhātassa sarīradesassa pīḷanato vihiṃsāsaddavacanīyaṃ, tadeva dassetabbaṃ, itarañca nivattetabbanti abhuttapaccayā uppajjanakattena khudā visesitāti āha ‘‘khudāya visesana’’nti. Ye pana ‘‘kammajatejapaccayā dukkhā vedanā khudā’’ti vadanti, tesaṃ abhuttapaccayā uppajjanakāti visesanameva na yujjati. Satipi tasmiṃ bhūtatthakathane vihiṃsūparatipurāṇavedanāpaṭihananānaṃ visesābhāvo āpajjatīti purimoyevettha attho. Etāsaṃ ko visesoti abhuttapaccayā uppajjanakavedanā, bhuttapaccayā na uppajjanakavedanāti dvepi cetā vedanā yāvatā anāgatāyevāti adhippāyo. Satipi anāgatatte purimā uppannasadisī, itarā pana ataṃsadisī accantaṃ anuppannāvāti ayamettha viseso. Teneva ‘‘yathāpavattā’’ti purimāyaṃ vuttaṃ, itarattha ca ‘‘appavattā’’ti. Atha vā abhuttapaccayā uppajjanakavedanā pubbe katakammassa vipākattā purāṇavedanā nāma. Appaccavekkhaṇādiayuttaparibhogapaccayā paccavekkhaṇādiyuttaparibhogato āyatiṃ na uppajjissatīti bhuttapaccayā na uppajjanakavedanā navavedanā nāma. Vihiṃsānimittatā vihiṃsānibbattatā.

1355. Because conceit proceeds in the manner of intoxication, it is said, 'Conceit itself is the intoxication of conceit.' Indeed, prides such as pride of birth and so on are classified precisely as a state of conceit by the terms 'conceit, conceiving,' and so on. Hunger, by name, is the heat produced by kamma. But since that arises both when one has not eaten and when one has eaten, that which is to be called 'harm' due to the affliction of that part of the body called the stomach, that alone should be pointed out, and the other should be excluded. Therefore, hunger is specified by its arising from the condition of not having eaten; thus he says, 'the specification of hunger.' But for those who say, 'Hunger is a painful feeling conditioned by the heat produced by kamma,' the specification 'arising from the condition of not having eaten' is not fitting. Even if that is so, in the factual explanation, it would follow that there is no distinction between the cessation of harm and the warding off of old feelings. Therefore, the former meaning is the one here. What is the distinction between these? The feeling that arises from the condition of not having eaten, and the feeling that does not arise from the condition of having eaten. The intention is that both these feelings pertain to the future. Although they pertain to the future, the former is like one that has arisen, while the other is unlike that, being completely unarisen. This is the distinction here. For that very reason, concerning the former it is said, 'as it occurs,' and concerning the other, 'not occurring.' Alternatively, the feeling arising from the condition of not having eaten is called 'old feeling' because it is the result of previously performed kamma. The feeling that does not arise from the condition of having eaten is called 'new feeling'; this is because a feeling that would arise from consumption combined with non-reflection and so on will not arise in the future from consumption combined with reflection and so on. Being a sign of harm means being produced by harm.

Yāpenti etenāti yāpanāti vuttassa sarīrayāpanakāraṇassa jīvitindriyassapiyāpanakāraṇanti imassa visesassadassanatthaṃ ‘‘jīvitindriyayāpanatthāyā’’ti vatvā na kevalaṃ jīvitindriyasseva yāpanakāraṇamāhāro, atha kho ṭhānādipavattiākāravisesayuttassa sakalasarīrassapi yāpanakāraṇanti taṃdīpanatthaṃ yātrāti vacananti yāpanā me bhavissatīti avisesena vuttanti dassento ‘‘catunnaṃ iriyāpathānaṃ avicchedasaṅkhātā yāpanā yātrā’’ti āha. Aṭṭhānayojanaaparibhogadupparibhogādivasena saddhādeyyassa vināsanaṃ saddhādeyyavinipātanaṃ. Yenāti gaṇabhojanalakkhaṇappattassa thūpīkatādikassa vā paṭiggahaṇena. Sāvajjaṃ sanindaṃ paribhogaṃ karotīti vā attho.

They sustain with this, thus it is called sustenance—to show the distinction that the means of sustaining the body is also the means of sustaining the life faculty, it is said, 'for the sake of sustaining the life faculty.' This indicates that food is not merely the means of sustaining the life faculty alone, but also the means of sustaining the entire body, which is endowed with various characteristics such as posture and activity. To clarify this, the word 'yātrā' (maintenance) is used. Showing that it is said without distinction, 'sustenance will be for me,' he said, 'The uninterrupted continuity of the four postures is called sustenance, maintenance.' The destruction of what is given in faith due to improper application, non-consumption, improper consumption, or other reasons is called the squandering of what is given in faith. 'By which' refers to the acceptance of food characterized by group meals or that which has been piled up, etc. Or the meaning is: 'He engages in blameworthy and reprehensible consumption.'

Iriyā…pe… vuttanti sukhaṃ pavattamānehi iriyāpathehi tesaṃ tathāpavattiyā kāraṇanti gahitattā viditattā yathāvuttabhuñjanapivanāni pubbakālakiriyābhāvena vuccamānāni iriyāpathakattukāni viya vuttānīti attho. Yathā hi ‘‘paññāya cassa disvā āsavā parikkhīṇā hontī’’ti [Pg.203] (ma. ni. 1.271; 2.182) dassanassa khayahetutā, ‘‘ghataṃ pivitvā balaṃ bhavati, sīhaṃ disvā bhayaṃ bhavatī’’ti ca pānadassanānaṃ balabhayahetutā vuccati, evaṃ bhuñjanapivanānaṃ iriyāpathasukhappavattihetubhāvo vuttoti evamettha attho daṭṭhabbo. Sulabhānavajjabhāvo viya appabhāvopi paccayānaṃ paramasallekhavuttīnaṃ sukhavihārāya pariyattoti cīvarasenāsanānaṃ appabhāvukkaṃsānujānanavasena pavattāhi anantaragāthāhi idhāpi dhammasenāpatinā sukhavihārāya pariyatto appabhāvukkaṃso anuññātoti viññāyatīti ‘‘punapī’’tiādinā ‘‘bhutvānā’’ti pāṭhaṃ samatthayati.

Postures… and so on… are said. The meaning is that the aforementioned eating and drinking, being spoken of as prior actions, are said as if they were the agents of the postures, because they are understood and recognized as the cause for the smooth functioning of those postures. Just as it is said, “Through wisdom, having seen, the taints are destroyed for him” (MN 1.271; 2.182), where seeing is the cause of destruction, and “Having drunk ghee, strength arises; having seen a lion, fear arises,” where drinking and seeing are the causes of strength and fear—so too, eating and drinking are said to be the causes of the pleasant functioning of postures. This is how the meaning should be understood here. Just as the ease of obtaining and blamelessness, so also the meagerness of requisites is sufficient for a happy dwelling for those of the highest austere practice. By the subsequent verses that proceed by way of permitting the praise of the meagerness of robes and dwellings, it is understood that here too the General of the Dhamma has permitted the praise of meagerness, which is sufficient for a happy dwelling. With “again,” and so on… he supports the reading “having eaten.”

1368. Satiādidhammāti satipaññāsamādhivīriyasammāvācādidhammā, ye chahi dukehi pariggahitā.

1368. The qualities beginning with mindfulness are mindfulness, wisdom, concentration, energy, right speech, and other such qualities, which are included in the six pairs.

1373. Paṭivijjhitabbehi paṭivedho vutto. Visayenapi hi visayī vuccati sahacarabhāvato. Yathā –

1373. Penetration is spoken of by means of what is to be penetrated. For by the object, the subject is also spoken of, due to their being associated. As, for example:

‘‘Uppādetvāna saṃvegaṃ, dukkhenassa ca hetunā;

Vaḍḍhayitvā sammasitvā, muttiyā maggamabravī’’ti

"Having produced a sense of urgency, through suffering and its cause; having developed and comprehended, he spoke the path to liberation."

‘‘Saccapariyosāne’’ti ca.

"And 'at the end of the truths.'"

Yathā dukkhādīnaṃ pariññādivasena pavattamānaṃ paṭivedhañāṇaṃ asammohato te avilometvā avirodhetvā pavattati nāma, evaṃ tadupanissayabhāvaṃ vipassanāñāṇampi yathābalaṃ te avilometvā pavattatīti catunnaṃ saccānaṃ anulomanti vuttanti dutiyo atthavikappo vutto. Ettha ca ‘‘catunnaṃ saccāna’’nti padaṃ vinā upacārena vuttaṃ, purimasmiṃ upacārenāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Sammādiṭṭhippadhānattā vā sesamaggaṅgānaṃ maggasaccekadesassa paṭivedhassa anulomaṃ samudāyānulomaṃ vuttaṃ, catusaccekadesassa maggassa vā.

Just as the knowledge of penetration, which proceeds by way of the full understanding of suffering and so on, proceeds without confusion, without inverting or opposing them, so too does insight knowledge, being its supporting condition, proceed according to its strength without inverting them—thus it is said to be in conformity with the four truths. This is the second alternative meaning stated. And here, the phrase 'of the four truths' is spoken literally, without figure of speech, whereas in the former instance, it should be understood, it was spoken figuratively. Alternatively, because of the predominance of right view, conformity with the whole is spoken of for the remaining path factors, which are in conformity with the penetration of a portion of the path truth, or of the path, which is a portion of the four truths.

1380. Khayasamayeti khayasamūhe. ‘‘Kilesānaṃ khayavasena pavattadhammapuñje’’ti ca vadanti.

1380. In the collection of destruction (khayasamaye) means in the group of destruction. And they say, "in the collection of phenomena that proceed by way of the destruction of defilements."

1381. Aparibandhabhāvena nirāsaṅkā, ārammaṇe abhiratibhāvena ca pavatti adhimuccanaṭṭhoti āha ‘‘ani…pe… ttanaṭṭhenā’’ti.

1381. Because of being unobstructed, they are without hesitation; and the proceeding through delight in the object has the meaning of resolution—thus he says, 'ani…pe… ttanaṭṭhena'.

1382. Ariyamaggappavattiyā [Pg.204] uttarakālaṃ pavattamānaṃ phalañāṇaṃ taṃtaṃmaggavajjhakilesānaṃ khayapariyosāne pavattattā ‘‘khīṇante ñāṇa’’nti vuttaṃ. Yasmā pana taṃ maggānantaraṃ uppajjati, tasmā maggena ṭhānaso khīṇesu kilesesu tesaṃ khīṇabhāvānantaraṃ pavattamānaṃ khīṇabhāvānaṃ paṭhamakāle pavattantipi vuccatīti dutiyo vikappo vutto.

1382. The knowledge of fruition that arises subsequent to the occurrence of the Noble Path is called 'knowledge of destruction' because it occurs at the conclusion of the destruction of the defilements to be abandoned by that particular path. However, since it arises immediately after the path, when the defilements have been destroyed in their place by the path, it is also said to occur at the first moment of their state of destruction. This is the second alternative stated.

Dukanikkhepakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the section on pairs is concluded.

Nikkhepakaṇḍavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the chapter on exposition is concluded.

4. Aṭṭhakathākaṇḍaṃ

4. The Commentary Section

Tikaatthuddhāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Extraction of Meaning from the Triad

1384. Nayagamananti [Pg.205] nīyati, neti, nīyanti vā etenāti nayo, gammati etenāti gamanaṃ, nayova, nayassa vā gamanaṃ nayagamanaṃ. Gati eva vā gamanaṃ. Paṭhamena ādi-saddena abhidhammabhājanīyādisaṅgahāsaṅgahādiekakādisuddhikasacchi kaṭṭhādimūlamūlādikā pañcapakaraṇikā nayagati saṅgayhati. Anulomādīti pana paccanīyaanulomapaccanīyapaccanīyānulomapakārā ekamūlādippakārā ca. Ettha atthesu nicchitesūti etasmiṃ aṭṭhakathākaṇḍe cittuppādavasena bhūmantaravisesayogato sabbesaṃ mātikāpadānaṃ atthesu saṅkhepato vavatthāpitesu.

1384. 'Nayagamana' means that by which one is led, leads, or they are led—thus, it is 'naya' (method). That by which one goes is 'gamana' (going). Therefore, 'nayagamana' is the method itself, or the going of the method. Alternatively, 'gamana' is simply 'gati' (course). By the first word 'ādi' (etc.), the fivefold procedural method is included, encompassing Abhidhammabhājanīya, etc., inclusion and non-inclusion, etc., singles, etc., pure, sacchikaṭṭha, etc., root, root-cause, etc. As for 'anuloma' (conformity), etc., this includes the negative, positive-negative, and negative-positive types, as well as single-root types, etc. 'Here, when the meanings are determined' refers to when, in this commentary section, the meanings of all the mātikā terms have been briefly established according to the arising of consciousness and in connection with the distinctions between planes of existence.

Pañhuddhārantiādīsu ‘‘siyā kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjeyya hetupaccayā’’tiādinā (paṭṭhā. 1.1.25) kusalapadaṃ ādiṃ katvā kusalākusalābyākatantā tisso kusalādikā, kusalābyākataakusalābyākatakusalākusalantā tisso, kusalākusalābyākatantā ekāti kusalādikā satta pucchā, tathā akusalādikā, abyākatādikā, kusalābyākatādikā, akusalābyākatādikā, kusalākusalādikā, kusalākusalābyākatādikāti sattannaṃ sattakānaṃ vasena dhammānulome kusalattikaṃ nissāya hetupaccaye ekūnapaññāsa pucchā, tathā sesapaccayesu sesatikesu dhammapaccanīyādīsu ca. Taṃ sandhāya ‘‘ekūnapaññāsāya ekūnapaññāsāyā’’ti vuttaṃ. ‘‘Siyā hetuṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca hetudhammo uppajjeyya hetupaccayā’’tiādinā (paṭṭhā. 3.1.1) ‘‘hetuṃ paṭicca hetu, hetuṃ paṭicca nahetu, hetuṃ paṭicca hetu ca nahetu ca. Nahetuṃ paṭicca nahetu, nahetuṃ paṭicca hetu, nahetuṃ paṭicca hetu ca nahetu ca. Hetuñca nahetuñca paṭicca hetu, hetuñca nahetuñca paṭicca nahetu, hetuñca nahetuñca paṭicca hetu ca nahetu cā’’ti ekekasmiṃ duke hetupaccayādīsu ekamekasmiṃ paccaye nava nava pucchā honti. Tā sandhāya ‘‘navasu navasu pañhesū’’ti vuttaṃ.

In the section beginning with 'Pañhuddhāra' (Extraction of Questions), etc., with 'A wholesome state may arise dependent on a wholesome state by way of root condition,' etc. (Paṭṭh. 1.1.25), taking the 'wholesome' term as the starting point, there are seven questions beginning with 'wholesome': three ending in wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate; three ending in wholesome-indeterminate, unwholesome-indeterminate, and wholesome-unwholesome; and one ending in wholesome-unwholesome-indeterminate. Similarly, there are seven questions each starting with unwholesome, indeterminate, wholesome-indeterminate, unwholesome-indeterminate, wholesome-unwholesome, and wholesome-unwholesome-indeterminate. Thus, by way of seven sets of seven, in the positive enumeration of phenomena, relying on the wholesome triad, there are forty-nine questions in the root condition, and likewise in the remaining conditions, the remaining triads, and in the negative enumeration of phenomena, etc. Referring to this, it is said, 'forty-nine by forty-nine.' Again, with 'A root state may arise dependent on a root state by way of root condition,' etc. (Paṭṭh. 3.1.1), 'Dependent on a root, a root arises; dependent on a root, a non-root arises; dependent on a root, both a root and a non-root arise. Dependent on a non-root, a non-root arises; dependent on a non-root, a root arises; dependent on a non-root, both a root and a non-root arise. Dependent on both a root and a non-root, a root arises; dependent on both a root and a non-root, a non-root arises; dependent on both a root and a non-root, both a root and a non-root arise.' In each dyad, in the root condition and other conditions, there are nine questions in each condition. Referring to these, it is said, 'in nine by nine questions.'

Labbhamānassāti kusalattike tāva paṭiccavāre hetupaccaye ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjati hetupaccayā, kusalaṃ ekaṃ [Pg.206] khandhaṃ paṭicca tayo khandhā’’tiādinā (paṭṭhā. 1.1.53) kusalena kusalaṃ, kusalena abyākataṃ, kusalena kusalābyākataṃ, akusalena akusalaṃ, akusalena abyākataṃ, akusalena akusalābyākataṃ, abyākatena abyākataṃ, kusalābyākatena abyākataṃ, akusalābyākatena abyākatanti navannaṃ navannaṃ pañhānaṃ atthato sambhavantassa pañhassa vissajjanavasena uddharaṇaṃ, tathā sesapaccayavārattikādīsu. Tesuyevāti yathāvuttesu eva pañhesu atthasambhavato yathāvibhattānaṃ pañhavissajjanānaṃ ‘‘hetuyā navā’’tiādinā gaṇanāṭhapanaṃ. Pasaṭe dhammeti yathā heṭṭhā kaṇḍadvaye ‘‘yasmiṃ samaye kāmāvacaraṃ kusalaṃ citta’’ntiādinā (dha. sa. 1) vippakiṇṇe muttapupphe viya phassādayo dhamme. Avisiṭṭhaniddeso sāmaññaniddeso. Viññātadhammassa puggalassāti adhippāyo.

Concerning what is obtainable: in the wholesome triad, in the section on dependence, under the root condition, with 'A wholesome phenomenon arises dependent on a wholesome phenomenon by way of root condition; dependent on one wholesome aggregate, three aggregates arise,' and so forth (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.53), there is the extraction by way of answering the question that can potentially arise in meaning from the nine questions: wholesome by wholesome, indeterminate by wholesome, wholesome-and-indeterminate by wholesome; unwholesome by unwholesome, indeterminate by unwholesome, unwholesome-and-indeterminate by unwholesome; indeterminate by indeterminate, indeterminate by wholesome-and-indeterminate, and indeterminate by unwholesome-and-indeterminate. Likewise in the sections on the remaining conditions, triads, etc. 'In these very' refers to the establishing of the count of the questions and answers as they are divided according to the potential meaning in those very questions mentioned, such as 'nine by way of root condition,' etc. 'Scattered phenomena' refers to phenomena such as contact, etc., scattered like strewn flowers, just as in the two sections below, with 'At the time when a wholesome mind pertaining to the sense sphere arises...' (Dhammasaṅgaṇī 1). 'Undistinguished exposition' is general exposition. The intended meaning is 'for a person who has understood the phenomena'.

Yadi cittuppādarūpakaṇḍesu catubhūmicittuppādādivasena viññātadhammassa atthuddhāradesanā āraddhā, evaṃ sante idha kasmā kusalattikaniddeso vuttoti āha ‘‘yadipi kusalattikavitthāro’’tiādi. Dhammavisesanabhāvatoti ‘‘dhammā’’ti padassa padhānabhāvaṃ dasseti. Ato hi tadabhidheyyā pucchitabbā jātā. Viññātāhīti bhūmīnaṃ visesanalakkhaṇayogamāha. Ettha padhānanti kiñcāpi uddese kusalapadena dhammā visesitabbā, ‘‘catūsu bhūmīsu kusala’’nti imasmiṃ pana niddese bhūmīhi visesitabbattā kusalapadaṃ padhānanti visesanabhāvena vacanicchāya abhāvato satipi visesitabbadhammānaṃ kāmāvacarādiphassādibhede tadanapekkhaṃ anavajjasukhavipākatāsaṅkhātaṃ attano kusalākārameva gahetvā pavattamānattā ‘‘ekattameva upādāya pavattatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Sabbepi hi kusalā dhammā anavajjasukhavipākatāya ekasabhāvāyevāti.

If the exposition of the extraction of meaning for one who has understood the phenomena has begun by way of the four planes, the arising of consciousness, etc., in the sections on the arising of consciousness and form, this being so, why is the exposition of the wholesome triad stated here? To this, it is said, 'Although there is the detailed explanation of the wholesome triad,' etc. Because it is a qualifier of 'dhammā', it shows the predominance of the term 'dhammā'. For from that, what is denoted by it becomes the subject of inquiry. By 'known' he states the connection with the characteristic of qualifying the planes. Here, 'predominant' means that although in the summary the phenomena are to be qualified by the term 'wholesome', in this exposition, since they are to be qualified by the planes ('wholesome in the four planes'), the term 'wholesome' is predominant. Because there is no intention to speak by way of qualification, even though the phenomena to be qualified are differentiated as contact, etc., of the sense sphere, etc., it proceeds without regard to that, taking up only its own wholesome aspect, designated as 'being a faultless and pleasant result.' Hence, it is said, 'it proceeds by taking up oneness.' Indeed, all wholesome phenomena are of a single nature due to being faultless and pleasant results.

1385. Yathāyogaṃ yojetabbanti catūhi bhūmīhi ādhārabhūtāhi visesetvā samayaphassādibhedaṃ anāmasitvā vipākabhāvena ekattaṃ netvā ‘‘catūsu bhūmīsu vipāko’’ti vuttanti yojetabbaṃ. Esa nayo ‘‘tīsu bhūmīsu kiriyābyākata’’ntiādīsupi.

1385. 'It should be connected as is appropriate' means: it should be connected with the statement, 'Result in the four planes,' by specifying with the four planes as the basis, without touching upon distinctions such as occasion, contact, etc., and by bringing it to oneness through its nature as result. This is the method also in cases such as, 'Action-only indeterminate in three planes,' etc.

Uppajjati etthāti uppādo, cetasikā. Te hi cittassa sabbathāpi nissayādipaccayabhāvato ettha ca uppattiyā ādhārabhāvena apekkhitā. Yathā [Pg.207] ca cetasikā cittassa, evaṃ cittampi cetasikānaṃ nissayādipaccayabhāvato ādhārabhāvena vattabbataṃ arahatīti yathāvuttaṃ uppādasaddābhidheyyataṃ na vinivattati. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – ‘‘cittuppādo’’ti ettha uppādassa visesanabhāvena pavattamānampi cittaṃ attani yathāvuttauppādaatthasambhavato apariccattavisesitabbabhāvameva hutvā tassa visesanabhāvaṃ paṭipajjatīti. Yadāha ‘‘avayavena samudāyopalakkhaṇavasena attho sambhavatī’’ti. Cittasamānagatikassa idha cittaggahaṇena gahetabbatāya ‘‘dvepañcaviññāṇānī’’ti nidassanena vakkhamānattā ‘‘citta…pe… gahaṇaṃ kata’’nti vuttaṃ. Tattha aññassāti rūpassa.

'It arises herein' is 'uppāda' (arising), which refers to the mental factors. For they, being in all ways conditions such as dependence, etc., for the mind, are required here as the basis for arising. And just as mental factors are for the mind, so too the mind, being a condition such as dependence, etc., for the mental factors, deserves to be called the basis; thus, as previously stated, the applicability of the term 'arising' does not cease. This is what is meant: In 'cittuppāda' (arising of mind), though the mind functions as a qualifier of 'arising', it does not abandon its own state of being that which is qualified—because the meaning of 'arising' as explained is possible in itself—but proceeds to qualify it. As it is said: 'The meaning is possible by way of indicating the whole by a part.' Since that which has the same course as the mind is to be taken here by the term 'mind,' as will be stated with the example of 'the two sets of five consciousnesses,' it is said: 'mind... the taking is done.' Therein, 'of another' refers to form.

1420. Pañcadvāre vattabbameva natthi ekantaparittārammaṇattā pañcadvārikacittānaṃ. Iṭṭhāniṭṭhārammaṇānubhavananti vipākassa pakappetvā ārammaṇaggahaṇābhāvamāha. Tato kammānurūpaṃ pavattamāno vipāko parittakammavipākatāya parittārammaṇeyeva pavattitumarahati, na mahaggatappamāṇārammaṇeti adhippāyo. Samādhippadhānassapi kassaci kammassa appanāappattassa ekantena sadisavipākatāabhāvato ‘‘appanāppattassā’’ti kammaṃ visesitaṃ. Vaṇṇalakkhaṇādiṃ aggahetvā lokasaññānurodheneva gahite pathavādike parikammasaññāya samuppāditattā paṭibhāganimittasaṅkhātaṃ saññāvasaṃ ārammaṇaṃ assāti saññāvasārammaṇaṃ. Tādisenevāti samādhippadhānatāya appanāppattīhi viya saññāvasārammaṇatāya ca nibbiseseneva. Sopīti pi-saddo sampiṇḍanattho. Tenetaṃ dasseti ‘‘attano kammassa samānabhūmikadhammārammaṇatāya viya tassa ārammaṇārammaṇatāyapi vipāko kammānurūpoyeva nāma hotī’’ti.

1420. There is nothing to be said regarding the five sense doors, for the objects of the five-door consciousnesses are invariably of limited range. The phrase 'experiencing desirable and undesirable objects' is stated by way of determining the result, indicating the absence of grasping an object. Therefore, the resultant consciousness arising in accordance with kamma, being the result of limited kamma, should arise only in relation to a limited object, and not in relation to an object of the measure of the sublime – this is the intended meaning. For kamma for which concentration is predominant but which has not attained absorption, since there is no invariably similar result, the kamma is specified as 'that which has not attained absorption.' Not grasping characteristics such as color, but apprehending earth and other elements in accordance with worldly perception, the object called the counterpart sign arises, produced by preliminary perception; thus, it is called an object under the control of perception. In just the same way, just as there is no difference for that which has not attained absorption by way of predominance of concentration, so too there is no difference due to being an object under the control of perception. The word 'pi' here has a summative meaning. This shows that 'just as the result is in accordance with kamma by having as its object a state on the same plane as the kamma, so too, by having that object as its object, the result is indeed in accordance with kamma.'

Yadi evaṃ kasmā mahaggatappamāṇārammaṇassa parittakammassa vipāko tadārammaṇārammaṇo na hotīti? Appanāppattakammavipākassa viya tassa kammārammaṇārammaṇatāya niyamābhāvato kammānurūpatāya ca anekarūpattā. Yathā attano kammasadisassa mahaggatajavanassa parittārammaṇassapi tadārammaṇaṃ nānubandhakaṃ paricayābhāvato, evaṃ attano kammassa nimittabhūtepi tassa sahakārīkāraṇāhi apariyādinne mahaggatappamāṇe ārammaṇe paricayābhāvato parittavipāko na pavattati, kammanimittārammaṇo pana jāyamāno paritteneva tena hotīti āha [Pg.208] ‘‘paṭisandhiādibhūto’’tiādi. Yasmā panātiādinā pāḷiyāva yathāvuttamatthaṃ nicchinoti. Nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayo hi ettha adhippeto paccayapaccayuppannānaṃ bhinnārammaṇatāya vuttattā. Na cātiādinā parittavipākā eva idha paccayuppannabhāvena vuttāti dasseti. Idhāti imasmiṃ atthuddhārakaṇḍe.

If so, why does the result of a limited kamma, whose object is of great extent, not take that object as its object? Because, unlike the result of kamma that has attained absorption, there is no fixed rule that it must take the kamma's object as its object, and due to its conformity to the kamma and its manifold nature. Just as for a great javana (impulsion) similar to one's own kamma, even if its object is limited, tadārammaṇa does not follow due to lack of familiarity, so too, even when the object is of great extent, which is the sign of one's own kamma, and is not encompassed by its co-operative causes, the limited result does not occur due to lack of familiarity with such an object. However, when it arises with the kamma-sign as its object, it is indeed limited by that, hence it is said, 'At rebirth-linking, etc.' Moreover, by the phrase 'because,' etc., in the Pāli itself, the meaning is determined as stated above. Here, the condition of kamma arising at a different moment is intended, because it is stated that the objects of the condition and the conditioned are different. And by the phrase 'not,' etc., it is shown that here only limited results are mentioned as being conditionedly produced. 'Here' means in this section on the extraction of meaning.

Sativepullappattānaṃ sativirahitassa kāyakammassa sambhavaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘vāsanāvasenā’’ti vuttaṃ. Avītarāgānaṃ aparittepi katthaci ārammaṇe siyā cetaso uppilāvitattanti ‘‘kilesavirahe’’ti visesetvā vuttaṃ. Ādarākaraṇavasenevāti ādarākaraṇamattavasenevāti visesanivattiattho eva-saddo tameva nivattetabbaṃ visesaṃ dasseti, nāññathā. Kosajjādīti ādi-saddena dosādayo saṅgaṇhāti. Ādarākaraṇaṃ nirussukkatā evāti ādaraṃ karontā nirussukkabhāveneva na honti, na pana ādaraṃ na karontiyevāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Ekacce pana ‘‘akammaññasarīratāya aññavihitatāya ca khīṇāsavānaṃ asakkaccadānādipavatti na anādaravasenā’’ti vadanti.

To show the arising of bodily action devoid of mindfulness in those who have attained fullness of mindfulness, it is said, 'due to latent tendencies.' Since, for those not free from lust, agitation of mind is possible even with a non-trifling object, it is specified as 'in the absence of defilements.' 'Merely due to non-reverence'—the word 'eva' (only), whose function is to exclude, shows that it excludes precisely that specification, and not otherwise. 'Sloth, etc.'—by the word 'etc.,' aversion and other faults are included. Non-reverence is simply lack of enthusiasm. It should be understood that those who show reverence are not merely unenthusiastic, nor are they simply irreverent. However, some say, 'Due to the unworkability of the body and their engagement in other activities, the occurrence of disrespectful giving, etc., by the arahants is not due to non-reverence.'

1421. Atipaguṇānanti subhāvitānaṃ suṭṭhutaraṃ vasippattānaṃ. Evaṃ paguṇajjhānesupi pavatti hoti tattha vicāraṇussāhassa mandabhāvatoti adhippāyo. Pubbe dassitanti ‘‘tīṇi lakkhaṇānīti ahanti vā’’tiādinā pubbe dassitaṃ. ‘‘Avijjamāno aparamatthabhāvato, vijjamāno ca lokasaṅketasiddhiyā sammutisaccabhāvato attho arīyati cittena gammati ñāyatī’’ti ācariyā vadanti. Yato tabbisayā cittuppādā navattabbaṃ ārammaṇaṃ etesanti navattabbārammaṇāti aññapadatthasamāsavasena vuccanti. Ayaṃ pana vādo hevatthikavādo viya hotīti tassa accantaṃ avijjamānataṃ maññanto ito ca aññathā avijjamānapaññattiṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘sammutisacce panā’’tiādimāha. Kathaṃ pana tassa accantamavijjamānatte tabbisayānaṃ dhammānaṃ pavatti navattabbārammaṇabhāvo cāti āha ‘‘avijjamānampī’’tiādi. Parittādiārammaṇāti na vattabbāti vuttāti parittādayo viya tassa visuṃ vavatthitabhāvaṃ nisedheti.

1421. 'Atipaguṇānaṃ' means those who are well-developed and have attained the highest mastery. Thus, even in familiar jhānas, the weakening of investigation and effort occurs—this is the intended meaning. 'Pubbe dassitaṃ' refers to what was previously shown, such as 'the three characteristics' or 'the self,' etc. The teachers say: 'When it does not exist, it is considered non-ultimate in nature; and when it exists, it is established by worldly convention as a conventional truth—the meaning is discerned, grasped, and known by the mind.' Since mental states arising in relation to it cannot designate an object, they are called 'non-designatable objects'—this is expressed through a compound with another meaning. However, this statement is like the doctrine of those who hold a nihilistic view. Believing it to be absolutely non-existent, he then explains the concept of non-existence differently, saying, 'But in conventional truth,' etc. But how can there be an absolute non-existence of that, and how can phenomena related to it arise as non-designatable objects? He explains this with 'avijjamānampi,' etc. It is said that it should not be spoken of as 'limited object,' etc.—thus, it denies its distinct established nature, just like limited objects, etc.

Vikkhipanaṃ nānārammaṇesu cittassa pavattanaṃ. Anavaṭṭhānaṃ ekasmiṃyeva pavattituṃ appadānaṃ. Dutiyādimaggapurecārikaṃ phalasamāpattipurecārikañca kāmāvacarañāṇaṃ [Pg.209] nibbānārammaṇatāya lokuttaracittassa āvajjanaṭṭhāniyatāya ca paṭhamamaggapurecārikañāṇena samānanti katvā vuttaṃ ‘‘gotrabhuvodāne gotrabhūti gahetvā’’ti.

Scattering is the mind's occurrence on diverse objects. Instability is the inability to remain fixed on a single object. Sense-sphere knowledge, which is a precursor to the second and higher paths and a precursor to fruition attainment, is said to be similar to the knowledge that is a precursor to the first path because it has nibbāna as its object and functions as the preliminary stage for supramundane consciousness. Hence it is said, 'In the utterance on change of lineage, having taken it as 'gotrabhū'.'

Sabbatthapādakanti nipphādetabbe, payojane vā bhummaṃ ‘‘cetaso avūpasame’’tiādīsu viya. Tena sabbesu vipassanādīsu nipphādetabbesūti attho. Tenevāha ‘‘sabbesū’’tiādi. Atītaṃsañāṇassa kāmāvacarattā iddhividhādīsu tassa aggahaṇaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tassa pana atītasattadivasato heṭṭhā yāva paccuppannapaṭisandhi, tāva visayoti vadanti. Atītasattadivasesupi khandhapaṭibaddhānaṃ tassa visayabhāvo yutto viya dissati.

'The basis everywhere' means in what is to be produced, or in application, in the sense of the locative case, just as in phrases such as 'in the non-pacification of the mind.' Therefore, the meaning is 'in all things to be accomplished, such as insight and so forth.' Hence, it is said, 'in all,' etc. Regarding the knowledge of the past, since it belongs to the sense-sphere, its non-inclusion with psychic powers, etc., should be understood. However, they say its range extends from within the past seven days up to the present rebirth-linking. Even within the past seven days, its being an object for things connected to the aggregates seems reasonable.

Pādakajjhānacittaṃ parikammehi gahetvāti pādakajjhānaṃ samāpajjitvā vuṭṭhāya ‘‘idaṃ cittaṃ viya ayaṃ kāyo sīghagamano hotū’’ti pubbabhāgaparikammehi rūpakāyassa viya pādakajjhānacittassapi gahetabbataṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Idaṃ pana adhiṭṭhānaṃ evaṃ pavattatīti veditabbaṃ. Adhippetaṭṭhānapāpuṇanatthaṃ gantukāmataṃ purakkhatvā pādakajjhānaṃ samāpajjitvā vuṭṭhāya ‘‘idaṃ cittaṃ viya ayaṃ kāyo sīghagamano hotū’’ti karajakāyārammaṇaṃ parikammaṃ katvā bhavaṅgaṃ otaritvā vuṭṭhāya pādakajjhānaṃ samāpajjitvā puna bhavaṅge otiṇṇe manodvārāvajjanaṃ rūpakāyaṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā uppajjati anulomāni ca. Tato adhiṭṭhānacittampi tamevārammaṇaṃ katvā uppajjati. Tassānubhāvena yathādhippetaṭṭhānaṃ gatoyeva hoti. Evaṃ adissamānena kāyena gacchanto panāyaṃ kiṃ tassa adhiṭṭhānacittassa uppādakkhaṇe gacchati, udāhu ṭhitikkhaṇe bhaṅgakkhaṇe vāti? Tīsu khaṇesu gacchatīti icchanti. Citteti pādakajjhānacitte. Samodahatīti cittānugatikaṃ cittaṃ viya sīghagamanaṃ karotīti attho. Yathā hi cittaṃ icchitakkhaṇe atidūrepi visayaṃ ārabbha pavattati, evaṃ rūpakāyassapi lahuparivattibhāvāpādanaṃ cittavasena kāyapariṇāmanaṃ. Na cettha rūpadhammānaṃ dandhaparivattibhāvato ekacittakkhaṇena desantaruppatti na yujjatīti vattabbā adhiṭṭhānacittena rūpakāyassa lahuparivattibhāvassa āpāditattā. Tenevāha ‘‘cittavasena kāyaṃ adhiṭṭhahitvā sukhasaññañca lahusaññañca okkamitvā adissamānena kāyena brahmalokaṃ gacchatī’’ti (visuddhi. 2.397). Acinteyyo hi iddhimantānaṃ iddhivisayoti.

'Taking the basis-jhāna consciousness with preliminary practices' means it is said with reference to the fact that the basis-jhāna consciousness, like the form-body, is to be taken by means of preliminary practices, after entering and emerging from the basis-jhāna, thinking, 'May this body move swiftly like this mind.' It should be understood that this resolve proceeds thus: desiring to reach the intended destination, one first attains the basis-jhāna, emerges, and thinks, 'May this body move swiftly like this mind.' Having performed the preliminary work with the physical body as the object, one descends into the life-continuum. Upon emerging again, one attains the basis-jhāna once more. When the life-continuum is entered again, mind-door adverting arises, taking the form-body as its object, as well as the conformity moments. Then the resolve-consciousness also arises, taking that same object. By its power, one indeed reaches the intended destination. Thus, while moving with an invisible body, does one move at the moment of arising, the moment of presence, or the moment of dissolution of the resolve-consciousness? Some hold that movement occurs in all three moments. 'Mind' refers to the basis-jhāna consciousness. 'Samodahati' means it makes swift movement in accordance with the mind, like the mind itself. Just as the mind operates on objects even at a great distance in the moment of intention, so too the rapid transformation of the form-body is induced by the mind's influence on the body's malleability. Here, it should not be said that material phenomena, due to their slow transformation, cannot arise in a distant place within a single mind-moment, because the resolve-consciousness induces rapid transformation in the form-body. Hence it is said, 'Having resolved upon the body through the mind, and having entered into the perception of ease and lightness, one goes to the Brahma-world with an invisible body' (Visuddhimagga 2.397). Indeed, the range of psychic powers for those possessing them is inconceivable.

Cittasantānaṃ [Pg.210] rūpakāye samodahitanti yattakehi cittehi dissamānena kāyena yathādhippetaṭṭhānappatti, tattakānaṃ cittānaṃ pabandhassa dandhagamanakaraṇato imassa adhiṭṭhānassa karajakāye āropitaṃ tadanuguṇanti attho. Idampi adhiṭṭhānapādakajjhānaṃ samāpajjitvā vuṭṭhāya ‘‘ayaṃ kāyo viya idaṃ cittaṃ dandhagamanaṃ hotū’’ti samāpajjitvā vuṭṭhitajjhānacittārammaṇaṃ parikammaṃ katvā bhavaṅgaṃ otaritvā bhavaṅgato vuṭṭhāya pādakajjhānaṃ samāpajjitvā puna bhavaṅge otiṇṇe manodvārāvajjanaṃ pādakajjhānaṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā uppajjati anulomāni ca. Tato adhiṭṭhānacittampi tamevārammaṇaṃ katvā uppajjati. Tassānubhāvena antarā pañcaviññāṇādīsu uppannesupi apatanto icchitaṭṭhānaṃ gacchati. Evaṃ gacchanto ca sace icchati, pathavīkasiṇavasena ākāse maggaṃ nimminitvā padasā gacchati. Sace icchati, vāyokasiṇavasena vāyuṃ adhiṭṭhahitvā tūlapicu viya vāyunā gacchati. Apica gantukāmatāva ettha pamāṇaṃ. Sati hi gantukāmatāya evaṃ katādhiṭṭhāno adhiṭṭhānavegakkhittoveso issāsapakkhitto saro viya dissamāno gacchatīti. Tattha ākāse maggaṃ nimminitvā gacchanto vināpi abhiññāñāṇena pakatipathaviyaṃ viya gacchati. Teneva ‘‘padasā gacchatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Vāyuṃ adhiṭṭhahitvā gacchanto abhiññāñāṇasamuṭṭhitavāyodhātuparamparāya gacchati. Ubhayatthāpi antarā vanarāmaṇīyakādīni pekkhamāno āpāthagate sadde ca suṇamāno gacchatīti vadanti. Keci pana ‘‘adissamānena kāyena ekacittakkhaṇeneva icchitaṭṭhānagamane dissamānena kāyena padasā vāyunā ca gamane abhiññācittasamuṭṭhitakāyaviññattivipphārena gamana’’nti vadanti. Apare ‘‘abhiññācittassa viññattinibbattanakiccaṃ natthī’’ti vadanti.

'The continuity of mind is integrated with the form-body' means that the attainment of the desired place by the visible body occurs with however many mind-moments, and due to the slow movement caused by the succession of those minds, this determination is imposed on the physical body, making it conform accordingly. This too is done by entering the basis-jhāna of determination. Upon emerging, one resolves: 'Just as this body is, so too may this mind move slowly.' After performing preliminary work, taking the jhāna-consciousness one has just emerged from as the object, one descends into the life-continuum. Rising from the life-continuum, one enters the basis-jhāna again. When one has again entered the life-continuum, mind-door adverting arises, taking the basis-jhāna as its object, followed by conformity moments. Then, the mind of determination also arises, taking that same object. By its power, even if the five sense-consciousnesses and other states arise in between, one does not deviate but proceeds to the desired destination. Proceeding thus, if one wishes, one can create a path in the air through the earth-kasiṇa and walk step by step. If one wishes, one can determine the wind through the air-kasiṇa and move like a tuft of cotton carried by the wind. Moreover, the desire to go is the measure here. Indeed, one who has made such a determination, propelled by the force of resolve, is seen moving like an arrow shot by an archer. There, one who creates a path in the air and walks does so without relying on higher knowledge, just as one would walk on ordinary ground. Hence, it is said, 'he walks step by step.' One who determines the wind and moves does so through a succession of wind elements produced by higher knowledge. In both cases, it is said that one moves while observing forests, delightful groves, and other sights along the way, and hearing sounds that come within range. Some, however, say: 'With an invisible body, one reaches the desired destination in a single mind-moment. With a visible body, walking step by step or moving by wind is due to the manifestation of bodily intimation produced by the mind of higher knowledge.' Others say: 'The mind of higher knowledge has no function of producing intimation.'

Adhiṭṭhānadvayanti cittakāyavasena kāyacittapariṇāmanabhūtaṃ rūpakāyapādakajjhānacittārammaṇaṃ ubhayaṃ adhiṭṭhānaṃ. Taṃsampayuttāyāti yathāvuttaadhiṭṭhānadvayasampayuttāya. Sukhasaññālahusaññābhāvatoti sukhasaññālahusaññāsabbhāvato, tabbhāvaṃ āpajjanatoti attho. Sukhasaññāti cettha upekkhāsampayuttā saññā. Upekkhā hi ‘‘santaṃ sukha’’nti vuttā. Sāyeva ca saññā nīvaraṇehi ceva vitakkādīhi paccanīkehi ca vimuttattā ‘‘lahusaññā’’tipi veditabbā. Tāhi samokkantāhi rūpakāyopi tūlapicu viya sallahuko hoti. So evaṃ vātakkhittatūlapicunā [Pg.211] viya sallahukena ekacittakkhaṇena adissamānena ca kāyena yathāruci gacchatīti.

'The two determinations' means both determinations, which consist of the transformation of body and mind by means of mind and body, and which take the basis-jhāna consciousness of the form-body as their object. 'Associated with that' means associated with the aforementioned pair of determinations. 'From the state of perception of pleasure and lightness' means from the existence of the perception of pleasure and lightness; that is, from having attained that state. Here, the perception of pleasure refers to the perception associated with equanimity. For equanimity is said to be 'peaceful happiness.' And that very perception, being free from hindrances and from opposing factors such as initial thought, should also be understood as 'light perception.' When pervaded by these, even the form-body becomes as light as a tuft of cotton. Thus, with a body as light as a tuft of cotton blown by the wind, and with an invisible body, one goes in a single mind-moment as one wishes.

‘‘Mutto vatamhi tāya anatthasaṃhitāya dukkarakārikāya, sādhu vatamhi sammāsambodhiṃ sambujjha’’nti (saṃ. ni. 1.137) pavattaṃ bhagavato cetoparivitakkamaññāya māro ‘‘amuttabhāvamassa karissāmī’’ti,

“I am truly freed from that profitless arduous practice. It is good that I have attained perfect self-awakening.” Knowing the Blessed One’s mental reflection, Māra thought, “I will make him unliberated.”

‘‘Tapokammā apakkamma, yaṃ na sujjhanti māṇavā;

Asuddho maññasi suddho, suddhimaggā aparaddho’’ti. (saṃ. ni. 1.137) –

“Having abandoned ascetic practices, by which humans are not purified; impure, you consider yourself pure, having strayed from the path of purity.”

Āhāti evamādiṃ sandhāya ‘‘mārādīnampi bhagavato cittajānanaṃ vutta’’nti vuttaṃ. Nibbānapaccavekkhaṇañca pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇena nibbānā…pe… ñātesu pavattatīti sambandho. Nibbānā…pe… ñātesūti idaṃ abhiññāñāṇassa parato pavattamānaṃ paccavekkhaṇaṃ abhiññāñāṇassa visaye viya abhiññāñāṇavisayavisayepi kadāci pavattituṃ arahatīti katvā vuttaṃ. Appamāṇārammaṇatanti appamāṇakhandhārammaṇatanti attho. Tasmāti yasmā pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇassa nibbānārammaṇabhāvadīpako koci pāṭho natthi, tasmā. Paccavekkhaṇakicce vuccamāneti ruḷhiṃ aggahetvā maggādīnaṃ atītānaṃ pati pati avekkhanaṃ anussaraṇaṃ paccavekkhaṇanti pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇassa kiccaṃyeva paccavekkhaṇanti vuccamāneti attho. Anuññātāti dissatīti ‘‘maggaphalanibbānapaccavekkhaṇato’’ti idameva sandhāya vuttaṃ. Ayañhettha attho – pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇena nibbānārammaṇe khandhe disvā ‘‘ime dhammā kiṃ nu kho ārabbha pavattā’’ti āvajjentassa pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇaṃ nibbānārammaṇe pavattatīti. Anāgataṃsañāṇepi eseva nayo.

With reference to such statements as the one beginning 'He said,' it is stated: 'The Blessed One's knowing of the minds of Māra and others is also mentioned.' The connection is as follows: the reviewing of Nibbāna, by means of the knowledge of recollection of past lives, occurs with regard to things known, beginning with Nibbāna. This phrase, 'with regard to things known, beginning with Nibbāna,' is stated because the reviewing knowledge that arises subsequent to the higher knowledge is sometimes fit to arise even in the sphere of the object of the higher knowledge, just as it arises in the sphere of the higher knowledge itself. 'Having the immeasurable as its object' means having the immeasurable aggregates as its object. Therefore: because there is no textual passage indicating that the knowledge of recollection of past lives has Nibbāna as its object. When the function of reviewing is mentioned: the meaning is that, without adhering to the conventional usage, the repeated examination and recollection of past paths and so on is called 'reviewing'; thus, it is said that the very function of the knowledge of recollection of past lives is reviewing. 'It is acknowledged' or 'it is seen' is said with reference to 'from the reviewing of path, fruition, and Nibbāna.' Herein, this is the meaning: when one, by means of the knowledge of recollection of past lives, sees the aggregates that have Nibbāna as their object and reflects, 'In dependence on what, indeed, have these phenomena arisen?'—then the knowledge of recollection of past lives operates with Nibbāna as its object. The same principle applies to the knowledge of the future.

Yadi evaṃ kasmā parittattike ‘‘appamāṇo dhammo mahaggatassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.12.58) ettha ‘‘appamāṇā khandhā cetopariyañāṇassa pubbenivāsaanāgataṃsañāṇassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti ajjhattattike ca ‘‘bahiddhādhammo bahiddhādhammassa, bahiddhādhammo ajjhattassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti etesaṃ vibhaṅgesu ‘‘bahiddhā khandhā [Pg.212] iddhividhañāṇassa cetopariyapubbenivāsayathākammūpagaanāgataṃsaāvajjanāya ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.20.29) ettakameva vuttaṃ, na vuttaṃ nibbānanti. Cetopariyaiddhividhādiñāṇehi saha vuttattāti ce, evampi visuṃ vibhajitabbaṃ siyā. Na hi visuṃ vibhajanārahaṃ saha vibhajatīti? Na, avacanassa aññakāraṇattā. Yāni hi puthujjanānaṃ pubbenivāsaanāgataṃsañāṇāni, tesaṃ avisayo eva nibbānaṃ. Ariyānaṃ pana maggaphalapaccavekkhaṇehi sacchikatanibbānānaṃ imehi ñāṇehi paccakkhakaraṇe payojanaṃ natthīti sādhāraṇena iddhividhañāṇādīnaṃ gahitattā nibbānaṃ na vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Nibbattakkhandhajānanamāha, na nibbattakakkhandhajānanaṃ. Yathākammūpagañāṇakiccañhi tanti. Attho sambhavatīti idaṃ anāgataṃsañāṇassapi anibbānārammaṇataṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ.

If so, why in the limited triad is it said, “The immeasurable dhamma is a condition for the exalted dhamma by way of object condition” (Paṭṭhā. 2.12.58), where it is stated, “The immeasurable aggregates are a condition for the knowledge of others’ minds, the knowledge of past lives, and the knowledge of the future by way of object condition”? And in the internal triad, it is said, “An external dhamma is a condition for an external dhamma, and an external dhamma is a condition for an internal dhamma by way of object condition.” In their analyses, it is stated, “External aggregates are a condition for the knowledge of psychic powers, the knowledge of others’ minds, the knowledge of past lives, knowledge of faring according to kamma, knowledge of the future, and adverting by way of object condition” (Paṭṭhā. 2.20.29). Only this much is said, but Nibbāna is not mentioned. If it is argued that this is because it is stated together with the knowledge of others’ minds, psychic powers, etc., even so, it should be analyzed separately. For it does not analyze together what is worthy of separate analysis, does it? No, because there is another reason for its not being stated. Indeed, Nibbāna is entirely beyond the scope of the knowledge of past lives and future knowledge possessed by ordinary people. However, for noble ones who have realized Nibbāna through reviewing the path and fruition, there is no purpose in directly realizing it with these knowledges. Therefore, it should be understood that Nibbāna is not mentioned because it is included generally with the knowledge of psychic powers and so on. It refers to the knowledge of aggregates that are produced, not the knowledge of the aggregates that produce. For such is the function of the knowledge of faring according to kamma. This is said with reference to the fact that the knowledge of the future also does not have Nibbāna as its object, and thus the meaning is tenable.

1429. Maggārammaṇattike yasmā cittuppādakaṇḍe bodhitesu cittuppādesu ekantato maggārammaṇāyeva keci natthi, maggārammaṇāyeva pana kadāci maggādhipatino honti, tasmā ‘‘katame dhammā maggārammaṇā’’ti ekameva pucchaṃ katvā tayopi koṭṭhāsā labbhamānavasena vibhattā. Iminā nayena paratopi evarūpesu ṭhānesu attho veditabbo. ‘‘Cittuppādā’’ti, ‘‘maggārammaṇā’’ti ca vuttadhammānaṃyeva maggahetukattābhāvaṃ sādhetuṃ ‘‘asahajātattā’’ti idaṃ hetuvacananti ‘‘asampayuttattāti attho’’ti vuttaṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘na hi arūpadhammāna’’ntiādi. ‘‘Aññadhammārammaṇakāle evā’’ti avadhāraṇassa aggahitattā garuṃ akatvā maggārammaṇakālepi maggādhipatibhāvena na vattabbāti ayampi attho aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pariggahitoyevāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. ‘‘Garuṃ katvā paccavekkhaṇakāle’’ti hi vuttattā garuṃ akatvā paccavekkhaṇakālepi atthi eva. Tadā ca maggādhipatibhāvena na vattabbā te dhammāti bhiyyopi siddhovāyamattho.

1429. In the Path-as-Object Triad, since among the arisings of consciousness taught in the chapter on the arising of consciousness there are none that exclusively have the path as object, but sometimes they become path-dominant, therefore, having asked the single question, “Which states have the path as their object?” the three sections are distinguished according to how they are obtained. By this method, the meaning should be understood in similar places elsewhere. To establish that the states spoken of as “arisings of consciousness” and “having the path as object” are not caused by the path, the reason given is “because they are not co-arisen,” which means “because they are not associated.” Therefore, it is said, “For immaterial states…,” and so on. It should be understood that because the exclusive particle in “only at the time of having another state as object” is not taken, this meaning—that even at the time of having the path as object, they should not be said to be path-dominant when it is not made prominent—is also accepted in the commentary. For, since it is said, “at the time of reviewing, having made it prominent,” it also exists at the time of reviewing without making it prominent. And at that time, those states should not be said to be path-dominant; thus this meaning is further established.

1434. Atītārammaṇāvāti uddhaṭaṃ, ‘‘atītārammaṇā’’ti pana aṭṭhakathāpāṭho bahūsu potthakesu dissati. Tasmāti yasmā paṭiccasamuppādavibhaṅgavaṇṇanāyaṃ (vibha. a. 227) ‘‘maraṇasamaye ñātakā ‘ayaṃ, tāta, tavatthāya buddhapūjā karīyati, cittaṃ pasādehī’ti vatvā’’tiādinā pañcadvāre rūpādiārammaṇūpasaṃharaṇaṃ tattha tadārammaṇapariyosānānaṃ cuddasannaṃ [Pg.213] cittānaṃ pavattiñca vatvā tasmiṃyeva ekacittakkhaṇaṭṭhitike ārammaṇe paṭisandhicittaṃ uppajjatīti paccuppannārammaṇabhāvaṃ paṭisandhiyā vakkhati, tasmāti attho. Dve bhavaṅgāni āvajjanaṃ maraṇassāsannabhāvena mandībhūtavegattā pañca javanāni dve tadārammaṇāni cuticittanti ekādasa cittakkhaṇā atītāti āha ‘‘pañcacittakkhaṇāvasiṭṭhāyuke’’ti. Itaratthāti aññatadārammaṇāya cutiyā. Idāni tameva ‘‘itaratthā’’ti saṅkhepato vuttamatthaṃ vitthārato dassetuṃ ‘‘yadā hī’’tiādimāha. Cutiyā tadārammaṇarahitattā paṭisandhiyā ca paccuppannārammaṇattā ‘‘rūpā…pe… jjantassā’’ti udāhaṭaṃ. Cha bhavaṅgāni paccuppannārammaṇāni honti, nava cittakkhaṇā atītāti sattacittakkhaṇāvasiṭṭhāyuke gatinimitte paṭisandhiyā pavattattāti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

1434. The word ‘Atītārammaṇāvāti’ is quoted; however, the reading ‘atītārammaṇā’ is found in many manuscripts of the commentary. The meaning of ‘therefore’ is: because in the explanation of the analysis of dependent origination (Vibha. A. 227), after stating, by way of “At the time of death, relatives say, ‘Dear one, this offering to the Buddha is being done for your sake. Please gladden your mind,’” and so on, the presentation of an object such as form at the five sense doors and the occurrence there of the fourteen consciousnesses that end with that-object-registration, it will be stated that the rebirth-linking consciousness arises with that same object that has a duration of a single moment of consciousness, thus indicating the present-object nature of rebirth-linking. Two life-continuum moments, an advertence, five impulsions (their force weakened due to the proximity of death), two registration moments, and the death consciousness—these eleven mind-moments are past. Hence, it is said, “when five mind-moments of life remain.” “In the other case” means in the case of another death without that-object-registration. Now, to explain in detail what was stated concisely as “in the other case,” it begins with “For when….” Because the death process is without that-object-registration and the rebirth-linking has a present object, the passage “form… of the dying one” is cited. Six life-continuum moments have a present object, and nine mind-moments are past. Thus, it should be understood that rebirth-linking occurs with the sign of destiny when seven mind-moments of life remain.

Vijjamānameva kāyaṃ ārammaṇaṃ karotīti etena sukhalahusaññokkamanena paccuppannasseva bhūtupādāyarūpasaṅghātassa lahuparivattibhāvāpādanaṃ, na bhāvinoti dasseti.

By this—‘it makes the existing body its object’—it is shown that through the access of the perception of lightness and ease, there is the production of a state of rapid transformation in the presently arisen aggregate of primary and derived matter, not in what is to come.

Etthantareti apākaṭakālato paṭṭhāya yāva pākaṭakālo, etasmiṃ antare. Yasmā pana kassaci kiñci sīghaṃ pākaṭaṃ hoti, kassaci dandhaṃ, tasmā ‘‘ekadvesantativārā’’ti aniyametvā vuttaṃ. ‘‘Vacanasiliṭṭhatāvasena vutta’’nti eke, keci pana ‘‘etthantare pavattā rūpadhammā arūpadhammā ca paccuppannāti gahite eko santativāro hoti, taṃ pana dvidhā vibhajitvā apākaṭakālaṃ ādiṃ katvā yebhuyyena pākaṭakālato orabhāvo eko koṭṭhāso yebhuyyena pākaṭakālaṃ ādiṃ katvā yāva supākaṭakālo ekoti ete dve santativārā. Iminā nayena sesasantativārabhedāpi veditabbā. Tattha kālavasena sabbesaṃ samānabhāvaṃ aggahetvā dhammānaṃ sadisappavattivasena santatiparicchedo dīpitabbo’’ti vadanti. Kiñci kiñci kālaṃ sadisaṃ pavattamānāpi hi utucittādisamuṭṭhānā rūpadhammā santativārāti vuccanti. Yadāha ‘‘atiparittā’’tiādinā, arūpasantatipi cettha yathāvuttarūpasantatiparicchinnā saṅgahitāyevāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Paccuppannesu dhammesu saṃhīratīti taṇhādiṭṭhīhi ākaḍḍhanīyaṭṭhānabhāvena vuttaṃ. ‘‘Yo cāvuso, mano ye ca dhammā’’ti visayivisayabhūtā ekabhavabhūtā ca ekasantatipariyāpannā dhammā vibhāgaṃ akatvā gayhamānā addhāpaccuppannaṃ hoti, sati pana vibhāgakaraṇe [Pg.214] khaṇasantatipaccuppannatā labbhatīti āha ‘‘addhāpaccuppannaṃ hontaṃ etaṃ ubhayaṃ hotī’’ti.

Here, ‘in the interval’ refers to the period from the unmanifest time up to the manifest time; in this interval. However, since for some, something becomes manifest quickly, while for others it becomes manifest slowly, it is stated without specifying a fixed duration as ‘one or two continuities.’ Some say it is stated for verbal fluency, while others explain: ‘In this interval, the material and immaterial phenomena that occur are taken as present. This forms one continuity. Then, dividing it into two parts—taking the unmanifest period as the beginning, the part mostly before the manifest time forms one portion; and taking the manifest time as the beginning, up to the fully manifest time, forms another—these are the two continuities. In this way, the remaining distinctions of continuities should also be understood. Here, without taking the duration to be equal for all, the division of continuity should be shown based on the similar progression of phenomena.’ For, even material phenomena arising from temperature, mind, etc., that progress similarly for some time are called continuities, as stated in ‘extremely subtle,’ etc. Here, it should be understood that the immaterial continuity is also included, as delimited by the aforesaid material continuity. ‘It is drawn into present phenomena’ is said because it is a place to be drawn by craving and views. ‘Friend, the mind and the mental objects’—when these phenomena, being both subject and object, belonging to a single existence, and included within one continuity, are grasped without making a distinction, it is the durational present. However, when a distinction is made, the state of being present as a momentary continuity is obtained. Thus, it is said: ‘This, being the durational present, is both.’

Tassāti mahājanassa. Atītādivibhāgaṃ akatvāti āvajjanādīnaṃ samānākārappavattiyā upāyaṃ dasseti. Siddhaṃ hotīti khaṇapaccuppannārammaṇattepi parikammacetopariyañāṇānaṃ ayaṃ pāḷi suṭṭhu nītā hotīti attho. Atītattiko ca evaṃ abhinno hotīti evaṃ khaṇapaccuppanneyeva dhamme idha paccuppannoti gayhamāne aññapadasaṅgahitasseva anantarapaccayabhāvaṃ pakāsento atītattiko ca paṭṭhāne abhedato sammā atthassa uddhaṭattā avināsito hoti. Atha vā atītattikoti paṭṭhāne atītattikapāḷi, imāya atītattikapāḷiyā yathāvuttakāraṇatoyeva abhinno avisiṭṭho aññadatthu saṃsandati sametīti attho.

‘Tassa’ means of the multitude. ‘Atītādivibhāgaṃ akatvā’ indicates the method of the uniform occurrence of advertence and so forth, without making a distinction of past, etc. ‘Siddhaṃ hoti’ means that even when the object is momentary and present, this passage is well applied to the preparatory and mind-penetrating knowledges. ‘Atītattiko ca evaṃ abhinno hoti’ means that in this way, even when a phenomenon is grasped as present in the momentary present, it reveals the immediately preceding conditionality of what is comprised in other terms, and thus the past triad in the Paṭṭhāna is not destroyed due to the correct extraction of the meaning in an undifferentiated manner. Alternatively, ‘atītattiko’ refers to the past triad passage in the Paṭṭhāna. Due to the reason stated, this past triad passage is not different, not distinct, but indeed converges and agrees in meaning.

Yathāsambhavanti āvajjanāya anāgatārammaṇatā, javanānaṃ paccuppannātītārammaṇatā anāgatapaccuppannātītārammaṇatāti yojetabbaṃ. Nānārammaṇatā na siyā addhāvasena paccuppannārammaṇattāti adhippāyo. Ayañca attho ekissā javanavīthiyā ekasmiṃyeva citte pavattiyaṃ āvajjanādīnaṃ anāgatādiārammaṇatā sambhavatīti sambhavadassanavasena vuttoti yathādhippetassa abhiññācittassa khaṇapaccuppanne pavattiṃ yojetvā dassetuṃ ‘‘tenā’’tiādimāha. Tīṇīti ‘‘atītārammaṇo dhammo atītārammaṇassa dhammassa āsevanapaccayena paccayo, anāgatārammaṇo dhammo anāgatārammaṇassa dhammassa, paccuppannārammaṇo dhammo paccuppannārammaṇassa dhammassa āsevanapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.19.34) padantarasaṅgahitadhammānapekkhā dhammā tīṇi pañhavissajjanānīti attho. Anāsevanaṃ natthīti āsevanalābhe sati yathādhammasāsane avacanassa kāraṇaṃ natthīti avacanena tattha itaresaṃ pañhānaṃ paṭisedho viññāyatīti adhippāyo.

‘Yathāsambhavaṃ’ means that it should be connected thus: for advertence, the object is future; for impulsions, the objects are present or past—or future, present, and past. The intention is that there would be no diversity of objects, because in terms of time, the object is present. And this meaning is stated by way of showing the possibility that, within a single impulsion process and in the occurrence of a single consciousness, the advertence and other factors can have future, etc., objects. Thus, to show how the intended supernormal consciousness functions in the momentary present, it is said, ‘Therefore,’ and so forth. ‘Tīṇi’ means that the phenomena, being independent of phenomena included in other terms, are the three answers to the question: ‘A past-object phenomenon is related to a past-object phenomenon by way of the repetition condition; a future-object phenomenon is related to a future-object phenomenon; a present-object phenomenon is related to a present-object phenomenon by way of the repetition condition’ (Paṭṭhāna 2.19.34). ‘Anāsevanaṃ natthi’ means that when repetition is obtained, there is no reason for non-statement according to the proper teaching. By this non-statement, the rejection of other questions is understood—this is the intended meaning.

Etassa vādassāti ‘‘āvajjanajavanānaṃ anāgatapaccuppannārammaṇattepi cetopariyañāṇaṃ siddha’’nti vādassa. Nissayabhāvoti atthasambhavato yathāvuttanayassa jotakabhāvo. Yanti cittaṃ. Tassāti āvajjanajavanānaṃ [Pg.215] khaṇapaccuppannaniruddhārammaṇatāvacanassa. Ettha ca kālavisesaṃ āmasati, anāgatāyeva ca āvajjanā pavattatīti nayidaṃ yujjamānakaṃ. Atha ‘‘yaṃ imassa cittaṃ bhavissati, taṃ jānāmī’’ti ābhogaṃ karoti, evaṃ sati parikammābhiññācittānampi anāgatārammaṇattamevāti sabbattha āvajjanajavanānaṃ anāgatapaccuppannārammaṇatā na sijjhatīti āha ‘‘pavatti…pe… vuttattā’’ti. Dosāpattiyāti dosāpajjanena, dosāpattito vā. Rāsiekadesāvajjanapaṭivedheti yathārutavaseneva purimavādipakkhamāha, sampattasampattāvajjanajānaneti attanā niddhāritapakkhaṃ. Purimavādino nānujāneyyunti addhāsantatipaccuppannapadatthatā abhidhammamātikāyaṃ āgatapaccuppannapadassa natthīti adhippāye ṭhatvā nānujāneyyuṃ. Ettha ca satipi sabhāvabhede ākārabhedābhāvato ekattanayavasena āvajjanaparikammābhiññācittānaṃ nānārammaṇatādoso natthīti khaṇapaccuppannārammaṇatā cetopariyañāṇassa purimavādīnaṃ adhippāyavibhāvanamukhena dassitā. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana ‘‘sabhāvabhede sati nānārammaṇatādosābhāvo natthi evāti ekasmiṃ eva citte addhāsantativasena paccuppannārammaṇatā vibhāvitā’’ti dvīsupi vādesu yaṃ yuttaṃ, taṃ vicāretvā gahetabbaṃ.

‘Etassa vādassa’ refers to the argument: ‘Even when advertence and impulsions have future or present objects, the knowledge of others’ minds is established.’ ‘Nissayabhāvo’ means the illuminating role of the method stated previously, due to the logical possibility of the meaning. ‘Yaṃ’ refers to the citta. ‘Tassa’ refers to the statement that advertence and impulsions have momentary-present or ceased objects. Here, it touches upon the distinction of time, and since advertence only occurs with a future object, this is not valid. Then, if one reflects, thinking, ‘I know what this mind will be,’ in that case, even the preparatory and supernormal consciousnesses would only have future objects. Thus, it is not established anywhere that advertence and impulsions have future or present objects. Hence, it is said: ‘Because the process is stated… and so forth.’ ‘Dosāpattiyā’ means either by incurring a fault or due to a fault. ‘Rāsiekadesāvajjanapaṭivedha’ states the position of the earlier disputant just as heard. ‘Sampattasampattāvajjanajānana’ is the position he himself has determined. ‘Purimavādino nānujāneyyuṃ’ means they would not agree, standing on the intention that in the Abhidhamma matrix, the term ‘present’ does not refer to the temporal present or the continuity present. Here, even though there is a difference in nature, since there is no difference in mode, there is no fault of differing objects for the advertence, preparatory, and supernormal consciousnesses, as they are unified in approach. Thus, the momentary-present object of the knowledge of others’ minds is shown through clarifying the intention of the earlier disputants. In the commentary, however, it is said: ‘Even when there is a difference in nature, there is indeed a fault of differing objects. Thus, in a single citta, the present object is clarified as being by way of temporal continuity.’ In both arguments, what is reasonable should be considered and accepted.

Tenevāti yasmā atītattike uppannattike ca cetopariyañāṇassa vattamānadhammārammaṇabhāvajotano pāṭho na dissati, teneva kāraṇena. Dvīsu ñāṇesūti pubbenivāsacetopariyañāṇesu. Kammamukhena gayhantīti satipi ārammaṇabhāve cattāro khandhā yathākammūpagañāṇena kammadvārena kusalākusalā icceva gayhanti, na pana vibhāgasoti dasseti. Lobhādisampayogavisesena duccaritabhāvo, alobhādisampayogavisesena ca sucaritabhāvo lakkhīyatīti duccaritasucaritāni vibhāventaṃ lobhādayopi vibhāvetiyeva nāma hotīti āha ‘‘duccarita…pe… bhāvanaṃ hotī’’ti.

‘Teneva’ means that because in the past triad and the arisen triad, the passage illuminating present phenomena as the object of the knowledge of others’ minds is not found, for that very reason. ‘Dvīsu ñāṇesu’ refers to the knowledge of past lives and the knowledge of others’ minds. ‘Kammamukhena gayhanti’ means that even with the four aggregates as objects, they are grasped by the knowledge of how beings fare according to their kamma, through the door of kamma, as merely wholesome or unwholesome, but it does not indicate a detailed classification. The nature of misconduct is characterized by specific association with greed and other defilements, while the nature of good conduct is characterized by specific association with non-greed and other virtues. Thus, it shows that when misconduct and good conduct are distinguished, greed and other defilements are also distinguished; therefore, it is said: ‘misconduct… development occurs.’

1435. Asabhāvadhammassa ‘‘aha’’ntiādipaññattiyā ajjhattadhammupādānatāya siyā koci ajjhattapariyāyo, na pana sabhāvadhammassa asattasantāneva tassāti vuttaṃ ‘‘sabhāva…pe… ahonta’’nti. Tathā hi ‘‘attano khandhādīni paccavekkhantassā’’ti ettha ‘‘ajjhattārammaṇā’’ti padassa atthavivaraṇavasena ‘‘ajjhattaṃ gayhamānaṃ ahanti paññattiṃ ādi-saddena gaṇhātī’’ti [Pg.216] vakkhati. Yadi evaṃ tassa ajjhattattikepi ajjhattabhāvo vattabbo siyā? Na, bahiddhābhāvassa viya ajjhattabhāvassapi ajjhattattike nippariyāyavasena adhippetattāti. Yadāha ‘‘asabhā…pe… na vutta’’nti. Ākiñcaññāyatanādīti ādi-saddena sāvajjanāni tassa purecārikaupacāracittāni tassa ārammaṇena pavattanakapaccavekkhaṇaassādanādicittāni ca saṅgaṇhāti.

1435. For a non-intrinsic phenomenon, there might be some internal aspect due to the grasping of internal phenomena through designations like ‘I,’ and so forth, but for an intrinsic phenomenon, it is not said to be so, as it is not in the continuity of a non-being. This is stated as ‘inherent nature… not existing.’ Thus, in the phrase ‘for one who reflects on one’s own aggregates, and so forth,’ as an explanation of the meaning of the term ‘internal object,’ it will be said, ‘taking up the designation “I” internally, including other designations with the word “etc.”’ If so, should the internal nature also be stated in the internal triad? No, because just as the external nature is intended in a direct sense in the external triad, so too is the internal nature in the internal triad intended in a direct sense. As it is said: ‘non-inherent… not said.’ ‘Ākiñcaññāyatana, etc.’—with the word ‘etc.,’ it includes blameworthy states, the preliminary and access consciousnesses preceding it, and also the consciousnesses that arise with it as an object, such as reviewing, relishing, and so forth.

Ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ taṃ-saddena ākaḍḍhitvā vadati, na pana taṃ sabbanti vuttaṃ, yañca tassa purecārikanti attho. Lesavacananti ekadesasāruppena samānārammaṇabhāvena ekadesasseva vacanaṃ. Lissati silissati ekadesena allīyatīti hi leso. Yesanti kāmāvacarakusalākusalamahākiriyāvajjanacittānaṃ kusalakiriyābhedassa rūpāvacaracatutthassa ca. Evaṃ upekkhāsahagataniddesādīsūti yesaṃ adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttatā vuttā, tesu ekameva upekkhāsahagataniddesaṃ vatvā itaraṃ na vattabbaṃ siyāti attho. Ādi-saddena hetusampayuttakāmāvacarādiniddese saṅgaṇhāti. Tatthāpi hi parittasahetukādibhāvena vuttesu dhammesu ekameva vatvā itaraṃ na vattabbaṃ siyāti. Abhāvanāniṭṭhappavattiyāti abhāvanāniṭṭhappavattiyā abhāvanākārassa ukkaṃsappavattiyāti attho, abhāvassa vā ukkaṃsappavattiyā. Navattabbaṃ jātaṃ ajjhattārammaṇādibhāvenāti adhippāyo. Tānīti ākiñcaññāyatanena samānārammaṇāni āvajjanādīni. Yadi evaṃ ‘‘abhāvanāsāmaññe’’ti kasmā vuttaṃ. Na hi ākiñcaññāyatanārammaṇassa paccavekkhaṇaassādanādivasena pavattacittānaṃ abhāvanākārena pavatti atthīti? Na, abhāvetabbatāya adhippetattā. Na bhāvīyatīti hi abhāvanaṃ, na na bhāvetīti.

It speaks of the dimension of nothingness by drawing it in with the word ‘that,’ but it is not said to be ‘all,’ the meaning being that which precedes it. ‘Lesavacanaṃ’ (partial statement) means the statement of only a part, due to partial similarity by way of having a common object. For ‘lesa’ means to cling or stick, to adhere partially. ‘Yesaṃ’ (of which) refers to the sense-sphere wholesome, unwholesome, great functional, and advertence consciousnesses, and to the fourth fine-material jhāna with its division into wholesome and functional. Thus, in the expositions of states accompanied by equanimity, and so forth, where their association with neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling is stated, the meaning is that by stating only one such exposition, the others need not be stated. By the word ‘ādi’ (etc.), it includes the expositions of sense-sphere states associated with roots, and so forth. There too, when certain phenomena are described as being limited, having a root, and so forth, only one is stated, and the others need not be. ‘Abhāvanāniṭṭhappavattiyā’ (by the occurrence culminating in non-development) means by the supreme occurrence of the mode of non-development, or by the supreme occurrence of absence. The intention is that it has become indescribable by way of being an internal object, and so forth. ‘Tāni’ (those) refers to advertence and so forth, which have the same object as the dimension of nothingness. If so, why was it said, ‘due to the generality of non-development’? For consciousnesses that occur by way of reviewing, relishing, and so forth, with the dimension of nothingness as their object, do not occur in the mode of non-development. No, because it is intended in the sense of what ought not to be developed. For ‘abhāvana’ means ‘not being developed,’ not ‘does not develop.’

Gahaṇavisesanimmitānītiādīsu ayamadhippāyo – yadipi bhāvanāñāṇanimmitākāramattesu sabhāvato avijjamānesu visayesu yebhuyyena mahaggatā dhammā pavattanti, bahiddhākāraggahaṇavasena pana kasiṇādīnaṃ bahiddhābhāvoti tadārammaṇadhammā bahiddhārammaṇāti vuttaṃ. Kasiṇānañhi santānaṃ muñcitvā upaṭṭhānaṃ visesato vaḍḍhitakasiṇavasena viññāyati, paṭhamāruppaviññāṇābhāvassa pana na bahiddhākāro, nāpi ajjhattākāroti [Pg.217] ubhayākāravidhure tasmiṃ anaññasādhāraṇena pavattiyākārena pavattamānaṃ ākiñcaññāyatanameva navattabbārammaṇaṃ vuttaṃ, na itare itarākārappavattitoti. Kāmāvacarakusalānanti nidassanamattaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ.

In phrases such as ‘gahaṇavisesanimmitāni’ (created by a specific grasping), this is the intended meaning: Although for the most part sublime phenomena arise in regard to objects that are mere forms created by meditation-knowledge and do not exist by their own nature, yet by way of grasping the external aspect, there is the externality of the kasiṇas, and so forth. Therefore, the phenomena that have them as objects are called ‘having an external object.’ For the appearance of kasiṇas, having abandoned their continuity, is especially recognized by way of the enlarged kasiṇa. However, for the absence of the consciousness of the first immaterial sphere, there is neither an external aspect nor an internal aspect. Since it is devoid of both aspects, only the dimension of nothingness, which occurs with a mode of occurrence not common to any other, is said to have an ‘indescribable object,’ not the others, because they occur with the other aspect. ‘Kāmāvacarakusalāni’ (sense-sphere wholesome states) should be seen as a mere example.

Ākiñcaññāyatanavipākaṃ nevasaññānāsaññāyatanassa vipākādikassāti atthavasena vibhatti pariṇāmetabbā. Abhinīhārāsambhavatoti samāpatticittassa abhinīharaṇāsambhavato. Kusalameva vipākassa ārammaṇanti katvā ‘‘vipākassā’’tiādi vuttaṃ.

The case ending of ‘Ākiñcaññāyatanavipākaṃ’ (the result of the dimension of nothingness) should be changed according to the meaning to the genitive, for the resultant consciousness, etc., of the dimension of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. ‘Abhinīhārāsambhavato’ (because of the impossibility of directing) means because of the impossibility of directing the attainment consciousness. Taking it that only the wholesome consciousness is the object of the resultant consciousness, it is stated, ‘of the resultant,’ and so forth.

Asabhāvadhammattepi bahiddhākārena gahaṇīyabhāvato kasiṇānaṃ bahiddhābhāvo viya ekantato idha ajjhattadhammupādānatāya ahanti paññattiyā siyā ajjhattabhāvoti vuttaṃ ‘‘ajjhatta’’ntiādi. ‘‘Khandhādīti ādi-saddena dhātuāyatanādi saṅgayhatī’’ti ca vadanti. Esa nayoti ‘‘arūpakkhandhe khandhāti gahetvā’’tiādikaṃ vaṇṇanānītiṃ āha. Paresaṃ khandhādiggahaṇeti paresaṃ khandhādīti imassa padassa kathane uccāraṇe. Sabbaṃ upādāpaññattiṃ āha ādisaddenāti sambandho.

Although they are phenomena without own-nature, just as the kasiṇas have an external nature because they are to be grasped with an external aspect, so here, because of exclusively appropriating internal phenomena, the concept ‘I’ might have an internal nature; thus it is said ‘internal,’ and so forth. And they say, ‘By “aggregates, etc.,” the word “etc.” includes the elements, bases, and so on.’ ‘This is the method’ refers to the commentarial method such as ‘having taken the immaterial aggregates as “aggregates.”’ ‘In the grasping of others’ aggregates, etc.’ means in the stating, the uttering of this phrase ‘others’ aggregates, etc.’ The connection is that by the word ‘ādi’ (etc.) it refers to every derivative concept.

Tikaatthuddhāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Extraction of Meaning of the Triads is finished.

Dukaatthuddhāravaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Extraction of Meaning of the Dyads

1473. Aññathāti vuttappakārassa dassane. Vuttappakārassa dassanato eva hi aṭṭhakathāyaṃ sasaṅkhārikānaṃ thinamiddhavirahe asaṅkhārikasadisī yojanā na dassitā. Bhavarāgādīsūti bhavarāgamūlikādīsu yojanāsu.

1473. ‘Otherwise’ means in showing a way different from the one stated. For it is precisely by showing the stated manner that in the commentary, the application similar to the unprompted is not shown for those prompted states that are free from sloth and torpor. ‘In craving for existence, etc.’ means in applications rooted in craving for existence, and so forth.

1511. Dveti uddhaccāvijjānīvaraṇāni. Tīṇīti kāmacchandabyāpādavicikicchāsu ekekena uddhaccāvijjānīvaraṇāni. Dve vā tīṇi vāti pāḷiyaṃ vā-saddassa luttaniddiṭṭhataṃ āha. Atha vā nipātasaddasannidhānepi nāmapadādīhi eva samuccayādiattho vuccati, na nipātapadehi tesaṃ avācakattāti antarenapi nipātapadaṃ ayamattho labbhati. Tathā vacanicchāya sambhavo eva hettha pamāṇanti pāḷiyaṃ ‘‘dve tīṇī’’ti vuttaṃ. Yattha [Pg.218] sahuppattītiādinā ‘‘dve tīṇī’’ti lakkhaṇavacananti sabbasādhāraṇamatthamāha. Tathā hi ‘‘evañca katvā kilesagocchake cā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tassāyamadhippāyo – kilesadvayasahitasseva cittuppādassa abhāvepi pāḷiyaṃ dviggahaṇaṃ kataṃ, kilesānañca sambhavantānaṃ sabbesaṃ sarūpena gahaṇaṃ na katanti dve tayoti lakkhaṇakaraṇanti viññāyatīti.

1511. ‘Two’ means the hindrances of restlessness and ignorance. ‘Three’ means the hindrances of restlessness and ignorance, each together with one of sensual desire, ill will, or doubt. He states that in the Pāḷi, the word ‘vā’ (or) is indicated as elided. Alternatively, even in the presence of a particle, a meaning such as conjunction is expressed by nouns and other such words, not by the particle-words, as they are not denotative; thus, this meaning is obtained even without the particle-word. Likewise, the very possibility arising from the intention to speak is the authority here; thus, it is stated in the Pāḷi as ‘two, three.’ By the words ‘where there is co-arising,’ and so forth, he states the general meaning that ‘two, three’ is a characteristic statement. For so it is said: ‘And having done so, also in the cluster of defilements…’ The intention is this: it is understood that ‘two, three’ is a making of a characteristic, because even when there is no arising of a consciousness accompanied by two defilements, the taking of two is made in the Pāḷi, and because there is no taking of all possible defilements by their own nature.

Yadi sabbākusale uppajjanakassapi uddhaccassa eko eva cittuppādo visayabhāvena vuccati, avijjānīvaraṇassapi tathā vattabbanti adhippāyena ‘‘kasmā vutta’’ntiādinā codeti. Itaro uddhaccanīvaraṇasseva tathā vattabbataṃ avijjānīvaraṇassa tathā vattabbatābhāvañca dassetuṃ ‘‘suttante’’tiādimāha. Tattha suttante vuttesu pañcasu nīvaraṇesūti uddhaccasahagate uddhaccassa avijjānīvaraṇena nīvaraṇasahitataṃ āsaṅkitvā vuttaṃ. Nanu ca suttantepi ‘‘avijjānīvaraṇānaṃ sattāna’’ntiādīsu (saṃ. ni. 2.124) avijjā ‘‘nīvaraṇa’’nti vuttāti? Saccametaṃ, jhānaṅgānaṃ paṭipakkhabhāvena pana suttante bahulaṃ kāmacchandādayo pañceva nīvaraṇāni vuttānīti yebhuyyavuttivasena etaṃ vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

With the intention that if only one consciousness-arising is spoken of as the domain for restlessness, which can arise in all unwholesome states, then the same should be said for the hindrance of ignorance, he raises the objection, beginning with ‘Why was it said?’ The other, to show that it is fitting to speak thus only of the hindrance of restlessness, and that it is not fitting to speak thus of the hindrance of ignorance, states what begins with ‘in the suttas.’ Therein, the phrase ‘among the five hindrances mentioned in the suttas’ is stated on the suspicion that restlessness, in a consciousness accompanied by it, is included as a hindrance along with the hindrance of ignorance. But is it not said in the suttas that ignorance is a ‘hindrance,’ as in ‘for beings hindered by ignorance,’ etc. (SN 2.124)? This is true. However, since in the suttas it is mostly only the five hindrances beginning with sensual desire that are mentioned as the counterparts to the jhāna factors, it should be understood that this was stated according to the predominant usage.

Keci pana ‘‘yathā nikkhepakaṇḍe kusalapaṭipakkhabhūtāni dubbalānipi nīvaraṇāni paṭṭhāne viya dassitāni. Tathā hi paṭṭhāne (paṭṭhā. 3.8.1) ‘nīvaraṇaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca nīvaraṇo dhammo uppajjati na purejātapaccayā. Arūpe kāmacchandanīvaraṇaṃ paṭicca thinamiddhanīvaraṇaṃ uddhaccanīvaraṇa’ntiādi vuttaṃ, na evaṃ aṭṭhakathākaṇḍe. Aṭṭhakathākaṇḍe pana jhānapaṭipakkhabhūtāniyeva nīvaraṇāni niddiṭṭhānīti ‘uddhaccanīvaraṇaṃ uddhaccasahagate cittuppāde uppajjatī’ti vuttaṃ. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana uddhaccanīvaraṇassa kāmacchandādīhi ekato uppattidassanaṃ nikkhepakaṇḍānusārena kataṃ ekato uppattiyā pabhedadassanatthaṃ. Tattha hi pāḷiyaṃyeva tāni vitthārato vuttānī’’ti vadanti. Ayañca vādo ‘‘uddhaccanīvaraṇaṃ uddhaccasahagate cittuppāde uppajjatī’’ti idameva vacanaṃ ñāpakanti katvā vutto. Aññathā avijjānīvaraṇaṃ viya vattabbaṃ siyā. Na ti ito aññaṃ pariyuṭṭhānapaṭṭhāyīniyeva nīvaraṇāni atthuddhārakaṇḍe adhippetānīti imassa atthassa sādhakaṃ vacanaṃ atthi, idaṃ vacanaṃ dvetīṇivacanassa sāmaññena sabbanīvaraṇasaṅgāhakattā yathāvuttavacanassa visayavisesappakāsanasaṅkhātena [Pg.219] payojanantarena vuttabhāvassa dassitattā ca ñāpakaṃ na bhavatīti dissati, tasmā vicāretvā gahetabbaṃ.

Some, however, say: 'Just as in the Nikkhepakaṇḍa, even weak hindrances that are opposed to the wholesome are shown, as in the Paṭṭhāna. For in the Paṭṭhāna (Paṭṭh. 3.8.1), it is said: 'A hindrance-state arises in dependence on a hindrance-state, not by way of pre-nascence condition. In the formless sphere, in dependence on the hindrance of sensual desire, the hindrance of sloth and torpor and the hindrance of restlessness arise,' and so on. But it is not so in the Aṭṭhakathākaṇḍa. In the Aṭṭhakathākaṇḍa, however, only those hindrances that are opposed to jhāna are specified, for it is said: 'The hindrance of restlessness arises in a consciousness-moment accompanied by restlessness.' However, in the Aṭṭhakathā, the showing of the simultaneous arising of the hindrance of restlessness with sensual desire, etc., is done in accordance with the Nikkhepakaṇḍa, for the purpose of showing distinctions in their simultaneous arising. For in the Pāḷi itself, these are explained in detail,' they say. And this argument is made by taking this very statement, 'The hindrance of restlessness arises in a consciousness-moment accompanied by restlessness,' as the indicator. Otherwise, it would have to be spoken of like the hindrance of ignorance. For there is no other statement than this that supports the meaning that in the Atthuddhārakaṇḍa only those hindrances that are established as obsessions are intended. It is seen that this statement is not an indicator, because the phrase 'two or three' generally includes all hindrances, and because it has been shown that the aforementioned statement was made with another purpose, namely, to clarify a specific subject. Therefore, this should be accepted after investigation.

Aggahetvāti yathārutavaseneva atthaṃ aggahetvā yathā nikkhepakaṇḍapaṭṭhānādīhi na imissā pāḷiyā virodho hoti, evaṃ adhippāyo gavesitabboti yathāvuttamevatthaṃ nigameti.

'Not grasping' means not grasping the meaning just as it is heard, but that the intended meaning should be sought in such a way that there is no contradiction of this Pāḷi text with the Nikkhepakaṇḍa, Paṭṭhāna, and so on. Thus he concludes the meaning just as stated.

1577. Tesanti lobhādito aññesaṃ. Dassitāti kathaṃ dassitā? Māno tāva lobhamohauddhaccaahirikānottappehi, lobhamohathinauddhaccaahirikānottappehi, tathā diṭṭhi, vicikicchā mohauddhaccaahirikānottappehi, thinaṃ lobhamohadiṭṭhiuddhaccaahirikānottappehi, lobhamohamānauddhaccaahirikānottappehi, lobhamohauddhaccaahirikānottappehi, dosamohauddhaccaahirikānottappehi, uddhaccaṃ lobhamohadiṭṭhiahirikānottappehi, lobhamohadiṭṭhithinaahirikānottappehi, lobhamohamānaahirikānottappehi, lobhamohamānathinaahirikānottappehi, lobhamohathinaahirikānottappehi, lobhamohaahirikānottappehi, dosamohaahirikānottappehi, dosamohathinaahirikānottappehi, mohavicikicchāahirikānottappehi, mohaahirikānottappehi ekato uppajjati.

1577. 'Of these' means of others than greed and so on. 'Shown'—how are they shown? Conceit, for instance, arises together with greed, delusion, restlessness, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread, and with greed, delusion, sloth, restlessness, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread; wrong view likewise; doubt with delusion, restlessness, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread; sloth with greed, delusion, wrong view, restlessness, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread, with greed, delusion, conceit, restlessness, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread, with greed, delusion, restlessness, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread, and with hatred, delusion, restlessness, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread; restlessness with greed, delusion, wrong view, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread, with greed, delusion, wrong view, sloth, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread, with greed, delusion, conceit, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread, with greed, delusion, conceit, sloth, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread, with greed, delusion, sloth, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread, with greed, delusion, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread, with hatred, delusion, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread, with hatred, delusion, sloth, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread, with delusion, doubt, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread, and with delusion, shamelessness, and lack of moral dread.

Yathā ca uddhaccaṃ, evaṃ ahirikānottappāni ca yojetvā veditabbāni. Kathaṃ? Ahirikaṃ lobhamohadiṭṭhiuddhaccānottappehi, lobhamohadiṭṭhithinauddhaccānottappehi, lobhamohamānauddhaccānottappehi, lobhamohamānathinauddhaccānottappehi, lobhamohathinauddhaccānottappehi, lobhamohauddhaccānottappehi, dosamohauddhaccānottappehi, dosamohathinauddhaccānottappehi, mohavicikicchāuddhaccānottappehi, mohauddhaccānottappehi ca ekato uppajjati. Anottappaṃ lobhamohadiṭṭhiuddhaccāhirikehi, lobhamohadiṭṭhithinauddhaccāhirikehi, lobhamohamānauddhaccāhirikehi, lobhamohamānathinauddhaccāhirikehi, lobhamohathinauddhaccāhirikehi, lobhamohauddhaccāhirikehi, dosamohauddhaccāhirikehi, dosamohathinauddhaccāhirikehi, mohavicikicchāuddhaccāhirikehi[Pg.220], mohauddhaccāhirikehi ca ekato uppajjatīti evamettha mānādīnampi ekato uppatti veditabbā. Sesaṃ uttānatthameva.

Just as restlessness is explained, so too should shamelessness and lack of moral dread be understood by combining them. How? Shamelessness arises together with greed, delusion, wrong view, restlessness, and lack of moral dread; with greed, delusion, wrong view, sloth and torpor, restlessness, and lack of moral dread; with greed, delusion, conceit, restlessness, and lack of moral dread; with greed, delusion, conceit, sloth and torpor, restlessness, and lack of moral dread; with greed, delusion, sloth and torpor, restlessness, and lack of moral dread; with greed, delusion, restlessness, and lack of moral dread; with hatred, delusion, restlessness, and lack of moral dread; with hatred, delusion, sloth and torpor, restlessness, and lack of moral dread; with delusion, doubt, restlessness, and lack of moral dread; and with delusion, restlessness, and lack of moral dread. Lack of moral dread arises together with greed, delusion, wrong view, restlessness, and shamelessness; with greed, delusion, wrong view, sloth and torpor, restlessness, and shamelessness; with greed, delusion, conceit, restlessness, and shamelessness; with greed, delusion, conceit, sloth and torpor, restlessness, and shamelessness; with greed, delusion, sloth and torpor, restlessness, and shamelessness; with greed, delusion, restlessness, and shamelessness; with hatred, delusion, restlessness, and shamelessness; with hatred, delusion, sloth and torpor, restlessness, and shamelessness; with delusion, doubt, restlessness, and shamelessness; and with delusion, restlessness, and shamelessness. In this way, the simultaneous arising of conceit and others should be understood here. The rest is clear in meaning.

Aṭṭhakathākaṇḍavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Commentary Section is completed.

Iti dhammasaṅgaṇīmūlaṭīkāya līnatthapadavaṇṇanā

Thus ends the Līnatthapadavaṇṇanā, the Root Sub-commentary to the Dhammasaṅgaṇī.

Dhammasaṅgaṇī-anuṭīkā samattā.

The Anuṭīkā to the Dhammasaṅgaṇī is completed.