Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa

Homage to the Blessed One, the Arahant, the Perfectly Self-Enlightened One.

Abhidhammapiṭake

The Abhidhamma Piṭaka

Pañcapakaraṇa-mūlaṭīkā

The Root Commentary on the Five Treatises

Dhātukathāpakaraṇa-mūlaṭīkā

The Root Commentary on the Dhātukathā Treatise

Ganthārambhavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Beginning of the Composition

Dhātukathāpakaraṇaṃ [Pg.1] desento bhagavā yasmiṃ samaye desesi, taṃ samayaṃ dassetuṃ, vibhaṅgānantaraṃ desitassa pakaraṇassa dhātukathābhāvaṃ dassetuṃ vā ‘‘aṭṭhārasahī’’tiādimāha. Tattha balavidhamanavisayātikkamanavasena devaputtamārassa, appavattikaraṇavasena kilesābhisaṅkhāramārānaṃ, samudayappahānapariññāvasena khandhamārassa, maccumārassa ca bodhimūle eva bhañjitattā parūpanissayarahitaṃ niratisayaṃ taṃ bhañjanaṃ upādāya bhagavā eva ‘‘mārabhañjano’’ti thomito. Tattha māre abhañjesi, mārabhañjanaṃ vā etassa, na pararājādibhañjananti mārabhañjano. Mahāvikkanto mahāvīriyoti mahāvīro.

The Blessed One, while teaching the Dhātukathāpakaraṇa, to reveal the time at which he taught it, or to show that the Dhātukathā is the treatise that follows the Vibhaṅga, said, 'Eighteen elements,' and so on. There, by transcending the sphere of Devaputta-Māra's power and its defeat, by preventing the arising of Kilesābhisaṅkhāra-Māra, by fully comprehending the arising and abandoning of Khandha-Māra, and by subjugating Maccumāra at the foot of the Bodhi tree, the Blessed One is praised as ‘Mārabhañjano’ (the Subduer of Māra) on account of that unsurpassed subjugation, free from dependence on others. He subdued Māra, or the subduing of Māra belongs to him—not the subduing of other kings, etc.—therefore he is ‘Mārabhañjano’. He is ‘Mahāvīro’ (the Great Hero) because of his great prowess and great energy.

Khandhādayo araṇantā dhammā sabhāvaṭṭhena dhātuyo, abhidhammakathādhiṭṭhānaṭṭhena vāti katvā tesaṃ kathanato imassa pakaraṇassa dhātukathāti adhivacanaṃ. Yadipi aññesu ca pakaraṇesu te sabhāvā kathitā, ettha pana tesaṃ sabbesaṃ saṅgahāsaṅgahādīsu cuddasasu nayesu ekekasmiṃ kathitattā sātisayaṃ kathananti idameva evaṃnāmakaṃ. Ekadesakathanameva hi aññattha katanti. Khandhāyatanadhātūhi vā khandhādīnaṃ araṇantānaṃ saṅgahāsaṅgahādayo nayā vuttāti tattha mahāvisayānaṃ dhātūnaṃ [Pg.2] vasena dhātūhi kathā dhātukathāti evaṃ assa nāmaṃ vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Dvidhā tidhā chadhā aṭṭhārasadhāti anekadhā dhātubhedaṃ pakāsesīti dhātubhedappakāsanoti. Tassatthanti tassā dhātukathāya atthaṃ. A-kāre ā-kārassa lopo daṭṭhabbo. ‘‘Yaṃ dhātukatha’’nti vā ettha pakaraṇanti vacanaseso sattannaṃ pakaraṇānaṃ kamena vaṇṇanāya pavattattāti tena yojanaṃ katvā tassa pakaraṇassa atthaṃ tassatthanti a-kāralopo vā. Tanti taṃ dīpanaṃ suṇātha, taṃ vā atthaṃ taṃdīpanavacanasavanena upadhārethāti attho. Samāhitāti nānākiccehi avikkhittacittā, attano citte āhitāti vā attho.

The aggregates and other phenomena, up to the unconditioned, are called elements in the sense of their intrinsic nature, or as the foundation of Abhidhamma discussion. Therefore, because they are discussed here, this treatise is called the Dhātukathā (Discussion of Elements). Although these intrinsic natures are also discussed in other treatises, here they are discussed extensively because they are covered in each of the fourteen methods, such as inclusion and exclusion. This is why it is specifically named so. Indeed, elsewhere only partial discussions are made. Alternatively, it should be understood that its name is stated as Dhātukathā because the methods of inclusion and exclusion, etc., of the aggregates and so forth, up to the unconditioned, are stated by means of aggregates, sense bases, and elements; and there, due to the vast scope of the elements, the discussion is by means of elements. It explains the divisions of elements in various ways—twofold, threefold, sixfold, eighteenfold, and so on—hence it is called Dhātubhedappakāsana (Exposition of the Divisions of Elements). 'Tassattha' means 'the meaning of that Dhātukathā.' The elision of the vowel 'ā' before the vowel 'a' should be noted. Alternatively, in 'that which is the Dhātukathā,' the word 'treatise' is to be supplied, because the commentary proceeds by way of explaining the seven treatises in sequence; connecting it thus, 'the meaning of that treatise' becomes 'tassattha' by the elision of the vowel 'a'. 'Listen to that exposition'—or, by hearing that explanatory statement, one should grasp its meaning. 'Composed' (samāhitā) means with mind undistracted by various tasks, or 'placed in one's own mind' (attano citte āhitā). This is the meaning.

Ganthārambhavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Beginning of the Composition is completed.

1. Mātikāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Matrix

1. Nayamātikāvaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Naya Matrix

1. Ko [Pg.3] panetassa pakaraṇassa paricchedoti? Na so idha vattabbo, aṭṭhasāliniyaṃ (dha. sa. aṭṭha. nidānakathā) pakaraṇaparicchedo vutto evāti dassento āha ‘‘cuddasavidhena vibhattanti vutta’’nti. Khandhādīnaṃ desanā nīyati pavattīyati etehi, khandhādayo eva vā nīyanti ñāyanti etehi pakārehīti nayā, nayānaṃ mātikā uddeso, nayā eva vā mātikāti nayamātikā. Etesaṃ padānaṃ mūlabhūtattāti ‘‘mūlamātikā’’ti vattabbānaṃ saṅgahāsaṅgahādīnaṃ cuddasannaṃ padānaṃ khandhādidhammavibhajanassa imassa pakaraṇassa mūlabhūtattā nissayabhūtattāti attho.

1. And what is the scope of this treatise? It is not to be stated here; to show that the scope of the treatise has already been stated in the Aṭṭhasālinī (Dhammasaṅgaṇi Commentary, Introduction), he said, 'It is said to be classified in fourteen ways.' Nayas are so called because the teaching of the aggregates and so forth is conveyed and presented by them, or because the aggregates and other categories themselves are conveyed and understood by these modes. The matrix of nayas is the enumeration of the nayas, or the nayas themselves are the matrix. The fourteen terms, such as inclusion and non-inclusion, are to be called the 'root matrix' because they are fundamental. The meaning is that they are fundamental to and form the basis of this treatise, which is an analysis of phenomena such as the aggregates.

2. Abbhantaramātikāvaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Internal Matrix

2. ‘‘Pañcakkhandhā’’tiādīhi rūpakkhandhādipadāni dassitāni, paṭiccasamuppādavacanena ca yesu dvādasasu aṅgesu paccekaṃ paṭiccasamuppādasaddo vattati, tadatthāni dvādasa padāni dassitānīti tesaṃ tathādassitānaṃ sarūpeneva dassitānaṃ phassādīnañca padānaṃ vasena āha ‘‘pañcavīsādhikena padasatenā’’ti. Tattha kammupapattikāmabhavādīnaṃ idha vibhattānaṃ bhāvanabhavanabhāvena bhave viya sokādīnaṃ jarāmaraṇassa viya aniṭṭhattā tannidānadukkhabhāvena ca jarāmaraṇe antogadhatāya paṭiccasamuppādassa dvādasapadatā daṭṭhabbā. Ettha ca pāḷiyaṃ bhinditvā avissajjitānampi satipaṭṭhānādīnaṃ bhinditvā gahaṇaṃ karonto tesaṃ bhinditvāpi vissajjitabbataṃ dassetīti veditabbaṃ.

2. By terms such as 'five aggregates,' the terms 'form aggregate' and so forth are shown. And by the statement on dependent origination, twelve terms are shown, for each of the twelve factors to which the term 'dependent origination' applies. Thus, by means of these terms so shown, the terms shown by their own form such as 'contact,' and others, it is said: 'with one hundred and twenty-five terms.' Here, it should be understood that dependent origination has twelve factors because karma-existence, rebirth-existence, sensual existence, and the like, which are analyzed here, are included in 'existence' due to their nature of being and becoming, just as sorrow and the like are included in 'aging-and-death' due to their undesirability and their nature as suffering caused by that. And it should be understood that here, by taking up terms like the foundations of mindfulness in a split form, even though they are not explained in a split form in the Pāḷi, it is shown that they can be explained even when split.

Nayamātikādikā lakkhaṇamātikantā mātikā pakaraṇantarāsādhāraṇatāya dhātukathāya mātikā nāma, tassā abbhantare vutto vibhajitabbānaṃ uddeso abbhantaramātikā nāmāti imamatthaṃ pakāsento ‘‘ayañhī’’tiādimāha. Tattha evaṃ avatvāti yathā ‘‘sabbāpi…pe… mātikā’’ti ayaṃ dhātukathāmātikato bahiddhā vuttā, evaṃ avatvāti attho. Dhātukathāya abbhantareyevāti ca dhātukathāmātikāya abbhantareyevāti attho daṭṭhabbo. Tadāveṇikamātikāabbhantare hi ṭhapitā tassāyeva abbhantare ṭhapitāti vuttā[Pg.4]. Atha vā evaṃ avatvāti yathā ‘‘sabbāpi…pe… mātikā’’ti etena vacanena dhātukathāto bahibhūtā kusalādiaraṇantā mātikā pakaraṇantaragatā vuttā, evaṃ avatvāti attho. Dhātukathāya abbhantareyevāti ca imassa pakaraṇassa abbhantare eva sarūpato dassetvā ṭhapitattāti attho. Sabbassa abhidhammassa mātikāya asaṅgahitattā vikiṇṇabhāvena pakiṇṇakatā veditabbā.

The mātikā, beginning with the Nayamātikā up to the Lakkhaṇamātikā, is called the mātikā of the Dhātukathā because it is uncommon to other treatises. The enumeration of what is to be analyzed, stated within it, is called the internal mātikā—explaining this meaning, he said 'for this…' and so on. Here, 'not having been stated thus' means not stating it in the way that 'all mātikās…' is stated outside the Dhātukathā mātikā; this is the meaning. And 'within the Dhātukathā itself' should be understood as meaning 'within the Dhātukathā mātikā itself.' For when it is placed within the unique mātikā, it is said to be placed within that very mātikā. Alternatively, 'not having been stated thus' means that by the statement 'all mātikās…,' the mātikā from wholesome states up to the unconditioned, which is outside the Dhātukathā and belongs to other treatises, is mentioned; this is the meaning. And 'within the Dhātukathā itself' means that it is placed within this treatise by showing its essence; this is the meaning. Since it is not included in the mātikā of the entire Abhidhamma, it should be understood as miscellaneous due to its scattered nature.

3. Nayamukhamātikāvaṇṇanā

3. The Explanation of the Matrix of the Openings of Methods

3. Nayānaṃ pavattidvārabhūtā saṅgahāsaṅgahaviyogīsahayogīdhammā nayamukhānīti tesaṃ uddeso nayamukhamātikā. Cuddasapi hi saṅgahāsaṅgahasampayogavippayogānaṃ vomissakatāvasena pavattāti yehi te cattāropi honti, te dhammā cuddasannampi nayānaṃ mukhāni hontīti. Tattha saṅgahitenaasaṅgahitapadādīsu saccādīhipi yathāsambhavaṃ saṅgahāsaṅgaho yadipi vutto, so pana saṅgāhakabhūtehi tehi vutto, na saṅgahabhūtehi, sopi ‘‘cakkhāyatanena ye dhammā khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitā āyatanasaṅgahena asaṅgahitā’’tiādinā pucchitabbavissajjitabbadhammuddhāre tatthāpi khandhādīheva saṅgahehi niyametvā vutto, tasmā ‘‘tīhi saṅgaho, tīhi asaṅgaho’’ti vuttaṃ. Pucchitabbavissajjitabbadhammuddhārepi pana pucchāvissajjanesu ca rūpakkhandhādīnaṃ araṇantānaṃ yathāsambhavaṃ sampayogavippayogā catūheva khandhehi hontīti ‘‘catūhi sampayogo, catūhi vippayogo’’ti vuttaṃ.

3. Dhammas that serve as the doors for the arising of the methods—namely, inclusion, exclusion, association, and dissociation—are called the openings of methods; their enumeration is the matrix of the openings of methods. Indeed, all fourteen methods arise by way of the commingling of inclusion, exclusion, association, and dissociation; and those four dhammas by which they arise are the openings for all fourteen methods. Here, although inclusion and exclusion are stated as appropriate in terms such as 'included by the non-included,' and also with the truths, etc., this is stated by those that are the includers, not by those that are included. Even in the extraction of dhammas to be questioned and answered, in statements such as 'those dhammas included by the aggregate-inclusion but not included by the sense-base-inclusion,' it is stated by being restricted to the aggregates, etc., as the includers. Therefore, it is said, 'inclusion by three, exclusion by three.' However, in the extraction of dhammas to be questioned and answered, and in the questions and answers themselves, the association and dissociation of the form-aggregate, etc., up to the non-contentious, occur as appropriate only with the four aggregates. Thus, it is said, 'association by four, dissociation by four.'

Nanu ca vippayogo rūpanibbānehipi hoti, kasmā ‘‘catūhi vippayogo’’ti vuttanti? Rūpanibbānehi bhavantassapi catūheva bhāvato. Na hi rūpaṃ rūpena nibbānena vā vippayuttaṃ hoti, nibbānaṃ vā rūpena, catūheva pana khandhehi hotīti catunnaṃ khandhānaṃ rūpanibbānehi vippayogopi vippayujjamānehi catūhi khandhehi niyamito tehi vinā vippayogābhāvato. So cāyaṃ vippayogo anārammaṇassa, anārammaṇaanārammaṇamissakehi missakassa ca na hoti, anārammaṇassa pana missakassa ca sārammaṇena, sārammaṇassa sārammaṇena anārammaṇena missakena ca hotīti veditabbo.

But does not dissociation also occur with form and Nibbāna? Why then is it said, 'dissociation is with four'? Because even when occurring with form and Nibbāna, it is only by way of the four. For form is not dissociated from form or from Nibbāna, nor is Nibbāna from form; it occurs only with the four aggregates. Thus, the dissociation of the four aggregates from form and Nibbāna is determined by the four dissociating aggregates, since without them there is no dissociation. And this dissociation does not occur for the objectless, nor for the mixed with the objectless. It should be understood, however, that for the objectless and for the mixed it occurs with the object-possessing; and for the object-possessing, it occurs with the object-possessing, with the objectless, and with the mixed.

4. Lakkhaṇamātikāvaṇṇanā

4. The Exposition of the Matrix of Characteristics

4. Saṅgahoyeva [Pg.5] saṅgahanayo. Sabhāgo. Visabhāgoti etassa ‘‘tīhi saṅgaho, tīhi asaṅgaho’’ti etena, ‘‘catūhi sampayogo, catūhi vippayogo’’ti etenapi visuṃ yojanā kātabbā. Tena saṅgaho asaṅgaho ca sabhāgo visabhāgo ca bhāvo, tathā sampayogo vippayogo cāti ayamattho viññāyati. Yassa vā saṅgaho ca asaṅgaho ca, so dhammo sabhāgo visabhāgo ca, tathā yassa sampayogo vippayogo ca, sopi sabhāgo visabhāgo cāti. Tattha yena rūpakkhandho…pe… manoviññāṇadhātūti dhammā gaṇanaṃ gacchanti, so ruppanādiko samānabhāvo saṅgahe sabhāgatā, ekuppādādiko sampayoge veditabbo.

4. Inclusion is indeed the method of inclusion. Similar. Dissimilar—with this, a separate application should be made to 'inclusion by three, exclusion by three,' and also to 'association by four, dissociation by four.' Thereby, this meaning is understood: inclusion and exclusion are states of similarity and dissimilarity, and likewise association and dissociation. Or, a dhamma that has both inclusion and exclusion is similar and dissimilar; likewise, one that has both association and dissociation is also similar and dissimilar. Herein, that common nature, such as being subject to deformation, by which the dhammas—from the form aggregate... up to the mind-consciousness element—are enumerated, is similarity in inclusion; and co-arising, etc., should be understood in association.

5. Bāhiramātikāvaṇṇanā

5. The Exposition of the External Matrix

5. Evaṃ dhātukathāya mātikato bahi ṭhapitattāti ‘‘sabbāpi…pe… mātikā’’ti etena ṭhapanākārena bahi piṭṭhito ṭhapitattāti attho. Etena vā ṭhapanākārena kusalādīnaṃ araṇantānaṃ idha aṭṭhapetvā dhātukathāya mātikato bahi pakaraṇantaramātikāya imassa pakaraṇassa mātikābhāvena ṭhapitattā tathā pakāsitattāti attho.

5. Thus, because it was placed outside the matrix of the Dhātukathā, the meaning is that by this manner of placement, 'all... etc... the matrix' was placed outside, at the back. Or, the meaning is that because the wholesome and other states, ending with the non-contentious, were not placed here but were placed outside the matrix of the Dhātukathā as the matrix of another treatise—while serving as the matrix of this treatise—it was thus expounded.

Saṅgaho asaṅgahotiādīsu saṅgaho ekavidhova, so kasmā ‘‘catubbidho’’ti vuttoti? Saṅgahoti atthaṃ avatvā aniddhāritatthassa saddasseva vuttattā. Saṅgaho asaṅgahotiādīsu saddesu saṅgahasaddo tāva attano atthavasena catubbidhoti ayañhetthattho. Atthopi vā aniddhāritaviseso sāmaññena gahetabbataṃ patto ‘‘saṅgaho asaṅgaho’’tiādīsu ‘‘saṅgaho’’ti vuttoti na koci doso. Niddhārite hi visese tassa ekavidhatā siyā, na tato pubbeti. Jātisaddassa sāpekkhasaddattā ‘‘jātiyā saṅgaho’’ti vutte ‘‘attano jātiyā’’ti viññāyati sambandhārahassa aññassa avuttattāti jātisaṅgahoti rūpakaṇḍe vutto sajātisaṅgaho vutto hoti.

In the terms 'inclusion, exclusion,' etc., inclusion is indeed of one kind. Why then is it said to be 'of four kinds'? Because the word 'inclusion' is used without stating its meaning, its meaning being undetermined. Here, the meaning is that in the words 'inclusion, exclusion,' etc., the word 'inclusion' is of four kinds according to its meaning. Or, if the meaning, being unspecified in its particularity, is taken generally, there is no fault in saying 'inclusion' in 'inclusion, exclusion,' etc. For if a specific distinction were determined, it would be of one kind, but not before that. Because the word 'birth' is a relative word, when 'inclusion by birth' is stated, it is understood as 'by one's own birth,' since no other related term is stated. Thus, what is stated in the section on form as 'inclusion by birth' is said to be 'inclusion with the same birth'.

Ettha [Pg.6] nayamātikāya ‘‘saṅgaho asaṅgaho, sampayogo vippayogo’’ti ime dve pucchitabbavissajjitabbadhammavisesaṃ aniddhāretvā sāmaññena dhammānaṃ pucchanavissajjananayauddesā, avasesā niddhāretvā. ‘‘Saṅgahitena asaṅgahita’’nti hi ‘‘saṅgahitena asaṅgahitaṃ asaṅgahita’’nti vattabbe ekassa asaṅgahitasaddassa lopo daṭṭhabbo. Tena saṅgahitavisesavisiṭṭho yo asaṅgahito dhammaviseso, tannissito asaṅgahitatāsaṅkhāto pucchāvissajjananayo uddiṭṭho hoti, ‘‘saṅgahitenā’’ti ca visesane karaṇavacanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Esa nayo tatiyādīsu dasamāvasānesu nayuddesesu chaṭṭhavajjesu. Tesupi hi vuttanayena dvīhi dvīhi padehi pucchitabbavissajjitabbadhammavisesaniddhāraṇaṃ katvā tattha tattha antimapadasadisena tatiyapadena pucchanavissajjananayā uddiṭṭhāti. Tattha catutthapañcamesu kattuatthe karaṇaniddeso, sattamādīsu ca catūsu sahayoge daṭṭhabbo, na dutiyatatiyesu viya samānādhikaraṇe visesane. Tattha hi sabhāvantarena sabhāvantarassa visesanaṃ kataṃ, etesu dhammantarena dhammantarassāti. Ekādasamādīsu pana catūsu ādipadeneva dhammavisesaniddhāraṇaṃ katvā itarehi pucchanavissajjananayā uddiṭṭhā. Visesane eva cettha karaṇavacanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Pucchāvissajjanānañhi nissayabhūtā dhammā saṅgahitatādivisesena karaṇabhūtena sampayuttavippayuttādibhāvaṃ attano visesentīti.

Here, in the matrix of methods, these two—'inclusion, exclusion' and 'association, dissociation'—are outlines of the general method of questioning and answering regarding dhammas, without specifying the particular dhammas to be questioned and answered; the remainder are specified. For when 'by the included, the non-included' is stated, it should be understood that one word 'non-included' is omitted from 'by the included, the non-included is non-included.' Thus, the method of questioning and answering, known as the state of non-inclusion, is outlined, based on that particular dhamma which is non-included and qualified by the particularity of being included. And here, the instrumental case ('by the included') should be seen as a qualifier. This method applies in the outlines of methods from the third up to the tenth, excluding the sixth. In those too, after specifying the particular dhammas to be questioned and answered by pairs of terms in the manner stated, the methods of questioning and answering are outlined in each instance by a third term similar to the last term. Herein, in the fourth and fifth, the instrumental case is an indication of agency; and in the seventh and the following four, it should be understood as indicating concomitance, not as a qualifier in apposition as in the second and third. For there, one intrinsic nature qualifies another intrinsic nature, whereas in these, one dhamma qualifies another dhamma. In the eleventh and the following four, however, after specifying the particular dhamma by the first term alone, the methods of questioning and answering are outlined by the remaining terms. Here too, the instrumental case should be seen precisely as a qualifier. For the dhammas that are the basis of questions and answers qualify their own states of association or dissociation through the instrumental relation of specific distinctions like inclusion.

Vikappatoti vividhakappanato, vibhāgatoti attho. Sanniṭṭhānavasenāti adhimokkhasampayogavasena. Sanniṭṭhānavasena vuttā ca sabbe ca cittuppādā sanniṭṭhānavasena vuttasabbacittuppādā, tesaṃ sādhāraṇavasenāti evamettha attho daṭṭhabbo. Adhimokkho hi sanniṭṭhānavasena vuttānaṃ cittuppādānaṃ sādhāraṇavasena vutto, itare sabbesanti. Tattha sādhāraṇā pasaṭā pākaṭā cāti ādito pariggahetabbā, tasmā tesaṃ saṅgahādipariggahatthaṃ uddeso kato, asādhāraṇāpi pana pariggahetabbāvāti tesu mahāvisayena aññesampi saṅgahādipariggahaṃ dassetuṃ adhimokkho uddiṭṭho. ‘‘Sanniṭṭhānavasena vuttā’’ti ca dhammasaṅgahavaṇṇanāyaṃ paṭiccasamuppādavibhaṅge ca vacanaṃ sandhāya vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Sanniṭṭhānavasena ye vuttā, tesaṃ sabbesaṃ sādhāraṇatoti pana atthe sati [Pg.7] sādhāraṇāsādhāraṇesu vattabbesu yo asādhāraṇesu mahāvisayo adhimokkho, tassa vasena vuttasabbacittuppādasādhāraṇato phassādayo sabbasādhāraṇāti adhimokkho ca asādhāraṇesu mahāvisayoti katvā vutto aññassa tādisassa abhāvāti ayamadhippāyo daṭṭhabbo.

'Vikappato' means 'through various determinations'; the meaning is 'division.' 'Sanniṭṭhānavasena' means 'by way of association with resolve.' And all thought-moments spoken of by way of determination are all thought-moments spoken of by way of determination; their common aspect should be understood thus here. For resolve is stated as common to the thought-moments mentioned by way of determination, while the others are common to all. Here, the common ones, such as the spread out and the manifest, should be grasped from the beginning. Therefore, an outline is made to encompass them, etc. However, the uncommon ones should also be grasped; therefore, resolve is outlined to show the inclusion, etc., even of others among them, by way of a great scope. And the phrase 'spoken of by way of determination' should be understood as referring to the statement in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī commentary and the Paṭiccasamuppādavibhaṅga. However, if the meaning is that all those stated by way of determination are common, then, among what is to be stated regarding the common and uncommon, resolve is of great scope among the uncommon. Thus, contact, etc., are common to all thought-moments stated by way of resolve, and resolve is stated as being of great scope among the uncommon due to the absence of any other similar factor. This is the intended meaning to be seen.

Jīvitindriyaṃ panettha rūpamissakattā na vuttanti veditabbaṃ, cittekaggatā pana asamādhisabhāvā sāmaññasaddeneva sāmaññavisesasaddehi ca samādhisabhāvā visesasaddavacanīyaṃ aññaṃ byāpetabbaṃ nivattetabbañca natthīti anaññabyāpakanivattakasāmaññavisesadīpanato tasseva dhammassa bhedadīpakehi vattabbā, na sukhādisabhāvā vedanā viya vuttalakkhaṇaviparītehi sāmaññavisesasaddeheva, tasmā ‘‘cittekaggatā’’ti ayaṃ sāmaññasaddo samādhisabhāve visesasaddanirapekkho pavattamāno sayameva visesasaddamāpajjitvā asamādhisabhāvameva pakāseyya, itaro ca samādhisabhāvamevāti dvidhā bhinnā cittekaggatā asādhāraṇā ceva appavisayā cāti idha uddesaṃ na arahati. Abhinnāpi vā phassādīnaṃ viya pākaṭattābhāvato aññadhammanissayena vattabbato ca sā jīvitañca na arahatīti na uddiṭṭhāti.

Herein, it should be understood that the life faculty is not mentioned because it is mixed with materiality. One-pointedness of mind, however, when it is not of the nature of concentration, is expressed by the general term alone. But when it is of the nature of concentration, because there is nothing else to be encompassed or excluded that should be expressed by a specific term, and because it indicates general and specific distinctions that do not encompass or exclude others, it should be spoken of by terms that reveal the divisions of that very phenomenon. It is not like feeling, which is of the nature of pleasure and so forth, described by general and specific terms contrary to its stated characteristics. Therefore, this general term 'one-pointedness of mind,' when occurring without a specific term in the context of the nature of concentration, itself becomes a specific term and would indicate only that which is not of the nature of concentration, while the other would indicate only the nature of concentration. Thus, one-pointedness of mind, being divided in two ways—as both uncommon and of limited scope—does not deserve mention here. Alternatively, even if undivided, like contact and so forth, due to its lack of prominence and because it must be spoken of in dependence on other phenomena, it—along with the life faculty—does not deserve mention and thus is not listed.

Mātikāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Matrix is finished.

2. Niddesavaṇṇanā

2. The Commentary on the Exposition

1. Paṭhamanayo saṅgahāsaṅgahapadavaṇṇanā

1. The First Method: The Commentary on the Terms of Inclusion and Non-inclusion

1. Khandhapadavaṇṇanā

1. The Commentary on the Section of the Aggregates

6. Khandhāyatanadhātuyomahantare [Pg.8] abhiññeyyadhammabhāvena vuttā, tesaṃ pana sabhāvato abhiññātānaṃ dhammānaṃ pariññeyyatādivisesadassanatthaṃ saccāni, adhipatiyādikiccavisesadassanatthaṃ indriyādīni ca vuttānīti saccādiviseso viya saṅgahāsaṅgahaviseso ca abhiññeyyanissito vuccamāno suviññeyyo hotīti ‘‘tīhi saṅgaho. Tīhi asaṅgaho’’ti nayamukhamātikā ṭhapitāti veditabbā. Evañca katvā ‘‘catūhī’’ti vuttā sampayogavippayogā ca abhiññeyyanissayena khandhādīheva pucchitvā vissajjitāti. Rūpakkhandho ekena khandhenāti ye dhammā ‘‘rūpakkhandho’’ti vuccanti, tesaṃ pañcasu khandhesu rūpakkhandhabhāvena sabhāgatā hotīti rūpakkhandhabhāvasaṅkhātena, rūpakkhandhavacanasaṅkhātena vā gaṇanena saṅgahaṃ gaṇanaṃ dasseti. Tenāha ‘‘yañhi kiñcī’’tiādi. Rūpakkhandhoti hi saṅgahitabbadhammo dassito. Yena saṅgahena saṅgayhati, tassa saṅgahassa dassanaṃ ‘‘ekena khandhenā’’ti vacanaṃ. Pañcasu khandhagaṇanesu ekena khandhagaṇanena gaṇitoti ayañhettha attho. Yasmā ca khandhādivacanehi saṅgaho vuccati, tasmā upari ‘‘khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitā’’tiādiṃ vakkhatīti.

6. The aggregates, sense bases, and elements are spoken of as phenomena to be directly known within their great divisions. However, for those phenomena directly known in their individual nature, the truths are stated to show distinctions such as their being fully comprehended; and the faculties and so forth are mentioned to show distinctions in functions such as predominance. Thus, just as the distinctions of the truths and so forth, so too the distinctions of inclusion and non-inclusion, being dependent on what is to be directly known, become easily understandable when spoken of. Therefore, it should be understood that the introductory matrix of the method is established as: 'inclusion by three, non-inclusion by three.' And having done so, the association and dissociation stated as 'by four' are also questioned and answered based on what is to be directly known, by means of the aggregates and so forth themselves. When it is said, 'The form aggregate by one aggregate,' it means that for whatever phenomena are called 'the form aggregate,' their commonality as the form aggregate among the five aggregates shows their inclusion, their counting, by means of the designation of the form aggregate’s nature or by means of the term 'form aggregate.' Hence it is said, 'whatever material form,' and so forth. Indeed, 'the form aggregate' is shown as the phenomenon to be included. The phrase 'by one aggregate' shows the inclusion by which it is included. The meaning here is that it is counted by one aggregate-count among the five aggregate-counts. And since inclusion is spoken of by terms such as 'aggregate' and so forth, it will be stated later, 'included by the aggregate-inclusion,' and so forth.

Asaṅgahanayaniddeseti idaṃ ‘‘saṅgaho asaṅgaho’’ti etasseva nayassa ekadesanayabhāvena vuttaṃ, na nayantaratāyāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Rūpakkhandhamūlakāyeva cettha dukatikacatukkā dassitāti etena vedanākkhandhamūlakā purimena yojiyamāne viseso natthīti pacchimeheva yojetvā tayo dukā dve tikā eko catukko, saññākkhandhamūlakā dve dukā eko tiko, saṅkhārakkhandhamūlako eko dukoti ete labbhantīti dasseti. Tesaṃ pana bhedato pañcakapucchāvissajjanānantaraṃ pucchāvissajjanaṃ kātabbaṃ saṃkhittanti daṭṭhabbaṃ, vuttanayena vā sakkā ñātunti pāḷiṃ na āropitanti.

Regarding 'The Exposition of the Method of Non-inclusion': this should be understood as stated as a partial method of this very same method, namely 'inclusion, non-inclusion,' and not as a different method. Here, only the dyads, triads, and tetrads rooted in the aggregate of form are shown. By this it is shown that since there is no difference when the sets rooted in the feeling aggregate are applied in the same way as the former, by applying the method to the subsequent aggregates, the following are obtained: for the feeling aggregate, three dyads, two triads, and one tetrad; for the perception aggregate, two dyads and one triad; and for the formation aggregate, one dyad. However, regarding their distinctions, it should be understood that after the fivefold question-and-answer, the question-and-answer is to be done concisely. Alternatively, since it can be known by the method stated, the Pāli text has not been set down.

Āyatanapadādivaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Section of the Sense Bases and So Forth

40. Yasmā [Pg.9] ca dukatikesūti yadipi ekakepi sadisaṃ vissajjanaṃ, ekake pana sadisavissajjanānaṃ cakkhundriyasotindriyasukhindriyādīnaṃ dukādīsu asadisavissajjanaṃ diṭṭhaṃ. Na hettha cakkhusotacakkhusukhindriyadukānaṃ aññamaññasadisavissajjanaṃ, nāpi dukehi tikassa, idha pana dukkhasamudayadukkhamaggadukānaṃ aññamaññaṃ tikena ca sadisaṃ vissajjananti dukatikesveva sadisavissajjanataṃ samudayānantaraṃ maggasaccassa vacane kāraṇaṃ vadati.

40. And since, regarding 'in the dyads and triads': although in the single case there is a similar answer, for those with similar answers in the single case—such as the eye faculty, ear faculty, pleasure faculty, and so forth—a dissimilar answer is seen in the dyads and so forth. Here, there is no mutually similar answer for the dyad of the eye and ear faculties, or the dyad of the eye and pleasure faculties, nor between the dyads and the triad. But here, the answers for the dyad of suffering and its origin, and the dyad of suffering and the path, are mutually similar, and also similar to the triad. Therefore, he states the similarity of the answers only in the dyads and triads as the reason for mentioning the truth of the path immediately after the truth of the origin.

6. Paṭiccasamuppādavaṇṇanā

6. The Commentary on Dependent Arising

61. ‘‘Pucchaṃ anārabhitvā avijjā ekena khandhena, avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā ekena khandhenā’’ti likhitabbepi pamādavasena ‘‘avijjā ekena khandhenā’’ti idaṃ na likhitanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Sarūpekasesaṃ vā katvā avijjāvacanena avijjāvissajjanaṃ dassitanti. Sabbampi vipākaviññāṇanti ettha vipākaggahaṇena visesanaṃ na kātabbaṃ. Kusalādīnampi hi viññāṇānaṃ dhātukathāyaṃ saṅkhārapaccayāviññāṇādipadehi saṅgahitatā vippayuttenasaṅgahitāsaṅgahitapadaniddese ‘‘vipākā dhammā’’ti imassa vissajjanāsadisena tesaṃ vissajjanena dassitā, idha ca nāmarūpassa ekādasahāyatanehi saṅgahavacanena akammajānampi saṅgahitatā viññāyatīti.

61. Although it should have been written, without raising a question, as 'Ignorance by one aggregate; formations conditioned by ignorance by one aggregate,' it should be understood that 'Ignorance by one aggregate' was not written due to negligence. Alternatively, having made an ellipsis of its own form, the answer for ignorance is shown by the term 'ignorance.' Here, in 'all resultant consciousness,' the qualification by taking the term 'resultant' should not be made. For indeed, the inclusion of even skillful and other types of consciousness is shown in the Dhātukathā by terms such as 'consciousness conditioned by formations,' and by their answer being similar to the answer for 'resultant phenomena' in the exposition of the terms 'included by the dissociated' and 'not included.' And here, by the statement of the inclusion of name-and-form with eleven bases, the inclusion of even that which is not born of kamma is understood.

71. Jāyamānaparipaccamānabhijjamānānaṃ jāyamānādibhāvamattattā jātijarāmaraṇāni paramatthato vinibbhujjitvā anupalabbhamānāni paramatthānaṃ sabhāvamattabhūtāni, tāni rūpassa nibbattipākabhedabhūtāni ruppanabhāvena gayhantīti rūpakkhandhadhammasabhāgāni, arūpānaṃ pana nibbattiādibhūtāni rūpakalāpajātiādīni viya sahuppajjamānacatukkhandhakalāpanibbattiādibhāvato ekekabhūtāni vediyanasañjānanavijānanehi ekantaparamatthakiccehi agayhamānāni saṅkhatābhisaṅkharaṇena anekantaparamatthakiccena gayhantīti saṅkhārakkhandhadhammasabhāgāni, tathā duvidhānipi tāni cakkhāyatanādīhi ekantaparamatthakiccehi agayhamānāni nissattaṭṭhena dhammāyatanadhammadhātudhammehi sabhāgāni, tena tehi khandhādīhi saṅgayhantīti ‘‘jāti dvīhi khandhehī’’tiādimāha.

71. Birth, aging, and death, being merely the state of arising, maturing, and breaking up, are not apprehended when separated out in an ultimate sense, as they are merely the intrinsic nature of ultimate realities. These, being the origination, maturation, and dissolution of material form, are grasped through the nature of being afflicted, and thus share the nature of the phenomena of the form aggregate. But for the immaterial, their origination and so forth are individual entities—like the birth of material clusters—due to being the nature of the origination of the cluster of four aggregates that arise simultaneously. Not being grasped by feeling, perceiving, and cognizing, which have exclusively ultimate functions, they are grasped by the conditioning of the conditioned, which is a function not exclusively ultimate, and thus share the nature of the phenomena of the aggregate of formations. Similarly, both these types, not being grasped by the eye-base and so forth, which have exclusively ultimate functions, share the nature of the phenomena of the dhamma-base and the dhamma-element in the sense of being impersonal. Therefore, they are included by those aggregates and so forth, for which reason he says, 'birth by two aggregates,' and so forth.

Paṭhamanayasaṅgahāsaṅgahapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Terms of Inclusion and Non-inclusion of the First Method is finished.

2. Dutiyanayo saṅgahitenaasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

2. The Second Method: The Commentary on the Terms 'Not Included by the Included'

171. Saṅgahitenaasaṅgahitapadaniddese [Pg.10] yaṃ taṃ uddese asaṅgahitatāya pucchitabbaṃ vissajjitabbañca saṅgahitatāvisiṭṭhaṃ asaṅgahitaṃ dhammajātaṃ niddhāritaṃ, tadeva tāva dassento ‘‘cakkhāyatanena ye dhammā khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitā āyatanadhātusaṅgahena asaṅgahitā’’ti āha. Sabbattha khandhādisaṅgahasāmaññānaṃ niccaṃ visesāpekkhattā bhedanissitattā ca pucchāvissajjanānaṃ savisesāva khandhādigaṇanā suddhā. Tattha saṅgahitenaasaṅgahitavacanamattena dhammavisesassa niddhāritattā tīsu saṅgahesu ekena dvīhi vā ye saṅgahitā hutvā aññehi asaṅgahitā, teyeva dhammā ‘‘khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitā āyatanadhātusaṅgahena asaṅgahitā’’ti ettakeneva dassetabbā siyuṃ, tesaṃ pana evaṃvidhānaṃ asambhavā nayamātikāya ca abbhantarabāhiramātikāpekkhattā uddesepi yaṃ yaṃ rūpakkhandhādīsu araṇantesu saṅgāhakaṃ, taṃ taṃ apekkhitvā saṅgahitenaasaṅgahitaṃ niddhāritanti viññāyatīti tena tena saṅgāhakena yathāniddhāritaṃ dhammaṃ niyametvā dassetuṃ ‘‘cakkhāyatanenā’’tiādimāha. Yattha hi pucchitabbavissajjitabbadhammavisesaniddhāraṇaṃ natthi, tasmiṃ paṭhamanaye chaṭṭhanaye ca pucchitabbavissajjitabbabhāvena, itaresu ca yaṃ yaṃ pucchitabbavissajjitabbaṃ niddhāritaṃ, tassa tassa niyāmakabhāvena rūpakkhandhādayo araṇantā uddiṭṭhāti.

171. In the exposition of the term 'included by the not-included', the class of phenomena that is not included, yet is distinguished by inclusion, and is to be questioned and answered in the summary due to its non-inclusion, is determined. To illustrate this, it is said: “By the eye-base, what phenomena are included by the aggregate-inclusion but not included by the base- and element-inclusion.” Everywhere, because the generalities of the inclusion of aggregates and so on always require specifics and are based on division, the enumeration of aggregates and so on, with its specifics, is purely for questioning and answering. There, since the specific phenomena are determined by the mere statement 'included by the not-included', only those phenomena that are included by one or two of the three inclusions but not by the others should be demonstrated merely as “included by the aggregate-inclusion but not included by the base- and element-inclusion.” However, since such things are impossible, and because the matrix of method depends on the internal and external matrices, it is understood that in the summary also, the 'included by the not-included' is determined with reference to whatever is the includer among the form aggregate, etc., up to the unblemished. Therefore, to present the phenomena, restricting them as determined by each includer, he said: “by the eye-base,” and so on. Where there is no determination of the specific phenomena to be questioned and answered, in the first and sixth methods, it is by way of being what is to be questioned and answered; and in the others, the form aggregate, etc., up to the unblemished, are stated as the determiners of whatever is determined as what is to be questioned and answered.

Tattha ‘‘cakkhāyatanena…pe… phoṭṭhabbadhātuyā’’ti kattuatthe karaṇaniddeso daṭṭhabbo, ‘‘khandhasaṅgahena āyatanasaṅgahena dhātusaṅgahenā’’ti karaṇatthe. Ettha ca yena yena saṅgāhakena khandhādisaṅgahesu tena tena saṅgahetabbāsaṅgahetabbaṃ aññaṃ atthi, taṃ tadeva saṅgāhakāsaṅgāhakabhāvena uddhaṭaṃ. Rūpakkhandhena pana khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahetabbo añño dhammo natthi, tathā vedanākkhandhādīhi, na ca so eva tassa saṅgāhako asaṅgāhako vā hoti. Yañca ‘‘rūpakkhandho ekena khandhena saṅgahito’’ti vuttaṃ, tañca na tasseva tena saṅgahitataṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, rūpakkhandhabhāvena pana rūpakkhandhavacanena vā gahitataṃ sandhāya vuttanti pakāsitoyamattho.

Here, regarding the phrase “by the eye-base… up to the tangible element,” the instrumental designation should be understood in the sense of the agent; in the phrases “by aggregate-inclusion, by base-inclusion, by element-inclusion,” it is in the sense of the instrument. And here, by whichever includer among the aggregate-inclusions and so on there is another phenomenon to be included or not included by it, that very thing is extracted by way of being an includer or a non-includer. However, there is no other phenomenon to be included by the form aggregate by means of aggregate-inclusion, and similarly with the feeling aggregate and so on, nor does that very aggregate become its own includer or non-includer. And as for what is said, “the form aggregate is included by one aggregate,” that is not stated with reference to its being included by itself; rather, it is stated with reference to its being taken as the state of a form aggregate, or by the term “form aggregate.” This meaning has been made clear.

Yadi ca so eva tena saṅgayheyya, saṅgahitenasampayuttavippayuttapadaniddese – ‘‘vedanākkhandhena ye dhammā khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitā āyatanasaṅgahena [Pg.11] saṅgahitā dhātusaṅgahena saṅgahitā, te dhammā tīhi khandhehi ekenāyatanena sattahi dhātūhi sampayuttā’’tiādi vattabbaṃ siyā, na ca vuttaṃ, tasmā yathā cittaṃ cittena sampayuttaṃ vippayuttañca na hoti, evaṃ rūpakkhandho rūpakkhandhena saṅgahito asaṅgahito ca na hoti, tathā vedanākkhandhādayo vedanākkhandhādīhi. Na hi so eva tassa sabhāgo visabhāgo cāti. Teneva na ekadesā viya samudāyassa, samudāyo ekadesānaṃ saṅgāhako asaṅgāhako ca. Yathā rūpakkhandho cakkhāyatanādīnaṃ, dhammāyatanaṃ vedanākkhandhādīnaṃ, saraṇā dhammā catunnaṃ khandhānaṃ. Samudāyantogadhānañhi ekadesānaṃ na vibhāgo atthi, yena te samudāyassa samudāyo ca tesaṃ sabhāgo visabhāgo ca siyāti, tathā na samudāyo ekadesasabhāgavisabhāgānaṃ saṅgāhako asaṅgāhako ca. Yathā dhammāyatanaṃ sukhumarūpasabhāgassa vedanādivisabhāgassa ca rūpakkhandhekadesassa khandhasaṅgahena, jīvitindriyaṃ rūpārūpajīvitasabhāgavisabhāgassa rūpakkhandhekadesassa saṅkhārakkhandhekadesassa ca jīvitavajjassa khandhasaṅgaheneva. Na hi ekadesasabhāgaṃ samudāyasabhāgaṃ, nāpi ekadesavisabhāgaṃ samudāyavisabhāganti, tasmā satipi attato attani antogadhato attekadesasabhāgato ca aññassa asaṅgāhakatte saṅgāhakattameva etesaṃ natthi, yena saṅgahitassa asaṅgāhakā siyunti saṅgāhakattābhāvato eva evarūpānaṃ aggahaṇaṃ veditabbaṃ.

If that very thing were to be included by itself, in the exposition of the term 'associated-dissociated by the included' it would have to be said: “Those phenomena included by the feeling aggregate by means of aggregate-inclusion, included by means of base-inclusion, included by means of element-inclusion—those phenomena are associated with three aggregates, one base, and seven elements,” and so on—but it was not said. Therefore, just as consciousness is not associated or dissociated with consciousness, so too the form aggregate is not included or not included by the form aggregate, and likewise the feeling aggregate and so on by the feeling aggregate and so on. For the very same thing is not both homogeneous and heterogeneous with itself. For that same reason, it is not like a part of a whole, where the whole is an includer and non-includer of its parts. For example, the form aggregate is of the eye-base and so on; the mind-object base is of the feeling aggregate and so on; the states with recollection are of the four aggregates. For indeed, of the parts comprised within the whole, there is no division, whereby they could be homogeneous or heterogeneous with the whole, and the whole homogeneous or heterogeneous with them. Similarly, the whole is not an includer and non-includer of parts that are homogeneous and heterogeneous with each other. For example, the mind-object base, by aggregate-inclusion, is of a part of the form aggregate that is homogeneous with subtle form and heterogeneous with feeling and so on. The life faculty, by aggregate-inclusion itself, is of a part of the form aggregate and a part of the formations aggregate—which are homogeneous and heterogeneous with material and immaterial life—excluding life itself. For a part that is homogeneous is not homogeneous with the whole, nor is a part that is heterogeneous heterogeneous with the whole. Therefore, even though a thing is comprised within itself and is homogeneous with its own parts, these aggregates have no capacity to include, whereby they could be non-includers of what is included. Thus, it should be understood that the non-taking of such things is precisely due to the absence of the capacity to include.

Yaṃ pana ‘‘dhammāyatanaṃ asaṅkhataṃ khandhato ṭhapetvā catūhi khandhehi saṅgahita’’nti (dhātu. 25), ‘‘cakkhāyatanañca sotāyatanañca ekena khandhena saṅgahita’’nti (dhātu. 26) ca vuttaṃ, na tena ekadesānaṃ samudāyasaṅgāhakattaṃ, samudāyassa ca ekadesasaṅgāhakattaṃ dasseti, catukkhandhagaṇanabhedehi pana dhammāyatanassa gaṇetabbāgaṇetabbabhāvena pañcadhā bhinnataṃ, cakkhāyatanādīnaṃ ekakkhandhagaṇanena gaṇetabbatāya ekavidhatañca dasseti. Saṅgāhakāsaṅgāhakanirapekkhānaṃ gaṇetabbāgaṇetabbānaṃ taṃtaṃgaṇanehi gaṇanadassanamattameva hi paṭhamanayo kammakaraṇamattasabbhāvā, dutiyādayo pana saṅgāhakāsaṅgāhakehi saṅgahitāsaṅgahitānaṃ agaṇanādidassanāni kattukaraṇakammattayasabbhāvā. Tathā paṭhamanaye tathā tathā gaṇetabbāgaṇetabbabhāvasaṅkhāto taṃtaṃkhandhādibhāvābhāvo sabhāgavisabhāgatā[Pg.12], dutiyādīsu yathāniddhāritadhammadassane saṅgāhakasaṅgahetabbānaṃ samānakkhandhādibhāvo sabhāgatā, tadabhāvo ca visabhāgatā. Pucchāvissajjanesu taṃtaṃkhandhādibhāvābhāvo evāti ayametesaṃ visesoti.

Furthermore, what is said—“the mind-object base, setting aside the unconditioned from the aggregates, is included by four aggregates” (Dhātu. 25), and “the eye-base and the ear-base are included by one aggregate” (Dhātu. 26)—does not show that parts are includers of the whole, or that the whole is an includer of parts. Rather, it shows the fivefold division of the mind-object base by way of its being countable or uncountable due to the different enumerations of the four aggregates, and the single nature of the eye-base and so on by their being countable through the enumeration of a single aggregate. For the first method is merely the demonstration of counting what is countable and not countable by their respective counts, having only the existence of object and instrument, without regard to includer and non-includer. The second method onward, however, are demonstrations of the non-counting, etc., of what is included and not included by includers and non-includers, having the existence of the triad of agent, instrument, and object. Similarly, in the first method, homogeneity and heterogeneity are the presence or absence of the respective aggregates, etc., reckoned as the state of being countable or not countable in various ways. In the second method onward, in the demonstration of phenomena as determined, homogeneity is the state of the includer and the included having the same aggregate, etc., while heterogeneity is the absence of that. In questions and answers, it is simply the presence or absence of the respective aggregates, etc. This is the distinction between them.

Samudayasaccasukhindriyasadisāni pana tehi saṅgahetabbameva atthi, na saṅgahitaṃ asaṅgahetabbanti asaṅgāhakattābhāvato na uddhaṭāni. Dukkhasaccasadisāni tehi visabhāgasamudāyabhūtehi anekakkhandhehi khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahetabbaṃ, itarehi asaṅgahetabbañca natthīti saṅgāhakattāsaṅgāhakattābhāvato. Evaṃ saṅgāhakattābhāvato asaṅgāhakattābhāvato ubhayābhāvato ca yathāvuttasadisāni anuddharitvā saṅgāhakattāsaṅgāhakattabhāvato cakkhāyatanādīneva uddhaṭānīti veditabbāni. Tattha ‘‘cakkhāyatanena ye dhammā khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitā’’ti cakkhāyatanavajjā rūpadhammā khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitāti veditabbā, na rūpakkhandhoti. Na hi ekadeso samudāyasaṅgāhakoti dassitametanti.

However, things similar to the truth of origin and the faculty of pleasure have only what is to be included by them; there is nothing included that is not to be included. Thus, they are not extracted because of the absence of the state of being a non-includer. As for things similar to the truth of suffering, there is nothing to be included by aggregate-inclusion by them—which are dissimilar collections of many aggregates—and not to be included by the others; thus, they are not extracted because of the absence of the state of being an includer and a non-includer. In this way, it should be understood that, not having extracted the aforesaid similar things—because of the absence of the state of being an includer, the absence of the state of being a non-includer, and the absence of both—only the eye-base and so on are extracted, because of the presence of the state of being an includer and a non-includer. Here, when it is said, “by the eye-base, what phenomena are included by aggregate-inclusion,” it should be understood as the material phenomena apart from the eye-base that are included by aggregate-inclusion, not the form aggregate. For it has been shown that a part is not an includer of the whole.

Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana khandhapadenāti khandhapadasaṅgahenāti attho, na saṅgāhakenāti. ‘‘Kenaci saṅgāhakenā’’ti idaṃ pana ānetvā vattabbaṃ. Taṃ pana rūpakkhandhādīsu na yujjatīti taṃ vissajjanaṃ rūpakkhandhādīsu saṅgāhakesu na yujjatīti attho. Rūpakkhandhena hi…pe… saṅgahitoti etena nayena cakkhāyatanena rūpakkhandhova saṅgahito, so ca aḍḍhekādasahi āyatanadhātūhi asaṅgahito nāma natthīti evaṃ cakkhāyatanādīnipi na gahetabbānīti āpajjatīti ce? Nāpajjati. Na hi aññamattanivāraṇaṃ evasaddassa attho, atha kho saṅgāhakato aññanivāraṇaṃ. So cātiādi ca na nirapekkhavacanaṃ, atha kho saṅgāhakāpekkhanti. Kathaṃ? Rūpakkhandhena hi rūpakkhandhova saṅgahitoti yathā cakkhāyatanena cakkhāyatanato aññampi khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitaṃ atthi, yaṃ āyatanadhātusaṅgahehi asaṅgahitaṃ hoti, na evaṃ rūpakkhandhena rūpakkhandhato aññaṃ khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitaṃ atthi, yaṃ āyatanadhātusaṅgahehi asaṅgahitaṃ siyā, rūpakkhandhena pana rūpakkhandhova khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahitoti ayañhettha adhippāyo yutto. Siyā panetaṃ ‘‘so eva rūpakkhandho rūpakkhandhena āyatanadhātusaṅgahehi asaṅgahito hotū’’ti, taṃ nivārento āha ‘‘so ca aḍḍhekādasahi āyatanadhātūhi asaṅgahito nāma natthī’’ti[Pg.13]. Ettha ca ‘‘rūpakkhandhenā’’ti ānetvā vattabbaṃ. Tattha rūpakkhandho rūpakkhandhassa vā tadekadesānaṃ vā cakkhādīnaṃ āyatanadhātusaṅgahehi saṅgāhako asaṅgāhako ca na hotīti iminā pariyāyena asaṅgahitatāya abhāvo vuttoti yujjati, na rūpakkhandhena rūpakkhandhassa tadekadesānaṃ vā aḍḍhekādasahi āyatanadhātusaṅgahehi saṅgahitatāya. Na hi sā saṅgahitatā atthi. Yadi siyā, saṅgahitenasampayuttavippayuttapadaniddese rūpakkhandhopi uddharitabbo siyā. Tena hi tīhipi saṅgahehi rūpakkhandho tadekadeso vā saṅgahitā siyuṃ, atthi ca tesaṃ vippayuttatāti.

In the commentary, 'by the aggregate term' means by way of inclusion under the aggregate term, not by way of an includer. However, the phrase 'by any includer' should be brought in and stated. But that is not applicable to the form aggregate and so forth; the meaning is that this resolution is not applicable to the form aggregate and so forth when they are includers. For 'by the form aggregate... is included...' By this method, if it is argued that by the eye-base only the form aggregate is included, and there is nothing of it that is not included by the eleven and a half bases and elements, and thus the eye-base and so forth should also not be taken, would that follow? It would not. For the meaning of the word 'eva' (only) is not merely the exclusion of another, but the exclusion of another from the includer. And 'that' and so forth is not an independent statement, but is dependent on the includer. How so? For just as by the eye-base something other than the eye-base is included by way of aggregate-inclusion, which is not included by way of base-and-element-inclusions, it is not so with the form aggregate. There is nothing other than the form aggregate included by way of aggregate-inclusion that might not be included by way of base-and-element-inclusions. Rather, by the form aggregate, only the form aggregate is included by way of aggregate-inclusion; this is the appropriate intention here. One might, however, argue, 'Let that very form aggregate be not included by the form aggregate by way of base-and-element-inclusions.' To refute this, it is said, 'and there is nothing of it that is not included by the eleven and a half bases and elements.' Here, the phrase 'by the form aggregate' should be brought in and stated. In this context, it is fitting that the absence of non-inclusion is stated in this way: the form aggregate is neither an includer nor a non-includer of itself or its parts, such as the eye, by way of base-and-element-inclusions. This is not due to the fact of the form aggregate or its parts being included by the form aggregate through the eleven and a half base-and-element-inclusions. For such inclusion does not exist. If it did, the form aggregate would also have to be cited in the exposition of the terms 'associated with the included' and 'dissociated from the included'. For then the form aggregate or its parts would be included by the three inclusions, and there is dissociation for them.

Evaṃ asaṅgahitatāya abhāvato etāni, aññāni cāti etthāpi cakkhāyatanādīhi viya etehi aññehi ca saṅgahitānaṃ asaṅgahitatāya abhāvato etāni aññāni ca yathā vā tathā vā etāni viya ayujjamānavissajjanattā evarūpāni padāni saṅgāhakabhāvena na gahitānīti adhippāyo.

Thus, the intention is that such terms are not taken as includers because of the absence of non-inclusion of these and others; and here also, just as with the eye-base and so forth, due to the absence of non-inclusion of those included by these and others, and because these and others, whether in this way or that, are like these an inapplicable resolution.

Tattha yaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘rūpakkhandhena hi rūpakkhandhova saṅgahito’’ti, taṃ teneva tassa saṅgahitattāsaṅgahitattābhāvadassanena nivāritaṃ. Yañhettha aggahaṇe kāraṇaṃ vuttaṃ, tañca satipi saṅgahitatte asaṅgahitatāya abhāvatoti viññāyamānaṃ samudayasaccādīsu yujjeyya sati tehi saṅgahite tadasaṅgahitattābhāvato. Rūpakkhandhādīhi pana saṅgahitameva natthi, kuto tassa asaṅgahitatā bhavissati, tasmā saṅgāhakattābhāvo evettha aggahaṇe kāraṇanti yuttaṃ. Saṅgahitattābhāvena asaṅgahitattaṃ yadipi rūpakkhandhādinā attano attani antogadhassa attekadesasabhāgassa ca natthi, aññassa pana atthīti na dukkhasaccādīsu viya ubhayābhāvo cettha aggahaṇe kāraṇaṃ bhavituṃ yuttoti. Dhammāyatanajīvitindriyādīnañca khandhacatukkadukādisaṅgāhakatte sati na tesaṃ saṅgahitānaṃ tehi dhammāyatanajīvitindriyādīhi āyatanadhātusaṅgahehi asaṅgahitatā natthīti asaṅgahitatāya abhāvo anekantiko, tasmā pubbe vuttanayeneva aggahitānaṃ aggahaṇe, gahitānañca gahaṇe kāraṇaṃ veditabbanti.

Here, what was said—'the form aggregate is indeed included by the form aggregate itself'—is refuted by showing the absence of its being included and not included by that very thing. And the reason given here for non-apprehension, if understood as 'the absence of non-inclusion even when there is inclusion,' would apply to the truth of origin and so forth, since when something is included by them, there is an absence of its non-inclusion. But by the form aggregate and so forth, nothing whatsoever is included; how, then, could there be non-inclusion of it? Therefore, it is fitting that the absence of being an includer is indeed the reason for non-apprehension here. Although non-inclusion due to the absence of inclusion does not exist for the form aggregate, etc., with regard to itself, what is contained in itself, and what is homogeneous with a part of itself, it does exist for another. Thus, it is not fitting that the absence of both, as in the case of the truth of suffering, etc., is the reason for non-apprehension here. And regarding the mind-base, the life faculty, and so forth, when they are includers of the four aggregates, dyads, and so forth, it is not the case that for those things included by them there is no non-inclusion by the mind-base, life faculty, etc., through base-and-element-inclusions. Therefore, the absence of non-inclusion is not invariable. Thus, the reason for the non-apprehension of what is not apprehended, and for the apprehension of what is apprehended, should be understood according to the method previously stated.

Anidassanaṃ punadeva sappaṭighanti ettha anidassananti etena ‘‘sanidassanasappaṭigha’’nti ettha vuttena sappaṭighasaddena saddhiṃ yojetvā anidassanasappaṭighā [Pg.14] dassitā. Punadevāti etena tattheva avisiṭṭhaṃ sanidassanapadaṃ nivattetvā gaṇhanto sanidassanadukapadaṃ dasseti. ‘‘Cakkhāyatanena cakkhāyatanamevekaṃ saṅgahita’’nti idaṃ na sakkā vattuṃ. Na hi ‘‘cakkhāyatanena cakkhāyatanaṃ āyatanasaṅgahena saṅgahita’’nti ca ‘‘asaṅgahita’’nti ca vattabbanti dassitoyaṃ nayoti. Evaṃ sabbattha tasseva samudāyekadesānañca saṅgāhakasaṅgahitanti vacanesu asaṅgāhakaasaṅgahitanti vacanesu ca tadavattabbatā yojetabbā. Asaṅgāhakattābhāvato eva hi cakkhāyatanādīni cakkhāyatanādīhi asaṅgahitānīti na vuccanti, na saṅgāhakattābhāvatoti.

With regard to 'The unseen is again with impact': here, by 'unseen', 'unseen with impact' is shown by combining it with the word 'with impact' mentioned in 'seen and with impact'. And by 'again', by turning back and taking the unqualified term 'seen' from that very context, it indicates the dyad of 'seen'. It cannot be said that 'by the eye-base, only the eye-base itself is included.' For this method has been shown: that one cannot say both 'the eye-base is included by the eye-base by way of base-inclusion' and 'it is not included.' Thus, everywhere, in statements about an includer including itself or its parts, and in statements about a non-includer not including, that non-statability should be applied. Indeed, it is precisely because of the absence of being a non-includer that the eye-base and so forth are not said to be 'not included' by the eye-base and so forth, not because of the absence of being an includer.

Dutiyanayasaṅgahitenaasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the term 'not included by the included' in the Second Method is completed.

3. Tatiyanayo asaṅgahitenasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

3. The Third Method: Explanation of the Term 'Included by the Unincluded'.

179. Asaṅgahitenasaṅgahitapadaniddese rūpakkhandhena khandhasaṅgahena asaṅgahitesu vedanādīnaṃ tiṇṇaṃ khandhānaṃ nibbānassa ca sukhumarūpena saha āyatanadhātusabhāgatte satipi na sukhumarūpameva rūpakkhandhoti rūpakkhandhena āyatanadhātusabhāgattaṃ natthi, tasmā na tena tāni āyatanadhātusaṅgahehi saṅgahitāni. Na kevalaṃ saṅgahitāneva, asaṅgahitānipi tena tāni tehi saṅgahehi na honteva tadekadesena sukhumarūpena āyatanadhātusabhāgattā, saṅgahitābhāvo eva pana idhādhippeto, viññāṇakkhandhacakkhāyatanādīhi pana asaṅgahitā na te tehi kathañci sammissāti sabbathā te tehi na saṅgahitā. Dukkhasaccādīhi ca pañcakkhandhasamudāyabhūtehi khandhasaṅgahena asaṅgahitaṃ nibbānaṃ rūpakkhandhena viya āyatanadhātusaṅgahehi saṅgahitaṃ tehi na hoti, tasmā saṅgāhakattābhāvato eva evarūpānaṃ asaṅgāhakabhāvena aggahaṇaṃ veditabbaṃ, sanibbānapañcakkhandhasamudāyabhūtānaṃ pana abyākatadhammādīnaṃ asaṅgāhakattābhāvatova. Na hi taṃ kañci atthi, yassa te khandhasaṅgahena asaṅgāhakā siyuṃ, na ca attano ekadeso attekadesasabhāgo ca attanā asaṅgahito hotīti attanā asaṅgahitasaṅgāhakattā pana vedanākkhandhādīnaṃ gahaṇaṃ katanti.

179. In the exposition of the term 'included by the unincluded': Among those unincluded by the form aggregate through aggregate-inclusion are the three aggregates of feeling, etc., and Nibbāna. Even though there is homogeneity with the bases and elements together with subtle form, since subtle form alone is not the form aggregate, there is no homogeneity with the bases and elements by the form aggregate. Therefore, they are not included by it through base-and-element-inclusions. Not only are they not included, but they are also not unincluded by it through those inclusions, because of homogeneity with the bases and elements through a part of it, subtle form; however, the absence of inclusion is what is intended here. Moreover, those unincluded by the consciousness aggregate, the eye-base, etc., are not mixed with them in any way; thus, they are entirely not included by them. And Nibbāna, which is unincluded through aggregate-inclusion by the truth of suffering, etc. (which are the collection of the five aggregates), is not included by them through base-and-element-inclusions, just as with the form aggregate. Therefore, the non-apprehension of such things as non-includers should be understood as being due to the absence of being an includer. However, for indeterminate dhammas, etc., which are the collection of the five aggregates together with Nibbāna, it is due to the absence of being a non-includer. For there is nothing whatsoever of which they could be non-includers by way of aggregate-inclusion. Nor is a part of oneself or what is homogeneous with a part of oneself unincluded by oneself. However, the apprehension of the feeling aggregate, etc., is done because they are includers of what is unincluded by themselves.

Yaṃ [Pg.15] pana aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘ye dhammāyatanena saṅgahitā’’ti, taṃ na sakkā vattuṃ. Dhammāyatanena hi na koci dhammo kenaci saṅgahena saṅgahito atthi visabhāgakkhandhanibbānasamudāyattā, khandhasaṅgahena sayameva attano saṅgāhakaṃ na hotīti āyatanadhātusaṅgahehi ca saṅgāhakattābhāvatoti dassitoyaṃ nayoti etassa dhammāyatanagaṇanena gaṇitāti attho. Yāni…pe… gahitānīti etena viññāṇasammissaṃ dhammāyatanekadesaṃ dīpentāni iddhipādādipadāni, oḷārikarūpasammissaṃ dīpentāni rūpakkhandhādipadāni, sabbena sabbaṃ dhammāyatanaṃ adīpentāni viññāṇakkhandhacakkhāyatanādipadāni, sakaladhammāyatanadīpakāni dhammāyatanādipadāni ca vajjetvā dhammāyatanekadesaṃ aññāyatanena asammissaṃ dīpentāni gahitānīti dasseti.

But what is stated in the commentary as, 'those phenomena included by the dhammā-base,' that cannot be said. For, by the dhammā-base, no phenomenon is included by any inclusion, because it is a collection of dissimilar aggregates and Nibbāna. An aggregate itself does not become its own includer by the inclusion of aggregates, and because there is no function of including by the sense-bases and elements, this method is shown. The meaning here is that they are counted by this enumeration of the dhammā-base. By 'those... etc. ...taken,' this indicates that the terms like 'bases of psychic power' illuminate a portion of the dhammā-base mixed with consciousness; the terms like 'aggregate of form' illuminate what is mixed with gross form; the terms like 'aggregate of consciousness' and 'eye-base' do not illuminate the entire dhammā-base; and, excluding the terms like 'dhammā-base' which illuminate the whole dhammā-base, it shows that those indicating a portion of the dhammā-base unmixed with another base are 'taken'.

Tatiyanayaasaṅgahitenasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the term 'included by the unincluded' of the Third Method is completed.

4. Catutthanayo saṅgahitenasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

4. The Fourth Method: Explanation of the Term 'Included by the Included'.

191. Saṅgahitenasaṅgahitapadaniddese yasmā yathā dutiyatatiyanayā tiṇṇaṃ saṅgahānaṃ saṅgahaṇāsaṅgahaṇappavattivisesena ‘‘saṅgahitena asaṅgahitaṃ, asaṅgahitena saṅgahita’’nti ca uddiṭṭhā, nevaṃ catutthapañcamā. Saṅgahaṇappavattiyā eva hi saṅgahitena saṅgahitaṃ uddiṭṭhaṃ, asaṅgahaṇappavattiyā eva ca asaṅgahitena asaṅgahitanti, tasmā saṅgahaṇappavattivisesavirahe saṅgahitadhammāsaṅgahitadhammavisese nissitā ete dve nayāti ettha kenaci saṅgahitena dhammavisesena puna saṅgahito dhammaviseso saṅgahitena saṅgahito saṅgahitatāya pucchitabbo vissajjitabbo ca, tameva tāva yathāniddhāritaṃ dassento ‘‘samudayasaccena ye dhammā khandha…pe… saṅgahitā, tehi dhammehi ye dhammā khandha…pe… saṅgahitā’’ti āha. Ettha ca ye tīhipi saṅgahehi na saṅgāhakā rūpakkhandhaviññāṇakkhandhadhammāyatanadukkhasaccādīni viya, ye ca dvīhāyatanadhātusaṅgahehi asaṅgāhakā cakkhāyatanādīni viya, ye ca ekena khandhasaṅgaheneva dhātusaṅgaheneva ca na saṅgāhakā vedanādikkhandhanirodhasaccajīvitindriyādīni viya cakkhuviññāṇadhātādayo viya ca, te dhammā saṅgāhakattābhāvasabbhāvā saṅgāhakabhāvena na uddhaṭā, tīhipi pana saṅgahehi [Pg.16] ye saṅgāhakā, te saṅgāhakattābhāvābhāvato idha uddhaṭā. Tehi saṅgahitāpi hi ekantena attano saṅgāhakassa saṅgāhakā honti, yassa puna saṅgaho pucchitabbo vissajjitabbo cāti.

191. In the exposition of the term 'included by the included': Because, just as in the second and third methods, the three inclusions were designated as 'unincluded by the included' and 'included by the unincluded' due to a distinction in the process of inclusion and non-inclusion, the fourth and fifth are not so. For 'included by the included' is designated precisely by the process of inclusion, and 'unincluded by the unincluded' precisely by the process of non-inclusion. Therefore, in the absence of a distinction in the process of inclusion, these two methods depend on the distinction between included and unincluded phenomena. Here, a particular phenomenon that is again included by some included phenomenon is 'included by the included,' and it is regarding its inclusion that one should question and answer. To illustrate this as previously determined, it is said: 'The phenomena that are aggregates... etc. ...included by the truth of origin...; by those phenomena, the phenomena that are aggregates... etc. ...are included.' In this context, those phenomena that are not includers by any of the three inclusions—such as the aggregate of form, the aggregate of consciousness, the dhammā-base, the truth of suffering, etc.—those that are non-includers by the two inclusions of sense-bases and elements—such as the eye-base, etc.—and those that are non-includers by a single inclusion of aggregates or by a single inclusion of elements—such as the aggregates of feeling, etc., the truth of cessation, the life faculty, etc., and the eye-consciousness element, etc.—these phenomena, due to their invariable nature of not being includers, are not presented as being includers. However, those phenomena that are includers by all three inclusions are presented here due to the non-absence of their nature as includers. For those included by them are invariably includers of their own includer, and it is the inclusion of this which is to be questioned and answered.

Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana sakalena hi khandhādipadenāti sakalavācakena rūpakkhandhādipadenāti attho. Yaṃ panetaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘yaṃ attano saṅgāhakaṃ saṅgaṇhitvā puna teneva saṅgahaṃ gaccheyyā’’ti, taṃ tena khandhādipadenāti evaṃ ayojetvā taṃ aññaṃ saṅgahitaṃ nāma natthīti evaṃ na sakkā vattuṃ. Na hi yena yaṃ saṅgahitaṃ, teneva tassa saṅgaho pucchito vissajjito, na ca tasseva, atha kho tena saṅgahitassāti. Yathā vedanā saddo ca khandho āyatanañca, na evaṃ sukhumarūpaṃ, taṃ pana khandhāyatanānaṃ ekadesova, tasmā ‘‘sukhumarūpekadesaṃ vā’’ti avatvā ‘‘sukhumarūpaṃ vā’’ti vuttaṃ. Sabbattha ca aññena asammissanti yojetabbaṃ. Yampi cetaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘tadeva yehi dhammehi khandhādivasena saṅgahitaṃ, te dhamme sandhāyā’’ti, tampi tathā na sakkā vattuṃ. Na hi saṅgahitena saṅgahitassa saṅgahitena saṅgaho ettha pucchito vissajjito ca, atha kho saṅgahova, tasmā ekena khandhenāti ekena khandhagaṇanenāti ayamevettha attho, na saṅgāhakenāti. Na hi eko khandho attano ekadesassa saṅgāhakoti.

In the commentary, however, 'by the term "aggregate" etc. in its entirety' means by the term 'aggregate of form,' etc., which conveys the whole. But regarding what is stated here—'having included what is its own includer, it might then be included by that very thing'—it cannot be said that 'there is nothing else included' by not connecting it thus with 'by that term "aggregate", etc.'. For it is not the case that the inclusion of that which is included by something is questioned or answered by that very thing, nor is it of itself, but rather, of what is included by that. For example, the term 'feeling' is both an aggregate and a base, but subtle form is not so. Yet subtle form is only a part of aggregates and bases. Therefore, instead of saying 'or a part of subtle form,' it is said 'or subtle form.' And in all cases, it should be connected as 'unmixed with another.' Furthermore, what is stated—'that very thing, by those phenomena by which it is included by way of aggregates, etc., refers to those phenomena'—this too cannot be said in that way. For here, it is not the inclusion of what is included by the included that is questioned or answered by the included, but rather, it is the inclusion itself. Therefore, 'by one aggregate' means 'by one enumeration of aggregates'—this is the meaning here, not 'by an includer.' For one aggregate is not an includer of its own part.

Catutthanayasaṅgahitenasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the term 'included by the included' of the Fourth Method is completed.

5. Pañcamanayo asaṅgahitenaasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

5. The Fifth Method: Explanation of the Term 'Unincluded by the Unincluded'.

193. Asaṅgahitenaasaṅgahitapadaniddesepi vuttanayeneva yathāniddhāritadhammadassanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Ettha ca sasukhumarūpaviññāṇasahitadhammasamudāyā ye te dukkhasaccaanidassanaappaṭighaacetasikānupādāsadisā satipi ekena dvīhi vā saṅgahehi kesañci asaṅgāhakatte tīhipi asaṅgahetabbassa abhāvato paripuṇṇasaṅgahāsaṅgāhakā na honti, abyākatadhammasadisā kenaci saṅgahena asaṅgahetabbabhāvato asaṅgāhakā eva na honti, tena te asaṅgāhakabhāvena na uddhaṭā, itare pana tabbipariyāyena uddhaṭāti.

193. Even in the exposition of the term 'unincluded by the unincluded,' the seeing of phenomena as determined should be understood in the same way as previously stated. Here, regarding the collections of phenomena together with subtle form and consciousness—such as the truth of suffering, the invisible and non-resistant, mental factors, and the unclung-to—even though for some there is the state of being a non-includer by one or two inclusions, because there is an absence of anything unincludable by all three, they are not complete includers or non-includers. Like indeterminate phenomena, they are simply not includers because of their state of being unincludable by any inclusion. Therefore, they are not presented by virtue of being non-includers, while others are presented by the opposite.

Yaṃ [Pg.17] pana aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘tādisena hi padena nibbānaṃ khandhasaṅgahamattaṃ na gaccheyyā’’ti vuttaṃ, taṃ dukkhasaccaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Anidassanaappaṭighesu pana asaṅgāhakesu nibbānaṃ antogadhaṃ, na ca tadeva tassa asaṅgāhakanti. Sadisavissajjanānaṃ vasena samodhānetvā katehi saddhinti evaṃ katehi dutiyapañhādīhi saddhiṃ paṭhamapañhanāmarūpapañhādayo sabbepi catuttiṃsa hontīti attho. Yaṃ pucchāya uddhaṭaṃ padaṃ, tadevāti rūpakkhandhādivisesakapadaṃ vadati, na niddhārite pucchitabbadhamme. Te hi lakkhaṇato dassitā, na padena sarūpatoti. Tattha tadevāti eva-saddena na taṃ kadāci saṅgahitena asaṅgahitaṃ na hotīti uddhaṭasseva asaṅgahitenaasaṅgahitabhāve niyatataṃ aññassa ca aniyatataṃ dassetīti veditabbaṃ. ‘‘Tadeva yehi asaṅgahita’’nti ettha hi ‘‘niyamato’’ti sakkā vacanaseso yojetunti. Atha vā tadevāti pucchāya uddhaṭameva evaṃpakārameva hutvā yehi asaṅgahitanti tassa pucchāya uddhaṭabhāvena evaṃ asaṅgahitenaasaṅgahitabhāvaniyamanattho eva-saddo, na aññassa asaṅgahitenaasaṅgahitatānivāraṇatthoti daṭṭhabbo. Pucchāya uddhaṭañhi aññasahitaṃ asahitañca asaṅgahitena asaṅgahitaṃ hoti. Rūpakkhandhādīni hi aññasahitāni viññāṇakkhandhādīni asahitānīti.

Now, as for what is stated in the commentary, 'For by such a term, Nibbāna would not undergo mere inclusion by aggregates,' this is said with reference to the truth of suffering. However, Nibbāna is included among the non-includers which are invisible and non-resistant, and that very thing is not a non-includer of itself. The meaning is that when the first question, the name-and-form question, etc., are combined with the second question, etc., which are made by way of similar answers, all thirty-four questions are thus formed. The term extracted by the question, 'that very thing,' refers to a specific term like 'aggregate of form,' not to the determined phenomena to be questioned. For these are shown by their characteristics, not by a term indicating their own nature. Here, by the word 'eva' in 'that very thing,' it should be understood that it shows the certainty of what is extracted being 'unincluded by the unincluded,' and the uncertainty of another, because it is not that that is never 'unincluded by the included.' In the phrase, 'that very thing by which it is unincluded,' the remainder of the statement 'by necessity' can be supplied. Alternatively, 'that very thing' means that what is extracted by the question, being of just such a nature, is unincluded by those; the word 'eva' here is for the purpose of establishing the certainty of its being 'unincluded by the unincluded' due to its being extracted by the question, not for the purpose of preventing the state of being 'unincluded by the unincluded' for another. For what is extracted by the question, both associated with another and unassociated, is 'unincluded by the unincluded.' Indeed, the aggregate of form and so on are associated with another, while the aggregate of consciousness and so on are unassociated.

Avasesā saṅgahitāti idaṃ avasesā asaṅgahitā na hontīti evaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tehipi viññāṇadhammehi te rūpadhammāva tīhi saṅgahehi asaṅgahitāti pucchāya uddhaṭā tīhipi saṅgahehi asaṅgāhakā hutvā asaṅgahitāti adhippāyo. Anuddhaṭā vedanādayopi hi asaṅgahitā evāti. Ettha ca paṭhame naye vedanādayopi viññāṇena asaṅgahitāti vuttā, dutiye rūpadhammāvāti ayaṃ viseso. Vedanādayo hi rūpaviññāṇeheva khandhādisaṅgahena asaṅgahitāti oḷārikarūpehi viññāṇena ca tīhipi saṅgahehi asaṅgahitāti attho. Rūpekadeso hi ettha rūpaggahaṇena gahitoti.

“The remainder are included”—this should be understood as “the remainder are not unincluded.” The meaning is that those material phenomena, extracted by the question, are not included by the three modes of inclusion even by those consciousness-phenomena; and having become non-includers by the three modes of inclusion, they are not included. For feelings, etc., even if not extracted, are also unincluded. Here, in the first method, feelings, etc., are said to be unincluded by consciousness; in the second, only material phenomena—this is the distinction. For feelings, etc., are unincluded by materiality and consciousness themselves through inclusion by aggregates, etc.—this is the meaning: that they are unincluded by the three modes of inclusion by gross material phenomena and consciousness. Indeed, a portion of materiality is taken here by the inclusion of materiality.

196. Catutthapañhe cakkhāyatanaṃ vedanādīhi catūhīti ettha cakkhāyatananti etena pucchāya uddhaṭaṃ asaṅgāhakaṃ dassetīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Cakkhāyatanena pana asaṅgahitena asaṅgahitāni dasa oḷārikāyatanāni na cakkhāyatanamevāti. ‘‘Rūpañca dhammāyatana’’ntiādinā yehi dhammehi tīhipi saṅgahehi asaṅgahitaṃ taṃ viññāṇameva hoti, asaṅgahitena tena [Pg.18] asaṅgahitañca viññāṇavajjaṃ sabbaṃ teva dhamme udāneti. Sadisavissajjanā hi ekato udānetvā dassetabbā. Tattha paṭhamena rūpakkhandhena sadisavissajjanesu ekato udānetvā dassitesu aññe visadisavissajjanā nayadānena dassitā honti. Tenāha ‘‘rūpañca dhammāyatananti…pe… aññenākārena saṅkhipitvā dassitā’’ti. Tattha dve bhavāti asaññekavokārabhavā. Dveti bāhirupādādhamme eva sandhāya vuttaṃ. Yena asaṅgāhakena asaṅgahitena asaṅgahitaṃ pucchitabbaṃ vissajjitabbañca paricchijjati, so rūpakkhandhādiko tassa pucchāvissajjanānañca nissayabhāvato ‘‘visayo’’ti vutto, yathādassitassa pana uddānassa nayadānamattattā ‘‘nayo’’ti vuttaṃ. ‘‘Dvevīsanayo cā’’tipi pāṭho, dvevīsapadiko esa nayo cāti attho.

196. In the fourth question, regarding ‘the eye-base by the four beginning with feeling,’ here, by ‘eye-base,’ it should be understood that it shows the non-includer extracted by the question. However, the ten gross bases that are not included by the unincluded eye-base are not the eye-base itself. By ‘form and the mental phenomena base,’ etc., that which is not included by the three modes of inclusion by those phenomena is only consciousness. And that which is not included by that unincluded thing, namely everything except consciousness, cites those very phenomena. Similar answers should indeed be shown by citing them together. There, when similar answers are shown by citing them together with the first form aggregate, the other dissimilar answers are shown by giving the method. Hence it is said: ‘Form and the mental phenomena base…pe… they are shown by summarizing in another way.’ Here, ‘two existences’ refers to the existence of non-percipient beings and the single-aggregate realm. ‘Two’ is said with reference to external grasped phenomena. That by which what is to be questioned and answered, which is not included by the unincluded non-includer, is delimited—that, such as the form aggregate, is called ‘the sphere’ because it is the basis for those questions and answers. However, since it is merely the giving of a method for the summary as shown, it is called ‘the method.’ The reading ‘and the twenty-two methods’ is also found; the meaning is ‘and this method consists of twenty-two terms.’

Pañcamanayaasaṅgahitenaasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the term ‘not included by what is not included,’ according to the fifth method, is completed.

6. Chaṭṭhanayo sampayogavippayogapadavaṇṇanā

6. The Sixth Method: The Explanation of the Terms of Association and Dissociation

228. Sampayogavippayogapade yaṃ labbhati, yañca na labbhati, taṃ sabbaṃ pucchāya gahitanti idaṃ na rūpakkhandhādīni padāni sandhāya vuttaṃ, atha kho sampayogapadaṃ vippayogapadañcāti veditabbaṃ. Rūpakkhandhādīsu hi yaṃ dhammāyatanādipadaṃ na labbhati, taṃ pucchāyapi na gahitaṃ. Sampayogapadaṃ pana rūpakkhandhādīsu alabbhamānampi ‘‘rūpakkhandho katihi…pe… sampayutto’’ti evaṃ pucchāya gahitaṃ, vedanākkhandhādīsu labbhamānaṃ, vippayogapadaṃ pana sabbattha labbhamānamevāti. Rūpadhammānaṃ pana rūpena nibbānena vā, nibbānassa ca rūpena saddhiṃ sampayogo nāma natthīti ekuppādādisabhāgatāya abhāvato sampayogaṃ nivārentena sā eva ekuppādāditā etesaṃ visabhāgatāti tadabhāvato vippayogopi nivārito eva hotīti daṭṭhabbo. Catūsu hi khandhesu vijjamānā ekuppādāditā tesaṃ aññamaññaṃ sabhāgatā hoti rūpanibbānehi tesaṃ tehi ca rūpanibbānānaṃ visabhāgatā ca, na ca rūpekadesassa nibbānassa vā sā ekuppādāditā atthi, yā rūpekadesena rūpekadesanibbānānaṃ nibbānena ca rūpassa visabhāgatā siyā. Teneva ‘‘catūhi vippayogo’’ti vuttanti.

228. In the section on association and dissociation, whatever is obtainable and whatever is not obtainable, all that is included in the question. This is not said with reference to terms such as the form aggregate, but it should be understood as referring to the term 'association' and the term 'dissociation.' For, in the case of the form aggregate and so on, any term such as the 'dhammāyatana' that is not obtainable is also not included in the question. However, the term 'association,' though unobtainable in the case of the form aggregate and so on, is included in the question thus: 'With how many... is the form aggregate... associated?' It is obtainable in the case of the feeling aggregate and so on, while the term 'dissociation' is indeed obtainable everywhere. Furthermore, for material phenomena, there is no such thing as association with material form or with Nibbāna, nor is there association of Nibbāna with material form, because of the absence of a common nature such as co-arising. It should be understood that by precluding association on account of the absence of a common nature such as co-arising, that very absence constitutes their dissimilarity, and because of this absence, dissociation is also precluded. For, the common nature of co-arising, etc., that exists among the four aggregates constitutes their mutual similarity, and also their dissimilarity from material form and Nibbāna, and the dissimilarity of material form and Nibbāna from them. And for a part of material form or for Nibbāna, there is no such common nature of co-arising, etc., that would constitute a dissimilarity of a part of material form with another part of material form, of a part of material form with Nibbāna, or of Nibbāna with material form. Therefore it is said, 'dissociation from four.'

Sattasu [Pg.19] viññāṇadhātūsu ekāyapi avippayutteti yathā rūpabhavo tīhi viññāṇadhātūhi, nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammā pañcahi, avitakkaavicārā ekāya vippayutte anārammaṇamissake dhamme dīpenti, evaṃ adīpetvā ekāyapi vippayutte ahonte sattahipi sampayutte sattapi vā tā dīpentīti adhippāyo. Avippayutteti hi ye vippayuttā na honti, te dhammeti vuttaṃ hoti, na sampayutteti. Tena yāni tāhi sampayutte dīpenti dhammāyatanādipadāni, yāni ca sampayuttavippayuttabhāvehi navattabbaṃ dīpenti acetasikādipadāni, yāni ca sampayuttanavattabbāni dīpenti dukkhasaccādipadāni, tesaṃ sabbesaṃ anārammaṇamissakadhammadīpakānaṃ aggahaṇaṃ vuttaṃ hoti. Na hi anārammaṇamissakasabbaviññāṇadhātutaṃsampayuttatadubhayasamudāyānaṃ khandhāyatanadhātūsu kenaci sampayogo vippayogo vā atthīti.

The meaning of '(not) dissociated from even one of the seven consciousness elements' is this: Just as they show phenomena mixed with the objectless as being dissociated from three consciousness elements (in the case of the form realm), from five (in the case of neither-resultant-nor-result-producing phenomena), and from one (in the case of what is without initial and sustained thought), so here, without showing them as dissociated from even one, since they are not dissociated, do they show them as associated with all seven, or do they show all seven elements themselves? For 'not dissociated' means those phenomena that are not dissociated; it does not mean 'associated.' Therefore, it is stated that there is an exclusion of all those terms that indicate phenomena mixed with the objectless: namely, terms like 'dhammāyatana,' etc., which show what is associated with them; terms like 'non-cetasikas,' etc., which show what is inexpressible in terms of being associated or dissociated; and terms like 'the truth of suffering,' etc., which show what is associated and inexpressible. For there is no association or dissociation whatsoever in the aggregates, bases, and elements for the entire collection of all consciousness elements mixed with the objectless, for what is associated with them, and for the combination of both.

Yadi evaṃ vippayuttenavippayuttapadaniddese ‘‘kusalehi dhammehi ye dhammā vippayuttā, tehi dhammehi ye dhammā vippayuttā’’ti na vattabbaṃ. Akusalābyākatā hi anārammaṇamissobhayadhammāti? Na, yathāvuttasamudāyānaṃ khandhādīheva sampayogavippayogābhāvavacanato. Khandhādayo hi tadekadesā tadekadesaññasamudāyā ca, samudāyekadesānañca vibhāgābhāvato na sabhāgavisabhāgatā atthi, tena tesaṃ khandhādīhi sampayogavippayogābhāvo hoti. Kusalā pana dhammā akusalābyākatehi vibhattā, te ca kusalehi, na tesaṃ samudāyekadesabhāvo tadekadesaññasamudāyabhāvo vā, tasmā khandhādīni anāmasitvā vippayuttatāmattena yathāniddhāritadhammadassane kusalehi itaresaṃ, itarehi ca kusalānaṃ vippayogo na na hoti visabhāgatāsabbhāvatoti tesaṃ aññamaññavippayuttatā vuttā. Esa nayo sabbesu evarūpesu.

If so, then in the exposition of the term 'dissociated from the dissociated,' it should not be said: 'Are those phenomena that are dissociated from wholesome phenomena, dissociated from those latter phenomena?' For are not unwholesome and indeterminate phenomena both mixed with the objectless? No, because it is stated that for the aforementioned collections, there is an absence of association and dissociation with the aggregates, etc. For the aggregates, etc., are partly identical with them and are collections of what is partly different from them. And since there is no division between a collection and its parts, there is no similarity or dissimilarity. Therefore, there is an absence of association and dissociation of them with the aggregates, etc. But wholesome phenomena are distinct from unwholesome and indeterminate phenomena, and these in turn are distinct from wholesome phenomena; for them, there is no state of being partly identical with the collection or a collection of what is partly different. Therefore, without referring to the aggregates, etc., and merely by considering the state of dissociation, when viewing the phenomena as specified, the dissociation of wholesome phenomena from the others, and of the others from the wholesome, certainly exists because of the presence of dissimilarity. Thus their mutual dissociation is stated. This is the method in all such cases.

Uddāne pana aṭṭhārasa tato pareti idaṃ ‘‘soḷasā’’ti vattabbaṃ, tevīsanti idañca ‘‘ekavīsa’’nti. Sabbattha ca kālasantānabhedarahitārahitabahudhammasamodhānānaṃ saṅkhārakkhandhadhammāyatanadhammadhātūnaṃ ekadesā samudayasaccavedanākkhandhādayo ekadesasammissā ca iddhipādādayo anārammaṇehi asammissā rūpakkhandhādayo ca sārammaṇehi asammissā sampayogīvippayogībhāvena [Pg.20] samānakālasantānehi ca ekadesantarehi vibhattā eva gahitāti tehi te kehici ekadesantarehi vibhattehi yathāyogaṃ sampayogaṃ vippayogañca labhanti. Atthi hi tesaṃ ekuppādāditā sabhāgatā visabhāgatā cāti. Tena tattha tattha ‘‘ekena khandhena ekenāyatanena ekāya dhātuyā kehici sampayutta’’nti ca, ‘‘ekenāyatanena ekāya dhātuyā kehici vippayutta’’nti ca vuttaṃ. Bhinnakālasamudāyā eva pana vedanāsaññāviññāṇakkhandhā vattamānā ca ekekadhammā eva, tasmā tesaṃ samānakālassa vibhajitabbassa abhāvato na sukhindriyādīni vedanākkhandhassa vibhāgaṃ karonti, cakkhuviññāṇadhātādayo ca viññāṇakkhandhassa manāyatanassa ca. Tena ‘‘sukhindriyaṃ ekena khandhena kehici vippayutta’’nti, ‘‘cakkhuviññāṇadhātu ekena khandhena ekenāyatanena kehici vippayuttā’’ti ca evamādi na vuttaṃ, khandhāyatanavibhāgavirahitampi pana viññāṇaṃ dhātuvibhāgena vibhattameva vuttanti ‘‘cakkhuviññāṇadhātu…pe… manoviññāṇadhātu soḷasahi dhātūhi vippayuttā’’ti vuttaṃ, evamevaṃ indriyavibhāgena vibhattānaṃ sukhindriyādīnaṃ ‘‘sukhindriyena ye dhammā vippayuttā’’tiādīsu yathāyogaṃ vippayogo daṭṭhabbo, nāvibhattassa vedanākkhandhassāti.

But in the summary, 'eighteen beyond that' should be stated as 'sixteen,' and 'twenty-three' as 'twenty-one.' In all cases, the formations aggregate, the dhamma-base, and the dhamma-element—which are combinations of many dhammas, both with and without distinctions of time and continuity—are taken as being distinguished by other parts that have simultaneous continuity, through the state of being associated and dissociated. Some of their parts, like the truth of origin and the feeling aggregate, are mixed with other parts; the bases of spiritual power, etc., are unmixed with the objectless; and the form aggregate, etc., are unmixed with what has an object. Thus, they obtain association and dissociation as is appropriate with certain other parts by which they are distinguished. For they possess co-arising, etc., similarity, and dissimilarity. Therefore, it is said in various places: 'associated with one aggregate, one base, one element in some respects,' and 'dissociated from one base, one element in some respects.' However, the feeling, perception, and consciousness aggregates are just collections with different time-points, and the presently occurring ones are just individual dhammas. Therefore, because there is no simultaneous factor to be divided, the faculties such as the pleasure faculty do not create a division of the feeling aggregate, nor do the eye-consciousness element, etc., create a division of the consciousness aggregate or the mind base. Thus, it is not said: 'The pleasure faculty is dissociated from one aggregate in some respects,' or 'The eye-consciousness element is dissociated from one aggregate and one base in some respects,' and so on. But consciousness, though devoid of division by aggregate and base, is said to be divided by the division of elements; thus it is said: 'The eye-consciousness element... the mind-consciousness element is dissociated from sixteen elements.' Similarly, for the pleasure faculty, etc., which are distinguished by the division of faculties, their dissociation should be understood as appropriate in such phrases as 'those phenomena dissociated from the pleasure faculty,' etc., but this does not apply to the undivided feeling aggregate.

235. Yathā taṃsampayogībhāvaṃ sandhāya ‘‘samudayasaccaṃ tīhi khandhehi sampayutta’’nti vuttaṃ, evaṃ taṃvippayogībhāvaṃ sandhāya ‘‘tīhi khandhehi vippayutta’’nti kasmā na vuttanti ce? Avibhāgehi tehi vippayogavacanassa ayuttattā. Vibhāge hi sati samudayasaccaṃ sukhadukkhadomanassindriyehi manoviññāṇadhātuto aññaviññāṇadhātūhi vippayuttanti yuttaṃ vattuṃ vibhāgeneva visabhāgatāya saṅgahitattā, vibhāgarahitehi pana vedanākkhandhādīhi na yuttaṃ, tehi vijjamānehi vijjamānassa samudayassa visabhāgabhāvābhāvato. Yañhi anuppannā dhammā viya āmaṭṭhakālabhedaṃ na hoti saṅkhataṃ uddharitabbaṃ, taṃ paccuppannabhāvaṃ nissāya sampayogīvippayogībhāvena uddharīyati, tañca vibhāgarahitehi khandhādīhi saṅkhatehi paccuppannabhāvameva nissāya anāmaṭṭhakālabhede atthitāya eva nissitabbattā. Avijjamānassa hi avijjamānena, avijjamānassa ca vijjamānena, vijjamānassa ca avijjamānena sampayogo natthi, vippayogo pana avijjamānatādīpake bhede gahite teneva visabhāgatāpi gahitā evāti hoti[Pg.21]. Bhede pana aggahite tena tena gahaṇena visabhāgatāya aggahitattā sati sabhāgatte vijjamānatāya eva dhammānaṃ sabhāgassa paricchindanato vijjamānatā dassitāti ekuppādādibhāvasaṅkhātā sabhāgatāpi gahitā eva hoti. Tassā ca gahitattā sampayogova labbhati, na vippayogo, tasmā samudayasaccaṃ vedanākkhandhādīhi sampayuttattena vuttaṃ, na vippayuttattenāti. Esa nayo maggasaccādīsupīti.

235. If it is asked: 'Just as it was said, with reference to the state of being associated, "the truth of origin is associated with three aggregates," why was it not said, with reference to the state of being dissociated, "dissociated from three aggregates"?' Because it is inappropriate to speak of dissociation from them when they are undivided. For when there is division, it is proper to say that the truth of origin is dissociated from the faculties of pleasure, pain, and displeasure, and from the consciousness elements other than the mind-consciousness element, because dissimilarity is included by the very division. But this is not proper with the undivided feeling aggregate, etc., because when they exist, there is an absence of a state of dissimilarity for the existing origin. For a conditioned thing that is not to be extracted with a temporal distinction (like unarisen phenomena) is extracted by way of association or dissociation based on its present state; and that must be relied upon as existing in a time without distinction, based only on its present state along with the undivided conditioned aggregates. For there is no association of the non-existent with the non-existent, of the non-existent with the existent, or of the existent with the non-existent. But dissociation occurs when a distinction indicating non-existence is grasped, for by that very fact dissimilarity is also grasped. However, when a distinction is not grasped, dissimilarity is not grasped by that grasping. When similarity is present, since the existence of phenomena is shown by defining what is similar, similarity—defined as having co-arising, etc.—is also grasped. And since that similarity is grasped, only association is obtained, not dissociation. Therefore, the truth of origin is spoken of as associated with the feeling aggregate, etc., not as dissociated. This is the method also for the truth of the path, etc.

262. ‘‘Dutiyajjhānavicārañhi ṭhapetvā sesā avitakkavicāramattā’’ti aṭṭhakathāvacanaṃ ye padhānā vitakko viya koṭṭhāsantaracittuppādesu alīnā, te eva idha avitakkavicāramattāti adhippetāti dasseti. Teneva hi anantaranaye samudayasaccena samānagatikā na savitakkasavicārehīti te na gahitā. Dasamosānanayesu ca tehi vippayuttehi vippayuttānaṃ tehi vippayuttānañca soḷasahi dhātūhi vippayogo aṭṭhārasasaṅgahito ca vutto. Vitakkasahitesupi pana tesu gahitesu sabbepi te vicārena sampayuttāti ‘‘ekena khandhena kehici sampayuttā’’ti sakkā vattuṃ. So hi samudāyo vicāraṃ vajjetvā aññena kenaci sampayutto na hoti. Na hi tadekadesassa vitakkassa vicārato aññena sampayogo samudāyassa hoti. Yathā nānācittuppādesu uppajjamānānaṃ iddhipādānaṃ samudāyassa iddhipādassa ekadesānaṃ tīhi khandhehi sampayogo samudāyassa na hoti, evamidhāpi daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yathā pana tesu ekopi vedanāsaññākkhandhehi saṅkhārakkhandhekadesena ca asampayutto nāma natthīti samudāyassa tehi sampayuttatā vuttā, evamidhāpi vicārena asampayuttassa avitakkavicāramattassa kassaci abhāvato samudāyassa tena sampayuttatā na na sakkā vattuṃ. Na hi avitakkavicāramattānaṃ dassanenapahātabbahetukādīnaṃ viya sampayuttatā na vattabbā. Yathā hi dassanenapahātabbahetukesu keci saṅkhārakkhandhekadesena mohena sampayuttā, keci asampayuttāti na samudāyo tena sampayutto, nāpi añño koci dhammo atthi, yena so samudāyo sampayutto siyāti ‘‘dassanenapahātabbahetukā dhammā sampayuttāti natthī’’ti vuttaṃ, evaṃ bhāvanāyapahātabbahetukasahetukādayopi. Na panevaṃ yena avitakkavicāramattasamudāyo sampayutto siyā, taṃ natthi avitakkavicāramattesu kassaci vicārena [Pg.22] asampayuttassa abhāvā, tasmā te ‘‘sampayuttā’’ti na na vattabbāti. Sabbattha ca ekadhammepi kehicīti bahuvacananiddeso saṅkhāya aniyamitattā katoti veditabbo.

262. The commentary statement, “‘Excluding the sustained thought of the second jhāna, the rest are merely without initial thought but with sustained thought,’” shows that what is intended here by ‘merely without initial thought but with sustained thought’ are those prominent states that, like initial thought, are not submerged in the arising of consciousness in other sections. For this reason, in the immediately following method, those states that have the same course as the truth of the origin are not included with those that are ‘with initial thought and with sustained thought.’ And in the ten final methods, it is stated that the dissociation from the sixteen elements of those dissociated from what is dissociated from them, and of what is dissociated from them, is included in the eighteen. However, even when those states accompanied by initial thought are included, since all of them are associated with sustained thought, it can be said that they are ‘associated with one aggregate in some respects.’ For that collection, apart from sustained thought, is not associated with anything else. The association of the collection does not come about through the association of one of its parts, initial thought, with something other than sustained thought. Just as, in the case of the bases for spiritual power arising in various consciousness-arisings, the association of the collection of the bases for spiritual power with the three aggregates does not apply to some parts of the bases for spiritual power, so it should be understood here. And just as in those cases there is not a single one that is unassociated with the aggregates of feeling and perception and with a part of the aggregate of formations—for which reason the association of the collection with them is stated—so too here, since there is no instance of a state that is ‘merely without initial thought but with sustained thought’ that is unassociated with sustained thought, it cannot be said that the collection is not associated with it. For it is not that their association cannot be stated, unlike the case of the roots to be abandoned by seeing and so on. For example, among the roots to be abandoned by seeing, some are associated with delusion, a part of the aggregate of formations, while others are not; thus the collection is not associated with it, nor is there any other phenomenon with which that collection could be associated. Hence it is said: ‘There are no phenomena associated with the roots to be abandoned by seeing.’ The same applies to the roots to be abandoned by cultivation, those with roots, and so on. But this is not the case here, for it is not that there is no phenomenon with which the collection of states merely without initial thought but with sustained thought could be associated, since among these states there is not a single one that is unassociated with sustained thought. Therefore, it cannot be said that they are not ‘associated.’ And in all cases, the plural designation ‘in some respects’ (kehici), even in regard to a single phenomenon, should be understood as being used because the number is not fixed.

Chaṭṭhanayasampayogavippayogapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Here ends the explanation of the terms of association and dissociation in the sixth method.

7. Sattamanayo sampayuttenavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā

7. The Seventh Method: Explanation of the Term “Dissociated from the Associated”

306. Sampayuttenavippayuttapadaniddese rūpakkhandhādayo tehi sampayuttābhāvato na gahitā. Samudayasaccādīni satipi tehi sampayutte, sampayuttehi ca vippayutte sampayuttenavippayuttānaṃ khandhādīhi vippayogābhāvato. Na hi samudayasaccena sampayuttehi lobhasahagatacittuppādehi vippayuttānaṃ tato aññadhammānaṃ khandhādīsu kenaci vippayogo atthi. Nanu ca te eva cittuppādā cattāro khandhā aḍḍhadutiyāni āyatanāni aḍḍhadutiyā dhātuyo ca hontīti tehi vippayogo vattabboti? Na, tadaññadhammānaṃ khandhādibhāvato. Na hi te eva dhammā cattāro khandhā, atha kho te ca tato aññe ca, tathā aḍḍhadutiyāyatanadhātuyopi. Na ca tadaññasamudāyehi aññe vippayuttā honti samudāyekadesānaṃ ekadesaññasamudāyānañca vippayogābhāvato. Esa nayo maggasaccasukhindriyādīsu. Avitakkavicāramattesupi niravasesesu adhippetesu tesaṃ savitakkasavicārasamānagatikattā aggahaṇe kāraṇaṃ na dissati.

306. In the exposition of the terms “dissociated from the associated,” the form aggregate and so on are not included because they are not associated with those phenomena. The truth of the origin and so on, although there are states associated with them, are not included because there is no dissociation from the aggregates, etc., for those states that are dissociated from what is associated with them. For there is no dissociation whatsoever with the aggregates, etc., for other phenomena that are dissociated from the consciousness-arisings accompanied by greed, which are associated with the truth of the origin. But are not those very consciousness-arisings the four aggregates, one and a half bases, and one and a half elements? Should not dissociation from them be stated? No, because those other phenomena constitute the aggregates, etc. For those phenomena are not themselves the four aggregates, but they and others are; similarly for the one and a half bases and elements. Nor are other phenomena dissociated from those other collections, because there is no dissociation between parts of one collection and parts of another collection. This is the method for the truth of the path, the faculty of pleasure, and so on. Even in the case of the states that are “merely without initial thought but with sustained thought,” when they are all intended without remainder, no reason is seen for their non-inclusion, since they have the same course as the states that are “with initial thought and with sustained thought.”

Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana evarūpānīti yathā rūpakkhandhe vissajjanaṃ na yujjati, evaṃ yesu aññesupi na yujjati, tāni vissajjanassa ayogena ‘‘evarūpānī’’ti vuttāni, na sampayuttābhāvenāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yāni pana padāni dhammadhātuyā sampayutte dhamme dīpentīti etena vedanākkhandhādipadāni dasseti, viññāṇañca aññena asammissanti viññāṇakkhandhamanāyatanādipadāni. Tattha aññena asammissanti asampayuttena asammissanti attho. Adukkhamasukhāyavedanāyasampayuttapadānipi hi sampayuttehi sammissaviññāṇadīpakāni idha gahitānīti. Etena ca lakkhaṇena evarūpāneva gahitānīti dasseti, na evarūpāni gahitānevāti samudayasaccādiiddhipādādipadānaṃ [Pg.23] asaṅgahitattā. ‘‘Atha phassasattakaṃ cittaṃ saha yuttapadehi sattā’’ti purāṇapāṭho, ayaṃ pana ūnoti katvā ‘‘atha phassasattakaṃ, tike tayo satta mahantare cā’’ti pāṭho kato.

However, in the commentary, it should be understood that just as an answer is not appropriate in the case of the form aggregate, so too for other things for which it is not appropriate, they are called “of such a kind” because of the inappropriateness of an answer, not because of an absence of association. By the words “those terms that illuminate phenomena associated with the dhamma-element,” it indicates the terms for the feeling aggregate and so on; and by “consciousness is unmixed with another,” the terms for the consciousness aggregate, mind base, and so on. Here, “unmixed with another” means unmixed with what is unassociated. For even the terms associated with neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, which indicate consciousness mixed with associated states, are included here. And by this characteristic it shows that only things of such a kind are included, not that all things of such a kind are included, because terms for the truth of the origin, the bases for spiritual power, and so on are not included. The ancient reading is: “Then the sevenfold contact, the mind together with the seven associated terms.” But considering this to be deficient, the reading was made: “Then the sevenfold contact, three in the triad, and seven in the great intermediate section.”

309. Pucchāya uddhaṭapadeneva saddhiṃ vippayuttānaṃ vasenāti idaṃ pucchāya uddhaṭapadena sampayuttehi vippayuttā tena saddhiṃ vippayuttā hontīti katvā vuttaṃ. Pāḷiuddānagāthāyaṃ dve ca manena yuttā, vitakkavicāraṇāti manodhātuyā ekantasampayuttā dve vitakkavicārāti savitakkapadaṃ savicārapadañca dasseti.

309. The phrase “by way of those dissociated along with the very term extracted from the question” is stated on the grounds that those dissociated from what is associated with the term extracted from the question are dissociated along with it. In the summary verse of the Pāli, the line “and two associated with mind, that is, initial thought and sustained thought” indicates the two, initial thought and sustained thought, which are exclusively associated with the mind-element, thus pointing to the term “with initial thought” and the term “with sustained thought.”

Sattamanayasampayuttenavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Here ends the explanation of the terms “dissociated from the associated” in the seventh method.

8. Aṭṭhamanayo vippayuttenasampayuttapadavaṇṇanā

8. The Eighth Method: Explanation of the Term 'Associated with the Dissociated'.

317. Vippayuttenasampayuttapadaniddese rūpakkhandhādīhi vippayuttenasampayuttameva yathāniddhāritaṃ natthīti ‘‘rūpakkhandhena ye dhammā vippayuttā, tehi dhammehi ye dhammā sampayuttā’’ti avatvā ‘‘rūpakkhandhena ye dhammā vippayuttā, te dhammā katihi khandhehi…pe… sampayuttāti natthī’’ti vuttaṃ. Tena rūpakkhandhena vippayuttānaṃ kenaci khandhādinā sampayogābhāvato yathāniddhāritaṃ vippayuttenasampayuttameva natthi, kuto tassa puna khandhādīhi sampayuttatāti dasseti.

317. In the exposition of the term 'associated with the dissociated,' concerning the form aggregate, etc., it is stated that there is nothing 'associated with the dissociated' as determined. Instead of saying, 'Those phenomena dissociated from the form aggregate are associated with these phenomena,' it is said: 'Those phenomena dissociated from the form aggregate—with how many aggregates... are they associated? They are not.' This shows that since those phenomena dissociated from the form aggregate have no association with any aggregate, etc., there is indeed nothing 'associated with the dissociated' as determined. How, then, could there be any association for it with aggregates, etc.?

Aṭṭhamanayavippayuttenasampayuttapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Here ends the explanation of the term 'associated with the dissociated' in the eighth method.

9. Navamanayo sampayuttenasampayuttapadavaṇṇanā

9. The Ninth Method: Explanation of the Term 'Associated with the Associated'.

319. Sampayuttenasampayuttapadavaṇṇanāyaṃ yaṃkhandhādivasenāti samāsapadaṃ idaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ, yassa khandhādino vasenāti attho. Tassevāti ca tasseva khandhādinoti attho. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – yaṃ idha sampayuttaṃ vuttaṃ, taṃ rūpakkhandhādīsu araṇantesu yena vedanākkhandhādinā sampayuttaṃ, puna tasseva vedanākkhandhādino khandhādīhi sampayogaṃ pucchitvā vissajjanaṃ kataṃ[Pg.24]. Tañhi attanā sampayuttena sampayuttattā ‘‘sampayuttena sampayutta’’nti niddhāritanti. Rūpena vāti etena nirodhasaccaappaccayaasaṅkhatehipi ayogo vutto hotīti daṭṭhabbo, tathā rūpamissakehi vāti etena anupādinnaanupādāniyādīhi nibbānamissakehipi. Vakkhati hi ‘‘nibbānaṃ pana sukhumarūpagatikamevā’’ti. Sabbārūpakkhandhasaṅgāhakehīti vattamānānameva sampayogo labbhatīti vattamānesu ekampi dhammaṃ anapanetvā avikalacatukkhandhasaṅgāhakehi arūpabhavādīhīti attho. Ayaṃ panettha saṅkhepo – ye sampayogaṃ na labhanti rūpakkhandhādayo, te sabbe na gahitā, itare ca vedanākkhandhādayo sabbe gahitāti.

319. In the explanation of the term 'associated with the associated,' the compound 'yaṃkhandhādivasena' should be understood to mean 'by way of which aggregate, etc.' And 'tasseva' means 'of that very aggregate, etc.' This is what is said: Whatever is here called 'associated' among those terms not including the form aggregate and so on, is associated with some feeling aggregate, etc. Then, an answer is given after asking about the association of that very feeling aggregate, etc., with the aggregates, etc. For since it is associated with that with which it is itself associated, it is determined as 'associated with the associated.' By 'or with form,' it should be understood that non-connection with the unconditioned—the truth of cessation and the conditionless—is also stated. Similarly, by 'or with what is mixed with form,' non-connection with what is mixed with Nibbāna, such as the non-clung-to and non-clinging, is also stated. For it will be said: 'Nibbāna, however, has subtle form as its resort.' The phrase 'by those that include all the formless aggregates' means that association is obtained only with present phenomena; that is, by those that include the complete four aggregates, such as formless existence, etc., without removing a single present phenomenon. This is the summary here: those that do not obtain association, such as the form aggregate and so on, are all not taken; the others, such as the feeling aggregate and so on, are all taken.

Navamanayasampayuttenasampayuttapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Here ends the explanation of the term 'associated with the associated' in the ninth method.

10. Dasamanayo vippayuttenavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā

10. The Tenth Method: Explanation of the Term 'Dissociated from the Dissociated'.

353. Vippayuttenavippayuttapadaniddese aggahitesu dhammāyatanādidhammā anārammaṇamissakasabbacittuppādagatadhammabhāvato tehi vippayuttassa abhāvā na gahitā, dukkhasaccacatumahābhavaabyākatādidhammā tehi vippayuttehi vippayuttānaṃ khandhādīhi vippayogābhāvatoti ayaṃ viseso veditabboti.

353. In the exposition of the term 'dissociated from the dissociated,' among the phenomena not taken are those such as the mind-object base, because they are phenomena included in all consciousness-arisings mixed with the objectless, and thus there is nothing dissociated from them. Also not taken are phenomena such as the truth of suffering, the four great elements, and the indeterminate, because for things dissociated from them, there is no further dissociation from aggregates, etc. This distinction should be understood.

Dasamanayavippayuttenavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Here ends the explanation of the term 'dissociated from the dissociated' in the tenth method.

11. Ekādasamanayo saṅgahitenasampayuttavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā

11. The Eleventh Method: Explanation of the Terms 'Associated and Dissociated with the Included'.

409. Ekādasamanayavaṇṇanāyaṃ ‘‘te ca sesehi tīhi khandhehi ekena manāyatanena sattahi viññāṇadhātūhī’’ti etesaṃ padānaṃ ‘‘sampayuttā nāmā’’ti etena saha sambandho. ‘‘Kehicī’’ti etassa panatthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘saṅkhārakkhandhe dhammāyatanadhammadhātūsu ca ṭhapetvā taṇha’’nti etena ‘‘te cā’’ti vutte samudayasaccena khandhādisaṅgahena saṅgahitadhamme visesetvā tesaṃ eva visesitānaṃ attavajjehi sesehi saṅkhārakkhandhe taṇhāya dhammāyatanadhammadhātūsu ca taṇhāya vedanāsaññākkhandhehi sampayogārahehi [Pg.25] sampayuttataṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘sesehi sampayuttattā kehici sampayuttā nāmā’’ti.

409. In the explanation of the eleventh method, the terms 'and those, with the remaining three aggregates, with one mind-base, and with seven consciousness-elements' are connected with 'are called associated.' But to show the meaning of 'by some,' when 'and those' is said, he specifies the phenomena included by the inclusion of aggregates, etc., with the truth of origin. Then, with reference to the association of these very specified phenomena—which are fit for association with the feeling and perception aggregates, with the remaining formations aggregate (excluding itself), and with craving in the mind-object base and dhamma-element—he says by means of the phrase 'except for craving in the formations aggregate, the mind-object base, and the dhamma-element': 'Because they are associated with the remaining, they are called "associated by some".'

Ekādasamanayasaṅgahitenasampayuttavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Here ends the explanation of the terms 'associated and dissociated with the included' in the eleventh method.

12. Dvādasamanayo sampayuttenasaṅgahitāsaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

12. The Twelfth Method: Explanation of the Terms 'Included and Not Included with the Associated'.

417. Dvādasamanaye ca navamanaye viya sampayogārahāva labbhantīti āha ‘‘teyeva uddhaṭā’’ti.

417. In the twelfth method, just as in the ninth method, only those fit for association are obtained; hence it is said, 'Those very ones are extracted.'

Dvādasamanayasampayuttenasaṅgahitāsaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Here ends the explanation of the terms 'included and not included with the associated' in the twelfth method.

13. Terasamanayo asaṅgahitenasampayuttavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā

13. The Thirteenth Method: Explanation of the Terms 'Associated and Dissociated with the Unincluded'.

448. Terasamanayavaṇṇanāyaṃ yehi tīhipi saṅgahehi asaṅgahitaṃ viññāṇameva hoti, te pāḷiyaṃ ‘‘rūpañca dhammāyatana’’ntiādiuddānagāthāya dassitā bāvīsa dhammā ‘‘rūpakkhandhena sadisapañhā dhammā’’ti vuttā. Yehi pana tīhipi saṅgahehi asaṅgahitāni arūpabhavena viya oḷārikāyatanāneva honti, te vuttāvasesā sabbe idha uddhaṭā ‘‘arūpabhavena sadisā’’ti vuttā. Sesāti sesā pañcamanaye āgatā vedanākkhandhādayo satipi asaṅgāhakatte idha vissajjanaṃ na ruhantīti na uddhaṭā. Ye pana asaṅgāhakā eva na honti dukkhasaccādidhammā, tesu vattabbameva natthi. Yathā pana vedanākkhandhādayo na ruhanti, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘vedanākkhandhena hī’’tiādimāha. Tattha tesañca sampayogo nāma natthīti rūpārūpadhammānaṃ asampayogehi vomissatāya sampayogo natthīti attho.

448. In the explanation of the thirteenth method, that which is unincluded by all three inclusions is only consciousness; these twenty-two phenomena, shown in the Pāli summary verse beginning 'rūpañca dhammāyatana,' are called 'phenomena of the question similar to the form aggregate.' But those which are unincluded by all three inclusions are only the gross bases, in the manner of the formless; all the remaining ones mentioned are extracted here and called 'similar to the formless.' The rest—that is, the remaining feeling aggregate, etc., from the fifth method—although non-including, are not extracted here because they do not arise in the answer. As for those phenomena that are not non-including at all, such as the truth of suffering, there is nothing to be said. To show how the feeling aggregate, etc., do not arise, he says, 'For with the feeling aggregate...' and so on. Here, 'there is no association of them' means that because material and immaterial phenomena are mixed with things with which they are not associated, there is no association.

Yadi pana te kadāci asabbaviññāṇadhātusampayuttā arūpadhammā rūpadhammā ca siyuṃ, na tesaṃ vippayogo natthīti ‘‘vippayogo ca natthī’’ti na vuttaṃ, na vedanākkhandhena asaṅgahitānaṃ vippayogassa atthitāyāti veditabbaṃ. Ubhayābhāvato hi vedanākkhandhādayo idha na ruhantīti. Evaṃ panettha siyā ‘‘vedanākkhandhena hi khandhādivasena anārammaṇamissakā sattaviññāṇadhātudhammā asaṅgahitā honti, tesañca sampayogo [Pg.26] vippayogo ca natthī’’ti. Anārammaṇasahitānañhi sabbaviññāṇadhātūnaṃ sabbaviññāṇadhātusampayuttānaṃ tadubhayadhammānañca vedanākkhandhādiviññāṇakkhandhādicakkhāyatanādīhi tīhipi saṅgahehi asaṅgahitānaṃ sampayogavippayogābhāvo aruhaṇe kāraṇaṃ. Jātivippayogabhūmikālasantānavippayogato catubbidho vippayogo. Tattha jātivippayogo ‘‘kusalā dhammā, akusalā dhammā’’tiādi, bhūmivippayogo ‘‘kāmāvacarā, rūpāvacarā’’tiādi, kālavippayogo ‘‘atītā dhammā, anāgatā dhammā’’tiādi, santānavippayogo ‘‘ajjhattā dhammā, bahiddhā dhammā’’tiādi. Evaṃ vippayogo catudhā veditabbo.

However, if those immaterial and material phenomena were at some time associated with what is not all the consciousness elements, it is not that their dissociation is non-existent. Therefore, it was not said, 'and there is no dissociation,' because it should be understood that dissociation does not exist for what is unincluded by the feeling aggregate. For it is due to the absence of both association and dissociation that the feeling aggregate, etc., do not arise here. Here it might be thus: 'For by the feeling aggregate, the phenomena of the seven consciousness-elements mixed with the objectless by way of aggregates, etc., are unincluded, and for them there is neither association nor dissociation.' For the absence of association and dissociation is the reason for the non-arising of that which is unincluded by the three inclusions—the feeling aggregate, etc., the consciousness aggregate, etc., and the eye-base, etc.—in the case of all consciousness-elements together with the objectless, all phenomena associated with all consciousness-elements, and both of these kinds of phenomena. Dissociation is fourfold: by kind, plane, time, and continuity. Among these, dissociation by kind is as in 'wholesome phenomena, unwholesome phenomena,' etc.; dissociation by plane is as in 'sense-sphere phenomena, form-sphere phenomena,' etc.; dissociation by time is as in 'past phenomena, future phenomena,' etc.; dissociation by continuity is as in 'internal phenomena, external phenomena,' etc. Thus dissociation should be understood in four ways.

Terasamanayaasaṅgahitenasampayuttavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Here ends the explanation of the terms 'associated and dissociated with the unincluded' in the thirteenth method.

14. Cuddasamanayo vippayuttenasaṅgahitāsaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

14. The Explanation of the Terms 'Included' and 'Unincluded' by way of the Dissociated in the Fourteenth Method.

456. Cuddasamanaye dhammāyatanādīnaṃ anārammaṇamissakasabbacittuppādagatadhammabhāvato vippayogassa aruhaṇaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Jātiādittayassa cettha dhammasabhāvamattattā na kathañci sampayogo vippayogo ca ruhati ajjhattabahiddhadhammānaṃ sabbadhammasamodhānattā, anidassanaappaṭighādīnaṃ anārammaṇamissakasabbacittuppādattā. Dukkhasaccādidhammāva idha tehi vippayuttānaṃ saṅgahāsaṅgahasabbhāvā gahitāti.

456. In the fourteenth method, it should be seen that dissociation does not arise for the dharma-base and so on, because they are phenomena included among all consciousness-arisings mixed with the objectless. Here, in regard to the triad of birth, etc., because they are merely the nature of phenomena, neither association nor dissociation arises in any way, due to the inclusion of internal and external phenomena among all phenomena; and for the invisible, non-impinging, etc., because they are all consciousness-arisings mixed with the objectless. The phenomena such as the truth of suffering are taken up here because there exists inclusion and non-inclusion of states dissociated from them.

Pāḷiuddānagāthāyaṃ samucchede na labbhantīti pariyosāne naye na labbhantīti attho. Moghapucchakena cāti alabbhamānā ca te moghapucchakena hetunā na labbhanti tesaṃ pucchāya moghattāti vuttaṃ hoti. Atha vā moghapucchako aṭṭhamo nayo, tena ca saha osānanaye ete dhammā vippayogassapi abhāvā sabbathāpi na labbhantīti attho.

In the summary verse of the Pāḷi, the words 'they are not found in the section' mean they are not found in the final method. And the words 'by the futile questioner' mean that since they are unobtainable, they are not obtained for the reason of the futile questioner; that is to say, because their question is futile. Alternatively, the futile questioner is the eighth method, and the meaning is that together with that, in the final method, these phenomena are not found in any way at all, due to the absence of dissociation as well.

Cuddasamanayavippayuttenasaṅgahitāsaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Terms 'Included' and 'Unincluded' by way of the Dissociated in the Fourteenth Method is finished.

Dhātukathāpakaraṇa-mūlaṭīkā samattā.

The Root Subcommentary on the Treatise of the Discourse on Elements is completed.

Puggalapaññattipakaraṇa-mūlaṭīkā

The Root Subcommentary on the Treatise of the Designation of Persons

1. Mātikāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Matrix

1. Dhammasaṅgahe [Pg.27] tikadukavasena saṅgahitānaṃ dhammānaṃ vibhaṅge khandhādivibhāgaṃ dassetvā tathāsaṅgahitavibhattānaṃ dhātukathāya saṅgahāsaṅgahādippabhedaṃ vatvā yāya paññattiyā tesaṃ sabhāvato upādāya ca paññāpanaṃ hoti, taṃ pabhedato dassetuṃ ‘‘cha paññattiyo’’tiādinā puggalapaññatti āraddhā. Tattha ye dhamme pubbāpariyabhāvena pavattamāne asabhāvasamūhavasena upādāya ‘‘puggalo, itthī, puriso, devo, manusso’’tiādikā puggalapaññatti hoti, tesaṃ aññesañca bāhirarūpanibbānānaṃ sasabhāvasamūhasasabhāvabhedavasena paññāpanā sabhāvapaññattīti khandhapaññattiādikā pañcavidhā veditabbā. Tāya dhammasaṅgahādīsu vibhattā sabhāvapaññatti sabbāpi saṅgahitā hoti. Puggalapaññatti pana asabhāvapaññatti. Tāya ca samayavimuttādippabhedāya sattasantānagate pariññeyyādisabhāvadhamme upādāya pavattito padhānāya ‘‘vihāro mañco’’tiādikā ca sabbā asabhāvapaññatti saṅgahitā hoti.

1. After showing in the Vibhaṅga the division into aggregates, etc., of the phenomena collected by way of triads and dyads in the Dhammasaṅgaha, and after stating in the Dhātukathā the distinctions of inclusion, non-inclusion, etc., of those phenomena thus collected and divided, the Puggalapaññatti is begun with the words 'six designations,' etc., in order to show in detail the designation by which those phenomena are made known both from their own-nature and by derivation. Therein, the designation of persons is that which designates phenomena that occur in sequence as 'person,' 'woman,' 'man,' 'deva,' 'human,' etc., based on a collection of non-own-natures. The designation of own-nature—which is the designation of these phenomena, and of others such as external form and Nibbāna, by way of their own-nature, collection of own-natures, and distinctions of own-nature—should be understood as fivefold, beginning with the designation of aggregates. By this, all designations of own-nature as divided in the Dhammasaṅgaha, etc., are included. The designation of persons, however, is a designation of non-own-nature. And by means of this primary designation, which has distinctions such as 'one liberated by occasion,' all designations of non-own-nature are included, such as 'monastery,' 'couch,' etc., which proceed by derivation from phenomena that have the nature of what is to be fully understood, etc., and are found in the continuity of a being.

Ettāvatā ca paññatti nāma vijjamānapaññatti avijjamānapaññatti ca. Tā eva hi vomissā itarā catassoti. Tasmā tāsaṃ dassanena imasmiṃ pakaraṇe sabbā paññattiyo dassitāti veditabbā. Khandhādipaññattīsu pana chasu aññattha adassitappabhedaṃ idheva ca dassitappabhedaṃ puggalapaññattiṃ upādāya imassa pakaraṇassa puggalapaññattīti nāmaṃ vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Ye dhamme idha paññapetukāmoti paññattiyā vatthubhāvena dassetukāmoti adhippāyo. Na hi etasmiṃ pakaraṇe paññāpanaṃ karoti, vatthūhi pana paññattiyo dassetīti.

And thus far, designation is of two kinds: designation of the existent and designation of the non-existent. These indeed, with the mixed and the other, are four. Therefore, it should be understood that by showing these, all designations are shown in this treatise. However, it should be understood that this treatise is called 'Designation of Persons' on account of the designation of persons—among the six designations beginning with the aggregates—the distinctions of which are shown here but not shown elsewhere. The words 'those who wish to designate phenomena here' mean 'those who wish to show them as the basis for designation.' For in this treatise, one does not perform the act of designating, but rather shows the designations by means of their bases.

Khandhāti [Pg.28] paññāpanāti idaṃ khandhāti rūpaṃ pathavītiādikā sabbāpi sāmaññappabhedapaññāpanā nāma hoti, taṃ sandhāya vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Paññāpanāti etassa pana dassanā ṭhapanāti ete dve atthā, tesaṃ pakāsanā nikkhipanāti. Tattha ‘‘rūpakkhandho…pe… aññātāvindriyaṃ samayavimutto’’tiādinā idamevaṃnāmakaṃ idamevaṃnāmakanti taṃtaṃkoṭṭhāsikakaraṇaṃ bodhanameva nikkhipanā, na paññapetabbānaṃ mañcādīnaṃ viya ṭhānasambandhakaraṇaṃ. Yo panāyaṃ ‘‘nāmapaññatti hi dasseti ca ṭhapeti cā’’ti kattuniddeso kato, so bhāvabhūtāya karaṇabhūtāya vā nāmapaññattiyā tesaṃ tesaṃ dhammānaṃ diṭṭhatāya ṭhapitatāya ca taṃnimittataṃ sandhāya katoti veditabbo.

The phrase 'designation of aggregates' is the name for all general and specific designations, such as 'this is the aggregate of form,' 'this is earth,' and so on; it should be understood that this is said in reference to that. Now, this word 'designation' has two meanings: showing and establishing. Their explanation is revealing and placing. Herein, by means of such phrases as 'the form aggregate... the faculty of one who has final knowledge... one liberated by occasion,' the making of the respective divisions as 'this has such a name, this has such a name' is simply an instruction, which is 'placing'; it is not the making of a spatial connection as with designatable things like couches. But as for the statement made with reference to the agent, 'for a name-designation shows and establishes,' it should be understood as made in reference to its being the cause for the seen-ness and established-ness of those respective phenomena by the name-designation, whether as an entity or as an instrument.

Vijjamānapaññattītiādinā vacanena pāḷiyaṃ anāgatataṃ sandhāya ‘‘pāḷimuttakenā’’tiādimāha. Kusalākusalassevāti kusalākusalassa viya. Vijjamānassāti etassa attho satoti, tassa attho sambhūtassāti. Vijjamānassa satoti vā vijjamānabhūtassāti attho. Tamevatthaṃ dassento āha ‘‘sambhūtassā’’ti. Tena avijjamānabhāvaṃ paṭikkhipati. Tathā avijjamānassāti yathā kusalādīni akusalādisabhāvato, phassādayo ca vedanādisabhāvato vinivattasabhāvāni vijjanti, tathā avijjamānassa ye dhamme upādāya ‘‘itthī, puriso’’ti upaladdhi hoti, te apanetvā tehi vinivattassa itthiādisabhāvassa abhāvato asambhūtassāti attho. Yaṃ panetassa ‘‘tenākārena avijjamānassa aññenākārena vijjamānassā’’ti atthaṃ keci vadanti, tattha yaṃ vattabbaṃ, taṃ paññattiduke vuttameva. Avijjamānepi sabhāve lokaniruttiṃ anugantvā anabhinivesena cittena ‘‘itthī, puriso’’ti gahaṇasabbhāvā ‘‘lokaniruttimattasiddhassā’’ti āha. Sābhinivesena pana cittena gayhamānaṃ pañcamasaccādikaṃ na sabhāvato, nāpi saṅketena siddhanti ‘‘sabbākārenapi anupalabbhaneyya’’nti vuttaṃ. Tāsu imasmiṃ…pe… labbhantīti imasmiṃ pakaraṇe sarūpato tissannaṃ āgatataṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ.

By the words 'designation of the existent,' etc., he says 'by what is outside the Pāḷi,' etc., in reference to what is not found in the Pāḷi text. 'As of the wholesome and unwholesome' means 'like the wholesome and unwholesome.' 'Of the existent' means 'of the real'; its meaning is 'of what has come to be.' Or 'of the existent, of the real' means 'of what has become existent.' Showing that very meaning, he says 'of what has come to be.' By this he rejects the state of non-existence. Similarly, 'of the non-existent' means 'of what has not come to be,' because just as wholesome states, etc., exist with a nature distinct from the nature of unwholesome states, etc., and contact, etc., exists with a nature distinct from the nature of feeling, etc., so too, with regard to the non-existent, when one removes those phenomena on the basis of which the perception 'woman,' 'man' occurs, there is an absence of an own-nature of 'woman,' etc., distinct from them. But as to the meaning some give for this, 'of what is non-existent in one aspect and existent in another aspect,' what is to be said on that has already been said in the Dyad on Designations. Although the own-nature is non-existent, because there is the possibility of grasping 'woman,' 'man' with a non-adherent mind in accordance with worldly convention, he says 'of what is established merely by worldly convention.' But what is grasped by a mind with adherence, such as a fifth truth, is established neither by own-nature nor by convention; hence it is said, 'it is not to be apprehended in any way at all.' The words 'among these... are found' are said in reference to the fact that three of them are found in their own form in this treatise.

Yathāvuttassa pana aṭṭhakathānayassa avirodhena ācariyavādā yojetabbā, tasmā paññapetabbaṭṭhena cesā paññattīti etassa sabhāvato avijjamānattā paññapetabbamattaṭṭhena paññattīti attho. Paññapetabbampi hi sasabhāvaṃ tajjaparamatthanāmalābhato na parato labhitabbaṃ [Pg.29] paññattināmaṃ labhati, nisabhāvaṃ pana sabhāvābhāvato na attano sabhāvena nāmaṃ labhatīti. Sattotiādikena nāmena paññapitabbamattaṭṭhena paññattīti nāmaṃ labhati, nisabhāvā ca sattādayo. Na hi sasabhāvassa rūpādīhi ekattena aññattena vā anupalabbhasabhāvatā atthīti.

However, the views of the teachers should be applied without contradicting the method of the commentary as stated. Therefore, the meaning of 'this is a designation in the sense of what is to be designated' is 'it is a designation in the sense of being merely what is to be designated,' because of its being non-existent in its own-nature. For even what is to be designated, if it has an own-nature, obtains the name 'designation'—which is not to be obtained from another—from obtaining a name of ultimate meaning related to it. But what is without own-nature, due to the absence of own-nature, does not obtain a name by its own nature. It obtains the name 'designation' in the sense of being merely what is to be designated by a name such as 'being,' and beings and so on are without own-nature. For that which has an own-nature does not have a nature that is unapprehendable either as identical with or as different from form and so on.

Kirīṭaṃ makuṭaṃ, taṃ assa atthīti kirīṭī. Etasmiñca ācariyavāde anūnena lakkhaṇena bhavitabbanti sabbasamorodho kātabbo. Dutiyaṃ tatiyanti evaṃpakārā hi upanidhāpaññatti upanikkhittakapaññatti ca saṅkhātabbappadhānattā chapi paññattiyo bhajatīti yuttaṃ vattuṃ, itarā ca yathāyogaṃ taṃ taṃ paññattinti. Dutiyaṃ tatiyaṃ dve tīṇītiādi pana saṅkhā nāma kāci natthīti tāsaṃ upādāsantatipaññattīnaṃ avijjamānapaññattibhāvaṃ, itarāsañca upanidhāpaññattīnaṃ yathānidassitānaṃ avijjamānenaavijjamānapaññattibhāvaṃ maññamāno āha ‘‘sesā avijjamānapakkhañceva avijjamānenaavijjamānapakkhañca bhajantī’’ti. Dutiyaṃ tatiyaṃ dve tīṇītiādīnaṃ upanidhāupanikkhittakapaññattīnaṃ avijjamānenaavijjamānapaññattibhāvameva maññati. Yañhi paṭhamādikaṃ apekkhitvā yassa cekādikassa upanikkhipitvā paññāpīyati, tañca saṅkhānaṃ kiñci natthīti. Tathā santatipaññattiyā ca. Na hi asīti āsītiko ca vijjamānoti.

‘Kirīṭa’ is a crown; he has it, therefore he is ‘kirīṭī’ (crowned). And in this teaching of the master, since it must be possessed of the complete characteristic, a complete synthesis should be made. For it is right to say that designations by comparison and designations by deposition of the kind 'second,' 'third,' pertain to all six designations, because what is to be counted is primary; and the others pertain to their respective designations as is appropriate. But thinking that there is no such thing as a number called 'second,' 'third,' 'two,' 'three,' etc., and thus that designations of continuity based on them are designations of the non-existent, and that the other designations by comparison as indicated are designations of the non-existent by means of the non-existent, he says: 'the remaining ones belong to the side of the non-existent and to the side of the non-existent by means of the non-existent.' He considers the designations by comparison and deposition such as 'second,' 'third,' 'two,' 'three,' etc., to be only designations of the non-existent by means of the non-existent. For that which is designated by depending on 'the first,' etc., and by depositing on 'the one,' etc.—that number is nothing whatsoever. The same for the designation of continuity. For 'eighty' and 'one who is eighty' do not exist.

Ekaccā bhūmipaññattīti kāmāvacarādipaññattiṃ sandhāyāha. Kāmāvacarādī hi sabhāvadhammāti adhippāyo. Kāmoti pana okāse gahite avijjamānenavijjamānapaññatti esā bhavituṃ arahati, kammanibbattakkhandhesu gahitesu vijjamānenavijjamānapaññatti. Yathā pana vacanasaṅkhātāya vacanasamuṭṭhāpakacetanāsaṅkhātāya vā kiriyāya bhāṇakoti puggalassa paññatti vijjamānenaavijjamānapaññattipakkhaṃ bhajati, evaṃ kiso thūloti rūpāyatanasaṅkhātena saṇṭhānena puggalādīnaṃ paññāpanā vijjamānenaavijjamānapaññatti bhavituṃ arahati. Saṇṭhānanti vā rūpāyatane aggahite avijjamānenaavijjamānapaññatti. Rūpaṃ phassotiādikā pana vijjamānapaññatti ruppanādikiccavasena kiccapaññattiyaṃ, paccattadhammanāmavasena paccattapaññattiyaṃ vā avarodhetabbā. Vijjamānāvijjamānapaññattīsu ca vuttāsu tāsaṃ vomissatāvasena [Pg.30] pavattā itarāpi vuttāyeva hontīti ayampi ācariyavādo sabbasaṅgāhakoti daṭṭhabbo.

By 'some designations of a plane,' he speaks referring to the designation of the sensual sphere and so on. The intended meaning is that the sensual sphere and so on are real phenomena. But when 'sensual sphere' is taken as a location, this can be a designation of the non-existent by means of the non-existent; when it is taken as the aggregates produced by kamma, it is a designation of the non-existent by means of the existent. Just as the designation 'speaker' for a person, based on the action called speech or the volition that originates speech, falls into the class of a designation of the non-existent by means of the existent, so the designation of persons and so on as 'thin' or 'fat' based on the shape, which is the form base, can be a designation of the non-existent by means of the existent. Or 'shape,' when the form base is not grasped, is a designation of the non-existent by means of the non-existent. However, designations such as 'form,' 'contact,' etc., are designations of the existent, to be included under functional designation, by way of the function of being afflicted, etc., or under individual designation, by way of the name of an individual phenomenon. And when designations based on the existent and on the non-existent have been stated, the others that proceed by way of their mixture are also stated. Thus it should be seen that this teaching of the masters is also all-inclusive.

2. ‘‘Yāvatā pañcakkhandhā’’tiādikassa atthaṃ dassento ‘‘yattakena paññāpanenā’’tiādimāha. Tattha yāvatā pañcakkhandhāti yāvatā rūpakkhandho…pe… viññāṇakkhandhoti khandhānaṃ khandhapaññatti, ettāvatā khandhānaṃ khandhapaññatti, evaṃ pāḷiyojanaṃ katvā saṅkhepappabhedavasena ayaṃ attho vuttoti veditabbo. ‘‘Yāvatā pañcakkhandhā’’ti, ‘‘khandhānaṃ khandhapaññattī’’ti hi imassa attho ‘‘yattakena paññāpanena saṅkhepato pañcakkhandhāti vā’’ti etena dassito, ‘‘yāvatā rūpakkhandho’’tiādikassa pana ‘‘pabhedato rūpakkhandho’’tiādikenāti. Tattha rūpakkhandho…pe… viññāṇakkhandhoti pabhedanidassanamattametaṃ. Tena avuttopi sabbo saṅgahito hotīti ‘‘tatrāpi rūpakkhandho kāmāvacaro’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Ayaṃ vā ettha pāḷiyā atthayojanā – ‘‘yāvatā’’ti idaṃ sabbehi padehi yojetvā yattakā pañcakkhandhā, tattakā khandhānaṃ khandhapaññatti. Yattako pañcannaṃ khandhānaṃ tappabhedānañca rūpakkhandhādīnaṃ pabhedo, tattako khandhānaṃ khandhapaññattiyā pabhedoti pakaraṇantare vuttena vatthubhedena khandhapaññattiyā pabhedaṃ dasseti. Esa nayo ‘‘yāvatā āyatanāna’’ntiādīsupi.

2. Showing the meaning of 'Insofar as the five aggregates,' etc., he said, 'by whatever designation,' etc. Herein, 'insofar as the five aggregates' means 'insofar as the form aggregate …pe… the consciousness aggregate'; this is the designation of the aggregates as aggregates. To that extent there is the designation of the aggregates as aggregates. Having thus construed the Pāli text, it should be understood that this meaning is stated by way of summary and detail. The meaning of 'Insofar as the five aggregates,' that is, 'the designation of aggregates as aggregates,' is shown by this: 'by whatever designation, in brief, as the five aggregates'; while the meaning of 'insofar as the form aggregate,' etc., is shown by 'in detail, as the form aggregate,' etc. Herein, 'the form aggregate …pe… the consciousness aggregate' is merely an illustration of the detailed division. Thereby, even what is not stated is included; thus it is said, 'therein, the form aggregate is of the sensual sphere,' etc. Or, the construing of the meaning of the Pāli text here is this: the word 'insofar as' should be connected with all the terms, so that: to whatever extent there are the five aggregates, to that extent there is the designation of the aggregates as aggregates. To whatever extent there is the division of the five aggregates and their subdivisions, such as the form aggregate, etc., to that extent there is the division of the designation of aggregates. Thus he shows the division of the designation of aggregates by the division of the subject matter stated in another treatise. This same method applies also to 'insofar as the bases,' etc.

7. Ekadesenevāti uddesamattenevāti attho.

7. ‘By one part only’ means merely by way of a brief statement.

Mātikāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Mātikā is finished.

2. Niddesavaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Exposition

1. Ekakaniddesavaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Exposition of the Ones

1. Jhānaṅgāneva [Pg.31] vimokkhoti iminā adhippāyenāha ‘‘vimokkhasahajātena nāmakāyenā’’ti. Yena hi saddhintiādinā paṭhamaṃ samaṅgibhāvatthaṃ vivarati. Phassenapi phuṭṭhāyeva nāmāti etena ‘‘apicesā’’tiādinā vuttaṃ dutiyaṃ samphassena phusanatthaṃ, itarehi itare kāraṇatthe. Samaṅgibhāvaphusanakāraṇabhāvā hi phusanāti vuttāti. Punapi paṭhamatthameva dubbiññeyyattā vivaranto ‘‘tatrāssā’’tiādimāha. Ṭhapetvā tāni aṅgāni sesā atirekapaṇṇāsadhammāti ettha vedanāsomanassindriyāni saṅgahitānīti āha ‘‘cattāro khandhā hontī’’ti. Evaṃ sati vedanāsomanassindriyehi sukhassa phusitabbattā tiṇṇañca tesaṃ anaññattā teneva tassa phusanā āpajjatīti? Nāpajjati, vedayitādhipatiyaṭṭhehi upanijjhāyanabhāvapaṭilābhassa vuttattā. Atha vā ṭhapetvā tāni aṅgānīti aṅgānaṃ bahuttā bahuvacanaṃ. Tesu pana paccekampi yojanā kātabbā ‘‘vitakkaṃ ṭhapetvā’’tiādinā. Tattha ‘‘sukhaṃ ṭhapetvā’’ti imissā yojanāya sesā tayo khandhā honti, itarāsu cattāroti. Sabbayojanāsu ca tayo anto katvā ‘‘cattāro khandhā hontī’’ti vuttaṃ.

1. It is with the intention 'The jhānic factors themselves are liberation' that he says, 'with the mental body co-arisen with liberation.' For by 'with faith,' etc., he first explains the meaning of being endowed. By 'mental phenomena are indeed touched by contact,' he explains the second meaning, that of touching by contact, stated in the passage beginning 'Moreover, this….' By the other factors, the other causal meanings are explained. For 'touching' is said because of the state of being endowed, the act of touching, and the state of being a cause. Again, because the first meaning is difficult to understand, he explains it further, saying, 'Therein, for him….' When it is said, 'Excluding those factors, the remaining over fifty phenomena,' he says, 'there are four aggregates,' because the feeling faculty and the faculty of mental pleasure are included here. If so, since happiness is to be touched by the feeling faculty and the faculty of mental pleasure, and since the three are not different from one another, does its touching come about through that very thing? It does not, because it is said that the state of meditative absorption is obtained through the dominant influence of feeling, etc. Alternatively, in 'excluding those factors,' the plural is used because of the plurality of the factors. But the application should be made to each of them individually, as in 'excluding applied thought,' etc. There, with the application 'excluding happiness,' there are the remaining three aggregates; in the other cases, there are four. And in all applications, it is said, 'there are four aggregates,' having included the three.

2. Yo asamayavimokkhena ekaccehi āsavehi vimutto asamayavimokkhūpanissayalābhena ca sātisayena samayavimokkhena, so eva samayavimutto. So hi tena vimutto jhānalābhī sekkho rūpārūpabhavato apunarāvaṭṭako kāmarāgādīhi tathāvimuttova hotīti samayavimuttapaññattiṃ laddhuṃ arahati. Puthujjano pana jhānalābhī punarāvaṭṭakadhammo puna kāmarāgādisamudācārabhāvato vimutto nāma na hotīti samayavimuttapaññattiṃ nārahati, tena so ‘‘samayavimutto’’ti na vutto. Arahato pana aparikkhīṇā āsavā natthi, yato vimucceyya. Diṭṭhadhammasukhavihāramattā hi tassa aṭṭha vimokkhāti. Tasmā tassa na aṭṭha vimokkhā samayavimuttapaññattibhāvassa asamayavimuttapaññattibhāvassa vā kāraṇaṃ. Tadakāraṇabhāvameva dassetuṃ [Pg.32] ‘‘na heva kho…pe… viharatī’’ti vuttaṃ, na sukkhavipassakasseva asamayavimuttabhāvaṃ dassetunti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Sabbopi hi arahā asamayavimuttoti. Bāhirānanti lokuttarato bahibhūtānaṃ, lokiyānanti attho.

2. One who is liberated from certain taints by temporary liberation, and by an excellent temporary liberation through obtaining a supporting condition for unconditional liberation, is 'temporarily liberated.' For he, liberated by that, a jhāna-attainer and a trainee, a non-returner from the form and formless existence, is thus liberated from sensual lust and so on, and is worthy to receive the designation 'temporarily liberated.' A worldling, however, though a jhāna-attainer, has a nature of returning and is not called 'liberated' because of the re-occurrence of sensual lust and so on; thus he is not worthy of the designation 'temporarily liberated,' and for that reason he is not called 'temporarily liberated.' As for the arahant, there are no unextirpated taints from which he could be liberated. For him, the eight liberations are merely a pleasant abiding in the here and now. Therefore, for him the eight liberations are not a reason for being designated as 'temporarily liberated' or 'unconditionally liberated.' To show that this is not a reason, it is said: 'It is not in this way that …pe… he abides.' This should be seen as not showing that the state of being unconditionally liberated belongs only to a dry-insight practitioner. For every arahant is unconditionally liberated. 'Of the external' means of what is external to the supramundane, that is, the worldly.

3. Arūpakkhandhanibbānamattavācako arūpasaddo na hotīti dassanatthaṃ ‘‘rūpato añña’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. Cittamañjūsanti samādhiṃ. Abhiññādīnañhi dhammānaṃ pādakabhāvena samādhi mañjūsāsadiso hoti. Addhānaṃ pharitunti dīghakālaṃ byāpetuṃ, pavattetunti attho. ‘‘Sammajjitabba’’nti cintetvā tattha ādarassa akatattā vattabhedoti veditabbo. Evaṃ vattabhedamattena naṭṭhā pana samāpatti kāmacchandādīhi naṭṭhā viya na kiñcena paccāharitabbā hoti mandapāripanthakattā, tasmā vattasamitakaraṇamatteneva paccāharitabbattā ‘‘appentova nisīdī’’ti āha.

3. To show that the word 'formless' is not a term merely for the non-existence of the form aggregate, it is said, 'other than form,' etc. 'A casket for the mind' means concentration. For by being the basis for the direct knowledges and other states, concentration is like a casket. 'To pervade for a long time' means to make it last for a long time. It should be understood that there is a 'breach of observance' because of not paying attention to it, thinking, 'It should be swept.' An attainment lost merely through such a breach of observance, however, does not have to be restored by any means like one lost through sensual desire, etc., because the obstruction is weak. Therefore, because it can be restored merely by fulfilling the observance, he said, 'he sat down applying his mind.'

4. Attano anurūpena pamādena vītināmentānampi samāpatti na kuppatīti parihīno nāma na hoti, tasmiṃ tasmiṃ byāsaṅge paṭisaṃhaṭamatte samāpajjituṃ samatthatāyāti adhippāyo. ‘‘Kissa pana, bhante, khīṇāsavassa bhikkhuno lābhasakkārasiloko antarāyāyāti? Yā hissa sā, ānanda, akuppā cetovimutti, nāhaṃ tassā lābhasakkārasilokaṃ antarāyāya vadāmi. Ye ca khvassa, ānanda, appamattassa ātāpino pahitattassa viharato diṭṭhadhammasukhavihārā adhigatā, tesāhamassa lābhasakkārasilokaṃ antarāyāya vadāmī’’ti sutte (saṃ. ni. 2.179) pana samayena samayaṃ āpajjanena pariharitabbānaṃ samāpattisukhavihārānaṃ tasmiṃ tasmiṃ byāsaṅgakāle anipphattito lābhasakkārasiloko antarāyoti vuttoti adhippāyenassa tena avirodho veditabbo.

4. The attainment of those who pass their time with a negligence suitable for them is not shaken; one is not said to have 'declined.' The intention is that one is capable of attaining it as soon as one has withdrawn from this or that preoccupation. In the sutta (SN 17:5), it is said: 'But why, venerable sir, are gain, honor, and fame an obstacle for a bhikkhu whose taints are destroyed?' 'Ānanda, as to that unshakeable liberation of mind of his, I do not say that gain, honor, and fame are an obstacle to that. But, Ānanda, as to those pleasant abidings in the here and now that have been attained by him dwelling heedful, ardent, and resolute, I say that gain, honor, and fame are an obstacle to these.' The intention here is that gain, honor, and fame are called an obstacle because, at the time of this or that preoccupation, they lead to the non-attainment of the pleasant abidings of the attainments, which are to be maintained by entering them from time to time. Thus it should be understood that there is no contradiction with that sutta.

5. Dhammānaṃ…pe… pīti ettha ‘‘dhammehī’’ti vattabbaṃ. Idha hi tāhi samāpattīhi parihāyeyyāti dhammehi puggalassa parihānampi aparihānampi vuttaṃ. Tattha ca puggalassa pamādamāgamma tā samāpattiyo kuppeyyunti dhammānaṃ kuppanaṃ akuppanañca vuttaṃ, puggalassa pana parihānadhammānameva vināsoti vacananānattamattena vacanatthanānattamattena vā pariyāyantaratā vuttāti daṭṭhabbā.

5. In the phrase 'Of states …pe… rapture,' here it should be said 'from states' (in the ablative). For here, the decline and non-decline of a person from states—that is, from those attainments—is spoken of. And there, depending on the person's negligence, those attainments might be shaken; thus the shaking and non-shaking of the states is spoken of. But for the person, it is the destruction only of the states subject to decline. It should be seen that a different formulation is stated merely through a difference in expression or a difference in the meaning of the expression.

7-8. Cetanā [Pg.33] samāpatticetanā tadāyūhanā ca. Anurakkhaṇā samāpattiupakārānupakārapariggāhikā paññāsahitā sati. Tāhi cetiyamānaanurakkhiyamānasamāpattīnaṃ bhabbā cetanābhabbā anurakkhaṇābhabbā.

7-8. Volition is the volition for attainment and the exertion for it. Guarding is mindfulness accompanied by wisdom that comprehends what is helpful and unhelpful to the attainment. Attainments that are fit to be willed and fit to be guarded by these are called 'fit for volition' and 'fit for guarding'.

10. Puthujjanagottanti puthujjanasikkhaṃ, puthujjanagatā tisso sikkhā atikkantāti attho. Tā hi saṃyojanattayānupacchedena ‘‘puthujjanasikkhā’’ti vuccantīti.

10. 'The lineage of the worldling' means the training of a worldling; the meaning is that one has transcended the three trainings pertaining to a worldling. For because of the non-severing of the three fetters, these are called 'the training of a worldling'.

11. Arahattamaggaṭṭho ca vaṭṭabhayato paññubbegena ubbijjanto uddhambhāgiyasaṃyojanehi uparatoti bhayūparato nāmāti āha ‘‘satta sekkhā bhayūparatā’’ti.

11. And one standing on the path to arahantship, being agitated with wisdom-born revulsion from the fear of the round of rebirth, has ceased from the higher fetters, and is thus called 'one who has ceased through fear.' Thus he says, 'Seven trainees have ceased through fear.'

12. Bhavaṅgapaññāvirahitā ‘‘vipākāvaraṇena samannāgatā’’ti iminā gahitāti tihetukapaṭisandhikā keci ‘‘duppaññā’’ti iminā gayhantīti dassento āha ‘‘appaṭiladdhamaggaphalūpanissayā’’ti. Paññāya hi vinā na tadupanissayo atthīti.

12. Those devoid of the wisdom of the life-continuum are included by the phrase ‘possessed of the obstruction of result.’ To show that some with a three-rooted rebirth-linking are included by the term ‘unwise,’ he says: ‘They have not obtained the decisive support for the path and fruit.’ For without wisdom, that decisive support does not exist.

14. Yattha niyatāniyatavomissā pavatti atthi, tattheva niyatadhammā hontīti uttarakurūsu tadabhāvā niyato nāma natthīti dassento ‘‘yā pana uttarakurukāna’’ntiādimāha.

14. Where there is a mixed occurrence of fixed and unfixed destinies, there alone are fixed phenomena. To show that, due to the absence of this in Uttarakuru, there is nothing called ‘fixed,’ he says, ‘But as to the Uttarakurus,’ and so on.

16. Terasasu sīsesu palibodhasīsādīni pavattasīsañca pariyādiyitabbāni, adhimokkhasīsādīni pariyādakāni, pariyādakaphalaṃ gocarasīsaṃ. Tañhi visayajjhattaphalavimokkhoti. Pariyādakassa maggassa phalassa ca ārammaṇaṃ saṅkhārasīsaṃ saṅkhāravivekabhūto nirodhoti pariyādiyitabbānaṃ pariyādakaphalārammaṇānaṃ saha viya saṃsiddhidassanena samasīsibhāvaṃ dassetuṃ paṭisambhidāyaṃ (paṭi. ma. 1.87) terasa sīsāni vuttāni. Idha pana ‘‘apubbaṃ acarimaṃ āsavapariyādānañca hoti jīvitapariyādānañcā’’ti vacanato tesu kilesapavattasīsānameva vasena yojanaṃ karonto ‘‘tattha kilesasīsa’’ntiādimāha. Tattha pavattasīsampi vaṭṭato vuṭṭhahanto maggo cutito uddhaṃ appavattikaraṇavasena yadipi pariyādiyati, yāva pana cuti, tāva pavattisabbhāvato ‘‘pavattasīsaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ [Pg.34] cuticittaṃ pariyādiyatī’’ti āha. Kilesapariyādānena pana attano anantaraṃ viya nipphādetabbā paccavekkhaṇavārā ca kilesapariyādānasseva vārāti vattabbataṃ arahanti. ‘‘Vimuttasmiṃ vimuttamiti ñāṇaṃ hotī’’ti (ma. ni. 1.78; saṃ. ni. 3.12, 14) vacanato hi paccavekkhaṇaparisamāpanena kilesapariyādānaṃ samāpitaṃ nāma hoti. Taṃ pana parisamāpanaṃ yadi cuticittena hoti, teneva jīvitaparisamāpanañca hotīti imāya vāracutisamatāya kilesapariyādānajīvitapariyādānānaṃ apubbācarimatā hotīti āha ‘‘vārasamatāyā’’ti. Bhavaṅgaṃ otaritvā parinibbāyatīti ettha parinibbānacittameva bhavaṅgotaraṇabhāvena vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

16. Among the thirteen headings, the headings of obstacles, etc., and the heading of occurrence are to be overcome; the headings of resolution, etc., are the overcoming factors; the fruit of overcoming is the heading of the domain. For that is liberation, the fruit internal to its domain. The object of the overcoming path and its fruit is the heading of formations, which is cessation as detachment from formations. To show the sameness of the headings, as if from seeing the simultaneous accomplishment of what is to be overcome and the object of the fruit of overcoming, thirteen headings are mentioned in the Paṭisambhidāmagga (Paṭisambhidā I 87). Here, however, based on the statement, ‘The overcoming of the taints and the overcoming of life occur without before or after,’ he makes the connection by way of the headings of defilements and occurrence among them, saying, ‘Here, the heading of defilements,’ and so on. In this context, although the path, in rising out of the round of existence, overcomes the heading of occurrence by causing non-occurrence after death, still, because occurrence exists until death, he says: ‘It overcomes the heading of occurrence, the life faculty, and the death-consciousness.’ However, the occasions of reviewing, which are to be produced as if immediately after the overcoming of the taints, deserve to be called occasions of the overcoming of the taints itself. For based on the statement, ‘When one is liberated, the knowledge arises: “I am liberated,”’ the overcoming of the taints is said to be completed with the conclusion of the reviewing. If that conclusion occurs with the death-consciousness, the conclusion of life occurs with it as well. Thus, because of this sameness of the occasion and death, the overcoming of the taints and the overcoming of life are said to occur without before or after; hence he says, ‘because of the sameness of the occasion.’ As for ‘having descended into the life-continuum, one attains final Nibbāna,’ it should be understood that here the consciousness of final Nibbāna itself is spoken of in terms of descending into the life-continuum.

17. Mahāpayogoti mahākiriyo vipattikaraṇamahāmeghuṭṭhānākāravināso. Tiṭṭheyyāti vināso nappavatteyyāti attho.

17. ‘Great enterprise’ means a great action, a cause of calamity, a destruction like that from the arising of a great storm cloud. ‘May it stand’: the meaning is, may the destruction not proceed.

18. Araṇīyattāti payirupāsitabbattā.

18. Because it is fit to be attended upon.

20. Yāya katakiccatā hoti, tāya aggavijjāya adhigatāya tevijjatābhāvo nippariyāyatā, sā ca āgamanavasena siddhā sātisayā tevijjatāti āha ‘‘āgamanīyameva dhura’’nti.

20. When that supreme knowledge by which the task is accomplished has been attained, there is definitely the absence of the (mundane) threefold knowledge. And he says that this supreme knowledge—the surpassing threefold knowledge established by way of the scriptures—is ‘indeed the responsibility to be undertaken.’

22. Tattha cāti nimittatthe bhummaṃ, sabbaññutaññāṇappattiyā ādhārabhāve vā. Tattheva hi sabbaññutaṃ patto nāma hotīti.

22. In the phrase ‘tattha ca,’ the locative case is used in the sense of a reason, or as the basis for the attainment of the knowledge of omniscience. For it is right there that one is said to have attained omniscience.

23. Ananussutesu dhammesūti ca ananussutesu saccesūti attho.

23. ‘In teachings unheard before’ means ‘in truths unheard before.’

24. ‘‘Rūpī rūpāni passatī’’tiādike (ma. ni. 2.248; 3.312; paṭi. ma. 1.209; dha. sa. 248) nirodhasamāpattiante aṭṭha vimokkhe vatvā ‘‘yato kho, ānanda, bhikkhu ime aṭṭha vimokkhe kāyena phusitvā viharati, paññāya cassa disvā āsavā parikkhīṇā honti. Ayaṃ vuccati, ānanda, bhikkhu ubhatobhāgavimutto’’ti yadipi mahānidānasutte vuttaṃ, taṃ pana ubhatobhāgavimuttaseṭṭhavasena vuttanti idha kīṭāgirisuttavasena sabbaubhatobhāgavimuttasaṅgahatthaṃ ‘‘aṭṭha samāpattiyo sahajātanāmakāyena paṭilabhitvā viharatī’’ti āha. Kīṭāgirisutte [Pg.35] hi ‘‘idha, bhikkhave, ekacco puggalo ye te santā vimokkhā atikkamma rūpe āruppā, te kāyena phusitvā viharati, paññāya cassa disvā āsavā parikkhīṇā honti. Ayaṃ vuccati, bhikkhave, puggalo ubhatobhāgavimutto’’ti (ma. ni. 2.182) arūpasamāpattivasena cattāro ubhatobhāgavimuttā vuttā, ubhatobhāgavimuttaseṭṭho ca vuttalakkhaṇopapattitoti. Kāyasakkhimhipi eseva nayo.

24. Although in the Great Discourse on Causation (DN 15), after stating the eight liberations and the attainment of cessation, it is said: ‘When, Ānanda, a bhikkhu dwells having contacted these eight liberations with his body, and his taints are destroyed through his seeing with wisdom—this, Ānanda, is called a bhikkhu liberated in both ways,’ that was stated with reference to the foremost of those liberated in both ways. Here, however, following the Kīṭāgiri Sutta and in order to include all who are liberated in both ways, it is said: ‘He dwells having attained the eight attainments together with the co-nascent mental body.’ For in the Kīṭāgiri Sutta (MN 70) four types of those liberated in both ways are described in terms of the formless attainments: ‘Here, bhikkhus, a certain person dwells having contacted with his body those peaceful formless liberations that transcend form, and his taints are destroyed through his seeing with wisdom—this, bhikkhus, is called a person liberated in both ways.’ And the foremost of those liberated in both ways possesses the characteristic mentioned. This same method applies to the body-witness as well.

Paññāya cassa disvā āsavā parikkhīṇā hontīti na āsavā paññāya passanti, dassanakāraṇā pana parikkhīṇā disvā parikkhīṇāti vuttā. Dassanāyattaparikkhayattā eva hi dassanaṃ purimakiriyā hotīti. Nāmanissitako esoti eso ubhatobhāgavimutto rūpato muccitvā nāmaṃ nissāya ṭhito puna tato muccanato ‘‘nāmanissitako’’ti vatvā tassa ca sādhakaṃ suttaṃ vatvā ‘‘kāyadvayato suvimuttattā ubhatobhāgavimutto’’ti āhāti attho. Sutte hi ākiñcaññāyatanalābhino upasīvabrāhmaṇassa bhagavatā nāmakāyā vimuttoti ubhatobhāgavimuttoti muni akkhātoti.

‘His taints are destroyed through his seeing with wisdom’: it is not that the taints see with wisdom, but because they are destroyed on account of seeing, they are said to be ‘destroyed having been seen.’ For it is just because their destruction is dependent on seeing that seeing is the prior action. ‘This one is dependent on name’: this one who is liberated in both ways, having been liberated from form, stands relying on name; because he is then liberated from that too, he is called ‘dependent on name.’ Having stated the sutta that supports this, he states the meaning: ‘Because he is well-liberated from the two bodies, he is liberated in both ways.’ For in the sutta, the Blessed One declared to the brahmin Upasīva, an attainer of the base of nothingness, that the sage is liberated from the mental body and is thus described as one liberated in both ways.

Paṭhamattheravāde dvīhi bhāgehi vimutto ubhatobhāgavimutto, dutiyattheravāde ubhato bhāgato vimuttoti ubhatobhāgavimuttoti, tatiyattheravāde dvīhi bhāgehi dve vāre vimuttoti ayametesaṃ viseso. Tattha vimuttoti kilesehi vimutto, kilesavikkhambhanasamucchedanehi vā kāyadvayato vimuttoti attho daṭṭhabbo. Arūpāvacaraṃ pana nāmakāyato ca vimuttanti nīvaraṇasaṅkhātanāmakāyato vimuttanti vuttaṃ hoti. Tañhi nīvaraṇadūrībhāvena nāmakāyato rūpataṇhāvikkhambhanena rūpakāyato ca vimuttattā ekadesena ubhatobhāgavimuttaṃ nāma hotīti arahattamaggassa pādakabhūtaṃ ubhatobhāgavimuttanāmalābhassa kāraṇaṃ bhavituṃ yuttanti adhippāyo.

In the first Elders’ interpretation, one liberated in two parts is ‘liberated in both ways.’ In the second Elders’ interpretation, one liberated from both parts is ‘liberated in both ways.’ In the third Elders’ interpretation, one is liberated in two parts on two occasions. This is the distinction among them. Here, ‘liberated’ means liberated from the defilements, or liberated from the two bodies by the suppression and eradication of defilements. Further, regarding the formless sphere, it is said to be ‘liberated from the mental body’—that is, liberated from the mental body designated as the hindrances. For since one is liberated from the mental body by the removal of the hindrances and from the physical body by the suppression of craving for form, one is in a sense called ‘liberated in both ways.’ The intention is that this state, being a basis for the path of arahantship, is fit to be the cause for gaining the designation ‘liberated in both ways.’

25. Etesu hi ekopi aṭṭhavimokkhalābhī na hotīti ubhatobhāgavimuttabhāvassa kāraṇabhūtaṃ rūpakāyato vimuttaṃ ekampi vimokkhaṃ [Pg.36] anadhigatoti adhippāyo. Arūpāvacaresu hi ekampi adhigato ubhatobhāgavimuttabhāvakāraṇapaṭilābhato aṭṭhavimokkhekadesena tena taṃnāmadāne samatthena ‘‘aṭṭhavimokkhalābhī’’tveva vuccati. Tenāha ‘‘arūpāvacarajjhānesu panā’’tiādi.

25. The meaning is that since not even one among these persons is an attainer of the eight liberations, he has not attained even a single liberation from the physical body, which is a cause for the state of being liberated in both ways. But one who has attained even one of the formless sphere attainments is called ‘an attainer of the eight liberations’ because he has acquired a cause for the state of being liberated in both ways and is thus able, by this fraction of the eight liberations, to be given that designation. Therefore he says: ‘But in the case of the formless sphere absorptions,’ and so on.

26. Phuṭṭhantaṃ sacchikarotīti phuṭṭhānaṃ anto phuṭṭhanto, phuṭṭhānaṃ arūpāvacarajjhānānaṃ anantaro kāloti adhippāyo. Accantasaṃyoge cettha upayogavacanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Phuṭṭhānantarakālameva sacchikaroti sacchikātabbopāyenāti vuttaṃ hoti. ‘‘Ekamantaṃ nisīdī’’tiādīsu (dī. ni. 1.165) viya bhāvanapuṃsakaṃ vā etaṃ. Yo hi arūpajjhānena rūpakāyato nāmakāyekadesato ca vikkhambhanavimokkhena vimutto, tena nirodhasaṅkhāto vimokkho ālocito pakāsito viya hoti, na pana kāyena sacchikato. Nirodhaṃ pana ārammaṇaṃ katvā ekaccesu āsavesu khepitesu tena so sacchikato hoti, tasmā so sacchikātabbaṃ nirodhaṃ yathāālocitaṃ nāmakāyena sacchikarotīti kāyasakkhīti vuccati, na tu vimuttoti ekaccānaṃ āsavānaṃ aparikkhīṇattā.

26. ‘He directly realizes the touched-end’: the end of what has been touched is the ‘touched-end’; the intended meaning is the time immediately following the formless absorptions that have been touched. Here, the locative should be understood as the locative of usage in the sense of continuous connection. This means that he directly realizes the time immediately following what was touched by means of that which is to be realized. Or, as in such examples as ‘he sat down to one side,’ this is a neuter noun of state. For one who is liberated from the physical body and from a part of the mental body by the liberation of suppression through a formless absorption, the liberation called cessation is, as it were, considered and illuminated, but not realized with the body. When, however, he has made cessation his object and has destroyed some taints, it is realized by him. Therefore, because he directly realizes with the mental body the cessation that is to be realized, just as it was considered, he is called a ‘body-witness,’ but not ‘liberated,’ because some taints are not yet destroyed.

27. Diṭṭhattā pattoti etena catusaccadassanasaṅkhātāya diṭṭhiyā nirodhassa pattataṃ dīpeti. ‘‘Diṭṭhantaṃ patto’’ti vā pāṭho, dassanasaṅkhātassa sotāpattimaggañāṇassa anantaraṃ pattoti vuttaṃ hoti. Paṭhamaphalato paṭṭhāya hi yāva aggamaggā diṭṭhippattoti.

27. ‘Attained through vision’: by this he indicates the attainment of cessation through the vision designated as the seeing of the Four Noble Truths. Or the reading is ‘attained the end of vision,’ which means that it is attained immediately after the knowledge of the path of stream-entry, which is designated as vision. For from the first fruition up to the supreme path, one is called a ‘vision-attainer.’

28. Imaṃ pana nayaṃ ‘‘no’’ti paṭikkhipitvāti ettha diṭṭhippattasaddhāvimuttabhāvappattānaṃ paññānānattaṃ vuttaṃ, na pana yena visesena so viseso patto, so vuttoti imaṃ dosaṃ disvā paṭikkhepo katoti daṭṭhabbo. Āgamaṭṭhakathāsūti ca vacanena āgamanīyanānattasanniṭṭhānameva thiraṃ karotīti veditabbaṃ. Saddahanto vimuttoti etena sabbathā avimuttassapi saddhāmattena vimuttabhāvaṃ dasseti. Saddhāvimuttoti vā saddhāya adhimuttoti attho.

28. ‘However, having rejected this method with “no”’: here the diversity of wisdom among those who have attained the state of a vision-attainer and one liberated by faith is stated, but the specific quality by which that distinction is attained is not stated. It should be understood that the rejection was made on seeing this fault. And it should be known that with the words ‘in the commentaries to the Āgamas,’ he confirms the conclusion that the diversity is to be learned from the scriptures. ‘Liberated through having faith’: by this he shows a state of liberation through faith alone even for one who is not in all ways liberated. Or ‘liberated by faith’ means ‘resolved through faith.’

29. Paññaṃ vāhetīti paññaṃ sātisayaṃ pavattetīti attho. Paññā imaṃ puggalaṃ vahatīti nibbānābhimukhaṃ gametīti attho.

29. `Paññaṃ vāheti` means that it makes wisdom proceed with excellence. `Paññā imaṃ puggalaṃ vahati` means that wisdom leads this person, that is, it makes him go towards Nibbāna.

31. Evaṃ [Pg.37] maggakkhaṇepīti ayaṃ api-saddo kasmā vutto, nanu ariyena aṭṭhaṅgikena maggena samannāgato maggakkhaṇe eva hotīti tadā eva sotāpanno nāmāti āpannanti? Nāpannaṃ. Maggena hi attanā sadisassa aṭṭhaṅgikassa vā sattaṅgikassa vā phalassa sototi nāmaṃ dinnanti tenapi samannāgatassa sotāpannabhāvato, sotena vā maggena pavattetuṃ aparihīnena phalaṭṭhopi samannāgato eva nāma, na ca tena paṭhamamaggakkhaṇe viya soto samāpajjiyamāno, tasmā samāpannasotattā paṭhamaphalato paṭṭhāya ‘‘sotāpanno’’ti vattuṃ yutto. Vuttañhi ‘‘ye keci, bhikkhave, mayi aveccappasannā, sabbe te sotāpannā. Tesaṃ sotāpannānaṃ pañcannaṃ idha niṭṭhā, pañcannaṃ idha vihāya niṭṭhā’’ti (a. ni. 10.64). Tattha dutiyaphalaṭṭhādīnaṃ visuṃ nāmaṃ atthīti paṭhamaphalaṭṭho eva itarehi visesiyamāno ‘‘sotāpanno’’ti vattuṃ yuttoti so eva idhādhippeto. Paṭiladdhamaggena bujjhatīti etena paṭiladdhamaggassa catusaccapaccavekkhaṇādīnaṃ upanissayabhāvaṃ dasseti. Sambodhi paraṃ ayanaṃ nissayo etassāti hi sambodhiparāyaṇoti. Dutiyenatthena sambodhi paraṃ ayanaṃ gati etassāti sambodhiparāyaṇo.

31. As to 'even at the moment of the path': why is this word 'even' used? Is it not that one endowed with the Noble Eightfold Path is at the moment of the path, and at that very time is called a stream-enterer, having entered the stream? Not so. For by the path the name 'stream' has been given to the fruit—eightfold or sevenfold—which is similar to itself. Thus, one endowed with that is in the state of a stream-enterer. Or, one established in fruition, not having fallen away from the propelling stream-path, is indeed called 'endowed,' but the stream is not being attained by him in the same way as at the moment of the first path. Therefore, because of having attained the stream, from the first fruition onwards it is proper to call one a 'stream-enterer.' For it is said: 'Bhikkhus, whoever has unshakeable confidence in me, all of them are stream-enterers. Of those stream-enterers, five attain their final state here, and five attain their final state after passing away from here' (AN 10.64). Therein, since those established in the second fruit and so on have distinct names, it is the one established in the first fruit, being distinguished from the others, who is properly called a 'stream-enterer,' and he alone is intended here. By 'he awakens by means of the path he has attained,' this shows that the attained path is a decisive support for reviewing the Four Noble Truths and so on. For `sambodhiparāyaṇo` means: 'Enlightenment is his supreme course and support.' By the second meaning, `sambodhiparāyaṇo` means: 'Enlightenment is his supreme course and destination.'

32. Kevalena kulasaddena mahākulameva vuccatīti āha ‘‘mahābhogakulesuyeva nibbattatīti attho’’ti.

32. He says that by the mere word 'clan,' a great clan is meant, explaining: 'The meaning is that he is reborn only in clans of great wealth.'

33. Khandhabījaṃ nāma paṭisandhiviññāṇaṃ. Ihaṭṭhakanijjhānikavaseneva imasmiṃ ṭhāne kathitāti sajjhānako ajjhattasaṃyojanasamucchede akatepi anāgāmisabhāgo anāvattidhammo idha gaṇanūpago na hoti, heṭṭhā upari ca saṃsaraṇako kāmabhavagato hīnajjhānako idha gaṇanūpagoti adhippāyo.

33. 'Seed of the aggregates' is a name for rebirth-linking consciousness. Since this is stated here in terms of one who is an attainer of jhāna, one who possesses jhāna and is of a nature similar to a non-returner, one of irreversible nature, is not included in this count, even though the destruction of the internal fetters has not been accomplished. The intention is that one who wanders below and above, who has gone to the sense-sphere existence, who has inferior jhāna, is included in this count.

34. Yaṃ vattabbanti ‘‘dvīhi kāraṇehi tanubhāvo veditabbo’’tiādi yaṃ vattabbaṃ siyāti attho.

34. As to `Yaṃ vattabbaṃ`: the meaning is, whatever should be said, such as, 'The attenuated state is to be understood for two reasons,' and so on.

36. Upapannaṃ vā samanantarāti upapannaṃ vā etena puggalena hoti, atha samanantarā ariyamaggaṃ sañjaneti. Appattaṃ vā vemajjhaṃ āyuppamāṇanti āyuppamāṇaṃ tassa puggalassa vemajjhaṃ appattaṃ hoti, etthantare ariyamaggaṃ [Pg.38] sañjanetīti ayamettha pāḷiattho. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana ‘‘appatvā pabbataṃ nadī’’ti viya āyuppamāṇaṃ vemajjhaṃ appattaṃ vā hutvāti parasaddayoge parato bhūto hutvā saddo vacanasesabhūto payuttoti veditabbo.

36. As to `Upapannaṃ vā samanantarā`: this means either this person has been reborn, and then immediately generates the noble path. As to `Appattaṃ vā vemajjhaṃ āyuppamāṇaṃ`: this means the lifespan of that person has not reached the midpoint, and in the interim he generates the noble path. This is the meaning of the Pāli text here. In the commentary, however, just as in the phrase 'a river not having reached the mountain,' regarding the phrase 'or the lifespan not having reached the midpoint,' it should be understood that the word `hutvā` is used as a complement to the sentence, having been placed after the main phrase due to its connection with the subsequent word.

37. Upahaccāti etassa upagantvāti attho, tena vemajjhātikkamo kālakiriyopagamanañca saṅgahitaṃ hoti. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘atikkamitvā vemajjha’’ntiādi.

37. As to `Upahacca`: the meaning is 'having approached.' By this, both passing beyond the midpoint and the approach of death are included. Therefore it is said: 'Having passed beyond the midpoint,' and so on.

40. Uddhaṃvāhibhāvenāti uddhaṃ vahatīti uddhaṃvāhī, taṇhāsotaṃ vaṭṭasotaṃ vā, tassa bhāvo, tena uddhaṃvāhibhāvenāti vuttaṃ hoti. Avihesu uddhaṃsoto yadipi tattha parinibbāyī na hoti, yattha vā tattha vā gantvā parinibbāyatu, parinibbāyino pana tassa asaṅkhāraparinibbāyitā sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyitā ca atthīti tattha dasa anāgāmino vuttā, evaṃ atappādīsupi. Anupahaccatalāti appattatalā. Asaṅkhārasasaṅkhāraparinibbāyīnaṃ lahusālahusagatikā eva parittavipulatiṇakaṭṭhajhāpakapappaṭikāsadisatā veditabbā, na uppajjitvāva nibbāyanakādīhi adhimattatā viya samuddaṃ patvā nibbāyanakato anadhimattatā viya ca antarā upahaccaparinibbāyīhi uddhaṃsotato ca adhimattānadhimattatā. Te eva hi asaṅkhārasasaṅkhāraparinibbāyinoti. Tato mahantatareti vacanaṃ tiṇakaṭṭhajhāpanasamatthapappaṭikādassanatthaṃ, na adhimatta nādhimattadassanatthanti.

40. As to `Uddhaṃvāhibhāvena`: `uddhaṃvāhī` is one who flows upward, that is, along the stream of craving or the stream of the round. Its state is `uddhaṃvāhibhāva`. Thus it is said `uddhaṃvāhibhāvena`. Although one who goes upstream to the Aviha realm does not attain parinibbāna right there, he may attain parinibbāna wherever he goes. For such a one who attains parinibbāna, there exists both attainment of parinibbāna without exertion and with exertion. Thus ten non-returners are mentioned there, and similarly in the Atappa realm and so on. As to `Anupahaccatalā`: this means not having reached the base. The swift and slow progress of those who attain parinibbāna without exertion and with exertion should be understood only as being like a spark that can burn up little or much grass and sticks. It is not like the extreme degree of speed of those who attain Nibbāna immediately upon arising, nor like the non-extreme degree of one who attains Nibbāna after reaching the ocean, nor like the extreme and non-extreme degrees of the one who attains parinibbāna in the interval and the one who goes upstream. For these are the very ones who attain parinibbāna without exertion and with exertion. The phrase 'then a greater one' is for the purpose of illustrating a spark capable of burning up grass and sticks, not for indicating an extreme or non-extreme degree.

No cassa no ca me siyāti avijjāsaṅkhārādikaṃ hetupañcakaṃ no ca assa, viññāṇādikaṃ idaṃ phalapañcakaṃ vattamānaṃ no ca me siyāti attho. Tena atītabhavasaṃsiddhito dukkhasamudayato imassa dukkhassa pavattidassanato paccayasamudayaṭṭhena khandhānaṃ udayadassanapaṭipatti vuttā hoti. Na bhavissati, na me bhavissatīti yadi etarahi hetupañcakaṃ na bhavissati, anāgate phalapañcakaṃ na me bhavissatīti attho. Etena paccayanirodhaṭṭhena vayadassanapaṭipatti vuttā hoti, etarahi anāgate ca attattaniyanivāraṇavasena suññatāpaṭipatti vā catūhipi vuttā. Yadatthīti yaṃ atthi. Bhūtanti sasabhāvaṃ nibbattaṃ vā yathādiṭṭhaudayabbayaṃ yathādiṭṭhasuññataṃ vā khandhapañcakaṃ parikappitaitthipurisasattādibhāvarahitaṃ nāmarūpamattanti attho. Vivaṭṭānupassanāya vivaṭṭamānaso taṃ bhūtaṃ pajahāmīti [Pg.39] upekkhaṃ paṭilabhati, saṅkhārupekkhāñāṇena upekkhako hotīti vuttaṃ hoti.

As to `No cassa no ca me siyā`: the meaning is, if the fivefold cause—ignorance, formations, etc.—were not, this present fivefold fruit—consciousness, etc.—would not be for me. Thereby, from the accomplishment in past existence, from the origin of suffering, and from seeing the occurrence of this suffering, the practice of seeing the arising of the aggregates in the sense of the arising of conditions is stated. As to `Na bhavissati, na me bhavissati`: the meaning is, if the fivefold cause will not exist now, the fivefold fruit will not exist for me in the future. By this, the practice of seeing the passing away in the sense of the cessation of conditions is stated. Or, by all four phrases, the practice of emptiness is stated, by way of preventing the notions of self and what belongs to self in the present and the future. As to `Yadatthi`: that which exists. As to `Bhūtaṃ`: that which has come to be, that is, produced with its own nature; or the five aggregates as seen in terms of arising and passing away, or as seen in terms of emptiness, devoid of the conceptually contrived state of a woman, man, being, etc.—mere name-and-form. This is the meaning. With a mind turning away by means of the insight that leads to turning away, thinking, 'I abandon that which has come to be,' he gains equanimity. The meaning is that he becomes equanimous through the knowledge of equanimity towards formations.

Bhave na rajjati, sambhave na rajjatīti avisiṭṭhe visiṭṭhe ca bhave na rajjatīti keci vadanti. Paccuppanno pana bhavo bhavo, anāgato jātiyā gahaṇena gahito sambhavoti veditabbo. Atha vā bhavoti bhūtameva vuccati, sambhavo tadāhāro, tasmiṃ dvaye na rajjatīti sekkhapaṭipattiṃ dasseti. Bhūte hi sasambhave ca virāgo sekkhapaṭipatti. Yathāha ‘‘bhūtamidanti, bhante, yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya passati, bhūtamidanti yathābhūtaṃ sammappaññāya disvā bhūtassa nibbidāya virāgāya nirodhāya paṭipanno hoti. Tadāhārasambhavanti yathābhūtaṃ…pe… disvā tadāhārasambhavassa nibbidāya…pe… paṭipanno hoti. Tadāhāranirodhāya yaṃ bhūtaṃ, taṃ nirodhadhammanti yathābhūtaṃ…pe… disvā nirodhadhammassa nibbidāya virāgāya nirodhāya paṭipanno hoti. Evaṃ kho, bhante, sekkho hotī’’ti (saṃ. ni. 2.31). Athuttarīti atha evaṃ arajjamāno uttari santaṃ padaṃ nibbānaṃ anukkamena maggapaññāya sammā passati, tañca khvassa padaṃ na sabbena sabbaṃ sacchikataṃ catutthamaggeneva sacchikātabbassa tassa tena asacchikatattā.

As to `Bhave na rajjati, sambhave na rajjati` (He is not attached to existence, he is not attached to new existence): some say this means he is not attached to existence whether it is undistinguished or distinguished. However, present existence is 'existence'; future existence, being grasped by the taking of birth, is to be understood as 'new existence.' Alternatively, 'existence' refers to what has come to be, and 'new existence' is its nutriment. Not being attached to this pair shows the practice of a trainee. For dispassion towards what has come to be and its nutriment is the practice of a trainee. As it is said: 'Venerable sir, one sees with right wisdom as it really is: "This has come to be." Having seen with right wisdom as it really is, "This has come to be," one is practicing for disenchantment, dispassion, and cessation regarding what has come to be. One sees with right wisdom as it really is: "This is the nutriment for its coming to be." … Having seen this … one is practicing for disenchantment … regarding the nutriment for its coming to be. One sees with right wisdom as it really is: "With the cessation of that nutriment, what has come to be is subject to cessation." … Having seen this … one is practicing for disenchantment, dispassion, and cessation regarding what is subject to cessation. In this way, venerable sir, one is a trainee' (SN 2.31). As to `Athuttari` (Then further): then, not being attached in this way, he sees perfectly with the wisdom of the path, in gradual succession, the peaceful state, Nibbāna, which is further beyond. Yet that state has not been completely and entirely realized by him, because, since it is to be realized only by the fourth path, he has not yet realized it.

Ekakaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Exposition of the Ones is finished.

2. Dukaniddesavaṇṇanā

2. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Dyads

63. Kassaci kilesassa avikkhambhitattā kassaci kathañci avimutto kāmabhavo ajjhattaggahaṇassa visesapaccayoti ajjhattaṃ nāma. Tattha bandhanaṃ ajjhattasaṃyojanaṃ, tena sampayutto ajjhattasaṃyojano.

63. Because some defilement is unsuppressed, and because one is in some way unliberated, sensual existence is a specific condition for internal grasping; this is what is called 'internal'. Herein, the bondage is the internal fetter; one associated with it is bound by the internal fetter.

83. Kāraṇena vinā pavattahitacitto akāraṇavacchalo. Anāgatampi payojanaṃ apekkhamāno purimaggahitaṃ taṃ kataṃ upādāya kataññū eva nāma hoti, na pubbakārīti āha ‘‘karissati me’’tiādi. Tamojotiparāyaṇo puññaphalaṃ anupajīvanto eva puññāni karotīti ‘‘pubbakārī’’ti vutto. ‘‘Iṇaṃ demī’’ti saññaṃ karotīti evaṃsaññaṃ akarontopi karonto viya hotīti attho.

83. One whose mind is inclined to be helpful without a cause is called 'affectionate without cause.' Even while anticipating a future benefit, one who relies on a past deed received is called only 'grateful,' not 'a benefactor,' as when thinking: 'He will do something for me,' and so on. One who is intent on light over darkness, who performs meritorious deeds without living off the fruit of merit, is called 'a benefactor.' The meaning is that even without forming the perception, 'I am repaying a debt,' one acts as if one is doing so.

86. Acchamaṃsaṃ [Pg.40] labhitvā sūkaramaṃsanti na kukkuccāyatīti acchamaṃsanti jānantopi sūkaramaṃsanti na kukkuccāyati, madditvā vītikkamatīti vuttaṃ hoti.

86. Having obtained bear's meat, one does not feel remorse, thinking it is pork. This means that even while knowing it is bear's meat, one does not feel remorse, thinking it is pork. It is said that one crushes it and transgresses.

90. Tittoti niṭṭhitakiccatāya nirussukko.

90. 'Satisfied' (titto) means one is without anxiety because one's task is finished.

Dukaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Dyads is finished.

3. Tikaniddesavaṇṇanā

3. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Triads

91. Sesasaṃvarabhedenāti manosaṃvarabhedena, satisaṃvarādibhedena vā. Akusalasīlasamannāgamenāti ‘‘katame ca thapati akusalā sīlā? Akusalaṃ kāyakammaṃ akusalaṃ vacīkammaṃ pāpako ājīvo’’ti vuttehi samannāgamena. Tassa hi…pe… evaṃ sāsaṅkasamācāro hotīti evaṃ sāsaṅko samācāro hotīti attho.

91. 'By the breaking of the remaining restraints' means by the breaking of mental restraint, or by the breaking of restraint through mindfulness and so on. 'By being endowed with unwholesome morality' means by being endowed with what was stated as: 'And what, householder, are the unwholesome kinds of morality? Unwholesome bodily action, unwholesome verbal action, and wrong livelihood.' For him... and so on... 'thus his conduct is suspect' means his conduct is suspect.

94. Samānavisayānaṃ puggalānaṃ visesadassanavasena ‘‘kāyasakkhī’’tiādikaṃ vuttaṃ.

94. The terms 'bodily witness' and so on are stated with respect to persons of a similar domain by way of seeing distinctions among them.

107. Samādhi vā ādīti lokuttaradhammā hi paramatthato sāsananti tadattho pādakasamādhi tassa ādi vutto, tadāsannattā vipassanā, tassa mūlekadesattā maggo.

107. 'Or concentration as the beginning': For the supramundane states are the Teaching in the ultimate sense. Therefore the concentration that serves as its basis is said to be its beginning; insight, because of its proximity to it; and the path, because it is a part of its root.

108. Ucchaṅgo viya ucchaṅgapañño puggalo daṭṭhabboti ucchaṅgasadisapaññatāya eva paññā viya puggalopi ucchaṅgo viya hoti, tasmiṃ dhammānaṃ aciraṭṭhānatoti adhippāyena vuttaṃ. Vakkhati hi ‘‘ucchaṅgasadisapaññotiattho’’ti.

108. A person with lap-like wisdom should be seen as being like a lap. Because his wisdom is like a lap, the person himself is also like a lap. This is said with the intention that teachings do not remain long with him. For it will be said: 'The meaning is one with wisdom like a lap.'

109. Yathā ca ucchaṅgasadisā paññā, evaṃ nikkujjakumbhasadisā paññā evāti daṭṭhabbo, tattha dhammānaṃ anavaṭṭhānato.

109. And just as wisdom is like a lap, so too it should be seen that wisdom is like an overturned pot, because teachings do not remain therein.

113. Ciraṭṭhānato thiraṭṭhānato ca pāsāṇalekhasadisā parāparādhanibbattā kodhalekhā yassa so pāsāṇalekhūpamasamannāgato pāsāṇalekhūpamoti vutto, evaṃ itarepi.

113. Because it lasts long and is firmly established, the line of anger produced by major and minor offenses is like an inscription on stone. One whose line of anger is like this, being endowed with the simile of an inscription on stone, is called 'one like an inscription on stone.' Similarly for the others.

118. Sutādivatthurahito [Pg.41] tucchamāno naḷo viyāti ‘‘naḷo’’ti vuccati, so uggato naḷo etassāti unnaḷo.

118. Devoid of the substance of learning and so on, empty and conceited like a reed, he is called 'a reed.' He for whom that reed is uplifted is 'conceited' (unnaḷo).

122. ‘‘Sīlakathā ca no bhavissatī’’ti ettha vuttaṃ sīlakathābhavanaṃ paṭhamārambhopi dussīlena saha na hotīti dassento āha neva sīlakathā hotī’’ti.

122. Regarding the statement, 'And for us there will be talk on virtue,' in order to show that the occurrence of talk on virtue mentioned here, even its initial undertaking, does not happen with an immoral person, he says: 'There is no talk on virtue at all.'

123. Tattha tatthāti tasmiṃ tasmiṃ anuggahetabbe paññāya sodhetabbe ca vaḍḍhetabbe ca adhikasīlaṃ nissāya uppannapaññāya anuggaṇhāti nāmāti attho.

123. The phrase 'here and there' means this: in each and every case where something is to be supported, purified, and developed by wisdom, one gives support with the wisdom that has arisen in dependence on the higher virtue.

124. Gūthakūpo viya dussīlyanti etena dussīlyassa gūthasadisattameva dasseti.

124. 'Immorality is like a cesspool': by this, he shows the very similarity of immorality to filth.

130. No ca sammā paññapetuṃ sakkontīti yebhuyyena na sakkontīti imamatthaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, uppanne tathāgate tasmiṃ anādariyaṃ katvā samāpattiṃ uppādetuṃ vāyamantassa asamatthabhāvaṃ vā. Titthiyā vā pūraṇādayo adhippetā.

130. 'And they are not able to make it known rightly': this is said with reference to the meaning that for the most part they are unable to do so; or it refers to the inability of one who, having shown disrespect to the Tathāgata who has arisen, strives to produce an attainment; or the sectarians such as Pūraṇa and others are intended.

Tikaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Triads is finished.

4. Catukkaniddesavaṇṇanā

4. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Tetrads

133. Parena kataṃ dussīlyaṃ āṇattiyā attanā ca payogena katanti āṇattiyā pāpassa dāyādo ‘‘tato upaḍḍhassa dāyādo’’ti vutto.

133. Regarding immorality done by another: when it is done through one's own command and instigation, one who is an heir to the evil by command is said to be 'an heir to half of it.'

145. Ayanti ‘‘tesu paṭhamo’’tiādikaṃ nayaṃ vadati.

145. 'This' refers to the method of phrasing such as 'the first among them,' and so on.

148. Desanāya dhammānaṃ ñāṇassa āpāthabhāvasampādanaṃ ñāṇugghāṭanaṃ. Saha udāhaṭavelāyāti udāhaṭavelāya saddhiṃ tasmiṃ kāle anatikkante evāti attho.

148. 'The uncovering of knowledge' is the accomplishment of bringing teachings into the range of knowledge by means of a discourse. 'Simultaneously with the time of utterance' means together with the time of utterance, at that very time, without it having passed.

152. Tanti anantaravacanaṃ vadati. ‘‘Katamo loko’’ti vutte ‘‘pañcupādānakkhandhā’’ti mahantaṃ atthaṃ saṅgahitvā ṭhitavacanaṃ atthayuttaṃ. Lujjatīti lokoti kāraṇayuttaṃ.

152. 'That' refers to the immediately preceding statement. When it is asked, 'What is the world?,' the answer, 'The five aggregates subject to clinging,' is a statement that stands having encompassed a great meaning and is thus meaningful. The statement, 'It crumbles, therefore it is called the world,' is endowed with a reason.

156. Sahitāsahitassāti [Pg.42] sahitāsahiteti attho, sahitāsahitassa paricchindaneti vā. Dveyevāti dutiyacatutthāyeva. Desakasāvakasampattiyā bodhetuṃ samatthatāya sabhāvadhammakathikā, saccadhammakathikāti attho.

156. 'Of the connected and unconnected' means 'connected and unconnected,' or 'in the discrimination of the connected and unconnected.' 'Only two' means only the second and the fourth. The meaning is: because of the ability to enlighten due to the accomplishment of the teacher and the disciple, he is a speaker on the Dhamma as it really is, a speaker on the true Dhamma.

157. Kusaladhammehi cittassa vāsanābhāvanā vāsadhuraṃ. Ayaṃ pāpapuggaloti catuttho vutto, na paṭhamo. Paṭhamo hi avisaṃvādetukāmo verañjabrāhmaṇasadiso adhippetoti.

157. The perfuming and developing of the mind with wholesome states is the yoke of dwelling. 'This is an evil person' refers to the fourth type, not the first. For the first is intended to be like the brahmin of Verañja, who wished not to be deceived.

159. Puggalepi ariyānaṃ abhikkamanādisadisatāti puggale abhikkamanādīnaṃ ariyānaṃ abhikkamanādisadisatāti attho, ariyānaṃ abhikkamanādinā puggalassa sadisatāti vā sadisābhikkamanāditāti attho.

159. 'In a person, too, there is similarity to the noble ones regarding advancing, etc.': the meaning is that a person's advancing and so on is similar to the advancing and so on of the noble ones; or it means the person's similarity to the noble ones by way of advancing and so on; or the meaning is 'one who has a similar advancing and so on.'

166. Dussīlaṃ ‘‘dussīlo’’ti vadanto bhūtaṃ bhāsati nāma. Pāṇātipātena dussīlaṃ adinnādānena dussīloti avatvā pāṇātipātenevāti vadanto tacchaṃ bhāsati nāma. Yamidaṃ ‘‘kālenā’’ti vuttaṃ, tatra tasmiṃ vacane, yo ‘‘kālena bhaṇatī’’ti vutto, so kīdisoti dassanatthaṃ ‘‘kālaññū hotī’’tiādi vuttanti dassento ‘‘yamidaṃ kālenāti vuttaṃ, tatra yo puggalo’’tiādimāha.

166. Calling an immoral person 'immoral,' one speaks what is factual. Not saying, 'He is immoral because of killing and immoral because of stealing,' but saying, 'He is immoral simply because of killing,' one speaks what is true. To show what kind of person is he who, in the statement 'at the right time,' is called 'one who speaks at the right time,' it is said, 'He is one who knows the right time,' etc. In showing this, the commentator says: 'Regarding what was said as "at the right time," the person in that case...' and so on.

168. Āgamanavipatti nāma kammaṃ, pubbuppannapaccayavipatti sukkasoṇitaṃ. Pavatte, pavattassa vā paccayā pavattapaccayā, āhārādayo. Jotetīti joti, āloko. Kulasampattiyādīhi jotamāno ca joti viyāti joti.

168. A defect in the approach is kamma; a defect in the previously arisen condition is the sperm and blood. In the course of existence, the conditions for what has come to be are the sustaining conditions, such as nutriment and so on. 'It shines,' thus it is light, radiance. And because one shines with accomplishments such as family and so on, one is like a light, thus one is called 'light.'

173. Pahīnāvasiṭṭhakilesapaccavekkhaṇāpi yehi kilesehi vimutto avimutto ca, tesaṃ dassanavasena vimuttidassanameva hotīti āha ‘‘vimuttiñāṇadassanaṃ ekūnavīsatividhaṃ paccavekkhaṇañāṇa’’nti.

173. Even the reviewing of abandoned and remaining defilements—that is, the seeing of those defilements from which one is liberated and those from which one is not liberated—is itself the vision of liberation. Thus it is said: 'The knowledge and vision of liberation is the nineteenfold reviewing knowledge.'

174. Yāni kānici tantāvutānanti tantāvutānaṃ vatthānaṃ yāni kānici vatthānīti vuttaṃ hoti. Sāyaṃ tatiyaṃ assāti sāyatatiyo. Anuyuñjanaṃ anuyogo. Taṃ anuyuttoti upayogavacanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ, bhāvanapuṃsakaṃ vā.

174. 'Whatever are woven with threads' means whatever cloths are woven with threads. 'He for whom this is the third evening' means one for whom it is the third evening. 'Devotion' is engagement. 'Devoted to that' should be seen as a word expressing application, or as a neuter noun in the sense of development.

178. Tattha [Pg.43] sikkhanabhāvenāti sikkhāya sājīve ca sikkhanabhāvena. Sikkhaṃ paripūrentoti sīlasaṃvaraṃ paripūrento. Sājīvañca avītikkamantoti ‘‘nāmakāyo padakāyo niruttikāyo byañjanakāyo’’ti vuttaṃ sikkhāpadaṃ bhagavato vacanaṃ avītikkamanto hutvāti attho. Idameva ca dvayaṃ ‘‘sikkhana’’nti vuttaṃ. Tattha sājīvānatikkamo sikkhāpāripūriyā paccayo. Tato hi yāva maggā saṃvarapāripūrī hotīti. Vināsanabhāvatoti hiṃsanabhāvato. Haliddirāgo viya na thirakatho hotīti ettha kathāya aṭṭhitabhāvena haliddirāgasadisatā veditabbā, na puggalassa.

178. Here, 'by the nature of training' means by the nature of training in the training itself and in livelihood. 'Fulfilling the training' means fulfilling moral restraint. 'And not transgressing the livelihood' means not transgressing the word of the Blessed One, the training rule spoken of as 'the body of names, the body of phrases, the body of expressions, the body of letters.' This is the meaning. And these two together are called 'the training.' Therein, not transgressing the livelihood is a condition for the fulfillment of the training. For from that, the fulfillment of restraint occurs all the way up to the path. 'From the nature of destruction' means from the nature of harming. 'Like turmeric dye, his speech is not stable': here, the similarity to turmeric dye should be understood with regard to the instability of the speech, not of the person.

179. Dārumāsakoti ye vohāraṃ gacchantīti iti-saddena evaṃpakāre dasseti. Aññaṃ dassetvā aññassa parivattananti dasagghanakaṃ vatthayugaṃ dassetvā tassa ajānantassa pañcagghanakassa dānaṃ.

179. 'A wooden mosquito': with the word 'iti' (thus), he indicates such things as are mere conventional usage. 'Showing one thing and exchanging another' means showing a pair of cloths worth ten and giving one worth five to a person who is unaware.

181. Avikiṇṇasukhanti rūpādīsu subhādiparikappanavasena avisaṭasukhaṃ.

181. 'Unscattered happiness' means happiness not dispersed by way of conceiving of beauty and so on in forms and so on; that is, unmixed happiness.

187. Khandhadhammesu aniccādivasena pavattā vipassanā maggaphalalābhena paṭiladdhā nāma hoti tadalābhena anavaṭṭhānatoti maggaphalalābhī eva ‘‘adhipaññādhammavipassanālābhī’’ti vutto, maggaphalañāṇameva ca adhikapaññābhāvato catusaccadhamme sabbadhammassa vare nibbāne eva vā visiṭṭhadassanabhāvato ca adhipaññādhammavipassanāti daṭṭhabbā.

187. Insight that proceeds by way of impermanence and so on in regard to the phenomena of the aggregates is called 'attained' with the gain of the path and its fruition, because without that gain it is not established. Thus, only one who gains the path and its fruition is called 'a gainer of insight into the Dhamma through higher wisdom.' And the knowledge of the path and its fruition itself should be seen as 'insight into the Dhamma through higher wisdom' because it is higher wisdom, and because it is a distinguished vision of the Dhamma of the Four Truths, or of Nibbāna, the best of all states.

189. Sutena anupapannoti yathāsutena vā atthena vā na samannāgatoti attho.

189. 'Not endowed with what has been learned' means not endowed with what was heard as it was heard, or with its meaning; this is the meaning.

Catukkaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Tetrads is finished.

5. Pañcakaniddesavaṇṇanā

5. Commentary on the Exposition of the Pentads

191. Paṭhamapañcake uddeseneva puggalavibhāgo viññāyatīti yathā tesu paṭipajjitabbaṃ, tāya paṭipattiyā te vibhajanto ‘‘tatra yvāya’’ntiādimāha. Ārambhasaddoti ārambhakiriyāvācako saddoti attho. Phaluppattiyā [Pg.44] maggakiccaṃ niṭṭhitaṃ hotīti ‘‘maggakiccavasena phalameva vutta’’nti āha. Āyācanasādhūti na pasaṃsanādisādhūti attho.

191. In the first pentad, the classification of individuals is understood by the statement alone; thus, explaining how one should practice in regard to them, he classifies them by that practice and says what begins with 'Therein, this person…' The word 'ārambha' means a word denoting the action of beginning; this is the meaning. With the arising of the fruit, the task of the path is completed; thus, it is said: 'The fruit alone is spoken of in terms of the function of the path.' 'Good for requesting' means not 'good' in the sense of praise and so on; this is the meaning.

192. Ādito dheyyaṃ ṭhapetabbaṃ ādheyyaṃ, dassanasavanapaṭivacanadānavasena mukhena viya pavattaṃ gahaṇaṃ mukhanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Taṃ mukhaṃ ādheyyaṃ, gahaṇatthaṃ pakatimukhameva vā ādheyyaṃ yassa so ādheyyamukho, avicāretvā ādikathāya eva ṭhapitagahaṇoti vuttaṃ hoti.

192. From the beginning, what is to be received (dheyyaṃ) is to be established (ṭhapetabbaṃ) as 'ādheyyaṃ.' The grasping that proceeds as if by the mouth—by way of seeing, hearing, responding, and giving—is to be understood as 'mouth' (mukha). That 'mouth' is 'ādheyyaṃ.' Or, he for whom the natural mouth itself is 'ādheyyaṃ' for the purpose of grasping is an 'ādheyyamukho.' This means one who establishes his grasp on the initial statement alone, without investigation.

194. Rajaggasminti rajaggabhāve.

194. `Rajaggasmiṃ` means in the state of being a heap of dust.

199. Gavā khīraṃ aggamakkhāyatīti na evaṃ sambandho, uppattito pana pañca gorase dassetvā tesu sappimaṇḍassa aggabhāvadassanatthaṃ ‘‘gavā khīra’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘gāvito khīraṃ nāma hotī’’tiādi.

199. The connection is not as stated in the phrase 'From a cow, milk is declared preeminent.' Rather, having shown the five cow-products in terms of their origin, what begins with 'from a cow, milk…' is stated in order to show the preeminence of cream among them. Therefore, he said what begins with 'From a cow there is what is called milk…'

Pañcakaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Pentads is finished.

6. Chakkaniddesavaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Exposition of the Hexads

202. Chakke ekantato pākaṭā sammāsambuddhādayo te yathāvuttaguṇā puggalāti dassento ‘‘sammāsambuddho tena daṭṭhabbo’’tiādimāha. Tattha tenāti sāmaṃ saccābhisamayo tattha ca sabbaññutappattibalesu ca vasibhāvappattīti etena sabbena samuditena. ‘‘Sabbaññutaññāṇenā’’ti pana vutte sabbamidaṃ saṅgahitaṃ hoti sāmaṃ saccābhisamayena balesu ca vasibhāvappattiyā ca vinā sabbaññutaññāṇassa abhāvā, tasmā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘sabbaññutaññāṇenā’’ti ettakameva vuttaṃ. Tattha anācariyakena attanā uppāditenāti vacanena sabbaññutaññāṇassa sācariyakattaṃ parato uppattiñca paṭisedheti, na sācariyakaṃ parehi uppāditañca sabbaññutaññāṇaṃ. Na hi taṃ tādisaṃ nivāretabbaṃ atthīti.

202. In the Hexad, to show that the Perfectly Self-Enlightened Ones and others are individuals possessing the aforesaid qualities and are altogether manifest, he says what begins with: 'The Perfectly Self-Enlightened One is to be seen by that.' Herein, 'by that' means by all this combined: the direct realization of the truths by oneself, the attainment of omniscience, and the attainment of mastery over the powers. But when 'by the knowledge of omniscience' is said, all this is included, for without the direct realization of the truths by oneself and the attainment of mastery over the powers, there is no knowledge of omniscience. Therefore, in the commentary, only 'by the knowledge of omniscience' is stated. Herein, with the words 'produced by oneself without a teacher,' he denies that the knowledge of omniscience has a teacher or arises from another; he does not deny a knowledge of omniscience that has a teacher and is produced by others, for there is no such thing that needs to be prevented.

Chakkaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Hexads is finished.

7. Sattakaniddesavaṇṇanā

7. Commentary on the Exposition of the Heptads

203. Saddhā [Pg.45] nāma sādhuladdhikāti ummujjatīti etena kusalesu dhammesu antogadhā, bodhipakkhiyadhammesu vā adhimokkhabhūtā saddhā sādhūti ummujjamānaṃ kusalaṃ dasseti, evaṃ hirīyādīsu ca. Kusalesu dhammesūti ettha bhummaniddeso tadantogadhatāya tadupakāratāya vā veditabbo. Ettha ca ummujjati sāhu saddhā kusalesu dhammesūtiādinā saddhādīnaṃ ummujjanapaññāya saddhādīnaṃ uppattiṃ dasseti. Teneva ‘‘tassa sā saddhā neva tiṭṭhatī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. ‘‘Sāhu saddhā kusalesu dhammesū’’ti vā ummujjanassa upakārakaṃ ānisaṃsadassanaṃ vatvā ‘‘ummujjatī’’ti etena saddhāsaṅkhātameva ummujjanaṃ dassitanti veditabbaṃ. Caṅkavāreti rajakānaṃ khāraparisāvane. Ekakammanibbattā paṭisandhibhavaṅgacutisantati eko cittavāroti cutito anantaro yathāgahito dutiyo hotīti āha ‘‘dutiyacittavārenā’’ti. Ummujjitvā ṭhitādayo cattāro tāya tāya jātiyā arahattaṃ asacchikarontā aneke puggalā veditabbā, sacchikaronto pana ekopi pubbabhāge tatiyapuggalādibhāvaṃ āpajjitvā ante sattamapuggalo hotīti.

203. Faith is 'well-gained.' By the word 'emerges,' it shows that faith is included in wholesome states, or that faith, being resolve among the requisites of enlightenment, is the wholesome quality that emerges as 'good'; and similarly for moral shame and so on. Here, the locative in 'in wholesome states' should be understood as indicating either inclusion within them or assistance to them. And here, by what begins with 'faith emerges as good in wholesome states,' it shows the arising of faith and so on by means of the wisdom of emergence. For that reason, what begins with 'that faith of his does not stand still' is said. Or, it should be understood that having stated the seeing of the benefit that assists emergence with 'faith is good in wholesome states,' by 'emerges' it shows the very emergence that is designated as faith. The word `caṅkavāre` refers to the dyers' straining of lye. A single continuum of rebirth-linking, life-continuum, and death, produced by a single kamma, is one mind-process; thus, he says 'by the second mind-process,' meaning the second one that arises immediately after the death-consciousness, which is apprehended as such. The four types of individuals beginning with 'one who has emerged and stands still,' who do not realize arahantship in that very life, are to be understood as many individuals. But the one who does realize it, even if he attains the state of the third individual in the earlier phase, in the end becomes the seventh individual.

Sattakaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Heptads is finished.

10. Dasakaniddesavaṇṇanā

10. Commentary on the Exposition of the Decads

209. Pañcannaṃ idha niṭṭhā, pañcannaṃ idha vihāya niṭṭhāti ettha ye sotāpannādayo rūpārūpabhave upapajjitvā parinibbāyissanti, te idha vihāya niṭṭhāpakkhaṃ bhajamānāpi ajjhattasaṃyojanānaṃ asamucchinnattā puthujjanasādhāraṇe ca ṭhāne upapattiyā na gahitā. Asādhāraṇaṭṭhānuppattivasena pana antarāparinibbāyīādayo eva ‘‘idha vihāya niṭṭhā’’ti vuttāti veditabbāti.

209. Regarding the statement 'For five, the conclusion is here; for five, the conclusion is after departing from here': Herein, those stream-enterers and others who will attain final Nibbāna after being reborn in the form and formless realms, although they belong to the side of 'conclusion after departing from here,' are not included because their internal fetters are not cut off and because of their rebirth in a place common to worldlings. But it should be understood that it is only those such as the one who attains Nibbāna in the interval, on account of their rebirth in an uncommon state, who are said to have their 'conclusion after departing from here.'

Dasakaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Decads is finished.

Puggalapaññattipakaraṇa-mūlaṭīkā samattā.

The Mūlaṭīkā on the Puggalapaññatti-pakaraṇa is completed.

Kathāvatthupakaraṇa-mūlaṭīkā

The Root Subcommentary on the Kathāvatthupakaraṇa.

Ganthārambhakathāvaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Introduction

Kathānaṃ [Pg.47] vatthubhāvatoti kathāsamudāyassa pakaraṇassa attano ekadesānaṃ okāsabhāvaṃ vadati. Samudāye hi ekadesā antogadhāti. Yena pakārena saṅkhepena adesayi, taṃ dassento ‘‘mātikāṭhapaneneva ṭhapitassā’’ti āha.

Because it is the subject matter of the discussions: this states that the treatise, a collection of discussions, provides the ground for its own component parts. For the component parts are included within the collection. To show the manner in which it was taught concisely, it is said: 'of that which was established merely by the laying down of the matrix.'

Nidānakathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Introduction

Anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyīti parinibbānameva parinibbānassa parinibbānantarato visesanatthaṃ karaṇabhāvena vuttaṃ. Yāya vā nibbānadhātuyā adhigatāya pacchimacittaṃ appaṭisandhikaṃ jātaṃ, sā tassa appaṭisandhivūpasamassa karaṇabhāvena vuttāti. Dubbalapakkhanti na kāḷāsokaṃ viya balavantaṃ, atha kho ekamaṇḍalikanti vadanti. Dhammavādīadhammavādīvisesajananasamatthāya pana paññāya abhāvato dubbalatā vuttā. Tesaṃyevāti bāhuliyānameva, bahussutikātipi nāmaṃ. Bhinnakāti mūlasaṅgītito mūlanikāyato vā bhinnā, laddhiyā suttantehi liṅgākappehi ca visadisabhāvaṃ gatāti attho.

'He attained final Nibbāna with the Nibbāna-element without residue remaining': here, final Nibbāna itself is spoken of as the instrument for final Nibbāna in order to distinguish it from what immediately follows. Alternatively, that Nibbāna-element by which, when attained, the final consciousness arises without relinking—this is spoken of as the instrument for the pacification of that non-relinking. 'Weak faction': not strong like Kālāsoka, but rather, they say, a single circle. The weakness is mentioned because of the absence of wisdom capable of generating a distinction between speakers of Dhamma and speakers of non-Dhamma. 'Of those very ones': of the Bāhuliyas themselves, also named Bahussutikas. 'Split': separated from the original council or the original Nikāyas; the meaning is that they have come to a state of dissimilarity in doctrine, discourses, and outward signs and deportment.

Mūlasaṅgahanti pañcasatikasaṅgītiṃ. Aññatra saṅgahitātiādīsu dīghādīsu aññatra saṅgahitato suttantarāsito taṃ taṃ suttaṃ nikkaḍḍhitvā aññatra akariṃsūti vuttaṃ hoti. Saṅgahitato vā aññatra asaṅgahitaṃ suttaṃ aññatra katthaci akariṃsu, aññaṃ vā akariṃsūti attho. Atthaṃ dhammañcāti pāḷiyā atthaṃ pāḷiñca. Vinaye nikāyesu ca pañcasūti vinaye ca avasesapañcanikāyesu ca.

Root collection: this refers to the Council of the Five Hundred. In such phrases as 'apart from what was compiled,' concerning the Dīgha Nikāya and so on, it is said that, apart from what was compiled from the collection of discourses, they extracted this or that discourse and made it something different. Or, the meaning is that, apart from what was compiled, they composed an uncompiled discourse elsewhere, or they composed a different one. Meaning and Dhamma: this means the meaning of the Pāli text and the Pāli text itself. In the Vinaya and the five Nikāyas: this means in the Vinaya and in the remaining five Nikāyas.

‘‘Dvepānanda[Pg.48], vedanā vuttā mayā pariyāyenā’’tiādi (ma. ni. 2.89) pariyāyadesitaṃ. Upekkhāvedanā hi santasmiṃ paṇīte sukhe vuttā bhagavatāti ayañhettha pariyāyo. ‘‘Tisso imā, bhikkhave, vedanā sukhā dukkhā upekkhā vedanā’’tiādi (saṃ. ni. 4.249-251) nippariyāyadesitaṃ. Vedanāsabhāvo hi tividhoti ayamettha nippariyāyatā. ‘‘Sukhāpi vedanā aniccā saṅkhatā’’tiādi (dī. ni. 2.123) nītatthaṃ. ‘‘Yaṃ kiñci vedayitaṃ, sabbaṃ taṃ dukkha’’ntiādi (saṃ. ni. 2.32) neyyatthaṃ. ‘‘Tīhi, bhikkhave, ṭhānehi jambudīpakā manussā uttarakuruke ca manusse adhiggaṇhanti deve ca tāvatiṃse’’tiādikaṃ (a. ni. 9.21) aññaṃ sandhāya bhaṇitaṃ gahetvā aññaṃ atthaṃ ṭhapayiṃsu. ‘‘Natthi devesu brahmacariyavāso’’tiādikaṃ (kathā. 270) suttañca aññaṃ sandhāya bhaṇitaṃ atthañca aññaṃ ṭhapayiṃsūti evamettha attho daṭṭhabbo. ‘‘Atthekacco puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’’tiādi (pu. pa. mātikā 4.24) byañjanacchāyāya saṇhasukhumaṃ suññatādiatthaṃ bahuṃ vināsayuṃ.

'Ānanda, two feelings have been spoken of by me by way of an indirect method,' and so on (MN 59), is a teaching with an indirect meaning. For equanimous feeling has been spoken of by the Blessed One as peaceful, sublime happiness—this here is the indirect meaning. 'Monks, there are these three feelings: pleasant feeling, painful feeling, and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling,' and so on (SN 36.5), is a teaching with a direct meaning. For the nature of feeling is threefold—this here is its directness. 'Pleasant feeling, too, is impermanent, conditioned,' and so on (DN 16), is of explicit meaning. 'Whatever is felt is included in suffering,' and so on (SN 12.32), is of interpretable meaning. 'Monks, in three respects the people of Jambudīpa surpass the people of Uttarakuru and the Tāvatiṃsa gods,' and so on (AN 9.20), was spoken with reference to one thing, but they took it and established another meaning. 'There is no living of the holy life among the gods,' and so on (Kvu 2.9), is a discourse spoken with reference to one thing, and they established another meaning—thus the meaning here should be understood. 'Here, a certain person is practicing for his own welfare,' and so on (Pug 4.1), through the shadow of the letter, they destroyed much of the subtle and fine meaning of emptiness and so on.

Vinayagambhīranti vinaye gambhīrañca ekadesaṃ chaḍḍetvāti attho. Kilesavinayena vā gambhīraṃ ekadesaṃ suttaṃ chaḍḍetvāti attho. Patirūpanti attano adhippāyānurūpaṃ suttaṃ, suttapatirūpakaṃ vā asuttaṃ. Ekacce aṭṭhakathākaṇḍameva vissajjiṃsu, ekacce sakalaṃ abhidhammapiṭakanti āha ‘‘atthuddhāraṃ abhidhammaṃ chappakaraṇa’’nti. Kathāvatthussa savivādattepi avivādāni chappakaraṇāni paṭhitabbāni siyuṃ, tāni nappavattantīti hi dassanatthaṃ ‘‘chappakaraṇa’’nti vuttanti. Tatiyasaṅgītito vā pubbe pavattamānānaṃ vasena ‘‘chappakaraṇa’’nti vuttaṃ. Aññānīti aññāni abhidhammapakaraṇādīni. Nāmanti yaṃ buddhādipaṭisaṃyuttaṃ na hoti mañjusirītiādikaṃ, taṃ nikāyanāmaṃ. Liṅganti nivāsanapārupanādivisesakataṃ saṇṭhānavisesaṃ. Sikkādikaṃ parikkhāraṃ. Ākappo ṭhānādīsu aṅgaṭṭhapanaviseso daṭṭhabbo. Karaṇanti cīvarasibbanādikiccaviseso.

Deep in the Vinaya: this means having abandoned a part that is deep in the Vinaya. Or, the meaning is, having abandoned a discourse, a part that is deep on account of the taming of the defilements. Suitable: a discourse that conforms to their own intention, or a non-discourse that is a counterfeit of a discourse. Some rejected only a section of the commentary; some, the entire Abhidhamma Piṭaka, saying: 'The Abhidhamma is the extraction of meaning, the six treatises.' The statement 'six treatises' is made to show that, although the Kathāvatthu is controversial, the six non-controversial treatises should be recited, but these are not practiced by them. Alternatively, 'six treatises' is said with reference to those that were current before the Third Council. Others: other treatises of the Abhidhamma, etc. Name: that which is not connected with the Buddha and so on, such as 'Mañjusiri'; that is a sectarian name. Mark: a particular form made by distinctions in wearing the lower and upper robes, etc. Requisites: such as the carrying net for the bowl. Deportment: this should be understood as the particular disposition of the limbs in postures such as standing. Action: a particular task such as the sewing of robes.

Saṅkantikassapikena nikāyena vādena vā bhinnā saṅkantikāti attho. Saṅkantikānaṃ bhedā suttavādī anupubbena bhijjatha bhijjiṃsūti attho. Bhinnavādenāti bhinnā vādā etasminti bhinnavādo, tena abhinnena [Pg.49] theravādena saha aṭṭhārasa hontīti vuttaṃ hoti. Bhinnavādenāti vā bhinnāya laddhiyā aṭṭhārasa honti, te sabbepi sahāti attho. Theravādānamuttamoti ettha thera-iti avibhattiko niddeso. Therānaṃ ayanti thero. Ko so? Vādo. Thero vādānamuttamoti ayamettha attho.

The meaning of Saṅkantika is: those who split from the Kassapika school by their doctrine. The meaning is: the Suttavādins, a branch of the Saṅkantikas, gradually split off. With the divided doctrine: 'divided doctrine' is that from which doctrines have divided. It is said that with it, together with the undivided Theravāda, they become eighteen. Alternatively, with the divided doctrine: by the divided view they become eighteen; the meaning is all of them together. In 'the supreme Theravāda,' here 'thera' is an uninflected term. This doctrine of the elders is 'thero.' What is that? The doctrine. The meaning here is: the doctrine of the elders is supreme among doctrines.

Uppanne vāde sandhāya ‘‘parappavādamathana’’nti āha. Āyatiṃ uppajjanakavādānaṃ paṭisedhanalakkhaṇabhāvato ‘‘āyatilakkhaṇa’’nti vuttaṃ.

With reference to the dispute that had arisen, it is said, 'the crushing of others' doctrines.' Because it has the characteristic of refuting doctrines that might arise in the future, it is called 'having a future characteristic' (āyatilakkhaṇa).

Nidānakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Introduction is finished.

Mahāvaggo

The Great Chapter

1. Puggalakathā

1. Discussion on the Person

1. Suddhasaccikaṭṭho

1. The Purely Real Meaning

1. Anulomapaccanīkavaṇṇanā

1. Exposition on the Forward and Reverse Methods

1. Māyāya [Pg.50] amaṇiādayo maṇiādiākārena dissamānā ‘‘māyā’’ti vuttā. Abhūtena maṇiudakādiākārena gayhamānā māyāmarīciādayo abhūtaññeyyākārattā asaccikaṭṭhā. Yo tathā na hoti, so saccikaṭṭhoti dassento āha ‘‘māyā…pe… bhūtattho’’ti. Anussavādivasena gayhamāno tathāpi hoti aññathāpīti tādiso ñeyyo na paramattho, attapaccakkho pana paramatthoti dassento āha ‘‘anussavā…pe… uttamattho’’ti.

1. Non-gems and so forth that appear in the form of gems and so forth due to illusion are called 'illusion.' Illusions, mirages, and so forth, being grasped in an unreal form as gems, water, and so forth, do not have a real meaning because their form is an unreal object of knowledge. To show that what is not like that has a real meaning, he says: 'illusion ... the real meaning.' What is grasped by way of oral tradition and so on may be so or otherwise; such an object of knowledge is not the ultimate meaning. But direct personal experience is the ultimate meaning. To show this, he says: 'oral tradition ... the highest meaning.'

Chalavādassāti atthīti vacanasāmaññena atthīti vuttehi rūpādīhi sāmaññavacanassāti adhippāyo. ‘‘So sacci…pe… laddhiṃ gahetvā āmantāti paṭijānātī’’ti vacanato pana ‘‘chalavādassā’’ti na sakkā vattuṃ. Na hi laddhi chalanti. Okāsaṃ adadamānoti patiṭṭhaṃ pacchindanto. Yadi saccikaṭṭhena upalabbhati, rūpādayo viya upalabbheyya, tathā anupalabbhanīyato na tava vādo tiṭṭhatīti nivattentoti adhippāyo. Taṃ sandhāyāti ‘‘yo saccikaṭṭho’’ti ettha vutto yo saccikaṭṭho, so sappaccayādibhāvena dīpito ‘‘rūpañca upalabbhatī’’tiādīsu āgato dhammappabhedoti dasseti.

'Of one with a tricky thesis' (`chalavādassa`): the intention is that by the general statement 'there is,' it is a general statement about form, etc., which are said to 'exist.' However, from the passage 'He acknowledges ... having grasped the view ... he affirms,' it is not possible to say 'of one with a tricky thesis,' for a view is not tricky. 'Not giving an opportunity' means cutting off the basis. The intention of 'refuting' is: 'If it were found in a real sense, it would be found like form, etc.; since it is not found in that way, your thesis does not stand.' Referring to that, he shows that the 'real meaning' spoken of here in the phrase 'what has a real meaning' is the classification of dhammas that appears in passages such as 'and form is found,' which is explained as being conditioned and so on.

‘‘Tena saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’’ti vatvā ‘‘tenākārenā’’ti vadato ayamadhippāyo – saccikaṭṭhaparamatthākārena upalabbhamānaṃ saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena upalabbhamānaṃ nāma hotīti. Aññathā tatoti tassa tenākārenāti vattabbaṃ siyā. Ko panetissā purimapucchāya ca visesoti? Purimapucchāya sattapaññāsavidho dhammappabhedo yathā bhūtena sabhāvatthena upalabbhati, evaṃ puggalo upalabbhatīti vuttaṃ. Idha pana bhūtasabhāvatthena upalabbhamāno so dhammappabhedo yena ruppanādisappaccayādiākārena upalabbhati, kiṃ tenākārena puggalopi [Pg.51] upalabbhatīti esa viseso. Yathā pana rūpaṃ viya bhūtasabhāvatthena upalabbhamānā vedanā na ruppanākārena upalabbhati, evaṃ dhammappabhedo viya bhūtasabhāvatthena upalabbhamāno puggalo na ruppanādisappaccayādiākārena upalabbhatīti sakkā paravādinā vattunti acodanīyaṃ etaṃ siyā. Avajānanañca tassa yuttanti niggaho ca na kātabbo. Dhammappabhedato pana aññassa saccikaṭṭhassa asiddhattā dhammappabhedākāreneva codeti. Avajānaneneva niggahaṃ dasseti. Anujānanāvajānanapakkhā sāmaññavisesehi paṭiññāpaṭikkhepapakkhā anulomapaṭilomapakkhā paṭhamadutiyanayāti ayametesaṃ viseso veditabbo.

Having said, 'By the real and ultimate meaning,' when one says, 'in that manner,' this is the intention: what is found in the manner of the real and ultimate meaning is called 'what is found by the real and ultimate meaning.' Otherwise, it should be said, 'from that, of that, in that manner.' What, then, is the difference between this and the previous question? In the previous question, it was said that the person is found in the same way as the fifty-sevenfold classification of dhammas is found in a real sense, by its intrinsic nature. Here, however, the difference is this: that classification of dhammas, being found by its real intrinsic nature, is found in a certain manner—as being subject to affliction, as being conditioned, and so on. Is the person also found in that manner? Just as feeling, though found by its real intrinsic nature like form, is not found in the manner of being subject to affliction, so too it could be said by the opponent that the person, though found by his real intrinsic nature like the classification of dhammas, is not found in the manner of being subject to affliction, being conditioned, and so on. This would not be open to censure. And disregard of him would be proper, and no refutation should be made. However, since no real meaning other than the classification of dhammas is established, one censures only in the manner of the classification of dhammas. By the very act of disregard, one shows the refutation. The difference between these should be understood thus: the first and second methods are, respectively, the theses of concession and disregard, the theses of affirmation and denial in general and particular, and the theses of the forward and reverse methods.

‘‘Tena vata re vattabbe’’ti vadanto vattabbassa avacane dosaṃ pāpetīti iminā adhippāyena ‘‘niggahassa pāpitattā’’ti vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. ‘‘Evametaṃ niggahassa ca anulomapaṭilomato catunnaṃ pāpanāropanañca vuttattā upalabbhatītiādikaṃ anulomapañcakaṃ nāmā’’ti vuttaṃ, anulomapaṭilomato pana dvīhi ṭhapanāhi saha sattakena bhavitabbaṃ, taṃvajjane vā kāraṇaṃ vattabbaṃ. Yaṃ pana vakkhati ‘‘ṭhapanā nāma paravādīpakkhassa ṭhapanato ‘ayaṃ tava doso’ti dassetuṃ ṭhapanamattameva hoti, na niggahassa vā paṭikammassa vā pākaṭabhāvakaraṇa’’nti (kathā. aṭṭha. 2). Tenādhippāyena idhāpi ṭhapanādvayaṃ vajjeti. Yathā pana tattha paṭikammapañcakabhāvaṃ avatvā paṭikammacatukkabhāvaṃ vakkhati, evamidhāpi niggahacatukkabhāvo vattabbo siyā. Suddhikaniggahassa pana niggahappadhānattā uddesabhāvena vutto niggahova visuṃ vuttoti daṭṭhabbo. Ye pana ‘‘ayathābhūtaniggahattā tattha paṭikammaṃ visuṃ na vutta’’nti vadanti, tesaṃ dutiye vādamukhe niggahacatukkabhāvo paṭikammapañcakabhāvo ca āpajjati.

When one says, 'Therefore, sir, it should be stated,' one makes him incur the fault of not stating what should be stated. It should be understood that with this intention it is said, 'because of having made him incur refutation.' It is said: 'Thus, because the application and imputation of the four points of refutation in forward and reverse order is stated, the section beginning with "it is found" is called the "pentad of conformity."' But in the forward and reverse methods, there should be a heptad together with the two 'statements of the thesis'; or if they are omitted, a reason should be given. But what will be said is: 'A statement of the thesis is merely a statement for the purpose of showing, "This is your fault," by stating the opponent's position; it is not a making manifest of the refutation or the counter-refutation.' With this intention, here too, the pair of statements of the thesis is omitted. Just as there, without speaking of a pentad of counter-refutation, he will speak of a tetrad of counter-refutation, so here too a tetrad of refutation should have been stated. However, it should be understood that since a pure refutation has refutation as its principal part, the refutation mentioned by way of a heading is stated separately. But as for those who say, 'Because the refutation is not in accordance with reality, a counter-refutation is not stated separately there,' for them, in the second opening of the debate, a tetrad of refutation and a pentad of counter-refutation would result.

2. Attanā adhippetaṃ saccikaṭṭhamevāti sammutisaccaṃ sandhāyāti adhippāyo. Vakkhati hi ‘‘suddhasammutisaccaṃ vā paramatthamissakaṃ vā sammutisaccaṃ sandhāya ‘yo saccikaṭṭho’ti puna anuyogo paravādissā’’ti (kathā. aṭṭha. 6). Tattha yadi paravādinā attanā adhippetasaccikaṭṭho sammutisaccaṃ, sammutisaccākārena puggalo upalabbhatīti vadantena samānaladdhiko nappaṭisedhitabbo, kathā evāyaṃ nārabhitabbā. Atha sakavādinā attanā [Pg.52] ca adhippetasaccikaṭṭhaṃyeva sandhāya paravādī ‘‘yo saccikaṭṭho’’tiādimāhāti ayamattho. Sakavādinā sammutisaccaṃyeva saccikaṭṭhoti adhippetanti āpajjati. Yadi ubhayaṃ adhippetaṃ, puna ‘‘sammutisaccaparamatthasaccāni vā ekato katvāpi evamāhā’’ti na vattabbaṃ siyāti. Yadi ca dvepi saccāni saccikaṭṭhaparamatthā, saccikaṭṭhekadesena upaladdhiṃ icchantena ‘‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’’tiādi anuyogo na kātabbo, na ca saccikaṭṭhekadesena anuyogo yutto. Na hi vedayitākārena upalabbhamānā vedanā ruppanākārena upalabbhatīti anuyuñjitabbā, na ca paravādī ruppanādisabhāvaṃ puggalaṃ icchati, atha kho saccikaṭṭhaparamatthamevāti. Paramatthasaccato aññasmiṃ saccikaṭṭhe vijjamāne nāssa paramatthasaccatā anuyuñjitabbā. Asaccikaṭṭhe saccikaṭṭhavohāraṃ āropetvā taṃ sandhāya pucchatīti vadantānaṃ voharitasaccikaṭṭhassa attanā adhippetasaccikaṭṭhatā na yuttā. Voharitaparamatthasaccikaṭṭhānañca dvinnaṃ saccikaṭṭhabhāve vuttanayova doso. Sammutisaccākārena upalabbhamānañca bhūtasabhāvatthena upalabbheyya vā na vā. Yadi bhūtasabhāvatthena upalabbhati, puggalopi upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti anujānanto nānuyuñjitabbo. Atha na bhūtasabhāvatthena, taṃvinimutto sammutisaccassa saccikaṭṭhaparamatthākāro na vattabbo asiddhattā. Vakkhati ca ‘‘yathā rūpādayo paccattalakkhaṇasāmaññalakkhaṇavasena atthi, na evaṃ puggalo’’ti. Tasmā maggitabbo ettha adhippāyo.

2. The intention is that 'what is intended by oneself as the real meaning' refers to conventional truth. For it will be said: 'Whether referring to pure conventional truth or conventional truth mixed with the ultimate, the further inquiry "what is the real meaning?" belongs to the opponent' (Kvu-a 6). In that case, if for the opponent the real meaning intended by himself is conventional truth, then one who holds the same view, who says that the person is found in the manner of conventional truth, should not be refuted, and this very discussion should not be begun. Or, this is the meaning: the opponent says 'what is the real meaning,' etc., referring to the real meaning intended by the proponent and by himself. This would imply that the proponent intends conventional truth alone to be the real meaning. If both are intended, then it should not be said again that 'he speaks thus having combined conventional truth and ultimate truth.' And if both truths are the real and ultimate meaning, then one who wishes for a finding by a part of the real meaning should not make the inquiry 'is the person found by the real and ultimate meaning?,' nor is an inquiry by a part of the real meaning proper. For one should not inquire whether feeling, which is found in the manner of being felt, is found in the manner of being afflicted. And the opponent does not maintain that the person has the nature of being afflicted, etc., but rather that he is just the real and ultimate meaning. If there exists a real meaning other than ultimate truth, its status as ultimate truth should not be questioned. For those who say that one asks by referring to what has been superimposed with the designation 'real meaning' on what is not the real meaning, it is not proper for the 'real meaning' so designated to be the 'real meaning' intended by oneself. And if both the designated and the ultimate are 'real meanings,' the same fault as stated applies. And is what is found in the manner of conventional truth found by its real intrinsic nature or not? If it is found by its real intrinsic nature, then one who concedes that 'the person is found by the real and ultimate meaning' should not be questioned. But if it is not by its real intrinsic nature, then a manner of conventional truth being the real and ultimate meaning, independent of that, cannot be stated, as it is unestablished. And it will be said: 'A person does not exist in the way that form, etc., exist by way of their individual and general characteristics.' Therefore, the intention here must be sought.

Dvinnaṃ saccānanti ettha saccadvayākārena anupalabbhanīyato anuññeyyametaṃ siyā, na vā kiñci vattabbaṃ. Yathā hi ekadesena paramatthākārena anupalabbhanīyatā anujānanassa na kāraṇaṃ, evaṃ ekadesena sammutiyākārena upalabbhanīyatā paṭikkhepassa cāti maggitabbo etthāpi adhippāyo. Nupalabbhatīti vacanasāmaññamattanti nupalabbhatīti idameva vacanaṃ anuññātaṃ paṭikkhittañcāti etaṃ chalavādaṃ nissāyāti adhippāyo. Yathā upalabbhatīti etasseva anujānanapaṭikkhepehi ahaṃ niggahetabbo, evaṃ nupalabbhatīti etasseva anujānanapaṭikkhepehi tvanti evaṃ sambhavantassa sāmaññena asambhavantassa kappanaṃ panettha chalavādo bhavituṃ arahati. Tena nupalabbhatīti vacanasāmaññamattaṃ chalavādassa kāraṇattā ‘‘chalavādo’’ti vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Vacanasāmaññamattañca chalavādañca [Pg.53] nissāyāti vā attho. Ṭhapanā niggahappaṭikammānaṃ pākaṭabhāvakaraṇaṃ na hotīti idaṃ vicāretabbaṃ. Na hi pakkhaṭṭhapanena vinā purimaṃ anujānitvā pacchimassa avajānanaṃ, pacchimaṃ vā avajānantassa purimānujānanaṃ micchāti sakkā āropetunti.

Regarding 'of the two truths,' here, since it is not found in the manner of a duality of truths, this might be conceded, or nothing at all should be said. For just as not being found in one respect in the manner of the ultimate is not a reason for concession, so too being found in one respect in the manner of convention is not a reason for rejection. Here too the intention must be sought. The intention is that 'the mere generality of the statement "it is not found"' relies on this tricky thesis: that this very statement 'it is not found' is both conceded and rejected. Just as I can be refuted by the concession and rejection of this very statement 'it is found,' so you can be by the concession and rejection of this very statement 'it is not found.' Thus, the general imputation of what is possible to what is impossible can be a tricky thesis here. Therefore, it should be understood that the mere generality of the statement 'it is not found' is called a 'tricky thesis' because it is a cause for a tricky thesis. Or the meaning is that it relies on the mere generality of the statement and on a tricky thesis. This should be investigated: that the statement of the thesis is not a making manifest of the refutation and the counter-refutation. For without stating the position, it is not possible to impute the error of conceding the first part and then disregarding the second, or of disregarding the second while conceding the first.

3. Tavāti, paṭijānantanti ca paccatte sāmiupayogavacanānīti adhippāyena ‘‘tvaṃyeva paṭijānanto’’ti āha.

3. The words 'tava' ('your') and 'paṭijānanto' ('acknowledging') are terms of individual ownership and application. With this intention, he says, 'tvaṃyeva paṭijānanto' ('you yourself acknowledging').

4-5. Catūhi pāpanāropanāhi niggahassa upanītattāti ‘‘dunniggahitā ca homa, hañcī’’tiādinā tayā mama kato niggaho, mayā tava kato niggaho viya micchāti evaṃ tena anulomapañcake catūhi pāpanāropanāhi katassa niggahassa tena niyāmena dukkaṭabhāvassa attanā kataniggahena saha upanītattā aniggahabhāvassa vā upagamitattāti attho daṭṭhabbo. Evameva tena hi yaṃ niggaṇhāsi hañci…pe… idaṃ te micchāti etassa aniggahabhāvanigamanasseva niggamanacatukkatā veditabbā.

4–5. 'Because a reproof has been presented by means of the four applications of the charge': by such words as, 'Indeed, we are poorly reproved,' it is implied that 'the reproof you have made against me is wrong, just as the reproof I have made against you is wrong.' Thus, the meaning should be understood as follows: in the fivefold direct method, because the state of being wrongly done of the reproof made by the four applications of the charge has, by that method, been presented along with the reproof made by oneself, or because it has reached the state of being no reproof. Just so, the tetrad of conclusion should be understood as precisely the conclusion that this is no reproof: 'Indeed, if you reprove... this is wrong for you.'

Anulomapaccanīkavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Direct and Reverse Orders is finished.

2. Paccanīkānulomavaṇṇanā

2. The Explanation of the Reverse and Direct Orders

7-10. ‘‘Attano laddhiṃ nissāya paṭiññā paravādissā’’ti vatvā puna ‘‘paramatthavasena puggalassa abhāvato paṭikkhepo paravādissā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tatrāyaṃ paṭikkhepo attano laddhiyā yadi kato, paramatthato aññena saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena puggalo upalabbhatīti ayamassa laddhīti āpajjati. Tathā ca sati nāyaṃ sammutisaccavasena upaladdhiṃ icchantena niggahetabbo. Atha attano laddhiṃ niggūhitvā parassa laddhivasena paṭikkhipati, purimapaṭiññāya avirodhitattā na niggahetabbo. Na hi attano ca parassa ca laddhiṃ vadantassa doso āpajjatīti. Attano pana laddhiyā paṭijānitvā paraladdhiyā paṭikkhipantena attano laddhiṃ chaḍḍetvā paraladdhi gahitā hotīti niggahetabboti ayamettha adhippāyo siyā.

7–10. Having said, 'Relying on one's own doctrine, the thesis is the opponent's,' it is then said, 'Because of the non-existence of a person in the ultimate sense, the refutation is the opponent's.' Here, if this refutation is made based on one's own doctrine, it would follow that this is his doctrine: 'In an ultimate sense, a person is found by another ultimate reality that is a real existent.' If that is so, he should not be reproved by one who wishes for a finding by way of conventional truth. But if one refutes based on the opponent's doctrine while concealing one's own, one should not be reproved, as this does not contradict the initial thesis. For no fault accrues to one who states both their own and the other's doctrine. However, one who, having asserted their own doctrine, then refutes based on the opponent's doctrine, has abandoned their own doctrine and adopted the opponent's; therefore, they should be reproved. This might be the intended meaning here.

Paccanīkānulomavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Reverse and Direct Orders is finished.

Suddhasaccikaṭṭhavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Pure Real Existent is finished.

2. Okāsasaccikaṭṭho

2. The Real Existent as Location

1. Anulomapaccanīkavaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Direct and Reverse Orders

11. Sabbatthāti [Pg.54] sabbasmiṃ sarīreti ayamatthoti dassento āha ‘‘sarīraṃ sandhāyā’’ti. Tatthāti tasmiṃ saṃkhittapāṭhe. Yasmā sarīraṃ sandhāya ‘‘sabbattha na upalabbhatī’’ti vutte sarīrato bahi upalabbhatīti āpajjati, tasmā paccanīke paṭikkhepo sakavādissāti etena na kenaci sabhāvena puggalo upalabbhatīti ayamattho vutto hoti. Na hi kenaci sabhāvena upalabbhamānassa sarīratadaññāvimutto upaladdhiokāso atthīti.

11. Showing that the meaning of 'everywhere' is 'in the entire body,' he says, 'with reference to the body.' 'There' means in that concise text. Because when it is said, 'it is not found everywhere' with reference to the body, it would follow that it is found outside the body, therefore in the reverse method, 'the refutation is the proponent's.' By this, the meaning stated is that a person is not found by any intrinsic nature. For something that is found by some intrinsic nature, there is no location for its finding that is not the body or something other than it.

3. Kālasaccikaṭṭho

3. The Real Existent in Time

1. Anulomapaccanīkavaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Direct and Reverse Orders

12. Purimapacchimajātikālañcāti majjhimajātikāle upalabbhamānassa tasseva purimapacchimajātikālesu upaladdhiṃ sandhāyāti adhippāyo. Sesaṃ paṭhamanaye vuttasadisamevāti imesu tīsu paṭhame ‘‘sabbatthā’’ti etasmiṃ naye vuttasadisameva, kiṃ taṃ? Pāṭhassa saṃkhittatāti attho. Idhāpi hi yasmā ‘‘sabbadā na upalabbhatī’’ti vutte ekadā upalabbhatīti āpajjati, tasmā paccanīke paṭikkhepo sakavādissāti yojetabbanti.

12. 'And the time of the former and latter birth': the intention is with reference to the finding in the former and latter periods of existence of that same thing which is found in the middle period of existence. 'The rest is just like what was said in the first method': in these three, the first method, concerning 'everywhere,' is just like what was said. What is that? The meaning is the conciseness of the text. For here too, since when it is said, 'it is not always found,' it would follow that it is found at some time, therefore in the reverse method, it should be connected as: 'the refutation is the proponent's.'

4. Avayavasaccikaṭṭho

4. The Real Existent as a Constituent Part

1. Anulomapaccanīkavaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Direct and Reverse Orders

13. Tatiyanaye ca yasmā ‘‘sabbesu na upalabbhatī’’ti vutte ekasmiṃ upalabbhatīti āpajjati, tasmā paccanīke paṭikkhepo sakavādissāti yojetabbaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘tādisamevā’’ti.

13. And in the third method, since when it is said, 'it is not found in all,' it would follow that it is found in one, therefore in the reverse method, it should be connected as: 'the refutation is the proponent's.' Therefore he said, 'it is just the same.'

Okāsādisaccikaṭṭho

The Real Existent as Location, etc.

2. Paccanīkānulomavaṇṇanā

2. The Explanation of the Reverse and Direct Orders

14. Tattha anulomapañcakassātiādimhi anulomapañcakanti niggahapañcakaṃ, paccanīkanti ca paṭikammaṃ vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tattha anulomapañcakassa ‘‘sabbattha [Pg.55] puggalo nupalabbhatī’’tiādikassa attho ‘‘sabbattha puggalo nupalabbhatī’’tiādipāḷiṃ saṃkhipitvā āgate sarūpena avutte ‘‘yasmā sarīraṃ sandhāyā’’tiādinā (kathā. aṭṭha. 11) vuttanayena veditabbo, paccanīkassa ca ‘‘sabbattha puggalo upalabbhatī’’tiādikassa paṭikammakaraṇavasena vuttassa attho paṭikammādipāḷiṃ saṃkhipitvā ādimattadassanena āgate ‘‘puggalo upalabbhatī’’tiādimhi anulome ‘‘sabbatthāti sarīraṃ sandhāya anuyogo sakavādissā’’tiādinā (kathā. aṭṭha. 11) vuttanayena veditabboti evamattho daṭṭhabbo. Atha vā tatthāti yaṃ āraddhaṃ, tasminti evaṃ atthaṃ aggahetvā tattha tesu tīsu mukhesūti attho gahetabbo. Anulomapañcakamūlakā cettha sabbānulomapaccanīkapañcakapāḷi anulomapañcakassa pāḷīti vuttā, tathā paccanīkānulomapañcakapāḷi ca paccanīkassa pāḷīti. Taṃ saṃkhipitvā paṭikammavasena āgate sarūpena avutte ‘‘puggalo nupalabbhatī’’tiādike paccanīke ‘‘upalabbhatī’’tiādike anulome ca attho heṭṭhā suddhikasaccikaṭṭhe vuttanayeneva veditabboti vuttaṃ hoti.

14. Therein, in the phrase beginning 'of the fivefold direct method,' it should be understood that 'fivefold direct method' means the fivefold reproof, and 'reverse method' means the counter-action. Therein, the meaning of the fivefold direct method beginning 'a person is not found everywhere' should be known according to the method stated in the passage beginning 'because with reference to the body,' when it is not stated in its full form, having been presented in abbreviation from the Pāli text beginning 'a person is not found everywhere.' And the meaning of the reverse method beginning 'a person is found everywhere,' which is stated by way of making a counter-action, should be known according to the method stated in the passage beginning '“Everywhere” means with reference to the body; the interrogation is the proponent’s,' when it is presented in the direct method beginning 'a person is found,' having been abbreviated from the Pāli of the counter-action and showing only the beginning. Thus the meaning should be seen. Alternatively, without taking the meaning of 'therein' as 'in that which was undertaken,' the meaning should be taken as 'therein, in those three approaches.' Here, the entire Pāli text of the fivefold direct and reverse methods, which is rooted in the fivefold direct method, is called 'the Pāli of the fivefold direct method,' and similarly the Pāli of the fivefold reverse and direct methods is called 'the Pāli of the reverse method.' The meaning in the reverse method beginning 'a person is not found' and in the direct method beginning 'is found'—when they are presented by way of counter-action, having been abbreviated—is said to be known in the same way as stated above in the section on the pure real existent.

Saccikaṭṭhavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Real Existent is finished.

5. Suddhikasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā

5. The Commentary on the Simple Comparison

17-27. Rūpādīhi saddhiṃ saccikaṭṭhasaṃsandananti saccikaṭṭhassa puggalassa rūpādīhi saddhiṃ saṃsandanaṃ, saccikaṭṭhe vā rūpādīhi saddhiṃ puggalassa saṃsandananti adhippāyo. Puggalo rūpañcāti ca-kārassa samuccayatthattā yathā rūpanti evaṃ nidassanavasena vutto attho vicāretabbo. Rūpādīhi añño anañño ca puggalo na vattabboti laddhi samayo. ‘‘Aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīranti abyākatametaṃ bhagavatā’’tiādikaṃ (saṃ. ni. 4.416) suttaṃ. Anuññāyamāne tadubhayavirodho āpajjatīti imamatthaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘samayasuttavirodhaṃ disvā’’ti.

17-27. 'Comparison in the ultimate sense with form, etc.' means the comparison of a person existing in the ultimate sense with form, etc., or the comparison of a person with form, etc., in the ultimate sense—this is the intended meaning. The phrase 'the person and form' is to be considered by way of example, as in 'like form,' since the 'ca' (and) particle has the meaning of combination. The doctrine is the tenet that a person is not to be described as other than or not other than form, etc. The sutta states: 'That the life principle is one thing and the body another—this has been left undeclared by the Blessed One,' and similar passages (SN 44.10). With reference to the fact that if this were conceded, a contradiction of both would follow, it is said: 'having seen the contradiction with the doctrine and the sutta.'

Dhammatoti pāḷito. ‘‘Paṭikammacatukkādīni saṃkhittāni. Paravādī…pe… dassitānī’’ti vadantehi puggalo nupalabbhati…pe… ājānāhi paṭikammanti [Pg.56] ettha ājānāhi niggahanti pāṭho diṭṭho bhavissati. Aññattaṃ paṭijānāpanatthanti yathā mayā aññattaṃ vattabbaṃ, tathā ca tayāpi taṃ vattabbanti aññattapaṭiññāya codanatthanti attho. Sammutiparamatthānaṃ ekattanānattapañhassa ṭhapanīyattāti abyākatattāti attho. Yadi ṭhapanīyattā paṭikkhipitabbaṃ, parenapi ṭhapanīyattā laddhimeva nissāya paṭikkhepo katoti sopi na niggahetabbo siyā. Paro pana puggaloti kañci sabhāvaṃ gahetvā tassa ṭhapanīyattaṃ icchati, sati ca sabhāve ṭhapanīyatā na yuttāti niggahetabbo. Sammuti pana koci sabhāvo natthi. Tenevassa ekattanānattapañhassa ṭhapanīyataṃ vadanto na niggahetabboti sakavādinā paṭikkhepo katoti ayamettha adhippāyo yutto.

From the Dhamma, that is, from the Pāḷi text. For those who say, 'The tetrad of counter-action and so on are condensed. The opponent... has been shown,' [the argument is] 'a person is not found... admit the counter-action.' In this context, for 'paṭikammaṃ' (counter-action), the reading 'niggahaṃ' (refutation) will have been seen. The purpose is to make one acknowledge otherness, meaning to charge them based on the acknowledgment of otherness, with the argument: 'Just as I must state it is other, so too must you.' 'Because the question of identity and difference concerning conventional and ultimate realities is to be set aside' means because it is indeterminate. If it is to be rejected because it should be set aside, then since the opponent also made the rejection by relying on his own view that it should be set aside, he too should not be refuted. But the opponent, taking some intrinsic nature as 'person,' wishes for it to be set aside; and since it is not appropriate for it to be set aside when an intrinsic nature exists, he should be refuted. For a convention, however, there is no intrinsic nature. Therefore, one who says that the question of its identity and difference is to be set aside should not be refuted. Thus the rejection is made by our own proponent. This is the proper intention here.

Suddhikasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Simple Comparison is finished.

6. Opammasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā

6. The Commentary on the Comparison by Simile

28-36. Upaladdhisāmaññena aññattapucchā cāti idañca dvinnaṃ samānatā no aññattassa kāraṇaṃ yuttaṃ, atha kho visuṃ attano sabhāvena saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena upalabbhanīyatāti vicāretabbaṃ. ‘‘Ekavīsādhikānī’’ti purimapāṭho, vīsādhikānīti pana paṭhitabbaṃ.

28-36. As for the question of otherness based on a commonality of apprehension, this similarity between the two is not a proper reason for otherness. Rather, it should be investigated on the grounds that it is to be apprehended separately, by its own intrinsic nature, in the real and ultimate sense. 'More than twenty-one' is the former reading, but 'more than twenty' should be recited.

37-45. ‘‘Atthi puggalo’’ti suttaṃ anujānāpentena upaladdhi anujānitā hotīti maññamāno āha ‘‘upaladdhisāmaññaṃ āropetvā’’ti. Vīsādhikāni nava paṭikammapañcakasatāni dassitānīti etena suddhikasaṃsandanepi ‘‘ājānāhi paṭikamma’’micceva pāṭhoti viññāyati. Yañca vādamukhesu suddhikasaccikaṭṭhe ‘‘paṭikammacatukka’’nti vuttaṃ, tampi ‘‘paṭikammapañcaka’’nti.

37-45. Thinking that by assenting to the sutta statement, 'There is a person,' one assents to its apprehension, he says, 'having superimposed a commonality of apprehension.' By the fact that nine hundred and twenty pentads of preliminary refutation have been shown, it is understood that even in the Simple Comparison the reading is indeed 'Admit the preliminary refutation.' And what was called the 'tetrad of preliminary refutation' in the openings of the debate concerning the simple ultimate reality, that too is a 'pentad of preliminary refutation.'

Opammasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Comparison by Simile is finished.

7. Catukkanayasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā

7. The Commentary on the Comparison by the Fourfold Method

46-52. Ekadhammatopi [Pg.57] aññattaṃ anicchanto rūpādiekekadhammavasena nānuyuñjitabbo. Samudāyato hi ayaṃ aññattaṃ anicchanto ekadesato anaññattaṃ paṭikkhipanto na niggahāraho siyāti etaṃ vacanokāsaṃ nivattetuṃ ‘‘ayañca anuyogo’’tiādimāha. Sakalanti sattapaññāsavidho dhammappabhedo puggaloti vā paramatthasaccaṃ puggaloti vā evaṃ sakalaṃ sandhāyāti attho. Evaṃ sakalaṃ paramatthaṃ cintetvā tantivasena anuyogalakkhaṇassa ṭhapitattā sakalaparamatthato ca aññassa saccikaṭṭhassa abhāvā saccikaṭṭhena puggalena tato aññena na bhavitabbanti ‘‘rūpaṃ puggalo’’ti imaṃ pañhaṃ paṭikkhipantassa niggahāropanaṃ yuttanti attho.

46-52. One who does not desire otherness even from a single phenomenon should not be questioned by way of individual phenomena such as form. For one who does not desire otherness from the aggregate, while rejecting non-otherness from a part, would not be liable to censure. To prevent this opening for argument, he said, 'And this questioning...' and so on. 'The whole' means with reference to the whole, that is, either the fifty-sevenfold classification of phenomena as 'person,' or the ultimate truth as 'person.' The meaning is that since, having thus considered the entire ultimate reality, the characteristic of the questioning has been established by the textual method, and since there is no real truth apart from the entire ultimate reality, a person in the real sense cannot be other than that, it is therefore proper to impose censure on one who rejects the question, 'Is form the person?'

Sabhāgavinibbhogatoti rūpato aññasabhāgattāti vuttaṃ hoti. Sabbadhammāti rūpavajje sabbadhamme vadati. ‘‘Rūpasmiṃ puggalo’’ti ettha nissayavināse vināsāpattibhayena paṭikkhipatīti adhippāyenāha ‘‘ucchedadiṭṭhibhayena cevā’’ti. Tīsu pana samayavirodhena paṭikkhepo adhippeto. Na hi so sakkāyadiṭṭhiṃ icchati, apica sassatadiṭṭhibhayena paṭikkhipatīti yuttaṃ vattuṃ. Sakkāyadiṭṭhīsu hi pañceva ucchedadiṭṭhiyo, sesāsassatadiṭṭhiyoti. Aññatra rūpāti ettha ca rūpavā puggaloti ayamattho saṅgahitoti veditabbo.

'From being parted from what is similar' means it is said to be of a different nature from form. 'All phenomena' refers to all phenomena except form. In the statement 'The person is in form,' he rejects out of fear of incurring destruction with the destruction of the support; with this intention he says, 'and out of fear of the annihilationist view.' But in the three other cases, rejection is intended because of contradiction with the doctrine. For he does not hold to the identity view; rather, it is fitting to say that he rejects out of fear of the eternalist view. For among the identity views, only five are annihilationist views; the rest are eternalist views. And here, in 'apart from form,' it should be understood that the meaning 'a person possesses form' is included.

Catukkanayasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Comparison by the Fourfold Method is finished.

Niṭṭhitā ca saṃsandanakathāvaṇṇanā.

And the Commentary on the Discussion of Comparisons is finished.

8. Lakkhaṇayuttivaṇṇanā

8. Exposition on the Application of Characteristics

54. Paccanīkānulometi idaṃ yaṃ vakkhati ‘‘chalavasena pana vattabbaṃ ‘ājānāhi paṭikamma’ntiādī’’ti (kathā. aṭṭha. 54), tena pana na sameti. Paccanīkānulome hi paccanīke ‘‘ājānāhi niggaha’’nti vattabbaṃ, na pana ‘‘paṭikamma’’nti.

54. The phrase 'in the direct and reverse methods' refers to what will be said: 'But it should be stated in the sixfold way: "Acknowledge the counter-demonstration," and so on' (Kv-a 54). But this does not accord with that. For in the direct and reverse methods, one should say to the opponent, 'Acknowledge the refutation,' not 'the counter-demonstration.'

Lakkhaṇayuttivaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Application of Characteristics is finished.

9. Vacanasodhanavaṇṇanā

9. Exposition on the Correction of the Statement

55-59. Puggalo [Pg.58] upalabbhatīti padadvayassa atthato ekatteti ettha tadeva ekattaṃ parena sampaṭicchitaṃ asampaṭicchitanti vicāretabbametaṃ. Puggalassa hi avibhajitabbataṃ, upalabbhatīti etassa vibhajitabbataṃ vadanto vibhajitabbāvibhajitabbatthānaṃ upalabbhatipuggala-saddānaṃ kathaṃ atthato ekattaṃ sampaṭiccheyyāti? Yathā ca vibhajitabbāvibhajitabbatthānaṃ upalabbhati-rūpa-saddānaṃ taṃ vibhāgaṃ vadato rūpaṃ kiñci upalabbhati, kiñci na upalabbhatīti ayaṃ pasaṅgo nāpajjati, evaṃ etassapi yathāvuttavibhāgaṃ vadato yathāāpāditena pasaṅgena na bhavitabbanti maggitabbo ettha adhippāyo.

55-59. Regarding the unity in meaning of the two terms in the phrase 'a person is found,' here this very unity should be investigated as to whether it is accepted by the other party or not. For one who asserts the indivisibility of 'person' and the divisibility of 'is found'—how could he accept a unity in meaning for the words 'is found' and 'person,' which have divisible and indivisible meanings respectively? And just as for one who asserts that distinction for the words 'is found' and 'form,' which have divisible and indivisible meanings, the undesirable consequence 'some form is found, some form is not found' does not arise, so too for this one who asserts the aforesaid distinction, the intention should be sought here whereby the undesirable consequence that has been adduced would not obtain.

60. ‘‘Suññato lokaṃ avekkhassū’’ti (su. ni. 1125) etena atthato puggalo natthīti vuttaṃ hotīti āha ‘‘natthītipi vutta’’nti.

60. By the words, 'View the world as empty' (Sn 1125), it is said that in reality a person does not exist. Thus he says: 'it is also said, "does not exist."'.

Vacanasodhanavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Correction of the Statement is finished.

10. Paññattānuyogavaṇṇanā

10. Exposition on the Application of Designations

61-66. Rūpakāyāvirahaṃ sandhāya ‘‘rūpakāyasabbhāvato’’ti āha. ‘‘Rūpino vā arūpino vā’’ti (itivu. 90) sutte āgatapaññattiṃ sandhāya ‘‘tathārūpāya ca paññattiyā atthitāyā’’ti. Vītarāgasabbhāvatoti kāmībhāvassa anekantikattā kāmadhātuyā āyattattābhāvato ca ‘‘kāmī’’ti na vattabboti paṭikkhipatīti adhippāyo.

61-66. Referring to the presence of a form-body, he said, 'from the existence of a form-body.' Referring to the designation that occurs in the sutta, 'whether with form or without form' (Iti 90), he said, 'and because of the existence of such a designation.' As to 'from the existence of one devoid of lust': the intention is that he rejects that one should be called a 'sensual being' because the state of being a sensual being is inconclusive and because of the lack of dependence on the sense-sphere realm.

67. Kāyānupassanāyāti kāraṇavacanametaṃ, kāyānupassanāya kāraṇabhūtāya evaṃladdhikattāti attho. Āhacca bhāsitanti ‘‘aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīranti abyākatametaṃ mayā’’ti (ma. ni. 2.128) āhacca bhāsitaṃ.

67. 'By contemplation of the body': this is a causal expression. The meaning is: because of holding such a view which has contemplation of the body as its cause. 'A statement made on a specific occasion': this refers to the statement made on a specific occasion, 'That the life principle is one thing and the body another—this has been left undeclared by me' (MN 2:128).

Paññattānuyogavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Application of Designations is finished.

11. Gatianuyogavaṇṇanā

11. Exposition on the Investigation of Destinations

69-72. ‘‘Dassento [Pg.59] ‘tena hi puggalo sandhāvatī’tiādimāhā’’ti vuttaṃ, ‘‘dassento ‘na vattabbaṃ puggalo sandhāvatī’tiādimāhā’’ti pana bhavitabbaṃ, dassetvāti vā vattabbaṃ.

69-72. It is stated: 'Showing, he said, "Then a person transmigrates," and so on.' But it should be: 'Showing, he said, "It should not be said, ‘A person transmigrates,’" and so on'; or it should be said, 'having shown'.

91. Yena rūpasaṅkhātena sarīrena saddhiṃ gacchatīti ettha ‘‘rūpena saddhiṃ gacchatī’’ti vadantena ‘‘rūpaṃ puggalo’’ti ananuññātattā yenākārena taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīranti idaṃ āpajjati, so vattabbo. Asaññūpapattiṃ sandhāyāti nirayūpagassa puggalassa asaññūpagassa arūpūpagassa ca antarābhavaṃ na icchatīti cutito anantaraṃ upapattiṃ sandhāyāti attho daṭṭhabbo. Ye pana cutikāle upapattikāle ca asaññūpapattikāle ca asaññasattesu saññā atthīti gahetvā asaññūpagassa ca antarābhavaṃ iccheyyuṃ, tesaṃ antarābhavabhāvato ‘‘asaññūpapatti avedanā’’ti na sakkā vattunti.

91. Here, regarding the phrase 'he goes together with the body designated as form': since 'form is the person' is not admitted, for one who says 'he goes together with form,' the consequence 'that life principle is that body' follows in some way. That is the refutation. 'Referring to rebirth in the non-percipient realm': the meaning should be understood as referring to rebirth immediately after death, because one does not accept an intermediate existence for a person going to hell, for one going to the non-percipient realm, or for one going to the formless realm. But as for those who would accept an intermediate existence for one going to the non-percipient realm—holding that perception exists in non-percipient beings at the time of death, at the time of rebirth, and at the time of rebirth in the non-percipient realm—for them, because of the existence of an intermediate existence, it is not possible to say, 'rebirth in the non-percipient realm is without feeling.'

92. Avedanotiādīsu tadaññanti saññabhavato aññaṃ asaññānevasaññānāsaññāyatanupapattiṃ. Nevasaññānāsaññāyatanepi hi na vattabbaṃ saññā atthīti icchanti.

92. In 'without feeling,' etc., 'other than that' means other than existence with perception, referring to rebirth in the non-percipient realm and the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. For they hold that it should not be said that perception exists even in the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception.

93. Yasmā rūpādidhamme vinā puggalo natthīti indhanupādāno aggi viya indhanena rūpādiupādāno puggalo rūpādinā vinā natthīti laddhivasena vadati.

93. Because a person does not exist without phenomena such as form, he speaks in accordance with the tenet that just as a fire, which is dependent on fuel, does not exist without fuel, so a person, who is dependent on form and so on, does not exist without form and so on.

Gatianuyogavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Investigation of Destinations is finished.

12. Upādāpaññattānuyogavaṇṇanā

12. Exposition on the Investigation of Dependent Designations

97. Nīlaṃ rūpaṃ upādāya nīlotiādīsūti ‘‘nīlaṃ rūpaṃ upādāya nīlakassa puggalassa paññattī’’ti ettha yo puṭṭho nīlaṃ upādāya nīloti, tadādīsūti attho.

97. The phrase 'in "in dependence on blue form, 'blue'," and so on' means: this refers to the question 'in dependence on blue, "blue"?' and so on, which is asked in the context of 'the designation of a blue person is in dependence on blue form.' That is the meaning.

98. Chekaṭṭhaṃ sandhāyāti chekaṭṭhaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, na kusalapaññattiṃ. ‘‘Kusalaṃ vedanaṃ upādāyā’’ti maññamāno paṭijānātīti attho daṭṭhabbo.

98. 'Referring to the meaning of 'skilled'': this means it is stated with reference to the meaning of 'skilled,' not to the designation 'wholesome.' The meaning should be understood thus: he agrees, thinking it means 'in dependence on wholesome feeling.'

112. Idāni [Pg.60]…pe… dassetuṃ ‘‘yathā rukkha’’ntiādimāhāti pubbapakkhaṃ dassetvā uttaramāhāti vuttaṃ hoti.

112. It is said that now ...pe... to show this, he states 'just as a tree,' and so on. This means that having stated the first position, he states the reply.

115. ‘‘Yassa rūpaṃ so rūpavā’’ti uttarapakkhe vuttaṃ vacanaṃ uddharitvā ‘‘yasmā’’tiādimāha.

115. Having extracted the statement made in the rejoinder, 'He whose is form, he is possessed of form,' he then says, 'because,' and so on.

116. Cittānupassanāvasenāti cittānupassanāvasena paridīpitassa sarāgādicittayogassa vasenāti adhippāyo.

116. 'By way of contemplation of mind': the intention is, by way of the connection with a mind accompanied by lust, etc., which is explained by way of the contemplation of mind.

118. Yenāti cakkhunti ‘‘yenā’’ti vuttaṃ karaṇaṃ cakkhunti attho. Cakkhumeva rūpaṃ passatīti viññāṇanissayabhāvūpagamanameva cakkhussa dassanaṃ nāma hotīti sandhāya vadati.

118. 'By which' is the eye: the meaning is that the instrument referred to as 'by which' is the eye. He says, 'The eye itself sees form,' with reference to the fact that the 'seeing' of the eye is simply its functioning as a support for consciousness.

Upādāpaññattānuyogavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Inquiry into Dependent Designation is finished.

13. Purisakārānuyogavaṇṇanā

13. The Exposition of the Inquiry into Human Effort

123. Karaṇamattanti kammānaṃ nipphādakappayojakabhāvena pavattā khandhā.

123. "Mere doing" refers to the aggregates that function by producing and instigating kamma.

124. Purimakammena vinā puggalassa jāti, jātassa ca vijjaṭṭhānādīsu sammā micchā vā pavatti natthīti sandhāya ‘‘purimakammameva tassā’’tiādimāha.

124. Without previous kamma, there is no birth for a person, and for one who is born, there is no right or wrong conduct in matters such as occupations, etc.—with this in mind, it is said, "previous kamma alone is its cause," etc.

125. Kammavaṭṭassāti ettha kammakārakassa yo kārako, tenapi aññaṃ kammaṃ kātabbaṃ, tassa kārakenapi aññanti evaṃ kammavaṭṭassa anupacchedaṃ vadanti. Puggalassa kārako kammassa kārako āpajjatīti vicāretabbametaṃ. Mātāpitūhi janitatādinā tassa kārakaṃ icchantassa kammakārakānaṃ kārakaparamparā āpajjatīti idañca vicāretabbaṃ.

125. Regarding 'the cycle of kamma': here, some argue that for the doer of kamma there is an agent, and by that agent another kamma must be done, and by its agent yet another—thus they speak of the non-interruption of the cycle of kamma. This should be investigated: Does the agent of a person become the agent of kamma? And this too should be investigated: for one who posits an agent for that person on the basis of being born from a mother and father, etc., a succession of agents for the doers of kamma would result.

170. Suttavirodhabhayenāti ‘‘so karoti so paṭisaṃvedayatīti kho, brāhmaṇa, ayameko anto’’tiādīhi (saṃ. ni. 2.46) virodhabhayā.

170. "Out of fear of contradicting the suttas": due to the fear of contradiction with such statements as, "‘The one who acts is the one who experiences’—this, brahmin, is one extreme," etc. (SN 12:46).

171. ‘‘Idha nandati pecca nandatī’’ti (dha. pa. 18) vacanato kammakaraṇakāle vipākapaṭisaṃvedanakāle ca soyevāti paṭijānātīti adhippāyo. Sayaṃkataṃ [Pg.61] sukhadukkhanti ca puṭṭho ‘‘kiṃ nu kho, bho gotama, sayaṃkataṃ sukhaṃ dukkhanti? Mā hevaṃ kassapā’’tiādisuttavirodhā (saṃ. ni. 2.18) paṭikkhipati.

171. According to the statement, "Here he rejoices, hereafter he rejoices" (Dhp 18), the meaning is that one asserts it is the very same person both at the time of performing the kamma and at the time of experiencing its result. And when asked, "Is pleasure and pain self-made?" he rejects this because of its contradiction with the sutta that says: "'What now, Master Gotama, is pleasure and pain self-made?' 'Not so, Kassapa,'" etc. (SN 12:17).

176. Laddhimattamevetanti soyeveko neva so hoti na aññoti idaṃ pana nattheva, tasmā evaṃvādino asayaṃkārantiādi āpajjatīti adhippāyo. Apicātiādinā idaṃ dasseti – na parassa icchāvaseneva ‘‘so karotī’’tiādi anuyogo vutto, atha kho ‘‘so karotī’’tiādīsu ekaṃ anicchantassa itaraṃ, tañca anicchantassa aññaṃ āpannanti evaṃ kārakavedakicchāya ṭhatvā ‘‘so karotī’’tiādīsu taṃ taṃ anicchāya āpannavasenāpīti. Atha vā na kevalaṃ ‘‘so karotī’’tiādīnaṃ sabbesaṃ āpannattā, atha kho ekekasseva ca āpannattā ayaṃ anuyogo katoti dasseti. Purimanayenevāti etena ‘‘idha nandatī’’tiādi sabbaṃ paṭijānanādikāraṇaṃ ekato yojetabbanti dasseti.

176. "It is merely a view": This view that one is 'the very same, yet neither the same nor another' simply does not exist. Therefore, for one who speaks thus, the consequence is the charge of 'not self-made,' etc.—this is the meaning. By 'Moreover,' etc., this is shown: The charge 'he acts,' etc., is not made simply according to another's wish. Rather, with regard to the statements 'he acts,' etc., when one does not accept one of them, another follows as a consequence; and when one does not accept that one, yet another follows. Thus, taking one's stand on the desire for a doer and an experiencer, with regard to the statements 'he acts,' etc., one falls into one or another of them by rejecting the others. Or alternatively, it is shown that this charge is made not only because all the statements 'he acts,' etc., follow as a consequence, but also because each one individually follows. By 'as in the previous method,' it is shown that all the reasoning for the assertion 'here he rejoices,' etc., should be connected together.

Purisakārānuyogavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Inquiry into Human Effort is finished.

Kalyāṇavaggo niṭṭhito.

The Kalyāṇa Chapter is finished.

14. Abhiññānuyogavaṇṇanā

14. The Exposition of the Inquiry into Higher Knowledge

193. Abhiññānuyogādivasena arahattasādhanāti ettha ‘‘nanu atthi koci iddhiṃ vikubbatī’’ti abhiññāanuyogo ca ‘‘hañci atthi koci iddhiṃ vikubbatī’’ti ṭhapanā ca ‘‘tena vata re’’tiādi pāpanā ca ādisaddasaṅgahito atthova daṭṭhabbo. Āsavakkhayañāṇaṃ panettha abhiññā vuttāti tadabhiññāvato arahato sādhanaṃ ‘‘arahattasādhanā’’ti āha. Arahato hi sādhanā tabbhāvassa ca sādhanā hotiyevāti.

193. Regarding 'the means for arahantship through the inquiry into higher knowledge, etc.': here, the inquiry into higher knowledge is the question, "Surely, is there someone who manifests psychic power?"; the positing is, "If there is someone who manifests psychic power"; and the adducing is, "Then indeed, sir...," etc. The meaning should be understood as included by the word 'etc.' Here, the knowledge of the destruction of the taints is called a higher knowledge; thus 'the means for arahantship' is said of the means for the arahant who possesses that higher knowledge. For a means for an arahant is indeed a means for the attainment of that state.

Abhiññānuyogavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Inquiry into Higher Knowledge is finished.

15-18. Ñātakānuyogādivaṇṇanā

15-18. The Exposition of the Inquiry into Relatives, etc.

209. Tathārūpassāti [Pg.62] tatiyakoṭibhūtassa saccikaṭṭhassa abhāvāti adhippāyo. Evaṃ pana paṭikkhipanto asaccikaṭṭhaṃ tatiyakoṭibhūtaṃ puggalaṃ vadeyyāti tādisaṃ puggalaṃ icchanto hi suttena niggahetabbo siyā. Kasmā? Tathārūpassa saccikaṭṭhassa abhāvatoti, tathārūpassa kassaci sabhāvassa abhāvato paṭikkhepārahattā attano laddhiṃ nigūhitvā paṭikkhepo paravādissāti ayamattho daṭṭhabbo.

209. Regarding 'of such a kind': the meaning is the absence of an ultimate reality that constitutes a third category. However, in rejecting thus, one might say that a person who constitutes a third category is not an ultimate reality. Indeed, one who posits such a person could be refuted by the sutta. Why? Because of the absence of such an ultimate reality. This meaning should be understood: since rejection is justified by the absence of any such intrinsic nature, the rejection is made by the opponent who is concealing his own view.

Ñātakānuyogādivaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Inquiry into Relatives, etc., is finished.

19. Paṭivedhānuyogādivaṇṇanā

19. The Exposition of the Inquiry into Penetration, etc.

218. Pariggahitavedanoti vacanena apariggahitavedanassa ‘‘sukhitosmi, dukkhitosmī’’ti jānanaṃ pajānanaṃ nāma na hotīti dasseti yogāvacarassa sukhumānampi vedanānaṃ paricchedanasamatthatañca.

218. By the words 'feeling that is comprehended,' it is shown that for one whose feeling is not comprehended, there is no true knowing or understanding such as 'I am happy' or 'I am miserable.' And it also shows the meditator's ability to discern even subtle feelings.

228. Lakkhaṇavacananti rūpabbhantaragamanaṃ saharūpabhāvo, bahiddhā nikkhamanaṃ vinārūpabhāvoti adhippāyo.

228. "The defining statement": the meaning is that entering within form is the state of being with form, while emerging externally is the state of being without form.

237. Imā khoti oḷāriko attapaṭilābho manomayo attapaṭilābho arūpo attapaṭilābhoti imā lokassa samaññā, yāhi tathāgato voharati aparāmasaṃ, yo sacco mogho vā siyā, tasmiṃ anupalabbhamānepi attani tadanupalabbhatoyeva parāmāsaṃ attadiṭṭhiṃ anuppādento loke attapaṭilābhoti pavattavohāravaseneva voharatīti ayamettha attho. Ettha ca paccattasāmaññalakkhaṇavasena puggalassa atthitaṃ paṭikkhipitvā lokavohārena atthitaṃ vadantena puggaloti koci sabhāvo natthīti vuttaṃ hoti. Sati hi tasmiṃ attano sabhāveneva atthitā vattabbā siyā, na lokavohārenāti. Iminā pana yathā sameti, yathā ca [Pg.63] parāmāso na hoti, evaṃ ito purimā ca atthavaṇṇanā yojetabbā.

237. 'These indeed'—the gross personal existence, the mind-made personal existence, and the formless personal existence—these are the world's designations, by which the Tathāgata communicates without grasping. Even when no self is found in that personal existence—be it real or unreal—precisely because it is not found, he does not generate grasping and the view of self, but communicates simply in accordance with the established convention in the world regarding 'personal existence.' This is the meaning here. And here, by rejecting the existence of a person in terms of specific and general characteristics, and stating its existence by way of worldly convention, it is said that there is no intrinsic nature called 'a person.' For if it existed, its existence would have to be asserted based on its own intrinsic nature, not on worldly convention. By this principle, the preceding explanations of meaning should be connected in such a way that they are consistent and that grasping does not arise.

Lokasammutikāraṇanti yasmā lokasammutivasena pavattaṃ, tasmā saccanti vuttaṃ hoti. Tathalakkhaṇanti tathakāraṇaṃ. Yasmā dhammānaṃ tathatāya pavattaṃ, tasmā saccanti dasseti.

'Having worldly convention as its reason' means: because it proceeds by way of worldly convention, it is therefore said to be a truth. 'Having suchness as its characteristic' means having suchness as its reason. Because it proceeds in accordance with the suchness of phenomena, it is therefore shown to be a truth.

Paṭivedhānuyogādivaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Inquiry into Penetration, etc., is finished.

Puggalakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on the Person is finished.

2. Parihānikathā

2. Discourse on Decline

1. Vādayuttiparihānikathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Exposition of the Discourse on Decline Due to Argumentation

239. ‘‘Dveme[Pg.64], bhikkhave, dhammā sekkhassa bhikkhuno parihānāya saṃvattantī’’ti (a. ni. 2.185) idaṃ suttaṃ arahato parihāniladdhiyā na nissayo, atha kho anāgāmiādīnaṃ parihāniladdhiyā, tasmā arahatopi parihāniṃ icchantīti ettha pi-saddena anāgāmissapi sakadāgāmissapīti yojetabbaṃ.

239. ‘These two things, bhikkhus, lead to the decline of a bhikkhu in training’ (AN 2.185)—this sutta is not a basis for the view of an arahant’s decline, but rather for the view of the decline of non-returners and the like. Therefore, in the statement ‘wishing for the decline even of an arahant,’ the word ‘even’ should be connected with ‘of a non-returner’ and ‘of a once-returner.’

‘‘Tatiyasmimpi mudindriyāva adhippetā. Tesañhi sabbesampi parihāni na hotīti tassa laddhī’’ti purimapāṭho, mudindriyesveva pana adhippetesu parikkhepo na kātabbo siyā, kato ca, tasmā ‘‘tatiyasmimpi tikkhindriyāva adhippetā. Tesañhi sabbesampi parihāni na hotīti tassa laddhī’’ti paṭhanti.

‘In the third case, too, those with dull faculties are intended. For there is no decline for any of them—this is his view.’ This is the earlier reading. However, if only those with dull faculties were intended, the limitation should not have been made, but it was made. Therefore, they recite: ‘In the third case, too, those with sharp faculties are intended. For there is no decline for any of them—this is his view.’

Ayoniso atthaṃ gahetvāti sotāpannoyeva niyatoti vuttoti soyeva na parihāyati, na itareti atthaṃ gahetvā. ‘‘Uparimaggatthāyā’’ti vuttaṃ atthaṃ aggahetvā niyatoti sotāpattiphalā na parihāyatīti etamatthaṃ gaṇhīti pana vadanti.

‘Having grasped the meaning improperly’ means having taken it that since it is said, ‘Only the stream-enterer is fixed,’ he alone does not decline, not the others. But some say that, without grasping the stated meaning ‘for the sake of the higher paths,’ one grasps this meaning: ‘He is fixed in that he does not fall away from the fruit of stream-entry.’

Vādayuttiparihānikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Decline Due to Argumentation is finished.

2. Ariyapuggalasaṃsandanaparihānivaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of Decline by Comparing Noble Persons

241. Yaṃ panetthātiādimhi dassanamaggaphale ṭhitassa anantaraṃ arahattappattiṃ, tato parihāyitvā tattha ca ṭhānaṃ icchanto puna vāyāmena tadanantaraṃ arahattappattiṃ na icchatīti vicāretabbametaṃ.

241. But regarding the passage beginning ‘As to this,’ it should be investigated whether one who is established in the fruit of the path of vision immediately attains arahantship, then falls away from it, and, while desiring to be established there, does not wish to attain arahantship again immediately through renewed effort.

262. Avasippatto jhānalābhīti sekkho vuttoti daṭṭhabbo. Puthujjano pana vasippatto avasippatto ca samayavimuttaasamayavimuttatantiyā aggahito, bhajāpiyamāno pana samāpattivikkhambhitānaṃ kilesānaṃ vasena samayavimuttabhāvaṃ bhajeyyāti vuttoti.

262. It should be understood that a learner is spoken of as one who has not attained mastery but is an obtainer of jhāna. A worldling, however, whether having attained mastery or not, is not included in the series of the temporarily liberated and the untemporarily liberated. But it is said that if he cultivates it, he may partake of the state of temporary liberation by means of the suppression of the defilements through the meditative attainments.

Ariyapuggalasaṃsandanaparihānivaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of Decline by Comparing Noble Persons is finished.

3. Suttasādhanaparihānivaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of Decline Proven by Suttas

265. Uttamahīnabhedo [Pg.65] ‘‘tatra yāyaṃ paṭipadā sukhā khippābhiññā, sā ubhayeneva paṇītā akkhāyatī’’tiādisuttavasena (dī. ni. 3.152) vutto. ‘‘Diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ muta’’nti ettha viya mutasaddo pattabbaṃ vadatīti āha ‘‘phusanāraha’’nti.

265. The distinction between superior and inferior is stated by way of the sutta passage (DN 3.223) beginning: ‘Therein, that practice which is pleasant and quick to direct knowledge is declared to be superior in both ways.’ Just as in the phrase ‘seen, heard, sensed,’ here the word ‘sensed’ speaks of what is to be attained; thus he says ‘worthy of contact.’

267. Appattaparihānāya ceva saṃvattanti yathākatasanniṭṭhānassa samayavimuttassāti adhippāyo.

267. The meaning is that for the temporarily liberated one whose resolution is established as made, it conduces to the non-decline of what has not yet been attained.

Suttasādhanaparihānivaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of Decline Proven by Suttas is finished.

Parihānikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Decline is finished.

3. Brahmacariyakathā

3. Discourse on the Holy Life

1. Suddhabrahmacariyakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Discourse on the Pure Holy Life

269. ‘‘Paranimmitavasavattideve [Pg.66] upādāya taduparī’’ti vuttaṃ, ‘‘tīhi, bhikkhave, ṭhānehī’’ti (a. ni. 9.21) pana suttassa vacanena heṭṭhāpi maggabhāvanampi na icchantīti viññāyati.

269. It is said: ‘With reference to the Paranimmitavasavattī devas and those above them’; but from the statement in the sutta (AN 9.21) beginning, ‘By three things, bhikkhus,’ it is understood that they do not wish even for the cultivation of the path below.

270. ‘‘Gihīnañceva ekaccānañca devānaṃ maggapaṭilābhaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhepo tassevā’’ti vuttaṃ, ‘‘yattha natthī’’ti pana okāsavasena puṭṭho puggalavasena tassa paṭikkhepo na yutto. Yadi ca tassāyaṃ adhippāyo, sakavādinā samānādhippāyattā na niggahetabbo.

270. It is said: ‘The refutation is made with reference to the attainment of the path by some householders and devas.’ But when asked about the location with the words, ‘Where is it not found?,’ a refutation based on the person is not proper. And if this is his intention, he should not be censured, because his intention is the same as the proponent’s.

271. Ekantarikapañhāti paravādīsakavādīnaṃ aññamaññaṃ pañhantarikā pañhā.

271. ‘Intervening questions’ means questions that intervene in the mutual questioning between the opponent and the proponent.

Suddhabrahmacariyakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Pure Holy Life is finished.

2. Saṃsandanabrahmacariyakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Discourse on the Holy Life by Comparison

273. Rūpāvacaramaggena hi so idhavihāyaniṭṭho nāma jātoti idaṃ ‘‘idha bhāvitamaggo hi anāgāmī idhavihāyaniṭṭho nāma hotī’’tiādikena laddhikittanena kathaṃ sametīti vicāretabbaṃ. Pubbe pana anāgāmī eva anāgāmīti vutto, idha jhānānāgāmisotāpannādikoti adhippāyo. Idha arahattamaggaṃ bhāvetvā idheva phalaṃ sacchikarontaṃ ‘‘idhaparinibbāyī’’ti vadati, idha pana maggaṃ bhāvetvā tattha phalaṃ sacchikarontaṃ ‘‘tatthaparinibbāyī arahā’’ti.

273. It should be investigated how the statement, ‘For by the form-sphere path he becomes one named “one whose finality is in this very life,”’ accords with the declaration of the view beginning: ‘For a non-returner whose path is developed here becomes one named “one whose finality is in this very life.”’ Previously, only a non-returner was called a non-returner; here the intention includes a non-returner who is a jhāna-attainer, a stream-enterer, and so on. One who develops the path to arahantship here and realizes the fruit right here is called ‘one who attains final Nibbāna here,’ while one who develops the path here and realizes the fruit there is called ‘an arahant who attains final Nibbāna there.’

Saṃsandanabrahmacariyakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Holy Life by Comparison is finished.

Brahmacariyakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Holy Life is finished.

4. Odhisokathāvaṇṇanā

4. Explanation of the Discourse on Limited Grief

274. Odhiso [Pg.67] odhisoti etassa atthaṃ dassento ‘‘ekadesena ekadesenā’’ti āha.

274. To show the meaning of ‘odhiso, odhiso,’ he said: ‘partially, partially.’

Odhisokathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Limited Grief is finished.

4. Jahatikathāvaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Discourse on Abandoning

1. Nasuttāharaṇakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discourse on Not Citing Suttas

280. Kiccasabbhāvanti tīhi pahātabbassa pahīnataṃ. Taṃ pana kiccaṃ yadi teneva maggena sijjhatīti laddhi, puthujjanakāle eva kāmarāgabyāpādā pahīnāti laddhīti etaṃ na sameti, tasmā puthujjanakāle pahīnānampi dassanamagge uppanne puna kadāci anuppattito tiṇṇaṃ maggānaṃ kiccaṃ sambhavatīti adhippāyo.

280. ‘The reality of the task’ means the abandonment of what is to be abandoned by the three paths. But if the view is that this task is accomplished by that very path, then the view that sensual desire and ill will are abandoned even at the time of a worldling would follow, but this is not consistent. Therefore, the intended meaning is that even though they are abandoned at the time of a worldling, since they might recur at some time when the path of seeing has arisen, the task of the three paths becomes possible.

Nasuttāharaṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Not Citing Suttas is finished.

Jahatikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Abandoning is finished.

5. Sabbamatthītikathā

5. The Discourse that All Exists

1. Vādayuttivaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Logic of Debate

282. Sabbasmiṃ sarīre sabbanti sirasi pādā pacchato cakkhūnīti evaṃ sabbaṃ sabbattha atthīti attho. Sabbasmiṃ kāleti bālakāle yuvatā, vuḍḍhakāle bālatā, evaṃ sabbasmiṃ kāle sabbaṃ. Sabbenākārenāti nīlākārena pītaṃ, pītākārena lohitanti evaṃ. Sabbesu dhammesūti cakkhusmiṃ sotaṃ, sotasmiṃ ghānanti evaṃ. Ayuttanti yogarahitaṃ vadati, taṃ pana ekasabhāvaṃ. Kathaṃ pana ekasabhāvassa yogarahitatāti taṃ dassento ‘‘nānāsabhāvānañhī’’tiādimāha. Dvinnañhi nānāsabhāvānaṃ aṅgulīnaṃ meṇḍakānaṃ vā aññamaññayogo hoti, na ekasseva sato, tasmā yo nānāsabhāvesu hoti yogo, tena rahitaṃ ekasabhāvaṃ ayoganti vuttaṃ. Idaṃ pucchatīti paravādīdiṭṭhiyā [Pg.68] micchādiṭṭhibhāvaṃ gahetvā uppannāya attano diṭṭhiyā sammādiṭṭhibhāvo atthīti vuttaṃ hoti.

282. ‘Everything in the entire body’ means: in the head are the feet, in the back are the eyes; thus everything exists everywhere—this is the meaning. ‘In all time’ means: in childhood there is youthfulness, in old age there is childhood; thus in all time there is everything. ‘In every aspect’ means: yellow in the aspect of blue, red in the aspect of yellow; thus. ‘In all phenomena’ means: the ear in the eye, the nose in the ear; thus. ‘Unconnected’ means devoid of connection; but that is of a single nature. But how can something of a single nature be devoid of connection? To show this, he said, ‘For of different natures…’ and so on. For there is a mutual connection between two things of different natures, such as two fingers or two rams, but not of a single existing thing. Therefore, a single nature is said to be ‘unconnected,’ that is, devoid of that connection which exists among different natures. When he asks this, it means that having taken the other debater's view to be a wrong view, it is said that one's own view, which has arisen, is a right view.

Vādayuttivaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Logic of Debate is finished.

2. Kālasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Connection of Time

285. Atītānāgataṃ pahāya paccuppannarūpameva appiyaṃ avibhajitabbaṃ karitvāti paccuppannasaddena rūpasaddena cāti ubhohipi paccuppannarūpameva vattabbaṃ katvāti vuttaṃ hoti. Paññattiyā avigatattāti etena idaṃ viññāyati ‘‘na rūpapaññatti viya vatthapaññatti sabhāvaparicchinne pavattā vijjamānapaññatti, atha kho pubbāpariyavasena pavattamānaṃ rūpasamūhaṃ upādāya pavattā avijjamānapaññatti, tasmā vatthabhāvassa odātabhāvavigame vigamāvattabbatā yuttā, na pana rūpabhāvassa paccuppannabhāvavigame’’ti.

285. ‘Having abandoned the past and future, and having made only present form something unpleasing and indivisible’ means that it is said that by both the word ‘present’ and the word ‘form,’ only present form should be spoken of. ‘Because designation has not departed’—by this it is understood: ‘The designation of an object, unlike the designation of form, is not a designation of something existent that proceeds within a delimited nature. Rather, it is a designation of something non-existent that proceeds in dependence on a collection of forms occurring in a sequence of prior and posterior. Therefore, it is proper that cessation should be spoken of when the state of whiteness of a substance ceases, but not when the state of presentness of form ceases.’

Kālasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Connection of Time is finished.

Vacanasodhanavaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Purification of Statement

288. Anāgataṃ vā paccuppannaṃ vā hutvā hotīti vuttanti ettha anāgataṃ anāgataṃ hutvā puna paccuppannaṃ hontaṃ hutvā hotīti, tathā paccuppannaṃ paccuppannaṃ hontaṃ pubbe anāgataṃ hutvā paccuppannaṃ hotīti hutvā hotīti vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Kiṃ te tampi hutvā hotīti tabbhāvāvigamato hutvāhotibhāvānuparamaṃ anupacchedaṃ pucchatīti adhippāyo yutto. Hutvā bhūtassa puna hutvā abhāvatoti anāgataṃ hutvā paccuppannabhūtassa puna anāgataṃ hutvā paccuppannābhāvato.

288. When it is said, ‘The future or the present, having been, is,’ here it should be understood that it is said ‘having been, is’ because the future, having been future, then becoming present, ‘having been, is’; and similarly, the present, being present, was formerly future and becomes present, thus it is said ‘having been, is.’ The proper intention of the question, ‘Why for you is that too ‘having been, is’?’ is that he asks about the non-cessation, the non-interruption, of the state of ‘having been, is’ due to the non-departure from that state. ‘Because of the non-existence, through having been again, of what has come to be through having been’ means: because of the non-existence in the present, through having been future again, of what had become present through having been future.

Yasmā tanti taṃ hutvā bhūtaṃ paccuppannaṃ yasmā anāgataṃ hutvā paccuppannaṃ hontaṃ ‘‘hutvā hotī’’ti saṅkhyaṃ gataṃ, tasmā dutiyampi ‘‘hutvā hotī’’ti vacanaṃ arahatīti paṭijānātīti adhippāyo. Evaṃ pana dhamme hutvāhotibhāvānuparamaṃ vadantassa adhamme sasavisāṇe nahutvāna hotibhāvānuparamo āpajjatīti adhippāyena ‘‘atha na’’ntiādimāha.

The intention is that he agrees as follows: ‘Because that present, which has come to be through having been, is designated ‘having been, is’ since, having been future, it becomes present, therefore it also deserves the second statement ‘having been, is’.’ But with the intention that for one who speaks of the non-cessation of the state of ‘having been, is’ in regard to phenomena, there would follow the non-cessation of the state of ‘not having been, is’ in regard to non-phenomena like a hare's horn, he says, ‘But if not…’ and so on.

Paṭikkhittanayenāti [Pg.69] kālanānattena. Paṭiññātanayenāti atthānānattena. Atthānānattaṃ icchantopi pana anāgatassa paccuppanne vuttaṃ hotibhāvaṃ, paccuppannassa ca anāgate vuttaṃ hutvābhāvaṃ kathaṃ paṭijānātīti vicāretabbaṃ. Atthānānattameva hi tena anuññāyati, na anāgate paccuppannabhāvo, paccuppanne vā anāgatabhāvoti. Purimaṃ paṭikkhittapañhaṃ parivattitvāti anuññātapañhassa hutvā hoti hutvā hotīti doso vuttoti avuttadosaṃ atikkamma paṭikkhittapañhaṃ puna gahetvā tena codetīti attho. Ettha ca atthānānattena hutvāhotīti anujānantassa doso kālanānattāyeva anāgataṃ paccuppannanti paṭikkhepena kathaṃ hotīti? Tasseva anujānanapaṭikkhepatoti adhippāyo.

‘By the rejected method’ means by the difference of time. ‘By the accepted method’ means by the non-difference of meaning. But even while wishing for non-difference of meaning, how does he accept the state of ‘is’ spoken of for the future in the present, and the state of ‘having been’ spoken of for the present in the future? This should be investigated. For only non-difference of meaning is permitted by him, not the state of the present in the future, nor the state of the future in the present. ‘Having reversed the former rejected question’ means: since the fault in the accepted question has been stated as ‘having been, is; having been, is,’ he bypasses the unstated fault, takes up the rejected question again, and challenges with it—this is the meaning. And here, for one who permits ‘having been, is’ by non-difference of meaning, how can there be the fault through the rejection ‘the future is the present’ based only on the difference of time? The intention is: from his very own permission and rejection.

Ekekanti anāgatampi na hutvā na hoti paccuppannampīti tadubhayaṃ gahetvā ‘‘ekekaṃ na hutvā na hoti na hutvā na hotī’’ti vuttaṃ, na ekekameva na hutvā na hoti na hutvā na hotīti. Esa nayo purimasmiṃ ‘‘ekekaṃ hutvā hoti hutvā hotī’’ti vacanepi. Anāgatassa hi ‘‘hutvā hotī’’ti nāmaṃ paccuppannassa cāti dvepi nāmāni saṅgahetvā ‘‘hutvā hoti hutvā hotī’’ti coditaṃ, tathā ‘‘na hutvā na hoti na hutvā na hotī’’ti cāti adhippāyo. Sabbato andhakārena pariyonaddho viyāti etena apariyonaddhena paṭijānitabbaṃ siyāti dasseti. Ettha ca purimanaye hutvā bhūtassa puna hutvāhotibhāvo codito, dutiyanaye anāgatādīsu ekekassa hutvāhotināmatāti ayaṃ viseso.

‘Each’ means: taking both ‘the future, not having been, is not’ and ‘the present…,’ it is said, ‘Each, not having been, is not; not having been, is not’; not that each one by itself is ‘not having been, is not; not having been, is not.’ This is the method also in the earlier statement, ‘Each, having been, is; having been, is.’ The intention is that the challenge ‘having been, is; having been, is’ is made by combining the two names—the name ‘having been, is’ for the future and for the present; and similarly for ‘not having been, is not; not having been, is not.’ ‘As if enveloped all around by darkness’—by this he shows that what is not enveloped should be acknowledged. And here, this is the distinction: in the first method, the state of ‘having been, is’ again for what has already come to be through having been is challenged; in the second method, it is the naming of each of the future, etc., as ‘having been, is.’

Vacanasodhanavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Purification of Statement is finished.

Atītañāṇādikathāvaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge of the Past and So On

290. Puna puṭṭho…pe… atthitāya paṭijānātīti ettha paccuppannaṃ ñāṇaṃ tenāti etena anuvattamānāpekkhanavacanena kathaṃ vuccatīti vicāretabbaṃ.

290. Herein, regarding the statement, ‘Again, when asked… he acknowledges its existence,’ it should be investigated how this is expressed by the phrase ‘present knowledge is by that,’ a statement implying continuation and expectation.

Atītañāṇādikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge of the Past and So On is finished.

Arahantādikathāvaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Discourse on the Arahant and So On

291. Yuttivirodho [Pg.70] arahato sarāgādibhāve puthujjanena anānattaṃ brahmacariyavāsassa aphalatāti evamādiko daṭṭhabbo.

291. The contradiction in reasoning—such as an Arahant possessing lust and so on, thus being no different from a worldling, and the living of the holy life being fruitless—should be understood.

Arahantādikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Arahant and So On is finished.

Padasodhanakathāvaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Discourse on the Analysis of Terms

295. Tena kāraṇenāti atītaatthisaddānaṃ ekatthattā atthisaddatthassa ca nvātītabhāvato ‘‘atītaṃ nvātītaṃ, nvātītañca atītaṃ hotī’’ti vuttaṃ hoti. Ettha pana atītādīnaṃ atthitaṃ vadantassa paravādissevāyaṃ doso yathā āpajjati, na pana ‘‘nibbānaṃ atthī’’ti vadantassa sakavādissa, tathā paṭipādetabbaṃ.

295. For that reason, because the words ‘past’ and ‘exists’ have a single meaning, and because the meaning of the word ‘exists’ is in fact the state of being past, it is said: ‘The past is indeed past, and what is indeed past is the past.’ Here, however, it should be demonstrated that this fault applies to the opponent who speaks of the existence of the past and so on, but not to one of our own school who says, ‘Nibbāna exists.’

Padasodhanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Analysis of Terms is finished.

Sabbamatthītikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse 'Everything Exists' is finished.

7. Ekaccaṃatthītikathā

7. The Discourse 'Something Exists'

1. Atītādiekaccakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Discourse on Some Aspects of the Past and So On

299. Tiṇṇaṃ rāsīnanti avipakkavipākavipakkavipākaavipākānaṃ. Vohāravasena avipakkavipākānaṃ atthitaṃ vadanto kathaṃ codetabboti vicāreti ‘‘kammupacayaṃ cittavippayuttaṃ saṅkhāraṃ icchantī’’ti.

299. Regarding ‘of the three heaps’: this refers to the results of the unripened, the results of the ripened, and non-results. He investigates how one who speaks, in a conventional sense, of the existence of the results of the unripened should be questioned, concluding: ‘They desire an accumulation of kamma, a formation dissociated from consciousness.’

Ekaccaṃatthītikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse 'Something Exists' is finished.

8. Satipaṭṭhānakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Explanation of the Discourse on the Establishments of Mindfulness

301. Lokuttarabhāvaṃ pucchanatthāyāti lokiyalokuttarāya sammāsatiyā satipaṭṭhānattā, lokuttarāyayeva vā paramatthasatipaṭṭhānattā tassā vasena lokuttarabhāvaṃ pucchanatthāyāti attho. Pabhedapucchāvasenāti [Pg.71] lokiyalokuttarasatipaṭṭhānasamudāyabhūtassa satipaṭṭhānassa pabhedānaṃ pucchāvasena.

301. The phrase ‘for the purpose of asking about the supramundane state’ means this: since the establishment of mindfulness consists of right mindfulness that is both mundane and supramundane, or since the establishment of mindfulness in the ultimate sense is exclusively supramundane, the purpose is to ask about its supramundane state. The phrase ‘by way of asking about the divisions’ refers to asking about the divisions of the establishment of mindfulness, which is an aggregate of the mundane and supramundane establishments of mindfulness.

Satipaṭṭhānakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Establishments of Mindfulness is finished.

9. Hevatthikathāvaṇṇanā

9. Explanation of the Discourse 'It Is So'

304. Ayoniso patiṭṭhāpitattāti avattabbuttarena upekkhitabbena patiṭṭhāpitattāti attho daṭṭhabbo.

304. The phrase ‘because of being improperly established’ should be understood to mean ‘because of being established in a way that should be met with equanimity as an unanswerable question.’

Hevatthikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse 'It Is So' is finished.

Mahāvaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Great Chapter is finished.

2. Dutiyavaggo

2. The Second Chapter

1. Parūpahāravaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Discourse on Contempt for Others

307. Adhimānikānaṃ sukkavissaṭṭhidassanaṃ vicāretabbaṃ. Te hi samādhivipassanāhi vikkhambhitarāgāva, bāhirakānampi ca kāmesu vītarāgānaṃ sukkavissaṭṭhiyā abhāvo vuttoti. Adhimānikapubbā pana adhippetā siyuṃ.

307. The occurrence of a seminal emission in those who are conceited should be investigated. For they have only suppressed lust by means of concentration and insight; and it has been said that there is an absence of seminal emission even for outsiders who are free from lust for sensual pleasures. However, those who were formerly conceited may be intended.

308. Vacasāyattheti nicchayatthe, ‘‘kiṃ kāraṇā’’ti pana kāraṇassa pucchitattā brahmacariyakathāyaṃ viya kāraṇattheti yuttaṃ.

308. The phrase 'for the sake of speech' means 'for the sake of certainty.' But since the reason is asked with the question, 'What is the reason?', it is fitting that it has the meaning of 'cause,' as in the discourse on the holy life.

Parūpahāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Contempt for Others is finished.

5. Vacībhedakathāvaṇṇanā

5. Explanation of the Discourse on the Division of Speech

326. Vacībhedakathāyaṃ lokuttaraṃ paṭhamajjhānaṃ samāpannoti paṭhamamaggaṃ sandhāya vadati, yasmā so dukkhanti vipassati, tasmā dukkhamicceva vācaṃ bhāsati, na samudayotiādīnīti adhippāyo.

326. In the Discourse on the Division of Speech, the statement 'one has attained the first supramundane jhāna' is said with reference to the first path. The intention is this: because one sees 'this is suffering,' one therefore utters only the word 'suffering,' not 'origination' and so on.

328. Yena [Pg.72] taṃ saddaṃ suṇātīti idaṃ vacīsamuṭṭhāpanakkhaṇe eva etaṃ saddaṃ suṇātīti icchite āropite vā yujjati.

328. The statement, 'By which one hears that sound,' is applicable at the very moment of originating speech, when it is wished or intended that 'one hears this sound.'

332. Lokuttaramaggakkhaṇe vacībhedaṃ icchato parassa abhibhūsuttāharaṇe adhippāyo vattabbo.

332. The intention of the opponent who desires a division of speech at the moment of the supramundane path is discerned in the adducing of the Abhibhū Sutta.

Vacībhedakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Division of Speech is finished.

7. Cittaṭṭhitikathāvaṇṇanā

7. Explanation of the Discourse on the Stability of Mind

335. Cittaṭṭhitikathāyaṃ cullāsīti…pe… ādivacanavasenāti āruppeyeva evaṃ yāvatāyukaṭṭhānaṃ vuttaṃ, na aññatthāti katvā paṭikkhipatīti adhippāyo. Etena pana ‘‘na tveva tepi tiṭṭhanti, dvīhi cittasamohitā’’ti (mahāni. 10 thokaṃ visadisaṃ) dutiyāpi aḍḍhakathā passitabbā. Purimāya ca vassasatādiṭṭhānānuññāya avirodho vibhāvetabbo. Muhuttaṃ muhuttanti pañho sakavādinā pucchito viya vutto, paravādinā pana pucchitoti daṭṭhabbo.

335. In the Discourse on the Stability of Mind, regarding the phrase 'by means of the initial statement "eighty-four thousand..." and so on,' the intention is that he rejects the opponent's view, thinking: 'It is only in the formless attainments that a duration for the entire lifespan is stated thus, not elsewhere.' By this, however, the second subcommentary should also be consulted: 'Indeed, they do not remain, being confused by two minds' (Mahāniddesa 10, slightly different). And the non-contradiction with the previous allowance of a duration of a hundred years and so on should be clarified. The question, 'For a moment? For a moment?' is stated as if asked by our own proponent, but it should be understood as having been asked by the opponent.

Cittaṭṭhitikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Stability of Mind is finished.

9. Anupubbābhisamayakathāvaṇṇanā

9. Explanation of the Discourse on Gradual Realization

339. Anupubbābhisamayakathāyaṃ athavātiādinā idaṃ dasseti – catunnaṃ ñāṇānaṃ ekamaggabhāvato na ekamaggassa bahubhāvāpatti, anupubbena ca sotāpattimaggaṃ bhāvetīti upapannanti paṭijānātīti.

339. In the Discourse on Gradual Realization, by the phrase beginning 'or...,' he shows this: since the four knowledges constitute a single path, there is no fault of that single path becoming multiple. And because one develops the path to stream-entry gradually, he acknowledges that this is logical.

344. Tadāti dassane pariniṭṭhite.

344. The word 'then' means: when the seeing is perfected.

345. Aṭṭhahi ñāṇehīti ettha paṭisambhidāñāṇehi saha aṭṭhasu gahitesu niruttipaṭibhānapaṭisambhidāhi sotāpattiphalasacchikiriyā kathaṃ hotīti vicāretabbaṃ.

345. Regarding the phrase 'with eight knowledges': here, when the eight are taken as including the knowledges of analytical discrimination, it should be investigated how the realization of the fruit of stream-entry occurs by means of the analytical discriminations of language and ready-wit.

Anupubbābhisamayakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Gradual Realization is finished.

10. Vohārakathāvaṇṇanā

10. Commentary on the Discourse on Conventional Speech

347. Vohārakathāyaṃ [Pg.73] udāhu sotādīnipīti ekantalokiyesu visayavisayīsu visayasseva lokuttarabhāvo, na visayīnanti natthettha kāraṇaṃ. Yathā ca visayīnaṃ lokuttarabhāvo asiddho, tathā visayassa saddāyatanassa. Tattha yathā asiddhalokuttarabhāvassa tassa lokuttaratā, evaṃ sotādīnaṃ āpannāti kinti tānipi lokuttarānīti attho daṭṭhabbo.

347. In the Discourse on Conventional Speech: Or is it that among the exclusively worldly sense objects and sense faculties, only the object is supramundane, not the faculty? There is no reason for this here. And just as the supramundane nature of the faculties is unestablished, so too is that of the sound-base as an object. In that case, just as supramundane status is applied to that whose supramundane nature is unestablished, so too it is applied to the ear faculty and so on. Thus, the meaning to be understood is: 'How, then, are they also supramundane?'

Yadi lokuttare paṭihaññeyya, lokuttaro siyāti attho na gahetabbo. Na hi lokuttare paṭihaññatīti parikappitepi saddassa lokuttarabhāvo atthīti adhippāyo. ‘‘Lokiyena ñāṇenā’’ti uddhaṭaṃ, ‘‘viññāṇenā’’ti pana pāḷi, tañca viññāṇaṃ sotasambandhena sotaviññāṇanti viññāyatīti. Anekantatāti lokiyena ñāṇena jānitabbato lokiyoti etassa hetussa lokiye lokuttare ca sambhavato anekantabhāvo siyāti adhippāyo.

The meaning 'If it were to be struck by the supramundane, it would be supramundane' should not be taken. For the intention is that even when it is conceived that 'it is not struck by the supramundane,' the sound does not have a supramundane nature. 'By worldly knowledge' is an extraction; the Pāḷi, however, is 'by consciousness,' and that consciousness is known as ear-consciousness because of its connection with the ear. Because of inconclusiveness: The intention is that since this reason—'it is worldly because it is to be known by worldly knowledge'—can exist in both the worldly and the supramundane, it would be inconclusive.

Vohārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Conventional Speech is finished.

11. Nirodhakathāvaṇṇanā

11. Commentary on the Discourse on Cessation

353. Dve dukkhasaccāni na icchatīti yesaṃ dvinnaṃ dvīhi nirodhehi bhavitabbaṃ, tāni dve dukkhasaccāni na icchatīti vuttaṃ hoti. Ye paṭisaṅkhāya lokuttarena ñāṇena aniruddhātiādinā paṭisaṅkhāya vinā niruddhā asamudācaraṇasaṅkhārā appaṭisaṅkhāniruddhāti dasseti, na uppajjitvā bhaṅgāti. Tena appaṭisaṅkhānirodho ca asamudācaraṇanirodhoti dassitaṃ hoti.

353. 'He does not accept the two truths of suffering' means that he does not accept those two truths of suffering for which there must be two kinds of cessation. By the words 'not ceased by reflective wisdom with supramundane knowledge,' and so on, he shows that formations that have ceased without reflection, due to non-arising, are 'ceased without reflection,' not by arising and breaking up. Thereby it is shown that cessation without reflection is cessation due to non-arising.

Nirodhakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Cessation is finished.

Dutiyavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Second Chapter is finished.

3. Tatiyavaggo

3. The Third Chapter

1. Balakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discourse on the Powers

354. Indriyaparopariyattaṃ [Pg.74] asādhāraṇanti yathā niddesato vitthārato sabbaṃ sabbākāraṃ ṭhānāṭṭhānādiṃ ajānantāpi ‘‘aṭṭhānametaṃ anavakāso, yaṃ diṭṭhisampanno puggalo kañci saṅkhāraṃ niccato upagaccheyyā’’tiādinā (a. ni. 1.268) ṭhānāṭṭhānāni uddesato saṅkhepato sāvakā jānanti, na evaṃ ‘‘āsayaṃ jānāti anusayaṃ jānātī’’tiādinā (paṭi. ma. 1.113) uddesamattenapi indriyaparopariyattaṃ jānantīti ‘‘asādhāraṇa’’nti āha. Therena pana saddhādīnaṃ indriyānaṃ tikkhamudubhāvajānanamattaṃ sandhāya ‘‘sattānaṃ indriyaparopariyattaṃ yathābhūtaṃ pajānāmī’’ti (paṭi. ma. 2.44) vuttaṃ, na yathāvuttaṃ indriyaparopariyattañāṇaṃ tathāgatabalanti ayamettha adhippāyo daṭṭhabbo. ‘‘Uddesato ṭhānāṭṭhānādimattajānanavasena paṭijānātī’’ti vuttaṃ, evaṃ pana paṭijānantena ‘‘tathāgatabalaṃ sāvakasādhāraṇa’’nti idampi evameva paṭiññātaṃ siyāti kathamayaṃ codetabbo siyā.

354. The knowledge of the disposition of faculties is called 'unshared' because, although disciples do not know in every way, in detail and by exposition, all about possibilities and impossibilities and so on, they still know possibilities and impossibilities in summary by way of a statement such as: 'It is impossible, it is no occasion, that a person accomplished in view would regard any formation as permanent' (AN 1.268). But they do not in the same way know the disposition of faculties even by a mere statement, such as 'He knows the inclination, he knows the underlying tendency' (Paṭis I 113); hence, it is called 'unshared.' The Elder, however, referring only to the knowledge of the sharpness and dullness of the faculties of faith and so on, said: 'I understand as it really is the disposition of the faculties of beings' (Paṭis II 44). The intention to be understood here is that this is not the knowledge of the disposition of faculties that is the Tathāgata's power. It is said, 'He professes it by way of knowing merely possibilities and impossibilities, etc., from a summary statement.' But if one professes it in this way, one might also profess in the very same way that 'the Tathāgata's power is shared with disciples.' How then could this person be censured?

356. Sesesu paṭikkhepo sakavādissa ṭhānāṭṭhānañāṇādīnaṃ sādhāraṇāsādhāraṇattā tattha sādhāraṇapakkhaṃ sandhāyāti adhippāyo.

356. The intention is that the refutation in the remaining cases, for the proponent of his own thesis, refers to the shared aspect, because the knowledges of possibilities and impossibilities, etc., are both shared and unshared.

Balakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Powers is finished.

2. Ariyantikathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discourse concerning the Noble Ones

357. Saṅkhāre sandhāya paṭijānantassa dvinnaṃ phassānaṃ samodhānaṃ kathaṃ āpajjati yathāvuttanayenāti vicāretabbaṃ. Parikappanavasena āropetvā ṭhapetabbatāya satto ‘‘paṇidhī’’ti vutto. So pana ekasmimpi āropetvā na ṭhapetabboti ekasmimpi āropetvā ṭhapetabbena tena rahitatā vuttā.

357. It should be investigated how, for one who makes a claim with reference to formations, the convergence of two contacts comes about in the way stated. A being is called a 'postulate' because it is to be posited by way of conceptual superimposition. But since it should not be posited by superimposing it on even one thing, it is said to be devoid of that which is to be posited by superimposing it on even one thing.

Ariyantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse concerning the Noble Ones is finished.

4. Vimuccamānakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Discourse on Being Liberated

366. Jhānena [Pg.75] vikkhambhanavimuttiyā vimuttaṃ cittaṃ maggakkhaṇe samucchedavimuttiyā vimuccamānaṃ nāma hotīti etissā laddhiyā ko dosoti vicāretabbaṃ. Yadi vippakataniddese doso, tatrāpi tena vimuccamānatāya ‘‘vimuttaṃ vimuccamāna’’nti vuttaṃ. Sati ca dose uppādakkhaṇe vimuttaṃ, vayakkhaṇe vimuccamānanti vimuttavimuccamānavacanassa na codetabbaṃ siyā, atha kho vimuccamānavacanamevāti. Ekadesena, ekadese vā vimuccamānassa ca vimuttakiriyāya ekadeso visesanaṃ hotīti ‘‘bhāvanapuṃsaka’’nti vuttaṃ. Kaṭādayoti kaṭapaṭādayo. Ekeneva cittenāti ekeneva phalacittenāti adhippāyo.

366. It should be investigated what fault there is in this view: 'The mind freed by the liberation of suppression through jhāna is, at the moment of the path, in the process of being freed by the liberation of eradication.' If there is a fault in the scattered explanation, even there it is said 'freed, being freed' because of its state of being freed. And if there is a fault, the statement 'freed, being freed'—meaning freed at the moment of arising and being freed at the moment of dissolution—should not be censured, but only the statement 'being freed.' Because a part of the action of being freed is a qualifier of 'being freed' in part, or in one part, it is called a 'verbal noun in the neuter.' 'Kaṭa, etc.' means 'kaṭa, paṭa, etc.' 'By a single mind' means by a single fruition-mind; this is the intention.

Vimuccamānakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Being Liberated is finished.

5. Aṭṭhamakakathāvaṇṇanā

5. Commentary on the Eighth Discourse

368. Anulomagotrabhukkhaṇepi asamudācarantā maggakkhaṇepi pahīnā eva nāma bhaveyyunti laddhi uppannāti adhippāyena anulomagotrabhuggahaṇaṃ karoti.

368. The view has arisen that even if defilements do not occur at the moment of conformity and change-of-lineage, they are indeed abandoned at the moment of the path. With this intention, he posits the concept of conformity and change-of-lineage.

Aṭṭhamakakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Eighth Discourse is concluded.

6. Aṭṭhamakassa indriyakathāvaṇṇanā

6. Exposition of the Discourse on the Faculties in the Eighth Discourse

371. Indriyāni paṭilabhati appaṭiladdhindriyattā anindriyabhūtāni saddhādīni niyyānikāni bhāvento indriyāni paṭilabhati, na pana indriyāni bhāventoti adhippāyo.

371. He attains the faculties. By developing faith and so on—which are conducive to liberation and which, because the faculties have not yet been attained, are in a state of non-faculties—one attains the faculties. The meaning is that this is not done by developing what are already faculties.

Aṭṭhamakassa indriyakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Faculties in the Eighth Discourse is concluded.

7. Dibbacakkhukathāvaṇṇanā

7. Exposition of the Discourse on the Divine Eye

373. Upatthaddhanti [Pg.76] yathā visayānubhāvagocarehi visiṭṭhaṃ hoti, tathā paccayabhūtena katabalādhānanti attho. Taṃmattamevāti purimaṃ maṃsacakkhumattameva dhammupatthaddhaṃ na hotīti attho. Anāpāthagatanti maṃsacakkhunā gahetabbaṭṭhānaṃ āpāthaṃ nāgataṃ. Ettha ca visayassa dīpakaṃ ānubhāvagocarānameva asadisataṃ vadanto yādiso maṃsacakkhussa visayoti visayaggahaṇaṃ na visayavisesadassanatthaṃ, atha kho yādise visaye ānubhāvagocaravisesā honti, tādisassa rūpavisayassa dassanatthanti dīpeti, sadisassa vā visayassa ānubhāvagocaravisesova visesaṃ.

373. 'Supported': the meaning is that it is strengthened by a supporting condition so that it becomes distinguished in its sphere of influence and experience of objects. 'Just that much': the meaning is that the previous mere fleshly eye is not what is supported by the Dhamma. 'Not come into range': it has not come into the range of what can be grasped by the fleshly eye. And here, explaining the object and speaking of the incomparability of just the spheres of influence and experience, when he says, 'such is the object of the fleshly eye,' the mention of 'object' is not for the purpose of seeing a specific object. Rather, he shows that it is for the purpose of seeing the kind of form-object in which there are specific spheres of influence and experience. Or, the distinction is simply the specific sphere of influence and experience with regard to a similar object.

Na ca maṃsacakkhumeva dibbacakkhūti icchatīti dhammupatthaddhakāle purimaṃ maṃsacakkhumevāti na icchatīti adhippāyo. Maṃsacakkhussa uppādo maggoti maṃsacakkhupaccayatādassanatthameva vuttaṃ, na tena anupādinnatāsādhanatthaṃ. Rūpāvacarikānanti rūpāvacarajjhānapaccayena uppannāni mahābhūtāni rūpāvacarikānīti so icchatīti adhippāyo. Esa nayo ‘‘arūpāvacarikāna’’nti etthāpi. Arūpāvacarakkhaṇe rūpāvacaracittassa abhāvā paṭikkhipatīti tasmiṃyeva khaṇe rūpāvacaraṃ hutvā arūpāvacaraṃ na jātanti paṭikkhipatīti adhippāyo.

The meaning of 'He does not hold that the divine eye is just the fleshly eye' is that he does not hold that at the time it is supported by the Dhamma it is just the previous fleshly eye. The statement 'the arising of the fleshly eye is the path' is said only to show its nature as a condition for the fleshly eye, not to establish that it is not sustained by clinging. 'Of the form realm': the meaning is that he holds that the great elements that have arisen conditioned by a form-realm jhāna are 'of the form realm.' This same method applies also to 'of the formless realm.' The meaning of 'he rejects it because of the absence of form-realm consciousness at the moment of the formless realm' is that he rejects that at that very moment, having been of the form realm, it is born as of the formless realm.

374. Kiñcāpi dibbacakkhuno dhammupatthaddhassa paññācakkhubhāvaṃ na icchati, yena tīṇi cakkhūni dhammupatthambhena cakkhuntarabhāvaṃ vadato bhaveyyunti adhippāyo.

374. The meaning is that although he does not hold that the divine eye, when supported by the Dhamma, becomes the wisdom eye, for one who says this, the three eyes would become different kinds of eyes through the support of the Dhamma.

Dibbacakkhukathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Divine Eye is concluded.

9. Yathākammūpagatañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

9. Exposition of the Discourse on the Knowledge of How Beings Fare According to Their Kamma

377. Dibbena cakkhunā yathākammūpage satte pajānātīti yathākammūpagatañāṇassa upanissaye dibbacakkhumhi karaṇaniddeso kato, na yathākammūpagatajānanakiccake. Taṃkiccakeyeva pana paro karaṇaniddesaṃ maññatīti āha ‘‘ayoniso gahetvā’’ti. Yathākammūpagatañāṇameva dibbacakkhunti laddhīti iminā vacanena dibbacakkhumeva yathākammūpagatañāṇanti evaṃ [Pg.77] bhavitabbaṃ. Eva-saddo ca aṭṭhāne ṭhito dibbacakkhusaddassa parato yojetabbo. Yathākammūpagatañāṇassa hi so dibbacakkhuto atthantarabhāvaṃ nivāreti. Na hi dibbacakkhussa yathākammūpagatañāṇatoti.

377. In the phrase 'with the divine eye he understands beings faring according to their kamma,' the instrumental case indicates the divine eye as a proximate cause for the knowledge of how beings fare according to their kamma, not as the instrument for the function of knowing how they fare. But the other person thinks the instrumental case indicates the function itself; thus it is said, 'having grasped it improperly.' Regarding the view 'The knowledge of how beings fare according to kamma is the divine eye,' this statement should be understood as 'The divine eye is the knowledge of how beings fare according to kamma.' The word 'eva' is misplaced; it should be placed after the word 'divine eye.' For it denies that the knowledge of how beings fare according to kamma is something different from the divine eye, not that the divine eye is something different from the knowledge of how beings fare according to kamma.

Yathākammūpagatañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Knowledge of How Beings Fare According to Their Kamma is concluded.

10. Saṃvarakathāvaṇṇanā

10. Exposition of the Discourse on Restraint

379. Cātumahārājikānaṃ saṃvarāsaṃvarasabbhāvo āṭānāṭiyasuttena pakāsitoti ‘‘tāvatiṃse deve upādāyā’’ti āha. Evaṃ sati sugatikathāyaṃ ‘‘tāvatiṃse saṅgahitānaṃ pubbadevānaṃ surāpānaṃ, sakkadevānaṃ surāpānanivāraṇaṃ suyyati, taṃ tesaṃ surāpānaṃ asaṃvaro na hotī’’ti vattabbaṃ hoti.

379. Since the existence of restraint and non-restraint among the devas of the Four Great Kings is revealed by the Āṭānāṭiya Sutta, he said, 'taking the Tāvatiṃsa devas as the starting point.' This being so, in the discussion on good destinations, it would have to be said: 'The drinking of liquor by the former devas included among the Tāvatiṃsa is heard of, as is the prevention of liquor drinking by Sakka's devas; that drinking of liquor by them is not non-restraint.'

Saṃvarakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Restraint is concluded.

Tatiyavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Third Chapter is concluded.

4. Catutthavaggo

4. The Fourth Chapter

1. Gihissa arahātikathāvaṇṇanā

1. Exposition of the Discourse on Whether a Householder Can Be an Arahant

387. Gihisaṃyojanasampayuttatāyāti etena gihichandarāgasampayuttatāya eva ‘‘gihī’’ti vuccati, na byañjanamattenāti imamatthaṃ dasseti.

387. 'Because of being associated with the household fetter': by this he shows the following meaning: one is called a 'householder' precisely because of being associated with household desire and lust, not merely by designation.

Gihissa arahātikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Whether a Householder Can Be an Arahant is concluded.

2. Upapattikathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discourse on Rebirth

388. Ayonisoti opapātiko hoti, tattha tassāyevūpapattiyā parinibbāyīti atthaṃ gahetvāti adhippāyo.

388. The intention is that, having taken the meaning of 'not from a womb' as 'he is of spontaneous birth,' one understands that in that very rebirth he is one who attains final Nibbāna.

Upapattikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Rebirth is concluded.

4. Samannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Discourse on Being Endowed

393. Samannāgatakathāyaṃ [Pg.78] pattiṃ sandhāya paṭijānanto catūhi khandhehi viya samannāgamaṃ na vadatīti tassa catūhi phassādīhi samannāgamappasaṅgo yathā hoti, taṃ vattabbaṃ.

393. In the Discourse on Being Endowed, when one acknowledges an attainment, one does not speak of endowment in the same way as with the four aggregates. Therefore, it should be stated how the consequence of being endowed with the four beginning with contact applies to him.

Samannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Being Endowed is concluded.

5. Upekkhāsamannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā

5. Commentary on the Discourse on Being Endowed with Equanimity

397. Imināva nayenāti ‘‘tattha dve samannāgamā’’tiādi sabbaṃ yojetabbaṃ. Tattha pattidhammo nāma rūpāvacarādīsu aññatarabhūmiṃ paṭhamajjhānādivasena pāpuṇantassa paṭhamajjhānādīnaṃ paṭilābho. Niruddhesupi paṭhamajjhānādīsu anirujjhanato cittavippayutto saṅkhāro, yena supanto sajjhāyādipasuto ca tehi samannāgatoti vuccatīti vadanti.

397. By this same method, everything beginning with 'Therein are two endowments' should be connected. Herein, the state of attainment is the acquisition of the first jhānas and so on for one who reaches one or another plane among the form realm planes and so on by way of the first jhānas and so on. Even when the first jhānas and so on have ceased, a formation dissociated from mind does not cease, on account of which one who is sleeping or engaged in recitation and so on is said to be endowed with them—so they say.

Upekkhāsamannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Being Endowed with Equanimity is concluded.

6. Bodhiyābuddhotikathāvaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Discourse on 'A Buddha by Enlightenment'

398. Tasmāti yathāvuttassa ñāṇadvayassa bodhibhāvato. Taṃ aggahetvā pattidhammavasena natthitāya bodhiyā samannāgato buddhoti yesaṃ laddhi, te sandhāya pucchā ca anuyogo ca sakavādissāti yojanā daṭṭhabbā.

398. 'Therefore' means: because the aforesaid pair of knowledges has the nature of enlightenment. The connection should be understood thus: the question and the cross-question are from the proponent, directed at those whose view is that, without grasping that, one is a Buddha endowed with an enlightenment that does not exist by way of an attained state.

Bodhiyābuddhotikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on 'A Buddha by Enlightenment' is concluded.

7. Lakkhaṇakathāvaṇṇanā

7. Commentary on the Discourse on the Marks

402. Bodhisattameva sandhāya vuttanti lakkhaṇasamannāgatesu abodhisatte chaḍḍetvā bodhisattameva gahetvā idaṃ suttaṃ vuttaṃ, na [Pg.79] bodhisattato añño lakkhaṇasamannāgato natthīti. Nāpi sabbesaṃ lakkhaṇasamannāgatānaṃ bodhisattatā, tasmā asādhakanti adhippāyo.

402. 'It was said with reference only to the Bodhisatta' means that this sutta was spoken having taken only the Bodhisatta, after excluding non-Bodhisattas from among those endowed with the marks; it does not mean that there is no one other than the Bodhisatta who is endowed with the marks. Nor is it the case that all who are endowed with the marks are Bodhisattas. Therefore, the intention is that this is not a conclusive proof.

Lakkhaṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Marks is concluded.

8. Niyāmokkantikathāvaṇṇanā

8. Commentary on the Discourse on Entering the Fixed Course

403. Ṭhapetvā pāramīpūraṇanti pāramīpūraṇeneva te ‘‘bodhiyā niyatā narā’’ti vuccantīti dasseti. Kevalañhi nantiādinā ca na niyāmakassa nāma kassaci uppannattā byākarontīti dasseti.

403. 'Setting aside the fulfillment of the perfections' shows that it is only through the fulfillment of the perfections that they are called 'persons destined for enlightenment.' And by the words beginning with 'kevalañhi na,' it shows that they do not make a prediction because of the arising of some so-called determining factor.

Niyāmokkantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Entering the Fixed Course is concluded.

10. Sabbasaṃyojanappahānakathāvaṇṇanā

10. Commentary on the Discourse on the Abandoning of All Fetters

413. Nippariyāyenevāti avasiṭṭhassa pahātabbassa abhāvā ‘‘sabbasaṃyojanappahāna’’nti imaṃ pariyāyaṃ aggahetvā arahattamaggena pajahanato evāti gaṇhātīti vuttaṃ hoti. Appahīnassa abhāvāti avasiṭṭhassa pahātabbassa abhāvā paṭijānātīti vadanti, tathā ‘‘anavasesappahāna’’nti etthāpi. Evaṃ sati tena attano laddhiṃ chaḍḍetvā sakavādissa laddhiyā paṭiññātanti āpajjati.

413. 'Unconditionally' means: it is said that one understands this is simply from abandoning by means of the path of arahantship—without taking up this method 'the abandoning of all fetters'—because there is nothing remaining to be abandoned. 'Because of the absence of the unabandoned' means: they say that one acknowledges because there is nothing remaining to be abandoned; similarly also in the case of 'abandoning without remainder.' This being so, it follows that he has acknowledged the proponent's view after having abandoned his own.

Sabbasaṃyojanappahānakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Abandoning of All Fetters is concluded.

Catutthavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Fourth Chapter is concluded.

5. Pañcamavaggo

5. The Fifth Chapter

1. Vimuttikathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discourse on Liberation

418. Phalañāṇaṃ na hotīti ‘‘vimuttānī’’ti vā tadaṅgavimuttiyādibhāvato maggena pahīnānaṃ puna anuppattito ca ‘‘avimuttānī’’ti vā [Pg.80] na vattabbānīti adhippāyo. Gotrabhuñāṇañcettha vipassanāggahaṇena gahitanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

418. It is not that there is no fruition-knowledge. The intention is that they should not be called 'liberated' on account of being in a state of liberation by substitution and so on, nor 'unliberated' on account of the non-rearising of what was abandoned by the path. And it should be understood that herein the change-of-lineage knowledge is included by the term 'insight'.

Vimuttikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Liberation is concluded.

2. Asekhañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discourse on the Adept's Knowledge

421. Na panetaṃ asekhanti etena asekhavisayattā asekhameva ñāṇanti parassa laddhi, na pana asekhassāti imamatthaṃ dasseti.

421. By the words 'But this is not the adept's knowledge,' this meaning is shown: the other's view is that 'the knowledge is the adept's knowledge because its domain is the adept'; but the proponent's view is that it is not of the adept.

Asekhañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Adept's Knowledge is concluded.

3. Viparītakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discourse on Perversion

424. Na pathavīyevāti lakkhaṇapathavīyeva, sasambhārapathavīyeva vā na hotīti attho. Anicce niccantiādivipariyeso pana viparītañāṇaṃ nāmāti aññāṇepi ñāṇavohāraṃ āropetvā vadatīti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

424. ‘Not just the earth’ means it is not merely earth as a characteristic, or earth with its components. But the perversion of perceiving the permanent in the impermanent, and so on, is called ‘perverted knowledge.’ It should be understood that one speaks by superimposing the designation ‘knowledge’ even on ignorance.

Viparītakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Perversion is finished.

4. Niyāmakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Discourse on the Fixed Course

428-431. Ñāṇaṃ atthi, yaṃ saccānulomaṃ maggañāṇānugatikaṃ passanto bhagavā ‘‘bhabbo’’ti jānātīti laddhi. Paṭhamapañhameva catutthaṃ katvāti ettha ‘‘niyatassa aniyāmagamanāyā’’ti viparītānuyogato pabhuti gaṇetvā ‘‘catuttha’’nti āha.

428-431. The view is that there is a knowledge that conforms to the truth and follows the path-knowledge, seeing which the Blessed One knows, ‘He is capable.’ As to ‘having made the first question the fourth,’ here he said ‘fourth,’ having counted onwards from the reversed cross-question, ‘for the going away from the fixed course of one who is fixed.’

Niyāmakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Fixed Course is finished.

5. Paṭisambhidākathāvaṇṇanā

5. Commentary on the Discourse on the Analytical Knowledges

432-433. Yaṃkiñci ariyānaṃ ñāṇaṃ, sabbaṃ lokuttaramevāti gaṇhantenapi sabbaṃ ñāṇaṃ paṭisambhidāti na sakkā vattuṃ. Anariyānampi hi ñāṇaṃ ñāṇamevāti[Pg.81]. Tassa vā ñāṇataṃ na icchatīti vattabbaṃ. Pathavīkasiṇasammutiyaṃ samāpattiñāṇaṃ sandhāyāti anariyassa etaṃ ñāṇaṃ sandhāyāti adhippāyo siyā.

432-433. Even one who holds that whatever knowledge noble ones have is entirely supramundane cannot say that all knowledge is analytical knowledge. For the knowledge of the ignoble, too, is indeed knowledge. Or, it should be said that one does not accept its nature as knowledge. The intention might be that this is with reference to the knowledge of attainment in the convention of the earth kasiṇa, that is, with reference to this knowledge of an ignoble person.

Paṭisambhidākathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Analytical Knowledges is finished.

6. Sammutiñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

6. Explanation of the Discourse on Conventional Knowledge

434-435. Saccanti vacanasāmaññena ubhayassapi saccasāmaññattaṃ gahetvā vadatīti dassento ‘‘tatthā’’tiādimāha.

434-435. To show that he speaks by taking the commonality of truth in both cases through the common expression ‘truth,’ he says, ‘Therein,’ etc.

Sammutiñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Conventional Knowledge is finished.

7. Cittārammaṇakathāvaṇṇanā

7. Explanation of the Discourse on Mental Objects

436-438. Phassassa phusanalakkhaṇaṃ manasikarototi etena purimā vattabbapaṭiññā anupadadhammamanasikārato aññaṃ samudāyamanasikāraṃ sandhāya katāti dasseti.

436-438. By this—‘He attends to the characteristic of contact as touching’—it is shown that the previous declaration that was to be stated was made with reference to attention to a collection, which is different from attention to phenomena in sequence.

Cittārammaṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Mental Objects is finished.

8. Anāgatañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge of the Future

439-440. Sabbasmimpīti ‘‘pāṭaliputtassa kho’’tiādinā anāgate ñāṇanti vuttanti anāgatabhāvasāmaññena anantarānāgatepi ñāṇaṃ icchantīti vuttaṃ hoti.

439-440. Regarding ‘In all’: since by the passage beginning, ‘Of Pāṭaliputta…,’ it is said ‘knowledge of the future,’ it means that by the commonality of futurity, knowledge of the immediately succeeding future is also intended.

Anāgatañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge of the Future is finished.

9. Paṭuppannañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

9. Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge of the Present

441-442. Vacanaṃ [Pg.82] nissāyāti atthato āpannaṃ vacanaṃ, anujānanavacanaṃ vā nissāya. Santatiṃ sandhāyāti bhaṅgānupassanānaṃ bhaṅgato anupassanāsantatiṃ sandhāyāti adhippāyo.

441-442. ‘Depending on speech’ means depending on speech that has attained the meaning, or on assenting speech. ‘With reference to continuity’ means the intention is with reference to the continuity of contemplation of dissolution for those who contemplate dissolution.

Paṭuppannañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge of the Present is finished.

10. Phalañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

10. Explanation of the Discourse on Fruition Knowledge

443-444. Buddhānaṃ viyāti yathā buddhā sabbappakāraphalaparopariyattajānanavasena attano eva ca balena phalaṃ jānanti, evanti vuttaṃ hoti.

443-444. ‘Like the Buddhas’: this means it is said that just as the Buddhas know the fruit by their own power and by means of the knowledge that comprehends the fruit of others in all its aspects, so it is.

Phalañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Fruition Knowledge is finished.

Pañcamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Fifth Chapter is finished.

Mahāpaṇṇāsako samatto.

The Great Fifty is finished.

6. Chaṭṭhavaggo

6. The Sixth Chapter

1. Niyāmakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Discourse on the Fixed Course

445-447. Aniyato nāma na hotīti yathā micchattaniyatassa bhavantare aniyataṃ nāma hoti, evaṃ etassa kadācipi aniyatatā na hotīti yo niyāmo, so asaṅkhatoti adhippāyo.

445-447. ‘There is indeed no uncertainty’ means that just as for one fixed in wrongness there is indeed uncertainty in a future existence, so for this one there is never any uncertainty. The intention is that the fixed course is the unconditioned.

Niyāmakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Fixed Course is finished.

2. Paṭiccasamuppādakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Discourse on Dependent Origination

451. Kāraṇaṭṭhena ṭhitatāti kāraṇabhāvoyeva. Etena ca dhammānaṃ kāraṇabhāvo dhammaṭṭhitatāti etamatthaṃ dasseti. Tathā ‘‘dhammaniyāmatā’’ti etthāpi.

451. ‘Stability in the sense of a cause’ means simply the state of being a cause. And by this it shows the meaning that the causal nature of phenomena is the stability of phenomena. Likewise also in the case of ‘the fixed orderliness of phenomena’.

Paṭiccasamuppādakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Discourse on Dependent Origination is finished.

3. Saccakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of the Discourse on Truth

452-454. Vatthusaccanti [Pg.83] jātiyādi kāmataṇhādi sammādiṭṭhiādi ca. Bādhanapabhavaniyyānikalakkhaṇehi lakkhaṇasaccaṃ bādhanādi.

452-454. ‘Truth as basis’ means birth, etc., sensual craving, etc., and right view, etc. ‘Truth as characteristic,’ by means of the characteristics of affliction, origination, and escape, is affliction, etc.

Saccakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Discourse on Truth is finished.

5. Nirodhasamāpattikathāvaṇṇanā

5. Explanation of the Discourse on the Attainment of Cessation

457-459. Kariyamānā karīyatīti arūpakkhandhānaṃ pavattamānānaṃ samathavipassanānukkamena appavatti sādhīyatīti attho. Saṅkhatāsaṅkhatalakkhaṇānaṃ pana abhāvenāti vadanto sabhāvadhammataṃ paṭisedheti. Vodānañca vuṭṭhānapariyāyova. Asaṅkhatabhāve kāraṇaṃ na hoti sabhāvadhammattāsādhakattāti adhippāyo.

457-459. ‘Being effected, it is effected’: the meaning is that the non-occurrence of the occurring formless aggregates is accomplished by the sequence of serenity and insight. But by saying ‘through the absence of the characteristics of the conditioned and the unconditioned,’ he rejects an intrinsic nature. And ‘cleansing’ is just a synonym for emergence. The intention is that in the unconditioned state there is no cause, because it does not serve to establish an intrinsic nature.

Nirodhasamāpattikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Discourse on the Attainment of Cessation is finished.

Chaṭṭhavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Sixth Chapter is finished.

7. Sattamavaggo

7. The Seventh Chapter

1. Saṅgahitakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Discourse on What Is Connected

471-472. Saṅgahitāti sambandhā.

471-472. ‘Connected’ means related.

Saṅgahitakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Discourse on What Is Connected is finished.

2. Sampayuttakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Discourse on What Is Associated

473-474. Nānattavavatthānaṃ natthīti vadanto ‘‘tilamhi telaṃ anupaviṭṭha’’nti vacanameva na yujjatīti ‘‘na heva’’nti paṭikkhittanti dasseti.

473-474. It shows that for one who says, ‘There is no determination of difference,’ the very statement ‘Oil has entered the sesame seed’ is not fitting; and that ‘Not so’ is the rejection.

Sampayuttakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Discourse on What Is Associated is finished.

3. Cetasikakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of the Discourse on Mental Factors

475-477. Phassādīnaṃ [Pg.84] ekuppādatādivirahitā sahajātatā natthīti āha ‘‘sampayuttasahajātataṃ sandhāyā’’ti.

475-477. It is said with reference to ‘association and co-nascence’ that for contact and the others there is no co-nascence that is devoid of simultaneous arising, etc.

Cetasikakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Discourse on Mental Factors is finished.

4. Dānakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Explanation of the Discourse on Giving

478. Deyyadhammavasena codetunti yadi cetasikova dhammo dānaṃ, ‘‘diyyatīti dāna’’nti imināpi atthena cetasikasseva dānabhāvo āpajjatīti codetunti attho.

478. ‘They object by way of the thing to be given’: the meaning is that they object that if giving were only a mental factor, then even by the meaning ‘it is given, therefore it is a gift,’ it would follow that the nature of a gift belongs only to the mental factor.

479. Aniṭṭhaphalantiādi acetasikassa dhammassa dānabhāvadīpanatthaṃ vuttanti phaladānabhāvadīpanatthaṃ na vuttanti attho daṭṭhabbo. Aniṭṭhaphalantiādinā acetasikassa dhammassa phaladānaṃ vuttaṃ viya hoti, na dānabhāvo, tannivāraṇatthañcetamāhāti. Evañca katvā anantaramevāha ‘‘na hi acetasiko annādidhammo āyatiṃ vipākaṃ detī’’ti. Iṭṭhaphalabhāvaniyamanatthanti deyyadhammo viya kenaci pariyāyena aniṭṭhaphalatā dānassa natthi, ekantaṃ pana iṭṭhaphalamevāti niyamanatthanti attho.

479. The meaning should be understood thus: the passage beginning ‘undesirable fruit’ is stated to clarify the nature of giving with respect to a non-mental phenomenon, not to clarify the nature of its giving a fruit. By the passage beginning ‘undesirable fruit,’ it seems as if the giving of a fruit by a non-mental phenomenon is stated, but not its nature as a gift; this is said to prevent that. And having stated this, he immediately says: ‘For a non-mental phenomenon such as food does not give a result in the future.’ ‘For the purpose of restricting it to the state of being a desirable fruit’: the meaning is that, whereas a thing to be given might in some way have an undesirable fruit, this is not the case for giving; it is exclusively a desirable fruit. This is the meaning of ‘for the purpose of restriction’.

Itarenāti ‘‘diyyatīti dāna’’nti iminā pariyāyena. Na pana ekenatthenāti ‘‘deyyadhammova dāna’’nti imaṃ sakavādīvādaṃ nivattetuṃ ‘‘saddhā hiriya’’ntiādikaṃ suttasādhanaṃ paravādīvāde yujjati, ‘‘idhekacco annaṃ detī’’tiādikañca, ‘‘cetasikova dhammo dāna’’nti imaṃ nivattetuṃ ‘‘cetasiko dhammo dāna’’nti imaṃ pana sādhetuṃ ‘‘saddhā hiriya’’ntiādikaṃ sakavādīvāde yujjati, ‘‘idhekacco annaṃ detī’’tiādikaṃ vā ‘‘deyyadhammo dāna’’nti sādhetunti evaṃ nivattanasādhanatthanānattaṃ sandhāya ‘‘na pana ekenatthenā’’ti vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tattha yathā paravādīvāde ca suttasādhanatthaṃ ‘‘na vattabbaṃ cetasiko dhammo dāna’’nti pucchāyaṃ cetasikovāti attho daṭṭhabbo, tathā ‘‘na vattabbaṃ deyyadhammo dāna’’nti pucchāya ca deyyadhammovāti. Deyyadhammo iṭṭhaphaloti iṭṭhaphalābhāvamattameva paṭikkhittanti ettha ‘‘iṭṭhaphalabhāvamattameva paṭikkhitta’’nti pāṭhena bhavitabbanti[Pg.85]. ‘‘Iṭṭhaphalābhāvamattameva disvā paṭikkhitta’’nti vā vattabbaṃ. Saṅkarabhāvamocanatthanti cetasikassa dātabbaṭṭhena deyyadhammassa ca iṭṭhaphalaṭṭhena dānabhāvamocanatthanti vuttaṃ hoti.

‘By the other’ means by the method, ‘It is given, therefore it is a gift.’ It should be understood that ‘But not by one meaning’ is said with reference to the diverse purposes of refutation and establishment. For example, to refute the opponent’s thesis ‘Only the object given is the gift,’ one uses scriptural proofs such as ‘faith, moral shame…’ and ‘here someone gives food…’. To refute the thesis ‘Only the mental factor is the gift’ and establish one’s own thesis ‘The mental factor is the gift,’ one uses proofs like ‘faith, moral shame…’; while to establish ‘The object given is the gift,’ one uses proofs like ‘here someone gives food…’. Therein, in the opponent’s argument, in the question ‘Should it not be said “the mental factor is the gift”?’ the meaning ‘only the mental factor’ is intended. Similarly, in the question ‘Should it not be said “the object given is the gift”?’ the meaning is ‘only the object given.’ ‘The object given is a desirable fruit’: here only its not being a desirable fruit is rejected. Here the reading should be: ‘only its being a desirable fruit is rejected.’ Or it should be said: ‘having seen only that it is not a desirable fruit, it is rejected.’ ‘For the purpose of releasing from a state of confusion’: this means it is said for the purpose of preventing the confusion of applying the nature of giving to the mental factor in the sense of being something to be given, and to the object given in the sense of being a desirable fruit.

Dānakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Discourse on Giving is finished.

5. Paribhogamayapuññakathāvaṇṇanā

5. Explanation of the Discourse on Merit Arising from Use

483. Paribhogamayaṃ nāma cittavippayuttaṃ puññaṃ atthīti laddhi. Tañhi te sandhāya paribhogamayaṃ puññaṃ pavaḍḍhatīti vadantīti adhippāyo.

483. There is a view that there exists merit called ‘arising from use,’ which is dissociated from the mind. For it is with reference to this that they say, ‘Merit arising from use increases’—this is the intended meaning.

485. Tassāpi vasenāti tassāpi laddhiyā vasena. Pañcaviññāṇānaṃ viya etesampi samodhānaṃ siyāti paṭijānātīti vadanti. Pañcaviññāṇaphassādīnameva pana samodhānaṃ sandhāya paṭijānātīti adhippāyo.

485. ‘By means of that also’ means by means of that view also. They say that the proponent claims there could be a conjunction for these, just as for the five consciousnesses. However, the intended meaning is that the proponent claims a conjunction only with reference to contact and so on connected with the five consciousnesses.

486. Aparibhuttepīti iminā ‘‘paṭiggāhako paṭiggahetvā na paribhuñjati chaḍḍetī’’tiādikaṃ dasseti. Aparibhutte deyyadhamme puññabhāvato paribhogamayaṃ puññaṃ pavaḍḍhatīti ayaṃ vādo hīyati. Tasmiñca hīne sakavādīvādo balavā. Cāgacetanāya eva hi puññabhāvo evaṃ siddho hotīti adhippāyo. Aparibhuttepi deyyadhamme puññabhāve cāgacetanāya eva puññabhāvoti āha ‘‘sakavādīvādova balavā’’ti.

486. ‘Even when not used’: by this is shown such cases as, ‘The recipient accepts it but does not use it; he discards it.’ The thesis that merit arising from use increases from a gift-object that has not been used, on account of its meritorious nature, is refuted. And when that is refuted, the proponent's own thesis becomes strong. For the intended meaning is that the state of merit is thus established through the volition of giving alone. Since there is a state of merit even when the gift-object is not used, the state of merit comes from the volition of giving alone; therefore it is said, ‘The proponent's own thesis is indeed strong.’

Paribhogamayapuññakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Discourse on Merit Arising from Use is finished.

6. Itodinnakathāvaṇṇanā

6. Explanation of the Discourse on What Is Given from Here

488-491. Teneva yāpentīti teneva cīvarādinā yāpenti, teneva vā cīvarādidānena yāpenti, sayaṃkatena kammunā vināpīti adhippāyo. Iminā kāraṇenāti yadi yaṃ ito cīvarādi dinnaṃ, na tena yāpeyyuṃ, kathaṃ anumodeyyuṃ…pe… somanassaṃ paṭilabheyyunti laddhiṃ patiṭṭhapentassapīti vuttaṃ hoti.

488-491. 'They are maintained by that' means they are maintained by that robe, etc., or they are maintained by the giving of that robe, etc.; the intended meaning is 'even without kamma done by themselves.' 'Because of this reason': this is said of one who establishes the view that if they were not maintained by the robe, etc., given from here, how could they rejoice ... gain gladness?

Itodinnakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on What Is Given from Here is concluded.

7. Pathavīkammavipākotikathāvaṇṇanā

7. Explanation of the Discourse on 'Earth Is a Result of Kamma'

492. Phasso [Pg.86] sukhavedanīyādibhedo hotīti phassena sabbampi kammavipākaṃ dassetvā puna attavajjehi sampayogadassanatthaṃ ‘‘so ca saññādayo cā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Atthi ca nesanti sāvajjane cakkhuviññāṇādisahajātadhamme sandhāya vuttaṃ. Yo tattha iṭṭhavipāko, tassa patthanāti iṭṭhavipāke eva patthanaṃ katvā kammaṃ karontīti kammūpanissayabhūtameva patthanaṃ dasseti, paccuppannavedanāpaccayaṃ vā taṇhaṃ upādānādinibbattanavasena dukkhassa pabhāvitaṃ. Mūlataṇhāti paccuppannavipākavaṭṭanibbattakakammassa upanissayabhūtaṃ purimataṇhaṃ, kammasahāyaṃ vā vipākassa upanissayabhūtaṃ.

492. 'Contact is of different kinds, such as that accompanied by pleasant feeling, etc.': having thus shown the entire kamma-result by means of contact, it is then said, 'it and perception, etc.,' in order to show the association with what pertains to the self. 'And for them there is': this is said with reference to the blameworthy states co-nascent with eye-consciousness, etc. 'The aspiration for that which is an agreeable result therein': this shows that one performs kamma having made an aspiration only for an agreeable result, and thus that the aspiration itself is a supporting condition for kamma; or it shows craving, which is conditioned by present feeling and which originates suffering by way of producing clinging, etc. 'Root-craving' is the prior craving that is a supporting condition for the kamma that produces the round of present resultants, or it is the craving accompanying kamma that is a supporting condition for the result.

493. Sakasamayavasena ca codanāya payujjamānataṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘tesañca laddhiyā’’tiādimāha.

493. And to show that the objection is being applied in accordance with their own tenet, he said, 'And by their view,' and so on.

494. Paṭilābhavasenāti kamme sati pathaviyādīnaṃ paṭilābho hotīti kammaṃ taṃsaṃvattanikaṃ nāma hotīti dasseti.

494. 'By way of acquisition' means: it shows that when there is kamma, there is the acquisition of earth, etc., and thus that kamma is called 'conducive to that'.

Pathavīkammavipākotikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on 'Earth Is a Result of Kamma' is concluded.

8. Jarāmaraṇaṃvipākotikathāvaṇṇanā

8. Explanation of the Discourse on 'Aging-and-Death Is a Result'

495. Sampayogalakkhaṇābhāvāti ‘‘ekārammaṇā’’ti imassa sampayogalakkhaṇassa abhāvāti adhippāyo.

495. 'Because of the absence of the characteristic of association': the intended meaning is the absence of this characteristic of association, namely, 'having a single object'.

496. Pariyāyo natthīti sakavādinā attanā vattabbatāya pariyāyo natthīti abyākatānaṃ jarāmaraṇassa vipākanivāraṇatthaṃ abyākatavasena pucchā na katāti dasseti.

496. 'There is no alternative': this shows that there is no alternative way for the proponent of his own view to state this, and that the question was not posed in terms of the undeclared in order to prevent aging-and-death from being the result of undeclared states.

497. Aparisuddhavaṇṇatā jarāyevāti keci, taṃ akusalakammaṃ kammasamuṭṭhānassātiādinā rūpasseva dubbaṇṇatādassanena samamevāti.

497. Some hold that impurity of complexion is due to aging alone; but this is just the same as what is shown by the statement beginning 'that unwholesome kamma for the kamma-originated...,' namely, the ugliness of material form itself.

Jarāmaraṇaṃvipākotikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on 'Aging-and-Death Is a Result' is concluded.

9. Ariyadhammavipākakathāvaṇṇanā

9. Explanation of the Discourse on 'The Noble Dhamma Is a Result'

500. Vaṭṭanti [Pg.87] kammādivaṭṭaṃ.

500. 'They revolve' means the round of kamma and so on.

Ariyadhammavipākakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on 'The Noble Dhamma Is a Result' is concluded.

10. Vipākovipākadhammadhammotikathāvaṇṇanā

10. Explanation of the Discourse on 'A Result Is a State Conditioning a Result'

501. Tappaccayāpīti yassa vipākassa vipāko aññamaññapaccayo hoti tappaccayāpi aññamaññapaccayabhūtatopīti adhippāyo. So hītiādinā purimapaṭiññāya imassa codanassa kāraṇabhāvaṃ dasseti. Aññamaññapaccayādīsu paccayaṭṭhenāti ādi-saddena sahajātādipaccaye saṅgaṇhitvā tesu tena tena paccayabhāvenāti dasseti.

501. 'Also because of that as condition': the intended meaning is that since one resultant is a mutual condition for another resultant, it is 'also because of being a mutual condition.' By 'For it is...,' etc., it shows that the previous assertion is the reason for this objection. 'Among mutual conditions, etc., in the sense of condition': by the word 'etc.' it includes co-nascence and other conditions, and shows that this is by being a condition in this or that way among them.

Vipākovipākadhammadhammotikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on 'A Result Is a State Conditioning a Result' is concluded.

Sattamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Seventh Chapter is concluded.

8. Aṭṭhamavaggo

8. The Eighth Chapter

1. Chagatikathāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Discourse on the Six Destinations

503-504. Vaṇṇoti vaṇṇanibhā saṇṭhānañca vuccatīti āha ‘‘sadisarūpasaṇṭhānā’’ti.

503-504. 'Vaṇṇa': since this refers to complexion, lustre, and shape, it is said, 'of similar form and shape.'

Chagatikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Six Destinations is concluded.

2. Antarābhavakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Discourse on the Intermediate Existence

505. Atidūrassa antaritassa pattabbassa desassa dassanato dibbacakkhuko viya. Ākāsena pathavantaraṭṭhānāni bhinditvā gamanato iddhimā viya. Na sahadhammenāti yadi so bhavānaṃ antarā na siyā, na nāma antarābhavoti paṭikkhepe karaṇaṃ natthīti adhippāyo.

505. Like one with the divine eye who sees a place that is very far, obstructed, and to be reached. Like one with psychic power who travels by breaking through the intervening space. 'Not by a similar principle' means: the intention is that if that were not between existences, there would be no reason to refute it by saying, 'It is not an intermediate existence.'

506. Tattha [Pg.88] jātijarāmaraṇāni ceva cutipaṭisandhiparamparañca anicchantoti etena cutianantaraṃ antarābhavaṃ khandhāti, vattamānā jātīti, mātukucchimeva paviṭṭhā antaradhāyamānā maraṇanti na icchati.

506. There, 'not wishing for birth, aging, and death, nor for the succession of death and rebirth-linking': by this he does not wish that there are aggregates of an intermediate existence immediately after death, or that there is a present birth, or that there is death by disappearing just after having entered a mother's womb.

507. Yathā kāmabhavādīsu tattha tattheva punappunaṃ cavitvā upapattivasena cutipaṭisandhiparamparā hoti, evaṃ taṃ tattha na icchatīti dasseti.

507. It shows that just as in sensual existence and so on there is a succession of death and rebirth-linking by way of being reborn after dying again and again right in those same places, so one does not wish for that there.

Antarābhavakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Intermediate Existence is concluded.

3. Kāmaguṇakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of the Discourse on the Strands of Sensual Pleasure

510. Kāmabhavassa kamanaṭṭhena kāmabhavabhāvo sabbepi kāmāvacarā khandhādayo kāmabhavoti iminā adhippāyena daṭṭhabbo. Upādinnakkhandhānameva pana kāmabhavabhāvo dhātukathāyaṃ dassito, na kamanaṭṭhena kāmabhavabhāvo. ‘‘Pañcime, bhikkhave, kāmaguṇā’’ti vacanamattaṃ nissāyāti pañceva kāmakoṭṭhāsā ‘‘kāmo’’ti vuttāti kāmadhātūtivacanaṃ na aññassa nāmanti iminā adhippāyenevaṃ vacanamattaṃ nissāyāti attho.

510. The state of sensual existence, in the sense of desiring it, should be understood with this intention: all the aggregates, etc., belonging to the sense-sphere are sensual existence. However, in the Dhātukathā, the state of sensual existence is shown only for the clung-to aggregates, not the state of sensual existence in the sense of desiring. The phrase 'relying on the mere statement' refers to the statement, 'Bhikkhus, there are these five strands of sensual pleasure.' The meaning is that one relies on this mere statement with the intention that only the five portions of sensuality are called 'sensual pleasure' and that the term 'sensual element' is not a name for anything else.

Kāmaguṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discussion of the strands of sensual pleasure is finished.

5. Rūpadhātukathāvaṇṇanā

5. Commentary on the Discussion of the Form Element

515-516. Rūpadhātukathāyaṃ rūpadhātūti vacanato rūpīdhammeheva rūpadhātuyā bhavitabbanti laddhi daṭṭhabbā. Suttesu ‘‘tayome bhavā’’tiādinā (dī. ni. 3.305) paricchinnabhūmiyova bhūmiparicchedo, ‘‘heṭṭhato avīcinirayaṃ pariyantaṃ karitvā’’tiādikammaparicchindanampi (vibha. 182) vadanti.

515-516. In the discussion of the form element, the view should be understood that because of the term 'form element,' the form element must consist only of material phenomena. In the suttas, the delimitation of planes by such phrases as 'these three kinds of existence' is a delimitation of only the specified planes, and they also speak of the delimitation of kamma, such as 'having made the Avīci hell the lower limit.'

Rūpadhātukathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discussion of the form element is finished.

6. Arūpadhātukathāvaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Discussion of the Formless Element

517-518. Imināvupāyenāti [Pg.89] yathā hi purimakathāyaṃ rūpino dhammā avisesena ‘‘rūpadhātū’’ti vuttā, evamidhāpi arūpino dhammā avisesena ‘‘arūpadhātū’’ti vuttāti tattha vuttanayo idhāpi samānoti adhippāyo.

517-518. The intention of 'by this same method' is: just as in the previous discussion material phenomena were called 'form element' without distinction, so too here immaterial phenomena are called 'formless element' without distinction; thus the method stated there is the same here too.

Arūpadhātukathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discussion of the formless element is finished.

7. Rūpadhātuyāāyatanakathāvaṇṇanā

7. Commentary on the Discussion of the Bases in the Form Realm

519. Ghānanimittānipīti idaṃ ghānādinimittānipīti vattabbaṃ. Nimittanti ghānādīnaṃ okāsabhāvena upalakkhitaṃ tathāvidhasaṇṭhānaṃ rūpasamudāyamāha.

519. The phrase 'also the signs of the nose' should be stated as 'also the signs of the nose, etc.' 'Sign' refers to a collection of matter of such a shape, marked by being the location for the nose and other sense bases.

Rūpadhātuyāāyatanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discussion of the bases in the form realm is finished.

8. Arūperūpakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Commentary on the Discussion of Form in the Formless Realm

524-526. Sukhumarūpaṃ atthi, yato nissaraṇaṃ taṃ āruppanti adhippāyo.

524-526. The intention is: There is subtle matter; the escape from it is the formless attainment.

Arūperūpakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discussion of form in the formless realm is finished.

9. Rūpaṃkammantikathāvaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Discussion of Matter's Relation to Kamma

527-537. Pakappayamānāti āyūhamānā, sampayuttesu adhikaṃ byāpāraṃ kurumānāti attho. Purimavāreti ‘‘yaṃkiñci akusalena cittena samuṭṭhitaṃ rūpaṃ, sabbaṃ taṃ akusala’’nti imaṃ pañhaṃ vadati.

527-537. The meaning of 'constructing' is striving, making a greater effort among associated states. By 'on the first occasion,' he states this question: 'Whatever matter has arisen from an unwholesome mind, is all that unwholesome?'

Rūpaṃkammantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discussion of matter's relation to kamma is finished.

10. Jīvitindriyakathāvaṇṇanā

10. Commentary on the Discussion of the Life Faculty

540. Arūpajīvitindriyantipañhe [Pg.90] ‘‘atthi arūpīnaṃ dhammānaṃ āyū’’tiādikaṃ pañhaṃ antaṃ gahetvā vadati. Arūpadhammānaṃ cittavippayuttaṃ jīvitindriyasantānaṃ nāma atthīti icchatīti ettha rūpārūpadhammānaṃ taṃ icchanto arūpadhammānaṃ icchatīti vattuṃ yuttoti ‘‘arūpadhammāna’’nti vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

540. In the question on the formless life faculty, he speaks taking the question beginning, 'Is there a life-span for immaterial phenomena?' to its conclusion. Here, he wishes that there is indeed a continuity of the life faculty disassociated from mind for immaterial phenomena. It should be understood that since it is proper for one who wishes this for both material and immaterial phenomena to say that he wishes it for immaterial phenomena, the words 'for immaterial phenomena' are stated.

541. Sattasantāne rūpino vā dhammā hontūtiādināpi tameva jīvitindriyasantānaṃ vadatīti veditabbaṃ.

541. It should be known that also by the phrase beginning, 'Whether there are material phenomena in the continuity of a being...,' he speaks of that very same continuity of the life faculty.

542. Pubbāparabhāgaṃ sandhāyāti samāpattiyā āsannabhāvato tadāpi samāpannoyevāti adhippāyo.

542. The intention of 'referring to the earlier and later parts' is that because of the proximity to the attainment, even then one is indeed one who has attained.

544-545. Dve jīvitindriyānīti ‘‘pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassā’’ti purimapāṭho. ‘‘Pucchā paravādissa, paṭiññā sakavādissā’’ti pacchimapāṭho, so yutto.

544-545. Regarding 'two life faculties,' the earlier reading is: 'The question is the proponent's, the admission is the other's.' The later reading is: 'The question is the opponent's, the admission is the proponent's.' That is correct.

Jīvitindriyakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discussion of the life faculty is finished.

11. Kammahetukathāvaṇṇanā

11. Commentary on the Discussion of Kamma as Cause

546. Sesanti pāṇātipātādikammassa hetūti ito purimaṃ sotāpannādianuyogaṃ vadati. Handa hīti paravādissevetaṃ sampaṭicchanavacananti sampaṭicchāpetunti na sakkā vattuṃ, ‘‘katamassa kammassa hetū’’ti pana sakavādī taṃ sampaṭicchāpetuṃ vadatīti yujjeyya, sampaṭicchāpetunti pana pakkhaṃ paṭijānāpetunti atthaṃ aggahetvā paravādī attano laddhiṃ sakavādiṃ gāhāpetunti attho daṭṭhabbo.

546. By 'the remainder,' he refers to the preceding inquiry concerning the stream-enterer and so on, saying it is the cause of kamma beginning with the destruction of life. 'Come now!' is a word of acceptance of the opponent, so it cannot be said, 'he makes him accept.' However, it would be logical that the proponent says, 'Of which kamma is it the cause?' in order to make him accept. But the meaning of 'makes him accept' should be understood not by taking the meaning 'makes him acknowledge his position,' but that the opponent makes the proponent grasp his own view.

Kammahetukathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discussion of kamma as cause is finished.

Aṭṭhamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Eighth Chapter is finished.

9. Navamavaggo

9. The Ninth Chapter

1. Ānisaṃsadassāvīkathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discussion of Seeing the Benefits

547. Vibhāgadassanatthanti [Pg.91] visabhāgadassanatthanti vuttaṃ hoti. Nānācittavasena paṭijānantassa adhippāyamaddanaṃ kathaṃ yuttanti vicāretabbaṃ. Ārammaṇavasena hi dassanadvayaṃ saha vadantassa tadabhāvadassanatthaṃ idaṃ āraddhanti yuttanti. Anussavavasenātiādinā na kevalaṃ aniccādiārammaṇameva ñāṇaṃ vipassanā, atha kho ‘‘anuppādo khema’’ntiādikaṃ nibbāne ānisaṃsadassanañcāti dīpeti.

547. 'For the purpose of seeing the distinction' means 'for the purpose of seeing what is dissimilar'; so it is said. It should be considered how it is proper to crush the intention of one who professes this by way of diverse consciousness. For, for one who speaks of the twofold seeing together by way of the object, it is proper that this is undertaken for the purpose of seeing the absence of that. By the words 'by way of oral tradition,' etc., it is shown that insight is not only knowledge that has impermanence and so on as its object, but also the seeing of the benefit in Nibbāna, such as 'non-arising is security,' and so on.

Ānisaṃsadassāvīkathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Seeing the Benefits is concluded.

2. Amatārammaṇakathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Exposition of the Discourse on the Deathless as Object

549. Suttabhayenāti ‘‘pārimaṃ tīraṃ khemaṃ appaṭibhayanti kho, bhikkhave, nibbānassetaṃ adhivacana’’nti (saṃ. ni. 4.238) asaṃyojaniyādibhāvaṃ sandhāya khemādibhāvo vuttoti evamādinā suttabhayenāti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

549. ‘By fear of the sutta’: It should be understood that because of fear of contradicting a sutta such as, ‘The further shore, security, freedom from peril, bhikkhus: this is a designation for Nibbāna’ (SN 35.197), the state of security and so on is spoken of with reference to the state of not being subject to the fetters, and so on.

Amatārammaṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Deathless as Object is concluded.

3. Rūpaṃsārammaṇantikathāvaṇṇanā

3. The Exposition of the Discourse on Whether Material Form is with an Object

552-553. Ārammaṇatthassa vibhāgadassanatthanti paccayaṭṭho olubbhaṭṭhoti evaṃ vibhāge vijjamāne paccayolubbhānaṃ visesābhāvaṃ kappetvā akappetvā vā sappaccayattā olubbhārammaṇenapi sārammaṇamevāti na gahetabbanti dassanatthanti vuttaṃ hoti.

552–553. This is said for the purpose of showing the distinction in the meaning of ‘object,’ that is, the meaning of ‘condition’ and the meaning of ‘support.’ When such a distinction exists, this is said to show that one should not hold the view that—whether or not one construes a lack of difference between condition and support—because something has a condition, it is therefore ‘with an object’ even when it has a support as its object.

Rūpaṃsārammaṇantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Whether Material Form is with an Object is concluded.

4. Anusayāanārammaṇātikathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Exposition of the Discourse on Whether Latent Tendencies are Without an Object

554-556. Appahīnattāva [Pg.92] atthīti vuccati, na pana vijjamānattāti adhippāyo.

554–556. The intended meaning is that it is said to ‘exist’ because it has not been abandoned, but not because it is actually present.

Anusayāanārammaṇātikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Whether Latent Tendencies are Without an Object is concluded.

5. Ñāṇaṃanārammaṇantikathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Exposition of the Discourse on Whether Knowledge is Without an Object

557-8. Tassa ñāṇassāti maggañāṇassāti vadanti.

557–558. By ‘that knowledge,’ they say, path knowledge is meant.

Ñāṇaṃanārammaṇantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Whether Knowledge is Without an Object is concluded.

7. Vitakkānupatitakathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Exposition of the Discourse on What is Accompanied by Applied Thought

562. Avisesenevāti ārammaṇasampayogehi dvīhipīti attho.

562. ‘Indiscriminately’ means by both—association and having as an object; this is the meaning.

Vitakkānupatitakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on What is Accompanied by Applied Thought is concluded.

8. Vitakkavipphārasaddakathāvaṇṇanā

8. The Exposition of the Discourse on the Sound of the Pervasion of Applied Thought

563. Sabbasoti savitakkacittesu sabbattha sabbadā vāti imamatthaṃ dassento āha ‘‘antamaso manodhātupavattikālepī’’ti. Vitakkavipphāramattanti vitakkassa pavattimattanti adhippāyo.

563. ‘In every way’ means in all places and at all times in consciousness accompanied by applied thought. Showing this meaning, he says: ‘even at the time of the occurrence of the mind-element.’ The intended meaning of ‘the mere pervasion of applied thought’ is ‘the mere occurrence of applied thought.’

Vitakkavipphārasaddakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Sound of the Pervasion of Applied Thought is concluded.

9. Nayathācittassavācātikathāvaṇṇanā

9. The Exposition of the Discourse on Whether Speech is Not in Accordance with One’s Thought

565. Anāpattīti visaṃvādanādhippāyassa abhāvā musāvādo na hotīti vuttaṃ.

565. ‘No offense’: it is said that because there is no intention to deceive, it is not false speech.

Nayathācittassavācātikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Whether Speech is Not in Accordance with One’s Thought is concluded.

11. Atītānāgatasamannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā

11. The Exposition of the Discourse on Being Endowed with the Past and the Future

568-570. Tāsūti [Pg.93] tāsu paññattīsu. Samannāgamapaññattiyā samannāgatoti vuccati, paṭilābhapaññattiyā lābhīti vuccati. Samannāgatoti vuccati ayaṃ samannāgamapaññatti nāma. Lābhīti vuccati ayaṃ paṭilābhapaññatti nāmāti vā adhippāyo yojetabbo.

568–570. ‘In those’ means in those designations. One is called ‘endowed’ by the designation of endowment; one is called ‘an acquirer’ by the designation of acquisition. Or the meaning should be construed thus: ‘One is called “endowed”’—this is what is named the designation of endowment; ‘One is called “an acquirer”’—this is what is named the designation of acquisition.

Atītānāgatasamannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Being Endowed with the Past and the Future is concluded.

Navamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Ninth Chapter is concluded.

10. Dasamavaggo

10. The Tenth Chapter

1. Nirodhakathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Exposition of the Discourse on Cessation

571-2. Bhavaṅgacittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇena sahevātiādiṃ vadantena kiriyakhandhānaṃ bhaṅgakkhaṇena saha upapattesiyā khandhā uppajjantīti ca vattabbaṃ, tathā upapattesiyānaṃ bhaṅgakkhaṇena saha upapattesiyā, kiriyānaṃ bhaṅgakkhaṇena saha kiriyāti. Cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ kiriyācatukkhandhaggahaṇena gahaṇaṃ. Ñāṇanti maggañāṇaṃ yuttaṃ.

571–572. By one who says ‘simultaneously with the dissolution-moment of the life-continuum consciousness,’ etc., it should also be said that the rebirth-linking aggregates arise simultaneously with the dissolution-moment of the functional aggregates. Similarly, that rebirth-linking aggregates arise simultaneously with the dissolution-moment of rebirth-linking aggregates, and functional aggregates with the dissolution-moment of functional aggregates. The inclusion of eye-consciousness and so on is by taking them as the four functional aggregates. ‘Knowledge’ means path knowledge; this is proper.

Nirodhakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Cessation is concluded.

3. Pañcaviññāṇasamaṅgissamaggakathāvaṇṇanā

3. The Exposition of the Discourse on the Path of One Endowed with the Five Consciousnesses

576. Taṃ lakkhaṇanti ‘‘cha viññāṇā’’ti avatvā ‘‘pañcaviññāṇā uppannavatthukā’’tiādinā vuttaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ. ‘‘Cha viññāṇā’’ti avacanaṃ panettha ‘‘no ca vata re vattabbe’’tiādivacanassa kāraṇanti adhippetaṃ.

576. ‘That characteristic’ is the characteristic stated not by saying ‘six consciousnesses,’ but by the words beginning ‘the five consciousnesses have an arisen physical basis.’ Here, not saying ‘six consciousnesses’ is intended as the reason for the statement beginning ‘But, sir, it should not be said so.’

577. Lokiyoti vipassanāmaggamāha. Yaṃ tattha animittanti cakkhuviññāṇasamaṅgikkhaṇe yaṃ animittaṃ gaṇhanto na nimittaggāhīti vutto, tadeva suññatanti adhippāyo.

577. ‘Worldly’ refers to the path of insight. The intended meaning of ‘that which is signless there’ is this: since one who grasps the signless at the moment one is endowed with eye-consciousness is said to be ‘not a grasper of signs,’ that very thing is ‘emptiness.’

Pañcaviññāṇasamaṅgissamaggakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Path of One Endowed with the Five Consciousnesses is concluded.

5. Pañcaviññāṇāsābhogātikathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Exposition of the Discourse on Whether the Five Consciousnesses Are with Attention

584-586. Kusalākusalavasena [Pg.94] namīti kusalākusalabhāvena namitvā pavattīti vuttaṃ hoti. Sā pana ārammaṇappakāraggahaṇaṃ yena alobhādīhi lobhādīhi ca sampayogo hotīti daṭṭhabbo ‘‘sukhamiti cetaso abhāgo’’tiādīsu viya.

584-586. ‘It inclines by way of the wholesome and unwholesome’ means it proceeds having inclined towards the state of being wholesome or unwholesome. This, however, should be understood as the grasping of the object's mode, through which association occurs with non-greed and so on, or with greed and so on, as in such cases as ‘pleasure is a portion of the mind,’ and so forth.

Pañcaviññāṇāsābhogātikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Whether the Five Consciousnesses Are with Attention is concluded.

6. Dvīhisīlehītikathāvaṇṇanā

6. The Commentary on the Discourse on Twofold Morality

587-589. Khaṇabhaṅganirodhaṃ, na appavattinirodhaṃ, sīlavītikkamanirodhaṃ vā. Vītikkamaṃ viyāti yathā vītikkame kate dussīlo, evaṃ niruddhepīti evaṃ vītikkamena ninnānaṃ sallakkhentoti attho.

587-589. The cessation of momentary dissolution, not the cessation of non-occurrence, nor the cessation of the transgression of morality. ‘The transgression passes away’: just as one becomes immoral when a transgression has been committed, so too, when it has ceased, one observes the decline by means of the transgression—this is the meaning.

Dvīhisīlehītikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Twofold Morality is concluded.

7. Sīlaṃacetasikantikathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Commentary on the Discourse ‘Morality is Non-Mental’

590-594. Yena so sīlavāyeva nāma hotīti yena cittavippayuttena ṭhitena upacayena akusalābyākatacittasamaṅgī sīlavāyeva nāma hotīti adhippāyo. Sesamettha ‘‘dānaṃ acetasika’’nti kathāyaṃ vuttanayeneva veditabbanti vuttaṃ, sā pana kathā maggitabbā.

590-594. ‘By which he is indeed called virtuous’: the intention is that by an established accumulation dissociated from the mind, one who is endowed with unwholesome or indeterminate consciousness is indeed called virtuous. It is said that the rest here should be understood in the same way as stated in the discourse on ‘Giving is non-mental.’ But that discourse should be sought out.

Sīlaṃacetasikantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse ‘Morality is Non-Mental’ is concluded.

9. Samādānahetukathāvaṇṇanā

9. The Commentary on the Discourse on the Cause of Undertaking

598-600. Samādānahetukathāyaṃ \100 purimakathāsadisamevāti paribhogakathekadesasadisatā daṭṭhabbā.

598-600. In the discourse on the cause of undertaking, it is just like the previous discourse; the similarity to a part of the discourse on use should be seen.

Samādānahetukathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Cause of Undertaking is concluded.

11. Aviññattidussīlyantikathāvaṇṇanā

11. The Commentary on the Discourse ‘Immorality by Non-Intimation’

603-604. Āṇattiyā [Pg.95] ca pāṇātipātādīsu aṅgapāripūrinti ekasmiṃ divase āṇattassa aparasmiṃ divase pāṇātipātaṃ karontassa tadā sā āṇatti viññattiṃ vināyeva aṅgaṃ hotīti aviññatti dussīlyanti adhippāyo.

603-604. ‘And by command there is fulfillment of the factors in killing living beings, etc.’: the intention is that when someone who was commanded on one day kills a living being on another day, then that command becomes a factor even without intimation; thus ‘immorality by non-intimation.’

Aviññattidussīlyantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse ‘Immorality by Non-Intimation’ is concluded.

Dasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Tenth Chapter is concluded.

Dutiyo paṇṇāsako samatto.

The second group of fifty is completed.

11. Ekādasamavaggo

11. The Eleventh Chapter

4. Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Commentary on the Discourse on Knowledge

614-615. Ñāṇakathāyaṃ seyyathāpi mahāsaṅghikānanti pubbe ñāṇaṃanārammaṇantikathāyaṃ (kathā. 557 ādayo) vuttehi andhakehi aññe idha mahāsaṅghikā bhaveyyuṃ. Yadi aññāṇe vigatetiādinā rāgavigamo viya vītarāgapaññattiyā aññāṇavigamo ñāṇīpaññattiyā kāraṇanti dasseti. Na hi ñāṇaṃ assa atthīti ñāṇī, atha kho aññāṇīpaṭipakkhato ñāṇīti. Yasmā ñāṇapaṭilābhenāti ettha ca ñāṇapaṭilābhena aññāṇassa vigatattā so ñāṇīti vattabbataṃ āpajjatīti attho daṭṭhabbo.

614-615. In the discourse on knowledge, regarding ‘just as the Mahāsaṅghikas’: the Mahāsaṅghikas here might be different from the Andhakas mentioned earlier in the discourse ‘Knowledge is without an object’ (Discourse 557, etc.). By the phrase beginning ‘If, when ignorance has departed,’ it shows that just as the departure of lust is the cause for the designation ‘one free from lust,’ so the departure of ignorance is the cause for the designation ‘one with knowledge.’ For it is not because he possesses knowledge that he is ‘one with knowledge,’ but rather he is ‘one with knowledge’ by opposition to one with ignorance. And here, in the phrase ‘Because through the acquisition of knowledge,’ the meaning to be understood is that since ignorance has departed through the acquisition of knowledge, he becomes fit to be called ‘one with knowledge.’

Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Knowledge is concluded.

6. Idaṃdukkhantikathāvaṇṇanā

6. The Commentary on the Discourse ‘This is Suffering’

618-620. Itaro pana sakasamayeti paravādī attano samayeti attho.

618-620. ‘But the other, in his own doctrine’: the meaning is, the opponent in his own doctrine.

Idaṃdukkhantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse ‘This is Suffering’ is concluded.

7. Iddhibalakathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Commentary on the Discourse on the Power of Psychic Potency

621-624. Kammassa [Pg.96] vipākavasena vāti nirayaṃva sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tattha hi abbudādiparicchedo tādisassa kammavipākassa vasena vutto. Vassagaṇanāya vāti manusse cātumahārājikādideve ca sandhāya. Tesañhi asaṅkhyeyampi kālaṃ vipākadānasamatthaṃ kammaṃ vassagaṇanāya paricchijjatīti.

621-624. ‘By way of the result of kamma’ is said with reference to hell. For there the division into Abbuda and so on is stated by way of such a result of kamma. ‘By counting years’ is said with reference to humans and the devas of the Cātumahārājika realm and so on. For their kamma, which is capable of giving its result for even an incalculable period, is delimited by the counting of years.

Iddhibalakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Power of Psychic Potency is concluded.

8. Samādhikathāvaṇṇanā

8. Commentary on the Discourse on Concentration

625-626. Samādhānaṭṭhenāti samaṃ ṭhapanaṭṭhena samādhi nāma cetasikantaraṃ atthīti aggahetvāti attho. Chalenāti ekacittakkhaṇikatte cakkhuviññāṇassa ca jhānacittassa ca na koci visesoti etena sāmaññamattenāti adhippāyo.

625-626. 'In the sense of concentrating': the meaning is not accepting that there is a separate mental factor called samādhi in the sense of 'placing evenly.' 'By a pretext': the intention is by this mere generality that, in being momentary, there is no difference between eye-consciousness and jhāna-consciousness.

Samādhikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Concentration is concluded.

9. Dhammaṭṭhitatākathāvaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Discourse on the Stability of Phenomena

627. Anantarapaccayatañcevāti avijjā saṅkhārānaṃ anantarapaccayo avijjāya yā ṭhitatā tato hoti, tāya ṭhitatāya anantarapaccayabhāvasaṅkhātā ṭhitatā hotīti adhippāyo. Anantarapaccayaggahaṇañcettha aññamaññapaccayabhāvarahitassa ekassa paccayassa dassanatthanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tena hi sabbo tādiso paccayo dassito hotīti. Aññamaññapaccayatañcāti avijjā saṅkhārānaṃ paccayo, saṅkhārā ca avijjāya. Tattha avijjāya saṅkhārānaṃ paccayabhāvasaṅkhātāya ṭhitatāya saṅkhārānaṃ avijjāya paccayabhāvasaṅkhātā ṭhitatā hoti, tassā ca itarāti adhippāyo.

627. 'And by contiguity conditionality': the intention is that ignorance is the contiguity condition for formations. This arises from the stability of ignorance; by that stability there is the stability designated as the state of being a contiguity condition. And it should be understood that the taking up of 'contiguity condition' here is for the purpose of showing a single condition that is devoid of being a mutual condition. For thereby every such condition is shown. 'And by mutuality conditionality': ignorance is a condition for formations, and formations are a condition for ignorance. The intention is: there, by the stability designated as ignorance being a condition for formations, there comes to be the stability designated as formations being a condition for ignorance, and vice versa.

Dhammaṭṭhitatākathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Stability of Phenomena is concluded.

10. Aniccatākathāvaṇṇanā

10. Commentary on the Discourse on Impermanence

628. Rūpādayo [Pg.97] viya parinipphannāti rūpādīhi saha uppajjitvā nirujjhanato parinipphannāti attho. Aniccatāvibhāgānuyuñjanavasenāti tīsu daṇḍesu daṇḍavohāro viya tīsu lakkhaṇesu aniccatāvohāro hotīti tassā vibhāgānuyuñjanavasenāti vadanti.

628. 'Like materiality, etc., it is fully produced': the meaning is that because it arises and ceases together with materiality, etc., it is fully produced. 'By way of applying the analysis of impermanence': they say this means that just as there is the designation 'stick' in relation to three sticks, so there is the designation 'impermanence' in relation to the three characteristics; thus it is by way of applying the analysis of that.

Aniccatākathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Impermanence is concluded.

Ekādasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Eleventh Chapter is concluded.

12. Dvādasamavaggo

12. The Twelfth Chapter

1. Saṃvarokammantikathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Commentary on the Discourse on Restraint in Action

630-632. Vipākadvāranti bhavaṅgamanaṃ vadati. Kammadvāranti kusalākusalamanaṃ.

630-632. 'The door of result': this refers to the mind of the life-continuum. 'The door of kamma': this refers to the wholesome and unwholesome mind.

Saṃvarokammantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Restraint in Action is concluded.

2. Kammakathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Commentary on the Discourse on Kamma

633-635. Abyākataṃ sandhāya paṭikkhepoti sakasamayalakkhaṇena paṭikkhepo katoti vadanti. Avipākacetanāya sarūpena dassitāya savipākāpi dassitāyeva nāma hotīti maññamāno āha ‘‘savipākāvipākacetanaṃ sarūpena dassetu’’nti.

633-635. 'The rejection with reference to the indeterminate': they say that the rejection is made by the characteristic of their own doctrine. Thinking, 'When non-resultant volition is shown by its own nature, resultant volition is also indeed shown,' he says: 'Show resultant and non-resultant volition by its own nature.'

Kammakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Kamma is concluded.

3. Saddovipākotikathāvaṇṇanā

3. The Commentary on the Discourse 'Sound is a Resultant'

636-637. Kammasamuṭṭhānā arūpadhammāvātiādinā kammasamuṭṭhānesu cakkhādīsupi vipākavohāro natthi, ko pana vādo akammasamuṭṭhāne saddeti dasseti.

636-637. By the passage beginning, 'Immaterial states originating from kamma,' he shows that there is no usage of the term 'resultant' even for the eye and other bases that originate from kamma, so what then to say of sound, which does not originate from kamma?

Saddovipākotikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse 'Sound is a Resultant' is concluded.

4. Saḷāyatanakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Commentary on the Discourse on the Six Sense Bases

638-640. Tasmā [Pg.98] vipākoti avisesena saḷāyatanaṃ vipākoti yesaṃ laddhīti vuttaṃ hoti.

638-640. Therefore, it is said that it is the doctrine of those who hold: 'The six sense bases, without distinction, are a resultant.'

Saḷāyatanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Six Sense Bases is concluded.

5. Sattakkhattuparamakathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Commentary on the Discourse on One Bound to at Most Seven Rebirths

641-645. Sattakkhattuparamatāniyatoti sattakkhattuparamatāya niyato. Imaṃ vibhāganti imaṃ visesaṃ. Tvaṃ panassa niyāmaṃ icchasīti avinipātadhammatāphalappattīhi aññasmiṃ sattakkhattuparamabhāve ca niyāmaṃ icchasīti attho.

641-645. 'One fixed as bound to at most seven rebirths': this means one who is fixed in being bound to at most seven rebirths. 'This division': this means this distinction. 'But you desire his fixed course': the meaning is that you desire a fixed course in another state of being bound to at most seven rebirths, apart from the attainment of the fruit of being of a nature not subject to downfall.

Ānantariyābhāvanti yena so dhammābhisamayena bhabbo nāma hoti, tassa ānantariyakammassa abhāvanti attho, puggalassa vā ānantariyabhāvassa abhāvanti. Kiṃ pana so antarādhammaṃ abhisamissatīti? Keci vadanti ‘‘sattakkhattuparamo sattamaṃ bhavaṃ nātikkamati, orato pana natthi paṭisedho’’ti. Apare ‘‘yo bhagavatā ñāṇabalena byākato, tassa antarā abhisamayo nāma natthi, tathāpi bhavaniyāmassa kassaci abhāvā bhabboti vuccati. Yathā kusalā abhiññācetanā kadāci vipākaṃ adadamānāpi sati kāraṇe dātuṃ bhabbatāya vipākadhammadhammā nāma, tathā indriyānaṃ mudutāya sattakkhattuparamo, na niyāmasabbhāvā nāpi bhagavatā byākatattā, na ca indriyamudutā abhabbatākaro dhammoti na so abhabbo nāma. Abhabbatākaradhammābhāvato cettha abhabbatā paṭisedhitā, na pana antarā abhisametuṃ bhabbatā vuttā. Yadi ca sattakkhattuparamo antarā abhisameyya, kolaṃkolo siyā’’ti. Visesaṃ pana akatvā bhabbasabhāvatāya bhabboti vattuṃ yuttaṃ. Na bhavaniyāmakaṃ kiñcīti ettha passitvāti vacanaseso, byākarotīti vā sambandho.

'Because of the absence of an immediately effective kamma': the meaning is, because of the absence of that immediately effective kamma, by which he is capable of realizing the Dhamma; or, because of the absence of the state of having committed an immediately effective kamma for that person. But will he realize the Dhamma in the interim? Some say: 'One bound to at most seven rebirths does not go beyond a seventh existence, but there is no prohibition on realizing it sooner.' Others say: 'For one who has been declared by the Blessed One through the power of his knowledge, there is no realization in the interim. Nevertheless, because of the absence of any fixed course of existence, he is called 'capable.' Just as a wholesome volition for direct knowledge, though sometimes not yielding a result, is by its nature a result-producing state because of its capability to give a result when the cause is present, so too, one is bound to at most seven rebirths because of the softness of his faculties—not because of the existence of a fixed course, nor because he was declared by the Blessed One. And since softness of faculties is not a factor that makes one incapable, he is not incapable. Here, incapability is rejected because of the absence of a factor that would make him incapable, but the capability to realize in the interim is not asserted. And if one bound to at most seven rebirths were to realize in the interim, he would be a 'one who goes from family to family.' However, without making a distinction, it is proper to say he is 'capable' because of his capable nature. The words 'having seen that there is nothing that fixes the course of existence' are to be supplied here; or there is a connection with 'he declares.'

Sattakkhattuparamakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on One Bound to at Most Seven Rebirths is concluded.

Dvādasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Twelfth Chapter is concluded.

13. Terasamavaggo

13. The Thirteenth Chapter

1. Kappaṭṭhakathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Commentary on the Discourse on Remaining for the Eon

654-657. Kappaṭṭhakathāyaṃ [Pg.99] heṭṭhāti iddhibalakathāyaṃ.

654-657. 'Below in the Discourse on Remaining for the Eon': this refers to the Discourse on the Power of Spiritual Might.

Kappaṭṭhakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Remaining for the Eon is concluded.

3. Anantarāpayuttakathāvaṇṇanā

3. The Commentary on the Discourse on Immediate Consequence

660-662. Anantarāpayuttakathāyaṃ ānantariyaṃ payuttaṃ etenāti anantarāpayuttoti ānantariye anantarāsaddaṃ āropetvā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ attho vuttoti daṭṭhabbo. ‘‘Anantarapayutto’’tipi pāḷi dissati.

660-662. In the Discourse on Immediate Consequence: 'An immediately effective kamma is connected with this, thus it is anantarāpayutta.' It should be understood that the meaning is stated in the commentary by superimposing the word 'anantarā' on 'ānantariya.' The Pāḷi reading 'anantarapayutto' is also found.

Anantarāpayuttakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Immediate Consequence is concluded.

4. Niyatassaniyāmakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Commentary on the Discourse on the Unfixed Course of the Fixed Person

663-664. Sesā tebhūmakadhammā aniyatā nāmāti ettha appattaniyāmānaṃ dhamme sandhāya ‘‘tebhūmakadhammā’’ti āha. Eteva hi sandhāya ‘‘tehi samannāgatopi aniyatoyevā’’ti vuttanti. Iti imaṃ vohāramattaṃ gahetvā ‘‘niyato bodhisatto pacchimabhaviko bhabbo dhammaṃ abhisametuṃ okkamitu’’nti adhippāyena ‘‘niyāmaṃ okkamatī’’ti yesaṃ laddhīti atthayojanā. Evaṃ pana vohāramattasabbhāvo ‘‘niyato’’ti vacanassa, dhammaṃ abhisametuṃ bhabbatā ca ‘‘niyāmaṃ okkamatī’’ti vacanassa kāraṇabhāvena vuttā hoti, bhabbatāyeva pana ubhayassapi kāraṇanti yuttaṃ. Aññenāti yadi niyato niyāmaṃ okkameyya, micchattaniyato sammattaniyāmaṃ, sammattaniyato vā micchattaniyāmaṃ okkameyya, na ca taṃ atthīti dassanatthanti attho.

663-664. Here, in the phrase, 'The remaining phenomena of the three planes are called unfixed,' he says 'phenomena of the three planes' with reference to states that have not attained a fixed course. For it is with reference to these that it is said: 'Even one endowed with them is still unfixed.' Thus, having taken this mere conventional expression, the construction of the meaning for those whose doctrine is 'he enters upon the fixed course' is with the intention: 'The Bodhisatta, being fixed and destined for a final existence, is capable of realizing the Dhamma.' However, the mere existence of the convention for the word 'fixed,' and the capability to realize the Dhamma, are stated as the reason for the expression 'he enters upon the fixed course.' But it is proper that capability itself is the reason for both. 'By another': this is to show that if one who is fixed were to enter upon a fixed course, then one fixed in wrongness might enter upon the fixed course of rightness, or one fixed in rightness might enter upon the fixed course of wrongness, but that is not the case.

Niyatassaniyāmakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Unfixed Course of the Fixed Person is concluded.

8. Asātarāgakathāvaṇṇanā

8. The Commentary on the Discourse on Unsatisfying Lust

674. Asātarāgakathāyaṃ [Pg.100] ‘‘aho vata me etadeva bhaveyyā’’ti rajjanāti iminā evaṃ pavattamānoyeva lobho idha ‘‘rāgo’’ti adhippeto, na aññathāti dasseti.

674. In the Discourse on Unsatisfying Lust, the statement "being impassioned thus: 'Oh, if only this were mine!'" shows that it is this very greed, arising in such a way, that is intended here by "lust," and not otherwise.

675. Sutte panāti etassa ‘‘adhippāyo’’ti etena sambandho.

675. The phrase "But in the Sutta" is connected with the word "intention."

Asātarāgakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Unsatisfying Lust is concluded.

9. Dhammataṇhāabyākatātikathāvaṇṇanā

9. The Commentary on the Discourse that Craving for Dhammas is Indeterminate

676-680. Yasmā dhammataṇhāti vuttā, tasmā abyākatāti kusalesu dhammesu lokuttaresu vā sabbesu taṇhā ‘‘dhammataṇhā’’ti gahetvā yasmā sā taṇhā, tasmā kusalā na hoti, yasmā pana dhamme pavattā, tasmā akusalā na hotīti abyākatāti laddhīti dasseti. Tīhi koṭṭhāsehi chapi taṇhā saṃkhipitvā dassitā, tasmā dhammataṇhāpi kāmataṇhādibhāvato na abyākatāti adhippāyo.

676-680. It shows the view that since it is called "craving for dhammas," it is therefore indeterminate. The reasoning is: taking "craving for dhammas" as craving for any wholesome or supramundane dhammas, since it is craving, it is not wholesome; but since it occurs in relation to dhammas, it is not unwholesome—thus it is indeterminate. The six kinds of craving have been shown summarized into three divisions. Therefore, the intention is that even craving for dhammas is not indeterminate, since it partakes of the nature of craving for sensual pleasures, etc.

Dhammataṇhāabyākatātikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse that Craving for Dhammas is Indeterminate is concluded.

Terasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Thirteenth Chapter is concluded.

14. Cuddasamavaggo

14. The Fourteenth Chapter

1. Kusalākusalapaṭisandahanakathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Commentary on the Discourse on the Connection of Wholesome and Unwholesome

686-690. Tanti kusalaṃ akusalañcāti visuṃ sambandho daṭṭhabbo. Taṃ ubhayanti vā vacanaseso. Paṭisandahatīti ghaṭeti, anantaraṃ uppādetīti vuttaṃ hoti.

686-690. The connection with "wholesome" and "unwholesome" should be understood as being separate for each. Or, "that both" is an ellipsis. "Connects" means it joins together; that is to say, "it produces immediately after."

Kusalākusalapaṭisandahanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Connection of Wholesome and Unwholesome is concluded.

2. Saḷāyatanuppattikathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Commentary on the Discourse on the Arising of the Six Sense Bases

691-692. Keci [Pg.101] vādino ‘‘aṅkure sākhāviṭapādisampannānaṃ rukkhādīnaṃ bījamattaṃ āvibhāvaṃ gacchatī’’ti vadantīti tesaṃ vādaṃ nidassanaṃ karonto āha ‘‘sampannasākhāviṭapāna’’ntiādi.

691-692. Some theorists say: "In the sprout of trees and so on that are endowed with branches, foliage, etc., the mere seed becomes manifest." Illustrating their theory, he says: "of those endowed with branches and foliage," etc.

Saḷāyatanuppattikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Arising of the Six Sense Bases is concluded.

3. Anantarapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā

3. The Commentary on the Discourse on the Proximity Condition

693-697. Cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati sotaviññāṇanti ettha ‘‘laddhivasena paṭijānātī’’ti anantaruppattiṃ sallakkhentopi na so cakkhumhi rūpārammaṇaṃ sotaviññāṇaṃ icchati, atha kho sotamhiyeva saddārammaṇanti anantarūpaladdhivasena āpannattā ‘‘paṭijānātī’’ti yuttaṃ vattuṃ.

693-697. Regarding the statement "Dependent on the eye and on forms, ear-consciousness arises," one concedes this based on the received text. This means that although one notes the immediate arising, one does not maintain that ear-consciousness has form as its object and is dependent on the eye; rather, it has sound as its object and is dependent on the ear. Therefore, because this position is arrived at based on the received text concerning an immediately subsequent form, it is proper to say "one concedes."

Anantarapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Proximity Condition is concluded.

4. Ariyarūpakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Commentary on the Discourse on Noble Material Form

698-699. Sammāvācādi rūpaṃ maggo cāti icchanto ‘‘ariyarūpa’’ntipi vadati.

698-699. One who maintains that the material form of right speech, etc., is also the path, speaks of "noble material form."

Ariyarūpakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Noble Material Form is concluded.

5. Aññoanusayotikathāvaṇṇanā

5. Commentary on the Discourse: 'The Underlying Tendency is Different'

700-701. ‘‘Sarāgotiādi pana tasmiṃ samaye rāgassa appahīnattā sarāgoti vattabbata’’nti purimapāṭho, ‘‘sānusayotiādi pana tasmiṃ samaye anusayassa appahīnattā sānusayoti vattabbata’’nti pacchimapāṭho, so yutto. So hi na anusayapariyuṭṭhānānaṃ aññattaṃ, tasmā taṃ asādhakanti etena sametīti.

The earlier reading is: "But 'with lust,' etc.: because at that time lust is not abandoned, it is said to be 'with lust.'" The later reading is: "But 'with an underlying tendency,' etc.: because at that time the underlying tendency is not abandoned, it is said to be 'with an underlying tendency.'" That is correct. For this does not imply a difference between the underlying tendency and obsession; therefore, that is not a valid proof, and this accords with it.

Aññoanusayotikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse: 'The Underlying Tendency is Different' is concluded.

6. Pariyuṭṭhānaṃcittavippayuttantikathāvaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Discourse: 'Obsession is Dissociated from Consciousness'

702. Yasmā [Pg.102] aniccādito manasikarotopi rāgādayo uppajjanti, na ca te vipassanāya sampayuttā, tasmā pariyuṭṭhānaṃ cittavippayuttanti laddhīti adhippāyo.

702. The intention is that the following view is held: Because lust and so on arise even while one is attending to impermanence, etc., and these are not associated with insight, therefore obsession is dissociated from consciousness.

Pariyuṭṭhānaṃcittavippayuttantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse: 'Obsession is Dissociated from Consciousness' is concluded.

7. Pariyāpannakathāvaṇṇanā

7. Commentary on the Discourse on the Included

703-705. Tividhāyāti kilesavatthuokāsavasena, kāmarāgakāmavitakkakāmāvacaradhammavasena vā tividhāya. Kilesakāmavasenāti kilesakāmabhūtakāmadhātubhāvenāti vuttaṃ hoti. Adhippāyaṃ asallakkhentoti rūpadhātusahagatavasena anusetīti, rūpadhātudhammesu aññatarabhāvena rūpadhātupariyāpannoti ca pucchitabhāvaṃ asallakkhentoti attho.

'Threefold' means threefold by way of defilements, objects, and location; or threefold by way of sensual lust, sensual thought, and sense-sphere phenomena. 'By way of defilement-desire' means by way of being the sense-desire sphere which consists of defilement-desire. 'Not noting the intention' means that one has an underlying tendency associated with the form sphere; the meaning is that one does not note that the question is about being included in the form sphere by being one of the phenomena of the form sphere.

Pariyāpannakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Included is concluded.

8. Abyākatakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Commentary on the Discourse on the Undeclared

706-708. Diṭṭhigataṃ ‘‘sassato lokoti kho, vaccha, abyākatameta’’nti sassatādibhāvena akathitattā ‘‘abyākata’’nti vuttanti sambandho. Ettha pana na diṭṭhigataṃ ‘‘abyākata’’nti vuttaṃ, atha kho ‘‘ṭhapanīyo eso pañho’’ti dassitaṃ, tasmā sabbathāpi diṭṭhigataṃ ‘‘abyākata’’nti na vattabbanti yuttaṃ.

The connection is that the speculative view, 'The world is eternal,' is called 'undeclared' because it was not stated by me, Vaccha, to be eternal, etc. But here the view is not called 'undeclared'; rather, it is shown that 'this question is to be set aside.' Therefore, it is proper that the speculative view should in no way be called 'undeclared.'

Abyākatakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Undeclared is concluded.

9. Apariyāpannakathāvaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Discourse on the Unincluded

709-710. Tasmāti yasmā diṭṭhirāgānaṃ samāne vikkhambhanabhāvepi ‘‘vītarāgo’’ti vuccati, na pana ‘‘vigatadiṭṭhiko’’ti, tasmā diṭṭhi lokiyapariyāpannā na hotīti atthaṃ vadanti. Rūpadiṭṭhiyā abhāvā pana kāmadhātupariyāpannāya diṭṭhiyā bhavitabbaṃ. Yadi ca pariyāpannā siyā, tathā ca [Pg.103] sati kāmarāgo viya jhānalābhino diṭṭhipi vigaccheyyāti ‘‘vigatadiṭṭhiko’’ti vattabbo siyā, na ca vuccati, tasmā apariyāpannā diṭṭhi. Na hi sā tassa avigatā diṭṭhi kāmarāgo viya kāmadiṭṭhi yena kāmadhātuyā pariyāpannā siyāti vadatīti veditabbaṃ.

Therefore: Since, although the suppression of views and lust is similar, one is called 'devoid of lust' but not 'one who has overcome views,' for that reason they state the meaning that view is not included in the worldly. However, due to the absence of a view pertaining to the form realm, there must be a view included in the desire realm. And if it were included, then, just as sensual lust departs for one who attains jhāna, so too view would depart, and one would be designated 'one who has overcome views.' But this is not said; therefore, view is unincluded. For it is not said that this unabandoned view of his is a desire-realm view like sensual lust, by which it would be included in the desire realm. Thus it should be understood.

Apariyāpannakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Unincluded is concluded.

Cuddasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Fourteenth Chapter is concluded.

15. Pannarasamavaggo

15. The Fifteenth Chapter

1. Paccayatākathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discourse on Conditionality

711-717. Tasmā paccayatā vavatthitāti hetupaccayabhūtassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayabhāvādinā viya adhipatipaccayatādinā ca na bhavitabbanti hetupaccayabhāvoyevetassa vavatthito hotīti attho.

Therefore, 'conditionality is established' means that for a phenomenon that is a root condition, its nature as a root condition is specifically established, in that it does not also become an object condition, a predominance condition, and so on. This is the meaning.

Paccayatākathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Conditionality is concluded.

2. Aññamaññapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discourse on the Mutual Condition

718-719. Apuññābhisaṅkhārova gahito ‘‘nanu avijjā saṅkhārena sahajātā’’ti vuttattāti adhippāyo. Sahajātaaññamaññaatthiavigatasampayuttavasenāti ettha nissayo kamabhedena atthiggahaṇena gahito hotīti na vutto, kammāhārā asādhāraṇatāyāti veditabbā. Vakkhati hi ‘‘tīṇi upādānāni avijjāya saṅkhārā viya taṇhāya paccayā hontī’’ti (kathā. aṭṭha. 718-719), tasmā upādānehi samānā evettha saṅkhārānaṃ paccayatā dassitāti.

The intention is that only the demeritorious formation is taken, because it was said: 'Is not ignorance co-nascent with the formation?' By way of co-nascence, mutuality, presence, non-disappearance, and association: here, the dependence condition is not mentioned because it is included by the mention of the presence condition, according to the sequence; it should be understood that the kamma and nutriment conditions are dissimilar. For it will be said: 'The three kinds of clinging are conditions for craving, just as formations are for ignorance.' Therefore, the conditionality of the formations is shown here as being similar to that of the clingings.

Aññamaññapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Mutual Condition is concluded.

9. Tatiyasaññāvedayitakathāvaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Third Discourse: On Cessation of Perception and Feeling

732. Tatiyasaññāvedayitakathāyaṃ [Pg.104] sesasatte sandhāyāti nirodhasamāpannato aññe yesaṃ nirodhasamāpattiyā bhavitabbaṃ, te pañcavokārasatte sandhāyāti adhippāyo, asaññasattānampi ca saññuppādā cutiṃ icchantīti sesasabbasatte sandhāyāti vā. Sarīrapakatinti tathārūpo ayaṃ kāyo, yathārūpe kāye pāṇisamphassāpi kamantītiādikaṃ.

732. In the Third Discourse, on Cessation of Perception and Feeling: The phrase 'remaining beings' refers to beings in the five-constituent existence other than one who has attained cessation, those for whom the attainment of cessation is possible. This is the intention. Or, it refers to all remaining beings, since even non-percipient beings desire to pass away with the arising of perception. 'The body’s nature' means: this body is of such a kind that on such a body even the touch of a living creature can have an effect, and so on.

733-734. Suttavirodho siyāti idaṃ paravādiṃ sampaṭicchāpetvā vattabbaṃ.

'There would be a contradiction with the Sutta'—this should be said after getting the proponent of the other view to accept this.

Tatiyasaññāvedayitakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Third Discourse: On Cessation of Perception and Feeling is concluded.

10. Asaññasattupikākathāvaṇṇanā

10. Commentary on the Discourse Concerning Non-Percipient Beings

735. Saññāvirāgavasena pavattabhāvanā asaññasamāpattipīti laddhikittane saññāvirāgavasena pavattabhāvanaṃ catutthajjhānasamāpattiṃ ‘‘asaññasamāpattī’’ti aggahetvā sāpi asaññitā saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpattiyeva nāmāti parassa laddhīti dasseti. Yasmā asaññasamāpattiṃ samāpannassa alobhādayo atthīti ettha sakasamayasiddhā catutthajjhānasamāpatti ‘‘asaññasamāpattī’’ti vuttā.

735. In the statement of the tenet, 'The meditative development that proceeds by way of dispassion towards perception is the non-percipient attainment,' it shows the tenet of the other school. They do not take the fourth jhāna attainment—which is the meditative development that proceeds by way of dispassion towards perception—as the 'non-percipient attainment.' Rather, their tenet is that the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling is also called 'non-percipient.' Because for one who has attained the non-percipient attainment there exist non-greed and so on, here the fourth jhāna attainment, which is established in our own doctrine, is called the 'non-percipient attainment.'

736. Saññāvirāgavasena samāpannattā asaññitā, na saññāya abhāvatoti catutthajjhānasamāpattimeva sandhāya vadati.

736. It is called 'non-percipient' because one attains it through dispassion towards perception, not because of the absence of perception—this is said with specific reference to the fourth jhāna attainment.

Asaññasattupikākathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse Concerning Non-Percipient Beings is concluded.

11. Kammūpacayakathāvaṇṇanā

11. Commentary on the Discourse on the Accumulation of Kamma

738-739. Kammena sahajātoti pañhesu ‘‘kammūpacayaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, cittavippayuttaṃ sandhāya paṭijānātī’’ti katthaci pāṭho, ‘‘cittasampayuttaṃ [Pg.105] sandhāya paṭikkhipati, cittavippayuttaṃ sandhāya paṭijānātī’’ti aññattha. Ubhayampi vicāretabbaṃ.

738-739. In the questions on what is “co-nascent with kamma”: in some places the reading is, “one rejects by referring to the accumulation of kamma, but accepts by referring to what is dissociated from consciousness.” Elsewhere, the reading is, “one rejects by referring to what is associated with consciousness, but accepts by referring to what is dissociated from consciousness.” Both should be investigated.

741. Tasmāti tiṇṇampi ekakkhaṇe sabbhāvato tiṇṇaṃ phassānañca samodhānā ca ekattaṃ pucchatīti adhippāyo daṭṭhabbo.

741. “Therefore”: the intention should be understood as questioning the oneness that arises from the convergence of the three contacts, since all three exist in a single moment.

Kammūpacayakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Accumulation of Kamma is concluded.

Pannarasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Fifteenth Chapter is concluded.

Tatiyo paṇṇāsako samatto.

The Third Fifty is completed.

16. Soḷasamavaggo

16. The Sixteenth Chapter

3. Sukhānuppadānakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discourse on the Non-Giving of Happiness

747-748. Sukhānuppadānakathāyaṃ yaṃ evarūpanti yaṃ nevattano, na paresaṃ, na tassa, evarūpaṃ nāma anuppadinnaṃ bhavituṃ na arahati aññassa asakkuṇeyyattāti laddhimattena paṭijānāti, na yuttiyāti adhippāyo.

747-748. In the Discourse on the Non-Giving of Happiness: The phrase “that which is of such a nature” refers to what belongs neither to oneself, nor to others, nor to him. The intention is that he accepts, merely out of adherence to a tenet and not based on reason, that such a thing, called “not given,” is not fit to be, because of another’s inability.

Sukhānuppadānakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Non-Giving of Happiness is concluded.

4. Adhigayhamanasikārakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Discourse on Apprehending by Attention

749-753. Taṃcittatāyāti tadeva ārammaṇabhūtaṃ cittaṃ etassāti taṃcitto, tassa bhāvo taṃcittatā, tāya taṃcittatāya. Taṃ vā ālambakaṃ ālambitabbañca cittaṃ taṃcittaṃ, tassa bhāvo tasseva ālambakaālambitabbatā taṃcittatā, tāya codetunti attho.

749-753. Regarding 'by the state of having that mind' (taṃcittatāyāti): He for whom that very mind has become the object is 'one with that mind' (taṃcitto). The state of being such is 'the state of having that mind' (taṃcittatā); by that state of having that mind. Or alternatively, the apprehending mind and the object to be apprehended are 'that mind' (taṃcittaṃ). The state of that, the very condition of being the apprehending and the apprehended, is 'the state of having that mind' (taṃcittatā). The meaning is that by this one is urged.

Adhigayhamanasikārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Apprehending by Attention is concluded.

9. Rūpaṃrūpāvacarārūpāvacarantikathāvaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Discourse on 'Form, Form-Sphere, and Formless-Sphere'

768-770. Rūpaṃrūpāvacarārūpāvacarantikathāyaṃ heṭṭhāti cuddasamavagge āgatapariyāpannakathāyaṃ (kathā. aṭṭha. 703-705). ‘‘Samāpattesiya’’ntiādi vuttanayameva. Yañcettha [Pg.106] ‘‘atthi rūpaṃ arūpāvacara’’nti arūpāvacarakammassa katattā rūpaṃ vuttaṃ, tattha ca yaṃ vattabbaṃ, taṃ aṭṭhamavagge arūperūpakathāyaṃ (kathā. aṭṭha. 524-526) vuttanayamevāti.

768-770. In the Discourse on 'Form, Form-Sphere, and Formless-Sphere,' the word 'below' (heṭṭhā) refers to the Discourse on What Is Included, which comes in the fourteenth chapter (Kv-a 14.703-705). The passage beginning 'one who seeks attainment' (samāpattesiya) is just as was stated. And here, when it is said, 'There is form that is formless-sphere,' form is spoken of because formless-sphere kamma has been performed. Whatever should be said about that has been stated in the same way in the eighth chapter in the Discourse on Form in the Formless (Kv-a 8.524-526).

Rūpaṃrūpāvacarārūpāvacarantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on 'Form, Form-Sphere, and Formless-Sphere' is concluded.

Soḷasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Sixteenth Chapter is concluded.

17. Sattarasamavaggo

17. The Seventeenth Chapter

1. Atthiarahatopuññūpacayakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discourse that an Arahant Accumulates Merit

776-779. Cittaṃ anādiyitvāti ‘‘kiriyacittena dānādipavattisabbhāvato’’ti vuttaṃ kiriyacittaṃ abyākataṃ anādiyitvāti attho.

776-779. 'Not taking up the mind' (cittaṃ anādiyitvā) means not taking up the functional, indeterminate consciousness, which is mentioned in the phrase 'because of the existence of the occurrence of giving, etc., with functional consciousness.' This is the meaning.

Atthiarahatopuññūpacayakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse that an Arahant Accumulates Merit is concluded.

2. Natthiarahatoakālamaccūtikathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discourse that there is No Untimely Death for an Arahant

780. Ayoniso gahetvāti aladdhavipākavārānampi kammānaṃ byantībhāvaṃ na vadāmīti atthaṃ gahetvāti adhippāyo. Keci pana ‘‘kammānaṃ vipākaṃ appaṭisaṃviditvā puggalassa byantībhāvaṃ na vadāmīti evaṃ ayoniso atthaṃ gahetvā’’ti vadanti.

780. 'Having grasped unwisely' (ayoniso gahetvā) means having grasped the meaning: 'I do not speak of the termination of kammas even for those whose turn for the result has not come.' This is the intention. Some, however, say it means: 'Having unwisely grasped the meaning thus: "Without having experienced the result of kammas, I do not speak of the termination of the person."'.

781. Tāva na kamatīti laddhiyā paṭikkhipatīti tāva na kamati, tato paraṃ kamatīti laddhiyā paṭikkhipatīti adhippāyo. Ettha kira ‘‘sati jīvite jīvitāvasese jīvitā voropetī’’ti vacanato attano dhammatāya marantaṃ koṭṭentassa vā sīsaṃ vā chindantassa natthi pāṇātipātoti ācariyā vadanti. Pāṇo pāṇasaññitā vadhakacittaupakkamamaraṇesu vijjamānesupi na tena upakkamena matoti natthi pāṇātipātoti adhippāyo. Evaṃ pana marantena tena ekacittavārampi dhammatāmaraṇato orato na matoti dubbiññeyyametaṃ.

781. The intention is that by saying, 'It does not go that far,' he rejects the opponent's view, and by saying, 'It goes beyond that,' he rejects their view. Here, it seems, the teachers say that according to the passage, 'While life exists, while a remnant of life exists, he deprives him of life,' there is no offense of killing for one who strikes or beheads a person who is dying naturally. The intention is that although life, the perception of a living being, the intention to kill, the attempt, and the death are all present, since the person did not die by that attempt, there is no offense of killing. However, this is difficult to ascertain: that a person dying in this way did not die even for a single mind-moment before the natural death.

Natthiarahatoakālamaccūtikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse that there is No Untimely Death for an Arahant is concluded.

3. Sabbamidaṃkammatotikathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discourse that 'All This Is from Kamma'

784. Bījato [Pg.107] aṅkurassevāti yathā aṅkurassa abījato nibbatti natthi, tathā paccuppannapavattassapi akammato kammavipākato nibbatti natthi, taṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipatīti adhippāyo. Deyyadhammavasena dānaphalaṃ pucchatīti deyyadhammavasena yāya cetanāya taṃ deti, tassa dānassa phalaṃ pucchati, na deyyadhammassāti vuttaṃ hoti.

784. Regarding 'just as for a sprout from a seed': The intention is that he refutes the view by considering that just as there is no arising of a sprout without a seed, so too there is no arising of what has come to be in the present without kamma, that is, from the result of kamma. 'He asks about the fruit of giving by way of the gift' means that he asks about the fruit of that giving which one gives with a certain volition by way of the gift; it is not about the gift itself. This is what is said.

Sabbamidaṃkammatotikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse that 'All This Is from Kamma' is concluded.

4. Indriyabaddhakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Discourse on the Bound Faculties

788. Vināpi aniccattenāti ‘‘yāva dukkhā nirayā’’tiādīsu (ma. ni. 3.250) viya dukkhārammaṇattenapi dukkhaṃ vattabbanti adhippāyo.

788. Regarding 'even without impermanence': The intention is that, just as in such passages as 'So painful are the hells' (MN 130), suffering should be spoken of also because of its having suffering as its object.

Indriyabaddhakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Discourse on the Bound Faculties is concluded.

7. Navattabbaṃsaṅghodakkhiṇaṃvisodhetītikathāvaṇṇanā

7. Commentary on the Discourse that One Should Not Say, 'The Sangha Purifies the Offering'

793-794. Navattabbaṃsaṅghodakkhiṇaṃvisodhetītikathāyaṃ na ca tāni dakkhiṇaṃ visodhetuṃ sakkontīti yathā puggalo sīlaparisodhanādīni katvā nirodhampi samāpajjitvā visodhetuṃ sakkoti, na evaṃ maggaphalānīti adhippāyo, appaṭiggahaṇatoti vā.

793-794. In the Discourse that One Should Not Say, 'The Sangha Purifies the Offering,' the intention of the passage 'and those are not able to purify the offering' is this: just as a person is able to purify an offering by doing such things as purifying his virtue and even attaining cessation, the paths and fruits are not able to do so in the same way; or because they are not recipients.

Navattabbaṃsaṅghodakkhiṇaṃvisodhetītikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Discourse that One Should Not Say, 'The Sangha Purifies the Offering' is concluded.

11. Dakkhiṇāvisuddhikathāvaṇṇanā

11. Commentary on the Discourse on the Purity of an Offering

800-801. Dakkhiṇāvisuddhikathāyaṃ visujjheyyāti etassa atthaṃ dassento ‘‘mahapphalā bhaveyyā’’ti āha. Dāyakasseva cittavisuddhi vipākadāyikā hotīti paṭiggāhakanirapekkhā paṭiggāhakena paccayabhūtena vinā dāyakeneva mahāvipākacetanattaṃ āpādikā, paṭiggāhakanirapekkhā vipākadāyikā hotīti adhippāyo. Añño aññassa kārakoti [Pg.108] yadi dāyakassa dānacetanā nāma paṭiggāhakena katā bhaveyya, yuttarūpaṃ siyāti kasmā vuttaṃ, nanu laddhikittane ‘‘dāyakena dānaṃ dinnaṃ, paṭiggāhakena vipāko nibbattitoti añño aññassa kārako bhaveyyā’’ti vuttanti? Saccametaṃ, paṭiggāhakena vipākanibbattanampi pana dānacetanānibbattanena yadi bhaveyya, evaṃ sati añño aññassa kārakoti yuttarūpaṃ siyāti adhippāyo.

800-801. In the Discourse on the Purity of an Offering, when showing the meaning of 'it would be purified,' he said, 'it would be of great fruit.' The intention is that the purity of the donor's mind alone gives the result. Independent of the recipient, without the recipient as a condition, it is the donor alone who brings about the state of a volition with great result; it gives the result independent of the recipient. Why is it said: 'Regarding the statement, “One is the maker of another,” if the donor’s volition to give were made by the recipient, this would be proper'? For is it not said in the statement of the thesis: 'The gift is given by the donor, the result is produced by the recipient; thus one would be the maker of another'? This is true. However, the intention is that if the production of the result by the recipient were to occur by means of the production of the volition to give, in that case it would be proper to say, 'One is the maker of another'.

Dakkhiṇāvisuddhikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Discourse on the Purity of an Offering is concluded.

Sattarasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Seventeenth Chapter is concluded.

18. Aṭṭhārasamavaggo

18. The Eighteenth Chapter

1. Manussalokakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discussion Concerning the Human World

802-803. Ayonisoti ‘‘tusitapuraṃ sandhāyā’’tiādikaṃ gahaṇaṃ sandhāyāha.

802-803. The word ayoniso refers to the grasping mentioned in such passages as 'intending the Tusita celestial abode.'

Manussalokakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion Concerning the Human World is concluded.

2. Dhammadesanākathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discussion Concerning the Teaching of the Dhamma

804-806. Tassa ca desanaṃ sampaṭicchitvā sayameva ca āyasmatā ānandattherena desitoti vadati.

804-806. And having accepted his teaching, he says that it was taught by the Venerable Elder Ānanda himself.

Dhammadesanākathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion Concerning the Teaching of the Dhamma is concluded.

6. Jhānasaṅkantikathāvaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Discussion Concerning the Transition between Jhānas

813-816. Jhānasaṅkantikathāyaṃ uppaṭipāṭiyāti paṭhamajjhānato vuṭṭhāya vitakkavicārā ādīnavato manasikātabbā, tato dutiyajjhānena bhavitabbanti evaṃ yo upacārānaṃ jhānānañca anukkamo, tena vināti attho.

813-816. In the Discussion on the Transition between Jhānas, the phrase 'out of order' means that after emerging from the first jhāna, one should attend to thought and examination as a danger, and then one should cultivate the second jhāna. Thus the meaning is 'without that sequence of access concentrations and the jhānas.'

Jhānasaṅkantikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion Concerning the Transition between Jhānas is concluded.

7. Jhānantarikakathāvaṇṇanā

7. Commentary on the Discussion Concerning the Interval between Jhānas

817-819. Jhānantarikā [Pg.109] nāma esāti paṭhamajjhānādīsu aññatarabhāvābhāvato na jhānaṃ, atha kho dakkhiṇapubbādidisantarikā viya jhānantarikā nāma esāti. Katarā? Yoyaṃ avitakkavicāramatto samādhīti yojetabbaṃ.

817-819. This is called the interval between jhānas. It is not a jhāna because of the absence of any state belonging to the first jhāna and so on. Rather, like an intermediate direction such as the southeast, this is called the interval between jhānas. Which is it? It should be connected with the words: 'that concentration that is merely without thought and examination.'

Jhānantarikakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion Concerning the Interval between Jhānas is concluded.

9. Cakkhunārūpaṃpassatītikathāvaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Discussion Concerning 'The Eye Sees a Form'

826-827. Paṭijānanaṃ sandhāyāti ‘‘cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā nimittaggāhī hotī’’tiādinā (dha. sa. 1352) nayena vuttaṃ manoviññāṇapaṭijānanaṃ kira sandhāyāti adhippāyo, tasmā ‘‘evaṃ sante rūpaṃ manoviññāṇaṃ āpajjatīti manoviññāṇapaṭijānanaṃ pana rūpadassanaṃ kathaṃ hotī’’ti vicāretabbaṃ.

826-827. The intention is that this refers to the acknowledgement of mind-consciousness, which is spoken of in the way beginning, 'having seen a form with the eye, he grasps the sign' (Dhs §1352). Therefore, it should be investigated: 'This being so, since a form becomes an object of mind-consciousness, how then is the seeing of a form an acknowledgement of mind-consciousness?'

Cakkhunārūpaṃpassatītikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion Concerning 'The Eye Sees a Form' is concluded.

Aṭṭhārasamavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Eighteenth Chapter is concluded.

19. Ekūnavīsatimavaggo

19. The Nineteenth Chapter

1. Kilesapajahanakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discussion Concerning the Abandoning of Defilements

828-831. Anuppannāyeva nuppajjantīti pahīnā nāma honti, tasmā natthi kilesapajahanāti paṭikkhipati. Te pana neva uppajjitvā vigatā, nāpi bhavissanti, na ca uppannāti atīte kilese pajahatītiādi na vattabbanti dasseti.

828-831. He refutes the view: 'Because they are unarisen, they do not arise, and are thus called 'abandoned'; therefore there is no abandoning of defilements.' He shows that since those defilements have neither ceased after having arisen, nor will they arise, nor are they arisen, it should not be said that 'one abandons past defilements,' and so on.

Kilesapajahanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion Concerning the Abandoning of Defilements is concluded.

2. Suññatakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discussion on Emptiness

832. Anattalakkhaṇaṃ [Pg.110] tāva ekaccanti arūpakkhandhānaṃ anattalakkhaṇaṃ vadati. Ekena pariyāyenāti anattalakkhaṇassa jarāmaraṇabhāvapariyāyenāti vadanti. Rūpakkhandhādīnañhi mā jīratu mā maratūti alabbhaneyyo avasavattanākāro anattatā, sā atthato jarāmaraṇameva, tañca ‘‘jarāmaraṇaṃ dvīhi khandhehi saṅgahita’’nti (dhātu. 71) vuttattā arūpakkhandhānaṃ jarāmaraṇaṃ saṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannanti ayametesaṃ adhippāyo.

832. Firstly, 'according to some' means that he speaks of the characteristic of not-self of the formless aggregates. They say that 'by one way' means by the way of the characteristic of not-self being aging and death. For in regard to the form aggregate and so on, not-self is the state of not being subject to one's will, the unobtainability of the wish, 'May it not age! May it not die!' In meaning, this is simply aging and death. And since it is said, 'Aging and death are comprised in two aggregates' (Dhātuk. 71), the aging and death of the formless aggregates are included in the aggregate of formations. This is their intention.

Suññatakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on Emptiness is concluded.

3. Sāmaññaphalakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discussion on the Fruits of Recluseship

835-836. Phaluppatti cāti pattidhammaṃ vadati.

The phrase 'and the arising of the fruit' speaks of the state of attainment.

Sāmaññaphalakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on the Fruits of Recluseship is concluded.

5. Tathatākathāvaṇṇanā

5. Commentary on the Discussion on Suchness

841-843. Rūpādisabhāvatāsaṅkhātāti ettha rūpādīnaṃ sabhāvatāti rūpādisabhāvatāti evamattho daṭṭhabbo. Bhāvaṃ hesa tathatāti vadati, na bhāvayoganti.

Here, in the phrase 'designated as the intrinsic nature of form, etc.,' the meaning should be understood as follows: rūpādisabhāvatā is the intrinsic nature of form and so on. For this calls the state itself tathatā (suchness), not its connection with a state.

Tathatākathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on Suchness is concluded.

6. Kusalakathāvaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Discussion on the Wholesome

844-846. Anavajjabhāvamatteneva nibbānaṃ kusalanti yaṃkiñci kusalaṃ, sabbaṃ taṃ anavajjabhāvamatteneva, tasmā nibbānaṃ kusalanti vuttaṃ hoti.

Nibbāna is called 'wholesome' merely because of its blameless nature. Whatever is wholesome is so merely because of its blameless nature. Therefore, it is said that Nibbāna is 'wholesome.'

Kusalakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on the Wholesome is concluded.

7. Accantaniyāmakathāvaṇṇanā

7. Commentary on the Discussion on Absolute Certainty

847. ‘‘Sakiṃ [Pg.111] nimuggo nimuggova hotī’’ti suttaṃ nissāyāti tāya jātiyā lokuttarasaddhādīnaṃ anuppattiṃ sandhāya kataṃ avadhāraṇaṃ saṃsārakhāṇukabhāvaṃ sandhāya katanti maññamāno puthujjanassāyaṃ accantaniyāmatā, yāyaṃ niyatamicchādiṭṭhīti ‘‘atthi puthujjanassa accantaniyāmatā’’ti vadati. Vicikicchuppatti niyāmantaruppatti ca accantaniyāmanivattakā vicāretvā gahetabbā.

847. Relying on the sutta, 'One who has sunk once remains sunk,' and thinking that the assertion made with reference to the non-arising of supramundane faith and so on in that birth was made with reference to the state of being a stump in saṃsāra, he says, 'There is absolute certainty for a worldling,' this being the absolute certainty that is fixed wrong view. The arising of doubt and the arising of an intermediate certainty should be investigated and understood as what reverses absolute certainty.

Accantaniyāmakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on Absolute Certainty is concluded.

8. Indriyakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Commentary on the Discussion on the Faculties

853-856. Lokiyānampīti lokuttarānaṃ viya lokiyānampi saddhādīnaṃyeva saddhindriyādibhāvadassanena lokiyasaddhindriyādibhāvaṃ sādhetuṃ saddhādīnaṃyeva saddhindriyādibhāvadassanatthaṃ vuttanti attho daṭṭhabbo.

The meaning of the phrase 'of the worldly ones too' should be understood as follows: it is said for the purpose of showing that faith and so on are themselves the faith faculty and so on, in order to establish the existence of the worldly faith faculty and so on by demonstrating that, just as for the supramundane, for the worldly too faith and so on are themselves the faith faculty and so on.

Indriyakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on the Faculties is concluded.

Ekūnavīsatimavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Nineteenth Chapter is concluded.

20. Vīsatimavaggo

20. The Twentieth Chapter

2. Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discussion on Knowledge

863-865. Ñāṇakathāyaṃ dukkhaṃ parijānātīti lokuttaramaggañāṇameva dīpetīti ‘‘dukkhaṃ parijānātī’’ti vadanto idaṃ tava vacanaṃ lokuttaramaggañāṇameva dīpeti, na tasseva ñāṇabhāvaṃ. Kasmā? Yasmā na lokuttarameva ñāṇaṃ, tasmā na idaṃ sādhakanti vuttaṃ hoti.

In the discussion on knowledge, the statement 'one fully understands suffering' indicates the supramundane path-knowledge itself. Thus, in saying 'one fully understands suffering,' this statement of yours indicates only the supramundane path-knowledge, not its nature as knowledge. Why? Because knowledge is not only supramundane, therefore it is said that this is not a proof.

Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on Knowledge is concluded.

3. Nirayapālakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discussion on the Wardens of Hell

867-868. Paṇunnanti [Pg.112] paṇuditaṃ, anavasesakhittanti attho.

'Paṇunnaṃ' means 'driven away'; the meaning is 'completely cast out.'

Nirayapālakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on the Wardens of Hell is concluded.

4. Tiracchānakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Discussion on Frivolous Talk

869-871. Tassa atthitāya paṭiññāti tassa hatthināgassa ca dibbayānassa ca atthitāyāti visuṃ yojetabbaṃ.

The phrase 'by acknowledging its existence' should be construed separately with 'the existence of that great elephant' and 'the existence of the divine vehicle'.

Tiracchānakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on Frivolous Talk is concluded.

6. Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Discussion on Knowledge

876-877. Ñāṇakathāyaṃ sace taṃ dvādasavatthukanti ettha ca ‘‘lokuttara’’nti vacanaseso, taṃ vā lokuttarañāṇaṃ sace dvādasavatthukanti attho. Pariññeyyanti pubbabhāgo, pariññātanti aparabhāgo, saccañāṇaṃ pana maggakkhaṇepi parijānanādikiccasādhanavasena hotīti āha ‘‘saddhiṃ pubbabhāgaparabhāgehī’’ti.

876-877. In the discussion on knowledge, in the phrase 'if that has twelve bases,' the word 'supramundane' is to be supplied. The meaning is: if that supramundane knowledge has twelve bases. 'To be fully understood' is the prior part; 'has been fully understood' is the subsequent part. But the knowledge of the truth occurs even at the moment of the path by way of accomplishing the function of fully understanding, etc. Hence it is said, 'together with the prior and subsequent parts.'

Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discussion on knowledge is concluded.

Vīsatimavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the twentieth chapter is concluded.

Catuttho paṇṇāsako samatto.

The Fourth Fifty is completed.

21. Ekavīsatimavaggo

21. The Twenty-first Chapter

1. Sāsanakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discussion on the Dispensation

878. Tīsupi pucchāsu codanatthaṃ vuttanti tīsupi pucchāsu ‘‘sāsana’’ntiādivacanaṃ vuttanti samudāyā ekadesānaṃ adhikaraṇabhāvena vuttāti daṭṭhabbā.

878. It should be understood that in all three questions, the statement is made for the purpose of censure. The words 'dispensation,' etc., in all three questions are spoken by taking the aggregate as the locus for some of its parts.

Sāsanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discussion on the Dispensation is concluded.

4. Iddhikathāvaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Discussion on Psychic Powers

883-884. Iddhikathāyaṃ [Pg.113] atthi adhippāyaiddhīti adhippāyavasena ijjhanato adhippāyoti evaṃnāmikā iddhi atthīti attho.

883-884. In the discussion on psychic power, there is the psychic power of resolution. Because it succeeds by means of resolution, it is called 'resolution.' The meaning is that a psychic power so named exists.

Iddhikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discussion on psychic powers is concluded.

7. Dhammakathāvaṇṇanā

7. Commentary on the Discussion on the Dhamma

887-888. Dhammakathāyaṃ rūpaṭṭhato aññassa rūpassa abhāvāti yo rūpassa niyāmo vucceyya, so rūpaṭṭho nāma koci rūpato añño natthīti rūpaṭṭhato aññaṃ rūpañca na hoti, tasmā rūpaṃ rūpameva, na vedanādisabhāvanti adhippāyena ‘‘rūpaṃ rūpaṭṭhena niyata’’nti vattabbaṃ, na aññathā rūpaṭṭhena niyāmenāti adhippāyo. Tattha rūpato aññassa rūpaṭṭhassa abhāve dassite rūpaṭṭhato aññassa rūpassa abhāvo dassitoyeva nāma hotīti tameva rūpato aññassa rūpaṭṭhassa abhāvaṃ dassento ‘‘rūpasabhāvo hī’’tiādimāha. Esa vohāroti rūpassa sabhāvo rūpasabhāvo, rūpassa attho rūpaṭṭhoti evaṃ aññattaṃ gahetvā viya pavatto rūpasabhāvavohāro rūpaṭṭhavohāro vā vedanādīhi nānattameva so sabhāvoti nānattasaññāpanatthaṃ hotīti attho. Tasmāti rūpassa rūpaṭṭhena anaññattā. ‘‘Rūpaṃ rūpameva, na vedanādisabhāva’’nti avatvā ‘‘rūpaṃ rūpaṭṭhena niyata’’nti vadato tañca vacanaṃ vuttappakārena sadosaṃ, atha kasmā ‘‘rūpañhi rūpaṭṭhena niyatanti rūpaṃ rūpameva, na vedanādisabhāvanti adhippāyena vattabba’’nti vadanto ‘‘rūpaṃ rūpaṭṭhena niyata’’nti paṭijānātīti attho daṭṭhabbo. Nanu cetaṃ attanāva vuttaṃ, na parenāti paṭijānātīti na vattabbanti? Na, attānampi paraṃ viya vacanato. Vattabbanti vā sakavādinā vattabbanti vuttaṃ hoti. Yadi ca tena vattabbaṃ paṭijānāti ca so etamatthanti, atha kasmā paṭijānāti sakavādīti ayamettha attho. Atthantaravasenāti tattha vuttameva kāraṇaṃ nigūhitvā parena coditanti tameva kāraṇaṃ dassetvā codanaṃ nivatteti. Ito aññathāti rūpādisabhāvamattaṃ muñcitvā tena parikappitaṃ niyataṃ natthīti tassa [Pg.114] parikappitassa nivattanatthaṃ puna teneva nayena codetuṃ ‘‘micchattaniyata’’ntiādimāhāti attho.

887-888. In the discussion on the Dhamma: Since there is no form other than form-nature, and since there is nothing called 'form-nature' that is other than form, nor is there any form other than form-nature, therefore, with the intention that 'form is just form, not of the nature of feeling, etc.,' one should say, 'form is determined by form-nature,' and not otherwise by the determination of form-nature. This is the intention. When it is shown that there is no form-nature other than form, it is thereby shown that there is no form other than form-nature. To show just this—that there is no form-nature other than form—he says, 'For the intrinsic nature of form…' etc. This is the usage: the intrinsic nature of form is 'form-nature'; the meaning of form is 'form-nature.' The usage 'form-nature' or 'the nature of form' proceeds as if grasping a difference, and its purpose is to make known its distinctness from feeling, etc.—that this nature is distinct. Therefore, because form and form-nature are not different, for one who says 'form is determined by form-nature' without saying 'form is just form, not of the nature of feeling, etc.,' that statement is faulty in the way explained. Why then, while saying, 'One should say, "For form is determined by form-nature," with the intention that "form is just form, not of the nature of feeling, etc.,"' does he acknowledge, 'form is determined by form-nature'? This is the meaning to be understood. But isn't this said by oneself, not by another? So should one not say 'he acknowledges'? No, for one can speak of oneself as if of another. Or, 'one should say' means it is said by one's own proponent. If it should be said by him, and he acknowledges this meaning, then why does the proponent acknowledge it? This is the point here. By way of another meaning: when challenged by another who has concealed the very reason stated there, he refutes the challenge by revealing that same reason. Other than this: To refute his conception that there is no determination apart from the mere intrinsic nature of form, etc., as he has imagined, he challenges him again in the same way, saying, 'fixed in wrongness,' etc. This is the meaning.

Dhammakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discussion on the Dhamma is concluded.

Ekavīsatimavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the twenty-first chapter is concluded.

22. Bāvīsatimavaggo

22. The Twenty-Second Chapter

2. Kusalacittakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discourse on Wholesome Consciousness

894-895. Kusalacittakathāyaṃ javanakkhaṇeti parinibbānacittato purimajavanakkhaṇe.

894-895. In the Discourse on Wholesome Consciousness, 'the moment of impulsion' is the moment of impulsion preceding the consciousness of final Nibbāna.

Kusalacittakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Wholesome Consciousness is concluded.

3. Āneñjakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discourse on the Imperturbable

896. Bhavaṅgacitteti bhavaṅgapariyosānattā cuticittaṃ ‘‘bhavaṅgacitta’’nti āha.

896. ‘The bhavaṅga-consciousness’: he calls the death-consciousness ‘bhavaṅga-consciousness’ because it is the conclusion of the life-continuum.

Āneñjakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Imperturbable is concluded.

5-7. Tissopikathāvaṇṇanā

5-7. Commentary on the Discourse concerning Tissa

898-900. Sattavassikaṃ gabbhaṃ disvā ‘‘gabbheyeva arahattappattihetubhūto indriyaparipāko atthī’’ti ‘‘arahattappattipi atthī’’ti maññati, ākāsasupinaṃ disvā ‘‘ākāsagamanādiabhiññā viya dhammābhisamayo arahattappatti ca atthī’’ti maññatīti adhippāyo.

898-900. Having seen a seven-year gestation, one thinks: 'In the womb itself there is the maturation of the faculties that is the cause for attaining arahantship,' and one thinks: 'There is also the attainment of arahantship.' Having seen a dream about the sky, one thinks: 'Just as there are the supernormal powers of moving through the sky and so on, so there is the penetration of the Dhamma and the attainment of arahantship.' This is the meaning.

Tissopikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse concerning Tissa is concluded.

9. Āsevanapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Discourse on the Repetition Condition

903-905. Na [Pg.115] koci āsevanapaccayaṃ āsevati nāmāti yathā bījaṃ catumadhurabhāvaṃ na gaṇhāti, evaṃ bhāvanāsaṅkhātaṃ āsevanapaccayaṃ gaṇhanto āsevanto nāma koci natthīti attho.

903-905. ‘No one, as such, practices the repetition condition’: The meaning is that just as a seed does not acquire the quality of the four sweets, so there is no one who, by taking up the repetition condition called ‘development,’ can be said to be ‘one who practices.’

Āsevanapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Repetition Condition is concluded.

10. Khaṇikakathāvaṇṇanā

10. Commentary on the Discourse on the Momentary

906-907. Pathaviyādirūpesu kesañci uppādo kesañci nirodhoti evaṃ patiṭṭhānaṃ rūpasantatiyā hoti. Na hi rūpānaṃ anantarādipaccayā santi, yehi arūpasantatiyā viya rūpasantatiyā pavatti siyāti citte ‘‘citte mahāpathavī saṇṭhātī’’tiādi coditaṃ.

906-907. In regard to material phenomena such as the earth element, for some there is arising and for others cessation; thus there is an establishment for the continuity of material phenomena. For material phenomena do not have contiguity conditions and so on, by which the continuity of material phenomena could proceed like the continuity of immaterial phenomena. Thus, concerning the mind, the objection was raised: 'Does the great earth element subsist in the mind?' and so on.

Khaṇikakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Momentary is concluded.

Bāvīsatimavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Twenty-Second Chapter is concluded.

23. Tevīsatimavaggo

23. The Twenty-Third Chapter

1. Ekādhippāyakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discourse on a Single Intention

908. Karuṇādhippāyena ekādhippāyoti rāgādhippāyato aññādhippāyovāti vuttaṃ hoti. Eko adhippāyoti ettha ekatobhāve ekasaddo daṭṭhabbo. Samānatthe hi sati rāgādhippāyepi ekādhippāyenāti ekādhippāyatā atthīti.

908. ‘A single intention’ means a single intention by way of compassion; this is said to be a different intention from an intention of lust. Here in the phrase ‘a single intention,’ the word ‘single’ should be understood in the sense of uniqueness. For if it meant ‘sameness,’ then even in the case of an intention of lust there would be a ‘singleness of intention,’ that is, it would be a single intention.

Ekādhippāyakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on a Single Intention is concluded.

3-7. Issariyakāmakārikākathāvaṇṇanā

3-7. Commentary on the Discourse on Action from Desire for Sovereignty

910-914. Issariyena yathādhippetassa karaṇaṃ issariyakāmakārikā. Gaccheyyāti gabbhaseyyokkamanaṃ gaccheyya. Issariyakāmakārikāhetu [Pg.116] nāma dukkarakārikā micchādiṭṭhiyā karīyatīti ettha dukkarakārikā nāma issariyakāmakārikāhetu kariyamānā micchādiṭṭhiyā karīyatīti attho daṭṭhabbo, issariyakāmakārikāhetu nāma vinā micchādiṭṭhiyā kariyamānā natthīti vā.

910-914. ‘Action from desire for sovereignty’ is accomplishing what one wishes by means of sovereignty. ‘He would go’: he would go to lie in a womb. Here, the meaning should be understood thus: an ascetic practice undertaken on account of the desire for sovereignty is done with wrong view; or, there is no action undertaken on account of the desire for sovereignty that is done without wrong view.

Issariyakāmakārikākathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Action from Desire for Sovereignty is concluded.

8. Patirūpakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Commentary on the Discourse on the Counterfeit

915-916. Mettādayo sandhāya ‘‘mettādayo viya na rāgo rāgapatirūpako koci atthīti rāgameva gaṇhāti, evaṃ dosepī’’ti vadanti.

915-916. With reference to loving-kindness and so on, they say: ‘Unlike loving-kindness and so on, there is no such thing as a lust that is a counterfeit of lust. Thus one grasps only lust; similarly in the case of hatred.’

Patirūpakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Counterfeit is concluded.

9. Aparinipphannakathāvaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Discourse on the Unaccomplished

917-918. Na aniccādibhāvanti ettha aniccādiko bhāvo etassāti aniccādibhāvanti rūpaṃ vuttaṃ. ‘‘Na kevalañhi paṭhamasaccameva dukkha’’nti vadantena ‘‘dukkhaññeva parinipphanna’’nti dukkhasaccaṃ sandhāya pucchā katāti dassitaṃ hoti. Evaṃ sati tena ‘‘cakkhāyatanaṃ aparinipphanna’’ntiādi na vattabbaṃ siyā. Na hi cakkhāyatanādīni anupādinnāni lokuttarāni vā. Tanti ‘‘dukkhaññeva parinipphannaṃ, na pana rūpa’’nti etaṃ rūpassa ca dukkhattā no vata re vattabbeti attho.

917-918. ‘Not having the nature of impermanence, etc.’: here, material form is spoken of as ‘having the nature of impermanence, etc.’ By the one who says, ‘It is not only the first truth that is suffering,’ it is shown that the question, ‘Is only suffering accomplished?’ was asked with reference to the truth of suffering. This being so, he should not have said, ‘The eye base is unaccomplished,’ and so on. For the eye base and so on are neither unclung-to nor supramundane. Therefore, the meaning is that this statement—‘Only suffering is accomplished, but not material form’—should certainly not be said, because material form, too, is suffering.

Aparinipphannakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Unaccomplished is concluded.

Tevīsatimavaggavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Twenty-Third Chapter is concluded.

Kathāvatthupakaraṇa-mūlaṭīkā samattā.

The Root Subcommentary on the Kathāvatthu-ppakaraṇa is concluded.

Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa

Homage to the Blessed One, the Arahant, the Perfectly Self-Enlightened One.

Yamakapakaraṇa-mūlaṭīkā

Root Subcommentary on the Yamaka-ppakaraṇa

Ganthārambhavaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Opening of the Text

Kathāvatthupakaraṇena [Pg.117] saṅkhepeneva desitena dhammesu viparītaggahaṇaṃ nivāretvā tesveva dhammesu dhammasaṅgahādīsu pakāsitesu dhammapuggalokāsādinissayānaṃ sanniṭṭhānasaṃsayānaṃ vasena nānappakārakaosallatthaṃ yamakapakaraṇaṃ āraddhaṃ, taṃ samayadesadesakavaseneva dassetvā saṃvaṇṇanākkamañcassa anuppattaṃ ‘‘āgato bhāro avassaṃ vahitabbo’’ti saṃvaṇṇanamassa paṭijānanto āha ‘‘saṅkhepenevā’’tiādi.

After the wrong grasp of teachings was prevented by the Kathāvatthu-ppakaraṇa, which was taught only in brief, and after those same teachings were clarified in the Dhammasaṅgaha and other texts, the Yamaka-ppakaraṇa was undertaken for the purpose of attaining skill in various ways by resolving doubts concerning the support of teachings, persons, location, and so on. Having shown this according to time, place, and teacher, and since the turn for its commentary has now come, undertaking its commentary with the thought, ‘A burden that has arrived must be borne,’ he says, ‘Only in brief,’ and so on.

Tattha yamassa visayātītoti jātiyā sati maraṇaṃ hotīti jāti, pañca vā upādānakkhandhā yamassa visayo, taṃ samudayappahānena atītoti attho. Yamassa vā rañño visayaṃ maraṇaṃ, tassa āṇāpavattiṭṭhānaṃ desaṃ vā atīto. ‘‘Chaccābhiṭhānāni abhabba kātu’’nti (khu. pā. 6.11; su. ni. 234) vuttānaṃ channaṃ abhabbaṭṭhānānaṃ desakoti chaṭṭhānadesako. Ayamā ekekā hutvā āvattā nīlā amalā ca tanuruhā assāti ayamāvattanīlāmalatanuruho.

Therein, ‘one who has gone beyond the sphere of Yama’: since when there is birth there is death, the five aggregates subject to clinging are the sphere of Yama. The meaning is that he has gone beyond it by abandoning its origin. Or, he has gone beyond death, the sphere of King Yama, or the domain where his command prevails. ‘Teacher of the six places’: he is the teacher of the six states of inability spoken of in the passage, ‘Incapable of doing six things.’ ‘He whose body-hairs are turned to the right, blue, and pure’: this refers to him whose body-hairs are turned to the right, blue, and pure.

Ganthārambhavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Opening of the Text is concluded.

1. Mūlayamakaṃ

1. The Root Yamaka

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Chapter on the Summary

1. Yamakānaṃ vasena desitattāti iminā dasasu ekekassa yamakasamūhassa taṃsamūhassa ca sakalassa pakaraṇassa yamakānaṃ vasena laddhavohārataṃ dasseti.

1. By the words ‘Because it is taught by way of pairs,’ this shows that each of the ten groups of pairs, and the entire treatise which is that collection, has received its designation by way of pairs.

Kusalākusalamūlasaṅkhātānaṃ [Pg.118] dvinnaṃ atthānaṃ vasena atthayamakanti etena ‘‘ye keci kusalā dhammā, sabbe te kusalamūlā’’ti etasseva yamakabhāvo āpajjatīti ce? Nāpajjati ñātuṃ icchitānaṃ dutiyapaṭhamapucchāsu vuttānaṃ kusalakusalamūlavisesānaṃ, kusalamūlakusalavisesehi vā ñātuṃ icchitānaṃ paṭhamadutiyapucchāsu sanniṭṭhānapadasaṅgahitānaṃ kusalakusalamūlānaṃ vasena atthayamakabhāvassa vuttattā. Ñātuṃ icchitānañhi visesānaṃ visesavantāpekkhānaṃ, taṃvisesavataṃ vā dhammānañca visesāpekkhānaṃ ettha padhānabhāvoti ekekāya pucchāya ekeko eva attho saṅgahito hotīti. Atthasaddo cettha na dhammavācako hetuphalādivācako vā, atha kho pāḷiatthavācako. Tenevāha ‘‘tesaññeva atthāna’’ntiādi.

It is a ‘pair of meanings’ (atthayamaka) by way of the two things designated as wholesome states and wholesome roots. If it is asked, ‘Does this mean that the statement, “Whatever wholesome states there are, are they all wholesome roots?” by itself constitutes a pair?’ No, it does not. For it is said to be a ‘pair of meanings’ because of the wholesome states and wholesome roots themselves—which are either the distinctions between wholesome and wholesome-root stated in the second and first questions for those who wish to know, or are the things included in the terms of the thesis in the first and second questions for those who wish to know by means of those distinctions. Indeed, for those who wish to know, the distinctions are primary in relation to the things possessing them, and the things possessing those distinctions are primary in relation to the distinctions. Thus, in each question, only one ‘thing’ is included. Here the word ‘attha’ does not denote ‘dhamma’ or ‘cause and effect,’ but denotes the meaning of the Pāli text. Thus it is said, ‘of those very things,’ etc.

Tīṇipi padāni ekato katvāti idaṃ nāmapadassa kusalādīnaṃ saṅgāhakattamattameva sandhāya vuttaṃ, na niravasesasaṅgāhakattaṃ. Sabbakusalādisaṅgaṇhanatthameva ca nāmapadassa vuttattā ‘‘kusalattikamātikāya catūsu padesū’’ti vuttaṃ.

‘The three terms are combined into one’; this is said merely with regard to the name-term's function of encompassing ‘wholesome,’ and so on, not its encompassing them without remainder. And because the name-term is stated for the very purpose of collecting all ‘wholesome,’ and so on, it is said: ‘in the four terms of the mātikā of the wholesome triad.’

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Chapter on the Summary is concluded.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Exposition Chapter

52. Aññamaññayamake ye keci kusalāti apucchitvāti ettha yathā dutiyayamake ‘‘ye keci kusalamūlā’’ti apucchitvā ‘‘ye keci kusalā’’ti pucchā katā, evamidhāpi ‘‘ye keci kusalā’’ti pucchā kātabbā siyā purimayamakavisiṭṭhaṃ apubbaṃ gahetvā pacchimayamakassa appavattattāti adhippāyo. ‘‘Paṭilomapucchānurūpabhāvato’’ti keci. Purimapucchāya pana atthavasena katāya tadanurūpāya pacchimapucchāya bhavitabbaṃ anulome vigatasaṃsayassa paṭilome saṃsayuppattito. Tena na ca pacchimapucchānurūpāya purimapucchāya bhavitabbanti purimovettha adhippāyo yutto. Imināpi byañjanena tassevatthassa sambhavatoti idamevaṃ na sakkā vattuṃ. Na hi kusalabyañjanattho eva kusalamūlena ekamūlabyañjanattho, teneva vissajjanampi asamānaṃ hoti. Kusalabyañjanena hi [Pg.119] pucchāya katāya ‘‘avasesā’’ti imasmiṃ ṭhāne ‘‘avasesā kusalā dhammā’’ti vattabbaṃ hoti, itarathā avasesā kusalamūlasahajātā dhammāti, na ca tāni vacanāni samānatthāni kusalakusalābyākatadīpanatoti. Ayaṃ panettha adhippāyo siyā – ‘‘ye keci kusalā’’ti imināpi byañjanena ‘‘ye keci kusalamūlena ekamūlā’’ti vuttabyañjanatthasseva sambhavato dutiyayamake viya apucchitvā ‘‘ye keci kusalamūlena ekamūlā’’ti pucchā katā. Na hi kusalamūlehi viya kusalamūlena ekamūlehi aññe kusalā santi, kusalehi pana aññepi te santīti.

52. In the Mutual Pair, regarding the words 'without asking, “Whatever are wholesome…”': The intention is that just as in the second pair the question 'Whatever are wholesome…' was asked without asking 'Whatever are wholesome roots…,' so here too the question 'Whatever are wholesome…' should have been asked, since the latter pair does not proceed by taking up something new and distinct from the former pair. Some say this is 'because it conforms to the counter-question.' However, when the initial question is made according to its meaning, the subsequent question should conform to it, since in the direct order doubt is removed, while in the reverse order doubt arises. Therefore, the initial question need not conform to the subsequent one; this former intention is correct here. Still, one cannot say this just because that meaning is possible even with this phrasing. For the meaning of the expression 'wholesome' is not the same as the meaning of the expression 'single-rooted with a wholesome root'; thus the answer is also different. If the question were asked with the expression 'wholesome,' then in place of 'the remaining,' one would have to say 'the remaining wholesome states'; otherwise, one would say 'the remaining states co-nascent with a wholesome root.' These statements are not synonymous, as they clarify what is wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate. Alternatively, the intention here might be this: since by the expression 'Whatever are wholesome…' the meaning of the expression 'Whatever are single-rooted with a wholesome root' is also possible, the question was asked as 'Whatever are single-rooted with a wholesome root' without asking 'Whatever are wholesome...', just as in the second pair. For, unlike the case of wholesome roots, there are no other wholesome states apart from those that are single-rooted with a wholesome root; but apart from wholesome states, there are also those others.

Paṭilomapucchāvaṇṇanāyaṃ ‘‘kusalamūlena ekamūlā’’ti hi pucchāya katāya ‘‘mūlāni yāni ekato uppajjantī’’ti heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva vissajjanaṃ kātabbaṃ bhaveyyāti vuttaṃ, tampi tathā na sakkā vattuṃ. ‘‘Ye vā pana kusalamūlena aññamaññamūlā, sabbe te dhammā kusalamūlena ekamūlā’’ti ca pucchite ‘‘āmantā’’ icceva vissajjanena bhavitabbaṃ. Na hi kusalamūlena aññamaññamūlesu kiñci ekamūlaṃ na hoti, yena anulomapucchāya viya vibhāgo kātabbo bhaveyya. Yattha tīṇi kusalamūlāni uppajjanti, tattha tāni aññamaññamūlāni ekamūlāni ca dvinnaṃ dvinnaṃ ekekena aññamaññekamūlattā. Yattha pana dve uppajjanti, tattha tāni aññamaññamūlāneva, na ekamūlānīti etassa gahaṇassa nivāraṇatthaṃ ‘‘mūlāni yāni ekato uppajjantī’’tiādinā vissajjanaṃ kātabbanti ce? Na, ‘‘āmantā’’ti imināva vissajjanena taṃgahaṇanivāraṇato anulomapucchāvissajjanena ca ekato uppajjamānānaṃ dvinnaṃ tiṇṇañca mūlānaṃ aññamaññekamūlabhāvassa nicchitattā. Aññamaññamūlānañhi samānamūlatā eva ekamūlavacanena pucchīyati, na aññamaññasamānamūlatā, atthi ca dvinnaṃ mūlānaṃ samānamūlatā. Tesu hi ekekaṃ itarena mūlena taṃmūlehi aññehi samānamūlanti.

In the explanation of the counter-question, it is said that if the question were asked, 'Are they single-rooted with a wholesome root?', the answer should be given in the way stated below: 'The roots that arise together.' But this too cannot be said so. For if the question were asked, 'Or those states that are mutually rooted with a wholesome root, are all those states single-rooted with a wholesome root?', the answer should be just 'Yes.' For among those that are mutually rooted with a wholesome root, there is nothing that is not single-rooted, which would require a distinction to be made as in the direct question. Where three wholesome roots arise, they are mutually rooted and single-rooted, because each pair is mutually single-rooted with the one other. But where two arise, they are only mutually rooted, not single-rooted. If it is said that to prevent this interpretation, the answer should be given as, 'The roots that arise together,' etc.—No, because by the answer 'Yes' alone that interpretation is prevented, and because by the answer to the direct question it is determined that two or three roots arising together have the state of being mutually single-rooted. For by the term 'single-rooted,' the common-rootedness of the mutually-rooted is being asked, not their mutual common-rootedness. And there is a common-rootedness of two roots. For in their case, each one is common-rooted with the other root and with other states rooted therein.

Aññamaññamūlatte pana nicchite ekamūlattasaṃsayābhāvato ‘‘sabbe te dhammā kusalamūlena ekamūlā’’ti pucchā na katāti daṭṭhabbā. ‘‘Aññamaññassa mūlā etesantipi aññamaññamūlā, samānatthena ekaṃ mūlaṃ etesanti ekamūlā’’ti ubhayampi vacanaṃ mūlayuttatameva vadati, teneva ca ubhayatthāpi ‘‘kusalamūlenā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tattha mūlayogasāmaññe ekamūlatte nicchite tabbiseso aññamaññamūlabhāvo na nicchito hotīti anulomapucchā pavattā, mūlayogavisese pana aññamaññamūlatte nicchite na vinā ekamūlattena [Pg.120] aññamaññamūlattaṃ atthīti mūlayogasāmaññaṃ ekamūlattaṃ nicchitameva hoti, tasmā ‘‘ekamūlā’’ti pucchaṃ akatvā yathā kusalamūlavacanaṃ ekamūlavacanañca kusalabhāvadīpakaṃ na hotīti kusalabhāve saṃsayasabbhāvā paṭhamadutiyayamakesu ‘‘sabbe te dhammā kusalā’’ti paṭilomapucchā katā, evaṃ aññamaññamūlavacanaṃ kusalabhāvadīpakaṃ na hotīti kusalabhāve saṃsayasabbhāvā kusalādhikārassa ca anuvattamānattā ‘‘sabbe te dhammā kusalā’’ti paṭilomapucchā katāti.

But it should be understood that since mutual-rootedness is determined, there is no doubt about single-rootedness, and thus the question 'Are all those states single-rooted with a wholesome root?' is not asked. 'They have a mutual root' (aññamaññamūlā), that is, the roots are for each other; 'they have a single root' (ekamūlā), that is, they have one root in the sense of being common. Both expressions speak only of connection with a root, which is why in both cases it is said 'with a wholesome root.' Here, when single-rootedness, the general connection with a root, is determined, its specific mode, mutual-rootedness, is not yet determined; hence the direct question proceeds. But when mutual-rootedness, the specific connection with a root, is determined, since mutual-rootedness cannot exist without single-rootedness, the general connection with a root—single-rootedness—is necessarily determined. Therefore, without asking 'Are they single-rooted?', the counter-question 'Are all those states wholesome?' is asked in the first and second pairs because doubt about their wholesome nature exists, since neither the expression 'with a wholesome root' nor 'single-rooted' clarifies their wholesome nature. Similarly, since the expression 'mutually rooted' does not clarify their wholesome nature, and since the section on the wholesome is still current, the counter-question 'Are all those states wholesome?' is asked.

53-61. Mūlanaye vutte eva atthe kusalamūlabhāvena mūlassa visesanena samānena mūlena aññamaññassa ca mūlena mūlayogadīpanena cāti iminā pariyāyantarena pakāsetuṃ mūlamūlanayo vutto. Aññapadatthasamāsantena ka-kārena tīsupi yamakesu mūlayogameva dīpetuṃ mūlakanayo vutto. Mūlamūlakanayavacanapariyāyo vuttappakārova.

53-61. When the matter has been stated in the Root Method, the Root-Root Method is stated to clarify it by another mode, that is: by the state of being a wholesome root, by the distinction of the root, by the common root, by the mutual root, and by explaining the root-connection. The Mūlaka Method is stated to show the root-connection in all three pairs by means of the suffix '-ka' at the end of a bahubbīhi compound. The explanation of the terms of the Mūlamūlaka and Mūlaka methods is as already stated.

74-85. Abbohārikaṃ katvāti na ekamūlabhāvaṃ labhamānehi ekato labbhamānattā sahetukavohārarahitaṃ katvā. Na vā sahetukaduke viya ettha hetupaccayayogāyogavasena abbohārikaṃ kataṃ, atha kho sahetukavohārameva labhati, na ahetukavohāranti abbohārikaṃ kataṃ. Ekato labbhamānakavasenāti ahetukacittuppādanibbānehi hetupaccayarahitehi saha labbhamānakarūpavasenāti attho.

74-85. 'Having made it non-conventional': having made it devoid of the convention 'with roots' because it is obtained together with things that do not obtain the state of being single-rooted. It is not made non-conventional here as in the Duka on the Rooted, based on the presence or absence of the root-condition. Rather, it is made non-conventional in the sense that it obtains the convention 'with roots,' not the convention 'rootless.' 'By way of being obtained together': the meaning is by way of form, which is obtained together with rootless consciousness-arisings and Nibbāna, which are devoid of the root-condition.

86-97. Yassaṃ pāḷiyaṃ ‘‘ahetukaṃ nāmamūlena na ekamūlaṃ, sahetukaṃ nāmamūlena ekamūla’’nti (yama. 1.mūlayamaka.87) pāṭho āgato, tattha ‘‘ye keci nāmā dhammā’’ti nāmānaṃ niddhāritattā ‘‘ahetukaṃ sahetuka’’nti ca vutte ‘‘nāma’’nti ca idaṃ viññāyamānamevāti na vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Yattha pana ‘‘ahetukaṃ nāmaṃ, sahetukaṃ nāma’’nti (yama. 1.mūlayamaka.87) ca pāṭho, tattha supākaṭabhāvatthaṃ ‘‘nāma’’nti vuttanti.

86-97. In the Pāli text where the reading is found, 'The rootless is not single-rooted with the name-root; the rooted is single-rooted with the name-root' (Yama. 1. Mūlayamaka.87), it should be understood that since 'name' has been specified by 'Whatever states are name…,' when 'rootless' and 'rooted' are said, the word 'name' is understood and thus not stated. But where the reading is, 'Rootless name, rooted name' (Yama. 1. Mūlayamaka.87), the word 'name' is stated for the sake of clarity.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Exposition Chapter is finished.

Mūlayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Mūlayamaka is finished.

2. Khandhayamakaṃ

2. The Pairs on the Aggregates

1. Paṇṇattivāro

1. The Section on Designations

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Summary Chapter

2-3. Khandhayamake [Pg.121] chasu kālabhedesu puggalaokāsapuggalokāsavasena khandhānaṃ uppādanirodhā tesaṃ pariññā ca vattabbā. Te pana khandhā ‘‘rūpakkhandho’’tiādīhi pañcahi padehi vuccanti, tesaṃ dasa avayavapadāni. Tattha yo rūpādiavayavapadābhihito dhammo, kiṃ so eva samudāyapadassa attho. Yo ca samudāyapadena vutto, so eva avayavapadassāti etasmiṃ saṃsayaṭṭhāne rūpādiavayavapadehi vutto ekadeso sakalo vā samudāyapadānaṃ attho, samudāyapadehi pana vutto ekantena rūpādiavayavapadānaṃ atthoti imamatthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘rūpaṃ rūpakkhandho, rūpakkhandho rūpa’’ntiādinā padasodhanavāro vutto.

In the Pairs on the Aggregates, regarding the six divisions of time, the arising and cessation of the aggregates in relation to individuals, locations, and individuals in locations, as well as their full understanding, are to be stated. These aggregates are referred to by five terms, such as 'the form aggregate,' and they have ten component terms. Here, is the phenomenon designated by a component term like 'form' the same as the meaning of the collective term? And is what is expressed by the collective term the same as the meaning of the component term? In this point of doubt, to show that what is expressed by component terms such as 'form' is either a part or the whole of the meaning of the collective terms, while what is expressed by the collective terms is entirely the meaning of the component terms, the section on the clarification of terms is stated with the words: 'Form is the form aggregate, the form aggregate is form,' etc.

Puna ‘‘rūpakkhandho’’tiādīnaṃ samāsapadānaṃ uttarapadatthappadhānattā padhānabhūtassa khandhapadassa vedanādiupapadatthassa ca sambhavato yathā ‘‘rūpakkhandho’’ti etasmiṃ pade rūpāvayavapadena vuttassa rūpakkhandhabhāvo hoti rūpasaddassa khandhasaddassa ca samānādhikaraṇabhāvatoti, evaṃ tattha padhānabhūtena khandhāvayavapadena vuttassa vedanākkhandhādibhāvo hoti khandhapadena vedanādipadānaṃ samānādhikaraṇattāti etasmiṃ saṃsayaṭṭhāne khandhāvayavapadena vutto dhammo koci kenaci samudāyapadena vuccati, na sabbo sabbenāti imamatthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘rūpaṃ rūpakkhandho, khandhā vedanākkhandho’’tiādinā padasodhanamūlacakkavāro vutto. Evañca dassentena rūpādisaddassa visesanabhāvo, khandhasaddassa visesitabbabhāvo, visesanavisesitabbānaṃ samānādhikaraṇabhāvo ca dassito hoti.

Again, in compound terms such as 'the form aggregate,' the meaning of the final member is primary. Since there can be the principal term 'aggregate' and subordinate terms such as 'feeling,' the following issue arises. Just as in the term 'the form aggregate,' what is expressed by the component term 'form' has the nature of being the form aggregate because the words 'form' and 'aggregate' are in apposition; so too, what is expressed by the principal component term 'aggregate' has the nature of being the feeling aggregate, etc., because the word 'aggregate' is in apposition with words like 'feeling.' In this point of doubt—that some phenomenon expressed by the component term 'aggregate' is expressed by some collective term, but not every such phenomenon by every collective term—to show this meaning, the section on the Root-Cycle of Term-Clarification is stated, beginning: 'Form is the form aggregate, aggregates are the feeling aggregate,' etc. And in showing this, the status of words like 'form' as qualifiers, the status of the word 'aggregate' as the qualified, and the apposition of the qualifier and the qualified are all shown.

Tenettha saṃsayo hoti – kiṃ khandhato aññampi rūpaṃ atthi, yato vinivattaṃ rūpaṃ khandhavisesanaṃ hoti, sabbeva khandhā kiṃ khandhavisesanabhūtena rūpena visesitabbāti, kiṃ pana taṃ khandhavisesanabhūtaṃ rūpanti? Bhūtupādāyarūpaṃ tasseva gahitattā. Niddese ‘‘khandhā rūpakkhandho’’ti padaṃ uddharitvā vissajjanaṃ katanti. Evaṃ etasmiṃ saṃsayaṭṭhāne na khandhato aññaṃ rūpaṃ atthi, teneva cetena rūpasaddena vuccamānaṃ suddhena khandhasaddena vuccate, na [Pg.122] ca sabbe khandhā khandhavisesanabhūtena rūpena visesitabbā, teneva te vibhajitabbā, esa nayo vedanākkhandhādīsupīti imamatthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘rūpaṃ khandho, khandhā rūpa’’ntiādinā suddhakhandhavāro vutto.

On this, a doubt arises: Is there any form apart from the aggregate, from which a distinguished form becomes a qualifier of the aggregate? Or should all aggregates be qualified by the form that serves as their qualifier? And what is that form that serves as the qualifier of the aggregate? It is primary and derived form, because that very thing is taken. In the Exposition, the phrase 'aggregates, form-aggregate' is extracted and an explanation is given. Thus, in this point of doubt: there is no form apart from the aggregate. For that very reason, what is expressed by this word 'form' is also expressed by the simple word 'aggregate.' And not all aggregates are to be qualified by the form that serves as their qualifier; by this they are to be analyzed. This is the method also for the feeling aggregate and so on. To show this meaning, the Pure Aggregate Section is stated, beginning: 'Form is an aggregate, aggregates are form,' etc.

Tato ‘‘rūpaṃ khandho’’ti etasmiṃ anuññāyamāne ‘‘na kevalaṃ ayaṃ khandhasaddo rūpavisesanova, atha kho vedanādivisesano cā’’ti rūpassa khandhabhāvanicchayānantaraṃ khandhānaṃ rūpavisesanayoge ca saṃsayo hoti. Tattha na sabbe khandhā vedanādivisesanayuttā, atha kho keci kenaci visesanena yuñjantīti dassetuṃ suddhakhandhamūlacakkavāro vuttoti. Evaṃ yesaṃ uppādādayo vattabbā, tesaṃ khandhānaṃ paṇṇattisodhanavasena tannicchayatthaṃ paṇṇattivāro vuttoti veditabbo.

Then, when 'form is an aggregate' is granted, a doubt arises: 'Is this word 'aggregate' a qualifier only of form, or is it also a qualifier of feeling, etc.?' After the determination of form's nature as an aggregate, a doubt also arises concerning the connection of the aggregates with form as a qualifier. To show that, in this regard, not all aggregates are connected with qualifiers such as feeling, but rather some are connected with some qualifier, the section on the Root-Cycle of the Pure Aggregate is stated. Thus, it should be understood that for those aggregates whose arising, etc., are to be stated, the Section on Designations is stated in order to determine their nature by way of clarifying the designations.

Cattāri cattāri cakkāni bandhitvāti ettha cakkāvayavabhāvato cakkānīti yamakāni vuttāni ekekakhandhamūlāni cattāri cattāri yamakāni bandhitvāti. Iminā hi ettha atthena bhavitabbanti. Cattāri cattāri yamakāni yathā ekekakhandhamūlakāni honti, evaṃ bandhitvāti vā attho daṭṭhabbo. Tattha ‘‘rūpaṃ rūpakkhandho’’ti evamādikaṃ mūlapadaṃ nābhiṃ katvā ‘‘khandhā’’ti idaṃ nemiṃ, ‘‘vedanākkhandho’’tiādīni are katvā cakkabhāvo vuttoti veditabbo, na maṇḍalabhāvena sambajjhanato. Vedanākkhandhamūlakādīsupi hi heṭṭhimaṃ sodhetvāva pāṭho gato, na maṇḍalasambandhenāti. Teneva ca kāraṇenāti suddhakhandhalābhamattameva gahetvā khandhavisesane rūpādimhi suddharūpādimattatāya aṭṭhatvā khandhavisesanabhāvasaṅkhātaṃ rūpādiatthaṃ dassetuṃ khandhasaddena saha yojetvā ‘‘khandhā rūpakkhandho’’tiādinā nayena padaṃ uddharitvā atthassa vibhattattāti attho.

Regarding 'having constructed four and four wheels': here the pairs (yamakas) are called 'wheels' because they are components of a wheel. This means 'having constructed four and four pairs, each rooted in a single aggregate.' This is the meaning to be understood here. Alternatively, the meaning should be seen as: 'having constructed four and four pairs in such a way that they are each rooted in a single aggregate.' Here, the nature of a wheel should be understood as being described by making the root phrase 'form is the form aggregate,' etc., the hub; the word 'aggregates' the rim; and 'the feeling aggregate,' etc., the spokes—not because of a connection in a circular arrangement. For in the cycles rooted in the feeling aggregate and so on, the text proceeds by clarifying the lower term, not by circular connection. For that very reason, the meaning is that because the meaning has been analyzed by taking only the attainment of the pure aggregate, not resting on the mere purity of form, etc., as a qualifier of the aggregate, and in order to show the meaning of 'form,' etc., designated as the qualifier of the aggregate, by combining it with the word 'aggregate' and extracting the phrase in the way beginning 'aggregates are the form aggregate,' etc.

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Summary Chapter is finished.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Exposition Chapter

26. Piyarūpaṃ sātarūpanti ‘‘cakkhuṃ loke piyarūpaṃ…pe… rūpā loke…pe… cakkhuviññāṇaṃ…pe… cakkhusamphasso…pe… cakkhusamphassajā vedanā…pe… rūpasaññā…pe… rūpasañcetanā…pe… rūpataṇhā…pe… rūpavitakko…pe… rūpavicāro’’ti (dī. ni. 2.400; ma. ni. 1.133; vibha. 203) evaṃ vuttaṃ taṇhāvatthubhūtaṃ [Pg.123] tebhūmakaṃ veditabbaṃ, tasmā yaṃ pañcakkhandhasamudāyabhūtaṃ piyarūpasātarūpaṃ, taṃ ekadesena rūpakkhandho hotīti āha ‘‘piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ rūpaṃ na rūpakkhandho’’ti. Piyasabhāvatāya vā rūpakkhandho piyarūpe pavisati, na ruppanasabhāvenāti ‘‘piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ rūpaṃ na rūpakkhandho’’ti vuttaṃ. Saññāyamake tāva diṭṭhisaññāti ‘‘viseso’’ti vacanaseso. Tattha diṭṭhi eva saññā diṭṭhisaññā. ‘‘Sayaṃ samādāya vatāni jantu, uccāvacaṃ gacchati saññasatto’’ti (su. ni. 798), ‘‘saññāvirattassa na santi ganthā’’ti (su. ni. 853) ca evamādīsu hi diṭṭhi ca ‘‘saññā’’ti vuttāti.

26. Regarding 'dear and agreeable form': 'The eye is dear and agreeable in the world... forms... eye-consciousness... eye-contact... feeling born of eye-contact... perception of forms... volition regarding forms... craving for forms... thought about forms... examination of forms' (Dī. Ni. 2.400; Ma. Ni. 1.133; Vibha. 203). Thus it is said. The basis for craving, belonging to the three planes, should be understood. Therefore, that dear and agreeable form which constitutes the collection of the five aggregates is in part the form aggregate. Thus he said: 'Dear and agreeable form is form, but not the form aggregate.' Or, the form aggregate is included in 'dear form' because of its nature of being dear, not because of its nature of being afflicted. Thus it is said: 'Dear and agreeable form is form, but not the form aggregate.' In the Yamaka on Perception, first, 'perception of view'—'a distinction' is what is to be supplied. Therein, view itself is perception of view. For in such passages as, 'A being, having himself undertaken vows, attached to perception, goes to high and low states' (Sn 798), and 'For one dispassionate towards perception, there are no fetters' (Sn 853), view is also called 'perception'.

28. ‘‘Na khandhā na vedanākkhandhoti? Āmantā’’ti evaṃ khandhasaddappavattiyā abhāve vedanākkhandhasaddappavattiyā ca abhāvoti paṇṇattisodhanamattameva karotīti daṭṭhabbaṃ, na aññadhammasabbhāvo evettha pamāṇaṃ. Evañca katvā ‘‘nāyatanā na sotāyatananti? Āmantā’’tiādiṃ vakkhatīti.

28. 'Not the aggregates, not the feeling aggregate?' 'Yes.' Thus it should be understood that this is merely a clarification of a designation, due to the non-application of the word 'aggregate' and the non-application of the word 'feeling aggregate,' not that the existence of another phenomenon is the standard here. And having done so, it will be said: 'Not the sense bases, not the ear sense base?' 'Yes,' and so on.

39. Rūpato aññe vedanādayoti ettha lokuttarā vedanādayo daṭṭhabbā. Te hi piyarūpā ca sātarūpā ca na honti taṇhāya anārammaṇattāti rūpato aññe hontīti. Rūpañca khandhe ca ṭhapetvā avasesāti idampi etehi saddhiṃ na-saddānaṃ appavattimattameva sandhāya vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Evañca katvā ‘‘cakkhuñca āyatane ca ṭhapetvā avasesā na ceva cakkhu na ca āyatanā’’tiādiṃ (yama. 1.āyatanayamaka.15) vakkhati. Na hi tattha avasesaggahaṇena gayhamānaṃ kañci atthi. Yadi siyā, dhammāyatanaṃ siyā. Vakkhati hi ‘‘dhammo āyatananti? Āmantā’’ti (yama. 1.āyatanayamaka.16). Taṇhāvatthu ca na taṃ siyā. Yadi siyā, piyarūpasātarūpabhāvato rūpaṃ siyā ‘‘rūpaṃ khandhoti? Āmantā’’ti (yama. 1.khandhayamaka.40) vacanato khandho cāti. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana avijjamānepi vijjamānaṃ upādāya itthipurisādiggahaṇasabbhāvaṃ sandhāya avasesāti ettha paññattiyā gahaṇaṃ katanti veditabbaṃ.

39. Regarding 'feeling, etc., are other than form,' here the supramundane feeling, etc., should be understood. For they are not dear and agreeable, because they are not an object for craving; hence, they are other than form. And regarding 'setting aside form and the aggregates, the remainder,' this too should be understood as said with reference to the mere non-application of the word 'not' in conjunction with these. And having done so, it will be said: 'Setting aside the eye and the sense bases, the remainder is neither the eye nor a sense base,' and so on (Yam. 1, Āyatanayamaka, 15). For there is nothing at all to be grasped by the term 'remainder.' If there were, it would be the mind-object base. For it will be said: 'Is a mind-object a base?' 'Yes' (Yam. 1, Āyatanayamaka, 16). And that could not be a basis for craving. If it were, by virtue of being dear and agreeable, it would be form, and since it is said, 'Is form an aggregate?' 'Yes' (Yam. 1, Khandhayamaka, 40), it would also be an aggregate. In the commentary, however, it should be understood that although it is non-existent, by relying on what is existent, with reference to the existence of such designations as 'man' and 'woman,' the term 'remainder' here is taken as a concept.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Niddesa Chapter is finished.

2. Pavattivāravaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Chapter on Occurrence

50-205. Pavattivāre [Pg.124] vedanākkhandhādimūlakāni pacchimeneva saha yojetvā tīṇi dve ekañca yamakāni vuttāni, na purimena. Kasmā? Amissakakālabhedesu vāresu atthavisesābhāvato. Purimassa hi pacchimena yojitayamakameva pacchimassa purimena yojanāya pucchānaṃ uppaṭipāṭiyā vucceyya, atthe pana na koci visesoti. Pucchāvissajjanesupi viseso natthi, tena tathā yojanā na katāti. Kālabhedā panettha cha eva vuttā. Atītena paccuppanno, anāgatena paccuppanno, anāgatenātītoti ete pana tayo yathādassitā missakakālabhedā eva tayo, na visuṃ vijjantīti na gahitā. Tattha tattha hi paṭilomapucchāhi atītena paccuppannādayo kālabhedā dassitā, teneva ca nayena ‘‘yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjittha, tassa vedanākkhandho uppajjatī’’tiādi sakkā yojetuṃ. Teneva hi missakakālabhedesu ca na pacchimapacchimassa khandhassa purimapurimena yojanaṃ katvā yamakāni vuttāni, amissakakālabhedesu gahitaniyāmena sukhaggahaṇatthampi pacchimapacchimeneva yojetvā vuttānīti.

In the Chapter on Occurrence, the Yamakas based on the feeling aggregate, etc., are stated as three, two, and one, connected only with the subsequent term, not with the preceding one. Why? Because in the sections on the unmixed divisions of time, there is no difference in meaning. For a Yamaka connecting the preceding with the subsequent would be stated simply by reversing the questions of a Yamaka connecting the subsequent with the preceding, but there would be no difference in meaning. There is also no difference in the questions and answers, so such a connection was not made. Here, only six divisions of time are mentioned. The past with the present, the future with the present, and the future with the past—these three are shown as mixed divisions of time, and since they do not exist separately, they are not taken up. For in each case, the divisions of time—past with present, etc.—are shown by means of reverse questions, and by that same method it is possible to formulate such questions as: 'For one for whom the form aggregate arose, does the feeling aggregate arise?' and so on. For that very reason, in the mixed divisions of time, Yamakas have not been stated by connecting a subsequent aggregate with a preceding one. In the unmixed divisions of time, for the sake of easy comprehension and in accordance with the principle adopted, they are stated as connected only with a subsequent aggregate.

Imināyeva ca lakkhaṇenātiādinā yena kāraṇena ‘‘purepañho’’ti ca ‘‘pacchāpañho’’ti ca nāmaṃ vuttaṃ, taṃ dasseti. Yassa hi sarūpadassanena vissajjanaṃ hoti, so paripūretvā vissajjetabbatthasaṅgaṇhanato paripuṇṇapañho nāma. Taṃvissajjanassa pana purimakoṭṭhāsena sadisatthatāya purepañho, pacchimakoṭṭhāsasadisatthatāya ‘‘pacchāpañho’’ti ca nāmaṃ vuttaṃ. Sadisatthatā ca sanniṭṭhānasaṃsayapadavisesaṃ avicāretvā ekena padena saṅgahitassa khandhassa uppādanirodhalābhasāmaññamattena purepañhe daṭṭhabbā. Sanniṭṭhānapadasaṅgahitassa vā khandhassa anuññātavasena purepañho vuttoti yuttaṃ.

By 'And by this very characteristic,' etc., he shows the reason why they are called 'prior question' and 'subsequent question.' For a question whose answer is given by showing its own nature is called a 'complete question' because it fully comprehends the meaning to be answered. Moreover, because its answer has a meaning similar to the prior part, it is called a 'prior question,' and because it has a meaning similar to the latter part, it is called a 'subsequent question.' The similarity in the prior question should be seen merely in the commonality of the arising, ceasing, and obtaining of an aggregate comprised in a single term, without considering the specific term of the thesis and the term of the doubt. Or, it is fitting that the prior question is so called by way of the approval of the aggregate comprised in the term of the thesis.

Sanniṭṭhānatthasseva paṭikkhipanaṃ paṭikkhepo, saṃsayatthanivāraṇaṃ paṭisedhoti ayaṃ paṭikkhepapaṭisedhānaṃ viseso. Pāḷipadameva hutvāti pucchāpāḷiyā ‘‘nuppajjatī’’ti yaṃ padaṃ vuttaṃ, na-kāravirahitaṃ tadeva padaṃ hutvāti attho. Tattha uppattinirodhapaṭisedhassa paṭisedhanatthaṃ pāḷigatiyā vissajjanaṃ uppattinirodhānameva paṭisedhanatthaṃ paṭisedhena vissajjanaṃ katanti veditabbaṃ.

`Paṭikkhepa` (rejection) is the refutation of the meaning of the thesis; `paṭisedha` (denial) is the prevention of the meaning of the doubt—this is the distinction between rejection and denial. 'Becoming the very Pāḷi term' means that in the Pāḷi of the question the term `nuppajjatī` ('does not arise') was stated; it means becoming that very term but without the negative particle `na`. Therein, it should be understood that the answer is given according to the Pāḷi style for the purpose of denying the denial of arising and cessation, and the answer is made with a denial for the purpose of denying arising and cessation themselves.

Catunnaṃ [Pg.125] pañhānaṃ pañcannañca vissajjanānaṃ sattavīsatiyā ṭhānesu pakkhepo tadekadesapakkhepavasena vuttoti veditabbo. Paripuṇṇapañho eva hi sarūpadassanena ca vissajjanaṃ sattavīsatiyā ṭhānesu pakkhipitabbanti.

It should be understood that the application of the four questions and five answers in the twenty-seven places is stated by way of partial application. For only the complete question and the answer by showing its own nature should be applied in the twenty-seven places.

Kiṃ nu sakkā ito paranti ito pāḷivavatthānadassanādito añño kiṃ nu sakkā kātunti aññassa sakkuṇeyyassa abhāvaṃ dasseti.

'What, indeed, is possible beyond this?' This means: what else can be done beyond this, beyond the analysis of the Pāḷi's structure? It indicates the absence of anything else that could be done.

‘‘Suddhāvāsānaṃ tesaṃ tattha rūpakkhandho ca nuppajjittha vedanākkhandho ca nuppajjitthā’’ti etena suddhāvāsabhūmīsu ekabhūmiyampi dutiyā upapatti natthīti ñāpitaṃ hoti. Paṭisandhito pabhuti hi yāva cuti, tāva pavattakammajasantānaṃ ekattena gahetvā tassa uppādanirodhavasena ayaṃ desanā pavattā. Tasmiñhi abbocchinne kusalādīnañca pavatti hoti, vocchinne ca appavattīti teneva ca uppādanirodhā dassitā, tasmā tassa ekasattassa paṭisandhiuppādato yāva cutinirodho, tāva atītatā natthi, na ca tato pubbe tattha paṭisandhivasena kammajasantānaṃ uppannapubbanti khandhadvayampi ‘‘nuppajjitthā’’ti vuttaṃ. Kasmā pana etāya pāḷiyā sakalepi suddhāvāse dutiyā paṭisandhi natthīti na viññāyatīti? Uddhaṃsotapāḷisabbhāvā. Dvepi hi pāḷiyo saṃsandetabbāti.

'For those beings in the Pure Abodes, there, neither the form aggregate nor the feeling aggregate arose.' By this, it is shown that in the planes of the Pure Abodes there is not even a second birth in a single plane. From rebirth-linking until death, the continuous succession of kamma-produced phenomena is taken as a single unit, and this teaching proceeds based on their arising and ceasing. For in that unbroken succession, the occurrence of wholesome and other states happens, and when it is broken, there is no occurrence—thus, their arising and ceasing are shown. Therefore, for that one being, from the arising of rebirth-linking until the cessation at death, there is no past; nor before that was a continuity of kamma-produced phenomena ever arisen there through rebirth-linking. Hence, both aggregates are said to have 'not arisen.' But why is it not understood from this passage that in all of the Pure Abodes there is no second rebirth-linking? Because of the passage regarding the Upstreamer. For both passages must be compared.

‘‘Asaññasattānaṃ tesaṃ tattha rūpakkhandho uppajjissatī’’ti ettha ‘‘yassa yattha rūpakkhandho uppajjissatī’’ti etena sanniṭṭhānena visesitā asaññasattāpi santīti te eva gahetvā ‘‘asaññasattāna’’nti vuttaṃ. Tena ye sanniṭṭhānena vajjitā, te tato pañcavokāraṃ gantvā parinibbāyissanti, na tesaṃ puna asaññe upapattippasaṅgo atthīti te sandhāyāha – ‘‘pacchimabhavikānaṃ tesaṃ tattha rūpakkhandho ca nuppajjissati vedanākkhandho ca nuppajjissatī’’ti (yama. 1.khandhayamaka.65). Ettha kiṃ pañcavokārādibhāvo viya pacchimabhavopi koci atthi, yattha tesamanuppatti bhavissatīti? Natthi pañcavokārādibhavesveva yattha vā tattha vā ṭhitānaṃ pacchimabhavikānaṃ ‘‘yassa yattha rūpakkhandho nuppajjissatī’’ti etena sanniṭṭhānena saṅgahitattā. Tesaṃ tattha itarānuppattibhāvañca anujānanto ‘‘vedanākkhandho ca nuppajjissatī’’ti āhāti.

'For non-percipient beings, the form aggregate will arise there.' Here, by the thesis 'for whom the form aggregate will arise there,' non-percipient beings are specified. Taking just them, it is said 'for non-percipient beings.' Therefore, those who are excluded by the thesis will proceed from there to the five-constituent existence and attain final Nibbāna; there is no possibility of their rebirth in the non-percipient state again. Referring to them, he says: 'For those in their final existence, the form aggregate will not arise there, nor will the feeling aggregate arise there' (Yam. 1. Khandhayamaka.65). Here, is there any final existence like the five-constituent existence, etc., where their non-arising will occur? There is none; for those in their final existence, whether situated here or there in the five-constituent existences, are included by the thesis 'for whom the form aggregate will not arise there.' And acknowledging the non-arising of the other aggregate for them there, he says, 'nor will the feeling aggregate arise there.'

‘‘Suddhāvāse [Pg.126] parinibbantāna’’nti idaṃ sappaṭisandhikānaṃ appaṭisandhikānañca suddhāvāsānaṃ taṃtaṃbhūmiyaṃ khandhaparinibbānavasena vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Sabbesañhi tesaṃ tattha vedanākkhandho nuppajjitthāti. Yathā pana ‘‘nirujjhissatī’’ti vacanaṃ paccuppannepi uppādakkhaṇasamaṅgimhi pavattati, na evaṃ ‘‘uppajjitthā’’ti vacanaṃ paccuppanne pavattati, atha kho uppajjitvā vigate atīte eva, tasmā ‘‘parinibbantānaṃ nuppajjitthā’’ti vuttaṃ uppannasantānassa avigatattā. Anantā lokadhātuyoti okāsassa aparicchinnattā okāsavasena vuccamānānaṃ uppādanirodhānampi paricchedābhāvato saṃkiṇṇatā hotīti ‘‘yattha vedanākkhandho uppajjati, tattha saññākkhandho nirujjhatīti? Āmantā’’ti vuttaṃ.

“Those who attain final Nibbāna in the Pure Abodes”—this should be understood as stated with reference to the final Nibbāna of the aggregates in their respective planes for those inhabitants of the Pure Abodes who have a subsequent rebirth-linking and for those who do not. For all of them, the feeling aggregate did not arise there. Just as the statement “it will cease” applies even in the present to one at the moment of arising, so the statement “it arose” does not apply in the present; rather, it applies only to the past, after it has arisen and passed away. Therefore, it is said, “it did not arise for those who have attained final Nibbāna,” because their arisen continuum has not passed away. “In the infinite world-systems”—because space is boundless, the arising and ceasing spoken of in terms of space also lack demarcation and are thus intermingled. Hence it is said: “Where the feeling aggregate arises, does the perception aggregate cease there? Yes.”

Pavattivāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section on Occurrence is completed.

3. Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā

3. The Explanation of the Section on Full Understanding

206-208. Puggalokāsavāro labbhamānopīti kasmā vuttaṃ, nanu okāsavārassa alābhe tassapi alābhena bhavitabbanti? Na, tattha puggalasseva pariññāvacanato. Puggalokāsavārepi hi okāse puggalasseva pariññā vuccati, na okāsassa. Okāsavāropi ca yadi vucceyya, ‘‘yattha rūpakkhandhaṃ parijānātī’’ti okāse puggalasseva parijānanavasena vucceyya, tasmā puggalokāsavārasseva labbhamānatā vuttā, na okāsavārassāti. Tenāha – ‘‘āmantā…pe… siyā’’ti.

206–208. Why is it said that the Section on the Person and Location is obtainable, when, if the Section on Location is unobtainable, that too should be unobtainable? No, because there the statement is about the full understanding of the person alone. For even in the Section on the Person and Location, it is the full understanding of the person in a location that is spoken of, not of the location. And if the Section on Location were to be stated—as in “where one fully understands the form aggregate”—it would be stated in terms of the person’s fully understanding in that location. Therefore, it is the obtainability of the Section on the Person and Location alone that is stated, not that of the Section on Location. Hence it is said: “Yes …pe… it might be.”

Tenevāti pavatte cittakkhaṇavasena tiṇṇaṃ addhānaṃ lābhato eva, aññathā cutipaṭisandhikkhaṇe rūpakkhandhaparijānanassa abhāvā ‘‘yo rūpakkhandhaṃ parijānāti, so vedanākkhandhaṃ parijānātī’’ti ettha ‘‘natthī’’ti vissajjanena bhavitabbaṃ siyā, ‘‘āmantā’’ti ca katanti. Sanniṭṭhānasaṃsayapadasaṅgahitānaṃ pariññānaṃ pavatte cittakkhaṇe eva lābhaṃ dassento ‘‘lokuttaramaggakkhaṇasmiñhī’’tiādimāha. Na parijānātīti pañhe puthujjanaṃ sandhāya āmantāti vuttanti idaṃ puthujjanassa sabbathā pariññākiccassa abhāvato vuttaṃ. ‘‘Arahā rūpakkhandhaṃ na parijānāti no ca vedanākkhandhaṃ na parijānittha, aggamaggasamaṅgiñca arahantañca ṭhapetvā avasesā puggalā rūpakkhandhañca na parijānanti [Pg.127] vedanākkhandhañca na parijānitthā’’ti pana vacanena ‘‘aggamaggasamaṅgiṃ ṭhapetvā añño koci parijānātī’’ti vattabbo natthīti dassitaṃ hoti, tena tadavasesapuggale sandhāya ‘‘āmantā’’ti vuttanti viññāyatīti.

For that very reason, it is because the three periods of time are obtained by way of the mind-moment during the process of existence; otherwise, since there is no full understanding of the form aggregate at the moment of death and rebirth-linking, the answer to the question, “Does one who fully understands the form aggregate fully understand the feeling aggregate?” would have to be “No,” but it is given as “Yes.” Showing that the full understanding of the things included in the terms of the thesis and antithesis is obtained only at a mind-moment during the process, he says, “for at the moment of the supramundane path,” etc. To the question, “Does not fully understand?” it is said “Yes” with reference to the worldling. This is stated because a worldling has no function of full understanding whatsoever. However, by the statement, “An arahant does not fully understand the form aggregate, but it is not that he did not fully understand the feeling aggregate; and apart from one endowed with the highest path and an arahant, the remaining persons do not fully understand the form aggregate and did not fully understand the feeling aggregate,” it is shown that one should not say, “Apart from one endowed with the highest path, someone else fully understands.” Therefore, it is understood that “Yes” is said with reference to those remaining persons.

Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section on Full Understanding is completed.

Khandhayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Khandhayamaka is completed.

3. Āyatanayamakaṃ

3. The Yamaka of the Bases

1. Paṇṇattivāro

1. The Section on Concepts

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Section of the Summary

1-9. Āyatanayamakādīsu ca paṇṇattivāre padasodhanavārādīnaṃ vacane kāraṇaṃ khandhayamake vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. ‘‘Ekādasa ekādasa katvā tettiṃsasataṃ yamakānī’’tiādinā kesuci potthakesu gaṇanā likhitā, sā tathā na hoti. ‘‘Dvattiṃsasata’’ntiādinā aññattha likhitā.

1–9. In the Yamaka of the Bases and so on, and in the Section on Concepts, the reason for the statements in the Section on Word Analysis and so on should be understood in the same way as explained in the Yamaka of Aggregates. In some books a calculation is written, such as: “Making eleven by eleven, there are thirty-three hundred yamakas,” but this is not so. Elsewhere it is written as “thirty-two hundred,” etc.

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section of the Summary is completed.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Section of Exposition

10-17. Vāyanaṭṭhenāti pasāraṇaṭṭhena, pākaṭabhāvaṭṭhena vā. ‘‘Kāyo dhammo’’ti ca vuccamānaṃ sabbaṃ sasabhāvaṃ āyatanamevāti ‘‘kāyo āyatana’’nti, ‘‘dhammo āyatana’’nti ca ettha ‘‘āmantā’’ti vuttaṃ. Kāyavacanena pana dhammavacanena ca avuccamānaṃ kañci sasabhāvaṃ natthīti ‘‘na kāyo nāyatanaṃ, na dhammo nāyatana’’nti ettha ‘‘āmantā’’icceva vuttaṃ.

10–17. By the meaning of vāyana is meant the meaning of spreading out, or the meaning of becoming manifest. And when it is said, “The body is a dhamma,” everything with its own intrinsic nature is a base; hence for “the body is a base” and “a dhamma is a base,” the answer “Yes” is given. But since there is nothing with its own intrinsic nature that is not expressed by the word ‘body’ or the word ‘dhamma,’ therefore for the questions on the negative terms, “what is not the body is not a base” and “what is not a dhamma is not a base,” the answer is also just “Yes.”

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section of Exposition is completed.

2. Pavattivāro

2. The Section on Occurrence

1. Uppādavāravaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Section on Arising

18-21. Pavattivāre [Pg.128] cakkhāyatanamūlakāni ekādasāti paṭisandhicutivasena upādinnapavattassa uppādanirodhavacane etasmiṃ alabbhamānavissajjanampi saddāyatanena saddhiṃ yamakaṃ pucchāmattalābhena saṅgaṇhitvā vadatīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Chasaṭṭhi yamakānīti ettha cakkhusotaghānajivhākāyarūpāyatanamūlakesu ekekaṃ saddāyatanamūlakāni pañcāti ekādasa yamakāni vissajjanavasena hāpetabbāni. Vakkhati hi ‘‘saddāyatanassa paṭisandhikkhaṇe anuppattito tena saddhiṃ yamakassa vissajjanameva natthī’’ti (yama. aṭṭha. āyatanayamaka 18-21).

18–21. In the Section on Occurrence, when it is said there are eleven yamakas rooted in the eye-base, it should be understood that this is said concerning the arising and ceasing of the ongoing process of what is grasped, in terms of rebirth-linking and death, and that he includes the yamakas with the sound-base, which have no resolution, by counting them on the mere basis of the question being asked. When it says, “sixty-six yamakas,” here, the eleven yamakas that are to be omitted by way of resolution are the six rooted in the bases of eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and form, and the five rooted in the sound-base. For it will be said: “Since the sound-base does not arise at the moment of rebirth-linking, there is no resolution for a yamaka involving it” (Yamaka-aṭṭhakathā, Āyatanayamaka 18–21).

Dutiyaṃ kiñcāpi paṭhamena sadisavissajjanantiādi puggalavārameva sandhāya vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Okāsavāre pana asadisavissajjanattā vuttaṃ, na taṃ sabbattha sadisavissajjananti ñāpetuṃ puggalavārepi vissajjitanti. Gandharasaphoṭṭhabbāyatanehi saddhiṃ tīṇi yamakāni sadisavissajjanānīti rūpāvacarasatte sandhāya ‘‘sacakkhukānaṃ agandhakāna’’ntiādinā vissajjitabbattā vuttaṃ. Tesañhi virattakāmakammanibbattassa paṭisandhibījassa evaṃsabhāvattā ghānādīni gandhādayo ca na santīti. Ghānāyatanayamakena sadisavissajjanattāti cakkhāyatanamūlakesu ghānāyatanayamakena saddhiṃ sadisavissajjanattāti attho. Nanu tattha ‘‘sacakkhukānaṃ aghānakānaṃ upapajjantāna’’ntiādinā vissajjanaṃ pavattaṃ, idha pana ghānāyatanamūlakesu ‘‘yassa ghānāyatanaṃ uppajjati, tassa jivhāyatanaṃ uppajjatīti? Āmantā’’ti vissajjanena bhavitabbanti natthi sadisavissajjanatāti? Saccaṃ, yathā pana tattha ghānāyatanayamakena jivhākāyāyatanayamakāni sadisavissajjanāni, evamidhāpi jivhākaāyāyatanayamakāni sadisavissajjanāni, tasmā tattha tattheva sadisavissajjanatā pāḷiyaṃ anāruḷhatāya kāraṇanti. Nidassanabhāvena pana gahitaṃ cakkhāyatanamūlakānaṃ sadisavissajjanakānaṃ sadisavissajjanaṃ nidassanabhāveneva kāraṇanti dassento ‘‘ghānāyatanayamakena sadisavissajjanattā’’ti āha. Sadisavissajjanatā cettha ghānāyatanamūlakesu yebhuyyatāya daṭṭhabbā. Tesu hi jivhākāyāyatanayamakesu tiṇṇaṃ pucchānaṃ ‘‘āmantā’’ti vissajjanena bhavitabbaṃ[Pg.129], pacchimapucchāya ‘‘sakāyakānaṃ aghānakānaṃ upapajjantāna’’ntiādināti.

It should be understood that the second point, “although it has a similar resolution to the first,” etc., is stated only with reference to the Section on the Person. In the Section on Location, however, it is stated that the resolution is dissimilar; and to show that the resolution is not similar in all cases, it is resolved thus even in the Section on the Person. As to the three yamakas involving the smell, taste, and tangible bases, it is said that they have similar resolutions because they must be resolved with reference to beings in the form realm, with answers such as, “For those with eyes but without smell….” This is because, for them, due to the nature of the rebirth-linking seed produced by karma detached from sensual pleasures, the nose, etc., and smells, etc., do not exist. “Because of the similar resolution with the yamaka on the nose-base” means that among the yamakas rooted in the eye-base, the resolution is similar to that of the yamaka on the nose-base. But is it not so that there the resolution proceeds, “For those with eyes but without noses who are arising…,” whereas here, in the yamakas rooted in the nose-base, the resolution to “For one for whom the nose-base arises, does the tongue-base arise?” must be “Yes,” and thus the resolutions are not similar? True. But just as there the yamakas on the nose-base have similar resolutions to the yamakas on the tongue- and body-bases, so here too the yamakas on the tongue- and body-bases have similar resolutions. Therefore, the similarity of resolution in each case is the reason for their not being included in the Pāli. And showing that the similar resolution of the yamakas with similar resolutions rooted in the eye-base, which was taken as an example, is the reason, he said, “because of the similar resolution with the yamaka on the nose-base.” And this similarity of resolution in the yamakas rooted in the nose-base should be understood as applying for the most part. For in them, in the yamakas on the tongue- and body-bases, three questions must be answered with “Yes,” and the last question with “For those with a body but without a nose who are arising…,” etc.

Atha vā yathā vedanākkhandhādimūlakānaṃ saññākkhandhādiyamakānaṃ amissakakālabhedesu tīsu ‘‘āmantā’’ti paṭivacanavissajjanena yathāvuttavacanassa vissajjanabhāvānujānanaṃ kattabbanti apubbassa vattabbassa abhāvā vissajjanaṃ na kataṃ, evamidhāpi ghānāyatanamūlakaṃ jivhāyatanayamakaṃ apubbassa vattabbassa abhāvā pāḷiṃ anāruḷhanti pākaṭoyamattho. Kāyāyatanayamakaṃ pana dutiyapucchāya vasena vissajjitabbaṃ siyā, sā ca cakkhāyatanamūlakesu ghānāyatanayamakena sadisavissajjanā, tasmā yassā pucchāya vissajjanā kātabbā, tassā ghānāyatanayamakena sadisavissajjanattā taṃsesāni pāḷiṃ anāruḷhānīti evamettha attho daṭṭhabbo. Tathāti idaṃ pāḷianāruḷhatāsāmaññeneva vuttaṃ, na kāraṇasāmaññena. Ghānajivhākāyāyatanānaṃ pana agabbhaseyyakesu pavattamānānaṃ gabbhaseyyakesu ca āyatanapāripūrikāle sahacāritāya avisesattā ca appavisesattā ca ekasmiṃ ghānāyatanayamake vissajjite itarāni dve, ghānāyatanamūlakesu ca vissajjitesu itaradvayamūlakāni na vissajjīyantīti veditabbāni. Rūpāyatanamanāyatanehi saddhinti ‘‘yassa rūpāyatanaṃ uppajjati, tassa manāyatanaṃ uppajjatī’’ti etissā pucchāya vuttehi rūpāyatanamanāyatanehi saddhinti adhippāyo. Rūpāyatanamūlakesu hi manāyatanayamake ādipucchāya gandharasaphoṭṭhabbayamakesu ādipucchānaṃ sadisavissajjanatā yamakānaṃ avissajjane kāraṇabhāvena vuttā. Dutiyapucchānañhi paṭivacanavissajjanena bhavitabbanti pubbe vuttanayena vissajjanaṃ na kātabbaṃ, ādipucchānañca na kātabbanti.

Or alternatively, just as in the three unmixed divisions of time concerning the couplets on the perception aggregate, etc., rooted in the feeling aggregate, etc., an answer is not given because the reply 'Yes' is simply an approval of the statement as it was said, and there is nothing new to state; so here too, the tongue-base couplet rooted in the nose-base is not included in the Pāli text because there is nothing new to state. This is the evident meaning. The body-base couplet, however, should be answered by way of the second question, and its answer is similar to that for the nose-base couplet among those rooted in the eye-base. Therefore, for whichever question an answer is to be given, since its answer is similar to that of the nose-base couplet, the remaining ones are not included in the Pāli text. Thus should the meaning be understood here. The word 'tathā' is stated merely due to the general similarity of not being included in the Pāli text, not due to a general similarity of reason. Furthermore, regarding the nose, tongue, and body bases, because of their co-occurrence, lack of distinction, and lack of significant difference when they arise in those not born from a womb and, for those born from a womb, at the time of the completion of the sense bases, when one—the nose-base couplet—is answered, the other two are not. And when those rooted in the nose-base are answered, it should be understood that those rooted in the other two are not answered. 'With the form-base and the mind-base'—the intention is 'with the form-base and the mind-base' as stated in this question: 'For whom the form-base arises, for them does the mind-base arise?' For in the couplets rooted in the form-base, regarding the mind-base couplet, the similarity of the answer to the first question with the first questions in the smell, taste, and touch couplets is stated as the reason for not answering the couplets. For the second questions, there should be a reply by way of a counter-question, but according to the method stated before, an answer is not to be given. And for the first questions, an answer is not to be given either.

Heṭṭhimehi sadisavissajjanattāti ettha gandhāyatanamūlakānaṃ rasaphoṭṭhabbayamakānaṃ rasāyatanamūlakassa ca phoṭṭhabbayamakassa paṭivacanavissajjaneneva bhavitabbanti pubbe vuttanayeneva vissajjanaṃ na kātabbanti yesaṃ kātabbaṃ, tesaṃ gandharasaphoṭṭhabbamūlakānaṃ manāyatanadhammāyatanayamakānaṃ cakkhādipañcāyatanamūlakehi manāyatanadhammāyatanayamakehi sadisavissajjanattāti attho. Cakkhāyatanādimūlakāni saddāyatanayamakāni saddāyatanamūlakāni sabbāni avissajjaneneva alabbhamānavissajjanatādassanena [Pg.130] vissajjitāni nāma hontīti āha ‘‘chasaṭṭhi yamakāni vissajjitāni nāma hontī’’ti.

Regarding 'Because of the similarity of their answers to the preceding ones': here, for the taste and touch couplets rooted in the smell-base, and for the touch couplet rooted in the taste-base, there should be a reply by way of a counter-question, but according to the method stated before, an answer is not to be given. For those that are to be answered, the meaning is that their mind-base and phenomena-base couplets rooted in smell, taste, and touch are answered similarly to the mind-base and phenomena-base couplets rooted in the five bases beginning with the eye. The sound-base couplets rooted in the eye-base and so on, and all couplets rooted in the sound-base, are considered answered precisely by not being answered, by showing that an answer is unobtainable. Therefore, it is said, 'Sixty-six couplets are considered answered.'

Jaccandhampi jaccabadhirampīti ettha ca jaccabadhiraggahaṇena jaccandhabadhiro gahitoti veditabbo. Saghānakānaṃ sacakkhukānanti paripuṇṇāyatanameva opapātikaṃ sandhāya vuttanti ettha eva-saddaṃ vuttanti-etassa parato yojetvā yathā ‘‘saghānakānaṃ acakkhukāna’’nti idaṃ aparipuṇṇāyatanaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, na evaṃ ‘‘saghānakānaṃ sacakkhukāna’’nti etaṃ. Etaṃ pana paripuṇṇāyatanaṃ sandhāya vuttamevāti attho daṭṭhabbo. Tena jaccabadhirampi sandhāya vuttatā na vāritā hotīti.

Regarding 'Jaccandhampi jaccabadhirampīti' (the congenitally blind and the congenitally deaf), here, by the inclusion of 'jaccabadhira,' it should be understood that the congenitally blind and deaf is included. Regarding 'Saghānakānaṃ sacakkhukānaṃ' (for those with a nose and with eyes), this is stated with reference only to a spontaneously born being with complete sense bases. Here, the word 'eva' should be connected after 'vuttanti,' so that just as 'saghānakānaṃ acakkhukānaṃ' (for those with a nose but without eyes) is stated with reference to one with incomplete sense bases, 'saghānakānaṃ sacakkhukānaṃ' is not so. Rather, this is stated with reference to one with complete sense bases only. Thus, its being stated with reference also to the congenitally deaf is not precluded.

22-254. Yattha cakkhāyatananti rūpībrahmalokaṃ pucchatīti niyamato tattha cakkhusotānaṃ sahuppattimattaṃ passanto vadati, okāsavāre pana tasmiṃ puggalassa anāmaṭṭhattā yattha kāmadhātuyaṃ rūpadhātuyañca cakkhāyatanaṃ uppajjati, tattha sotāyatanampi ekantena uppajjatīti ‘‘āmantā’’ti (yama. 1.āyatanayamaka.22) vuttaṃ.

22-254. When the question is 'Where the eye-base...', it asks about the form Brahma-world. Seeing only the mere co-arising of the eye and ear there, one speaks with certainty. However, in the opportunity section (okāsavāra), since the person is not touched upon in it, wherever the eye-base arises—in the sense-sphere and the form-sphere—there the ear-base also arises without exception. Thus, it is stated, 'Yes' (Yam. 1. Āyatanayamaka.22).

‘‘Yassa vā pana rūpāyatanaṃ uppajjissati, tassa cakkhāyatanaṃ uppajjissatīti? Āmantā’’ti kasmā paṭiññātaṃ, nanu yo gabbhaseyyakabhāvaṃ gantvā parinibbāyissati, tassa rūpāyatanaṃ paṭisandhiyaṃ uppajjissati, na pana cakkhāyatananti? Yassa rūpāyatanaṃ uppajjissati, tassa tadavatthassa puggalassa rūpāyatanuppādato uddhaṃ cakkhāyatanasantānuppādassa pavattiyampi bhavissantassa paṭiññātabbattā. Atha kasmā ‘‘yassa vā pana rūpāyatanaṃ nuppajjissati, tassa cakkhāyatanaṃ nuppajjissatīti? Āmantā’’ti paṭiññātaṃ, nanu gabbhaseyyakassa pacchimabhavikassa upapajjantassa ekādasamasattāhā orato ṭhitassa rūpāyatanaṃ nuppajjissati no ca cakkhāyatanaṃ nuppajjissatīti? Tasmiṃ bhave bhavissantassa uppādassa anāgatabhāvena avacanato. Bhavantare hi tassa tassa āyatanasantānassa yo ādiuppādo paṭisandhiyaṃ pavatte ca bhavissati, so anāgatuppādo tabbhāvena vuccati addhāpaccuppannānantogadhattā. Na pana yo tasmiṃyeva bhave pavatte bhavissati, so anāgatuppādabhāvena vuccati addhāpaccuppannantogadhattā. Addhāvasena hettha kammajapavattassa paccuppannādikālabhedo adhippeto. Evañca katvā indriyayamake (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.368) ‘‘yassa itthindriyaṃ uppajjati[Pg.131], tassa purisindriyaṃ uppajjissatīti? Pacchimabhavikānaṃ itthīnaṃ upapajjantīnaṃ, yā ca itthiyo rūpāvacaraṃ arūpāvacaraṃ upapajjitvā parinibbāyissanti, yā ca itthiyo eteneva bhāvena katici bhave dassetvā parinibbāyissanti, tāsaṃ upapajjantīnaṃ tāsaṃ itthindriyaṃ uppajjati, no ca tāsaṃ purisindriyaṃ uppajjissatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Na hi tāsaṃ sabbāsaṃ tasmiṃ bhave pavatte purisindriyaṃ na uppajjissati liṅgaparivattanasabbhāvā, bhavantare pana ādiuppādassa abhāvaṃ sandhāya ‘‘no ca tāsaṃ purisindriyaṃ uppajjissatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Bhavantare hi ādiuppādassa anāgatattaṃ adhippetanti. Evañca katvā ‘‘katici bhave dassetvā’’ti bhavaggahaṇaṃ katanti.

'Or for whom the form-base will arise, for them will the eye-base arise? Yes.' Why is this acknowledged? Surely, for one who, having gone to an embryonic state, will attain final Nibbāna, the form-base will arise at rebirth-linking, but not the eye-base? It is to be acknowledged because for that person for whom the form-base will arise, for that individual in that state, after the arising of the form-base, the arising of the continuity of the eye-base will also occur in the course of existence. Then why is it acknowledged: 'Or for whom the form-base will not arise, for them will the eye-base not arise? Yes.'? Surely, for a being in their last existence who is being reborn in a womb, for one existing for less than eleven weeks, the form-base will not arise, but it is not the case that the eye-base will not arise? This is because an arising that will occur in that existence is not spoken of as 'future'. For in a future existence, the initial arising of the continuity of that particular base, which will occur at rebirth-linking and in the course of existence, is called 'future arising'. But that which will arise in the course of this very existence is not called 'future arising' because it is included in the present time-period. Here, by 'time-period', the division of time into present, etc., for the kamma-born life-continuum is intended. And so it is that in the Indriya Yamaka (Yam. 3. Indriyayamaka.368) it is said: 'For whom the female faculty arises, for them will the male faculty arise? For females in their last existence who are being reborn, and for those females who, having been reborn in the form realm or formless realm, will attain final Nibbāna, and for those females who, having shown a few existences in this same state, will attain final Nibbāna—for them, as they are being reborn, the female faculty arises, but the male faculty will not arise for them.' For it is not the case that the male faculty will fail to arise for all of them in the course of that existence, due to the possibility of a change of sex. But with reference to the absence of an initial arising in a future existence, it is said: 'but the male faculty will not arise for them.' For 'future' is intended to mean the initial arising in a future existence. And so it is that the taking of 'existence' is done in the phrase 'having shown a few existences'.

‘‘Āyatanānaṃ paṭilābho jātī’’ti (dī. ni. 2.388; vibha. 235) vacanato taṃtaṃāyatananibbattakakammena gahitapaṭisandhikassa avassaṃbhāvīāyatanassa yāva āyatanapāripūri, tāva uppajjatīti pana atthe gayhamāne pucchādvayavissajjanaṃ sūpapannaṃ hoti. Evañca sati ‘‘yassa vā pana sotāyatanaṃ nuppajjissati, tassa cakkhāyatanaṃ nuppajjatīti? Pacchimabhavikānaṃ pañcavokāraṃ upapajjantānaṃ, ye ca arūpaṃ upapajjitvā parinibbāyissanti, tesaṃ upapajjantānaṃ tesaṃ sotāyatanaṃ nuppajjissati, no ca tesaṃ cakkhāyatanaṃ nuppajjatī’’ti evamādīsu (yama. 1.āyatanayamaka.95) gabbhaseyyakāpi pacchimabhavikādayo upapajjantā gahitā honti. Evañca katvā indriyayamake (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.186) ‘‘yassa vā pana somanassindriyaṃ uppajjati, tassa cakkhundriyaṃ uppajjatīti? Āmantā’’ti idampi upapannaṃ hoti. Somanassindriyuppādakassa kammassa ekantena cakkhundriyuppādanato gabbhepi yāva cakkhundriyuppatti, tāva uppajjamānatāya tassā abhinanditabbattā.

'The acquisition of the bases is birth' (Dī. Ni. 2.388; Vibha. 235). According to this, for one who has taken rebirth-linking through the kamma that generates the respective bases, until the bases are fully complete, they are necessarily arising. When the meaning is taken thus, the two-fold question and answer become appropriate. And so, in such cases as: 'For one whose ear base will not arise, does their eye base not arise? For those in their final existence who are being reborn into the five-constituent realm, and for those who, having been reborn into the formless realm, will attain final Nibbāna—for them, while they are being reborn, their ear base will not arise, but it is not the case that their eye base does not arise,' (Yam. 1. Āyatanayamaka.95) even womb-born beings, those in their final existence, and so on, who are being reborn, are included. Having established this, in the Indriya Yamaka (Yam. 3. Indriyayamaka.186), the statement: 'For one for whom the faculty of joy arises, does the eye faculty arise? Yes,' also becomes fitting. This is because the kamma that produces the faculty of joy invariably produces the eye faculty, and even in the womb, until the eye faculty arises, it is in the process of arising, and this should be acknowledged.

Yaṃ pana ‘‘yassa vā pana yattha rūpāyatanaṃ uppajjittha, tassa tattha ghānāyatanaṃ uppajjatīti? Kāmāvacarā cavantānaṃ, aghānakānaṃ kāmāvacaraṃ upapajjantānaṃ, rūpāvacarānaṃ tesaṃ tattha rūpāyatanaṃ uppajjittha, no ca tesaṃ tattha ghānāyatanaṃ uppajjatī’’ti ettha ‘‘aghānakānaṃ kāmāvacaraṃ upapajjantāna’’nti (yama. 1.āyatanayamaka.76) vuttaṃ, taṃ ye ekādasamasattāhā orato kālaṃ karissanti, tesaṃ ghānāyatanānibbattakakammena gahitapaṭisandhikānaṃ vasena vuttanti veditabbaṃ. ‘‘Yassa yattha ghānāyatanaṃ na nirujjhati, tassa [Pg.132] tattha rūpāyatanaṃ na nirujjhissatīti? Kāmāvacaraṃ upapajjantānaṃ, aghānakānaṃ kāmāvacarā cavantānaṃ, rūpāvacarānaṃ tesaṃ tattha ghānāyatanaṃ na nirujjhati, no ca tesaṃ tattha rūpāyatanaṃ na nirujjhissatī’’ti hi ettha ‘‘aghānakānaṃ kāmāvacarā cavantāna’’nti (yama. 1.āyatanayamaka.181) vacanaṃ anuppanneyeva ghānāyatane gabbhaseyyakānaṃ cuti atthīti dīpeti. Na hi kāmāvacare gabbhaseyyakato añño aghānako atthi dhammahadayavibhaṅge (vibha. 978 ādayo) ‘‘kāmadhātuyā upapattikkhaṇe kassaci aṭṭhāyatanāni pātubhavantī’’ti avuttattāti. Atha kasmā opapātike eva sandhāya idha, indriyayamake ca yathādassitāsu pucchāsu ‘‘āmantā’’ti vuttanti na viññāyatīti? Yamake sanniṭṭhānena gahitatthassa ekadese saṃsayatthasambhavena paṭivacanassa akaraṇato. Bhinditabbe hi na paṭivacanavissajjanaṃ hoti. Yadi siyā, paripuṇṇavissajjanameva na siyāti. Atha kasmā ‘‘yassa vā pana somanassindriyaṃ uppajjati, tassa cakkhundriyaṃ uppajjatīti? Āmantā’’ti (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.186) iminā ‘‘gabbhaseyyakānaṃ somanassapaṭisandhi natthī’’ti na viññāyatīti? ‘‘Kāmadhātuyā upapattikkhaṇe kassa dasindriyāni pātubhavanti? Gabbhaseyyakānaṃ sattānaṃ sahetukānaṃ ñāṇasampayuttānaṃ upapattikkhaṇe dasindriyāni pātubhavanti kāyindriyaṃ manindriyaṃ itthindriyaṃ vā purisindriyaṃ vā jīvitindriyaṃ somanassindriyaṃ vā upekkhindriyaṃ vā saddhindriya’’ntiādivacanato (vibha. 1012).

As for what was said: 'For one for whom the form base arose in a certain place, does the nose base arise there for them? For those passing away from the sense-sphere realm, for those without a nose being reborn in the sense-sphere realm, and for those in the form realm—for them, the form base arose there, but the nose base does not arise there for them.' Here, the phrase 'for those without a nose being reborn in the sense-sphere realm' (Yam. 1.Āyatanayamaka.76) is said with reference to those who will die before the eleventh week; it should be understood as referring to those whose rebirth-linking is grasped by kamma that does not produce the nose base. And in the statement: 'For one for whom the nose base does not cease in a certain place, will the form base not cease there for them? For those being reborn in the sense-sphere realm, for those without a nose passing away from the sense-sphere realm, and for those in the form realm—for them, the nose base does not cease there, but it is not the case that the form base will not cease for them.' Here, the phrase 'for those without a nose passing away from the sense-sphere realm' (Yam. 1.Āyatanayamaka.181) indicates that death can occur for womb-born beings even when the nose base has not yet arisen. For in the sense-sphere realm, apart from womb-born beings, there are no others without a nose, as it is not stated in the Dhammahadayavibhaṅga (Vibh. 978 ff.) that 'at the moment of rebirth in the sense-sphere realm, for some, eight bases become manifest.' Then why is it not understood that here, and in the questions shown in the Indriya Yamaka, the answer 'Yes' is given with reference only to spontaneously arisen beings? Because in the Yamaka, a reply is not given when there is a possibility of a doubtful meaning in a part of the meaning grasped by the thesis. For when something is to be analyzed, there is no conclusive answer. If there were, it would not be a complete answer. Then why is it not understood from the statement: 'For one for whom the faculty of joy arises, does the eye faculty arise for them? Yes' (Yam. 3.Indriyayamaka.186), that 'there is no rebirth-linking with joy for womb-born beings'? Because of the statement: 'At the moment of rebirth in the sense-sphere realm, for whom do ten faculties become manifest? For womb-born beings with roots, associated with knowledge, at the moment of rebirth ten faculties become manifest: the body faculty, the mind faculty, the femininity faculty or the masculinity faculty, the life faculty, the faculty of joy or the faculty of equanimity, the faculty of faith,' and so on (Vibh. 1012).

Nirodhavāre anāgatakālabhede yathā tasseva cittassa nirodho anāgatabhāvena tassa uppattikkhaṇe vutto, evaṃ tasseva kammajasantānassa nirodho anāgatabhāvena tassa uppāde vattabboti sabbattha upapajjantānaṃ eva so tathā vutto, na uppannānaṃ. Uppannānaṃ pana aññassa anāgatassa santānassa nirodho anāgatabhāvena vattabbo, na tasseva. Tassa hi uppādānantaraṃ nirodho āraddho nāma hotīti. Tasmā arahataṃ pavatte sotassa cakkhussa ca bhede satipi anāgatakālāmasanavaseneva ‘‘yassa cakkhāyatanaṃ nirujjhissati, tassa sotāyatanaṃ nirujjhissatīti? Āmantā. Yassa vā pana sotāyatanaṃ nirujjhissati, tassa cakkhāyatanaṃ nirujjhissatīti? Āmantā’’ti vissajjanadvayaṃ upapannameva hotīti. Yasmā ca upapattianantaraṃ nirodho [Pg.133] āraddho nāma hoti, taṃniṭṭhānabhāvato pana cutiyā nirodhavacanaṃ, tasmā pavatte niruddhepi santānekadese aniruddhaṃ upādāya aniṭṭhitanirodhoti cutiyāva tassa nirodhoti vuccati. Vakkhati hi ‘‘yassa vā pana somanassindriyaṃ nirujjhati, tassa cakkhundriyaṃ nirujjhatīti? Āmantā’’ti, tenetthāpi cutinirodhe eva ca adhippete yañca pavatte nirujjhissati, tañca niṭṭhānavasena cutiyā eva nirujjhissatīti vuttanti ‘‘āmantā’’ti yuttaṃ paṭivacanaṃ. ‘‘Sacakkhukāna’’ntiādīsu ca ‘‘paṭiladdhacakkhukāna’’ntiādinā attho viññāyatīti.

In the section on cessation, regarding the distinction of future time, just as the cessation of that very mind is spoken of at its moment of arising by virtue of its future nature, so too the cessation of that very kamma-born continuum should be spoken of at its arising by virtue of its future nature. Thus, it is stated in this way for all who are being reborn, not for those who have already arisen. For those who have already arisen, it is the cessation of another, future continuum that should be spoken of by virtue of its future nature, not of that very one. For its cessation is said to have begun immediately after its arising. Therefore, for an Arahant, even though there is a difference between the ear and the eye in the course of existence, by way of referring to future time, the two answers—'For one whose eye base will cease, will their ear base cease? Yes. Or for one whose ear base will cease, will their eye base cease? Yes'—are indeed appropriate. And since cessation is said to have begun immediately after arising, but the term 'cessation' is used for death because that is its conclusion, therefore, even when a part of the continuum has ceased in the course of existence, with reference to the part that has not ceased, it is 'cessation not yet concluded,' and thus its cessation is spoken of only as death. For it will be said: 'For one for whom the faculty of joy is ceasing, is their eye faculty ceasing? Yes.' Therefore, here too, since cessation at death is intended, and since what will cease in the course of existence is also said to cease at death by way of conclusion, the reply 'Yes' is appropriate. And in phrases like 'those with eyes,' the meaning is understood as 'those who have obtained eyes,' and so on.

‘‘Yassa cakkhāyatanaṃ na nirujjhati, tassa sotāyatanaṃ na nirujjhissatīti? Sabbesaṃ upapajjantānaṃ, acakkhukānaṃ cavantānaṃ tesaṃ cakkhāyatanaṃ na nirujjhati, no ca tesaṃ sotāyatanaṃ na nirujjhissatī’’ti ettha āruppe pacchimabhavike ṭhapetvā sabbe upapajjantā, acakkhukā cavantā ca gahitāti daṭṭhabbā. Te hi dutiyakoṭṭhāsena saṅgayhantīti tadapekkhattā sāvasesamidaṃ sabbavacanaṃ acakkhukavacanañcāti. ‘‘Āruppe pacchimabhavikāna’’nti ettha ca arūpato pañcavokāraṃ agacchantā anaññūpapattikāpi ‘‘arūpe pacchimabhavikā’’icceva saṅgayhantīti veditabbā. Esa nayo aññesupi evarūpesūti.

'For one for whom the eye base is not ceasing, will their ear base not cease? For all who are being reborn, and for the eyeless who are passing away, their eye base is not ceasing, but it is not the case that their ear base will not cease.' Here, it should be seen that, having excluded those in their final existence in the formless realm, all who are being reborn and the eyeless who are passing away are included. For they are included by the second part; therefore, this word 'all' and the word 'eyeless' are with a remainder, in dependence on that. And here, by 'those in their final existence in the formless realm,' it should be understood that even those not coming from the formless realm to the five-constituent existence and not taking another rebirth are included as 'those in their final existence in the formless realm.' This is the method in other such cases as well.

Pavattivāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Section on the Course of Existence is concluded.

Āyatanayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Yamaka on the Bases is concluded.

4. Dhātuyamakaṃ

4. The Yamaka on the Elements.

1-19. Labbhamānānanti idaṃ pavattivāre saddadhātusambandhānaṃ yamakānaṃ cakkhuviññāṇadhātādisambandhānañca cutipaṭisandhivasena alabbhamānataṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ.

1-19. The phrase 'of those that are obtainable' is stated in the Section on the Course of Existence with reference to the non-obtainability—by way of death and rebirth-linking—of the yamakas connected with the sound element and those connected with the eye-consciousness element and so forth.

Dhātuyamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Yamaka on the Elements is concluded.

5. Saccayamakaṃ

5. The Yamaka on the Truths.

1. Paṇṇattivāro

1. The Section on Concepts.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Section of Exposition.

10-26. ‘‘Dukkhaṃ [Pg.134] dukkhasaccanti? Āmantā’’ti ettha kiñcāpi dukkhadukkhaṃ saṅkhāradukkhaṃ vipariṇāmadukkhanti tīsupi dukkhasaddo pavattati, ‘‘jātipi dukkhā’’tiādinā (mahāva. 14; vibha. 190) jātiādīsu ca, so pana dukkhadukkhato aññattha pavattamāno aññanirapekkho nappavattati. Suddhañcettha dukkhapadaṃ aññanirapekkhaṃ gahetvā paṇṇattisodhanaṃ karoti, tena nippariyāyato dukkhasabhāvattā eva yaṃ dukkhadukkhaṃ, tasmiṃ dukkhadukkhe esa dukkhasaddo, tañca ekantena dukkhasaccamevāti ‘‘āmantā’’ti vuttaṃ. Suddhasaccavāre saccavibhaṅge vuttesu samudayesu koci phaladhammesu natthi, na ca phaladhammesu koci nirodhoti vuccamāno atthi, maggasaddo ca phalaphalaṅgesu maggaphalattā pavattati, na maggakiccasabbhāvā. Pariniṭṭhitaniyyānakiccāni hi tāni. Niyyānavācako cettha maggasaddo, na niyyānaphalavācako, tasmā samudayo saccaṃ, nirodho saccaṃ, maggo saccanti etesupi ‘‘āmantā’’icceva vissajjanaṃ kataṃ.

10-26. 'Is suffering the truth of suffering? Yes.' Here, although the term 'suffering' applies in three ways—as suffering as suffering (dukkha-dukkha), suffering due to formations (saṅkhāra-dukkha), and suffering due to change (vipariṇāma-dukkha)—and though it is also used in phrases like 'birth is suffering' (jātipi dukkhā) (Mahāvagga 14; Vibhaṅga 190) regarding birth and so on, when it applies elsewhere than to suffering-as-suffering, it does not do so independently. Here, the term 'suffering' is taken purely, without reference to anything else, to clarify its designation. Thus, because that which is suffering as suffering is inherently of the nature of suffering without qualification, the term 'suffering' applies to that suffering as suffering. And that is exclusively the truth of suffering—hence the answer 'Yes' is given. In the section on the pure truths in the Analysis of the Truths, among the origins mentioned, none are found among resultant phenomena, nor is any cessation spoken of as existing among resultant phenomena. The term 'path' (magga) applies to the fruit and the factors of fruition because it is the fruit of the path, not because of the existence of the path's function. For those are functions that have completed the task of leading out (niyyāna). Here, the term 'path' signifies the leading out, not the fruit of leading out. Therefore, for 'origin is a truth,' 'cessation is a truth,' and 'the path is a truth,' the reply given to these is also simply 'Yes.'

Atha vā padasodhanena padesu sodhitesu saccavisesanabhūtā eva dukkhādisaddā idha gahitāti viññāyanti. Tesaṃ pana ekantena saccavisesanabhāvaṃ, saccānañca tabbisesanayogavisesaṃ dīpetuṃ suddhasaccavāro vuttoti saccavisesanānaṃ dukkhādīnaṃ ekantasaccattā ‘‘dukkhaṃ saccaṃ…pe… maggo saccanti? Āmantā’’ti vuttanti. Yathā cettha, evaṃ khandhayamakādīsupi suddhakhandhādivāresu khandhādivisesanabhūtānameva rūpādīnaṃ gahaṇaṃ yuttaṃ. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ (yama. aṭṭha. khandhayamaka 38) pana ‘‘yasmā piyarūpasātarūpasaṅkhātaṃ vā rūpaṃ hotu bhūtupādārūpaṃ vā, sabbaṃ pañcasu khandhesu saṅgahaṃ gacchateva, tasmā āmantāti paṭijānātī’’ti vacanena rūpādicakkhādidukkhādiggahaṇehi suddhakhandhādivāresupi khandhādivisesanato aññepi gahitāti ayamattho dīpito hoti, tena tadanurūpatāvasena itaro attho vutto.

Or, by analyzing the terms, when the terms are analyzed, it is understood that the words such as 'suffering' here are taken as exclusively descriptive of the truths. However, to clearly show their absolute nature as descriptors of the truths, and the specific connection of the truths to those descriptors, the section on pure truths is stated. Thus, because suffering, etc., as descriptors, are exclusively truths, it is said: 'Is suffering a truth… is the path a truth? Yes.' Just as here, so too in the Yamaka on the Aggregates, etc., in the pure sections on aggregates, etc., it is appropriate to take only form, etc., as descriptive features of the aggregates, etc. However, in the commentary (Yamaka Aṭṭhakathā, Khandhayamaka 38), it is explained: 'Because whatever form is considered pleasing form or delightful form, or material form derived from the elements, all are invariably included within the five aggregates, therefore one acknowledges with “yes.”' This statement clarifies that in the sections on pure aggregates, etc., even things other than descriptors of the aggregates, etc., are included by taking form, etc., the eye, etc., and suffering, etc. Thus, this meaning is illuminated, and accordingly, the other meaning is stated in conformity with it.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Exposition Section is concluded.

2. Pavattivāravaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Section on Occurrence

27-164. Antamaso [Pg.135] suddhāvāsānampīti idaṃ tesaṃ ariyattā dukkhasaccena upapajjane āsaṅkā siyāti katvā vuttaṃ. Taṇhāvippayuttacittassāti idaṃ pañcavokāravaseneva gahetabbanti vuttaṃ. Yassa dukkhasaccaṃ uppajjatīti etena pana sanniṭṭhānena sabbe upapajjantā pavattiyaṃ catuvokāre maggaphalato aññacittānaṃ uppādakkhaṇasamaṅgino pañcavokāre ca sabbacittānaṃ uppādakkhaṇasamaṅgino saṅgahitāti tesveva sanniṭṭhānena nicchitesu keci ‘‘pavatte taṇhāvippayuttacittassa uppādakkhaṇe’’ti etena dukkhasamudayesu ekakoṭṭhāsappavattisamaṅgino dassīyanti sanniṭṭhānena gahitasseva vibhāgadassanato, tena catuvokārānampi gahaṇaṃ upapannameva. Na hi tesu maggaphaluppādasamaṅgīsu pasaṅgatā atthi taṃsamaṅgīnaṃ tesaṃ sanniṭṭhānena aggahitattāti. Idaṃ idha na gahetabbanti idaṃ catuvokāre phalasamāpatticittaṃ idha saccānaṃ uppādavacane na gahetabbanti vuttaṃ hoti.

27-164. 'Even up to the Pure Abodes'—this is said considering that for them, due to their nobility, a doubt might arise regarding their rebirth with the truth of suffering. 'Of one with a mind dissociated from craving'—this is said to be understood only in terms of the five-aggregate existence. 'But for whom the truth of suffering arises'—by this thesis-clause, all who are being reborn in the course of existence are included: those in the four-aggregate existence at the moment of arising of a mind other than path and fruition, and those in the five-aggregate existence at the moment of arising of all minds. Thus, when these have been determined by the thesis-clause, some, by this phrase 'in the course of existence, at the moment of the arising of a mind dissociated from craving,' show those who are experiencing one part among the origins of suffering. This is because a distinction is shown of what was taken by the thesis-clause itself, and thus, the inclusion of those in the four-aggregate existence is also appropriate. For there is no implication for those at the moment of the arising of path or fruition, since they, being at such a moment, are not included by the thesis-clause. 'This should not be taken here'—this means that the fruition-attainment mind in the four-aggregate existence is not to be included here in the statement about the arising of the truths.

Ettha ca sabbesaṃ upapajjantānanti idaṃ kammajapavattassa paṭhamuppādadassanena vuttaṃ, asaññasattāpettha saṅgahitā. Pavatte taṇhāvippayuttacittassa uppādakkhaṇeti idaṃ pana samudayasaccuppādavomissassa dukkhasaccuppādassa taṃrahitassa dassanavasena vuttaṃ. Taṇhāya uppādakkhaṇeti taṃsahitassa samudayasaccuppādavomissassa. Tesaṃ pana asaññasattānaṃ pavattiyaṃ dukkhasaccassa uppādo sabbattha na gahito, tathā nirodho cāti. Maggasaccayamakepi eseva nayo. Tesaṃ tasmiṃ upapattikkhaṇe ca taṇhāvippayuttacittuppattikkhaṇe cāti evamettha khaṇavasena okāso veditabboti vuttaṃ, evañca sati ‘‘yassa yattha dukkhasaccaṃ uppajjati, tassa tattha samudayasaccaṃ uppajjissatī’’ti (yama. 1.saccayamaka.71) etassa vissajjane pacchimakoṭṭhāse ‘‘itaresaṃ catuvokāraṃ pañcavokāraṃ upapajjantānaṃ, pavatte cittassa uppādakkhaṇe tesaṃ tattha dukkhasaccañca uppajjati samudayasaccañca uppajjissatī’’ti idaṃ na yujjeyya. Na hi upapattikkhaṇe cittuppattikkhaṇe ca samudayasaccaṃ uppajjissatīti. Tasmā upapattikkhaṇataṇhāvippayuttacittuppattikkhaṇasamaṅgīnaṃ puggalānaṃ yasmiṃ kāmāvacarādiokāse sā upapatti cittuppatti ca pavattamānā, tattha tesanti okāsavasenevettha [Pg.136] tattha-saddassa attho yujjati. Puggalokāsavāro hesa. Tattha puggalavisesadassanatthaṃ ‘‘sabbesaṃ upapajjantāna’’ntiādi vuttaṃ, okāso pana yattha te, so evāti.

Here, 'for all beings who are being reborn' is stated to show the first arising of kamma-born existence; the non-percipient beings are also included here. In the course of existence, 'the moment of arising of consciousness dissociated from craving' is stated to show the arising of the truth of suffering when it is devoid of the arising of the truth of origin, as distinct from when it is mixed with it. 'The moment of arising of craving' refers to that which is accompanied by it, mixed with the arising of the truth of origin. However, for those non-percipient beings, the arising of the truth of suffering is not included everywhere in their existence, and likewise for cessation. In the Yamaka on the Truth of the Path also, this is the same method. For them, 'at the moment of rebirth and at the moment of arising of consciousness dissociated from craving'—thus, it is said that the opportunity here should be understood in terms of moments. And if this were so, in the reply to 'For whom the truth of suffering arises in a certain place, for them the truth of the origin will arise there' (Yam. 1. Saccayamaka. 71), it would not be fitting to say in the latter part, 'For other beings, whether of four aggregates or five aggregates, who are being reborn, at the moment of arising of consciousness in the course of existence, for them there the truth of suffering arises and the truth of the origin will arise.' For the truth of the origin will not arise at the moment of rebirth or at the moment of arising of consciousness. Therefore, for individuals at the moment of rebirth and at the moment of arising of consciousness dissociated from craving, in whatever realm—such as the sense-sphere realm, etc.—where that rebirth and arising of consciousness are occurring, for them there—the meaning of the word 'there' here is fitting in terms of location. This is the section on the location of individuals. There, 'for all beings who are being reborn,' etc., is stated to show the distinction among individuals, but the location is simply wherever they are.

‘‘Sabbesaṃ cavantānaṃ pavatte cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe āruppe maggassa ca phalassa ca uppādakkhaṇe tesaṃ samudayasaccañca nuppajjati dukkhasaccañca nuppajjatī’’ti ettha pana ‘‘pavatte cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe dukkhasaccaṃ nuppajjatī’’ti cittapaṭibaddhavuttittā cittajarūpameva idhādhippetaṃ, na kammajādirūpaṃ cittaṃ anapekkhitvāva uppajjanatoti keci vadanti. ‘‘Yassa vā pana samudayasaccaṃ nuppajjatī’’ti etena pana sanniṭṭhānena gahito puggalo na cittaṃ apekkhitvāva gahito, atha kho yo koci evaṃpakāro, tasmā ‘‘tassa dukkhasaccaṃ nuppajjatī’’ti etena ca na cittāpekkhameva dukkhasaccaṃ vuttaṃ, atha kho yaṃ kiñcīti cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe yaṃ kiñci dukkhasaccaṃ nuppajjatīti ayamattho viññāyatīti. Na hi yamake vibhajitabbe avibhattā nāma pucchā atthīti.

Regarding the statement, 'For all who are passing away, at the moment of cessation of mind in the course of existence, and in the formless realm at the moment of arising of the path and its fruit, for them the truth of origin does not arise and the truth of suffering does not arise'—here, concerning the phrase 'the truth of suffering does not arise at the moment of cessation of mind in the course of existence,' some say that since the expression is connected with the mind, it refers only to mind-produced form, not to kamma-produced form and so on, because they arise independently of the mind. However, regarding 'Or for whom the truth of origin does not arise'—by this thesis-clause, the person included is not taken only in dependence on the mind, but rather whoever is of such a kind. Therefore, by 'for them the truth of suffering does not arise,' the truth of suffering spoken of is not only that which is dependent on the mind, but rather whatever it may be. Thus, the meaning to be understood is that whatever truth of suffering there is does not arise at the moment of the mind's cessation. For in the Yamaka, when an analysis is to be made, there is no question that is left unanalyzed.

‘‘Suddhāvāsānaṃ dutiye cittevattamāne’’ti idaṃ sabbantimena paricchedena yassa yattha dukkhasaccaṃ uppajjittha, no ca samudayasaccaṃ, taṃdassanavasena vuttaṃ. Tasmiṃ pana dassite tena samānagatikattā dutiyākusalacittato purimasabbacittasamaṅgino teneva dassitā honti. Tesampi hi tattha dukkhasaccaṃ uppajjittha no ca tesaṃ tattha samudayasaccaṃ uppajjitthāti. Evañca katvā ‘‘itaresaṃ catuvokārapañcavokārāna’’nti ettha yathāvuttā suddhāvāsā aggahitā honti. Yathā ‘‘yassa yattha dukkhasaccaṃ uppajjati, tassa tattha samudayasaccaṃ uppajjitthā’’ti (yama. 1.saccayamaka.61) etassa vissajjane ‘‘suddhāvāsānaṃ upapatticittassa uppādakkhaṇe’’ti (yama. 1.saccayamaka.61) eteneva upapatticittuppādakkhaṇasamaṅgisamānagatikā dutiyākusalato purimasabbacittuppādakkhaṇasamaṅgino dassitā hontīti na te ‘‘itaresa’’nti etena gayhanti, evamidhāpi daṭṭhabbanti. ‘‘Itaresa’’nti vacanaṃ pañcavokārānaṃ visesanatthaṃ, na catuvokārānaṃ. Na hi te pubbe vuttā vajjetabbā santi pañcavokārā viya yathāvuttā suddhāvāsāti. ‘‘Abhisametāvīnaṃ tesaṃ tattha dukkhasaccañca uppajjittha maggasaccañca uppajjitthā’’ti (yama. 1.saccayamaka.41) etena sanniṭṭhānena puggalokāsā aññamaññaparicchinnā gahitāti yasmiṃ okāse abhisametāvino, te evaṃ ‘‘abhisametāvīna’’nti etena gahitāti daṭṭhabbā[Pg.137]. Tena ye kāmāvacare rūpāvacare arūpāvacare vā abhisametāvino rūpāvacaraṃ arūpāvacaraṃ vā upapannā, yāva tatthābhisamayo uppanno bhavissati, tāva te ettha na gayhanti, te pana purimakoṭṭhāse ‘‘suddhāvāsānaṃ dutiye citte vattamāne’’ti evaṃ dassitehi suddhāvāse anuppannābhisamayehi samānagatikāti visuṃ na dassitā. ‘‘Anabhisametāvīna’’nti gahitā ye sabbattha tattha ca anabhisametāvino, tesu suddhāvāsānaṃ gahaṇakālavisesanatthaṃ ‘‘suddhāvāsānaṃ dutiye citte vattamāne’’ti (yama. 1.saccayamaka.42) vuttanti.

“When the second consciousness of the Pure Abodes is occurring”—this is stated by way of the final delimitation, referring to those for whom the truth of suffering arose there, but not the truth of the origin. When that is shown, then, because they share the same destination, those endowed with all preceding consciousnesses from the second unwholesome consciousness are also indicated by that. For them too, the truth of suffering arose there, but not the truth of the origin. This being so, in the phrase “of these others, the four-constituent and five-constituent existences,” the Pure Abodes, as stated, are not included. Just as in the explanation of “For whom the truth of suffering arises in a certain place, for them the truth of the origin also arose there?” (Yam. 1.saccayamaka.61), by the very phrase “at the moment of the arising of rebirth-linking consciousness for the Pure Abodes” (Yam. 1.saccayamaka.61), those sharing the same destination, endowed with the arising moment of rebirth-linking consciousness, and those endowed with all preceding arising moments of consciousness from the second unwholesome consciousness, are indicated, and thus they are not included by “of these others”; so too should it be understood here. The phrase “of these others” is for specifying the five-constituent existences, not the four-constituent existences. For they [the four-constituent beings] are not previously mentioned beings to be excluded, unlike the five-constituent beings, from which the aforementioned beings of the Pure Abodes are excluded. By the conclusion, “For those who have attained, the truth of suffering and the truth of the path arose there” (Yam. 1.saccayamaka.41), individuals and locations are taken as mutually delimited. Thus, it should be understood that those who have attained are included by the phrase “those who have attained” in whichever location they are. Therefore, those who have attained in the sense-sphere, form-sphere, or formless-sphere and have been reborn in the form-sphere or formless-sphere—as long as attainment has not arisen there—are not included here. However, in the earlier section, with the statement “When the second consciousness of the Pure Abodes is occurring,” those in the Pure Abodes who have not yet attained, sharing the same destination, are not separately indicated. “Those who have not attained” includes those who have not attained anywhere and those who have not attained there. For them, the specific time for including the Pure Abodes is given by the statement “When the second consciousness of the Pure Abodes is occurring” (Yam. 1.saccayamaka.42).

Yassa cittassa anantarā aggamaggaṃ paṭilabhissantīti etena vodānacittasamaṅginā samānagatikā tato purimataracittasamaṅginopi yāva sabbantimataṇhāsampayuttacittasamaṅgī, tāva dassitāti veditabbā. Esa nayo aññesu evarūpesūti.

“After which consciousness they will attain the supreme path”—by this, it should be understood, are indicated those who share the same destination as one endowed with the purification consciousness (vodāna-citta), and even those endowed with earlier consciousnesses than that, up to those endowed with the very last consciousness associated with craving. This is the method in other similar cases.

Pavatte cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇeti āgataṭṭhāne paṭisandhicittassapi bhaṅgakkhaṇaggahaṇaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ, tathā ‘‘pavatte cittassa uppādakkhaṇe’’ti āgataṭṭhāne ca cuticittassapi uppādakkhaṇassāti. ‘‘Yassa dukkhasaccaṃ na nirujjhati, tassa samudayasaccaṃ na nirujjhissatī’’ti (yama. 1.saccayamaka.116) etassa vissajjane dvīsupi koṭṭhāsesu ‘‘arūpe maggassa ca phalassa ca bhaṅgakkhaṇe’’icceva (yama. 1.saccayamaka.116) vuttaṃ, na visesitaṃ. Kasmā? Ekassapi maggassa ca phalassa ca bhaṅgakkhaṇasamaṅgino ubhayakoṭṭhāsabhajanato. Yassa dukkhasaccaṃ na nirujjhatīti etena sanniṭṭhānena gahitesu hi arupe maggaphalabhaṅgakkhaṇasamaṅgīsu kesañci tiṇṇaṃ phalānaṃ dvinnañca maggānaṃ bhaṅgakkhaṇasamaṅgīnaṃ nirantaraṃ anuppādetvā antarantarā vipassanānikantiṃ bhavanikantiṃ uppādetvā ye uparimagge uppādessanti, tesaṃ samudayasaccaṃ nirujjhissatīti tesaṃyeva pana kesañci antarā taṇhaṃ anuppādetvā uparimaggauppādentānaṃ maggaphalabhaṅgakkhaṇasamaṅgīnaṃ samudayasaccaṃ na nirujjhissatīti. Sāmaññavacanenapi ca purimakoṭṭhāse vuccamānena pacchimakoṭṭhāse vakkhamāne vajjetvāva gahaṇaṃ hotīti dassitoyaṃ nayoti.

In the place where “at the moment of dissolution of consciousness in the course of life” occurs, the taking of the moment of dissolution of rebirth-linking consciousness should also be understood; similarly, in the place where “at the moment of arising of consciousness in the course of life” occurs, that of the moment of arising of death consciousness should also be understood. Regarding the statement, “For whom the truth of suffering does not cease, for them the truth of origin will not cease?” (Yam. 1, Saccayamaka.116), in its explanation, it is said in both sections: “At the moment of dissolution in the formless realm, for both the path and the fruit” (Yam. 1, Saccayamaka.116), without specification. Why? Because one endowed with the dissolution moment of even a single path or fruit belongs to both sections. For among those included by the conclusion “For whom the truth of suffering does not cease,” who are in the formless realm and are endowed with the dissolution moment of path and fruit: for some who are endowed with the dissolution moment of the three fruits and two paths, and who will generate higher paths not continuously, but by generating liking for insight and liking for existence intermittently, for them the truth of origin will cease. However, for some others among them who, without generating craving in between, proceed to generate higher paths, for those endowed with the dissolution moment of the path and fruit, the truth of origin will not cease. Furthermore, this method is shown: by a general statement made in the first section, the inclusion of cases is to be understood as excluding what will be stated in the latter section.

Pavattivāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Division on Occurrence is concluded.

3. Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā

3. Exposition of the Division on Full Understanding

165-170. Pariññāvāre [Pg.138]…pe… tissopettha pariññā labbhantīti ettheva visesanaṃ khandhayamakādīsu sabbakhandhādīnaṃ viya sabbasaccānaṃ apariññeyyatādassanatthaṃ sacchikaraṇabhāvanāvasena imassa vārassa appavattidassanatthañca. Dukkhassa pariññatthaṃ samudayassa ca pahānatthaṃ bhagavati brahmacariyaṃ vussatīti pariññāpahānaṃ saccesu dassetuṃ dukkhe tīraṇapariññā vuttā, na pahānapariññā. Samudaye ca pahānapariññā, na tīraṇapariññā. Ñātapariññā pana sādhāraṇāti ubhayattha vuttā. Maggañāṇañhi dukkhasamudayāni vibhāvetīti ñātapariññā ca hoti, dukkhatīraṇakiccānaṃ nipphādanato tīraṇapariññā ca, samudayassa appavattikaraṇatova pahānapariññā cāti tissopi pariññā maggakkhaṇe eva yojetabbāti.

165-170. In the Division on Full Understanding... here, the specification “all three kinds of full understanding are obtained” is for the purpose of showing that not all truths are subject to full understanding—just as in the Aggregate-Pairs, etc., not all aggregates, etc., are—and for the purpose of showing the non-occurrence of this division by way of realization and development. The holy life is lived under the Blessed One for the purpose of fully understanding suffering and abandoning its origin. To show full understanding and abandonment in relation to the truths, full understanding by penetration is stated for suffering, not full understanding by abandonment; and for the origin, full understanding by abandonment is stated, not full understanding by penetration. However, full understanding by knowledge is common to both and is stated in both places. For the knowledge of the path makes clear suffering and its origin—thus it is full understanding by knowledge. And because it accomplishes the function of penetrating suffering, it is full understanding by penetration, and because it causes the non-occurrence of the origin, it is full understanding by abandonment. Thus, all three types of full understanding should be connected with the moment of the path.

Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Division on Full Understanding is concluded.

Saccayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Pairs of Truths is concluded.

6. Saṅkhārayamakaṃ

6. The Pairs of Formations

1. Paṇṇattivāravaṇṇanā

1. Exposition of the Division on Designations

1. Khandhādayo viya pubbe avibhattā kāyasaṅkhārādayoti tesaṃ aviññātattā ‘‘assāsapassāsā kāyasaṅkhāro’’tiādinā (saṃ. ni. 4.348) tayo saṅkhāre vibhajati. Kāyassa saṅkhāroti paṭhame atthe sāmiatthe eva sāmivacanaṃ, dutiye atthe kattuatthe. Vaciyā saṅkhāroti kammatthe sāmivacanaṃ. Cittassa saṅkhāroti ca kattuattheyeva. So pana karaṇavacanassa atthoti katvā ‘‘karaṇatthe sāmivacanaṃ katvā’’ti vuttaṃ.

1. Just as the aggregates and so on were not previously distinguished, so too the bodily formations and so on. Because they were not understood, it analyzes the three formations as “in-breath and out-breath are the bodily formation,” and so on (Saṃ. Ni. 4.348). “Formation of the body”: in the first meaning, the genitive is indeed in the sense of the possessor; in the second meaning, in the sense of the agent. “Formation of speech”: the genitive is in the sense of the object. And “formation of the mind” is indeed in the sense of the agent. But since this has the meaning of the instrumental case, it is said, “taking the genitive in the sense of the instrument.”

2-7. Suddhikaekekapadavasena atthābhāvatoti padasodhanataṃmūlakacakkavārehi yopi attho dassito dvīhi padehi labbhamāno eko assāsapassāsādiko, tassa suddhikehi kāyādipadehi suddhikena [Pg.139] ca saṅkhārapadena avacanīyattā yathā rūpapadassa khandhekadeso khandhapadassa khandhasamudāyo padasodhane dassito yathādhippeto attho atthi, evaṃ ekekapadassa yathādhippetatthābhāvatoti adhippāyo. Kāyo kāyasaṅkhārotiādi pana vattabbaṃ siyāti yadi visuṃ adīpetvā samudito kāyasaṅkhārasaddo ekattha dīpeti, kāyasaṅkhārasaddo kāyasaṅkhāratthe vattamāno khandhasaddo viya rūpasaddena kāyasaddena visesitabboti adhippāyena vadati. Suddhasaṅkhāravāro hesāti etena imassa vārassa padasodhanena dassitānaṃ yathādhippetānameva gahaṇato tesañca kāyādipadehi aggahitattā ‘‘kāyo kāyasaṅkhāro’’tiādivacanassa ayuttiṃ dasseti. Idha pana saṅkhārayamake kāyādipadānaṃ saṅkhārapadassa ca asamānādhikaraṇattā ‘‘kāyo saṅkhāro, saṅkhārā kāyo’’tiādimhi vuccamāne adhippetatthapariccāgo anadhippetatthapariggaho ca kato siyāti suddhasaṅkhārataṃmūlacakkavārā na vuttā. Padasodhanavārataṃmūlacakkavārehi pana asamānādhikaraṇehi kāyādipadehi saṅkhārasaddassa visesanīyatāya dassitāya saṃsayo hoti ‘‘yo atthantarappavattinā kāyasaddena visesito kāyasaṅkhāro, eso atthantarappavattīhi vacīcittehi visesito udāhu añño’’ti. Evaṃ sesesupi. Ettha tesaṃ aññattha dassanatthaṃ ‘‘kāyasaṅkhāro vacīsaṅkhāro’’tiādinā anulomapaṭilomavasena cha yamakāni vuttānīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana suddhasaṅkhāravāraṭṭhāne vuttattā ayaṃ nayo suddhasaṅkhāravāroti vutto.

2-7. 'Due to the absence of meaning by way of a single, pure word': By the root cycles of word-analysis, whatever meaning is shown, obtainable by two words, such as the single phenomenon of in-and-out-breathing, cannot be expressed by the pure words 'body,' etc., nor by the pure word 'formation.' Just as in word-analysis, for the word 'form' a part of an aggregate is shown, and for the word 'aggregate' a collection of aggregates is shown, and the intended meaning exists, so the intention is that for a single word there is an absence of the intended meaning. However, it might be said, 'The body is a bodily formation,' etc. If the compound word 'bodily formation' indicates a single meaning without being explained separately, he says with the intention that the word 'bodily formation', when occurring in the sense of 'bodily formation', should be qualified by the word 'form' or the word 'body', like the word 'aggregate' is by the word 'form'. 'For this is the section on pure formations': by this, he shows the unsuitability of the statement 'the body is a bodily formation,' because in this section, only the intended meanings shown by word-analysis are grasped, and those are not grasped by the words 'body,' etc. Here, however, in the Yamaka on Formations, since the words 'body,' etc., and the word 'formation' do not have a common referent, if it were said, 'The body is a formation; formations are the body,' etc., the intended meaning would be abandoned and an unintended meaning would be adopted. Therefore, the root cycles based on pure formations are not stated. But by the root cycles of the section on word-analysis, since it has been shown that the word 'formation' is to be qualified by words like 'body,' etc., which have different referents, a doubt arises: 'Is the bodily formation, which is qualified by the word 'body' that has a different meaning, also qualified by 'speech' and 'mind' which have different meanings, or is it something else?' And so for the rest. Here, to show their meaning elsewhere, six pairs are stated in forward and reverse order, such as, 'Bodily formation, verbal formation,' etc. This should be understood. In the commentary, however, since this method is stated in the section on pure formations, it is called the section on pure formations.

Paṇṇattivāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Division on Designations is concluded.

2. Pavattivāravaṇṇanā

2. Exposition of the Division on Occurrence

19. Pavattivāre saṅkhārānaṃ puggalānañca okāsattā jhānaṃ bhūmi ca visuṃ okāsabhāvena gahitāti puggalavāre ca okāsavasena puggalaggahaṇena tesaṃ dvinnaṃ okāsānaṃ vasena gahaṇaṃ hoti, tasmā ‘‘vinā vitakkavicārehi assāsapassāsānaṃ uppādakkhaṇe’’ti dutiyatatiyajjhānokāsavasena gahitā puggalā visesetvā dassitāti daṭṭhabbā[Pg.140]. Puna paṭhamajjhānaṃ samāpannānanti jhānokāsavasena puggalaṃ dasseti, kāmāvacarānanti bhūmokāsavasena. Dvippakārānampi pana tesaṃ visesanatthamāha ‘‘assāsapassāsānaṃ uppādakkhaṇe’’ti. Tena rūpārūpāvacaresu paṭhamajjhānasamāpannake kāmāvacare gabbhagatādike ca nivatteti. Kāmāvacarānampi hi gabbhagatādīnaṃ vinā assāsapassāsehi vitakkavicārānaṃ uppatti atthi. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana ekantikattā rūpārūpāvacarā nidassitā. Vinā assāsapassāsehi vitakkavicārānaṃ uppādakkhaṇeti etena pana dassitā puggalā paṭhamajjhānokāsā kāmāvacarādiokāsā ca assāsapassāsavirahavisiṭṭhā daṭṭhabbā. Iminā nayena sabbattha puggalavibhāgo veditabbo.

19. In the Division on Occurrence, because formations and individuals have an occasion, jhāna and plane are grasped separately by their nature as occasions. Thus, in the division on individuals, by the grasping of individuals in terms of occasion, there is a grasping in terms of these two occasions. Therefore, it should be understood that the individuals grasped by way of the occasion of the second and third jhānas, 'at the moment of the arising of in-and-out breaths without initial and sustained thought,' are distinguished and shown. Again, 'those who have attained the first jhāna' shows an individual in terms of the jhāna-occasion, while 'those of the sense-sphere' shows them in terms of the plane-occasion. But to distinguish these two kinds, he says, 'at the moment of the arising of in-and-out breaths.' By this, he excludes those who have attained the first jhāna in the form and formless realms, as well as those in the sense-sphere such as those in the womb. For even for those of the sense-sphere, such as those in the womb, there is the arising of initial and sustained thought without in-and-out breaths. In the commentary, however, those of the form and formless realms are indicated because they are definitive. By this, 'at the moment of the arising of initial and sustained thought without in-and-out breaths,' it should be understood that the individuals shown—those of the first jhāna-occasion and the sense-sphere-occasion, etc.—are distinguished by the absence of in-and-out breaths. In this way, the classification of individuals should be understood everywhere.

21. ‘‘Paṭhamajjhāne kāmāvacareti kāmāvacarabhūmiyaṃ uppanne paṭhamajjhāne’’ti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaṃ, etasmiṃ pana atthe sati ‘‘catutthajjhāne rūpāvacare arūpāvacare tattha cittasaṅkhāro uppajjati, no ca tattha kāyasaṅkhāro uppajjatī’’ti etthāpi rūpārūpāvacarabhūmīsu uppanne catutthajjhāneti attho bhaveyya, so ca aniṭṭho bhūmīnaṃ okāsabhāvasseva aggahitatāpattito, sabbacatutthajjhānassa okāsavasena aggahitatāpattito ca, tasmā jhānabhūmokāsānaṃ saṅkaraṃ akatvā visuṃ eva okāsabhāvo yojetabbo. Paṭhamajjhānokāsepi hi kāyasaṅkhāro ca uppajjati vacīsaṅkhāro ca uppajjati kāmāvacarokāse ca. Yadipi na sabbamhi paṭhamajjhāne sabbamhi ca kāmāvacare dvayaṃ uppajjati, tattha pana taṃdvayuppatti atthīti katvā evaṃ vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Visuṃ okāsattā ca ‘‘aṅgamattavasena cetthā’’tiādivacanaṃ na vattabbaṃ hotīti. Imamhi ca yamake avitakkavicāramattaṃ dutiyajjhānaṃ vicāravasena paṭhamajjhāne saṅgahaṃ gacchatīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Muddhabhūtaṃ dutiyajjhānaṃ gahetvā itaraṃ asaṅgahitanti vā. Yassayatthake ‘‘nirodhasamāpannāna’’nti na labbhati. Na hi te asaññasattā viya okāse hontīti.

21. In the commentary it is said, 'The first jhāna in the sense-sphere means the first jhāna that has arisen in the sense-sphere plane.' However, if this were the meaning, then in the statement, 'In the fourth jhāna in the form realm and formless realm, mental formation arises there, but bodily formation does not arise there,' the meaning would also be 'in the fourth jhāna that has arisen in the form and formless planes.' But this is undesirable, because it would lead to the non-grasping of the planes' nature as an occasion, and to the non-grasping of the entire fourth jhāna by way of occasion. Therefore, without confusing the occasions of jhāna and plane, their nature as an occasion should be applied separately. For in the occasion of the first jhāna both bodily formation and verbal formation arise, and they also arise in the occasion of the sense-sphere. Although it is not that both arise in every first jhāna and in every sense-sphere, it should be understood that it is stated thus because the arising of both is possible there. And because they are separate occasions, the statement 'and here only by way of a factor' should not be made. And in this Yamaka, it should be understood that the second jhāna, which is merely without initial thought but with sustained thought, is included in the first jhāna by way of sustained thought. Or, having taken the principal second jhāna, the other is not included. In this Yamaka, 'for those who have attained cessation' is not obtained, for they do not exist in an occasion like the non-percipient beings.

37. Suddhāvāsānaṃ dutiye citte vattamāneti tesaṃ paṭhamato avitakkaavicārato dutiye savitakkasavicārepi bhavanikantiāvajjane vattamāne ubhayaṃ nuppajjitthāti dassentena tato purimacittakkhaṇesupi nuppajjitthāti [Pg.141] dassitameva hoti. Yathā pana cittasaṅkhārassa ādidassanatthaṃ ‘‘suddhāvāsaṃ upapajjantāna’’nti vuttaṃ, evaṃ vacīsaṅkhārassa ādidassanatthaṃ ‘‘dutiye citte vattamāne’’ti vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

37. When it is said, 'For the Suddhāvāsa beings, when the second consciousness is occurring': by showing that for them—whose first consciousness is without initial and sustained thought, and whose second, the advertence of delight in existence, is with initial and sustained thought—neither bodily nor verbal formation arose, it is thereby shown that they did not arise in the preceding moments of consciousness either. Just as 'for those being reborn in the Suddhāvāsa' is stated to show the beginning of mental formation, so 'when the second consciousness is occurring' is stated to show the beginning of verbal formation; this should be understood.

Pavattivāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Division on Occurrence is concluded.

Saṅkhārayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Yamaka on Formations is concluded.

7. Anusayayamakaṃ

7. The Yamaka on Underlying Tendencies

Paricchedaparicchinnuddesavāravaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Section on the Indication of the Defined and the Definition

1. Paccayapariggahapariyosānā ñātapariññāti paccayadīpakena mūlayamakena ñātapariññaṃ, khandhādīsu tīraṇabāhullato khandhādiyamakehi tīraṇapariññañca vibhāvetvā anusayapahānantā pahānapariññāti pahātabbamuddhabhūtehi anusayehi pahānapariññaṃ vibhāvetuṃ anusayayamakaṃ āraddhaṃ. Labbhamānavasenāti anusayabhāvena labbhamānānaṃ vasenāti attho. Tīhākārehi anusayānaṃ gāhāpanaṃ tesu tathā aggahitesu anusayavārādipāḷiyā duravabodhattā.

1. Full understanding of the known culminates in the comprehension of conditions; having elucidated the full understanding of the known by means of the root-yamaka that illuminates conditions, and having elucidated the full understanding by investigation by means of the yamakas on the aggregates and so on, due to the abundance of investigation into the aggregates, etc.; and since the full understanding by abandonment culminates in the abandonment of the underlying tendencies, the Yamaka on Underlying Tendencies has been commenced to elucidate the full understanding by abandonment by means of the underlying tendencies, which are the foremost things to be abandoned. 'By way of being obtainable' means by way of those that are obtainable in the state of underlying tendencies. The underlying tendencies are made to be grasped in three aspects because, if they are not grasped in that way, the Pāḷi text beginning with the section on underlying tendencies is difficult to comprehend.

Ayaṃ panettha purimesūti etesu sānusayavārādīsu purimesūti attho. Atthavisesābhāvato ‘‘kāmadhātuṃ vā pana upapajjantassa kāmadhātuyā cutassa, rūpadhātuṃ vā pana upapajjantassa kāmadhātuyā cutassā’’ti evamādīhi avuccamāne kathamayaṃ yamakadesanā siyāti? Nāyaṃ yamakadesanā, purimavārehi pana yamakavasena desitānaṃ anusayānaṃ cutiupapattivasena anusayaṭṭhānaparicchedadassanaṃ. Yamakadesanābāhullato pana sabbavārasamudāyassa anusayayamakanti nāmaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Atha vā paṭilomapucchāpi atthavasena labbhanti, atthavisesābhāvato pana na vuttāti labbhamānatāvasena etissāpi desanāya yamakadesanatā veditabbā.

Here, the meaning of ‘in the former’ (purimesu) is ‘in the former among these sections beginning with the section on underlying tendencies.’ Since there is no difference in meaning, how could this exposition in pairs (yamaka) be possible if phrases like “for one being reborn in the sense-sphere or passing away from the sense-sphere, or for one being reborn in the form-sphere or passing away from the sense-sphere” were not stated? This is not in itself an exposition in pairs, but rather a demonstration of the delimitation of the bases of underlying tendencies—which were taught in the former sections in the manner of pairs—by way of passing away and rebirth. However, due to the abundance of expositions in pairs, the entire collection of sections should be regarded as the Yamaka on Underlying Tendencies. Alternatively, reverse questions are also obtained in terms of the meaning. However, because there is no difference in meaning, they are not explicitly stated; thus, by the very fact that they can be obtained, this exposition too should be understood as an exposition in pairs.

Anurūpaṃ kāraṇaṃ labhitvā uppajjantīti etena kāraṇalābhe uppattiarahataṃ dasseti. Appahīnā hi anusayā kāraṇalābhe sati uppajjanti. Yāva ca maggena tesaṃ anuppattiarahatā na katā hoti, tāva [Pg.142] te evaṃpakārā evāti ‘‘anusayā’’ti vuccanti. So evaṃpakāro uppajjati-saddena gahito, na khandhayamakādīsu viya uppajjamānatā. Teneva ‘‘yassa kāmarāgānusayo uppajjati, tassa paṭighānusayo uppajjatīti? Āmantā’’tiādinā uppajjanavāro anusayavārena ninnānākaraṇo vibhatto. Anurūpaṃ kāraṇaṃ pana labhitvā ye uppajjiṃsu uppajjamānā ca, tepi appahīnaṭṭhena thāmagatā ahesuṃ bhavanti ca. Uppattiarahatāya eva ca te uppajjiṃsu uppajjanti ca, na ca atītānāgatapaccuppannato aññe uppattiarahā nāma atthi, tasmā sabbe atītānāgatapaccuppannā kāmarāgādayo ‘‘anusayā’’ti vuccanti. Appahīnaṭṭheneva hi anusayā, appahīnā ca atītādayo eva, maggassa pana tādisānaṃ anuppattiarahatāpādanena anusayappahānaṃ hotīti. Appahīnākāro nāma dhammākāro, na dhammo, dhammo eva ca uppajjatīti iminā adhippāyenāha ‘‘appahīnākāro ca uppajjatīti vattuṃ na yujjatī’’ti. Sattānusayāti ettha yadi appahīnaṭṭhena santāne anusentīti anusayā, atha kasmā satteva vuttā, nanu sattānusayato aññesampi kilesānaṃ appahīnattā anusayabhāvo āpajjatīti ce? Nāpajjati, appahīnamattasseva anusayabhāvassa avuttattā. Vuttañhi ‘‘anusayoti pana appahīnaṭṭhena thāmagatakileso vuccatī’’ti (yama. aṭṭha. anusayayamaka 1), tasmā appahīnaṭṭhena thāmagato kilesoyeva anusayo nāmāti yuttaṃ. Thāmagatanti ca aññehi asādhāraṇo sabhāvo daṭṭhabbo. Tathā hi dhammasabhāvabodhinā tathāgatena imeyeva ‘‘anusayā’’ti vuttā. Thāmagatoti anusayasamaṅgīti attho.

By this, ‘having obtained a suitable cause, they arise,’ it shows their capability of arising when a cause is obtained. For underlying tendencies, when not abandoned, arise when a cause is obtained. And as long as their incapability of arising has not been brought about by the path, they remain of such a nature—hence they are called ‘underlying tendencies.’ That nature is understood by the term ‘arises,’ not as the state of arising as in the Khandhayamaka and so forth. For this reason, by such statements as, ‘For one in whom the underlying tendency of sensual desire arises, does the underlying tendency of aversion also arise? Yes,’ the section on arising is analyzed without being differentiated from the section on underlying tendencies. Those that have arisen or are arising upon obtaining a suitable cause—they too, by the fact of not being abandoned, have become firmly established and continue to be so. They arose and arise precisely because they are capable of arising, and there are no others capable of arising apart from past, future, and present. Thus, all past, future, and present instances of sensual desire and the like are called ‘underlying tendencies.’ For it is by the fact of not being abandoned that they are underlying tendencies, and it is only the unabandoned past, future, and present that are such. The path, however, brings about their incapability of arising, thereby abandoning the underlying tendencies. The aspect of not being abandoned is a characteristic of a phenomenon, not the phenomenon itself. Yet the phenomenon itself does arise—with this meaning, it is said: ‘It is not correct to say that the aspect of not being abandoned arises.’ As for the ‘seven underlying tendencies’—if underlying tendencies are so called because they lie latent in the continuum by not being abandoned, then why are only seven mentioned? Should not other defilements, by not being abandoned, also qualify as underlying tendencies? They do not, because the mere fact of not being abandoned is not stated as sufficient for being an underlying tendency. For it is said: ‘An underlying tendency is a defilement that is firmly established by not being abandoned.’ Thus, it is proper that only a defilement firmly established by not being abandoned is called an underlying tendency. ‘Firmly established’ should be understood as a unique characteristic not shared by others. Indeed, the Tathāgata, who understands the true nature of phenomena, declared only these as ‘underlying tendencies.’ ‘Firmly established’ means one endowed with an underlying tendency; this is the meaning.

Anusayauppajjanavārānaṃ samānagatikattā yathā ‘‘anusetī’’ti vacanaṃ appahīnākāradīpakaṃ, evaṃ ‘‘uppajjatī’’ti vacanaṃ siyāti uppajjanavārena ‘‘uppajjatī’’ti vacanassa avuttatā sakkā vattunti ce? Taṃ na, vacanatthavisesena taṃdvayassa vuttattā. ‘‘Anurūpaṃ kāraṇaṃ labhitvā uppajjatī’’ti hi etasmiṃ atthe avisiṭṭhepi ‘‘anusetī’’ti vacanaṃ santāne anusayitataṃ thāmagatabhāvaṃ dīpeti. Yadi tameva ‘‘uppajjatī’’ti vacanaṃ dīpeyya, kassaci visesassa abhāvā uppajjanavāro na vattabbo siyā, ‘‘uppajjatī’’ti vacanaṃ pana uppattiyoggaṃ dīpeti. Kasmā? Uppajjanavārena uppattiyoggassa [Pg.143] dassitattā, anusayasaddassa sabbadā vijjamānānaṃ aparinipphannasayanatthatāya nivāraṇatthaṃ uppattiarahatāya thāmagatabhāvasaṅkhātassa yathādhippetasayanatthassa dassanatthaṃ ‘‘anusentīti anurūpaṃ kāraṇaṃ labhitvā uppajjantī’’ti yaṃ uppattiyoggavacanaṃ vuttaṃ, taṃ suvuttamevāti adhippāyo. Tampi suvuttameva iminā tantippamāṇenāti sambandho. Tantittayenapi hi cittasampayuttatā dīpitā hoti.

Should it be said that because the sections on underlying tendencies and on arising have the same course, just as the term ‘lies latent’ indicates the aspect of not being abandoned, so too might the term ‘arises,’ and that therefore the term ‘arises’ is not stated with a distinct meaning in the section on arising? That is not so, because the two are expressed with distinction by the meaning of their terms. For in this context, even if no distinction were made in the meaning of ‘having obtained a suitable cause, it arises,’ the term ‘lies latent’ reveals the state of being firmly established as an underlying tendency in the continuum. If the term ‘arises’ were to indicate the very same thing, then, due to the absence of any distinction, the section on arising should not be stated. However, the term ‘arises’ indicates the potential for arising. Why? Because the potential for arising is demonstrated by the section on arising. The statement ‘they lie latent’ (anusenti) means ‘having obtained a suitable cause, they arise’ (anurūpaṃ kāraṇaṃ labhitvā uppajjanti). This statement, which refers to the potential for arising, is well-stated. This is the intended meaning, for it is stated to prevent the misunderstanding that the term ‘underlying tendency’ refers to those always existing in a state of unmanifest latency, and to show the intended meaning of ‘lying latent’ as being characterized by the state of being firmly established due to the capability of arising. The connection is that this too is well-stated according to the authority of this text. For even by the threefold textual method, association with consciousness is revealed.

Paricchedaparicchinnuddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section on the Enumeration of the Defined and the Definition is concluded.

Uppattiṭṭhānavāravaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Section on the Grounds of Arising

2. Kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsūti kāmāvacarabhūmiyaṃ sukhāya ca upekkhāya cāti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ kāmadhātuggahaṇaṃ dvinnaṃ vedanānaṃ visesanabhāvena vuttaṃ, evaṃ sati kāmadhātuyā kāmarāgānusayassa anusayaṭṭhānatā na vuttā hoti. Dvīsu pana rāgesu bhavarāgassa tīsu dhātūsu rūpārūpadhātūnaṃ anusayaṭṭhānatā vuttāti kāmadhātuyā kāmarāgassa anusayaṭṭhānatā vattabbā. Dhātuvedanāsabbasakkāyapariyāpannavasena hi tippakāraṃ anusayānaṃ anusayaṭṭhānaṃ vuttanti. Tasmā tīsu dhātūsu kāmadhātuyā tīsu vedanāsu dvīsu vedanāsu ettha kāmarāgānusayo anusetīti visuṃ anusayaṭṭhānatā dhātuyā vedanānañca yojetabbā. Dvīsu vedanāsūti idañca vedanāsu anusayamāno kāmarāgānusayo dvīsveva anuseti, na tīsūti tiṇṇampi ṭhānatānivāraṇatthameva vuttanti na sabbāsu dvīsu anusayanappatto atthi, tena vedanāvisesanatthaṃ na kāmadhātuggahaṇena koci attho. Bhavarāgānusayanaṭṭhānañhi aṭṭhānañca anusayānaṃ apariyāpannaṃ sakkāye kāmarāgānusayassa anusayaṭṭhānaṃ na hotīti pākaṭametaṃ. Yathā ca ‘‘dvīsu vedanāsū’’ti vutte paṭighānusayānusayaṭṭhānato aññā dve vedanā gayhanti, evaṃ bhavarāgānusayānusayanaṭṭhānato ca aññā tā gayhantīti.

2. “In the sense-sphere realm, in two feelings” means in the sense-sphere plane, in pleasant and in neutral feeling. In the commentary, the taking up of the sense-sphere realm is stated as a specification of the two feelings. If this is so, then the sense-sphere realm as a ground for the underlying tendency of sensual lust is not stated. However, of the two lusts, for the lust for existence, the form and formless realms among the three realms are stated as its ground; therefore, the sense-sphere realm should be stated as the ground for the lust for sensual pleasure. For the ground for underlying tendencies is stated in three ways: by way of realm, of feeling, and of all that is included in the totality of one's own existence. Therefore, the status as a ground for an underlying tendency should be connected separately to the realm and to the feelings, thus: ‘Among the three realms, in the sense-sphere realm; among the three feelings, in two feelings—here the underlying tendency of sensual lust lies latent.’ The phrase “in two feelings” is stated merely to preclude it being a ground in all three feelings, meaning that the underlying tendency of sensual lust, when lying latent in feelings, lies latent in only two, not three. It does not mean that it applies to all instances of two feelings; therefore, there is no purpose in taking up the sense-sphere realm for the sake of specifying the feelings. Indeed, it is clear that the ground for the underlying tendency of lust for existence—which is also not a ground for the other tendencies and is not included in the totality of one's own existence—is not the ground for the underlying tendency of sensual lust. And just as when “in two feelings” is stated, two feelings other than the ground for the underlying tendency of aversion are understood, so too, they are understood as other than the ground for the underlying tendency of lust for existence.

Ettha ca dvīhi vedanāhi sampayuttesu aññesu ca piyarūpasātarūpesu iṭṭharūpādīsu uppajjamāno kāmarāgānusayo sātasantasukhagiddhiyā pavattatīti dvīsu vedanāsu tassa anusayanaṃ vuttaṃ. Aññattha uppajjamānopi [Pg.144] hi so imāsu dvīsu vedanāsu anugato hutvā seti sukhamicceva abhilabhatīti. Evaṃ paṭighānusayo ca dukkhavedanāsampayuttesu aññesu ca appiyarūpāsātarūpesu aniṭṭharūpādīsu uppajjamāno dukkhapaṭikūlato dukkhamicceva paṭihaññatīti dukkhavedanameva anugato hutvā seti, tena pana tasmiṃ anusayanaṃ vuttaṃ. Evaṃ kāmarāgapaṭighānaṃ tīsu vedanāsu anusayavacanena iṭṭhaiṭṭhamajjhattaaniṭṭhesu ārammaṇapakatiyā viparītasaññāya ca vasena iṭṭhādibhāvena gahitesu kāmarāgapaṭighānaṃ uppatti dassitā hoti. Tattha uppajjamānā hi te tīsu vedanāsu anusenti nāma. Vedanāttayamukhena vā ettha iṭṭhādīnaṃ ārammaṇānaṃ gahaṇaṃ veditabbaṃ, kāmadhātuādiggahaṇena kāmassādādivatthubhūtānaṃ kāmabhavādīnaṃ. Tattha kāmarāgānusayo bhavassādavasena anusayamāno kāmadhātuyā anuseti, kāmasukhassādavasena anusayamāno sukhopekkhāvedanāsu. Paṭigho dukkhapaṭighātavaseneva pavattatīti yattha tattha paṭihaññamānopi dukkhavedanāya eva anuseti. Rūpārūpabhavesu pana rūpārūpāvacaradhammesu ca kāmassādassa pavatti natthīti tattha anusayamāno rāgo bhavarāgoicceva veditabbo. Dhātuttayavedanāttayaggahaṇena ca sabbasakkāyapariyāpannānaṃ gahitattā ‘‘yattha kāmarāgānusayo nānuseti, tattha diṭṭhānusayo nānusetī’’ti (yama. 2.anusayayamaka.46) evamādīnaṃ vissajjanesu dhātuttayavedanāttayavinimuttaṃ diṭṭhānusayādīnaṃ anusayaṭṭhānaṃ na vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Nanu ca anuttaresu vimokkhesu pihaṃ upaṭṭhāpayato pihapaccayā uppannadomanasse paṭighānusayo nānuseti, tathā nekkhammassitasomanassupekkhāsu kāmarāgena nānusayitabbanti tadanusayanaṭṭhānato aññāpi diṭṭhānusayānusayanaṭṭhānabhūtā kāmāvacaravedanā santīti? Hontu, na pana dhātuttayavedanāttayato aññaṃ tadanusayanaṭṭhānaṃ atthi, tasmā taṃ na vuttaṃ. Yasmā pana ‘‘yattha kāmarāgānusayo ca paṭighānusayo ca mānānusayo ca nānusenti, tattha diṭṭhānusayo vicikicchānusayo nānusetīti? Āmantā’’ti (yama. 2.anusayayamaka.52) vuttaṃ, tasmā avisesena dukkhaṃ paṭighānusayassa anusayanaṭṭhānanti samudāyavasena gahetvā vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Tathā lokiyasukhopekkhā kāmarāgamānānusayanaṭṭhānanti.

Here, the latent tendency of sensual lust, arising in connection with two feelings and other agreeable and pleasing forms, desirable forms, etc., operates due to greed for what is pleasant and happy; thus, its latency is spoken of in relation to two feelings. Even when arising elsewhere, it lies latent by following these two feelings, as it seeks only pleasure. Similarly, the latent tendency of aversion, arising in connection with painful feeling and other disagreeable and unpleasing forms, undesirable forms, etc., is repelled by suffering itself out of aversion to suffering; thus, it lies latent by following only painful feeling, and so its latency is spoken of in relation to it. In this way, by the statement of their latency in the three feelings, the arising of sensual lust and aversion is shown in objects taken as desirable, neutral, and undesirable, by way of the nature of the object and perverted perception. For when they arise therein, they are indeed said to lie latent in the three feelings. Alternatively, the grasping of desirable, etc., objects should be understood here through the gateway of the triad of feelings; and the grasping of sensual existence, etc., which are the basis of sensual enjoyment, etc., through the mention of the Kāmadhātu, etc. Therein, the latent tendency of sensual lust, when lying latent by way of attachment to the pleasure of existence, lies latent in the Kāmadhātu; when lying latent by way of attachment to sensual pleasure, it lies latent in pleasant and equanimous feelings. Aversion, however, operates solely by way of resistance to suffering; thus, wherever it recoils, it lies latent only in painful feeling. But in the form and formless existences, and in phenomena of the form and formless spheres, since the enjoyment of sensual pleasures does not occur, the lust that lies latent there should be understood simply as craving for existence. Moreover, since the three realms and three feelings encompass all that is included in personal existence, it should be noted that in the answers to questions such as, “Where the latent tendency of sensual lust does not lie latent, does the latent tendency of views not lie latent there?,” etc., a ground for the latency of views, etc., apart from the three realms and three feelings is not mentioned. Is it not so that the latent tendency of aversion does not lie latent in the displeasure conditioned by yearning for the supreme liberations? And that sensual lust should not lie latent in joy and equanimity connected with renunciation? Therefore, are there not sensual-sphere feelings that are grounds for the latency of the latent tendency of views, etc., which are other than those grounds of latency? Let them be so. But there is no other ground for their latency apart from the three realms and three feelings; therefore, it is not mentioned. However, since it is said, “Where the latent tendencies of sensual lust, aversion, and conceit do not lie latent, do the latent tendencies of views and doubt not lie latent there? Yes,” it should be understood that suffering in general is stated as the ground for the latency of aversion, being taken collectively. Similarly, worldly pleasant and equanimous feelings are the grounds for the latency of sensual lust and conceit.

Apica [Pg.145] sutte ‘‘idhāvuso visākha, bhikkhu iti paṭisañcikkhati ‘kudāssu nāmāhaṃ domanassaṃ pajaheyya’nti, so iti paṭisañcikkhitvā paṭighaṃ tena pajahati, na tattha paṭighānusayo anusetī’’ti nekkhammassitaṃ domanassaṃ uppādetvā taṃ vikkhambhetvā vīriyaṃ katvā anāgāmimaggena paṭighassa samugghātanaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Na hi paṭigheneva paṭighappahānaṃ, domanassena vā domanassappahānaṃ atthīti. Paṭighuppattirahaṭṭhānatāya pana idha sabbaṃ dukkhaṃ ‘‘paṭighānusayassa anusayanaṭṭhāna’’nti vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Nippariyāyadesanā hesā, sā pana pariyāyadesanā. Evañca katvā paṭhamajjhānavikkhambhitaṃ kāmarāgānusayaṃ tathā vikkhambhitameva katvā anāgāmimaggena samugghātanaṃ sandhāya ‘‘vivicceva…pe… paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati, rāgaṃ tena pajahati, na tattha rāgānusayo anusetī’’ti vuttaṃ. Evaṃ catutthajjhānavikkhambhitaṃ avijjānusayaṃ tathā vikkhambhitameva katvā arahattamaggena samugghātanaṃ sandhāya ‘‘sukhassa ca pahānā…pe… catutthaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati, avijjaṃ tena pajahati, na tattha avijjānusayo anusetī’’ti (ma. ni. 1.465) vuttaṃ. Na hi lokiyacatutthajjhānupekkhāya avijjānusayo sabbathā nānusetīti sakkā vattuṃ ‘‘sabbasakkāyapariyāpannesu dhammesu ettha avijjānusayo anusetī’’ti (yama. aṭṭha. anusayayamaka 2) vuttattā, tasmā avijjānusayasseva vatthu catutthajjhānupekkhā, nekkhammassitadomanassañca paṭighānusayassa vatthu na na hotīti tatthāpi tassa anusayanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Avatthubhāvato hi idha anusayanaṃ na vuccati, na suttantesu viya vuttanayena taṃpaṭipakkhabhāvato taṃsamugghātakamaggassa balavūpanissayabhāvato cāti.

Moreover, in the Sutta, it is said: “Here, friend Visākha, a monk reflects thus: ‘When indeed shall I abandon distress?’ Reflecting thus, he abandons aversion; the latent tendency of aversion does not lie latent there.” This is said with reference to uprooting aversion through the path of the non-returner by generating distress connected with renunciation, suppressing it, and making an effort. For it is not by aversion that aversion is abandoned, nor by distress that distress is abandoned. But here, all suffering should be seen as stated to be “the ground for the latency of aversion” because it is a place where aversion can arise. This is a teaching of direct meaning, whereas that is a teaching requiring interpretation. And in the same way, with reference to uprooting the latent tendency of sensual lust—suppressed by the first jhāna—by the path of the non-returner after having suppressed it in that way, it is said: “Quite secluded… he enters and dwells in the first jhāna. He abandons lust; the latent tendency of lust does not lie latent there.” Similarly, with reference to uprooting the latent tendency of ignorance—suppressed by the fourth jhāna—by the path of the arahant after having suppressed it in that way, it is said: “With the abandoning of pleasure… he enters and dwells in the fourth jhāna. He abandons ignorance; the latent tendency of ignorance does not lie latent there.” For it cannot be said that the latent tendency of ignorance does not lie latent at all in the equanimity of the mundane fourth jhāna, because it is said: “The latent tendency of ignorance lies latent in all phenomena included in personal existence.” Therefore, the equanimity of the fourth jhāna is indeed a basis for the latent tendency of ignorance, and distress connected with renunciation is indeed a basis for the latent tendency of aversion; thus its latency should be understood there too. For here, in this system, non-latency is spoken of because of the absence of a basis, not as in the Suttas where it is spoken of in the stated manner because of its being the opposite of that defilement and because of its being a strong support for the path that uproots it.

Ettha ca ārammaṇe anusayaṭṭhāne sati bhavarāgavajjo sabbo lobho kāmarāgānusayoti na sakkā vattuṃ. Dukkhāya hi vedanāya rūpārūpadhātūsu ca anusayamānena diṭṭhānusayena sampayuttopi lobho lobho eva, na kāmarāgānusayo. Yadi siyā, diṭṭhānusayassa viya etassapi ṭhānaṃ vattabbaṃ siyāti. Atha pana ajjhāsayavasena tanninnatāya anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ vuttaṃ. Yathā iṭṭhānaṃ rūpādīnaṃ sukhāya ca vedanāya appaṭiladdhaṃ vā appaṭilābhato samanupassato, paṭiladdhapubbaṃ vā atītaṃ niruddhaṃ vigataṃ pariṇataṃ samanupassato uppajjamāno paṭigho dukkhe paṭihaññanavaseneva pavattatīti dukkhameva tassa anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ vuttaṃ, nālambitaṃ, evaṃ dukkhādīsu abhinivesanavasena [Pg.146] uppajjamānena diṭṭhānusayena sampayuttopi lobho sukhābhisaṅgavaseneva pavattatīti sātasantasukhadvayamevassa anusayaṭṭhānaṃ vuttanti bhavarāgavajjassa sabbalobhassa kāmarāgānusayatā na virujjhati, ekasmiṃyeva ca ārammaṇe rajjanti dussanti ca. Tattha rāgo sukhajjhāsayo paṭigho dukkhajjhāsayoti tesaṃ nānānusayaṭṭhānatā hoti.

Here, when there is an object that is a ground for latency, it cannot be said that all greed, except for craving for existence, is the latent tendency of sensual lust. For greed associated with the latent tendency of views, which lies latent in painful feeling and in the form and formless realms, is just greed, not the latent tendency of sensual lust. If it were so, its ground would have to be stated, just like that of the latent tendency of views. However, the ground for latency is stated according to disposition and inclination. For example, aversion arises for one who reflects on not having obtained desirable forms, etc., and pleasant feeling, or who reflects on what was formerly obtained but is now past, ceased, gone, and changed; it operates by way of being struck by suffering, and so suffering alone is said to be its ground of latency, not its object. Similarly, even greed that arises associated with the latent tendency of views due to adherence to suffering, etc., operates by way of attachment to pleasure. Therefore, only agreeable and pleasant feeling are said to be its ground. Thus, it is not contradictory for all greed—except for craving for existence—to be the latent tendency of sensual lust. Moreover, in the same object, beings are both impassioned and averse. Therein, lust has an inclination towards pleasure, while aversion has an inclination towards suffering. Hence, they have different grounds for their latent tendencies.

Evañca katvā ‘‘yattha kāmarāgānusayo anuseti, tattha paṭighānusayo anusetīti? No’’ti (yama. 2.anusayayamaka.14) vuttanti. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana dvīsu vedanāsu iṭṭhārammaṇe ca domanassuppattiṃ vatvā ‘‘domanassamattameva pana taṃ hoti, na paṭighānusayo’’ti (yama. aṭṭha. anusayayamaka 2) vuttattā yathā tattha paṭigho paṭighānusayo na hoti, evaṃ dukkhādīsu uppajjamānena diṭṭhānusayena sahajāto lobho kāmarāgānusayo na hoticceva viññāyatīti. Yaṃ panetaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘domanassamattameva pana taṃ hoti, na paṭighānusayo’’ti, ettha na paṭighānusayoti natthi paṭighānusayoti attho daṭṭhabbo. Na hi domanassassa paṭighānusayabhāvāsaṅkā atthīti.

This being so, it is said: 'Where the underlying tendency to sensual lust lies dormant, does the underlying tendency to aversion also lie dormant there? No.' However, in the commentary, after stating that displeasure arises in regard to the two feelings and in regard to a desirable object, it is said: 'But that is merely displeasure, not the underlying tendency to aversion.' Therefore, just as aversion in that case is not the underlying tendency to aversion, so too, it should be understood that the greed co-arisen with the underlying tendency to views, which arises in regard to suffering and so on, is not the underlying tendency to sensual lust. Furthermore, as to what was said, 'But that is merely displeasure, not the underlying tendency to aversion,' here 'not the underlying tendency to aversion' should be understood to mean 'there is no underlying tendency to aversion.' For there is no reason to suspect that displeasure itself is the underlying tendency to aversion.

Desanā saṃkiṇṇā viya bhaveyyāti bhavarāgassapi kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsu ārammaṇakaraṇavaseneva uppatti vuttā viya bhaveyya, tasmā ārammaṇavisesena visesadassanatthaṃ evaṃ desanā katā sahajātavedanāvisesābhāvatoti adhippāyo.

The teaching might seem confused, as it could appear that the arising of the craving for existence in the sense-sphere is said to occur only by way of taking the two feelings as its object. Therefore, this teaching is given in order to show the distinction by means of the specific object, because there is no distinction based on co-arisen feelings—this is the intended meaning.

Uppattiṭṭhānavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Section on the Place of Arising is concluded.

Mahāvāro

The Great Section

1. Anusayavāravaṇṇanā

1. The Exposition on the Section on Underlying Tendencies

3. Anuseti uppajjatīti paccuppannavohārā pavattāvirāmavasena veditabbā. Maggeneva hi anusayānaṃ virāmo vicchedo hoti, na tato pubbeti.

3. 'It lies dormant, it arises'—this should be understood as a present-day expression in the sense of continuance and non-cessation. For the cessation and cutting off of the underlying tendencies occurs only by means of the path, not before that.

20. Nāpi ekasmiṃ ṭhāne uppajjanti, na ekaṃ dhammaṃ ārammaṇaṃ karontīti ettha purimena ekasmiṃ cittuppāde uppatti nivāritā, pacchimena ekasmiṃ ārammaṇeti ayaṃ viseso. Puggalokāsavārassa paṭilome tesaṃ tesaṃ puggalānaṃ [Pg.147] tassa tassa anusayassa ananusayanaṭṭhānaṃ pakatiyā pahānena ca veditabbaṃ, ‘‘tiṇṇaṃ puggalānaṃ dukkhāya vedanāya tesaṃ tattha kāmarāgānusayo nānuseti, no ca tesaṃ tattha paṭighānusayo nānuseti, tesaññeva puggalānaṃ rūpadhātuyā arūpadhātuyā apariyāpanne tesaṃ tattha kāmarāgānusayo ca nānuseti, paṭighānusayo ca nānusetī’’ti pakatiyā dukkhādīnaṃ kāmarāgādīnaṃ ananusayaṭṭhānataṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, ‘‘dvinnaṃ puggalānaṃ sabbattha kāmarāgānusayo ca nānuseti, paṭighānusayo ca nānusetī’’ti (yama. 2.anusayayamaka.56) anusayappahānena. Ettha purimanayena okāsaṃ avekkhitvā puggalassa vijjamānānaṃ anusayānaṃ ananusayanaṃ vuttaṃ, pacchimanayena puggalaṃ avekkhitvā okāsassa kāmadhātuādikassa anokāsatāti.

20. They neither arise in a single place, nor do they take a single phenomenon as their object. Here, by the former phrase, their arising in a single mind-moment is precluded; by the latter, their taking a single object. This is the distinction. In the reverse order of the section on individuals and planes, the place where a particular underlying tendency is not latent for various individuals should be understood both by its nature and by abandonment. It is stated with reference to suffering, etc., being by nature a place where sensual lust, etc., are not latent, that: 'For three types of individuals, the underlying tendency to sensual lust does not lie dormant in relation to painful feeling, but it is not the case that the underlying tendency to aversion does not lie dormant for them there. For those same individuals, in the form realm, the formless realm, and the supramundane, the underlying tendency to sensual lust does not lie dormant for them there, and the underlying tendency to aversion does not lie dormant for them there.' And it is by way of the abandonment of underlying tendencies that it is said: 'For two types of individuals, the underlying tendencies to sensual lust and aversion do not lie dormant anywhere.' Here, by the former method, considering the plane, the non-latency of an individual's existing underlying tendencies is stated; by the latter method, considering the individual, it is stated that a plane, such as the sense-sphere, is not a plane for those tendencies.

Anusayavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Section on Underlying Tendencies is concluded.

2. Sānusayavāravaṇṇanā

2. The Exposition on the Section on Being with Underlying Tendencies

66-131. Sānusayapajahanapariññāvāresu ‘‘sānusayo, pajahati, parijānātī’’ti puggalo vutto. Puggalassa ca imasmiṃ bhave sānusayoti evaṃ bhavavisesena vā, imasmiṃ kāmarāgānusayena sānusayo imasmiṃ itaresu kenacīti evaṃ bhavānusayavisesena vā sānusayatāniranusayatādikā natthi. Tathā dvīsu vedanāsu kāmarāgānusayena sānusayo, dukkhāya vedanāya niranusayoti idampi natthi. Na hi puggalassa vedanā okāso, atha kho anusayānanti. Anusayassa pana tassa tassa so so anusayanokāso puggalassa tena tena anusayena sānusayatāya, tassa tassa pajahanaparijānanānañca nimittaṃ hoti, ananusayanokāso ca niranusayatādīnaṃ, tasmā okāsavāresu bhummaniddesaṃ akatvā ‘‘yato tato’’ti nimittatthe nissakkavacanaṃ kataṃ, pajahanapariññāvāresu apādānatthe eva vā. Tato tato hi okāsato apagamakaraṇaṃ vināsanaṃ pajahanaṃ parijānanañcāti.

66-131. In the sections on being with underlying tendencies, abandoning, and full understanding, it is the individual who is spoken of as 'one with underlying tendencies, one who abandons, one who fully understands.' However, for an individual, the state of being with or without underlying tendencies does not exist either by way of a specific existence—as in 'one is with underlying tendencies in this existence'—or by way of a specific underlying tendency of existence—as in 'one is with the underlying tendency to sensual lust in this existence, and with some other in another.' Similarly, it is not the case that one is with the underlying tendency to sensual lust in regard to two feelings, and without underlying tendencies in regard to painful feeling. For feeling is not the plane for an individual, but rather for the underlying tendencies. However, for each underlying tendency, its respective plane of latency is the sign for the individual's being with that particular underlying tendency, and for abandoning and fully understanding it; and the plane of non-latency is the sign for being without underlying tendencies, and so on. Therefore, in the sections on the plane, instead of a locative designation, the ablative expression 'from which... from that' is used in the sense of a sign; or, in the sections on abandoning and full understanding, it is used in the ablative sense. For abandoning and fully understanding are the act of removing and destroying from that very plane.

Tattha yatoti yato anusayaṭṭhānato anulome, paṭilome ananusayaṭṭhānatoti attho. Anusayānānusayasseva hi nimittāpādānabhāvadassanatthaṃ [Pg.148] ‘‘rūpadhātuyā arūpadhātuyā tato mānānusayena sānusayoti (yama.2.anusayayamaka.77), pajahatī’’ti (yama. 2.anusayayamaka.143) ca ‘‘dukkhāya vedanāya tato kāmarāgānusayena niranusayoti (yama. 2.anusayayamaka.110), na pajahatī’’ti (yama. 2.anusayayamaka.174-176) ca evamādīsu rūpadhātuādayo eva bhummaniddeseneva niddiṭṭhāti. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana catutthapañhavissajjanena sarūpato anusayanaṭṭhānassa dassitattā tadatthe ādipañhepi ‘‘yato’’ti anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ vuttanti imamatthaṃ vibhāvetvā puna ‘‘yato’’ti etassa vacanatthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘uppannena kāmarāgānusayena sānusayo’’ti vuttaṃ, taṃ pamādalikhitaṃ viya dissati. Na hi uppanneneva anusayena sānusayo, uppattirahaṭṭhānatañca sandhāyeva nissakkavacanaṃ na sakkā vattuṃ. Na hi apariyāpannānaṃ anusayuppattirahaṭṭhānatāti taṃ tatheva dissati. Evaṃ panettha attho daṭṭhabbo – yato uppannenāti yato uppannena bhavitabbaṃ, tenāti uppattirahaṭṭhāne nissakkavacanaṃ katanti. Tathā sabbadhammesu uppajjanakenāti. Uppattipaṭisedhe akate anuppattiyā anicchitattā sabbadhammesu uppajjanakabhāvaṃ āpannena anuppajjanabhāvaṃ apaneti nāma. Sabbatthāti etassa pana sabbaṭṭhānatoti ayamattho na na sambhavati. Ttha-kārañhi bhummato aññatthāpi saddavidū icchantīti.

Here, 'from which' (yato) means from the place of latency in the forward order, and from the place of non-latency in the reverse order. For, in order to show the nature of being a sign and an ablative cause for the presence or absence of underlying tendencies, it is stated in examples such as: 'In the form realm and the formless realm, from there, one is with the underlying tendency to conceit,' and 'one abandons'; and 'from painful feeling, from there, one is without the underlying tendency to sensual lust,' and 'one does not abandon.' In such cases, the form realm and so on are indicated simply by a locative designation. However, in the commentary, because the place of latency is shown in its own nature by the reply to the fourth question, for that purpose, even in the first question, 'from which' is said to refer to the place of latency. Having clarified this meaning, then again, to explain the meaning of the word 'from which,' it is said: 'One is with the arisen underlying tendency to sensual lust.' This appears to have been written carelessly. For one is not with an underlying tendency merely because it has arisen. And it is not possible to use the ablative expression with reference to a place devoid of arising. For is it not the case that the supramundane is a place devoid of the arising of underlying tendencies? Thus it appears. Here, however, the meaning should be understood as follows: 'from which it has arisen' means 'from which it is to arise'; by that, the ablative expression is used for the place of arising. Similarly, 'by that which is capable of arising in all phenomena.' When the preclusion of arising is not made, because non-arising is not intended, by having attained the state of being capable of arising in all phenomena, one removes the state of non-arising. However, the meaning of 'everywhere' (sabbattha) as 'in all places' is not impossible. For grammarians accept the suffix '-ttha' in senses other than the locative.

Sānusayavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Section on Being with Underlying Tendencies is concluded.

3. Pajahanavāravaṇṇanā

3. The Exposition on the Section on Abandoning

132-197. Pajahanavāre yena kāmarāgānusayādayo sāvasesā pahīyanti, so te pajahatīti sanniṭṭhānaṃ katvā vattabbo na hoti apajahanasabbhāvā, tasmā sanniṭṭhāne niravasesappajahanakoyeva pajahatīti vutto, tasmā ‘‘yo vā pana mānānusayaṃ pajahati, so kāmarāgānusayaṃ pajahatīti? No’’ti (yama. 2.anusayayamaka.132) vuttaṃ. Yasmā pana saṃsayapadena pahānakaraṇamattameva pucchati, na sanniṭṭhānaṃ karoti, tasmā yathāvijjamānaṃ pahānaṃ sandhāya ‘‘yo kāmarāgānusayaṃ pajahati, so mānānusayaṃ pajahatīti? Tadekaṭṭhaṃ pajahatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Paṭilome pana ‘‘nappajahatī’’ti pajahanābhāvo eva sanniṭṭhānapadena saṃsayapadena ca vinicchito [Pg.149] pucchito ca, tasmā yesaṃ pajahanaṃ natthi niravasesavasena pajahanakānaṃ, te ṭhapetvā avasesā appajahanasabbhāveneva nappajahantīti vuttā, na ca yathāvijjamānena pahāneneva vajjitāti daṭṭhabbāti. ‘‘Anāgāmimaggasamaṅgiñca aṭṭhamakañca ṭhapetvā avasesā puggalā kāmarāgānusayañca nappajahanti vicikicchānusayañca nappajahantī’’ti (yama. 2.anusayayamaka.165) ettha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘puthujjano pahānapariññāya abhāvena nappajahati, sesā tesaṃ anusayānaṃ pahīnattā’’ti (yama. aṭṭha. anusayayamaka 132-197) vuttaṃ.

In the section on abandoning, since latent tendencies such as sensual desire are abandoned with residue, a question based on the definitive statement, "he abandons them," does not arise, because their nature is not one of complete abandonment. Therefore, in a definitive statement, only one who abandons without residue is said to "abandon." Hence, it is said, "Or does one who abandons the latent tendency of conceit abandon the latent tendency of sensual desire? No" (Yam. 2, Anusaya Yamaka 132). However, because the question is asked using a term of doubt, it only inquires about the act of abandoning, without making a definitive statement. Therefore, referring to the abandonment as it actually occurs, it is said, "Does one who abandons the latent tendency of sensual desire abandon the latent tendency of conceit? He abandons it in the same context." In the reverse order, however, the absence of abandonment, "he does not abandon," is both determined and questioned by the definitive term and the term of doubt. Therefore, setting aside those who abandon without residue, for whom there is no act of abandoning, the rest are said "not to abandon" precisely because of their nature of not abandoning. And it should be understood that they are not excluded merely by the abandonment as it actually occurs. "Except for one endowed with the non-returner's path and the eighth person, the remaining persons do not abandon the latent tendency of sensual desire nor the latent tendency of doubt" (Yam. 2, Anusaya Yamaka 165). Here, the commentary states, "The ordinary person does not abandon due to the absence of the full understanding of abandonment, while the others (are said not to abandon them) because those latent tendencies have already been abandoned" (Yam. Aṭṭha., Anusaya Yamaka 132-197).

Tattha kiñcāpi kesañci vicikicchānusayo kesañci ubhayanti sesānaṃ tesaṃ pahīnatā atthi, tathāpi sotāpannādīnaṃ vicikicchānusayassa pahīnatā ubhayāpajahanassa kāraṇaṃ na hotīti tesaṃ pahīnattā ‘‘nappajahantī’’ti na sakkā vattuṃ, atha pana kāmarāgānusayañca nappajahantīti imaṃ sanniṭṭhānena tesaṃ puggalānaṃ saṅgahitatādassanatthaṃ vuttanti na tattha kāraṇaṃ vattabbaṃ, pucchitassa pana saṃsayatthassa kāraṇaṃ vattabbaṃ. Evaṃ sati ‘‘sesā tassa anusayassa pahīnattā’’ti vattabbanti? Na vattabbaṃ ‘‘yo kāmarāgānusayaṃ nappajahati, so diṭṭhānusayaṃ vicikicchānusayaṃ nappajahatī’’ti paṭikkhipitvā pucchite sadisavissajjanake diṭṭhivicikicchānusaye sandhāya kāraṇassa vattabbattā, tasmā tesaṃ anusayānaṃ pahīnattāti tesaṃ diṭṭhivicikicchānusayānaṃ pahīnattā te saṃsayatthasaṅgahite anusaye nappajahantīti attho daṭṭhabbo.

Here, although for some the latent tendency of doubt is abandoned, and for some both are abandoned, and for the rest there is the state of their having been abandoned, still, for stream-enterers and others, the abandonment of the latent tendency of doubt is not the reason for their non-abandonment of both. Therefore, it cannot be said that they 'do not abandon' because those tendencies have been abandoned in them. Rather, the statement 'they do not abandon the latent tendency of sensual desire' is made to show the inclusion of those individuals by this definitive statement, and no reason needs to be stated there. However, a reason should be stated for the matter of doubt that is questioned. This being the case, should it be said, 'The others (do not abandon) because that latent tendency has been abandoned'? It should not be said, for when it is asked by way of refutation, 'One who does not abandon the latent tendency of sensual desire also does not abandon the latent tendencies of wrong view and doubt,' the reason should be stated with reference to the latent tendencies of wrong view and doubt in a similar answer. Therefore, the meaning should be understood as: 'because those latent tendencies have been abandoned' means that because those latent tendencies of wrong view and doubt have been abandoned, they do not abandon the latent tendencies included in the matter of doubt.

Pajahanavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the section on abandoning is finished.

5. Pahīnavāravaṇṇanā

5. Explanation of the Section on the Abandoned

264-274. Pahīnavāre phalaṭṭhavaseneva desanā āraddhāti anulomaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Paṭilome hi puthujjanavasenapi desanā gahitāti. ‘‘Phalaṭṭhavasenevā’’ti ca sādhāraṇavacanena maggasamaṅgīnaṃ aggahitataṃ dīpeti. Anusayaccantapaṭipakkhekacittakkhaṇikānañhi maggasamaṅgīnaṃ na koci anusayo uppattiraho, nāpi anuppattirahataṃ āpādito, tasmā te na anusayasānusayapahīnauppajjanavāresu gahitāti.

264-274. In the section on the abandoned, the teaching was begun based on the state of fruition; this is said with reference to the direct order. For in the reverse order, the teaching is also taken from the perspective of an ordinary person. And the phrase "based on the state of fruition" indicates, by its general statement, the non-inclusion of those endowed with the path. For those endowed with the path, in a single moment of consciousness that is the complete antithesis of the latent tendencies, no latent tendency is capable of arising, nor has it been brought to a state of being incapable of arising. Therefore, they are not included in the sections on latent tendencies, with latent tendencies, abandoned, or arising.

275-296. Okāsavāre [Pg.150] so so anusayo attano attano okāse eva anuppattidhammataṃ āpādito pahīno, anāpādito ca appahīnoti pahīnāppahīnavacanāni tadokāsameva dīpenti, tasmā anokāse tadubhayāvattabbatā vuttāti. Sādhāraṇaṭṭhāne tena saddhiṃ pahīno nāma hotīti tena saddhiṃ samānokāse pahīno nāmāti attho, na samānakāle pahīnoti.

275-296. In the section on opportunity, each latent tendency, having been brought to the nature of non-arising in its own respective opportunity, is abandoned; if not so brought, it is not abandoned. Thus, the statements of 'abandoned' and 'not abandoned' indicate only that specific opportunity. Therefore, it is said that in the absence of an opportunity, the applicability of both is not stated. In a common basis, it is called "abandoned together with that," meaning it is abandoned in a common opportunity with that, not abandoned at the same time.

Pahīnavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the section on the abandoned is finished.

7. Dhātuvāravaṇṇanā

7. Explanation of the Section on Elements

332-340. Dhātuvāre santānaṃ anugatā hutvā sayantīti yasmiṃ santāne appahīnā, taṃsantāne appahīnabhāvena anugantvā uppattiarahabhāvena sayantīti attho. Uppattirahatā eva hi anurūpaṃ kāraṇaṃ labhitvā uppajjantīti idhāpi yuttāti. Ettha ca na kāmadhātuādīni cha paṭinisedhavacanāni dhātuvisesaniddhāraṇāni na hontīti ‘‘na kāmadhātuyā cutassa na kāmadhātuṃ upapajjantassā’’tiādimhi vuccamāne imaṃ nāma upapajjantassāti na viññāyeyya, tasmā taṃmūlikāsu yojanāsu ‘‘na kāmadhātuyā cutassa kāmadhātuṃ rūpadhātuṃ arūpadhātuṃ upapajjantassā’’ti paṭhamaṃ yojetvā puna anukkamena ‘‘na kāmadhātuṃ upapajjantassā’’tiādikā yojanā katā. Evañhi na kāmadhātuādipadehi yathāvuttadhātuyoyeva gahitā, na kañcīti viññāyati. Yathā anusayavāre ‘‘anusentīti padassa uppajjantīti attho gahito’’ti vuttaṃ, tatthāpi uppajjamānameva sandhāya uppajjantīti gahetuṃ na sakkā ‘‘yassa kāmarāgānusayo anuseti, tassa paṭighānusayo anusetīti? Āmantā’’tiādivacanato. Athāpi appahīnataṃ sandhāya uppajjantīti attho tattha gahito, idhāpi so na na yujjatīti. Bhaṅgāti bhañjitabbā, dvidhā kātabbāti attho. Nanu na koci anusayo yattha uppajjantassa anuseti nānuseti cāti dvidhā kātabbā, tattheva kasmā ‘‘kati anusayā bhaṅgā? Anusayā bhaṅgā natthī’’ti pucchāvissajjanāni katāni. Na hi pakārantarābhāve saṃsayo yuttoti[Pg.151]? Na na yutto, ‘‘anusayā bhaṅgā natthī’’ti avutte bhaṅgābhāvassa aviññātattāti.

332-340. In the section on elements, "having followed the continuum, they lie dormant" means that in whichever continuum they are not abandoned, having followed that continuum by way of not being abandoned, they lie dormant with the capacity to arise. For only those capable of arising do arise upon obtaining a suitable cause; thus, this is also appropriate here. And here, the six phrases of negation, such as "not for one who has passed away from the kāmadhātu," are not determinations of specific elements. For if it were said, "not for one who has passed away from the kāmadhātu, not for one who is reborn in the kāmadhātu," it would not be understood which particular one is being reborn. Therefore, in the applications based on that, it is first constructed as "not for one who has passed away from the kāmadhātu and is reborn in the kāmadhātu, rūpadhātu, or arūpadhātu," and then, in sequence, the applications beginning with "not for one reborn in the kāmadhātu" are made. In this way, it is understood that by the terms "kāmadhātu," etc., only the specified element itself is taken, and not any other. Just as in the section on latent tendencies it was said, "the meaning of the term 'anusenti' (lies dormant) is taken as 'uppajjati' (arises)," there too, it cannot be taken as "arises" with reference only to what is presently arising, because of statements like, "For one in whom the latent tendency of sensual desire lies dormant, does the latent tendency of aversion lie dormant? Yes." But if the meaning "arises" is taken there with reference to not being abandoned, that is not unsuitable here either. "Bhaṅga" means to be broken, to be made twofold. Surely, is there not some latent tendency that, for one who is arising somewhere, both lies dormant and does not lie dormant, and thus should be made twofold? Why then were the question and answer, "How many latent tendencies are broken? There are no latent tendencies that are broken," given right there? Is doubt not appropriate in the absence of an alternative? It is not inappropriate, for if it were not said, "there are no latent tendencies that are broken," the absence of breaking would not be known.

Dhātuvāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the section on elements is finished.

Anusayayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Anusayayamaka is finished.

8. Cittayamakaṃ

8. The Yamaka on Consciousness

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Summary Section

1-62. Cittayamakavaṇṇanāyaṃ āditova tayo suddhikamahāvārā hontīti ime tayo mahāvārā sarāgādikusalādīhi missakā suddhikā ca, tesu ādito suddhikā hontīti attho. Missakesu ca ekekasmiṃ sarāgādimissakacitte tayo tayo mahāvārā, te tattha tattha pana vutte sampiṇḍetvā ‘‘soḷasa puggalavārā’’tiādi vuttaṃ, na nirantaraṃ vutteti. ‘‘Yassa cittaṃ uppajjati na nirujjhati, tassa cittaṃ nirujjhissati nuppajjissatī’’tiādinā uppādanirodhānaṃ paccuppannānāgatakālānañca saṃsaggavasena ekekāya pucchāya pavattattā ‘‘uppādanirodhakālasambhedavāro’’ti vutto. Evaṃ sesānampi vārānaṃ taṃtaṃnāmatā pāḷianusārena veditabbā.

1-62. In the explanation of the Cittayamaka, from the beginning there are three pure great sections. This means that these three great sections are both mixed—with states such as those accompanied by lust, and with wholesome states, etc.—and pure. Among them, the first are pure. And in the mixed sections, in each consciousness mixed with lust and so on, there are three great sections each. These, however, being stated in various places, are grouped together, and thus it is said, "sixteen sections on persons," etc.; they are not stated continuously. Because each question proceeds by way of the connection between arising and cessation, and between the present and future times, as in "For whom a consciousness arises but does not cease, for that person will the consciousness cease but not arise?" it is called the "section on the combination of the times of arising and cessation." Similarly, the names of the remaining sections should be understood according to the Pāli text.

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the summary section is finished.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Exposition Section

63. Tathārūpasseva khīṇāsavassa cittaṃ sandhāyāti idaṃ uppādakkhaṇasamaṅgipacchimacittasamaṅgimhi puggale adhippete tañca cittaṃ adhippetameva hotīti katvā vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Arahato pacchimacittampīti nuppajjati nirujjhatīti evaṃpakāraṃ bhaṅgakkhaṇasamaṅgimeva sandhāya vuttaṃ.

63. It should be understood that this is said with reference to the consciousness of such an Arahant, when a person endowed with the final consciousness at its arising moment is intended, and because that consciousness is indeed the intended object. The statement, 'Even the final consciousness of an Arahant does not arise again and ceases,' is said with reference only to one endowed with the moment of dissolution.

65-82. Uppādavārassa dutiyapucchāvissajjane cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe, nirodhasamāpannānaṃ, asaññasattānaṃ tesaṃ cittaṃ uppajjittha, no ca tesaṃ cittaṃ uppajjatīti [Pg.152] ettha ‘‘cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe tesaṃ cittaṃ uppajjitthā’’ti etassa ‘‘sabbesaṃ cittaṃ khaṇapaccuppannameva hutvā uppādakkhaṇaṃ atītattā uppajjittha nāmā’’ti attho vutto. Cittassa uppādakkhaṇe tesaṃ cittaṃ uppajjittha ceva uppajjati cāti etassapi uppādaṃ pattattā uppajjittha, anatītattā uppajjati nāmāti dvayametaṃ evaṃ na sakkā vattuṃ. Na hi khaṇapaccuppanne ‘‘uppajjitthā’’ti atītavohāro atthi. Yadi siyā, yaṃ vā pana cittaṃ uppajjittha, taṃ cittaṃ uppajjatīti ettha ‘‘no’’ti avatvā vibhajitabbaṃ siyā. Tathā ‘‘yaṃ cittaṃ uppajjati, taṃ cittaṃ uppajjitthā’’ti ettha ca ‘‘no’’ti avatvā ‘‘āmantā’’ti vattabbaṃ siyā. ‘‘Cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe’’ti pana bhijjamānacittasamaṅgī puggalo vutto, tassa atītaṃ cittaṃ uppajjittha, na ca kiñci cittaṃ uppajjati. Cittassa uppādakkhaṇeti ca uppajjamānacittasamaṅgī puggalo vutto, tassapi atītaṃ cittaṃ uppajjittha, taṃ pana cittaṃ uppajjatīti evamettha attho daṭṭhabbo. Cittanti hi sāmaññavacanaṃ ekasmiṃ anekasmiñca yathāgahitavisese tiṭṭhatīti. ‘‘Yassa vā pana cittaṃ uppajjissati, tassa cittaṃ uppajjatīti? Cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe’’ti ettha yassa vā pana cittaṃ uppajjissatīti etena sanniṭṭhānena gahitapuggalasseva cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇeti evaṃ sabbattha sanniṭṭhānavasena niyamo veditabbo. Uppannuppajjamānavāro niruddhanirujjhamānavāro ca puggalavārādīsu tīsupi ninnānākaraṇā uddiṭṭhā niddiṭṭhā ca. Tattha puggalavāre avisesena yaṃ kañci tādisaṃ puggalaṃ sandhāya ‘‘uppannaṃ uppajjamāna’’ntiādi vuttaṃ, dhammavāre cittameva, puggaladhammavāre puggalaṃ cittañcāti ayamettha viseso daṭṭhabbo.

65-82. In the second question-and-answer of the section on arising, regarding the answer for those at the moment of the dissolution of consciousness, for those who have attained cessation, and for non-percipient beings—'for them consciousness arose, and for them consciousness is not arising'—here, regarding the statement 'at the moment of the dissolution of consciousness, their consciousness arose,' the meaning is explained as follows: 'All consciousness, having become momentarily present, had the moment of arising as past, hence it is said to have arisen.' Regarding the statement 'at the moment of the arising of consciousness, their consciousness both arose and is arising,' here too, because it has reached the state of arising, it is said to have arisen, and because it is not past, it is said to be arising. However, these two cannot be stated in this way. For in the momentarily present, there is no past expression such as 'arose.' If there were, then regarding the statement 'whatever consciousness arose, that consciousness is arising,' instead of saying 'no,' it should be analyzed. Similarly, regarding the statement 'whatever consciousness is arising, that consciousness arose,' instead of saying 'no,' it should be answered 'yes.' However, the phrase 'at the moment of the dissolution of consciousness' refers to a person endowed with disintegrating consciousness. For them, past consciousness arose, but no consciousness is arising. The phrase 'at the moment of the arising of consciousness' refers to a person endowed with arising consciousness. For them too, past consciousness arose, and that consciousness is arising. Thus, the meaning here should be understood in this way. The word 'consciousness' is a general term that applies to both singular and plural instances according to the specific condition taken. In the phrase 'For whomsoever consciousness will arise, for them is consciousness arising? At the moment of the dissolution of consciousness,' the phrase 'for whomsoever consciousness will arise' refers to a person determined by the thesis. Thus, in all cases, the restriction should be understood as based on the thesis. The sections on arisen and arising, and ceased and ceasing, have been stated and explained in all three sections—the section on persons, etc.—without differentiation. There, in the section on persons, it is stated generally with reference to any such person as 'arisen and arising,' etc. In the section on phenomena, it is only consciousness, while in the combined section on persons and phenomena, it is both the person and consciousness. This distinction should be seen here.

83. Atikkantakālavāre imassa puggalavārattā puggalo pucchitoti puggalasseva vissajjanena bhavitabbaṃ. Yathā yassa cittaṃ uppajjitthāti etena na koci puggalo na gahito, evaṃ yassa cittaṃ uppajjamānaṃ khaṇaṃ khaṇaṃ vītikkantaṃ atikkantakālanti etena sanniṭṭhānena na koci na gahito. Na hi so puggalo atthi, yassa cittaṃ uppādakkhaṇaṃ atītaṃ natthi, te ca pana nirujjhamānakkhaṇātītacittā na na hontīti paṭhamo pañho ‘‘āmantā’’ti vissajjitabbo siyā, tathā dutiyatatiyā. Catuttho pana ‘‘pacchimacittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe tesaṃ cittaṃ bhaṅgakkhaṇaṃ avītikkantaṃ, no ca tesaṃ cittaṃ uppādakkhaṇaṃ avītikkantaṃ, itaresaṃ cittaṃ bhaṅgakkhaṇañca avītikkantaṃ uppādakkhaṇañca avītikkanta’’nti vissajjitabbo bhaveyya, tathā avissajjetvā kasmā sabbattha cittameva vibhattanti[Pg.153]? Cittavasena puggalavavatthānato. Khaṇassa hi vītikkantatāya atikkantakālatāvacanena vattamānassa ca cittassa vasena puggalo uppādakkhaṇātītacitto vutto atītassa ca, tattha purimassa cittaṃ na bhaṅgakkhaṇaṃ vītikkantaṃ pacchimassa vītikkantanti evamādiko puggalavibhāgo yassa cittassa vasena puggalavavatthānaṃ hoti, tassa cittassa taṃtaṃkhaṇavītikkamāvītikkamadassanavasena dassito hotīti sabbavissajjanesu cittameva vibhattaṃ. Atha vā nayidha dhammamattavisiṭṭho puggalo pucchito, atha kho puggalavisiṭṭhaṃ cittaṃ, tasmā cittameva vissajjitanti veditabbaṃ. Yadipi puggalappadhānā pucchā, athāpi cittappadhānā, ubhayathāpi dutiyapucchāya ‘‘āmantā’’ti vattabbaṃ siyā, tathā pana avatvā nirodhakkhaṇavītikkamena atikkantakālatā na uppādakkhaṇavītikkamena atikkantakālatā viya vattamānassa atthīti dassanatthaṃ ‘‘atītaṃ citta’’nti vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yassa cittaṃ na uppajjamānanti ettha uppajjamānaṃ khaṇaṃ khaṇaṃ vītikkantaṃ atikkantakālaṃ yassa cittaṃ na hotīti attho. Esa nayo ‘‘na nirujjhamāna’’nti etthāpi.

83. In the section on past time, since this is a section on persons, and a person is questioned, the answer should be given in terms of the person. Just as no individual is excluded by the statement 'For whom consciousness arose,' so too, no one is excluded by the thesis 'For whom consciousness, arising moment by moment, has passed beyond—that is, past time.' For there is no individual whose consciousness's arising moment is not past, and those whose consciousness has passed the moment of dissolution do indeed exist. Thus, the first question should be answered with 'Yes,' and similarly the second and third. The fourth, however, should be answered as follows: 'At the moment of the dissolution of the final consciousness, for them the consciousness has not passed beyond the moment of dissolution, but it is not the case that for them the consciousness has not passed beyond the moment of arising; for the others, their consciousness has not passed beyond the moment of dissolution and has not passed beyond the moment of arising.' If not answered this way, why is consciousness alone analyzed in all cases? Because the individual is determined by the state of consciousness. The statement 'past time' refers to the passing of the moment, and by means of the present consciousness, the individual is said to have a past arising moment—that is, in the past. Here, the earlier consciousness has not passed beyond the moment of dissolution, while the later one has. Such distinctions of individuals are made based on consciousness, and by showing whether each respective moment has passed or not passed for that consciousness by which the individual is determined, consciousness alone is analyzed in all responses. Alternatively, here it is not merely an individual distinguished by phenomena who is questioned, but rather consciousness distinguished by the individual. Therefore, it should be understood that the response is given in terms of consciousness alone. Even if the question is primarily about the individual, or primarily about consciousness, in both cases the second question could be answered with 'Yes.' However, instead of stating that, it should be understood that 'past consciousness' is said to show that the passing of the moment of cessation constitutes past time for the present, unlike the passing of the moment of arising. Regarding 'for whom consciousness is not arising,' here the meaning is 'for whom consciousness is not one that, arising, has passed beyond moment by moment, being past time.' The same method applies to 'not ceasing.'

114-116. Missakavāresu yassa sarāgaṃ cittaṃ uppajjati na nirujjhati, tassa cittaṃ nirujjhissati nuppajjissatīti pucchā, noti vissajjanañca aṭṭhakathāyaṃ dassitaṃ. Pāḷiyaṃ pana ‘‘yassa sarāgaṃ cittaṃ uppajjati na nirujjhati, tassa sarāgaṃ cittaṃ nirujjhissati nuppajjissatī’’ti mātikāṭhapanāyaṃ vuttattā vissajjanepi tatheva sanniṭṭhānasaṃsayatthesu sarāgādimissakacittavaseneva pucchā uddharitvā ‘‘sarāgapacchimacittassa uppādakkhaṇe tesaṃ sarāgaṃ cittaṃ uppajjati na nirujjhati nirujjhissati nuppajjissati, itaresaṃ sarāgacittassa uppādakkhaṇe tesaṃ sarāgaṃ cittaṃ uppajjati na nirujjhati nirujjhissati ceva uppajjissati cā’’ti evamādinā nayena yebhuyyena suddhikavārasadisameva vissajjanaṃ kātabbanti katvā saṃkhittanti viññāyati.

114-116. In the mixed sections, the question, 'For whom a consciousness with lust arises and is not ceasing, for them will that consciousness cease and not arise?' and the answer, 'No,' are shown in the commentary. However, in the Pāli text, in establishing the matrix, it is stated: 'For whom a consciousness with lust arises and is not ceasing, for them will that consciousness with lust cease and not arise?' Therefore, in the answers as well, the questions should be extracted with reference only to states of consciousness mixed with lust and so on, in the senses of thesis and doubt. 'For one with the final consciousness with lust, at the moment of its arising, for them a consciousness with lust arises and is not ceasing; it will cease and will not arise. For others, at the moment a consciousness with lust arises, for them a consciousness with lust arises and is not ceasing; it will both cease and arise.' It is understood that this has been abbreviated because the answer should be given, for the most part, in a manner similar to the pure sections.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition Section is concluded.

Cittayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Cittayamaka is concluded.

9. Dhammayamakaṃ

9. The Yamaka on Phenomena

1. Paṇṇattivāro

1. The Section on Concepts

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Summary Section

1-16. Dhammayamakavaṇṇanāyaṃ [Pg.154] kusalādidhammānaṃ mātikaṃ ṭhapetvāti yathā mūlayamake kusalādidhammā desitā, yathā ca khandhayamakādīsu ‘‘pañcakkhandhā’’tiādinā aññathā saṅgahetvā desitā, tathā adesetvā yā kusalādīnaṃ dhammānaṃ ‘‘kusalākusalā dhammā’’tiādikā mātikā, taṃ idha ādimhi ṭhapetvā desitassāti attho.

1-16. In the Commentary on the Dhammayamaka, the phrase 'having established the matrix of wholesome states and so on' means this: just as wholesome states and so on were taught in the Mūlayamaka, and as they were taught differently in the Khandhayamaka and other treatises by being grouped as 'the five aggregates' and so on—it is not taught in that way here. Rather, that matrix of states, such as 'wholesome and unwholesome states,' is established at the beginning and then taught. This is the meaning.

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Summary Section is concluded.

2. Pavattivāravaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Section on Occurrence

33-34. ‘‘Yassa kusalā dhammā uppajjanti, tassa abyākatā dhammā uppajjantī’’ti etassa vissajjane ‘‘abyākatā cāti cittasamuṭṭhānarūpavasena vutta’’nti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaṃ, imasmiṃ pana pañhe kammasamuṭṭhānādirūpañca labbhati, taṃ pana paṭilomavārassa vissajjane sabbesaṃ cavantānaṃ, pavatte cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe, āruppe akusalānaṃ uppādakkhaṇe tesaṃ kusalā ca dhammā na uppajjanti abyākatā ca dhammā na uppajjantīti ettha pavatte cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe uppajjamānampi kammasamuṭṭhānādirūpaṃ aggahetvā ‘‘abyākatā ca dhammā na uppajjantī’’ti vuttattā cittasamuṭṭhānarūpameva idhādhippetaṃ. Kammasamuṭṭhānādirūpe na vidhānaṃ, nāpi paṭisedhoti keci vadanti, tathā cittasamuṭṭhānarūpameva sandhāya ‘‘yassa kusalā dhammā uppajjanti, tassa abyākatā dhammā nirujjhantīti? No’’ti (yama. 3.dhammayamaka.163) vuttanti. Taṃ panetaṃ evaṃ na sakkā vattuṃ cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe kammasamuṭṭhānarūpādīnampi uppādassa uppādakkhaṇe ca nirodhassa evamādīhi eva pāḷīhi paṭisedhasiddhito.

33-34. In the explanation of the question, 'For whom do wholesome states arise, for them do indeterminate states arise?', it is said in the commentary: '“And indeterminate states” is stated in terms of mind-originated materiality.' However, in this question, kamma-originated and other types of materiality are also obtained. But in the explanation of the converse section—'for all who are passing away, at the moment of dissolution of consciousness in the course of existence, and at the moment of arising of unwholesome states in the formless realm, for them neither wholesome states arise nor do indeterminate states arise'—here, although kamma-originated and other materiality is arising at the moment of dissolution of consciousness in the course of existence, it is not taken into account. Since it is said, 'nor do indeterminate states arise,' only mind-originated materiality is intended here. Some say that regarding kamma-originated and other materiality, there is neither a provision nor a prohibition. Similarly, with reference only to mind-originated materiality, it is said: 'For whom do wholesome states arise, for them do indeterminate states cease? No.' But this cannot be said thus, because the prohibition of the arising of kamma-originated materiality and so on at the moment of dissolution of consciousness, and of their cessation at the moment of arising, is established by just such Pāli passages.

Ye ca vadanti ‘‘yathā paṭisambhidāmagge nirodhakathāyaṃ ‘sotāpattimaggakkhaṇe jātā dhammā ṭhapetvā cittasamuṭṭhānarūpaṃ sabbepi virāgā ceva honti virāgārammaṇā virāgagocarā virāgasamudāgatā virāgapatiṭṭhā’tiādīsu ‘ṭhapetvā rūpa’nti avatvā cittapaṭibaddhattā cittajarūpānaṃ [Pg.155] ‘ṭhapetvā cittasamuṭṭhānarūpa’nti vuttaṃ, evamidhāpi cittapaṭibaddhattā cittajarūpameva kathita’’nti, tañca tathā na hoti. Yesañhi sotāpattimaggo sahajātapaccayo hoti, yesu ca virāgādiāsaṅkā hoti, te sotāpattimaggasahajātā dhammā sotāpattimaggakkhaṇe jātā dhammāti tattha vuttā. Sotāpattimaggakkhaṇe jātāti hi vacanaṃ magge jātataṃ dīpeti, na ca kammajādīni amagge jāyamānāni maggakkhaṇe jātavohāraṃ arahanti tesaṃ tassa sotāpattimaggakkhaṇe sahajātapaccayattābhāvato, tasmā maggakkhaṇe taṃsahajātadhammesu ṭhapetabbaṃ ṭhapetuṃ ‘‘ṭhapetvā cittasamuṭṭhānarūpa’’nti vuttaṃ, idha pana kusalādidhammā yassa yattha uppajjanti nirujjhanti ca, tassa puggalassa tasmiñca okāse abyākatadhammānaṃ uppādanirodhānaṃ kusalādipaṭibaddhatā appaṭibaddhatā ca āmaṭṭhā, na ca kammajādirūpaṃ abyākataṃ na hoti, tasmā sanniṭṭhānena gahitassa puggalassa okāse vā uppādanirodhesu vijjamānesu abyākatānaṃ te veditabbā, avijjamānesu ca paṭisedhetabbā, na ca acittapaṭibaddhā abyākatāti ettha na gahitāti sakkā vattuṃ nirodhasamāpannānaṃ asaññasattānañca uppādanirodhavacanatoti.

And as for those who say: 'Just as in the section on cessation in the Paṭisambhidāmagga, where it is stated, “At the moment of the stream-entry path, all phenomena that arise—except for mind-originated materiality—are characterized by dispassion, have dispassion as their object, dispassion as their domain, arise from dispassion, and are established in dispassion,” and so on, the phrase “except for mind-originated materiality” is used, not “except for materiality,” because materiality connected to the mind is mind-originated; thus “except for mind-originated materiality” is stated. Similarly, here too, because it is connected to the mind, only mind-originated materiality is discussed'—that is not so. For those for whom the stream-entry path is a conascent condition, and for whom dispassion and so on is to be expected, those phenomena conascent with the stream-entry path are called 'phenomena born at the moment of the stream-entry path' there. The statement 'born at the moment of the stream-entry path' indeed indicates being born in the path, and kamma-born and other phenomena, being born not in the path, are not worthy of the designation 'born at the moment of the path', because for them there is no state of being a conascent condition at that moment of the stream-entry path. Therefore, in order to exclude what should be excluded among the phenomena conascent with it at the moment of the path, it is said, 'except for mind-originated materiality.' Here, however, the connection and non-connection of the arising and cessation of indeterminate phenomena with wholesome and other phenomena are examined in relation to that person and that location where wholesome and other phenomena arise and cease. And kamma-born and other materiality is not non-indeterminate; therefore, for the person or in the location taken by the thesis, when arising and cessation are present, those of the indeterminate phenomena should be known; and when they are not present, they should be denied. And it cannot be said that indeterminate phenomena unconnected with the mind are not included here, because of the statement about the arising and cessation for those in the attainment of cessation and for non-percipient beings.

Catutthapañhe pavatte akusalābyākatacittassa uppādakkhaṇeti idaṃ ‘‘yassa vā pana abyākatā dhammā uppajjantī’’ti etena sanniṭṭhānena gahitesu pañcavokāre akusalābyākatacittānaṃ catuvokāre ca abyākatacittasseva uppādakkhaṇasamaṅgino sandhāya vuttaṃ. Evaṃ sabbattha sanniṭṭhānavasena viseso veditabbo.

In the fourth question, the phrase 'the moment of arising of unwholesome and indeterminate consciousness in the course of existence' is stated with reference to those endowed with the moment of arising of unwholesome and indeterminate consciousness in the five-constituent existence, and of only indeterminate consciousness in the four-constituent existence, who are included in the thesis 'or for whom indeterminate states arise.' Thus, everywhere the distinction should be understood according to the thesis.

79. ‘‘Ekāvajjanena 166 uppannassā’’ti vuttaṃ, nānāvajjanenapi pana tato purimatarajavanavīthīsu uppannassa ‘‘uppādakkhaṇe tesaṃ akusalā dhammā nuppajjissanti, no ca tesaṃ kusalā dhammā nuppajjantī’’ti idaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ labbhateva, tasmā etena lakkhaṇena samānalakkhaṇaṃ sabbaṃ yassa cittassa anantarā aggamaggaṃ paṭilabhissanti, tassa cittassa uppādakkhaṇeti eteneva kusalānāgatabhāvapariyosānena tāya eva samānalakkhaṇatāya dīpitaṃ hotīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Esa nayo akusalātītabhāvassa abyākatātītabhāvassa ca ādimhi ‘‘dutiye akusale’’ti, ‘‘dutiye citte’’ti ca vuttaṭṭhāne. Yathā hi bhāvanāvāre bhāvanāpahānānaṃ pariyosānena [Pg.156] aggamaggena tato purimatarānipi bhāvanāpahānāni dassitāni honti, evamidhāpi taṃ taṃ tena tena ādinā antena ca dassitanti.

79. It is said, 'of that which has arisen with a single adverting,' but even for that which has arisen with various advertings in the preceding impulsion-processes, this characteristic is indeed obtained: 'At the moment of their arising, unwholesome states will not arise for them, but it is not that wholesome states will not arise for them.' Therefore, it should be seen that the moment of arising of any consciousness, immediately after which they will attain the highest path, which has the same characteristic as this characteristic, is indicated by this very conclusion of the future wholesome state, due to that very sameness of characteristic. This is the method at the beginning for the pastness of the unwholesome and the pastness of the indeterminate, in the places where it is said 'at the second unwholesome' and 'at the second consciousness.' For just as in the section on development, the abandonments by development that are even earlier are shown by the conclusion with the highest path, so too here, each is shown by its respective beginning and end.

100. Pañcavokāre akusalānaṃ bhaṅgakkhaṇe tesaṃ akusalā ca dhammā nirujjhanti abyākatā ca dhammā nirujjhantīti vacanena paṭisandhicittato soḷasamaṃ, tato parampi vā bhavanikanticittaṃ hoti, na tato oranti viññāyatīti.

100. By the statement, 'In the five-constituent existence, at the moment of dissolution of unwholesome states, for them both unwholesome states cease and indeterminate states cease,' it is understood that the consciousness of craving for existence occurs at the sixteenth moment from the rebirth-linking consciousness, or even beyond that, but not prior to that.

Pavattivāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the section on the course of existence is concluded.

Dhammayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Dhammayamaka is concluded.

10. Indriyayamakaṃ

10. The Indriya Yamaka

1. Paṇṇattivāro

1. The Section on Designations

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Summary Section

1. Indriyayamake vibhaṅge viya jīvitindriyaṃ manindriyānantaraṃ aniddisitvā purisindriyānantaraṃ uddiṭṭhaṃ ‘‘tīṇimāni, bhikkhave, indriyāni. Katamāni tīṇi? Itthindriyaṃ purisindriyaṃ jīvitindriya’’nti (saṃ. ni. 5.492) sutte desitakkamena. Pavattivāre hi ekantaṃ pavattiyaṃ eva uppajjamānānaṃ sukhindriyādīnaṃ kammajānaṃ akammajānañca anupālakaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ cutipaṭisandhīsu ca pavattamānānaṃ kammajānanti taṃmūlakāni yamakāni cutipaṭisandhipavattivasena vattabbānīti veditabbāni. Cakkhundriyādīsu pana purisindriyāvasānesu yaṃ mūlakameva na hoti manindriyaṃ, taṃ ṭhapetvā avasesamūlakāni cutiupapattivaseneva vattabbāni āyatanayamake viya, tasmā jīvitindriyaṃ tesaṃ majjhe anuddisitvā ante uddiṭṭhanti.

1. In the Indriya Yamaka, as in the Vibhaṅga, the life-faculty is not indicated immediately after the mind-faculty, but is indicated after the masculine faculty, according to the sequence taught in the sutta (Saṃyutta Nikāya 5.492): 'Bhikkhus, there are these three faculties. Which three? The feminine faculty, the masculine faculty, and the life-faculty.' For in the section on the course of existence, the life-faculty is the sustainer of the kamma-born and non-kamma-born pleasure-faculty and so on, which arise exclusively in the course of existence, and of the kamma-born faculties occurring in death and rebirth-linking. Therefore, the pairs of doubles rooted in it should be understood as being spoken of in terms of death, rebirth-linking, and the course of existence. But concerning the eye-faculty and so on, ending with the masculine faculty, excluding the mind-faculty which is not a root at all, the remaining roots should be spoken of only in terms of death and rebirth, as in the Āyatana Yamaka. Therefore, the life-faculty, not having been indicated in the middle of them, is indicated at the end.

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Summary Section is concluded.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Exposition Section

94. Itthī itthindriyanti ettha yasmā itthīti koci sabhāvo natthi, na ca rūpādidhamme upādāya itthiggahaṇaṃ na hoti, tasmā itthiggahaṇassa avijjamānampi [Pg.157] vijjamānamiva gahetvā pavattito tathāgahitassa vasena ‘‘natthī’’ti avatvā ‘‘no’’ti vuttaṃ. Sukhassa ca bhedaṃ katvā ‘‘sukhaṃ somanassa’’nti, dukkhassa ca ‘‘dukkhaṃ domanassa’’nti vacaneneva somanassato aññā sukhā vedanā sukhaṃ, domanassato ca aññā dukkhā vedanā dukkhanti ayaṃ viseso gahitoyevāti ‘‘sukhaṃ sukhindriyaṃ dukkhaṃ dukkhindriya’’nti ettha ‘‘āmantā’’ti vuttaṃ.

94. Here, regarding 'a woman is the feminine faculty,' since there is no intrinsic nature as 'woman,' and yet the designation 'woman' does not occur without depending on phenomena such as form, etc., therefore, because the designation 'woman,' though non-existent, is taken as if existent and proceeds based on what is thus taken, it is said 'no' instead of 'it does not exist.' Furthermore, by the very statement making a distinction of pleasure as 'pleasure is joy,' and of pain as 'pain is sorrow,' this distinction is indeed understood: that pleasant feeling other than joy is pleasure, and painful feeling other than sorrow is pain. Therefore, regarding 'pleasure is the pleasure-faculty, pain is the pain-faculty,' it is said 'yes.'

140. Suddhindriyavāre cakkhu indriyanti ettha dibbacakkhupaññācakkhūni paññindriyāni hontīti ‘‘āmantā’’ti vuttaṃ. Avasesaṃ sotanti taṇhāsotamevāha.

140. In the Pure Faculties Section, regarding 'the eye is a faculty,' it is said 'yes,' because the divine eye and the wisdom eye are the wisdom faculty. In the remaining case, 'stream' refers only to the stream of craving.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Niddesa Chapter is concluded.

2.Pavattivāravaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Occurrence Chapter

186. Pavattivāre ‘‘chayimāni, bhikkhave, indriyāni. Katamāni cha? Cakkhundriyaṃ…pe… kāyindriyaṃ manindriya’’nti (saṃ. ni. 5.495) sutte vuttanayena idha uddiṭṭhaṃ manindriyaṃ cutipaṭisandhipavattīsu pavattamānehi kammajākammajehi sabbehipi yogaṃ gacchati, na ca jīvitindriyaṃ viya aññadhammanissayena gahetabbaṃ, pubbaṅgamattāva padhānaṃ, tasmā kūṭaṃ viya gopānasīnaṃ sabbindriyānaṃ samosaraṇaṭṭhānaṃ ante ṭhapetvā yojitaṃ. Jīvitindriyādimūlakesu pavattiñca gahetvā gatesu ‘‘yassa jīvitindriyaṃ uppajjati, tassa sukhindriyaṃ uppajjatīti? Sabbesaṃ upapajjantānaṃ, pavatte sukhindriyavippayuttacittassa uppādakkhaṇe tesaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ uppajjati, no ca tesaṃ sukhindriyaṃ uppajjati, sukhindriyasampayuttacittassa uppādakkhaṇe tesaṃ jīvitindriyañca uppajjati sukhindriyañca uppajjatī’’tiādinā sukhadukkhadomanassindriyehi lokuttarindriyehi ca yojanā labbhati, tathā ‘‘yassa sukhindriyaṃ uppajjati, tassa dukkhindriyaṃ uppajjatīti? No’’tiādinā taṃmūlakā ca nayā. Tehi pana pavattiyaṃyeva uppajjamānehi yojanā taṃmūlakā ca cutipaṭisandhipavattīsu pavattamānehi somanassindriyādīhi yojanāya jīvitindriyamūlakehi ca nayehi pākaṭāyevāti katvā na vuttāti daṭṭhabbā.

186. In the Occurrence Chapter, the mind-faculty mentioned here, in the manner stated in the sutta (Saṃyutta Nikāya 5.495)—'Monks, there are these six faculties. Which six? The eye-faculty... the body-faculty, the mind-faculty'—is connected with all kamma-born and non-kamma-born phenomena occurring in death, rebirth-linking, and occurrence. It should not be taken as dependent on another phenomenon like the life-faculty; rather, its being a forerunner is primary. Therefore, like the peak of a roof where the main rafters converge, it is placed last, being the converging point of all faculties, and is thus connected. In the root-pairs beginning with the life-faculty, when occurrence is also included, the following connections are obtained: 'For one in whom the life-faculty arises, does the pleasure-faculty arise? For all those undergoing rebirth, and at the moment of the arising of a consciousness dissociated from the pleasure-faculty in occurrence, their life-faculty arises, but their pleasure-faculty does not arise. However, at the moment of the arising of a consciousness associated with the pleasure-faculty, both their life-faculty and their pleasure-faculty arise.' Similarly, connections are obtained with the pleasure, pain, and grief-faculties, and the transcendent faculties. Likewise, the methods rooted in these are: 'For one in whom the pleasure-faculty arises, does the pain-faculty arise? No,' and so on. However, the connections with those faculties that arise only in occurrence, and the methods rooted in them, as well as the connections with the joy-faculty and others that occur in death, rebirth-linking, and occurrence, and the methods rooted in the life-faculty, are already evident. Therefore, it should be understood that they are not explicitly mentioned.

‘‘Sacakkhukānaṃ [Pg.158] vinā somanassenāti upekkhāsahagatānaṃ catunnaṃ mahāvipākapaṭisandhīnaṃ vasena vutta’’nti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaṃ, taṃ somanassavirahitasacakkhukapaṭisandhinidassanavasena vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Na hi ‘‘catunnaṃyevā’’ti niyamo kato, tena taṃsamānalakkhaṇā parittavipākarūpāvacarapaṭisandhiyopi dassitā honti. Tattha kāmāvacaresu somanassapaṭisandhisamānatāya mahāvipākehi catūhi nidassanaṃ kataṃ, tena yathā sasomanassapaṭisandhikā acakkhukā na honti, evaṃ itaramahāvipākapaṭisandhikāpīti ayamattho dassito hoti. Gabbhaseyyakānañca anuppannesu cakkhādīsu cavantānaṃ ahetukapaṭisandhikatā sahetukapaṭisandhikānaṃ kāmāvacarānaṃ niyamato sacakkhukādibhāvadassanena dassitā hoti. Gabbhaseyyakepi hi sandhāya ‘‘yassa vā pana somanassindriyaṃ uppajjati, tassa cakkhundriyaṃ uppajjatīti? Āmantā’’ti idaṃ vacanaṃ yathā yujjati, tathā āyatanayamake dassitaṃ. Na hi sanniṭṭhānena saṅgahitānaṃ gabbhaseyyakānaṃ vajjane kāraṇaṃ atthi, ‘‘itthīnaṃ aghānakānaṃ upapajjantīna’’ntiādīsu (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.187) ca te eva vuttāti.

It is stated in the commentary: '“Among those with eyes, without joy (somanassa)” is said by way of the four great resultant rebirth-linkings accompanied by equanimity.' This should be understood as being stated by way of example of a rebirth-linking with eyes but without joy. For there is no rule that it applies 'only to those four'; thereby, rebirth-linkings of the fine-material sphere and minor resultants with similar characteristics are also indicated. There, among sense-sphere beings, the example is made with the four great resultants due to their similarity to a rebirth-linking accompanied by joy. Thus, the meaning shown is that just as those with a rebirth-linking accompanied by joy are not without eyes, so too are those with the other great resultant rebirth-linkings. Furthermore, for those lying in the womb who die before the eyes and other faculties have arisen, their having a rootless rebirth-linking is shown by indicating that those with a rooted rebirth-linking in the sense-sphere invariably possess eyes and so forth. Regarding those in the womb, it is shown in the Āyatana Yamaka how the statement 'For one in whom the joy-faculty arises, does the eye-faculty arise? Yes' is applicable. For there is no reason to exclude those in the womb who are included by the determination, and they are indeed referred to in passages such as 'women who are without the nose-faculty when they are reborn' (Yamaka 3, Indriyayamaka, 187).

Upekkhāya acakkhukānanti ahetukapaṭisandhivasena vuttanti ettha ca kāmāvacare sopekkhaacakkhukapaṭisandhiyā taṃsamānalakkhaṇaṃ arūpapaṭisandhiñca nidassetīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Kesuci pana potthakesu ‘‘ahetukārūpapaṭisandhivasenā’’ti pāṭho dissati, so eva seyyo.

Regarding 'For those without eyes, by way of equanimity,' this is said by way of rootless rebirth-linking. Here, it should be understood that it indicates formless rebirth-linking as having the same characteristic as sense-sphere rebirth-linking with equanimity and without eyes. However, in some books, the reading 'by way of rootless formless rebirth-linking' is found, and that is indeed better.

‘‘Tattha hi ekanteneva saddhāsatipaññāyo natthi, samādhivīriyāni pana indriyappattāni na hontī’’ti vuttaṃ, yadi pana samādhivīriyāni santi, ‘‘indriyappattāni na hontī’’ti na sakkā vattuṃ ‘‘samādhi samādhindriyanti? Āmantā’’ti (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.113) ‘‘vīriyaṃ vīriyindriyanti? Āmantā’’ti (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.111) vacanato. Ahetukapaṭisandhicitte ca yathā samādhileso ekaggatā atthi, na evaṃ vīriyaleso atthi, tasmā evamettha vattabbaṃ siyā ‘‘tattha hi ekanteneva saddhāvīriyasatipaññāyo natthi, ekaggatā pana samādhileso eva hotī’’ti. Ayaṃ panettha adhippāyo siyā – yathā aññesu kesuci ahetukacittesu samādhivīriyāni honti indriyappattāni ca, evamidha samādhivīriyāni indriyappattāni na hontīti. Samādhivīriyindriyānameva abhāvaṃ dassento ahetukantarato viseseti[Pg.159]. Tattha ‘‘samādhivīriyāni pana na hontī’’ti vattabbe ‘‘indriyappattānī’’ti samādhilesassa samādhindriyabhāvaṃ appattassa sabbhāvato vuttaṃ, na vīriyalesassa. Visesanañhi visesitabbe pavattati. Yesu pana potthakesu ‘‘tattha ekanteneva saddhāvīriyasatipaññāyo natthī’’ti pāṭho, so eva sundarataro.

It is stated: 'Here, there is absolutely no faith, mindfulness, or wisdom, and concentration and energy do not attain the status of faculties.' But if concentration and energy exist, it cannot be said that 'they do not attain the status of faculties,' according to the statements: 'Is concentration the faculty of concentration? Yes' (Yamaka 3, Indriyayamaka, 113), and 'Is energy the faculty of energy? Yes' (Yamaka 3, Indriyayamaka, 111). In the rootless rebirth-linking consciousness, just as there is a trace of concentration, namely one-pointedness, there is no such trace of energy. Therefore, it should be stated thus: 'Here, there is absolutely no faith, energy, mindfulness, or wisdom, but one-pointedness is indeed a trace of concentration.' Here, the intended meaning might be this: just as in some other rootless consciousnesses, concentration and energy exist and attain the status of faculties, so here, concentration and energy do not attain the status of faculties. By showing the absence of the faculties of concentration and energy, it distinguishes this from other rootless states. There, when it should be said 'but concentration and energy do not exist,' the phrase 'do not attain the status of faculties' is stated because of the existence of a trace of concentration that has not attained the status of the faculty of concentration, but not because of a trace of energy. For a qualification applies to what is qualified. However, in some books, the reading 'Here, there is absolutely no faith, energy, mindfulness, or wisdom' is found, and that is indeed more elegant.

Yāva cakkhundriyaṃ nuppajjati, tāva gabbhagatānaṃ acakkhukānaṃ bhāvo atthīti iminā adhippāyenāha ‘‘sahetukānaṃ acakkhukānanti gabbhaseyyakavasena ceva arūpīvasena ca vutta’’nti. Gabbhaseyyakāpi pana avassaṃ uppajjanakacakkhukā na labbhantīti daṭṭhabbā. Sacakkhukānaṃ ñāṇavippayuttānanti kāmadhātuyaṃ duhetukapaṭisandhikānaṃ vasena vuttanti idhāpi ahetukapaṭisandhikā ca acakkhukā labbhanteva. Itthipurisindriyasantānānampi upapattivasena uppādo, cutivasena nirodho bāhullavasena dassito. Kadāci hi tesaṃ paṭhamakappikādīnaṃ viya pavattiyampi uppādanirodhā hontīti. Ettha purisindriyāvasānesu indriyamūlayamakesu paṭhamapucchāsu sanniṭṭhānehi gahitehi upapatticutivasena gacchantehi cakkhundriyādīhi niyamitattā jīvitindriyādīnaṃ pavattivasenapi labbhamānānaṃ upapatticutivaseneva dutiyapucchāsu sanniṭṭhānehi gahaṇaṃ veditabbaṃ.

As long as the eye-faculty has not arisen, the state of being without eyes exists for those in the womb; with this meaning, it is said: 'For those with root-causes but without eyes,' which is stated by way of those in the womb and also by way of formless beings. However, it should be understood that those in the womb are not necessarily found to be ones for whom the eye-faculty will inevitably arise. Regarding 'those with eyes but dissociated from knowledge,' this is stated by way of those who take rebirth in the sense-sphere with two root-causes. Here, those with rootless rebirth-linking and those without eyes are also found. The arising of the continuity of the feminine and masculine faculties by way of rebirth, and their cessation by way of death, are shown for the most part. For sometimes, their arising and cessation also occur in the course of life, as in the case of those in the first cosmic cycle, etc. Here, in the root-pairs of faculties ending with the masculine faculty, since it is determined by the eye-faculty and others—which proceed by way of rebirth and death and are taken by the determinations in the first questions—it should be understood that the life-faculty and others, which are obtainable even by way of occurrence, are taken by the determinations in the second questions only by way of rebirth and death.

190. Rūpajīvitindriyaṃ cakkhundriyādisamānagatikaṃ cutipaṭisandhivaseneva gacchati santānuppattinirodhadassanatoti āha ‘‘pavatte somanassavippayuttacittassa uppādakkhaṇeti arūpajīvitindriyaṃ sandhāya vutta’’nti. Etesañceva aññesañca pañcindriyānaṃ yathālābhavasenāti ettha etesaṃ jīvitindriyādīnaṃ cutipaṭisandhipavattesu, aññesañca cakkhundriyādīnaṃ cutipaṭisandhīsūti evaṃ yathālābho daṭṭhabbo. Ayaṃ pana chedeyevāti ettha tassa tassa paripuṇṇapañhassa tasmiṃ tasmiṃ sarūpadassanena vissajjane vissajjite pacchimakoṭṭhāsassa chedoti nāmaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ.

190. The material life faculty, having a course similar to the eye faculty and so forth, proceeds only by way of death and rebirth-linking, from showing the arising and cessation of the continuity. Thus it is said, 'At the moment of arising of a consciousness dissociated from joy in the course of existence,' this refers to the immaterial life faculty. Here, 'according to the availability of these and other five faculties' means that for these, the life faculty and so forth, in death, rebirth-linking, and the course of existence, and for the others, the eye faculty and so forth, in death and rebirth-linking, thus the availability should be understood. But here, 'this is indeed the cutting off' means that when an answer is given for each complete question by showing its respective nature, the final portion should be understood as the name 'the cutting off'.

Yassa vā pana somanassindriyaṃ na uppajjati, tassa jīvitindriyaṃ na uppajjatīti? Vinā somanassena upapajjantānaṃ pavatte somanassavippayuttacittassa uppādakkhaṇe tesaṃ somanassindriyaṃ na uppajjati, no ca tesaṃ [Pg.160] jīvitindriyaṃ na uppajjatīti ettha ‘‘nirodhasamāpannānaṃ asaññasattāna’’nti avacanaṃ rūpajīvitindriyassa cakkhundriyādisamānagatikataṃ dīpeti. Tassa hi upapattiyaṃyeva uppādo vattabboti. ‘‘Vinā somanassena upapajjantāna’’nti ettha asaññasatte saṅgahetvā pavattivasena te ca nirodhasamāpannā ca na vuttā, anuppādopi panetassa cutiupapattīsveva vattabbo, na pavatteti. Pacchimakoṭṭhāsepi ‘‘sabbesaṃ cavantānaṃ, pavatte cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe tesaṃ somanassindriyañca na uppajjati jīvitindriyañca na uppajjatī’’ti evaṃ ‘‘sabbesaṃ cavantāna’’nti ettheva asaññasatte saṅgaṇhitvā pavattivasena te ca nirodhasamāpannā na ca vuttā. Yassayatthake ca nirodhasamāpannā na dassetabbā na gahetabbāti attho. Na hi ‘‘nirodhasamāpannāna’’nti vacanaṃ ‘‘asaññasattāna’’nti vacanaṃ viya okāsadīpakaṃ, nāpi ‘‘upekkhāsampayuttacittassa uppādakkhaṇe, sabbesaṃ cittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe’’tiādivacanaṃ viya somanassindriyādīnaṃ anuppādakkhaṇadīpakaṃ, atha kho puggaladīpakamevāti.

Or for one in whom the faculty of joy does not arise, does the faculty of life not arise? For those arising without joy, at the moment of arising of a consciousness dissociated from joy in the course of existence, the faculty of joy does not arise in them, but the faculty of life does arise. Here, the non-mention of 'for those in cessation attainment and non-percipient beings' indicates that the material life faculty has a course similar to the eye faculty and so forth. For its arising should be stated only at rebirth. In the phrase 'for those arising without joy,' non-percipient beings are included, but neither they nor those in cessation attainment are mentioned in terms of the course of existence. Moreover, its non-arising should be stated only at death and rebirth, not in the course of existence. In the final section too, in the statement 'for all who are dying, at the moment of dissolution of consciousness in the course of existence, the faculty of joy does not arise in them, nor does the faculty of life arise,' non-percipient beings are included within 'for all who are dying,' but neither they nor those in cessation attainment are mentioned in terms of the course of existence. The meaning is that those in cessation attainment should not be shown or included in the context of the 'yassa' proposition. For the statement 'for those in cessation attainment' is not like the statement 'for non-percipient beings,' which indicates a location, nor is it like the statements 'at the moment of arising of a consciousness associated with equanimity,' or 'at the moment of dissolution of all consciousnesses,' which indicate the moments of non-arising of the faculty of joy and so forth. Rather, it indicates only individuals.

Atītakālabhede suddhāvāsānaṃ upapatticittassa uppādakkhaṇe tesaṃ tattha somanassindriyañca na uppajjittha jīvitindriyañca na uppajjitthāti ettha ‘‘upapatticittassa uppādakkhaṇe’’ti kasmā vuttaṃ, nanu ‘‘suddhāvāsaṃ upapajjantānaṃ, asaññasattānaṃ tesaṃ tattha somanassindriyañca na uppajjittha manindriyañca na uppajjitthā’’ti (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.277) ettha viya ‘‘upapajjantāna’’nti vattabbanti? Na vattabbaṃ. Yathā hi somanassamanindriyānaṃ vasena upapajjantā puggalā upapatticittasamaṅgino honti, na evaṃ somanassajīvitindriyānaṃ vasena upapattisamaṅginoyeva honti. Jīvitindriyassa hi vasena yāva paṭhamarūpajīvitindriyaṃ dharati, tāva upapajjantā nāma honti. Tadā ca dutiyacittato paṭṭhāya ‘‘jīvitindriyañca na uppajjitthā’’ti na sakkā vattuṃ arūpajīvitindriyassa uppajjitvā niruddhattā, tasmā ubhayaṃ uppādakkhaṇena nidassitaṃ. Yathā hi ‘‘na nirujjhitthā’’ti idaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ upapatticittassa dvīsu khaṇesu labbhamānaṃ sabbapaṭhamena upapatticittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇena nidassitaṃ, evamidhāpi daṭṭhabbaṃ.

In the distinction of past time, at the moment of the arising of the rebirth-linking consciousness of those in the Pure Abodes, neither the faculty of joy nor the life faculty arose there for them. Here, why is it said, 'at the moment of the arising of the rebirth-linking consciousness'? Should it not be said, 'for those being reborn in the Pure Abodes,' as in the text 'for those being reborn in the Pure Abodes, for non-percipient beings, neither the faculty of joy nor the mind faculty arose there for them' (Yam. 3.277)? It should not be said so. For just as individuals being reborn by means of the faculties of joy and mind are endowed with the rebirth-linking consciousness, it is not so that they are endowed with the rebirth-process by means of the faculties of joy and life. For by means of the life faculty, as long as the first material life faculty endures, they are called 'being reborn.' But then, from the second consciousness onward, it cannot be said, 'the life faculty did not arise,' because the immaterial life faculty has arisen and ceased. Therefore, both are indicated by the moment of arising. Just as the characteristic 'did not cease' is found in two moments of the rebirth-linking consciousness but is indicated by the dissolution moment of the very first rebirth-linking consciousness, so too should this be understood here.

Anāgatakālabhede uppajjissamāne sanniṭṭhānaṃ katvā aññassa ca uppajjissamānatāva pucchitā. Tattha yathā paccuppannakālabhede sanniṭṭhānasaṃsayabhedehi uppajjamānasseva gahitattā ‘‘yassa cakkhundriyādīni uppajjanti[Pg.161], upapajjantassa tassa jīvitindriyādīni uppajjantī’’ti upapajjantasseva pucchitānaṃ upapattiyaṃyeva tesaṃ uppādo sambhavati, na aññattha, na evamidha ‘‘yassa cakkhundriyādīni uppajjissanti, upapajjantassa tassa jīvitindriyādīni uppajjissantī’’ti upapajjantasseva pucchitānaṃ tesaṃ upapattito aññattha uppādo na sambhavati, tasmā ‘‘yassa cakkhundriyaṃ uppajjissati, tassa somanassindriyaṃ uppajjissatīti? Āmantā’’ti vuttaṃ. Evañca katvā nirodhavārepi ‘‘yassa cakkhundriyaṃ nirujjhissati, tassa somanassindriyaṃ nirujjhissatīti? Āmantā’’ti vuttaṃ. Na hi yassa cakkhundriyaṃ nirujjhissati, tassa somanassindriyaṃ na nirujjhissati, api pacchimabhavikassa upekkhāsahagatapaṭisandhikassa. Na hi upapajjantassa tassa cutito pubbeva somanassindriyanirodho na sambhavatīti. Ettha hi paṭhamapucchāsu sanniṭṭhānattho pucchitabbatthanissayo mādisova upapattiuppādindriyavā ubhayuppādindriyavā attho paṭinivattitvāpi pucchitabbatthassa nissayoti evaṃ viya dutiyapucchāsu sanniṭṭhānatthameva niyameti, na tattheva pucchitabbaṃ anāgatabhāvamattena sarūpato gahitaṃ uppādaṃ vā nirodhaṃ vā saṃsayatthanti. Yasmā cevaṃ sanniṭṭhānatthassa niyamo hoti, tasmā ‘‘yassa vā pana somanassindriyaṃ uppajjissati, tassa cakkhundriyaṃ uppajjissatīti? Āmantā’’ti (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.281) vuttaṃ. Esa nayo nirodhavārepi.

In the distinction of the future tense, having made a determination regarding what will arise, the arising of another is also questioned. There, just as in the distinction of the present tense—because in the determination and doubt sections only what is presently arising is taken—for the question, 'For one in whom the eye faculty and so forth arise, for one who is being reborn, do the life faculty and so forth arise?', their arising is possible only at rebirth, not elsewhere. But it is not so here; for the question, 'For one in whom the eye faculty and so forth will arise, for one who is being reborn, will the life faculty and so forth arise?', it is not the case that their arising is impossible elsewhere than at rebirth. Therefore, it is said: 'For one in whom the eye faculty will arise, will the faculty of joy arise? Yes.' And so, in the cessation section too, it is said: 'For one in whom the eye faculty will cease, will the faculty of joy cease? Yes.' For it is not the case that for one in whom the eye faculty will cease, the faculty of joy will not cease—even for one in their last existence who is reborn with equanimity. For it is not the case that for one who is being reborn, the cessation of the faculty of joy is impossible before their death. Here, in the first questions, the meaning of the determination serves as the basis for what is to be asked; similarly, the meaning—whether of faculties arising at rebirth or of faculties arising in both ways—even when reversed, serves as the basis for what is to be asked. Thus, in the second questions, it fixes only the meaning of the determination, and what is to be questioned there—the arising or cessation, taken in its own nature merely by virtue of being in the future—is not the object of doubt. And because the meaning of the determination is thus fixed, it is therefore said: 'Or for one in whom the faculty of joy will arise, will the eye faculty arise? Yes.' (Yam. 3.281). This is the method in the cessation section as well.

Paṭilome pana yathā anulome ‘‘uppajjissati nirujjhissatī’’ti uppādanirodhā anāgatā sarūpavasena vuttā, evaṃ avuttattā yathā tattha saṃsayapadena gahitassa indriyassa pavattiyampi uppādanirodhā cakkhundriyādimūlakesu yojitā, na evaṃ yojetabbā. Yathā hi uppādanirodhe atikkamitvā appatvā ca uppādanirodhā sambhavanti yojetuṃ, na evaṃ anuppādānirodhe atikkamitvā appatvā ca anuppādānirodhā sambhavanti abhūtābhāvassa abhūtābhāvaṃ atikkamitvā appatvā ca sambhavānuppattito, abhūtuppādanirodhābhāvo ca paṭilome pucchito, tasmāssa visesarahitassa abhūtābhāvassa vattamānānaṃ uppādassa viya kālantarayogābhāvato yādisānaṃ cakkhādīnaṃ uppādanirodhābhāvena pucchitabbassa nissayo sanniṭṭhānena sannicchito, tannissayā tādisānaṃyeva upapatticutiuppādanirodhānaṃ jīvitādīnampi anuppādānirodhā saṃsayapadena [Pg.162] pucchitā hontīti ‘‘yassa cakkhundriyaṃ nuppajjissati, tassa somanassindriyaṃ nuppajjissatīti? Āmantā’’ti (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.308) ca, ‘‘yassa cakkhundriyaṃ na nirujjhissati, tassa somanassindriyaṃ na nirujjhissatīti? Āmantā’’ti ca vuttaṃ, na vuttaṃ ‘‘ye arūpaṃ upapajjitvā parinibbāyissantī’’tiādinā jīvitindriyaupekkhindriyādīsu viya vissajjananti.

But in the reverse order, unlike in the forward order where future arising and cessation are stated in terms of their own nature as 'will arise, will cease,' since it is not stated thus here, the arising and cessation of the faculty taken by the term of doubt, just as they are connected in the sections rooted in the eye faculty and so on, should not be connected in this way. For just as it is possible to connect arising and cessation by having gone beyond and not having reached them, it is not so possible to connect non-arising and non-cessation by having gone beyond and not having reached them, because it is impossible for the non-existence of what has not been to occur by having gone beyond or not having reached the non-existence of what has not been. And in the reverse order, what is asked is the non-existence of the arising and cessation of what has not been. Therefore, for that non-existence of what has not been, which is without distinction and, like the arising of present things, has no connection with another time, the basis of what is to be questioned by the non-existence of arising and cessation of such things as the eye faculty and so on, is determined by the conclusion. Based on that, the non-arising and non-cessation of such things as rebirth, death, arising, and cessation, and even of the life faculty and so on, are questioned by the term of doubt. Thus it is said: 'For one whose eye faculty will not arise, will the faculty of joy not arise? Yes.' (Yam. 3. Indriyayamaka.308) and 'For one whose eye faculty will not cease, will the faculty of joy not cease? Yes.' It is not stated as in the answer regarding the life faculty, the faculty of equanimity, and so on, with 'those who will attain final Nibbāna after being reborn in the formless realm,' etc.

Ye rūpāvacaraṃ upapajjitvā parinibbāyissanti, tesaṃ ghānindriyaṃ na uppajjissati, no ca tesaṃ somanassindriyaṃ na uppajjissatī’’ti ettha ye sopekkhapaṭisandhikā bhavissanti, te ‘‘ye ca arūpaṃ upapajjitvā parinibbāyissantī’’ti etena pacchimakoṭṭhāsavacanena taṃsamānalakkhaṇatāya saṅgahitāti ye somanassapaṭisandhikā bhavissanti, te eva vuttāti daṭṭhabbā.

In the passage, 'For those who, having been reborn in the Form realm, will attain final Nibbāna, their olfactory faculty will not arise, but it is not the case that for them the faculty of joy will not arise'—here, those who will have rebirth-linking with equanimity are included by the statement of the final portion, 'and those who, having been reborn in the Formless realm, will attain final Nibbāna,' due to sharing the same characteristic. It should be understood that only those who will have rebirth-linking with joy are spoken of.

Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ yesu ādimapotthakesu ‘‘atītānāgatavāre suddhāvāsānaṃ upapatticittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe manindriyañca nuppajjitthāti dhammayamake viya uppādakkhaṇātikkamavasena atthaṃ aggahetvā’’ti likhitaṃ, taṃ pamādalikhitaṃ. Yesu pana potthakesu ‘‘paccuppannātītavāre suddhāvāsānaṃ upapatticittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe manindriyañca nuppajjitthāti…pe… tasmiṃ bhave anuppannapubbavasena attho gahetabbo’’ti pāṭho dissati, so eva sundarataroti.

In the commentary, in some initial manuscripts, it is written—without taking the meaning as transcending the moment of arising, as in the Dhamma Yamaka—"In the past-future case, for the Suddhāvāsā, at the moment of dissolution of the rebirth-linking consciousness, the mind faculty also did not arise." This, however, is carelessly written. But in some manuscripts, the reading is found: "In the present-past case, for the Suddhāvāsā, at the moment of dissolution of the rebirth-linking consciousness, the mind faculty also did not arise… the meaning should be taken as 'not having arisen previously in that existence.'" This is the more excellent reading.

Pavattivāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Section on Occurrence is concluded.

3. Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of the Section on Full Understanding

435-482. Pariññāvāre lokiyaabyākatamissakāni cāti dukkhasaccapariyāpannehi ekantapariññeyyehi lokiyaabyākatehi missakattā tāni upādāya manindriyādīnaṃ vedanākkhandhādīnaṃ viya pariññeyyatā ca vuttā. Yadi pariññeyyamissakattā pariññeyyatā hoti, kasmā dhammayamake ‘‘yo kusalaṃ dhammaṃ bhāveti, so abyākataṃ dhammaṃ parijānātī’’tiādinā abyākatapadena yojetvā yamakāni na vuttānīti? Yathā ‘‘kusalaṃ bhāvemi, akusalaṃ pajahāmī’’ti kusalākusalesu [Pg.163] bhāvanāpahānābhiniveso hoti, tathā ‘‘vedanākkhandho anicco, dhammāyatanaṃ anicca’’ntiādinā khandhādīsu parijānābhiniveso hoti, tattha vedanākkhandhādayo ‘‘anicca’’ntiādinā parijānitabbā, te ca vedanākkhandhādibhāvaṃ gahetvā parijānitabbā, na abyākatabhāvanti.

435-482. In the Section on Full Understanding, with reference to the mixed mundane indeterminate states, the quality of being fully understandable is also stated for things like the mind faculty and the feeling aggregate, because they are mixed with mundane indeterminate states that are included in the truth of suffering and are entirely to be fully understood. If the quality of being fully understandable arises from being mixed with what is to be fully understood, why in the Dhammayamaka were the paired statements not made by connecting the term 'indeterminate,' as in 'One who develops a wholesome state fully understands an indeterminate state,' etc.? Just as there is an emphasis on developing the wholesome and abandoning the unwholesome with statements like 'I develop the wholesome, I abandon the unwholesome,' so too there is an emphasis on fully understanding the aggregates, etc., with statements like 'The aggregate of feeling is impermanent, the phenomena base is impermanent.' Here, the aggregate of feeling, etc., are to be fully understood as 'impermanent,' etc., and they must be fully understood by grasping their nature as the aggregate of feeling, etc., not their nature as indeterminate.

Kasmā panettha dukkhasaccabhājanīye āgatassa domanassassa pahātabbatāva vuttā, na pariññeyyatā, nanu dukkhasaccapariyāpannā vedanākkhandhādayo kusalākusalabhāvena aggahitā kusalākusalāpi pariññeyyāti? Saccaṃ, yathā pana vedanākkhandhādibhāvo bhāvetabbapahātabbabhāvehi vināpi hoti, na evaṃ domanassindriyabhāvo pahātabbabhāvena vinā hotīti imaṃ visesaṃ dassetuṃ domanassindriyassa pahātabbatāva idha vuttā, na pariññeyyabhāvassa abhāvatoti daṭṭhabbo. Akusalaṃ ekantato pahātabbamevāti etena pahātabbameva, na appahātabbanti appahātabbameva nivāreti, na pariññeyyabhāvanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Aññindriyaṃ bhāvetabbaniṭṭhaṃ, na pana sacchikātabbaniṭṭhanti bhāvetabbabhāvo eva tassa gahitoti. ‘‘Dve puggalā’’tiādi ‘‘cakkhundriyaṃ na parijānātī’’tiādikassa parato likhitabbaṃ uppaṭipāṭiyā likhitanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Cakkhundriyamūlakañhi atikkamitvā domanassindriyamūlake idaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘dve puggalā domanassindriyaṃ na pajahanti no ca aññindriyaṃ na bhāventī’’ti (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.440).

Why here is only the quality of being abandonable stated for sorrow, which comes under the classification of the truth of suffering, and not the quality of being fully understandable? Is it not the case that the feeling aggregate and so on, included in the truth of suffering, whether wholesome or unwholesome, are to be fully understood, not being grasped by way of their nature as wholesome or unwholesome? It is true. However, it should be understood that the quality of being abandonable of the sorrow faculty is stated here to show this distinction: that while the nature of the feeling aggregate and so on can exist even without being states to be developed or abandoned, the nature of the sorrow faculty cannot exist without being a state to be abandoned. This is stated not because of the absence of its quality of being fully understandable. By 'the unwholesome is entirely to be abandoned,' it should be understood that this precludes only its non-abandonment, not its quality of being fully understandable. The faculty of final knowledge has development as its culmination, not realization as its culmination; thus, its nature as something to be developed is what is taken up. It should be understood that 'Two persons,' etc., was written out of order; it should have been written after 'does not fully understand the eye faculty,' etc. For, having passed over the section rooted in the eye faculty, this was said in the section rooted in the sorrow faculty: 'Two persons do not abandon the sorrow faculty, but they do develop the faculty of final knowledge' (Yam. 3, Indriyayamaka, 440).

Ettha ca puthujjano, aṭṭha ca ariyāti nava puggalā. Tesu puthujjano bhabbābhabbavasena duvidho, so ‘‘puthujjano’’ti āgataṭṭhānesu ‘‘cha puggalā cakkhundriyañca na parijānittha domanassindriyañca na pajahitthā’’tiādīsu ca abhinditvā gahito. ‘‘Ye puthujjanā maggaṃ paṭilabhissantī’’ti (yama. 1.saccayamaka.49, 51-52) āgataṭṭhānesu ‘‘pañca puggalā cakkhundriyañca parijānissanti domanassindriyañca pajahissantī’’tiādīsu (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.451) ca bhabbo eva bhinditvā gahito. ‘‘Ye ca puthujjanā maggaṃ na paṭilabhissantī’’ti (yama. 1.saccayamaka.51) āgataṭṭhānesu ‘‘tayo puggalā domanassindriyañca nappajahissanti cakkhundriyañca na parijānissantī’’tiādīsu (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.455) ca abhabbo eva. Aggaphalasamaṅgī ca paṭhamaphalasamaṅgī arahā cāti duvidho. Sopi ‘‘arahā’’ti āgataṭṭhānesu ‘‘tayo puggalā anaññātaññassāmītindriyañca bhāvittha [Pg.164] domanassindriyañca pajahitthā’’tiādīsu (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.444) ca abhinditvā gahito. ‘‘Yo aggaphalaṃ sacchikarotī’’ti (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.446) āgataṭṭhānesu ‘‘tayo puggalā domanassindriyaṃ pajahittha, no ca aññātāvindriyaṃ sacchikaritthā’’tiādīsu (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.444) ca paṭhamaphalasamaṅgī ca bhinditvā gahito. ‘‘Yo aggaphalaṃ sacchākāsī’’ti (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.443, 446) āgataṭṭhānesu itarovāti evaṃ puggalabhedaṃ ñatvā tattha tattha sanniṭṭhānena gahitapuggale niddhāretvā vissajjanaṃ yojetabbanti.

Herein, there are nine individuals: the ordinary person and the eight noble ones. Among them, the ordinary person is of two kinds: capable and incapable. In contexts where 'ordinary person' appears, such as, 'Six individuals have neither fully understood the eye faculty nor abandoned the faculty of grief,' and so on, this term is taken as undivided. In contexts such as, 'Those ordinary persons who will attain the path,' the capable one is taken separately, as in, 'Five individuals will fully understand the eye faculty and will abandon the faculty of grief,' and so on. In contexts such as, 'Those ordinary persons who will not attain the path,' it is only the incapable one, as in, 'Three individuals will neither abandon the faculty of grief nor fully understand the eye faculty,' and so on. The arahant is of two kinds: the one endowed with the highest fruit and the one endowed with the first fruit. That one too, in contexts where 'arahant' appears, such as, 'Three individuals have developed the faculty of ‘I shall know the unknown’ and have abandoned the faculty of grief,' and so on, is taken as undivided. In contexts such as, 'One who is realizing the highest fruit,' the one endowed with the first fruit is taken separately, as in, 'Three individuals have abandoned the faculty of grief but have not realized the faculty of final knowledge,' and so on. In contexts such as, 'One who has realized the highest fruit,' it refers to the other one. Thus, having understood this distinction of individuals, one should determine the individuals indicated by the subject term in each case and then apply the explanation.

Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section on Full Understanding is concluded.

Indriyayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Yamaka of the Faculties is concluded.

Yamakapakaraṇa-mūlaṭīkā samattā.

The Root Subcommentary on the Book of Pairs is concluded.

Paṭṭhānapakaraṇa-mūlaṭīkā

The Root Subcommentary on the Book of Conditional Relations

Ganthārambhavaṇṇanā

The Exposition on the Commencement of the Book

Dibbanti [Pg.165] kāmaguṇādīhi kīḷanti laḷanti, tesu vā viharanti, vijayasamatthatāyogena paccatthike vijetuṃ icchanti, issariyaṭṭhānādisakkāradānaggahaṇaṃ taṃtaṃatthānusāsanañca karontā voharanti, puññayogānubhāvappattāya jutiyā jotanti, yathābhilāsitañca visayaṃ appaṭighātena gacchanti, yathicchitanipphādane sakkontīti vā devā, devanīyā vā taṃtaṃbyasananittharaṇatthikehi saraṇaṃ parāyaṇanti gamanīyā, abhitthavanīyā vā. Sobhāvisesayogena kamanīyāti vā devā. Te tividhā – sammutidevā upapattidevā visuddhidevāti. Bhagavā pana niratisayāya abhiññākīḷāya, uttamehi dibbabrahmaariyavihārehi, saparasantānasiddhāya pañcavidhamāravijayicchānipphattiyā, cittissariyasattadhanādisammāpaṭipattiaveccappasādasakkāradānaggahaṇasaṅkhātena dhammasabhāvapuggalajjhāsayānurūpānusāsanīsaṅkhātena ca vohārātisayena, paramāya paññāsarīrappabhāsaṅkhātāya jutiyā, anopamāya ca ñāṇasarīragatiyā, māravijayasabbaññuguṇaparahitanipphādanesu appaṭihatāya sattiyā ca samannāgatattā sadevakena lokena saraṇanti gamanīyato, abhitthavanīyato, bhattivasena kamanīyato ca sabbe te deve tehi guṇehi atikkanto atisayo vā devoti devātidevo. Sabbadevehi pūjanīyataro devoti vā devātidevo, visuddhidevabhāvaṃ vā sabbaññuguṇālaṅkāraṃ pattattā aññadevehi atirekataro vā devo devātidevo. Devānanti upapattidevānaṃ tadā dhammapaṭiggāhakānaṃ. Sakkādīhi devehi pahārādaasurindādīhi dānavehi ca pūjito. Kāyavacīsaṃyamassa sīlassa indriyasaṃvarassa cittasaṃyamassa samādhissa ca paṭipakkhānaṃ accantapaṭippassaddhiyā suddhasaṃyamo.

They are called devas because they play (dibbanti) and delight with sense-pleasures and so forth, or they dwell among them; they wish to conquer their enemies through the power of their victorious capability; they conduct themselves by receiving honors such as positions of authority and giving advice suited to each situation; they glow with the radiance attained through the power of meritorious deeds; they move through desired realms without obstruction; or because they can accomplish whatever they wish. Or they are devas because they are worthy of being approached (devanīyā) as refuge and resort by those seeking to overcome various calamities, or they are worthy of praise. Or they are devas because they are delightful (kamanīyā) due to their supreme beauty. They are of three kinds: devas by convention, devas by birth, and devas of purity. But the Blessed One—due to his unsurpassed play of higher knowledge; the supreme divine, brahma, and noble abodes; the fulfillment of his wish to conquer the five kinds of Māra, accomplished in his own and others' mental continuities; his excellence in conduct, which consists of sovereignty over the mind, the seven kinds of wealth, and so forth through right practice, unwavering confidence, the receiving of honors and offerings, and teaching in accordance with the nature of the Dhamma and the inclinations of individuals; due to his supreme radiance, which is the light of his wisdom-body; his incomparable movement of his knowledge-body; and his unimpeded power in conquering Māra, in the qualities of omniscience, and in accomplishing the welfare of others; and because he is worthy of being approached as refuge by the world with its devas, worthy of praise, and worthy of being sought through devotion—has surpassed all those devas in these qualities, or he is the supreme deva; hence, he is Devātideva, the deva beyond devas. Or he is Devātideva because he is a deva more worthy of veneration than all devas; or, having attained the state of a deva of purity adorned with the qualities of omniscience, he is a deva superior to other devas. 'Of the devas' refers to those devas by birth who were then receptive to the Dhamma. He was honored by devas such as Sakka, and by asura lords such as Pahārāda and other dānavas. His is a pure restraint through the complete pacification of the opponents of bodily and verbal restraint, morality, sense-restraint, mind-restraint, and concentration.

Isisattamoti [Pg.166] catusaccāvabodhagatiyā isayoti saṅkhyaṃ gatānaṃ sataṃ pasatthānaṃ isīnaṃ atisayena santo pasatthoti attho. Vipassīādayo ca upādāya bhagavā ‘‘sattamo’’ti vutto. Yato viññāṇaṃ paccudāvattati, taṃ nāmarūpaṃ samudayanirodhanena nirodhesīti nāmarūpanirodhano. Atigambhīranayamaṇḍitadesanaṃ paṭṭhānaṃ nāma desesi pakaraṇanti sambandho.

'Seventh of the Seers' (Isisattamo) means that he is exceedingly good and praised among the good, praised seers who are counted as 'seers' through their attainment of understanding the four truths. The Blessed One is called 'the seventh' with reference to Vipassī and the others. Because consciousness turns back from it, he caused that name-and-form to cease through the cessation of its origin; thus, he is the 'one who causes the cessation of name-and-form'. He taught the treatise named 'Paṭṭhāna', a teaching adorned with extremely profound methods—this is the connection.

Ganthārambhavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Commencement of the Book is concluded.

Paccayuddesavaṇṇanā

The Exposition on the Enumeration of Conditions

‘‘Ke pana te nayā, kiñca taṃ paṭṭhānaṃ nāmā’’ti nayidaṃ pucchitabbaṃ. Kasmā? Nidānakathāyaṃ paṭṭhānasamānane anulomādīnaṃ nayānaṃ paṭṭhānassa ca dassitattāti imamatthaṃ vibhāvento ‘‘sammāsambuddhena hi…pe… nāmāti hi vutta’’nti tattha vuttaṃ aṭṭhakathāpāḷiṃ āhari. Tattha gāthātthaṃ aṭṭhakathādhippāyañca parato vaṇṇayissāmāti.

‘But what are those methods, and what is that which is called Paṭṭhāna?’ This should not be asked. Why? Because in the Introductory Discourse, in the exposition of the Paṭṭhāna, the methods such as the forward order and the Paṭṭhāna itself have been shown. Clarifying this point, the author cited the commentary passage stated there: ‘For by the Perfectly Enlightened One… it is indeed called by name.’ I shall explain the meaning of the verse and the intention of the commentary later.

Paṭṭhānanāmattho pana tikapaṭṭhānādīnaṃ tikapaṭṭhānādināmattho, imassa pakaraṇassa catuvīsatisamantapaṭṭhānasamodhānatā cettha vattabbā. Evañhi saṅkhepato paṭṭhāne ñāte vitthāro sukhaviññeyyo hotīti. Tattha ca nāmattho paṭhamaṃ vattabboti ‘‘tattha yesaṃ…pe… nāmattho tāva evaṃ veditabbo’’ti vatvā sabbasādhāraṇassa paṭṭhānanāmasseva tāva atthaṃ dassento ‘‘kenaṭṭhena paṭṭhāna’’ntiādimāha. Pa-kāro hīti upasaggapadaṃ dasseti. So ‘‘pavibhattesu dhammesu, yaṃ seṭṭhaṃ tadupāgamuntiādīsu viya nānappakāratthaṃ dīpeti. Nanu pakārehi vibhattā pavibhattāti pa-iti upasaggo pakāratthameva dīpeti, na nānappakāratthanti? Na, tesaṃ pakārānaṃ nānāvidhabhāvato. Atthato hi āpannaṃ nānāvidhabhāvaṃ dassetuṃ nānā-saddo vuttoti. Tattha ekassapi dhammassa hetuādīhi anekapaccayabhāvato ca ekekassa paccayassa anekadhammabhāvato ca nānappakārapaccayatā veditabbā.

Now, the meaning of the name 'Paṭṭhāna' is the meaning of the names 'Tika-Paṭṭhāna' and so forth. And here, the integration of this treatise with the twenty-four comprehensive Paṭṭhānas should be stated. For when the Paṭṭhāna is known in brief, the detailed account becomes easy to understand. And there, the meaning of the name should be stated first. Therefore, having said, 'Therein, of which... the meaning of the name should be understood thus,' and showing first the meaning of the general name 'Paṭṭhāna', the author begins with, 'In what sense is it Paṭṭhāna?' The syllable 'pa', it is said, indicates a prefix. It reveals the meaning 'various kinds', as in such passages as, 'Among the distinguished phenomena, he approached that which is best.' 'But since “distinguished in kinds” (pavibhattā) means distinguished by kinds (pakārehi), does not the prefix “pa-” indicate only the meaning of kind, not various kinds?' No, because those kinds are of many different sorts. The word 'various' (nānā) is used to show the state of being of many different sorts which is implied by the meaning. Herein, the quality of being of various kinds of conditions should be understood from the fact that a single phenomenon has many conditions, such as root-condition, and from the fact that each single condition pertains to many phenomena.

Hetupaccayādivasena vibhattattāti etena dhammasaṅgahādīsu vuttato kusalādivibhāgato sātisayavibhāgataṃ paṭṭhānanāmalābhassa kāraṇaṃ [Pg.167] dasseti. Goṭṭhāti vajā. Paṭṭhitagāvoti gatagāvo. Āgataṭṭhānasminti mahāsīhanādasuttaṃ vadati. Pavattagamanattā etthāti vacanaseso. Atha vā gacchati etthāti gamanaṃ, sabbaññutaññāṇassa nissaṅgavasena pavattassa gamanattā gamanadesabhāvato ekekaṃ paṭṭhānaṃ nāmāti attho. Tattha aññehi gatimantehi atisayayuttassa gatimato gamanaṭṭhānabhāvadassanatthaṃ ‘‘sabbaññutaññāṇassā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tassa mahāvegassa purisassa papātaṭṭhānaṃ viya dhammasaṅgaṇīādīnaṃ sāsaṅgagamanaṭṭhānabhāvaṃ imassa ca mahāpatho viya nirāsaṅgagamanaṭṭhānabhāvaṃ dassento atisayayuttagamanaṭṭhānabhāvo paṭṭhānanāmalābhassa kāraṇanti dasseti.

By this, it shows that the reason for obtaining the name 'Paṭṭhāna' is its superior division by way of conditions such as the root condition, surpassing the division into wholesome and so forth stated in the Dhammasaṅgaha and other texts. 'Goṭṭha' means a cattle pen. 'Paṭṭhitagāvo' means cows that have gone. Regarding 'in the place of arrival', he refers to the Mahāsīhanāda Sutta. The remainder of the statement is 'because of proceeding movement here.' Alternatively, 'gamana' means 'it goes here'; because it is the place of movement for the movement of omniscient knowledge proceeding without attachment, each one is called a 'paṭṭhāna'—this is the meaning. There, to show that it is a place of movement for that which moves with superiority over other things that move, it is said, 'of the omniscient knowledge.' Illustrating that the Dhammasaṅgaṇī and other texts are a place of movement with attachment, like a precipice for a man of great speed, while this is a place of movement without attachment, like a great road, he shows that being a place of movement endowed with superiority is the reason for obtaining the name 'Paṭṭhāna'.

Tikānanti tikavasena vuttadhammānaṃ. Samantāti anulomādīhi sabbākārehipi gatāni catuvīsati hontīti attho. Etasmiṃ atthe catuvīsatisamantapaṭṭhānānīti ‘‘samantacatuvīsatipaṭṭhānānī’’ti vattabbe samantasaddassa parayogaṃ katvā vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Atha vā samantā cha cha hutvāti etena anulomādisabbakoṭṭhāsato tikādichachabhāvaṃ dasseti. Tena samantasaddo tikādichachapaṭṭhānavisesanaṃ hoti, na catuvīsativisesanaṃ, tasmā samantato paṭṭhānāni tāni catuvīsatīti katvā ‘‘catuvīsatisamantapaṭṭhānānī’’ti vuttaṃ. Samantato vā dhammānulomāditikādipaṭiccavārādipaccayānulomādihetumūlakādippakārehi pavattāni paṭṭhānāni samantapaṭṭhānāni, anūnehi nayehi pavattānīti vuttaṃ hoti. Tāni pana catuvīsati honti. Tenevāha ‘‘imesaṃ catuvīsatiyā khuddakapaṭṭhānasaṅkhātānaṃ samantapaṭṭhānānaṃ samodhānavasenā’’ti.

'Of the triads' refers to the phenomena spoken of in terms of the triads. 'Comprehensively' means that they amount to twenty-four, having been taken in all aspects, such as the forward order and so forth—this is the meaning. In this context, it should be understood that 'catuvīsatisamantapaṭṭhānāni' is stated by placing the word 'samanta' after the number, when it should have been 'samantacatuvīsatipaṭṭhānāni'. Alternatively, 'comprehensively, being six by six' shows the sixfold nature of the triads and so forth from all sections, such as the forward order. Thus, the word 'samanta' serves as a qualifier for the sixfold Paṭṭhānas of the triads and so forth, not for the twenty-four. Therefore, it is said 'catuvīsatisamantapaṭṭhānāni,' taking it as 'the Paṭṭhānas are comprehensive, and they are twenty-four.' Or, the Paṭṭhānas that proceed comprehensively ('samantato') through various modes—such as the forward order of phenomena, the triads and so forth, the condition-relation sequences and so forth, and the forward order of conditions, the root-cause, and so forth—are comprehensive Paṭṭhānas; this means that they proceed by complete methods. These, indeed, amount to twenty-four. Hence, it is stated: 'By the method of combining these twenty-four comprehensive Paṭṭhānas, known as the minor Paṭṭhānas...'

Hetu ca so paccayo cāti iminā vacanena hetuno adhipatipaccayādibhūtassa ca gahaṇaṃ siyāti taṃ nivārento āha ‘‘hetu hutvā paccayo’’ti. Etenapi so eva doso āpajjatīti punāha ‘‘hetubhāvena paccayoti vuttaṃ hotī’’ti. Tena idha hetu-saddena dhammaggahaṇaṃ na kataṃ, atha kho dhammasattiviseso gahitoti dasseti. Tassa hi paccayasaddassa ca samānādhikaraṇataṃ sandhāya ‘‘hetu ca so paccayo cā’’ti, ‘‘hetu hutvā paccayo’’ti ca vuttaṃ. Evañca katvā parato pāḷiyaṃ ‘‘hetū hetusampayutta…pe… hetupaccayena paccayo’’tiādinā (paṭṭhā. 1.1.1) tena [Pg.168] tena hetubhāvādiupakārena tassa tassa dhammassa upakārattaṃ vuttaṃ. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana ‘‘yo hi dhammo yaṃ dhammaṃ appaccakkhāya tiṭṭhati vā uppajjati vā, so tassa paccayo’’ti ‘‘mūlaṭṭhena upakārako dhammo hetupaccayo’’ticcevamādinā dhammappadhānaniddesena dhammato aññā dhammasatti nāma natthīti dhammeheva dhammasattivibhāvanaṃ katanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Idhāpi vā hetu ca so paccayo cāti dhammeneva dhammasattiṃ dasseti. Na hi hetupaccayotiādiko uddeso kusalādiuddeso viya dhammappadhāno, atha kho dhammānaṃ upakārappadhānoti. Etīti etassa attho vattatīti, tañca uppattiṭṭhitīnaṃ sādhāraṇavacanaṃ. Tenevāha – ‘‘tiṭṭhati vā uppajjati vā’’ti. Koci hi paccayo ṭhitiyā eva hoti yathā pacchājātapaccayo, koci uppattiyāyeva yathā anantarādayo, koci ubhayassa yathā hetuādayoti.

Lest the phrase 'it is both a root and a condition' imply the inclusion of a root that has also become a dominant condition and so forth, he states, preventing this, 'It is a condition by being a root.' As the same flaw might arise even with this, he says again, 'It is said to be a condition by virtue of being a root.' By this, he shows that here the word 'hetu' (root) does not denote the grasping of a phenomenon, but rather indicates a specific power of a phenomenon. This is because, referring to the co-referentiality of the word 'hetu' and the word 'paccaya', it is said 'it is both a root and a condition' and 'it is a condition by being a root.' And having done so, later in the Pāli text, beginning with 'Roots, associated with roots... by way of the root condition' (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.1), the helpfulness of each phenomenon by means of that particular state of being a root and so forth is stated. In the commentary, however, it should be understood that by the exposition centered on phenomena, such as 'A phenomenon that, without failing, either persists or arises for another phenomenon, is a condition for it,' and 'The root condition (hetupaccaya) is a phenomenon that is helpful in the sense of being a root,' it is shown that there is no 'power of phenomena' separate from phenomena themselves, and thus the manifestation of the 'power of phenomena' is made through phenomena alone. Here too, the phrase 'it is both a root and a condition' demonstrates the power of phenomena through phenomena themselves. Indeed, the enumeration of conditions like 'root condition' is not primarily about phenomena, as in the case of the enumeration of wholesome and so forth, but rather about the supportive role of phenomena. The meaning of 'eti' (it goes) is 'vattati' (it proceeds), and this is a common expression for both persistence and arising. Hence, it is stated: 'either persists or arises.' For some conditions apply only to persistence, like the post-nascence condition; some apply only to arising, like the immediately contiguous condition and others; and some apply to both, like the root condition and others.

Upakārakalakkhaṇoti ca dhammena dhammasattiupakāraṃ dassetīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Hinoti patiṭṭhāti etthāti hetu. Anekatthattā dhātusaddānaṃ hi-saddo mūla-saddo viya patiṭṭhatthoti daṭṭhabboti. Hinoti vā etena kammanidānabhūtena uddhaṃ ojaṃ abhiharantena mūlena viya pādapo tappaccayaṃ phalaṃ gacchati pavattati vuḍḍhiṃ virūḷhiṃ āpajjatīti hetu. Ācariyānanti revatattheraṃ vadati.

And it should be understood that 'the characteristic of being helpful' shows the helpfulness of a phenomenon's power through the phenomenon itself. The root is hi [as in hinoti]. One is established (patiṭṭhāti) on it (ettha); thus, it is a cause (hetu). Because verbal roots have diverse meanings, the root hi should be understood to have the meaning of establishment, like the word 'mūla' (root). Alternatively, by means of this, a tree—just as by its root, which is the basis of its function and draws sap upward—dependent on that, goes to its fruit, proceeds, and attains growth and increase; thus, it is a cause (hetu). 'Of the teachers' refers to the Elder Revata.

‘‘Yoniso, bhikkhave, manasikaroto anuppannā ceva kusalā dhammā uppajjanti, uppannā ca kusalā dhammā abhivaḍḍhantī’’tiādīhi (a. ni. 1.66-67) kusalabhāvassa yonisomanasikārapaṭibaddhatā siddhā hotīti āha ‘‘yonisomanasikārapaṭibaddho kusalabhāvo’’ti. Eteneva akusalābyākatabhāvā kusalabhāvo viya na hetupaṭibaddhāti dassitaṃ hoti. Yaṃ paneke maññeyyuṃ ‘‘ahetukahetussa akusalabhāvo viya sahetukahetūnaṃ sabhāvatova kusalādibhāvo aññesaṃ taṃsampayuttānaṃ hetupaṭibaddho’’ti, tassa uttaraṃ vattuṃ ‘‘yadi cā’’tiādimāha. Alobho kusalo vā siyā abyākato vā, yadi alobho sabhāvato kusalo, kusalattā abyākato na siyā. Atha abyākato, taṃsabhāvattā kusalo na siyā alobhasabhāvassa adosattābhāvo viya. Yasmā pana ubhayathāpi so [Pg.169] hoti, tasmā yathā ubhayathā hontesu phassādīsu sampayuttesu hetupaṭibaddhakusalādibhāvaṃ pariyesatha, na sabhāvato, evaṃ hetūsupi kusalāditā aññapaṭibaddhā pariyesitabbā, na sabhāvatoti. Yaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘sampayuttahetūsu sabhāvatova kusalādibhāvo’’ti, taṃ na yujjati, sā pana pariyesiyamānā yonisomanasikārādipaṭibaddhā hotīti hetūsu viya sampayuttesupi yonisomanasikārādipaṭibaddho kusalādibhāvo, na hetupaṭibaddhoti siddhaṃ hotīti adhippāyo.

“Bhikkhus, for one who applies the mind wisely, unarisen wholesome states arise, and arisen wholesome states increase.” Through such statements (A. 1.66-67), the dependence of the wholesome nature on wise attention is established. Hence, it is said, “The wholesome nature is dependent on wise attention.” By this, it is shown that the unwholesome and indeterminate natures, like the wholesome nature, are not dependent on roots. Some might think: “Just as the unwholesome nature of a rootless [state], the wholesome and other natures of rooted roots are inherent, while for other states associated with them, it is dependent on the roots.” To state the answer to that, he says “If, indeed…” Non-greed may be wholesome or indeterminate. If non-greed is inherently wholesome, it could not be indeterminate because of its wholesome nature. But if it is indeterminate, then by its very nature, it could not be wholesome—just as the nature of non-greed is not the state of non-hatred. However, since it can be both, just as in the case of associated factors like contact, which can be both, one seeks a wholesome or other nature that is dependent on roots, not inherent, so too in the case of the roots themselves, their wholesome nature and so forth should be sought as dependent on something else, not as inherent. The statement that “the wholesome and other natures are inherent in associated roots” is not correct. Instead, when examined, that nature is found to be dependent on wise attention and other conditions. Thus, it is established that in the case of associated factors, just as in the case of the roots themselves, the wholesome and other natures are dependent on wise attention and so forth, not on the roots. This is the intended meaning.

Ārabhitvāpīti ettha pi-saddena imamatthaṃ dasseti – rūpāyatanādimatte yasmiṃ kismiñci ekasmiṃ aṭṭhatvā ‘‘yaṃ yaṃ dhammaṃ ārabbhā’’ti aniyamena sabbarūpāyatana…pe… dhammāyatanānañca ārammaṇapaccayabhāvassa vuttattā na koci dhammo na hotīti.

Regarding 'Ārabhitvāpi' (Even having taken as object), the particle ‘pi’ here indicates this meaning: because it has been stated without restriction in the phrase 'taking whatever phenomenon as object' that all form-bases… up to… the phenomenon-base have the nature of being an object condition—without being limited to any single instance such as the mere form-base—there is no phenomenon that is not such a condition.

‘‘Chandavato kiṃ nāma na sijjhatī’’tiādikaṃ purimābhisaṅkhārūpanissayaṃ labhitvā uppajjamāne citte chandādayo dhurabhūtā jeṭṭhakabhūtā sayaṃ sampayuttadhamme sādhayamānā hutvā pavattanti, taṃsampayuttadhammā ca tesaṃ vase vattanti hīnādibhāvena tadanuvattanato, tena te adhipatipaccayā honti. Garukātabbampi ārammaṇaṃ tanninnapoṇapabbhārānaṃ paccavekkhaṇaassādamaggaphalānaṃ attano vase vattayamānaṃ viya paccayo hoti, tasmāyaṃ attādhīnānaṃ patibhāvena upakārakatā adhipatipaccayatāti daṭṭhabbā.

“What, indeed, does not succeed for one with desire?” and so on—desire and other factors, being foremost and principal, having obtained the decisive support of previous volitional formations, arise in the mind and proceed while accomplishing the states associated with themselves. And the states associated with them, being inferior and so on, follow them, functioning subject to their control. Thus, they become the dominant condition. Even an object that should be treated with respect becomes a condition for reviewing, enjoyment, path, and fruition that are inclined, sloped, and biased towards it, as if bringing them under its own control. Therefore, this helpfulness, by its nature of having things dependent on itself, should be seen as the dominant condition.

Manoviññāṇadhātūtiādi cittaniyamoti ettha ādi-saddena santīraṇānantaraṃ voṭṭhabbanaṃ, cutianantarā paṭisandhīti yassa yassa cittassa anantarā yaṃ yaṃ cittaṃ uppajjati, tassa tassa tadanantaruppādaniyamo taṃtaṃsahakārīpaccayavisiṭṭhassa purimapurimacittasseva vasena ijjhatīti dasseti. Bhāvanābalena pana vāritattāti ettha yathā rukkhassa vekhe dinne pupphituṃ samatthasseva pupphanaṃ na hoti, agadavekhe pana apanīte tāyayeva samatthatāya pupphanaṃ hoti, evamidhāpi bhāvanābalena vāritattā samuṭṭhāpanasamatthasseva asamuṭṭhāpanaṃ, tasmiñca apagate tāyayeva samatthatāya samuṭṭhāpanaṃ hotīti adhippāyo.

“The mind-consciousness element, etc.,” refers to the fixed order of the mind. Here, by the word “etc.” is included the determining consciousness (voṭṭhabbana) immediately after the investigating consciousness (santīraṇa), and the rebirth-linking consciousness (paṭisandhi) immediately after the death consciousness (cuti). For each and every consciousness that arises immediately after another consciousness, the fixed order of its immediate arising is accomplished by virtue of each and every preceding consciousness distinguished by its respective cooperating conditions. However, “because it is prevented by the power of development” means this: just as a tree, though capable of flowering, does not flower if a wound is inflicted, but when the wound is healed, it flowers by that very capability; so too here, because it is prevented by the power of development, though capable of arising, it does not arise; and when that prevention is removed, it arises by that very capability. This is the intended meaning.

Byañjanamattatovettha nānākaraṇaṃ paccetabbaṃ, na atthatoti upacayasantatiadhivacananiruttipadānaṃ viya saddatthamattato nānākaraṇaṃ, na vacanīyatthatoti [Pg.170] adhippāyo. Teneva saddatthavisesaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘katha’’ntiādimāha. Tattha purimapacchimānaṃ nirodhuppādantarābhāvato nirantaruppādanasamatthatā anantarapaccayabhāvo. Rūpadhammānaṃ viya saṇṭhānābhāvato paccayapaccayuppannānaṃ sahāvaṭṭhānābhāvato ca ‘‘idamito heṭṭhā uddhaṃ tiriya’’nti vibhāgābhāvā attanā ekattamiva upanetvā suṭṭhu anantarabhāvena uppādanasamatthatā samanantarapaccayatā.

Here, the distinction should be understood as one of phrasing only, not of meaning—just as with terms like ‘accumulation,’ ‘continuity,’ ‘designation,’ and ‘expression,’ the distinction is one of sound-meaning only, not of the meaning to be expressed. This is the intention. For that very reason, to show the specific meaning of the word, he says, “How?” and so on. Therein, because there is no interval between the cessation of the preceding and the arising of the succeeding, the capability to produce without interval is the state of contiguity condition. Because, unlike for material phenomena, there is no shape, and because of the absence of co-existence of the condition and the conditioned, and because of the absence of divisions such as “this is below, above, or across that,” the capability to produce in a state of perfect contiguity, having brought them to a state of unity, as it were, is the immediate proximity condition.

Uppādanasamatthatāti ca abyāpārattā dhammānaṃ yasmiṃ yadākāre niruddhe vattamāne vā sati taṃtaṃvisesavantā dhammā honti, tassa sova ākāro vuccatīti daṭṭhabbo. Dhammānaṃ pavattimeva ca upādāya kālavohāroti nirodhā vuṭṭhahantassa nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaphalasamāpattīnaṃ asaññasattā cavantassa purimacutipacchimapaṭisandhīnañca nirodhuppādanirantaratāya kālantaratā natthīti daṭṭhabbā. Na hi tesaṃ antarā arūpadhammānaṃ pavatti atthi, yaṃ upādāya kālantaratā vucceyya, na ca rūpadhammappavatti arūpadhammappavattiyā antaraṃ karoti aññasantānattā. Rūpārūpadhammasantatiyo hi dve aññamaññaṃ visadisasabhāvattā aññamaññopakārabhāvena vattamānāpi visuṃyeva honti. Ekasantatiyañca purimapacchimānaṃ majjhe vattamānaṃ taṃsantatipariyāpannatāya antarakārakaṃ hoti. Tādisañca kañci nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaphalasamāpattīnaṃ majjhe natthi, na ca abhāvo antarakārako hoti abhāvattāyeva, tasmā javanānantarassa javanassa viya, bhavaṅgānantarassa bhavaṅgassa viya ca nirantaratā suṭṭhu ca anantaratā hotīti tathā uppādanasamatthatā nevasaññānāsaññāyatanacutīnampi daṭṭhabbā. Uppattiyā paccayabhāvo cettha anantarapaccayādīnaṃ pākaṭoti uppādanasamatthatāva vuttā. Paccuppannānaṃ pana dhammānaṃ pubbantāparantaparicchedena gahitānaṃ ‘‘uppajjatī’’ti vacanaṃ alabhantānaṃ ‘‘atīto dhammo paccuppannassa dhammassa anantarapaccayena paccayo’’tiādinā (paṭṭhā. 2.18.5) anantarādipaccayabhāvo vuttoti na so uppattiyaṃyevāti viññāyati. Na hi kusalādiggahaṇaṃ viya paccuppannaggahaṇaṃ aparicchedaṃ, yato uppattimattasamaṅginoyeva ca gahaṇaṃ siyā, teneva ca atītattike paṭiccavārādayo na santīti.

The capability to produce should be understood thus: because phenomena are without activity, when a certain state has ceased or is present in a particular mode, other states possessing that specific distinction come to be; that very mode is said to be the capability. And the convention of time is based on the occurrence of phenomena. Thus it should be understood that for one emerging from the attainment of cessation, for the fruition attainment of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, and for a non-percipient being passing away, there is no time interval between the preceding cessation and subsequent arising, such as death and rebirth-linking, because of their uninterruptedness. For there is no occurrence of immaterial phenomena between them that could be called an interval, nor does the occurrence of material phenomena create an interval in the occurrence of immaterial phenomena, because they belong to different continuities. The continuities of material and immaterial phenomena, though mutually supportive and occurring with mutually different natures, are indeed distinct. Within a single continuity, what occurs between the preceding and subsequent acts as an intermediary because it is included in that continuity. But in the case of the fruition attainment of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, there is no such thing in between, and an absence cannot act as an intermediary, precisely because it is an absence. Therefore, just as for an impulsion following an impulsion, or for a life-continuum following a life-continuum, there is uninterruptedness and perfect contiguity, so too the capability to produce should be understood for the death-consciousnesses of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception and of non-percipient beings. Here, since the state of being a condition for arising is manifest for the contiguity condition, etc., only the capability to produce is mentioned. However, for present phenomena, which are grasped by delimiting the past and future and for which the statement “it arises” is not obtained, the state of being a contiguity condition, etc., is stated thus: “a past phenomenon is a condition for a present phenomenon by way of contiguity condition, etc.” (Paṭṭhāna 2.18.5). Thus, it is understood that this is not only about arising. For the grasping of the present is not without delimitation, unlike the grasping of “wholesome,” etc., from which the grasping would be only of that which possesses the mere moment of arising. And for that very reason, in the past triad, the section on dependence, etc., do not exist.

Uppajjamānova [Pg.171] sahuppādabhāvenāti etthāpi uppattiyā paccayabhāvena pākaṭena ṭhitiyāpi paccayabhāvaṃ nidassetīti daṭṭhabbaṃ, paccayuppannānaṃ pana sahajātabhāvena upakārakatā sahajātapaccayatāti.

In the phrase “Just while arising, by its nature as co-arisen,” it should be seen that here too, through the manifest state of being a condition for arising, the state of being a condition for presence is also indicated. But for conditioned phenomena, their helpfulness by way of being co-nascent is the co-nascence condition.

Attano upakārakassa upakārakatā aññamaññapaccayatā, upakārakatā ca aññamaññatāvaseneva daṭṭhabbā, na sahajātādivasena. Sahajātādipaccayo hontoyeva hi koci aññamaññapaccayo na hoti, na ca purejātapacchājātabhāvehi upakārakassa upakārakā vatthukhandhā aññamaññapaccayā hontīti.

The helpfulness to that which is helpful to oneself is the mutuality condition. And this helpfulness should be seen only by way of mutuality, not by way of co-nascence, etc. For indeed, while being a co-nascence condition, etc., something is not necessarily a mutuality condition; nor are the material base and the mental aggregates, which are helpful by way of pre-nascence and post-nascence, mutuality conditions.

Taruādīnaṃ pathavī viya adhiṭṭhānākārena pathavīdhātu sesadhātūnaṃ, cakkhādayo ca cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ upakārakā cittakammassa paṭādayo viya nissayākārena khandhādayo taṃtaṃnissayānaṃ khandhādīnaṃ.

The earth element is helpful to the remaining elements in the manner of a foundation, just as the earth is for trees, etc.; the eye, etc., are helpful to eye-consciousness, etc.; and the aggregates, etc., are helpful in the manner of a support to their respectively dependent aggregates, etc., just as a cloth, etc., is for a painting.

Tadadhīnavuttitāya attano phalena nissitoti yaṃ kiñci kāraṇaṃ nissayoti vadati. Tattha yo bhuso, taṃ upanissayoti niddhāreti.

Whatever cause is depended upon by its own result, because that result's existence is dependent on it, is called a support. Therein, that which is powerful is defined as a decisive support.

Pakatoti ettha pa-kāro upasaggo, so attano phalassa uppādane samatthabhāvena suṭṭhukatataṃ dīpeti. Tathā ca kataṃ attano santāne kataṃ hotīti āha ‘‘attano santāne’’ti. Karaṇañca duvidhaṃ nipphādanaṃ upasevanañcāti dassetuṃ ‘‘nipphādito vā’’tiādimāha. Tattha upasevito vāti etena kāyaallīyāpanavasena upabhogūpasevanaṃ vijānanādivasena ārammaṇūpasevanañca dassetīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tena anāgatānampi cakkhusampadādīnaṃ ārammaṇūpasevanena yathāpaṭisevitānaṃ pakatūpanissayatā vuttā hoti.

Here in the word ‘pakata,’ the letter ‘pa-’ is a prefix; it indicates thoroughness by way of the capability to produce its own result. And thus, what is done is done in one’s own continuity; so he says, “in one’s own continuum.” To show that ‘doing’ is twofold—producing and frequenting—he says, “produced or…” and so on. Therein, by “or frequented,” it should be understood that he indicates both frequenting through enjoyment by way of bodily application and frequenting of an object by way of knowing, etc. Thereby it is stated that even for future accomplishments, such as the accomplishment of the eye, their state as a natural decisive support comes about through the frequenting of an object, according as they have been frequented.

Yathā pacchājātena vinā santānāvicchedahetubhāvaṃ agacchantānaṃ dhammānaṃ ye pacchājātākārena upakārakā, tesaṃ sā vippayuttākārādīhi visiṭṭhā upakārakatā pacchājātapaccayatā, tathā nissayārammaṇākārādīhi visiṭṭhā purejātabhāvena vinā upakārakabhāvaṃ agacchantānaṃ vatthārammaṇānaṃ purejātākārena upakārakatā purejātapaccayatā, evaṃ sabbattha paccayānaṃ paccayantarākāravisiṭṭhā upakārakatā yojetabbā.

Just as for phenomena that do not attain the state of being a cause for the non-interruption of the continuity without a post-nascent condition, their helpfulness, which functions in the manner of post-nascence and is distinguished by modes such as dissociation, etc., is the post-nascence condition; so too, for material bases and objects that do not attain the state of being helpful without pre-nascence, their helpfulness, which functions in the manner of pre-nascence and is distinguished by modes such as support, object, etc., is the pre-nascence condition. In this way, for all conditions, their helpfulness, distinguished by the modes of other conditions, should be applied everywhere.

Gijjhapotakasarīrānaṃ [Pg.172] āhārāsācetanā viyāti etena manosañcetanāhāravasena pavattamānehi arūpadhammehi rūpakāyassa upatthambhitabhāvaṃ dasseti. Teneva ‘‘āhārāsā viyā’’ti avatvā cetanāgahaṇaṃ karoti.

Like the volition of desire for food in the bodies of vulture chicks—by this, it shows how the material body is sustained by immaterial phenomena operating by way of mental volition as nutriment. For this very reason, instead of saying 'like the desire for food,' it takes up volition.

Kusalādibhāvena attanā sadisassa payogena karaṇīyassa punappunaṃ karaṇaṃ pavattanaṃ āsevanaṭṭho, attasadisasabhāvatāpādanaṃ vāsanaṃ vā. Ganthādīsu purimāpurimābhiyogo viyāti purimā purimā āsevanā viyāti adhippāyo.

The repeated doing or occurrence of what should be done, through an application similar to itself in terms of wholesome states, etc., is the meaning of cultivation (āsevana); or it is the production of a state similar to itself, or a habit. The phrase 'like earlier and earlier application in texts, etc.' means 'like earlier and earlier cultivation'—this is the intended meaning.

Cittappayogo cittakiriyā, āyūhananti attho. Yathā hi kāyavacīpayogo viññatti, evaṃ cittappayogo cetanā. Sā tāya uppannakiriyatāvisiṭṭhe santāne sesapaccayasamāgame pavattamānānaṃ vipākakaṭattārūpānampi teneva kiriyabhāvena upakārikā hoti. Tassa hi kiriyabhāvassa pavattattā tesaṃ pavatti, na aññathāti. Sahajātānaṃ pana tena upakārikāti kiṃ vattabbanti.

The application of mind is the activity of mind; its meaning is exertion. Just as bodily and verbal application is intimation, so mental application is volition. That volition, being an activity arisen by it, is helpful by that very nature of activity even to resultant and kamma-produced material phenomena occurring in the continuum distinguished by that activity, when the remaining conditions come together. For their occurrence is due to the occurrence of that nature of activity, not otherwise. But what should be said about its helpfulness to co-arisen states?

Nirussāhasantabhāvenāti etena saussāhehi vipākadhammadhammehi kusalākusalehi sārammaṇādibhāvena sadisavipākabhāvaṃ dasseti. So hi vipākānaṃ payogena asādhetabbatāya payogena aññathā vā sesapaccayesu siddhesu kammassa kaṭattāyeva siddhito nirussāho santabhāvo hoti, na kilesavūpasamasantabhāvo, tathāsantasabhāvatoyeva bhavaṅgādayo duviññeyyā. Pañcadvārepi hi javanappavattiyā rūpādīnaṃ gahitatā viññāyati, abhinipātasampaṭicchanasantīraṇamattā pana vipākā duviññeyyāyeva. Nirussāhasantabhāvāyāti nirussāhasantabhāvatthāya. Etena tappaccayavataṃ avipākānampi vipākānukulaṃ pavattiṃ dasseti.

By 'the state of being tranquil without exertion,' it shows that resultants are similar in nature to wholesome and unwholesome states—which are exertive and have the nature of producing a result—in that they have an object, and so on. For a resultant, being incapable of being achieved through exertion or otherwise when the remaining conditions are fulfilled, is tranquil without exertion due to the mere fact that kamma has been done, not due to the tranquil state of the subsiding of defilements. It is precisely because of such a tranquil nature that the life-continuum and other states are difficult to discern. For even in the five-door process, the apprehension of forms, etc., is discernible during the occurrence of impulsion, but the resultants—mere impact, receiving, and investigating—are indeed very difficult to discern. 'For the state of being tranquil without exertion' means for the purpose of that state of being tranquil without exertion. By this, it indicates the occurrence favorable to resultants even for those non-resultant states that have them as a condition.

Satipi janakatte upatthambhakattaṃ āhārānaṃ padhānakiccanti āha ‘‘rūpārūpānaṃ upatthambhakattenā’’ti. Upatthambhakattañhi satipi janakatte arūpīnaṃ āhārānaṃ āhārajarūpasamuṭṭhāpakarūpāhārassa ca hoti, asatipi catusamuṭṭhānikarūpūpatthambhakarūpāhārassa, asati pana upatthambhakatte āhārānaṃ janakattaṃ natthīti upatthambhakattaṃ padhānaṃ. Janayamānopi hi [Pg.173] āhāro avicchedavasena upatthambhayamānoyeva janetīti upatthambhanabhāvo āhārabhāvoti.

Even when there is a generating role, the supporting function is the primary function of nutriment; thus, it is said: 'by supporting material and immaterial phenomena.' For the supporting function is present both when there is a generating role for immaterial nutriment and for the material nutriment that produces nutriment-produced materiality, and also, when there is no generating role, for the material nutriment that supports materiality arisen from the four causes. But in the absence of the supporting function, nutriment does not have a generating role; thus, the supporting function is primary. For even while generating, nutriment generates only by supporting without interruption; thus, the nature of supporting is the nature of nutriment.

Adhipatiyaṭṭhenāti ettha na adhipatipaccayadhammānaṃ viya pavattinivārake abhibhavitvā pavattanena garubhāvo adhipatiyaṭṭho, atha kho dassanādikiccesu cakkhuviññāṇādīhi jīvane jīvantehi sukhitādibhāve sukhitādīhi adhimokkhapaggahupaṭṭhānāvikkhepajānanesu anaññātaññassāmīti pavattiyaṃ ājānane aññātāvībhāve ca saddhādisahajātehīti evaṃ taṃtaṃkiccesu cakkhādipaccayehi cakkhādīnaṃ anuvattanīyatā. Tesu tesu hi kiccesu cakkhādīnaṃ issariyaṃ tappaccayānañca tadanuvattanena tattha pavattīti. Itthipurisindriyānaṃ pana yadipi liṅgādīhi anuvattanīyatā atthi, sā pana na paccayabhāvato. Yathā hi jīvitāhārā yesaṃ paccayā honti, te tesaṃ anupālakaupatthambhakā atthi, avigatapaccayabhūtā ca honti, na evaṃ itthipurisabhāvā liṅgādīnaṃ kenaci pakārena upakārakā honti, kevalaṃ pana yathāsakeheva paccayehi pavattamānānaṃ liṅgādīnaṃ yathā itthādiggahaṇassa paccayabhāvo hoti, tato aññenākārena taṃsahitasantāne appavattito liṅgādīhi anuvattanīyatā indriyatā ca tesaṃ vuccati, tasmā na tesaṃ indriyapaccayabhāvo vutto. Cakkhādayo arūpadhammānaṃyevāti ettha sukhadukkhindriyānipi cakkhādiggahaṇena gahitānīti daṭṭhabbāni.

Here, by 'in the sense of dominance,' the meaning of dominance is not a state of being weighty by occurring having overpowered those that prevent occurrence, as in the case of dominant condition phenomena. Rather, it is the state of being followed by the eye, etc., by their respective conditions in their respective functions: in functions such as seeing, by eye-consciousness and so on; in living, by the living faculty; in the state of being happy, etc., by the happy faculty, etc.; in resolution, exertion, mindfulness, non-distraction, and knowing, in the occurrence of 'I shall know the unknown,' and in the state of being a knower, by faith and other co-arisen states. For in those respective functions, the eye, etc., have authority, and the occurrence of their conditions there is by following them. As for the faculties of femininity and masculinity, although they are followed by characteristics and so on, this is not in the sense of being a condition. For while life and nutriment are conditions for those things they protect and support, and are never absent as conditions, the states of femininity and masculinity do not assist the characteristics and so on in any way. Rather, it is only that the characteristics and so on, occurring by their own respective conditions, become a condition for the grasping of 'feminine,' etc. Because these characteristics do not occur in any other way in a continuum associated with those faculties, the faculties are said to be 'followed' by the characteristics, and this constitutes their 'faculty-nature.' Therefore, their conditionality as faculties is not stated. Regarding the phrase 'The eye, etc., are for immaterial phenomena only,' here it should be understood that even the faculties of pleasure and pain are included by the term 'the eye, etc.'.

Lakkhaṇārammaṇūpanijjhānabhūtānaṃ vitakkādīnaṃ vitakkanādivasena ārammaṇaṃ upagantvā nijjhānaṃ pekkhanaṃ, cintanaṃ vā vitakkādīnaṃyeva sādhāraṇo byāpāro upanijjhāyanaṭṭho. Ṭhapetvā sukhadukkhavedanādvayanti sukhindriyadukkhindriyadvayaṃ ṭhapetvāti adhippāyo. ‘‘Sabbānipī’’ti vatvā ‘‘sattajhānaṅgānī’’ti vacanena ajhānaṅgānaṃ upekkhācittekaggatānaṃ nivattanaṃ katanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yadi evaṃ ‘‘satta jhānaṅgānī’’ti eteneva siddhe ‘‘ṭhapetvā sukhadukkhavedanādvaya’’nti kasmā vuttaṃ? Vedanābhedesu pañcasu sukhadukkhadvayassa ekantena ajhānaṅgattadassanatthaṃ jhānaṅgaṭṭhāne niddiṭṭhattā. Satipi vā jhānaṅgavohāre vedanābhedadvayassa ekantena jhānapaccayattābhāvadassanatthaṃ. Upekkhācittekaggatānaṃ pana yadipi jhānapaccayattābhāvo atthi, jhānapaccayabhāvo pana na natthīti ‘‘sabbānipi satta jhānaṅgānī’’ti ettha gahaṇaṃ [Pg.174] kataṃ. Tattha ‘‘sabbānipī’’ti vacanaṃ sabbakusalādibhedasaṅgaṇhanatthaṃ, na pana sabbacittuppādagatasaṅgaṇhanatthanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

The meaning of 'close examination' (upanijjhāyana) is the common function of initial application (vitakka) and so on—which are the close examination of the object and its characteristic—namely, examining or contemplating the object by approaching it by way of initial application, etc. 'Excluding the pair of pleasant and painful feelings' means excluding the pair of the pleasant faculty and the painful faculty—this is the intention. Having stated 'all,' by the phrase 'seven jhāna factors,' it should be understood that the non-jhāna factors, equanimity and one-pointedness of mind, are excluded. If so, since this is established by the phrase 'seven jhāna factors,' why is 'excluding the pair of pleasant and painful feelings' stated? It is to show that among the fivefold classification of feelings, the pair of pleasant and painful feelings are entirely non-jhāna factors, as they are not specified in the section on jhāna factors. Alternatively, even though they are sometimes designated as jhāna factors, it is to show that this pair of feelings is entirely not a jhāna condition. However, regarding equanimity and one-pointedness of mind, although there are instances where they are not a jhāna condition, it is not that they are never a jhāna condition; hence, they are included here in 'all seven jhāna factors.' Here, the statement 'all' is for the purpose of including all divisions such as wholesome, etc., but not for the purpose of including those factors found in every arising of consciousness. This should be understood.

Yato tato vāti sammā vā micchā vāti attho. Ete pana dvepi jhānamaggapaccayā ahetukacittesu na labbhantīti idaṃ ahetukacittesu na labbhanti, na sahetukacittesūti sahetukacittesu alābhābhāvadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ, na ahetukacittesu lābhābhāvadassanatthanti. Evaṃ atthe gayhamāne ahetukacittesu katthaci kassaci lābho na vāritoti ettakameva viññāyeyya, na savitakkāhetukacittesu jhānapaccayasseva alābhābhāvadassanatthaṃ katanti. Ahetukacittesu vā lābhābhāvadassanatthe pana imasmiṃ vacane savitakkāhetukacittesu jhānapaccayassa lābhābhāvo āpajjati, tasmā yena alābhena dhammasaṅgaṇiyaṃ manodhātuādīnaṃ saṅgahasuññatavāresu jhānaṃ na uddhaṭaṃ, taṃ alābhaṃ sandhāya esa jhānapaccayassapi ahetukacittesu alābho vuttoti veditabbo. Yathā hi sahetukesu vitakkādīnaṃ sahajāte saṃkaḍḍhitvā ekattagatabhāvakaraṇaṃ upanijjhāyanabyāpāro balavā, na tathā ahetukacittesu hoti. Imasmiṃ pana pakaraṇe dubbalampi upanijjhāyanaṃ yadipi kiñcimattampi atthi, tena upakārakatā hotīti savitakkāhetukacittesupi jhānapaccayo vuttova, tasmā ye evaṃ paṭhanti ‘‘na ete pana dvepi jhānamaggapaccayā yathāsaṅkhyaṃ dvipañcaviññāṇaahetukacittesu labbhantī’’ti, tesaṃ so pāṭho sundarataro, imassa pakaraṇassāyaṃ atthavaṇṇanā, na dhammasaṅgaṇiyāti.

“From whatever direction” means whether rightly or wrongly. However, these two, jhāna and path conditions, are not found in rootless consciousness. This statement, “they are not found in rootless consciousness, not in consciousness with roots,” is said to show the non-absence of attainment in consciousness with roots, not to show the absence of attainment in rootless consciousness. If the meaning is understood thus, then only this much should be understood: in rootless consciousness, attainment is not prohibited for anyone, anywhere. It is not meant to show only the non-absence of attainment of the jhāna condition in rootless consciousness accompanied by initial thought. Alternatively, if the intention here is to show the absence of attainment in rootless consciousness, then in this statement the absence of attainment of the jhāna condition would also apply to rootless consciousness accompanied by initial thought. Therefore, it should be understood that the absence of the jhāna condition in rootless consciousness is stated with reference to that absence by which jhāna is not extracted in the sections void of inclusion in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, such as those dealing with the mind-element. For in consciousness with roots, the function of close examination, which draws together co-arisen factors such as initial thought and makes them attain a state of unity, is strong; but this is not so in rootless consciousness. In this treatise, however, even a weak close examination, if there is even a little, becomes helpful; thus, the jhāna condition is indeed mentioned even in rootless consciousness accompanied by initial thought. Therefore, for those who recite thus: “These two conditions, jhāna and path, are not found respectively in the two sets of five sense-consciousnesses and in rootless consciousnesses,” their recitation is more excellent. This is an explanation of the meaning within this treatise, not of the Dhammasaṅgaṇī.

Samaṃ pakārehi yuttatāya ekībhāvopagamena viya upakārakatā sampayuttapaccayatā.

Associated conditionality is helpfulness as if by attaining oneness, through being conjoined with uniform characteristics.

Yuttānampi sataṃ vippayuttabhāvena nānattūpagamena upakārakatā vippayuttapaccayatā. Na hi vatthusahajātapacchājātavasena ayuttānaṃ rūpādīnaṃ ārammaṇādibhāvena upakārakānaṃ vippayuttānaṃ vippayuttapaccayatā atthīti. Rūpānaṃ pana rūpehi satipi avinibbhoge vippayogoyeva natthīti na tesaṃ vippayuttapaccayatā. Vuttañhi ‘‘catūhi sampayogo catūhi vippayogo’’ti (dhātu. 3).

Dissociated conditionality is helpfulness by way of dissociation, by attaining a state of difference, even among things that are conjoined. For dissociated conditionality does not apply to things that are merely unassociated—such as material forms, etc., that are helpful as objects, etc.—in the way that it applies by means of base, co-nascence, and post-nascence. However, for material forms, even when they are inseparable from other material forms, there is no dissociation; thus, for them there is no dissociated conditionality. For it has been said: “Association is with four; dissociation is from four” (Dhātukathā 3).

Paccuppannalakkhaṇenāti [Pg.175] paccuppannasabhāvena. Tena ‘‘atthi me pāpakammaṃ kata’’nti (pārā. 38), ‘‘atthekacco puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’’ti (pu. pa. mātikā 4.24) ca evamādīsu vuttaṃ nibbattaupalabbhamānatālakkhaṇaṃ atthibhāvaṃ nivāreti. Satipi janakatte upatthambhakappadhānā atthibhāvena upakārakatāti āha ‘‘upatthambhakattenā’’ti. Idañca upatthambhakattaṃ vatthārammaṇasahajātādīnaṃ sādhāraṇaṃ atthibhāvena upakārakattaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ.

“By the characteristic of being present” means by the nature of being present. Therefore, it excludes the state of existence characterized by having been produced and being perceived, as mentioned in statements like, “I have done an evil deed” (Pārā. 38) and, “There is a certain person practicing for their own welfare” (Puggalapaññatti Mātikā 4.24). Even when it has a generative function, it is helpful by way of existence, being primarily supportive; hence it is said, “by supporting.” And this supportiveness should be seen as the helpfulness by way of existence that is common to base, object, co-nascence, and so on.

Ārammaṇe phusanādivasena vattamānānaṃ phassādīnaṃ anekesaṃ sahabhāvo natthīti ekasmiṃ phassādisamudāye sati dutiyo na hoti, asati pana hoti, tena natthibhāvena upakārakatā natthipaccayatā. Satipi purimataracittānaṃ natthibhāve na tāni natthibhāvena upakārakāni, anantarameva pana attano atthibhāvena pavattiokāsaṃ alabhamānānaṃ natthibhāvena pavattiokāsaṃ dadamānaṃ viya upakārakaṃ hotīti ‘‘pavattiokāsadānena upakārakatā’’ti āha.

The simultaneous existence of many instances of contact, etc., occurring by way of touching, etc., in relation to an object, does not happen. Therefore, when one assemblage of contact, etc., exists, a second does not; but when it does not exist, a second does. Thus, helpfulness by way of non-existence is the non-existence condition. Although more remote past consciousnesses are also non-existent, they are not helpful by their non-existence; but the immediately preceding consciousness, by its non-existence, is helpful as if giving an opportunity for occurrence to that which is unable to obtain an opportunity for occurrence through its [the preceding consciousness's] existence. Thus, it is said, “helpfulness by giving an opportunity for occurrence.”

Ettha ca abhāvamattena upakārakatā okāsadānaṃ natthipaccayatā, sabhāvāvigamena appavattamānānaṃ sabhāvavigamena upakārakatā vigatapaccayatā, natthitā ca nirodhānantarasuññatā, vigatatā nirodhappattatā, ayametesaṃ viseso, tathā atthitāya sasabhāvato upakārakatā atthipaccayatā, sabhāvāvigamena nirodhassa appattiyā upakārakatā avigatapaccayatāti paccayabhāvaviseso dhammāvisesepi veditabbo. Dhammānañhi sattivisesaṃ sabbaṃ yāthāvato abhisambujjhitvā tathāgatena catuvīsatipaccayavisesā vuttāti bhagavati saddhāya ‘‘evaṃvisesā ete dhammā’’ti sutamayañāṇaṃ uppādetvā cintābhāvanāmayehi tadabhisamayāya yogo kātabbo.

Herein, helpfulness merely by absence, which is the giving of an opportunity, is the non-existence condition. Helpfulness by way of the departure of own-nature for that which does not occur due to the non-departure of own-nature is the departed condition. Non-existence is the emptiness immediately after cessation; departedness is the attainment of cessation. This is their distinction. Similarly, helpfulness by way of existence with its own-nature is the presence condition; helpfulness by way of the non-departure of own-nature, due to the non-attainment of cessation, is the non-departed condition. Thus, the distinction in the nature of the condition should be understood, even when there is no distinction in the phenomena themselves. For the Tathāgata, having fully awakened to all the distinctions in the power of phenomena as they really are, declared the twenty-four distinctions of conditions. Therefore, having faith in the Blessed One, one should generate knowledge based on hearing that “these phenomena are distinct in this way,” and then apply oneself through thought and meditative development for the sake of its full comprehension.

Catūsu khandhesu ekassapi asaṅgahitattābhāvato nāmadhammekadesatā anantarādīnaṃ natthīti ‘‘nāmadhammāvā’’ti vatvā na kevalaṃ paccayapaccayuppannabhāve bhajantānaṃ catunnaṃyeva khandhānaṃ nāmatā, atha kho nibbānañca nāmamevāti dassento ‘‘nibbānassa asaṅgahitattā’’tiādimāha. Purejātapaccayo rūpekadesoti ettha ekadesavacanena rūparūpato [Pg.176] aññaṃ vajjeti, rūparūpaṃ pana kusalattike anāgatampi purejātapaccayabhāvena aññattha āgatameva. Vuttañhi ‘‘anidassanaappaṭigho dhammo anidassanaappaṭighassa dhammassa purejātapaccayena paccayo – ārammaṇapurejātaṃ, vatthupurejātaṃ. Ārammaṇapurejātaṃ vatthuṃ itthindriyaṃ purisindriyaṃ āpodhātuṃ kabaḷīkāraṃ āhāraṃ aniccato…pe… domanassaṃ uppajjatī’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.22.39).

Having said “or mental phenomena,” in order to show that not only are the four aggregates—which function as conditions and conditioned phenomena—mental phenomena, but that Nibbāna is also a mental phenomenon, the author states, “because Nibbāna is not included,” and so on. For immediate condition, etc., are not a part of the mental phenomena in the same way, because they are not included in even one of the four aggregates. The pre-nascence condition is a part of materiality. Here, the term “part” excludes what is other than material form itself. However, material form itself, even if not included in the wholesome or unwholesome categories of the first triad, is still found elsewhere as a pre-nascence condition. For it is said: “A non-manifesting, non-resistant phenomenon is a condition by way of pre-nascence for a non-manifesting, non-resistant phenomenon—as object pre-nascence or as base pre-nascence. As object pre-nascence: when one contemplates the base, the femininity faculty, the masculinity faculty, the water element, or physical nutriment as impermanent… etc. … grief arises.” (cf. Paṭṭhāna 2.22.39).

Paccayuddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Enumeration of Conditions is concluded.

Paccayaniddeso

Exposition of Conditions

1. Hetupaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Exposition of the Root Condition

1. Yo hetupaccayoti uddiṭṭho, so evaṃ veditabboti etena hetusaṅkhātassa paccayadhammassa hetusampayuttakataṃsamuṭṭhānarūpasaṅkhātānaṃ paccayuppannānaṃ hetupaccayena paccayabhāvo hetupaccayoti uddiṭṭhoti. Yo pana hetubhāvena yathāvutto paccayadhammo yathāvuttānaṃ paccayuppannānaṃ paccayo hoti, so hetupaccayoti uddiṭṭhoti veditabboti dasseti. Ubhayathāpi hetubhāvena upakārakatā hetupaccayoti uddiṭṭhoti dassitaṃ hoti. Esa nayo sesapaccayesupi. Upakārakatā pana dhammasabhāvo eva, na dhammato aññā atthīti. Tathā tathā upakārakaṃ taṃ taṃ dhammaṃ dassento hi bhagavā taṃ taṃ upakārakataṃ dassetīti.

1. That which was pointed out as “the root condition” should be understood thus: by this it is pointed out that “root condition” is the state of being a condition by way of the root condition for the conditioned phenomena—namely, the phenomena associated with the root and the materiality produced thereby—on the part of the conditioning phenomenon, which is designated as a root. Furthermore, it shows that it should be understood that the conditioning phenomenon, which is a condition by way of being a root for the conditioned phenomena as stated, is what is pointed out as “the root condition.” In both ways, it is shown that helpfulness by way of being a root is what is pointed out as “the root condition.” This same method applies to the remaining conditions. Helpfulness, indeed, is the very nature of phenomena; it is not something other than the phenomena. For the Blessed One, by showing that this or that phenomenon is helpful in such and such a way, thereby reveals that particular helpfulness.

Hetū hetusampayuttakānanti ettha paṭhamo hetu-saddo paccattaniddiṭṭho paccayaniddeso. Tena etassa hetubhāvena upakārakatā hetupaccayatāti dasseti. Dutiyo paccayuppannavisesanaṃ. Tena na yesaṃ kesañci sampayuttakānaṃ hetupaccayabhāvena paccayo hoti, atha kho hetunā sampayuttānamevāti dasseti. Nanu ca sampayuttasaddassa sāpekkhattā dutiye hetusadde avijjamānepi aññassa apekkhitabbassa aniddiṭṭhattā attanāva sampayuttakānaṃ hetupaccayena paccayoti ayamattho viññāyatīti? Nāyaṃ ekanto. Hetusaddo hi paccattaniddiṭṭho ‘‘hetupaccayena paccayo’’ti ettheva byāvaṭo yadā gayhati[Pg.177], tadā sampayuttavisesanaṃ na hotīti sampayuttā avisiṭṭhā ye keci gahitā bhaveyyunti evaṃ sampayuttasaddena attani eva byāvaṭena hetusaddena visesanena vinā yesaṃ kesañci sampayuttānaṃ gahaṇaṃ hotīti taṃ sandhāya ‘‘athāpi…pe… attho bhaveyyā’’ti āha. Nanu yathā ‘‘arūpino āhārā sampayuttakānaṃ dhammāna’’nti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.15), ‘‘arūpino indriyā sampayuttakāna’’nti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.16) ca vutte dutiyena āhāraggahaṇena indriyaggahaṇena ca vināpi āhārindriyasampayuttakāva gayhanti, evamidhāpi siyāti? Na, āhārindriyāsampayuttassa abhāvato. Vajjetabbābhāvato hi tattha dutiyaāhārindriyaggahaṇe asatipi taṃsampayuttakāva gayhantīti taṃ na kataṃ, idha pana vajjetabbaṃ atthīti vattabbaṃ dutiyaṃ hetuggahaṇanti.

Here, in 'roots for those associated with roots,' the first word 'root' is a designation of the condition, specified in its own right. By this, it shows that its helpfulness by way of being a root is the root condition. The second is a qualification of the conditionally arisen. By this, it shows that it is not a condition by way of root condition for just any associated phenomena, but only for those associated with a root. Now, since the word 'associated' is relative, even if the second word 'root' were absent, would not this meaning be understood—that it is a condition by way of the root condition for those associated with itself—since no other referent is specified? This is not a fixed rule. For when the word 'root,' specified in its own right, is taken as applying only in the phrase 'is a condition by way of the root condition,' then it is not a qualification of 'associated.' Thus, any associated phenomena whatsoever would be taken without specification. In this way, with the word 'associated' applying only to itself, without the qualifying word 'root,' any associated phenomena whatsoever would be taken. It is with reference to this that it is said, 'Yet... the meaning could be...' Now, just as in the statements 'immaterial nutriment for associated states' (Paṭṭh. 1.1.15) and 'immaterial faculties for associated states' (Paṭṭh. 1.1.16), even without a second mention of 'nutriment' or 'faculty,' only things associated with nutriment and faculty are taken, so could it not be the same here? No, because there is nothing that is immaterial nutriment or faculty and unassociated. For in those cases, because there is nothing to be excluded, even without the second mention of 'nutriment' or 'faculty,' only those things associated with them are taken; therefore, that second mention was not made. Here, however, there is something to be excluded, so the second mention of 'root' must be stated.

Evampi hetū hetusampayuttakānanti ettha hetusampayuttakānaṃ so eva sampayuttakahetūti visesanassa akatattā yo koci hetu yassa kassaci hetusampayuttakassa hetupaccayena paccayoti āpajjatīti? Nāpajjati, paccattaniddiṭṭhasseva hetussa puna sampayuttavisesanabhāvena vuttattā, etadatthameva ca vināpi dutiyena hetusaddena hetusampayuttabhāve siddhepi tassa gahaṇaṃ kataṃ. Atha vā asati dutiye hetusadde hetusampayuttakānaṃ hetupaccayena paccayo, na pana hetūnanti evampi gahaṇaṃ siyāti tannivāraṇatthaṃ so vutto, tena hetusampayuttabhāvaṃ ye labhanti, tesaṃ sabbesaṃ hetūnaṃ aññesampi hetupaccayena paccayoti dassitaṃ hoti. Yasmā pana hetujhānamaggā patiṭṭhāmattādibhāvena nirapekkhā, na āhārindriyā viya sāpekkhā eva, tasmā etesveva dutiyaṃ hetādiggahaṇaṃ kataṃ. Āhārindriyā pana āharitabbaisitabbāpekkhā eva, tasmā te vināpi dutiyena āhārindriyaggahaṇena attanā eva āharitabbe ca isitabbe ca āhārindriyabhūte aññe ca sampayuttake paricchindantīti taṃ tattha na kataṃ, idha ca dutiyena hetuggahaṇena paccayuppannānaṃ hetunā paccayabhūteneva sampayuttānaṃ hetūnaṃ aññesañca paricchinnattā puna visesanakiccaṃ natthīti pañhāvāre ‘‘kusalā hetū sampayuttakānaṃ khandhāna’’ntiādīsu (paṭṭhā. 1.1.401) dutiyaṃ hetuggahaṇaṃ na katanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

Even so, in 'roots for those associated with roots,' since the qualification 'that very root with which they are associated' is not made for the associated phenomena, does it follow that any root whatsoever is a condition for any associated phenomenon by way of the root condition? It does not follow, because the very root that is specified in its own right is again stated as a qualification of 'associated.' And it is for this very purpose that its mention is made, even though the state of being associated with a root is established without the second word 'root.' Or, if the second word 'root' were absent, one might take it that it is a condition by way of root condition for the associated phenomena, but not for the roots themselves; to prevent this, it is stated. By this, it is shown that it is a condition by way of root condition for all those that attain the state of being associated with a root—that is, for the other roots and for other associated states. Furthermore, because the root, jhāna, and path factors are independent by way of being a mere foundation and so on, and are not dependent like the nutriment and faculty factors, the second mention of 'root,' etc., is made only for these. The nutriment and faculty factors, however, are dependent on what is to be nourished and governed; therefore, even without the second mention of 'nutriment' or 'faculty,' they themselves delimit the other associated things and those things that are to be nourished and governed, which have the nature of nutriment and faculty. Hence, that was not done in those instances. And here, because with the second mention of 'root' the conditionally arisen—the other roots and associated things that are associated with the conditioning root—are delimited, there is no further need for qualification. Therefore, it should be understood that in the section of questions, in such phrases as 'wholesome roots for the associated aggregates' (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.401), the second mention of 'root' is not made.

Niddisitabbassa [Pg.178] apākaṭattāti taṃ-saddo purimavacanāpekkho vuttasseva niddeso ‘‘rūpāyatanaṃ cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyā taṃsampayuttakāna’’ntiādīsu (paṭṭhā. 1.1.2) purimavacanena niddisitabbe pākaṭībhūte eva pavattati. Ettha ca paccattaniddiṭṭho hetusaddo ‘‘hetupaccayena paccayo’’ti ettha byāvaṭo sampayuttasaddena viya taṃ-saddenapi anapekkhanīyo añño ca koci niddisitabbappakāsako vutto natthi, tasmā ‘‘taṃsampayuttakāna’’nti ca na vuttanti adhippāyo.

Because what is to be specified is not manifest: the word 'that' (taṃ) is dependent on a preceding expression, a specification of what has been stated. As in 'the form base for the eye-consciousness element and for those associated with it,' etc. (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.2), it functions only when what is to be specified by the preceding expression has become manifest. And here, the word 'root' (hetu), specified in its own right, is occupied with the phrase 'is a condition by way of root condition' and is not to be referred to by the word 'associated' or by the word 'that'; nor has any other word been stated that clarifies what is to be specified. Therefore, the intention is that 'for those associated with that' (taṃsampayuttakāna) is not stated.

‘‘Hetusampayuttakāna’’nti iminā pana paccayuppannavacanena asamattena paccayuppannavacanantarāpekkhena pubbe vuttena taṃ-saddena niddisitabbaṃ pākaṭīkataṃ, tena ‘‘taṃsamuṭṭhānāna’’nti ettha taṃgahaṇaṃ katanti. Kiṃ pana tasmiṃ hetusampayuttakasadde taṃ-saddena niddisitabbaṃ pākaṭībhūtanti? Yehi hetūhi sampayuttā ‘‘hetusampayuttakā’’ti vuttā, te hetū ceva sampayuttakavisesanabhūtā tabbisesitā ca hetusampayuttakā. Tenāha ‘‘te hetū cevā’’tiādi. Aññathā ‘‘te hetū cevā’’ti etassa paccattaniddiṭṭhena hetusaddena sambandhe sati yathā idha teneva taṃ-saddena niddisitabbā pākaṭā, evaṃ pubbepi bhavituṃ arahantīti ‘‘niddisitabbassa apākaṭattā ‘taṃsampayuttakāna’nti na vutta’’nti idaṃ na yujjeyyāti. Duvidhampi vā hetuggahaṇaṃ apanetvā taṃsaddavacanīyataṃ codeti pariharati ca. Taṃsamuṭṭhānānanti ca hetusamuṭṭhānānanti yuttaṃ. Hetū hi paccayāti.

However, by this expression for the conditionally arisen, 'for those associated with roots' (hetusampayuttakāna)—which is incomplete and requires another expression for the conditionally arisen—what is to be specified by the previously mentioned word 'that' (taṃ) is made manifest. Therefore, the word 'that' (taṃ) is included in the phrase 'for those arisen from that' (taṃsamuṭṭhānāna). But what is it in that word 'hetusampayuttaka' that has become manifest to be specified by the word 'taṃ'? Those that are associated with roots are called 'hetusampayuttakā'; they are both the roots themselves and the associated things qualified by them. Therefore, it is said, 'those roots themselves,' etc. Otherwise, if 'those roots themselves' were connected with the word 'root' specified in its own right, then just as here what is to be specified is manifest by that very word 'that' (taṃ), so too it should have been possible earlier. Thus, the statement 'because what was to be specified was not manifest, "for those associated with that" (taṃsampayuttakāna) was not stated' would not be correct. Or, having removed both mentions of 'root,' it raises an objection regarding the expressibility by the word 'that' and resolves it. And 'for those arisen from that' (taṃsamuṭṭhānāna) is appropriate as 'for those arisen from roots' (hetusamuṭṭhānāna), for roots are conditions.

Cittajarūpaṃ ajanayamānāpīti pi-saddena janayamānāpi. Yadi ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhānāna’’nti vacanena paṭisandhikkhaṇe kaṭattārūpassa aggahaṇato taṃ na vuttaṃ, sahajātapaccayavibhaṅge cittacetasikānaṃ tassa kaṭattārūpassa paccayabhāvo na vutto bhaveyya. Yadi ca tattha cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ paccayabhāvena taṃsamānalakkhaṇānaṃ kaṭattārūpānampi paccayabhāvo nidassito, evamidhāpi bhavitabbaṃ. ‘‘Cittasamuṭṭhānāna’’nti pana avatvā ‘‘taṃsamuṭṭhānāna’’nti vacanaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ sabbacittacetasikasamuṭṭhānatādassanatthaṃ. Evaṃpakārena hi taṃsamuṭṭhānavacanena tattha tattha vuttaṃ samuṭṭhānavacanaṃ visesitaṃ hoti. Nanu ‘‘cittacetasikā dhammā cittasamuṭṭhānāna’’nti vacanena cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ cittacetasikasamuṭṭhānatā vuttāti? Na vuttā. Cittacetasikānaṃ paccayabhāvo eva hi tattha vuttoti.

Even when not producing mind-born matter: by the word 'pi' (even), this implies also when producing. If it is argued that the phrase 'that-originated' is used instead of 'mind-originated' because the latter would not include kamma-born matter at the moment of rebirth-linking, then in the analysis of the co-nascence condition, the conditionality of mind and mental factors for that kamma-born matter would not have been stated. And if there, by way of conditionality for mind-originated phenomena, the conditionality for kamma-born matter, which has similar characteristics, is also shown, then it should be so here too. However, the phrase 'that-originated' (taṃsamuṭṭhānāna) is used instead of 'mind-originated' (cittasamuṭṭhānāna) to show that mind-originated phenomena originate from all mind and mental factors. In this way, by the term 'that-originated,' the term 'originated' stated in various contexts is qualified. Now, is it not the case that by the statement 'mind and mental factors for mind-originated phenomena,' the origination of mind-originated phenomena from mind and mental factors is stated? It is not stated. For there, only the conditionality of mind and mental factors is stated.

Cittapaṭibaddhavuttitāyāti [Pg.179] eteneva hetuādipaṭibaddhatañca dasseti. ‘‘Yañca, bhikkhave, ceteti, yañca pakappeti, yañca anuseti, ārammaṇametaṃ hoti, viññāṇassa ṭhitiyā ārammaṇe sati patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa hoti, tasmiṃ patiṭṭhite viññāṇe viruḷhe nāmarūpassa avakkanti hoti, nāmarūpapaccayā saḷāyatana’’nti (saṃ. ni. 2.39) imasmimpi sutte paṭisandhināmarūpassa viññāṇapaccayatā vuttāti āha ‘‘tasmiṃ patiṭṭhite’’tiādi.

By 'because its occurrence is bound to mind' (cittapaṭibaddhavuttitāya), it also shows its being bound to roots (hetu) and so on. 'Whatever, bhikkhus, one intends, whatever one plans, and whatever one has a latent tendency towards, that becomes an object for the stationing of consciousness. When there is an object, there is an establishment of consciousness. When consciousness is established and has grown, there is the descent of name-and-form. Conditioned by name-and-form, the six sense bases arise' (Saṃyutta Nikāya 2.39). To show that in this discourse too the conditioning of rebirth name-and-form by consciousness is stated, it is said, 'When it is established,' etc.

Purimatarasiddhāya pathaviyā bījapatiṭṭhānaṃ viya purimatarasiddhe kamme tannibbattasseva viññāṇabījassa patiṭṭhānaṃ kammassa kaṭattā uppattīti vuttaṃ hoti. Tenāha – ‘‘kammaṃ khettaṃ, viññāṇaṃ bīja’’nti. Kassa pana taṃ khettaṃ bījañcāti? Nāmarūpaṅkurassa.

Just as a seed finds its establishment in previously existing earth, so too the consciousness-seed, produced by that very karma, finds its establishment in previously existing karma; thus, it is said that its arising is due to the performance of karma. Hence it is said: 'Karma is the field, consciousness the seed.' But whose field and seed is this? It is for the sprout of name-and-form.

Ayañca panatthoti paṭisandhiyaṃ kammajarūpānaṃ cittapaṭibaddhavuttitā. Okāsavasenevāti nāmarūpokāsavaseneva. So hi tassa atthassa okāsoti. Vatthurūpamattampīti vadanto vatthurūpassa upatthambhakānaṃ sesarūpānampi tadupatthambhakabhāveneva arūpadhammānaṃ paccayabhāvaṃ dasseti, sahabhavanamattaṃ vā. Tattha kāyabhāvādikalāpānaṃ katthaci abhāvato katthaci abhāvābhāvato ‘‘vatthurūpamattampi vinā’’ti āha. Sassāmiketi etasseva visesanatthaṃ ‘‘sarājake’’ti vuttaṃ.

And this is the meaning: the mode of behavior of kamma-born matter at rebirth-linking is bound to the mind. 'By way of space alone' means by way of the space of name-and-form alone. For that is the space for that meaning. By saying 'even merely the base-matter,' it shows the conditionality for immaterial phenomena of the remaining materialities that support the base-matter, by way of their supportive nature, or merely their co-existence. Here, because the groups such as the body-sensitivity and faculty decades are sometimes absent and sometimes not absent, it is said, 'even without merely the base-matter.' 'With an owner' is said to specify this very point, as is 'with a king.'

Pavattiyaṃ kaṭattārūpādīnaṃ paccayabhāvapaṭibāhanatoti idaṃ kasmā vuttaṃ, nanu tesaṃ paccayabhāvappasaṅgoyeva natthi ‘‘hetū sahajātāna’’nti (paṭṭhā. aṭṭha. 1.1) vacanato. Na hi yesaṃ hetū sahajātapaccayo na honti, tāni hetusahajātāni nāma honti. Yadi siyuṃ, ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ sahajāto abyākato dhammo uppajjati na hetupaccayā’’tiādi ca labbheyya, na pana labbhati, tasmā na tāni hetusahajātānīti? Saccametaṃ, yo pana hetūhi samānakāluppattimattaṃ gahetvā hetusahajātabhāvaṃ maññeyya, tassāyaṃ pasaṅgo atthīti idaṃ vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Bhagavā pana vacanānaṃ lahugarubhāvaṃ na gaṇeti, bodhaneyyānaṃ pana ajjhāsayānurūpato dhammasabhāvaṃ avilomento tathā tathā desanaṃ niyāmetīti na katthaci akkharānaṃ bahutā vā appatā vā codetabbāti.

Why is this said, namely, the refutation of the conditionality of kamma-born matter and so forth in the course of existence? Is there not, in fact, no possibility of their conditionality, since it is stated, 'Roots are conditions for conascent phenomena'? For those phenomena for which roots are not a conascent condition are not called 'root-conascent.' If they were, statements such as 'conascent with a wholesome state, an indeterminate state arises not by way of root condition' would be found, but they are not. Therefore, they are not root-conascent. This is true. But for one who, taking merely their simultaneous arising with roots, might consider them to be root-conascent, this possibility exists; it should be understood that this is said for that reason. The Blessed One, however, does not consider the lightness or heaviness of words, but in accordance with the dispositions of those to be taught, he sets forth the teaching in various ways without distorting the true nature of phenomena. Thus, one should not find fault anywhere with an abundance or scarcity of words.

Hetupaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the exposition of the root condition is concluded.

2. Ārammaṇapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

2. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Object Condition

2. Uppajjanakkhaṇeyevāti [Pg.180] etena vattamānakkhaṇekadesena sabbaṃ vattamānakkhaṇaṃ gayhatīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Na hi uppajjanakkhaṇeyeva cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ rūpādīni ārammaṇapaccayo, atha kho sabbasmiṃ vattamānakkhaṇeti. Tena ālambiyamānānampi rūpādīnaṃ cakkhuviññāṇādivattamānatāya pure pacchā ca vijjamānānaṃ ārammaṇapaccayattābhāvaṃ dasseti, ko pana vādo anālambiyamānānaṃ. Na ekato hontīti nīlādīni sabbarūpāni saha na honti, tathā saddādayopīti attho. ‘‘Yaṃ ya’’nti hi vacanaṃ rūpādīni bhindatīti. Tattha purimenatthena ‘‘uppajjantī’’ti vacanena ārammaṇapaccayabhāvalakkhaṇadīpanatthaṃ ‘‘yaṃ yaṃ dhamma’’ntiādi vuttanti dasseti, pacchimena ‘‘yaṃ ya’’nti vacanena rūpādibhedadīpanatthanti. ‘‘Yaṃ yaṃ vā panārabbhā’’ti etassa vaṇṇanāyaṃ dassitasabbārammaṇādivasena vā idhāpi attho gahetabboti.

2. 'At the very moment of arising'—by this, it should be understood that a part of the present moment is taken as the entire present moment. For forms and so forth are not the object condition for eye-consciousness and so forth only at the moment of arising, but throughout the entire present moment. This shows that even for forms and so forth which are being apprehended as objects, there is no object-conditionality in the moments existing before and after, due to the present-moment nature of eye-consciousness and so forth; what then is to be said of those not being apprehended as objects? 'They do not occur together' means that all forms, such as blue and so on, do not occur simultaneously, and likewise with sounds and so on. For the expression 'whatever' distinguishes forms and so forth. Here, it shows that by the former meaning, the word 'arise' is stated in the phrase 'whatever phenomenon,' and so on, to indicate the characteristic of being an object condition; and by the latter, the expression 'whatever' is for indicating the distinction of forms and so forth. Or, the meaning here too should be understood in terms of all objects and so on, as shown in the explanation of 'or depending on whatever.'

Evaṃ vuttanti yathā nadīpabbatānaṃ sandanaṃ ṭhānañca pavattaṃ avirataṃ avicchinnanti sandanti tiṭṭhantīti vattamānavacanaṃ vuttaṃ, evaṃ ‘‘ye ye dhammā’’ti atītānāgatapaccuppannānaṃ sabbasaṅgahasamudāyavasena gahitattā tesaṃ uppajjanaṃ pavattanaṃ aviratanti uppajjantīti vattamānavacanaṃ vuttanti adhippāyo. Ime pana na hetādipaccayā sabbepi atītānāgatānaṃ honti. Na hi atīto ca anāgato ca atthi, yassete paccayā siyuṃ. Evañca katvā atītattike atītānāgatānaṃ na koci paccayo vutto, tasmā idhāpi ‘‘uppajjantī’’ti vacanena yesaṃ rūpādayo ārammaṇadhammā ārammaṇapaccayā honti, te paccuppannāva dassitāti daṭṭhabbā. Tesu hi dassitesu atītānāgatesu taṃtaṃpaccayā ahesuṃ bhavissanti cāti ayamattho dassito hoti, na pana taṃtaṃpaccayavantatā. Paccayavanto hi paccuppannāyevāti.

Thus it is said: Just as the flowing of rivers and the standing of mountains, being continuous and uninterrupted processes, are described by the present-tense verbs 'they flow' and 'they stand,' so too, the intention is that because the phrase 'whatever phenomena' is taken as a complete aggregate encompassing all past, future, and present phenomena, their arising and occurrence is continuous—hence the present-tense verb 'they arise' is used. However, not all of these conditions, such as the root condition, apply to past and future phenomena. For neither the past nor the future exists in such a way that these could be their conditions. And for this reason, in the triad concerning the past, no condition is stated for past and future phenomena. Therefore, here too, it should be understood that by the word 'arise,' only present phenomena are indicated, for which forms and so forth are object-phenomena and object conditions. For when past and future phenomena are indicated in relation to these present phenomena, the meaning shown is that their respective conditions existed and will exist, but not that they themselves possessed those conditions. For only present phenomena possess conditions.

Ettha ca ‘‘yaṃ yaṃ dhammaṃ ārabbhā’’ti ekavacananiddesaṃ katvā puna ‘‘te te dhammā’’ti bahuvacananiddeso ‘‘yaṃ ya’’nti vuttassa ārammaṇadhammassa anekabhāvopi atthīti dassanattho. Cattāro hi khandhā saheva ārammaṇapaccayā honti, te sabbepi ārabbha uppajjamānampi tesu ekekaṃ ārabbha uppajjamānaṃ na na hoti, tasmā vedanādīsu phassādīsu ca ekekassapi ārammaṇapaccayabhāvadassanatthaṃ ‘‘yaṃ ya’’nti vuttaṃ, sabbesaṃ ekacittuppādapariyāpannānaṃ [Pg.181] ārammaṇapaccayabhāvadassanatthaṃ ‘‘te te’’ti. Tattha yo ca rūpādiko ekekova yaṃyaṃ-saddena vutto, ye ca aneke phassādayo ekekavasena yaṃyaṃ-saddena vuttā, te sabbe gahetvā ‘‘te te’’ti vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Atha vā yasmiṃ kāle ārabbha uppajjanti, tasmiṃ kāle nīlādīsu cittuppādesu ca ekekameva ārabbha uppajjantīti dassanatthaṃ ‘‘yaṃ ya’’nti vuttaṃ, te pana ālambiyamānā rūpārammaṇadhammā ca aneke, tathā saddādiārammaṇadhammā cāti dassanatthaṃ ‘‘te te’’ti.

Here, after making the singular designation 'depending on whatever phenomenon,' the subsequent plural designation 'those phenomena' is for the purpose of showing that the object-phenomenon referred to by 'whatever' can also be manifold. For the four aggregates are object conditions simultaneously. When consciousness arises in dependence on all of them, or when it arises in dependence on each one of them, it certainly does arise. Therefore, 'whatever' is stated to show the nature as object condition of each individual feeling, contact, and so forth; and 'those' is stated to show the nature as object condition of all of them that are included in a single mind-moment. Here, it should be understood that whatever single form and so forth is referred to by the expression 'whatever,' and whatever multiple instances of contact and so forth are referred to individually by the expression 'whatever'—all of them are taken together and referred to by 'those.' Alternatively, 'whatever' is stated to show that at the time they arise in dependence on an object, they arise in dependence on each single object, such as blue and so on, or each single mind-moment. 'Those,' however, is stated to show that the form-objects being apprehended are many, and likewise the sound-objects and so forth are also many.

Nibbānārammaṇaṃ kāmāvacararūpāvacarakusalassa apariyāpannato kusalavipākassa kāmāvacararūpāvacarakiriyassa cāti imesaṃ channaṃ rāsīnaṃ ārammaṇapaccayo hotīti idaṃ pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇena khandhapaṭibaddhānussaraṇakāle nibbānampi rūpāvacarakusalakiriyānaṃ ārammaṇaṃ hotīti iminā adhippāyena vuttaṃ. Evaṃ sati yathā ‘‘appamāṇā khandhā pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.12.58) vuttaṃ, evaṃ ‘‘nibbāna’’nti ca vattabbaṃ siyā, na ca taṃ vuttaṃ. Na hi nibbānaṃ pubbe nivuṭṭhaṃ asaṅkhatattā, na ca pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇena pubbe nivuṭṭhesu appamāṇakkhandhesu ñātesu nibbānajānane na tena payojanaṃ atthi. Yathā hi cetopariyañāṇaṃ cittaṃ vibhāventameva cittārammaṇajānanassa kāmāvacarassa paccayo hoti, evamidampi appamāṇakkhandhe vibhāventameva tadārammaṇajānanassa kāmāvacarassa paccayo hotīti. Diṭṭhanibbānoyeva ca pubbe nivuṭṭhe appamāṇakkhandhe anussarati, tena yathādiṭṭhameva nibbānaṃ tesaṃ khandhānaṃ ārammaṇanti daṭṭhabbaṃ, na pana pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇena tadārammaṇavibhāvanaṃ kātabbaṃ. Vibhūtameva hi taṃ tassāti. Evaṃ anāgataṃsañāṇepi yathārahaṃ yojetabbaṃ, tasmā nibbānaṃ na kassaci rūpāvacarassa ārammaṇanti ‘‘catunnaṃ rāsīna’’nti vattuṃ yuttaṃ.

That Nibbāna is the object-condition for these six categories—namely, sense-sphere and form-sphere wholesome, the unincluded, wholesome resultant, and sense-sphere and form-sphere functional—this is stated with the intention that at the time of recollecting the aggregates connected with past lives through the knowledge of recollection of past lives (pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇa), Nibbāna also becomes the object for the form-sphere wholesome and functional. If this were so, then just as it is said, 'The immeasurable aggregates are a condition for the knowledge of recollection of past lives by way of the object-condition' (Paṭṭhāna 2.12.58), so too 'Nibbāna' should be stated, but it is not stated. For Nibbāna is not something previously dwelt in, owing to its unconditioned nature, nor is there any purpose for the knowledge of recollection of past lives to know Nibbāna when the immeasurable aggregates previously dwelt in are known. Just as the knowledge of penetrating others' minds (cetopariyañāṇa), only when it distinguishes the mind, is a condition for the sense-sphere consciousness that knows the mind-object, so too this knowledge of recollection of past lives, only when it distinguishes the immeasurable aggregates, is a condition for the sense-sphere consciousness that knows those objects. Moreover, one recollects the immeasurable aggregates previously dwelt in only after Nibbāna has been seen. Therefore, it should be understood that Nibbāna is the object for those aggregates just as it was seen, but the knowledge of recollection of past lives should not be made to distinguish that object. For that is already clear to him. Similarly, in the case of the knowledge of the future (anāgataṃsañāṇa), it should be applied as appropriate. Therefore, since Nibbāna is not an object for any form-sphere consciousness, it is proper to say 'for the four categories'.

Ārammaṇapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Object-Condition is completed.

3. Adhipatipaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Exposition of the Dominance Condition

3. Dhuranti [Pg.182] dhuraggāhaṃ. Jeṭṭhakanti seṭṭhaṃ. Chandādhipati chandasampayuttakānanti ettha purimachandassa samānarūpena tadanantaraṃ niddiṭṭhena taṃsambandhena chandasaddeneva paccayabhūtassa chandassa sampayuttakavisesanabhāvo dassito hotīti ‘‘chandādhipati sampayuttakāna’’nti avatvā ‘‘chandasampayuttakāna’’nti vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Esa nayo itaresupi.

3. ‘Dhuranti’ means ‘taking up the burden.’ ‘Jeṭṭhakanti’ means ‘the best.’ Regarding ‘chandādhipati chandasampayuttakānaṃ,’ it should be understood that it is said ‘chandasampayuttakānaṃ’ (for things associated with desire) and not ‘chandādhipati sampayuttakānaṃ’ (for things associated with dominance by desire) because the adjectival quality of being associated with the desire that is the condition is shown by the very word ‘chanda’ itself, which is stated immediately after the initial chanda, has the same form, and is connected to it. This method applies to the others as well.

Garukāracittīkāravasena vāti kusalābyākatānaṃ pavattiṃ dasseti. Aladdhaṃ laddhabbaṃ, laddhaṃ avijahitabbaṃ. Yena vā vinā na bhavitabbaṃ, taṃ laddhabbaṃ, tassevattho avijahitabbanti. Anavaññātanti avaññātampi adosadassitāya assādanena anavaññātaṃ katvā.

By way of valuing and giving attention, it shows the occurrence of wholesome and indeterminate states. What has not been obtained should be obtained; what has been obtained should not be abandoned. That without which one cannot exist, that should be obtained—this is the meaning of ‘should not be abandoned.’ ‘Anavaññātaṃ’ (not despised) means making even what is despised not despised by seeing no fault in it and by savoring it.

Micchattaniyatā appanāsadisā mahābalā vinā adhipatinā nuppajjantīti ‘‘ekantenevā’’ti āha. Kammakilesāvaraṇabhūtā ca te saggāvaraṇā ca maggāvaraṇā ca paccakkhasaggānaṃ kāmāvacaradevānampi uppajjituṃ na arahanti, ko pana vādo rūpārūpīnanti.

States fixed in wrongness, similar to absorption, are very powerful and do not arise without a dominance condition. Therefore, it is said, ‘ekanteneva’ (certainly). These, being obstacles in the form of kamma and defilements, and being obstacles to heavenly realms and the path, are not able to arise even for the sense-sphere devas who directly perceive heavenly realms; what then to speak of those in the form and formless realms?

Kāmāvacarādibhedato pana tividho kiriyārammaṇādhipati lobhasahagatākusalasseva ārammaṇādhipatipaccayo hotīti idaṃ parasantānagatānaṃ sārammaṇadhammānaṃ ‘‘ajjhattārammaṇo dhammo bahiddhārammaṇassa dhammassa adhipatipaccayena paccayo’’ti etassa abhāvato ‘‘bahiddhārammaṇo dhammo bahiddhārammaṇassā’’ti ettha ca ārammaṇādhipatino anuddhaṭattā adhipatipaccayatā natthīti viññāyamānepi ‘‘bahiddhā khandhe garuṃ katvā assādetī’’tiādivacanaṃ (paṭṭhā. 2.20.31) nissāya arahato kiriyadhammā puthujjanādīhi garuṃ katvā assādiyantīti iminā adhippāyena vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. ‘‘Sanidassanasappaṭighā khandhā’’tiādīsu (paṭṭhā. 2.22.30) viya khandhasaddo rūpe eva bhavituṃ arahatīti vicāritametaṃ. Puthujjanādikāle vā anāgate kiriyadhamme garuṃ katvā assādanaṃ sandhāyetaṃ vuttaṃ. ‘‘Nevavipākanavipākadhammadhamme khandhe garuṃ katvā assādeti abhinandatī’’tiādivacanato (paṭṭhā. 1.3.96) kiriyadhammā rāgadiṭṭhīnaṃ adhipatipaccayo honteva, te ca ‘‘atītārammaṇe anāgate khandhe garuṃ katvā assādetī’’tiādivacanato [Pg.183] (paṭṭhā. 2.19.23) anāgatā tebhūmakāpi adhipatipaccayo hontīti. Āvajjanakiriyasabbhāvato pana idampi vicāretabbaṃ.

However, regarding the threefold division based on the sense-sphere, etc., the object-dominance of functional states is an object-dominance condition only for unwholesome states accompanied by greed. This is because, for object-bearing phenomena belonging to another’s continuum, there is no ‘internal object as a condition for an external object by way of the dominance condition.’ And even though it is understood that in the statement ‘an external phenomenon is a condition for another external phenomenon,’ there is no dominance condition because object-dominance is not adduced there, it should be understood that the statement ‘externally, one delights in the aggregates by valuing them,’ etc. (Paṭṭhāna 2.20.31) is made with the intention that the functional states of an arahant are valued and delighted in by ordinary people, etc. In statements like ‘the aggregates with visible form and resistance,’ etc. (Paṭṭhāna 2.22.30), it has been considered that the term ‘aggregates’ can refer only to material form. Alternatively, this statement refers to valuing and delighting in future functional states at the time of an ordinary person, etc. From statements like ‘one delights in and rejoices in the aggregates that are neither-result-nor-result-producing-dhammas’ etc. (Paṭṭhāna 1.3.96), it follows that functional states are indeed dominance conditions for lust and wrong views. And from statements like ‘one delights in past and future aggregates by valuing them,’ etc. (Paṭṭhāna 2.19.23), it follows that future aggregates of the three realms can also be dominance conditions. Moreover, this should also be considered in terms of the existence of advertence and functional states.

Adhipatipaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Dominance Condition is completed.

4. Anantarapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Exposition of the Immediacy Condition

4. Yathā okāsadānavisesabhāvena natthivigatā vuttā, na evaṃ anantarasamanantarā, ete pana cittaniyāmahetuvisesabhāvena vuttā, tasmā taṃ cittaniyāmahetuvisesabhāvaṃ dassento ‘‘cakkhuviññāṇadhātū’’tiādinā dhātuvasena kusalādivasena ca niddesamāha. Tattha ‘‘manoviññāṇadhātu manoviññāṇadhātuyā’’ti vutte paccayapaccayuppannaviseso na viññāyatīti ‘‘purimā purimā pacchimāya pacchimāyā’’ti vattabbaṃ siyā. Tathā ca sati dhātuvisesena cittavisese dassanaṃ yaṃ kātuṃ āraddho, taṃ vocchijjeyya. ‘‘Manoviññāṇadhātu manodhātuyā’’ti idampi na sakkā vattuṃ niyāmābhāvato, ‘‘manodhātu cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyā’’ti ca tatheva na sakkā. Na hi manodhātu cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyāyeva anantarapaccayoti niyāmo atthi, tasmā pākaṭā pañcaviññāṇadhātuyo ādiṃ katvā yāva dhātuvisesaniyāmo atthi, tāva nidassanena nayaṃ dassetvā puna niravasesadassanatthaṃ ‘‘purimā purimā kusalā’’tiādimāha. Sadisakusalānanti vedanāya vā hetūhi vā sadisakusalānaṃ anurūpakusalānanti vā attho. Tena bhūmibhinnānampi paccayabhāvo vutto hoti. Bhavaṅgaggahaṇena kusalākusalamūlakesu cutipi gahitāti daṭṭhabbaṃ, abyākatamūlake tadārammaṇampi.

4. Just as the non-existence and disappearance conditions are stated by way of the specific nature of granting opportunity, the immediacy and contiguity conditions are not so. These, however, are stated by way of the specific nature of being a cause of mental regularity. Therefore, to show that specific nature of being a cause of mental regularity, the exposition is given in terms of elements, like ‘the eye-consciousness element,’ etc., and also in terms of wholesome states, etc. Here, when it is said, ‘the mind-consciousness element for the mind-consciousness element,’ the distinction between condition and conditioned is not discerned. Thus, it would have to be said, ‘each preceding one for each succeeding one.’ But if this were so, the demonstration of the distinction of consciousness through the distinction of elements, which was undertaken, would be interrupted. Nor can it be said, ‘the mind-consciousness element for the mind-element,’ due to the absence of regularity. Similarly, it cannot be said, ‘the mind-element for the eye-consciousness element,’ for there is no fixed rule that the mind-element is invariably an immediacy condition for the eye-consciousness element. Therefore, having first taken the five manifest sense-consciousness elements as the starting point, and as far as the regularity of the distinction of elements exists, the method is shown through illustration. Then, to demonstrate without omission, it is said, ‘preceding, preceding wholesome states,’ and so on. ‘Similar wholesome states’ means those similar in feeling or roots, or states conforming to the wholesome—this is the meaning. By this, conditionality even among those of different planes is stated. It should be understood that by including the life-continuum, even death in the case of wholesome and unwholesome roots is included, as well as the registration consciousness in the case of an indeterminate root.

Kāmāvacarakiriyāvajjanassāti kāmāvacarakiriyāya āvajjanassāti āvajjanaggahaṇena kāmāvacarakiriyaṃ visesetīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Kāmāvacaravipāko kāmāvacarakiriyarāsissa ca anantarapaccayo hoti, honto ca āvajjanassevāti ayañhettha adhippāyo. Āvajjanaggahaṇeneva cettha voṭṭhabbanampi gahitanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

‘Kāmāvacarakiriyāvajjanassa’ means ‘of the advertence of the sense-sphere functional state.’ It should be understood that by the inclusion of the word ‘advertence,’ the sense-sphere functional state is being qualified. The sense-sphere resultant state is an immediacy condition for the aggregate of sense-sphere functional states, and in being so, it is only for advertence. This is the intended meaning here. It should be understood that by the inclusion of the word ‘advertence,’ even determination (voṭṭhabbana) is included here.

Anantarapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Immediacy Condition is completed.

6. Sahajātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Exposition of the Co-nascence Condition

6. ‘‘Aññamaññassāti [Pg.184] añño aññassā’’ti porāṇapāṭho. Pāḷiyaṃ pana ‘‘aññamaññaṃ sahajātapaccayena paccayo’’ti ettha vuttassa ‘‘aññamañña’’nti imassa attho vattabbo, na avuttassa ‘‘aññamaññassā’’ti imassa, na ca samānatthassapi saddantarassa atthe vutte saddantarassa attho vutto hoti, tasmā ‘‘aññamaññanti añño aññassā’’ti paṭhanti. Okkantīti pañcavokārapaṭisandhiyeva vuccati, na itarāti iminā adhippāyenāha ‘‘pañcavokārabhave paṭisandhikkhaṇe’’ti. Rūpino dhammā arūpīnaṃ dhammānanti idaṃ yadipi pubbe ‘‘okkantikkhaṇe nāmarūpa’’nti vuttaṃ, tathāpi na tena khaṇantare paccayabhāvo rūpīnaṃ nivāritoti tannivāraṇatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Kañci kāleti keci kismiñci kāleti vā attho. Tena rūpino dhammā keci vatthubhūtā kismiñci paṭisandhikāleti rūpantarānaṃ vatthussa ca kālantare arūpīnaṃ sahajātapaccayaṃ pubbe anivāritaṃ nivāreti. Evañca katvā ‘‘kañci kāla’’nti vā ‘‘kismiñci kāle’’ti vā vattabbe vibhattivipallāso kato. Tena hi ‘‘kañcī’’ti upayogekavacanaṃ ‘‘rūpino dhammā’’ti etena saha sambandhena paccattabahuvacanassa ādeso, ‘‘kāle’’ti iminā sambandhena bhummekavacanassāti viññāyati. Purimena ca ‘‘eko khandho vatthu ca tiṇṇannaṃ khandhāna’’ntiādinā nāmasahitasseva vatthussa ‘‘nāmassa paccayo’’ti vattabbatte āpanne etena kevalasseva tathā vattabbataṃ dasseti.

6. “‘Aññamaññassa’ means ‘one to another’” —this is the ancient reading. In the Pāḷi, however, where it is said, “mutuality is a condition by way of co-nascence condition,” the meaning of the stated term ‘aññamaññaṃ’ is to be explained, not that of the unstated term ‘aññamaññassa.’ Nor, when the meaning of one word is stated, is the meaning of another word stated, even if it has the same meaning. Therefore, they read, “‘Aññamaññaṃ’ means ‘one to another.’” “‘Entry’ refers only to rebirth-linking in the five-constituent existence, and not to any other. With this intention, it is said, ‘at the moment of rebirth-linking in the five-constituent existence.’ The phrase ‘material phenomena for immaterial phenomena’—although it was previously stated, ‘at the moment of entry, name-and-form’—is stated here to preclude the idea that the conditionality of material phenomena at another moment is thereby prevented. ‘Kañci kāle’ means ‘at some time’ or ‘at a certain time.’ Thereby, it precludes a co-nascence conditionality that was not previously precluded: that of some material phenomena—being the physical basis at some time of rebirth-linking—for other material phenomena, for the basis at another time, and for immaterial phenomena. And in so doing, when ‘kañci kālaṃ’ or ‘kismiñci kāle’ should have been said, a case inversion has been made. Therefore, ‘kañcī’ is understood as an instrumental singular, which, in connection with ‘rūpino dhammā,’ is a substitute for the accusative plural; and ‘kāle’ is understood as a locative singular in this connection. And by the earlier statement, ‘one aggregate and the physical basis are for the three aggregates,’ etc., since it would follow that the physical basis is to be stated as ‘a condition for name’ only when accompanied by name, this shows that it is to be stated thus even when it is alone.

Tayo na aññamaññavasenāti labbhamānepi katthaci aññamaññasahajātapaccayabhāve vacanena asaṅgahitattā tassa evaṃ vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Catusamuṭṭhānikassa rūpassa ekadesabhūte kammasamuṭṭhānarūpe samudāyekadesavasena sāmivacanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ, niddhāraṇe vā.

Regarding ‘three not by way of mutuality,’ it should be understood that this is stated thus because, even though a state of mutual co-nascence condition is found in some cases, it is not included by the wording. In the case of material form with four origins, the genitive case with reference to kamma-originated material form, which is a part of it, should be understood as expressing a part of a whole, or in the sense of specification.

Sahajātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the exposition of the co-nascence condition is concluded.

8. Nissayapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

8. Commentary on the Exposition of the Dependence Condition

8. Nissayapaccayaniddese ‘‘rūpino dhammā arūpīnaṃ dhammānaṃ kismiñci kāle’’ti idaṃ na labbhati. Yaṃ panettha labbhati ‘‘rūpino dhammā kecī’’ti, tattha [Pg.185] te eva dhamme dassetuṃ ‘‘cakkhāyatana’’ntiādi vuttanti. ‘‘Vatthurūpaṃ pañcavokārabhave’’ti vuttattā ‘‘ṭhapetvā āruppavipāka’’nti idaṃ na vattabbanti ce? Na, ‘‘tebhūmakavipākassā’’ti vutte pañcavokārabhave anuppajjanakaṃ ṭhapetabbaṃ ajānantassa tassa pakāsetabbattā.

8. In the exposition of the dependence condition, the phrase “material phenomena for immaterial phenomena at some time” is not found. What is found here is “some material phenomena,” and in that context, to indicate those very phenomena, “the eye-base,” etc., is stated. If it is said that, since it is stated “the physical basis is in the five-constituent existence,” the phrase “excluding the formless-sphere resultant” should not be stated, the answer is: No, because when “for the resultant of the three planes” is said, it must be made clear to one who does not know that what does not arise in the five-constituent existence should be excluded.

Nissayapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the exposition of the dependence condition is concluded.

9. Upanissayapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Exposition of the Decisive Support Condition

9. Te tayopi rāsayoti upanissaye tayo anekasaṅgāhakatāya rāsayoti vadati. Etasmiṃ pana upanissayaniddese ye purimā yesaṃ pacchimānaṃ anantarūpanissayā honti, te tesaṃ sabbesaṃ ekanteneva honti, na kesañci kadāci, tasmā yesu padesu anantarūpanissayo saṅgahito, tesu ‘‘kesañcī’’ti na sakkā vattunti na vuttaṃ. Ye pana purimā yesaṃ pacchimānaṃ ārammaṇapakatūpanissayā honti, te tesaṃ na sabbesaṃ ekantena honti, yesaṃ uppattipaṭibāhikā paccayā balavanto honti, tesaṃ na honti, itaresaṃ honti. Tasmā yesu padesu anantarūpanissayo na labbhati, tesu ‘‘kesañcī’’ti vuttaṃ. Siddhānaṃ paccayadhammānaṃ yehi paccayuppannehi akusalādīhi bhavitabbaṃ, tesaṃ kesañcīti ayañcettha attho, na pana avisesena akusalādīsu kesañcīti.

9. He calls these three ‘masses’ because in decisive support, the three are masses due to their gathering of many things. In this exposition of decisive support, those earlier states that are immediate decisive supports for later ones are so for all of them invariably, never for some at some time. Therefore, in the passages where immediate decisive support is included, it is not possible to say “for some”—thus it is not stated. However, those earlier states that are object or natural decisive supports for later ones are not so for all of them invariably. They are not so for those whose arising is obstructed by strong conditions, but they are for the others. Therefore, in the passages where immediate decisive support is not found, it is said “for some.” And the meaning here is ‘for some’ of those conditioned phenomena, such as unwholesome states, that are to come into being from established conditioning states, but not ‘for some’ among unwholesome and other states indiscriminately.

Purimā purimā kusalā…pe… abyākatānaṃ dhammānanti yesaṃ upanissayapaccayena bhavitabbaṃ, tesaṃ abyākatānaṃ pacchimānanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Na hi rūpābyākataṃ upanissayaṃ labhatīti. Kathaṃ? Ārammaṇānantarūpanissaye tāva na labhati anārammaṇattā pubbāparaniyamena appavattito ca, pakatūpanissayañca na labhati acetanena rūpasantānena pakatassa abhāvato. Yathā hi arūpasantānena saddhādayo nipphāditā utubhojanādayo ca upasevitā, na evaṃ rūpasantānena. Yasmiñca utubījādike kammādike ca sati rūpaṃ pavattati, na taṃ tena pakataṃ hoti. Sacetanasseva hi uppādanupatthambhanupayogādivasena cetanaṃ pakappanaṃ pakaraṇaṃ, rūpañca acetananti. Yathā ca nirīhakesu paccayāyattesu dhammesu kesañci sārammaṇasabhāvatā hoti, kesañci na, evaṃ [Pg.186] sappakaraṇasabhāvatā nippakaraṇasabhāvatā ca daṭṭhabbā. Utubījādayo pana aṅkurādīnaṃ tesu asantesu abhāvato eva paccayā, na pana upanissayādibhāvatoti. Purimapurimānaṃyeva panettha upanissayapaccayabhāvo bāhullavasena pākaṭavasena ca vutto. ‘‘Anāgate khandhe patthayamāno dānaṃ detī’’tiādivacanato (paṭṭhā. 2.18.8) pana anāgatāpi upanissayapaccayā honti, te purimehi ārammaṇapakatūpanissayehi taṃsamānalakkhaṇatāya idha saṅgayhantīti daṭṭhabbā.

“The earlier, earlier wholesome states… for neutral states”—this should be understood as for the later neutral states that are to come into being through the decisive-support condition. For material neutral states do not obtain decisive support. How so? In the case of object and immediate decisive support, they do not obtain it because they are without an object and because they do not occur according to a fixed sequence of earlier and later. And they do not obtain natural decisive support, since there is nothing produced by a non-volitional material continuity. For just as faith and other states are produced by immaterial continuity, and seasons, food, and the like are utilized, it is not so with material continuity. And when material phenomena arise dependent on seasons, seeds, or kamma, they are not naturally produced by it. For volition alone, through its functions of producing, sustaining, and using, is what arranges and fashions; material phenomena, however, are non-volitional. And just as among inactive, dependent phenomena, some have the nature of having an object and some do not, so too the nature of having an agent and not having an agent should be understood. But seasons, seeds, and the like are merely conditions for sprouts and so on because the latter are absent when the former are absent, not because they function as decisive support or similar conditions. Here, the state of being a decisive-support condition is spoken of extensively and evidently only in relation to the earlier, earlier states. Yet from statements such as, “One who aspires to future aggregates gives gifts,” future states also serve as decisive-support conditions. These should be understood as included here due to sharing similar characteristics with the earlier ones through object and natural decisive support.

Puggalopi senāsanampīti puggalasenāsanaggahaṇavasena upanissayabhāvaṃ bhajante dhamme dasseti, pi-saddena cīvarāraññarukkhapabbatādiggahaṇavasena upanissayabhāvaṃ bhajante sabbe saṅgaṇhāti. ‘‘Abyākato dhammo abyākatassa dhammassa upanissayapaccayena paccayo’’tiādīsu hi ‘‘senāsanaṃ kāyikassa sukhassā’’tiādivacanena senāsanaggahaṇena upanissayabhāvaṃ bhajantāva dhammā upanissayapaccayena paccayoti imamatthaṃ dassentena puggalādīsupi ayaṃ nayo dassito hotīti. Paccuppannāpi ārammaṇapakatūpanissayā paccuppannatāya senāsanasamānalakkhaṇattā ettheva saṅgahitāti daṭṭhabbā. Vakkhati hi ‘‘paccuppannaṃ utuṃ bhojanaṃ senāsanaṃ upanissāya jhānaṃ uppādetī’’tiādinā senāsanassa paccuppannabhāvaṃ viya paccuppannānaṃ utuādīnaṃ pakatūpanissayabhāvaṃ, ‘‘paccuppannaṃ cakkhuṃ…pe… vatthuṃ paccuppanne khandhe garuṃ katvā assādetī’’tiādinā (paṭṭhā. 2.18.4) cakkhādīnaṃ ārammaṇūpanissayabhāvañcāti. Paccuppannānampi ca tādisānaṃ pubbe pakatattā pakatūpanissayatā daṭṭhabbā.

“A person also, a lodging also”—this shows the phenomena that partake of the nature of decisive support by way of including persons and lodgings. The word “pi” (also) includes all things that partake of the nature of decisive support by way of including robes, forests, trees, mountains, and so on. For in statements such as “An indeterminate phenomenon is a condition for an indeterminate phenomenon by way of decisive support condition,” by showing this meaning—that by the inclusion of “lodging” in the phrase “a lodging for bodily comfort,” it is phenomena that partake of the nature of decisive support that are a condition by decisive support condition—this same method is shown for persons and so on as well. It should be understood that present phenomena serving as object and natural decisive supports are included right here because, by their presentness, they share the same characteristic as a lodging. For it will be said: “Depending on present weather, food, or lodging, one arouses jhāna,” showing that, like the present condition of a lodging, present weather, etc., serves as a natural decisive support. Similarly, “One delights in the present eye... basis, taking the present aggregates as weighty,” shows that the eye, etc., serve as object decisive supports. Moreover, it should be understood that even such present things have the nature of natural decisive support because they were naturally produced previously.

Kasiṇārammaṇādīni ārammaṇameva honti, na upanissayoti iminā adhippāyena ‘‘ekaccāyā’’ti āha.

Kasiṇa-objects and the like are merely objects, not decisive supports. With this intention, he said “in a certain case.”

Arūpāvacarakusalampi yasmiṃ kasiṇādimhi jhānaṃ anuppāditaṃ, tasmiṃ anuppannajhānuppādane sabbassa ca uppannajhānassa samāpajjane iddhividhādīnaṃ abhiññānañca upanissayoti imamatthaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘tebhūmakakusalo catubhūmakassapi kusalassā’’ti. Vuttampi cetaṃ ‘‘arūpāvacaraṃ saddhaṃ upanissāya rūpāvacaraṃ jhānaṃ vipassanaṃ maggaṃ abhiññaṃ samāpattiṃ uppādetī’’ti (paṭṭhā. 4.13.285). Kāmāvacarakusalaṃ rūpāvacarārūpāvacaravipākānampi taduppādakakusalānaṃ upanissayabhāvavasena[Pg.187], paṭisandhiniyāmakassa cutito purimajavanassa ca vasena upanissayo, rūpāvacarakusalaṃ arūpāvacaravipākassa, arūpāvacarakusalañca rūpāvacaravipākassa taduppādakakusalūpanissayabhāvenāti evaṃ paccekaṃ tebhūmakakusalānaṃ catubhūmakavipākassa tebhūmakakiriyassa ca yathāyogaṃ paccayabhāvo veditabbo. Pāḷiyampi hi pakatūpanissayo nayadassanamatteneva pañhāvāresu vissajjitoti.

Even immaterial-sphere wholesome states serve as a decisive support for producing an unarisen jhāna in a kasiṇa, etc., in which a jhāna has not been produced, for attaining all arisen jhānas, and for the direct knowledges such as psychic powers. With reference to this meaning, it is said: 'The wholesome of the three planes is a decisive support for the wholesome of the four planes.' And it is also stated: 'Relying on immaterial-sphere faith, one produces material-sphere jhāna, insight, the path, direct knowledge, and attainments' (Paṭṭhāna 4.13.285). Sense-sphere wholesome is a decisive support for the resultants of the material and immaterial spheres by way of being a decisive support for the wholesome states that produce them, and by way of the impulsion preceding death which determines rebirth-linking. Material-sphere wholesome is a decisive support for the resultant of the immaterial sphere, and immaterial-sphere wholesome is a decisive support for the resultant of the material sphere, by way of being a decisive support for the wholesome states that produce them. Thus, it should be understood how the wholesome of the three planes is individually a condition, as appropriate, for the resultant of the four planes and for the functional of the three planes. For in the Pāḷi too, the natural decisive support is explained in the question sections merely by showing the method.

Iminā pana nayenāti lokuttaranibbattanaṃ upanissāya sinehuppādanalesenāti attho. Lokuttarā pana dhammā akusalānaṃ na kenaci paccayena paccayo hontīti na idaṃ sārato daṭṭhabbanti adhippāyo. Kāmāvacarāditihetukabhavaṅgaṃ kāyikasukhādi ca rūpāvacarādikusalānaṃ upanissayo, arūpāvacaravipāko rūpāvacarakusalassa taṃ patthetvā tannibbattakakusaluppādanatthaṃ uppādiyamānassa, rūpāvacarakiriyassa ca pubbe nivuṭṭhādīsu arūpāvacaravipākajānanatthaṃ jhānābhiññāyo uppādentassa arahato, catubhūmakavipākānaṃ pana taduppādakakusalūpanissayabhāvavasena so so vipāko upanissayo. Tenāha ‘‘tathā tebhūmakavipāko’’ti. Yadipi arahattaphalattaṃ jhānavipassanā uppādeti anāgāmī, na pana tena taṃ kadāci diṭṭhapubbaṃ puthujjanādīhi sotāpattiphalādīni viya, tasmā tāni viya tesaṃ jhānādīnaṃ imassa ca aggaphalaṃ na jhānādīnaṃ upanissayo. Upaladdhapubbasadisameva hi anāgatampi upanissayoti. Tenāha ‘‘upariṭṭhimaṃ kusalassapī’’ti.

'By this method' means: by a trace of producing affection, relying on the production of the supramundane. However, supramundane states are not a condition for unwholesome states by any condition; the intention is that this should not be regarded as essential. The sense-sphere rootless life-continuum, bodily pleasure, etc., are a decisive support for wholesome states of the form-sphere and so on. The formless-sphere resultant is a decisive support for the form-sphere wholesome being produced by one who aspires for it in order to produce wholesome states that bring it about, and for the form-sphere functional of an Arahant who produces jhānas and direct knowledges to know the formless-sphere resultant regarding what was previously dwelt in. Moreover, each resultant of the four planes is a decisive support by way of being a decisive support for the wholesome states that produce it. Hence it is said, 'Thus also the resultant of the three planes.' Although a non-returner produces jhāna and insight for the fruit of arahantship, it has never been seen by them before, unlike the fruits of stream-entry, etc., by ordinary people and others. Therefore, unlike those, this supreme fruit is not a decisive support for their jhāna and so on. For only what is similar to what has been previously attained is a decisive support even for the future. Hence it is said, 'Even for the higher wholesome.'

Kiriyaatthapaṭisambhidādimpi patthetvā dānādikusalaṃ karontassa tebhūmakakiriyāpi catubhūmakassapi kusalassa upanissayapaccayena paccayo. Yonisomanasikāre vattabbameva natthi, taṃ upanissāya rāgādiuppādane akusalassa, kusalākusalūpanissayabhāvamukhena catubhūmakavipākassa. Evaṃ kiriyassapi yojetabbaṃ. Tenāha ‘‘kiriyasaṅkhātopi pakatūpanissayo catubhūmakānaṃ kusalādikhandhānaṃ hotiyevā’’ti. Nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammesu pana utubhojanasenāsanānameva tiṇṇaṃ rāsīnaṃ pakatūpanissayabhāvadassanaṃ nayadassanamevāti. Imasmiṃ paṭṭhānamahāpakaraṇe āgatanayenāti idaṃ ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca abyākato dhammo uppajjati na upanissayapaccayā, kusale khandhe paṭicca cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpa’’nti [Pg.188] (paṭṭhā. 1.1.91) evamādikaṃ upanissayapaṭikkhepaṃ, anulome ca anāgamanaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Suttantikapariyāyenāti ‘‘viññāṇūpanisaṃ nāmarūpaṃ, nāmarūpanisaṃ saḷāyatana’’ntiādikena (saṃ. ni. 2.23),

For one who performs wholesome deeds such as giving, having aspired to the analytical knowledge of meaning pertaining to the functional, and so forth, the functional of the three planes is a condition by way of decisive support condition for the wholesome of even the four planes. Regarding wise attention, there is nothing to be said, for relying on it is a decisive support for the unwholesome in producing lust, etc., and for the resultant of the four planes by way of being a decisive support for wholesome and unwholesome states. Thus it should be applied to the functional as well. Hence it is said: 'The natural decisive support, reckoned as functional, is indeed for the wholesome and other aggregates of the four planes.' However, regarding states that are neither resultant nor resultant-producing phenomena, the demonstration of the three groups—climate, food, and lodging—as being a natural decisive support is merely a showing of the method. 'In accordance with the method that has come in this great treatise, the Paṭṭhāna'—this was said with reference to the refutation of decisive support, such as: 'Dependent on a wholesome state, an indeterminate state arises, not by decisive support condition; dependent on the wholesome aggregates, mind-originated matter arises' (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.91), and with reference to its non-occurrence in the positive enumeration. 'By way of the Suttanta method' refers to such passages as: 'Name-and-form has consciousness as its decisive support, the six sense bases have name-and-form as their decisive support' (SN 12.23),

‘‘Yathāpi pabbato selo, araññasmiṃ brahāvane;

Taṃ rukkhā upanissāya, vaḍḍhante te vanappatī’’ti (a. ni. 3.49). –

“Just as a rocky mountain, in a great forest wilderness; relying on it, trees grow, those lords of the woods.” (AN 3.49).

Ādikena ca.

and so on.

Upanissayapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the exposition on the decisive support condition is concluded.

10. Purejātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

10. Explanation of the Exposition on the Pre-nascence Condition

10. Nayadassanavasena yāni vinā ārammaṇapurejātena na vattanti, tesaṃ cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ ārammaṇapurejātadassanena manodvārepi yaṃ yadārammaṇapurejātena vattati, tassa tadālambitaṃ sabbampi rūparūpaṃ ārammaṇapurejātanti dassitameva hoti, sarūpena pana adassitattā ‘‘sāvasesavasena desanā katā’’ti āha. Cittavasena kāyaṃ pariṇāmayato iddhividhābhiññāya ca aṭṭhārasasu yaṃkiñci ārammaṇapurejātaṃ hotīti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

10. By showing the object-prenascence of eye-consciousness and so on—which, according to the showing of the method, do not occur without object-prenascence—it is thereby shown that even at the mind-door, for whatever occurs with object-prenascence, all material form taken as its object is also object-prenascence. However, because it is not shown in its own nature, it is said, 'The teaching was given with a remainder.' It should be understood that for one transforming the body by means of the mind, and in the eighteen bases of the direct knowledge of psychic powers, whatever there is becomes object-prenascence.

Tadārammaṇabhāvinoti ettha paṭisandhibhāvino vatthupurejātābhāvena itarassapi abhāvā aggahaṇaṃ. Bhavaṅgabhāvino pana gahaṇaṃ kātabbaṃ na vā kātabbaṃ paṭisandhiyā viya aparibyattassa ārammaṇassa ārammaṇamattabhāvato, ‘‘manodhātūnañcā’’ti ettha santīraṇabhāvino manoviññāṇadhātuyāpi.

Here, regarding that which has registering consciousness: for that which has rebirth-linking, there is non-inclusion due to the absence of basis-prenascence and the absence of the other as well. However, for that which has life-continuum, should inclusion be made or not? This is because, like rebirth-linking, the object is not distinct, being merely an object. And in the phrase 'and of the mind-elements,' the mind-consciousness-element which has the nature of investigating is also included.

Purejātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the exposition on the pre-nascence condition is concluded.

11. Pacchājātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

11. Explanation of the Exposition on the Post-nascence Condition

11. Tassevāti [Pg.189] idaṃ kāmāvacararūpāvacaravipākānaṃ niravasesadassitapurejātadassanavasena vuttaṃ, rūpāvacaravipāko pana āhārasamuṭṭhānassa na hotīti.

11. This phrase 'of that very one' is stated by way of showing the pre-nascence that was shown without remainder for the resultants of the sense-sphere and form-sphere; however, the form-sphere resultant is not a condition for what is nutriment-originated.

Pacchājātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the exposition on the post-nascence condition is concluded.

12. Āsevanapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

12. Explanation of the Exposition on the Repetition Condition

12. Paguṇatarabalavatarabhāvavisiṭṭhanti etena vipākābyākatato viseseti.

12. 'Distinguished by the state of being more proficient and more powerful'—by this it is distinguished from the resultant and the indeterminate.

Āsevanapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the exposition on the repetition condition is concluded.

13. Kammapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

13. Explanation of the Exposition on the Kamma Condition

13. Cetanāsampayuttakammaṃ abhijjhādi kammapaccayo na hotīti ‘‘cetanākammamevā’’ti āha. Satipi hi vipākadhammadhammatte na cetanāvajjā evaṃsabhāvāti. Attano phalaṃ uppādetuṃ samatthenāti kammassa samatthatā tassa kammapaccayabhāvo vuttāti daṭṭhabbā.

13. Because kamma associated with volition, such as covetousness, is not a kamma condition, it is said, 'only the kamma that is volition.' For even when there are resultant-producing phenomena, those apart from volition do not have this nature. It should be understood that the capacity of kamma—'by being able to produce its own fruit'—is said to be its state of being a kamma condition.

Pañcavokāreyeva, na aññatthāti etena kāmāvacaracetanā ekavokāre rūpampi na janetīti dasseti.

'Only in the five-constituent existence, not elsewhere'—by this it is shown that sense-sphere volition does not produce even material form in the one-constituent existence.

Kammapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the exposition on the kamma condition is concluded.

14. Vipākapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

14. Explanation of the Exposition on the Resultant Condition

14. Vipākapaccayaniddese yesaṃ ekantena vipāko vipākapaccayo hoti, tesaṃ vasena nayadassanaṃ kataṃ. Na hi āruppe bhūmidvayavipāko rūpassa paccayo hoti.

14. In the exposition of the resultant condition, the showing of the method is made by way of those for which resultant is exclusively a resultant condition. For in the formless realm, the resultant of the two planes is not a condition for material form.

Vipākapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the exposition on the resultant condition is concluded.

15. Āhārapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

15. Explanation of the Exposition on the Nutriment Condition

15. Kabaḷaṃ [Pg.190] karitvā ajjhoharitovāti asitapītādivatthūhi saha ajjhoharitovāti vuttaṃ hoti. Pātabbasāyitabbānipi hi sabhāvavasena kabaḷāyeva hontīti.

15. 'Having made a mouthful and swallowed it'—this means having swallowed it along with substances such as things that are eaten and drunk. For even things to be drunk or tasted are by their own nature just a mouthful.

Sesatisantatisamuṭṭhānassa anupālakova hutvāti ettha cittasamuṭṭhānassa āhārapaccayabhāvo vicāretvā gahetabbo. Na hi cittasamuṭṭhāno kabaḷīkāro āhāro nocittasamuṭṭhāno tadubhayañca cittasamuṭṭhānakāyassa āhārapaccayo vutto, tividhopi pana so nocittasamuṭṭhānakāyassa vuttoti.

Here, regarding 'having been merely a preserver of the remaining continuity-originated,' the state of being a nutriment condition for the mind-originated should be understood by investigation. For physical nutriment is not mind-originated, nor is mind-originated nutriment physical, yet both are said to be a nutriment condition for the mind-originated body. However, all three kinds are stated for the body not originated by mind.

Āhārapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the exposition on the nutriment condition is concluded.

16. Indriyapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

16. Explanation of the Exposition of the Faculty Condition

16. Arūpajīvitindriyampi saṅgahitanti missakattā jīvitindriyaṃ na sabbena sabbaṃ vajjitabbanti adhippāyo.

16. The formless life faculty is also included; since, due to its mixed nature, the life faculty is not to be entirely excluded—this is the intended meaning.

Avinibbhuttadhammānanti ettha ayaṃ adhippāyo – rūpārūpānaṃ aññamaññaṃ avinibbhuttavohāro natthīti arūpānaṃ indriyapaccayabhūtāni paccayantarāpekkhāni cakkhādīni attano vijjamānakkhaṇe avinibbhuttadhammānaṃ indriyapaccayataṃ apharantānipi indriyapaccayā siyuṃ. Yo pana nirapekkho indriyapaccayo avinibbhuttadhammānaṃ hoti, so attano vijjamānakkhaṇe tesaṃ indriyapaccayataṃ apharanto nāma natthi. Yadi ca itthindriyapurisindriyāni indriyapaccayo liṅgādīnaṃ siyuṃ, avinibbhuttānaṃ tesampi siyuṃ. Na hi rūpaṃ rūpassa, arūpaṃ vā arūpassa vinibbhuttassa indriyapaccayo atthīti. Sati cevaṃ itthipurisindriyehi avinibbhuttattā kalalādikāle ca liṅgādīni siyuṃ, yesaṃ tāni indriyapaccayataṃ phareyyuṃ, na ca pharanti. Tasmā na tehi tāni avinibbhuttakāni, avinibbhuttattābhāvato ca tesaṃ indriyapaccayataṃ na pharanti. Aññesaṃ pana yehi tāni sahajātāni, tesaṃ abījabhāvatoyeva na pharanti, tasmā āpannavinibbhuttabhāvānaṃ tesaṃ liṅgādīnaṃ avinibbhuttānaṃ aññesañca samānakalāpadhammānaṃ indriyapaccayatāya [Pg.191] apharaṇato tāni indriyapaccayo na hontīti. Yesaṃ bījabhūtāni itthipurisindriyāni, tesaṃ liṅgādīnaṃ aparamatthabhāvatoti keci, te pana kalalādikālepi liṅgādīnaṃ tadanurūpānaṃ atthitaṃ icchanti.

Regarding 'non-separated phenomena,' here this is the meaning: there is no designation of 'non-separated' between material and immaterial phenomena. The eye faculty and so on, which are faculty-conditions for immaterial phenomena and are dependent on other conditions, could be faculty-conditions even while not bringing about the state of being a faculty-condition for their own non-separated phenomena at their moment of existence. However, an independent faculty-condition for non-separated phenomena that does not bring about their faculty-conditionality at its moment of existence does not exist. And if the female and male faculties were a faculty-condition for gender characteristics and so on, they would also be so for their non-separated phenomena. For there is no faculty-condition of a material phenomenon for a separated material phenomenon, or of an immaterial phenomenon for a separated immaterial phenomenon. This being so, due to non-separation from the female and male faculties, gender characteristics and so on would exist even at the kalala stage, and those faculties would bring about faculty-conditionality for them; but they do not. Therefore, those characteristics are not non-separated from them; and due to the absence of non-separation, the faculties do not bring about faculty-conditionality for them. However, for other phenomena with which those faculties are co-nascent, they do not bring about faculty-conditionality precisely because of their non-seed nature. Therefore, because they do not bring about faculty-conditionality for those gender characteristics and so on, which have attained a state of separation, nor for other non-separated phenomena of the same material group, those faculties are not a faculty-condition. Some say that for those for whom the female and male faculties are the seed, their gender characteristics and so on are not of ultimate reality. But they hold that corresponding gender characteristics and so on exist even at the kalala stage.

Jātibhūmivasena vuttesu bhedesu kusalajātiyaṃ rūpāvacarakusalameva āruppe ṭhapetabbanti ‘‘ṭhapetvā pana rūpāvacarakusalaṃ avasesā kusalākusalā’’ti vuttaṃ. Paṭhamalokuttaraṃ pana domanassayuttañca visuṃ ekā jāti bhūmi vā na hotīti āruppe alabbhamānampi na ṭhapitaṃ. Hetuādīsupi ‘‘tathā apariyāpannakusalahetu, tathā akusalahetū’’tiādīsu (paṭṭhā. aṭṭha. 1.1) esa nayo yojetabbo.

Among the divisions stated by way of class and plane, in the wholesome class, only the fine-material-sphere wholesome is to be excluded in the formless sphere. Thus it is said, 'But having excluded the fine-material-sphere wholesome, the remaining are wholesome and unwholesome.' However, because the first supramundane and that associated with displeasure are not a separate class or plane, they are not excluded, even though they are unobtainable in the formless sphere. Regarding roots and so on, in statements like 'Similarly, the unincluded wholesome root, similarly the unwholesome roots,' and so on (Paṭṭhāna Commentary 1.1), this method should be applied.

Ṭhitikkhaṇeti idaṃ rūpajīvitindriyassa sahajātapaccayattābhāvaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Uppādakkhaṇepi pana tassa indriyapaccayatā na sakkā nivāretuṃ. Vakkhati hi ‘‘abyākataṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca…pe… asaññasattānaṃ ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ paṭicca…pe… indriyapaccayaṃ kammapaccayasadisa’’nti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.66). Na hi asaññasattānaṃ indriyapaccayā uppajjamānassa rūpassa rūpajīvitindriyato añño indriyapaccayo atthi, pañcavokāre pavatte ca kaṭattārūpassa. Paṭiccavārādayo ca cha uppādakkhaṇameva gahetvā pavattā, evañca katvā pacchājātapaccayo etesu anulomato na tiṭṭhatīti.

The term 'at the moment of persistence' is stated with reference to the absence of the state of being a co-nascence condition for the material life faculty. However, even at the moment of arising, its conditionality as a faculty cannot be denied. For it will be said: 'Conditioned by an indeterminate phenomenon... for non-percipient beings, conditioned by one great element... the faculty condition is similar to the kamma condition' (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.66). Indeed, for the material phenomenon arising for non-percipient beings, there is no faculty-condition other than the material life faculty, and also in the five-constituent existence for kamma-originated material form. Moreover, the six sections beginning with the Dependent Origination Section operate taking only the moment of arising. And thus, the post-nascence condition does not obtain in these in the positive method.

Indriyapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Exposition of the Faculty Condition is concluded.

17. Jhānapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

17. Explanation of the Exposition of the Jhāna Condition

17. Vitakkavicārapītisomanassadomanassupekkhācittekaggatāsaṅkhātānīti ettha yadipi somanassadomanassasaṅkhātāni jhānaṅgāni natthi, sukhadukkhasaṅkhātāni pana somanassadomanassabhūtāneva jhānaṅgāni, na kāyikasukhadukkhabhūtānīti imassa dassanatthaṃ somanassadomanassaggahaṇaṃ kataṃ. Nanu ca ‘‘dvipañcaviññāṇavajjesū’’ti vacaneneva kāyikasukhadukkhāni vajjitānīti sukhadukkhaggahaṇameva kattabbanti? Na, jhānaṅgasukhadukkhānaṃ jhānaṅgabhāvavisesanato. ‘‘Dvipañcaviññāṇavajjesu sukhadukkhupekkhācittekaggatāsaṅkhātānī’’ti hi vutte dvipañcaviññāṇesu upekkhācittekaggatāhi saddhiṃ kāyikasukhadukkhānipi [Pg.192] vajjitānīti ettakameva viññāyati, na pana yāni sukhadukkhāni jhānaṅgāni honti, tesaṃ jhānaṅgabhūto sukhabhāvo dukkhabhāvo ca visesito, tasmā somanassadomanassabhāvavisiṭṭhoyeva sukhadukkhabhāvo sukhadukkhānaṃ jhānaṅgabhāvoti dassanatthaṃ somanassadomanassaggahaṇaṃ karoti. Tena ‘‘dvipañcaviññāṇavajjesū’’ti vacanena vajjiyamānānampi sukhadukkhānaṃ somanassadomanassabhāvābhāvato jhānaṅgabhāvābhāvoti dassitaṃ hoti. Yathāvajjitā pana sukhadukkhopekkhekaggatā kasmā vajjitāti? Yattha jhānaṅgāni uddharīyanti cittuppādakaṇḍe, tattha ca jhānaṅganti anuddhaṭattā. Kasmā pana na uddhaṭāti taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘pañcannaṃ pana viññāṇakāyāna’’ntiādimāha.

17. Here, regarding the terms beginning with applied thought, sustained thought, zest, mental pleasure, mental displeasure, equanimity, and one-pointedness of mind: although there are no jhāna factors designated as mental pleasure and displeasure, the jhāna factors designated as pleasure and pain are indeed those that are mental pleasure and displeasure, not those that are bodily pleasure and pain. It is to show this that 'mental pleasure and displeasure' are included. But surely, since bodily pleasure and pain are excluded by the phrase 'excluding the two sets of fivefold consciousnesses,' the inclusion of 'pleasure and pain' alone should suffice? No, because this specifies the nature of the pleasure and pain that are jhāna factors. For if it were said, 'excluding the two sets of fivefold consciousnesses, those designated as pleasure, pain, equanimity, and one-pointedness of mind,' then it would only be understood that bodily pleasure and pain are excluded in the two sets of fivefold consciousnesses, along with equanimity and one-pointedness of mind. However, the specific nature of the pleasure and pain that are jhāna factors would not be distinguished. Therefore, to show that the nature of pleasure and pain as jhāna factors is specifically that of mental pleasure and displeasure, 'mental pleasure and displeasure' are included. Thus, it is shown that for the pleasure and pain that are to be excluded by the phrase 'excluding the two sets of fivefold consciousnesses,' their absence of the nature of mental pleasure and displeasure implies their absence of the nature of jhāna factors. But why are pleasure, pain, equanimity, and one-pointedness of mind excluded where they are excluded? Because in the Chapter on the Arising of Consciousness, where the jhāna factors are enumerated, they are not enumerated there as jhāna factors. To show why they are not enumerated, the text states, 'But as for the five classes of consciousnesses…' and so on.

Abhinipātamattattāti etena āvajjanasampaṭicchanamattāyapi cintanāpavattiyā abhāvaṃ dasseti. ‘‘Tesu vijjamānānipi upekkhāsukhadukkhānī’’ti porāṇapāṭho. Tattha upekkhāsukhadukkheheva taṃsamānalakkhaṇāya cittekaggatāyapi yathāvutteneva kāraṇena anuddhaṭabhāvo dassitoti daṭṭhabbo. Pubbe pana satta aṅgāni dassentena cattāri aṅgāni vajjitānīti tesaṃ vajjane kāraṇaṃ dassentena na samānalakkhaṇena lesena dassetabbaṃ. Aṭṭhakathā hesāti. Yadi ca lesena dassetabbaṃ, yathāvuttesupi tīsu ekameva vattabbaṃ siyā, tiṇṇaṃ pana vacanena tato aññassa jhānaṅganti uddhaṭabhāvo āpajjati, yathāvuttakāraṇato aññena kāraṇena anuddhaṭabhāvo vā, tasmā taṃdosapariharaṇatthaṃ ‘‘upekkhācittekaggatāsukhadukkhānī’’ti paṭhanti. Ye pana ‘‘jhānaṅgabhūtehi somanassādīhi sukhadukkhena avibhūtabhāvena pākaṭatāya indriyakiccayuttatāya ca samānānaṃ sukhādīnaṃ jhānaṅganti anuddhaṭabhāve kāraṇaṃ vattabbaṃ, na cittekaggatāyāti sā ettha na gahitā’’ti vadanti, tesaṃ taṃ rucimattaṃ. Yadi jhānaṅgasamānānaṃ jhānaṅganti anuddhaṭabhāve kāraṇaṃ vattabbaṃ, cittekaggatā cettha jhānaṅgabhūtāya vicikicchāyuttamanodhātuādīsu cittekaggatāya samānāti tassā anuddhaṭabhāve kāraṇaṃ vattabbamevāti. Sesāhetukesupi jhānaṅgaṃ uddhaṭameva uddharaṇaṭṭhāne cittuppādakaṇḍeti adhippāyo.

By 'because of being a mere falling upon,' it shows the absence of the process of thought even with the mere occurrence of adverting and receiving. The ancient reading is: 'Among them, even when equanimity, pleasure, and pain are present.' Here, it should be understood that it is shown that for equanimity, pleasure, and pain, and also for one-pointedness of mind which has a similar characteristic, the non-enumeration is for the reason already stated. However, previously, when showing the seven factors, four factors were excluded. In explaining the reason for their exclusion, it should not be shown by the pretext of a similar characteristic. For this is a commentary. And if it were to be shown by way of a pretext, then even among the three mentioned, only one should be stated. But by mentioning all three, either the enumeration of another as a jhāna factor would result, or its non-enumeration would be for a reason other than that already stated. Therefore, to avoid that fault, they read: 'equanimity, one-pointedness of mind, pleasure, and pain.' But as for those who say, 'The reason should be stated for the non-enumeration as jhāna factors of pleasure and so on, which are similar to the jhāna factors such as mental pleasure in being pleasure and pain, in being manifest through their unseparated nature, and in being connected with the function of a faculty, but not for one-pointedness of mind, which is not included here'—that is merely their preference. If the reason for the non-enumeration as jhāna factors must be stated for those similar to jhāna factors, then since one-pointedness of mind here is similar to the one-pointedness of mind in the doubt-accompanied mind-element and so on, which is a jhāna factor, the reason for its non-enumeration must also be stated. The meaning is that even in the remaining rootless states, the jhāna factor is indeed enumerated in the Chapter on the Arising of Consciousness, the place for enumeration.

Jhānapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Exposition of the Jhāna Condition is concluded.

18. Maggapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

18. Explanation of the Exposition of the Path Condition

18. Paññā [Pg.193] vitakko sammāvācākammantājīvā vīriyaṃ sati samādhi micchādiṭṭhi micchāvācākammantājīvāti imāni dvādasaṅgānīti ettha duvidhampi saṅkappaṃ vīriyaṃ samādhiñca vitakkavīriyasamādhivacanehi saṅgaṇhitvā ‘‘ayameva kho, āvuso, aṭṭhaṅgiko micchāmaggo abrahmacariyaṃ. Seyyathidaṃ – micchādiṭṭhi…pe… micchāsamādhī’’tiādīhi (saṃ. ni. 5.18) suttavacanehi micchāvācākammantājīvesupi maggaṅgavohārasiddhito tehi saha dvādasaṅgāni idha labbhamānāni ca alabbhamānāni ca maggaṅgavacanasāmaññena saṅgaṇhitvā vuttāni. Evañhi suttantavohāropi dassito hoti, evaṃ pana dassentena ‘‘maggapaccayaniddese maggaṅgānī’’ti evaṃ uddharitvā tassa pāṭhagatassa maggaṅgasaddassa atthabhāvena imāni dvādasaṅgāni na dassetabbāni. Na hi pāḷiyaṃ maggaṅgasaddassa micchāvācākammantājīvoti attho vattabbo. Tehi sammāvācādīhi paṭipakkhā cetanādhammā tappaṭipakkhabhāvatoyeva ‘‘micchāmaggaṅgānī’’ti sutte vuttāni, na pana maggapaccayabhāvena. Maggaṅgāni maggapaccayabhūtāni ca idha pāḷiyaṃ ‘‘maggaṅgānī’’ti vuttāni, na ca aññaṃ uddharitvā aññassa attho vattabbo. Pariyāyanippariyāyamaggaṅgadassanatthaṃ pana icchantena pāḷigatamaggaṅgasaddapatirūpako añño maggaṅgasaddo ubhayapadattho uddharitabbo yathā ‘‘adhikaraṇaṃ nāma cattāri adhikaraṇānī’’ti (pārā. 386, 405). Idha pana ‘‘maggapaccayaniddese maggaṅgānī’’ti pāḷigatoyeva maggaṅgasaddo uddhaṭo, na ca atthuddharaṇavasena dassetvā adhippetatthaniyamanaṃ kataṃ, tasmā pāḷiyaṃ maggaṅgasaddassa micchāvācādīnaṃ atthabhāvo mā hotūti ‘‘sammādiṭṭhisaṅkappavācākammantājīvavāyāmasatisamādhimicchādiṭṭhisaṅkappavāyāmasamādhayoti imāni dvādasaṅgānī’’ti paṭhanti. Nanu evaṃ ‘‘ahetukacittuppādavajjesū’’ti na vattabbaṃ. Na hi tesu sammādiṭṭhiādayo yathāvuttā santi, ye vajjetabbā siyunti? Na, uppattiṭṭhānaniyamanatthattā. Ahetukacittuppādavajjesveva etāni uppajjanti, nāhetukacittuppādesu. Tatthuppannāni dvādasaṅgānīti ayañhettha attho.

18. Wisdom, thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, effort, mindfulness, concentration, wrong view, wrong speech, wrong action, wrong livelihood—these are the twelve factors. Here, by including both types of intention (saṅkappa), effort (vīriya), and concentration (samādhi) under the terms “thought” (vitakka), “effort,” and “concentration,” and by the establishment of the designation “path factor” even for wrong speech, wrong action, and wrong livelihood through sutta passages such as, “Indeed, friends, this eightfold wrong path is not the holy life, namely—wrong view… wrong concentration” (Saṃ. Ni. 5.18), these twelve factors, whether found here or not, are included and stated by the general term “path factors” along with them. In this way, the usage in the suttas is also shown. However, when presenting it thus, these twelve factors should not be shown by extracting the term “path factors” as it appears in the text, in the phrase “in the exposition of the path condition, the path factors,” and assigning it as the meaning of that term. For in the Pāli text, the term “path factor” cannot be said to mean wrong speech, wrong action, and wrong livelihood. Those volitional states (cetanā-dhammā) that are opposed to right speech, etc., are called “wrong path factors” in the sutta precisely because of their opposing nature, not because they are path conditions. Path factors, which are path conditions, are called “path factors” in the Pāli text here, and one should not extract something else and assign it a different meaning. However, for one who wishes to show path factors both directly and indirectly, another term resembling the Pāli term “path factor,” applicable to both meanings, should be extracted, as in “Disputes are of four kinds” (Pārā. 386, 405). Here, however, the very term “path factors” as found in the Pāli text is extracted in the phrase “in the exposition of the path condition, the path factors,” and the meaning is not fixed by showing it from another context. Therefore, to prevent the term “path factor” in the Pāli text from having the meaning of wrong speech, etc., some read: “right view, right intention, right speech, right action, right livelihood, right effort, right mindfulness, right concentration, wrong view, wrong intention, wrong effort, and wrong concentration—these are the twelve factors.” But should it not be said, “excluding rootless consciousness-arisings”? For in those, right view, etc., as mentioned, do not exist, so what is there to exclude? No, because it is for the purpose of limiting the place of their arising. These twelve factors arise only in non-rootless consciousness-arisings, not in rootless consciousness-arisings. The meaning here is that these twelve factors arise there.

Maggapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Path Condition is concluded.

20. Vippayuttapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

20. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Dissociated Condition

20. Sampayogāsaṅkāya [Pg.194] abhāvatoti etena sampayogāsaṅkāvatthubhūto upakārakabhāvo vippayuttapaccayatāti dasseti.

20. By 'due to the absence of association,' it shows that the helpful state, which is the basis for the apprehension of conjunction, is the dissociated condition.

Vippayuttapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Dissociated Condition is concluded.

21. Atthipaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

21. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Presence Condition

21. Kusalādivasena pañcavidho atthipaccayo vutto, na nibbānaṃ. Yo hi atthibhāvābhāvena anupakārako atthibhāvaṃ labhitvā upakārako hoti, so atthipaccayo hoti. Nibbānañca nibbānārammaṇānaṃ na attano atthibhāvābhāvena anupakārakaṃ hutvā atthibhāvalābhena upakārakaṃ hoti. Uppādādiyuttānaṃ vā natthibhāvopakārakatāviruddho upakārakabhāvo atthipaccayatāti na nibbānaṃ atthipaccayo.

21. The presence condition is stated as fivefold by way of the wholesome, etc., but not Nibbāna. For that which, being unhelpful due to the absence of presence, becomes helpful by gaining presence, is the presence condition. But Nibbāna, for those who take Nibbāna as an object, does not become helpful by gaining presence after being unhelpful due to the absence of its own presence. Or, the helpful state that is not contrary to the helpfulness of absence for those endowed with arising, etc., is the presence condition; thus, Nibbāna is not a presence condition.

Sati ca yesaṃ paccayā honti, tehi ekato puretaraṃ pacchā ca uppannatte sahajātādipaccayattābhāvato āha ‘‘āhāro indriyañca sahajātādibhedaṃ na labhatī’’ti. Tadabhāvo ca etesaṃ dhammasabhāvavasena daṭṭhabbo.

And because for those for whom they are conditions, there is no co-nascence condition, etc., due to their not arising simultaneously, previously, or subsequently with them, he said: 'Food and faculty do not obtain distinctions such as co-nascent, etc.' And their absence should be seen according to the intrinsic nature of these phenomena.

Atthipaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Presence Condition is concluded.

22-23-24. Natthivigataavigatapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

22-23-24. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Absence, Disappearance, and Non-disappearance Conditions

22-23. Paccayalakkhaṇameva hettha nānanti etena natthivigatapaccayesu atthiavigatapaccayesu ca byañjanamatteyeva nānattaṃ, na attheti idaṃ yo paccayoti attho, tasmiṃ nānattaṃ natthi, byañjanasaṅgahite paccayalakkhaṇamatteyeva nānattanti imamatthaṃ sandhāya vuttanti viññāyati.

22-23. Here, only the characteristic of a condition is diverse. This means that concerning conditions that are absent and ceased, and concerning conditions that are present and not ceased, the diversity is merely in the expression, not in the essence. In the meaning 'this is a condition,' there is no diversity; but the diversity exists only in the characteristic of a condition that is included in the expression. This is understood as being said with this meaning in mind.

Natthivigataavigatapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Absence, Disappearance, and Non-disappearance Conditions is concluded.

Paccayaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of Conditions is concluded.

Paccayaniddesapakiṇṇakavinicchayakathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Miscellaneous Analytical Discourse on the Exposition of Conditions

‘‘Lobhadosamohā [Pg.195] vipākapaccayāpi na honti, sesānaṃ sattarasannaṃ paccayānaṃ vasena paccayā hontī’’tiādimapāṭho. Ettha ca lobhadosamohānaṃ paccekaṃ sattarasahi paccayehi paccayabhāvo vutto, sabbe hetū saha aggahetvā ekadhammassa anekapaccayabhāvadassanatthaṃ amohādīnaṃ visuṃ gahitattāti dosassapi sattarasahi paccayabhāvo āpajjati, tathā ca sati dosassapi garukaraṇaṃ pāḷiyaṃ vattabbaṃ siyā. ‘‘Akusalo pana ārammaṇādhipati nāma lobhasahagatacittuppādo vuccatī’’ti (paṭṭhā. aṭṭha. 1.4) etthāpi lobhadosasahagatacittuppādāti vattabbaṃ siyā, na pana vuttaṃ, tasmā dosassa adhipatipaccayatāpi nivāretabbā. Na ca ‘‘sesāna’’nti vacanena adhipatipaccayo nivārito, atha kho saṅgahito purejātādīhi yathāvuttehi sesattāti tannivāraṇatthaṃ dosaṃ lobhamohehi saha aggahetvā visuñca aggahetvā ‘‘doso adhipatipaccayopi na hoti, sesānaṃ paccayānaṃ vasena paccayo hotī’’ti paṭhanti. Iminā nayenāti etena phoṭṭhabbāyatanassa sahajātādipaccayabhāvaṃ, sabbadhammānaṃ yathāyogaṃ hetādipaccayabhāvañca dasseti. Na hi etaṃ ekapaccayassa anekapaccayabhāvadassananti rūpādīnaṃ pakatūpanissayabhāvo ca etena dassitoti daṭṭhabbo.

"Greed, hatred, and delusion are not conditions by way of result, but are conditions by way of the remaining seventeen conditions"—this is the initial reading. In this context, the conditionality of greed, hatred, and delusion by way of seventeen conditions is stated for each individually, without including all roots together, to show the multiple conditionality of a single phenomenon. Because non-delusion and others are taken separately, hatred too would become a condition by way of seventeen conditions. Moreover, in that case, an emphasis on hatred should also be stated in the Pāli text. For example, in the passage, 'An unwholesome mind-state accompanied by greed is called the condition of object predominance' (Paṭṭhāna Commentary 1.4), it could also be said, 'mind-states accompanied by greed or hatred.' However, this is not stated, so hatred’s conditionality by way of predominance should also be excluded. And by the word 'remaining,' the predominance condition is not excluded; rather, it is included as being among the remaining, as stated previously with the pre-arisen, etc. To exclude that, they recite, without grouping hatred with greed and delusion, nor taking it separately: 'Hatred is also not a predominance condition, but serves as a condition by way of the remaining conditions.' By this method, it shows the conditionality of the tactile base by way of co-nascence, etc., and the conditionality of all phenomena by way of root, etc., as appropriate. This is not merely to demonstrate multiple conditions for a single phenomenon; rather, it should be understood that material phenomena, etc., also serve as natural decisive support conditions in this way.

Catunnaṃ khandhānaṃ bhedā cakkhuviññāṇadhātuādayoti bhedaṃ anāmasitvā te eva gahetvā āha ‘‘catūsu khandhesū’’ti. Micchāvācākammantājīvā tehi ceva kammāhārapaccayehi cāti ekūnavīsatidhāti idamevaṃ na sakkā vattuṃ. Na hi micchāvācādayo micchādiṭṭhi viya maggapaccayā honti cetanāya maggapaccayattābhāvato. Yadi ca bhaveyya, pañhāvāre ‘‘kammapaccayā magge tīṇī’’ti vattabbaṃ siyā, tasmā micchāvācādīnaṃ maggapaccayabhāvo na vattabbo. Paṭṭhānasaṃvaṇṇanā hesā. Sesapaccayabhāvo ca cetanāya anekapaccayabhāvavacanena vuttoyevāti na idaṃ paṭhitabbanti na paṭhanti. ‘‘Ahirikaṃ…pe… middhaṃ uddhaccaṃ vicikicchā’’tiādimapāṭho, vicikicchā pana adhipatipaccayo na hotīti taṃ tattha apaṭhitvā ‘‘vicikicchāissāmacchariyakukkuccāni tato adhipatipaccayaṃ apanetvā’’ti evamettha paṭhanti.

The eye-consciousness element and so on are divisions of the four aggregates. Without referring to the division, but taking them just as they are, it is said, 'in the four aggregates.' It is not possible to say thus: 'Wrong speech, wrong action, wrong livelihood, and those very things by way of kamma and nutriment conditions—thus nineteenfold.' For wrong speech and so on are not path conditions like wrong view, because volition does not have the nature of a path condition. If it were so, in the Question Section, it should be said, 'In the path, three are by kamma condition.' Therefore, the state of wrong speech and so on as path conditions cannot be stated. This is the explanation of the Paṭṭhāna. And the state of being the remaining conditions is already stated by the statement of volition's state of being multiple conditions, so this should not be recited—thus they do not recite it. 'Shamelessness... sloth, torpor, restlessness, doubt'—this is the initial reading. But since doubt is not a predominance condition, not reciting it there, they recite here thus: 'Doubt, envy, stinginess, and remorse—having removed the predominance condition from them.'

‘‘Cattāri [Pg.196] mahābhūtāni ārammaṇa…pe… purejātavippayuttaatthiavigatavasena dasadhā paccayā honti, puna tathā hadayavatthū’’ti purimapāṭho, mahābhūtāni pana vippayuttapaccayā na hontīti ‘‘purejātaatthiavigatavasena navadhā paccayā honti, vippayuttapaccayaṃ pakkhipitvā dasadhā vatthu’’nti paṭhanti. Ettakamevettha apubbanti etasmiṃ purejātapaccaye sahajātanissayehi apubbaṃ rūpasaddagandharasāyatanamattamevāti attho, ārammaṇāni panetāni ārammaṇapaccayadhammānaṃ anekapaccayabhāve vuttānīti sabbātikkantapaccayāpekkhā etesaṃ apubbatā natthīti. Indriyādīsu apubbaṃ natthīti rūpajīvitindriyassapi arūpajīvitindriyato apubbassa paccayabhāvassa abhāvaṃ maññamānena apubbatā na vuttā. Tassa pana purejātapaccayabhāvato apubbatā. Kabaḷīkārāhārassa ca purejātena saddhiṃ sattadhā paccayabhāvo yojetabbo.

'The four great elements are object... and so on... they are conditions in ten ways, by way of pre-nascence, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance. Again, similarly, the heart-base'—this is the earlier reading. However, the great elements are not dissociation conditions. Therefore, they recite: 'By way of pre-nascence, presence, and non-disappearance, they are conditions in nine ways. Including the dissociation condition, the base becomes tenfold.' 'Here, only this much is unprecedented' means that in this pre-arisen condition, compared with co-nascence and support conditions, only the sense-spheres of form, sound, odor, and taste are unprecedented. But since these objects are stated in the context of the multiple conditionality of phenomena that are object conditions, there is no unprecedentedness for them with respect to the all-surpassing condition. 'In the faculties, etc., there is nothing unprecedented'—unprecedentedness is not mentioned because it is thought that even the physical life-faculty has no unprecedented conditionality compared to the immaterial life-faculty. However, its unprecedentedness is due to its being a pre-arisen condition. And the conditionality of edible food should be connected in seven ways together with the pre-arisen condition.

Ākāroti mūlādiākāro. Atthoti tenākārena upakārakatā. ‘‘Yenākārenā’’ti etassa vā atthavacanaṃ ‘‘yenatthenā’’ti. Vipākahetūsuyeva labbhatīti ettha amohavipākahetussa adhipatipaccayabhāvo ca lokuttaravipākeyeva labbhatīti. Evaṃ sabbattha labbhamānālabbhamānaṃ sallakkhetabbaṃ. Vippayuttaṃ apaṭhitvā ‘‘chahākārehī’’ti purimapāṭho, taṃ pana paṭhitvā ‘‘sattahākārehī’’ti paṭhanti. Ukkaṭṭhaparicchedo hettha vuccati, na ca yaṃ ārammaṇaṃ nissayo hoti, taṃ vippayuttaṃ na hotīti.

'Mode' means the mode beginning with root. 'Meaning' means helpfulness through that mode. Or, the explanation of the meaning of 'by which mode' is 'by which meaning.' 'It is obtained only in resultant roots'—here, the state of the non-delusion resultant root as a predominance condition is obtained only in supramundane resultants. Thus, everywhere, what is obtainable and unobtainable should be noted. Without reciting 'dissociation', the earlier reading was 'in six modes'; but reciting it, they read 'in seven modes.' Here, the highest determination is stated, and it is not the case that whatever is an object and a support is not a dissociation.

Anantarasamanantaresu yaṃ kammapaccayo hoti, taṃ na āsevanapaccayo. Yañca āsevanapaccayo hoti, na taṃ kammapaccayoti daṭṭhabbaṃ. ‘‘Pakatūpanissayo pakatūpanissayovā’’ti vuttaṃ, kammapaccayopi pana so hoti, tasmā ‘‘kammapaccayo cā’’ti paṭhanti. Ayaṃ panettha attho – pakatūpanissayo yebhuyyena pakatūpanissayova hoti, koci panettha kammapaccayo ca hotīti. ‘‘Ārammaṇapurejāte panettha indriyavippayuttapaccayatā na labbhatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Tattha ārammaṇapurejātanti yadi kañci ārammaṇabhūtaṃ purejātaṃ vuttaṃ, ārammaṇabhūtassa vatthussa vippayuttapaccayatā labbhatīti sā na labbhatīti na vattabbā. Atha pana [Pg.197] vatthupurejātato aññaṃ vatthubhāvarahitārammaṇameva ‘‘ārammaṇapurejāta’’nti vuttaṃ, tassa nissayapaccayatā na labbhatīti ‘‘nissayindriyavippayuttapaccayatā na labbhatī’’ti vattabbaṃ. Ito uttaripīti purejātato paratopīti attho, ito vā indriyavippayuttato nissayindriyavippayuttato vā uttari ārammaṇādhipatiādi ca labbhamānālabbhamānaṃ veditabbanti attho vattabbo. Kammādīsu pana labbhamānālabbhamānaṃ na vakkhatīti purimoyevettha attho adhippeto.

In contiguity and proximity conditions, what is a kamma condition is not a repetition condition. And what is a repetition condition is not a kamma condition—this should be understood. It was said, 'Natural decisive support or natural decisive support,' but it is also a kamma condition. Therefore, they recite 'and a kamma condition.' Here, this is the meaning: Natural decisive support is for the most part just natural decisive support, but in some cases, it is also a kamma condition. It was said, 'Here, in an object pre-nascence condition, the conditionality by way of faculty and dissociation is not obtained.' In that context, if any pre-nascent thing that has become an object is spoken of, the dissociation conditionality of the base that has become an object is obtainable; thus, it should not be said that it is unobtainable. If, however, other than a pre-nascent base, only an object devoid of the nature of a base is called an 'object pre-nascence condition,' for that, support conditionality is unobtainable. Therefore, it should be said, 'The conditionality by way of support, faculty, and dissociation is unobtainable.' 'And beyond this' means 'beyond the pre-nascence condition'; or, the meaning to be explained is that beyond this—that is, beyond faculty-dissociation or support-faculty-dissociation—object, predominance, and so on are to be known as obtainable or unobtainable. But since in the case of kamma and so on, what is obtainable or unobtainable will not be stated, the former meaning is intended here.

‘‘Kabaḷīkāro āhāro āhārapaccayovā’’ti purimapāṭho, atthiavigatapaccayopi pana so hoti, tena ‘‘kabaḷīkāro āhāro āhārapaccayattaṃ avijahantova atthiavigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi dvīhākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchatī’’ti paṭhanti.

'Edible food is a nutriment condition'—this is the earlier reading, but it is also a presence and non-disappearance condition. Therefore, they recite: 'Edible food, while not abandoning its nature as a nutriment condition, attains a state of multiple conditionality through two other modes, namely, by way of presence and non-disappearance.'

‘‘Yathānurūpaṃ jhānapaccaye vuttānaṃ dasannaṃ hetuadhipatīnañcāti imesaṃ vasenā’’ti purimapāṭho, ‘‘yathānurūpaṃ jhānapaccaye vuttānaṃ maggavajjānaṃ navannaṃ hetuadhipatijhānānañcāti imesaṃ vasenā’’ti pacchimapāṭho, tesu vicāretvā yutto gahetabbo.

'As is suitable, by way of these ten roots and predominances mentioned in the jhāna condition'—this is the earlier reading. 'As is suitable, by way of these nine roots, predominances, and jhānas mentioned in the jhāna condition, excluding the path'—this is the later reading. Having considered these, the suitable one should be taken.

Samanantaraniruddhatāya ārammaṇabhāvena ca sadiso paccayabhāvo paccayasabhāgatā, viruddhapaccayatā paccayavisabhāgatā. ‘‘Iminā upāyenā’’ti vacanato hetuādīnaṃ sahajātānaṃ sahajātabhāvena sabhāgatā, sahajātāsahajātānaṃ hetuārammaṇādīnaṃ aññamaññavisabhāgatāti evamādinā upāyena sabhāgatā visabhāgatā yojetabbā.

Similarity of condition is the similar state of being a condition due to having just ceased and due to being an object. Dissimilarity of condition is opposing conditionality. According to the statement 'by this method,' the similarity of co-nascent conditions, such as root, is due to their co-nascent nature; and the mutual dissimilarity between co-nascent and non-co-nascent conditions, such as root and object—by this method and so on, similarity and dissimilarity should be applied.

Janakāyeva, na ajanakāti janakabhāvappadhānāyeva hutvā paccayā honti, na upatthambhakabhāvappadhānāti attho daṭṭhabbo. Yesaṃ hetuādayo paccayā honti, te tehi vinā neva uppajjanti, na ca pavattantīti tesaṃ ubhayappadhānatā vuttā. Na hi te anantarādayo viya jananeneva pavattiṃ karontīti.

They are only generative, not non-generative, which means they are conditions by being primarily generative in nature, not primarily supportive in nature—this is the meaning to be understood. For those things for which root and other conditions are conditions, they neither arise nor continue without them. Thus, their primary role in both respects is stated. For they do not, like contiguity and other such conditions, bring about continuation solely through generation.

Sabbesaṃ ṭhānaṃ kāraṇabhāvo sabbaṭṭhānaṃ, taṃ etesaṃ atthīti sabbaṭṭhānikā. Upanissayaṃ bhindantena tayopi upanissayā vattabbā, abhinditvā [Pg.198] vā upanissayaggahaṇameva kātabbaṃ. Tattha bhindanaṃ pakatūpanissayassa rūpānaṃ paccayattābhāvadassanatthaṃ, ārammaṇānantarūpanissayānaṃ pana pubbe ārammaṇādhipatianantaraggahaṇehi gahitattā tesu ekadesena anantarūpanissayena itarampi dassetīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Purejātapacchājātāpi asabbaṭṭhānikā arūparūpānaññeva yathākkamena paccayabhāvatoti ettha purejātapaccayo anantarādīsu eva vattabbo taṃsamānagatikattā, na ca yugaḷabhāvo pacchājātena saha kathane kāraṇaṃ asabbaṭṭhānikadassanamattassa adhippetattāti taṃ tattha paṭhitvā ‘‘pacchājātopi asabbaṭṭhāniko rūpānaṃyeva paccayabhāvato’’ti paṭhanti.

The state of being a cause in all instances is 'all-instance'; since this belongs to them, they are called 'applicable in all instances.' When analyzing decisive support, all three decisive supports should be stated; or, without analyzing, just the taking up of decisive support should be done. There, the analysis is for the purpose of showing the absence of conditionality for material phenomena by natural decisive support. However, regarding object-decisive support and contiguity-decisive support, since they have previously been taken up by the inclusion of object-predominance and contiguity, it should be understood that among these, by one part, namely contiguity-decisive support, the other is also shown. Pre-nascence and post-nascence are also not applicable in all instances, because they are conditions respectively for only immaterial and material phenomena. Here, the pre-nascence condition should be stated among the contiguity condition and so on, because its course is similar. Its being a pair is not a reason for stating it together with post-nascence, since only the showing of its not being applicable in all instances is intended. Therefore, having recited that there, they recite: 'Post-nascence is also not applicable in all instances, because it is a condition for material phenomena only.'

Paccayaniddesapakiṇṇakavinicchayakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the discourse on miscellaneous determinations concerning the exposition of conditions is concluded.

Pucchāvāro

The Chapter of Questions

1. Paccayānulomavaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of Conformity with Conditions

Ekekaṃ tikadukanti ekekaṃ tikaṃ dukañcāti attho, na tikadukanti.

'One by one, a triad and a dyad' means one triad and one dyad; this is the meaning, not 'a triad-dyad'.

Paccayā cevāti ye kusalādidhamme paṭiccāti vuttā, te paṭiccatthaṃ pharantā kusalādipaccayā cevāti attho. Tenevāha ‘‘te ca kho sahajātāvā’’ti. Yehi pana hetādipaccayehi uppatti vuttā, te sahajātāpi honti asahajātāpīti. Ettha paṭiccasahajātavārehi samānatthehi paṭiccasahajātābhidhānehi samānatthaṃ bodhentena bhagavatā pacchimavārena purimavāro, purimavārena ca pacchimavāro ca bodhitoti veditabbo. Esa nayo paccayanissayavāresu saṃsaṭṭhasampayuttavāresu ca, evañca niruttikosallaṃ janitaṃ hotīti.

The phrase 'and as conditions' means that those wholesome and other states which are said to arise 'dependent on,' pervade the meaning of conditionality; thus, they are themselves conditions for the wholesome and so forth. Therefore, it is said, 'and they are co-arisen.' However, those phenomena whose arising is described through conditions such as roots can be either co-arisen or not co-arisen. Here, it should be understood that the Blessed One, by using the term 'conditionally co-arisen' in the later section, which conveys the same meaning as the sections on conditionality and co-arising, clarifies the earlier section through the later section, and the later section through the earlier section. This method also applies to the sections on condition and dependence, and the sections on association and conjunction. And thus, skill in exposition is generated.

‘‘Te te pana pañhe uddharitvā puna kusalo hetu hetusampayuttakānaṃ dhammāna’’nti likhitaṃ. ‘‘Kusalā hetū sampayuttakānaṃ khandhāna’’nti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.401) pañhāvārapāṭhoti pamādalekhā esāti pāḷiyaṃ āgatapāṭhameva paṭhanti. Purimavāresu sahajātanissayasampayuttapaccayabhāvehi kusalādidhamme niyametvā tasmiṃ niyame kusalādīnaṃ hetupaccayādīhi uppattiṃ pucchitvā vissajjanaṃ kataṃ, na tattha ‘‘ime nāma te dhammā hetādipaccayabhūtā’’ti viññāyanti, tasmā tattha ‘‘siyā kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjeyya [Pg.199] hetupaccayā’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.25) evamādīhi saṅgahite paṭiccatthādipharaṇakabhāve hetādipaccayapaccayuppannesu hetādipaccayānaṃ nicchayābhāvato pañhā nijjaṭā niggumbā ca katvā na vibhattā, idha pana ‘‘siyā kusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo’’ti evamādīhi saṅgahitā hetādipaccayabhūtā kusalādayo paccayuppannā ca nicchitā, na koci pucchāsaṅgahito attho anicchito nāma atthīti āha ‘‘sabbepi te pañhā nijjaṭā niggumbā ca katvā vibhattā’’ti. Pañhā pana uddharitvā vissajjanaṃ sabbattha samānanti na taṃ sandhāya nijjaṭatā vuttāti daṭṭhabbā.

Having extracted those very questions, it is written again: 'A wholesome root for states associated with the root.' The text of the question section is 'Wholesome roots for associated aggregates' (Paṭṭhā. 1.1.401). This is a careless writing; therefore, they recite only the text that has come down in the Pāli. In the previous sections, having determined wholesome and other states by way of co-nascence, dependence, and association conditions, an answer was given after asking about the arising of wholesome and other states by way of root-condition and other conditions. There, it is not discerned that 'these states are root-conditions, etc.' Therefore, in that context, because of the absence of determination of the root-conditions and other conditions among the condition-dependently arisen states that fulfill the function of conditionality, etc., which are included in such questions as 'Might a wholesome state arise dependent on a wholesome state through root condition?' (Paṭṭhā. 1.1.25), the questions were not analyzed, having been made entangled and dense. Here, however, in such questions as 'A wholesome state may be a condition for a wholesome state by way of root-condition,' the wholesome and other states that are root-conditions, etc., and the condition-dependently arisen states are determined. There is no meaning included in the question that is undetermined. Therefore, it is said: 'All those questions have been analyzed, having been made disentangled and cleared.' However, extracting the questions and giving the answers is the same everywhere; it should be understood that the disentanglement was not spoken of with reference to that.

Uppattiyā paññāpitattāti pucchāmatteneva uppattiyā ṭhapitattā pakāsitattā, nānappakārehi vā ñāpitattāti attho.

'Because of being made known by arising' means: because of being established or declared by arising merely through the question, or because of being indicated in various ways; this is the meaning.

25-34. Parikappapucchāti vidhipucchā. Kiṃ siyāti eso vidhi kiṃ atthīti attho. Kiṃ siyā, atha na siyāti sampucchanaṃ vā parikappapucchāti vadati. Kimidaṃ sampucchanaṃ nāma? Samecca pucchanaṃ, ‘‘kiṃ suttantaṃ pariyāpuṇeyya, atha abhidhamma’’nti aññena saha sampadhāraṇanti attho. Yo kusalo dhammo uppajjeyya hetupaccayā, so kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca siyāti etasmiṃ atthe sati pacchājātavipākapaccayesupi sabbapucchānaṃ pavattito ‘‘yo kusalo dhammo uppajjeyya pacchājātapaccayā vipākapaccayā, so kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca siyā’’ti ayamattho viññāyeyya, tathā ca sati pacchājātapaccayā vipākapaccayāti uppajjamānaṃ niddhāretvā tassa kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca bhavanassa pucchanato kusalānaṃ tehi paccayehi uppatti anuññātāti āpajjati, na ca taṃtaṃpaccayā uppajjamānānaṃ kusalādīnaṃ kusalādidhamme paṭicca bhavanamatthitā ettha pucchitā, atha kho uppatti, evañca katvā vissajjane ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjatī’’ti uppattiyeva vissajjitāti, tasmā ayamattho sadosoti ‘‘atha vā’’ti atthantaravacanaṃ vuttaṃ.

25-34. A deliberative question is a question of method. 'What might be?' means 'Does this method exist?'. 'Might it be, or might it not be?' is an inquiry, or it is called a deliberative question. What is this 'inquiry'? It is asking after careful consideration, meaning deliberation with another, as in: 'Should one master the Suttanta, or the Abhidhamma?'. If the meaning were 'If a wholesome state were to arise due to a root condition, might it be dependent on a wholesome state?', then, because all questions proceed in the same way for post-nascence and resultant conditions as well, the meaning 'If a wholesome state were to arise due to a post-nascence condition or a resultant condition, might it be dependent on a wholesome state?' would be understood. And if that were the case, then by determining what arises from post-nascence and resultant conditions and then asking about its existence as dependent on a wholesome state, the arising of wholesome states by those conditions would be admitted. But the existence of wholesome and other states dependent on wholesome and other states, arising due to those various conditions, is not what is asked here; rather, it is the arising. And so, in the answer, 'A wholesome state arises dependent on a wholesome state,' it is the arising that is answered. Therefore, this meaning is faulty, so the expression 'Or else...' is stated to introduce another meaning.

Tattha ‘‘kusalo dhammo uppajjeyyā’’ti uppattiṃ anujānitvā ‘‘hetupaccayā siyā eta’’nti tassā hetupaccayā bhavanapucchanaṃ, ‘‘uppajjeyya hetupaccayā’’ti hetupaccayā uppattiṃ anujānitvā tassā ‘‘siyā eta’’nti bhavanapucchanañca na yuttaṃ. Anuññātañhi nicchitamevāti. Tasmā ananujānitvā [Pg.200] ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjeyya hetupaccayā’’ti evaṃ yathāvuttaṃ uppajjanaṃ kiṃ siyāti pucchatīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Uppajjeyyāti vā idampi sampucchanameva, kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo kiṃ uppajjeyya hetupaccayāti attho. Siyāti yathāpucchitasseva uppajjanassa sambhavaṃ pucchati ‘‘kiṃ evaṃ uppajjanaṃ siyā sambhaveyyā’’ti, ayaṃ nayo siyāsaddassa pacchāyojane. Yathāṭhāneyeva pana ṭhitā ‘‘siyā’’ti esā sāmaññapucchā, tāya pana pucchāya ‘‘idaṃ nāma pucchita’’nti na viññāyatīti tassāyeva pucchāya visesanatthaṃ ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjeyya hetupaccayā’’ti pucchati, evaṃ visesitabbavisesanabhāvena dvepi pucchā ekāyeva pucchāti daṭṭhabbā.

Here, it is not proper to first permit the arising with 'a wholesome state might arise' and then ask about its being by way of root-condition with 'might this be by root-condition?'; nor is it proper to first permit the arising by way of root-condition with 'it might arise by root-condition' and then ask about its being with 'might this be?'. For what is permitted is already determined. Therefore, it should be understood that, without first permitting it, one asks: 'Might the arising as stated—"a wholesome state dependent on a wholesome state might arise by way of root-condition"—be possible?'. Alternatively, 'might arise' is also a complete question, meaning: 'Might a wholesome state arise dependent on a wholesome state by way of root-condition?'. The word 'might be' inquires about the possibility of the arising as asked: 'Might such an arising be, might it occur?'. This is the method when the word 'might be' is construed at the end. However, when 'might be' stands in its own place, it is a general question. By that question alone, it is not understood what is being asked. Therefore, to specify that question, one asks: 'Might a wholesome state arise dependent on a wholesome state by way of root-condition?'. Thus, through the relationship of that which is to be specified and that which specifies, both should be seen as a single question.

Gamanussukkavacananti gamanassa samānakattukapacchimakālakiriyāpekkhavacananti attho. Yadipi paṭigamanuppattīnaṃ purimapacchimakālatā natthi, paccayapaccayuppannānaṃ pana sahajātānampi paccayapaccayuppannabhāvena gahaṇaṃ purimapacchimabhāveneva hotīti gahaṇappavattiākāravasena paccayāyattatāattapaṭilābhasaṅkhātānaṃ paṭigamanuppattikiriyānampi purimapacchimakālavohāro hotīti daṭṭhabbo. Gamanaṃ vā uppatti evāti gacchantassa paṭigamanaṃ uppajjantassa paṭiuppajjanaṃ samānakiriyā. Paṭikaraṇañhi paṭisaddatthoti. Tasmā ‘‘kusalaṃ dhamma’’nti upayoganiddiṭṭhaṃ paccayaṃ uppajjamānaṃ paṭicca tadāyattuppattiyā paṭigantvāti ayamettha attho, tena paṭiccāti sahajātapaccayaṃ katvāti vuttaṃ hoti. Sahajātapaccayakaraṇañhi uppajjamānābhimukhauppajjamānaṃ paṭigamanaṃ, taṃ katvāti paṭiccasaddassa atthoti.

'A statement of eagerness for going' means a statement that anticipates the final action of going by the same agent. Although there is no prior and posterior time for returning and arising, the grasping of even co-nascent conditions and condition-dependently arisen states, by way of their being conditions and condition-dependently arisen, occurs precisely as if there were a prior and posterior. Thus, it should be understood that, according to the mode in which the process of grasping occurs, there is a conventional designation of prior and posterior time even for the actions of returning and arising, which are characterized by dependence on conditions and the acquisition of their own nature. Or, going is simply arising; thus, the returning of one who is going and the re-arising of one who is arising are similar actions. For 'acting in response to' is the meaning of the prefix 'paṭi'. Therefore, the meaning here is this: having returned to the arising condition indicated by the application 'a wholesome state,' by means of an arising that is dependent on it. By this, 'dependent on' is said to mean 'having made it a co-nascent condition.' For making something a co-nascent condition is a returning to what is arising, facing what is arising. 'Having done that' is the meaning of the word 'paṭicca'.

35-38. Tāsu pāḷiyaṃ dveyeva dassitāti hetārammaṇaduke dvinnaṃ pucchānaṃ dassitattā vuttaṃ. Ettha ca ekamūlakādibhāvo pucchānaṃ vuttoti veditabbo, paccayānaṃ pana vasena sabbapaṭhamo paccayantarena avomissakattā suddhikanayo, dutiyo ārammaṇādīsu ekekassa hetu eva ekamūlakanti katvā ekamūlakanayo. Evaṃ hetārammaṇadukādīnaṃ adhipatiādīnaṃ mūlabhāvato dukamūlakādayo nayā veditabbā. Tevīsatimūlakanayo ca tato paraṃ mūlassa abhāvato ‘‘sabbamūlaka’’nti pāḷiyaṃ vutto. Tattha napuṃsakaniddesena eka…pe… sabbamūlakaṃ paccayagamanaṃ pāḷigamanaṃ vāti viññāyati, eka…pe… sabbamūlakaṃ nayaṃ asammuyhantenāti upayogo vā[Pg.201], idha ca sabbamūlakanti ca tevīsatimūlakasseva vuttattā paccanīye vakkhati ‘‘yathā anulome ekekassa padassa ekamūlakaṃ…pe… yāva tevīsatimūlakaṃ, evaṃ paccanīyepi vitthāretabba’’nti (paṭṭhā. aṭṭha. 1.42-44).

Among them, 'in the Pāḷi, only two are shown' is said because in the root-object dyad, two questions are shown. And here it should be understood that the state of having a single root, etc., is stated of the questions. But with regard to the conditions, the very first is the pure method because it is unmixed with another condition; the second is the single-root method, taking it that for each of object, etc., the root is just one. Thus, because of predominance, etc., being the root of the root-object dyad, etc., the methods should be known as the two-root methods, etc. And the twenty-three-root method is called 'all-rooted' in the Pāḷi because there is no root beyond that. There, by the neuter designation, 'eka...pe... sabbamūlakaṃ' is understood as either 'the procedure of conditions' or 'the procedure of the Pāḷi'; or it is the application, 'by one not being confused about the eka...pe... sabbamūlakaṃ method'. And here, since 'all-rooted' is said of just the twenty-three-root method, it will be said in the negative section: 'Just as in the positive section, for each term, there is the single-rooted... up to the twenty-three-rooted, so too in the negative section it should be elaborated' (Paṭṭhāna, Aṭṭhakathā 1.42-44).

39-40. ‘‘Ārammaṇapaccayā hetupaccayāti ettāvatā ārammaṇapaccayaṃ ādiṃ katvā hetupaccayapariyosāno ekamūlakanayo dassito’’ti vuttaṃ, evaṃ sati vinaye viya cakkabandhanavasena pāḷigati āpajjati, na heṭṭhimasodhanavasena. Heṭṭhimasodhanavasena ca idha abhidhamme pāḷi gatā, evañca katvā vissajjane ‘‘ārammaṇapaccayā hetuyā tīṇi, adhipatipaccayā tīṇi, adhipatipaccayā hetuyā nava, ārammaṇe tīṇī’’tiādinā heṭṭhimaṃ sodhetvāva pāḷi pavattā. Yo cettha ‘‘ekamūlakanayo’’ti vutto, so suddhikanayova. So ca visesābhāvato ārammaṇamūlakādīsu na labbhati. Na hi ārammaṇādīsu tasmiṃ tasmiṃ ādimhi ṭhapitepi paccayantarena sambandhābhāvena ādimhi vuttasuddhikato visesattho labbhati, teneva vissajjanepi ārammaṇamūlakādīsu suddhikanayo na dassitoti, tasmā ‘‘ārammaṇapaccayā hetupaccayā ārammaṇapaccayā adhipatipaccayā…pe… ārammaṇapaccayā avigatapaccayā’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.39) ayaṃ heṭṭhimasodhanavasena ekasmiṃ ārammaṇapaccaye hetupaccayādike yojetvā vutto ekamūlakanayo daṭṭhabbo. ‘‘Ārammaṇapaccayā…pe… avigatapaccayā’’ti vā ekamūlakesu anantarapaccayassa mūlakaṃ ārammaṇaṃ dassetvā ekamūlakādīni saṃkhipitvā sabbamūlakassāvasānena avigatapaccayena niṭṭhāpitanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Adhipatipaccayā anantarapaccayā samanantarapaccayā sahajātapaccayā aññamaññapaccayāti idaṃ mūlameva dassetvā ekamūlakādīnaṃ saṃkhipanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ, na suddhikadassanaṃ, nāpi sabbamūlake katipayapaccayadassanaṃ.

'By way of object condition, by way of root condition'—thus far, it is said, 'the single-root method, having the object condition as its beginning and the root condition as its end, has been shown.' This being so, the Pāḷi would proceed by way of 'binding the wheel,' as in the Vinaya, not by way of 'purifying from below.' But here in the Abhidhamma, the Pāḷi proceeds by way of 'purifying from below.' And having done so, in the explanation, the Pāḷi proceeds only after purifying from below, with such phrases as: 'by way of object condition, with root, three; by way of predominance condition, three; by way of predominance condition, with root, nine; in object, three,' etc. That which is here called the 'single-root method' is just the pure method. And that is not found in the object-rooted cases, etc., because there is no distinction. For in the object-rooted cases, etc., even when this or that is placed at the beginning, since there is no connection through another condition, no special meaning is obtained from the pure method stated at the beginning. For this reason, even in the explanation, the pure method is not shown in the object-rooted cases, etc. Therefore, 'by way of object condition, by way of root condition... by way of object condition, by way of non-disappearance condition' (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.39) should be understood as the single-root method, stated by way of 'purifying from below,' by connecting the root condition, etc., within a single object condition. Alternatively, 'by way of object condition... by way of non-disappearance condition' should be understood as showing the object as the root of the proximity condition among the single-rooted, summarizing the single-rooted, etc., and concluding with the non-disappearance condition as the end of the all-rooted. 'By way of predominance condition, by way of proximity condition, by way of contiguity condition, by way of conascence condition, by way of mutuality condition'—this should be understood as showing the root itself and summarizing the single-rooted, etc., not as showing the pure method, nor as showing some conditions in the all-rooted.

41. Tato nissayādīni mūlānipi saṃkhipitvā avigatamūlakanayaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘avigatapaccayā hetupaccayā’’tiādi āraddhaṃ. Etasmiñca suddhikassa adassanena ārammaṇamūlakādīsu visuṃ visuṃ suddhikanayo na labbhatīti ñāpito hoti. Na hi ādi katthaci saṃkhepantaragato hoti. Ādiantehi majjhimānaṃ dassanañhi saṅkhepo, ādito pabhuti katici [Pg.202] vatvā gatidassanaṃ vāti. Dutiyacatukkaṃ vatvā ‘‘vigatapaccayā’’ti padaṃ uddharitvā ṭhapitaṃ. Tena osānacatukkaṃ dasseti. Tatiyacatukkato pabhuti vā pañcakamūlāni saṃkhipitvā sabbamūlakassa avasānena niṭṭhapeti.

41. Then, having also summarized the roots such as dependence, etc., the passage beginning 'by way of non-disappearance condition, by way of root condition' is introduced to show the non-disappearance-rooted method. And in this, by the non-showing of the pure method, it is indicated that the pure method is not obtained separately in the object-rooted cases, etc. For the beginning is not included within any other summary. Indeed, a summary is the showing of the middle by means of the beginning and the end, or it is the showing of the procedure by stating a few things from the beginning. Having stated the second tetrad, the term 'disappearance condition' is extracted and set aside. By this, it shows the final tetrad. Alternatively, from the third tetrad onwards, it summarizes the five roots and concludes with the end of the all-rooted method.

Ettha ca dukamūlakādīsu yathā hetuārammaṇadukena saddhiṃ avasesā paccayā yojitā, hetārammaṇādhipatitikādīhi ca avasesāvasesā, evaṃ hetuadhipatidukādīhi hetuadhipatianantaratikādīhi ca avasesāvasesā yojetabbā siyuṃ. Yadi ca sabbesaṃ paccayānaṃ mūlabhāvena yojitattā hetumūlake hetuadhipatiādidukānaṃ adhipatimūlakādīsu adhipatihetuādidukehi viseso natthi. Te eva hi paccayā uppaṭipāṭiyā vuttā, tathāpi ārammaṇamūlakādīsu ārammaṇādhipatidukādīnaṃ avasesāvasesehi, hetumūlake ca hetuadhipatianantaratikādīnaṃ avasesāvasesehi yojane atthi visesoti. Yasmā pana evaṃ yojiyamānesupi sukhaggahaṇaṃ na hoti, na ca yathāvuttāya yojanāya sabbā sā yojanā paññavatā na sakkā viññātuṃ, tasmā tathā ayojetvā anupubbeneva yojanā katāti daṭṭhabbā. Dhammānaṃ desanāvidhāne hi bhagavāva pamāṇanti. Gaṇanāgāthā ādimapāṭhe kāci viruddhā, tasmā suṭṭhu gaṇetvā gahetabbā.

Here, in the two-root methods, etc., just as the remaining conditions are connected with the root-object dyad, and the remaining of the remaining with the root-object-predominance triads, etc., so too the remaining of the remaining should be connected with the root-predominance dyads, etc., and with the root-predominance-proximity triads, etc. And although, because all conditions are connected as roots, there is no distinction between the root-predominance dyads, etc., in the root-rooted method and the predominance-root dyads, etc., in the predominance-rooted method—for those same conditions are merely stated in a different order—nevertheless, there is a distinction in the object-rooted method, etc., when connecting the remaining of the remaining with the object-predominance dyads, etc., and in the root-rooted method when connecting the remaining of the remaining with the root-predominance-proximity triads, etc. However, since even when connected in this way, it is not easy to grasp, and not all such connections can be understood by a wise person through the method as described, it should therefore be understood that the connection was not made in that way, but was made sequentially. For in the method of teaching the dhammas, the Blessed One is the authority. Some counting verses in the initial text are contradictory; therefore, they should be carefully counted and understood.

‘‘Dvāvīsatiyā tikesu ekekaṃ tikaṃ dukānaṃ satena satena saddhiṃ yojetvā’’ti vuttaṃ, taṃ dukatikapaṭṭhāne kesañci potthakānaṃ vasena vuttaṃ. Kesuci pana ekeko duko dvāvīsatiyā dvāvīsatiyā tikehi yojito, tañca gamanaṃ yuttaṃ. Na hi tattha tikassa yojanā atthi, atha kho tikānaṃ ekekena padena dukassāti. Tattha chasaṭṭhiyā tikapadesu ekekena saṃsanditvā chasaṭṭhi hetudukā, tathā sahetukadukādayo cāti dukānaṃ chasatādhikāni chasahassāni honti. Tesu ekekasmiṃ paṭiccavārādayo satta vārā nayā pucchā ca sabbā dukapaṭṭhāne hetudukena samānā.

'In the twenty-two triads, each triad is combined with one hundred dyads,' it is said. This is stated according to some books regarding the Dyad-Triad Paṭṭhāna. However, in some books, each dyad is combined with the twenty-two triads, and that procedure is correct. For there, the combination is not of the triad as a whole, but of the dyad with each term of the triads. In that case, by combining each dyad with the sixty-six triad terms, there are sixty-six root dyads, and similarly for the with-root dyads and so on; thus, there are six thousand six hundred dyads. In each of these, the seven rounds beginning with the conditional relation round, the methods, and the questions are all the same as for the root dyad in the Dyad Paṭṭhāna.

‘‘Dukasate ekekaṃ dukaṃ dvāvīsatiyā tikehi saddhiṃ yojetvā’’ti ca vuttaṃ, tampi tikadukapaṭṭhāne kesañci potthakānaṃ vasena vuttaṃ. Vuttanayena pana yuttagamanesu ekeko tiko dukasatena yojito. Tattha hetupadaṃ pakkhipitvā vutto eko kusalattiko, tathā nahetupadaṃ…pe… araṇapadanti kusalattikānaṃ dve [Pg.203] satāni honti, tathā vedanāttikādīnampīti sabbesaṃ catusatādhikāni cattāri sahassāni honti. Tesu ekekasmiṃ vāranayapucchā tikapaṭṭhāne kusalattikena samānā.

And it is also said, 'In a hundred dyads, each dyad is combined with twenty-two triads'; that too is stated according to some books regarding the Triad-Dyad Paṭṭhāna. However, in the correct procedure according to the method stated, each triad is combined with a hundred dyads. Therein, for the one wholesome triad, by combining it with the 'root' term, and similarly with the 'non-root' term... up to the 'non-conflict' term, there come to be two hundred combinations for the wholesome triad. Likewise for the feeling triad and others, so that for all of them there are four thousand four hundred. In each of these, the questions concerning rounds and methods are the same as for the wholesome triad in the Triad Paṭṭhāna.

‘‘Cha anulomamhi nayā sugambhīrā’’ti vacanato panāti etena idaṃ dasseti – ‘‘anulomamhī’’ti ‘‘tikādayo chanayā’’ti ca avisesena vuttattā paṭiccavārādivasena sattavidhampi anulomaṃ saha gahetvā ‘‘cha anulomamhī’’ti vuttaṃ, anulomādivasena catubbidhaṃ tikapaṭṭhānaṃ saha gahetvā ‘‘tikañca paṭṭhānavara’’nti, tathā catubbidhāni dukapaṭṭhānādīni saha gahetvā ‘‘dukuttama’’ntiādiṃ vatvā ‘‘cha nayā sugambhīrā’’ti vuttanti imamatthaṃ gahetvā imasmiṃ paccayānulome sattappabhede chapi ete paṭṭhānā paṭṭhānanayā catuppabhedā pucchāvasena uddharitabbāti. Evañhi sabbasmiṃ paṭṭhāne sabbo paccayānulomo dassito hotīti. Paccanīyagāthādīsupi eseva nayo. Ettha ca dukatikapaṭṭhānādīsu visesitabbehi tikehi paṭṭhānaṃ tikapaṭṭhānaṃ. Dukānaṃ tikapaṭṭhānaṃ dukatikapaṭṭhānaṃ. Dukavisesitā vā tikā dukatikā, dukatikānaṃ paṭṭhānaṃ dukatikapaṭṭhānanti iminā nayena vacanattho veditabbo. Dukādivisesitassa cettha tikādipadassa dukādibhāvo daṭṭhabbo. Dukapaṭṭhānameva hi tikapadasaṃsandanavasena dukapadasaṃsandanavasena ca pavattaṃ dukatikapaṭṭhānaṃ dukadukapaṭṭhānañca, tathā tikapaṭṭhānameva dukapadasaṃsandanavasena tikapadasaṃsandanavasena ca pavattaṃ tikadukapaṭṭhānaṃ tikatikapaṭṭhānañcāti.

The statement 'Six methods are profound in the forward order' indicates this: because 'in the forward order' and 'the triads and so on, six methods' are stated without distinction, all seven kinds of forward order, by way of the conditional section, etc., are included when it is said 'six in the forward order.' Including the four kinds of Triad Paṭṭhāna, by way of the forward order, etc., it is stated, 'and the Triad, the supreme Paṭṭhāna.' Similarly, including the four kinds of Dyad Paṭṭhāna, etc., and saying 'the supreme Dyad,' etc., it is stated, 'six profound methods.' Understanding this meaning, in this conditional forward order of seven kinds, these six Paṭṭhānas—the Paṭṭhāna methods being of four kinds—should be extracted by way of questions. Thus, in every Paṭṭhāna, the entire conditional forward order is shown. This same method applies to the counterpart verses, etc. Here, in the Dyad-Triad Paṭṭhāna and others, the Paṭṭhāna specified by triads is the Triad Paṭṭhāna. The Paṭṭhāna of dyads and triads is the Dyad-Triad Paṭṭhāna. Alternatively, triads specified by dyads are Dyad-Triads; the Paṭṭhāna of Dyad-Triads is the Dyad-Triad Paṭṭhāna. In this way, the meaning of the terms should be understood. Here, it should be understood that a triad term, etc., specified by a dyad, etc., takes on the nature of a dyad, etc. For the Dyad Paṭṭhāna itself, proceeding by way of connection with a triad term and a dyad term, becomes the Dyad-Triad Paṭṭhāna and the Dyad-Dyad Paṭṭhāna respectively. Similarly, the Triad Paṭṭhāna itself, proceeding by way of connection with a dyad term and a triad term, becomes the Triad-Dyad Paṭṭhāna and the Triad-Triad Paṭṭhāna respectively.

Paccayānulomavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of the Conditional Forward Order is concluded.

2. Paccayapaccanīyavaṇṇanā

2. Exposition of the Conditional Counterpart

42-44. Tevīsatimūlakanti idañcettha dumūlakaṃyeva sandhāya vuttanti idaṃ dukamūlake pucchānaṃ mūlabhūtā tevīsati dukā sambhavantīti tassa ‘‘tevīsatimūlaka’’nti nāmaṃ katvā yāva yattako pabhedo atthi, tāva tattakaṃ tevīsatimūlakaṃ yathānulome vitthāritaṃ. Evaṃ paccanīyepi vitthāretabbanti dukamūlakena tikamūlakādīsu nayaṃ dassetīti iminā adhippāyena vuttaṃ siyā. Yadi pana yāva tevīsatimaṃ mūlaṃ yathā vitthāritanti ayamattho adhippeto, ‘‘yāva tevīsatimaṃ mūla’’ntveva pāṭhena bhavitabbaṃ [Pg.204] siyā. Na hi ‘‘tevīsatimūlaka’’nti etassa byañjanassa tevīsatimaṃ mūlakanti ayamattho sambhavati. Yathā anulome ‘‘ekekapadassā’’tiādinā pana ekamūlādisabbamūlakapariyosānaṃ tattha nayadassanavasena dassitaṃ ekekassa padassa vitthāraṃ dassetīti sabbamūlakameva cettha ‘‘tevīsatimūlaka’’nti vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Tañhi tevīsatiyā paccayānaṃ avasesassa paccayassa mūlabhāvato ‘‘tevīsatimūlaka’’nti ca tato paraṃ mūlassa aññassa abhāvato ‘‘sabbamūlaka’’nti ca vuccati.

42-44. The term 'Tevīsatimūlaka' is stated here with reference to the two-rooted section. This is because in the two-rooted section, twenty-three dyads, which are the basis of the questions, arise; hence it is named 'Tevīsatimūlaka,' and the 'Tevīsatimūlaka' is elaborated as in the forward order, according to the extent of its classifications. Similarly, it should be elaborated in the counterpart as well. It might be said that this is stated with the intention of showing the method in the three-rooted section, etc., by means of the two-rooted section. If, however, the intended meaning is 'as it is elaborated up to the twenty-third root,' then the reading should be 'up to the twenty-third root.' For the meaning 'the twenty-third root' is not possible for the expression 'Tevīsatimūlaka.' However, just as in the forward order, by means of 'of each term,' etc., the detailed exposition of each term is shown, demonstrating the method there from the single root up to the conclusion with all roots, so it should be understood that here the entire root section itself is called 'Tevīsatimūlaka.' For it is called 'Tevīsatimūlaka' because it is the root of the twenty-three remaining conditions, and it is called 'Sabbamūlaka' because there is no other root beyond that.

Paccayapaccanīyavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of the Conditional Counterpart is concluded.

3. Anulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanā

3. Exposition of the Forward-Counterpart

45-48. Anulome vuttesu sabbesu ekamūlakādīsu ekekaṃ padaṃ parihāpetvāti tattha ekamūlake catuvīsati paccayapadāni idha ekamūlake tevīsati, eko pana paccayo mūlabhāvena ṭhito apubbatābhāvato agaṇanūpago. Tattha dumūlake tevīsati paccayapadāni gaṇanūpagāni, idha dumūlake dvāvīsatīti evaṃ parihāpetvāti attho.

45-48. 'Omitting one term in each of all those stated in the forward order, beginning with the single root,' means this: whereas in the single-rooted section there are twenty-four condition terms, here in the single-rooted section there are twenty-three. One condition, however, standing as the root, is not subject to enumeration due to its lack of a precedent. Whereas in the two-rooted section there are twenty-three condition terms subject to enumeration, here in the two-rooted section there are twenty-two. Thus, this is the meaning of 'omitting one in each case.'

Anulomato ṭhitassa paccanīyato alabbhamānānaṃ suddhikapaccayānañca alabbhamānataṃ sandhāya ‘‘labbhamānapadāna’’nti vuttaṃ. Na hi aññathā pucchāvasena koci paccayo alabbhamāno nāma atthīti. Vissajjanāvaseneva vā pavattaṃ anulomapaccanīyadesanaṃ sandhāya ‘‘labbhamānapadāna’’nti vuttaṃ.

It is said 'of obtainable terms' with reference to the non-obtainment from the counterpart of that which is established in the forward order, and the non-obtainment of pure conditions. For otherwise, there is indeed no condition whatsoever that is unobtainable by way of questioning. Alternatively, it is said 'of obtainable terms' with reference to the teaching of the Forward-Counterpart, which proceeds only by way of answering.

Anulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of the Forward-Counterpart is concluded.

Pucchāvāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of the Section on Questions is concluded.

1. Kusalattikaṃ

1. The Wholesome Triad

1. Paṭiccavāravaṇṇanā

1. Exposition of the Conditional Section

1. Paccayānulomaṃ

1. The Conditional Forward Order

(1) Vibhaṅgavāro

(1) The Section on Analysis

53. Yā kusalattike labhanti, na tāyeva vedanāttikādīsūti tikapadanānattamattena vinā mūlāvasānavasena sadisataṃ sandhāya ‘‘na [Pg.205] tāyevā’’ti vuttaṃ, na ca kevalaṃ tikantareyeva, kusalattikepi pana yā paṭiccavāre labhanti, na tāyeva paccayavārādīsūti sabbapucchāsamāharaṇaṃ idha kattabbameva. Dhammānulomapaccanīye ca tikapaṭṭhāne vitakkattikapītittikānaṃ vissajjane sabbāpetā vissajjanaṃ labhantīti ettha pītittikaggahaṇaṃ na kātabbaṃ. Na hi tattha ekūnapaññāsa pucchā vissajjanaṃ labhantīti.

53. Those that are obtained in the wholesome triad are not the same as those in the feeling triad, etc. The phrase 'not the same' is stated with reference to the similarity by way of root and conclusion, apart from the mere diversity of the triad terms. And not only between different triads, but also within the wholesome triad, those obtained in the Conditional Section are not the same as those in the Condition Section, etc. Here, a comprehensive collection of all questions should indeed be made. In the Phenomena Forward-Counterpart and in the Triad Paṭṭhāna, in the answering for the thought-triad and the joy-triad, they obtain an all-inclusive answer. Here, the inclusion of the joy-triad should not be made, for there, forty-nine questions do not obtain an answer.

Tena saddhinti tena sahajātapaccayabhūtena saddhinti attho daṭṭhabbo. ‘‘Yāva nirodhagamanā uddhaṃ pajjatī’’ti ca ‘‘uppādādayo vā pāpuṇātī’’ti ca vacanehi khaṇattayasamaṅgī uppajjatīti vuccatīti anuññātaṃ viya hoti, uppādakkhaṇasamaṅgīyeva pana evaṃ vuttoti daṭṭhabbo.

With that faith—it should be understood as meaning “with that co-arisen condition of faith.” The phrases “it blazes up until it reaches cessation” and “or it attains arising, etc.” seem to imply that it arises endowed with three moments. This is as if permitted, but it should be understood that it is said thus only when endowed with just the arising moment.

Yasmā pana eko khandho ekassātiādi idha kusalavacanena gahite khandhe sandhāya vuttaṃ. Vedanāttikādīsu pana ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭicca dvinnaṃ, dve paṭicca ekassapi, hetudukādīsu ca saṅkhārakkhandhekadesaṃ paṭicca saṅkhārakkhandhekadesassapi uppatti vuttāti saha uppajjamānānaṃ sabbesaṃ dhammānaṃ paccayo honto ekekassapi dukatikādibhedānañca paccayo nāma hotiyeva, tathā dukādibhedānañcāti.

Since 'one aggregate for one,' etc., is stated here with reference to the aggregates included under the term 'wholesome.' But in the feeling-triad, etc., the arising of two dependent on one aggregate, or of one dependent on two, is stated; and in the root-dyad, etc., the arising of a part of the formations aggregate dependent on a part of the formations aggregate is stated. Thus, being a condition for all phenomena arising together, it is indeed a condition for each one, and for the divisions into dyads, triads, etc., and similarly for the divisions of dyads, etc.

‘‘Rūpena saddhiṃ anuppattito āruppavipākañca na gahetabba’’nti vuttaṃ, taṃ pana na sabbasmiṃ etasmiṃ vacane gahetabbaṃ, atha kho ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhānañca rūpa’’nti ettheva. Na kevalañca āruppavipākova, atha kho lokuttaravipākakiriyābyākatampi āruppe uppajjamānaṃ ettha na gahetabbaṃ. ‘‘Vipākābyākataṃ kiriyābyākataṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭicca tayo khandhā’’ti ettha pana na kiñci rūpena vinā saha vā uppajjamānaṃ sahetukaṃ vipākakiriyābyākataṃ aggahitaṃ nāma atthi. Tattha pana yaṃ rūpena saha uppajjati, tassa paccayuppannavisesaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhānañca rūpa’’nti vuttaṃ.

It is said, 'The formless resultant should also not be taken, due to its not arising together with form.' This, however, should not be taken in every instance of this statement, but rather only in the case of 'and mind-originated form.' Not only the formless resultant, but also the supramundane resultant, functional, and indeterminate arising in the formless realm are not to be taken here. However, in the statement, 'Dependent on one resultant-indeterminate or functional-indeterminate aggregate, three aggregates arise,' there is nothing whatsoever, arising with or without form, that is a rooted resultant-indeterminate or functional-indeterminate which is not included. There, however, to show the specific nature of the conditionally arisen phenomena that arise together with form, it is said, 'and mind-originated form.'

‘‘Vatthuṃ paṭicca khandhā’’ti ettake vattabbe paccayabhūtassa vatthussa ‘‘kaṭattā ca rūpa’’nti etasmiṃ sāmaññavacane paccayuppannabhāvena aggahitatāpattiṃ nivāretuṃ ‘‘khandhe paṭicca vatthū’’ti vuttaṃ. Khandhe paṭicca vatthu, vatthuṃ paṭicca khandhāti vā vatthukhandhānaṃ aññamaññapaccayabhūtānaṃ paccayabhāvavisesadassanatthaṃ aññamaññāpekkhaṃ vacanadvayaṃ vuttaṃ sāmaññena gahitampi visuṃ uddhaṭaṃ.

“Depending on the base, the aggregates”—when this much has been said, to prevent the fault of the base, which is a condition, not being grasped as conditionally arisen in the general statement “and form produced by kamma,” it is said, “depending on the aggregates, the base.” “Depending on the aggregates, the base,” or “depending on the base, the aggregates”—these two mutually related statements are made to show the specific nature of the conditional relationship between the base and the aggregates, which are mutual conditions. Though grasped generally, they are also distinguished and stated separately.

Mahābhūtepi [Pg.206] paṭicca uppattidassanattanti yaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānarūpaṃ kaṭattārūpañca upādārūpaṃ upādārūpaggahaṇena vinā ‘‘khandhe paṭicca uppajjatī’’ti vuttaṃ, tassa mahābhūtepi paṭicca uppattidassanatthanti attho. Etasmiṃ pana dassane khandhapaccayasahitāsahitañca sabbaṃ upādārūpaṃ ito paresu sahajātapaccayādīsu saṅgahitanti imamatthaṃ sandhāya ‘‘kaṭattārūpaṃ paṭisandhiyampī’’ti pi-saddo vuttoti daṭṭhabbo.

The meaning of “to show arising dependent on the great elements as well” is this: for that derived form—which is mind-originated form and kamma-produced form—that is stated as “arising dependent on the aggregates” without the explicit mention of derived form, its arising dependent on the great elements as well is shown. In this view, however, all derived form—whether associated with the aggregates as a condition or not—is included under the co-nascence condition and other conditions that follow. It should be understood that, with this meaning in mind, the particle “pi” is used in the phrase “kamma-produced form, even at rebirth-linking.”

Mahābhūte paṭicca upādārūpanti vuttanayenāti ‘‘mahābhūte paṭicca cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpa’’nti ettha atthato ayaṃ nayo vuttoti sandhāyāha.

He says “by the method stated as ‘Dependent on the great elements, derived form’” with reference to the fact that this method is stated in meaning in the phrase “Dependent on the great elements, mind-originated form, kamma-produced form, [and] derived form.”

54. Rūpamissakā pahāyāti yāsu pucchāsu rūpena vinā paccayuppannaṃ na labbhati, atha kho rūpamissakameva labbhati, tā pahāyāti adhippāyo.

54. “Abandoning those mixed with form”: The meaning is to abandon those questions in which a conditionally arisen state is not found without form, but rather only what is mixed with form is found.

57. ‘‘Tiṇṇaṃ sannipātā gabbhassa avakkanti hotī’’ti vacanatoti gabbhaseyyakapaṭisandhiyā pañcakkhandhasabbhāvena tāya samānalakkhaṇā sabbāpi pañcavokārapaṭisandhi okkantināmakāti sādheti. Paripuṇṇadhammānaṃ vissajjanaṃ ettha atthīti paripuṇṇavissajjanā.

57. From the statement, “The descent into the womb occurs through the concurrence of three factors,” it is established that all rebirth-linking in the five-constituent existence, which shares the same characteristics as rebirth-linking for one in the womb, is called “descent” by virtue of the existence of the five aggregates. Because the explanation of the complete phenomena is present here, it is called “complete explanation.”

Ettha ca ‘‘ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ paṭicca tayo…pe… mahābhūte paṭicca cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpa’’nti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.53) ettāvatā pañcavokāre sabbaṃ cittakammasamuṭṭhānarūpaṃ dassitaṃ. Avasesaṃ pana dassetuṃ ‘‘bāhira’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha bāhiranti etena anindriyabaddharūpaṃ dasseti, puna āhārasamuṭṭhānaṃ utusamuṭṭhānanti etehi sabbaṃ indriyabaddhaṃ āhārautusamuṭṭhānarūpaṃ. Tattha ‘‘utusamuṭṭhānaṃ eka’’ntiādinā asaññasattānampi utusamuṭṭhānaṃ vuttamevāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Na hi tattha tassa vajjane kāraṇaṃ atthīti. Ādimhi pana ‘‘ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ paṭiccā’’tiādi avisesavacanaṃ sahajātaṃ arūpampi paccayaṃ hetādike ca paccaye bahutare labhantaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānakaṭattārūpadvayaṃ saha saṅgaṇhitvā vuttaṃ, evañca katvā tassa pariyosāne ‘‘mahābhūte paṭicca cittasamuṭṭhānarūpaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpa’’nti vuttaṃ, tasmā tattha kaṭattārūpaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānasambandhaṃ taṃsamānagatikaṃ pañcavokāre vattamānameva gahitanti aggahitaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘asaññasattānaṃ ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ paṭiccā’’tiādi vuttaṃ, tasmā upādārūpaṃ idhapi [Pg.207] kammapaccayavibhaṅge viya ‘‘mahābhūte paṭicca kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpa’’nti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.63) kaṭattārūpabhāvavisiṭṭhaṃ upādārūpaṃ gahitanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Na hi vuttassa utusamuṭṭhānassa punavacane payojanaṃ atthīti.

Here, by the phrase “depending on one great element, three… depending on the great elements, mind-originated form, kamma-produced form, and derived form” (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.53), all mind-originated and kamma-produced materiality in the five-constituent existence is shown. To show the remainder, “external,” etc., is stated. By “external,” materiality not bound to the sense faculties is shown; further, by “nutriment-originated” and “temperature-originated,” all sense-faculty-bound materiality originated from nutriment and temperature is shown. Herein, it should be understood that by “temperature-originated is one,” etc., temperature-originated materiality is stated even for non-percipient beings, for there is no reason for its exclusion there. Initially, however, the general statement “depending on one great element,” etc., is made by taking together the two—mind-originated and kamma-produced form—which obtain co-nascent immaterial conditions and many other conditions, such as root condition. And having done so, at its conclusion, it is stated, “depending on the great elements, mind-originated form, kamma-produced form, and derived form.” Therefore, the kamma-produced form there is taken as that which is connected to mind-originated form, has a similar course, and occurs only in the five-constituent existence. To indicate the kamma-produced form not included, “for non-percipient beings, depending on one great element,” etc., is stated. Therefore, it should be understood that derived materiality here, as in the analysis of the kamma condition, is taken as derived materiality specified by its nature as kamma-produced form, as stated: “depending on the great elements, kamma-produced form, [which is] derived form” (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.63). For there is no purpose in repeating what has been stated about temperature-originated materiality.

Kasmā pana yathā bāhirādīsu ‘‘mahābhūte paṭicca upādārūpa’’nti avisesetvā upādārūpaṃ vuttaṃ, evaṃ avatvā cittakammajaupādārūpāni ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpa’’nti hetupaccayādīsu saha ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ upādārūpaṃ asaññasattānaṃ…pe… kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpa’’nti adhipatipaccayādīsu visuṃ cittasamuṭṭhānarūpabhāvakaṭattārūpabhāvehi visesetvāva vuttānīti? Tattha bāhiraggahaṇādīhi viya ettha mahābhūtānaṃ kenaci avisesitattā. Apica iddhicittanibbattānaṃ kammapaccayānañca iṭṭhāniṭṭhānaṃ bāhirarūpāyatanādīnaṃ cittaṃ kammañca hetādīsu na koci paccayo, āhārautusamuṭṭhānānaṃ pana cittaṃ pacchājātabhāvena upatthambhakameva, na janakaṃ, mahābhūtāneva pana tesaṃ sahajātādibhāvena janakāni, tasmā satipi cittena kammena ca vinā abhāve hetādipaccayabhūtehi arūpehi uppajjamānāni cittasamuṭṭhānarūpakaṭattārūpabhūtāneva upādārūpāni honti, na aññānīti imaṃ visesaṃ dassetuṃ cittakammajesveva upādārūpesu visesanaṃ kataṃ. Aññāni vā samānajātikena rūpena samuṭṭhānāni pākaṭavisesanānevāti na visesanaṃ arahanti, etāni pana asamānajātikehi arūpehi samuṭṭhitāni visesanaṃ arahantīti visesitānīti veditabbāni. Yathā vā cittakammāni cittakammasamuṭṭhānānaṃ savisesena paccayabhāvena paccayā honti sahajātādipaccayabhāvato mūlakaraṇabhāvato ca, na evaṃ utuāhārā taṃsamuṭṭhānānanti cittakammajāneva visuṃ visesanaṃ arahanti. Itarāni pana mahābhūtaviseseneva visesitāni, idha upādārūpavisesanena mahābhūtāni viya. Na hi aññataravisesanaṃ ubhayavisesanaṃ na hotīti.

Why then, unlike in the case of the external, etc., where derived form is stated without specification as 'derived form depends on the great elements,' are the derived forms produced by mind and kamma stated separately, specifically distinguished by their nature as mind-produced form and kamma-produced form—with phrases like 'mind-produced form, kamma-produced form, derived form' under the root condition, etc., and 'mind-produced form is derived form… for non-percipient beings… kamma-produced form is derived form' under the dominance condition, etc.? Because there, as with the inclusion of 'external,' etc., the great elements are not specified by anything. Moreover, for the external form bases, etc., whether desirable or undesirable, produced by the mind of psychic potency or conditioned by kamma, mind and kamma are not a condition among the root conditions, etc. For forms arising from nutriment and temperature, however, mind is merely a supporter by way of post-nascence, not a generator. The great elements, on the other hand, are their generators by way of co-nascence, etc. Therefore, even though they cannot exist without mind and kamma, the derived forms that arise from immaterial factors that are root conditions, etc., are only those that are mind-produced and kamma-produced forms, and not others. To show this distinction, the specification is made only for derived forms produced by mind and kamma. Alternatively, other forms, being originated from matter of a similar kind, are already clearly specified and thus do not require specification. But these, being originated from dissimilar immaterial phenomena, require specification, and thus they are specified. Or, just as mind and kamma are conditions for mind-produced and kamma-produced forms in a specific way—by being co-nascent conditions and root causes—nutriment and temperature are not so for the forms they originate. Hence, only those produced by mind and kamma require separate specification. The others, however, are specified only by the specification of the great elements, just as the great elements are specified here by the specification of derived form. For it is not the case that a specification of one is not a specification of both.

58. Aññamaññapaccaye khandhe paṭicca vatthu, vatthuṃ paṭicca khandhāti khandhavatthūnaṃ aññamaññapaccayatādassanena pubbe visuṃ paccayabhāvena dassitānaṃ khandhānaṃ ekato paccayabhāvo dassito hotīti iminā adhippāyenāha ‘‘catunnampi khandhānaṃ ekato vatthunā aññamaññapaccayataṃ dassetuṃ vutta’’nti. ‘‘Khandhe [Pg.208] paṭicca vatthū’’ti idaṃ pana catunnampi khandhānaṃ ekato paṭiccatthapharaṇatādassanatthaṃ, ‘‘vatthuṃ paṭicca khandhā’’ti vatthussa. Na kevalañca khandhānaṃ idheva, hetupaccayādīsupi ayameva nayo. Tattha sabbesaṃ khandhānaṃ visuṃ paṭiccatthapharaṇataṃ dassetvā puna ‘‘vatthuṃ paṭicca khandhā’’ti vatthussapi dassitāya ‘‘ekaṃ khandhañca vatthuñca paṭicca tayo khandhā’’tiādinā khandhavatthūnañca dassitāyeva hotīti daṭṭhabbā.

58. In the mutual condition, by showing the mutual conditionality of the aggregates and the base through the phrases ‘Depending on the aggregates, the base’ and ‘Depending on the base, the aggregates,’ the conditional nature of the aggregates, which was previously shown separately, is now shown collectively. With this intention, he says: ‘It is stated to show the mutual conditionality of all four aggregates together with the base.’ The phrase ‘Depending on the aggregates, the base’ is for the purpose of showing the collective pervasion of the meaning of dependence for all four aggregates, while ‘Depending on the base, the aggregates’ is for the base. This method applies not only here for the aggregates, but also for the root condition and others. There, after the separate pervasion of the meaning of dependence has been shown for all the aggregates, and then again for the base by the phrase ‘Depending on the base, the aggregates,’ it should be understood that it is also shown for the aggregates and the base through phrases like ‘Depending on one aggregate and the base, three aggregates arise,’ etc.

Kasmā panettha ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca abyākato dhammo uppajjati aññamaññapaccayā, kusale khandhe paṭicca cittasamuṭṭhānā mahābhūtā’’ti evamādi na vuttaṃ, nanu yadeva paṭiccatthaṃ pharati, na teneva aññamaññapaccayena bhavitabbaṃ hetupaccayādīhi viya. Na hi yaṃ ‘‘ekaṃ tayo dve ca khandhe paṭiccā’’ti vuttaṃ, te hetupaccayabhūtā eva honti. Esa nayo ārammaṇapaccayādīsupi. Paccayavāre ca ‘‘abyākataṃ dhammaṃ paccayā kusalo dhammo uppajjati aññamaññapaccayā’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.256) vuttaṃ, na vatthu kusalānaṃ aññamaññapaccayo hoti, atha ca pana taṃpaccayā khandhānaṃ aññamaññapaccayā uppatti vuttā eva. Yadipi kusalā khandhā mahābhūtānaṃ aññamaññapaccayā na honti, tathāpi te paṭicca tesaṃ uppatti vattabbā siyāti? Na vattabbā khandhasahajātānaṃ mahābhūtānaṃ khandhānaṃ paccayabhāvābhāvato. Aññamaññasaddo hi na hetādisaddo viya nirapekkho, sahajātādisaddo viya vā aññatarāpekkho, atha kho yathāvuttetaretarāpekkho. Paccayapaccayuppannā ca khandhā mahābhūtā idha yathāvuttā bhaveyyuṃ, tesu ca mahābhūtā khandhānaṃ na koci paccayo. Yassa ca sayaṃ paccayo, tato tena tannissitena vā aññamaññapaccayena uppajjamānaṃ aññamaññapaccayā uppajjatīti vattabbataṃ arahati, yathā khandhe paṭicca khandhā, vatthuṃ paccayā khandhā. Tasmā attano paccayassa paccayattābhāvato tadapekkhattā ca aññamaññasaddassa khandhe paṭicca paccayā ca mahābhūtānaṃ aññamaññapaccayā uppatti na vuttā, na aññamaññapaccayā ca vuttā. Khandhā pana vatthuṃ paccayā uppajjamānā vatthussa pacchājātapaccayā honti, tannissitena ca aññamaññapaccayena uppajjanti. Tasmā vatthuṃ paccayā khandhānaṃ kusalādīnaṃ aññamaññapaccayā uppatti vuttāti.

Why is it not stated here, for instance, 'an indeterminate phenomenon arises dependent on a wholesome phenomenon by mutuality condition,' or 'the mind-originated great elements depend on the wholesome aggregates,' and so forth? Surely, whatever fulfills the meaning of dependence, should it not be by mutuality condition, just as with root condition and so on? For what is stated as 'depending on one, three, or two aggregates' does not mean that these are only root conditions. This same method applies to object condition and others. And in the section on conditions, it is stated: 'A wholesome phenomenon arises dependent on an indeterminate phenomenon by mutuality condition' (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.256). But the base is not a mutual condition for wholesome phenomena. Yet, the arising of the aggregates by mutuality condition dependent on that base is indeed stated. Even though wholesome aggregates are not a mutual condition for the great elements, should their arising dependent on them still be stated? It should not be stated, because the aggregates are not a condition for the great elements co-nascent with them. For the word 'mutuality' is not independent like the word 'root,' nor is it dependent on just one factor like the word 'co-nascence,' but rather it is dependent on the reciprocal relationship as described. Here, the aggregates and great elements would be the condition and the conditioned phenomenon as described; but among them, the great elements are in no way a condition for the aggregates. A phenomenon deserves to be described as 'arising by mutuality condition' when it arises by mutuality condition from that which is itself a condition for it, or from that which is dependent on it—just as aggregates arise dependent on aggregates, or aggregates arise dependent on a base. Therefore, because the great elements are not a condition for their own condition, and because the word 'mutuality' is dependent on this, the arising of the great elements by mutuality condition dependent on the aggregates is not stated, nor is it stated by way of mutuality condition. The aggregates, however, when arising dependent on the base, are a post-nascence condition for the base, and they arise by mutuality condition while being dependent on it. Therefore, the arising of wholesome and other aggregates by mutuality condition dependent on the base is stated.

59. Na [Pg.209] sā gahitāti cakkhāyatanādīni nissayabhūtāni paṭiccāti na vuttanti adhippāyo. Nissayapaccayabhāvena pana na cakkhāyatanādīni ārammaṇapaccayabhāvena rūpāyatanādīni viya na gahitānīti.

59. The meaning is that it is not stated 'depending on the eye-sphere and so on, which are supports.' However, it is not that the eye-sphere and so on are not taken by way of support condition, just as the form-sphere and so on are taken by way of object condition.

60. Dvīsu upanissayesu vattabbameva natthi, ārammaṇūpanissayampi pana ye labhanti, tesaṃ vasena ārammaṇapaccayasadisanti evaṃ vuttanti dassetuṃ ‘‘tattha kiñcāpī’’ti āha. Tattha ‘‘na sabbe akusalā abyākatā ārammaṇūpanissayaṃ labhantī’’ti purimapāṭho. Kusalāpi pana mahaggatā ekantena, kāmāvacarā ca kadāci na labhantīti ‘‘na sabbe kusalākusalābyākatā’’ti paṭhanti.

60. Among the two types of strong dependence condition, there is nothing to be said. However, to show that for those who obtain object-strong-dependence condition, it is similar to the object condition, it is stated 'in that case, although...' There, the previous reading is: 'Not all unwholesome and indeterminate states obtain object-strong-dependence condition.' But wholesome sublime states definitely do not, and sense-sphere states sometimes do not. Therefore, they read 'not all wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate states.'

61. Purejātapaccaye yathā aññattha paccayaṃ aniddisitvāva desanā katā, evaṃ akatvā kasmā ‘‘vatthuṃ purejātapaccayā’’ti vuttanti? Niyamasabbhāvā. Hetuādīsu hi niyamo natthi. Na hi tehi uppajjamānānaṃ alobhādīsu kusalādīsu rūpādīsu ca ayameva paccayoti niyamo atthi, idha pana vatthu na vatthudhammesu purejātapaccayā uppajjamānānaṃ dhammānaṃ niyamato chabbidhaṃ vatthu purejātapaccayo hotīti imamatthaṃ dassetuṃ idaṃ vuttaṃ. Ārammaṇapurejātampi hi vatthupurejāte avijjamāne na labbhati, evañca katvā paṭisandhivipākassa napurejātapaccayā eva uppatti vuttā, paccuppannārammaṇassapi tassa purejātapaccayo na uddhaṭo. ‘‘Nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammaṃ paṭicca vipāko dhammo uppajjati purejātapaccayā’’ti etassapi alābhato tattha ‘‘purejāte tīṇī’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.3.124) vuttanti.

61. In the case of pre-nascence condition, just as elsewhere the teaching is given without specifying the condition, why is it said here, 'The base by way of pre-nascence condition'? Because of the existence of a fixed rule. For in the case of root condition and others, there is no fixed rule. There is no fixed rule that these alone are the conditions for the arising of non-greed and other wholesome states, or for materiality, etc. But here, this is stated to show the following meaning: for phenomena that arise by pre-nascence condition dependent on a base, the sixfold base is necessarily the pre-nascence condition. For object-prenascence is also unobtainable without base-prenascence. Thus, the arising of the rebirth-linking resultant is stated to be without a pre-nascence condition, and for it, the pre-nascence condition for a present object is not specified. Because this case—'a resultant dhamma arises dependent on a neither-resultant-nor-resultant-producing dhamma by pre-nascence condition'—is not obtained, it is said there, 'In pre-nascence, three' (Paṭṭhāna 1.3.124).

63. Tathā paṭisandhikkhaṇe mahābhūtānanti mahābhūtānaṃ ekakkhaṇikanānākkhaṇikakammapaccayavaseneva tadupādārūpānampi vadatīti ca daṭṭhabbaṃ. Kaṭattārūpānanti pavattiyaṃ kaṭattārūpānanti adhippāyo.

63. Similarly, at the moment of rebirth-linking, when the great elements are spoken of, it should be understood that just as the great elements are conditioned by momentary and non-momentary kamma, so too is their derived materiality. The phrase 'kamma-produced materiality' refers to kamma-produced materiality in the course of existence.

64. Yathālābhavasenāti indriyarūpesu yaṃ yaṃ paṭisandhiyaṃ labbhati, tassa tassa vasena.

64. "According to what is obtained" means according to whichever faculty-materiality is obtained at rebirth-linking.

69. Vippayuttapaccayā uppajjamānānampi kesañci niyamato vatthu vippayuttapaccayo, kesañci khandhā, na ca samānavippayuttapaccayā eva kusalādike paṭicca uppajjamānā uppajjanti, atha kho nānāvippayuttapaccayāpi, tasmā taṃ [Pg.210] visesaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘vatthuṃ vippayuttapaccayā, khandhe vippayuttapaccayā’’ti tattha tattha vuttaṃ. Tattha tadāyattavuttitāya paccayuppanno paccayaṃ paccayaṃ karotīti imassatthassa vasena upayogavacanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Vatthuṃ khandhe vippayuttapaccayakaraṇatoti ayañhettha attho. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana ‘‘vatthuṃ paṭicca vippayuttapaccayā, vatthunā vippayuttapaccayataṃ sādhentenā’’ti attho vutto, tattha kusalānaṃ khandhānaṃ vatthuṃ paṭicca uppatti natthīti ‘‘vatthuṃ paṭiccā’’ti na sakkā vattunti, idaṃ pana paṭiccasaddena ayojetvā ‘‘paṭicca uppajjanti vatthuṃ vippayuttapaccayā’’ti yojetvā tassattho ‘‘vatthunā vippayuttapaccayataṃ sādhentenā’’ti vuttoti daṭṭhabbo. Kiṃ pana paṭiccāti? Yaṃ ‘‘ekaṃ khandha’’ntiādikaṃ pāḷiyaṃ paṭiccāti vuttaṃ. Tameva atthaṃ pākaṭaṃ katvā ‘‘vatthuṃ vippayuttapaccayāti khandhe paṭicca khandhā, vatthunā vippayuttapaccayataṃ sādhentenā’’ti paṭhanti. Anantarattā pākaṭassa abyākatacittasamuṭṭhānasseva gahaṇaṃ mā hotūti ‘‘abyākatacittasamuṭṭhānampi kusalākusalacittasamuṭṭhānampī’’ti āha. Āsannampi dūrampi sabbanti vuttaṃ hotīti.

69. Even among those arising by dissociation condition, for some the base is necessarily the dissociation condition, and for others, the aggregates. They do not arise solely by similar dissociation conditions in relation to wholesome states, etc., but also by various dissociation conditions. Therefore, to indicate that distinction, it is stated in various places: 'the base by way of dissociation condition, the aggregates by way of dissociation condition.' Here, the expression of application (upayoga) should be understood in the sense that the conditioned phenomenon, its existence being dependent on the condition, makes the condition a condition. The meaning here is that the base makes the aggregates a dissociation condition. In the commentary, however, the meaning is given as: 'dependent on the base by way of dissociation condition, meaning, by the base establishing dissociation-conditionality.' There, since wholesome aggregates do not arise dependent on the base, one cannot say 'dependent on the base.' Instead, this should be understood: without connecting it with the word 'dependent on,' it should be construed as 'they arise dependent... the base being by way of dissociation condition,' and its meaning is given as 'by the base establishing dissociation-conditionality.' What then is it dependent on? It is dependent on what is stated in the Pāli text, such as 'one aggregate.' Clarifying that very meaning, they read: 'the base by way of dissociation condition' means 'aggregates dependent on aggregates, with the base establishing dissociation-conditionality.' Lest only the immediately manifest indeterminate consciousness-originated materiality be taken, it is said: 'both indeterminate consciousness-originated and wholesome/unwholesome consciousness-originated.' This means that all, whether near or far, is included.

71-72. ‘‘Ime vīsati paccayāti saṃkhipitvā dassitānaṃ vasenetaṃ vutta’’nti vuttaṃ. Tattha yadi ekenapi desanaṃ saṃkhittaṃ saṃkhittameva, ādimhi pana tayo paccayā vippayuttapaccayo ekampi padaṃ aparihāpetvā vitthāritāti te cattāro pacchājātañca vajjetvā ‘‘ime ekūnavīsati paccayā’’ti vattabbaṃ siyā. Ettakā hi saṃkhipitvā dassitāti. Ye pana pāḷiyaṃ vitthāritaṃ avitthāritañca sabbaṃ saṅgahetvā vuttanti vadanti, tesaṃ ‘‘ime tevīsati paccayā’’ti pāṭhena bhavitabbaṃ. Ādimhi pana tayo paccaye vitthārite vajjetvā yato pabhuti saṅkhepo āraddho, tato catutthato pabhuti saṃkhittaṃ vitthāritañca saha gahetvā ‘‘ime tevīsati paccayā’’ti vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

71-72. It is said: 'This is stated by way of summarizing what has been shown as “these twenty conditions.”' Herein, if a teaching is summarized by even one condition, it is indeed a summary. However, at the beginning, the three conditions and the dissociated condition are explained in detail without omitting a single word. Excluding those four and also the postnascence condition, it should be said: 'these nineteen conditions,' for that many are shown in summary. But for those who say that everything, whether detailed or not detailed, is included as stated in the Pāḷi, for them the reading should be: 'these twenty-three conditions.' However, at the beginning, excluding the three conditions that are explained in detail, from where the summary begins, that is, from the fourth onwards, taking together the summarized and the detailed, it should be understood that 'these twenty-three conditions' is stated.

Vibhaṅgavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Analysis Section is concluded.

(2) Saṅkhyāvāro

(2) The Enumeration Section

73. Tathā purejātapaccayeti yathā aññamaññapaccaye viseso vibhaṅge atthi, tathā purejātapaccayepi atthīti attho. ‘‘Vatthuṃ purejātapaccayā’’ti hi tattha viseso paṭisandhiabhāvo cāti. Vipākāni ceva [Pg.211] vīthicittāni ca na labbhantīti etena ‘‘kiriyābyākataṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭiccā’’tiādike (paṭṭhā. 1.1.53) vibhaṅge vipākābyākatābhāvaṃ kiriyābyākate ca ajavanassa sabbena sabbaṃ alabbhamānataṃ visesaṃ dasseti.

73. Just as there is a distinction in the mutuality condition in the analysis, so too is there in the prenascence condition; this is the meaning. For there the distinction is 'the base by way of prenascence condition' and the absence of rebirth-linking. Because neither resultants nor process-consciousness are obtainable, this shows the distinction that, in the analysis of 'depending on one functional indeterminate aggregate,' etc. (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.53), there is an absence of resultant-indeterminate, and in the functional indeterminate, the complete non-obtainment of javana.

74. Ekamūlake dassitāya desanāya labbhamānagaṇanaññeva ādāyāti idaṃ etasmiṃ anulome suddhikanaye dassitagaṇanato tato paresu nayesu aññissā abhāvaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Abahugaṇanena yuttassa tena samānagaṇanatā ca imasmiṃ anulomeyeva daṭṭhabbā. Paccanīye pana ‘‘nahetupaccayā nārammaṇe eka’’ntiādiṃ (paṭṭhā. 1.1.104) vakkhatīti.

74. ‘Taking only the obtainable count shown in the teaching of the single root’—this is said with reference to the absence of any other count in the methods subsequent to the count shown in this positive, pure method. The equality of count with that which is associated with a not-manifold count should also be seen in this very positive method. However, in the negative method, it will be stated, 'Not by root condition, in non-object, one,' etc. (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.104).

76-79. Te pana saṅkhipitvā tevīsatimūlakovettha dassitoti ettha pacchājātavipākānaṃ parihīnattā ‘‘dvāvīsatimūlako’’ti vattabbaṃ siyā sāsevanasavipākānaṃ vasena. Duvidhampi pana dvāvīsatimūlakaṃ saha gahetvā saṅgahite tasmiṃ ubhayasabbhāvato ‘‘tevīsatimūlako’’ti āhāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Āsevanavipākānaṃ vā virodhābhāve sati pucchāya dassitanayena tevīsatimūlakena bhavitabbaṃ, tassa ca nāmaṃ dvāvīsatimūlake āropetvā ‘‘tevīsatimūlako’’ti vuttanti ayamettha ruḷhī.

76-79. However, these, when summarized, are shown here as the twenty-three-rooted. Here, due to the omission of postnascence and resultant conditions, it should be said 'twenty-two-rooted' by way of conditions with repetition and with resultant. However, when both kinds of the twenty-two-rooted are taken together and included, it should be understood that it is called 'twenty-three-rooted' due to the presence of both. Or, there being no contradiction with repetition and resultant conditions, it must be the twenty-three-rooted by the method shown in the question. And its name, having been superimposed on the twenty-two-rooted, is called 'twenty-three-rooted'—this is the established usage here.

Ārammaṇapade cevāti etena ekamūlake aññapadāni vajjeti. Na hi ekamūlake hetādīsu tayovāti adhippāyo. Suddhikanayo pana ārammaṇamūlakādīsu na labbhatīti ārammaṇamūlake ‘‘navā’’ti etāya adhikagaṇanāya abhāvadassanatthaṃ ‘‘ārammaṇe ṭhitena sabbattha tīṇeva pañhā’’ti vuttaṃ. Tattha kātabbāti vacanaseso. Tīṇevāti ca tato uddhaṃ gaṇanaṃ nivāreti, na adho paṭikkhipati. Tena ‘‘vipāke eka’’nti gaṇanā na nivāritāti daṭṭhabbā. Tīsu ekassa antogadhatāya ca ‘‘tīṇevā’’ti vuttanti. Itītiādinā ‘‘sabbattha tīṇevā’’ti vacanena attano vacanaṃ daḷhaṃ karoti.

‘And in the object term’—by this, it excludes other terms in the single-rooted case. For the intention is not that in the single-rooted case there are three in root, etc. However, since the pure method is not found in the object-rooted, etc., in order to show the absence of an excessive count for 'nine' in the object-rooted case, it is said, 'standing on object, there are only three questions everywhere.' Here, 'to be done' is the remainder of the statement. And 'only three' prevents a count above that; it does not reject one below. Therefore, it should be understood that the count 'in resultant, one' is not prevented. And because one is included within the three, 'only three' is stated. With 'thus,' etc., by the statement 'only three everywhere,' he strengthens his own statement.

80-85. Ye …pe… taṃ dassetunti etthāyamadhippāyo – yadipi avigatānantaraṃ ‘‘ārammaṇapaccayā hetuyā tīṇī’’ti vuttepi ūnataragaṇanena saddhiṃ saṃsandane yā gaṇanā labbhati, sā dassitā hoti, tathāpi [Pg.212] ūnataragaṇanehi samānagaṇanehi ca saddhiṃ saṃsandane ūnatarā samānā ca hoti, na evaṃ āvikaraṇavasena dassitā hoti, vipallāsayojanāya pana tathā dasseti. Vacanena vā hi liṅgena vā atthavisesāvikaraṇaṃ hotīti. Tenetaṃ āvikarotīti etthāpi evameva adhippāyo yojetabbo. Paccanīyādīsupi pana ‘‘nārammaṇapaccayā nahetuyā ekaṃ…pe… novigatapaccayā nahetuyā eka’’ntiādinā (paṭṭhā. 1.1.107) mūlapadaṃ ādimhiyeva ṭhapetvā yojanā katā, na ca tattha etaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ labbhati, tasmā mūlapadassa ādimhi ṭhapetvā yojanameva kamo, na cakkabandhananti ‘‘ārammaṇapaccayā hetuyā tīṇī’’tiādi yojitaṃ, na ca viññāte atthe vacanena liṅgena ca payojanamatthīti.

80-85. Here, this is the intention: although, even when it is said, 'by object condition, for root, three,' immediately after non-disappearance, the count that is obtained by comparison with a lesser count is shown, nevertheless, in comparison with lesser counts and equal counts, it is both lesser and equal, but it is not shown in this way by means of making it manifest. However, it is shown thus for the purpose of connecting with perversion. For the manifestation of a special meaning occurs either by statement or by sign. Therefore, 'this makes it manifest'—here too, the intention should be applied in the same way. Moreover, in the negative methods, etc., such as 'not by object condition, not for root, one... etc... not by non-disappearance condition, not for root, one' (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.107), the connection is made by placing the root term at the very beginning, but that characteristic is not found there. Therefore, placing the root term at the beginning and making the connection is the sequence, not a 'wheel-binding.' Thus, 'by object condition, for root, three,' etc., is connected, and there is no purpose for a statement or a sign when the meaning is understood.

Paccayānulomavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Positive Order of Conditions is concluded.

Paṭiccavāro

The Section on Dependence

Paccayapaccanīyavaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Negative Order of Conditions

86-87. ‘‘Ahetukaṃ vipākābyākatanti idaṃ rūpasamuṭṭhāpakavaseneva veditabba’’nti vuttaṃ, sabbasaṅgāhakavasena panetaṃ na na sakkā yojetuṃ.

86-87. It is said: 'This “rootless, resultant-indeterminate” should be understood only by way of that which originates materiality.' But it is not impossible to apply this in an all-inclusive way.

93. Sahajātapurejātapaccayā saṅgahaṃ gacchantīti ettha ca sahajātā ca hetādayo purejātā ca ārammaṇādayo paccayā saṅgahaṃ gacchantīti attho daṭṭhabbo. Na hi napacchājātapaccayā uppajjamānā dvīheva sahajātapurejātapaccayehi uppajjanti, atha kho pacchājātavajjehi sabbehīti.

93. Here, in 'conascence and prenascence conditions are included,' the meaning to be understood is that conascent conditions such as root, etc., and prenascence conditions such as object, etc., are included. For indeed, things arising not by postnascence condition do not arise by only the two conditions, conascence and prenascence, but rather by all conditions except postnascence.

94-97. Nāhārapaccaye ekaccaṃ rūpameva paccayapaccayuppannanti yaṃ paṭicca uppajjati, so paccayo rūpamevāti katvā vuttaṃ. Yasmā pana paccayā uppajjati, so arūpampi hoti yathā kammaṃ kaṭattārūpassa.

94-97. In the non-nutriment condition, 'some materiality alone is both condition and conditionally arisen'—this is said having considered that the condition which it arises in dependence on is materiality alone. But the condition from which it arises can also be non-material, like kamma for materiality produced by kamma.

99-102. Namaggapaccaye yadipi cittasamuṭṭhānādayo sabbe rūpakoṭṭhāsā labbhanti, tathāpi yaṃ maggapaccayaṃ labhati, tassa pahīnattā ‘‘ekaccaṃ rūpaṃ [Pg.213] paccayuppanna’’nti vuttaṃ, evameva pana nahetupaccayādīsupi ekaccarūpassa paccayuppannatā daṭṭhabbā.

99-102. In the non-path condition, although all portions of materiality, such as those originated by consciousness, are obtainable, nevertheless, because that which obtains path condition is abandoned, it is said, 'some materiality is conditionally arisen.' In the same way, the conditionally arisen nature of some materiality should also be understood in the case of non-root condition, etc.

107-130. Nāhāranaindriyanajhānanamaggapaccayā sabbattha sadisavissajjanāti idaṃ etesu mūlabhāvena ṭhitesu gaṇanāya samānataṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Mūlānañhi idha vissajjanaṃ gaṇanāyeva, na sarūpadassananti. Nasahajātādicatukkaṃ idhāpi parihīnamevāti suddhikanaye viya mūlesupi parihīnamevāti attho.

107-130. 'Not by nutriment, not by faculty, not by jhāna, not by path condition, everywhere a similar answer'—this is said with reference to the equality in counting when these are established as roots. For here, the answer concerning the roots is merely the count, not the showing of their intrinsic nature. 'The quartet beginning with not-conascent is also omitted here'—the meaning is that just as in the pure method, so too in the roots they are omitted.

Paccayapaccanīyavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Negative Order of Conditions is concluded.

Paccayānulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Positive-Negative Order of Conditions

131-189. Hetādhipatimaggapaccayesu anulomato ṭhitesu…pe… aṭṭha paccanīyato na labbhantīti tiṇṇampi sādhāraṇānaṃ paccanīyato alabbhamānānaṃ sabbesaṃ saṅgahavasena vuttaṃ, tasmā maggapaccaye itarehi sādhāraṇā satteva yojetabbā. Adhipatipaccaye anulomato ṭhite hetupaccayopi paccanīyato na labbhati, so pana maggena asādhāraṇoti katvā na vuttoti daṭṭhabbo. Yehi vinā arūpaṃ na uppajjati, te ekantikattā arūpaṭṭhānikāti idha vuttāti daṭṭhabbā, tena purejātāsevanapaccayā tehi vināpi arūpassa uppattito vajjitā honti. Sabbaṭṭhānikā aññamaññaāhārindriyā ca tehi vinā arūpassa anuppattito saṅgahitāti. Ūnataragaṇanānaṃyeva vasenāti yadi anulomato ṭhitā ekakādayo dvāvīsatipariyosānā ūnataragaṇanā honti, tesaṃ vasena paccanīyato yojitassa tassa tassa gaṇanā veditabbā. Atha paccanīyato yojito ūnataragaṇano, tassa vasena anulomato ṭhitassapi gaṇanā veditabbāti attho. ‘‘Aññamaññapaccayā nārammaṇe eka’’ntiādivacanato (paṭṭhā. 1.1.146) pana na idaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ ekantikaṃ.

131-189. When the root, dominance, and path conditions are established in direct order… and so forth… eight are not obtained in reverse order. Thus, with respect to all three common ones, since they are unobtainable in reverse order, all are stated by way of inclusion. Therefore, in the path condition, only the seven common ones should be connected with the others. When the dominance condition is established in direct order, the root condition is also not obtained in reverse order; but since it is not common with the path, it is not mentioned—this should be understood. Those without which the immaterial states do not arise are, being exclusive, said here to be based on the immaterial sphere—this should be understood. Hence, the prenascence and habitual-recurrence conditions are excluded because of the arising of immaterial states even without them. And the all-sphere-based, mutual, nutriment, and faculty conditions are included because of the non-arising of immaterial states without them. Only by way of the lesser counts: If those established in direct order, from the single, etc., up to the twenty-second, are lesser counts, then the count of each of those connected in reverse order should be understood by way of them. Or if that which is connected in reverse order is a lesser count, then the count of that which is established in direct order should also be understood by way of it—this is the meaning. However, from the statement, “The mutual condition is not-object, one,” etc. (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.146), this characteristic is not exclusive.

Paccayānulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of Conditional Relations in Direct and Reverse Order is completed.

Paccayapaccanīyānulomavaṇṇanā

The Exposition of Conditional Relations in Reverse-Direct Order

190. Sabbatthevāti [Pg.214] na kevalaṃ hetumhiyeva, atha kho sabbesu paccayesu paccanīkato ṭhitesūti attho. Purejātaṃ āsevanañca alabhantaṃ kañci nidassanavasena dassento ‘‘paṭisandhivipāko panā’’tiādimāha.

190. 'In all cases' means not only in the root condition, but in all conditions when they are established in reverse order. Showing an example of something that does not obtain prenascence and habitual-recurrence, he says, 'But rebirth-linking result...' and so forth.

‘‘Purejātapacchājātāsevanavipākavippayuttesu paccanīkato ṭhitesu ekaṃ ṭhapetvā avasesā anulomato labbhantī’’ti idaṃ avasesānaṃ lābhamattaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Na sabbesaṃ avasesānaṃ lābhanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yadipi hi pacchājāte pasaṅgo natthi ‘‘anulomato sabbattheva na labbhatī’’ti apavādassa katattā, purejāto pana vippayutte paccanīkato ṭhite anulomato labbhatīti idampi avasesā sabbeti atthe gayhamāne āpajjeyya. Yampi keci ‘‘vippayuttapaccayarahite āruppepi ārammaṇapurejātassa sambhavaṃ ñāpetuṃ evaṃ vutta’’nti vadanti, tampi tesaṃ rucimattameva. Na hi yattha vatthupurejātaṃ na labbhati, tattha ārammaṇapurejātabhāvena upakārakaṃ hotīti dassitoyaṃ nayoti. Yujjamānakavasenāti paccanīkato ṭhitassa ṭhapetabbattā vuttaṃ, yujjamānakapaccayuppannavasena vāti attho. ‘‘Maggapaccaye paccanīkato ṭhite hetupaccayo anulomato na labbhatī’’ti purimapāṭho, adhipatipaccayopi pana na labbhatīti ‘‘hetādhipatipaccayā anulomato na labbhantī’’ti paṭhanti. Adhipatipaccaye paccanīkato ṭhite pacchājātato añño anulomato alabbhamāno nāma natthīti na vicāritaṃ. Aññamaññe paccanīkato ṭhite ‘‘arūpānaṃyevā’’ti vuttā nava anulomato na labbhanti, tampi paccanīkato ṭhitehi ārammaṇapaccayādīhi sadisatāya suviññeyyanti na vicāritaṃ bhavissatīti.

'When prenascence, postnascence, habitual-recurrence, result, and dissociation are established in reverse order, excluding one, the remaining ones are obtained in direct order'—this is stated with reference to merely the obtaining of the remaining ones. It should be understood that not all remaining ones are obtained. Although there is no implication for postnascence, since the exception 'it is not obtained in direct order in all cases' has been made, if 'all remaining ones' is taken to mean that prenascence is obtained in direct order when dissociation is established in reverse order, this too would be an error. And what some say—'this was stated to indicate the possibility of an object-prenascence even in the immaterial realms where the dissociation condition is absent'—that too is merely their inclination. For it has been shown that where base-prenascence is not obtained, there is no assistance through the nature of object-prenascence. 'By way of what is fitting' is stated because that which is established in reverse order must be set aside, or alternatively, the meaning is 'by way of what arises from a fitting condition'. 'When the path condition is established in reverse order, the root condition is not obtained in direct order' is the earlier reading; but since the dominance condition is also not obtained, they read 'the root and dominance conditions are not obtained in direct order'. When the dominance condition is established in reverse order, there is no other condition apart from postnascence that is not obtained in direct order—this has not been investigated. When the mutual condition is established in reverse order, the nine conditions stated as 'only for the immaterial states' are not obtained in direct order; this too, being similar to the object condition, etc., established in reverse order, will be easily understood and therefore not investigated.

191-195. Yāva āsevanā sabbaṃ sadisanti na aññamaññena ghaṭitassa mūlassa vitthāritattā tato parāni mūlāni sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tesu hi anulomato yojetabbapaccayā ca pañhā cāti sabbaṃ sadisanti.

191-195. All are similar up to habitual-recurrence, not because of the extensive spread of the root joined mutually, but with reference to the roots beyond that. For among them, both the conditions to be applied in direct order and the questions are all similar.

Imasmiṃ paccanīyānulometi etassa ‘‘imesampi pakiṇṇakānaṃ vasenettha gaṇanavāro asammohato veditabbo’’ti etena saha sambandho[Pg.215]. Tattha etthāti etesu paccayesūti attho veditabbo. Imasmiṃ paccanīyānulome labbhamānesu paccayuppannadhammesupīti vā yojetabbaṃ. Tattha pi-saddena imamatthaṃ dīpeti – na kevalaṃ paccayesveva kismiñci paccanīkato ṭhite keci anulomato na labbhanti, atha kho paccayuppannadhammesupi koci ekaccaṃ paccayaṃ labhamāno kañci paccayaṃ na labhatīti. Tattha kammapaccayaṃ labhamāno yebhuyyena indriyapaccayaṃ labhati, maggapaccayaṃ labhamāno yebhuyyena hetupaccayaṃ, tathā ca jhānapaccayaṃ labhamāno maggapaccayanti etesveva lābhālābhā vicāritā. Yatthāti pañcavokārapavatte asaññesu ca. Rūpadhammāti yathāvuttāni kaṭattārūpāneva sandhāya vadati. Na hi pañcavokārapavatte sabbe rūpadhammā hetādīni na labhantīti. ‘‘Hetādhipativipākindriyapaccaye na labhantī’’ti purimapāṭho, jhānamaggepi pana na labhantīti ‘‘hetādhipativipākindriyajhānamaggapaccaye na labhantī’’ti paṭhanti. Ye rūpadhammānaṃ paccayā honti, tesu arūpaṭṭhānikavajjesu eteyeva na labhantīti adhippāyo. Pacchājātāhāravippayuttapaccayepi hi pavatte kaṭattārūpaṃ labhatīti. Labbhamānālabbhamānapaccayadassanamattañcetaṃ, na tehi paccayehi uppattianuppattidassananti. Evaṃ indriyapaccayālābho jīvitindriyaṃ sandhāya vutto siyā. Yathāvuttesu hi dhammavasena pacchājātādittayampi alabhantaṃ nāma kaṭattārūpaṃ natthi. Ko pana vādo sabbaṭṭhānikakammesu. Indriyaṃ pana alabhantaṃ atthi, kintaṃ? Jīvitindriyanti. Yadi evaṃ upādārūpāni sandhāya aññamaññapaccayampi na labhantīti vattabbaṃ, taṃ pana pākaṭanti na vuttaṃ siyā. Arūpindriyālābhaṃ vā sandhāya indriyapaccayālābho vuttoti daṭṭhabbo.

The connection of 'in this reverse-direct order' is with 'the counting section here should be understood without confusion even by way of these miscellaneous factors'. Here, 'here' should be understood to mean 'in these conditions'. Alternatively, it should be construed as 'even in the states arisen from conditions obtainable in this reverse-direct order'. Here, by the particle 'pi', this meaning is indicated: not only are some not obtained in direct order when something is established in reverse order among the conditions, but even among states arisen from conditions, some obtain a certain condition while not obtaining another. In this regard, one who obtains the kamma condition generally obtains the faculty condition; one who obtains the path condition generally obtains the root condition; and one who obtains the jhāna condition obtains the path condition. Thus, gains and losses are examined in these very cases. Where? In the five-aggregate existence and in the unconscious beings. 'Material phenomena' refers only to the previously mentioned kamma-produced material phenomena. For not all material phenomena in the five-aggregate existence fail to obtain root and so forth. The earlier reading states, 'They do not obtain root, dominance, result, and faculty conditions.' But since they also do not obtain them in jhāna and path, they read 'they do not obtain root, dominance, result, faculty, jhāna, or path conditions.' The meaning is that among the conditions for material phenomena, these are the very conditions that are not obtained, with the exception of those pertaining to the immaterial sphere. For even in postnascence, nutriment, and dissociation conditions, kamma-produced material phenomena are obtained in the process of existence. And this is merely a demonstration of obtainable and unobtainable conditions, not a demonstration of arising or non-arising through those conditions. Thus, the non-obtainment of the faculty condition may be stated with reference to the life faculty. For among the states as described, there is no kamma-produced material phenomenon that does not obtain even the trio of postnascence and so forth. What need be said of kamma pertaining to all realms? But is there a faculty that is not obtained? Yes—the life faculty. If so, then it should also be stated that derived material phenomena do not obtain the mutual condition; but that may not have been stated because it is obvious. Alternatively, the non-obtainment of the faculty condition should be understood as referring to the non-obtainment of the immaterial faculties.

196-197. Nārammaṇamūlakesu dukādīsu hetuyā pañcāti yadipi tikādīsu ‘‘hetuyā pañcā’’ti idaṃ natthi, tathāpi dukādīsu sabbattha anuttānaṃ vattukāmo ‘‘dukādīsū’’ti sabbasaṅgahavasena vatvā tattha yaṃ ādiduke vuttaṃ ‘‘hetuyā pañcā’’ti, taṃ niddhāreti. Keci pana ‘‘nārammaṇamūlake hetuyā pañcā’’ti pāṭhaṃ vadanti. ‘‘Aññamaññe ekanti bhūtarūpameva sandhāya vutta’’nti purimapāṭho, vatthupi pana labbhatīti ‘‘bhūtarūpāni ceva vatthuñca sandhāya vutta’’nti paṭhanti. Timūlaketi idhāpi dumūlakaṃ timūlakanti vadanti.

196-197. Although 'five by way of root' is not found in the triads etc. that are rooted in not-object, nevertheless, wishing to speak of all dyads etc. implicitly, having said 'in the dyads etc.' by way of including all, he specifies that which was stated in the initial dyad as 'five by way of root'. However, some recite the text as 'in that which is rooted in not-object, five by way of root'. 'Mutually, one' was the earlier reading, stated with reference to only fundamental material form; but since the base is also obtained, they read 'stated with reference to both fundamental material forms and the base'. Here too, regarding 'three-rooted', they speak of the two-rooted as three-rooted.

203-233. Nakammamūlake [Pg.216] hetuyā tīṇītiādīsu cetanāva paccayuppannāti idaṃ ‘‘hetuyā tīṇī’’ti evaṃpakāre cetanāmattasaṅgāhake sandhāya vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Ādi-saddo hi pakāratthova hotīti. Sahajātaaññamaññanissayāhāraatthiavigatesu pana rūpampi labbhatīti.

203-233. In 'three by way of root,' etc., in the non-kamma-rooted, 'volition alone is conditionally arisen'—this should be understood as stated with reference to the inclusion of volition alone in such instances as 'three by way of root.' For the word 'etc.' indeed has the meaning of 'manner.' But in the cases of co-nascence, mutuality, dependence, nutriment, presence, and non-disappearance, materiality is also obtained.

Paccayapaccanīyānulomavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Negative and Positive of Conditions is completed.

Paṭiccavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Dependent Origination Section is completed.

2. Sahajātavāravaṇṇanā

2. Exposition of the Co-nascence Section

234-242. Kusalaṃ dhammaṃ sahajāto, kusalaṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ sahajātotiādīsu sahajātasaddena sahajātapaccayakaraṇaṃ sahajātāyattabhāvagamanaṃ vā vuttanti tassa karaṇassa gamanassa vā kusalādīnaṃ kammabhāvato upayogavacanaṃ katanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Esa nayo paccayavārādīsupi. Tatrāpi hi paccayasaddena ca nissayapaccayakaraṇaṃ nissayāyattabhāvagamanaṃ vā vuttaṃ, saṃsaṭṭhasaddena ca sampayuttapaccayakaraṇaṃ sampayuttāyattabhāvagamanaṃ vāti taṃkammabhāvato upayogavacanaṃ kusalādīsu katanti. Sahajātampi ca upādārūpaṃ bhūtarūpassa paccayo na hotīti ‘‘paṭiccā’’ti iminā vacanena dīpito paccayo na hotīti attho. ‘‘Upādārūpaṃ bhūtarūpassā’’ti ca nidassanavasena vuttaṃ. Upādārūpassapi hi upādārūpaṃ yathāvutto paccayo na hoti, vatthuvajjāni rūpāni ca arūpānanti.

234-242. In phrases such as “a wholesome state is conascent,” “one wholesome aggregate is conascent,” the term ‘conascent’ (sahajāta) is used to denote either the function of being a conascent condition or the state of dependence through conascence. It should be understood that this function or state is described as ‘application’ (upayoga) in relation to wholesome states, etc., because of their being action. This same method applies to other sections like the Condition Section (paccayavāra) and so on. There too, the term ‘condition’ (paccaya) signifies either the function of being a dependence condition (nissaya-paccaya) or the state of dependence through support (nissayāyatta). Similarly, the term ‘connected’ (saṃsaṭṭha) denotes either the function of being an associated condition (sampayutta-paccaya) or the state of dependence through association (sampayuttāyatta). Thus, in relation to wholesome states, etc., this is described as ‘application’ because of their being action. Moreover, conascent derived matter (upādārūpa) is not a condition for primary matter (bhūtarūpa). This is clarified by the word ‘paṭiccā,’ meaning that it is not a condition. The statement “derived matter for primary matter” is given as an illustration. For derived matter is also not a condition for other derived matter, as stated, and material forms apart from the bases are not conditions for immaterial states.

Sahajātavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Co-nascence Section is concluded.

3. Paccayavāravaṇṇanā

3. Exposition of the Condition Section

243. Paccayāti ettha pati ayo paccayo. Pati-saddo patiṭṭhatthaṃ dīpeti, aya-saddo gatiṃ, patiṭṭhābhūtā gati nissayo paccayoti vuttaṃ hoti, tato paccayā, paccayakaraṇato tadāyattabhāvagamanato vāti attho.

243. Here, ‘paccaya’ is derived from ‘pati’ and ‘aya.’ The word ‘pati’ signifies establishment, and ‘aya’ signifies movement. Thus, ‘paccaya’ is said to mean a movement that has become a basis—a support or condition. Therefore, ‘paccayā’ (conditions) are so called because of functioning as conditions or because of undergoing dependence on them. This is the meaning.

‘‘Mahābhūte [Pg.217] paccayā cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpa’’nti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.245) bhūtupādārūpāni saha saṅgaṇhitvā vuttaṃ. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana cittasamuṭṭhāne ca mahābhūte nissāya cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ upādārūpanti sayaṃ nissayo ahutvā nissaye uppajjamānena upādārūpena nidassanaṃ katanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

“Dependent on the great elements is mind-originated form” (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.245)—this is stated by taking primary elements and derived form together. However, in the commentary, it is said that mind-originated derived form arises depending on the mind-originated great elements. Thus, it should be understood that an illustration is made with derived form, which arises in a support without itself being a support.

255. Asañña…pe… kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpanti ettha yo paṭiccavāre sahajāte kammautujānaṃ, kamme ca ekantānekantakammajānaṃ vasena attho vutto, so nādhippeto eva ‘‘kaṭattārūpa’’nti kammasamuṭṭhānarūpasseva sabbassa ca gahitattāti taṃ pahāya yathāgahitassa kaṭattārūpassa visesanavasena ‘‘upādārūpasaṅkhātaṃ kaṭattārūpa’’nti atthamāha. Mahābhūte pana paṭicca paccayā ca mahābhūtānaṃ uppatti na nivāretabbāti upādārūpaggahaṇena kaṭattārūpaggahaṇaṃ avisesetvā upādārūpānaṃ nivattetabbānaṃ atthitāya kaṭattārūpaggahaṇeneva upādārūpaggahaṇassa visesanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ.

255. In 'In the non-percipient... kamma-born form is derived form,' the meaning stated in the Dependent Origination Section and the Co-nascence Section—in terms of kamma-originated and temperature-originated phenomena, and within kamma, in terms of exclusively and non-exclusively kamma-originated phenomena—is not intended here. This is because by ‘kamma-born form’ all kamma-originated form is included. Therefore, abandoning that, the meaning is stated as ‘kamma-born form reckoned as derived form,’ by way of specifying the kamma-born form as it was taken. However, since the arising of the great elements depending on conditions is not to be prevented, the inclusion of kamma-born form is not specified by the inclusion of derived form. Rather, due to the existence of derived forms that are to be excluded, the specification of the inclusion of derived form should be seen by the very inclusion of kamma-born form.

269-276. ‘‘Abyākatena abyākataṃ, kusalaṃ, akusala’’nti vattabbe ‘‘abyākatena kusalaṃ, akusalaṃ, abyākata’’nti, ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo ca akusalo ca dhammā kusalassāti anāmasitvā’’ti ca purimapāṭhe pamādalekhā daṭṭhabbā.

269-276. Where it should be said, “By the indeterminate, the indeterminate, the wholesome, and the unwholesome,” it is instead said, “By the indeterminate, the wholesome, the unwholesome, and the indeterminate.” Also, in the earlier reading, a scribal error should be noted in the phrase, “Dependent on a wholesome state, wholesome and unwholesome states are of the wholesome,” which is stated without reference.

286-287. Nahetupaccayā napurejāte dveti ettha aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘āruppe pana ahetukamohassa ahetukakiriyassa ca vasena dveti vuttā, navippayutte dveti āruppe ahetukākusalakiriyavasenā’’ti vuttaṃ, taṃ labbhamānesu ekadesena nidassanavasena vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Āruppe pana ahetukamohassa ahetukakiriyāya ahetukapaṭisandhiyā ekaccassa ca rūpassa vasena dve vuttāti, navippayutte dveti āruppe ahetukākusalakiriyāekaccarūpānaṃ vasenāti vuttanti. ‘‘Nonatthinovigatesu ekanti sabbarūpassa vasenā’’ti vuttaṃ, nahetumūlakattā imassa nayassa hetupaccayaṃ labhantaṃ na labbhatīti ‘‘ekaccassa rūpassa vasenā’’ti bhavitabbaṃ. Cakkhādidhammavasena pana cittasamuṭṭhānādikoṭṭhāsavasena vā sabbaṃ labbhatīti ‘‘sabbarūpassā’’ti vuttaṃ siyā.

286-287. Regarding ‘not by root condition’ and ‘not by pre-nascence condition, there are two,’ the commentary states: “But in the immaterial realm, ‘two’ is said on account of rootless delusion and rootless functional activity; and in ‘not-dissociated,’ ‘two’ is said in the immaterial realm on account of rootless unwholesome functional activity.” This should be regarded as stated by way of example, with a fraction of what is obtainable. But in the immaterial realm, ‘two’ is said on account of rootless delusion, rootless functional activity, rootless rebirth-linking, and certain materiality. In ‘not-dissociated,’ ‘two’ is said in the immaterial realm on account of rootless unwholesome functional activity and certain materiality. It is said: “‘In non-existence and non-disappearance, one, on account of all materiality.’” Since this method is not rooted in a root, and what obtains a root condition is not obtained, it should be “on account of certain materiality.” But perhaps “on account of all materiality” was said because all is obtainable on account of phenomena such as the eye, etc., or on account of sections such as mind-originated materiality.

289-296. Āgatānāgatanti [Pg.218] pañhavasena vuttaṃ, labbhamānālabbhamānanti āgate ca pañhe labbhamānālabbhamānadhammavasena.

289-296. ‘Come and not-come’ is stated in terms of questions; ‘obtainable and unobtainable’ is stated in terms of obtainable and unobtainable phenomena within the questions that have come.

Paccayavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Condition Section is concluded.

4. Nissayavāravaṇṇanā

4. Exposition of the Dependence Section

329-337. Paccayavārena nissayapaccayabhāvanti nissayavāre vuttassa nissayapaccayabhāvaṃ niyametunti attho.

329-337. ‘The state of being a dependence condition by the Condition Section’ means that it determines the state of being a dependence condition for what was stated in the Dependence Section.

Nissayavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Dependence Section is concluded.

5. Saṃsaṭṭhavāravaṇṇanā

5. Exposition of the Connected Section

351-368. Saṃsaṭṭhavāre paccanīye ‘‘navippayutte paṭisandhi natthī’’ti idaṃ vatthuvirahitāya paṭisandhiyā visuṃ anuddharaṇato vuttaṃ. Paṭiccavārādīsu hi sahajātassa paccayabhāvadassanatthaṃ savatthukā paṭisandhi uddhaṭā, sā idhāpi adhipatipurejātāsevanesu nakammanavipākanajhānanavippayuttesu na labbhati, aññesu ca anulomato paccanīyato ca labbhamānapaccayesu labbhatīti imassa visesassa dassanatthaṃ uddhaṭāti. Sesā terasa na labbhantīti ettha ‘‘sesā cuddasā’’ti bhavitabbaṃ. Na jhāne ekanti ahetukapañcaviññāṇavasenāti pañcaviññāṇānaṃ hetupaccayavirahitamattadassanatthaṃ ahetukaggahaṇaṃ katanti daṭṭhabbaṃ, ‘‘namagge ekanti ahetukakiriyavasenā’’ti vuttaṃ, ‘‘ahetukavipākakiriyavasenā’’ti bhavitabbaṃ.

351-368. In the Connected Section, in the negative, the statement “in ‘not-dissociated’ there is no rebirth-linking” is made because rebirth-linking devoid of a basis is not extracted separately. For in the Dependent Origination Section and so on, rebirth-linking with a basis is extracted to show the state of being a condition for what is co-nascent. Here, however, it is not found in dominance, pre-nascence, repetition, not-kamma, not-result, not-jhāna, and not-dissociated conditions, but it is found among other obtainable conditions, both positive and negative. It is extracted to show this distinction. Where it says, “The remaining thirteen are not found,” it should be “the remaining fourteen.” Regarding “‘In not-jhāna, one,’ on account of the five rootless consciousnesses,” it should be understood that the term ‘rootless’ is used merely to show the absence of root condition for the five consciousnesses. Where it says, “‘In not-path, one,’ on account of rootless functional consciousness,” it should be “on account of rootless resultant and functional consciousness.”

369-391. Heṭṭhā vuttanayenevāti paṭiccavāre anulomapaccanīye vuttanayena. ‘‘Nahetupaccayuppannesu ahetukamohova jhānamaggapaccayaṃ labhati, sesā na labhantī’’ti vuttaṃ, sesesu pana pañcaviññāṇavajjāhetukakkhandhā taṃsamuṭṭhānā paccayuppannadhammā jhānapaccayaṃ labhanti, na paccanīyānulome dvinnaṃ paccayānaṃ anulomena saha yojanā atthīti jhānamaggapaccayaṃ sahitaṃ labhatīti ca na sakkā vattuṃ, tasmā ‘‘ahetukamohova maggapaccayaṃ labhatī’’ti vattabbaṃ.

369-391. ‘In the way stated previously’ means in the manner explained in the Dependent Origination Section, in the positive-negative mode. It was said, “Among the states arisen by not-root condition, only rootless delusion obtains the jhāna and path conditions; the rest do not.” However, among the remaining rootless aggregates—excluding the five sense-consciousnesses—and the conditionally arisen phenomena originated together with them, they obtain the jhāna condition. But in the negative-positive, there is no combining of two conditions together with the positive, so it is not possible to say that it obtains the jhāna and path conditions together. Therefore, it should be stated, “Only rootless delusion obtains the path condition.”

Saṃsaṭṭhavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Connected Section is concluded.

6. Sampayuttavāravaṇṇanā

6. Exposition of the Associated Section

392-400. Sadisaṃ [Pg.219] sampayuttaṃ saṃsaṭṭhaṃ vokiṇṇañca saṃsaṭṭhaṃ na hotīti ubhayaṃ aññamaññāpekkhaṃ vuccamānaṃ aññamaññassa niyāmakaṃ hotīti.

392-400. ‘Similar,’ ‘associated,’ ‘connected,’ and ‘mixed’ do not mean simply ‘connected.’ Since both are spoken of with mutual reference, they are determinative of each other.

Sampayuttavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Associated Section is concluded.

7. Pañhāvāravibhaṅgavaṇṇanā

7. Exposition of the Analysis of the Section on Questions

401-403. Yehi paccayehi kusalo kusalassa paccayo hoti, te paccaye paṭipāṭiyā dassetunti yathākkamena āgatāgatapaṭipāṭiyā dassetunti attho. Kusalo kusalassāti nidassanamattametaṃ, tena kusalo kusalādīnaṃ, akusalo akusalādīnaṃ, abyākato abyākatādīnaṃ, kusalābyākatā kusalādīnantiādiko sabbo pabhedo nidassito hotīti yathānidassite sabbe gahetvā āha ‘‘te paccaye paṭipāṭiyā dassetu’’nti.

401-403. The conditions by which the wholesome becomes a condition for the wholesome—those conditions should be shown in sequence, meaning they should be shown in the order they arise. "The wholesome is a condition for the wholesome" is merely an illustration. By this, the wholesome for the wholesome and so on, the unwholesome for the unwholesome and so on, the indeterminate for the indeterminate and so on, the wholesome and indeterminate for the wholesome and so on—thus, all distinctions are illustrated. Having included all these as illustrated, it is said, "Those conditions should be shown in sequence."

404. Datvāti ettha dā-saddo sodhanatthopi hotīti mantvā āha ‘‘visuddhaṃ katvā’’ti. Tesañhi taṃ cittanti tesanti vattabbatārahaṃ sakadāgāmimaggādipurecārikaṃ taṃ gotrabhucittanti adhippāyo. Vipassanākusalaṃ pana kāmāvacaramevāti paccayuppannaṃ bhūmito vavatthapeti. Tenevāti dhammavaseneva dassanato, desanantarattāti adhippāyo.

404. Regarding 'datvā,' here the term 'dā' can also mean purification, hence it is explained as 'having purified.' For them, that mind—the meaning is that change-of-lineage mind which precedes the once-returner path, etc., and which is fit to be called 'theirs.' However, wholesome insight pertains only to the sense-sphere, thus it establishes the conditioned-arisen from its plane. By that very means—this is an illustration by way of the nature of the Dhamma itself, because of the subsequent teaching—this is the meaning.

405. Assādanaṃ sarāgassa somanassassa sasomanassassa rāgassa ca kiccanti āha ‘‘anubhavati ceva rajjati cā’’ti. Abhinandanaṃ pītikiccasahitāya taṇhāya kiccanti āha ‘‘sappītikataṇhāvasenā’’ti. Diṭṭhābhinandanā diṭṭhiyeva. Ettha pana pacchimatthameva gahetvā ‘‘abhinandantassa attā attaniyantiādivasena…pe… diṭṭhi uppajjatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Abhinandanā pana diṭṭhābhinandanāyevāti na sakkā vattuṃ ‘‘bhāvanāya pahātabbo dhammo bhāvanāya pahātabbassa dhammassa ārammaṇa…pe… bhāvanāya pahātabbaṃ rāgaṃ assādeti abhinandatī’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.8.72) vacanato, tasmā purimopi attho vuttoti daṭṭhabbo. Dvīsu pana somanassasahagatacittesu yathāvuttena somanassena [Pg.220] rāgena ca assādentassa tesuyeva sappītikataṇhāya catūsupi diṭṭhābhinandanāya abhinandantassa ca diṭṭhi uppajjatītipi sakkā yojetuṃ. Jātivasenāti suciṇṇasāmaññavasenāti attho.

405. 'Assādana' is the function of lustful joy and of joy-accompanied lust, as it is said, 'one both experiences and is impassioned.' 'Abhinandana' is the function of craving accompanied by the function of joy, as it is said, 'by way of craving associated with joy.' 'Diṭṭhābhinandanā' is simply view. Here, however, taking only the latter meaning, it is said, "For one who delights, the view arises by way of 'self,' 'belonging to self,' etc." But it cannot be said that 'abhinandana' is solely 'diṭṭhābhinandanā,' because of the statement, "A phenomenon to be abandoned by development is an object for a phenomenon to be abandoned by development... one enjoys and delights in lust, which is to be abandoned by development" (Paṭṭhāna 2.8.72). Therefore, it should be understood that the former meaning is also stated. Moreover, in the two types of consciousness accompanied by joy, for one who enjoys with joy and lust as stated, and in the four types, for one who delights by way of craving associated with joy and by delighting in views, it can also be connected that a view arises. 'Jātivasenā' means 'by way of well-practiced commonality,' that is, through long-standing common behavior.

406. Tadārammaṇatāti tadārammaṇabhāvena. Vibhattilopo hettha katoti. Bhāvavantato vā añño bhāvo natthīti bhāveneva vipākaṃ viseseti, vipāko tadārammaṇabhāvabhūtoti attho. Viññāṇañcāyatananevasaññānāsaññāyatanavipākānaṃ viya na kāmāvacaravipākānaṃ niyogato vavatthitaṃ idañca kammaṃ ārammaṇanti taṃ labbhamānampi na vuttaṃ. Tadārammaṇena pana kusalārammaṇabhāvena samānalakkhaṇatāya kammārammaṇā paṭisandhiādayopi dassitāyevāti daṭṭhabbā. Paṭilomato vā ekantarikavasena vāti vadantena anulomato samāpajjane yebhuyyena āsannasamāpattiyā ārammaṇabhāvo dassitoti daṭṭhabbo. Yathā pana paṭilomato ekantarikavasena ca samāpajjantassa anāsannāpi samāpatti ārammaṇaṃ hoti, evaṃ anulomato samāpajjantassapi bhaveyyāti. ‘‘Cetopariyañāṇassātiādīni parato āvajjanāya yojetabbānī’’ti vatvā ‘‘yā etesaṃ āvajjanā, tassā’’ti attho vutto, evaṃ sati ‘‘iddhividhañāṇassā’’tipi vattabbaṃ siyā. Yasmā pana kusalā khandhā abyākatassa iddhividhañāṇassa ārammaṇaṃ na hontīti taṃ na vuttaṃ, cetopariyañāṇādīnañca hontīti tāni vuttāni, tasmā kiriyānaṃ cetopariyañāṇādīnaṃ yāya kāyaci āvajjanāya ca kusalārammaṇāya kusalā khandhā ārammaṇapaccayena paccayoti evamattho daṭṭhabbo.

406. 'Tadārammaṇatā' means by way of being its object. Here, an elision of inflection is made. Or, since there is no state apart from that which possesses the state, it qualifies the result by the state itself; the meaning is that the result has become the state of being its object. And just as for the results of the base of infinite consciousness and the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, it is not established for sense-sphere results in a fixed way that 'this kamma is the object'; although it is obtainable, it is not stated. However, it should be understood that rebirth-linking and other processes which have kamma as their object are indeed shown by way of tadārammaṇa, due to the similar characteristic of being a wholesome object. Alternatively, it should be understood that when speaking of reverse order or occurring with an interval, the object relation is shown mostly in the case of attaining in forward order, generally through proximate attainment. Just as in reverse order and occurring with an interval, even a non-proximate attainment can be an object for one who is attaining, so too it may be for one attaining in forward order. After stating that 'the knowledge of others' minds, etc., should be connected to advertence from another,' the meaning is given as 'the advertence to these.' In this context, 'the knowledge of psychic powers' could also be mentioned. But since wholesome aggregates are not objects for the indeterminate knowledge of psychic powers, that is not stated, whereas they are objects for the knowledge of others' minds, etc., and so these are stated. Therefore, it should be understood that for functional states like the knowledge of others' minds, etc., wholesome aggregates are conditions by way of object condition through any advertence that has a wholesome object; thus is the meaning to be understood.

407-409. Vippaṭisārādivasena vāti ādi-saddena ādīnavadassanena sabhāvato ca aniṭṭhatāmattaṃ saṅgaṇhāti, akkhantibhedā vā.

407-409. "Through remorse, etc." Here, "etc." includes the perception of drawbacks, and their inherently undesirable nature. Alternatively, it refers to varieties of impatience.

410. Rūpāyatanaṃ cakkhuviññāṇassātiādinā viññāṇakāyehi niyatārammaṇehi abyākatassa abyākatānaṃ ārammaṇapaccayabhāvaṃ nidasseti. Sabbassa hi vattuṃ asakkuṇeyyattā ekasmiṃ santāne dhammānaṃ ekadesena nidassanaṃ karotīti.

410. "The visual object is a condition for eye-consciousness, etc." This illustrates the object-condition relationship of the indeterminate to the indeterminate, which has fixed objects, through the bodies of consciousness. Since it is impossible to state everything, an illustration is made with a portion of phenomena in one continuum.

413-416. Catubhūmakaṃ [Pg.221] kusalaṃ ārammaṇādhipatipaccayabhāvena dassitaṃ, paccayuppannaṃ pana kāmāvacarameva.

413-416. Wholesome states pertaining to the four planes are shown by way of object-condition and dominance-condition, but the conditioned-arisen is only in the sense-sphere.

417. Apubbato cittasantānato vuṭṭhānaṃ bhavaṅgameva, taṃ pana mūlāgantukabhavaṅgasaṅkhātaṃ tadārammaṇaṃ pakatibhavaṅgañca. Anulomaṃ sekkhāya phalasamāpattiyāti ettha kāyaci sekkhaphalasamāpattiyā avajjetabbattā vattabbaṃ natthīti nevasaññānāsaññāyatanakusalaṃ phalasamāpattiyāti imaṃ nibbisesanaṃ phalasamāpattiṃ uddharitvā dassento āha ‘‘phalasamāpattiyāti anāgāmiphalasamāpattiyā’’ti. Kāmāvacarakiriyā duvidhassapi vuṭṭhānassāti ettha kiriyānantaraṃ tadārammaṇavuṭṭhāne yaṃ vattabbaṃ, taṃ cittuppādakaṇḍe vuttameva.

417. Emerging from an unprecedented stream of consciousness is the life-continuum itself, and that is designated as the root and adventitious life-continuum, the tadārammaṇa, and the natural life-continuum. Regarding 'conformity for the fruition attainment of a trainee,' here, since there is nothing to be said because there is nothing to be adverted to by any fruition attainment of a trainee, thus, pointing out this unqualified 'fruition attainment'—which is the wholesome attainment of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception—it is said, 'By "fruition attainment" is meant the non-returner's fruition attainment.' Concerning the twofold emergence from sense-sphere functional consciousness, what should be said regarding the tadārammaṇa-emergence immediately after the functional consciousness has already been stated in the chapter on the arising of consciousness.

Tā ubhopi…pe… dvādasannanti idaṃ somanassasahagatamanoviññāṇadhātuvasena vuttaṃ, upekkhāsahagatā pana yathāvuttānaṃ dasannaṃ viññāṇadhātūnaṃ voṭṭhabbanakiriyassa manodhātukiriyassa cāti dvādasannaṃ hotīti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

That 'both... for the twelve' is said with regard to the mind-consciousness element accompanied by joy. However, it should be understood that that which is accompanied by equanimity is for the twelve, namely: the ten consciousness elements as stated, the functional determining consciousness, and the functional mind-element.

423. Dānādipuññakiriyāyattā sabbasampattiyo paṭivijjhitvāti sambandho. Na panetaṃ ekantena gahetabbanti ‘‘balavacetanāva labbhati, na dubbalā’’ti etaṃ ekantaṃ na gahetabbaṃ, daḷhaṃ vā na gahetabbanti adhippāyo. Kiṃ kāraṇanti? Balavato dubbalassa vā katokāsassa antarāyaṃ paṭibāhitvā vipaccanato ‘‘yaṃkañci yadi vipākaṃ janeti, upanissayo na hotī’’ti navattabbattā cāti dassento ‘‘katokāsañhī’’tiādimāha. Vipākattike pana pañhāvārapaccanīye ‘‘vipākadhammadhammo vipākassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo, upanissayapaccayena paccayo, kammapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.3.93) kammapaccayassa visuṃ uddhaṭattā, vedanāttike ca pañhāvārapaccanīye ‘‘nahetupaccayā naārammaṇapaccayā naupanissaye aṭṭhā’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.2.87) vuttattā ‘‘vipākajanakampi kiñci kammaṃ upanissayapaccayo na hotī’’ti sakkā vattunti.

423. The connection is that all kinds of prosperity are attained through meritorious deeds such as giving. However, this should not be taken as an absolute rule; 'Only strong volition is obtained, not weak'—this should not be taken as absolute, it should not be taken rigidly—this is the meaning. Why is this? Because for one who has made an opportunity, whether strong or weak, when an obstacle is prevented and it ripens, it cannot be said, "Whatever result it generates, it is not a decisive support-condition." Thus, it is shown by saying, "Because an opportunity has been made," etc. Moreover, in the rebuttal section of the Triplet on Results (Vipākattika) it says: "A phenomenon that is a result is a condition for a phenomenon that is a result by way of object-condition, decisive support-condition, and kamma-condition" (Paṭṭh. 1.3.93), since the kamma-condition is separately extracted. And in the rebuttal section of the Triplet on Feeling (Vedanāttika) it is said: "There are eight which are not root-condition, not object-condition, in (the case of) not-decisive-support" (Paṭṭh. 1.2.87). Therefore, it is possible to say, "Even some kamma that generates a result is not a decisive support-condition."

Tasmiṃ vā viruddhoti taṃnimittaṃ viruddho, viruddhanti vā pāṭho. Omānanti parassa pavattaomānaṃ. Rāgo rañjanavasena pavattā kāmarāgataṇhā, ‘‘iti me cakkhuṃ siyā anāgatamaddhānaṃ, iti rūpā’’ti appaṭiladdhassa paṭilābhāya cittapaṇidahanataṇhā patthanāti ayametesaṃ viseso.

Or 'in that, opposed' means 'opposed on account of that sign'; or the reading is 'opposed'. 'Omāna' means disrespect that has occurred towards another. Lust is the craving for sensual pleasure that proceeds by way of coloring. "May my eye be thus in the future, may forms be thus"—this craving, which is the directing of the mind for the attainment of what has not been attained, is 'aspiration' (patthanā). This is the distinction among these.

Tesu [Pg.222] aññampīti tesu yaṃkiñci pubbe hanitato aññampi pāṇaṃ hanatīti attho.

'In them, another also' means: among them, he kills another living being, different from whichever one was killed before.

Punappunaṃ āṇāpanavasena vāti mātughātakammena sadisatāya pubbe pavattāyapi āṇattacetanāya mātughātakammanāmaṃ āropetvā vadanti. Esa nayo dvīhi pahārehīti etthāpi.

Again and again, by way of commanding, or because of the similarity to the act of matricide, they apply the name 'act of matricide' to an intention of command, even though it arose previously. This same method applies also in the case of 'with two blows.'

Yatheva hi…pe… uppādeti nāmāti rāgaṃ upanissāya dānaṃ detīti rāgaṃ upanissāya dānavasena saddhaṃ uppādetīti ayamattho vutto hotīti iminā adhippāyena vadati. Yathā rāgaṃ upanissāya dānaṃ detītievamādi hoti, evaṃ rāgādayo saddhādīnaṃ upanissayapaccayoti idampi hotīti dasseti. Kāyikaṃ sukhantiādīnaṃ ekato dassanena visuṃyeva na etesaṃ paccayabhāvo, atha kho ekatopīti dassitaṃ hotīti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

Just as... indeed... it generates faith: this means that by giving dependent on lust, one generates faith by way of giving dependent on lust—this meaning is stated with this intention. Just as giving dependent on lust, and so on, occurs, so too it is shown that lust and other factors are a decisive support condition for faith and other factors. By showing bodily pleasure and so on together, it is demonstrated that their state as a condition is not separate, but rather is also as one; this should be understood.

425. Upatthambhakattena paccayattāyevāti etena idaṃ dasseti – na purimavāresu viya imasmiṃ paccayena uppatti vuccati, atha kho tassa tassa paccayuppannassa tesaṃ tesaṃ dhammānaṃ taṃtaṃpaccayabhāvo, na ca pacchājātakkhandhā upatthambhakattena paccayā na honti, tenesa pacchājātapaccayo idha anulomato āgatoti.

425. By this, 'by being a condition only through supporting', it is shown that, unlike in previous instances, arising is not spoken of by means of this condition. Rather, it is the state of those particular phenomena being that particular condition for that particular conditioned phenomenon, and the later-born aggregates are indeed conditions by way of support. Therefore, this later-born condition has come here in the direct order.

427. Cetanā vatthussapi paccayoti attano patiṭṭhābhūtassapi kammapaccayoti adhippāyo.

427. Intention is a condition even for its basis: the meaning is that it is a kamma condition even for that which is its own foundation.

Kasmā panettha paccayavāre viya nissayaatthiavigatesu dumūlakadukāvasānā pañhā na uddhaṭāti? Alabbhamānattā. Tattha hi paccayuppannappadhānattā desanāya kusalo ca abyākato ca dhammā ekato uppajjamānā kusalābyākatapaccayā labbhantīti ‘‘kusalañca abyākatañca dhammaṃ paccayā kusalo ca abyākato ca dhammā uppajjantī’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.246) vuttaṃ. Yato tato vā ubhayapaccayato paccayuppannassa uppattimattaṃyeva hi tattha adhippetaṃ, na ubhayassa ubhinnaṃ paccayabhāvoti. Idha pana paccayappadhānattā desanāya kusalābyākatā kusalābyākatānaṃ ubhinnaṃ nissayādibhūtā na labbhantīti [Pg.223] ‘‘kusalo ca abyākato ca dhammā kusalassa ca abyākatassa ca dhammassa nissayapaccayena paccayo’’tiādi na vuttaṃ.

Why here, as in the section on conditions, are questions concerning the dyads ending with the two-rooted dyad not raised in the cases of dependence, presence, and non-disappearance? Because they are unobtainable. For there, due to the prominence of conditioned phenomena in the teaching, skillful and indeterminate phenomena arising together are obtained as skillful-and-indeterminate conditions—thus it is said, 'skillful and indeterminate phenomena arise conditioned by skillful and indeterminate phenomena' (Paṭṭh. 1.1.246). For there, from either of the two conditions, only the mere arising of the conditioned phenomenon is intended, not the state of both being a condition for both. Here, however, due to the prominence of conditions in the teaching, skillful and indeterminate phenomena are not obtained as serving as dependence, etc., for both skillful and indeterminate phenomena—thus it is not said, 'skillful and indeterminate phenomena are a condition for a skillful and an indeterminate phenomenon by way of dependence condition,' etc.

Pañhāvāravibhaṅgavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Analysis of the Section on Questions is finished.

Pañhāvārassa ghaṭane anulomagaṇanā

In establishing the section on questions, enumeration in direct order:

439. ‘‘Ettha pana purejātampi labbhatī’’ti vuttaṃ, yadi evaṃ kasmā ‘‘tathā’’ti vuttanti? ‘‘Tīṇī’’ti gaṇanamattasāmaññato.

439. 'Here, the pre-nascent is also obtainable' is said—if so, why is it said 'thus'? Because of the commonality of the mere enumeration as 'three'.

440. ‘‘Adhipatipaccaye ṭhapetvā vīmaṃsaṃ sesādhipatino visabhāgā’’ti purimapāṭho nidassanavasena daṭṭhabbo. Yasmā pana hetupaccayassa visabhāgena ekena ārammaṇena nidassanaṃ akatvā anantarādīni vadanto sabbe visabhāge dasseti, tasmā indriyamaggapaccayā ca visabhāgā dassetabbāti ‘‘adhipatindriyamaggapaccayesu ṭhapetvā paññaṃ sesā dhammā visabhāgā’’ti paṭhanti. Tathā bhāvābhāvato hetupaccayabhāve sahajātādipaccayabhāvato. Nanu yathā amohavajjānaṃ hetūnaṃ hetupaccayabhāve adhipatindriyamaggapaccayabhāvo natthīti paññāvajjānaṃ adhipatipaccayādīnaṃ visabhāgatā, evaṃ kusalādihetūnaṃ hetupaccayabhāve vipākapaccayabhāvābhāvato hetuvajjānaṃ vipākānaṃ visabhāgatāya bhavitabbanti? Na bhavitabbaṃ, ubhayapaccayasahite cittacetasikarāsimhi hetupaccayabhāve vipākapaccayattābhāvābhāvato. Yathā hi hetusahajātapaccayasahitarāsimhi satipi hetuvajjasabbhāve hetūnaṃ hetupaccayabhāve sahajātapaccayattābhāvo natthīti na hetuvajjānaṃ sahajātānaṃ hetussa visabhāgatā vuttā, evamidhāpīti. Esa nayo vippayuttapaccayepi. Apica paccayuppannasseva paccayā vuccantīti paccayuppannakkhaṇe tathā bhāvābhāvavasena sabhāgatāya vuccamānāya nānākkhaṇavasena visabhāgatā tasseva na vattabbāti.

440. The earlier reading, 'In the dominance condition, excepting investigation, the remaining dominances are dissimilar,' should be understood by way of illustration. However, since, without making an illustration with a single dissimilar object for the root condition, he shows all dissimilarities when speaking of the contiguous condition and so on, therefore the dissimilar faculty and path conditions should also be shown. Thus, they recite: 'In the dominance, faculty, and path conditions, excepting wisdom, the remaining phenomena are dissimilar.' This is so due to presence and absence, the presence of the root condition, and the presence of the conascence and other conditions. Now, just as for the roots excluding non-delusion, when the root condition is present, the dominance, faculty, and path conditions are absent, thus there is dissimilarity for the dominance conditions and so on, which exclude wisdom; in the same way, for the wholesome and other roots, when the root condition is present, due to the absence of the resultant condition, should there not be dissimilarity for the resultants which exclude the roots? There should not be, because in the mass of consciousness and mental factors accompanied by both conditions, when the root condition is present, there is no absence of the state of being a resultant condition. For just as in the mass accompanied by the root and conascence conditions, even when there is the existence of things other than the roots, for the roots, when the root condition is present, there is no absence of the state of being a conascence condition, so the dissimilarity of the conascent things other than the roots to the root is not spoken of; so too here. This is the method also in the dissociated condition. Moreover, since conditions are spoken of only for a conditioned phenomenon, when similarity is spoken of at the moment of the conditioned phenomenon by way of presence or absence, the dissimilarity of that same thing by way of different moments should not be spoken of.

Kusalā vīmaṃsāti idaṃ ‘‘kusalā vīmaṃsādhipatī’’ti evaṃ vattabbaṃ. Na hi anadhipatibhūtā vīmaṃsā adhipatipaccayo hotīti.

'Skillful investigation': this should be stated as 'skillful investigation-dominance'. For investigation that has not become a dominant factor does not become a dominance condition.

441-443. ‘‘Sace [Pg.224] pana vippayuttapaccayo pavisati, itarāni dve labhatī’’ti purimapāṭho, ‘‘kusalo dhammo kusalassa ca abyākatassa cā’’ti idaṃ pana na labbhatīti ‘‘kusalo abyākatassa, abyākato abyākatassāti dve labhatī’’ti paṭhanti. Ūnataragaṇanesūti yesu paviṭṭhesu ūnatarā gaṇanā hoti, tesūti attho. Tīṇi dve ekanti evaṃ ūnataragaṇanesu vā aññamaññādīsu pavisantesu tesaṃ vasena tikato ūnaṃ yathāladdhañca ekanti gaṇanaṃ labhatīti attho.

441-443. "But if the dissociated condition enters, one obtains the other two"—this is the earlier reading. But this, "a skillful phenomenon for a skillful and an indeterminate one," is not obtained. Therefore, they recite: "A skillful one for an indeterminate one, an indeterminate one for an indeterminate one—one obtains two." 'In more deficient enumerations' means: in those cases where, when they have entered, the enumeration becomes more deficient. The meaning is: 'three, two, one'—thus, in more deficient enumerations, or when entering into mutuality, etc., by means of them, one obtains an enumeration that is less than the triad, and as obtained, one.

Avipākānīti anāmaṭṭhavipākānīti attho, na vipākaheturahitānīti.

'Non-resultant' means 'not touched by resultants', not 'devoid of the cause of resultants'.

Tattha sabbepi sahajātavipākā cevāti tattha ye sahajātā paccayuppannā vuttā, te sabbepi vipākā ceva vipākasahajātarūpā cāti attho. Taṃsamuṭṭhānarūpā cāti ettha paṭisandhiyaṃ kaṭattārūpampi taṃsamuṭṭhānaggahaṇeneva saṅgaṇhātīti veditabbaṃ. ‘‘Taṃsamuṭṭhānarūpakaṭattārūpā ca labbhantī’’tipi paṭhanti. Catutthe vipākacittasamuṭṭhānarūpamevāti etthāpi eseva nayo. ‘‘Kaṭattārūpañcā’’tipi pana paṭhanti.

There, 'all are both conascent and resultant' means: there, whatever conascent conditioned phenomena are mentioned, they are all both resultants and material phenomena conascent with resultants. 'And material phenomena originating from that' means: here it should be known that at rebirth-linking, kamma-produced matter is also included by the taking up of 'originating from that'. Some also read: 'Material phenomena originating from that and kamma-produced matter are obtained.' In the fourth, 'only material phenomena originating from resultant consciousness': here too this is the method. But some also read: 'And kamma-produced matter.'

Evampīti ‘‘etesu pana ghaṭanesu sabbapaṭhamānī’’tiādinā vuttanayenapi. Ghaṭanesu pana yo yo paccayo mūlabhāvena ṭhito, taṃpaccayadhammānaṃ niravasesaūnaūnataraūnatamalābhakkamena ghaṭanā vuccati, niravasesalābhe ca paccayuppannānaṃ niravasesalābhakkamena. Tathā ūnalābhādīsūti ayaṃ kamo veditabbo.

'Also thus' means: also by the method stated beginning with 'But in these combinations, all the first ones,' and so on. Moreover, among the combinations, whatever condition stands as the root, the combination of the phenomena of that condition is spoken of by the sequence of obtaining them completely, deficiently, more deficiently, and most deficiently; and in the case of complete obtaining, it is by the sequence of completely obtaining the conditioned phenomena. This sequence should be understood likewise in the cases of deficient obtaining and so on.

Hetumūlakaṃ niṭṭhitaṃ.

The section rooted in cause is finished.

445. Vatthuvasena sanissayaṃ vakkhatīti na idaṃ labbhamānassapi vatthussa vasena ghaṭananti adhippāyenāha ‘‘ārammaṇavaseneva vā’’ti.

445. He will speak of 'with dependence' by way of the basis; he does not say this with the intention that the combination is by way of the basis even when it is obtainable, but rather with the intention of 'or merely by way of the object.'

446. Sahajātena pana saddhiṃ ārammaṇādhipati, ārammaṇādhipatinā ca saddhiṃ sahajātaṃ na labbhatīti idaṃ yathā sahajātapurejātā eko nissayapaccayo atthipaccayo ca honti, evaṃ sahajātārammaṇādhipatīnaṃ ekassa adhipatipaccayabhāvassa abhāvato vuttaṃ[Pg.225]. Nissayabhāvo hi atthiavigatabhāvo ca sahajātapurejātanissayādīnaṃ samāno, na panevaṃ sahajātārammaṇādhipatibhāvo samāno. Sahajāto hi ārammaṇabhāvaṃ anupagantvā attanā saha pavattanavasena adhipati hoti, itaro ārammaṇaṃ hutvā attani ninnatākaraṇena. Sahajāto ca vijjamānabhāveneva upakārako, itaro atītānāgatopi ārammaṇabhāveneva, tasmā sahajātārammaṇapaccayā viya bhinnasabhāvā sahajātārammaṇādhipatinoti na te ekato eva adhipatipaccayabhāvaṃ bhajanti, teneva pañhāvāravibhaṅge ca ‘‘kusalo ca abyākato ca dhammā kusalassa dhammassa adhipatipaccayena paccayo’’tiādi na vuttanti.

446. However, the object-dominance condition cannot be found together with the co-nascent condition, nor can the co-nascent condition be found together with the object-dominance condition. This is stated because, just as the co-nascent and pre-nascent conditions are a single dependence condition and presence condition, the co-nascent and object-dominance conditions do not have a single state of dominance condition. For the state of dependence and the state of presence-and-non-disappearance are the same for co-nascent and pre-nascent dependence, etc., but the state of co-nascent and object-dominance is not the same in this way. The co-nascent condition, without becoming an object, is a dominance by way of occurring together with its conascents, while the other becomes a dominance by being an object and causing inclination towards itself. Moreover, the co-nascent condition is helpful merely by its being present, whereas the other can be helpful even as a past or future object. Therefore, just as the co-nascent and object conditions have distinct natures, so too do the co-nascent and object-dominance conditions; thus, they do not together partake of a single state of dominance condition. For this reason, in the Analysis of the Question Section, it is not stated: 'Wholesome and indeterminate states are a condition for a wholesome state by way of dominance condition,' and so forth.

447-452. Sāhārakaghaṭanānaṃ purato vīriyacittavīmaṃsānaṃ sādhāraṇavasena anāhārakāmaggakāni saindriyaghaṭanāni vattabbāni siyuṃ ‘‘adhipatisahajātanissayaindriyaatthiavigatanti satta. Adhipatisahajātaaññamaññanissayaindriyasampayuttaatthiavigatanti tīṇi. Adhipatisahajātanissayaindriyavippayuttaatthiavigatanti tīṇi. Adhipatisahajātanissayavipākaindriyaatthiavigatanti ekaṃ. Adhipatisahajātaaññamaññanissayavipākaindriyasampayuttaavigatanti ekaṃ. Adhipatisahajātanissayavipākaindriyavippayuttaatthiavigatanti eka’’nti. Kasmā tāni na vuttānīti? Indriyabhūtassa adhipatissa āhāramaggehi aññassa abhāvā. Cittādhipati hi āhāro, vīriyavīmaṃsā ca maggo hoti, na ca añño indriyabhūto adhipati atthi, yassa vasena anāhārakāmaggakāni saindriyaghaṭanāni vattabbāni siyuṃ, tasmā tāni avatvā cittādhipatiādīnaṃ ekantena āhāramaggabhāvadassanatthaṃ sāhārakasamaggakāneva vuttāni. Tesu ca samaggakesu dve paccayadhammā labbhanti, sāhārakesu ekoyevāti samaggakāni pubbe vattabbāni siyuṃ. Saindriyakāni pana yehi āhāramaggehi bhinditabbāni, tesaṃ kamavasena pacchā vuttāni. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana sadisattāti samaggakattena samānattā, anantararūpattāti vā attho.

447-452. Before the groupings with nutriment, the groupings with faculty that are without nutriment and path factors, being common to energy, consciousness, and investigation, should be stated as follows: "Seven are with dominance, co-nascent, dependence, faculty, presence, and non-disappearance. Three are with dominance, co-nascent, mutual dependence, associated faculty, presence, and non-disappearance. Three are with dominance, co-nascent, dependence, dissociated faculty, presence, and non-disappearance. One is with dominance, co-nascent, dependence, resultant faculty, presence, and non-disappearance. One is with dominance, co-nascent, mutual dependence, associated resultant faculty, and non-disappearance. One is with dominance, co-nascent, dependence, dissociated resultant faculty, presence, and non-disappearance." Why are these not stated? Because there is no other dominance that is a faculty apart from nutriment and the path factors. For mind-dominance is nutriment, and energy and investigation are path factors, and there is no other faculty that is a dominance by which the groupings without nutriment and path factors, with faculties, could be stated. Therefore, without stating those, to show the nature of nutriment and path factors exclusively for mind-dominance and others, only the groupings with nutriment and path factors are stated. In those groupings with path factors, two conditional phenomena are obtained, whereas in those with nutriment, only one is obtained. Hence, the groupings with path factors should be stated first. However, the groupings with faculties, which must be distinguished by nutriment and path factors, are stated afterward in order. In the commentary, however, 'sadisattā' means 'due to being similar' or 'due to being equal by being grouped together,' and 'anantararūpattā' means 'due to being immediately successive in nature.'

457-460. Kusalābyākato abyākatassāti cattārīti abyākatasahitassa kusalassa paccayabhāvadassanavasena kusalamūlakesveva dumūlakampi āharitvā vuttaṃ. Abyākate vatthurūpampīti idaṃ ‘‘kaṭattārūpampī’’ti [Pg.226] evaṃ vattabbaṃ. ‘‘Dutiyaghaṭane abyākatavissajjane rūpesu vatthumeva labbhatī’’ti purimapāṭho, bhūtarūpampi pana labbhatīti ‘‘vatthuñca bhūtarūpañca labbhatī’’ti paṭhanti. ‘‘Catutthe cittasamuṭṭhānarūpamevā’’ti vuttaṃ, ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhānarūpaṃ paṭisandhikkhaṇe kaṭattārūpañcā’’ti pana vattabbaṃ. Savipākesu paṭhame vipākā ceva vipākacittasamuṭṭhānarūpañcāti ettha catutthe vipākacittasamuṭṭhānamevāti idha ca kaṭattārūpampi vipākacittasamuṭṭhānaggahaṇena gahitanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. ‘‘Kaṭattārūpañcā’’tipi pana paṭhanti. Ettha pana sahajātaaññamaññanissayavipākasampayuttavippayuttaatthi avigatamūlakesu ghaṭanesu hetukammajhānamaggehi ghaṭanāni na yojitāni, yathāvuttesu atthiavigatamūlavajjesu āhārena, nissayavippayuttaatthiavigatavajjesu adhipatiindriyehi ca. Kasmāti? Tesu hi yojiyamānesu taṃtaṃcittuppādekadesabhūtā hetuādayo arūpadhammāva paccayabhāvena labbhanti. Tena tehi ghaṭanāni hetumūlakādīsu vuttasadisāneva rūpamissakattābhāvena suviññeyyānīti na vuttāni. Atthiavigatehi pana yojiyamāno āhāro nissayādīhi adhipatiindriyāni ca rūpamissakāni hontīti adhipatāhārindriyamūlakesu vuttasadisānipi ghaṭanāni atthiavigatamūlakesu nissayādimūlakesu ca āhārena adhipatindriyehi ca supākaṭabhāvatthaṃ yojitānīti daṭṭhabbānīti.

457-460. 'Wholesome and indeterminate are for the indeterminate, four (types of conditions).' This is stated by showing the conditionality of the wholesome together with the indeterminate, even including the two-rooted states within the wholesome-rooted ones themselves. Regarding the indeterminate, 'the physical base is also included'—this should be stated as 'kamma-produced materiality is also included.' In the second grouping, concerning the indeterminate analysis, 'only the physical base is found among material phenomena'—this is the earlier reading. However, primary materiality (bhūtarūpa) is also found; so, some read it as 'both the physical base and primary materiality are found.' In the fourth (grouping), 'only mind-produced materiality' is mentioned, but it should be stated as 'mind-produced materiality and kamma-produced materiality at the moment of rebirth-linking.' Among those with resultant (vipāka), in the first (grouping), 'both resultant and resultant mind-produced materiality' (are included). Here, in the fourth (grouping), 'only resultant mind-produced materiality' is mentioned, but it should be understood that kamma-produced materiality is also included under the term 'resultant mind-produced materiality.' Some, however, read it as 'kamma-produced materiality is also included.' Here, in the groupings rooted in co-nascence, reciprocal condition, dependence, resultant, association, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance, the groupings are not applied with root, kamma, jhāna, and path factors. As stated, they are applied only with nutriment in the groupings rooted in presence and non-disappearance; and with dominance and faculties in the groupings rooted in dependence, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance. Why? Because if they were applied there, the roots and other immaterial factors, which are part of those specific consciousness-arisings, would be obtained as conditions. Therefore, those groupings are not mentioned in the groupings rooted in root-condition, etc., since they are easily understood without mixing with materiality. However, when nutriment is applied with presence and non-disappearance, and dominance and faculties are in the dependence, etc., groupings, they are mixed with materiality. Thus, for the purpose of making clear, the groupings are applied in the groupings rooted in dominance, nutriment, and faculties, as well as in the groupings rooted in presence and non-disappearance, and in the groupings rooted in dependence, etc., with nutriment, dominance, and faculties. This should be understood.

462-464. Nissayamūlake ‘‘chaṭṭhe tīṇīti kusalādīni cittasamuṭṭhānassā’’ti purimapāṭho, cakkhādīni pana cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ labbhantīti ‘‘abyākatassa cakkhāyatanādīni cā’’ti paṭhanti.

462-464. In the dependence-rooted (groupings), the earlier reading states, 'In the sixth, three (types of conditions are stated), namely, wholesome, etc., for mind-produced (materiality).' But the eye, etc., are obtainable for eye-consciousness, etc., so some also read, 'And the eye-sphere, etc., for the indeterminate.'

466. Upanissayamūlake pakatūpanissayavasena vuttesu dvīsu paṭhame ‘‘lokiyakusalākusalacetanā paccayabhāvato gahetabbā’’ti vuttaṃ, lokuttarāpi pana gahetabbāva.

466. In the two (groupings) mentioned in relation to the natural decisive support condition, within the decisive-support-rooted (groupings), in the first, it is said, 'mundane wholesome and unwholesome volitions are to be taken as the condition.' However, supramundane (volitions) are also to be taken.

473-477. Kammamūlake paṭisandhiyaṃ vatthupīti ettha na pavatte viya khandhāyeva paccayuppannabhāvena gahetabbāti adhippāyo. Vipākāvipākasādhāraṇavasena vuttesu catūsu paṭhame ‘‘arūpena saddhiṃ cittasamuṭṭhānarūpaṃ labbhatī’’ti vuttaṃ, kaṭattārūpampi pana labbhateva. Imasmiṃ pana kammamūlake ‘‘kammapaccayā ārammaṇe dve’’ti, ārammaṇamūlake ca ‘‘ārammaṇapaccayā kamme [Pg.227] dve’’ti kasmā na vuttaṃ, nanu kusalākusalacetanā kammārammaṇānaṃ paṭisandhiyādīnaṃ kammapaccayo ārammaṇapaccayo ca hoti. Yathā ca ārammaṇabhūtaṃ vatthuṃ ārammaṇanissayapaccayabhāvena vuccati, evaṃ kammampi ārammaṇapaccayabhāvena vattabbanti? Na, dvinnaṃ paccayabhāvānaṃ aññamaññapaṭikkhepato. Paccuppannañhi vatthu nissayabhāvaṃ apariccajitvā tenevākārena tannissitena ālambiyamānaṃ nissayabhāvena ca nissayapaccayoti yuttaṃ vattuṃ. Kammaṃ pana tasmiṃ kate pavattamānānaṃ katūpacitabhāvena kammapaccayo hoti, nārammaṇākārena, visayamattatāvasena ca ārammaṇapaccayo hoti, na santānavisesaṃ katvā phaluppādanasaṅkhātena kammapaccayākārena, tasmā kammapaccayabhāvo ārammaṇapaccayabhāvaṃ paṭikkhipati, ārammaṇapaccayabhāvo ca kammapaccayabhāvanti ‘‘kammapaccayo hutvā ārammaṇapaccayo hotī’’ti, ‘‘ārammaṇapaccayo hutvā kammapaccayo hotī’’ti ca na sakkā vattunti na vuttaṃ. Esa ca sabhāvo vattamānānañca ārammaṇapurejātānaṃ vatthucakkhādīnaṃ, yaṃ ārammaṇapaccayabhāvena saha nissayādipaccayā hontīti vattabbatā, atītassa ca kammassa ayaṃ sabhāvo, yaṃ ārammaṇapaccayabhāvena saha kammapaccayo hotīti navattabbatā. Yathā sahajātapurejātanissayānaṃ saha nissayapaccayabhāvena vattabbatā sabhāvo, sahajātārammaṇādhipatīnañca saha adhipatipaccayabhāvena navattabbatā, evamidhāpīti.

473-477. In the kamma-rooted groupings, regarding 'the base at rebirth-linking,' the intention here is that, unlike in the course of existence, only the aggregates should be understood as produced by conditions. Among the four groupings mentioned as common to both resultant and non-resultant, in the first, it is stated, 'mind-produced materiality is obtained together with the immaterial,' but kamma-produced materiality is also obtained. However, in this kamma-rooted grouping, why is it not stated, 'By the kamma condition, two in the object,' and in the object-rooted grouping, 'By the object condition, two in kamma'? Is it not that wholesome and unwholesome volition is a kamma condition and an object condition for rebirth-linking, etc., which take kamma as their object? And just as the object, being the base, is spoken of as having the nature of an object-dependence condition, should not kamma also be spoken of as having the nature of an object condition? No, because the two conditional natures mutually exclude each other. For a present base, without abandoning its dependence-nature, when it is taken as an object by that which is dependent on it, it is appropriate to speak of it as a dependence condition also by way of its dependence-nature. But kamma, when it has been performed, is a kamma condition for presently occurring states by virtue of having been done and accumulated, not by way of being an object. It is an object condition merely by way of being a content, not by way of being a kamma condition, which is designated as producing a result by creating a specific continuity. Therefore, the nature of being a kamma condition excludes the nature of being an object condition, and the nature of being an object condition excludes the nature of being a kamma condition. Thus, it cannot be said, 'Having been a kamma condition, it becomes an object condition,' or 'Having been an object condition, it becomes a kamma condition,' and so it is not stated. This is the nature of presently occurring base, eye, etc., which are object-pre-nascent: that it is to be stated that they are object conditions together with dependence conditions, etc. And this is the nature of past kamma: that it is not to be stated that it is an object condition together with the kamma condition. Just as it is the nature of co-nascent and pre-nascent dependence to be spoken of as having the nature of a dependence condition together, but it is not the nature of co-nascent and object-dominance to be spoken of as having the nature of a dominance condition together—so too in this case.

478-483. Nirādhipativiññāṇāhāravasenāti anāmaṭṭhādhipatibhāvassa viññāṇāhārassa vasenāti adhippāyo. Vatthu parihāyatīti aññamaññampi labhantassa vatthussa vasena sabbassa kaṭattārūpassa parihānaṃ dasseti.

478-483. 'By way of consciousness-nutriment without dominance' means the intention is 'by way of consciousness-nutriment whose dominance-nature is untouched.' 'The base deteriorates' indicates the decline of all kamma-produced materiality by way of the base, which obtains even the mutuality condition.

484-495. ‘‘Tatiye arūpindriyāni rūpāna’’nti vuttaṃ, cakkhādīni ca pana cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ labbhanti. Tato vīriyavasena maggasampayuttāni chāti ettha yadipi vīmaṃsā labbhati, vīriyassa pana vasena taṃsamānagatikā vīmaṃsāpi gahitāti ‘‘vīriyavasenā’’ti vuttaṃ.

484-495. It is stated, 'In the third grouping, the immaterial faculties are for material phenomena,' but the eye faculty, etc., are also obtained for eye-consciousness, etc. Then, 'six associated with the path are by way of energy.' Here, although investigation is obtained, since investigation, which proceeds in the same way, is also included by way of energy, it is stated 'by way of energy.'

511-514. Vippayuttamūlake ‘‘dasame kusalādayo cittasamuṭṭhānāna’’nti vuttaṃ, paṭisandhiyaṃ pana ‘‘khandhā kaṭattārūpānaṃ vatthu ca khandhāna’’nti idampi labbhati. ‘‘Ekādasame paṭisandhiyaṃ vatthu khandhāna’’nti vuttaṃ, taṃ vipākapaccayassa [Pg.228] aggahitattā yassa vatthussa vasena ghaṭanaṃ kataṃ, tassa dassanavasena vuttaṃ. ‘‘Khandhā ca vatthussā’’ti idampi pana labbhateva. ‘‘Dvādasame paṭisandhiyaṃ khandhā kaṭattārūpāna’’nti pubbapāṭho, cittasamuṭṭhānāni pana na vajjetabbānīti ‘‘dvādasame khandhā pavatte cittasamuṭṭhānarūpānaṃ paṭisandhiyaṃ kaṭattārūpānañcā’’ti paṭhanti.

511-514. In the dissociation-rooted grouping, in the tenth, it is stated, 'wholesome states and the like are for mind-originated materiality,' but at rebirth-linking, 'the aggregates are for kamma-produced materiality, and the base is for the aggregates'—this too is obtained. In the eleventh, it is stated, 'at rebirth-linking, the base is for the aggregates'; that is stated from the perspective of showing that base by means of which the connection is made, since the resultant condition is not taken. And 'the aggregates are for the base'—this too is certainly obtained. The earlier reading is: 'In the twelfth, at rebirth-linking, the aggregates are for kamma-produced materiality.' But since mind-originated materiality should not be excluded, they recite: 'In the twelfth, during the course of existence, the aggregates are for mind-originated materiality, and at rebirth-linking, for kamma-produced materiality.'

515-518. Atthipaccayamūlake paṭhamaghaṭane ‘‘arūpavatthārammaṇamahābhūtaindriyāhārānaṃ vasena sahajātapurejātapacchājātapaccayā labbhantī’’ti vuttaṃ, ‘‘āhārindriyapaccayā cā’’tipi pana vattabbaṃ. Na hi indriyāhārānaṃ vasena sahajātādayo labbhantīti. ‘‘Dutiye pacchājātakabaḷīkārāhārā na labbhantī’’ti vuttaṃ, sabbānipi pana alabbhamānāni dassetuṃ ‘‘pacchājātakabaḷīkārāhārarūpajīvitindriyarūpādiārammaṇāni ca na labbhantī’’ti paṭhanti, chaṭṭhaṃ sabbesaṃ indriyānaṃ vasena vuttaṃ. Sattame tato rūpajīvitindriyamattaṃ parihāyatīti evametesaṃ viseso vattabbo. Tato ekādasameti ettha tatoti navamatoti attho. Terasame vatthārammaṇāti ettha vatthuggahaṇena cakkhādivatthūnipi gahitāni, tathā cuddasame vatthumevāti etthāpi. ‘‘Sattarasame pana tadeva ārammaṇādhipatibhāvena, aṭṭhārasamepi tadeva ārammaṇūpanissayavasenā’’ti purimapāṭho, ‘‘ārammaṇūpanissayavasenā’’ti ayaṃ pana sattarasamato viseso na hoti, vatthārammaṇānaṃ pana sattarasame aṭṭhārasame ca vatthusseva paccayabhāvo visesoti ‘‘sattarasame pana ārammaṇādhipatibhāvena cakkhādīni ca, aṭṭhārasame vatthusseva ārammaṇūpanissayavasenā’’ti paṭhanti.

515-518. In the presence-condition-rooted grouping, in the first section, it is stated that 'the co-nascent, pre-nascent, and post-nascent conditions are obtained by way of the immaterial, the base, the object, the great elements, the faculties, and nutriment,' but it should also be stated, 'and the nutriment and faculty conditions.' For co-nascent and the others are not obtained by way of faculties and nutriment alone. In the second, it is stated that 'post-nascent and physical nutriment are not obtained,' but to show all unobtainable factors, they recite, 'post-nascent, physical nutriment, material life faculty, and objects such as form, etc., are not obtained.' The sixth is stated by way of all faculties. In the seventh, only the material life faculty is lacking from that; thus, their distinction should be stated. Then, in 'the eleventh,' 'from that' means 'from the ninth.' In the thirteenth, in 'base and object,' by the inclusion of 'base,' the eye-base, etc., are also included; similarly, in the fourteenth, in 'only the base,' this is also the case. The earlier reading is: 'In the seventeenth, the same applies by way of object-dominance, and in the eighteenth also the same applies by way of object-decisive support.' However, 'by way of object-decisive support' is not a distinction from the seventeenth. But in the seventeenth and eighteenth, the conditionality of the base itself in relation to the base and object is the distinction. Hence, they recite: 'But in the seventeenth, by way of object-dominance, the eye, etc., are included, and in the eighteenth, the base itself is included by way of object-decisive support.'

519. Sahajātāni viya sahajātena kenaci ekena paccayena aniyamitattā tāni pakiṇṇakānīti vuttānīti ettha purejātapacchājātāhārindriyāni sahajātena aññamaññañca asāmaññavasena vippakiṇṇāni vuttāni. Ārammaṇamūlake anantarasamanantarapurejātāti ettha upanissayopi paṭhitabbo.

519. Because, unlike co-nascent conditions, they are not determined by any single co-nascent condition, they are called 'miscellaneous.' Here, the pre-nascent, post-nascent, nutriment, and faculty conditions are said to be scattered by way of not being common with the co-nascence and mutuality conditions. In the object-rooted grouping, where 'proximity, contiguity, and pre-nascence' are mentioned, the decisive support condition should also be recited.

Yesu pākaṭā hutvā paññāyanti, tāni dassetuṃ ‘‘hetumūlakādīna’’ntiādimāha. Alobhāditaṃtaṃnāmavasena pana hetuārammaṇādhipatiāhārindriyajhānamaggapaccayadhammā evaṃ pākaṭā hutvā na paññāyeyyunti te [Pg.229] paricchedavasena dassento ‘‘dvādaseva hi hetū’’tiādimāha. Tena ‘‘ettakāyeva paccayadhammā’’ti nicchayaṃ katvā pākaṭo hutvā apaññāyamānopi tesveva maggitabboti dasseti. Tattha cha ārammaṇāti etena ārammaṇādhipati rūpādiārammaṇabhāvato saṅgahitoti taṃ aggahetvā ‘‘cattāro adhipatayo’’ti vuttaṃ. Ekantena kusalavipākāti idaṃ indriyesu aññindriyavasena labbhati. Ekantena akusalavipākāti idaṃ pana na sakkā laddhuṃ. Jhānaṅgesvapi hi dukkhaṃ akusalameva vipākassa ajhānaṅgattā. Cittaṭṭhitipi akusalavipākakiriyā hotīti. Akusalassa vipākā akusalavipākāti evaṃ pana atthe gayhamāne indriyesu dukkhindriyavasena labbheyya, kusalavipākākusalavipākavisesena pana paccayayojanā natthīti ayamattho adhippetoti sakkā vattunti.

To show those in which they become evident and are discerned, he says, 'beginning with the root-rooted grouping,' etc. However, by way of their respective names, such as non-greed, the conditioning phenomena of root, object, dominance, nutriment, faculty, jhāna, and path would not become evident and be discerned in this way. Therefore, showing them by way of delimitation, he says, 'there are indeed six roots,' etc. Thus, having determined that 'these alone are the conditioning phenomena,' he shows that even if something is not evident and not discerned, it should still be sought among these. Here, in 'six objects,' by this, object-dominance is included because of its nature as objects such as form. Therefore, not including that, it is said, 'there are four dominances.' 'Wholly wholesome-resultant'—this is obtained among the faculties by way of the faculty of final knowledge. 'Wholly unwholesome-resultant'—this, however, cannot be obtained. For even among the jhāna factors, pain is only unwholesome, because a resultant is not a jhāna factor. And stability of mind is unwholesome-resultant or functional. But if the meaning 'unwholesome-resultants are the results of the unwholesome' is taken, it could be obtained among the faculties by way of the pain faculty. However, there is no application of conditions with a distinction between wholesome-resultant and unwholesome-resultant; this is the intended meaning, and thus it can be said.

Pañhāvārassa ghaṭane anulomagaṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The sequential enumeration in the section of the Chapter of Questions is completed.

Paccanīyuddhāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Enumeration of Counter-conditions

527. Ekena lakkhaṇenāti ‘‘kusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassa nahetupaccayena paccayo’’ti hetupaccayato aññena paccayena paccayoti attho. Hetupaccayato ca aññe paccayā aggahitaggahaṇena aṭṭha honti, tesu kusalo kusalassa tīhi paccayehi paccayo, akusalassa dvīhi, evaṃ tasmiṃ tasmiṃ paccaye paccanīyato ṭhite tato aññe paccayā imesveva ārammaṇādīsu aṭṭhasu paccayesu yathāyogaṃ yojetabbāti idamettha lakkhaṇaṃ veditabbaṃ. Etesu ca aṭṭhasu paccayesu purimapurimehi asaṅgahite saṅgahetvā pacchimapacchimā vuttāti ārammaṇato aññesaṃ dvinnaṃ vasena upanissayo, vatthupurejātassa vasena purejātaṃ, sahajātato upanissayato ca, aññissā cetanāya vasena kammaṃ, sahajātato aññassa kabaḷīkārāhārassa vasena āhāro, sahajātato purejātato ca aññassa rūpajīvitindriyassa vasena indriyaṃ vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Evañca katvā ‘‘kusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo, sahajātaupanissayapaccayena [Pg.230] paccayo’’ticceva (paṭṭhā. 1.1.404, 419, 423) vuttaṃ, tadaññābhāvā na vuttaṃ ‘‘kammāhārindriyapaccayena paccayo’’ti, tasmā ‘‘ārammaṇādhipati ārammaṇapaccaye saṅgahaṃ gacchatī’’ti evaṃ vattabbaṃ. Yaṃ pana parittattike pañhāvārapaccanīye ‘‘appamāṇo dhammo appamāṇassa dhammassa sahajātaupanissayapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.12.66, 74) ettha ārammaṇassa avacanaṃ, taṃ purimehi asaṅgahitavasena vuttānaṃ saṅgahitavivajjanābhāvato upanissayato aññārammaṇābhāvato ca, na pana ārammaṇūpanissayassa ārammaṇe asaṅgahitattā.

527. 'By one characteristic' means: 'A wholesome phenomenon is a condition for a wholesome phenomenon by a condition other than the root condition.' And other conditions apart from the root condition are eight by way of grasping what has not been grasped. Among these, the wholesome is a condition for the wholesome by three conditions, and for the unwholesome by two. Thus, when a condition is established as the counter-condition in each case, the other conditions from that should be applied accordingly among these eight conditions, such as object condition, etc. This is the characteristic to be understood here. And among these eight conditions, the later ones are stated by including what was not included by the earlier ones. Thus, decisive support is stated by way of the other two from the object condition; pre-nascent is stated by way of the pre-nascent base; kamma is stated by way of another volition from the co-nascent and decisive support conditions; nutriment is stated by way of another nutritive material food from the co-nascent condition; and faculty is stated by way of another material life faculty from the co-nascent and pre-nascent conditions. This should be seen. And having done so, it is stated: 'A wholesome phenomenon is a condition for a wholesome phenomenon by way of object condition, and by way of co-nascent decisive support condition' (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.404, 419, 423). Because there is no other such case, it is not stated: 'by way of kamma, nutriment, or faculty condition.' Therefore, it should be stated: 'Object-dominance is included in the object condition.' However, regarding the non-mention of object in the section on the finite triad in the counter-condition chapter of questions, where it is stated: 'An immeasurable phenomenon is a condition for an immeasurable phenomenon by way of co-nascent decisive support condition' (Paṭṭhāna 2.12.66, 74)—that is because there is no exclusion of what was included among those stated as not included by the earlier ones, and because there is no other object apart from decisive support. But it is not because object-decisive support is not included in the object condition.

Atthiavigatapaccayā yadipi sahajātapurejātapacchājātāhārindriyānaṃ vasena pañcavidhāva, sahajātapurejātānaṃ pana pacchājātāhārānaṃ pacchājātindriyānañca sahāpi atthiavigatapaccayabhāvo hoti, na tiṇṇaṃ vippayuttatā viya visuṃyevāti ‘‘atthiavigatesu ca ekekassa vasena chahi bhedehi ṭhitā’’ti atthiavigatapaccayalakkhaṇesu ekekaṃ saṅgahetvā vuttaṃ.

Although the presence and non-disappearance conditions are fivefold by way of co-nascent, pre-nascent, post-nascent, nutriment, and faculty conditions, however, the presence and non-disappearance condition also occurs together with co-nascent and pre-nascent phenomena, and with post-nascent nutriment and post-nascent faculties; it is not entirely separate like the three types of dissociation. Thus, by including each one among the characteristics of the presence and non-disappearance conditions, it is stated: 'And in the presence and non-disappearance conditions, each stands in six divisions.'

‘‘Rūpindriyapaccayo pana ajjhattabahiddhābhedato duvidho’’ti vuttaṃ, taṃ ‘‘ajjhattikabāhirabhedato’’ti evaṃ vattabbaṃ.

It was said that "the material faculty condition is twofold by way of the division into internal and external," but it should be said as "by way of the division into internal and external."

Catuvīsatiyāpīti na soḷasannaṃyeva, nāpi aṭṭhannaṃyeva, atha kho catuvīsatiyāpīti attho. Ārammaṇabhūtānaṃ adhipatiupanissayapaccayānaṃ upanissaye nissayapurejātavippayuttaatthiavigatānañca purejāte saṅgaho atthīti ārammaṇapaccayaṃ ārammaṇapaccayabhāveyeva ṭhapetvā tadekadesassa tesañca upanissayādīsu saṅgahaṃ vattukāmo ‘‘ārammaṇapaccaye ārammaṇapaccayova saṅgahaṃ gacchati, na sesā tevīsatī’’ti āha. Catutthe purejātapaccayeti ettha yathā ‘‘upanissayapaccaye adhipatibhūto ārammaṇapaccayo’’ti vuttaṃ, evaṃ ‘‘purejātabhūto ārammaṇapaccayo’’tipi vattabbaṃ, taṃ pana tattha vuttanayena gahetuṃ sakkāti katvā na vuttaṃ siyā. Atha pana ‘‘ārammaṇato aññaṃ purejātaggahaṇena gahita’’nti na vuttaṃ, evaṃ sati upanissayaggahaṇenapi ārammaṇato aññassa gahitatāya bhavitabbanti ‘‘adhipatibhūto ārammaṇapaccayo upanissaye saṅgahaṃ gacchatī’’ti na vattabbaṃ siyāti.

'By all twenty-four' means not merely sixteen, nor merely eight, but indeed by all twenty-four. Wishing to state that there is inclusion of object-dominant and decisive support conditions, which are objects, in decisive support, and of support, pre-nascent, dissociated, presence, and non-disappearance conditions in pre-nascent, he states, keeping the object condition as the object condition itself, and wishing to speak of the inclusion of a part of it and of those other conditions in decisive support, etc.: 'In the object condition, only the object condition itself is included, not the remaining twenty-three.' In the fourth, regarding the pre-nascent condition, just as it is stated: 'In the decisive support condition, the object condition functions as a dominant,' so too it should be stated: 'The object condition functions as pre-nascent.' However, it might not have been stated because it can be understood by the method stated there. But if it were not stated that 'something other than the object is included by the inclusion of pre-nascent,' then in that case, by the inclusion of decisive support, something other than the object would also have to be included. Thus, it should not be stated: 'The object condition, functioning as a dominant, is included in the decisive support condition.'

Yesu [Pg.231] pañhesu…pe… ekova paccayo āgatoti ettha āgatovāti evaṃ evasaddo ānetvā yojetabbo. Tena dvādasamacuddasamesu pañhesu sahajātapurejātesu ekeko paccayo na anāgato hoti, atha kho āgatovāti tesu aññatarapaṭikkhepe tepi pañhā parihāyantīti dassitaṃ hotīti. Yasmiṃ pana pañheti dutiyachaṭṭhapañhesu ekekavasena gahetvā ekavacanena niddisīyati. Evanti ārammaṇaupanissayavasenāti attho. Tena dvādasamacuddasame nivatteti. Tesupi hi dve paccayā āgatā, na pana ārammaṇaupanissayavasenāti. Avasesānaṃ vasenāti avasesānaṃ labbhamānānaṃ vasenāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Na hi terasamapannarasamesu pacchājātepi paṭikkhitte āhārindriyānaṃ vasena te pañhā labbhanti, atha kho sahajātasseva vasenāti. Idameva cettha lakkhaṇanti aṭṭhannaṃ paccayānaṃ sabbapaccayasaṅgāhakattaṃ, ukkaṭṭhavasena pañhāparicchedo, te te paccaye saṅgahetvā dassitapaccayaparicchedo, tasmiṃ tasmiṃ paccaye paṭikkhitte tassa tassa pañhassa parihānāparihānīti etaṃ sabbaṃ sandhāya vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Teneva ‘‘iminā lakkhaṇenā’’ti vuttaṃ.

In the questions... up to... 'one condition has come' (ekova paccayo āgato). Here, the word 'eva' should be brought and connected with 'āgato'. Thus, in the twelfth and fourteenth questions, regarding the co-nascent and pre-nascent conditions, each condition is not 'not come', but indeed 'come'. Therefore, it is shown that by rejecting any one of them, those questions too are diminished. But in 'which question', in the second and sixth questions, it is indicated in the singular, taking each individually. 'Thus' means by way of object and decisive support. Therefore, it excludes the twelfth and fourteenth questions, for even in those two conditions have come, but not by way of object and decisive support. 'By way of the remaining' should be understood as by way of what is obtainable among the remaining. For in the thirteenth and fifteenth questions, even when the post-nascent condition is rejected, those questions are not obtainable by way of nutriment and faculties, but only by way of the co-nascent. Here, this alone is the characteristic: the inclusion of all conditions within the eight conditions, the determination of questions by way of prominence, the determination of conditions shown by gathering those very conditions, and the diminishing or not diminishing of that particular question when a particular condition is rejected. All this should be understood as referring to that. Hence, it is said, 'By this characteristic...'

Tatrāti pabhedaparihānīsu. Tīhi paccayehi ekūnavīsati paccayā dassitāti ‘‘nahetupaccayā’’ti ettha labbhamānapaccaye sandhāya vuttaṃ. Ayaṃ pana paccayuddhāro sabbapaccanīyassa sādhāraṇalakkhaṇavasena vutto, na ‘‘nahetupaccayā’’ti ettheva labbhamānapaccayadassanavasena. Evañca katvā hetudukapañhāvārapaccanīye ‘‘hetudhammo hetussa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo, sahajātapaccayena paccayo, upanissayapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 3.1.43) vuttaṃ, aññathā ‘‘nahetupaccayā’’ti ettha labbhamānapaccayadassane ‘‘sahajātapaccayena paccayo’’ti na vattabbaṃ siyā, tasmā idhāpi sabbalabbhamānapaccayasaṅgahavasena paccayuddhārassa vuttattā tīhi paccayehi vīsati paccayā dassitāti daṭṭhabbā. Yaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘tatrāyaṃ vitthārakathā’’ti, tatra pabhede vitthārakathaṃ vatvā parihānīyaṃ dassento ‘‘tasmiṃ pana paccaye…pe… te parato vakkhāmā’’ti āha.

Therein, in the divisions and omissions. When it is said that nineteen conditions are shown by three conditions, this is stated referring to the conditions obtainable in 'by non-root condition'. However, this enumeration of conditions is stated based on the common characteristic of all counter-conditions, not merely to show the obtainable conditions under 'non-root condition'. Thus, in the section on the root-pair in the question chapter on counter-conditions, it is said: 'A root phenomenon is a condition for a root phenomenon by way of object condition, by way of co-nascence condition, and by way of decisive support condition' (Paṭṭhāna 3.1.43). Otherwise, if only the obtainable conditions under 'non-root condition' were shown, the phrase 'by co-nascence condition' should not be stated. Therefore, here too, since the enumeration of conditions is stated inclusively of all obtainable conditions, it should be understood that twenty conditions are shown by three conditions. As for what was said, 'Herein, this is the detailed explanation,' after giving a detailed explanation of the divisions, pointing out the omissions, he then says, 'But in that condition... we will speak of them later.'

528. Tathā akusalādikesupi catūsu pañhesu tehi tehi paccayehi te teyeva paccayā dassitāti kusalādikesu dassitehi [Pg.232] aññesaṃ abhāvaṃ sandhāya vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Na hi ‘‘akusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassā’’ti ettha dvīhi paccayehi tayo paccayā dassitā, atha kho dveyeva, abyākatassapi akusalo ārammaṇādhipatipaccayo na hotīti.

528. Similarly, in the case of the unwholesome and other categories in the four questions, it should be understood that the same conditions are shown by those very conditions by referring to the absence of others, as shown in the wholesome and other categories. For it is not that in the statement, 'An unwholesome phenomenon is a condition for a wholesome phenomenon,' three conditions are shown by two conditions, but rather only two. Also, an unwholesome phenomenon is not a condition for an indeterminate phenomenon by way of object or dominance.

530. Sahajātapaccayā pana na honti vatthumissakattāti asahajātapaccayena vatthunā sahajātapaccayabhāvena gahitattā tena saddhiṃ sahajātapaccayā na hontīti dasseti, na pana suddhānaṃ sahajātapaccayabhāvaṃ nivāreti. Vatthunā pana saddhiṃ yena nissayādinā paccayā honti, tameva nissayādiṃ visesetuṃ sahajātanti vuttanti dassento ‘‘tasmā tesa’’ntiādimāha.

530. However, they are not co-nascence conditions because of being mixed with the physical base. This shows that because the physical base, which is a non-co-nascence condition, is included as having the nature of a co-nascence condition, they are not co-nascence conditions together with it. Yet, it does not prevent the state of being a co-nascence condition for the pure ones. Showing that the term 'co-nascent' is used to specify only that dependence and other conditions by which they are conditions together with the physical base, he says, 'Therefore, for those...' and so on.

Imasmiṃ pana paccayuddhāre ārammaṇaupanissayakammaatthipaccayesu catūsu sabbapaccaye saṅgaṇhitvā kasmā tesaṃ vasena paccayuddhāro na katoti? Missakāmissakassa atthipaccayavibhāgassa duviññeyyattā. Na hi ‘‘avibhāgena atthipaccayena paccayo’’ti vutte sakkā viññātuṃ ‘‘kiṃ suddhena sahajātaatthipaccayena purejātapacchājātāhārindriyaatthipaccayena vā, atha sahajātapurejātamissakena pacchājātāhāramissakena pacchājātindriyamissakena vā’’ti. Atthipaccayavisesesu pana sahajātādīsu sarūpato vuccamānesu yattha suddhānaṃ sahajātādīnaṃ paccayabhāvo, tattha ‘‘sahajātapaccayena paccayo’’tiādinā suddhānaṃ, yattha ca missakānaṃ paccayabhāvo, tattha ‘‘sahajātaṃ purejāta’’ntiādinā missakānaṃ gahaṇato suviññeyyatā hoti, tasmā atthipaccayavisesadassanatthaṃ sahajātādayo gahitā, tena ca sabbapaccayānaṃ catūsu paccayesu saṅgaho dassito hoti.

In this enumeration of conditions, why is the enumeration of conditions not done based on the four conditions—object, decisive support, kamma, and presence—even though all conditions are included within them? It is because the division of the presence condition into mixed and unmixed aspects is difficult to understand. For when it is said, 'The condition is the presence condition without distinction,' it cannot be understood whether it refers to the pure co-nascence presence condition, or the pre-nascence, post-nascence, nutriment, or faculty presence condition; or whether it refers to the mixed co-nascence and pre-nascence, the mixed post-nascence and nutriment, or the mixed post-nascence and faculty condition. However, when the specific presence conditions—such as co-nascence, etc.—are mentioned according to their own nature, it becomes easy to understand. Where the condition is purely co-nascence, etc., it is stated as 'the condition is the co-nascence condition,' etc., referring to the pure ones, and where the condition is mixed, it is stated as 'co-nascence and pre-nascence,' etc., referring to the mixed ones. Therefore, to show the distinctions of the presence condition, co-nascence and other conditions are taken. And through this, the inclusion of all conditions within these four conditions is shown.

Kasmā pana sahajātapurejāte aggahetvā nissayo, purejātapacchājāte aggahetvā vippayutto vā atthipaccayavisesabhāvena na vuttoti? Avattabbattā, nissayo tāva na vattabbo sahajātapurejātānaṃ suddhānaṃ missakānañca nissayapaccayabhāvato vibhajitabbatāya atthipaccayena avisiṭṭhattā, vippayuttapaccayo ca sahajātapurejātapacchājātabhāvato atthipaccayo viya visesitabboti so viya na vattabbo. Sahajātapurejātānañca missakānaṃ atthipaccayabhāvo hoti, na [Pg.233] vippayuttabhāvo. Tathā sahajātapacchājātānañca missakānaṃ atthipaccayabhāvo hoti. Vakkhati hi ‘‘anupādinnaanupādāniyo dhammo upādinnupādāniyassa ca anupādinnaanupādāniyassa ca dhammassa atthipaccayena paccayo sahajātaṃ pacchājāta’’nti (paṭṭhā. 1.4.84), na pana vippayuttapaccayabhāvo, tasmā vippayuttaggahaṇena missakānaṃ atthipaccayabhāvassa aggahaṇato na so atthipaccayaviseso bhavituṃ yuttoti bhiyyopi na vattabbo.

But why, then, are support, without taking co-nascence and pre-nascence, or dissociation, without taking pre-nascence and post-nascence, not mentioned as a distinctive mode of the presence condition? Because they cannot be stated. First, support should not be stated, because for pure and mixed co-nascence and pre-nascence, its nature as a support condition needs to be distinguished, and because it is not distinct from the presence condition. Similarly, the dissociation condition, being co-nascent, pre-nascent, and post-nascent, should be distinguished like the presence condition, and therefore should not be stated like it. For mixed co-nascence and pre-nascence, there is the nature of the presence condition, not of the dissociation condition. Likewise, for mixed co-nascence and post-nascence, there is the nature of the presence condition. For it will be said: 'The unappropriated-unappropriable phenomenon is a condition for the appropriated-appropriable and the unappropriated-unappropriable phenomena by way of the presence condition: co-nascence and post-nascence' (Paṭṭhā. 1.4.84), but not by way of the dissociation condition. Therefore, because taking dissociation would not include the presence condition for mixed phenomena, that distinctive mode of the presence condition could not reasonably be stated. Hence, it should not be stated further.

Nanu ca sahajātapaccayo ca hetuādīhi visesitabboti sopi nissayavippayuttā viya atthipaccayavisesabhāvena na vattabboti? Na, viruddhapaccayehi avisesitabbattā. Nissayavippayuttā hi atthipaccayo viya uppattikālaviruddhehi paccayehi visesitabbā, na pana sahajāto. Hetuādayo hi sahajātā eva, na uppattikālaviruddhāti.

But should not the co-nascent condition also be specified by root and so forth, and thus, like support and dissociation, should it not be stated as a distinctive mode of the presence condition? No, because it is not to be specified by opposing conditions. For support and dissociation, like the presence condition, should be specified by conditions that are opposed in time of arising, but not the co-nascent condition. For the roots, etc., are only co-nascent, not opposed in time of arising.

Paccanīyuddhāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Enumeration of the Negative is concluded.

Paccanīyagaṇanavaṇṇanā

Exposition on the Counting of the Negative

Nahetumūlakavaṇṇanā

Exposition on Not-Root

532. Suddho ārammaṇapaccayo parihāyatīti ettha suddhaggahaṇena na kiñci payojanaṃ. Ārammaṇe hi paccanīyato ṭhite adhipatipaccayādibhūto ārammaṇapaccayo parihāyatiyevāti. Suddhoti vā aṭṭhasu paccayesu kevalaṃ ārammaṇapaccayo parihāyati, na sesāti dasseti. Ekādasannanti sahajāte saṅgahaṃ gacchantesu pannarasasu aññamaññavipākasampayuttavippayutte vajjetvā ekādasannaṃ vasena. Teti te sahajāte antogadhāyeva tasmiṃ paṭikkhitte aññenākārena vissajjanaṃ na labhantīti dasseti, anantogadhā pana ārammaṇādhipatipurejātanissayādayo ārammaṇādiākārena labhantīti.

532. Here, in the phrase 'the pure object condition is excluded,' the term 'pure' serves no purpose. For when the object condition is taken as negative, the object condition that is also dominance condition and so forth is indeed excluded. Or, the word 'pure' indicates that among the eight conditions, only the object condition is excluded, not the rest. 'Of the eleven' means by way of the eleven remaining from the fifteen included under co-nascence, after excluding mutual, resultant, associated, and dissociated. 'These' shows that those which are included within co-nascence, when it is rejected, cannot be explained in any other way. But those not included, such as object, dominance, pre-nascence, and support, are obtained in the manner of object and so on.

Kiñcāpi sahajātapaccayoyeva natthīti tasmiṃ paṭikkhitte ime vārā na labbheyyuṃ, atha kho nissayaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena ete labhitabbā siyunti adhippāyo. Yasmā panātiādinā yadipi sahajātapaccayo natthi[Pg.234], yasmā pana sahajātapaccayadhamme ṭhitā ete na nissayādayo na honti, yasmā ca sahajāte paṭikkhitte ye paṭikkhittā honti, te idha sahajātapaṭikkhepena paṭikkhittā, tasmā tepi vārā na labbhantīti dasseti.

Although, if the co-nascence condition were rejected, these instances would not be obtainable, the intention is that they might still be obtainable by way of the dependence, presence, and non-disappearance conditions. However, by the phrase 'And since...' and so on, it is shown that even if there is no co-nascence condition, since these conditions, while being phenomena of the co-nascence condition, are also dependence and so forth, and since those that are rejected when co-nascence is rejected are here rejected by the rejection of co-nascence, therefore those instances too are not obtainable.

Ṭhapetvā sahajātapaccayanti etena nissayādibhūtañca sahajātapaccayaṃ ṭhapetvāti vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Kusalato pavattamānesu kusalābyākatesu kusalassa kusalo aññamaññapaccayo hotīti imamatthaṃ sandhāyāha ‘‘aññamaññapaccayadhammavasena pavattisabbhāvato’’ti. Ye dhammā aññamaññapaccayasaṅgahaṃ gatāti tesaṃ tesaṃ paccayuppannānaṃ paccayabhāvena vuccamānā ye dhammā attano paccayuppannabhāvena vuccamānānaṃ aññamaññapaccayoti saṅgahaṃ gatāti attho. Kusalo ca kusalassa aññamaññapaccayoti katvā kusalābyākatānaṃ aññamaññapaccayasaṅgahaṃ gateheva dhammehi paccayo hoti, samudāyabhūto ekadesabhūtehīti ayamettha adhippāyo. Kusalo pana kusalassa aññamaññapaccayabhūteheva kusalābyākatānaṃ sahajātādīhi, na aññathāti aññamaññe paṭikkhitte so vāro parihāyatīti vattabbaṃ.

By 'except for the co-nascence condition,' it should be understood that this excludes the co-nascence condition which is also dependence, etc. When wholesome and indeterminate states arise from the wholesome, the wholesome is a mutual condition for the wholesome – this meaning is implied by the phrase 'because of the existence of occurrence by way of phenomena of the mutual condition.' The meaning is that those phenomena which are included in the category of mutual condition are spoken of as conditions for their respective conditioned phenomena, and those phenomena which are spoken of as their own conditioned phenomena are included in the category of mutual condition. Having established that the wholesome is a mutual condition for the wholesome, the wholesome is also a condition for the wholesome and indeterminate states through phenomena included in the mutual condition category, either as a totality or as a part – this is the intention here. However, the wholesome is a condition for the wholesome itself and for the wholesome and indeterminate states only through co-nascence and so on, as mutual conditions, and not otherwise. It should be stated that when mutual condition is excluded, that case is lost.

Catunnaṃ khandhānaṃ ekadesovāti sahajāte sandhāya vuttaṃ. Asahajātā hi āhārindriyā rūpakkhandhekadesova honti. Teti te vippayuttapaccayadhammā.

'A part of the four aggregates' is said with reference to the co-nascent. For nutriment and faculties that are not co-nascent are only a part of the form aggregate. These are phenomena of the dissociated condition.

533. ‘‘Dumūlakādivasena paccayagaṇanaṃ dassetu’’nti likhitaṃ, ‘‘paccanīyagaṇanaṃ dassetu’’nti pana vattabbaṃ. Paccanīyavāragaṇanā hi dassitāti.

533. It is written, 'to show the counting of conditions by way of the two-rooted, etc.,' but it should be said, 'to show the counting of the negative.' For the counting of the negative instances is shown.

‘‘Vipākaṃ panettha naupanissayapaccayena saddhiṃ ghaṭitattā na labbhatī’’ti vuttaṃ, vipākassapi pana kammaṃ upanissayo ahutvāpi kammapaccayo hotīti vipākattike dassitametanti.

It is said, 'Here, the resultant is not obtained because it is not connected with the not-decisive-support condition.' But it is shown in the Resultant Triad that even without being a decisive support for the resultant, kamma is a kamma condition for it.

Nahetumūlakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on Not-Root is concluded.

534. Satta pañca tīṇi dve ekanti paricchinnagaṇanānīti sattādiparicchedehi paricchinnagaṇanāni vissajjanāni hetumūlake dassitānīti āha.

534. 'Seven, five, three, two, and one' are definite enumerations; he says that these definite enumerations, which are the explanations, are shown in the Root Section by means of the divisions beginning with seven.

538. Nanissayapaccayā [Pg.235] naupanissayapaccayā napacchājāte tīṇīti mūlakaṃ saṅkhipitvā dasamūlake ‘‘napacchājāte tīṇī’’ti vuttaṃ gaṇanaṃ uddharati. ‘‘Tesu kaṭattārūpañca āhārasamuṭṭhānañca paccayuppanna’’nti vuttaṃ, dvīsu pana vipāko tatiye tesamuṭṭhānikakāyo ca paccayuppanno hotiyeva.

538. 'Not by dependence condition, not by decisive support condition, not by post-nascence condition—these three are the root.' Having summarized the root, he extracts the enumeration stated as 'Not by post-nascence condition—three' in the ten-rooted section. It is stated, 'Among these, form born of kamma and form originated from nutriment are conditionally arisen.' However, in two cases, the resultant, and in the third, the body arisen from them, are indeed conditionally arisen.

545. Abyākato ca sahajātaabyākatassāti ‘‘arūpābyākato arūpābyākatassa, rūpābyākato ca rūpābyākatassā’’ti etaṃ dvayaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Rūpābyākato pana arūpābyākatassa, arūpābyākato ca rūpābyākatassa sahajātapaccayo honto vippayuttapaccayo hotiyeva. ‘‘Abyākato sahajātāhārindriyavasena abyākatassāti evaṃ pañcā’’ti pana vattabbaṃ.

545. And the indeterminate for the co-nascent indeterminate: this is stated referring to the pair, 'the formless indeterminate for the formless indeterminate, and the material indeterminate for the material indeterminate.' However, the material indeterminate, being a co-nascence condition for the formless indeterminate, and the formless indeterminate, being a co-nascence condition for the material indeterminate, are indeed also dissociation conditions. But it should be stated: 'The indeterminate for the indeterminate by way of co-nascence, nutriment, and faculty—thus five.'

546. Noatthipaccayā nahetuyā navāti ettha ‘‘ekamūlakekāvasānā anantarapakatūpanissayavasena labbhantī’’ti vuttaṃ, atthipaccaye pana paṭikkhitte aṭṭhasu paccayesu sahajātapurejātapacchājātāhārindriyāni paṭikkhittāni, ārammaṇaupanissayakammāni ṭhitānīti tesaṃ tiṇṇaṃ ṭhitānaṃ vasena labbhantīti vattabbaṃ. Sabbattha hi aṭṭhasu paccayesu ye ye paṭikkhittā, te te apanetvā ye ye ṭhitā, tesaṃ vasena te te vārā labbhantīti idamettha lakkhaṇanti. Yāva nissayampīti na kevalaṃ nārammaṇeyeva ṭhatvā, atha kho yāva nissayaṃ, tāva ṭhatvāpi naupanissaye dve kātabbāti attho. Naupanissayato hi purimesu ca navapi labbhanti, naupanissaye pana pavatte atthiārammaṇaupanissayapaṭikkhepena satta paccayā paṭikkhittāti avasiṭṭhassa kammassa vasena dveyevāti.

546. Here, regarding 'Not by presence condition, not by root, nine,' it is said, 'They are obtained by way of single-rooted, single-ending, proximity, and natural decisive support.' But when the presence condition is rejected, among the eight conditions, co-nascence, pre-nascence, post-nascence, nutriment, and faculty are rejected. Object, decisive support, and kamma remain. Thus, it should be stated that they are obtained by way of these three remaining conditions. Indeed, everywhere among the eight conditions, whichever are rejected, having removed them, whichever remain, by way of those, those sections are obtained—this is the characteristic here. 'Even up to the dependence condition' means that not only by remaining in the non-object condition, but also by remaining up to the dependence condition, two should be made in the non-decisive support condition. For from the non-decisive support condition, the previous nine are also obtained. But when the non-decisive support condition is operative, seven conditions are rejected by the rejection of presence, object, and decisive support, leaving only two by way of the remaining kamma.

Paccanīyagaṇanavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Enumeration of the Negative is concluded.

Anulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanā

Exposition on the Positive-Negative.

550. Sadisavārāti anurūpavārāti attho. Naaññamaññe laddhesu hi ekādasasu ‘‘kusalo kusalassa akusalo akusalassā’’ti ime hetuyā laddhesu sattasu imeheva dvīhi samānā honti, atthābhāvato [Pg.236] pana na anurūpāti. Atha vā vacanato atthato ca uddesato yathāyogaṃ niddesato cāti sabbathā samānataṃ sandhāya ‘‘sadisavārā’’ti āha.

550. 'Similar sections' means 'corresponding sections.' For among the eleven cases obtained in the non-mutuality condition, these two—'the wholesome for the wholesome, the unwholesome for the unwholesome'—are the same as two among the seven obtained by root condition; but due to an absence of substance, they are not corresponding. Alternatively, referring to complete similarity in every way—in terms of statement, meaning, enumeration, and explanation as is suitable—he said 'similar sections.'

551. Paṭisandhināmarūpaṃ sandhāyāti paṭisandhiyaṃ hetunāmapaccayaṃ vatthurūpañca paccayuppannaṃ sandhāya. Tīṇi kusalādīni cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassāti ettha ‘‘abyākato kaṭattārūpassa cā’’ti idampi vattabbaṃ.

551. Referring to mentality-materiality at rebirth-linking: this refers to the mentality which is a root condition at rebirth-linking, and the material base which is conditionally arisen. Regarding 'the three—wholesome, etc.—for mind-originated matter,' here, this should also be stated: 'and the indeterminate for form born of kamma.'

556. Adhipatimūlake nahetuyā dasāti dvinnampi adhipatīnaṃ vasena vuttaṃ, nārammaṇe sattāti sahajātādhipatissa, nasahajāte sattāti ārammaṇādhipatissāti evaṃ sabbattha tasmiṃ tasmiṃ paccaye paṭikkhitte ghaṭanesu ca tasmiṃ tasmiṃ paccaye ghaṭite mūlabhāvena ṭhite paccaye ye dhammā parihāyanti, ye ca tiṭṭhanti, te sādhukaṃ sallakkhetvā ye dhammā ṭhitā yesaṃ paccayā honti, tesaṃ vasena gaṇanā uddharitabbā. Anulome vuttaghaṭite hi mūlabhāvena ṭhapetvā ghaṭitāvasesā paccayā paccanīyato yojitāti tattha laddhāyeva paccanīyato ṭhitapaccayānaṃ vasena samānā ūnā ca sakkā viññātunti.

556. In the dominance-rooted section, 'not by root condition, ten' is stated by way of both types of dominance. 'In non-object, seven' is due to co-nascent dominance; 'in non-co-nascence, seven' is due to object dominance. Thus, everywhere, when a particular condition is rejected, and in the connections where a particular condition is connected and stands as the root, having carefully noted which phenomena decline and which remain, the enumeration should be extracted by way of those phenomena that remain and are conditions for other phenomena. For in the positive order, when the stated connection is established as the root, the remaining connected conditions are applied from the negative order. Therefore, having been obtained there, it is possible to know both the equal and the deficient by way of the conditions that remain from the negative order.

Anulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Positive-Negative is concluded.

Paccanīyānulomavaṇṇanā

Exposition on the Negative-Positive.

631. Ūnataragaṇanena saddhiṃ atirekagaṇanassapi gaṇanaṃ parihāpetvāti ettha anulomato yojiyamānena paccayena saddhiṃ paccanīyato ṭhitassa atirekagaṇanassapi gaṇanaṃ parihāpetvāti adhippāyo. Parihāpanagaṇanāya ūnataragaṇanena saddhiṃ samānattañca na ekantikaṃ. Nahetunārammaṇadukassa hi gaṇanā adhipatipaccayena yojiyamānena ūnataragaṇanena saddhiṃ parihīnāpi adhipatipaccaye laddhagaṇanāya na samānā, atha kho tatopi ūnatarā hotīti āha ‘‘na panetaṃ sabbasaṃsandanesu gacchatī’’ti.

631. 'By omitting the enumeration of the excessive along with the enumeration of the lesser'—here, the meaning is that along with the condition being applied from the positive order, the enumeration of the excessive, which stands from the negative order, should also be omitted. The equality of the enumeration by omission with the enumeration of the lesser is not absolute. For the enumeration of the dyad of non-root and non-object, though diminished along with the lesser enumeration when connected with the dominance condition, is not equal to the enumeration obtained in the dominance condition, but is even lesser than that. Hence, it is said, 'But this does not hold for all combinations.'

Nissaye paccanīyato ṭhite sahajāte ca anulomato atiṭṭhamānānaṃ hetuādīnaṃ sahajātassa ca aṭṭhānaṃ pākaṭanti apākaṭameva [Pg.237] dassento ‘‘vatthupurejāto anulomato na tiṭṭhatī’’ti āha. Āhāre vātiādinā idaṃ dasseti – sahajāte paccanīyato ṭhite anulomato atiṭṭhamānā jhānamaggasampayuttā āhāre vā indriye vā paccanīyato ṭhite tiṭṭhantīti hetuādayopi tiṭṭhanti. Sabbajhānamaggehi pana catukkhandhekadesabhūtānaṃ sampayuttena ca catukkhandhabhūtānaṃ sabbesaṃ tesaṃ anulomato ṭhānaṃ dassetīti daṭṭhabbaṃ, itaresu vattabbameva natthi. Adhipatiupanissayāti ārammaṇamissānampi anulomato ṭhānaṃ dasseti.

When the dependence condition stands from the negative order, and the co-nascence condition does not stand from the positive order, showing the non-standing—both manifest and unmanifest—of roots, etc., and of co-nascence, he said, 'The pre-nascent base does not stand from the positive order.' By 'in nutriment, or...' etc., he shows this: when the co-nascence condition stands from the negative order, the states associated with jhāna and path, which do not stand from the positive order, do stand when nutriment or faculty stands from the negative order; thus roots, etc., also stand. However, it should be understood that with all jhānas and paths, he shows the standing from the positive order of all those states which are part of the four aggregates and those associated with the four aggregates. Regarding the others, there is nothing to be said. 'Dominance and decisive support' also shows the standing from the positive order of those mixed with object.

‘‘Indriye ekanti rūpajīvitindriyavasenā’’ti vuttaṃ, ‘‘cakkhundriyādīnaṃ rūpajīvitindriyassa ca vasenā’’ti pana vattabbaṃ. Kamena gantvā vippayutte tīṇīti idaṃ pākaṭabhāvatthaṃ ‘‘navamūlakādīsu vippayutte tīṇī’’ti evaṃ kesuci potthakesu uddhaṭaṃ. Imāni ca dve pacchājātindriyavasenāti idaṃ ‘‘imāni ca dve pacchājātāhārindriyavasenā’’ti ca vattabbaṃ.

It is said, ''One in faculty' is by way of the material life-faculty,' but it should be said, 'by way of the eye-faculty, etc., and the material life-faculty.' 'Proceeding in order, in dissociation, three'—for the sake of clarity, this is cited in some books as 'in the nine-rooted, etc., in dissociation, three.' And 'these two are by way of the post-nascence faculty'—this should also be said as 'and these two are by way of post-nascence nutriment and faculty.'

Nahetumūlakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Non-Root-Rooted is concluded.

636. Naaññamaññapaccayā hetuyā tīṇīti kusalādīni cittasamuṭṭhānānanti ettha ‘‘paṭisandhiyaṃ kaṭattārūpānañcā’’tipi vattabbaṃ. Hetuyā vuttehi tīhīti vārasāmaññameva sandhāya vadati, tathā kamme tīṇīti hetuyā vuttānevāti ca. Paccayesu pana sabbattha viseso sallakkhetabbo. Adhipatiyā tīṇīti naaññamaññanahetunaārammaṇapaccayā adhipatiyā tīṇīti etāni heṭṭhā hetuyā vuttānevāti.

636. 'Not by mutuality condition, by root, three'—here, regarding wholesome, etc., originated from mind, it should also be said, 'and at rebirth-linking, for form born of kamma.' When he says 'by the three stated by root,' he speaks referring only to the general nature of the section; and similarly, 'three by kamma' are the same as those stated by root. However, among the conditions, the difference should be noted everywhere. 'Three by dominance'—that is, 'not by mutuality, not by root, not by object condition, by dominance, three'—these are the same as those stated below by root.

644. Yathā ca heṭṭhāti yathā nahetumūlake yāva navipākā, tāva gantvā nāhārindriyesu ekekameva gahitaṃ, tathā idhāpi nārammaṇamūlakādīsu ekekameva gahitanti adhippāyo.

644. 'And as below'—the meaning is that just as in the non-root-rooted section, having gone as far as 'not by resultant condition', in 'not by nutriment condition' and 'not by faculty condition' each one is taken singly, so here too, in the non-object-rooted section, etc., each one is taken singly.

648. Nānākkhaṇikā kusalākusalacetanā kammasamuṭṭhānarūpassāti ettha ‘‘vipākāna’’ntipi vattabbaṃ. Āhārindriyesu tīṇi sahajātasadisāni rūpassapi paccayabhāvato, jhānamaggādīsu tīṇi hetusadisāni arūpānaṃyeva paccayabhāvatoti adhippāyo daṭṭhabbo. Ādi-saddena ca ‘‘navippayuttanahetunārammaṇapaccayā adhipatiyā tīṇī’’tiādīni (paṭṭhā. 1.1.649) saṅgaṇhāti.

648. 'Different-moment wholesome and unwholesome volitions for form originated from kamma'—here, 'and of resultants' should also be stated. The intention should be understood that in nutriment and faculty, three are similar to the co-nascence condition because of being a condition for form as well; and in jhāna, path, etc., three are similar to the root condition because of being a condition only for immaterial states. And by the word 'etc.,' he includes 'not by dissociation, not by root, not by object condition, by dominance, three,' etc. (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.649).

650. Yaṃ [Pg.238] panāti yaṃ paccayaṃ sakaṭṭhāne anulomato labhantampi aggahetvā tato paretarā paccanīyato gayhanti, so paccayo pacchā anulomatova yojanaṃ labhatīti attho. Yathā pana nahetumūlakādīsu nāhāre ghaṭite indriyavasena, nindriye ca ghaṭite āhāravasena pañhalābho hotīti tesu aññataraṃ paccanīyato ayojetvā anulomato yojitaṃ, evaṃ noatthinoavigatamūlakesu upanissaye ghaṭite kammavasena, kamme ca ghaṭite upanissayavasena pañhalābho hotīti tesu aññataraṃ paccanīyato ayojetvā anulomato yojitanti veditabbaṃ. Evametasmiṃ paccanīyānulome sabbāni mūlāni dvedhā bhinnāni nāhāranindriyāni naupanissayanakammāni ca patvāti.

650. “But that which”—that condition, though obtainable in its own place by the forward method, is not taken, but is taken by the reverse method from what is other than that; later, that condition obtains connection by the forward method—this is the meaning. Just as in the non-root-rooted sections and so on, when non-nutriment is connected, a question is obtained by way of faculty, and when non-faculty is connected, a question is obtained by way of nutriment—in these, one is not connected by the reverse method but is connected by the forward method—so too, in the non-existence-rooted and non-disappearance-rooted sections, when decisive support is connected, a question is obtained by way of kamma, and when kamma is connected, a question is obtained by way of decisive support—in these, one is not connected by the reverse method but is connected by the forward method—this should be understood. Thus, in this reverse-forward method, all roots are divided in two, becoming non-nutriment and non-faculties, and non-decisive-support and non-kamma.

Paccanīyānulomavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of the Reverse-Forward Method is concluded.

Kusalattikavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of the Wholesome Triad is concluded.

2. Vedanāttikavaṇṇanā

2. The Exposition of the Triad of Feeling

1. Vedanārūpanibbānāni pana tikamuttakāni paṭiccādiniyamaṃ paccayuppannavacanañca na labhanti. Paṭiccavārādīsu pana chasu yato hetupaccayādito tikadhammānaṃ uppatti vuttā, tattha yathānurūpato ārammaṇādipaccayabhāvena labbhantīti veditabbānīti.

1. However, feeling, form, and Nibbāna, being freed from the triad, do not obtain the rule of dependence, etc., or the designation 'conditionally arisen.' Yet, in the six sections beginning with the Dependent Section, since the arising of the phenomena of the triad is stated beginning from the root-condition onward, it should be understood that they are obtainable there by way of object-condition, etc., as is appropriate.

10. Sabbaarūpadhammapariggāhakā pana sahajātādayo paccayāti iminā kusalattikepi parihīnaṃ sahajātaṃ rūpārūpadhammapariggāhakattā ādimhi ṭhapetvā ādisaddena sabbārūpadhammapariggāhakavacanena ca paccayuppannavasena sabbaarūpadhammapariggāhakānaṃ ārammaṇādīnaṃ parihāniṃ dassetīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tena kusalattikaparihīnānaṃ sabbaṭṭhānikānaṃ catunnaṃ sabbatikādīsu parihāni dassitā hoti. Pacchājātapaccayañca vināva uppattitoti etena pana pacchājātapaccayassa anulome parihāniṃ, paccanīye ca lābhaṃ dasseti. Sahajātādayoti vā sahajātamūlakā sahajātanibandhanā paṭiccādiṃ pharantehi sahajātadhammehi vinā paccayā ahontāti vuttaṃ hoti. Kasmā pana sahajātanibandhanā sabbārūpadhammapariggāhakā ca ye, teva [Pg.239] parihāyanti, na pana yo sahajātānibandhano sabbārūpadhammapariggāhako ca na hoti, so pacchājātoti tattha kāraṇaṃ vadanto ‘‘sahajātādīhi vinā anuppattito pacchājātapaccayañca vināva uppattito’’ti āha. Tattha sahajātādīhi vināti sahajātanibandhanehi sabbārūpadhammapariggāhakehi ca vināti attho. Atha vā sahajātanibandhanānameva parihāni, na pacchājātassa sahajātānibandhanassāti ettheva kāraṇaṃ vadanto ‘‘sahajātādīhi vinā anuppattito pacchājātapaccayañca vināva uppattito’’ti āha. Sahajātanibandhanāpi pana sabbaarūpadhammapariggāhakāyeva parihāyantīti dassitametanti.

10. It should be seen that by this phrase, “But the conditions such as co-nascence, etc., which comprehend all formless phenomena,” he indicates the omission of object-condition, etc., which comprehend all formless phenomena by way of the conditionally arisen. This is done by placing at the beginning the co-nascence condition—which is omitted even in the wholesome triad because it comprehends both form and formless phenomena—and by the word ‘etc.’ at the beginning and by the phrase ‘comprehending all formless phenomena.’ By this, the omission of the four that apply in all instances, which are omitted from the wholesome triad, is shown in all triads, etc. And by this phrase, “and it arises without the post-nascence condition,” he shows the omission of the post-nascence condition in the forward method and its obtainment in the reverse method. Alternatively, ‘co-nascence, etc.’ means that it is said that conditions rooted in co-nascence, bound by co-nascence, do not exist without co-nascent phenomena that pervade dependent origination, etc. But why are only those that are bound by co-nascence and comprehend all formless phenomena omitted, and not the post-nascence condition, which is neither bound by co-nascence nor comprehends all formless phenomena? Stating the reason there, he says: “because there is no arising without co-nascence, etc., and because it arises without the post-nascence condition.” There, ‘without co-nascence, etc.’ means without those bound by co-nascence and comprehending all formless phenomena. Or, stating the reason right there—that only those bound by co-nascence are omitted, not the post-nascence condition, which is not bound by co-nascence—he says: “because there is no arising without co-nascence, etc., and because it arises without the post-nascence condition.” However, it is shown that even those bound by co-nascence are omitted only if they comprehend all formless phenomena.

17. Navipākepi eseva nayoti nayadassanameva karoti, na ca paccayapaccayuppannasāmaññadassanaṃ. Sukhāya hi adukkhamasukhāya ca vedanāya sampayutte dhamme paṭicca tāhi vedanāhi sampayuttā ahetukakiriyadhammā vicikicchuddhaccasahajātamoho cāti ayañhettha nayoti. Navippayutte ekanti āruppe āvajjanavasena vuttanti idaṃ āvajjanāhetukamohānaṃ vasena vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

17. In the case of non-resultants also, “this is the same method”; he only shows the method of exposition, not a general presentation of condition and conditionally arisen phenomena. For here, the method is this: dependent on phenomena associated with pleasant or neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, there arise rootless functional phenomena associated with those feelings, and delusion co-arisen with doubt and restlessness. As for “in non-associated, one,” it is stated as “in the formless realm by way of advertence”; this should be understood as spoken by way of delusions that have advertence as their cause.

25-37. Anulomapaccanīye yathā kusalattikaṃ, evaṃ gaṇetabbanti hetumūlakādīnaṃ nayānaṃ ekamūlakadvimūlakādivasena ca yojetvā gahetabbatāsāmaññaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, na gaṇanasāmaññaṃ. Ito paresupi evarūpesu eseva nayo. Ahetukassa pana cittuppādassātiādi nahetumūlakaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, ‘‘ahetukassa pana cittuppādassa mohassa cā’’ti panettha vattabbaṃ. Mohassa cāpi hi ahetukassa adhipatiabhāvato adhipatino nahetumūlake anulomato aṭṭhānanti. Parivattetvāpīti nahetupaccayā naadhipatipaccayā ārammaṇe tīṇīti evaṃ purato ṭhitampi ārammaṇādiṃ pacchato yojetvāti attho.

25-37. In the Forward and Reverse Methods, the statement “just as with the wholesome triad, so it should be reckoned” is said with reference to the commonality of how it should be taken, by applying and connecting the methods beginning with the root-rooted section in terms of one root, two roots, etc., not with reference to the commonality of counting. In other similar cases after this, this is the same method. However, the phrase beginning with “of a rootless mind-arising” is stated with reference to the non-root-rooted section, but here it should be stated as, “of a rootless mind-arising and of delusion.” For even in the case of rootless delusion, due to the absence of predominance, predominance has no place in the forward method of the non-root-rooted section. “Having reversed also” means that even the object-condition, etc., which stands before, is connected after, as in “not by root-condition, not by predominance-condition, in object-condition, three.”

39. Pañhāvāre domanassaṃ uppajjatīti etena taṃsampayutte dasseti. Upanissayavibhaṅge ‘‘saddhāpañcakesu mānaṃ jappeti diṭṭhiṃ gaṇhātīti kattabbaṃ, avasesesu na kattabba’’nti idaṃ pāṭhagatidassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ, na pana rāgādīhi mānadiṭṭhīnaṃ anuppattito. Kusalattikepi hi rāgādīsu ‘‘mānaṃ jappeti diṭṭhiṃ gaṇhātī’’ti pāḷi na vuttā, ‘‘rāgo doso moho māno diṭṭhi patthanā rāgassa dosassa mohassa mānassa [Pg.240] diṭṭhiyā patthanāya upanissayapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.2.53) pana rāgādīnaṃ mānadiṭṭhiupanissayabhāvo vutto. Tathā idhāpi daṭṭhabbanti. ‘‘Sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttena pana cittena gāmaghātaṃ nigamaghātaṃ karotī’’ti somanassasampayuttalobhasahagatacittena gāmanigamaviluppanaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ.

39. In the Question Section, by the phrase “grief arises,” he indicates what is associated with it. In the Analysis of Decisive Support, the statement, “In the five beginning with faith, ‘one mutters with conceit, one grasps a view’—this should be done; in the remaining cases, it should not be done,” is stated to show the textual procedure, not because conceit and views do not arise from lust, etc. For even in the wholesome triad, regarding lust, etc., the Pāli text “one mutters with conceit, one grasps a view” is not stated. But the state of lust, etc., as a decisive support for conceit and view is stated thus: “Lust, hatred, delusion, conceit, view, aspiration are a condition by way of decisive support for lust, hatred, delusion, conceit, view, and aspiration.” So too, here this should be seen. “But with a mind associated with pleasant feeling, one destroys villages and towns”—this is stated with reference to the plundering of villages and towns with a mind accompanied by greed and associated with gladness.

62. Suddhānanti paccayapaccayuppannapadānaṃ anaññattaṃ dasseti. Purejātapacchājātā panettha na vijjanti. Na hi purejātā pacchājātā vā arūpadhammā arūpadhammānaṃ paccayā hontīti ettha purejātāti imasmiṃ tike vuccamānā adhikārappattā sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttādayova arūpadhammānaṃ purejātā hutvā paccayā na honti purejātattābhāvatoti adhippāyo, tathā pacchājātattābhāvato pacchājātā vā hutvā na hontīti.

62. The phrase “Of the pure” shows the non-otherness of the terms ‘condition’ and ‘conditionally arisen phenomena.’ Here, pre-nascence and post-nascence do not exist. For formless phenomena do not serve as conditions for other formless phenomena by way of being either pre-nascent or post-nascent. In this context, the meaning is that those associated with pleasant feeling, etc., which are mentioned in this triad and are under discussion, do not serve as conditions for other formless phenomena by being pre-nascent, because of the absence of pre-nascence. Similarly, due to the absence of post-nascence, they do not serve as conditions by being post-nascent.

63-64. Sādhipatiamohavasenāti adhipatibhāvasahitāmohavasenāti attho.

63-64. “By way of non-delusion with predominance” means by way of non-delusion accompanied by a state of predominance.

83-87. Nahetupaccayā…pe… naupanissaye aṭṭhāti nahetupaccayā nārammaṇapaccayā naupanissaye aṭṭhāti evaṃ saṅkhipitvā uddharati. Nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayavasena veditabbāti idaṃ ‘‘dukkhāya vedanāya sampayutto sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttassā’’ti etaṃ vajjetvā avasesesu aṭṭhasupi nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayasambhavaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Na hi sahajātapaccayo aṭṭhasupi labbhati, atha kho tīsvevāti.

83-87. “Not by root-condition… (etc.) … not in decisive support, eight”—he summarizes and extracts this as: “not by root-condition, not by object-condition… (etc.) … not in decisive support, eight.” The statement, “It should be understood as by way of the different-moment kamma-condition,” is said with reference to the possibility of the different-moment kamma-condition in the remaining eight cases, excluding this one: “associated with painful feeling for one associated with pleasant feeling.” For the co-nascence condition is not obtained in all eight cases, but only in three.

Vedanāttikavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Triad of Feeling is concluded.

3. Vipākattikavaṇṇanā

3. The Exposition of the Resultant Triad

1-23. Vipākattike vipākadhammaṃ paṭiccāti vipākaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca. Samāsenapi hi soyevattho vuttoti pāḷiyaṃ samāsaṃ katvā likhitaṃ.

1-23. In the Resultant Triad, “dependent on a resultant phenomenon” (`vipākadhammaṃ paṭicca`) means “dependent on a resultant phenomenon” (`vipākaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca`). For this very meaning is stated even by a compound, thus in the Pāli text it is written as a compound.

24-52. ‘‘Nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammaṃ [Pg.241] paṭicca nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammo uppajjati navipākapaccayā’’ti etassa vibhaṅge ‘‘mahābhūte paṭicca cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ upādārūpa’’nti ettakameva vuttaṃ, na vuttaṃ ‘‘kaṭattārūpa’’nti. Taṃ khandhe paṭicca uppajjamānassa mahābhūte paṭicca uppattidassanatthattā na vuttaṃ. Na hettha kaṭattārūpassa khandhe paṭicca uppatti atthi, yassa mahābhūte paṭicca uppatti vattabbā siyā. Pavattiyaṃ pana kaṭattārūpaṃ ‘‘asaññasattānaṃ…pe… mahābhūte paṭicca kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpa’’nti eteneva dassitaṃ hoti. Evañca katvā asaññasattānaṃ rūpasamānagatikattā nāhārapaccaye ca pavattiyaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ na uddhaṭaṃ. Tampi hi uppādakkhaṇe āhārapaccayena vinā uppajjatīti uddharitabbaṃ siyāti.

24-52. 'A phenomenon that is neither resultant nor result-producing arises dependent on a phenomenon that is neither resultant nor result-producing—not by way of result condition.' In the analysis of this, only 'dependent on the great elements, mind-produced materiality, derived materiality' is mentioned, but not 'kamma-originated materiality.' This is not stated because it is for the purpose of showing that what arises dependent on the aggregates arises dependent on the great elements. For here, there is no arising of kamma-originated materiality dependent on the aggregates, such that its arising dependent on the great elements would need to be stated. However, in the course of existence, kamma-originated materiality is shown by this very phrase: 'For non-percipient beings... dependent on the great elements, kamma-originated materiality is derived materiality.' And having done so, since non-percipient beings have a similar course as materiality, kamma-originated materiality is not extracted in the course of existence under the nutriment condition. For even that arises at the moment of origination without the nutriment condition, and thus it should be extracted.

Vipākattikavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Resultant Triad is completed.

4. Upādinnattikavaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Appropriated Triad

15. Upādinnattike anupādinnaanupādāniyaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca anupādinnaanupādāniyo dhammo uppajjati nādhipatipaccayāti etena sayaṃ adhipatibhūtattā avirahitārammaṇādhipatīsupi adhipati duvidhenapi adhipatipaccayena uppajjatīti na vattabbo, ayametassa sabhāvoti dasseti.

15. In the Appropriated Triad, 'an unappropriated and non-appropriating phenomenon arises dependent on an unappropriated and non-appropriating phenomenon—not by way of dominance condition.' This shows that because dominance is itself a dominant factor, it should not be said that it arises by either of the two kinds of dominance condition, even in the case of conascence-dominance and object-dominance; this is its nature.

72. Upādinnupādāniyo kabaḷīkārāhāro upādinnupādāniyassa kāyassa āhārapaccayena paccayoti ettha kammajānaṃ rūpānaṃ abbhantaragatā ojā tasseva kammajakāyassa rūpajīvitindriyaṃ viya kaṭattārūpānaṃ anupālanupatthambhanavasena paccayo, na janakavasenāti ayamattho aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vutto. Etasmiṃ pana atthe sati upādinnupādāniyo ca anupādinnaanupādāniyo ca dhammā upādinnupādāniyassa dhammassa atthipaccayena paccayo pacchājātindriyanti ettha ‘‘āhāra’’ntipi vattabbaṃ, yadi ca kammajā ojā sakalāparūpānameva āhārapaccayo hoti, evaṃ sati ‘‘upādinnupādāniyo kabaḷīkārāhāro anupādinnupādāniyassa kāyassa āhārapaccayena paccayo’’ti na vattabbaṃ siyā, vuttañcidaṃ, tampi anajjhohaṭāya sasantānagatāya upādinnojāya anupādinnupādāniyassa kāyassa āhārapaccayaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Evañca sati [Pg.242] ‘‘upādinnupādāniyo ca anupādinnaanupādāniyo ca dhammā anupādinnupādāniyassa dhammassa atthipaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.4.85) ayampi pañho pacchājātāhāravasena uddharitabbo siyā, tasmā ajjhohaṭassa upādinnāhārassa lokuttarakkhaṇe abhāvato dumūlakesu paṭhamapañhe ‘‘āhāra’’nti na vuttaṃ. Dutiyapañho ca na uddhaṭo, na itarassa upādinnāhārassa kāmabhave asambhavābhāvatoti ajjhohaṭameva maṇḍūkādisarīragataṃ upādinnāhāraṃ sandhāya ‘‘upādinnupādāniyo kabaḷīkārāhāro upādinnupādāniyassa ca anupādinnupādāniyassa ca kāyassa āhārapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.4.74) vadantānaṃ vādo balavataro. Na hi ajjhohaṭamattāva maṇḍūkādayo kucchivitthataṃ na karonti, na ca balaṃ na upajāyanti, na ca rūpaviseso na viññāyatīti.

72. Ingested nutriment that is appropriated and appropriating is a condition for the body that is appropriated and appropriating by way of nutriment condition. Here, the nutritive essence contained within kamma-born material phenomena is a condition for that very kamma-born body—just as the material life faculty is for kamma-originated materiality—by way of supporting and maintaining, not by way of generating. This meaning is stated in the commentary. However, if this meaning holds, then in the case of 'phenomena that are appropriated and appropriating, and phenomena that are unappropriated and non-appropriating, are a condition for the phenomenon that is appropriated and appropriating by way of presence condition: post-nascence, faculty,' the term 'nutriment' should also be stated. And if kamma-born nutritive essence is a nutriment condition for all other material phenomena, then it should not be said, 'Ingested nutriment that is appropriated and appropriating is a nutriment condition for the body that is unappropriated and non-appropriating.' Yet this has been stated, and it is said with reference to the appropriated nutritive essence that is not ingested but belongs to one's own continuum, serving as a nutriment condition for the body that is unappropriated and non-appropriating. And if this is so, this question—'phenomena that are appropriated and appropriating, and phenomena that are unappropriated and non-appropriating, are a condition for the phenomenon that is unappropriated and non-appropriating by way of presence condition' (Paṭṭhāna 1.4.85)—should also be extracted by way of post-nascent nutriment. Therefore, because ingested appropriated nutriment does not exist at the supramundane moment, 'nutriment' is not mentioned in the first question of the two-rooted pairs. And the second question is not extracted, not because other appropriated nutriment is impossible in the sense-sphere existence. Thus, the argument of those who say, 'Ingested nutriment that is appropriated and appropriating is a condition for both the body that is appropriated and appropriating and the body that is unappropriated and non-appropriating by way of nutriment condition' (Paṭṭhāna 1.4.74) is stronger, referring to the ingested appropriated nutriment present in the bodies of frogs and the like. For frogs and similar creatures do not merely fill their bellies with ingested nutriment; they also gain strength, and their distinctive material form becomes apparent.

‘‘Anupādinnaanupādāniyo dhammo upādinnupādāniyassa ca anupādinnaanupādāniyassa ca dhammassa atthipaccayena paccayo sahajātaṃ pacchājāta’’nti (paṭṭhā. 1.4.83) evamādīhi idha vuttehi ekamūlakadukatikāvasānapañhavissajjanehi ‘‘kusalo dhammo kusalassa ca abyākatassa ca dhammassa atthipaccayena paccayo sahajāta’’ntiādinā idha dutiyadukāvasāne viya vissajjanaṃ labbhatīti viññāyati. Sukhāvabodhanatthaṃ pana tattha sahajātavaseneva vissajjanaṃ kataṃ. Paccanīye pana sahajātasseva apaṭikkhepe lābhato, paṭikkhepe ca alābhato sahajātapaccayavaseneva ekamūlakadukāvasānā tattha uddhaṭā, idha panetehi vissajjanehi eko dhammo sahajātādīsu atthipaccayavisesesu anekehipi anekesaṃ dhammānaṃ eko atthipaccayo hotīti dassitaṃ hoti. Eko hi dhammo ekassa dhammassa ekeneva atthipaccayavisesena atthipaccayo hoti, eko anekesaṃ ekenapi anekehipi, tathā aneko ekassa, aneko anekesaṃ samānatte paccayuppannadhammānaṃ, atthipaccayavisesesu pana pañcasu sahajātaṃ purejāteneva saha atthipaccayo hoti, anaññadhammatte pacchājātena ca, na nānādhammatte.

'An unappropriated and non-appropriating phenomenon is a condition for the appropriated and appropriating phenomenon, and for the unappropriated and non-appropriating phenomenon, by way of presence condition: co-nascence, post-nascence.' (Paṭṭhāna 1.4.83) By such statements given here, it is understood that the answers to the questions concluding the single-rooted dyads and triads are obtained similarly to the answers given here at the end of the second dyad, such as: 'A wholesome phenomenon is a condition for both a wholesome and an indeterminate phenomenon by way of presence condition: co-nascence,' and so on. For ease of understanding, however, the answer there was given solely in terms of co-nascence. In the negative section, however, since it is obtained when co-nascence is not rejected, and not obtained when it is rejected, the conclusions of the single-rooted dyads were extracted there based solely on the co-nascence condition. Here, however, through these answers, it is shown that a single phenomenon can be a single presence condition for many phenomena, even by way of many specific presence conditions such as co-nascence and others. For a single phenomenon is a presence condition for a single phenomenon by way of a single specific presence condition; a single phenomenon for many by way of one or many; likewise, many for one, and many for many, when the conditioned phenomena are of the same nature. Among the five specific presence conditions, co-nascence is a presence condition together with pre-nascence, and with post-nascence when the phenomena are not of a different nature, but not when they are of a different nature.

Yadi siyā, ‘‘upādinnupādāniyo ca anupādinnaanupādāniyo ca dhammā upādinnupādāniyassa dhammassa atthipaccayena paccayo pacchājātaṃ indriya’’nti ettha ‘‘sahajāta’’ntipi vattabbaṃ siyā. Kammajānañhi bhūtānaṃ sahajātānaṃ [Pg.243] pacchājātānañca lokuttarānaṃ ekakkhaṇe labbhamānānampi eko atthipaccayabhāvo natthi sahajātapacchājātānaṃ nānādhammānaṃ viruddhasabhāvattāti taṃ na vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Evañca katvā paccanīye ca ‘‘naindriye bāvīsā’’ti vuttaṃ. Aññathā hi indriyapaṭikkhepepi sahajātapacchājātavasena tassa pañhassa lābhato ‘‘tevīsā’’ti vattabbaṃ siyāti. Purejātaṃ sahajāteneva saha atthipaccayo hoti, na itarehi, tampi vatthu taṃsahitapurejātameva, na itaraṃ. Kusalattike hi pañhāvāre ‘‘navippayuttapaccayā atthiyā pañcā’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.649) vuttaṃ, sanidassanattike pana ‘‘vippayutte bāvīsā’’ti. Yaṃ pana tattha atthivibhaṅge paccayuddhāre ca timūlakekāvasānaṃ uddhaṭaṃ, taṃ vatthusahitassa ārammaṇapurejātassa sahajātena, saha paccayabhāvatoti pacchājātaṃ āhārindriyeheva, anaññadhammatte ca sahajātena ca, āhāro pacchājātindriyeheva, indriyaṃ pacchājātāhārenāti evametaṃ atthipaccayavibhāgaṃ sallakkhetvā anulome paccanīyādīsu ca labbhamānā pañhā uddharitabbā.

If it were so, in the case of 'Phenomena that are appropriated and appropriating, and phenomena that are unappropriated and non-appropriating, are a condition for the appropriated and appropriating phenomenon by way of presence condition: post-nascence, faculty,' then 'co-nascence' should also be mentioned here. For, even though co-nascent kamma-born elements and post-nascent supramundane phenomena may be obtained at a single moment, there is no single presence condition relationship for co-nascent and post-nascent phenomena, due to their contradictory natures as different phenomena. Therefore, it should be understood that this is not stated. And having done so, in the negative section for the faculty condition it is said, 'twenty-two.' Otherwise, even if the faculty condition is rejected, due to that question being obtainable by way of co-nascence and post-nascence, it would have to be said 'twenty-three.' Pre-nascence is a presence condition only together with co-nascence, not with the others. And that base is only the pre-nascent base accompanied by that, not another. For in the wholesome triad, in the section on questions, it is said, 'Five by way of non-disassociated condition and presence.' (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.649) But in the triad of the visible, it is said, 'twenty-two by way of disassociated condition.' But what is extracted there in the analysis of presence and the enumeration of conditions, at the conclusion of the three-rooted questions, is due to the object-prenascence accompanied by a physical base being a condition together with co-nascence. Thus, post-nascence is only through nutriment and faculty, and also with co-nascence when the phenomena are not of a different nature. Nutriment is only through the post-nascent faculties, and faculty through post-nascent nutriment. Having carefully considered this division of the presence condition, the questions arising in the positive, negative, and other sections should be extracted accordingly.

Upādinnattikavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Appropriated Triad is completed.

6. Vitakkattikavaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Triad of Applied Thought

22. Vitakkattike paṭiccavārānulome adhipatiyā tevīsāti sattasu mūlakesu yathākkamaṃ satta pañca tīṇi ekaṃ tīṇi tīṇi ekanti evaṃ tevīsa, aññamaññe aṭṭhavīsa satta pañca pañca tīṇi cattāri tīṇi ekanti evaṃ, purejāte ekādasa tīṇi cattāri dve dutiyatatiyadumūlakesu ekaṃ ekanti evaṃ, tathā āsevane. Aññāni gaṇanāni hetuārammaṇasadisāni.

22. In the Vitakka Triad, in the dependent sequence, by way of dominance, there are twenty-three instances: in the seven root-bases, seven, five, three, one, three, three, and one respectively, thus twenty-three. In mutual dependence, there are twenty-eight: seven, five, five, three, four, three, and one respectively. In pre-nascent condition, there are eleven: three, four, two; in the second and third root-bases, one and one respectively, thus eleven. So also, in repetition. Other enumerations are similar to those of cause and object.

31. Paccanīye nādhipatipaccaye paṭhamapañhe ‘‘avitakkavicāramatte khandhe paṭicca avitakkavicāramattā adhipatī’’ti vatvā puna ‘‘vipākaṃ avitakkavicāramattaṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭiccā’’tiādinā vissajjanaṃ kataṃ, na pana avisesena. Kasmā? Vipākavajjānaṃ avitakkavicāramattakkhandhānaṃ ekantena sādhipatibhāvato[Pg.244]. Vipākānaṃ pana lokuttarānameva sādhipatibhāvo, na itaresanti te visuṃ niddhāretvā vuttā. Lokuttaravipākādhipatissa cettha purimakoṭṭhāseyeva saṅgaho veditabbo.

31. In the negative section, regarding the first question on the non-dominance condition, it was stated, “Depending on the aggregates that are merely without initial and sustained thought, the dominants are merely without initial and sustained thought,” and then the answer was given beginning with, “Depending on one resultant aggregate that is merely without initial and sustained thought,” etc., but not without distinction. Why? Because aggregates that are merely without initial and sustained thought, excluding resultants, are definitively possessed of a dominant condition. However, among resultants, only supramundane ones are possessed of a dominant condition, not the others; therefore, they are separately specified and stated. Here, the supramundane resultant dominant should be understood as being included in the first category.

38. Nāsevanamūlake avitakkavicāramattaṃ vipākena saha gacchantenāti etaṃ mūlaṃ avitakkavicāramattaavitakkavicārapadehi avitakkehi saha yojentena napurejātasadisaṃ pāḷigamanaṃ kātabbanti vuttaṃ hoti. Sadisatā cettha yebhuyyena visadisatā ca daṭṭhabbā. Tattha hi āruppe avitakkavicāramattaṃ idha vipākaṃ avitakkavicāramattantiādi yojetabbanti ayamettha viseso. Idañca nāsevanavibhaṅgānantaraṃ likhitabbaṃ, na jhānānantaraṃ, kesuci potthakesu likhitaṃ.

38. In the root-base of non-repetition, it is said that the textual passage concerning this root—‘that which is merely without initial and sustained thought, proceeding together with the resultant’—should be constructed so as not to be similar to the pre-nascent condition, by connecting it with the terms ‘merely without initial and sustained thought,’ ‘without initial and sustained thought,’ and ‘without initial thought.’ Here, similarity and dissimilarity should be understood for the most part. For there, in the formless sphere, it is ‘merely without initial and sustained thought,’ whereas here it is ‘the resultant merely without initial and sustained thought,’ and so on, that should be connected—this is the distinction here. This should be written immediately after the analysis of non-repetition, and not after the jhāna analysis, as it is written in some books.

Paccayavāre paṭhamaghaṭane pavattipaṭisandhiyoti dumūlakesu paṭhame sattasupi pañhesu pavattiñca paṭisandhiñca yojetvāti vuttaṃ hoti.

In the section on conditions, in the first combination, it is said that in the first of the two-rooted bases, in all seven questions, both occurrence and rebirth-linking are to be connected.

49. Paccanīye sattasu ṭhānesu satta mohā uddharitabbā mūlapadesu evāti savitakkasavicārādipadesu mūlapadameva avasānabhāvena yesu pañhesu yojitaṃ, tesu sattasu pañhesu satta mohā uddharitabbāti attho.

49. In the negative section, seven delusions should be extracted in seven instances, just as in the root-terms. This means that in the terms such as 'with initial and sustained thought,' etc., where the root-term itself is applied as the conclusion in those questions, in those seven questions, seven delusions should be extracted.

Pañhāvārapaccanīye ‘‘avitakkavicāramatto dhammo avitakkavicāramattassa dhammassa ārammaṇasahajātaupanissayakammapaccayena paccayo’’ti kesuci potthakesu pāṭho dissati, upanissayena pana saṅgahitattā ‘‘kammapaccayena paccayo’’ti na sakkā vattuṃ. Upādinnattikapañhāvārapaccanīye hi ‘‘anupādinnaanupādāniyo dhammo anupādinnaanupādāniyassa dhammassa sahajātaupanissayapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.4.58, 62) ettakameva vuttaṃ. Parittattikapañhāvārapaccanīye ca ‘‘mahaggato dhammo mahaggatassa dhammassa ārammaṇasahajātaupanissayapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.12.57, 65, 73) ettakameva vuttanti. Ettakameva ca avitakkavicāramattaṃ kammaṃ appamāṇaṃ mahaggatañca, tañca dubbalaṃ na hotīti etehiyeva vacanehi viññāyatīti.

In the negative section of the question chapter, in some texts a reading appears: “A phenomenon that is merely without initial and sustained thought is a condition for a phenomenon that is merely without initial and sustained thought by way of object, conascence, decisive support, and kamma condition.” However, since it is included by decisive support, it is not possible to say “by kamma condition.” For in the negative section of the question chapter on the clung-to triad, only this much is stated: “A phenomenon that is unclung-to and not a basis for clinging is a condition for a phenomenon that is unclung-to and not a basis for clinging by way of conascence and decisive support condition.” And in the negative section of the question chapter on the limited triad, only this much is stated: “An exalted phenomenon is a condition for an exalted phenomenon by way of object, conascence, and decisive support condition.” And that the kamma that is merely without initial and sustained thought, immeasurable, and exalted, is not weak, is understood from these very statements.

Vitakkattikavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Triad of Initial Thought is concluded.

8. Dassanenapahātabbattikavaṇṇanā

8. Explanation of the Triad of Phenomena to be Abandoned by Seeing

Dassanenapahātabbattike [Pg.245] dassanena pahātabbo dhammo bhāvanāya pahātabbassa dhammassa ekenapi paccayena paccayo na hotīti idaṃ paṭiccasamuppādavibhaṅge vicāritanayena vicāretabbanti.

In the Triad of Phenomena to be Abandoned by Seeing, a phenomenon to be abandoned by seeing is not a condition, even by a single condition, for a phenomenon to be abandoned by development. This should be investigated according to the method of investigation in the Analysis of Dependent Origination.

Dassanenapahātabbattikavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Triad of Phenomena to be Abandoned by Seeing is concluded.

Pucchāgaṇanagāthāyo

Verses on the Enumeration of Questions

Kusalādi ekakattaya-mathādi antena majjhimantena;

Ādi ca majjhena dukā, tayo tikeko ca viññeyyo.

The wholesome, etc., as singles and triads, with beginning, end, and middle-ending terms; and the beginning with the middle as dyads; the three, the triad, and the single should be understood.

Tesvekekaṃ mūlaṃ katvā, taṃ sattasattakā pucchā;

Ekekapaccaye yathā, bhavanti ekūnapaññāsa.

Taking each of them as a root, the questions are forty-nine; accordingly, for each single condition, there are forty-nine.

Chasattatādhikasataṃ, sahassamekañca suddhike pucchā;

Esa ca nayonulome, paccanīye cāti nāññattha.

One thousand, one hundred and seventy-six are the questions in the pure method; and this is the method in the positive and negative sections, and nowhere else.

Rāsiguṇitassa rāsissaḍḍhaṃ, saha rāsikassa piṇḍo so;

Rāsissa vā sahekassaḍḍhaṃ, puna rāsinā guṇitaṃ.

The sum is half of the quantity multiplied by itself, plus half the quantity; or, half of the quantity plus one, multiplied by the quantity.

Iti hetumūlakāduka-tikādayo chacca sattatisatā dve;

Catuvīsatettha pucchā, aḍḍhuḍḍhasahassanahutañca.

Thus, the root-dyads, triads, and so on, amount to two hundred and seventy-six; here there are twenty-four questions, and one and a half thousand and ten thousand.

Tāsaṃ yasmā suddhika-nayo na paccekapaccaye tasmā;

Catuvīsatiguṇitānaṃ, sasuddhikānaṃ ayaṃ gaṇanā.

Since for these the pure method does not apply to each condition individually, therefore this is the calculation for those multiplied by twenty-four, including the pure method.

Lakkhattayaṃ dvinahutaṃ, pañca sahassāni satta ca satāni;

Dvāpaññāsā etā, anulome piṇḍitā pucchā.

Three hundred thousand, two myriads, five thousand, seven hundred, and fifty-two—these are the questions compiled in the positive section.

Anulomasadisagaṇanā, bhavanti pucchānaye ca paccanīye;

Hāpetvā pana sese, nayadvaye suddhike laddhā.

The calculation is similar to the positive section, and also for the method of questions in the negative section; but excluding the remaining ones, the pure questions are obtained in the two methods.

Chappaññāsa bhavanti pucchā, chasatasahitañca lakkhaterasakaṃ;

Pucchānayesu gaṇitā, paṭiccavāre catūsvapi.

The questions calculated in the methods of questions, in all four dependent sections, are thirteen lakhs, six hundred, and fifty-six.

Sattahi [Pg.246] guṇitā kusalattike dvayaṃ, navutiñceva pañcasatā;

Cattāri sahassāni ca, tathekanavute ca lakkhakā.

When multiplied by seven, for the pair in the wholesome triad, the result is ninety-one lakhs, four thousand, five hundred, and ninety.

Nādvāvīsati guṇitā, tikesu sabbesu vīsati ca koṭi;

Lakkhattayaṃ sahassaṃ, catuvīsati cāpi viññeyyā.

Not multiplied by twenty-two, the number of questions in all triads should be understood as twenty crores, three lakhs, one thousand, and twenty-four.

Tikapaṭṭhānaṃ.

The Triad Paṭṭhāna.

Ekakapaccaye pana, nava nava katvā sasoḷasadvisataṃ;

Hetudukapaṭhamavāre, paṭhamanaye suddhike pucchā.

However, for each single condition, making nine by nine, there are two hundred and sixteen; in the first section of the Hetu Dyad, in the first method, these are pure questions.

Hetādimūlakanaye-svekekasmiṃ dukādibhedayute;

Caturāsīticatusata-sahitaṃ sahassadvayaṃ pucchā.

In each single method of the roots, etc., combined with the divisions into dyads, etc., there are two thousand, four hundred and eighty-four questions.

Tā catuvīsatiguṇitā, sasuddhikā ettha honti anulome;

Dvattiṃsaṭṭhasatādhika-sahassanavakaḍḍhalakkhakā.

These, multiplied by twenty-four, including the pure method, are here in the positive section: nine and a half lakhs, one thousand, eight hundred, and thirty-two.

Evaṃ paccanīye dve, suddhikarahitā catūsvato honti;

Channavutaṭṭhasataṭṭha-tiṃsasahassadvilakkhakāni.

Thus, in the negative section, in the fourfold, there are two kinds, excluding the pure method: two lakhs, thirty-eight thousand, eight hundred, and ninety-six.

Tā pana sattaguṇā dve, sattatisatadvayaṃ sahassāni;

Dvāsattati honti tato, soḷasa lakkhāni hetuduke.

Then, these two multiplied by seven: two hundred and seventy thousand; seventy-two thereafter, and sixteen lakhs in the Hetu Dyad.

Tā sataguṇā dukasate, satadvayaṃ sattavīsati sahassā;

Dvāsattatilakkhāni ca, soḷasakoṭi tato pucchā.

Those, multiplied by one hundred in the hundred dyads, then become these questions: sixteen crores, seventy-two lakhs, twenty-seven thousand, and two hundred.

Dukapaṭṭhānaṃ.

The Dyad Paṭṭhāna.

Dukatikapaṭṭhāne tika-pakkhepo hoti ekamekaduke;

Tassa chasaṭṭhiguṇena te, chasaṭṭhisataṃ dukā honti.

In the Dyad-Triad Foundation, there is an inclusion of a triad in each individual dyad; multiplied by sixty-six, those dyads become sixty-six hundred.

Hetudukaladdhapucchā, guṇitā tehi ca honti tikapadameva;

Dukapaṭṭhāne pucchā, tāsaṃ gaṇanā ayaṃ ñeyyā.

The questions obtained from the root-dyads, multiplied by those, are indeed only triad-terms; the questions in the Dyad Foundation, this enumeration of them is to be known.

Dvāpaññāsa satāni ca, naveva nahutāni nava ca saṭṭhiñca;

Lakkhāni tīhi sahitaṃ, sataṃ sahassañca koṭinaṃ.

Fifty-two hundred, and nine myriads, and sixty-nine; three lakhs, and a hundred thousand crores.

Dukatikapaṭṭhānaṃ.

The Dyad-Triad Foundation.

Tikadukapaṭṭhāne [Pg.247] tika-mekekaṃ dvisatabhedanaṃ katvā;

Dvāvīsadvisataguṇā, ñeyyā kusalattike laddhā.

In the Triad-Dyad Foundation, each triad is divided into two hundred distinctions; those obtained from the wholesome triad are to be known as multiplied by twenty-two and two hundred.

Pucchā aṭṭhasatādhika-catusahassadvilakkhayuttānaṃ;

Koṭīnaṃ chakkamatho, koṭisahassāni cattāri.

The questions are four thousand and six crores, two lakhs, four thousand, and eight hundred.

Tikadukapaṭṭhānaṃ.

The Triad-Dyad Foundation.

Tikatikapaṭṭhāne, tesaṭṭhividhekekabhedanā tu tikā;

Tehi ca guṇitā kusala-ttikapucchāpi honti pucchā tā.

In the Triad-Triad Foundation, there are sixty-three kinds of divisions for each triad; and the questions of the wholesome triad, multiplied by these, become the total questions.

Dvādasa pañcasatā catu-saṭṭhisahassāni navuti cekūnā;

Lakkhānamekasaṭṭhi, dvādasasatakoṭiyo ceva.

Twelve, five hundred, sixty-four thousand, and eighty-nine; sixty-one lakhs, and twelve hundred crores.

Tikatikapaṭṭhānaṃ.

The Triad-Triad Foundation.

Dvayahīnadvayasataguṇo, ekeko dukaduke tehi;

Hetuduke laddhā saṅkhya-bhedehi ca vaḍḍhitā pucchā.

Each one in the dyad-dyad is multiplied by one hundred and ninety-eight; by these numerical distinctions the questions obtained in the root-dyad are increased.

Chasatayutāni pañcā-sītisahassāni lakkhanavakañca;

Ekādasāpi koṭi, puna koṭisatāni tettiṃsa.

The number is thirty-three hundred and eleven crores, nine lakhs, eighty-five thousand, and six hundred.

Dukadukapaṭṭhānaṃ.

The Dyad-Dyad Foundation.

Sampiṇḍitā tu pucchā, anulome chabbidhepi paṭṭhāne;

Chattiṃsatisatasahassa-ṭṭhakayutasattanahutāni.

The questions compiled in the six kinds of direct order in the Foundation are thirty-six hundred thousand, seven myriads, and eight;

Lakkhāni chacca cattā-līseva navātha koṭiyo dasa ca;

Sattakoṭisatehi ca, koṭisahassāni nava honti.

forty-six lakhs, then nine crores and ten crores; and with seven hundred crores, there are nine thousand crores.

Tā catuguṇitā pucchā, catuppabhede samantapaṭṭhāne;

Catucattālīsasatattayaṃ, sahassāni terasa ca.

Those questions multiplied by four, in the fourfold division of the comprehensive Foundation, are three hundred and forty-four, and thirteen thousand,

Sattāsīti [Pg.248] ca lakkhānaṃ, koṭīnañca sattasattatiyo;

Hontiṭṭhasatāniṭṭha-tiṃsasatasahassāni iti gaṇanā.

and eighty-seven lakhs, and seventy-seven crores, and thirty-eight hundred-thousands, and eight hundred—thus is the enumeration.

Paṭṭhānassa pucchāgaṇanagāthā.

Verses on the Enumeration of Questions in the Paṭṭhāna.

Paṭṭhānapakaraṇa-mūlaṭīkā samattā.

The Root Commentary on the Paṭṭhāna Treatise is concluded.

Iti bhadantaānandācariyakena katā līnatthapadavaṇṇanā

Thus, the Explanation of the Hidden Meanings was composed by the venerable teacher Ānanda.

Abhidhammassa mūlaṭīkā samattā.

The Root Commentary to the Abhidhamma is concluded.