Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa

Homage to the Blessed One, the Arahant, the Perfectly Enlightened One.

Abhidhammapiṭake

In the Abhidhamma Piṭaka

Dhammasaṅgaṇī-mūlaṭīkā

The Dhammasaṅgaṇī Mūlaṭīkā

Vīsatigāthāvaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Twenty Verses

1. Dhammasaṃvaṇṇanāyaṃ [Pg.1] satthari paṇāmakaraṇaṃ dhammassa svākkhātabhāvena satthari pasādajananatthaṃ, satthu ca avitathadesanabhāvappakāsanena dhamme pasādajananatthaṃ. Tadubhayappasādā hi dhammasampaṭipatti mahato ca atthassa siddhi hotīti. Atha vā ratanattayapaṇāmavacanaṃ attano ratanattayapasādassa viññāpanatthaṃ, taṃ pana viññūnaṃ cittārādhanatthaṃ, taṃ aṭṭhakathāya gāhaṇatthaṃ, taṃ sabbasampattinipphādanatthanti. Idaṃ pana ācariyena adhippetappayojanaṃ antarāyavisosanaṃ. Vakkhati hi ‘‘nipaccakārassetassa…pe… asesato’’ti. Ratanattayapaṇāmakaraṇañhi antarāyakarāpuññavighātakarapuññavisesabhāvato maṅgalabhāvato bhayādiupaddavanivāraṇato ca antarāyavisosane samatthaṃ hoti. Kathaṃ panetassāpuññavighātakarādibhāvo vijānitabboti? ‘‘Yasmiṃ mahānāma samaye ariyasāvako tathāgataṃ anussarati, nevassa tasmiṃ samaye rāgapariyuṭṭhitaṃ cittaṃ hotī’’tiādivacanato (a. ni. 6.10; 11.11), ‘‘pūjā ca pūjaneyyānaṃ, etaṃ maṅgalamuttama’’nti (khu. pā. 5.3; su. ni. 262) ca, ‘‘evaṃ buddhaṃ sarantānaṃ, dhammaṃ saṅghañca bhikkhavo. Bhayaṃ vā chambhitattaṃ vā, lomahaṃso na hessatī’’ti (saṃ. ni. 1.249) ca vacanatoti.

1. In this exposition of the Dhamma, the making of homage to the Teacher is for the purpose of generating confidence in the Teacher through the well-proclaimed nature of the Dhamma, and for generating confidence in the Dhamma by revealing the Teacher’s nature of teaching truthfully. For through confidence in both, the right practice of the Dhamma and the accomplishment of great benefit are achieved. Alternatively, the statement of homage to the Triple Gem is for the purpose of making known one’s own confidence in the Triple Gem; that, in turn, is for pleasing the minds of the wise; that is for the sake of apprehending the commentary; and that is for the fulfillment of all prosperity. This, however, is the purpose intended by the Teacher [the commentator]: the removal of obstacles. For it will be said: “For this one who pays homage reverently… completely.” Indeed, the making of homage to the Triple Gem is capable of removing obstacles because of its nature as a special kind of merit that obstructs demerit which causes obstacles, because of its nature as a blessing, and because it wards off dangers such as fear. But how is this nature of obstructing demerit, etc., to be understood? From statements such as: “At whatever time, Mahānāma, a noble disciple recollects the Tathāgata, his mind is not overcome by lust at that time,” and “To honor those worthy of honor—this is the greatest blessing,” and “For those, O bhikkhus, who recollect the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Saṅgha, there will be no fear or terror or bristling of hairs.”

Tattha yassa satthuno paṇāmaṃ kattukāmo, tassa guṇavisesadassanatthaṃ ‘‘karuṇā viyā’’tiādimāha. Guṇavisesavā hi paṇāmāraho [Pg.2] hoti, paṇāmārahe ca kato paṇāmo vuttappayojanasiddhikarova hotīti. Bhagavato ca desanā vinayapiṭake karuṇāppadhānā, suttantapiṭake paññākaruṇāppadhānā. Teneva ca kāraṇena vinayapiṭakassa saṃvaṇṇanaṃ karontena karuṇāppadhānā bhagavato thomanā katā, āgamasaṃvaṇṇanañca karontena ubhayappadhānā, abhidhammadesanā pana paññāppadhānāti katvā paññāppadhānameva thomanaṃ karonto ‘‘karuṇā viya sattesū’’ti karuṇaṃ upamābhāvena gahetvā paññāya thometi.

Here, wishing to pay homage to the Teacher, he says “like compassion,” and so on, to show his special qualities. For one endowed with special qualities is worthy of homage, and homage paid to one worthy of homage accomplishes the stated purpose. The Blessed One’s teaching in the Vinaya Piṭaka is predominantly compassionate, while in the Suttanta Piṭaka it is predominantly concerned with wisdom and compassion. For that very reason, when commenting on the Vinaya Piṭaka, the praise of the Blessed One is predominantly compassionate; when commenting on the Āgamas, it emphasizes both. But considering that the Abhidhamma teaching is predominantly concerned with wisdom, in offering a praise that is predominantly wise, he takes compassion as a simile and praises wisdom with the words “like compassion toward beings.”

Tattha karuṇā viyāti nidassanavacanametaṃ, yassa yathā karuṇā sabbesu sattesu pavattittha, evaṃ sabbesu ñeyyadhammesu paññāpi pavattitthāti attho. Sattesūti visayanidassanametaṃ. Paññāti nidassetabbadhammanidassanaṃ. Yassāti tadadhiṭṭhānapuggalanidassanaṃ. Mahesinoti tabbisesanaṃ. Ñeyyadhammesūti paññāvisayanidassanaṃ. Sabbesūti tabbisesanaṃ. Pavattitthāti kiriyānidassanaṃ. Yathārucīti vasībhāvanidassanaṃ.

Here, “like compassion” is an illustrative expression, meaning that just as his compassion extended to all beings, so too his wisdom extended to all knowable phenomena. “Towards beings” indicates the object. “Wisdom” indicates the phenomenon to be illustrated. “Of whom” indicates the individual in whom it is based. “Great seer” is its qualification. “Towards knowable phenomena” indicates the object of wisdom. “All” is its qualification. “Extended” indicates the action. “As desired” indicates mastery.

Tattha kiratīti karuṇā, paradukkhaṃ vikkhipati apanetīti attho. Rūpādīsu sattā visattāti sattā. Tassā pana paññattiyā khandhasantāne niruḷhabhāvato nicchandarāgāpi ‘‘sattā’’ti vuccanti. Pajānātīti paññā, yathāsabhāvaṃ pakārehi paṭivijjhatīti attho. Yassāti aniyamanaṃ. ‘‘Tassa pāde namassitvā’’ti etena niyamanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Mahesīti mahante sīlakkhandhādayo esi gavesīti mahesi. Ñātabbāti ñeyyā, sabhāvadhāraṇādinā atthena dhammā. Tattha ‘‘ñeyyā’’ti vacanena dhammānaṃ añeyyattaṃ paṭikkhipati. ‘‘Dhammā’’ti vacanena ñeyyānaṃ sattajīvādibhāvaṃ paṭikkhipati. Ñeyyā ca te dhammā cāti ñeyyadhammā. Sabbesūti anavasesapariyādānaṃ. Tena aññātābhāvaṃ dasseti. Pavattitthāti uppajjittha. Yathārucīti yā yā ruci yathāruci, rucīti ca icchā, kattukāmatā sā. Yā yā pavattā tappabhedā, yathā vā ruci tathā, rucianurūpaṃ pavattā ‘‘yathāruci pavattitthā’’ti vuccati. Yathā yathā vā ruci pavattā, tathā tathā pavattā paññā ‘‘yathāruci pavattitthā’’ti vuccati.

Here, `karuṇā` (compassion) is so called because it `kirati` (scatters); the meaning is that it dispels and removes the suffering of others. `Sattā` (beings) are so called because they are `sattā` (attached) and `visattā` (clinging) to forms and so on. However, because of the firmly established nature of that designation in the continuum of the aggregates, even those without desire and lust are called 'beings.' `Paññā` (wisdom) is so called because it `pajānāti` (discerns); the meaning is that it penetrates things according to their own-nature in various ways. `Yassa` ('of whom') indicates indefiniteness. By the phrase 'having paid homage at his feet,' definiteness should be understood. `Mahesī` (great seer) means one who `esi` (seeks) or `gavesi` (searches for) great things, such as the aggregates of virtue. `Ñeyyā` means 'to be known'; `dhammā` are things in the sense of bearing their own nature, and so on. Here, the word `ñeyyā` rejects the idea that things are unknowable, while the word `dhammā` rejects the idea that the knowable consists of a being, a life-principle, and so on. They are both knowable and things, thus they are `ñeyyadhammā`. `Sabbesu` ('in all') signifies complete inclusion, thereby showing that nothing remains unknown. `Pavattitthā` means 'arose.' `Yathāruci` means 'according to whatever inclination.' `Ruci` is wish, the desire to act. It is called 'arose as desired' because it arose in its various kinds, or because it arose in conformity with inclination. Or, in whatever way inclination arose, in that way wisdom arose; this is called 'arose as desired.'

Tattha bhagavati pavattāva karuṇā bhagavato paññāya nidassananti gahetabbā. Sā hi asādhāraṇā mahākaruṇā, na aññā. Yassāti ca karuṇāpaññānaṃ ubhinnampi ādhārapuggalanidassanaṃ. Na hi nirādhārā karuṇā atthīti [Pg.3] ‘‘karuṇā’’ti vutte tadādhārabhūto puggalo nidassetabbo hoti, so ca idha añño vutto natthi, na ca āsannaṃ vajjetvā dūrassa gahaṇe payojanaṃ atthīti ‘‘yassā’’ti nidassitapuggalova karuṇāya ādhāro. Tena idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti ‘‘yassa attano karuṇā viya paññāpi pavattitthā’’ti. Kathaṃ pana karuṇā sattesu pavattittha yathā paññāpi dhammesu pavattitthāti? Niravasesato yathāruci ca. Bhagavato hi karuṇā kañci sattaṃ avajjetvā sabbesu sattesu niravasesesu pavattati, pavattamānā ca rucivasena ekasmiṃ anekesu ca aññehi asādhāraṇā pavattati. Na hi aññesaṃ ‘‘mahoghapakkhandānaṃ sattānaṃ natthañño koci oghā uddhatā aññatra mayā’’ti passantānaṃ karuṇokkamanaṃ hoti yathā bhagavatoti. Paññāpi bhagavato sabbesu dhammesu niravasesesu pavattati, pavattamānā ca ekasmiṃ anekesu ca dhammesu sabhāvakiccādijānanena anāvaraṇā asādhāraṇā pavattati yathāruci, yathā ca passantassa bhagavato karuṇā yathāruci pavattati. Taṃ sabbaṃ paṭisambhidāmagge mahākaruṇāñāṇavibhaṅgavasena jānitabbaṃ, paññāya ca yathāruci pavatti sesāsādhāraṇañāṇavibhaṅgādivasena. Paññāgahaṇena ca tīsu kālesu appaṭihatañāṇaṃ catusaccañāṇaṃ catupaṭisambhidāñāṇaṃ, karuṇāgahaṇena mahākaruṇāsamāpattiñāṇassa gahitattā taṃ vajjetvā aññāni asādhāraṇañāṇāni catuvesārajjañāṇaṃ dasabalāni cha abhiññā catucattālīsa ñāṇavatthūni sattasattati ñāṇavatthūnīti evamādayo aneke paññāppabhedā saṅgayhanti, tasmā tassā tassā paññāya pavattivasena yathāruci pavatti veditabbā. Tenāha ‘‘karuṇā viya…pe… yathārucī’’ti.

Here, the compassion that arose in the Blessed One should be understood as an illustration for the Blessed One’s wisdom. For this is his unique great compassion, not any other. And the phrase "of whom" indicates the person who is the basis for both compassion and wisdom. For there is no compassion without a basis, so when "compassion" is mentioned, the person who serves as its basis must be pointed out. Here, no other person is mentioned, nor is there any purpose in referring to someone distant while excluding one who is near. Thus, the person indicated by "of whom" is the basis of compassion. Therefore, this is what is said: "Just as his own compassion arose, so too did wisdom arise." But how did compassion arise toward beings just as wisdom arose toward phenomena? Without exception and as desired. The Blessed One’s compassion extends to all beings without exception, leaving none aside. And as it extends, it functions uniquely—either toward one being or many—according to his inclination. For no others have compassion that surges forth like the Blessed One’s, seeing that "among beings swept away by the great flood, there is no one else to pull them out except me." Similarly, the Blessed One’s wisdom extends to all phenomena without exception. As it extends, it functions without obstruction—either toward one phenomenon or many—through knowing their nature, function, and so forth, uniquely and as desired, just as the compassion of the one who sees thus extends as desired. All this should be understood from the analysis of the knowledge of great compassion in the Paṭisambhidāmagga, and the arising of wisdom as desired from the analysis of the other unique knowledges. By the term 'wisdom,' unhindered knowledge of the three times, knowledge of the four truths, and knowledge of the four analytical knowledges are included. By the term 'compassion,' the knowledge of the attainment of great compassion is included. Excluding that, other unique knowledges are included—such as the four kinds of fearlessness, the ten powers, the six direct knowledges, the forty-four bases of knowledge, and the seventy-seven bases of knowledge—thus, many kinds of wisdom are encompassed. Therefore, the arising as desired should be understood in terms of the arising of each particular wisdom. Hence it is said: "Like compassion… as desired."

Tattha karuṇāgahaṇena mahābodhiyā mūlaṃ dasseti. Mahādukkhasambādhappaṭipannañhi sattanikāyaṃ disvā ‘‘tassa natthañño koci saraṇaṃ, ahametaṃ mutto mocessāmī’’ti karuṇāya sañcoditamānaso abhinīhāraṃ dīpaṅkarassa bhagavato pādamūle katvā bodhisambhāre samodhānetvā anupubbena sambodhiṃ pattoti karuṇā mahābodhiyā mūlanti. Sattesūti etena mahābodhiyā payojanaṃ dasseti. Sattā hi mahābodhiṃ payojenti. Sattasantāraṇatthañhi sabbaññutā abhipatthitā. Yathāha –

Therein, by the taking up of compassion, the root of Great Enlightenment is shown. For, having seen the multitude of beings who had fallen into the confinement of great suffering, with a mind stirred by compassion—'There is no other refuge for them; I, being liberated, will liberate them'—and having made the resolution at the feet of the Blessed One Dīpaṅkara, having accumulated the requisites for enlightenment, and having gradually attained perfect enlightenment, compassion is the root of Great Enlightenment. By the words 'for beings,' the purpose of Great Enlightenment is shown. Indeed, beings are the purpose of Great Enlightenment, for omniscience was wished for for the sake of delivering beings. As it is said:

‘‘Kiṃ [Pg.4] me ekena tiṇṇena, purisena thāmadassinā;

Sabbaññutaṃ pāpuṇitvā, santāressaṃ sadevaka’’nti. (bu. vaṃ. 2. 56);

"What use to me is crossing over alone, a man of strength and vision? Having attained omniscience, I shall ferry across the world with its gods."

Paññāgahaṇena mahābodhiṃ dasseti. Sabbaññutāya hi padaṭṭhānabhūtaṃ maggañāṇaṃ, maggañāṇapadaṭṭhānañca sabbaññutaññāṇaṃ ‘‘mahābodhī’’ti vuccatīti. Ñeyyadhammesu sabbesūti etena santāretabbānaṃ sattānaṃ abhiññeyyapariññeyyapahātabbabhāvetabbasacchikātabbe khandhāyatanadhātusaccindriyapaṭiccasamuppādasatipaṭṭhānādibhede kusalādibhede ca sabbadhamme dasseti. Pavattittha yathārucīti etena paṭivedhapaccavekkhaṇapubbaṅgamadesanāñāṇappavattidīpanena payojanasampattiṃ dasseti. Sabbadhammānañhi paṭivedhañāṇaṃ bodhipallaṅke ahosi. Maggañāṇameva hi tanti. Paccavekkhaṇañāṇañca visesena ratanagharasattāhe ahosi. Evaṃ paṭividdhapaccavekkhitānaṃ dhammānaṃ dhammacakkappavattanādīsu desanāñāṇaṃ ahosi, visesena ca paṇḍukambalasilāyaṃ sattappakaraṇadesanāyanti. Desanāñāṇena ca desento bhagavā sattesu hitapaṭipattiṃ paṭipajjatīti. Etena sabbena attahitapaṭipattiṃ parahitapaṭipattiñca dasseti. Mahābodhidassanena hi attahitapaṭipatti, itarehipi parahitapaṭipatti dassitāti. Tena attahitapaṭipannādīsu catūsu puggalesu bhagavato catutthapuggalabhāvaṃ dasseti, tena ca anuttaradakkhiṇeyyabhāvaṃ niratisayapaṇāmārahabhāvañca attano ca kiriyāya khettaṅgatabhāvaṃ dasseti.

By taking up wisdom, He shows the great enlightenment. For the path-knowledge, which is the foundation for omniscience, and the knowledge of omniscience, which has the path-knowledge as its foundation, are called ‘great enlightenment.’ By ‘in all knowable phenomena,’ He shows all dhammas—for the beings to be ferried across—to be directly known, fully understood, abandoned, developed, and realized: the aggregates, sense bases, elements, truths, faculties, dependent origination, foundations of mindfulness, etc., in their divisions as wholesome, etc. By ‘arose as he wished,’ He shows the accomplishment of the purpose by indicating the arising of the knowledge of teaching, which is preceded by penetration and reviewing. For the knowledge of penetration of all dhammas occurred at the seat of enlightenment. Indeed, the path-knowledge itself is the guideline. And the knowledge of reviewing occurred especially during the week in the Jeweled House. Thus, the knowledge of teaching concerning the dhammas that had been penetrated and reviewed arose in the turning of the Wheel of Dhamma, etc., and especially during the discourse on the seven treatises on the Paṇḍukambala stone. And teaching with the knowledge of teaching, the Blessed One engages in the practice for the welfare of beings. By all this, He shows both the practice for His own welfare and the practice for the welfare of others. For by showing the great enlightenment, the practice for His own welfare is shown; by the others, the practice for the welfare of others is shown. Thereby, among the four kinds of persons, such as the one who has entered upon the practice for his own welfare, He shows that the Blessed One is the fourth person. And thereby He shows His state of being an unsurpassed recipient of offerings, His state of being worthy of unsurpassed veneration, and His state of being a field for the action of others.

Ettha ca karuṇāgahaṇena lokiyesu mahaggatabhāvappattāsādhāraṇaguṇadīpanato sabbalokiyaguṇasampatti bhagavato dassitā hoti, paññāgahaṇenapi sabbaññutaññāṇapadaṭṭhānamaggañāṇadīpanato sabbalokuttaraguṇasampatti. Karuṇāvacanena ca upagamanaṃ nirupakkilesaṃ, paññāvacanena apagamanaṃ dasseti. Upagamanaṃ dassento ca loke sañjātasaṃvaḍḍhabhāvaṃ dasseti, apagamanaṃ dassento lokena anupalittataṃ. ‘‘Karuṇā viya sattesū’’ti ca lokasamaññānurūpaṃ bhagavato pavattiṃ dasseti, ‘‘ñeyyadhammesu sabbesu yathāruci paññā pavattitthā’’ti etena samaññāya anatidhāvanaṃ. Sabbadhammasabhāvānavabodhe hi sati samaññaṃ atidhāvitvā ‘‘satto jīvo atthī’’ti parāmasanaṃ hotīti. Sabbesañca buddhaguṇānaṃ karuṇā ādi tannidānabhāvato, paññā pariyosānaṃ tato [Pg.5] uttarikaraṇīyābhāvato. Ādipariyosānadassanena ca sabbe buddhaguṇā dassitāva honti. Karuṇāgahaṇena ca sīlakkhandhapubbaṅgamo samādhikkhandho dassito hoti. Karuṇānidānañhi sīlaṃ tato pāṇātipātādiviratippavattito tassā ca jhānattayasampayogato. Paññāvacanena paññākkhandho. Sīlañca sabbabuddhaguṇānaṃ ādi, samādhi majjhaṃ, paññā pariyosānanti evampi ādimajjhapariyosānakalyāṇā sabbe buddhaguṇā dassitā honti.

Here, by taking up compassion, the Blessed One’s accomplishment in all worldly qualities is shown, as it illuminates the uncommon virtues attained in worldly states of greatness. By taking up wisdom, His accomplishment in all supramundane qualities is shown, as it illuminates the path-knowledge that is the proximate cause for the knowledge of omniscience. Moreover, the word ‘compassion’ indicates approach, which is without defilement, while the word ‘wisdom’ indicates withdrawal. In showing approach, He shows His state of having been born and bred in the world; in showing withdrawal, He shows His being unsullied by the world. The phrase ‘like compassion toward beings’ illustrates the Blessed One’s conduct in conformity with worldly convention, while ‘wisdom arose as he wished in all knowable dhammas’ shows His not overstepping convention. For when there is no understanding of the true nature of all dhammas, one oversteps convention and misapprehends, ‘A being, a life exists.’ Furthermore, of all the Buddha’s qualities, compassion is the beginning, because it is their cause, and wisdom is the culmination, because there is nothing further to be done beyond it. Thus, by showing the beginning and the end, all the Buddha’s qualities are revealed. By taking up compassion, the aggregate of concentration, which is preceded by the aggregate of virtue, is shown. For virtue has compassion as its cause, since from that there arises abstention from killing living beings, etc., and because of its connection with the three jhānas. By the word ‘wisdom,’ the aggregate of wisdom is shown. Virtue is the beginning of all the Buddha’s qualities, concentration is the middle, and wisdom is the culmination. In this way, all the Buddha’s qualities are shown to be lovely in their beginning, middle, and end.

2. Evaṃ saṅkhepena sabbabuddhaguṇehi bhagavantaṃ thometvā yassā saṃvaṇṇanaṃ kattukāmo, tāya abhidhammadesanāya aññehi asādhāraṇāya thometuṃ ‘‘dayāya tāyā’’tiādimāha. Tassā pana desanāya nidānañca samuṭṭhānañca dassetuṃ ‘‘dayāya tāyā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Nidānañca duvidhaṃ abbhantaraṃ bāhirañcāti. Abbhantaraṃ karuṇā, bāhiraṃ desakālādi. Samuṭṭhānaṃ desanāpaññā. Tattha abbhantaranidānaṃ dassento ‘‘dayāya tāya sattesu, samussāhitamānaso’’ti āha. Tattha dayāti karuṇā adhippetā. Tāya hi samussāhito abhidhammakathāmaggaṃ sampavattayīti. Tāyāti ayaṃ ta-saddo pubbe vuttassa paṭiniddeso hoti.

2. Having thus briefly praised the Blessed One with all the qualities of a Buddha, and wishing to give an exposition of it, he begins, ‘through that compassion,’ etc., in order to praise Him by means of that Abhidhamma teaching, which is not shared by others. Now, to show both the cause and the origin of that teaching, the words ‘through that compassion,’ etc., were said. The cause is twofold: internal and external. The internal is compassion (karuṇā); the external is the place and time of the teaching, and so on. The origin is the wisdom of teaching. There, showing the internal cause, he says, ‘through that compassion for beings, with mind aroused.’ Herein, by ‘compassion’ (dayā), karuṇā is intended. For it was through that (tāya) that He, being aroused, set in motion the path of the Abhidhamma discourse. ‘That’ (tāya)—this word ‘ta’ is a reference back to what was previously stated.

Purimagāthāya ca padhānabhāvena paññā niddiṭṭhā, tabbisesanabhāvena karuṇā. Sā hi tassā nidassanabhūtā appadhānā taṃ visesetvā vinivattā, tasmā ‘‘tāyā’’ti paṭiniddesaṃ nārahati. Yā ca padhānabhūtā paññā, sā desanāya samuṭṭhānaṃ, na samussāhinīti tassā ca paṭiniddeso na yuttoti? Paññāya tāva paṭiniddeso na yuttoti suvuttametaṃ, karuṇāya pana paṭiniddeso no na yutto ‘‘dayāya tāyā’’ti dvinnaṃ padānaṃ samānādhikaraṇabhāvato. Samānādhikaraṇānañhi dvinnaṃ padānaṃ rūpakkhandhādīnaṃ viya visesanavisesitabbabhāvo hoti. Rūpa-saddo hi aññakkhandhanivattanatthaṃ vuccamāno visesanaṃ hoti, khandha-saddo ca nivattetabbagahetabbasādhāraṇavacanabhāvato visesitabbo, evamidhāpi ‘‘dayāya tāyā’’ti dvinnaṃ padānaṃ ekavibhattiyuttānaṃ samānādhikaraṇabhāvato visesanavisesitabbabhāvo hoti. Tattha dayā samussāhinīti padhānā, nivattetabbagahetabbasādhāraṇavacanañcidaṃ. Tasmā ‘‘dayāyā’’ti visesitabbavacanametaṃ, tassa ca yathā visesanaṃ hoti ‘‘tāyā’’ti [Pg.6] idaṃ vacanaṃ, tathā tassa paṭiniddesabhāvo yojetabbo. Na hi paññāpaṭiniddesabhāve dayāvisesanaṃ ta-saddo hoti, karuṇāpaṭiniddesabhāve ca hotīti. Padhānañca paññaṃ vajjetvā ‘‘dayāyā’’ti etena sambajjhamāno ‘‘tāyā’’ti ayaṃ ta-saddo appadhānāya karuṇāya paṭiniddeso bhavitumarahati. Ayamettha attho – yāya dayāya samussāhito, na sā yā kāci, sabbaññutaññāṇassa pana nidassanabhūtā mahākaruṇā, tāya samussāhitoti.

In the previous verse, wisdom was indicated as the primary factor, and compassion as its qualifier. For that compassion, being illustrative of wisdom and subordinate, withdraws after having qualified it; therefore, it does not deserve the reference back by ‘tāyā.’ (Objection:) And since the primary wisdom is the origin of the teaching, not the inspirer, is it not therefore correct that there is no reference back to it? (Reply:) That the reference back to wisdom is not right, this is well said. But the reference back to compassion is not inappropriate, because the two words, ‘dayāya’ and ‘tāyā,’ are in apposition. For two words in apposition, such as ‘form-aggregate,’ etc., have the relationship of qualifier and qualified. The word ‘form,’ being used to exclude the other aggregates, is the qualifier, while the word ‘aggregate,’ being a general term for what is to be excluded and what is to be taken, is the qualified. So too here, since the two words ‘dayāya tāyā’ are joined in the same case, they have the relationship of qualifier and qualified. Therein, ‘dayā’ is primary as it is the inspirer; this is a general term for what is to be excluded and what is to be taken. Therefore, ‘dayāya’ is the word to be qualified. And just as the word ‘tāyā’ is its qualifier, so its nature as a reference back should be construed. For the word ‘ta’ is not a qualifier of ‘dayā’ if it is a reference back to wisdom, but it is if it is a reference back to compassion. And excluding the primary wisdom, this word ‘ta’ in ‘tāyā,’ being connected with ‘dayāya,’ can be a reference back to the subordinate compassion. This is the meaning here: He was aroused by a certain compassion—not just any compassion, but by that great compassion which is illustrative of the knowledge of omniscience; by that was He aroused.

Kathaṃ pana karuṇā ‘‘dayā’’ti ñātabbā, nanu vuttaṃ ‘‘dayāpanno’’ti etassa aṭṭhakathāyaṃ (dī. ni. aṭṭha. 1.8) ‘‘mettacittataṃ āpanno’’ti, tasmā dayā mettāti yujjeyya, na karuṇāti? Yadi evaṃ ‘‘adayāpanno’’ti etassa aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘nikkaruṇataṃ āpanno’’ti vuttanti dayā mettāti ca na yujjeyya, tasmā dayā-saddo yattha yattha pavattati, tattha tattha adhippāyavasena yojetabbo. Dayā-saddo hi anurakkhaṇatthaṃ antonītaṃ katvā pavattamāno mettāya ca karuṇāya ca pavattatīti no na yujjati. Evañhi aṭṭhakathānaṃ avirodho hotīti. Karuṇā ca desanāya nidānabhāvena vuttā, na mettā ‘‘accantameva hi taṃ samayaṃ bhagavā karuṇāvihārena vihāsī’’ti (dī. ni. aṭṭha. 1.1; ma. ni. aṭṭha. 1.1 mūlapariyāyasuttavaṇṇanā; saṃ. ni. aṭṭha. 1.1.1; a. ni. aṭṭha. 1.1.1) evamādīsu, tasmā idha karuṇāva dayāvacanena gahitāti veditabbā. Sā hi samussāhinī, na mettā, mettā pana paññāgatikapavattinī hotīti.

But how, then, is karuṇā to be known as ‘dayā’? Was it not said in the commentary on ‘dayāpanno’ (one endowed with dayā) (D.A. 1.8) that it means ‘having attained a mind of loving-kindness (mettā)’? Therefore, it would be correct that dayā is mettā, not karuṇā, would it not? If so, since it is said in the commentary on ‘adayāpanno’ (one not endowed with dayā) that it means ‘having attained a state of lack of compassion (nikkaruṇataṃ),’ then it would not be correct that dayā is mettā. Therefore, wherever the word dayā occurs, it should be construed there according to the intended meaning. For it is indeed fitting that the word dayā, when used with the implicit meaning of ‘protecting,’ applies to both loving-kindness and compassion. For in this way, there is no contradiction in the commentaries. And karuṇā is stated as the cause of the teaching, not mettā—as in such passages as, ‘For at that very time the Blessed One was dwelling in the abiding in compassion’ (D.A. 1.1, etc.). Therefore, it should be understood that here it is karuṇā itself that is taken by the word dayā. For that is the instigator, not mettā. Mettā, however, proceeds with wisdom as its sphere.

‘‘Sattesū’’ti kasmā evaṃ vuttaṃ, nanu ‘‘tāyā’’ti etena vacanena sattavisayā karuṇā gahitāti? No na gahitā, purimagāthāya pana ‘‘sattesu karuṇā yathāruci pavattitthā’’ti sappadesasattavisayā nippadesasattavisayā ca sabbā vuttā, idha pana nippadesasattavisayataṃ gahetuṃ ‘‘sattesū’’ti nippadesasattavisayabhūtā dassitā. Tena sabbasattavisayāya karuṇāya samussāhito abhidhammakathāmaggaṃ devānaṃ sampavattayi, na devavisayāya eva, tasmā sabbasattahitatthaṃ abhidhammakathāmaggaṃ devānaṃ sampavattayi, na devānaṃyeva atthāyāti ayamattho dassitova hoti. Atha vā ‘‘sattesū’’ti idaṃ na dayāya ālambananidassanaṃ, samussāhanavisayo pana etena dassito. Abhidhammakathāmaggappavattanatthañhi bhagavā karuṇāya na devesuyeva samussāhito[Pg.7], sabbabodhaneyyesu pana sattesu samussāhito sabbesaṃ atthāya pavattattā, tasmā sattesu samussāhitamānasoti sattesu visayabhūtesu nimittabhūtesu vā samussāhitamānaso uyyojitacittoti attho daṭṭhabbo.

Why was it said thus: 'among beings'? Was not compassion for beings understood by the word 'tāyā'? No, it was not so understood. In the previous verse, however, it was said, 'compassion was extended among beings as desired,' and thus all compassion was mentioned, both that with a limited range of beings as its object and that with an unlimited range of beings as its object. But here, to convey the meaning of having an unlimited range of beings as its object, the phrase 'among beings' is shown as having an unlimited range of beings as its object. Thus, inspired by compassion for all beings, he set in motion the path of the Abhidhamma discourse for the devas, not by compassion having only the devas as its object. Therefore, this meaning is shown: he set in motion the path of the Abhidhamma discourse for the devas for the welfare of all beings, not for the benefit of the devas alone. Alternatively, this 'among beings' is not an indication of the object of compassion; rather, the scope of the inspiration is shown by this. For, in setting in motion the path of the Abhidhamma discourse, the Blessed One was inspired by compassion not in regard to the devas alone but in regard to all beings capable of being enlightened, as it was set in motion for the benefit of all. Therefore, 'his mind was inspired in regard to beings' should be understood to mean: his mind was inspired, his thought was directed, with beings as the object or as the basis.

Evaṃ abbhantaranidānaṃ dassetvā bāhiranidānaṃ dassento ‘‘pāṭihīrāvasānamhī’’tiādimāha. Tattha yasmiṃ kāle bhagavatā abhidhammakathāmaggo pavattito, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘pāṭihīrāvasānamhi vasanto’’ti vuttaṃ. ‘‘Avasānamhi vasanto tidasālaye’’ti vacanato yassāvasānamhi tidasālaye vasi, taṃ kaṇḍambamūle kataṃ yamakapāṭihāriyaṃ idha ‘‘pāṭihīra’’nti vuttaṃ, na bodhimūlādīsu kataṃ pāṭihāriyaṃ, nāpi ādesanānusāsaniyoti viññāyati, pākaṭattā ca āsannattā ca tadeva gahitanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Pāṭihāriyapadassa vacanatthaṃ (udā. aṭṭha. 1; itivu. aṭṭha. nidānavaṇṇanā) ‘‘paṭipakkhaharaṇato rāgādikilesāpanayanato pāṭihāriya’’nti vadanti, bhagavato pana paṭipakkhā rāgādayo na santi ye haritabbā. Puthujjanānampi hi vigatupakkilese aṭṭhaṅgaguṇasamannāgate citte hatapaṭipakkhe iddhividhaṃ pavattati, tasmā tattha pavattavohārena ca na sakkā idha ‘‘pāṭihāriya’’nti vattuṃ. Sace pana mahākāruṇikassa bhagavato veneyyagatā ca kilesā paṭipakkhā, tesaṃ haraṇato ‘‘pāṭihāriya’’nti vuttaṃ, evaṃ sati yuttametaṃ. Atha vā bhagavato ca sāsanassa ca paṭipakkhā titthiyā, tesaṃ haraṇato pāṭihāriyaṃ. Te hi diṭṭhiharaṇavasena diṭṭhippakāsane asamatthabhāvena ca iddhiādesanānusāsanīhi haritā apanītā hontīti. Atha vā paṭīti ayaṃ saddo ‘‘pacchā’’ti etassa atthaṃ bodheti ‘‘tasmiṃ paṭipaviṭṭhamhi, añño āgañchi brāhmaṇo’’tiādīsu (su. ni. 985; cūḷani. pārāyanavagga, vatthugāthā 4) viya, tasmā samāhite citte vigatupakkilese ca katakiccena pacchā haritabbaṃ pavattetabbanti paṭihāriyaṃ, attano vā upakkilesesu catutthajjhānamaggehi haritesu pacchā haraṇaṃ paṭihāriyaṃ, iddhiādesanānusāsaniyo ca vigatupakkilesena katakiccena ca sattahitatthaṃ puna pavattetabbā, haritesu ca attano upakkilesesu parasattānaṃ upakkilesaharaṇāni hontīti paṭihāriyāni bhavanti, paṭihāriyameva pāṭihāriyaṃ. Paṭihāriye vā iddhiādesanānusāsanisamudāye bhavaṃ ekekaṃ pāṭihāriyanti vuccati. Paṭihāriyaṃ [Pg.8] vā catutthajjhānaṃ maggo ca paṭipakkhaharaṇato, tattha jātaṃ, tasmiṃ vā nimittabhūte, tato vā āgatanti pāṭihāriyaṃ. Pāṭihāriyameva idha ‘‘pāṭihīra’’nti vuttaṃ. Avasānamhi vasantoti etehi kālaṃ nidasseti. Pāṭihīrakaraṇāvasānena hi tidasālayavāsena ca paricchinno abhidhammakathāmaggappavattanassa kāloti. Tidasālayeti desaṃ nidasseti. So hi abhidhammakathāmaggappavattanassa deso tattha vasantena pavattitattāti.

Having thus shown the internal cause, he now shows the external cause, saying: 'at the conclusion of the miracle,' etc. Herein, to indicate the time when the Blessed One expounded the path of the Abhidhamma discourse, it is said: 'dwelling at the conclusion of the miracle.' From the statement 'dwelling at the conclusion in the Tāvatiṃsa abode,' it is understood that the twin miracle performed at the foot of the Kaṇḍamba tree is here referred to as 'the miracle,' not the miracles performed at the foot of the Bodhi tree and elsewhere, nor those of mind-reading and instruction. It should be seen that this was taken because of its prominence and proximity. Regarding the meaning of the word 'pāṭihāriya' (miracle), some say: 'It is a pāṭihāriya because it removes (haraṇa) opposing factors (paṭipakkha), because it eliminates defilements such as lust.' But the Blessed One has no opposing factors such as lust to be removed. For even in the case of worldlings, the various kinds of psychic power operate when the mind is free from imperfections, endowed with the eight qualities, and has its opposing factors struck down; thus, based on that prevalent usage, it cannot be called a 'pāṭihāriya' here. However, if it is said that the defilements of those to be trained are the opposing factors for the greatly compassionate Blessed One, and their removal is the 'pāṭihāriya,' this would be appropriate. Alternatively, the opponents of the Blessed One and his Dispensation are the sectarians, and their removal is the pāṭihāriya. For they are removed, dispelled, by psychic power, mind-reading, and instruction, through the refutation of their views and because of their inability to proclaim their own doctrine. Or else, the word 'paṭi' conveys the meaning 'after,' as in such passages as: 'after he had entered, another brahmin arrived.' Thus, because it is to be brought about after the mind has been concentrated, is free from imperfections, and one has done what had to be done, it is called a 'pāṭihāriya.' Or, after one’s own imperfections have been removed by the fourth jhāna and the path, the subsequent removal is a 'pāṭihāriya.' Psychic power, mind-reading, and instruction are to be set in motion again for the welfare of beings by one who is free from imperfections and has done what had to be done. And when one’s own imperfections are removed, the removal of the imperfections of other beings occurs—these are the 'pāṭihāriyas.' A pāṭihāriya is simply a pāṭihāriya. Alternatively, each individual component occurring in the collection of pāṭihāriyas—psychic power, mind-reading, and instruction—is called a 'pāṭihāriya.' Or, the fourth jhāna and the path are a pāṭihāriya because they remove opposing factors; that which is born therein, or has that as its basis, or comes from that, is a pāṭihāriya. 'Pāṭihāriya' itself is here called 'pāṭihīra.' With 'dwelling at the conclusion' he indicates the time. For the time of expounding the path of the Abhidhamma discourse is delimited by the conclusion of the performance of the miracle and the residence in the Tāvatiṃsa abode. With 'in the Tāvatiṃsa abode' he indicates the place. For that was the place of the expounding of the path of the Abhidhamma discourse, as it was set in motion by him while dwelling there.

3. Tatthāpi desavisesadassanatthaṃ ‘‘pāricchattakamūlamhī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Yugandhareti sītapabbatesveko dvecattālīsayojanasahassubbedho, ādicco ca tadubbedhamaggacārī, so sati sambhave yathā yugandhare sobheyya, evaṃ sobhamāno nisinnoti attho.

3. Therein, too, to show the specific place, it is said: 'at the foot of the Pāricchattaka tree,' etc. Yugandhara is one of the encircling mountain ranges, forty-two thousand yojanas high, and the sun travels on a path at that same height. The meaning is: he was seated shining in such a way, just as the sun would shine upon Yugandhara, if that were possible.

4-5. Idāni puggale dhammapaṭiggāhake apadisanto ‘‘cakkavāḷasahassehī’’tiādimāha. Sabbasoti samantato āgamma sabbehi disābhāgehi, sannivesavasena vā samantato sanniviṭṭhehi dasahi cakkavāḷasahassehīti adhippāyo, na sabbaso cakkavāḷasahassehi dasahi dasahīti. Evaṃ sati cattālīsacakkavāḷasahassehi adhikehi vā āgamanaṃ vuttaṃ siyā, na cetaṃ adhippetanti. Samantato sannisinnenāti vā yojetabbaṃ. Samaṃ, sammā vā nisinnena sannisinnena, aññamaññaṃ abyābādhetvā bhagavati gāravaṃ katvā sotaṃ odahitvā nisajjadose vajjitabbe vajjetvā nisinnenāti attho. Mātaraṃ pamukhaṃ katvā sannisinnena devānaṃ gaṇena parivāritoti vā, mātaraṃ pamukhaṃ katvā abhidhammakathāmaggaṃ sampavattayīti vā yojanā kātabbā.

4–5. Now, indicating the persons who were receivers of the Dhamma, he said: 'from ten thousand world-systems,' etc. 'Sabbaso' means having come from all around, from all directions; or, by way of arrangement, the meaning is 'from ten thousand world-systems arranged all around.' The meaning is not 'from ten thousand world-systems, ten by ten.' If so, a coming from forty thousand or more world-systems would be stated, and this is not intended. Alternatively, it should be connected as 'seated all around' (samantato sannisinnena). Sannisinnena means seated evenly (samaṃ) or properly (sammā); the meaning is: seated without disturbing one another, having shown reverence to the Blessed One, having inclined the ear, and having avoided the avoidable faults of posture. Or, the construction is: 'surrounded by the assembly of devas seated with his mother at the forefront.' Or, the construction should be made thus: 'having placed his mother at the forefront, he set in motion the path of the Abhidhamma discourse'.

Idāni desanāya samuṭṭhānaṃ dassento ‘‘tassā paññāya tejasā’’ti āha. Yā sā ādimhi karuṇāya upamitā sabbañeyyadhammānaṃ yathāsabhāvajānanasamatthā, tesaṃ desetabbappakārajānanasamatthā, bodhetabbapuggalānaṃ āsayādhimuttiyādivibhāvanasamatthā ca paññā, tassā ca yathāvuttabalayogatoti attho. Tena sabbaññutaññāṇameva abhidhammakathāya samuṭṭhānabhāve samatthaṃ, nāññanti imamatthaṃ dīpento abhidhammakathāya asādhāraṇabhāvaṃ dasseti. Maggoti upāyo. Khandhāyatanādīnaṃ kusalādīnañca dhammānaṃ avabodhassa, saccappaṭivedhasseva vā upāyabhāvato ‘‘abhidhammakathāmaggo’’ti vutto. Pabandho [Pg.9] vā ‘‘maggo’’ti vuccati. So hi dīghattā maggo viyāti maggo, tasmā abhidhammakathāpabandho ‘‘abhidhammakathāmaggo’’ti vutto. Devānaṃ gaṇena parivāritoti vatvā puna devānanti vacanaṃ tesaṃ gahaṇasamatthataṃ dīpeti. Na hi asamatthānaṃ bhagavā desetīti.

Now, showing the origin of the teaching, he said, 'by the brilliance of that wisdom.' The meaning is this: by the application of the power, as described, of that wisdom which at the outset was conjoined with compassion, and which is capable of knowing all knowable phenomena according to their true nature, capable of knowing the manner in which they should be taught, and capable of discerning the inclinations, dispositions, and so forth of those to be enlightened. By this, while explaining that only the knowledge of omniscience is capable of being the origin of the Abhidhamma discourse and nothing else, he shows the unique nature of the Abhidhamma discourse. 'Magga' means method. It is called the 'path of the Abhidhamma discourse' because it is a method for the understanding of phenomena such as the aggregates and bases, and of wholesome states and so forth, or for the very penetration of the truths. Alternatively, a continuous discourse (pabandha) is called 'magga.' For on account of its length it is like a path, thus it is a path. Therefore, the continuous discourse of the Abhidhamma is called the 'path of the Abhidhamma discourse.' Having said, 'surrounded by an assembly of devas,' the repetition of the word 'devas' indicates their capacity to grasp the teaching. For the Blessed One does not teach those who are incapable.

6. Evaṃ karuṇāpaññāmukhehi guṇehi bhagavato abhidhammakathāmaggappavattanena ca hitappaṭipattiyā paramapaṇāmārahataṃ dassetvā idāni adhippetaṃ paṇāmaṃ karonto āha ‘‘tassa pāde namassitvā’’ti. Bhagavato thomaneneva ca dhammassa svākkhātatā saṅghassa ca suppaṭipannatā dassitā hoti tappabhavassa anaññathābhāvato, tasmā paṇāmārahaṃ tañca ratanadvayaṃ paṇamanto ‘‘saddhammañcassa…pe… cañjali’’nti āha. Tattha yasmā buddho ‘‘sadevake loke tathāgato vandanīyo’’ti, saṅgho ca ‘‘suppaṭipanno…pe… añjalikaraṇīyo’’ti (a. ni. 6.10) vutto, tasmā ‘‘tassa pāde namassitvā, katvā saṅghassa cañjali’’nti vuttaṃ. Dhammo pana svākkhātatādiguṇayutto tathānussaraṇena pūjetabbo hoti ‘‘tameva dhammaṃ sakkatvā garuṃkatvā upanissāya vihareyya’’nti (saṃ. ni. 1.173; a. ni. 4.21) vacanato, kāyavācācittehi sabbathā pūjetabbo, tasmā ‘‘saddhammañcassa pūjetvā’’ti vuttaṃ. Sirīmatoti ettha sirīti paññāpuññānaṃ adhivacananti vadanti. Atha vā puññanibbattā sarīrasobhaggādisampatti katapuññe nissayati, katapuññehi vā nissīyatīti ‘‘sirī’’ti vuccati, sā ca atisayavatī bhagavato atthīti sirīmā, bhagavā, tassa sirīmato.

6. Having thus shown that the Blessed One is worthy of the highest homage on account of his qualities headed by compassion and wisdom, and through his setting in motion the path of the Abhidhamma discourse for the practice of what is beneficial, now, making his intended homage, he says, “Having paid homage at his feet.” By praising the Blessed One, the well-proclaimed nature of the Dhamma and the good conduct of the Sangha are also shown, as they originate from him and are not otherwise. Therefore, paying homage to him who is worthy of homage, and to those two gems, he says, “and having revered his good Dhamma… and the añjali.” Herein, since the Buddha is declared as “the Tathāgata, worthy of veneration in the world with its devas,” and the Sangha as “of good conduct… worthy of the añjali gesture” (AN 6.10), it is thus said, “Having paid homage at his feet, and having made the añjali gesture to the Sangha.” The Dhamma, however, endowed with qualities such as being well-proclaimed, should be revered by such recollection: “Having respected and honored that very Dhamma, one should dwell depending on it” (SN 1.173; AN 4.21). It should be revered in every way by body, speech, and mind; hence it is said, “and having revered his good Dhamma.” As to “of the glorious one” (sirīmato): here, they say that “sirī” is a term for wisdom and merit. Alternatively, the perfection of bodily beauty and other assets produced by merit is dependent on one who has made merit, or is depended upon by those who have made merit; thus it is called “sirī.” This is present in the Blessed One to an exceedingly great degree, hence he is “sirīmā,” the glorious one, the Blessed One; “of that glorious one.”

7. Nipaccakārassāti paṇāmakiriyāya. Ānubhāvenāti balena. Sosetvāti sukkhāpetvā antaradhāpetvā atthaṃ pakāsayissāmīti sambandho. Antarāyeti atthappakāsanassa upaghātake. Asesatoti nissese sakale.

7. “Of one who shows respect” (nipaccakārassa) means by the act of homage. “By the power” (ānubhāvena) means by the strength. “Having dried up” (sosetvā) means having caused to dry up, having made disappear; the connection is with “I will explain the meaning.” “Obstacles” (antarāye) means that which destroys the explanation of the meaning. “Completely” (asesato) means without remainder, entirely.

8. Idāni abhidhammassa gambhīratthattā atthappakāsanassa dukkarabhāvaṃ dīpetuṃ ‘‘visuddhācārasīlenā’’tiādinā abhiyācanaṃ dasseti. Thullaccayādivisuddhiyā visuddhācāro, pārājikasaṅghādisesavisuddhiyā visuddhasīlo. Cārittavārittavisuddhiyā [Pg.10] vā visuddhācārasīlo, tena. Sakkaccanti cittiṃ katvā. Abhiyācitoti abhimukhaṃ yācito. Tena anādariyaṃ atthappakāsane kātuṃ asakkuṇeyyaṃ dasseti.

8. Now, to show the difficulty of explaining the meaning of the Abhidhamma on account of its profound meaning, he indicates the entreaty with the words “by one of pure conduct and virtue,” etc. One of pure conduct (visuddhācāra) is one purified of grave offenses and so on; one of pure virtue (visuddhasīla) is one purified of offenses entailing defeat (pārājika) and formal meetings of the Sangha (saṅghādisesa). Or, one of pure conduct and virtue (visuddhācārasīla) is one purified in respect of both conduct to be observed and conduct to be avoided; by that. “Respectfully” (sakkaccaṃ) means having paid respect. “Entreated” (abhiyācito) means requested face-to-face. By this, he shows that he would be unable to treat the explanation of the meaning with disrespect.

9. Idāni yassa atthaṃ pakāsetukāmo, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘yaṃ devadevo’’tiādimāha. Tattha yanti abhidhammaṃ. Devadevoti visuddhisammutiupapattidevānaṃ devo. Loke hi ye ‘‘saraṇaṃ parāyaṇa’’nti gantabbā gatibhūtā, te ‘‘devā’’ti vuccanti, bhagavā ca sabbadevānaṃ gatibhūtoti. Nayatoti saṅkhepato. Samācikkhīti sammā ācikkhi yathā thero bujjhati. Veneyyasatte vinetīti vināyako, nāyakavirahito vā, sayambhūti attho.

9. Now, to show that of which he wishes to explain the meaning, he says, “which the Deva of devas…,” etc. Herein, “which” refers to the Abhidhamma. “Deva of devas” means the deva of the devas by purification, by convention, and by rebirth. For in the world, those who are a destination to be gone to as a “refuge and final resort” are called “devas,” and the Blessed One is the destination for all devas. “By way of method” (nayato) means concisely. “He explained well” (samācikkhi) means he taught correctly so that the Elder would understand. He trains trainable beings (veneyyasatte vineti), thus he is a “trainer” (vināyako); or, he is one without a guide, meaning he is self-become (sayambhū).

10-12. Yañcāti yañca abhidhammaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ payirudāhāsīti sambandho. Payirudāhāsīti kathesi. Itīti iminā anukkamena. ‘‘Yo dhārito’’ti yanti upayogavasena vutto yaṃ-saddo dhāritoti paccattena sambajjhamāno paccattavasena pariṇamati, tasmā yo dhārito, yo ca saṅgīto, tassa atthaṃ pakāsayissāmīti yojanā kātabbā. Vedena paññāya īhati pavattatīti vedeho, tena muninā. Abhiṇhasoti bahuso. Abhidhammassāti etaṃ ‘‘atthaṃ pakāsayissāmī’’ti etena yojetabbaṃ. Idāni yo atthappakāsanassa nissayo, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘ādito’’tiādimāha. Tattha āditoti ādimhi paṭhamasaṅgītiyaṃ.

10–12. “And which” (yañca) is connected with “which Abhidhamma he recited to the bhikkhus.” “He recited” (payirudāhāsi) means he spoke. “Thus” (iti) means by this sequence. Regarding “which was retained” (yo dhārito): here the word “which” (yaṃ), stated in the sense of the object, when connected with the agentive “retained” (dhārito), is transformed into the agentive case. Therefore, the connection should be made thus: “that which was retained and that which was chanted, the meaning of that I will explain.” “He who strives and proceeds with knowledge (veda), that is, with wisdom (paññā), is a Vedeha (wise one)”; by that sage (muninā). “Repeatedly” (abhiṇhaso) means many times. “Of the Abhidhamma” is to be connected with “I will explain the meaning.” Now, to show the basis for the explanation of the meaning, he says, “from the beginning…,” etc. Herein, “from the beginning” means at the beginning, at the First Council.

13. Yā aṭṭhakathā saṅgītā, kassa pana sā aṭṭhakathāti? Aññassa vuttassa abhāvā ‘‘yassa atthaṃ pakāsayissāmī’’ti vuttaṃ, adhikāravasena ‘‘tassa abhidhammassā’’ti viññāyati. Saṅgītāti atthaṃ pakāsetuṃ yuttaṭṭhāne ‘‘ayaṃ etassa attho, ayaṃ etassa attho’’ti saṅgahetvā vuttā, pacchāpi ca dutiyatatiyasaṅgītīsu anusaṅgītā.

13. The commentary that was chanted—but whose commentary is it? Since nothing else has been mentioned, and since it was said, “whose meaning I will explain,” it is understood by way of the topic under discussion that it is “of that Abhidhamma.” “Chanted” (saṅgītā) means that, in order to explain the meaning, it was compiled and stated in appropriate places as “this is the meaning of this, this is the meaning of this,” and later it was also chanted in succession at the Second and Third Councils.

14-16. Abhisaṅkhatāti racitā. Tatoti aṭṭhakathāto. Tantinayānuganti tantigatiṃ anugataṃ. Bhāsanti māgadhabhāsaṃ. Nikāyantaraladdhīhīti antarantarā anuppavesitāhi. Asammissanti avokiṇṇaṃ. Anākulanti sanikāyepi anāvilaṃ paricchinnaṃ. Asammisso anākulo ca yo mahāvihāravāsīnaṃ atthavinicchayo, taṃ dīpayanto atthaṃ pakāsayissāmīti[Pg.11]. Etena tipiṭakacūḷanāgattherādīhi vutto theravādopi saṅgahito hoti. Atha vā tambapaṇṇibhāsaṃ apanetvā māgadhabhāsañca āropetvā pakāsiyamāno yo abhidhammassa attho asammisso anākuloyeva ca hoti mahāvihāravāsīnañca vinicchayabhūto, taṃ atthaṃ ‘‘eso mahāvihāravāsīnaṃ vinicchayo’’ti dīpayanto pakāsayissāmi. Tappakāsaneneva hi so tathā dīpito hotīti.

14–16. “Composed” (abhisaṅkhatā) means created. “From that” (tato) means from the commentary. “Following the textual method” (tantinayānugaṃ) means following the course of the canon. “They speak” refers to the Māgadhī language. “With the tenets of other schools” (nikāyantaraladdhīhi) means with those inserted here and there. “Unmixed” (asammissaṃ) means not blended. “Unconfused” (anākulaṃ) means, even within its own school, unadulterated and distinct. I will explain the meaning, illuminating that decision on the meaning of the residents of the Mahāvihāra which is unmixed and unconfused. By this, the Theravāda doctrine spoken by elders such as Tipiṭaka Cūḷanāga is also included. Or else: having removed the Tambapaṇṇi language and having established the Māgadhī language, I will explain the meaning, illuminating that meaning of the Abhidhamma which is being explained as unmixed and unconfused and which is the decision of the residents of the Mahāvihāra, by stating, “This is the decision of the residents of the Mahāvihāra.” For by that very explanation, it is thus illuminated.

17. Tosayanto vicakkhaṇeti vicakkhaṇe tosayanto gahetabbaṃ gahetvānāti evaṃ yojetvā ‘‘gahetabbaṭṭhāneyeva gahitaṃ suṭṭhu kata’’nti evaṃ tosayantoti atthaṃ vadanti. Evaṃ sati gahetabbaggahaṇeneva tosanaṃ kataṃ, na aññena atthappakāsanenāti etaṃ āpajjeyya. Tosayanto atthaṃ pakāsayissāmīti evaṃ pana yojanāya sati gahetabbaggahaṇaṃ aññañca sabbaṃ atthappakāsanaṃ hotīti sabbena tena tosanaṃ kataṃ hoti, tasmā tosayanto atthaṃ pakāsayissāmīti yuttarūpā.

17. As to “satisfying the discerning” (tosayanto vicakkhaṇe): some explain the meaning by connecting it thus: “having taken what should be taken, satisfying the discerning,” so that the meaning is “satisfying them by thinking, ‘What should be taken has been well taken.’” If this were so, it would follow that the satisfying is done only by the taking of what should be taken, not by any other explanation of the meaning. But when the connection is made thus: “Satisfying them, I will explain the meaning,” then the taking of what should be taken and all the other explanation of the meaning is included, so the satisfying is done by all of that. Therefore, the construction “Satisfying them, I will explain the meaning” is the more suitable one.

18-20. Idāni yaṃ atthappakāsanaṃ kattukāmo, tassa mahattaṃ pariharituṃ ‘‘kammaṭṭhānānī’’tiādimāha. Atthavaṇṇananti ettha vaṇṇanā nāma vivaritvā vitthāretvā vacanaṃ. Itīti ‘‘apanetvā tato bhāsa’’nti evamādinā yathādassitappakārena. Iti sotūnaṃ ussāhuppādanassa hetuṃ dasseti. Abhidhammakathanti abhidhammaṭṭhakathaṃ. Nisāmethāti suṇātha. Idāni avassaṃ ayaṃ sotabbāyevāti daḷhaṃ ussāhento āha ‘‘dullabhā hi ayaṃ kathā’’ti.

18–20. Now, to set forth the greatness of the explanation of the meaning he wishes to make, he says, “The meditation subjects…,” etc. Herein, “explanation of the meaning” (atthavaṇṇanā) is a statement that explains and elaborates. “Thus” (iti) refers to the manner shown by such phrases as “having removed the language from that….” Thus he shows the reason for arousing the enthusiasm of the listeners. “Discourse on Abhidhamma” (abhidhammakathā) means the commentary on the Abhidhamma. “Listen” (nisāmetha) means “you should hear.” Now, firmly encouraging them that this must certainly be listened to, he says, “for this discourse is rare.”

Vīsatigāthāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Twenty Verses is finished.

Nidānakathāvaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Introduction

Aṭṭhasāliniṃ tāva vaṇṇentehi ācariyehi tassā sanniveso vibhāvetabbo. Tasmā idaṃ vuccati –

First, when teachers explain the Aṭṭhasālinī, its structure should be made clear. Therefore, this is said:

‘‘Vacanattho paricchedo, sanniveso ca pāḷiyā;

Sāgarehi tathā cintā, desanāhi gambhīratā.

The meaning of the term, the division, and the structure of the Pāḷi; likewise, thought like the oceans, and profundity through the discourses.

‘‘Desanāya [Pg.12] sarīrassa, pavattiggahaṇaṃ tathā;

Therassa vācanāmagga-tappabhāvitatāpi ca.

The body of the teaching, likewise the grasp of its transmission; and also the Elder's path of recitation and its being imbued with that.

‘‘Paṭivedhā tathā buddha-vacanādīhi ādito;

Ābhidhammikabhāvassa, sādhanaṃ sabbadassino.

Likewise, the penetration from the beginning through the Buddha's words, etc.; the proof of the All-Seeing One's status as an expert in Abhidhamma.

‘‘Vinayenātha gosiṅga-suttena ca mahesinā;

Bhāsitattassa saṃsiddhi, nidānena ca dīpitā.

Then, the accomplishment of what was spoken by the Great Sage is illuminated by the Vinaya and the Gosiṅga Sutta, and also by the introduction.

‘‘Pakāsetvā imaṃ sabbaṃ, paṭiññātakathā katā;

Aṭṭhasāliniyā etaṃ, sannivesaṃ vibhāvaye’’ti.

Having explained all this, the statement of the topic is made; one should understand this as the structure of the Aṭṭhasālinī.

Vacanatthavijānanena viditābhidhammasāmaññatthassa abhidhammakathā vuccamānā sobheyyāti abhidhammaparijānanameva ādimhi yuttarūpanti tadatthaṃ pucchati ‘‘tattha kenaṭṭhena abhidhammo’’ti. Tattha tatthāti ‘‘abhidhammassa atthaṃ pakāsayissāmī’’ti yadidaṃ vuttaṃ, tasmiṃ. ‘‘Yassa atthaṃ pakāsayissāmī’’ti paṭiññātaṃ, so abhidhammo kenaṭṭhena abhidhammoti attho. Tatthāti vā ‘‘abhidhammakatha’’nti etasmiṃ vacane yo abhidhammo vutto, so kenaṭṭhena abhidhammoti attho. Dhammātirekadhammavisesaṭṭhenāti ettha dhammo atireko dhammātireko, suttantādhikā pāḷīti attho. Dhammo viseso dhammaviseso dhammātisayo, vicittā pāḷīti attho, dhammātirekadhammavisesā eva attho dhammātirekadhammavisesaṭṭho. Dvinnampi atthānaṃ abhidhammasaddassa atthabhāvena sāmaññato ekavacananiddeso kato. Tasmāti yasmā ‘‘abhikkamanti, abhikkantavaṇṇā’’tiādīsu viya atirekavisesaṭṭhadīpako abhisaddo, tasmā ayampi dhammo dhammātirekadhammavisesaṭṭhena ‘‘abhidhammo’’ti vuccatīti sambandho.

Thinking, “The discourse on Abhidhamma, when spoken, would be excellent for one who knows the general meaning of Abhidhamma through understanding the meaning of the term,” it is held that it is proper at the outset to understand the Abhidhamma itself. For that purpose, the question is asked: “In this context, in what sense is it ‘Abhidhamma’?” Here, “in this context” refers to what was said: “I will explain the meaning of the Abhidhamma.” The meaning is: that Abhidhamma whose meaning was pledged to be explained with the words, “whose meaning I will explain”—in what sense is it “Abhidhamma”? Or else, “in this context” refers to the phrase “discourse on Abhidhamma”; the meaning is: the Abhidhamma mentioned in this phrase—in what sense is it “Abhidhamma”? It is in the sense of additional Dhamma and special Dhamma. Here, Dhamma that is additional is “additional Dhamma” (dhammātireka); the meaning is the Pāḷi that is more than the Suttanta. Dhamma that is special is “special Dhamma” (dhammavisesa), a superior Dhamma; the meaning is the variegated Pāḷi. The meanings are precisely “additional Dhamma” and “special Dhamma,” which is the sense of “additional Dhamma and special Dhamma.” Because the word “Abhidhamma” has the sense of both meanings, a singular designation is made as a generic term. Therefore, because the prefix abhi- indicates the sense of “additional” and “special”—as in such phrases as “they advance” (abhikkamanti) and “of surpassing beauty” (abhikkantavaṇṇā)—this Dhamma is also called “Abhidhamma” in the sense of additional Dhamma and special Dhamma. This is the connection.

Tattha siyā – ‘‘abhikkamanti, abhikkantavaṇṇā’’ti ettha dhātusaddassa purato payujjamāno abhisaddo kiriyāya atirekavisesabhāvadīpako hotīti yuttaṃ upasaggabhāvato, dhammasaddo pana na dhātusaddoti etasmā purato abhisaddo payogameva nārahati. Athāpi payujjeyya, kiriyāvisesakā upasaggā, na ca dhammo kiriyāti dhammassa atirekavisesabhāvadīpanaṃ na yuttanti? No na yuttaṃ. Aññassapi hi upasaggassa adhātusaddā [Pg.13] purato payujjamānassa akiriyāyapi atirekavisesabhāvadīpakassa dassanatoti etamatthaṃ vibhāvetuṃ atichattādiudāharaṇaṃ dassento āha ‘‘yathā’’tiādi. Evamevāti yathā chattātirekachattavisesādiatthena atichattādayo honti atisaddassa upasaggassa adhātusaddassapi purato payujjamānassa akiriyāya ca tabbhāvadīpakattā, evamayampi dhammo dhammātirekadhammavisesaṭṭhena ‘‘abhidhammo’’ti vuccati abhi-saddassa upasaggassa adhātusaddassapi purato payujjamānassa akiriyāya ca tabbhāvadīpakattāti adhippāyo.

Here it might be said: In such expressions as 'they advance, of surpassing beauty,' it is suitable that the prefix 'abhi,' when placed before a verbal root, serves to indicate an exceeding or distinctive quality of the action, because it is a prefix. But the word 'dhamma' is not a verbal root, so it is not at all appropriate to use the prefix 'abhi' before it. And even if it were used, since prefixes are qualifiers of actions and 'dhamma' is not an action, would it not be unsuitable to indicate an exceeding or distinctive quality of 'dhamma'? It is not unsuitable. For another prefix, too, is seen to indicate an exceeding or distinctive quality even of what is not an action when placed before a non-verbal root. To clarify this point, he introduces examples like 'atichatta' and says, 'just as,' and so on. The meaning is this: Just as 'atichatta' (surpassing umbrella) and similar words have the meaning of an exceeding or special umbrella because the prefix 'ati' is used before a non-verbal root and indicates that quality even for a non-action, so too this 'dhamma' is called 'abhidhamma' with the meaning of an exceeding or special Dhamma because the prefix 'abhi' is used before a non-verbal root and indicates that quality even for a non-action.

Ekadeseneva vibhattāti ‘‘katame ca, bhikkhave, pañcakkhandhā? Rūpakkhandho…pe… viññāṇakkhandho. Katamo ca, bhikkhave, rūpakkhandho? Yaṃ kiñci rūpaṃ atītā…pe… santike vā, ayaṃ vuccati rūpakkhandho’’tievamādinā (saṃ. ni. 3.48; vibha. 2) uddesaniddesamatteneva vibhattā, ‘‘tattha katamaṃ rūpaṃ atīta’’ntievamādinā (vibha. 3) paṭiniddesassa abhidhammabhājanīyassa pañhapucchakassa ca abhāvā na nippadesena. Abhidhammaṃ patvā pana…pe… nippadesatova vibhattā, tasmā ayampi dhammo dhammātirekadhammavisesaṭṭhena ‘‘abhidhammo’’ti vuccati nippadesānaṃ tiṇṇampi nayānaṃ atirekapāḷibhāvato visesapāḷibhāvato cāti adhippāyo. Suttante bāvīsatiyā indriyānaṃ ekato anāgatattā indriyavibhaṅge suttantabhājanīyaṃ natthi. ‘‘Avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā sambhavantī’’tiādinā paṭiccasamuppāde tassa tassa paccayadhammassa paccayuppannadhammānaṃ paccayabhāvo uddiṭṭho, uddiṭṭhadhammānañca kusalādibhāvo pucchitvā vissajjetabbo, na cettha ‘‘avijjāsaṅkhārā’’ti evaṃ vutto uddeso atthīti pañhapucchakaṃ natthi. Suttante pañca sikkhāpadāni uddiṭṭhāni pāṇātipātā veramaṇītiādīni. Sā pana veramaṇī yadi sabhāvakiccādivasena vibhajīyeyya, ‘‘ārati viratī’’tiādinā abhidhammabhājanīyameva hoti. Athāpi cittuppādavasena vibhajīyeyya, tathāpi abhidhammabhājanīyameva hoti. Añño pana veramaṇīnaṃ vibhajitabbappakāro natthi, yena pakārena suttantabhājanīyaṃ vattabbaṃ siyā. Tasmā sikkhāpadavibhaṅge suttantabhājanīyaṃ natthi.

Classified only in part means: 'And what, bhikkhus, are the five aggregates? The aggregate of form… the aggregate of consciousness. And what, bhikkhus, is the aggregate of form? Whatever form there is, past… or nearby, this is called the aggregate of form.' Thus they are classified by mere statement and exposition (as in SN 3.48; Vibh 2). Because of the absence of a detailed exposition, an Abhidhamma-style analysis, and a question-and-answer section such as, 'Therein, what is past form?' (Vibh 3), they are not classified without remainder. But when it comes to the Abhidhamma… they are classified without remainder. The meaning is this: therefore this Dhamma, too, is called 'Abhidhamma' in the sense of an exceeding and special Dhamma, because it is a surpassing and special text with respect to the three methods of classification without remainder. In the Suttanta, because the twenty-two faculties are not treated together, there is no Suttanta-style analysis in the Indriyavibhaṅga. In the teaching on dependent origination, beginning with 'With ignorance as condition, volitional formations come to be,' the conditionality of each conditioning state for the conditioned states is pointed out, and the wholesome, etc., nature of the states thus pointed out is to be asked and answered. But here there is no statement given in the form 'ignorance-formations' to serve as a heading for analysis, so there is no question-and-answer section. In the Suttanta, the five training rules are stated, beginning with 'abstinence from the destruction of life.' But if that abstinence is analyzed by way of its nature, function, etc., as 'abstaining, refraining,' it becomes an Abhidhamma-style analysis. And if it is analyzed by way of the arising of consciousness, it still becomes an Abhidhamma-style analysis. There is no other way to analyze the abstinences that could be called a Suttanta-style analysis. Therefore, in the Sikkhāpadavibhaṅga, there is no Suttanta-style analysis.

Vacanatthato abhidhamme ñāte paricchedato ñāpetuṃ āha ‘‘pakaraṇaparicchedato’’tiādi. Katipayāva pañhavārā avasesāti dhammahadayavibhaṅge anāgatā hutvā mahādhammahadaye āgatā dhammahadayavibhaṅgavacanavasena [Pg.14] avasesā katipayāva pañhavārāti attho. Ettheva saṅgahitāti ‘‘apubbaṃ natthī’’ti vuttaṃ. Appamattikāva tanti avasesāti dhammahadayavibhaṅge anāgantvā mahādhammahadaye āgatatantito yadi pathavīādīnaṃ vitthārakathā mahādhātukathā rūpakaṇḍadhātuvibhaṅgādīsu, atha dhātukathāya vitthārakathā dhātukathāya anāgantvā mahādhātukathāya āgatatanti appamattikāvāti adhippāyo.

Having understood the Abhidhamma by way of its literal meaning, in order to explain it by way of its divisions, he said, 'by the division of the treatises,' and so on. The meaning of 'only a few question sections remain' is that the few remaining question sections—those that were not included in the Dhammahadayavibhaṅga but were included in the Mahādhammahadaya—are what remain, according to the statement in the Dhammahadayavibhaṅga. Because they are included right here, it is said, 'There is nothing new.' The intention behind 'only a very small text remains' is this: of the textual material that did not appear in the Dhammahadayavibhaṅga but did appear in the Mahādhammahadaya, while the detailed discussion of earth, etc., is found in the Mahādhātukathā, Rūpakaṇḍadhātuvibhaṅga, etc., the detailed discussion pertaining to the Dhātukathā that did not appear in the Dhātukathā itself but did appear in the Mahādhātukathā constitutes only a very small text.

Yaṃ pana vuttaṃ ‘‘sāvakabhāsitattā chaḍḍetha na’’nti, taṃ buddhabhāsitabhāvadassanena paṭisedhetuṃ ‘‘sammāsambuddho hī’’tiādimāha. Catūsu pañhesūti ‘‘upalabbhati nupalabbhatī’’ti paṭiññāya gahitāya paṭikkhepagahaṇatthaṃ ‘‘yo saccikaṭṭho’’ti vuttaṃ saccikaṭṭhaṃ nissayaṃ katvā upādāya pavattā dvepi pañcakā eko pañho, ‘‘sabbatthā’’ti sarīraṃ sabbaṃ vā desaṃ upādāya pavattā eko, ‘‘sabbadā’’ti kālamupādāya eko, ‘‘sabbesū’’ti yadi khandhāyatanādayo gahitā, te upādāya pavattā, atha pana ‘‘yo saccikaṭṭho sabbattha sabbadā’’ti etehi na koci saccikaṭṭho deso kālo vā aggahito atthi, te pana sāmaññavasena gahetvā anuyogo kato, na bhedavasenāti bhedavasena gahetvā anuyuñjituṃ ‘‘sabbesū’’ti vuttā saccikaṭṭhadesakālappadese upādāya ca pavattā ekoti etesu catūsu. Dvinnaṃ pañcakānanti ettha ‘‘puggalo upalabbhati…pe… micchā’’ti ekaṃ, ‘‘puggalo nupalabbhati…pe… micchā’’ti (kathā. 18) ekaṃ, ‘‘tvaṃ ce pana maññasi…pe… idaṃ te micchā’’ti (kathā. 3) ekaṃ, ‘‘ese ce dunniggahite…pe… idaṃ te micchā’’ti ekaṃ, ‘‘na hevaṃ niggahetabbe, tena hi yaṃ niggaṇhāsi…pe… sukatā paṭipādanā’’ti (kathā. 10) ekanti evaṃ niggahakaraṇaṃ, paṭikammakaraṇaṃ, niggahassa suniggahabhāvaṃ icchato paṭiññāṭhapanena paṭikammaveṭhanaṃ, paṭikammassa duppaṭikammabhāvaṃ icchato taṃnidassanena niggahassa dunniggahabhāvadassanena niggahanibbeṭhanaṃ, aniggahabhāvāropanādinā chedoti ayaṃ eko pañcako, yo aṭṭhakathāyaṃ anulomapañcakapaṭikammacatukkaniggahacatukkaupanayanacatukkanigamanacatukka nāmehi sakavādipubbapakkhe anulomapaccanīkapañcakoti vutto, paravādipubbapakkhe ca evameva paccanīyānulomapañcakoti vutto. Evaṃ dve pañcakā veditabbā. Evaṃ sesapañhesupīti aṭṭha pañcakā aṭṭhamukhā vādayuttīti [Pg.15] vuttā. Yuttīti upāyo, vādassa yutti vādayutti, vādappavattanassa upāyoti attho.

As to what was said, 'You should not reject it on the grounds that it was spoken by a disciple,' to refute that by showing it was spoken by the Buddha, he said, 'For the Perfectly Enlightened One,' and so on. Regarding the four questions: when the proposition 'is found' or 'is not found' is taken up, the phrase 'what is the real and ultimate sense' is stated for the purpose of rejection and acceptance. The two pentads that proceed based on this real and ultimate sense constitute one question. ‘Everywhere?’ proceeds with reference to the whole body or any location; this is one question. ‘Always?’ proceeds with reference to time; this is one. ‘In all things?’ proceeds with reference to the aggregates, sense bases, and so on, if they are taken up. However, with the phrases 'what is the real and ultimate sense, everywhere, always,' no real and ultimate place or time is left ungrasped. But that inquiry is made generally, not by way of division. To inquire by way of division, the question 'In all things?' is stated, proceeding with reference to the particulars of the real and ultimate sense, place, and time; this is one question. These are the four. Regarding the two pentads: here, (1) 'The person is found… this is wrong'; (2) 'The person is not found… this is wrong'; (3) 'But if you think… this of yours is wrong'; (4) 'If that is badly grasped… this of yours is wrong'; (5) 'One should not be refuted thus; therefore, what you are refuting… the rejoinder is well made.' Thus this one pentad consists of: the act of refutation, the act of making a counter-move, the envelopment of the counter-move by establishing the proposition for one who desires the refutation to be sound, the unraveling of the refutation by showing the counter-move to be flawed and by showing the refutation to be unsound for one who desires this, and the conclusion by means of imputing a state of non-refutation, and so on. This is one pentad, which in the commentary—by the names of the forward pentad, the counter-move tetrad, the refutation tetrad, the application tetrad, and the conclusion tetrad—is called the 'forward-and-backward pentad' in the case of the proponent's initial thesis, and is similarly called the 'backward-and-forward pentad' in the case of the opponent's initial thesis. Thus two pentads are to be understood. Similarly in the remaining questions, the eight pentads are called the 'eight-faceted method of debate.' `Yutti` means a means (`upāya`). The `yutti` of a debate (`vādassa yutti`) is `vādayutti`; the meaning is the means for conducting a debate.

Anulomapaccanīkapañcake ādiniggahaṃ dassetvā paccanīyānulomapañcake ca ādiniggahameva dassetvā mātikaṃ dīpetuṃ ‘‘sā panesā’’tiādimāha. Puggaloti attā satto jīvo. Upalabbhatīti paññāya upagantvā labbhati. Saccikaṭṭhaparamaṭṭhenāti māyāmarīciādayo viya nābhūtākārena, anussavādīhi gahetabbā viya na anuttamatthabhāvena, atha kho bhūtena uttamatthabhāvena upalabbhatīti pucchati. Itaro tādisaṃ icchanto paṭijānāti. Puna yo saccikaṭṭhaparamaṭṭhena upalabbhati, so saccikaṭṭhaparamaṭṭhato añño tadādhāro, aññatra vā tehi, tesaṃ vā ādhārabhūto, anañño vā tato ruppanādisabhāvato sappaccayādisabhāvato vā upalabbhamāno āpajjatīti anuyuñjati ‘‘yo saccikaṭṭho…pe… paramaṭṭhenā’’ti. Itaro puggalassa rūpādīhi aññattaṃ anaññattañca anicchanto ‘‘na heva’’nti paṭikkhipati. Puna sakavādī paṭiññāya ekattāpannaṃ appaṭikkhipitabbaṃ paṭikkhipatīti katvā niggahaṃ āropento āha ‘‘ājānāhi niggaha’’nti. ‘‘Puggalo nupalabbhatī’’ti puṭṭho sakavādī puggaladiṭṭhiṃ paṭisedhento ‘‘āmantā’’ti paṭijānāti. Puna itaro yo saccikaṭṭhena nupalabbhati puggalo, so saccikaṭṭhaparamaṭṭhato añño vā anañño vā nupalabbhatīti āpajjati aññassa pakārassa abhāvāti anuyuñjati ‘‘yo saccikaṭṭho…pe… paramaṭṭhenā’’ti. Yasmā pana puggalo sabbena sabbaṃ nupalabbhati, tasmā tassa aññattānaññattānuyogo ananuyogo puggalaladdhiṃ paṭisedhentassa anāpajjanatoti ‘‘na heva’’nti paṭikkhipati. Itaro paṭiññāya āpajjanalesameva passanto aviparītaṃ atthaṃ asambujjhantoyeva niggahaṃ āropeti ‘‘ājānāhi niggaha’’nti.

Having shown the initial refutation in the forward-and-backward pentad, and likewise having shown the initial refutation in the backward-and-forward pentad, in order to explain the matrix, he says, 'But this...' and so on. 'Person' means self, a being, a life-principle. 'Is apprehended' means it is found by being approached with wisdom. 'In the real and ultimate sense' means he asks whether it is apprehended, not in an unreal manner like an illusion or a mirage, nor as something to be grasped by mere oral tradition and so on in a sense that is not the highest, but rather as something that is apprehended in a real and ultimate sense. The other, desiring such, agrees. Again, he cross-questions with the words, 'That which is real... in the ultimate sense,' asking: 'Does one who is apprehended in the real and ultimate sense turn out to be apprehended as other than that, based on it, or apart from it, or as its basis, or as not other than that which has the nature of being afflicted, etc., or a conditioned nature, etc.?' The other, not wishing the person to be either different from or not different from form and so on, rejects this, saying, 'It is not so.' Again, the proponent of the thesis, on the grounds that the other rejects what should not be rejected after it has been admitted in the assertion, imposes the refutation, saying: 'Acknowledge the refutation.' When asked, 'Is a person not apprehended?' the proponent of the thesis, rejecting the view of a person, agrees, 'Yes.' Again, the other cross-questions with the words, 'That which is real... in the ultimate sense,' asking: 'If a person is not apprehended in the real sense, does it follow that the person is not apprehended as either other than, or not other than, that which is real in the ultimate sense, since there is no other alternative?' But since a person is not apprehended in any way whatsoever, for one who rejects the doctrine of a person, the inquiry into its otherness or non-otherness is not a valid inquiry, as it does not follow. Thus, he rejects it, saying, 'It is not so.' The other, seeing only a semblance of an implication in the assertion and not understanding the correct meaning, imposes the refutation: 'Acknowledge the refutation.'

Itīti yaṃ disvā mātikā ṭhapitā, evaṃ desitattāti adhippāyo. Yathā kinti yena pakārena buddhabhāsitaṃ nāma jātaṃ, taṃ nidassanaṃ kinti attho. Yatonidānanti yaṃkāraṇā chaajjhattikabāhirāyatanādinidānanti attho. Papañcasaññāsaṅkhāti taṇhāmānadiṭṭhipapañcasampayuttā saññākoṭṭhāsā. Samudācarantīti ajjhācaranti. Ettha ceti etesu āyatanādīsu taṇhāmānadiṭṭhīhi abhinanditabbaṃ abhivaditabbaṃ ajjhositabbañca natthi ce[Pg.16]. Nanu natthiyeva, kasmā ‘‘natthi ce’’ti vuttanti? Saccaṃ natthi, appahīnābhinandanābhivadanajjhosānānaṃ pana puthujjanānaṃ abhinanditabbādippakārāni āyatanādīni hontīti tesaṃ na sakkā ‘‘natthī’’ti vattuṃ, pahīnābhinandanādīnaṃ pana sabbathā natthīti ‘‘natthi ce’’ti vuttaṃ. Esevantoti abhinandanādīnaṃ natthibhāvakaro maggo tappaṭippassaddhibhūtaṃ phalaṃ vā rāgānusayādīnaṃ anto avasānaṃ, appavattīti attho.

Iti means: having seen which, the matrix was established; the intention is 'because it was taught thus.' Yathā kiṃ means: in what way did what is called the Buddha's utterance come to be? What is the illustration of that? This is the meaning. Yatonidānaṃ means: from what cause; that is, with the six internal and external sense bases and so on as the cause, is the meaning. Papañcasaññāsaṅkhā means portions of perception associated with the conceptual proliferations of craving, conceit, and views. Samudācaranti means they assail. Ettha ce means: if, in these sense bases and so on, there is nothing to be delighted in, spoken of with delight, and clung to by means of craving, conceit, and views. But surely there is nothing? Why then is it said, 'if there is nothing'? It is true that there is nothing. But for worldlings who have not abandoned delighting, speaking with delight, and clinging, the sense bases and so on become things to be delighted in, etc., so one cannot say to them, 'there is nothing.' For those who have abandoned delighting and so on, however, there is nothing at all; hence it is said, 'if there is nothing.' Esevanto means: the path that brings about the non-existence of delighting and so on, or the fruit which is the calming of that, is the end, the cessation, of the underlying tendencies to lust and so on, meaning their non-occurrence; this is the meaning.

Jānaṃ jānātīti sabbaññutaññāṇena jānitabbaṃ jānāti. Na hi padesañāṇavā jānitabbaṃ sabbaṃ jānātīti. Passaṃ passatīti dibbacakkhupaññācakkhudhammacakkhubuddhacakkhusamantacakkhusaṅkhātehi pañcahi cakkhūhi passitabbaṃ passati. Atha vā jānaṃ jānātīti yathā aññe savipallāsā kāmarūpapariññāvādino jānantāpi vipallāsavasena jānanti, na evaṃ bhagavā, bhagavā pana pahīnavipallāsattā jānanto jānātiyeva, diṭṭhidassanassa ca abhāvā passanto passatiyevāti attho. Cakkhubhūtoti paññācakkhumayattā sattesu ca taduppādanato lokassa cakkhubhūto. Ñāṇabhūtoti etassa ca evameva attho daṭṭhabbo. Dhammā bodhipakkhiyā. Brahmā maggo, tehi uppannattā lokassa ca taduppādanato tabbhūto. Vattāti catusaccadhamme vadatīti vattā. Pavattāti ciraṃ saccappaṭivedhaṃ pavattento vadatīti pavattā. Atthassa ninnetāti atthaṃ uddharitvā dassetā, paramatthaṃ vā nibbānaṃ pāpayitā. Amatassa dātāti amatasacchikiriyaṃ sattesu uppādento amataṃ dadātīti amatassa dātā. Bodhipakkhiyadhammānaṃ tadāyattabhāvato dhammassāmī. Suvaṇṇāliṅganti suvaṇṇamayaṃ āliṅgaṃ khuddakamudiṅgaṃ. Supupphitasatapattapadumamiva sassirikaṃ sasobhaṃ supupphitasatapattasassirikaṃ.

‘Knowing, he knows’ means he knows with the knowledge of omniscience what should be known. For one with partial knowledge does not know everything that should be known. ‘Seeing, he sees’ means he sees with the five eyes—the divine eye, the wisdom eye, the Dhamma eye, the Buddha eye, and the universal eye—what should be seen. Alternatively, ‘knowing, he knows’ means: while other proponents of the full understanding of sensual pleasure and form, being subject to distortion, know by way of distortion even when they know, the Blessed One is not so. Since the Blessed One has abandoned distortion, when he knows, he truly knows; and because of the absence of seeing based on views, when he sees, he truly sees. This is the meaning. ‘Become the eye’ means he has become the eye of the world because he consists of the wisdom eye and because he generates it in beings. The meaning of ‘become knowledge’ should be understood in the very same way. ‘Dhamma’ means the requisites of enlightenment. ‘Brahma’ means the path; he has ‘become Brahma’ because it has arisen in him and because he generates it in the world. ‘Speaker’ means he is a speaker because he speaks the Dhamma of the Four Truths. ‘Proclaimer’ means he is a proclaimer because he speaks while setting in motion for a long time the penetration of the truths. ‘Leader to the goal’ means he is one who points out the meaning after extracting it, or one who leads to the ultimate goal, Nibbāna. ‘Giver of the Deathless’ means he is the giver of the Deathless because he gives the Deathless by generating the realization of the Deathless in beings. He is the ‘Lord of the Dhamma’ because the requisites of enlightenment are dependent on him. Suvaṇṇāliṅga means a golden drum, a small kettledrum. Supupphitasatapattasassirikaṃ means glorious and beautiful like a fully bloomed hundred-petalled lotus.

Anumoditakālato paṭṭhāya…pe… buddhabhāsitaṃ nāma jātanti etena anumodanā buddhabhāsitabhāvassa kāraṇanti ayamattho vutto viya dissati, evañca sati kathāvatthussa buddhabhāsitabhāvo na siyā ananumoditattā, tasmā evamettha attho daṭṭhabbo – ‘‘mahākaccāyano evaṃ vibhajissatī’’ti disvā bhagavā mātikaṃ nikkhipitvā vihāraṃ paviṭṭho, tatheva ca thero bhagavatā dinnanayena ṭhapitamātikāya vibhajīti buddhabhāsitaṃ nāma jātaṃ, taṃ pana anumodanāya pākaṭaṃ jātanti etamatthaṃ sandhāya ‘‘evaṃ satthārā…pe… nāma jāta’’nti vuttanti.

By the statement, 'From the time of its approval... it came to be called the Buddha's utterance,' it seems to be said that the approval is the reason for its being the Buddha's utterance. If this were so, the Kathāvatthu would not be the Buddha's utterance, as it was not approved. Therefore, the meaning here should be understood thus: Seeing, 'Mahākaccāyana will analyze it in this way,' the Blessed One laid down the matrix and entered his dwelling. And just so, the Elder analyzed the matrix established by the Blessed One according to the method given, and thus it came to be called the Buddha's utterance. But it became manifest through the approval. It is with reference to this meaning that it was said: 'Thus by the Teacher... it came to be called.'

Idāni [Pg.17] pāḷiyā sannivesaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘tattha dhammasaṅgaṇīpakaraṇe’’tiādimāha. Kāmāvacarakusalato aṭṭhāti kāmāvacarakusale cattāro khandhe gahetvā tato aṭṭha cittāni uddharati. Paṭhamā vibhattītipi vadanti. Ekūnanavuti cittānīti yattha etāni cittāni vibhattāni, te pāḷippadesā ‘‘ekūnanavuti cittānī’’ti vuttā. Tesañca samudāyo cittavibhatti, tasmā upapannametaṃ ‘‘ekūnanavuti cittāni cittavibhattī’’ti. Mātikañca uddisitvā tattha ekekaṃ padaṃ uddharitvā yasmā cittāni vibhattāni, tasmā mātikāpi cittavibhattiantogadhāyevāti cittuppādakaṇḍaṃ mātikāpadabhājanīyavasena duvidhanti idampi vacanaṃ yujjati.

Now, to show the structure of the Pāli text, he says, 'Therein, in the book Dhammasaṅgaṇī,' and so on. 'Eight from the sense-sphere wholesome' means that, having taken the four aggregates in the sense-sphere wholesome, one extracts eight consciousnesses from them. Some also say it is the first case-ending. 'Eighty-nine consciousnesses' refers to the Pāli passages where these consciousnesses are analyzed; those passages are called 'eighty-nine consciousnesses.' And their collection is the 'Analysis of Consciousness'; therefore it is proper that 'eighty-nine consciousnesses' is the 'Analysis of Consciousness.' And since, after pointing out the matrix and extracting each term in it, the consciousnesses are analyzed, the matrix too is included within the 'Analysis of Consciousness' itself. Thus, the statement that the Chapter on the Arising of Consciousness is twofold—by way of the matrix and the exposition of its terms—is also fitting.

Mūlatoti ‘‘tīṇi kusalamūlānī’’tiādinā (dha. sa. 985) kusalādīnaṃ mūlavasena saṅkhipitvā vacanaṃ. ‘‘Vedanākkhandho’’tiādinā khandhato. ‘‘Kāyakamma’’ntiādinā dvārato. ‘‘Sukhabhūmiyaṃ kāmāvacare’’tiādinā (dha. sa. 988) bhūmito. Atthoti hetuphalaṃ. Dhammoti hetu. ‘‘Tīṇi kusalamūlāni tīṇi akusalamūlānī’’tiādinā (dha. sa. 985-986) hetuvasena saṅgaho dhammato nikkhepo. ‘‘Taṃsampayutto, taṃsamuṭṭhānā tadekaṭṭhā ca kilesā’’tiādinā (dha. sa. 985-986) hetuphalavasena saṅgaho atthato nikkhepo. Atha vā dhammoti bhāsito. Atthoti bhāsitattho. ‘‘Tayo kusalahetū’’ti (dha. sa. 1059) dhammo. ‘‘Tattha katame tayo kusalahetū alobho’’tiādi (dha. sa. 1060) attho, so ca dhammo. ‘‘Tattha katamo alobho’’tiādi (dha. sa. 1061) atthoti evaṃ atthadhammavasena nikkhepo veditabbo. Nāmatoti ‘‘tīṇi kusalamūlānī’’ti vuttadhammānaṃ alobhotiādināmavasena. Liṅgatoti uddiṭṭhassa ekasseva dhammassa ‘‘alobho alubbhanā alubbhitatta’’nti (dha. sa. 1061) purisādiliṅgavasena nikkhepo.

By way of root (mūlato): the statement summarizing wholesome and other states by way of root, beginning 'three wholesome roots' (Dhs §985). By way of aggregates (khandhato): beginning 'the aggregate of feeling.' By way of doors (dvārato): beginning 'bodily action.' By way of planes (bhūmito): beginning 'in the plane of pleasure, in the sense sphere' (Dhs §988). Meaning (attha) is cause-and-effect. Dhamma is cause. The summary by way of cause, beginning 'three wholesome roots, three unwholesome roots' (Dhs §§985-986), is the exposition by way of Dhamma. The summary by way of cause-and-effect, beginning 'the defilements associated with that, arising from that, and having a common object' (Dhs §§985-986), is the exposition by way of meaning. Alternatively, Dhamma is the text spoken. Meaning is the meaning of what has been spoken. 'Three wholesome causes' (Dhs §1059) is Dhamma. 'Therein, what are the three wholesome causes? Non-greed,' etc. (Dhs §1060) is meaning, and that is also Dhamma. 'Therein, what is non-greed?' etc. (Dhs §1061) is meaning. Thus the exposition should be understood by way of meaning and Dhamma. By way of name (nāmato): by way of the names 'non-greed,' etc., for the dhammas stated as 'three wholesome roots.' By way of gender (liṅgato): the exposition of a single indicated dhamma by way of masculine and other genders, as 'non-greed (alobho), non-greediness (alubbhanā), the state of non-greed (alubbhitattaṃ)' (Dhs §1061).

Gaṇanacāranti gaṇanappavattiṃ. Samānentīti samānaṃ karonti pūrenti, tathā samānetabbanti etthāpi. ‘‘Vijjābhāgino avijjābhāgino’’ti (dha. sa. dukamātikā 101) evamādīsu ettha viññātesu ābhidhammikattherā suttantaṃ suṇantā cintentā ca suttantesu ‘‘vijjābhāgino’’tiādīsu āgatesu atthassa viññātattā na kilamantīti etamatthaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ ‘‘ābhidhammikattherānaṃ…pe… akilamatthaṃ ṭhapitā’’ti.

Gaṇanacāraṃ means the procedure of counting. Samānenti means they make equal, they complete; so too here samānetabbaṃ means it should be made equal. When such things as 'states partaking of true knowledge, states partaking of ignorance' (Dhs. Dukamātikā §101) are understood here, then the elders versed in the Abhidhamma, when hearing and reflecting on the suttas, do not become fatigued when passages such as 'partaking of true knowledge' occur, because the meaning is already understood. It is with reference to this that it was said: 'For the elders versed in the Abhidhamma... it was established for the sake of their non-fatigue.'

Anamataggoti [Pg.18] aññātaggo. Khandhantaranti khandhanānattaṃ, khandhameva vā. Gahetuṃ asakkuṇeyyattā saṇhaṃ, sukhumāya paññāya gahetabbato sukhumañca dhammaṃ saṇhasukhumadhammaṃ. Balavatā ñāṇavegena pavattattā balavato ñāṇavegassa nimittabhāvato ca balavaṃ. Gambhīrameva gambhīragataṃ, gambhīrāni vā gatāni gamanāni etassa santīti gambhīragataṃ. Yathānupubbanti yathānupubbena. Nikhilenāti niravasesena desitaṃ, pañcakhilarahitena vā bhagavatā desitaṃ. Rūpagataṃvāti hatthagataṃ rūpaṃ viya cakkhunā. ‘‘Paṭivedhañāṇena samantapaṭṭhānaṃ yo passati, so attheva, no natthī’’ti attānaṃ sandhāya thero vadatīti.

'Beginningless' means of unknown beginning. 'Another aggregate' means the diversity of aggregates, or simply the aggregates. Because it is difficult to grasp, it is subtle; because it is to be grasped by subtle wisdom, it is a subtle and refined Dhamma. Because it proceeds with a powerful impetus of knowledge, and because it is a ground for the powerful impetus of knowledge, it is powerful. 'Gone to the profound' means simply profound; or, its goings are profound, thus it is 'gone to the profound.' 'Sequentially' means in due order. 'Completely' means taught without remainder, or taught by the Blessed One who is without the five mental barrennesses. 'Like form' means like a form that has come into the hand, seen by the eye. 'He who sees the all-embracing foundation with the knowledge of penetration, for him it exists, it is not non-existent'—the elder says this referring to himself.

Khuddakavatthuvibhaṅge āgatesu ekādhikesu aṭṭhasu kilesasatesu aṭṭhasatataṇhāvicaritāni apanetvā sesā dvāsaṭṭhi diṭṭhiyo ca uppannānuppannabhāvena diguṇitāni diyaḍḍhakilesasahassāni dasādhikāni honti, appakaṃ pana ūnamadhikaṃ vā na gaṇanūpagaṃ hotīti ‘‘diyaḍḍhakilesasahassa’’nti vuttaṃ. Itaresaṃ atītādibhāvāmasanā aggahaṇaṃ khepane daṭṭhabbaṃ.

In the Analysis of Minor Items, among the eight hundred and one defilements mentioned, having set aside the eight hundred preoccupations of craving, the remaining sixty-two views, when doubled on account of their arisen and unarisen states, amount to one thousand five hundred and ten defilements. But a small amount more or less is not included in the count, thus it is called 'one and a half thousand defilements.' The non-inclusion of the consideration of the past and other states for the others should be seen as an abbreviation.

Mecakapaṭāti nīlanibhā paṭā. Cittasamuṭṭhānā vaṇṇadhātūti cittapaccayautusamuṭṭhānā vaṇṇadhātūti attho gahetabbo. Kasmā? Na hi cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ bahi nigacchatīti, cittasamuṭṭhānarūpaparamparāya āgatattā pana evaṃ vuttaṃ. Atha vā cittasamuṭṭhānā vaṇṇadhātūti ettha paccayautusaddānaṃ lopaṃ katvā soyeva pubbe vutto attho suvaṇṇatā sussaratā viya. Ettha hi ‘‘sussaratā’’ti upādinnakādhikāre āgataṃ, na ca saddo upādinnako atthi, tasmā upādinnakarūpaoṭṭhatāluādinissayattā evaṃ vuttanti, evametthāpi cittapaccayautusamuṭṭhānaṃ sandhāya ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhānā vaṇṇadhātū’’ti vadati.

'Mecaka cloth' means a dark blue cloth. 'The color element originated from mind' means the color element originated from temperature conditioned by mind; this is the meaning to be understood. Why? Because matter originated from mind does not go outside. But it is stated thus because it comes through a succession of matter originated from mind. Alternatively, in the phrase 'the color element originated from mind,' by eliding the words 'condition' and 'temperature,' the very same meaning as stated before is to be understood, as in the cases of 'golden complexion' or 'melodious voice.' Here, 'melodious voice' is mentioned in the section on appropriated matter, but sound itself is not appropriated matter. Therefore, it is stated thus because it is dependent on appropriated matter such as the lips, palate, etc. So too here, referring to what is originated from temperature conditioned by mind, it says 'the color element originated from mind.'

Kāyasakkhinti paccakkhaṃ. Dantāvaraṇanti oṭṭhadvayaṃ. Mukhādānanti mukhavivaraṃ. Siliṭṭhanti saṃgataṃ susaṇṭhitaṃ. Sare nimittaṃ gahetvāti ‘‘dhammo eso vuccatī’’ti dhammassaravasena nimittaṃ gahetvā, na kilesānubyañjanavasena. Ekappahārenāti ettha pahāroti divasassa tatiyo bhāgo vuccati. Evaṃ santeti pubbe vuttamaggahetvā vācanāmaggassa therappabhavattavacanameva gahetvā tena purimavacanañca paṭikkhipanto codeti.

'Bodily witness' means direct experience. 'Tooth-covering' means the pair of lips. 'Mouth-receptacle' means the mouth-opening. 'Coherent' means connected, well-arranged. 'Having grasped the sign in the sound' means having grasped the sign by way of the sound of the Dhamma, thinking, 'This is the Dhamma being spoken,' not by way of the secondary characteristics of the defilements. 'With a single blow': here 'blow' refers to the third part of the day. 'This being so': having disregarded the way previously stated, and having taken only the elder's statement about the origin of the recitation-lineage, he objects, thereby rejecting the former statement.

Tenetametassāti [Pg.19] vinayassa. Attatthaparatthādibhedeti yo taṃ suttaṃ sajjhāyati suṇāti vāceti cinteti deseti, suttena saṅgahito sīlādiattho tassapi hoti, tena parassa sādhetabbato parassapi hotīti tadubhayaṃ taṃ suttaṃ sūceti dīpeti. Tathā diṭṭhadhammikasamparāyikatthe lokiyalokuttarattheti evamādibhede atthe ādisaddena saṅgaṇhāti. Atthasaddo cāyaṃ hitapariyāyavacanaṃ, na bhāsitatthavacanaṃ. Yadi siyā, suttaṃ attanopi bhāsitatthaṃ sūceti parasuttassapīti ayamattho siyā, suttena ca yo attho pakāsito, so tasseva hotīti na tena parattho sūcito hoti, tena ca sūcetabbassa paratthassa nivattetabbassa abhāvā attaggahaṇaṃ na kattabbaṃ, attatthaparatthavinimuttassa bhāsitatthassa abhāvā ādiggahaṇañca na kattabbaṃ, tasmā yathāvuttassa atthassa sutte asambhavato suttādhārassa puggalassa vasena attatthaparatthā vuttā.

In the division of one's own welfare, the welfare of others, etc.: whoever recites, hears, reads, reflects upon, or teaches that sutta, for him there is the welfare of virtue, etc., comprised in the sutta; and since it is to be accomplished for another by that person, it is also for another. Thus that sutta indicates and illuminates both. Similarly, with the word 'etc.', it includes welfares with such divisions as those pertaining to the present life and to future lives, and worldly and supramundane welfares. And this word 'welfare' (attha) is a synonym for benefit, not a word for the expressed meaning. If it were so, the meaning would be that the sutta indicates its own expressed meaning and also that of another sutta. But the meaning explained by a sutta belongs only to it; thus, the meaning of another is not indicated by it. And since there is no meaning of another to be indicated or refuted by it, the term 'one's own' should not be used. And since there is no expressed meaning apart from 'one's own meaning' and 'the meaning of another', the word 'etc.' should not be used either. Therefore, since the aforesaid meaning is impossible in this context, 'one's own welfare' and 'the welfare of others' are spoken of with reference to the person who is the bearer of the sutta.

Atha vā suttaṃ anapekkhitvā ye attatthādayopi atthappabhedā vuttā niddese (mahāni. 69; cūḷani. mogharājamāṇavapucchāniddesa 85) ‘‘attattho parattho ubhayattho diṭṭhadhammiko attho samparāyiko attho uttāno attho gambhīro attho guḷho attho paṭicchanno attho neyyo attho nīto attho anavajjo attho nikkileso attho vodāno attho paramattho attho’’ti, te suttaṃ sūcetīti attho. Atha vā ‘‘attanā ca appiccho hotī’’ti attatthaṃ, ‘‘appicchakathañca paresaṃ kattā hotī’’ti paratthaṃ sūcetīti. Evaṃ ‘‘attanā ca pāṇātipātā paṭivirato hotī’’tiādisuttāni (a. ni. 4.99) yojetabbāni. Vinayābhidhammehi ca visesetvā suttasaddassa attho vattabbo, tasmā veneyyajjhāsayavasappavattāya desanāya attahitaparahitādīni sātisayaṃ pakāsitāni honti, na āṇādhammasabhāvavasappavattāyāti idameva ‘‘atthānaṃ sūcanato sutta’’nti vuttaṃ.

Alternatively, without regard to any particular sutta, there are the kinds of welfare such as one's own welfare, etc., that are spoken of in the Niddesa (Mahāni. 69; Cūḷani. Mogharājamāṇavapucchāniddesa 85): 'one's own welfare, the welfare of others, the welfare of both; welfare in this life, welfare in future lives; the plain meaning, the profound meaning, the hidden meaning, the concealed meaning, the inferential meaning, the explicit meaning; the blameless welfare, the undefiled welfare, the pure welfare, the ultimate welfare'—the meaning is that the sutta indicates these. Or, 'he himself has few wishes' indicates one's own welfare, and 'he speaks to others on fewness of wishes' indicates the welfare of others. In this way, suttas such as 'He himself abstains from taking life' (AN 4.99) should be connected. And the meaning of the word 'sutta' should be stated by distinguishing it from the Vinaya and Abhidhamma. Therefore, in a teaching that proceeds according to the disposition of the disciples, one's own welfare, the welfare of others, etc., are revealed with special excellence, not so in a teaching that proceeds according to command and the intrinsic nature of phenomena. For this very reason it is said: 'A sutta because it indicates meanings.'

Sutte ca āṇādhammasabhāvā veneyyajjhāsayaṃ anuvattanti, na vinayābhidhammesu viya veneyyajjhāsayo āṇādhammasabhāve anuvattati, tasmā veneyyānaṃ ekantahitapaṭilābhasaṃvattanikā suttantadesanā hotīti ‘‘suvuttā cettha atthā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Pasavatīti phalati[Pg.20]. ‘‘Suttāṇā’’ti etassa atthaṃ pakāsetuṃ ‘‘suṭṭhu ca ne tāyatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Attatthaparatthādividhānesu ca suttassa pamāṇabhāvo tesañca saṅgāhakattaṃ yojetabbaṃ, tadatthappakāsane padhānattā suttassa itarehi visesanañca. Etanti ‘‘atthānaṃ sūcanato’’tiādikaṃ atthavacanaṃ. Etassāti suttassa.

And in a sutta, the command and the nature of phenomena conform to the disposition of the disciple, not as in the Vinaya and Abhidhamma where the disposition of the disciple conforms to the command and the nature of phenomena. Therefore, the Suttanta teaching leads exclusively to the attainment of welfare for the disciples; thus it is said, 'Well-spoken are the meanings herein,' etc. 'It yields' means it bears fruit. To explain the meaning of Suttāṇa, it is said, 'and it protects them well.' And in the provisions for one's own welfare, the welfare of others, etc., the sutta's status as an authority and its function of comprising them should be connected, as well as its distinction from the others, since the sutta is primary in explaining their meaning. 'This' means the statement of meaning beginning 'because it indicates meanings.' 'Of this' means of the sutta.

Abhikkamantīti ettha abhi-saddo kamanassa vuddhibhāvaṃ atirekattaṃ dīpeti. Abhikkantenāti ca ettha kantiyā adhikattaṃ visesabhāvanti yuttaṃ kiriyāvisesakattā upasaggassa. Abhiññātā, abhirājā, abhivinayeti ettha lakkhaṇapūjitaparicchinnesu rattiādīsu abhi-saddo vattatīti kathametaṃ yujjeyyāti? Lakkhaṇakaraṇañāṇapūjanaparicchedakiriyādīpanato tāhi ca kiriyāhi rattirājavinayānaṃ yuttattā. Bhāvanāpharaṇavuddhīhi vuddhimanto. Ārammaṇādīhīti ārammaṇasampayuttakammadvārapaṭipadādīhi. Avisiṭṭhanti aññamaññavisiṭṭhesu vinayasuttantābhidhammesu avisiṭṭhaṃ samānaṃ piṭakasaddanti attho. Yathāvuttenevāti ‘‘evaṃ duvidhatthenā’’tiādinā nayena.

In 'they go forward' (abhikkamanti), the prefix abhi- indicates the growth and excellence of the going. And in 'with forward loveliness' (abhikkantena), it is fitting that it denotes the superiority and special quality of the loveliness, because the prefix modifies the action. In 'a distinguished night' (abhiññātā ratti), 'a great king' (abhirājā), 'the higher discipline' (abhivinaye), how is it justified that the prefix abhi- applies to things like night, etc., that are distinguished by a characteristic, honored, or defined? Because it indicates the actions of making a characteristic, knowing, honoring, and defining, and because night, king, and discipline are connected with those actions. 'Possessing growth through development, pervasion, and increase.' 'By objects, etc.' means by objects, associated states, kamma, doors, path, etc. 'Undistinguished' means the word 'Piṭaka' is common and undifferentiated among the Vinaya, Suttanta, and Abhidhamma, which are otherwise distinguished from one another. 'As stated' means by the method beginning 'thus, by the twofold meaning...'

Kathetabbānaṃ atthānaṃ desakāyattena āṇādividhinā atisajjanaṃ pabodhanaṃ desanā. Sāsitabbapuggalagatena yathāparādhādinā sāsitabbabhāvena anusāsanaṃ vinayanaṃ sāsanaṃ. Kathetabbassa saṃvarāsaṃvarādino atthassa kathanaṃ vacanapaṭibaddhakaraṇaṃ kathā. Bheda-saddo visuṃ visuṃ yojetabbo ‘‘desanābhedaṃ sāsanabhedaṃ kathābhedañca yathārahaṃ paridīpaye’’ti. Bhedanti nānattaṃ, nānākaraṇanti attho. Sikkhā ca pahānāni ca gambhīrabhāvo ca sikkhāpahānagambhīrabhāvaṃ, tañca paridīpaye. Yanti pariyattiādiṃ. Yathāti upārambhādihetu pariyāpuṇanādippakārehi.

Teaching (desanā) is the thorough sending forth and awakening concerning meanings to be told, by way of command, etc., dependent on the teacher. Instruction (sāsana) is the admonishing and disciplining of persons to be instructed, according to their offenses, etc., in their capacity as those to be instructed. Discourse (kathā) is the telling of a meaning to be told, such as restraint and non-restraint, the act of binding it to speech. The word 'division' should be connected separately thus: 'He should explain the division of teaching, the division of instruction, and the division of discourse as is proper.' 'Division' means diversity; the meaning is making distinct. Training, abandonments, and profundity are 'training-abandonment-profundity'; and he should explain that. 'Which' means the scriptural learning, etc. 'As' means by way of mastering, etc., for reasons such as censure, etc.

Tīsupi cetesu ete dhammatthadesanāpaṭivedhāti ettha tantiattho tantidesanā tantiatthapaṭivedho ca tantivisayā hontīti vinayapiṭakādīnaṃ atthadesanāpaṭivedhādhārabhāvo yutto, piṭakāni pana tantiyoyevāti dhammādhārabhāvo kathaṃ yujjeyyāti? Tantisamudāyassa avayavatantiyā ādhārabhāvato, dhammādīnañca dukkhogāhabhāvato tehi vinayādayo gambhīrāti vinayādīnañca catubbidho gambhīrabhāvo vutto, tasmā ‘‘dhammādayo eva dukkhogāhattā gambhīrā, na [Pg.21] vinayādayo’’ti na codetabbametaṃ. Tattha paṭivedhassa dukkarabhāvato dhammatthānaṃ, desanāñāṇassa dukkarabhāvato desanāya ca dukkhogāhabhāvo veditabbo. Paṭivedhassa pana uppādetuṃ asakkuṇeyyattā tabbisayañāṇuppattiyā ca dukkarabhāvato dukkhogāhatā veditabbā.

In these three as well, these are the Dhamma, the meaning, the teaching, and the penetration. Here, since the meaning of the text, the teaching of the text, and the penetration of the meaning of the text are the domain of the text, it is proper that the Vinaya Piṭaka, etc., are the basis for the meaning, the teaching, and the penetration. But since the Piṭakas are themselves the texts, how is it justified that they are the basis for the Dhamma? Because the collection of texts is the basis for the component text, and because the Dhamma, etc., are difficult to fathom, for these reasons the Vinaya, etc., are profound. Thus the fourfold profundity of the Vinaya, etc., has been stated. Therefore, this should not be argued: 'Only the Dhamma, etc., are profound because they are difficult to fathom, not the Vinaya, etc.' Therein, the difficulty of fathoming the Dhamma and the meaning should be understood from the difficulty of penetration, and the difficulty of fathoming the teaching from the difficulty of the knowledge of teaching. Moreover, the difficulty of fathoming penetration should be understood from the impossibility of generating it and from the difficulty of the arising of knowledge concerning its domain.

Hetumhi ñāṇaṃ dhammapaṭisambhidāti etena vacanatthena dhammassa hetubhāvo kathaṃ ñātabboti? ‘‘Dhammapaṭisambhidā’’ti etassa samāsapadassa avayavapadatthaṃ dassentena ‘‘hetumhi ñāṇa’’nti vuttattā. ‘‘Dhamme paṭisambhidā’’ti ettha hi ‘‘dhamme’’ti etassa atthaṃ dassentena ‘‘hetumhī’’ti vuttaṃ, ‘‘paṭisambhidā’’ti etassa ca atthaṃ dassentena ‘‘ñāṇa’’nti, tasmā hetudhammasaddā ekatthā ñāṇapaṭisambhidāsaddā cāti imamatthaṃ dassentena sādhito dhammassa hetubhāvo. Atthassa hetuphalabhāvo ca evameva daṭṭhabbo. Yathādhammanti ettha dhamma-saddo hetuṃ hetuphalañca sabbaṃ gaṇhāti. Sabhāvavācako hesa, na pariyattihetubhāvavācako, tasmā yathādhammanti yo yo avijjāsaṅkhārādidhammo, tasmiṃ tasminti attho. Dhammābhilāpoti atthabyañjanako aviparītābhilāpo. Etena ‘‘tatra dhammaniruttābhilāpe ñāṇaṃ niruttipaṭisambhidā’’ti (vibha. 718-720) ettha vuttadhammaniruttiṃ dasseti. Anulomādivasena vā kathananti etena tassā dhammaniruttiyā abhilāpaṃ kathanaṃ tassa vacanassa pavattanaṃ dasseti. Adhippāyoti etena ‘‘desanāti paññattī’’ti etaṃ vacanaṃ dhammaniruttābhilāpaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, na tabbinimuttaṃ paññattiṃ sandhāyāti dasseti.

“Knowledge in the cause is the analytical knowledge of the Dhamma”—by this statement, how is it to be known that ‘dhamma’ means ‘cause’? Because it is said, “knowledge in the cause,” showing the meaning of the component parts of the compound word “analytical knowledge of the Dhamma.” For here, in “analytical knowledge in the Dhamma,” the meaning of “in the Dhamma” is shown by “in the cause,” and the meaning of “analytical knowledge” is shown by “knowledge.” Therefore, the words ‘cause’ and ‘dhamma’ are synonymous, and so are the words ‘knowledge’ and ‘analytical knowledge’; by showing this, the fact that ‘dhamma’ means ‘cause’ is established. The fact that ‘meaning’ (attha) is the fruit of the cause should be understood in the same way. Here, in the phrase “according to the Dhamma,” the word ‘dhamma’ includes the entire cause and its fruit. For this is a term for intrinsic nature, not a term for the teaching as cause. Therefore, “according to the Dhamma” means ‘in regard to each and every dhamma such as ignorance, formations, etc.’ “Expression about the Dhamma” is undistorted expression that makes known the meaning and the phrasing. By this is shown the ‘language of the Dhamma’ mentioned in the passage: “Knowledge in the expression of the language of the Dhamma is the analytical knowledge of language” (Vibh 718-720). Or, “speaking in sequence, etc.,” shows that the expression of that language of the Dhamma is the utterance, the delivery of that speech. The intention is to show that the statement “teaching is designation” is said with reference to the expression of the language of the Dhamma, not with reference to a designation apart from that.

So ca lokiyalokuttaroti evaṃ vuttaṃ abhisamayaṃ yena pakārena abhisameti, yañca abhisameti, yo ca tassa sabhāvo, tehi pākaṭaṃ kātuṃ ‘‘visayato asammohato ca atthādianurūpaṃ dhammādīsu avabodho’’ti āha. Tattha hi visayato atthādianurūpaṃ dhammādīsu avabodho avijjādidhammasaṅkhārādiatthatadubhayapaññāpanārammaṇo lokiyo abhisamayo. Asammohato atthādianurūpaṃ dhammādīsu avabodho nibbānārammaṇo maggasampayutto yathāvuttadhammatthapaññattīsu sammohaviddhaṃsano lokuttaro abhisamayoti. Abhisamayato aññampi paṭivedhatthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘tesaṃ tesaṃ vā’’tiādimāha. ‘‘Paṭivedhanaṃ [Pg.22] paṭivedho’’ti iminā hi vacanatthena abhisamayo, paṭivijjhīyatīti paṭivedhoti iminā taṃtaṃrūpādidhammānaṃ aviparītasabhāvo ca paṭivedhoti yujjati.

And that comprehension is mundane and supramundane. To make clear by what manner one comprehends the comprehension thus spoken of, what one comprehends, and what its intrinsic nature is, it is said: “understanding of dhammas, etc., in conformity with the meaning, etc., by way of the object and by way of non-delusion.” Herein, the mundane comprehension is the understanding of dhammas, etc., in conformity with the meaning, etc., by way of the object, which has as its object the dhammas such as ignorance, their meaning such as formations, and the designation of both. The supramundane comprehension is the understanding of dhammas, etc., in conformity with the meaning, etc., by way of non-delusion, which has Nibbāna as its object, is associated with the path, and destroys delusion concerning the dhammas, meanings, and designations as stated. To show another meaning of ‘penetration’ apart from ‘comprehension,’ he said, “of these and those,” etc. For by the statement “Penetrating is penetration,” ‘penetration’ means comprehension. And by the statement “It is penetrated, thus it is penetration,” it is fitting that ‘penetration’ also means the unperverted intrinsic nature of the various dhammas such as form.

Yathāvuttehi dhammādīhi piṭakānaṃ gambhīrabhāvaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘idāni yasmā etesu piṭakesū’’tiādimāha. Yo cetthāti etesu taṃtaṃpiṭakagatesu dhammādīsu yo paṭivedho etesu ca piṭakesu tesaṃ tesaṃ dhammānaṃ yo aviparītasabhāvoti yojetabbo. Dukkhogāhatā ca vuttanayeneva veditabbā. Ayaṃ panettha viseso ‘‘aviparītasabhāvasaṅkhāto paṭivedho dubbiññeyyatāya eva dukkhogāho’’ti.

To show the profundity of the Piṭakas by means of the dhammas, etc., as stated, he now says, “Now, because in these Piṭakas…” Here, the phrase “what is in them” (yo cettha) should be construed as: the penetration of the dhammas, etc., contained in the respective Piṭakas, and the unperverted intrinsic nature of those respective dhammas in these Piṭakas. The difficulty of fathoming should also be understood in the way already stated. Herein, this is the distinction: “The penetration, which is defined as the unperverted intrinsic nature, is difficult to fathom because it is difficult to understand.”

Yanti pariyattiduggahaṇaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Atthanti bhāsitatthaṃ payojanatthañca. Na upaparikkhantīti na vicārenti. Na nijjhānaṃ khamantīti nijjhānapaññaṃ na khamanti, nijjhāyitvā paññāya disvā rocetvā na gahetabbā hontīti adhippāyo. Itīti evaṃ etāya pariyattiyā vādappamokkhānisaṃsā attano upari parehi āropitavādassa niggahassa pamokkhappayojanā hutvā dhammaṃ pariyāpuṇanti. Vādappamokkhoti vā nindāpamokkho. Yassa catthāyāti yassa ca sīlādiparipūraṇassa anupādāvimokkhassa vā atthāya. Dhammaṃ pariyāpuṇantīti ñāyena pariyāpuṇantīti adhippāyo. Assāti assa dhammassa. Nānubhontīti na vindanti. Tesaṃ te dhammā duggahitattā upārambhamānadappamakkhapalāsādihetubhāvena dīgharattaṃ ahitāya dukkhāya saṃvattanti. Bhaṇḍāgāre niyutto bhaṇḍāgāriko, bhaṇḍāgāriko viyāti bhaṇḍāgāriko, dhammaratanānupālako. Aññaṃ atthaṃ anapekkhitvā bhaṇḍāgārikasseva sato pariyatti bhaṇḍāgārikapariyatti.

The word `yanti` is said with reference to the wrong grasping of the scriptural learning. ‘Meaning’ (atthaṃ) means both the expressed meaning and the purpose. “They do not examine” means they do not investigate. “They do not tolerate reflection” means they do not approve of the wisdom of reflection; the intention is that after reflecting and seeing with wisdom, they do not accept it with approval. Thus, having the benefit of release from debate as their aim for this scriptural learning, they master the Dhamma for the purpose of release from the refutation of a doctrine imposed upon them by others. Or, ‘release from debate’ means release from blame. “For the sake of which” means for the sake of fulfilling virtue, etc., or for the sake of final liberation without clinging. “They master the Dhamma”—the intention is that they master the Dhamma methodically. “Of it” (assa) means of this Dhamma. “They do not experience” means they do not attain. For them, those dhammas, being wrongly grasped, conduce to their harm and suffering for a long time by being a cause for censure, conceit, arrogance, hypocrisy, spite, and the like. One appointed to a storeroom is a storekeeper. “Like a storekeeper” means a guardian of the treasure of the Dhamma. Disregarding any other meaning, the scriptural learning of one who is merely a storekeeper is “storekeeper’s learning.”

Tāsaṃyevāti avadhāraṇaṃ pāpuṇitabbānaṃ chaḷabhiññācatupaṭisambhidānaṃ vinaye pabhedavacanābhāvaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Verañjakaṇḍe hi tisso vijjāva vibhattāti. Dutiye tāsaṃyevāti avadhāraṇaṃ catasso paṭisambhidā apekkhitvā kataṃ, na tisso vijjā. Tā hi chasu abhiññāsu antogadhāti sutte vibhattāyevāti. Ñatvā saṅgayhamānanti yojanā. Tesanti tesaṃ piṭakānaṃ. Sabbampīti sabbampi buddhavacanaṃ.

The emphasis in “of them alone” (tāsaṃ yeva) is stated with reference to the absence in the Vinaya of a statement of the divisions of the six direct knowledges and four analytical knowledges that are to be attained. For in the Verañja section, only the three true knowledges are analyzed. In the second case, the emphasis in “of them alone” is made with respect to the four analytical knowledges, not the three true knowledges. For since the latter are included in the six direct knowledges, they are indeed analyzed in the Sutta Piṭaka. The connection is: “having known, it is compiled.” “Of them” (tesaṃ) means of those Piṭakas. “All” (sabbampi) means the entire word of the Buddha.

Atthānulomanāmato anulomiko. Anulomikattaṃyeva vibhāvetuṃ ‘‘kasmā panā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Ekanikāyampīti ekasamūhampi. Poṇikā [Pg.23] ca cikkhallikā ca khattiyā, tesaṃ nivāso poṇikanikāyo cikkhallikanikāyo ca. Evaṃ dhammakkhandhato caturāsīti dhammakkhandhasahassānīti buddhavacanapiṭakādīni niṭṭhāpetvā anekacchariyapātubhāvapaṭimaṇḍitāya saṅgītiyā paṭhamabuddhavacanādiko sabbo vuttappabhedo aññopi uddānasaṅgahādibhedo saṅgītiyā ñāyatīti etassa dassanatthaṃ ‘‘evametaṃ sabbampī’’tiādi āraddhaṃ. Ayaṃ abhidhammo piṭakato abhidhammapiṭakantiādinā piṭakādibhāvadassaneneva majjhimabuddhavacanabhāvo tathāgatassa ca ādito ābhidhammikabhāvo dassitoti veditabbo.

From its name 'conforming to the meaning,' it is sequential. To clarify this very sequential nature, it is said, “But why?” and so on. “Even one Nikāya” means even one collection. The Poṇikas and the Cikkhallikas were khattiyas; their dwelling place was the Poṇika-nikāya and the Cikkhallika-nikāya. Thus, having established that the Buddha’s word, the Piṭaka, etc., consists of eighty-four thousand Dhamma aggregates, to show that every stated division beginning with the first word of the Buddha, and other divisions such as summaries and compilations, are known from the Communal Recitation, which was adorned with the appearance of many wonders, the text begins, “Thus all this…” It should be understood that by showing the status of this Abhidhamma as a Piṭaka, etc., with the words “the Abhidhamma as the Abhidhamma Piṭaka,” its status as the middle discourse of the Buddha is shown, and also that the Tathāgata was an expert in Abhidhamma from the beginning.

Ettha siyā ‘‘yadi tathāgatabhāsitabhāvo abhidhammassa siddho siyā, majjhimabuddhavacanabhāvo ca siddho bhaveyya, so eva ca na siddho’’ti tassa vinayādīhi buddhabhāsitabhāvaṃ sādhetuṃ vatthuṃ dassento ‘‘taṃ dhārayantesu bhikkhūsū’’tiādimāha. Sabbasāmayikaparisāyāti sabbanikāyikaparisāya pañcapi nikāye pariyāpuṇantiyā. Na uggahitanti sakalassa vinayapiṭakassa anuggahitattā āha. Vinayamattaṃ uggahitanti vibhaṅgadvayassa uggahitattā āha. Vinayaṃ avivaṇṇetukāmatāya ‘‘abhidhammaṃ pariyāpuṇassū’’ti bhaṇantassa anāpattiṃ, abhidhamme anokāsakataṃ bhikkhuṃ pañhaṃ pucchantiyā pācittiyañca vadantena bhagavatā abhidhammassa buddhabhāsitabhāvo dīpito buddhabhāsitehi suttādīhisaha vacanato, bāhirakabhāsitesu ca īdisassa vacanassa abhāvā.

Here it might be objected: “If the status of the Abhidhamma as spoken by the Buddha were established, its status as the middle discourse of the Buddha would also be established. But that very thing is not established.” To show the basis for proving its status as spoken by the Buddha by means of the Vinaya, etc., he says, “while the bhikkhus were holding it in mind,” etc. “Of the entire contemporary assembly” means of the assembly of all Nikāyas, which was mastering all five Nikāyas. “Not mastered” is said because the entire Vinaya Piṭaka was not mastered. “Only the Vinaya was mastered” is said because the two Vibhaṅgas were mastered. The Blessed One, by stating that there is no offense for one who, out of a desire not to disparage the Vinaya, says, “You should master the Abhidhamma,” and by stating that there is a pācittiya offense for one who asks a question about the Abhidhamma of a bhikkhu who has not been given leave, has illuminated the status of the Abhidhamma as spoken by the Buddha. This is because it is on a par with the suttas, etc., spoken by the Buddha, and because such a statement is absent in the teachings of outsiders.

Itopi balavataraṃ ābhidhammikassa sādhukāradānena vicikicchāvicchedassa katattā. Kammato aññaṃ kammaṃ kammantaraṃ, taṃ kāmāvacarādiṃ rūpāvacarādibhāvena, kaṇhavipākādiṃ sukkavipākādibhāvena kathento āloḷeti.

This is an even stronger reason, because doubt was cut off by the giving of approval to the expert in Abhidhamma. A different kamma from a kamma is ‘another kamma’ (kammantara). One who speaks of that—for instance, of sense-sphere kamma as being form-sphere kamma, or of kamma with dark result as being kamma with bright result—confuses the issue.

Jinacakketi jinasāsane. Visaṃvādetīti vippalambheti. Bhedakaravatthūsu ekasminti ‘‘bhāsitaṃ lapitaṃ tathāgatena abhāsitaṃ alapitaṃ tathāgatenāti dīpetī’’ti ekasmiṃ sandissati. Uttaripi evaṃ vattabbo…pe… na aññesaṃ visayo…pe… nidānakiccaṃ nāma natthīti apākaṭānaṃ kāladesadesakaparisānaṃ pākaṭabhāvakaraṇatthaṃ tadupadesasahitena nidānena bhavitabbaṃ, aññesaṃ avisayattā desako pākaṭo, okkantikālādīnaṃ pākaṭattā kālo ca, devaloke desitabhāvassa pākaṭattā desaparisā ca pākaṭāti kiṃ nidānakiccaṃ siyāti.

“In the Conqueror’s wheel” means in the Conqueror’s Dispensation. “He deceives” means he misleads. It is found in one of the grounds for causing a schism: “He represents what was spoken and uttered by the Tathāgata as not spoken and uttered by the Tathāgata.” It should be stated similarly in the other cases as well… It is not the domain of others… There is no need for an introduction. The argument is: An introduction should be given along with its instruction for the purpose of making apparent an unapparent time, place, teacher, and assembly. But since the Abhidhamma is not the domain of others, the teacher is apparent. And since the time of the descent, etc., is apparent, the time is apparent. And since the fact that it was taught in the deva world is apparent, the place and assembly are apparent. So what need would there be for an introduction?

Yattha [Pg.24] khandhādayo nippadesena vibhattā, so abhidhammo nāma, tasmā tassa nidānena khandhādīnaṃ nippadesatopi paṭividdhaṭṭhānena bhavitabbanti adhippāyena thero ‘‘mahābodhinidāno abhidhammo’’ti dasseti. ‘‘So evaṃ pajānāmi sammādiṭṭhipaccayāpi vedayita’’ntiādinā (saṃ. ni. 5.12) nayena paccayādīhi vedanaṃ upaparikkhanto khandhādipadesānaṃ vedanākkhandhādīnaṃ vasena vihāsi. Dhammeti kusalādiaraṇante.

That wherein the aggregates, etc., are analyzed without remainder is called Abhidhamma. Therefore, with the intention that its introduction should be the occasion when the aggregates, etc., were penetrated without remainder, the Elder shows that “the Abhidhamma has the Great Enlightenment as its introduction.” By the method beginning, “I understand thus: ‘Feeling is also experienced conditioned by right view’” (cf. SN 48.40), examining feeling by way of its conditions, etc., he dwelt by way of the sections of the aggregates, etc., namely, the feeling aggregate, etc. “Dhamma” means from the wholesome, etc., up to the absence of conflict.

Dhammaṃ parivattentoti sāṭṭhakathaṃ pāḷiṃ parivattento etaṃ paravādīcodanaṃ patvā ‘‘ayaṃ paravādī’’tiādimāha. Amhādisesu nidānaṃ jānantesu paṭisaraṇesu vijjamānesu appaṭisaraṇo araññe kandanto viya nidānasabbhāve sakkhibhūtesupi amhesu vijjamānesu asakkhikaṃ aḍḍaṃ karonto viya hoti, nidānassa atthibhāvampi na jānāti, nanu etaṃ nidānanti kathento evamāha. Ekamevāti desanānidānameva ajjhāsayānurūpena desitattā. Dve nidānānīti adhigantabbadesetabbadhammānurūpena desitattā. Abhidhammādhigamassa mūlaṃ adhigamaṃ nidetīti adhigamanidānaṃ. Bodhiabhinīhārasaddhāyāti yāya saddhāya dīpaṅkaradasabalassa santike bodhiyā cittaṃ abhinīhari paṇidhānaṃ akāsi.

“Turning over the Dhamma” means turning over the Pāḷi together with its commentary. Having encountered this challenge from an opponent, he says, “This is an opponent,” and so on. When there are refuges like us who know the causal occasion, he is like one without refuge crying in the wilderness. Even when we are present as witnesses to the existence of the causal occasion, he is like one making a claim without a witness. He does not even know of the existence of the causal occasion. Surely, while saying, “Is this not the causal occasion?”, he speaks thus. “Only one” means only the causal occasion of the teaching, because it was taught in accordance with the disposition. “Two causal occasions” means because it was taught in accordance with the Dhamma to be realized and to be taught. “The causal occasion of attainment” is so called because it indicates the attainment, which is the root for the realization of the Abhidhamma. “Through faith in the aspiration for enlightenment” means the faith by which, in the presence of Dīpaṅkara of the Ten Powers, he directed his mind toward enlightenment and made the resolution.

Sumedhakathāvaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Story of Sumedha

Caturo ca asaṅkhiyeti (bu. vaṃ. aṭṭha. 2.1-2) uddhaṃ ārohanavasena atikkamitvā amaraṃ nāma nagaraṃ ahosīti vacanasesayojanā kātabbā. Dasahīti hatthiassarathabherīsaṅkhamudiṅgavīṇāgītasammatāḷehi ‘‘asnātha pivatha khādathā’’ti dasamena saddena. Te pana ekadesena dassetuṃ ‘‘hatthisadda’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. Hatthisaddanti karaṇatthe upayogo daṭṭhabbo. Bherīsaṅkharathānañca saddehi avivittanti vā ghositanti vā yojetabbaṃ. Hatthisaddanti vā hatthisaddavantaṃ nagaraṃ. Khādatha pivatha cevāti iti-saddo ñātatthattā appayutto daṭṭhabbo.

Regarding “four incalculables” (Bu-a 2.1-2), having passed beyond them by way of ascending upwards, the connection with the remainder of the sentence, “there was a city named Amara,” should be made. With ten sounds—of elephants, horses, chariots, kettledrums, conches, tabors, lutes, songs, cymbals, and with the tenth sound, “Eat, drink, and consume!” But to show a portion of these, “the sound of elephants,” etc., is stated. “The sound of elephants”: the usage should be understood in the instrumental sense. And it should be connected with the sounds of kettledrums, conches, and chariots as either “incessant” or “resounding.” Or, “the sound of elephants” means a city possessing the sound of elephants. Regarding “Eat and drink as well,” the particle “iti” should be understood as not used because its meaning is known.

Sabbaṅgasampannaṃ uyyānapokkharaṇīādisampannattā. Lakkhaṇeti itthilakkhaṇe purisalakkhaṇe ca. Itihāseti porāṇe. Sadhammeti attano tevijjadhamme ca yaññavidhiādike ca. Pāraminti pārañāṇaṃ pārādhigamaṃ gato. Cintesahanti cintesiṃ ahaṃ sumedhabhūtoti satthā vadati. Atthi [Pg.25] hehitīti so vijjamāno bhavissati. Na hetuyeti abhavituṃ. Evamevāti evamevaṃ. Na gavesatīti na gantuṃ esati na icchati nānugacchati vā. Dhoveti dhovante. Serīti sāyattiko. Sayaṃvasīti savaso. Mahācorasamo viyāti kāyasārāgavasena duccaritānesanehi kusalabhaṇḍacchedanā. Nāthāti nāthavanto. Pañcadosavivajjitanti evamādikassa attho kesuci aṭṭhakathāpotthakesu likhitoti katvā na vakkhāma.

“Endowed with all features”: because it was endowed with gardens, lotus ponds, and so on. “In the characteristics”: in the characteristics of a woman and the characteristics of a man. “In history”: in ancient lore. “In his own Dhamma”: in his own threefold knowledge and in the methods of sacrifice, etc. “Perfection”: he has gone to the further shore of knowledge, to the realization of the beyond. “I pondered”: the Teacher says, “I, being Sumedha, pondered.” “He will be”: he will exist. “Not for this reason”: for not being. “Just so”: just so. “He does not seek”: he does not seek to go, does not wish, or does not pursue. “He washes”: they wash. “Independent”: self-dependent. “Self-controlled”: being his own master. “Like a great thief”: because of cutting off the goods of the wholesome through the pursuit of misconduct due to attachment to the essence of the body. “With a protector”: those who have a protector. Because the meaning of “free from the five faults” and so on is written in some commentarial manuscripts, we will not explain it.

Sāsaneti ettha tāpasasāsanaṃ jhānābhiññā ca. Vasībhūtassa sato. Mayi evaṃbhūte dīpaṅkaro jino uppajji. Sodheti jano. Añjasaṃ vaṭumāyananti pariyāyavacanehi maggameva vadati. Mā naṃ akkamitthāti ettha nanti padapūraṇamatte nipāto. Ghātiyāmahanti ettha ca a-iti ca haṃ-iti ca nipātā, ahaṃ-iti vā eko nipāto sānunāsiko kato. Āhutīnanti dakkhiṇāhutīnaṃ. Manti mama, maṃ vā abrvi.

“In the teaching”: here this means the ascetic's teaching, and jhāna and direct knowledge. Of one who has become a master. While I was thus, Dīpaṅkara the Victor arose. He purifies the people. By the synonyms “Añjasa” and “Vaṭumāyana,” he speaks only of the path. In “Mā naṃ akkamittha,” “naṃ” here is a particle that is merely an expletive. In “Ghātiyāmahaṃ,” “a” and “haṃ” are particles, or “ahaṃ” is a single particle made nasal. “Of offerings”: of gift-offerings. “Manti”: means “my” or “me.”

Kappe atikkamitvā vuttepi bodhimhi mātādisaṃkittane saṅgaṇhituṃ ‘‘bodhi tassa bhagavato’’tiādimāha. Sukhenāti uttamena sukhena. Asamoti tāpasehi asamo. Abhiññāsukhatopi visiṭṭhaṃ īdisaṃ buddhattabyākaraṇajaṃ sukhaṃ alabhiṃ. Yāti yāni nimittāni. Ābhujatīti āvattati. Abhiravantīti saddaṃ karonti. Chuddhāti nikkhantā. Nuddhaṃsatīti na uddhaṃ gacchati. Ubhayanti ubhayavacanaṃ. Dhuvasassatanti ekantasassataṃ, aviparītamevāti attho. Āpannasattānanti gabbhinīnaṃ. Yāvatādasa disā, tattha. Dhammadhātuyāti dhammadhātuyaṃ, sabbesu dhammesu vicināmīti attho.

Although it was said “having passed beyond the eons,” in order to include the brief mention of his mother and so on in the account of the enlightenment, he said, “the enlightenment of that Blessed One,” etc. “With happiness”: with supreme happiness. “Incomparable”: incomparable with ascetics. I obtained such happiness born from the prediction of Buddhahood, which is more distinguished than the happiness of direct knowledge. “Which”: which signs. “It bends”: it turns. “They resound”: they make a sound. “Cast out”: gone forth. “It does not perish”: it does not go up. “Both”: a dual word. “Permanent and eternal”: absolutely eternal; the meaning is “not otherwise.” “Of beings who have come to be”: of pregnant women. “As far as that direction”: there. “In the Dhamma-element”: in the Dhamma-element; the meaning is, “I investigate in all dhammas.”

Yassa sampuṇṇo, taṃ vamateva udakaṃ nissesaṃ. Eteti ekissāpi dānapāramitāya anekappakāratāya bahuvacananiddeso kato. Paṭilaggitaṃ rakkhatīti vacanaseso, bhummatthe vā upayogo. Catūsu bhūmīsūti pātimokkhādīsu saṃvarabhūmīsu. Advejjhamānasoti kadāci khamanaṃ kadāci akkhamanaṃ, kassaci khamanaṃ kassaci akkhamananti evaṃ dvedhābhāvaṃ anāpannamānaso hutvā. Saccassa vīthi nāma diṭṭhādi ca adiṭṭhādi ca yathābhūtaṃva vatthu. Adhiṭṭhānanti kusalasamādānādhiṭṭhānaṃ, samādinnesu kusalesu acalatā adhiṭṭhānaṃ nāma. Pathaviyā upekkhanaṃ nāma vikārānāpatti. Aññatrāti aññaṃ. Sabhāvarasalakkhaṇeti ettha bhāvoti aviparītatā vijjamānatā, saha bhāvena sabhāvo, aviparīto attano bodhiparipācanakiccasaṅkhāto [Pg.26] raso, anavajjavatthupariccāgādisaṅkhātaṃ lakkhaṇañca sabhāvarasalakkhaṇaṃ, tato sammasato. Dhammatejenāti ñāṇatejena. Calatāti calatāya kampanatāya. Sesīti sayi. Mā bhāthāti mā bhāyittha. Sabbītiyoti sabbā ītiyo upaddavā taṃ vivajjantu.

That which is full, it pours out the water completely. “Ete”: the plural designation is made because of the manifold nature of even the single perfection of giving. “He protects what is attached”: this is the remainder of the sentence; or the usage is in the locative sense. “In the four planes”: in the planes of restraint such as the Pātimokkha. “With an unwavering mind”: having a mind that does not fall into a twofold state of sometimes enduring and sometimes not enduring, of enduring for some and not enduring for others. The path of truth is the thing as it really is, whether seen, etc., or not seen, etc. “Resolution”: the resolution of undertaking wholesome things; steadfastness in wholesome things that have been undertaken is called resolution. “Equanimity towards the earth”: the non-occurrence of alteration. “Other than”: another. “In its nature, function, and characteristic”: here “being” (bhāva) is non-perversion, existence; “nature” (sabhāva) is “with being”; its “function” (rasa) is the unperverted task of maturing one's own enlightenment; its “characteristic” (lakkhaṇa) is the relinquishment of blameless things, etc. This is its nature, function, and characteristic, which one contemplates. “By the power of the Dhamma”: by the power of knowledge. “Shaking”: by shaking, by trembling. “He lay down”: he lay down. “Do not fear”: do not be afraid. “All calamities”: may all calamities and troubles avoid him.

Sumedhakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Story of Sumedha is finished.

Pavacchatīti deti. Yogenāti upāyena. Samiṃsūti sannipatiṃsu. Appattamānasāti appattaarahattā bhikkhū garahitā bhavanti. Rittāti suññā antarahitā. Sālakalyāṇī nāma eko rukkho. Buddhacakkavattikāleyeva kira ekāheneva uppajjati.

“He bestows” means “he gives.” “By means” means “by a method.” “They assembled” means “they gathered together.” “With mind unattained” means that monks who have not attained arahantship are censured. “Empty” means “void, disappeared.” Sālakalyāṇī is the name of a certain tree. It is said that it arises in a single day only at the time of a Buddha or a wheel-turning monarch.

Liṅgasampattīti purisaliṅgatā. Hetūti tihetukapaṭisandhitā. Guṇasampattīti abhiññāsamāpattilābhitā. Adhikāroti buddhānaṃ sakkārakaraṇaṃ. Chandatāti buddhattappattiyaṃ chandasamāyogo. Sabbaṅgasampannāti aṭṭhaṅgāni samodhānetvā katapaṇidhānā. Pakkhikāti pīṭhasappikā. Paṇḍakāti ubhayaliṅgarahitā. Bodhisattā ca brahmalokūpapattipaṭhamakappikesu kālesu ubhayaliṅgarahitā honti, na pana paṇḍakapariyāpannāti etamatthaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘pariyāpannā na bhavantī’’ti vuttaṃ, yathāvuttesu vā dosesu sabbesu pariyāpannā na bhavanti, bodhisattesu vā pariyāpannā tadantogadhā, paricchinnasaṃsārattā vā pariyāpannā bodhisattā ubhatobyañjanapaṇḍakā na bhavantīti attho. Sabbattha suddhagocarā yasmā, tasmā micchādiṭṭhiṃ na sevanti. Micchādiṭṭhinti natthikāhetukākiriyadiṭṭhiṃ. Bhavābhaveti khuddake ceva mahante ca bhave. Bhojaputteti luddake. Lagananti saṅgo. Aññathāti līnatā. Gāmaṇḍalāti gāmadārakā. Rūpanti vippakāraṃ. Ayaṃ tāva nidānakathā yāya abhidhammassa buddhabhāsitatāsiddhīti atthayojanā kātabbā.

‘Attainment of the sign’ means being of the male sign. ‘Cause’ means having a three-rooted relinking-consciousness. ‘Attainment of qualities’ means the gaining of the direct knowledges and attainments. ‘Qualification’ means the rendering of service to Buddhas. ‘Zeal’ means the application of zeal for the attainment of Buddhahood. ‘Complete in all factors’ means having made the aspiration after combining the eight factors. ‘A cripple’ means one who crawls on a stool. ‘A eunuch’ means one devoid of both signs of gender. Bodhisattas, at the time of their first-aeon birth in the Brahma-world, are devoid of both signs of gender, but they are not included in the category of eunuchs. To show this meaning, it is said, ‘They are not included.’ Or, they are not included in all the faults mentioned above. Or, the meaning is that Bodhisattas are not hermaphrodites or eunuchs, because they are included in the category of Bodhisattas, or because their saṃsāra is limited. Because their resort is pure everywhere, they do not cultivate wrong view. ‘Wrong view’ means the nihilistic view, the view of no-cause, and the inefficacy-of-action view. ‘In existence and non-existence’ means in small and great existences. ‘Sons of the Bhoja’ means hunters. ‘Clinging’ means attachment. ‘Otherwise’ means sluggishness. ‘Village-circle’ means village boys. ‘Form’ means alteration. This, indeed, is the Introductory Discourse by which the authenticity of the Abhidhamma as the Buddha’s word is established; thus the connection of the meaning should be made.

Nidānakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Introductory Discourse is finished.

1. Cittuppādakaṇḍaṃ

1. The Chapter on the Arising of Consciousness

Tikamātikāpadavaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Terms of the Triplet Matrix

Idāni [Pg.27] paṭiññātakathaṃ kātuṃ ‘‘idāni iti me…pe… kathanokāso sampatto’’tiādimāha. Ito paṭṭhāyāti kusaladhammapadato paṭṭhāya.

Now, to deliver the promised exposition, he says, “Now, thus... pe... the opportunity for exposition has arrived,” and so on. “From here on” means starting from the term ‘wholesome states.’”

1. Sabbapadehi laddhanāmoti tīsupi padesu vedanāsaddassa vijjamānattā tena laddhanāmo sabbapadehi laddhanāmo hoti. Nanu sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā dhammāti cattāri padāni, evaṃ sesesupīti dvādasetāni padāni, na tīṇīti vedanāsaddassa padattayāvayavattaṃ sandhāya ‘‘sabbapadehī’’ti vucceyya, na yuttaṃ. ‘‘Vedanāyā’’ti hi visuṃ padaṃ na kassaci padassa avayavo hoti, nāpi sukhādipadabhāvaṃ bhajatīti tena laddhanāmo kathaṃ sabbapadehi laddhanāmo siyāti? Adhippetappakāratthagamakassa padasamudāyassa padattā. Pajjati avabujjhīyati etenāti hi padaṃ, ‘‘sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā dhammā’’ti etena ca padasamudāyena yathādhippeto attho samatto viññāyati, tasmā so padasamudāyo ‘‘pada’’nti vuccati. Evaṃ itarepi veditabbā. Tasmā tesaṃ tiṇṇaṃ samudāyānaṃ avayavena laddhanāmo sabbapadehi laddhanāmoti yutto.

1. ‘Having a name derived from all phrases’ means that, because the word ‘feeling’ is present in all three phrases, that which is named from it is said to have a name derived from all phrases. But is it not so that ‘states associated with pleasant feeling’ consists of four words? And likewise for the remaining phrases, there are twelve words in total, not three. If it were said ‘from all phrases’ with reference to the word ‘feeling’ being a component of the three phrases, that would not be correct. For ‘feeling’ is a distinct word, not a component of any other word, nor does it partake of the nature of words like ‘pleasant.’ So how can something named after it be said to be named from all phrases? Because a collection of words that conveys the intended meaning is itself a phrase (pada). For a pada is that by which one proceeds and understands. By the collection of words ‘states associated with pleasant feeling,’ the intended meaning is completely understood. Therefore, that collection of words is called a ‘phrase’ (pada). The same should be understood for the others. Therefore, that which is named from a component of those three collections is correctly called ‘named from all phrases’.

Ganthato ca atthato cāti ettha hetupadasahetukapadādīhi sambandhattā ganthato ca hetuatthasahetukatthādīhi sambandhattā atthato ca aññamaññasambandho veditabbo. Sahetukahetusampayuttadukā hi hetuduke hetūhi sambandhattā hetudukasambandhā, hetusahetukaduko hetudukasahetukadukasambandho ubhayekapadavasena. Tathā hetuhetusampayuttaduko hetudukahetusampayuttadukasambandho, nahetusahetukaduko ekadvipadavasena hetudukasahetukadukasambandhoti. Kaṇṇikā viyāti pupphamayakaṇṇikā viya. Ghaṭā viyāti pupphahatthakādīsu pupphādīnaṃ samūho viya. Kaṇṇikāghaṭādīsu hi pupphādīni vaṇṭādīhi aññamaññasambandhāni hontīti tathāsambandhatā etesaṃ dukānaṃ vuttā. Dukasāmaññatoti aññehi hetudukādīhi dukavasena samānabhāvā. Aññehīti sārammaṇadukādīhi. Asaṅgahito padeso yesaṃ atthi, te sappadesā. Yesaṃ pana natthi, te nippadesā.

Regarding ‘textually and meaningfully’: here the mutual relationship should be understood thus: because of the connection with terms such as the root-term (`hetupada`) and the with-root-term (`sahetukapada`), the connection is textual (`ganthato`); because of the connection with meanings such as the root-meaning (`hetuattha`) and the with-root-meaning (`sahetukattha`), the connection is meaningful (`atthato`). For the dyad of ‘with-root’ and ‘root-associated’ is connected with the Root Dyad due to its connection with the roots. The ‘root and with-root’ dyad is connected with the Root Dyad and the With-Root Dyad by way of one or both terms. Similarly, the ‘root and root-associated’ dyad is connected with the Root Dyad and the Root-Associated Dyad. The ‘not-root and with-root’ dyad is connected with the Root Dyad and the With-Root Dyad by way of one or two terms. ‘Like a pericarp’ means like the pericarp of a flower. ‘Like a cluster’ means like a bunch of flowers in a bouquet. For in pericarps, clusters, and so on, the flowers are interconnected by their stalks; such is the connection spoken of for these dyads. ‘By dyad-generality’ means because of their shared nature as dyads with other dyads, such as the Root Dyad. ‘With others’ means with dyads such as the one ‘with an object.’ Those that have an unincluded portion are ‘with a remainder’ (`sappadesā`). Those that do not are ‘without a remainder’ (`nippadesā`).

‘‘Kacci [Pg.28] nu bhoto kusala’’nti evaṃ pucchitamevatthaṃ pākaṭaṃ katvā pucchituṃ ‘‘kacci bhoto anāmaya’’nti vuttaṃ, tasmā kusalasaddo anāmayattho hoti. Bāhitikasutte (ma. ni. 2.361) bhagavato kāyasamācārādayo vaṇṇentena dhammabhaṇḍāgārikena ‘‘yo kho, mahārāja, kāyasamācāro anavajjo’’ti kusalo kāyasamācāro vutto. Na hi bhagavato sukhavipākaṃ kammaṃ atthīti sabbasāvajjarahitā kāyasamācārādayo kusalāti vuttā. Kusalesu dhammesūti ca bodhipakkhiyadhammā ‘‘kusalā’’ti vuttā. Te ca vipassanāmaggaphalasampayuttā na ekantena sukhavipākāyevāti anavajjattho kusalasaddo. Aṅgapaccaṅgānanti kusalasaddayogena bhummatthe sāmivacanaṃ, aṅgapaccaṅgānaṃ vā nāmakiriyāpayojanādīsūti attho. Naccagītassāti ca sāmivacanaṃ bhummatthe, naccagītassa visesesūti vā yojetabbaṃ. Kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ samādānahetu evamidaṃ puññaṃ pavaḍḍhatīti puññavipākanibbattakakammaṃ ‘‘kusala’’nti vuttaṃ. Dhammā hontīti suññadhammattā sabhāvamattā hontīti attho. Evaṃ dhammesu dhammānupassīti etthāpi suññatattho dhammasaddo daṭṭhabbo.

“Is the venerable one well?”—to make the meaning of this question clear, it is said, “Is the venerable one free from illness?” Therefore, the word “kusala” means “free from illness.” In the Bāhitika Sutta, when the Treasurer of the Dhamma was praising the Blessed One’s bodily conduct and so on, he said, “Great king, bodily conduct that is blameless is ‘kusala.’” For the Blessed One has no kamma that ripens in pleasure, so his bodily conduct and so on, being entirely free from fault, are called “kusala.” And in the phrase “in wholesome states,” the factors of enlightenment are called “kusala.” Since these, being associated with insight, path, and fruition, do not exclusively ripen in pleasure, the word “kusala” has the meaning “blameless.” Regarding “of limbs and minor limbs,” in connection with the word “kusala,” the genitive is used in the sense of the locative; or the meaning is “in the naming, function, application, etc., of the limbs and minor limbs.” And regarding “of dance and song,” here too the genitive is used in the sense of the locative, or it should be construed as “in the special kinds of dance and song.” Because the undertaking of wholesome states is the cause for this merit to grow, kamma that generates the fruit of merit is called “kusala.” “They are dhammas” means they are mere intrinsic natures, because they are empty dhammas. Thus, in “contemplating dhammas in dhammas,” here too the word “dhamma” should be understood in the sense of emptiness.

Salayanti…pe… viddhaṃsentīti ettha purimassa purimassa pacchimaṃ pacchimaṃ atthavacanaṃ. Atha vā salanassa atthadīpanāni calanādīni tīṇi tadaṅgappahānādīhi yojetabbāni. Appahīnabhāvena santāne sayamānā akusalā dhammā rāgādiasucisampayogato nānāvidhadukkhahetuto ca kucchitena ākārena sayanti. Ñāṇavippayuttānampi ñāṇaṃ upanissayapaccayo hotīti sabbepi kusalā dhammā kusena ñāṇena pavattetabbāti kusalā. Uppannaṃsānuppannaṃsabhāgesu saṅgahitattā ubhayabhāgagataṃ saṃkilesapakkhaṃ pahānānuppādanehi lunanti sammappadhānadvayaṃ viya.

Regarding ‘they shake... pe... they demolish’: here each succeeding term is an explanation of the meaning of the preceding one. Alternatively, the three explanations of the meaning of ‘shaking’—trembling, etc.—should be connected with abandoning by their corresponding factors, and so on. Unwholesome states, lying in the mental continuum through not being abandoned, lie in a contemptible manner because of their association with impurities such as lust and because they are the cause of various kinds of suffering. Since knowledge serves as a decisive support condition even for states dissociated from it, all wholesome states are to be set in motion by ‘kusa,’ that is, by knowledge; hence they are ‘kusalā.’ Because they are included in the portions of the arisen and the unarisen, they, like the pair of right strivings, cut off the side of defilement that pertains to both portions by means of abandoning and preventing arising.

Sattādigāhakānaṃ cittānaṃ gocarā sattādayo viya paññāya upaparikkhiyamānā na nissabhāvā, kintu attano sabhāvaṃ dhārentīti dhammā. Na ca dhāriyamānasabhāvā añño dhammo nāma atthi. Na hi ruppanādīhi aññe rūpādayo, kakkhaḷādīhi ca aññe pathavīādayo dhammā vijjantīti. Aññathā pana avabodhetuṃ na sakkāti nāmavasena viññātāviññāte sabhāvadhamme aññe viya katvā ‘‘attano sabhāvaṃ dhārentī’’ti [Pg.29] vuttaṃ. Sappaccayadhammesu visesaṃ dassento ‘‘dhārīyanti vā paccayehī’’ti āha. Dhārīyantīti upadhārīyanti, lakkhīyantīti attho.

When examined by wisdom, they are not devoid of intrinsic nature—unlike beings and so on, which are the objects of consciousness that grasps at them—but because they bear their own intrinsic nature, they are called ‘dhammas.’ And there is no other dhamma apart from the intrinsic nature that is borne. For there are no material qualities other than the state of being afflicted, etc., nor are there other dhammas such as the earth element, etc., apart from hardness, etc. But since it is not possible to make this understood otherwise, having treated the intrinsic natures, whether known or unknown, as if they were different by way of names, it is said, “they bear their own intrinsic nature.” Showing a distinction in regard to conditioned phenomena, he said, “Or they are borne by conditions.” “They are borne” means they are supported, they are characterized; this is the meaning.

Akusalāti kusalapaṭisedhanamattaṃ kusalābhāvamattavacanaṃ tadaññamattavacanaṃ vā etaṃ na hoti, kintu tappaṭipakkhavacananti dassetuṃ ‘‘mittapaṭipakkhā amittā viyā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tappaṭipakkhavacanatā ca abyākatatatiyarāsivacanena viññāyati. Yadi hi kusalābhāvamattavacanaṃ akusalasaddo, tena na koci dhammo vuttoti abyākatavacaneneva ca tatiyo rāsi vutto na siyā, kusalā ceva dhammā abyākatā cāti dukovāyaṃ āpajjati, na tiko, evañca sati akusalavacanena na koci attho. Atha siyā, ‘‘anabyākatā’’ti ca vattabbaṃ siyā kusalānaṃ viya abyākatānañca abhāvamattasambhavā, tasmā abhāvamattavacane abyākatabhāvamattaṃ viya kusalābhāvamattaṃ akusalaṃ na koci rāsīti ‘‘abyākatā’’ti tatiyo rāsi na siyā. Tatiyarāsibhāvena ca abyākatā vuttāti akusalo ca eko rāsīti viññāyati. Tasmā nābhāvavacanatā, sabhāvadhāraṇādiatthena dhammasaddena samānādhikaraṇabhāvato ca akusalasaddassa kusalābhāvamattavacanatā na hoti, nāpi tadaññamattavacanatā tatiyarāsivacanato eva. Yadi hi kusalehi aññe akusalā cetasikehi aññe acetasikā viya, kusalākusalavacanehi sabbesaṃ dhammānaṃ saṅgahitattā asaṅgahitassa tatiyarāsissa abhāvā cetasikaduko viya ayañca duko vattabbo siyā ‘‘kusalā dhammā akusalā dhammā’’ti, na ‘‘abyākatā’’ti tatiyo rāsi vattabbo, vutto ca so, tasmā na tadaññamattavacanaṃ akusalasaddo, pārisesena tappaṭipakkhesu a-kārassa payogadassanato loke ‘‘amittā’’ti sāsane ‘‘alobho’’ti idhāpi tappaṭipakkhavacanatā akusalasaddassa siddhā, tattha niruḷhattā ca na itaravacanatā, tappaṭipakkhabhāvo ca viruddhasabhāvattā tappaheyyabhāvato ca veditabbo, na kusalavināsanato. Na hi kusalā akusalehi pahātabbā, mahābalavatāya pana kusalāyeva payoganipphāditā sadānusayite akusale tadaṅgavikkhambhanasamucchedavasena pajahantīti.

The term ‘unwholesome’ does not signify a mere negation of ‘wholesome,’ nor the mere absence of the wholesome, nor what is merely other than it; rather, to show that it signifies its opposite, it is stated, “like enemies are the opposite of friends,” and so on. That it signifies the opposite is understood from the statement of the third category, the indeterminate. For if the word ‘unwholesome’ were a term for the mere absence of the wholesome, then no dhamma would be designated by it, and the third category would not be stated as ‘indeterminate.’ This would result in a dyad—“wholesome dhammas and indeterminate dhammas”—not a triad, and this being so, the word ‘unwholesome’ would have no meaning. If it were so, one would also have to speak of ‘non-indeterminate,’ since a mere absence of the indeterminate is just as possible as a mere absence of the wholesome. Therefore, if the word were a term for mere absence, then ‘unwholesome,’ being the mere absence of the wholesome, would not be a category—just as the mere absence of the indeterminate is not a category—and so there would not be a third category called ‘indeterminate.’ But because the indeterminate is stated as a third category, it is understood that ‘unwholesome’ is also a category. Therefore, it does not signify mere absence. And because the word ‘unwholesome’ is in apposition with the word ‘dhamma,’ which has the meaning of bearing its own nature, etc., it does not signify the mere absence of the wholesome. Nor does it signify what is merely other than it, precisely because of the statement of the third category. For if ‘unwholesome’ were other than ‘wholesome’ (in the way that non-mental-factors are other than mental factors), then since all dhammas would be included by the words ‘wholesome’ and ‘unwholesome,’ there would be no unincluded third category, and this would have to be stated as a dyad—“wholesome dhammas and unwholesome dhammas”—like the dyad of mental factors, not with a third category ‘indeterminate.’ But since that is stated, the word ‘unwholesome’ does not signify what is merely other than it. By elimination, and from seeing the use of the prefix ‘a-’ for opposites in the world, as in ‘enemies’ (amittā), and in the teaching, as in ‘non-greed’ (alobha), here too it is established that the word ‘unwholesome’ signifies the opposite. Because of its established usage in that sense, it does not have the other meanings. Its being the opposite should be understood from its having a contrary nature and from its being something to be abandoned, not from its destroying the wholesome. For wholesome states are not to be abandoned by unwholesome states. Rather, due to their great power, wholesome states, when brought into being through practice, abandon the ever-latent unwholesome states by way of suppression by the opposite part, by suspension, and by eradication.

Na [Pg.30] byākatāti akathitā. Kathaṃ panete akathitā honti, nanu ‘‘sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā’’tiādīhi tikadukapadehi cakkhuviññāṇādivacanehi phassādivacanehi ca kathitāti? No na kathitā, tāni pana vacanāni idha anadhippetāni avuttattā ananuvattanato. Na hi ‘‘sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttā dhammā’’tiādiṃ vatvā ‘‘abyākatā’’ti vuttaṃ, tasmā na tāni idha anuvattantīti tabbacanīyabhāvena akathitatā na hoti, kusalākusalavacanāni pana idha vuttattā anuvattantīti tabbacanīyabhāvena akathitatā ñāyatīti ‘‘kusalākusalabhāvena akathitāti attho’’ti āha. Na byākatāti vā avipākā, abyākatavacaneneva ca avipākatthā ñāyanti. Na hi bhagavato vacanaṃ ñāpakasādhanīyaṃ, āsayānusayacariyādikusalena bhagavatā yesaṃ avabodhanatthaṃ dhammā vuttā tesaṃ vacanānantaraṃ tadatthapaṭivedhato, pacchimehi pana yathā tesaṃ avabodhanatthaṃ bhagavatā taṃ taṃ vacanaṃ vuttaṃ, yathā ca tehi tadattho paṭividdho, taṃ sabbaṃ ācariye payirupāsitvā sutvā veditabbaṃ hoti, tasmā kāraṇaṃ avatvā ‘‘kusalākusalabhāvena akathitāti attho’’ti āha. Yo ca vadeyya ‘‘akusalavipākabhāvena akathitattā, kusalā abyākatāti āpajjanti, kusalavipākabhāvena akathitattā akusalāpī’’ti, sopi ‘‘aññāpakasādhanīyavacano bhagavā’’ti nivāretabbo anuvattamānavacanavacanīyabhāvena akathitassa ca abyākatabhāvato. Na hi avipākavacanaṃ vuttaṃ kusalavacanañca avuttaṃ, yato avipākavacanassa adhikatabhāvo kusalassa ca tabbacanīyabhāvena akathitabhāvo siyā, tasmā na kusalānaṃ abyākatatā, evaṃ akusalānañca anabyākatabhāve yojanā kātabbā.

‘Not declared’ means unspoken. But how are these unspoken? Are they not spoken of by the triad and dyad terms such as ‘associated with pleasant feeling,’ by the statements about eye-consciousness, etc., and by the statements about contact, etc.? No, they are not spoken of, for those statements are not intended here, since they are not stated and do not follow on. For it is not said ‘undeclared’ after saying ‘states associated with pleasant feeling,’ etc. Therefore, since those statements do not follow on here, there is no ‘unspokenness’ in the sense of what is expressible by them. But since the terms ‘wholesome’ and ‘unwholesome’ are stated here, they do follow on, and thus the fact that they are unspoken in the sense of what is expressible by those terms is understood. Hence he said: ‘The meaning is, unspoken of as wholesome or unwholesome.’ Alternatively, ‘not declared’ means non-resultant, and the meaning ‘non-resultant’ is understood from the very word ‘undeclared.’ For the Blessed One’s word is not something to be established by an indicator. For those for whose awakening the Dhamma was spoken by the Blessed One, who is skilled in dispositions, latent tendencies, conduct, etc., penetrate its meaning immediately after the utterance. But later generations must learn by attending on a teacher and hearing from him all about how the Blessed One spoke this or that utterance for their awakening and how they penetrated its meaning. Therefore, without stating the reason, he said: ‘The meaning is, unspoken of as wholesome or unwholesome.’ And if someone should say: ‘Because they are not spoken of as unwholesome resultants, wholesome states would become undeclared; and because they are not spoken of as wholesome resultants, unwholesome states also would,’ he too should be refuted thus: ‘The Blessed One’s word is not something to be established by an indicator,’ and because the state of being undeclared pertains to what is unspoken of in the sense of what is expressible by the terms that follow on. For it is not the case that the term ‘non-resultant’ is stated while the term ‘wholesome’ is unstated, whereby the term ‘non-resultant’ would be additional and the wholesome would be unspoken in the sense of what is expressible by that term. Therefore, wholesome states are not undeclared. The construction should be applied in the same way to the non-undeclaredness of unwholesome states.

Atha vā vi-saddo virodhavacano, ā-saddo abhimukhabhāvappakāsano, tasmā attano paccayehi aññamaññavirodhābhimukhā katā, lakkhaṇavirodhato vināsakavināsitabbato cāti byākatā, kusalākusalā. Na byākatāti abyākatā. Te hi lakkhaṇato kusalākusalā viya viruddhā na honti. Na hi avipākatā dukkhavipākatā viya sukhavipākatāya sukhavipākatā viya ca dukkhavipākatāya sukhadukkhavipākatāhi virujjhatīti nāpi te kiñci pajahanti, na ca te kenaci pahātabbāti ayamettha attanomati.

Alternatively, the prefix ‘vi-’ expresses opposition, and the prefix ‘ā-’ discloses a state of being face to face. Therefore, because they are made mutually opposing and face to face by their own conditions, because of opposition in characteristic, and because of being destroyers and destructible, they are ‘declared’ (byākatā), namely, the wholesome and the unwholesome. What are not so declared are the ‘undeclared’ (abyākatā). For these are not opposed in characteristic like the wholesome and the unwholesome. For the state of being non-resultant is not opposed to the state of being of pleasant result as the state of being of painful result is, nor to the state of being of painful result as the state of being of pleasant result is, nor is it opposed by states of being of pleasant and painful result. Moreover, they abandon nothing, nor are they to be abandoned by anything. This is my personal opinion here.

Anavajjasukhavipākalakkhaṇāti [Pg.31] ettha natthi etesaṃ avajjanti anavajjā, garahitabbabhāvarahitā niddosāti attho. Tena nesaṃ agarahitabbabhāvaṃ dasseti, na gārayhavirahamattaṃ. Aññepi atthi niddosā abyākatāti anavajjavacanamattena tesampi kusalatāpattidosaṃ disvā taṃ pariharituṃ sukhavipākavacanaṃ āha. Avajjapaṭipakkhā vā idha anavajjāti vuttā, na bāhitikasutte (ma. ni. 2.361) viya paṭippassaddhāvajjā virahitāvajjamattā vā, tasmā anavajjavacanena avajjavināsanabhāvo dassito. Abyākatehi pana visiṭṭhaṃ kusalākusalānaṃ sādhāraṇaṃ savipākatālakkhaṇanti tasmiṃ lakkhaṇe visesadassanattaṃ sukhavipākavacanaṃ avoca. Siddho hi purimeneva akusalābyākatehi kusalānaṃ visesoti. Sukho vipāko etesanti sukhavipākā. Tena kusalākusalānaṃ sāmaññe vipākadhammabhāve sukhavipākavipaccanasabhāvaṃ dasseti, na tesaṃ sukhavipākasabbhāvameva. Anavajjā ca te sukhavipākā cāti anavajjasukhavipākā. Kusalā lakkhīyanti etenāti lakkhaṇaṃ, anavajjasukhavipākalakkhaṇaṃ etesanti anavajjasukhavipākalakkhaṇā. Nanu te eva kusalā anavajjasukhavipākā, kathaṃ te sayameva attano lakkhaṇaṃ hontīti? Viññātāviññātasaddatthabhāvena lakkhaṇalakkhitabbabhāvayuttito. Kusalasaddatthavasena hi aviññātā kusalā lakkhitabbā honti, anavajjasukhavipākasaddatthabhāvena viññātā lakkhaṇanti yuttametaṃ. Atha vā lakkhīyatīti lakkhaṇaṃ, sabhāvo. Anavajjasukhavipākā ca te lakkhaṇañcāti anavajjasukhavipākalakkhaṇā, anavajjasukhavipākā hutvā lakkhiyamānā sabhāvā kusalā nāmāti attho.

Regarding ‘having the characteristic of being blameless and of pleasant result’: Here, ‘there is no fault in them,’ thus they are blameless (anavajjā); the meaning is that they are devoid of censurability, faultless. Thereby he shows their non-censurability, not the mere absence of what is blameworthy. Seeing that since there are other faultless undeclared states, by the word ‘blameless’ alone there would be the fault of these too attaining wholesomeness, he stated the term ‘of pleasant result’ to avoid that. Alternatively, here ‘blameless’ is stated as the opposite of faulty, not as in the Bāhitika Sutta where it means that fault has been tranquillized or the mere absence of fault. Therefore, by the word ‘blameless’ the state of destroying fault is shown. But since the characteristic of having a result is common to wholesome and unwholesome states, which are distinct from undeclared states, he spoke the term ‘of pleasant result’ to show a distinction in that characteristic. For the distinction of wholesome states from unwholesome and undeclared states has already been established. ‘Pleasant is the result of these,’ thus they are ‘of pleasant result.’ Thereby, with regard to the general fact that wholesome and unwholesome states are states that have a result, he shows the nature of ripening with a pleasant result, not the mere existence of a pleasant result for them. They are both blameless and of pleasant result, thus ‘blameless and of pleasant result.’ ‘Wholesome states are characterized by this,’ thus it is a characteristic (lakkhaṇa); ‘this characteristic of being blameless and of pleasant result belongs to them,’ thus they have that characteristic. But are not the wholesome states themselves blameless and of pleasant result? How then can they be their own characteristic? Because of the appropriateness of the relationship between characteristic and characterized, due to the meaning of the words being partly known and partly unknown. For wholesome states, being unknown through the meaning of the word ‘wholesome,’ are to be characterized; the characteristic is known through the meaning of the words ‘blameless and of pleasant result.’ So this is proper. Alternatively, lakkhaṇa (characteristic) means intrinsic nature (sabhāvo). They are both blameless and of pleasant result, and that is their characteristic, their intrinsic nature; thus they are ‘of the characteristic of being blameless and of pleasant result.’ The meaning is: wholesome states are so called because, being blameless and of pleasant result, they are natures that are so characterized.

Atha vā anavajjavacanena anavajjattaṃ āha, sukhavipākavacanena sukhavipākattaṃ, tasmā anavajjañca sukhavipāko ca anavajjasukhavipākaṃ, taṃ lakkhaṇaṃ etesaṃ karaṇatthe ca kammatthe ca lakkhaṇasadde sabhāvabhūtanti anavajjasukhavipākalakkhaṇā, anavajjasukhavipākasabhāvena lakkhiyamānā taṃsabhāvavanto ca kusalāti vuttaṃ hoti. Tattha anavajjavacanena pavattisukhataṃ kusalānaṃ dasseti, sukhavipākavacanena vipākasukhataṃ. Purimañhi attano pavattisabhāvavasena lakkhaṇatāvacanaṃ, pacchimaṃ kālantare vipākuppādanasamatthatāyāti. Tathā purimena kusalānaṃ attasuddhiṃ dasseti[Pg.32], pacchimena visuddhavipākataṃ. Purimena ca kusalaṃ akusalasabhāvato nivatteti, pacchimena abyākatasabhāvato savipākattadīpakattā pacchimassa. Purimena vā vajjapaṭipakkhabhāvadassanato kiccaṭṭhena rasena akusalaviddhaṃsanarasataṃ dīpeti, pacchimena sampattiatthena iṭṭhavipākarasataṃ. Purimena ca upaṭṭhānākāraṭṭhena paccupaṭṭhānena vodānapaccupaṭṭhānataṃ dasseti, pacchimena phalatthena sukhavipākapaccupaṭṭhānataṃ. Purimena ca yonisomanasikāraṃ kusalānaṃ padaṭṭhānaṃ vibhāveti. Tato hi te anavajjā jātāti. Pacchimena kusalānaṃ aññesaṃ padaṭṭhānabhāvaṃ dasseti. Te hi sukhavipākassa kāraṇaṃ hontīti. Ettha ca sukhavipākasadde sukhasaddo iṭṭhapariyāyavacananti daṭṭhabbo. Iṭṭhacatukkhandhavipākā hi kusalā, na sukhavedanāvipākāva. Saṅkhāradukkhopasamasukhavipākatāya ca sambhavo eva natthi. Na hi taṃvipākoti. Yadi pana vipākasaddo phalapariyāyavacanaṃ, nissandavipākena iṭṭharūpenāpi sukhavipākatā yojetabbā.

Alternatively, by the word ‘blameless’ he stated blamelessness; by the word ‘of pleasant result’ he stated the quality of having a pleasant result. Therefore, ‘blameless and of pleasant result’ is the characteristic of these states. Since the word ‘characteristic’ has the sense of both instrument and object and is their intrinsic nature, they are ‘of the characteristic of being blameless and of pleasant result.’ This means that wholesome states are said to be those that are characterized by the nature of being blameless and of pleasant result and that possess that nature. Herein, the word ‘blameless’ shows the pleasantness of the occurrence of wholesome states; the word ‘of pleasant result’ shows the pleasantness of their result. The former is a statement of characteristic in terms of its own nature of occurrence; the latter, in terms of its capacity to produce a result at a later time. Similarly, the former shows the intrinsic purity of wholesome states; the latter, their purity of result. And the former turns the wholesome away from the nature of the unwholesome; the latter turns it away from the nature of the indeterminate, because the latter indicates the possession of a result. Or, the former, by showing its nature as the opposite of the faulty, reveals its function, in the sense of its duty, to be the destruction of the unwholesome; the latter, in the sense of accomplishment, reveals its function to be a desirable result. And the former, by its manifestation, in the sense of its mode of appearance, shows its manifestation to be purification; the latter, in the sense of fruit, shows its manifestation to be a pleasant result. And the former reveals wise attention as the proximate cause of wholesome states, for it is from that that they are born blameless. The latter shows that wholesome states are the proximate cause of other things, for they are the cause of a pleasant result. And here, in the term ‘of pleasant result,’ the word ‘pleasant’ should be understood as a synonym for ‘desirable.’ For wholesome states have the four desirable aggregates as their result, not just pleasant feeling as their result. And there is no possibility of their having as a result the pleasure of the calming of the suffering of formations, for that is not a result. If, however, the word ‘result’ is a synonym for ‘fruit,’ then the quality of having a pleasant result should also be connected with desirable matter as a flowing-on result.

Sāvajjadukkhavipākalakkhaṇāti ettha ca vuttavidhianusārena attho ca yojanā ca yathāsambhavaṃ veditabbā. Vipākārahatā kusalākusalānaṃ lakkhaṇabhāvena vuttā, tabbhāvena akathitā abyākatā avipākārahasabhāvā hontīti āha ‘‘avipākalakkhaṇā abyākatā’’ti. Yatheva hi sukhadukkhavipākārahā sukhadukkhavipākāti evaṃlakkhaṇatā kusalākusalānaṃ vuttā, evamidhāpi avipākārahā avipākāti evaṃlakkhaṇatā abyākatānaṃ vuttā. Tasmā ‘‘ahosi kammaṃ nāhosi kammavipāko na bhavissati kammavipāko natthi kammavipāko, atthi kammaṃ natthi kammavipāko na bhavissati kammavipāko, bhavissati kammaṃ na bhavissati kammavipāko’’ti (paṭi. ma. 1.234) evaṃpakārānaṃ kusalākusalānaṃ kusalākusalabhāvānāpatti abyākatabhāvāpatti vā na hoti. Na hi te sukhadukkhavipākārahā na honti vipākadhammattā, avipākārahā vā na honti avipākadhammattābhāvāti.

Regarding ‘having the characteristic of being faulty and of painful result,’ here too the meaning and the construction should be understood as far as possible in accordance with the method stated. The capacity to yield a result has been stated as the characteristic of wholesome and unwholesome states. Since the undeclared, not being spoken of in that way, have the nature of being incapable of yielding a result, he said: ‘The undeclared have the characteristic of being non-resultant.’ For just as for wholesome and unwholesome states the characteristic is stated thus: ‘being capable of pleasant and painful result, they are of pleasant and painful result,’ so here too for undeclared states the characteristic is stated thus: ‘being incapable of result, they are non-resultant.’ Therefore, for wholesome and unwholesome states of such kinds as described in the passage, “There was kamma, there was no kamma-result; there will be no kamma-result, there is no kamma-result…,” etc. (Paṭis I 234), there is no loss of their wholesome or unwholesome nature, nor do they acquire an undeclared nature. For it is not that they are incapable of yielding a pleasant and painful result, since they are by nature resultant dhammas; and they are not capable of being non-resultant, since it is not their nature to be non-resultant dhammas.

Kusalāti vā dhammāti vātiādīnīti kusaladhammapadāni dve, akusaladhammapadāni dve, abyākatadhammapadāni dveti. Ekatthanānatthānīti visuṃ visuṃ dvinnaṃ dvinnaṃ aññamaññāpekkhaṃ ekatthanānatthataṃ codeti, na channaṃ. Dosamettha vattukāmo codako pucchatīti ñatvā ācariyo āha ‘‘kiñcetthā’’ti. Ettha [Pg.33] ekatthanānatthatāyaṃ kiñci vattabbaṃ asamattā te codanā, avasiṭṭhaṃ tāva brūhīti vuttaṃ hoti. Yadi ekatthāni indasakkasaddānaṃ viya saddamatte eva bhedo, evaṃ kusaladhammasaddānaṃ, na attheti. Yathā ‘‘indo sakko’’ti vutte ‘‘indo indo’’ti vuttasadisaṃ hoti, evaṃ ‘‘kusalā dhammā’’ti idaṃ vacanaṃ ‘‘kusalā kusalā’’ti vuttasadisaṃ hoti. Evaṃ itaresupi ‘‘akusalā akusalā’’ti vuttasadisatā ‘‘abyākatā abyākatā’’ti vuttasadisatā ca yojetabbā. Atha nānatthāni, indakuverasaddānaṃ viya saddato atthato ca kusaladhammasaddānaṃ bhedo, tathā akusaladhammasaddādīnanti chahi padehi catūhi padehi ca cha cattāro ca atthā bhinnā vuttāti kusalattikādīnaṃ kusalachakkādibhāvo, hetudukādīnañca hetucatukkādibhāvo āpajjatīti.

Regarding the words 'wholesome', 'states', and so on, this means two terms for wholesome phenomena, two for unwholesome phenomena, and two for indeterminate phenomena. Regarding 'having one meaning and different meanings,' he raises an objection concerning the sameness and difference of meaning of each pair separately in relation to each other, not of all six. Knowing that the questioner asks wishing to point out a flaw, the teacher said: “What of it?” This means it was said: “Regarding this matter of having one meaning or different meanings, what is there to be said? Your objection is incomplete. First, state what remains.” If they have one meaning, like the words 'Inda' and 'Sakka', where the difference is only in the word, then for the words 'wholesome' and 'phenomena' there is likewise no difference in meaning. Just as when one says “Inda, Sakka,” it is like saying “Inda, Inda,” so this utterance “wholesome phenomena” is like saying “wholesome, wholesome.” Similarly, for the others, the likeness to saying “unwholesome, unwholesome” and “indeterminate, indeterminate” should be applied. But if they have different meanings, like the words 'Inda' and 'Kuvera', where there is a difference in both word and meaning, then there is a difference between the words 'wholesome' and 'phenomena', and similarly for 'unwholesome' and 'phenomena', and so on. Thus, since with six terms and four terms, six and four distinct meanings would be stated, it would follow that the wholesome triad and so on become a wholesome hexad and so on, and the root dyad and so on become a root tetrad and so on.

Nanu tiṇṇaṃ dhammasaddānaṃ tiṇṇaṃ indasaddānaṃ viya rūpābhedā atthābhedoti chakkabhāvo na bhavissati, tasmā evamidaṃ vattabbaṃ siyā ‘‘tikadukānaṃ catukkatikabhāvo āpajjatī’’ti, na vattabbaṃ, tiṇṇaṃ dhammasaddānaṃ ekatthānaṃ tiṇṇaṃ indasaddānaṃ viya vacane payojanābhāvā vuttānaṃ tesaṃ māsasaddānaṃ viya abhinnarūpānañca atthabhedo upapajjatīti, evamapi yathā eko māsasaddo abhinnarūpo kālaṃ aparaṇṇavisesaṃ suvaṇṇamāsañca vadati, evaṃ dhammasaddopi eko bhinne atthe vattumarahatīti kālādīnaṃ māsapadatthatāya viya tabbacanīyabhinnatthānaṃ dhammapadatthatāya abhedoti catukkatikabhāvo eva āpajjatīti, nāpajjati ekassa saddassa jātiguṇakiriyābhinnānaṃ anabhidhānato. Na hi māsa-saddo eko jātibhinnānaṃ kālādīnaṃ antarena sarūpekasesaṃ vācako hoti. Idha ca yadi sarūpekaseso kato siyā, dutiyo tatiyo ca dhamma-saddo na vattabbo siyā, vutto ca so, tasmā kusalādi-saddā viya abhinnakusalādijātīsu rūpasāmaññepi māsa-saddā viya tayo vinivattaaññajātīsu vattamānā tayo dve ca dhamma-saddā āpannāti tikadukānaṃ chakkacatukkabhāvo eva āpajjatīti.

Surely, since the three ‘dhamma’ words, like the three ‘Inda’ words, are identical in form, they are identical in meaning, and thus the state of being a hexad will not occur? Therefore, it might be said: ‘It follows that the triads and dyads become a tetrad and a triad.’ This should not be said. For if the three ‘dhamma’ words had one meaning, like the three ‘Inda’ words, there would be no purpose in uttering them; and for these uttered words, though they have an identical form like the word ‘māsa,’ a difference in meaning is possible. Even so, just as the one word ‘māsa,’ though identical in form, denotes time, a type of pulse, and a gold coin, so too the one word ‘dhamma’ can denote different meanings. Just as there is no difference in the status of time, etc., as being the meaning of the word ‘māsa,’ so there is no difference in the status of those distinct things denoted by it as being the meaning of the word ‘dhamma’; thus it follows that they become a tetrad and a triad. This does not follow, because one word does not denote things that are distinct in kind, quality, and action. For the one word ‘māsa’ does not, without an ellipsis of a word of the same form, designate time, etc., which are distinct in kind. And here, if such an ellipsis had been made, the second and third ‘dhamma’ word would not have been recited. But it was recited. Therefore, unlike the words ‘wholesome,’ etc., which refer to things within a single wholesome kind, the three ‘dhamma’ words—though having a common form like the word ‘māsa’—refer to three distinct and separate kinds. Thus, the three and the two ‘dhamma’ words are established, and it follows that the triads and dyads indeed become a hexad and a tetrad.

Padānañca asambandhoti kusaladhammapadānaṃ aññamaññaṃ tathā akusaladhammapadānaṃ abyākatadhammapadānañca asambandho āpajjatīti attho. Dvinnaṃ dvinnañhi icchito sambandho, na sabbesaṃ channaṃ catunnaṃ vā aññamaññanti. Idaṃ pana kasmā codeti, nanu nānatthatte sati atthantaradassanatthaṃ vuccamānesu dhamma-saddesu kusalākusalābyākata-saddānaṃ [Pg.34] viya asambandho vutto yutto evāti? Saccametaṃ, asambandhaṃ pana siddhaṃ katvā purimacodanā katā ‘‘tikadukānaṃ chakkacatukkabhāvo āpajjatī’’ti, idha pana taṃ asambandhaṃ sādhetuṃ idaṃ coditanti veditabbaṃ. Atha vā evamettha yojanā kātabbā – yadi pana chakkacatukkabhāvaṃ na icchasi, padānaṃ sambandhena bhavitabbaṃ yathāvuttanayena, so ca samānavibhattīnaṃ dvinnaṃ dvinnaṃ sambandho ekatthatte sati yujjeyya, tvaṃ pana nānatthataṃ vadasīti padānañca te asambandho āpajjati, neva nāpajjatīti. Niyamanattho ca-saddo. Pubbāpara…pe… nippayojanāni nāma hontīti chakkacatukkabhāvaṃ anicchantassa, nānatthataṃ pana icchantassāti adhippāyo. Avassañca sambandho icchitabbo pubbāparavirodhāpattitoti dassetuṃ ‘‘yāpi cesā’’tiādimāha. Pucchā hi padavipallāsakaraṇena dhammā eva kusalāti kusaladhamma-saddānaṃ idha uddiṭṭhānaṃ ekatthataṃ dīpeti, tava ca nānatthataṃ vadantassa neva hi dhammā kusalāti katvā tāyapi pucchāya virodho āpajjati, vuccati ca tathā sā pucchāti na nānatthatā yujjati.

‘And the non-connection of the terms’ means that it follows that the terms ‘wholesome’ and ‘states’ are not mutually connected, and likewise the terms ‘unwholesome’ and ‘states’, and ‘indeterminate’ and ‘states’. For a connection is intended between each pair, not between all six or four with one another. But why does he raise this objection? Surely, when there is a difference in meaning, and the ‘dhamma’ words are uttered to show a different meaning, it is quite proper that a non-connection is stated, just as with the words ‘wholesome,’ ‘unwholesome,’ and ‘indeterminate’? This is true. But having taken the non-connection as established, the previous objection was made: ‘It follows that the triads and dyads become a hexad and a tetrad.’ Here, however, it should be understood that this objection is raised to prove that non-connection. Alternatively, the application here should be made thus: if you do not desire the state of being a hexad and tetrad, there must be a connection of the terms in the way stated. And that connection of each pair in the same grammatical case would be tenable if there were a sameness of meaning. But you state a difference in meaning, so for you a non-connection of the terms follows. —No, it does not follow. The word ‘ca’ has a restrictive sense. The meaning is that for one who does not desire the state of being a hexad and tetrad, but desires a difference in meaning, the preceding and following ... are indeed pointless. To show that a connection must certainly be desired because a contradiction between the preceding and following would otherwise result, he says ‘And this...’ etc. For the question, by transposing the terms, shows the sameness of meaning of the terms ‘wholesome’ and ‘states’ stated here, as in ‘the states are indeed wholesome.’ But for you, who state a difference in meaning, since it is not the case that ‘the states are wholesome,’ a contradiction with that question also follows. And since that question is stated thus, a difference in meaning is not tenable.

Aparo nayoti ‘‘kusalā dhammā’’tiādīnaṃ dvinnaṃ dvinnaṃ ekatthattameva tiṇṇaṃ dhammasaddānaṃ ekatthanānatthattehi codeti. Tiṇṇaṃ dhammānaṃ ekattātiādimhi yathā tīhi inda-saddehi vuccamānānaṃ indatthānaṃ indabhāvena ekattā tato anaññesaṃ sakkapurindadasahassakkhasaddatthānaṃ ekattaṃ, evaṃ tiṇṇaṃ dhamma-saddatthānaṃ dhammabhāvena ekattā tato anaññesaṃ kusalākusalābyākata-saddatthānaṃ ekattaṃ āpajjatīti attho. Dhammo nāma bhāvoti sabhāvadhāraṇādinā atthena dhammoti vutto, so ca sabhāvasseva hoti, nāsabhāvassāti iminā adhippāyena vadati. Hotu bhāvo, tato kinti? Yadi tiṇṇaṃ dhammasaddānaṃ nānatthatā, tīsu dhammesu yo koci eko dhammo bhāvo, tato anaññaṃ kusalaṃ akusalaṃ abyākataṃ vā ekekameva bhāvo. Bhāvabhūtā pana dhammā aññe dve abhāvā hontīti tehi anaññe kusalādīsu dve ye keci abhāvā. Yopi ca so eko dhammo bhāvoti gahito, sopi samānarūpesu tīsu dhammasaddesu ayameva bhāvattho hotīti niyamassa abhāvā aññassa bhāvatthatte sati abhāvo hotīti tato anaññassapi abhāvattaṃ āpannanti kusalādīnaṃ sabbesampi abhāvattāpatti hoti. Na hi indassa amanussatte tato anaññesaṃ sakkādīnaṃ manussattaṃ atthīti.

Another method: He objects to the sameness and difference of meaning of the three ‘dhamma’ words by arguing for the mere sameness of meaning of each pair, such as ‘wholesome states.’ Regarding ‘the unity of the three states,’ etc., the meaning is this: just as, because the meanings denoted by the three ‘Inda’ words are unified by their nature as Inda, the meanings of the words Sakka, Purindada, and Sahassakkha, which are not other than that, are also unified; so too, because the meanings of the three ‘dhamma’ words are unified by their nature as dhamma, it follows that the meanings of the words ‘wholesome,’ ‘unwholesome,’ and ‘indeterminate,’ which are not other than that, are also unified. ‘Dhamma’ is ‘existence.’ It is called ‘dhamma’ with the meaning of upholding its own nature, etc. And that belongs only to what has a nature, not to what is without a nature—he speaks with this intention. Let it be existence. So what? If the three ‘dhamma’ words have different meanings, then among the three dhammas, whichever one is existence, then what is not other than it—the wholesome, the unwholesome, or the indeterminate—is each one existence. But then the other two dhammas must be non-existence. And so, the two among the wholesome, etc., that are not other than them, are also non-existence. Moreover, even that one dhamma that was taken as existence—since among the three ‘dhamma’ words of identical form there is no rule that this one alone has the meaning of existence, if another has the meaning of existence, the first becomes non-existence. Thus, what is not other than it also becomes non-existence. In this way, it follows that all of the wholesome, etc., become non-existent. For if Inda is non-human, it is not the case that Sakka and others, who are not other than him, are human.

Nanu [Pg.35] evamapi ekassa bhāvattaṃ vinā aññesaṃ abhāvattaṃ na sakkā vattuṃ, tattha ca ekeneva bhāvena bhavitabbanti niyamābhāvato tiṇṇampi bhāvatte siddhe tehi anaññesaṃ kusalādīnampi bhāvattaṃ siddhaṃ hotīti? Na hoti tiṇṇaṃ dhamma-saddānaṃ nānatthabhāvassa anuññātattā. Na hi tiṇṇaṃ bhāvatte nānatthatā atthi, anuññātā ca sā tayāti. Nanu tiṇṇaṃ dhammānaṃ abhāvattepi nānatthatā na siyāti? Mā hotu nānatthatā, tava pana nānatthataṃ paṭijānantassa ‘‘eso doso’’ti vadāmi, na pana mayā nānatthatā ekatthatā vā anuññātāti kuto me virodho siyāti. Atha vā abhāvattaṃ āpannehi dhammehi anaññe kusalādayopi abhāvā eva siyunti idaṃ vacanaṃ aniyamena ye keci dve dhammā abhāvattaṃ āpannā, tehi anaññesaṃ kusalādīsu yesaṃ kesañci dvinnaṃ kusalādīnaṃ abhāvattāpattiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ ekassa bhāvattā. Yampi vuttaṃ ‘‘tehi ca añño kusalaparopi abhāvo siyā’’ti, taṃ aniyamadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ, na sabbesaṃ abhāvasādhanatthaṃ. Ayañhi tattha attho akusalaparassa vā abyākataparassa vā dhammassa bhāvatte sati tehi añño kusalaparopi abhāvo siyāti.

Surely, even so, is it not impossible to speak of the non-existence of the others without the existence of one? And since there is no rule that there must be existence in only one, when the existence of all three is established, is not the existence of the wholesome, etc., which are not other than them, also thereby established? —It is not so, because the state of having different meanings for the three ‘dhamma’ words has been conceded. For if the three have existence, there is no difference in meaning, and that difference has been conceded by you. —Surely, even if the three dhammas were non-existent, would there not be a difference in meaning? —Let there be no difference in meaning. But it is to you who professes a difference in meaning that I say, ‘This is the fault.’ Since neither a difference nor a sameness of meaning has been conceded by me, how could there be a contradiction for me? Alternatively, this statement—‘The wholesome, etc., which are not other than the dhammas that have become non-existent, would also be non-existent’—was said without specification, with reference to the consequence that when any two dhammas have become non-existent, due to the existence of the one, any two of the wholesome, etc., which are not other than those two, would also become non-existent. And what was said, ‘And through them another associated with the wholesome would also be non-existent,’ was said to show this lack of specification, not to establish the non-existence of all. For this is the meaning there: if a dhamma associated with the unwholesome or with the indeterminate exists, then another, distinct from it and associated with the wholesome, could also be non-existent.

Sabbametaṃ akāraṇanti ettha kāraṇaṃ nāma yutti. Kusalakusalasaddānaṃ viya ekantaekatthataṃ, kusalarūpacakkhuma-saddānaṃ viya ekantanānatthatañca vikappetvā yāyaṃ punarutti chakkacatukkāpatti asambandhavirodhābhāvāpatti dosāropanayutti vuttā, sabbā sā ayutti, tathā ekatthanānatthatābhāvatoti vuttaṃ hoti. Yā yā anumati yathānumati anumatiyā anumatiyā vohārasiddhito. Anumatiyā anurūpaṃ vā yathānumati, yathā anumati pavattā, tathā tadanurūpaṃ vohārasiddhitoti attho. Anumati hi visesanavisesitabbābhāvato accantamabhinnesu katthaci kiriyāguṇādipariggahavisesena avivaṭasaddatthavivaraṇatthaṃ pavattā yathā ‘‘sakko indo purindado’’ti. Katthaci accantaṃ bhinnesu yathā ‘‘dhavo khadiro palāso ca ānīyantū’’ti. Katthaci visesanavisesitabbabhāvato bhedābhedavantesu seyyathāpi ‘‘nīluppalaṃ paṇḍitapuriso’’ti, tāya tāya anumatiyā tadanurūpañca te te vohārā siddhā. Tasmā ihāpi kusaladhamma-saddānaṃ visesanavisesitabbabhāvato visesatthasāmaññatthapariggahena samāne atthe bhedābhedayutte pavatti anumatāti [Pg.36] tāya tāya anumatiyā tadanurūpañca siddho eso vohāro. Tasmā vuttaṃ ‘‘sabbametaṃ akāraṇa’’nti.

Herein, when it is said, 'All this is not a reason,' the term 'reason' (kāraṇa) means 'validity' (yutti). The stated validity for imputing a fault—which involves positing either absolute identity of meaning, as with the words 'wholesome' and 'unwholesome,' or absolute difference of meaning, as with the words 'wholesome,' 'form,' and 'eye,' and thereby alleging tautology, the sixfold and fourfold fallacies, and the fallacy of being unconnected and non-contradictory—all that is invalidity, because there is no such absolute identity or difference of meaning. This is what is meant. By whatever convention, according to that convention, by means of that convention, a usage is established. 'According to convention' (yathānumati) means in conformity with convention; that is, just as a convention proceeds, so a corresponding usage is established. For a convention proceeds to clarify the meaning of a word that has not been explicitly stated. Sometimes it applies to things that are completely non-different, where there is no qualifier-qualified relationship, by grasping a distinction through an action, quality, or the like, as in 'Sakka, Indra, Purindada.' Sometimes it applies to things that are completely different, as in 'Let the dhava, khadira, and palāsa be brought.' And sometimes it applies to things possessing both difference and non-difference, where there is a qualifier-qualified relationship, as in 'a blue lotus,' 'a wise person.' By each such convention, the corresponding usages are established. Therefore, here too, in the case of the words 'wholesome' and 'dhamma,' because there is a qualifier-qualified relationship, their application to the same meaning—which possesses both difference and non-difference through the grasping of a specific meaning and a general meaning—is permitted. By that very convention, this corresponding usage is established. Therefore, it was said: 'All this is not a reason.'

Attano attano atthavisesaṃ tassa dīpentīti attanā pariggahitaṃ attanā vuccamānaṃ anavajjasukhavipākādikusalādibhāvaṃ dhamma-saddassa dīpenti tadatthassa tabbhāvadīpanavasenāti adhippāyo. Na hi dhamma-saddo kusalādibhāvo hotīti. Imināvāti ‘‘dhamma-saddo pariyattiādīsu dissatī’’tiādinā ‘‘attano sabhāvaṃ dhārentī’’tiādinā ca nayena. So hi sabbattha samāno, na kusala-saddo ārogyādīsu dissatīti ‘‘kucchite salayantī’’tiādiko, so ca visesanayo ‘‘ito paraṃ visesamattameva vakkhāmā’’ti etena apanītoti daṭṭhabbo. Na hi kusalādivisesaṃ gahetvā pavattā sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttātiādayo visesāti.

The intention is this: 'They reveal its own particular meaning' means that they reveal the state of being wholesome, etc.—which is faultless, has a pleasant result, and so on, a state grasped and spoken of by oneself—of the word 'dhamma' by way of illuminating its meaning and its very nature. For the word 'dhamma' is not itself the state of being wholesome, etc. This is by the method beginning, 'The word "dhamma" is seen in the scriptural texts, etc.' and 'They uphold their own nature.' For that word 'dhamma' is the same everywhere, whereas the word 'wholesome' is not seen in contexts such as health. The etymological method of distinction beginning, 'They shake off what is reprehensible,' has been set aside by the statement, 'Henceforth we will speak only of the distinction itself'; this should be understood. For such things as 'associated with pleasant feeling,' which proceed by grasping the distinction 'wholesome,' are not themselves the distinctions.

2. Sukhassa ca pahānāti ettha sukhindriyaṃ ‘‘sukha’’nti vuttaṃ, tañca sukhavedanāva hotīti ‘‘sukhavedanāyaṃ dissatī’’ti vuttaṃ, na pana ‘‘tisso imā, bhikkhave, vedanā sukhā vedanā’’tievamādīsu (saṃ. ni. 4.249 ādayo) sukha-saddo viya sukhavedanāsaddena samānatthattā. Ayañhi sukhindriyattho sukha-saddo kāyasukhanaṃ kāyānuggahaṃ sātavisesaṃ gahetvā pavatto, na pana sukhā vedanā ‘‘yaṃ kiñci vedanaṃ vedeti sukhaṃ vā (ma. ni. 1.409), yo sukhaṃ dukkhato’’tievamādīsu (saṃ. ni. 4.253) sukha-saddo viya sātasāmaññaṃ gahetvā pavattoti. Yasmiṃ sati sukhahetūnaṃ pavatti, taṃ sukhamūlaṃ. Buddhuppāde ca kāmasamatikkamādike virāge ca sati sukhahetūnaṃ puññapassaddhiādīnaṃ pavatti hotīti taṃ ‘‘sukhamūlaṃ sukha’’nti vuttaṃ. Sukhassa ca ārammaṇattā ‘‘rūpaṃ sukha’’nti vuttaṃ. Puññānīti yadidaṃ vacanaṃ, taṃ sukhassa ca adhivacanaṃ iṭṭhavipākassa adhivacanaṃ tadatthassa iṭṭhavipākavipaccanatoti attho. Sukhapaccayānaṃ rūpādīnaṃ iṭṭhānaṃ ṭhānaṃ okāso saggā nandanañcāti ‘‘sukhā saggā sukhaṃ nandana’’nti vuttaṃ. Diṭṭhadhammeti imasmiṃ attabhāve. Sukhavihārāti paṭhamajjhānavihārādī. Nīvaraṇādibyābādharahitattā ‘‘abyābajjhā’’ti vuttā. Sabbasaṅkhāradukkhanibbāpanato taṃnirodhattā vā ‘‘nibbānaṃ sukha’’nti vuttaṃ. Ādi-saddena ‘‘adukkhamasukhaṃ santaṃ, sukhamicceva bhāsita’’nti adukkhamasukhe. ‘‘Dvepi mayā, ānanda, [Pg.37] vedanā vuttā pariyāyena sukhā vedanā dukkhā vedanā’’ti (saṃ. ni. 4.267) sukhopekkhāsu ca iṭṭhāsūti evamādīsu pavatti saṅgahitā.

2. Here, in the phrase 'and by the abandoning of pleasure,' the pleasure faculty (sukhindriya) is called 'pleasure' (sukha). And since that is pleasant feeling, it is said, 'it is seen in pleasant feeling.' This is not because the word 'sukha' is synonymous with the word 'pleasant feeling,' as in such passages as: 'Bhikkhus, there are these three feelings: pleasant feeling…' (SN 36:1, etc.). For this word 'sukha' in the sense of the pleasure faculty proceeds by taking up bodily pleasure, a particular kind of agreeableness that supports the body; it does not proceed by taking up general agreeableness, as does the word 'sukha' in such passages as 'whatever feeling one feels, whether pleasant…' (MN 10) or 'one who regards pleasure as suffering…' (SN 36:5). That on which the occurrence of the causes of pleasure is based is the 'root of pleasure.' When there is the arising of a Buddha and dispassion, such as the surmounting of sensual pleasures, the causes of pleasure—merit, tranquility, etc.—occur. Thus that is called 'pleasure, the root of pleasure.' Because it is an object of pleasure, it is said, 'form is pleasure.' The statement 'merits' is a designation for pleasure and a designation for a desirable result; the meaning is that it ripens into a desirable result for one who aims at that. The place, the opportunity for desirable things such as forms, which are conditions for pleasure, is heaven and the Nandana Grove; thus it is said, 'Pleasant are the heavens, pleasant is the Nandana Grove.' 'In the present life' means in this very existence. 'Pleasant abidings' refers to the abidings in the first jhāna and so on. Because they are free from the affliction of the hindrances, etc., they are called 'unafflicted.' Because it is the extinguishing of the suffering of all formations, or because it is their cessation, it is said, 'Nibbāna is pleasure.' By the word 'etc.' is included its occurrence in relation to neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, as in 'The peaceful neither-painful-nor-pleasant is spoken of as pleasure.' Also included are its occurrences in relation to pleasant and equanimous feelings that are desirable, as in: 'Ānanda, I have spoken of two feelings in a certain way: pleasant feeling and painful feeling' (SN 36:19).

Dukkhavatthūti dukkhassa okāso. Attano paccayehi uppajjamānampi hi taṃ dukkhaṃ jātiādīsu vijjamānesu tabbatthukaṃ hutvā uppajjati. Dukkhapaccayeti dukkhahetumhi, dukkhassa janaketi attho. Dukkhapaccayaṭṭhāneti dukkhajanakakammassa sahāyabhūtānaṃ aniṭṭharūpādipaccayānaṃ ṭhāne. Paccayasaddo hi janake janakasahāye ca pavattatīti. Ādi-saddena ‘‘yadaniccaṃ taṃ dukkha’’ntiādinā (saṃ. ni. 3.15, 45-46, 76) saṅkhāradukkhādīsu pavatti daṭṭhabbā. Sampayutte vatthuñca karajakāyaṃ sukhayati laddhassāde anuggahite karotīti sukhā. Sukhāti vedanāsaddamapekkhitvā sukhabhāvamattassa appakāsanena napuṃsakaliṅgatā na katā. Sabhāvato saṅkappato ca yaṃ iṭṭhaṃ, tadanubhavanaṃ iṭṭhākārānubhavanaṃ vā iṭṭhānubhavanaṃ.

'The basis of suffering' means the opportunity for suffering. For although that suffering arises from its own conditions, when birth, etc., exist, it arises having them as its basis. 'In the condition for suffering' means in the cause of suffering; the meaning is 'in what generates suffering.' 'In the place of the condition for suffering' means in the place of conditions such as undesirable form that are ancillary to the kamma that generates suffering. For the word 'condition' is used for a generator and for an accessory to a generator. By the word 'etc.,' its occurrence in relation to the suffering of formations and so on should be understood, as in such passages as: 'Whatever is impermanent, that is suffering' (SN 22.15, etc.). It makes the body born of action, the associated states, and the basis pleasant; when savor has been obtained, it makes them favored; thus, it is 'pleasant' (sukhā). With reference to the word 'feeling' (vedanā), the word 'pleasant' (sukhā) is not made neuter because it does not merely indicate the state of pleasure. The experience of what is desirable by its own nature and by intention, or the experience of a desirable aspect, is 'the experience of the desirable.'

Samanti avisamaṃ. Samā ekībhāvūpagatā viya yuttā, samaṃ vā saha yuttāti yojetabbaṃ. Ekuppādāti eko samāno uppādo etesanti ekuppādā, samānapaccayehi sahuppattikāti attho. Sahuppattikānaṃ rūpārūpānañca aññamaññasampayuttatā āpajjeyyāti ‘‘ekanirodhā’’ti vuttaṃ, ye samānuppādā samānanirodhā ca, te sampayuttāti rūpārūpānaṃ aññamaññasampayogo nivārito hoti. Evamapi avinibbhogarūpānaṃ aññamaññasampayuttatā āpajjeyyāti ‘‘ekavatthukā’’ti vuttaṃ, ye ekuppādā ekanirodhā ekavatthukā ca, te sampayuttāti. Evamapi avinibbhogarūpesu ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ sesamahābhūtopādārūpānaṃ nissayapaccayo hotīti tena tāni ekavatthukānīti, cakkhādinissayabhūtāni vā bhūtāni ekaṃ vatthu etesu sannissitanti ekavatthukānīti kappentassa tesaṃ sampayuttatāpatti siyāti tannivāraṇatthaṃ ‘‘ekārammaṇā’’ti vuttaṃ, ye ekuppādā…pe… ekārammaṇā ca honti, te sampayuttāti. Paṭilomato vā ekārammaṇāti vutte ekavīthiyañca pañcaviññāṇasampaṭicchanānaṃ nānāvīthiyaṃ parasantāne ca ekasmiṃ ārammaṇe uppajjamānānaṃ bhinnavatthukānaṃ sampayuttatā āpajjeyyāti ‘‘ekavatthukā’’ti vuttaṃ, ye ekavatthukā hutvā ekārammaṇā, te sampayuttāti. Evamapi sampaṭicchanasantīraṇādīnaṃ sampayuttatā āpajjeyyāti ‘‘ekanirodhā’’ti vuttaṃ, ye ekanirodhā [Pg.38] hutvā ekavatthukā ekārammaṇā, te sampayuttāti. Kiṃ pana nānuppādāpi evaṃ tividhalakkhaṇā honti, atha ekuppādā evāti vicāraṇāya ekuppādā eva evaṃ tividhalakkhaṇā hontīti dassanatthaṃ ‘‘ekuppādā’’ti vuttaṃ.

‘Together’ (samaṃ) means not unequal (avisamaṃ). It should be construed as ‘conjoined as if having attained oneness’ (samā yuttā) or ‘conjoined together’ (samaṃ saha yuttā). ‘Having a single arising’ (ekuppādā): they have one, a single, arising. The meaning is that they are co-nascent with the same conditions. If this were all, the mutual association of co-nascent material and immaterial states would follow; to prevent this, ‘having a single cessation’ is stated. Those that have a single arising and a single cessation are associated; thus, the mutual association of material and immaterial states is prevented. Even so, the mutual association of inseparable material phenomena would follow; to prevent this, ‘having a single basis’ is stated. Thus, those that have a single arising, a single cessation, and a single basis are associated. Even so, in the case of inseparable material phenomena, one great element is the support condition for the remaining great elements and for derived materiality, and thus they would have a single basis. Or, if one were to imagine that the elements that are the support for the eye-faculty, etc., have a single basis in which they are supported, the fallacy of their association would follow. To prevent this, ‘having a single object’ is stated. Thus, those that have a single arising… and a single object are associated. Or, taking it in reverse: if only ‘having a single object’ were stated, the five sense consciousnesses and the receiving consciousness in a single cognitive process, or states arising in different cognitive processes or in another's continuum with a single object but different bases, would be considered associated. To prevent this, ‘having a single basis’ is stated. Thus, those that, having a single basis, have a single object are associated. Even so, the association of receiving, investigating, etc., would follow. To prevent this, ‘having a single cessation’ is stated. Thus, those that, having a single cessation, have a single basis and a single object are associated. But do things that do not arise together also have these three characteristics, or only those with a single arising? To show, upon investigation, that only those with a single arising have these three characteristics, ‘having a single arising’ is stated.

3. Vipakkabhāvamāpannānaṃ arūpadhammānanti yathā sālibījādīnaṃ phalāni taṃsadisāni nibbattāni vipakkāni nāma honti, vipākaniruttiñca labhanti, na mūlaṅkurapattakhandhanāḷāni, evaṃ kusalākusalānaṃ phalāni arūpadhammabhāvena sārammaṇabhāvena sukkakaṇhādibhāvena ca taṃsadisāni vipakkabhāvamāpannānīti vipākaniruttiṃ labhanti, na rūpadhammā kammanibbattāpi kammāsadisāti dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Jātijarāsabhāvāti jāyanajīraṇasabhāvā. Vipākapakatikāti vipaccanapakatikā. Vipaccanasabhāvatā ca anupacchinnāvijjātaṇhāmānasantāne sabyāpāratā, tena abhiññādikusalānaṃ bhāvanāyapahātabbādiakusalānañca vipākānuppādanepi vipākadhammatā siddhā hoti. Vipakkabhāvanti cettha bhāva-saddena sabhāvo eva vutto. Taṃ yathāvuttaṃ vipakkasabhāvaṃ dutiyassa vuttaṃ vipaccanasabhāvañca gahetvā ‘‘ubhayasabhāvapaṭikkhepavasenā’’ti āha.

3. The phrase 'of immaterial phenomena that have reached the state of being a result' means this: Just as the fruits of rice seeds and the like, which are produced similar to them, are called 'ripened' and receive the designation 'result'—but not the roots, sprouts, leaves, stems, or stalks—so too the fruits of wholesome and unwholesome actions, being similar to them in their nature as immaterial phenomena, in having an object, and in being bright, dark, etc., receive the designation 'result' when they have reached the state of being ripened. This is said to show that material phenomena, even if produced by kamma, are not similar to kamma. 'Having the nature of birth and aging' means having the nature of being born and growing old. 'Having the nature of a result' means having the nature of ripening. The nature of ripening is its activity in the uninterrupted continuity of ignorance, craving, and conceit. Therefore, the nature of being a result is established even when there is no production of a result for wholesome states such as the higher knowledges and for unwholesome states such as those to be abandoned by development. Here, in the word 'vipakkabhāva,' the term 'bhāva' just means intrinsic nature. Taking this aforesaid intrinsic nature of being a result and the intrinsic nature of ripening mentioned for the second, it is said: 'by way of rejecting both intrinsic natures.'

4. Upetena ādinnā upādinnā. Kiṃ pana taṃ upetaṃ, kena ca upetaṃ, kathañca upetaṃ, ke ca tena ādinnāti? Sati ca lokuttarānaṃ kesañci ārammaṇabhāve tannivattanatthaṃ upetasaddasambandhinā upaya-saddena vuccamānāhi catubbidhupādānabhūtāhi taṇhādiṭṭhīhi upetaṃ, tehi ca ārammaṇakaraṇavasena upetaṃ, na samannāgamavasena. Sati ca sabbatebhūmakadhammānaṃ upādānārammaṇatte yehi vipākakaṭattārūpāni amhehi nibbattattā amhākaṃ etāni phalānīti gaṇhantehi viya ādinnāni, tāni tebhūmakakammāni kammabhāvena ekattaṃ upanetvā upetanti idha gahitāni. Tehi ca nibbattāni vipākakaṭattārūpāni upādinnā dhammāti sabbametaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘ārammaṇakaraṇavasenā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Ayañca atthanayo yathāsambhavaṃ yojetabbo, na vacanānupubbenāti. Etthāha – yadi ārammaṇakaraṇavasena taṇhādiṭṭhīhi upetena ādinnā upādinnā, sabbatebhūmakadhammā ca taṇhādīnaṃ ārammaṇā honti, na ca upetasaddo kamme eva niruḷho, tena kammasseva gahaṇe kāraṇaṃ natthi, tasmā sabbatebhūmakadhammapaccayuppannānaṃ [Pg.39] avijjādihetūhi nibbattānaṃ saṅkhārādiphalānaṃ upādinnattaṃ āpajjati tesampi tehiphalabhāvena gahitattā. Upa-saddena ca upetatāmattaṃ jotitaṃ, na ārammaṇakaraṇaṃ samannāgamanivattakaṃ, ādinna-saddena ca gahitatāmattaṃ vuttaṃ, na kammasamuṭṭhānatāviseso. Tasmā sabbapaccayuppannānaṃ upādinnattaṃ āpajjatīti? Nāpajjati bodhaneyyajjhāsayavasena desanāpavattito. Yesañhi bodhanatthaṃ ‘‘upādinnā’’ti etaṃ vuttaṃ, te teneva vacanena yathāvuttappakāre dhamme bujjhiṃsu, etarahi pana tāvatā bujjhituṃ asakkontena sutvā tadattho veditabboti esā atthavibhāvanā katā ‘‘kammunā’’ti.

4. 'Grasped by that which is approached' means 'grasped-at.' But what is that which is 'approached' (upeta), by what is it 'approached,' how is it 'approached,' and what is 'grasped' (ādinna) by it? When some supramundane states are the object, in order to exclude them, it is 'approached' by craving and views, which constitute the four kinds of clinging and are expressed by the word 'upaya,' a cognate of 'upeta.' It is 'approached' by them in the sense of making them its object, not in the sense of being endowed with them. And when all phenomena of the three planes are objects of clinging, that kamma of the three planes—by which resultant kamma-produced matter, being produced by us, is grasped as if by those who think, 'These are our fruits'—is here taken as 'that which is approached' (upeta), having been brought to unity by way of being kamma. And the resultant kamma-produced matter produced by that kamma are the 'grasped-at' phenomena. To show all this, the phrase 'in the sense of making it an object,' etc., was said. This line of meaning should be applied as is possible, not according to the sequence of words. Here an objection is raised: If 'grasped-at' means grasped by that which is approached by craving and views in the sense of making them its object, and all phenomena of the three planes are objects of craving, etc., and the word 'upeta' is not conventionally restricted to kamma, then there is no reason to take it as kamma alone. Therefore, the state of being 'grasped-at' would apply to the results such as formations, which are produced by causes such as ignorance and arise from conditions that are phenomena of the three planes, because they too are grasped as results by them. The prefix 'upa-' illuminates merely the state of being approached, not the making of an object which would exclude being endowed with it. And by the word 'ādinna' merely the state of being grasped is stated, not the specific quality of arising from kamma. Therefore, does the state of being 'grasped-at' apply to all conditionally arisen phenomena? It does not, because the teaching proceeds according to the disposition of those to be taught. For those for whose instruction the word 'grasped-at' was spoken, they understood the phenomena in the way described by that very word. But now, since one is unable to understand by that much, the meaning must be known by hearing it. This explanation of the meaning has been made by the word 'by kamma.'

Ayaṃ pana aparo attho daṭṭhabbo – upa-saddo upetaṃ dīpeti. Ayañhi upa-saddo samāse payujjamāno ‘‘atimālā’’tiādīsu ati-saddo viya atikkamanaṃ sasādhanaṃ upagamanaṃ sasādhanaṃ vadati, upagamanañca upādānaupayo, tena upagataṃ upetaṃ. Kiṃ pana tanti? Yaṃ asati upādāne na hoti, taṃ ‘‘upādānapaccayā bhavo’’ti evaṃ vuttaṃ tebhūmakakammaṃ paccayabhāvena purimajātuppannena upādānena upagatattā ‘‘upeta’’nti vuccati. Na hi koci anupaggamma anicchanto kammaṃ karotīti. Tena upetena kammunā punabbhavassa ādānaṃ hoti. Kammunā hi sāsavena sattā ādiyanti punabbhavaṃ, tasmā ādātabbabhāvena pākaṭo punabbhavo. So ca upapattibhavo tebhūmakavipākakaṭattārūpasaṅgaho ‘‘bhavapaccayā jātī’’ti ettha jātivacane samavaruddhoti upādinnavacanena upapattibhavo vuccati, upapattibhavo ca tebhūmakavipākakaṭattārūpānīti dhātukathāyaṃ pakāsitametaṃ. Tasmā upetena ādinnāti te eva dhammā vuccantīti siddho ayamatthoti. Upādinna-saddassa atthaṃ vatvā taṃ vissajjetvā upādāniya-saddassa visuṃ upādinnasaddānapekkhaṃ atthaṃ vattuṃ ‘‘ārammaṇabhāvaṃ upagantvā’’tiādimāha. Tasmā eva avisesetvā ‘‘upādānassa ārammaṇapaccayabhūtānametaṃ adhivacana’’nti vuttaṃ. Taṃ pana upādāniyaṃ upādinnaṃ anupādinnanti duvidhaṃ. Tasmā taṃ visesanena dassento ‘‘upādinnā ca te upādāniyā cā’’tiādimāha.

Now, another meaning should be seen: the prefix 'upa-' illuminates 'upeta.' For this prefix 'upa-,' when used in a compound, speaks of approaching with its instrument, just as the prefix 'ati-' in 'atimālā,' etc., speaks of surpassing with its instrument. And approaching is the means of clinging; hence, what has been approached is 'upeta.' But what is that? It is that which does not exist when there is no clinging. This is the kamma of the three planes spoken of in the phrase 'with clinging as condition, becoming'; it is called 'upeta' because it has been approached by the clinging that arose in a previous birth as its condition. For no one performs kamma without approaching it, even if unwillingly. Through that 'approached' kamma, there is the taking up of renewed existence. For by kamma accompanied by taints, beings take up renewed existence; thus renewed existence is manifest as something to be taken up. And that existence at rebirth, which is a collection of the resultant aggregates and kamma-produced matter of the three planes, is included in the word 'birth' in the phrase 'with becoming as condition, birth.' Thus, by the word 'grasped-at' (upādinna), existence at rebirth is meant. And that existence at rebirth consists of the resultant aggregates and kamma-produced matter of the three planes has been explained in the Dhātukathā. Therefore, 'grasped by that which is approached' refers to these very phenomena, and thus this meaning is established. Having stated the meaning of the word 'upādinna' and set that aside, in order to state the meaning of the word 'upādāniya' (subject to clinging) separately, without reference to the word 'upādinna,' he begins with 'having approached as an object.' Thus, without making a distinction, it is said: 'This is a designation for those things that have become an object-condition for clinging.' But that which is subject to clinging is twofold: grasped-at and not-grasped-at. Therefore, showing this with a specific qualification, he says: 'They are both grasped-at and subject to clinging,' and so on.

5. Saṃkilesoti dasa kilesavatthūni vuccanti. Saṃkiliṭṭhāti tehi vibādhitā upatāpitā ca. Te pana yasmā saṃkilesasampayuttā ekuppādādīhi ninnānattā ekībhāvamiva gatā visādīhi viya sappiādayo vidūsitā [Pg.40] malīnā vibādhitā upatāpitā ca nāma honti, tasmā āha ‘‘saṃkilesena samannāgatā saṃkiliṭṭhā’’ti. Saṃkilesaṃ arahantīti saṃkilesassa ārammaṇabhāvena taṃ laddhuṃ arahantīti attho. Ārammaṇabhāvānatikkamanatoti etena saṃkilesānatikkamanameva dasseti, vatthayugikasuṅkasālikasaddānaṃ viya saṃkilesika-saddassa pavatti veditabbā.

5. 'Defilement' refers to the ten bases of defilement. 'Defiled' means afflicted and tormented by them. Because these phenomena, being associated with defilement, have no diversity on account of single arising, etc., and have gone as it were to a state of oneness—like ghee and other substances spoiled by poison—they are said to be corrupted, stained, afflicted, and tormented. Therefore, he said: 'Being endowed with defilement, they are defiled.' 'They are liable to defilement' means they are fit to receive it by way of being an object for defilement. By 'not transcending the state of being an object,' he shows just the non-transcendence of defilement. The derivation of the word 'saṃkilesika' (pertaining to defilement) should be understood like that of words such as 'vatthayugika' (costing a pair of cloths) and 'suṅkasālika' (liable to a toll on rice).

6. Saha vitakkena hontīti vacanaseso yojetabbo avuccamānassapi bhavati-atthassa viññāyamānattā. Mattāti pamāṇavācakaṃ ekaṃ padanti gahetvā ‘‘vicārova mattā etesa’’nti attho vutto. Aññattha avippayogīsu vitakkavicāresu vicārova etesaṃ mattā, tato uddhaṃ vitakkena sampayogaṃ na gacchantīti attho. Ayamaparo attho – matta-saddo visesanivattiattho. Savitakkasavicārā dhammā hi vitakkavisiṭṭhena vicārena savicārā, ete pana vicāramattena vitakkasaṅkhātavisesarahitena, tasmā ‘‘vicāramattā’’ti vuccanti, vicāramattavantoti attho. Vicāramattavacanena avitakkatte siddhe avitakkānaṃ aññesampi atthibhāvajotanatthaṃ avitakkavacanaṃ. Avitakkā hi vicāramattā ca santi avicārā cāti nivattetabbā gahetabbā ca honti, tesu avuccamānesu nivattetabbagahetabbassa adassitattā vicāramattāvaavitakkāti āpajjeyyāti. Visesanavisesitabbabhāvo pana yathākāmaṃ hotīti sāmaññena avitakkabhāvena saha vicāramattatāya dhammavisesanabhāvaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘avitakkavicāramattā’’ti padānukkamo kato.

6. 'They are with initial thought' is the rest of the sentence to be supplied, since the meaning 'they are' is understood even when not stated. Taking 'matta' as a single word denoting measure, the meaning 'sustained thought alone is their measure' is stated. Elsewhere, with regard to initial and sustained thought which are inseparable, sustained thought alone is their measure; the meaning is that beyond that they do not become associated with initial thought. Here is another meaning: the word 'matta' has the meaning of excluding a qualifier. For phenomena that are with initial thought and with sustained thought are 'with sustained thought' by means of a sustained thought that is qualified by initial thought. But these are so by means of mere sustained thought, which is devoid of the qualifier called initial thought. Therefore they are called 'with mere sustained thought,' meaning they possess mere sustained thought. Although the absence of initial thought is established by the term 'with mere sustained thought,' the term 'without initial thought' is stated to illuminate the existence of other things that are also without initial thought. For there are things without initial thought that are with mere sustained thought and also those that are without sustained thought; of these, the latter must be excluded and the former included. If these are not mentioned, since what is to be excluded and included would not be shown, it would follow that 'with mere sustained thought' is identical with 'without initial thought.' But since the relationship of qualifier and qualified can be as desired, in order to show in general the qualification of the phenomena by the state of being without initial thought together with the state of having mere sustained thought, the sequence of words 'without initial thought, with mere sustained thought' is made.

Atha vā savicārā duvidhā savitakkā avitakkā ca, tesu avitakke nivattetuṃ ādipadaṃ vuttaṃ. Avicārā ca duvidhā savitakkā avitakkā ca, tesu savitakke nivattetuṃ tatiyapadaṃ vuttaṃ. Ye pana dvīhipi nivattitā avitakkā savitakkā ca savicārā avicārā ca, tesu aññataradassanaṃ vā kattabbaṃ siyā ubhayadassanaṃ vā. Ubhayadassane kariyamāne yadi ‘‘savitakkasavicārā’’ti vucceyya, ādipadatthatāva āpajjati. Atha ‘‘avitakkaavicārā’’ti vucceyya, antapadatthatā. Atha pana ‘‘avitakkasavicārā savitakkaavicārā’’ti vucceyya, ajjhattabahiddhānaṃ viya atthantarābhāvo vā saṅkaradoso vā ekasseva savitakkāvitakkatāsavicārāvicāratāvirodho vā āpajjeyya, tasmā [Pg.41] aññataradassanena itarampi pakāsetuṃ avitakkavacanena dvippakāresu vattabbesu savitakkaavicāre nivattetvā avitakkasavicāre dassento āha ‘‘avitakkavicāramattā’’ti. Atha vā vitakkābhāvena ete vicāramattā, na vicārato aññassa kassaci dhammassa abhāvāti dassetuṃ avitakkavacanena vicāramattā visesitā.

Alternatively, things with sustained thought are twofold: with initial thought and without initial thought. The first term of the triad is stated to exclude from this class those that are without initial thought. And things without sustained thought are twofold: with initial thought and without initial thought. The third term is stated to exclude from this class those that are with initial thought. But as for the two types of states excluded by the first and third terms—namely, those without initial thought but with sustained thought, and those with initial thought but without sustained thought—one would have to show either one or both. If, in showing both, one were to say 'with initial thought and with sustained thought,' it would have the meaning of the first term. If one were to say 'without initial thought and without sustained thought,' it would have the meaning of the last term. And if one were to say 'without initial thought but with sustained thought, and with initial thought but without sustained thought,' it would either lead to an absence of distinction, like that between internal and external, or to the fault of confusion, or to the contradiction of a single category comprising states that are both with and without initial thought, and with and without sustained thought. Therefore, in order to illuminate the other by showing one of them, when the two kinds are to be stated, by the word 'without initial thought' he excludes 'with initial thought and without sustained thought' and, showing 'without initial thought but with sustained thought,' he says 'without initial thought, with mere sustained thought.' Alternatively, these are 'with mere sustained thought' because of the absence of initial thought, not because of the absence of any other phenomenon apart from sustained thought. To show this, 'with mere sustained thought' is qualified by the word 'without initial thought'.

7. Upekkhatīti vedayamānāpi majjhattavedanā sukhākāre dukkhākāre ca udāsinā hotīti attho. Atha vā upetā yuttā sukhadukkhānaṃ aviruddhā ikkhā anubhavanaṃ upekkhā. Visesadassanavasenāti nānattadassanavasena. Yadi hi pītisahagatā eva sukhasahagatā siyuṃ, ‘‘pītisahagatā’’ti eteneva siddhattā ‘‘sukhasahagatā’’ti idaṃ na vattabbaṃ siyā, ‘‘sukhasahagatā’’ti vā vuccamāne ‘‘pītisahagatā’’ti na vattabbaṃ, tato tikaṃ pūrentena dukkhasahagatapadaṃ vattabbaṃ siyā, evañca sati ‘‘vedanāttiko evāya’’nti vuttavacanaṃ āpajjati, tasmā ‘‘pītisahagatā’’ti vatvā ‘‘sukhasahagatā’’ti vadanto pītivippayuttampi sukhaṃ atthīti tatiyajjhānakāyaviññāṇasampayuttaṃ sukhaṃ sappītikasukhato bhinnaṃ katvā dassetīti adhippāyo. Atha vā pītisukhānaṃ dubbiññeyyanānattānaṃ nānattadassanatthaṃ ayaṃ tiko vutto. ‘‘Pītisahagatā’’ti ettha hi sukhekadeso saṅgahito, na pīti. ‘‘Sukhasahagatā’’ti ettha pīti saṅgahitā, na sukhaṃ. Pītivippayuttasukhasahagatā ca purimena asaṅgahitā pacchimena saṅgahitāti siddho pītisukhānaṃ visesoti.

7. 'To be equanimous' means that the neutral feeling, even while being experienced, remains indifferent to the aspects of pleasure and pain; this is the meaning. Alternatively, upekkhā is a seeing or experiencing that is suitable, fitting, and not in conflict with pleasure and pain. By 'by way of seeing distinction' is meant 'by way of seeing diversity.' For if states accompanied by rapture were the same as states accompanied by pleasure, then since this would be established by the term 'accompanied by rapture,' the term 'accompanied by pleasure' would not need to be stated. Or if 'accompanied by pleasure' were stated, 'accompanied by rapture' would not need to be stated; then, to complete the triad, the term 'accompanied by pain' would have to be stated. And if this were so, it would conflict with the statement, 'This is indeed the triad of feeling.' Therefore, by stating 'accompanied by rapture' and then 'accompanied by pleasure,' the intention is to show that there is also pleasure dissociated from rapture—that is, the pleasure associated with the body-consciousness of the third jhāna, which is shown as distinct from pleasure accompanied by rapture. Alternatively, this triad is stated in order to show the diversity of rapture and pleasure, a diversity that is difficult to discern. For in this context, in the term 'accompanied by rapture,' a portion of pleasure is included, not rapture. In the term 'accompanied by pleasure,' rapture is included, not pleasure. And since states accompanied by pleasure dissociated from rapture are not included by the former term but are included by the latter, the distinction between rapture and pleasure is thus established.

8. Nibbānaṃ dassanatoti nibbānārammaṇataṃ sandhāyāha. Atha vā dhammacakkhu punappunaṃ nibbattanena bhāvanābhāvaṃ appattaṃ dassanaṃ nāma, dhammacakkhu ca pariññādikiccakaraṇena catusaccadhammadassanaṃ tadatisayo, tasmā natthettha gotrabhussa dassanabhāvāpattīti. Ubhayapaṭikkhepavasenāti dvīhi padehi vuttadhammapaṭikkhepavasena, na pahāyakapaṭikkhepavasena. Tathā hi sati dassanabhāvanāhi añño samucchedavasena pahāyako atthi, tena pahātabbā neva dassanena na bhāvanāya pahātabbāti ayamattho āpajjati, na ca añño pahāyako atthi aññehi vikkhambhitānañca punappavattisabbhāvā, nāpi pahātabbā tatiyapadena saṅgayhanti, kintu [Pg.42] appahātabbā evāti. Tasmā pahātabbapadaṃ paccekaṃ yojetvā neva dassanena pahātabbā na bhāvanāya pahātabbāti dassanena bhāvanāya pahātabbehi aññe gahitāti veditabbā.

8. By seeing Nibbāna: this is said referring to having Nibbāna as its object. Alternatively, the Dhamma-eye, by arising repeatedly, has not reached the state of development, and is thus called 'seeing.' And the Dhamma-eye, by performing the function of full understanding and so on, is the seeing of the dhammas of the Four Truths; this is its excellence. Therefore, in this context, the change-of-lineage consciousness does not attain the state of 'seeing.' By way of rejecting both: this means by way of rejecting the dhammas stated by the two terms, not by way of rejecting an abandoner. For if that were so, it would follow that there is another abandoner by way of eradication, apart from seeing and development, and that by it things are to be abandoned that are to be abandoned neither by seeing nor by development. But there is no other abandoner, and things suppressed by other means can recur; nor are things to be abandoned included by the third term, but rather only things not to be abandoned. Therefore, applying the term 'to be abandoned' to each separately, it should be understood that by 'to be abandoned neither by seeing nor by development' are meant things other than those to be abandoned by seeing and by development.

9. Evamatthaṃ aggahetvāti atthāyuttito ca saddāyuttito ca aggahetabbataṃ dasseti. Dassanabhāvanāhi appahātabbahetumattesu hi gayhamānesu ahetukā asaṅgahitāti yathādhippetassa atthassa aparipuṇṇattā atthāyutti, pahātabbasaddassa niccasāpekkhatte ca sati na sambandhīsaddato pahāyakato aññaṃ paṭisedhaṃ apekkhamānassa hetusaddena samāso upapajjatīti saddāyutti ca veditabbā. Evamattho gahetabboti pahātabba-saddaṃ paṭisedhena ayojetvā yesaṃ aññapadatthe samāso, tabbisesanaṃ atthīti idaṃ paṭisedhena yojetvā dassanabhāvanāhi pahātabbo hetu etesaṃ nevatthīti attho gahetabboti vuttaṃ hoti. Evañca sati yathādhippetattho sabbo saṅgahitoti. Atthāyutti mā hotu, saddo pana idhāpi na yutto. Ekantayogīnaṃ atthi-saddameva hi apekkhamānānaṃ ubhinnaṃ pahātabbahetu-saddānaṃ samāso yutto, na paṭisedhaṃ apekkhamānānanti, tasmā gahetabbatthadassanamattaṃ etaṃ kataṃ, saddo pana yathā yujjati, tathā yojetabbo. Evaṃ pana yujjati – pahātabbo hetu etesaṃ atthīti pahātabbahetukā. Kena pahātabboti? Dassanena bhāvanāya ca. Tayidaṃ pahātabbahetukapadaṃ dassanabhāvanāpadehi visuṃ visuṃ yojetvā tehi yuttena ye dassanena pahātabbahetukā neva honti, bhāvanāya pahātabbahetukā ca na hontīti paṭisedhañca visuṃ visuṃ yojetvā te neva dassanena na bhāvanāya pahātabbahetukāti vuccanti. Nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammavacanaṃ viya hi purimapadadvayasaṅgahitadhammapaṭisedhanena tadaññadhammanidassanametaṃ hoti, na ahetukapadaṃ viya hetuvirahappakāsanenāti. Evañca katvā dve paṭisedhā yuttā honti.

9. ‘Not grasping the meaning in this way’ shows that this interpretation should not be accepted due to inconsistency of meaning (atthāyutti) and inconsistency of grammar (saddāyutti). For if only the causes that are not to be abandoned by seeing and development are taken, the rootless states (ahetukā) are not included; thus, because the intended meaning is incomplete, there is inconsistency of meaning. And since the word ‘to be abandoned’ (pahātabba) always requires a complement, a compound with the word ‘cause’ (hetu) is not grammatically possible when a negation is expected; this should be understood as the inconsistency of grammar. The meaning should be grasped thus: without connecting the word ‘to be abandoned’ with the negation, one should connect the negation with the word ‘exists’ (atthi), which is the qualifier in this possessive compound. The meaning to be grasped, it is said, is: ‘For them, a cause to be abandoned by seeing and development does not exist.’ In this way, the entire intended meaning is included. Granted, there is no inconsistency of meaning, but the grammar here is still not suitable. For those who hold to a single connection, a compound of the two words ‘to-be-abandoned’ and ‘cause’ is suitable only when they look to the word ‘exists,’ not when they look to a negation. Therefore, this is just a demonstration of the meaning to be grasped; the grammar should be construed as it fits. It fits in this way: ‘Those for whom there exists a cause to be abandoned’ are ‘those with a cause to be abandoned’ (pahātabbahetukā). By what is it to be abandoned? By seeing and by development. This term ‘those with a cause to be abandoned’ is connected separately with the terms ‘seeing’ and ‘development.’ Then, by connecting each of these with a negation, those who are neither ‘those with a cause to be abandoned by seeing’ nor ‘those with a cause to be abandoned by development’ are said to be ‘those with a cause to be abandoned neither by seeing nor by development.’ For this is a designation of dhammas other than those included in the first two terms by negating them, like the expression ‘dhammas that are neither resultant nor resultant-producing’; it is not like the term ‘rootless’ (ahetuka), which indicates the absence of a root. And having done it this way, the two negations are appropriate.

Hetuyeva hi tesaṃ natthi, yo dassanabhāvanāhi pahātabbo siyāti purimasmiñhi atthe hetūnaṃ dassanabhāvanāhi pahātabbatā paṭikkhittā, paṭikkhepo ca pahātabbāsaṅkāsabbhāve hoti, pahātabbāsaṅkā ca hetumhi sati siyā, tesaṃ pana ahetukānaṃ hetuyeva natthi, yo dassanabhāvanāhi pahātabbo siyā, tadabhāvā pahātabbāsaṅkā [Pg.43] natthīti taṃnivāraṇattho paṭikkhepo na sambhavati, tasmā ‘‘nevadassanena na bhāvanāya pahātabbo hetu etesa’’nti evaṃ ahetukānaṃ gahaṇaṃ na bhaveyyāti attho. Atha vā itarathā hi ahetukānaṃ aggahaṇaṃ bhaveyyāti atthassa pākaṭattā na kāraṇasādhanīyo esoti gahetabbatthasseva kāraṇaṃ vadanto ‘‘hetuyeva hi tesaṃ natthī’’tiādimāha. Tesañhi nevadassanena na bhāvanāyapahātabbahetukapadavacanīyānaṃ yo dassanabhāvanāhi pahātabbo siyā, so evaṃpakāro hetu natthi. Te hi anekappakārā sahetukā ahetukā cāti, tasmā nevadassanena na bhāvanāya pahātabbo hetu etesaṃ atthīti ayamattho gahetabboti attho.

For in them there is indeed no cause that is to be abandoned by seeing and development. For in the former meaning, the abandonability of causes by seeing and development was rejected. A rejection occurs when there is the possibility of a presumption of abandonability, and a presumption of abandonability would exist if there were a cause. But for these rootless states, there is no cause at all that is to be abandoned by seeing and development. Due to its absence, there is no presumption of abandonability, so a rejection for the purpose of precluding that is not possible. Therefore, the meaning is that the rootless states would not be included by the phrase 'for them there is a cause to be abandoned neither by seeing nor by development.' Alternatively, since it is plain that otherwise the rootless states would not be included, this is not a point that needs to be established by a reason. Stating the reason only for the meaning that is to be grasped, he says, 'For in them there is indeed no cause…' For of those designated by the term 'having a cause to be abandoned neither by seeing nor by development,' there is no cause of such a kind that is to be abandoned by seeing and development. For they are of many kinds: with roots and without roots. Therefore, the meaning is that this meaning is to be grasped: 'For them there exists a cause that is to be abandoned neither by seeing nor by development.'

10. Taṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvāti idaṃ catukiccasādhanavasena ārammaṇakaraṇaṃ sandhāya vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Aññathā gotrabhuphalapaccavekkhaṇādīnampi apacayagāmitā āpajjeyyāti. Atha vā hetubhāvena apacayaṃ nibbānaṃ gacchantīti apacayagāmino. Nibbānassa hi anibbattaniyattepi samudayappahānasamudayanirodhānaṃ adhigamaadhigantabbabhāvato hetuhetuphalabhāvo magganibbānānaṃ yujjati. Yathāha ‘‘dukkhanirodhe ñāṇaṃ atthapaṭisambhidā, dukkhanirodhagāminiyā paṭipadāya ñāṇaṃ dhammapaṭisambhidā’’ti (vibha. 719). Atthoti hi hetuphalaṃ. Dhammoti hetūti. Purimapacchimānaṃ purime sasampayuttā vuttā, pacchime kevalā. Purime viya pana pacchime atthepi ariyamaggasīsena sabbalokuttarakusalacittuppādā gahetabbā. Dutiye atthavikappe ‘‘ācayaṃ gāmino’’ti vattabbe anunāsikalopo katoti daṭṭhabbo. Ācinantīti vā ācayā, ācayā hutvā gacchanti pavattantītipi attho daṭṭhabbo.

10. 'Having made that its object': this should be understood as said with reference to making it an object by way of accomplishing the fourfold function. Otherwise, even change-of-lineage, fruition, and reviewing consciousnesses would be reckoned as leading to decline. Alternatively, apacayagāmino means 'they go to decline' (apacayaṃ gacchanti), that is, to Nibbāna, by way of cause. For even though Nibbāna is unproduced, a cause-and-effect relation between the path and Nibbāna is tenable, because the abandoning of the origin is the means of attainment and its cessation is what is to be attained. As it is said: 'Knowledge of the cessation of suffering is the analytical knowledge of the goal (atthapaṭisambhidā); knowledge of the path leading to the cessation of suffering is the analytical knowledge of the Dhamma (dhammapaṭisambhidā)' (Vibh. 719). For 'goal' (attha) is the fruit of the cause; 'Dhamma' is the cause. Of the former and latter dhammas, the former are stated as associated, the latter as isolated. However, just as in the former meaning, so in the latter, all supramundane wholesome consciousness-arisings headed by the noble path should be taken. In the second alternative explanation, it should be seen that an elision of the nasal has occurred where 'leading to accumulation' (ācayaṃ gāmino) should have been said. Or, 'they accumulate' (ācinanti), thus they are 'accumulations' (ācayā); the meaning can also be seen as: 'having become accumulations, they proceed,' that is, 'they occur.'

11. Satta pana sekkhā sikkhanasīlāti sekkhā, tesaṃ imeti sekkhā, aññāsādhāraṇā maggaphalattayadhammā. Sayameva sikkhantīti sikkhanasīlānametaṃ nidassanaṃ. Ye hi dhammā sikkhanti, te sikkhanasīlā hontīti. Akkharattho pana sikkhā etesaṃ sīlanti sekkhāti. Na sekkhāti yattha sekkhabhāvāsaṅkā atthi, tatthāyaṃ paṭisedhoti lokiyanibbānesu [Pg.44] asekkhabhāvānāpatti daṭṭhabbā. Sīlasamādhipaññāsaṅkhātā hi sikkhā attano paṭipakkhakilesehi vippamuttā parisuddhā upakkilesānaṃ ārammaṇabhāvampi anupagamanato etā sikkhāti vattuṃ yuttā aṭṭhasu maggaphalesu vijjanti, tasmā catumaggaheṭṭhimaphalattayadhammā viya arahattaphaladhammāpi tāsu sikkhāsu jātāti ca, taṃsikkhāsamaṅgino arahato itaresaṃ viya sekkhatte sati sekkhassa eteti ca, sikkhā sīlaṃ etesanti ca sekkhāti āsaṅkitabbā siyunti tadāsaṅkānivattanatthaṃ ‘‘asekkhā’’ti yathāvuttasekkhabhāvapaṭisedho kato. Arahattaphale hi pavattamānā sikkhā pariniṭṭhitasikkhākiccattā na sikkhākiccaṃ karonti, kevalaṃ sikkhāphalabhāveneva pavattanti, tasmā tā na sikkhāvacanaṃ arahanti, nāpi taṃsamaṅgino sekkhavacanaṃ, na ca taṃsampayuttā sikkhanasīlāti sikkhāsu jātātiādiatthehi aggaphaladhammā sekkhā na honti, heṭṭhimaphalesu pana sikkhā sakadāgāmimaggavipassanādīnaṃ upanissayabhāvato sikkhākiccaṃ karontīti sikkhāvacanaṃ arahanti, taṃsamaṅgino ca sekkhavacanaṃ, taṃsampayuttā ca sikkhanasīlavuttīti tattha dhammā yathāvuttehi atthehi sekkhā honti eva.

11. Now, the seven trainees are called 'sekkhā' because they are of a training nature. These 'sekkhā' are their states of the three lower paths and fruitions, which are not common to others. The explanation of 'of a training nature' is that they train themselves. Indeed, those qualities which train are of a training nature. The literal meaning, however, is that training is their nature, hence 'sekkhā.' The negation 'not a trainee' is used where there is a doubt about the trainee-state; it should be understood that the state of a non-trainee does not apply to mundane states and Nibbāna. For the trainings—consisting of virtue, concentration, and wisdom—being liberated from their opposing defilements, are purified, and because they do not even become an object for corruptions, it is proper to call them 'trainings' when they are found in the eight path and fruition states. Therefore, since the states of Arahantship fruition are also born in those trainings, just like the states of the four paths and the three lower fruitions, it might be suspected that the Arahant, who is endowed with those trainings, possesses the trainee-state like the others; that the Arahant's qualities belong to a trainee; and that the Arahant is a 'sekkhā' because 'training is their nature.' To avert this suspicion, the aforesaid negation of the trainee-state, 'asekkhā,' is made. For the trainings, when they occur in the Arahantship fruition, having completed the task of training, do not perform the task of training; they exist merely as the fruition of training. Therefore, they do not deserve the term 'trainings,' nor does one endowed with them deserve the term 'trainee,' nor are the associated states of a training nature. Thus, by meanings such as 'born in the trainings,' the states of the highest fruition are not 'sekkhā.' However, in the lower fruitions, the trainings perform the task of training by being a supporting condition for the once-returner path, insight, and so on, and thus deserve the term 'trainings.' One endowed with them deserves the term 'trainee,' and the associated states are said to be of a training nature. Therefore, in that case, the qualities are indeed 'sekkhā' by the meanings explained.

Sekkhāti vā apariyositasikkhā dassitā. Anantarameva ‘‘asekkhā’’ti vacanaṃ pariyositasikkhānaṃ dassananti na lokiyanibbānānaṃ asekkhatāpatti. Vuddhippattā vā sekkhāti etasmiṃ atthe sekkhadhammesu eva kesañci vuddhippattānaṃ asekkhatā āpajjati, tena arahattamaggadhammā vuddhippattā ca yathāvuttehi ca atthehi sekkhāti katvā asekkhā āpannāti? Na, taṃsadisesu tabbohārā. Arahattamaggato hi ninnānākaraṇaṃ arahattaphalaṃ ṭhapetvā pariññādikiccakaraṇaṃ vipākabhāvañca, tasmā te eva sekkhā dhammā arahattaphalabhāvaṃ āpannāti sakkā vattuṃ, kusalasukhato ca vipākasukhaṃ santataratāya paṇītataranti vuddhippattā ca te dhammā hontīti asekkhāti vuccantīti.

Or, by 'trainee,' those whose training is not completed are shown. Immediately after, the term 'non-trainee' is used to indicate those whose training is completed; thus, the non-trainee state does not apply to mundane states and Nibbāna. Or, 'trainee' means those who have attained growth. In this sense, does the non-trainee state apply to some who have attained growth among the trainee qualities? Therefore, are the qualities of the Arahantship path, having attained growth and being 'trainees' according to the aforementioned meanings, considered to have attained the state of 'non-trainee'? No, that designation is for those of a similar kind. For the Arahantship fruition is not different from the Arahantship path, except for performing the function of full understanding, etc., and its nature as a resultant. Therefore, it can be said that those very trainee qualities have attained the state of Arahantship fruition. And because resultant happiness is more peaceful and more sublime than wholesome happiness, those qualities that have attained growth are called 'non-trainees'.

12. Kilesavikkhambhanāsamatthatādīhi parittā. ‘‘Kilesa…pe… tāyā’’ti atthattayampi kusalesu yujjati, vipākakiriyesu dīghasantānatāva. Pamāṇakarehi vā oḷārikehi kāmataṇhādīhi paricchinnā parittā. Tehi aparicchinnattā sukhumehi rūpataṇhādīhi paricchinnā pamāṇamahattaṃ gatāti mahaggatā. Aparicchinnā appamāṇā.

12. They are limited due to their incapacity for suppressing defilements, etc. The three meanings, 'defilements...etc.,' also apply to wholesome states; in resultant and functional states, however, only long continuity applies. Or, being limited by coarse, measure-making defilements such as sensual craving, they are called limited. Because they are not limited by these, but are limited by subtle defilements such as craving for form, they have attained a great measure and are thus called exalted. Being unlimited, they are immeasurable.

14. Atappakaṭṭhenāti [Pg.45] divasampi paccavekkhiyamānā lokuttaradhammā tittiṃ na janenti samāpajjiyamānāpi phaladhammāti.

14. By the meaning of being insatiable: even when reviewed for a whole day, the supramundane states do not generate satiety; so too the fruition states, even when attained.

15. Mātughātādīsu pavattamānāpi hitasukhaṃ icchantāva pavattantīti te dhammā hitasukhāvahā me bhavissantīti āsīsitā honti, tathā asubhāsukhāniccānattesu subhādivipariyāsadaḷhatāya ānantariyakammaniyatamicchādiṭṭhīsu pavatti hotīti te dhammā asubhādīsu subhādiviparītappavattikā honti. Micchāsabhāvāti musāsabhāvā. Anekesu ānantariyesu katesu yaṃ tattha balavaṃ, taṃ vipaccati, na itarānīti ekantavipākajanakatāya niyatatā na sakkā vattunti ‘‘vipākadāne satī’’tiādimāha. Tattha khandhabhedānantaranti cutianantaraṃ. Cuti hi maraṇaniddese (vibha. 193) ‘‘khandhānaṃ bhedo’’ti vuttāti. Etena vacanena sati phaladāne cutianantaro eva, na añño etesaṃ phalakāloti phalakālaniyameneva niyatatā vuttā hoti, na phaladānaniyamenāti niyataphalakālānaṃ aññesampi upapajjavedanīyānaṃ diṭṭhadhammavedanīyānampi niyatatā āpajjati, tasmā vipākadhammadhammānaṃ paccayantaravikalatādīhi avipaccamānānampi attano sabhāvena vipākadhammatā viya balavatā ānantariyena vipāke dinne avipaccamānānampi ānantariyānaṃ phaladāne niyatasabhāvā ānantariyasabhāvā ca pavattīti attano sabhāvena phaladānaniyameneva niyatatā ānantariyatā ca veditabbā. Avassañca niyatasabhāvā ānantariyasabhāvā ca tesaṃ pavattīti sampaṭicchitabbametaṃ aññassa balavato ānantariyassa abhāve cutianantaraṃ ekantena phaladānato.

15. Even when engaging in actions such as matricide, one does so desiring one's own benefit and happiness, thinking, 'These actions will bring me benefit and happiness'; thus, they are wished for. Similarly, due to the firmness of the perversions of perception concerning the unattractive, suffering, impermanence, and non-self, there is engagement in fixed wrong views, which are an immediately effective kamma. Thus, these phenomena operate in a manner contrary to the nature of the unattractive and so on. 'Wrong nature' means false nature. When many immediately effective kammas have been performed, the strongest among them ripens, not the others. Therefore, it cannot be said that there is certainty in terms of producing an invariable result; thus, it was said, 'when there is the giving of a result,' and so on. Herein, 'immediately after the breakup of the aggregates' means immediately after death. For in the exposition on death, death is said to be 'the breakup of the aggregates.' By this statement, when there is the giving of a result, it is only immediately after death; there is no other time for the result of these kammas. Thus, certainty is stated only in terms of the fixedness of the time of the result, not in terms of the fixedness of the giving of the result. If it were so, this would entail the certainty of other kammas with a fixed time for their result, such as those to be experienced in subsequent existences and those to be experienced in this very life. Therefore, just as phenomena whose nature is to produce a result retain this nature even when they do not ripen due to the absence of other conditions and so on, so too, even for those immediately effective kammas that do not ripen when a stronger one has given its result, their fixed nature in giving a result and their immediately effective nature still operate. Thus, certainty and the immediately effective nature should be understood as being fixed by their own nature, precisely by the fixedness of giving a result. And it must certainly be accepted that the operation of these kammas is, by nature, fixed and immediately effective, because in the absence of another, stronger immediately effective kamma, they certainly give their result immediately after death.

Nanu evaṃ aññesampi upapajjavedanīyānaṃ aññasmiṃ vipākadāyake asati cutianantarameva ekantena phaladānato ānantariyasabhāvā niyatasabhāvā ca pavatti āpajjatīti? Nāpajjati asamānajātikena cetopaṇidhivasena upaghātakena ca nivattetabbavipākattā anantarekantaphaladāyakattābhāvā, na pana ānantariyakānaṃ paṭhamajjhānādīnaṃ dutiyajjhānādīni viya asamānajātikaṃ phalanivattakaṃ atthi sabbānantariyakānaṃ avīciphalattā, na ca heṭṭhupapattiṃ icchato sīlavato cetopaṇidhi viya uparūpapattijanakakammaphalaṃ ānantariyakaphalaṃ nivattetuṃ samattho [Pg.46] cetopaṇidhi atthi anicchantasseva avīcipātanato, na ca ānantariyakopaghātakaṃ kiñci kammaṃ atthi, tasmā tesaṃyeva anantarekantavipākajanakasabhāvā pavattīti.

Is it not so that for other kammas to be experienced in a subsequent existence, when there is no other kamma to give its result, a state of having an immediate and fixed nature would arise, since their fruit is given exclusively and immediately after death? It does not arise, because their result can be averted by a volition of a different kind and by a destructive kamma, and because they lack the nature of giving an immediate and exclusive result. For the ānantarika kammas, however, there is no result-averting factor of a different kind—as the second jhāna and so on are for the first jhāna and so on—because all ānantarika kammas result in the Avīci hell. Nor is there any volition capable of averting the result of an ānantarika kamma—unlike the volition of a virtuous person desiring a lower rebirth, which can avert the result of kamma that generates a higher rebirth—because it causes one to fall into Avīci even if one does not desire it. And there is no kamma that is destructive of an ānantarika kamma. Therefore, for them alone there is the state of having the nature to produce an immediate and exclusive result.

Anekāni ca ānantariyakāni katāni ekante vipāke sanniyatattā uparatāvipaccanasabhāvāsaṅkattā nicchitāni sabhāvato niyatāneva. Cutianantaraṃ pana phalaṃ anantaraṃ nāma tasmiṃ anantare niyuttāni tannibbattanena anantarakaraṇasīlāni anantarappayojanāni cāti sabhāvato ānantariyakāneva ca honti. Tesu pana samānasabhāvesu ekena vipāke dinne itarāni attanā kattabbassa kiccassa teneva katattā na dutiyaṃ tatiyampi ca paṭisandhiṃ karonti, na samatthatāvighātattāti natthi tesaṃ niyatānantariyatānivattīti. Na hi samānasabhāvaṃ samānasabhāvassa samatthataṃ vihanatīti. Ekassa pana aññānipi upatthambhakāni hontīti daṭṭhabbānīti. Sammā sabhāvāti saccasabhāvā.

Moreover, when many ānantarika kammas have been performed, they are by nature certain and fixed, because they are bound to a single result and because there is no doubt about their nature of unfailingly ripening. And by nature they are indeed ānantariyaka because, with regard to the result immediately after death, they are destined for that immediate moment, they have the nature of causing immediacy by producing that result, and they have an immediate purpose. Among these of similar nature, when one has given its result, the others do not produce a second or a third rebirth, because the task to be done by them has already been done by that one; it is not because their capacity has been obstructed. Therefore, there is no averting of their fixed immediacy. For a thing of a similar nature does not obstruct the capacity of another thing of a similar nature. It should be understood, however, that for one kamma, others can also be supporting factors. The phrase 'rightly by nature' means having a true nature.

16. Paripuṇṇamaggakiccattā cattāro ariyamaggāva idha ‘‘maggā’’ti vuttā. Paccayaṭṭhenāti maggapaccayaṭṭhena. Nikkhepakaṇḍepi hi ye maggapaccayaṃ labhanti, na pana sayaṃ maggapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchanti, te maggahetukāti dassetuṃ ‘‘ariyamaggasamaṅgissa maggaṅgāni ṭhapetvā’’tiādi (dha. sa. 1039) vuttaṃ. Yo pana tattheva ‘‘ariyamaggasamaṅgissa alobho adoso amoho, ime dhammā maggahetū’’ti ādinayo vutto, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘maggasampayuttā vā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. ‘‘Ariyamaggasamaṅgissa sammādiṭṭhi maggo ceva hetu cā’’tiādinā pana vuttanayaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘sammādiṭṭhi saya’’ntiādimāha. Tattha pana asaṅgahitasaṅgaṇhanavasena paṭipāṭiyā tayo nayā vuttā, hetubahutāvasena tatiyo nayo idha dutiyo vutto.

16. Because they fully accomplish the function of the path, only the four Noble Paths are referred to here as 'paths.' In the sense of a condition—that is, in the sense of a path-condition. For even in the Section on Exclusion, to show that those who obtain the path-condition but do not themselves become path-conditions are path-causes, it is said, 'excluding the path-factors of one endowed with the Noble Path,' etc. (Dhs. 1039). But to show the method stated there, 'For one endowed with the Noble Path, non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion—these states are path-causes,' etc., it is said, 'Or associated with the path,' etc. And to illustrate the method stated by 'For one endowed with the Noble Path, right view is both the path and the cause,' etc., it is said, 'Right view itself,' etc. There, however, three methods are presented in sequence by way of including what was unincluded, and due to the predominance of the cause-aspect, the third method is here presented as the second.

Abhibhavitvā pavattanaṭṭhenāti sahajātādhipatipi pubbābhisaṅkhāravasena jeṭṭhakabhāve pavattamāno sahajāte attano vase anuvattayamāno te abhibhavitvā pavattati, ārammaṇādhipatipi tadārammaṇe dhamme tatheva attānaṃ anuvattayamāno te dhamme abhibhavitvā ārammaṇabhāvena pavattati, na paccuppannabhāvena, tasmā adhipatidvayampi saṅgahitanti veditabbaṃ. ‘‘Maggo adhipati etesa’’nti ayañca attho nikkhepakaṇḍe udāharaṇavasena [Pg.47] āgataṃ atthanayaṃ gahetvā vutto. Yasmā pana paṭṭhāne (paṭṭhā. 2.16.11) ‘‘maggādhipatiṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca maggādhipati dhammo uppajjati nādhipatipaccayā, maggādhipatī khandhe paṭicca maggādhipati adhipatī’’ti vuttaṃ, tasmā maggo adhipati maggādhipatīti ayampi attho pāḷiyaṃ sarūpekasesavasena samānasaddatthavasena vā saṅgahitoti veditabbo.

By way of occurring through overcoming—thus, co-nascence dominance, when occurring in the position of seniority by means of prior volitional formations, brings the co-nascents under its control and overcomes them while occurring. Object dominance also, making the object-related states conform to itself in the same way, overcomes those states by way of being an object, not by way of being present. Therefore, it should be understood that both types of dominance are included. “The path is dominance among these”—this meaning is stated having taken the method of explanation that came by way of example in the Section on Laying Down. Moreover, because in the Paṭṭhāna (Paṭṭh. 2.16.11) it is said, “A path-dominant state arises dependent on a path-dominant state, not by the dominance condition; dependent on the path-dominant aggregates, the path-dominant is dominant,” therefore, the path is dominance, the path-dominance—this meaning should also be understood as included in the Pāli by way of ellipsis of a similar form or by way of the identical meaning of the word.

17. Anuppannāti etena sabbo uppannabhāvo paṭisiddho, na uppannadhammabhāvo evāti tena uppannā vigatā atītāpi na saṅgahitāti daṭṭhabbā. Yadi hi saṅgahitā siyuṃ, ‘‘anuppanno dhammo uppannassa dhammassa anantarapaccayena paccayo’’tievamādi vucceyya, na tu vuttanti. Anāgatāni vipākakaṭattārūpāni atīte anāgate vā kamme purimanipphanne eva uppajjissanti, nānipphanneti pariniṭṭhitakāraṇekadesāneva honti, tasmā tāni ‘‘avassaṃ uppajjissantīti uppādino dhammā’’ti vuccanti.

17. By 'unarisen', the entire state of having arisen is denied, not merely the state of being an arisen phenomenon. Thus, it should be understood that the arisen, the ceased, and the past are also not included. For if they were included, it would be said, 'An unarisen phenomenon is a condition for an arisen phenomenon by the contiguity condition,' and so on, but it is not so stated. Future resultant phenomena and kamma-produced matter, dependent on past or future kamma, will arise only when that kamma has been previously accomplished, not when it is unaccomplished, for they are a component of a completed cause. Therefore, they are called 'phenomena that will certainly arise'.

18. Attano sabhāvanti kakkhaḷaphusanādisabhāvaṃ.

18. “Its own nature”—that is, the nature of hardness, contact, and so on.

20. Evaṃ pavattamānāti evaṃ cakkhādibhāvena phusanādibhāvena ca ekasantatipariyāpannatāvasena pavattamānā. Attānaṃ adhi ajjhattāti adhi-saddo samāsavisaye adhikāratthaṃ pavattiatthañca gahetvā pavattatīti attānaṃ adhikicca uddissa pavattā ajjhattā. Tenāti yassa jhānā vuṭṭhahitvā ajjhattaṃ bahiddhā ajjhattabahiddhā ca suññataṃ āneñjañca manasikaroto ajjhattasuññatādīsu cittaṃ na pakkhandati na pasīdati na santiṭṭhati nādhimuccati, yo ca itiha tattha sampajāno, tena bhikkhunā. Tasmiṃyeva purimasmiṃ samādhinimitteti paṭhamajjhānādisamādhinimitte. Ajjhattamevāti jhānagocare kasiṇādimhi. Cittaṃ saṇṭhapetabbanti paṭhamajjhānādicittaṃ saṇṭhapetabbaṃ. Ajjhattaratoti gocarajjhatte nibbāne rato, samādhigocare kammaṭṭhāne vā rato. ‘‘Samāhito eko santusito tamāhu bhikkhu’’nti (dha. pa. 362) gāthāseso.

20. "Thus occurring" means occurring in this way, through the state of the eye, etc., and through the state of contact, etc., by way of being included in a single continuity. "Within oneself, internally"—the prefix "adhi" is used in the sense of emphasis and occurrence in compound formations, thus meaning "with regard to oneself," "directed toward oneself," "internally." "By that"—by whichever monk, having emerged from jhāna, contemplates internally, externally, or both internally and externally as emptiness and imperturbability, yet whose mind does not incline toward, find clarity in, settle upon, or become resolved in internal emptiness, etc.—and who is thus fully aware in that state, by that monk. "In that very same preliminary sign of concentration"—in the sign of concentration such as the first jhāna, etc. "Only internally"—within the meditation object such as a kasiṇa, etc., in the domain of jhāna. "The mind should be steadied"—the mind associated with the first jhāna, etc., should be steadied. "Delighting inwardly"—delighting in the internal object, Nibbāna, or delighting in the domain of concentration, the meditation subject. The remainder of the verse is: "Concentrated, solitary, and content—him they call a monk" (Dhammapada 362).

Ajjhattaṃ sampasādananti ettha jhānaṃ sakasantatipariyāpannattā ‘‘ajjhatta’’nti vuttanti niyakajjhattattho ajjhatta-saddo hoti. Ajjhattanti sakasantatiniyakaṃ. Ajjhatte bhavā ajjhattikāti niyakajjhattesupi abbhantarā cakkhādayo vuccanti. Ettha pana ajjhattika-saddo cakkhādīsu pavattamāno dassito[Pg.48], na ajjhattasaddo, atthi ca ajjhattaajjhattikasaddānaṃ bahiddhābāhira-saddānaṃ viya viseso. Ajjhattikasaddo hi saparasantānikesu sabbesu cakkhādīsu rūpādīsu bāhira-saddo viya pavattati, ajjhatta-saddo pana sakasantānikesveva cakkhurūpādīsu tato aññesveva bahiddhā-saddo viya pavattatīti tasmā saddato atthato ca asamānattā na idamettha udāharaṇaṃ yuttanti. Ayaṃ panettha adhippāyo daṭṭhabbo – ajjhatte bhavā ajjhattikāti ayañhi vacanattho. Yañca ajjhatte bhavaṃ, tena ajjhatteneva bhavitabbaṃ, tena taṃvācakassa ajjhatta-saddassa ajjhattika-saddassa ca samānatthatā. Ubhinnampi saddānaṃ samānatthabhāvato ajjhattajjhatte pavattamāne ajjhattika-sadde ajjhatta-saddo tattha pavattoti sakkā vattunti.

In 'Internal serenity,' here jhāna is called 'internal' (ajjhatta) because it is included within one's own continuum. Thus, the word 'ajjhatta' has the meaning of 'one's own internal.' 'Internal' means belonging to one's own continuum. That which exists internally is called 'internal' (ajjhattika), and even within one's own internal sphere, the inner faculties such as the eye are spoken of. Here, however, the word 'ajjhattika' is shown to apply to the eye and other faculties, not the word 'ajjhatta'. And there is a distinction between the words 'ajjhatta' and 'ajjhattika', just as there is between 'bahiddhā' (external) and 'bāhira' (outer). For the word 'ajjhattika' applies to all faculties such as the eye and forms belonging to one's own and others' continua, just as the word 'bāhira' does. But the word 'ajjhatta' applies only to the eye and forms within one's own continuum, while the word 'bahiddhā' applies to what is other than that. Therefore, because they are dissimilar in word and meaning, this is not a suitable example here. The intended meaning here, however, should be understood as follows: 'That which exists internally is called internal'—this is the meaning of the statement. And whatever exists internally must indeed be internal. For that reason, the word 'ajjhatta' and the word 'ajjhattika', which denote it, have the same meaning. Because both words have the same meaning, when the word 'ajjhattika' is used for what is internal, it can be said that the word 'ajjhatta' also applies there.

Ayaṃ kho panānanda, vihāroti vihārasuññatāsutte (ma. ni. 3.187) saṅgaṇikārāmatāya rūpādiratiyā ca ādīnavaṃ vatvā tappaṭipakkhavihāradassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Ajjhattaṃ suññatanti visayabhūtaṃ issariyaṭṭhānabhūtaṃ suññataṃ, suññatāphalasamāpattinti attho. Cittissarā hi buddhā bhagavanto dhammaṃ desentāpi yaṃ muhuttaṃ tuṇhī bhavitabbaṃ hoti, taṃ muhuttaṃ phalasamāpattiṃ samāpajjanti, pageva aññasmiṃ kāle, tasmā sabbatthāpi issariyānaṃ bahulaṃ phalasamāpattiyaṃ issariyassa pavattanato phalasamāpatti ‘‘issariyaṭṭhāna’’nti vuttā. Arahattaphalādhigamena vā tathāgatānaṃ issariyaṃ nibbattaṃ taṃjanakeneva maggenāti taṃ tesaṃ issariyaṭṭhānaṃ. Visayo ca anaññatthabhāvova yathā ‘‘ākāse sakuṇā udake macchā’’ti, buddhā ca aññattha dissamānāpi vivekapabbhāratāya phalasamāpattininnāva, tena tassā tassā kiriyāya anantaraṃ phalasamāpattiyaṃyeva bhavantīti sā tesaṃ visayo, tabbisayatā ca saccakasuttena (ma. ni. 1.364 ādayo) dīpetabbā.

This, indeed, Ānanda, is the dwelling—as mentioned in the Discourse on the Emptiness of the Dwelling (MN 3.187)—stated to show the drawbacks of delighting in assemblies and attachment to forms, etc., and to reveal the dwelling as the antidote. 'Internal emptiness' means emptiness that is the domain and the basis of sovereignty; the meaning is the attainment of the fruition of emptiness. For the Blessed Buddhas, who are sovereign over the mind, even when teaching the Dhamma, if there is a moment when silence is required, they enter fruition attainment at that moment—how much more so at other times. Therefore, because sovereignty manifests abundantly in fruition attainment in all respects, fruition attainment is called 'the basis of sovereignty.' Or, the sovereignty of the Tathāgatas is produced through the attainment of the fruition of Arahantship, by that very path which generates it; thus, that is their basis of sovereignty. And a domain is simply the state of being nowhere else, as in 'birds in the sky, fish in water.' Though the Buddhas may appear engaged in other things, they are inclined toward fruition attainment due to their inclination toward seclusion. Hence, immediately after any such activity, they abide in fruition attainment itself—that is their domain. This fact of it being their domain should be illustrated by the Discourse to Saccaka (MN 1.364, etc.).

22. Yesaṃ daṭṭhabbabhāvo atthi, te sanidassanā. Cakkhuviññāṇagocarabhāvova daṭṭhabbabhāvo, tassa rūpāyatanā anaññattepi aññehi dhammehi rūpāyatanaṃ visesetuṃ aññaṃ viya katvā ‘‘saha nidassanenāti sanidassanā’’ti vuttaṃ. Dhammasabhāvasāmaññena hi ekībhūtesu dhammesu yo nānattakaro sabhāvo, so añño viya katvā upacarituṃ yutto[Pg.49]. Evañhi atthavisesāvabodho hotīti. Sayañca nissayavasena ca sampattānaṃ asampattānañca paṭimukhabhāvo aññamaññapatanaṃ paṭihananabhāvo, yena byāpārādivikārapaccayantarasahitesu cakkhādīnaṃ visayesu vikāruppatti.

22. Those which have the nature of being visible are sanidassana ('with appearance'). The nature of being visible is the domain of eye-consciousness. Although the form-base (rūpāyatana) is not different from it, in order to distinguish the form-base from other phenomena, it is treated as if it were something else and is thus called sanidassana, from 'together with appearance.' For when phenomena are united by their shared nature, the characteristic that creates diversity is appropriately treated as if it were something distinct. In this way, an understanding of a specific meaning occurs. And the state of being face-to-face, mutual impinging, and the state of impact—of objects that are present and not present, both in themselves and by way of their support—is that by which an alteration arises in the objects of the eye and other senses, which are accompanied by other conditions such as activity and alteration.

Tikamātikāpadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Terms of the Triad Matrix is concluded.

Dukamātikāpadavaṇṇanā

The Exposition on the Terms of the Dyad Matrix

1-6. Mūlaṭṭhenāti suppatiṭṭhitabhāvasādhanena mūlabhāvena, na paccayamattaṭṭhena hetudhammā hetū dhammāti samāsāsamāsaniddesabhāvo dvinnaṃ pāṭhānaṃ viseso. Tathevāti sampayogatova. Sahetukānaṃ hetusampayuttabhāvato ‘‘sampayogato’’ti vuttanti veditabbaṃ, na sahasaddassa sampayogatthattā. Saha-saddo pana ekapuñje uppādato yāva bhaṅgā sahetukānaṃ hetūhi samānadesagahaṇānaṃ hetuādisabbhāvaṃ dīpeti, sampayutta-saddo ekuppādādivasena saha hetūhi ekībhāvupagamanaṃ, tato eva ca dvinnaṃ dukānaṃ nānattaṃ veditabbaṃ. Dhammanānattābhāvepi hi padatthanānattena dukantaraṃ vuccati. Na hi hetudukasaṅgahitehi dhammehi aññe sahetukadukādīhi vuccanti, te eva pana sahetukāhetukādibhāvato sahetukadukādīhi vuttā. Evaṃ sahetukadukasaṅgahitā eva hetusampayuttavippayuttabhāvato hetusampayuttadukena vuttā. Na hi dhammānaṃ avuttatāpekkhaṃ dukantaravacananti natthi punaruttidoso. Desetabbappakārajānanañhi desanāvilāso tathā desanāñāṇañcāti. Tena dhammānaṃ tappakāratā vuttā hoti. Sakalekadesavasena paṭhamadukaṃ dutiyatatiyehi saddhiṃ yojetvā catutthādayo tayo dukā vuttā. Sakalañhi paṭhamadukaṃ dutiyadukekadesena sahetukapadena tatiyadukekadesena hetusampayuttapadena ca yojetvā yathākkamaṃ catutthapañcamadukā vuttā, tathā paṭhamadukekadesaṃ nahetupadaṃ sakalena dutiyadukena yojetvā chaṭṭhaduko vutto. Idampi sambhavatīti etena avuttampi sambhavavasena dīpitanti dasseti. Sambhavo hi gahaṇassa kāraṇanti. Yathā hetusahetukāti idaṃ sambhavatīti katvā gahitaṃ, evaṃ hetuahetukāti idampi sambhavatīti katvā gahetabbamevāti evaṃ aññatthāpi yojetabbaṃ.

1-6. “By the meaning of root” (Mūlaṭṭhena) means by being a root in the sense of establishing a well-founded state, not merely by the meaning of a condition. The difference between the two readings, `hetudhammā` and `hetū dhammā`, is that one is a compounded exposition and the other is uncompounded. “Similarly” (Tatheva) means precisely by way of association. It should be understood that “by way of association” (sampayogato) is stated because root-accompanied phenomena are associated with roots, not because the word ‘saha’ has the meaning of association. The word ‘saha’, however, indicates the entire existence of roots and other factors—from their arising in a single mass until dissolution—for root-accompanied phenomena that occupy the same location as the roots. The word ‘sampayutta’ signifies unification with roots by way of single arising, and so on. From this very reason, the difference between the two dyads should be understood. Indeed, even in the absence of a difference in the phenomena, a different dyad is spoken of due to a difference in the meaning of the words. For it is not that phenomena other than those included in the root dyad are spoken of by the root-accompanied dyad and so on; rather, those very phenomena are spoken of by the root-accompanied dyad and so on due to their state of being root-accompanied, rootless, and so forth. Thus, the very phenomena included in the root-accompanied dyad are spoken of by the root-associated dyad due to their state of being associated with or dissociated from roots. There is no fault of repetition, for the speaking of a different dyad is not dependent on the phenomena being unstated. For the knowledge of the manner to be taught is indeed the elegance of the teaching, and also the knowledge of the teaching. By this, the characteristic of those phenomena is stated. The first dyad is combined with the second and third by way of the whole and a part, and thus the three dyads beginning with the fourth are stated. For the entire first dyad is combined with a part of the second dyad, the term ‘sahetuka’, and with a part of the third dyad, the term ‘hetusampayutta’, and thus the fourth and fifth dyads are stated in sequence. Similarly, a part of the first dyad, the term ‘nahetu’, is combined with the entire second dyad, and the sixth dyad is stated. “This too is possible” (Idampi sambhavatīti)—by this, it is shown that even what is unstated is indicated by way of possibility. For possibility is indeed the reason for inclusion. Just as “root and root-accompanied” (hetusahetukā) is included by considering “this is possible,” so too “root and rootless” (hetuahetukā) should be included by considering “this too is possible.” Thus, it should be applied elsewhere as well.

Evaṃ [Pg.50] paṭhamadukaṃ dutiyatatiyadukesu dutiyapadehi yojetvā ‘‘hetū ceva dhammā ahetukā ca, ahetukā ceva dhammā na ca hetū, hetū ceva dhammā hetuvippayuttā ca, hetuvippayuttā ceva dhammā na ca hetū’’ti ye dve dukā kātabbā, tesaṃ sambhavavaseneva saṅgahaṃ dassetvā kho pana-padena aparesampi dukānaṃ saṅgahaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘tatra yadeta’’ntiādimāha. Tatrāti pāḷiyaṃ. Ayaṃ atirekatthoti idāni yaṃ vakkhati, tamatthamāha. Tattha pana aññepi aññathāpīti etesaṃ visuṃ pavattiyā dve dukā dassitā, saha pavattiyā pana ayampi duko veditabbo ‘‘hetū ceva dhammā hetusampayuttāpi hetuvippayuttāpī’’ti, etesu pana pañcasu dukesu dutiyadukena tatiyaduko viya, catutthadukena pañcamaduko viya ca chaṭṭhadukena ninnānatthattā ‘‘na hetu kho pana dhammā hetusampayuttāpi hetuvippayuttāpī’’ti ayaṃ duko na vutto. Dassitaninnānatthanayo hi so purimadukehīti. Itaresu catūsu hetū ceva ahetukadukena samānatthattā hetū ceva hetuvippayuttaduko, hetusahetukadukena samānatthattā hetuhetusampayuttaduko ca nahetuhetusampayuttaduko viya na vattabbo. Tesu pana dvīsu pacchimaduke ‘‘hetū kho pana dhammā sahetukā’’ti padaṃ catutthaduke paṭhamapadena ninnānākaraṇattā na vattabbaṃ, ‘‘hetū kho pana dhammā ahetukā’’ti padaṃ ‘‘hetū ceva dhammā ahetukā’’ti etena ninnānattā na vattabbaṃ. Avasiṭṭhe pana ekasmiṃ duke ‘‘ahetukā ceva dhammā na ca hetū’’ti padaṃ chaṭṭhaduke dutiyapadena ekatthattā na vattabbaṃ. Idāni ‘‘hetū ceva dhammā ahetukā cā’’ti idamevekaṃ padaṃ avasiṭṭhaṃ, na ca ekena padena duko hotīti tañca na vuttanti. Catutthaduke dutiyapadena pana samānatthassa chaṭṭhaduke paṭhamapadassa vacanaṃ dukapūraṇatthaṃ, etena vā gatidassanena sabbassa sambhavantassa saṅgaho katoti daṭṭhabbo. Tathā hi sabbo sambhavaduko paṭhamaduke dutiyatatiyadukapakkhepena dassito, tesu ca paṭhamadukapakkhepenāti.

Thus, the first dyad is combined with the second terms of the second and third dyads to form the two dyads that should be made: 'states that are both roots and rootless' (hetū ceva dhammā ahetukā ca), 'states that are both rootless and not roots' (ahetukā ceva dhammā na ca hetū), 'states that are both roots and dissociated from roots' (hetū ceva dhammā hetuvippayuttā ca), and 'states that are both dissociated from roots and not roots' (hetuvippayuttā ceva dhammā na ca hetū). Having shown the inclusion of these by way of their possibility, the text then begins with 'Tatra yadetaṃ,' etc., in order to show the inclusion of other dyads by the term kho pana. Tatra in the Pāḷi text has an additional meaning. He now states the meaning that is about to be spoken. There, however, by the separate occurrence of 'others' (aññepi) and 'otherwise' (aññathāpi), two dyads are shown. But by their simultaneous occurrence, this dyad should also be understood: 'states that are roots, and also associated with roots and dissociated from roots' (hetū ceva dhammā hetusampayuttāpi hetuvippayuttāpi). Among these five dyads, the third dyad is like the second dyad, and the fifth dyad is like the fourth dyad; and the dyad, 'But states that are not roots are both associated with roots and dissociated from roots' (na hetu kho pana dhammā hetusampayuttāpi hetuvippayuttāpi), is not stated because its meaning is not different from the sixth dyad. For that method of showing non-difference in meaning has indeed been shown by the previous dyads. Among the remaining four, the dyad 'states that are both roots and dissociated from roots' should not be stated, just like the dyad 'not-roots and associated with roots,' because it has the same meaning as the dyad 'states that are both roots and rootless.' And the dyad 'roots and associated with roots' should not be stated because it has the same meaning as the dyad 'roots and with-roots.' But in the latter of those two dyads, the term 'But states that are roots are with-roots' (hetū kho pana dhammā sahetukā) should not be stated, because it does not create a difference from the first term in the fourth dyad; and the term 'But states that are roots are rootless' (hetū kho pana dhammā ahetukā) should not be stated, because it is not different from 'states that are both roots and rootless' (hetū ceva dhammā ahetukā). But in the one remaining dyad, the term 'states that are both rootless and not roots' (ahetukā ceva dhammā na ca hetū) should not be stated, because it has the same meaning as the second term in the sixth dyad. Now, only the single term 'states that are both roots and rootless' (hetū ceva dhammā ahetukā cā) remains, and since a dyad cannot be formed with just one term, it too is not stated. However, the statement of the first term of the sixth dyad, which has the same meaning as the second term in the fourth dyad, is for the purpose of completing the dyad. Alternatively, it should be understood that by this showing of the method, the inclusion of all possible dyads has been accomplished. Indeed, every possible dyad is shown by the addition of the second and third dyads to the first dyad, and by the addition of the first dyad to them.

7-13. Samānakālena asamānakālena kālavimuttena ca paccayena nipphannānaṃ paccayāyattānaṃ paccayabhāvamattena tesaṃ paccayānaṃ atthitaṃ dīpetuṃ sappaccayavacanaṃ, na sahetukavacanaṃ viya samānakālānameva, nāpi sanidassanaṃ viya taṃsabhāvassa anatthantarabhūtassa. Saṅkhata-saddo pana sametehi [Pg.51] nipphāditabhāvaṃ dīpetīti ayametesaṃ viseso dukantaravacane kāraṇaṃ. Ettha ca appaccayā asaṅkhatāti bahuvacananiddeso avinicchitatthaparicchedadassanavasena mātikāṭhapanato katoti veditabbo. Uddesena hi kusalādisabhāvānaṃ dhammānaṃ atthitāmattaṃ vuccati, na paricchedoti aparicchedena bahuvacanena uddeso vuttoti. Rūpanti rūpāyatanaṃ pathaviyādi vā. Purimasmiṃ atthavikappe rūpāyatanassa asaṅgahitatā āpajjatīti ruppanalakkhaṇaṃ vā rūpanti ayaṃ atthanayo vutto. Tattha rūpanti ruppanasabhāvo. Na lujjati na palujjatīti yo gahito tathā na hoti, so lokoti taṃgahaṇarahitānaṃ lokuttarānaṃ natthi lokatā. Dukkhasaccaṃ vā loko, tattha teneva lokasabhāvena viditāti lokiyā.

7-13. To indicate the existence of those conditions for things that are dependent on conditions and produced by conditions—whether simultaneously, non-simultaneously, or freed from time—by the mere fact of their being a condition, the term sappaccaya (“with conditions”) is used. It is not like the term sahetuka (“with roots”), which applies only to simultaneous occurrences, nor like sanidassana (“visible”), which implies the non-difference in essence of that nature. The word saṅkhata (“conditioned”), however, reveals the state of being produced by combined factors. This is the distinction between these terms and the reason for speaking of a different dyad. Here, the plural designation “unconditioned, without conditions” (appaccayā asaṅkhatā) should be understood as being made from the placement of the matrix, by way of showing an undetermined scope of meaning. For in the summary (uddesa), only the mere existence of phenomena such as wholesome qualities is stated, not their precise definition. Thus, the summary is given in the plural without specific determination. Rūpa (“form”) means either the form-base (rūpāyatana) or earth, etc. In the first alternative meaning, since the non-inclusion of the form-base would result, this line of meaning is stated: rūpa is the characteristic of being afflicted (ruppanalakkhaṇaṃ). There, rūpa means the nature of being afflicted. The world (loko) is that which is not as it is grasped—namely, as something that 'is not broken, is not shattered.' Therefore, for the supramundane states, which are devoid of such grasping, there is no worldliness. Or, the truth of suffering is the world. Therein, things are known as 'worldly' (lokiyā) by that very nature of the world.

Evaṃ sante cakkhuviññāṇena vijānitabbassa rūpāyatanassa teneva navijānitabbassa saddāyatanādikassa ca nānattā dvinnampi padānaṃ atthanānattato duko hoti. Evaṃ pana duke vuccamāne dukabahutā āpajjati, yattakāni viññāṇāni, tattakā dukā vuttā samattā ṭhapetvā sabbadhammārammaṇāni viññāṇāni. Tesu ca dukassa pacchedo āpajjati, tathā ca sati ‘‘kenacī’’ti padaṃ sabbaviññāṇasaṅgāhakaṃ na siyā, niddesena ca viruddhaṃ idaṃ vacanaṃ. Yo ca tattha ‘‘ye te dhammā cakkhuviññeyyā, na te dhammā sotaviññeyyāti ayaṃ duko na hotī’’ti paṭisedho kato, so ca kathaṃ yujjeyya. Na hi samatthā aṭṭhakathā pāḷiṃ paṭisedhetunti, na ca kenaci-saddassa tenevāti ayaṃ padattho sambhavati, ‘‘kenacī’’ti etassa ādipadassa aniyamitaṃ yaṃ kiñci ekaṃ padattho, taṃ vatvā vuccamānassa ‘‘kenacī’’ti dutiyapadassa yaṃ kiñci aparaṃ aniyamitaṃ padatthoti lokasiddhametaṃ, tatheva ca niddeso pavatto, na cettha viññātabbadhammabhedena dukabhedo samatto āpajjati yattakā viññātabbā, tattakā dukāti, tasmā natthi dukabahutā. Na hi ekaṃyeva viññātabbaṃ kenaci viññeyyaṃ kenaci na viññeyyañca, kintu aparampi aparampīti sabbaviññātabbasaṅgahe duko samatto hoti, evañca sati ‘‘kenacī’’ti padaṃ aniyamena sabbaviññāṇasaṅgāhakanti siddhaṃ hoti, viññāṇanānattena ca viññātabbaṃ bhinditvā ayaṃ duko vutto, na viññātabbānaṃ atthantaratāyāti. Etassa pana dukassa nikkheparāsiniddeso dukasaṅgahitadhammekadesesu [Pg.52] dukapadadvayappavattidassanavasena pavatto. Atthuddhāraniddeso niravasesadukasaṅgahitadhammadassanavasenāti veditabbo.

This being the case, a dyad arises from the difference in meaning of the two terms, due to the distinction between the form-base, which is to be cognized by eye-consciousness, and the sound-base and so on, which are not to be cognized by that same consciousness. However, if a dyad is spoken of in this way, a multiplicity of dyads would result; as many dyads would be stated in their entirety as there are consciousnesses, with the exception of those consciousnesses that take all phenomena as their object. And in their case, a break in the dyad would occur, and if that were so, the word ‘kenaci’ (‘by any’) would not be inclusive of all consciousnesses, and this statement would contradict the exposition. And how could the refutation made there be justified, namely: ‘Those phenomena that are cognizable by the eye are not cognizable by the ear; this is not a dyad’? For a commentary is not able to refute the Pāḷi. Nor is the meaning of the word ‘kenaci’ ‘by that same one.’ The meaning of the first instance of the word ‘kenaci’ is ‘any one indefinite thing’; having said that, the meaning of the second instance of the word ‘kenaci’ when it is spoken is ‘any other indefinite thing’—this is established in the world. And the exposition proceeds in just that way. And here, a complete division of dyads based on the division of cognizable phenomena—such that there are as many dyads as there are cognizable phenomena—does not result. Therefore, there is no multiplicity of dyads. For it is not that one and the same cognizable phenomenon is cognizable by one thing and not cognizable by another; rather, since there are others and still others, the dyad is completed by the inclusion of all cognizable phenomena. And this being so, it is established that the word ‘kenaci’ is inclusive of all consciousnesses in an indefinite way. And this dyad is stated by dividing the cognizable based on the diversity of consciousness, not because of an intrinsic difference in the cognizable phenomena themselves. The exposition of the deposition-collection of this dyad, however, should be understood as proceeding by way of showing the application of the two terms of the dyad in some of the phenomena included in the dyad. The exposition of the extraction of the meaning should be understood as proceeding by way of showing, without remainder, the phenomena included in the dyad.

14-19. Cakkhutopi…pe… manatopīti cakkhuviññāṇādivīthīsu tadanugatamanoviññāṇavīthīsu ca kiñcāpi kusalādīnampi pavatti atthi, kāmāsavādayo eva pana vaṇato yūsaṃ viya paggharaṇakaasucibhāvena sandanti, tasmā te eva ‘‘āsavā’’ti vuccanti. Tattha hi paggharaṇakaasucimhi niruḷho āsavasaddoti. Dhammato yāva gotrabhunti tato paraṃ maggaphalesu appavattito vuttaṃ. Ete hi ārammaṇakaraṇavasena dhamme gacchantā tato paraṃ na gacchantīti. Nanu tato paraṃ bhavaṅgādīnipi gacchantīti ce? Na, tesampi pubbe ālambitesu lokiyadhammesu sāsavabhāvena antogadhattā tato paratābhāvato. Ettha ca gotrabhuvacanena gotrabhuvodānaphalasamāpattipurecārikaparikammāni vuttānīti veditabbāni, paṭhamamaggapurecārikameva vā gotrabhu avadhinidassanabhāvena gahitaṃ, tato paraṃ maggaphalasamānatāya pana aññesu maggesu maggavīthiyaṃ phalasamāpattivīthiyaṃ nirodhānantarañca pavattamānesu phalesu nibbāne ca pavatti nivāritā āsavānanti veditabbā. Savantīti gacchanti. Duvidho hi avadhi abhividhivisayo anabhividhivisayo ca. Abhividhivisayaṃ kiriyā byāpetvā pavattati ‘‘ābhavaggā bhagavato yaso gato’’ti, itaraṃ bahi katvā ‘‘āpāṭaliputtā vuṭṭho devo’’ti. Ayañca ā-kāro abhividhiattho idha gahitoti ‘‘antokaraṇattho’’ti vuttaṃ.

14-19. From the eye... up to the mind—although there is the occurrence of wholesome and other states in the eye-consciousness processes, etc., and in the mind-consciousness processes that follow them, the influxes, such as the influx of sensual desire, indeed flow like pus from a wound, due to their nature of oozing impurity. Therefore, they alone are called 'āsavas' (influxes). For here, the word 'āsava' is established in the sense of oozing impurity. In terms of phenomena, it is said that they occur up to the change-of-lineage (gotrabhu), and do not occur beyond that in the path and fruition. For these influxes, proceeding by way of taking phenomena as their object, do not go beyond that. If it is asked, 'But do they not go beyond that to the life-continuum (bhavaṅga), etc.?' No, because those states too, having previously taken mundane phenomena subject to influxes as their object, are included within the domain of the influxes; therefore, there is no going beyond. And here, by the word 'gotrabhu', it should be understood that change-of-lineage, purification, and the preliminary work preceding fruition attainment are meant. Alternatively, the change-of-lineage that precedes the first path is taken as an indication of the limit. However, due to the similarity of path and fruition, it should be understood that beyond this, in the other paths, during the path process, the fruition attainment process, in the fruitions that occur immediately following cessation, and in Nibbāna, the occurrence of the influxes is prevented. 'They flow' means they go. The limit (avadhi) is twofold: that which has a range of inclusion (abhividhivisaya) and that which has a range of exclusion (anabhividhivisaya). The range of inclusion operates by pervading, as in 'The fame of the Blessed One has spread up to the summit of existence.' The other operates by excluding, as in 'The rain has fallen up to Pāṭaliputta.' And here, the prefix 'ā-' is taken in the sense of inclusion, hence it is said to have the meaning of 'including' (antokaraṇattho).

Cirapārivāsiyaṭṭho ciraparivutthatā purāṇabhāvo. Ādi-saddena ‘‘purimā, bhikkhave, koṭi na paññāyati bhavataṇhāyā’’ti (a. ni. 10.62) idaṃ suttaṃ saṅgahitaṃ. Avijjāsavabhavāsavānañca ciraparivutthatāya dassitāya tabbhāvabhāvīnaṃ kāmāsavadiṭṭhāsavānañca ciraparivutthatā dassitā hoti. Aññesupi yathāvutte dhamme okāsañca ārammaṇaṃ katvā pavattamānesu mānādīsu vijjamānesu attattaniyādiggāhavasena abhibyāpanaṃ madakaraṇavasena āsavasadisatā ca etesaṃyeva, nāññesanti etesveva āsavasaddo niruḷho daṭṭhabbo. Āyataṃ vā savanti phalantīti āsavā[Pg.53]. Na hi kiñci saṃsāradukkhaṃ āsavehi vinā uppajjamānaṃ atthīti. Ārammaṇabhāvena ye dhammā vaṇo viya āsave paggharanti, te asampayoge atabbhāvepi saha āsavehīti sāsavā, āsavavantoti attho.

The meaning of 'long-standing' (cirapārivāsiyaṭṭho) is the state of being long-established or ancient. By the word 'beginning' (ādi-saddena), this Sutta is included: 'Monks, a first point of craving for existence is not discerned' (AN 10.62). When the long-standing nature of the influxes of ignorance and existence is shown, the long-standing nature of the influxes of sensuality and views, which are conditioned by them, is also shown. Also, regarding other phenomena as stated, when conceit and so on are present, occurring by taking opportunity and object, the pervasion by way of grasping at 'self' and 'what is mine', and the similarity to the influxes by way of causing intoxication, belong to these alone, not to others. Thus, it should be understood that the term 'influx' is established in these alone. Alternatively, they are called 'āsavas' because they flow (savanti) and bear fruit (phalanti) for a long time (āyataṃ). Indeed, there is no suffering in saṃsāra that arises without the influxes. Those phenomena which, by way of being objects, cause the influxes to ooze like a wound—even when not associated with them, even when not identical to them—are called 'with influxes' (sāsavā), meaning 'possessing influxes'.

Osānaduke ‘‘no āsavā kho panā’’ti avatvā ‘‘āsavavippayuttā kho panā’’ti vacanaṃ sāsavānaṃ sahetukānaṃ viya sampayuttehi taṃsahitatā na hotīti dassanatthaṃ. Evaṃ sesagocchakesupi yathāsambhavaṃ vippayuttaggahaṇe payojanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Apica ‘‘no āsavā kho pana dhammā sāsavā’’ti idaṃ padaṃ catutthaduke dutiyapadena ninnānaṃ, na ca ekena duko hoti, tasmā āsavavippayuttapadameva gahetvā osānadukayojanā ñāyāgatāti katā. Hetugocchake pana hetuvippayuttānaṃ sahetukatā natthīti te gahetvā dukayojanāya asakkuṇeyyattā nahetupadaṃ gahetvā osānadukayojanā katā. Ye vā pana paṭhame duke dutiyassa pakkhepe eko, tatiyassa dve, paṭhamassa dutiye eko, tatiye dve, dutiyassa tatiye eko, dutiye ca tatiyassa ekoti aṭṭha dukā labbhanti, tesu tīhi itare ca nayato dassitāti veditabbā. Esa nayo sesagocchakesupi.

In the final dyad, instead of saying 'but they are not influxes', the statement 'but they are dissociated from the influxes' is used to show that, unlike things with influxes and with causes, they do not co-occur with associated things. Similarly, in the remaining groups, the purpose of taking the term 'dissociated' should be understood as is appropriate. Moreover, the phrase 'but phenomena that are not influxes are with influxes' is included under the second term of the fourth dyad, and a dyad is not formed with a single term; therefore, by taking only the term 'dissociated from the influxes', the application of the final dyad is considered logically arrived at. In the cause-group, however, since things dissociated from causes cannot be with a cause, they cannot be taken for the formation of a dyad; thus, the term 'not a cause' is taken, and the application of the final dyad is made. Furthermore, concerning the first dyad: by combination with the second, one dyad is obtained; with the third, two. By combination of the first term with the second dyad, one; with the third, two. By combination of the second dyad with the third, one; and from the second and third, one. Thus, eight dyads are obtained. Among these, it should be understood that by means of three, the others are also shown according to this method. This method applies to the remaining groups as well.

20-25. Kilesakammavipākavaṭṭānaṃ paccayabhāvena tattha saṃyojenti, satipi aññesaṃ tappaccayabhāve na vinā saṃyojanāni tesaṃ tappaccayabhāvo atthi, orambhāgiyuddhambhāgiyasaṅgahitehi ca taṃtaṃbhavanibbattakakammaniyamo bhavaniyamo ca hoti, na ca upacchinnasaṃyojanassa katānipi kammāni bhavaṃ nibbattentīti. Saṃyojetabbāti vā saṃyojaniyā, saṃyojane niyuttāti vā. Dūragatassapi ākaḍḍhanato nissarituṃ appadānavasena bandhanaṃ saṃyojanaṃ, ganthakaraṇaṃ saṅkhalikacakkalakānaṃ viya paṭibaddhatākaraṇaṃ vā ganthanaṃ gantho, saṃsilisakaraṇaṃ yojanaṃ yogoti ayametesaṃ visesoti veditabbo. Dhammānaṃ sabhāvakiccavisesaññunā pana bhagavatā sampayuttesu ārammaṇesu tappaccayesu ca tehi tehi nipphādiyamānaṃ taṃ taṃ kiccavisesaṃ passantena te te dhammā tathā tathā āsavasaṃyojanaganthādivasena vuttāti ‘‘kimatthaṃ eteyeva dhammā evaṃ vuttā, kasmā ca vuttā eva puna vuttā’’ti na codetabbametaṃ.

20-25. They yoke beings therein, in the round of defilements, kamma, and results, by being a condition for them. Although other things are also a condition for them, their state of being a condition does not exist without the fetters. And through those fetters comprised as lower and higher, there is the determination of kamma that generates a particular existence and the determination of that existence. And for one whose fetters are severed, even kamma that has been done does not generate a new existence. Or, they are saṃyojaniyā (fetters) because they are 'to be yoked' (saṃyojetabbā), or because they are 'engaged in yoking' (saṃyojane niyuttā). A fetter (saṃyojana) is a bond in the sense of dragging back even one who has gone far and of not allowing escape. A tie (gantho) is a tying that makes a knot, or that creates a connection like that of chains and wheels. A yoke (yogo) is a joining that causes adhesion. This should be understood as the distinction among them. However, the Blessed One, who knows the specific function and intrinsic nature of phenomena, seeing the various specific functions being produced by these phenomena in their associated objects and their conditions, spoke of these phenomena in such and such ways as influxes, fetters, ties, and so on. Therefore, this should not be questioned: 'For what reason are these very phenomena spoken of in this way, and why, having been spoken of, are they spoken of again?'

26-37. Ganthaniyāti [Pg.54] ettha ayamañño attho ‘‘ganthakaraṇaṃ ganthanaṃ, ganthane niyuttāti ganthaniyā, ganthayituṃ sakkuṇeyyā, ganthayituṃ arahantīti vā ganthaniyā’’ti. Evaṃ oghaniyādīsupi daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tenātikkamatīti etaṃ dhātvatthaṃ gahetvā oghaniyāti padasiddhi katā.

26-37. Here, regarding ganthaniyā, this is another meaning: 'The making of a tie is ganthanaṃ; because they are engaged in tying, they are ganthaniyā (ties). Or, they are ganthaniyā because they are able to tie or are fit to tie.' This should be understood similarly in the case of oghaniyā and the others. The formation of the word oghaniyā is accomplished by taking the root meaning from the phrase tena atikkamati ('one is overcome by it').

50-54. Dhammasabhāvaṃ aggahetvā parato āmasantīti parāmāsā. Paratoti niccādito. Āmasantīti sabhāvapaṭisedhena parimajjanti.

50-54. They are 'misapprehensions' (parāmāsā) because, without grasping the intrinsic nature of phenomena, they touch upon them from another standpoint. 'From another standpoint' (parato) means from the standpoint of permanence and so on. 'They touch upon' (āmasanti) means they grope at them by way of denying their intrinsic nature.

55-68. Sabhāvato vijjamānaṃ avijjamānaṃ vā vicittasaññāya saññitaṃ ārammaṇaṃ aggahetvā appavattito ālambamānā dhammā sārammaṇā. Cintanaṃ gahaṇaṃ ārammaṇūpaladdhi. Cetasi niyuttā, cetasā saṃsaṭṭhā vā cetasikā. Dubbiññeyyanānattatāya ekībhāvamivupagamanaṃ nirantarabhāvupagamanaṃ. Yesaṃ rūpānaṃ cittaṃ sahajātapaccayo hoti, tesaṃ cittassa ca suviññeyyanānattanti nirantarabhāvānupagamanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Ekato vattamānāpīti api-saddo ko pana vādo ekato avattamānāti etamatthaṃ dīpeti. Idamettha vicāretabbaṃ – avinibbhogarūpānaṃ kiṃ aññamaññaṃ saṃsaṭṭhatā, udāhu visaṃsaṭṭhatāti? Visuṃ ārammaṇabhāvena suviññeyyanānattattā na saṃsaṭṭhatā, nāpi visaṃsaṭṭhatā saṃsaṭṭhāti anāsaṅkanīyasabhāvattā. Catunnañhi khandhānaṃ aññamaññaṃ saṃsaṭṭhasabhāvattā rūpanibbānehipi so saṃsaṭṭhabhāvo atthi natthīti siyā āsaṅkā, tasmā tesaṃ itarehi, itaresañca tehi visaṃsaṭṭhasabhāvatā vuccati, na pana rūpānaṃ rūpehi katthaci saṃsaṭṭhatā atthīti tadāsaṅkābhāvato visaṃsaṭṭhatā ca rūpānaṃ rūpehi na vuccatīti. Esa hi tesaṃ sabhāvoti. Cittasaṃsaṭṭhasamuṭṭhānādipadesu saṃsaṭṭhasamuṭṭhānādisaddā cittasaddāpekkhāti paccekaṃ cittasaddasambandhattā cittasaṃsaṭṭhā ca te cittasamuṭṭhānā cāti paccekaṃ yojetvā attho vutto. Upādiyantevāti bhūtāni gaṇhanti eva, nissayanti evāti attho. Yathā bhūtāni upādiyanti gayhanti nissīyanti, na tathā etāni gayhanti nissīyanti, tasmā upādā. Atha vā bhūtāni amuñcitvā tesaṃ vaṇṇanibhādibhāvena gahetabbato upādā.

55-68. Phenomena that take an object are 'sārammaṇā' (with an object), in that they do not proceed without having grasped it. The object is that which is perceived by varied perception, whether it exists by its own nature or not. Thinking or grasping is 'ārammaṇūpaladdhi' (object-apprehension). Those yoked to the mind, or associated with the mind, are 'cetasikā' (mental factors). Because their diversity is difficult to discern, they seem to attain a state of oneness, a state of being uninterrupted. The easily discernible diversity of those forms for which mind is a conascent condition, and of the mind itself, should be understood as the non-attainment of an uninterrupted state. 'Even when occurring together' (ekato vattamānāpi)—the word 'api' (even) indicates the meaning, 'what then is to be said of them not occurring together?' Here, it should be considered: are inseparable forms mutually associated or disassociated? Because of their easily discernible diversity as separate objects, there is no association; nor is there disassociation, as their nature is not one about which the question of association can be raised. Since the four aggregates are mutually associated by nature, the doubt may arise whether such an associated state exists with respect to form and Nibbāna. Therefore, it is said that they are disassociated by nature from the others, and the others from them. However, since there is no association whatsoever of forms with forms, because of the absence of that doubt, the disassociation of forms with forms is also not stated. This indeed is their nature. In expressions such as 'cittasaṃsaṭṭhasamuṭṭhāna' (mind-associated and mind-originated), the words 'saṃsaṭṭha' (associated) and 'samuṭṭhāna' (originated) are dependent on the word 'citta' (mind). Therefore, the meaning is stated by construing them individually: 'they are both mind-associated and they are mind-originated' (cittasaṃsaṭṭhā ca te cittasamuṭṭhānā ca). The meaning of 'upādiyante' is that they indeed grasp the primary elements, they indeed rely on them. Just as the primary elements are taken up, grasped, and relied upon, these are not grasped and relied upon in the same way; therefore they are called 'upādā' (derived). Or, alternatively, because they are to be grasped as their color, appearance, and so on, without abandoning the primary elements, they are called 'upādā'.

75-82. Saṃkiliṭṭhattike vuttanayenāti saṃ-saddaṃ apanetvā kilisantīti kilesātiādinā nayena.

75-82. Regarding the triad of the defiled (saṃkiliṭṭhattika), it is by the method stated: by the method beginning with 'they defile (kilisanti), therefore they are defilements (kilesā)', having removed the prefix 'saṃ-'.

83-100. Kāmāvacarādīsu [Pg.55] ayamaparo attho – kāmataṇhā kāmo, evaṃ rūpārūpataṇhā rūpaṃ arūpañca. Ārammaṇakaraṇavasena tāni yattha avacaranti, te kāmāvacarādayoti. Evañhi sati aññabhūmīsu uppajjamānānaṃ akāmāvacarāditā kāmāvacarāditā ca nāpajjatīti siddhaṃ hoti. Nikkhepakaṇḍepi ‘‘etthāvacarā’’ti vacanaṃ avīciparanimmitaparicchinnokāsāya kāmataṇhāya ārammaṇabhāvaṃ sandhāya vuttanti veditabbaṃ, tadokāsatā ca taṇhāya tanninnatāya veditabbā. Yadi pariyāpannasaddassa antogadhāti ayamattho, maggādidhammānañca lokuttarantogadhattā pariyāpannatā āpajjati. Na hi ‘‘pariyāpannā’’ti ettha tebhūmakagahaṇaṃ atthīti? Nāpajjati sabbadā pavattamānassa paccakkhassa lokassa vasena pariyāpannanicchayato. Atha vā paricchedakārikāya taṇhāya paricchinditvā āpannā paṭipannā gahitāti pariyāpannā.

83-100. In the spheres of sense-desire and so on, this is another meaning: craving for sensual pleasures is 'sense-desire'; similarly, craving for form and the formless is 'form' and 'the formless'. Those dhammas are called 'of the sense-desire sphere, etc.' because they range therein by way of taking those cravings as their object. This being so, it is established that for phenomena arising in other planes, the designation 'not of the sense-desire sphere, etc.' or 'of the sense-desire sphere, etc.' does not obtain. Also in the Chapter on Classification, the statement 'ranging herein' should be understood as being said in reference to the state of being an object for sense-craving, which has as its domain the space delimited by Avīci and the Paranimmitavasavattī realm. And the fact that this is its domain should be understood from the craving's inclination towards it. If the meaning of the term `pariyāpanna` is 'included,' then the state of being 'included' would also apply to path-dhammas and other supramundane states, because they are included in the supramundane. For is there in the term 'included' (pariyāpannā) an acceptance of only the three planes? It does not apply, because the determination of what is 'included' is made by means of the directly perceived world which is always occurring. Alternatively, `pariyāpannā` means 'entered into, attained, or grasped', having been delimited by craving, the delimiting agent.

Anīya-saddo bahulā kattuabhidhāyakoti vaṭṭacārakato niyyantīti niyyānīyā, nī-kārassa rassattaṃ ya-kārassa ca ka-kārattaṃ katvā ‘‘niyyānikā’’ti vuttaṃ, niyyānakaraṇasīlā vā niyyānikā. Uttaritabbassa aññassa niddiṭṭhassa abhāvā niddisiyamānā sauttarā dhammāva uttaritabbāti ‘‘attāna’’nti āha. Rāgādīnanti rāgādīnaṃ dasannaṃ kilesānaṃ sabbaniyatākusalānaṃ vā. Tehi nānappakāradukkhanibbattakehi abhibhūtā sattā kandanti akandantāpi kandanakāraṇabhāvato. Yasmā pana pahānekaṭṭhatāvasena ca ‘‘saraṇā’’ti āha, tasmā ‘‘rāgādīna’’nti vacanena rāgadosamohāva gahitāti ñāyati. Raṇa-saddo vā rāgādireṇūsu niruḷho daṭṭhabbo, raṇaṃ vā yuddhaṃ, ‘‘kāmā te paṭhamā senā’’ti (su. ni. 438; mahāni. 28, 68, 149; cūḷani. nandamāṇavapucchāniddesa 47) evamādikā ca akusalā senā ariyamaggayuddhena jetabbattā sayuddhattā ‘‘saraṇā’’ti vuccantīti. Araṇavibhaṅgasutte (ma. ni. 3.323 ādayo) pana sadukkhā saupaghātā saupāyāsā sapariḷāhā micchāpaṭipadābhūtā kāmasukhānuyogādayo ‘‘saraṇā’’ti vuttāti dukkhādīnaṃ raṇabhāvo tannibbattakasabhāvānaṃ akusalānaṃ saraṇatā ca veditabbā.

The suffix '-anīya' frequently denotes the agent. Hence, 'niyyānīyā' means 'they lead forth' from the round of existence. By shortening the 'ī' of the root 'nī' and changing the 'y' to 'k', the word 'niyyānikā' is formed; alternatively, 'niyyānikā' are those whose nature it is to cause leading forth. Since nothing else is specified as that which is to be transcended, and since the dhammas under discussion are 'with a superior', they themselves are what is to be transcended; thus, the text says 'attānaṃ' (oneself). 'Rāgādīnaṃ' refers to the ten defilements beginning with lust, or all unwholesome states with fixed consequences. Overwhelmed by these, which produce various kinds of suffering, beings lament; even if they do not actually lament, they are subject to the cause of lamentation. However, since these states are called 'saraṇā' (with conflict) in the sense that their single function is to be abandoned, the term 'rāgādīnaṃ' is therefore understood to refer to lust, hatred, and delusion. Alternatively, the word 'raṇa' should be seen as established in the sense of the 'dust' of lust and so on. Or, 'raṇa' is battle; and because unwholesome states—the army beginning with, 'Sensual pleasures are your first army' (Snp 438)—are to be conquered by the battle of the noble path, they are called 'saraṇā' because they involve battle. In the Araṇavibhaṅgasutta (MN 139), however, the indulgence in sensual pleasures and other wrong courses of practice—being painful, vexatious, distressing, and feverish—are called 'saraṇā' (with conflict). Thus, the nature of suffering and so on as conflict, and the 'with conflict' nature of the unwholesome states that generate it, should be understood.

Piṭṭhidukā samattā.

The 'back' dyads are concluded.

Suttantikadukamātikāpadavaṇṇanā

An Explanation of the Terms in the Suttanta Dyad Matrix

101-108. Vijjārāsantogadhadhammā [Pg.56] vijjāsabhāgatāya tadekadese vijjākoṭṭhāse vattantīti vuttā. Vajirassa yattha taṃ patati, tattha abhejjaṃ nāma kiñci maṇipāsāṇādi natthi, na ca tena gamanamaggo viruhati, evameva arahattamaggena yattha so uppajjati, tasmiṃ santāne abhejjo kileso nāma natthi, na ca bhinno puna viruhatīti vajirupamatā veditabbā. Tadupacārena bālā yathā ‘‘mañcā ghosantī’’ti. Kaṇhābhijātīti apāyā vuccanti manussesu ca dobhaggiyaṃ. Tapanassa vā dukkhassa hitāti tapaniyā.

101-108. Those states included within the mass of knowledge are said to operate in a section or portion of knowledge because they partake of the nature of knowledge. Just as where a thunderbolt falls, there is nothing unbreakable such as jewels or stones, nor does the path of its passage grow again; just so, in the continuum where the path of arahantship arises, there is no unbreakable defilement, nor does that which is broken grow again. Thus its analogy with a thunderbolt should be understood. By way of metaphorical usage, it is as when the ignorant say, 'The beds are making a noise.' 'Of dark birth' refers to the woeful states, and among humans, to misfortune. Alternatively, because they are conducive to torment, that is, to suffering, they are called `tapaniyā`.

Dāsādīsupi sirivaḍḍhakādisaddā viya atathattā vacanamattameva adhikāraṃ katvā pavattā adhivacanā. Yasmā pana adhivacananiruttipaññattipadāni samānatthāni, sabbañca vacanaṃ adhivacanādibhāvaṃ bhajati, tasmā tesupi vacanavisesesu visesena pavattehi adhivacanādisaddehi sabbāni vacanāni atthappakāsanasāmaññena vuttānīti etenādhippāyena ayaṃ atthayojanā katāti veditabbā. Atha vā adhi-saddo uparibhāge, upari vacanaṃ adhivacanaṃ. Kassa upari? Pakāsetabbassa atthassāti viditovāyamattho. Adhīnaṃ vā vacanaṃ adhivacanaṃ. Kena adhīnaṃ? Atthena. Tathā taṃtaṃatthappakāsane nicchitaṃ, niyataṃ vā vacanaṃ nirutti. Pathavīdhātupurisāditaṃtaṃpakārena ñāpanato paññattīti evaṃ adhivacanādipadānaṃ sabbavacanesu pavatti veditabbā. Aññathā sirivaḍḍhakadhanavaḍḍhakappakārānameva abhilāpānaṃ adhivacanatā, abhisaṅkharontīti evaṃpakārānameva niddhāraṇavacanānaṃ niruttitā, takko vitakkoti evaṃpakārānameva ekamevatthaṃ tena tena pakārena ñāpentānaṃ paññattitā ca āpajjeyyāti.

Just as in the case of slaves and so on, names like 'Sirivaḍḍhaka' are designations current merely by verbal convention, due to their untruth. Furthermore, since the terms 'designation' (adhivacana), 'expression' (nirutti), and 'concept' (paññatti) are synonymous, and all speech partakes of the nature of being a designation and so on, it should be understood that this explanation of the meaning is made with this intention: due to their common function of clarifying meaning, all utterances are referred to by these terms, even though the terms themselves apply specifically to particular kinds of utterances. Alternatively, the prefix 'adhi-' is used in the sense of 'superior'; thus 'superior speech' (adhivacana). Superior to what? To the meaning to be explained—this is the meaning to be understood. Or, it is speech that is dependent (adhīna). Dependent on what? On the meaning. Similarly, speech that is determined or fixed in expressing a particular meaning is an 'expression' (nirutti). Because it makes known in various ways things like the 'earth-element' or a 'person', it is a 'concept' (paññatti). In this way, the application of the terms 'designation' and so on to all speech should be understood. Otherwise, it would follow that only utterances like 'Sirivaḍḍhaka' or 'Dhanavaḍḍhaka' would be designations; only definitive statements like 'they fabricate' would be expressions (nirutti); and only those that make known a single meaning in various ways, like 'reasoning is thinking', would be concepts.

109-118. Phasso vedanāti sabbadāpi arūpadhammānaṃ phassādināmakattā pathaviyādīnaṃ kesakumbhādināmantarāpatti viya nāmantarānāpajjanato ca sadā attanāva katanāmatāya catukkhandhanibbānāni nāmakaraṇaṭṭhena nāmaṃ. Namanaṃ avinābhāvato ārammaṇābhimukhatā, namanahetubhūtatā nāmanaṃ. Atha vā adhivacanasamphasso viya adhivacanaṃ nāmamantarena ye anupacitabodhisambhārānaṃ gahaṇaṃ na gacchanti, te nāmāyattaggahaṇā nāmaṃ. Rūpaṃ pana vināpi nāmasādhanaṃ attano ruppanasabhāvena gahaṇaṃ upayātīti rūpaṃ.

109-118. Contact, feeling, and so forth—since all immaterial phenomena always have names such as 'contact,' and since, unlike earth and so forth which can acquire other names such as 'hair' or 'pot,' they do not acquire other names, and since they always have names made by themselves, the four mental aggregates and Nibbāna are 'name' in the sense of naming. Bending towards an object due to inseparability, or being the cause of bending, is 'naming'. Alternatively, like contact through designation, there is designation; those who have not accumulated the requisites for enlightenment do not grasp them without a name, thus that which is grasped dependent on a name is 'name.' Form, however, even without the aid of a name, is grasped by its own nature of being afflicted; thus it is 'form'.

119-123. Ito [Pg.57] pubbe parikammaṃ pavattaṃ, ito paraṃ bhavaṅgaṃ, majjhe samāpattīti evaṃ samāpattīnaṃ appanāparicchedapaññā samāpattikusalatā. Vuṭṭhāne kusalabhāvo pubbe vuṭṭhāne paricchedakaraṇañāṇaṃ. Lakkhaṇādivasena aniccādivasena ca manasi karaṇaṃ manasikāro.

119-123. 'Before this, preliminary work was proceeding; after this, the life-continuum; in between, the attainment'—thus, the wisdom that discerns the absorption of the attainments is skill in attainments. Skill in emergence is the knowledge that determines the emergence beforehand. Bringing to mind by way of characteristics and so on, and by way of impermanence and so on, is attention.

124-134. Sucisīlatā soraccaṃ. Sā hi sobhanakammaratatāti. Sammodakassa, sammodako vā mudubhāvo sammodakamudubhāvo, saṇhavācatā. ‘‘Aguttadvāratā’’ti vutte kesu dvāresūti na paññāyatīti ‘‘indriyesū’’ti vuttaṃ. Sampajānātīti sampajāno, tassa bhāvo sampajaññaṃ. Tadapi ñāṇaṃ yasmā sampajānāti, tasmā ‘‘sampajānātīti sampajañña’’nti āha. Appaṭisaṅkhāne nimitte visaye vā. Vīriyasīsenāti vīriyapāmokkhena. Uppannaṃ balanti vīriyopatthambhena hi kusalabhāvanā balavatī thirā uppajjatīti tathā uppannā balavatī kusalabhāvanā balavanto satta bojjhaṅgātipi vuccanti. Kasiṇanimittaṃ viya saññāṇaṃ viya saviggahaṃ viya ca suṭṭhu upalakkhetabbākāraṃ ‘‘nimitta’’nti vuccati. Samatho ca evaṃ ākāroti ‘‘nimitta’’nti vutto. Tathā hi so paccavekkhantena paccavekkhaṇato gayhatīti. Uddhaccamiva cittaṃ na vikkhipatīti, vikkhepapaṭikkhepo vā avikkhepo.

124-134. Purity of virtue is gentleness, for it is delight in beautiful actions. The soft nature of one who is friendly, or of being friendly, is gentle friendliness; kind speech. When 'unguardedness of doors' is mentioned, it is not clear in which doors—thus, 'in the faculties' is said. 'He is clearly comprehending'—one who is clearly comprehending, his state is clear comprehension. That too is knowledge because he is clearly comprehending; therefore, it is said, 'It is clear comprehension because one is clearly comprehending.' In the absence of reflection, on the sign or the object. With energy at the head—with energy as the foremost. The arisen strength—for through the support of energy, the development of the wholesome arises strong and steadfast. Therefore, the arisen strong development of the wholesome is also called the strong seven factors of enlightenment. Like the kasiṇa sign, like a mark, like something embodied, the well-marked characteristic is called 'the sign.' And calm is of such a nature—thus, 'the sign' is said. For it is grasped by one who reviews through reviewing. It does not scatter the mind as restlessness does; or, the opposition to scattering is non-scattering.

135-142. Sīlameva punappunaṃ āseviyamānaṃ lokiyaṃ lokuttarampi sīlaṃ paripūretīti ‘‘sīlaparipūraṇato’’ti vuttaṃ. Sīlassa sampadāti kāraṇasīlampi phalasīlampi sampannasamudāyassa ekadesavasena vuttaṃ. Atha vā ‘‘katame ca thapati akusalā sīlā? Akusalaṃ kāyakammaṃ akusalaṃ vacīkammaṃ pāpako ājīvo’’ti (ma. ni. 2.264) vuttattā sabbampi kusalākusalaṃ ‘‘sīla’’nti gahetvā tattha kusalasīlaṃ niddhāretvā ‘‘sīlasampadā’’ti vuttaṃ. Evaṃ diṭṭhisampadāpi veditabbā.

135-142. Virtue itself, being repeatedly cultivated, fulfills both mundane and supramundane virtue—thus, 'from the fulfillment of virtue' is said. The accomplishment of virtue—both as causal virtue and resultant virtue—is spoken of as a part of the accomplished collection. Alternatively, as it is said, 'And what, householder, are unwholesome virtues? Unwholesome bodily action, unwholesome verbal action, wrong livelihood' (MN 2.264)—thus, taking all wholesome and unwholesome actions as 'virtue,' and having specified wholesome virtue therein, 'accomplishment of virtue' is said. Similarly, the accomplishment of view should be understood.

Diṭṭhivisuddhi kho pana yathādiṭṭhissa ca padhānanti kammassakatañāṇādisaṅkhātā diṭṭhivisuddhi cevāti paṭipāṭiyā diṭṭhivisuddhi diṭṭhivisuddhi kho panāti ca padadvayassa samānattā paññā. Yathādiṭṭhissāti nibbattitappakāradiṭṭhissa nibbattetabbapadhānānurūpadiṭṭhissa vā yathādiṭṭhipavattakiriyassa vā. Saṃvegoti sahottappaṃ ñāṇaṃ, ottappameva vā. Samattaṃ tussanaṃ titti [Pg.58] santuṭṭhi, natthi etassa santuṭṭhīti asantuṭṭhi, asantuṭṭhissa bhāvo asantuṭṭhitā. Vīriyappavāhe pavattamāne antarā eva paṭigamanaṃ nivattanaṃ paṭivānaṃ, taṃ assa atthīti paṭivānī, na paṭivānī appaṭivānī, tassa bhāvo appaṭivānitā. Vimuccanaṃ nāma ārammaṇe adhimuttatā kilesehi sabbasaṅkhārehi ca nissaṭatā ca. Paṭisandhivasenāti kilesānaṃ taṃtaṃmaggavajjhānaṃ uppannamagge khandhasantāne puna saṃdahanavasena. Anuppādabhūteti taṃtaṃphale. Anuppādapariyosāneti anuppādakaro maggo anuppādo, tassa pariyosāne.

The purification of view, however, is wisdom, which is the purification of view designated as the knowledge of ownership of kamma and so forth, and the striving for one whose view is as seen; this is because the two phrases, 'purification of view' and 'purification of view, however,' are identical in sequence. 'For one whose view is as seen' means for one whose view has arisen in a certain way, or for one whose view is in accordance with the effort to be undertaken, or for one whose action proceeds in accordance with the view. 'Sense of urgency' is knowledge accompanied by moral dread, or it is simply moral dread. Contentment is satisfaction, delight, contentment. 'He has no contentment' means discontent; the state of being discontent is discontentment. When the stream of energy is flowing, turning back midway, returning, is withdrawal. One who has this is one who withdraws; one who does not withdraw is one who does not withdraw; the state of one who does not withdraw is non-withdrawal. 'Liberation' means being resolved upon the object and being released from the defilements and all formations. 'By way of rebirth-linking' means by way of reconnecting in the continuity of aggregates for those defilements to be abandoned by the respective paths, once the path has arisen. 'Having become non-arisen' refers to the respective fruition. 'Ending in non-arising' means: the path that brings about non-arising is non-arising; at its conclusion.

Suttantikadukamātikāpadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Terms of the Suttanta Pairs Matrix is finished.

Dukamātikāpadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Terms of the Pairs Matrix is finished.

Kāmāvacarakusalapadabhājanīyavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Analysis of Terms concerning Sense-Sphere Wholesome States

1. ‘‘Ye vā pana…pe… arūpino dhammā’’ti idaṃ ‘‘phasso hotī’’ti evamādikaṃ viya na visuṃ ‘‘tepi hontī’’ti hoti-saddena sambandhaṃ katvā vuttaṃ, uddiṭṭhāvasese ca pana gahetvā ‘‘ime dhammā kusalā’’ti appetuṃ vuttanti appanāya avarodhitaṃ. Evañca katvā niddesepi etassa padabhājanīyaṃ na vuttanti. Sarūpena pana adassitattā ‘‘atthī’’ti vatvā dutiyena hoti-saddena sambandho niddeso ca na kato, saṅkhepena pana uddisitvā saṅkhepeneva ye vā pana dhammā niddiṭṭhāti etassa dhammassa uddese avarodho yutto. Dhammaniddese ca niddesāvasāne vuttassāti.

1. The phrase 'And whatever other… immaterial phenomena' is not stated separately by connecting it with the word 'are'—as in 'these too are'—like the phrase 'there is contact' and so on. Rather, having taken up the remainder of what was stated, it is said in order to bring it to a conclusion as 'these phenomena are wholesome'; thus it is included by way of application. And for this reason, in the exposition, the analysis of its terms is not stated. However, because it is not shown in its own form, a connection with a second word 'are' and an exposition are not made after stating 'there is'. But, having set it forth concisely, the 'whatever other phenomena' are expounded only concisely; therefore, the inclusion of this phenomenon in the summary statement is proper. And in the exposition of phenomena, the inclusion of what is stated at the conclusion of the exposition is also proper.

Pucchāparicchedavacaneneva pucchābhāve viññāte pucchāvisesañāpanatthaṃ āha ‘‘ayaṃ kathetukamyatāpucchā’’ti. Pañcavidhā hīti mahāniddese (mahāni. 150; cūḷani. puṇṇakamāṇavapucchāniddesa 12; mettagūmāṇavapucchāniddesa 18) āgatā pucchā dasseti. Lakkhaṇanti ñātuṃ icchito yo koci sabhāvo. Aññātanti yena kenaci ñāṇena aññātabhāvaṃ āha. Adiṭṭhanti dassanabhūtena ñāṇena paccakkhaṃ viya adiṭṭhataṃ. Atulitanti ‘‘ettakaṃ ida’’nti tulābhūtāya paññāya atulitataṃ. Atīritanti tīraṇabhūtāya paññāya akatañāṇakiriyāsamāpanataṃ. Avibhūtanti ñāṇassa apākaṭabhāvaṃ[Pg.59]. Avibhāvitanti ñāṇena apākaṭīkatabhāvaṃ. Adiṭṭhaṃ jotīyati etāyāti adiṭṭhajotanā. Anumatiyā pucchā anumatipucchā. ‘‘Taṃ kiṃ maññatha, bhikkhave’’tiādipucchāya hi ‘‘kā tumhākaṃ anumatī’’ti anumati pucchitā hoti. Kathetukamyatāti kathetukamyatāya.

When the existence of a question is known by the very statement of the question-section, in order to make known the specific kind of question, he says: 'This is a question from a desire to speak.' By the text beginning 'Fivefold indeed,' he shows the questions that come in the Mahāniddesa. 'Characteristic' is any intrinsic nature one wishes to know. By 'unknown,' he states the fact of not being known by any kind of knowledge. By 'unseen' is meant the state of not being seen as if directly by knowledge that is of the nature of seeing. By 'unweighed' is meant the state of not being weighed by wisdom, which is like a balance, as 'it is this much.' By 'unjudged' is meant the state where the act of knowing has not been brought to completion by wisdom, which is of the nature of judgment. By 'unmanifest' is meant the state of not being clear to knowledge. By 'unclarified' is meant the state of not having been made clear by knowledge. 'Illumination of the unseen' is so called because by it the unseen is illuminated. A question for agreement is a 'question of agreement.' For by a question such as, 'What do you think, bhikkhus?' agreement is asked for: 'What is your agreement?' 'From a desire to speak' is because of a desire to speak.

Pabhedato dhammānaṃ desananti mātikādesanaṃ āha. Tattha hi purato kusalādike pabhede vatvā pacchato dhammā vuttāti ‘‘pabhedavantadassanattha’’nti niddesaṃ āha. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – mātikāya savisesanā dhammā vuttā, te ca visesitabbattā padhānā, padhānañca itikattabbatāya yujjatīti dhammānameva padhānānaṃ pucchitabbatā vissajjitabbatā ca hoti, tasmā te pucchitabbe dassetuṃ ‘‘katame dhammā’’ti vuttaṃ, te pana visesavanto pucchitāti dassetuṃ puna ‘‘kusalā’’ti vuttanti evaṃ pabhedavantadassanatthaṃ ayaṃ padānukkamo katoti. ‘‘Ime dhammā kusalā’’ti vissajjanepi evameva yojanā kātabbā. ‘‘Pabhedato dhammānaṃ desanaṃ dīpetvā’’ti etassa atthaṃ vivarituṃ ‘‘imasmiñhī’’tiādimāha. Anekappabhedā desetabbāti sambandho. Tasmāti avohāradesanato dhammānameva desetabbattā tesañca ghanavinibbhogapaṭisambhidāñāṇāvahanato pabhedavantānaṃ desetabbattā ‘‘kusalā…pe… dīpetvā’’ti etena sambandho. Evameva hi yathāvuttadīpanassa hetuṃ sakāraṇaṃ pakāsetuṃ puna ‘‘dhammāyevā’’tiādi vuttanti. Dhammāti sāmaññamattavacanena samūhādighanavasena ekattaggahaṇaṃ hotīti ekattavinibbhogakaraṇaṃ ghanavinibbhogañāṇaṃ āvahati pabhedadesanā, tathā kusalādidhammānaṃ abyākatādiatthānañca dīpanato dhammapaṭisambhidādiñāṇañca āvahati. ‘‘Pabhedavantadassanattha’’nti etaṃ vivarituṃ ‘‘idāni ye tenā’’tiādimāha. Pabheda…pe… yujjati itikattabbatāyuttassa visesanattā. Atha vā uddeso dhammappadhāno, pucchā saṃsayitappadhānā, na ca dhammabhāvo saṃsayito, kusalādibhedo pana saṃsayitoti nicchitasaṃsayitavasenāyaṃ padānukkamo kato.

He calls the teaching of the Mātikā 'the teaching of phenomena by way of classification.' For there, having first stated the classifications such as wholesome, etc., phenomena are stated afterwards. Thus he gives the exposition 'for the purpose of showing that which possesses the classification.' This is what is said: In the Mātikā, phenomena are stated with their qualifiers. Since they are to be qualified, they are primary. And the primary is what is suitable for being questioned and answered; therefore, it is the primary phenomena themselves that should be questioned and answered. Therefore, to show what is to be questioned, it is said, 'What are the phenomena?' But to show that they are possessed of qualifiers and are being questioned, it is again said, 'Wholesome.' Thus this sequence of words is made for the purpose of showing that which possesses the classification. In the answer, 'These phenomena are wholesome,' the application should be made in just this same way. To explain the meaning of 'having shown the teaching of phenomena by way of classification,' he says, 'For in this…' and so on. The connection is: 'they should be taught with many classifications.' Therefore, because it is not a teaching of conventional designation and phenomena themselves should be taught, and because teaching them as possessing classifications brings about the knowledge of breaking down compactness and the analytical knowledges, the connection is with 'wholesome… having shown.' Indeed, in just this way, to clarify the reason with its cause for the exposition as stated, it is again said, 'phenomena themselves…' and so on. The word 'phenomena,' being merely a general term, implies a grasping of a single entity by way of a compact mass such as a group, etc. Thus the teaching by classification, by making a breakdown of that single entity, brings about the knowledge of breaking down compactness. Likewise, by showing the wholesome phenomena, etc., and the meanings of the undeclared, etc., it brings about the knowledge of the analytical knowledge of the Dhamma, etc. To explain 'for the purpose of showing that which possesses the classification,' he says, 'Now, those by which…' and so on. Classification… is suitable because it is a qualifier of that which is fit for being questioned and answered. Alternatively, the recitation has phenomena as its primary subject; the question has that which is doubted as its primary subject. The nature of phenomena is not doubted, but the classification into wholesome, etc., is doubted. Therefore this sequence of words is made on the basis of the determined and the doubted.

Etthāti etasmiṃ vacane. Kimatthamāha bhagavāti taṃ dassetuṃ āha ‘‘samaye niddisi citta’’nti. Pariyosāneti samaye cittaniddesassa ‘‘yasmiṃ…pe… ārabbhā’’ti etassa pariyosāne. Tasmiṃ samayeti tasmiṃ cittuppādasamaye[Pg.60]. Cittena samayaṃ niyametvāna atha pacchā bodhetunti sambandho. Vijjamānepi bhojanagamanādisamayanānatte samavāyādinānatte ca yathāvuttacittaniyamitā visesitā aññasmiṃ samaye yathādhippetānaṃ phassādīnaṃ abhāvā cittaniyamite samaye phassādayo bodhetuṃ visesanameva tāva cittaṃ dassetuṃ samaye cittaṃ niddisīti attho. Visesitabbopi hi samayo attano upakāratthaṃ visesanabhāvaṃ āpajjati, visesanabhūtañca cittaṃ tadupakāratthaṃ visesitabbabhāvanti. Santatighanādīnaṃ ayaṃ viseso – purimapacchimānaṃ nirantaratāya ekībhūtānamiva pavatti santatighanatā, tathā phassādīnaṃ ekasamūhavasena dubbiññeyyakiccabhedavasena ekārammaṇatāvasena ca ekībhūtānamiva pavatti samūhādighanatāti.

‘Here’ means in this statement. Why did the Blessed One speak thus? To show the purpose, [the author] said: ‘He indicated the mind in relation to the occasion.’ As for ‘at the conclusion,’ it means at the conclusion of this text ‘at which… concerning,’ which is the exposition of the mind in relation to the occasion. ‘At that time’ means at the time of the arising of that mind. The connection is: ‘Having determined the occasion by the mind, then afterwards He makes it known.’ The meaning is this: Although there exists a variety of occasions, such as the time for eating, going, etc., and a variety of concurrences, etc., because at any other occasion—apart from that which is determined and specified by the mind as stated—there is an absence of the intended phenomena such as contact, etc., in order to make known contact and the other phenomena at the occasion determined by the mind, He first showed the mind itself, which is the qualifier. Thus, He expounded on the mind in relation to the occasion. For the occasion, though it is to be qualified, takes on the state of being a qualifier for its own benefit; and the mind, which is the qualifier, takes on the state of being what is to be qualified for the benefit of that occasion. This is the distinction regarding the compactness of continuity and so on: the compactness of continuity is the occurrence as if unified due to the uninterruptedness of preceding and succeeding moments. Similarly, the compactness of a group, etc., is the occurrence as if unified by way of being a single group, by way of the distinction of functions being difficult to discern, and by way of having a single object, for phenomena such as contact and so on.

Kālañca samayañcāti yuttakālañca paccayasāmaggiñca. Khaṇoti okāso. Tathāgatuppādādiko hi maggabrahmacariyassa okāso tappaccayapaṭilābhahetuttā. Khaṇo eva ca samayo. Yo ‘‘khaṇo’’ti ca ‘‘samayo’’ti ca vuccati, so ekovāti attho. Mahāsamayoti mahāsamūho. Samayopi khoti sikkhāparipūraṇassa hetupi. Samayappavādaketi diṭṭhippavādake. Tattha hi nisinnā titthiyā attano attano samayaṃ pavadantīti. Atthābhisamayāti hitapaṭilābhā. Abhisametabboti abhisamayo, abhisamayo attho abhisamayaṭṭhoti pīḷanādīni abhisamitabbabhāvena ekībhāvaṃ upanetvā vuttāni, abhisamayassa vā paṭivedhassa visayabhūto attho abhisamayaṭṭhoti tāneva tathā ekattena vuttāni. Tattha pīḷanaṃ dukkhasaccassa taṃsamaṅgino hiṃ sanaṃ avipphārikatākaraṇaṃ. Santāpo dukkhadukkhatādibhāvena santāpanaṃ paridahanaṃ.

'Time (kāla) and occasion (samaya)' means a suitable time and a congruence of conditions. 'Moment' means opportunity. For the arising of a Tathāgata and so on is an opportunity for the holy life of the path because it is a cause for obtaining the conditions for it. A moment is also an occasion. The meaning is that what is called 'moment' and what is called 'occasion' are one and the same. 'Great occasion' means a great assembly. An occasion is also a cause for the fulfillment of the training. 'Proclaimers of doctrines' means proclaimers of views. For there, the sectarians, seated, each proclaim their own doctrine. 'Breakthrough to the meaning' is due to the attainment of benefit. What is to be fully understood is a breakthrough; the meaning that is a breakthrough is the meaning of breakthrough. Thus, 'oppression,' etc., are spoken of, having been brought to a state of oneness by their nature as what is to be fully understood. Or, the meaning which is the object of breakthrough, of penetration, is the meaning of breakthrough; thus, those same things are spoken of as one in that way. Therein, 'oppression' of the truth of suffering is the afflicting of one endowed with it, the making of it non-diffuse. 'Torment' is the scorching, the burning around, by way of the state of suffering due to suffering, etc.

‘‘Idhā’’ti vacanaṃ akusalesu abyākatesu ca kesuci khaṇassa asambhavato. Nanu kusalānañca navamena khaṇena vinā uppatti hotīti? No na hoti, na pana navamo eva khaṇo, catucakkānipi khaṇoti vuttāni. Sabbantimena paricchedena attasammāpaṇidhikhaṇamantarena natthi kusalassa uppattīti khaṇo idha gahito. Indriyavisayamanasikārādhīnaṃ viññāṇanti evamādi sādhāraṇaphalaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Navamoti aṭṭhakkhaṇe upādāya vuttaṃ. Catucakkaṃ vattatīti puna patirūpadesavāsādisampatti catucakkaṃ viparivattatīti [Pg.61] attho. Okāsabhūtānīti attano nibbattiyā ‘‘idāni uppajjantu kusalānī’’ti anumatidānaṃ viya bhūtāni.

The word 'here' is stated because of the impossibility of the meaning of 'moment' in unwholesome states and in certain indeterminate states. Surely, does not the arising of wholesome states also occur without the ninth moment? No, it is not that they do not arise; however, the moment is not only the ninth one, for the four wheels are also said to be moments. Because there is no arising of the wholesome without the moment of right self-application as the very final determination, the meaning of 'moment' is taken here. Such things as 'consciousness is dependent on sense faculty, object, and attention' should be understood as a common result. 'Ninth' is said with reference to the eight inopportune moments. 'The four wheels turn' means that again the four wheels of accomplishment, such as dwelling in a suitable region, revolve. 'Having become opportunities' means that due to their own arising, they are like the granting of permission, saying, 'Now, let wholesome states arise.'

Cittakāloti dhammeneva satā kālo visesito, na tassa pavattittha pavattissati pavattatīti etena avatthāvisesena, nāpi tassa vijānanakiccena, tasmā evaṃvidhe dhamme upādāya paññattoti vutto. Kamappavattā visesā eva paṭipāṭīti bījabhāvo ca paṭipāṭīti vattumarahatīti iminādhippāyena ‘‘bījakāloti dhammapaṭipāṭiṃ upādāya paññatto’’ti āha. Dhammapaṭipāṭiṃ vāti aṭṭhakalāpadhamme sandhāyāha. Sañcitā viya gayhamānakālā eva kālasañcayo, yathā vā tathā vā kāloti ekaṃ sabhāvaṃ gahetvā abhinivesaṃ karontassa tadabhinivesanisedhanatthaṃ ‘‘so panesa sabhāvato avijjamānattā paññattimattako’’ti āha. Ñatvā viññeyyoti sambandho. Itaro pana hetūti esa samayo paccayova viññeyyo. Etthāti etasmiṃ adhikāre na hetuhetu sādhāraṇahetu cāti attho. Samavāyo paccayasāmaggī, hetu pana ekeko paccayoti ayametesaṃ viseso veditabbo. Cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ anekapaccayadassanena taṃtaṃdvārikānaṃ kusalānañca tappaccayataṃ dasseti.

In the phrase 'the time of the mind' (cittakāla), time is distinguished by the very dhamma [of mind] that is present, not by this particular state of its—that it has occurred, will occur, or is occurring—nor by its function of cognition. Therefore, it is said to be designated by taking up a dhamma of this kind, devoid of such qualifiers. The particulars that proceed in sequence are indeed the order; therefore, the state of being a seed also deserves to be called the order. With this intention, he said, 'The time of the seed is designated by taking up the order of dhammas.' Alternatively, he said 'the order of dhammas' with reference to the dhammas of the material octad. The accumulation of time is just the moments being grasped as if they were accumulated. For the purpose of refuting the adherence of one who, having grasped 'time' as a single intrinsic nature in one way or another, makes an adherence, he said, 'But this, due to its non-existence in terms of intrinsic nature, is a mere designation.' The connection of the words is: 'having known, it is to be understood.' However, this other occasion, 'cause' (hetu), is to be understood simply as 'condition' (paccaya). Here, in this context, the meaning is that it is not a root-cause nor a common cause. Concurrence is the collection of conditions; a cause, however, is each single condition. This is the distinction between them that should be understood. By showing the multiple conditions for eye-consciousness and so on, he shows the state of being conditioned thereby for the wholesome states arising at their respective doors.

Pariggaho kato aṭṭhakathācariyehi. Ekakāraṇavādoti pakatikāraṇavādo, issarakāraṇavādo vā. Aññamaññāpekkhoti avayavānaṃ aññamaññāpekkhatāya samudāyo vutto. Apekkhā ca yāva sahāyakāraṇasamāgamo na hoti, tāva phalassa anipphādanaṃ samāgame nipphādanasamatthassa nipphādanañca. Samāgamo ca yesu yujjamānesu nibyāpāresupi phalassa pavatti, tesaṃ sabbhāvoti.

The comprehension (pariggaha) was made by the commentary teachers. 'The doctrine of a single cause' (ekakāraṇavāda) means the doctrine of nature as the cause, or the doctrine of a creator as the cause. 'Mutually dependent' (aññamaññāpekkha): the aggregate is so called because of the mutual dependence of its components. And dependence means that for as long as there is no convergence of contributory causes, there is the non-production of the fruit; and upon their convergence, there is the production [of the fruit] by that which is capable of producing it. And convergence is the actual existence of those [causes] which, when combined, result in the arising of the fruit even without further activity.

Asāmaggī…pe… pattitoti cakkhurūpālokamanasikārānaṃ asamavetānaṃ cakkhuviññāṇassa ahetubhāve sati samavetānañca taṃsabhāvāvinivattito hetubhāvānāpattitoti attho. Na hi sabhāvantaraṃ aññena sahitaṃ sabhāvantaraṃ hotīti. Ekasminti andhasate ekekasmiṃ andheti adhippāyo. Aññathā yathārutavasena atthe gayhamāne ekassa andhassa dassanāsamatthatā sabbesampi na hoti, nāpi ekassa asamatthatāya sabbesampi asamatthatā vuttā, kintu sabbesaṃ visuṃ asamatthatāya evāti upamāvacanaṃ na yujjeyya, nāpi upamopamitabbasambandho. Na [Pg.62] hi upamitabbesu cakkhādīsu ekassa asamatthatāya sabbesampi asamatthatā vuttā, kintu sabbesaṃ visuṃ asamatthatāya sahitānaṃ asamatthatāti. Andhasataṃ passatīti ca andhasataṃ sahitaṃ passatīti adhippāyo aññathā vuttanayena upamitabbāsamānatāpattito. Sādhā…pe… ṭhitabhāvoti yesu vijjamānesu phalappavatti tesaṃ samodhāne, yathā pavattamānesu tesu phalappavatti, tathā pavattimāha. Na yesaṃ kesañci anekesaṃ samodhānamattaṃ sāmaggī. Na hi saddagandharasaphoṭṭhabbasamodhānaṃ cakkhuviññāṇassa, kaṭṭhakapālapāsāṇasamodhānaṃ vā sotaviññāṇassa hetūti. Tanti taṃ dassanaṃ. Asā…pe… siddhoti nāyamattho sādhetabbo visuṃ ahetūnaṃ cakkhādīnaṃ sahitānaṃ hetubhāvassa paccakkhasiddhattāti attho. Na hi paccakkhasiddhe yuttimagganaṃ yuttanti.

Without harmony... attainment means this: when eye-sensitivity, form-object, light, and attention are unconjoined, they are in a state of not being a cause for eye-consciousness; and since, even when conjoined, they do not deviate from that nature, they do not attain the state of being a cause. Indeed, one nature does not become another nature by being conjoined with something else. In a hundred blind persons, each single one is blind—this is the intention. Otherwise, if the meaning were taken according to the literal expression, the inability of one blind person to see would not be the inability for all of them, nor is the inability of all of them stated because of the inability of one. But rather, it is only because of the separate inability of all of them; thus, the simile-statement would not be fitting, nor would the connection between the simile and the thing to be compared be fitting. Indeed, among the things to be compared—the eye, etc.—the inability of all of them is not stated because of the inability of one. But rather, the inability of them when conjoined is stated because of the separate inability of all of them. And 'a hundred blind persons see' means 'a hundred blind persons, when conjoined, do not see'—this is the intention; otherwise, by the method stated, it would result in dissimilarity with the thing to be compared. Harmony... the state of being established means: He states the occurrence thus: the arising of the effect occurs in the conjunction of those causes in whose presence it arises, and it occurs in accordance with the way those causes are occurring. The mere conjunction of any whatsoever many causes is not harmony. Indeed, the conjunction of sound, smell, taste, and tangible objects is not a cause for eye-consciousness, nor is the conjunction of a log, a potsherd, and a stone a cause for ear-consciousness. As for `taṃ`, it means 'that seeing'. Established... means: This meaning should not be established by logic, because the state of being a cause for the eye, etc.—which are non-causes individually—when they are conjoined is established by direct experience—this is the meaning. Indeed, for a matter established by direct experience, seeking for a logical reason is not fitting.

Manussattādīnaṃ khaṇāvayavānaṃ sāmaggī khaṇasāmaggī, taṃ vinā so navamacakkasampattisaṅkhāto khaṇo natthi. Sā eva hi khaṇasāmaggī so khaṇoti attho. Khaṇa…pe… dīpeti attano dullabhatāyāti attho. Khaṇattho vā samayasaddo khaṇasaṅkhāto samayoti vutto. So yasmiṃ dullabhe khaṇe satīti imassatthassa vibhāvanavasena tadāyattāya kusaluppattiyā dullabhabhāvaṃ dīpeti. Etenupāyena samavāya…pe… vuttiṃ dīpetīti ettha ito paresu ca yojanā tassa tassa taṃtaṃdīpane kātabbā.

The harmony of the constituents of the moment, such as human existence, is called the harmony of the moment. Without it, that moment designated as the ninth moment, the attainment of the four wheels, does not exist. Indeed, that very harmony of the moment is that moment; this is the meaning. The time designated as a 'moment' ... clarifies ... because of its own state of being difficult to obtain; this is the meaning. Alternatively, the word 'samaya', which has the meaning of 'moment', is said to be 'the time designated as a moment.' By way of clarifying the meaning of 'when that rare moment is present,' it shows the difficulty of the arising of the wholesome, which is dependent on it. By this method, both here in the passage '[it] clarifies the occurrence of combination...' and in what follows, the application should be made in clarifying the respective specific meaning of each.

Tassa purisassāti ‘‘seyyathāpi bhikkhave cattāro daḷhadhammā dhanuggahā sikkhitā katahatthā katupāsanā catuddisā ṭhitā assu, atha puriso āgaccheyya ‘ahaṃ imesaṃ…pe… katupāsanānaṃ kaṇḍe khitte khitte appatiṭṭhite pathaviyaṃ gahetvā āharissāmī’’’ti (saṃ. ni. 2.228) evaṃ vuttajavanapurisassa. Tāva parittakoti gamanassādānaṃ devaputtānaṃ heṭṭhupariyāyena paṭimukhaṃ dhāvantānaṃ sirasi pāde ca baddhakhuradhārāsannipātato ca parittataro kālo. Kālasaṅkhāto samayo cittaparicchinno vuccamāno teneva paricchedakacittena ‘‘evaṃ paritto aha’’nti attano parittataṃ dīpeti. Yathā cāhaṃ, evaṃ sabbo kusalacittappavattikāloti tassa parittataṃ dīpeti. Saddassa dīpanā vuttanayānusārena veditabbā.

‘Of that man’ refers to the swift man spoken of thus: ‘Just as, Bhikkhus, four archers with strong bows, trained, with practiced hands, and skilled, might stand in the four directions, and then a man might come, saying, “I will catch and bring back the arrows shot by these... skilled archers before they have landed on the ground”’ (Saṃ. Ni. 2.228). So brief is it. The time is even briefer than the clashing of razor blades bound to the heads and feet of devaputtas who delight in running, as they run towards one another, tumbling head over heels. The time designated as 'kāla', being said to be delimited by mind, shows its own brevity by means of that very delimiting mind, [as if saying,] ‘I am so brief.’ And it shows the brevity of the time of the occurrence of a wholesome mind [by showing], ‘Just as I am brief, so too is all the time of the occurrence of a wholesome mind.’ The clarification of the word should be understood in accordance with the method already stated.

Pakativādīnaṃ [Pg.63] mahato viya aṇuvādīnaṃ dviaṇukassa viya ca ekasseva. Hetu…pe… vuttitaṃ dīpetīti paccayāyattavuttidīpanato tapparabhāvā hetusaṅkhātassa parāyattavuttidīpanatā vuttā. Sati pana paccayāyattabhāve paccayasāmaggīāyattatā samavāyasaṅkhātena dīpiyatīti atapparabhāvato tassa taṃdīpanatā na vuttā. Anena samayena kattubhūtena, anena samayena vā karaṇabhūtena bhagavatā paṭisedhitoti attho. Esa nayo purimāsu dīpanāsu.

For the proponents of nature, it is like the great intellect; and for the proponents of atoms, it is like a dyad; of only one. Because of the pre-eminent nature of that which is called 'cause' in explaining existence dependent on conditions, its state of being an explanation of existence dependent on another is stated. But when there is the state of being dependent on conditions, the state of being dependent on the congruence of conditions is explained by that which is called 'confluence'. Therefore, because of its non-pre-eminent nature in that regard, its state of explaining that is not stated. By this word 'samaya' being the agent, or by this word 'samaya' being the instrument, it is prohibited by the Blessed One—this is the meaning. This is the method in the previous explanations.

Adhikaraṇavasenāti ādhāravasena. Etthāti kālasamūhasaṅkhāte samaye gahiteti attho. Kālopi hi cittaparicchinno sabhāvato avijjamānopi ādhārabhāveneva saññāto ‘‘adhikaraṇa’’nti vutto taṃkhaṇappavattānaṃ tato pubbe parato ca abhāvā. Bhāvoti kiriyā. Kiriyāya kiriyantaralakkhaṇaṃ bhāvenabhāvalakkhaṇaṃ. Yathā gāvīsu duyhamānāsu gato, duddhāsu āgatoti dohanakiriyā gamanakiriyāya lakkhaṇaṃ hoti, evamihāpi ‘‘yasmiṃ samaye tasmiṃ samaye’’ti ca vutte satīti ayamattho viññāyamāno eva hoti aññakiriyāsambandhābhāvena padatthassa sattāvirahābhāvatoti samayassa sattākiriyāya cittuppādakiriyā phassādibhavanakiriyā ca lakkhīyatīti ubhayattha samayasadde bhummaniddeso kato lakkhaṇabhūtabhāvayuttoti.

`Adhikaraṇavasena` means by way of a basis. `Ettha` means: when `samaya` is taken in the sense of time or aggregation, this is the meaning. Indeed, time, although delimited by the mind and not existing in its own ultimate nature, is recognized only as a basis and is called 'locus' because of the non-existence of things occurring at that moment, before and after it. `Bhāva` is action. The marking of one action by another action is the 'bhāvenabhāvalakkhaṇa' [locative absolute]. Just as in 'He went when the cows were being milked,' and 'He came when they had been milked,' the action of milking is a mark for the action of going, so also here, when it is said 'at whatever time... at that time...,' this meaning 'being' is indeed understood because of the absence of connection with another action and because of the non-absence of the action of 'being' from the meaning of the word. Therefore, by the action of 'being' of the 'samaya', the action of the arising of consciousness and the action of the occurrence of contact and so on are marked. Therefore, in both instances of the word 'samaya', the locative indication is made, it being connected with the action of 'being' which is the mark.

Uddānatoti uddesato saṅkhepato. Kilesakāmo vatthukāmabhāvaṃ bhajanto kāmanīyavasena bhajati, na kāmanavasenāti kāmanavasena kilesakāmo eva hoti, na vatthukāmo. Duvidhopesoti vacanena duvidhassapi sahitassa avacaraṇappadesaṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Tena vatthukāmasseva pavattideso rūpārūpadhātudvayaṃ apanītaṃ hoti. Nanu ca duvidhopi sahito rūpārūpadhātūsu pavattati rūpārūpāvacaradhammānaṃ vatthukāmattā tadārammaṇānaṃ rūpārūparāgānañca kilesakāmabhāvasiddhitoti? Taṃ na, bahalakilesassa kāmarāgassa kilesakāmabhāvena idha saṅgahitattā. Evañca katvā rūpārūpadhātūsu pavattamānesu kāmāvacaradhammesu nikanti idha na saṅgahitā sukhumattā. ‘‘Uddānato dve kāmā’’ti sabbakāme uddisitvāpi hi ‘‘duvidhopeso’’ti ettha tadekadesabhūtā aññamaññasahitatāparicchinnā kāmarāgatabbatthukadhammāva saṅgahitāti, niravaseso [Pg.64] vā kilesakāmo kāmarāgo kāmataṇhārūpataṇhāarūpataṇhānirodhataṇhābhedo idha pavattatīti anavasesappavattitaṃ sandhāya ‘‘duvidhopeso’’ti vuttaṃ, vatthukāmopi ca appako idhāpi na vattati rūpārūpāvacaravipākamatto, tathāpi paripuṇṇavatthukāmattā kāmāvacaradhammāva idha gahitā. Evañca katvā sasatthāvacaropamā yuttā hoti. ‘‘Rūpūpapattiyā maggaṃ bhāvetī’’ti (dha. sa. 163; vibha. 625) ettha rūpabhavo uttarapadalopaṃ katvā ‘‘rūpa’’nti vutto, evamidhāpi uttarapadalopo daṭṭhabbo. Aññathā hi cittaṃ kāmāvacarāvacaranti vucceyyāti. Ārammaṇakaraṇavasenātiādike ‘‘kāmo’’ti sabbaṃ taṇhamāha, tasmā ‘‘kāmañcesā’’tiādi vuttaṃ, ‘‘kāme avacāretīti kāmāvacāra’’nti vattabbe cā-saddassa rassattaṃ kataṃ.

“Uddānato” means “uddesato,” by way of exposition, and “saṅkhepato,” by way of summary. Sensual desire as a defilement (`kilesakāma`), when it partakes of the state of a sensual object (`vatthukāma`), does so by way of being desirable (`kāmanīyavasena`), not by way of desiring (`kāmanavasena`). Therefore, by way of desiring, it is only sensual desire as a defilement that is sensual desire, not the sensual object. By the statement “it is of two kinds,” it comprehends the region of resort for both kinds taken together. Therefore, the place of occurrence of the sensual object alone, namely the pair of form and formless realms, is excluded. (Objection:) But surely, do not both kinds taken together occur in the form and formless realms? This is because the phenomena of the form and formless spheres have the nature of sensual objects, and because the state of sensual desire as a defilement is established for the lust for form and the formless which has those phenomena as its object. That is not so, because here sensual lust (`kāmarāga`), which is a gross defilement, is included by way of being sensual desire as a defilement. And so, the delight in sensual-sphere phenomena that occur in the form and formless realms is not included here due to its subtlety. For although in the phrase “By way of summary, there are two sensual desires,” all sensual desires are indicated, here in the phrase “it is of two kinds,” only sensual lust and the phenomena that are its objects, which are a part of those and are defined by their mutual concomitance, are included. Or alternatively, sensual desire as a defilement—which is without remainder, having the divisions of sensual lust, craving for sensual pleasures, craving for form, craving for the formless, and craving for cessation—occurs here. Thus, it is with reference to its occurrence without remainder that “it is of two kinds” is stated. And the sensual object, being slight and merely the result of the form and formless spheres, also does not occur here. Nevertheless, because sensual-sphere phenomena possess the state of being complete sensual objects, only sensual-sphere phenomena are taken here. And so, the simile of the six spheres with their objects is appropriate. In the passage “He develops the path for rebirth in the form realm,” `rūpabhava` (form-existence) is stated as `rūpa` by eliding the final member of the compound. Similarly, here also, the elision of the final member should be understood. For otherwise, the mind would be called `kāmāvacarāvacara` (resorting to that which resorts to the sensual sphere). In the passage beginning with “by way of making it an object,” by “sensual desire” (`kāmo`) all craving is meant. Therefore, the passage beginning with “if this sensual desire” is stated. When it should be said, “`kāme avacāretīti kāmāvacāra`” (it causes to resort in sensual pleasures, thus `kāmāvacāra`), the shortening of the sound `cā` is done.

Ruḷhisaddenāti ñāṇasampayuttesu ruḷhena saddena, ñāṇasampayuttesu vā pavattitvā anavajjasukhavipākatāya taṃsadisesu ñāṇavippayuttesu ruḷhena saddena. Atha vā kiñci nimittaṃ gahetvā satipi aññasmiṃ taṃnimittayutte kismiñcideva visaye sammutiyā cirakālatāvasena nimittavirahepi pavatti ruḷhi nāma yathā ‘‘mahiyaṃ setīti mahiṃso, gacchantīti gāvo’’ti, evaṃ kusalasaddassapi ruḷhibhāvo veditabbo. Paññāniddese ‘‘kosalla’’nti abhidhamme (dha. sa. 16) vuttaṃ, tassa ca bhāvā kusalasaddappavattīti kosallayogā kusalanti ayaṃ abhidhammapariyāyo hoti. Kusalanti kusalabhāvaṃ āha.

By the term 'established usage' (ruḷhisaddena) is meant: in states associated with knowledge, by a term of established usage. Or, having arisen in states associated with knowledge, by reason of its being a blameless and pleasant result, it is applied by a metaphorical term in similar states dissociated from knowledge. Alternatively, having taken some sign as the cause for a word, even when there exists some other object connected with that sign, the occurrence of the word even in the absence of the sign due to long-standing convention is called 'established usage' (ruḷhi). For example: 'because he lies (seti) on the earth (mahiyaṃ), he is a buffalo (mahiṃso)'; 'because they go (gacchanti), they are cows (gāvo)'. In this way, the state of being an established term should also be understood for the word 'kusala'. In the Abhidhamma, in the Exposition of Wisdom, it is stated as 'skill' (kosalla), and because of the existence of that skill, the word 'kusala' occurs. Therefore, 'it is kusala because of its connection with skill'—this is the Abhidhamma method. By 'kusala', it states the state of being wholesome.

Vipākādīnaṃ avajjapaṭipakkhatā natthīti kusalameva anavajjalakkhaṇaṃ vuttaṃ. Anavajjalakkhaṇamevāti sukhavipākasabhāvassa lakkhaṇabhāvanivāraṇatthaṃ avadhāraṇaṃ kataṃ, taṃnivāraṇañca tassa paccupaṭṭhānataṃ vatthukāmatāya kataṃ. Sampattiatthena rasena vodānabhāvarasaṃ. Phalaṭṭhena paccupaṭṭhānena iṭṭhavipākapaccupaṭṭhānaṃ. Sabhāvo kakkhaḷādiphusanādiko asādhāraṇo. Sāmaññaṃ sādhāraṇo aniccādisabhāvo. Idha ca kusalalakkhaṇaṃ sabbakusalasādhāraṇasabhāvattā sāmaññaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ, akusalādīhi asādhāraṇatāya sabhāvo vā. Upaṭṭhānākāroti gahetabbabhāvena ñāṇassa upaṭṭhahanākāro. Phalaṃ pana attano kāraṇaṃ paṭicca tappaṭibimbabhāvena, paṭimukhaṃ vā upaṭṭhātīti paccupaṭṭhānaṃ.

Because results (vipāka) and so forth do not have the nature of being the opposite of what is faulty, only the wholesome (kusala) is said to have the characteristic of faultlessness. The emphasis in 'only the characteristic of faultlessness' is made to preclude the nature of being a pleasant result from being the characteristic. And that preclusion is made because of the intention to state that pleasant result as its manifestation (paccupaṭṭhāna). Its function (rasa) is the state of purity, in the sense of accomplishment. Its manifestation (paccupaṭṭhāna) is a desirable result, in the sense of fruit. Intrinsic nature (sabhāva) is unique, such as hardness, contact, and so on. General nature (sāmañña) is common, such as the nature of impermanence and so on. And here, the characteristic of the wholesome should be understood as a general characteristic, because it is a nature common to all wholesome states; or, it is an intrinsic characteristic due to its being uncommon with respect to unwholesome states and so on. The mode of manifestation is the mode of its appearing to knowledge as something to be grasped. The fruit, however, is called 'manifestation' (paccupaṭṭhāna) because, in dependence on its own cause, it arises either as a reflection of that cause or facing it.

Vijānātīti [Pg.65] saññāpaññākiccavisiṭṭhaṃ visayaggahaṇaṃ āha. Sabbacittasādhāraṇattā yattha yattha yathā yathā attho labbhati, tattha tattha tathā tathā gahetabboti. Yaṃ āsevanapaccayabhāvena cinoti, yañca kammunā abhisaṅkhatattā citaṃ, taṃ tathā ‘‘citta’’nti vuttaṃ. Yaṃ pana tathā na hoti, taṃ parittakiriyadvayaṃ antimajavanañca labbhamānacintanavicittatādivasena ‘‘citta’’nti veditabbaṃ. Hasituppādo pana aññajavanagatikova. Cittānaṃ panāti vicitrānanti attho. Tadantogadhattā hi samudāyavohārena avayavopi ‘‘citta’’nti vuccati yathā pabbatanadīsamuddādiekadesesu diṭṭhesu pabbatādayo diṭṭhāti vuccantīti. Caraṇaṃ nāma gahetvā caritabbacittapaṭo. Rūpānīti bimbāni.

By the text 'it cognizes' (vijānāti), he states the function of grasping an object, which is distinct from the function of perceiving (sañjānana) of perception (saññā) and the function of discerning (pajānana) of wisdom (paññā). Since it is common to all consciousness, in whatever mind and in whatever manner a meaning is obtained, it should be grasped in that mind and in that manner. That which it accumulates by way of repetition condition, and that which is accumulated because of being conditioned by kamma, is thus called 'citta'. But that which is not so, namely the two minor functional consciousnesses and the final impulsion, should be known as 'citta' by way of the obtainable diversity of thought and so on. The arising of a smile, however, is of the nature of other impulsions. 'Of minds' (cittānaṃ) means 'of various kinds' (vicitrānaṃ). For, because they are included within that, even a part is called 'citta' by collective designation, just as when a single part of a mountain, river, ocean, etc., is seen, it is said that the mountain, etc., is seen. The term 'conduct' (caraṇa) is the series of thoughts that, having been taken up, should be traversed. 'Forms' (rūpāni) means images.

Ajjhattikanti indriyabaddhaṃ vadati. Cittakatamevāti cittassa mūlakāraṇataṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Kammassa hetaṃ cittaṃ kāraṇanti. Taṃ pana atthaṃ vibhāvetuṃ ‘‘kāyakammādibheda’’ntiādimāha. Liṅganānattanti saṇṭhānanānattaṃ, bhinnasaṇṭhānaṅgapaccaṅgavato sarīrassa vā nānattaṃ. Vohāravasena itthipurisādibhāvena voharitabbesu patthanāvisesā uppajjanti, tato kammavisesā. Evamidaṃ kammanānattaṃ vohāranānattato hoti. Apā…pe… kāditāti evamādīsu ādi-saddehi gatiyā upapattiyā attabhāve lokadhammesu ca nānākaraṇāni suttāgatāni saṅgaṇhāti.

'Internal' (ajjhattika) refers to the personal existence bound to the faculties. 'Made by mind' is said with reference to the mind being the root cause. For this mind is the cause of kamma. To clarify that meaning, he said, 'divided into bodily action, etc.' Diversity of characteristics (liṅganānatta) means diversity of shape, or the diversity of a body with distinct major and minor limbs of different shapes. Through conventional usage, particular desires arise regarding what is to be conventionally designated as male, female, etc., and from that, particular actions arise. Thus, this diversity of action arises from diversity of convention. In 'apā...pe...kādita' and so on, by the word 'etc.' (ādi) he includes the various distinctions found in the suttas regarding destination, rebirth, personal existence, and worldly conditions.

Kammanānattādivasenāti ettha kusalākusalavasena kammanānattaṃ veditabbaṃ. Visadisasabhāvatā hi nānattanti. Kusalakammassa dānādivasena kāyasucaritādibhāvena ca puthuttaṃ, akusalakammassa ca macchariyādīhi kāyaduccaritādīhi ca puthuttaṃ veditabbaṃ. Bahuppakāratā hi puthuttanti. Annadānādivasena dānādīnaṃ pāṇātipātāviratiādivasena kāyasucaritādīnaṃ āvāsamacchariyādivasena macchariyādīnaṃ pāṇātipātādivasena kāyaduccaritādīnañca pabhedo veditabbo. Ekekassa hi pakārassa bhedo pabhedoti. Nānattādīnaṃ vavatthānaṃ tathā tathā vavatthitatā nicchitatā. Etenupāyena liṅganānattādīni veditabbāni. Kammanānattādīhi nibbattāni hi tānīti.

Herein, in the phrase 'by way of the diversity of kamma, etc.,' the diversity of kamma should be understood by way of wholesome and unwholesome. For diversity is the state of having a dissimilar nature. The multiplicity of wholesome kamma should be understood by way of giving, etc., and by way of bodily good conduct, etc., and the multiplicity of unwholesome kamma by way of stinginess, etc., and by way of bodily misconduct, etc. For multiplicity is the state of having many kinds. The specific division of giving, etc., by way of offering food, etc.; of bodily good conduct, etc., by way of abstaining from killing living beings, etc.; of stinginess, etc., by way of miserliness regarding dwellings, etc.; and of bodily misconduct, etc., by way of killing living beings, etc., should be understood. For a specific division is the division of each single kind. The establishment of diversity, etc., is the certainty of being established in such and such a way. By this method, the diversity of characteristics, etc., should be understood, for these are produced by the diversity of kamma, etc.

Paccuppannassa liṅgassa kammato pavattiṃ tadanukkamena paccuppannakammassa nipphattiñca dassetvā tato anāgataliṅganānattādinipphattidassanena saṃsāraṃ ghaṭento ‘‘kammanānākaraṇaṃ paṭiccā’’tiādimāha. Tattha purimena kammavacanena [Pg.66] avijjāsaṅkhārā, liṅgādivacanena viññāṇādīni bhavapariyosānāni, gatiādivacanena jātijarāmaraṇāni gahitānīti daṭṭhabbāni. Tattha gatīti nirayādayo pañca gatiyo vuccanti, tāsaṃ nānākaraṇaṃ apadādibhāvo. Tā hi tathā bhinnāti. Upapattīti gomahiṃsādikhattiyādicātumahārājikādiupapattiyo, tāsaṃ nānākaraṇaṃ uccāditā. Khattiyo eva hi ekacco kulabhogaissariyādīhi ucco hoti, ekacco nīco. Tehi eva hīnatāya hīno, padhānabhāvaṃ nītatāya paṇīto, aḍḍhatāya sugato, daliddatāya duggato. Kulavasena vā uccanīcatā, issariyavasena hīnapaṇītatā, bhogavasena sugataduggatatā yojetabbā. Suvaṇṇadubbaṇṇatāti odātasāmādivaṇṇasuddhiasuddhivasena vuttaṃ. Sujātadujjātatāti nigrodhaparimaṇḍalādiārohapariṇāhehi lakkhaṇehi vā attabhāvaparipuṇṇāparipuṇṇajātatāvasena. Susaṇṭhitadussaṇṭhitatāti aṅgapaccaṅgānaṃ saṇṭhānavasena.

Having shown the occurrence of the present characteristic due to past kamma, and in that sequence, the completion of present kamma, and then, due to that present kamma, wishing to connect saṃsāra by showing the completion of the diversity of future characteristics and so on, he said, 'Dependent on the diversity of kamma,' etc. Herein, it should be understood that by the first word 'kamma', ignorance and volitional formations are taken; by the word 'characteristic', etc., the factors from consciousness up to the culmination in becoming are taken; by the word 'destiny', etc., birth, aging, and death are taken. Herein, the five destinies such as hell are called 'destiny'; their diversity is the state of being footless, etc. For they are indeed distinct in that way. 'Rebirth' refers to rebirths such as those of cows and buffaloes, kshatriyas, the Four Great Kings, etc.; their diversity is the state of being high and so on. For indeed, a certain kshatriya is high due to family, wealth, power, etc., while another is low. By these very things, one is inferior due to deficiency, superior due to being brought to a state of prominence, fortunate due to wealth, and unfortunate due to poverty. Alternatively, the state of being high and low should be connected with family; the state of being inferior and superior, with power; and the state of being fortunate and unfortunate, with wealth. 'Good or bad complexion' is stated by way of the purity and impurity of color, such as white, dark, etc. 'Well-born or ill-born' is stated by way of height and circumference, such as the symmetrical proportions of a banyan tree; or by physical characteristics such as those of the hands and feet; or by way of being born with a complete or incomplete individual existence. 'Well-formed or ill-formed' is stated by way of the formation of the major and minor limbs.

Aparampi vuttaṃ ajjhattikacittassa yathāvuttassa cittakatabhāvasādhakaṃ suttaṃ ‘‘kammato’’tiādi. Kammañhi cittato nibbattanti tato nipphajjamānaṃ sabbampi cittaṃ cittakatamevāti sādheti. Kammanibbattato liṅgato pavattamānaliṅgasaññā mūlakāraṇato kammato āsannakāraṇato liṅgato ca pavattā hotīti ‘‘kammato…pe… pavattare’’ti āha. Atha vā liṅgañca saññā ca liṅgasaññā, tā yathāsaṅkhyaṃ kammato liṅgato ca pavattareti attho. Saññāto bhedaṃ gacchantīti te itthipurisādiliṅgasaññāto itthipurisādivohārabhedaṃ dhammā gacchanti, tathā tathā voharitabbāti attho. Imāya gāthāya atītapaccuppannaddhapaṭiccasamuppādavasena cittakataṃ cittaṃ dassitaṃ.

Furthermore, another sutta beginning with 'From kamma' has been spoken, which establishes the state of being made by mind of the internal variegated result, as has been stated. For kamma arises from mind; therefore, it establishes that all the variegated result that is produced from that kamma is indeed made by the original mind. Perceptions of a characteristic, which exist due to a characteristic that is produced from kamma, arise from kamma as the root cause and from the characteristic as the proximate cause; thus, he said, 'From kamma... they proceed.' Alternatively, a characteristic and perception are 'characteristic-perception'; the meaning is that these arise respectively from kamma and from the characteristic. As for 'they undergo differentiation from perception': those phenomena, due to the perception of a characteristic such as female and male, arrive at the distinction of designation such as 'female' and 'male'; the meaning is that they are to be designated accordingly. By this first verse, by way of dependent origination in terms of past and present time periods, the variegated result made by mind is shown.

Loko eva pajātattā pajāti purimapādassa vivaraṇaṃ pacchimapādo daṭṭhabbo. Yathā rathassa āṇi nibandhanā, evaṃ sattalokarathassa kammaṃ nibandhananti upamāsaṃsandanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Imāya ca gāthāya addhadvayavasena cittassa kammaviññāṇakatatā dassitā. Kittinti parammukhā kittanaṃ patthaṭayasataṃ. Pasaṃsanti sammukhā pasaṃsanaṃ thutiṃ. Kammanānākaraṇanti kammato nibbattanānākaraṇaṃ kammajehi anumiyamānaṃ kammasseva vā nānākaraṇaṃ.

The world of beings itself, because of being variously born, is called 'pajā' (progeny); thus, the last quarter of the verse should be seen as an explanation of the first quarter. Just as the linchpin of a chariot is a fastening, similarly, kamma is the fastening of the chariot that is the world of beings—thus, the connection of the simile should be understood. And by this second verse, by way of the two time periods, the state of the variegated result being made by kamma-consciousness is shown. 'Kitti' means praising in one's absence, the state of having widespread fame. 'Pasaṃsā' means praising in one's presence, extolling. 'Kammanānākaraṇa' means the distinction of the result that arises from kamma, or the distinction of kamma itself, which is inferred from the results born of kamma.

Kammassakāti [Pg.67] kammasayā. Kammassa dāyaṃ tena dātabbaṃ ādiyantīti kammadāyādā. Aṇḍajādīnañca yonīnaṃ kammato nibbattattā kammameva yoni attabhāvapaṭilābhanimittaṃ etesanti kammayonī. Bandhanaṭṭhena kammaṃ bandhu etesanti kammabandhū.

'Kammassakā' means they are owners of their kamma. Because they receive the inheritance of kamma, that which is to be given by that kamma, they are called 'kammadāyādā' (heirs of kamma). And for those of egg-born and other origins, because of being born from kamma, kamma itself is the origin for them, the cause for attaining an individual existence; therefore, they are called 'kammayonī' (of kamma-origin). Because of its nature of binding, kamma is their relative; therefore, they are called 'kammabandhū' (having kamma as their kin).

Cittassāti kammaviññāṇassa. Tassa pana aladdhokāsatā aññena kammena paṭibāhitattā tadavipaccanokāse puggalassa nibbattattā ca veditabbā. Vijjamānampi aparāpariyavedanīyakammaviññāṇaṃ kālagatipayogādisahakārīpaccayavikalatāya avasesapaccayavekallaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Ekaccacittanti cittena kattabbacitrena ekaccabhūtaṃ tena kattabbacitramāha.

'Of consciousness' (`cittassa`) means of kamma-consciousness. However, the state of its not obtaining an opportunity should be understood as being due to its obstruction by another kamma, and because of the person's arising in a place where that kamma cannot produce its result. Even an existing kamma-consciousness to be experienced in a subsequent life should be seen as a deficiency of the remaining conditions, due to the deficiency of co-acting causes such as time, destination, and effort. By 'a certain variegated result' (`ekaccacitta`), it speaks of a certain part of the variegated result to be produced by consciousness.

Anubhavitvā bhavitvā ca apagataṃ bhūtāpagataṃ. Anubhūtabhūtatā hi bhūtatāsāmaññena bhūtasaddena vuttā. Sāmaññameva hi upasaggena visesīyatīti. Anubhūtasaddo ca kammavacanicchābhāvato anubhavakavācako daṭṭhabbo. Vikappagāhavasena rāgādīhi tabbipakkhehi ca akusalaṃ kusalañca ārammaṇarasaṃ anubhavati, na vipāko kammavegakkhittattā, nāpi kiriyā ahetukānaṃ atidubbalatāya sahetukānañca khīṇakilesassa chaḷaṅgupekkhāvato uppajjamānānaṃ atisantavuttittā. Ettha ca purimanaye kusalākusalameva vattuṃ adhippāyavasena ‘‘bhūtāpagata’’nti vuttaṃ. Yaṃ ‘‘uppannānaṃ akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ pahānāya uppannānaṃ kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ ṭhitiyā’’ti (saṃ. ni. 5.651-662; vibha. 390-391) ettha uppannanti gahetvā taṃsadisānaṃ pahānaṃ, vuddhi ca vuttā, pacchimanaye pana ca-saddena kusalākusalañca ākaḍḍhitvā sabbaṃ saṅkhataṃ vuttaṃ bhūtāpagatabhāvābhidhānādhippāyena.

Having experienced and having been, that which has ceased is `bhūtāpagata`. Indeed, things that have been experienced and things that have been are spoken of by the single word `bhūta` due to the commonality of 'having been'. For the general meaning is indeed particularized by the prefix (`anu`). And the word `anubhūta` should be understood as denoting the agent of experiencing, due to the absence of the intention to denote the object of the action. By the power of conceptual grasping, due to passion and so forth and their opposites, the unwholesome and the wholesome experience the flavor of the object. Resultant consciousness does not experience, because it is thrown forth by the force of kamma. Nor does functional consciousness experience; in the case of rootless states, due to their extreme weakness, and in the case of states with roots, which arise in one whose defilements are destroyed and who possesses six-factored equanimity, due to their extremely tranquil mode of being. And here, in the first method, by the power of the speaker's intention, only the wholesome and unwholesome are called `bhūtāpagata`. In reference to the text, 'for the abandoning of arisen unwholesome states, for the stability of arisen wholesome states,' taking [that wholesome and unwholesome] as 'arisen,' the abandoning of similar states and their growth are spoken of. But in the latter method, by drawing in the wholesome and unwholesome with the word `ca`, with the intention of stating the state of being `bhūtāpagata`, all conditioned things are spoken of.

Vipaccituṃ okāsakaraṇavasena uppatitaṃ atītakammañca tato uppajjituṃ āraddho anāgato vipāko ca ‘‘okāsakatuppanna’’nti vutto. Yaṃ uppannasaddena vināpi viññāyamānaṃ uppannaṃ, taṃ sandhāya ‘‘nāhaṃ, bhikkhave, sañcetanikāna’’ntiādi (a. ni. 10.217, 219) vuttaṃ. Tāsu tāsu bhūmīsūti manussadevādiattabhāvasaṅkhātesu upādānakkhandhesu. Tasmiṃ tasmiṃ santāne anuppattianāpāditatāya asamūhataṃ. Ettha ca laddhabhūmikaṃ ‘‘bhūmiladdha’’nti vuttaṃ aggiāhito viya. Okāsakatuppannasaddepi ca okāso kato etenāti, okāso kato etassāti ca duvidhatthepi evameva katasaddassa paranipāto veditabbo.

The past kamma that has sprung up by way of providing an opportunity for ripening, and the future result that has begun to arise from that, is called 'okāsakatuppanna'. Regarding that which is understood as having arisen even without the word 'arisen,' it is said, 'Monks, I do not say of intentional [actions]...' etc. (Aṅguttara Nikāya 10.217, 219). 'In those various planes' refers to the aggregates of clinging designated as states of existence such as human and divine. In that particular continuum, it is not uprooted, due to not having been brought to a state of non-arising. And here, that which has obtained a plane is called 'bhūmiladdha', like `aggiāhito`. Also, in the word 'okāsakatuppanna', the post-positioning of the word 'kata' should be understood in just the same way, in both twofold meanings: 'an opportunity has been made by this' and 'an opportunity has been made for this'.

Sabbadā [Pg.68] avattamānampi gamiyacittaṃ paṭipakkhapaccavekkhaṇāya avikkhambhitattā ‘‘uppanna’’nti vuttaṃ. Antaradhāpetīti vikkhambhikā ānāpānassati vikkhambheti. Antarāyevāti bhūmiladdhe sabhūmiyaṃ abbocchinne vicchinditvāti attho. Anatītaṃ ananāgatañca khaṇattayekadesagatampi uppajjamānaṃ ‘‘khaṇattayagata’’nti vuttaṃ. Desanāya padhānena gahito attho ‘‘sīsa’’nti vuccati. Lokiyadhammañhi desetabbaṃ patvā desanāya cittaṃ pubbaṅgamaṃ hoti, dhammasabhāvaṃ vā sandhāyetaṃ vuttaṃ. Akusalāti sabbepi akusalā dhammā vuttā. Cetanāti keci. Akusalabhāgiyāti rāgādayo ekantaakusalā. Akusalapakkhikāti phassādayopi tappakkhikā. Mano tesaṃ dhammānaṃ paṭhamaṃ uppajjatīti sahajātopi mano sampayutte saṅgaṇhitvā adhipatibhāvena pavattamāno paṭhamaṃ uppanno viya hotīti evaṃ vutto. Sampayuttāpi tadanuvattanatāya anvadeva akusalā dhammāti vuttā, anantarapaccayamanaṃ vā sandhāya manopubbaṅgamatā vuttā. Cittena nīyatīti abhisaṅkhāraviññāṇaṃ sandhāyāha, taṇhāsampayuttaṃ vā. Pabhassaranti sabhāvapaṇḍarataṃ sandhāyāha. Arakkhiteti satiyā anunayapaṭighādīhi arakkhite, rāgādīhi byāpanne, tehi eva avassute. Cittassa pubbaṅgamabhāvasādhane aññamaññaṃ baladānavasena suttānurakkhaṇaṃ, idha vā upasaṃhatānaṃ ābhidhammikehi viññātānaṃ cirakālappavattivasena veditabbaṃ.

Always, even when not presently occurring, the mind of one who wishes to travel is said to be 'arisen' because it has not been dispelled by reflecting on its opposite. As for 'it causes to disappear', mindfulness of breathing, which is capable of dispelling, dispels it. 'In the very interval' means having cut off a defilement that has attained its plane while it is still uninterrupted in its own plane. A mind that is presently arising, which is not past and not future, and which occurs even in a fraction of the three moments, is said to be 'belonging to the three moments'. The meaning grasped as primary from the teaching is called 'sīsa' (the head). Indeed, when it comes to teaching a worldly state, the mind is the forerunner of the teaching; or alternatively, this was said with reference to the nature of the dhamma (i.e., mind) as a leader. By 'akusalā' (unwholesome), all unwholesome states are meant. Some say it means 'cetanā' (volition). By 'akusalabhāgiyā' (belonging to the unwholesome part), lust and so on, which are exclusively unwholesome, are meant. By 'akusalapakkhikā' (allied with the unwholesome), contact and so on, which belong to that faction, are also meant. As for 'The mind arises first among those states': although the mind is co-nascent, by grouping together the associated states and proceeding with the nature of a chief, it is as if it arose first; thus it is said. The associated states also, because of their conformity to that mind, are said to be 'unwholesome states that follow along'. Alternatively, the precedence of the mind is stated with reference to the mind as the contiguity condition. As for 'it is led by the mind', this is said with reference to consciousness that is an act of volition (abhisaṅkhāra), or that which is associated with craving. As for 'luminous', this is said with reference to its natural purity. As for 'unguarded', it means when unguarded by mindfulness from attraction, aversion, and so on; when corrupted by lust and so on; and when saturated by those very things. In establishing the state of the mind as forerunner, the mutual protection of the suttas should be understood by way of them mutually giving strength. Or alternatively, here it should be understood by way of the long-standing occurrence of the suttas that have been collected and are known by the Abhidhammikas.

Katarapaññaṃ tvantiādi na pāḷiāruḷhaṃ, evaṃ bhagavā pucchatīti aṭṭhakathāyameva vuttaṃ. Paññā pana kimatthiyāti idampi ekaṃ suttaṃ. ‘‘Abhiññatthā pariññatthā pahānatthā’’ti tassa vissajjanaṃ.

The words beginning with 'Katarapaññaṃ tvaṃ...' have not ascended to the Pāḷi Canon; that 'the Blessed One asks thus' is said only in the ancient commentary. 'But for what purpose is wisdom?'—this too is one sutta cited as an example. 'For the purpose of direct knowledge, for the purpose of full understanding, for the purpose of abandoning'—this is the answer to that question.

Sātanti sabhāvavasena vuttaṃ, madhuranti madhuraṃ viyāti upamāvasena. Ponobbhavikāti punabbhavakaraṇasīlā. Tatratatrābhinandanato nandī, nandibhūto rāgo nandirāgo, nandirāgabhāvena sahagatāti nandirāgasahagatāti na ettha sampayogavasena sahagatabhāvo atthīti sahagatasaddo taṇhāya nandirāgabhāvaṃ joteti. Nandirāgabhūtāti cassa attho. Nissayeti pādake. Rūpārūpārammaṇānanti pathavīkasiṇādiākāsādiārammaṇānaṃ. Saṃsaṭṭheti khīrodakaṃ viya samodite ekībhāvamiva gate. Sahajāteti sampayuttasahajāte, na sahajātamatte. Idhāpīti ‘‘imasmimpi pade ayameva attho adhippeto’’ti imissā aṭṭhakathāya yathādassitasaṃsaṭṭhasaddo [Pg.69] sahajāte adhippetoti. Arūpaṃ rūpenāti paṭisandhikkhaṇe vatthunā. Ukkaṭṭhaniddesoti anavasesasaṅgahena kato atisayaniddeso.

The word 'sāta' is stated by way of its intrinsic nature, and 'madhura' by way of simile, as in 'like something sweet'. 'Ponobbhavikā' means having the nature of creating a new existence. 'Nandī' is so called because of greatly delighting in this and that; 'nandirāgo' is lust that has become delight. 'Nandirāgasahagatā' means accompanied by the state of delight-lust. Here, the state of being 'sahagata' (accompanied) is not by way of association; rather, the word 'sahagata' illuminates the state of craving as delight-lust. And its meaning is 'that which has become delight-lust'. 'Nissaye' is in the sense of 'foundation'. 'Rūpārūpārammaṇānaṃ' refers to objects such as the earth-kasiṇa and objects such as the space-concept. 'Saṃsaṭṭhe' is in the sense of being mixed like milk and water, having reached a state as if of oneness. 'Sahajāte' is in the sense of associated co-arising, not mere co-arising. Here too (idhāpi): in this commentary, it is intended that the word 'saṃsaṭṭha', as has been shown, has the meaning of 'co-arisen' (sahajāte), in accordance with the statement, 'In this term also, this very meaning is intended'. As for 'arūpaṃ rūpena', it is with the physical basis at the moment of rebirth-linking. 'Ukkaṭṭhaniddeso' is a supreme exposition, that is, an extraordinary exposition made by way of an exhaustive inclusion.

Anābhaṭṭhatāyevāti ‘‘diṭṭhaṃ suta’’ntiādīsu diṭṭhatādayo viya abhāsitabbatā anābhaṭṭhatā. Sabbākārena sadisassa dutiyacittassa sasaṅkhārikatāvacanena imassa asaṅkhārikatā viññāyati, tasmā abhāsitabbatāya na gahitoti attho yujjati. Adhippāyo pana pāḷiyaṃ abhāsitattā eva tattha desetabbabhāvena na gahito na saṅgahito na tassatthassa abhāvāti. Atha vā pāḷiyaṃ anābhaṭṭhatāya eva aṭṭhakathāyaṃ na gahito na tassattho vutto. Niyametvāvāti parato evaṃvidhasseva sasaṅkhārikabhāvavacanato idha tadavacaneneva asaṅkhārikabhāvaṃ niyametvā.

As for 'anābhaṭṭhatāya eva': 'anābhaṭṭhatā' (not being mentioned) is the state of being unstatable, just as in 'diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ' etc., the state of being seen, etc., is meant. Because the prompted nature of the second consciousness, which is similar in all respects, is stated, the unprompted nature of this one is understood. Therefore, the meaning that it was not included because it was unstatable is fitting. The intention, however, is this: precisely because it is unstated in the Pāḷi, it is not included or comprised there as something to be taught; it is not because its meaning is absent. Alternatively, precisely because it was not mentioned in the Pāḷi, it was not included in the commentary, nor was its meaning stated. As for 'niyametvā': because later on the prompted state of just such a consciousness is stated, here, the unprompted state is determined precisely by the non-statement of that.

Manoviññāṇanti ettha dvāraṃ vatthūti vuttaṃ, dvārena vā taṃsahāyabhūtaṃ hadayavatthu vuttaṃ. Sarasabhāvenāti sakiccabhāvena. Avijjā hi saṅkhārānaṃ paccayabhāvakiccā, aññāsādhāraṇo vā rasitabbo viññātabbo bhāvo sarasabhāvo, avijjāsabhāvo saṅkhārasabhāvoti evamādiko. ‘‘Sarasasabhāvenā’’tipi pāṭho, soyeva attho. Avijjāpaccayāti vā sarasena, saṅkhārāti sabhāvena.

Here, in the context of 'mental consciousness', the door is spoken of as the base; or, by means of the door, the heart-base, which is its companion, is spoken of. 'By its own nature' means by its own function. Indeed, ignorance has the function of being a condition for formations. Alternatively, 'own nature' (sarasabhāvo) is the nature to be experienced or known, which is not shared with others, such as the nature of ignorance, the nature of formations, and so on. There is also the reading 'sarasasabhāvena'; the meaning is the very same. Alternatively, 'dependent on ignorance' is by its own function; 'formations' is by its own nature.

Ekasamuṭṭhānāditā rūpadhammesu eva yojetabbā tesu tabbohārabāhullato. Atītādibhāvo rūpārūpadhammesu, cittacetasikanibbānānampi vā yathāsabhāvaṃ ekadvinakutocisamuṭṭhānatā yojetabbā. Anāpāthagatāti cakkhādīnaṃ agocaragatā sukhumarajādirūpaṃ viya vatthuparittatāya tattāyoguḷe patitodakabindurūpaṃ viya khaṇaparittatāya atidūratāya accāsannāditāya atītānāgatatāya ca. Visayo anaññatthabhāvena, gocaro ca tattha caraṇena vutto, tabbisayanicchayena mano paṭisaraṇaṃ. Ayamattho siddho hoti aññathā tesaṃ dhammārammaṇabhāvena ‘‘nesaṃ gocaravisayaṃ paccanubhotī’’ti vacanassa anupapattito. Dibbacakkhudibbasotaiddhividhañāṇehi yathāvuttanayena anāpāthagatāni rūpādīni ālambiyamānāni na dhammārammaṇanti katthaci vuccamānāni diṭṭhāni, itarathā ca diṭṭhāni ‘‘dibbena cakkhunā rūpaṃ passatī’’tiādīsūti.

The state of having a single origin and so forth should be applied only to material phenomena, because of the abundance of such designations concerning them. The state of being past and so forth should be applied to material and immaterial phenomena. Alternatively, the state of having a single origin, a dual origin, or no origin whatsoever should be applied to consciousness, mental factors, and Nibbāna as well, according to their nature. 'Not having come into range' means not having come into the sphere of the sense-faculties, such as the eye, like the form of subtle dust particles and so forth, due to the minuteness of the physical basis; or like the form of a drop of water fallen on a red-hot iron ball, due to the brevity of the moment of continuity; or due to extreme distance, excessive proximity and so forth, and due to being past or future. It is called 'domain' (visaya) because of its not occurring in another sphere, and it is called 'range' (gocara) because of frequenting therein. By means of the determination of that domain, the mind is the resort. This meaning is established; otherwise, because of their being mind-objects, the statement 'one experiences their range and domain' would be untenable. For forms and so forth that have not come into range by the method stated, when taken as object by the divine eye, divine ear, and the knowledge of psychic powers, are nowhere seen to be spoken of as 'mind-objects'. But in another way, they are seen in texts such as, 'one sees form with the divine eye'.

Āpāthamāgacchati [Pg.70] manasā pañcaviññāṇehi ca gahetabbabhāvūpagamanena. Ghaṭṭetvāti paṭimukhabhāvāpāthaṃ gantvā. Sarabhāṇakassa osārakassa. Pakatiyā diṭṭhādivasena āpāthagamanañca bhojanapariṇāmautubhojanavisesaussāhādīhi kalyaṃ, rogino vātādīhi ca upaddutaṃ vā kāyaṃ anuvattantassa jāgarassa bhavaṅgassa calanapaccayānaṃ kāyikasukhadukkhautubhojanādiupanissayānaṃ cittapaṇidahanasadisāsadisasambandhadassanādipaccayānaṃ, suttassa ca supinadassane dhātukkhobhādipaccayānaṃ vasena veditabbaṃ. Adiṭṭhassa asutassa anāgatabuddharūpādino pasādadātukāmatāvatthussa taṃsadisatāsaṅkhātena diṭṭhasutasambandheneva. Na kevalaṃ taṃsadisatāva ubhayasambandho, kintu tabbipakkhatā tadekadesatā taṃsampayuttatādiko ca veditabbo. Kenaci vutte kismiñci sute avicāretvā saddahanaṃ saddhā, sayameva taṃ vicāretvā rocanaṃ ruci, ‘‘evaṃ vā evaṃ vā bhavissatī’’ti ākāravicāraṇaṃ ākāraparivitakko, vicārentassa katthaci diṭṭhiyā nijjhānakkhamanaṃ diṭṭhinijjhānakkhanti.

It comes into range by means of arriving at the state of being apprehendable by the mind and by the five consciousnesses. 'Having struck' means having gone to the range which is the state of confrontation. Of the sarabhāṇaka (reciter with a melodious voice) and of the one who introduces (the Pāḷi text). And the coming into range naturally by way of what is seen and so forth should be understood in the following ways. For one who is awake, attending to a body that is either healthy (due to digestion of food, season, special food, exertion, and so forth) or, in the case of a sick person, a body afflicted by wind and so forth, it is due to the conditions that cause the bhavaṅga to vibrate, namely, strong supporting conditions such as bodily pleasure and pain, season, food, and so forth, and conditions such as directing the mind, seeing a similar, dissimilar, or related object, and so forth. And for one who is asleep, in the seeing of a dream, it is due to conditions such as disturbance of the elements and so forth. For what has not been seen or heard, such as the form of a future Buddha and so forth, which is a basis for faith and for the desire to give, it comes into range only through the connection with what has been seen and heard, which is designated as 'similarity to that'. Not only is 'similarity to that' the mutual connection, but indeed its opposite, its being a part of it, its being associated with it, and so forth should also be understood as such. When something is said by someone or something is heard, believing without investigation is saddhā (faith). Approving of it after investigating it oneself is ruci (inclination). Investigating the mode, thinking, 'It might be this way, or it might be that way,' is ākāraparivitakka (reflection on the mode). For one who is investigating, the approval of some point through contemplation by means of a view is diṭṭhinijjhānakkhanti (approval through reflective acceptance of a view).

Gerukaharitālañjanādidhātūsu. Subhanimittaṃ subhaggahaṇassa nimittaṃ. Taṃ subhanimittattā rañjanīyattā ca lobhassa vatthu. Niyamitassa cittassa vasena niyamitavasena. Evamitaresu dvīsu. Ābhogo ābhujitaṃ. Lūkhapuggalā dosabahulā. Adosabahulā siniddhapuggalā. Tadadhimuttatāti pītininnacittatā. Imehi…pe… veditabbo pītiyā somanassavippayogāsambhavatoti adhippāyo.

In elements such as red ochre, yellow orpiment, collyrium, and so forth. The beautiful sign is a sign, or cause, for apprehending the beautiful. That, because it is a cause for apprehending the beautiful and because it is enticing, is a basis for greed. 'By way of regulation' means by way of a regulated mind. Likewise in the other two cases. Ābhoga (adverting) is ābhujita (inclination). Rough individuals are those with much aversion. Those with much non-aversion are smooth individuals. 'Tadadhimuttatā' (being resolved on that) means the state of having a mind inclined towards joy (pīti). For these reasons also, it should be understood that this is accompanied by gladness, because it is impossible for joy (pīti) to be dissociated from gladness (somanassa). This is the intention.

Jīvitavuttiyā āyatanabhāvato hatthārohādisippameva sippāyatanaṃ. Kasivāṇijjādikammameva kammāyatanaṃ. Āyuvedādivijjā eva vijjāṭṭhānaṃ. Abyāpajjeti domanassabyāpādarahite rūpabhave. Dhammapadāti dhammakoṭṭhāsā. Pilavantīti upaṭṭhahanti padissanti. Yogāti bhāvanābhiyogā samādhito. Vatthuvisadakiriyāti ajjhattikabāhirānaṃ vatthūnaṃ nimmalabhāvakiriyā. Saddhādīnaṃ indriyānaṃ aññamaññānativattanaṃ indriyasamattapaṭipādanatā. Gambhīrānaṃ ñāṇena caritabbānaṃ, gambhīrañāṇena vā caritabbānaṃ suttantānaṃ paccavekkhaṇā gambhīrañāṇacariyapaccavekkhaṇā.

The sphere of arts is precisely the art such as elephant riding and so forth, by virtue of being a means of livelihood. The sphere of actions is precisely work such as agriculture and trade and so forth. The foundation of knowledge is precisely sciences such as Āyurveda and so forth. 'Without ill will' means in the realm of form, free from the ill will of displeasure. 'Dhammapada' means sections of the Dhamma. 'They float' means they are present, they appear. 'Yoga' means, from concentration, application to development. 'The act of making objects clear' means the act of making internal and external objects stainless. The non-transgression of one another by the faculties of faith and so on is the establishing of the equipoise of the faculties. Reflection on profound suttas that are to be traversed by knowledge, or alternatively by profound knowledge, is the reflection on the practice of profound knowledge.

Vaṃsoti anukkamo. Tantīti santati. Paveṇīti sambandho. Sabbametaṃ cārittakiriyāpabandhassa vacanaṃ. Cārittasīlattā sīlamayaṃ. ‘‘Dassāmī’’ti vacībhedena vatthussa pariṇatattā tato paṭṭhāya dānaṃ āraddhaṃ nāma hoti[Pg.71], yato tassa attano pariṇāmanādīsu āpatti hoti. Vijjamānavatthusmiṃ cintanakālato paṭṭhāya dānaṃ āraddhanti tattha dānamayaṃ kusalaṃ hotīti adhippāyo. Na hi dānavatthuṃ avijjamānakampi saṅkharontassa kusalaṃ na hotīti. Taṃ pana dānamayassa pubbabhāgoti tadeva bhajeyya, vuttaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ. Kulavaṃsādivasenāti udāharaṇamattamevetaṃ. Attanā samādinnavattavasena sappurisavattagāmajanapadavattādivasena ca cārittasīlatā veditabbā.

'Lineage' means succession. 'Thread' means continuity. 'Tradition' means connection. All this is a designation for the continuity of customary action. Because it is customary virtue, it is called 'made of virtue'. By the verbal expression, 'I will give,' because the object has been dedicated, from then on the giving is said to be undertaken, since an offense occurs in dedicating it to oneself and so on. The meaning is that with respect to an existing object, the giving is undertaken from the time of thinking, and in that case the wholesome volition consisting of giving occurs. For it is not that wholesome volition does not occur for one who is preparing even a non-existent object of giving. But that is the preliminary part of what consists of giving, so it should be included in just that; it is stated in the commentary. The phrase 'by way of family lineage, etc.' is merely an example. Customary virtue should be understood by way of conduct undertaken by oneself, and by way of the conduct of good people, the conduct of villagers and country-folk, and so on.

Savatthukanti bheriādivatthusahitaṃ katvā. Vijjamānakavatthunti bheriādivatthuṃ. Dhammassavanaghosanādīsu ca savatthukaṃ katvā saddassa dānaṃ saddavatthūnaṃ ṭhānakaraṇānaṃ sasaddappavattikaraṇamevāti tassa cintanaṃ vijjamānavatthupariccāgo veditabbo. Bhājetvā dassesi dhammarājā idha ca rūpārammaṇādibhāvaṃ, aññattha ca ‘‘tīṇimāni, bhikkhave, puññakiriyavatthūnī’’ti (dī. ni. 3.305) dānamayādibhāvaṃ, aparattha ca ‘‘katame dhammā kusalā? Tīṇi…pe… taṃsamuṭṭhānaṃ kāyakamma’’ntiādinā kāyakammādibhāvañca vadanto. Apariyāpannā cāti paramatthato avijjamānattā aññāyatanattā ca asaṅgahitā.

'With a basis' means making it accompanied by a basis such as a drum, and so forth. An existing basis refers to a basis such as a drum, and so forth. And in the proclamation of Dhamma-hearing and so forth, the giving of sound, by making it with a basis, is precisely the causing of sound to arise from the places and instruments of sound-bases; thus, the thought concerning it should be understood as the relinquishment of an existing basis. The King of Dhamma taught by dividing, indicating: here, the nature of form as an object, and so forth; elsewhere, through the statement, 'Monks, there are these three grounds for meritorious action' (Dī. Ni. 3.305), the nature of what is based on generosity, and so forth; and elsewhere again, through the text beginning, 'What states are wholesome? Three... bodily action originating from that,' the nature of bodily action, and so forth. 'And unincluded' means not included because, in an ultimate sense, they are non-existent and because they are other sense-bases.

Paribhogaraso paribhogapaccayaṃ pītisomanassaṃ. Ayaṃ pana rasasamānatāvasena gahaṇaṃ upādāya rasārammaṇanti vutto, na sabhāvato. Sabhāvena pana gahaṇaṃ upādāya pītisomanassaṃ dhammārammaṇameva hotīti ‘‘sukhā vedanā dhammārammaṇa’’nti vuttaṃ. Ārammaṇameva nibaddhanti rūpārammaṇaṃ…pe… dhammārammaṇanti evaṃ niyametvā vuttaṃ. Kammassa anibaddhattāti kammassa aniyatattā. Yathā hi rūpādīsu ekārammaṇaṃ cittaṃ anaññārammaṇaṃ hoti, na evaṃ kāyadvārādīsu ekadvārikakammaṃ aññasmiṃ dvāre nuppajjati, tasmā kammassa dvāraniyamarahitattā dvārampi kammaniyamarahitanti idha ārammaṇaṃ viya niyametvā na vuttaṃ. Vinā ārammaṇena anuppajjanatoti etassapi cattho ‘‘yathā kāyakammādīsu ekaṃ kammaṃ tena dvārena vinā aññasmiṃ dvāre carati, na evaṃ rūpādīsu ekārammaṇaṃ cittaṃ tenārammaṇena vinā ārammaṇantare uppajjatī’’ti veditabbo. Na hi yathā vacīdvāre uppajjamānampi ‘‘kāyakamma’’nti vuccati, evaṃ saddārammaṇe uppajjamānaṃ ‘‘rūpārammaṇa’’nti vuccati.

The taste of enjoyment is the joy and gladness conditioned by enjoyment. This, however, is called a 'taste-object' by way of taking it up through its similarity to taste, not by its intrinsic nature. But by its intrinsic nature, when taken up, joy and gladness are only a mind-object; thus, it is said, 'Pleasant feeling is a mind-object.' Because 'the object alone is fixed,' it is spoken of as determined thus: 'form-object... and so on... mind-object.' 'Because kamma is not fixed' means because kamma is not determined. For just as, among forms and so on, a consciousness with one object does not have another object, it is not so that a kamma of one door, such as the body-door, does not arise in another door. Therefore, because kamma is devoid of determination by a door, the door is also devoid of determination by kamma; thus, here it is not spoken of as being determined like the object. The meaning of this, 'because it does not arise without an object,' should also be understood thus: 'Just as, among body-kamma and so on, one kamma can proceed through another door without that original door, it is not so that, among forms and so on, a consciousness with one object arises with a different object without that original object.' For, just as what arises at the speech-door is also called 'body-kamma', it is not so that what arises with a sound-object is called 'form-object'.

Kāmāvacarakusalaṃ

Wholesome Kamma of the Sensual Sphere.

Kāyakammadvārakathāvaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Discourse on the Door of Bodily Kamma

Imassa [Pg.72] panatthassāti kammadvārānaṃ aññamaññasmiṃ aniyatatāya ‘‘dvāre caranti kammānī’’tiādinā pakāsanatthaṃ. Pañca viññāṇānīti ettha chaṭṭhassa viññāṇassa tassa ca dvārassa anuddeso dvāradvāravantānaṃ sahābhāvā. Niyatarūparūpavasena catusamuṭṭhānikakāyā vuttāti saddassa vikārarūpādīnañca asaṅgaho.

As for this meaning, it is for the purpose of explaining the non-determination of the kamma-doors among one another by means of the phrase 'kammas proceed in the doors,' and so on. Here, in the phrase 'the five consciousnesses,' the non-indication of the sixth consciousness and its door is because of the non-coexistence of the door and the possessor of the door. Because the four-originated bodies are spoken of by way of determined material form, there is the non-inclusion of sound and of altered forms, and so on.

Paṭhamajavanasamuṭṭhitā vāyodhātu yadipi tasmiṃ khaṇe rūpānaṃ desantaruppattihetubhāvena cāletuṃ na sakkoti, tathāpi viññattivikārasahitāva sā veditabbā. Dasasu hi disāsu yaṃ disaṃ gantukāmo aṅgapaccaṅgāni vā khipitukāmo, taṃdisābhimukhāneva rūpāni sā santhambheti sandhāreti cāti tadabhimukhabhāvavikāravatī hoti, adhippāyasahabhāvī ca vikāro viññattīti. Evañca katvā āvajjanassapi viññattisamuṭṭhāpakabhāvo yathādhippāyavikārarūpuppādanena upapanno hoti, yato bāttiṃsa cittāni rūpiriyāpathaviññattijanakāni vuttānīti. Yojanaṃ gato, dasayojanaṃ gatoti vattabbataṃ āpajjāpeti anekasahassavāraṃ uppannā.

The air element arisen from the first javana, even though at that moment it is not able to cause movement by being the cause for the arising of material forms in another place, should nevertheless be understood as being together with the modification that is intimation. For, in the ten directions, to whichever direction one desires to go, or desires to move one's major and minor limbs, that air element stiffens and sustains the material forms that are indeed facing toward that direction. Thus, it possesses the modification which is the state of facing toward that direction. And the modification that occurs together with the intention is called intimation. For this reason, even adverting's state as a producer of intimation is suitable, through the production of modification-materiality in accordance with the intention, since it is said that thirty-two consciousnesses are producers of materiality, posture, and intimation. Having arisen many thousands of times, it brings about the state of being fit to be said: 'He has gone one yojana; he has gone ten yojanas.'

Vāyodhātuyā…pe… paccayo bhavitunti thambhanacalanesu vāyodhātuyā paccayo bhavituṃ samattho cittasamuṭṭhānamahābhūtānaṃ eko ākāraviseso atthi, ayaṃ viññatti nāma. Tesañhi tadākārattā vāyodhātu thambheti cāleti cāti. Na cittasamuṭṭhānāti etena paramatthato abhāvaṃ dasseti. Na hi rūpaṃ appaccayaṃ atthi, na ca nibbānavajjo attho nicco atthīti. Viññattitāyāti viññattivikāratāya. Cittasamuṭṭhānabhāvo viya mahābhūtavikāratāya upādārūpabhāvo ca adhippetoti veditabbo.

Regarding the phrase 'capable of being a cause for the air element...': There is a particular mode of the great elements arisen from consciousness that is capable of being a cause for the air element in stiffening and moving; this is called intimation. For, because they possess that mode, the air element stiffens and moves. By the phrase 'not arisen from consciousness,' it indicates its non-existence in an ultimate sense. For no material form exists without a cause, nor does any permanent reality, excluding Nibbāna, exist. 'By being intimation' means by being the modification that is intimation. It should be understood that, just as the state of being mind-originated is intended, so too, by its being a modification of the great elements, the state of being derived materiality is also intended.

Kāyikakaraṇanti kāyadvārappavattaṃ cittakiriyaṃ, adhippāyanti attho. Kāreti maññeti etena vaṇṇaggahaṇānusārena gahitāya viññattiyā yaṃ karaṇaṃ viññātabbaṃ, tassa vijānanena viññattiyā viññātattaṃ dasseti. Na hi viññattirahitesu rukkhacalanādīsu ‘‘idamesa kāretī’’ti vijānanaṃ hotīti. Cakkhuviññāṇassa hi rūpe abhinipātamattaṃ kiccaṃ, na adhippāyasahabhuno calanavikārassa gahaṇaṃ. Cittassa pana lahuparivattitāya cakkhuviññāṇavīthiyā [Pg.73] anantaraṃ manoviññāṇena viññātampi calanaṃ cakkhunā diṭṭhaṃ viya maññanti avisesaviduno, tasmā yathā nīlābhinipātavasappavattāya cakkhuviññāṇavīthiyā nīlanti pavattāya manoviññāṇavīthiyā ca antaraṃ na viññāyati, evaṃ aviññāyamānantarena manodvāraviññāṇena gahite tasmiṃ cittena saheva anuparivatte kāyathambhanavikāracopanasaṅkhāte ‘‘idamesa kāreti, ayamassa adhippāyo’’ti vijānanaṃ hoti.

Bodily action means the activity of the mind occurring through the body-door; the meaning is 'intention'. By this [thought], 'He causes to do,' one thinks, it shows that the intimation is known by means of knowing that action which is to be known through the intimation grasped in accordance with the grasping of appearance. For indeed, in things devoid of intimation, such as the movement of trees, there is no recognition that 'this one is causing this to be done.' Indeed, the function of eye-consciousness is merely the impingement on forms, not the grasping of the modification of movement accompanied by intention. But due to the mind's swift turning, even movement known by mind-consciousness immediately after the eye-consciousness process is thought by those who do not discern the distinction to be seen by the eye. Therefore, just as the distinction is not discerned between the eye-consciousness process occurring by the power of impinging on a blue object and the mind-consciousness process occurring as 'blue,' so too, when that modification designated as the stiffening and stirring of the body, which follows along with the mind, is grasped by a mind-door consciousness whose distinction from the prior process is not discerned, there arises the recognition: 'This one is causing this to be done; this is their intention.'

Tālapaṇṇādirūpāni disvā tadanantarappavattāya manodvāravīthiyā aviññāyamānantarāya tālapaṇṇādīnaṃ udakādisahacārippakārataṃ saññāṇākāraṃ gahetvā udakādiggahaṇaṃ viya. Ettha udakaṃ bhavissatītiādinā ca udakādisambandhanākārena rūpaggahaṇānusāraviññāṇena yaṃ udakādi viññātabbaṃ, tassa vijānanena tadākārassa viññātatā vuttāti daṭṭhabbā. Etassa pana kāyikakaraṇaggahaṇassa udakādiggahaṇassa ca purimasiddhasambandhaggahaṇaṃ upanissayo hotīti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Atha pana nālambitāpi viññatti kāyikakaraṇaggahaṇassa ca paccayo purimasiddhasambandhaggahaṇopanissayavasena sādhippāyavikārabhūtavaṇṇaggahaṇānantaraṃ pavattamānassa adhippāyaggahaṇassa adhippāyasahabhūvikārābhāve abhāvato, evaṃ sati vaṇṇaggahaṇānantarena udakādiggahaṇeneva tālapaṇṇādisaññāṇākāro viya vaṇṇaggahaṇānantarena adhippāyaggahaṇeneva viññatti pākaṭā hotīti ‘‘idañcidañca esa kāreti maññe’’ti adhippāyavijānaneneva viññattiyā viññātatā vuttā.

It is like the grasping of water and so on: having seen forms such as palm leaves, one grasps the mode which is the sign that they are accompanied by water and so on, through a mind-door process with an indiscernible interval that arises immediately after that seeing. Herein, it should be understood that by such as 'there will be water,' and by the mode of connection with water and so on, through the consciousness that follows the grasping of form, the state of being known of that mode is stated by the knowing of whatever water and so on is to be known. Moreover, it should be understood that for this grasping of bodily action and for the grasping of water and so on, the grasping of a previously established connection is a decisive support condition. Alternatively, intimation, even though not taken as an object, is a condition for the grasping of bodily action by way of the decisive support of grasping a previously established connection. This is because the grasping of intention, which occurs immediately after the grasping of the visible form that has become an alteration with intention, is absent in the absence of the alteration that is co-nascent with intention. This being so, just as the mode of the sign of palm leaves and so on becomes manifest just by the grasping of water and so on immediately after the grasping of the visible form, so too, intimation becomes manifest just by the grasping of intention immediately after the grasping of the visible form. Therefore, by 'I think, "He is causing this and that to be done,"' the state of the intimation's being known is stated to be just by the knowing of the intention.

Ayaṃ no paharitukāmoti adhippāyavijānanena viññattiyā pākaṭabhāvaṃ dasseti. Na hi tadapākaṭabhāve adhippāyavijānanaṃ hotīti. Sammukhī…pe… yeva nāma hotīti asammukhībhūtatāya anāpāthagatānaṃ rūpādīnaṃ cakkhuviññeyyādibhāvo viya sabhāvabhūtaṃ taṃ dvidhā viññattibhāvaṃ sādheti. Paraṃ bodhetukāmatāya vināpi abhikkamanādippavattanena so cittasahabhūvikāro adhippāyaṃ viññāpeti, sayañca viññāyatīti dvidhāpi viññattiyevāti veditabbā.

By 'This one desires to strike us,' it shows the manifest state of the intimation through the knowing of the intention. For when it is not manifest, there is no knowing of the intention. By 'It is indeed face to face... etc.,' it establishes that twofold state of intimation as its intrinsic nature, just like the state of being cognizable by eye-consciousness and so on of forms and so on that have not come into range, being not face to face. Even without the desire to make another understand, through the occurrence of advancing and so on, that alteration co-nascent with the mind makes the intention known, and is itself known. Thus, it should be known that it is intimation in both ways.

Tasmiṃ dvāre siddhāti tena dvārena viññātabbabhāvato teneva dvārena nāmalābhato tasmiṃ dvāre pākaṭabhāvavasena siddhā. Kusalaṃ vā akusalaṃ vāti ṭhapetabbaṃ. Kasmā? Yasmā paravādino avipākassa kammabhāvo [Pg.74] na siddho, itarassa pana siddhoti viññattisamuṭṭhāpakānaṃ ekādasannaṃ kiriyacittānaṃ vasena tikaṃ pūretvā ṭhapetabbaṃ.

Regarding 'established at that door': it is established by means of being manifest at that door, because of being cognizable through that door and because of obtaining a name through that very door. 'Whether wholesome or unwholesome'—this should be set aside. Why? Because for the proponents of other doctrines, the nature of kamma for that which is without result is not established, but for the other, it is established. Thus, having completed the triad by means of the eleven functional consciousnesses that generate intimation, it should be set aside.

Dvāre caranti kammānīti ettha ayamadhippāyo – yadi dvārā dvārantaracārino honti, dvārasambhedā kammasambhedopīti kāyakammaṃ kāyakammadvāranti aññamaññavavatthānaṃ na siyā, kammānampi kammantaracaraṇe eseva nayo. Yadi pana dvārānampi dvārabhāvena kammantaracaraṇaṃ kammānañca dvārantaracaraṇaṃ na siyā, suṭṭhutaraṃ kammadvāravavatthānaṃ siyā. Na pana kammānaṃ dvārantare acaraṇaṃ atthi, kintu dvāre aññasmiñca caranti kammāni aññānipi. Yasmā pana dvāre dvārāni na caranti, tasmā advāracārīhi dvārehi kāraṇabhūtehi kammāni dvārantare carantānipi vavatthitāni. Na kevalaṃ kammāneva, tehi pana dvārānipīti evaṃ kammadvārāni aññamaññaṃ vavatthitāni ‘‘yebhuyyenavuttitāya tabbahulavuttitāya cā’’ti vuccamānāya vavatthānayuttiyā. Tattha dvārāpekkhattā kammānaṃ kāyakammādibhāvassa advāracārīhi dvārehi vavatthānaṃ hoti, na pana dvārantaracārīhi kammehi dvārānaṃ avavatthānaṃ kammānapekkhakāyadvārādibhāvehi dvārehi vavatthitānaṃ kāyakammādīnaṃ kāyakammadvārādivavatthānakarattā. Atha vā dvārantare carantānipi kāyādīhi upalakkhitāneva caranti pāṇātipātādīnaṃ evaṃsabhāvattā āṇattihatthavikārādīhi vuccamānassapi kāyādīhi sādhetabbasabhāvāvabodhato, tasmā na kammantarassa attani carantassapi dvārantaraṃ sanāmaṃ deti, nāpi kammaṃ dvārassa, taṃtaṃdvārameva pana kammassa kammañca dvārantare carantampi attanoyeva dvārassa nāmaṃ detīti siddhaṃ aññamaññavavatthānaṃ. Pubbe pana dvāresu anibaddhatā kammānaṃ dvārantaracaraṇameva sandhāya vuttā, na etaṃ vavatthānanti.

‘Actions occur in the doors’—herein, this is the intended meaning: If the doors were to occur in other doors, then due to the mixing of doors, there would also be a mixing of actions. Thus, the mutual distinction as ‘bodily action’ and ‘door of bodily action’ would not exist. For actions too, in the case of occurring in another action, this is the same principle. However, if for doors there were no occurrence in another door as a door, and for actions there were no occurrence in another door, the distinction of action-doors would be exceedingly well established. It is not, however, that there is no occurrence of actions in another door; on the contrary, actions occur in one door, and other actions also occur in another. But because doors do not occur in other doors, actions, even while occurring in another door, are defined by the causal doors, which do not occur in other doors. Not only are the actions thus defined, but by them, the doors are also defined. Thus, action-doors are mutually defined by the principle of distinction stated as ‘due to general occurrence and frequent occurrence.’ Therein, because actions are dependent on doors, the definition of their state as bodily action, etc., is made by the doors which do not occur in other doors. But it is not that the doors are undefined by actions occurring in other doors, because bodily actions, etc.—which are defined by doors like the body-door that are independent of actions—cause the definition of ‘door of bodily action,’ etc. Alternatively, even while occurring in another door, actions occur only as characterized by the body, etc. This is because killing, etc., are of such a nature, and because even that which is expressed by way of command, hand gesture, etc., is understood as having a nature to be accomplished by the body, etc. Therefore, another door does not give its name to another action occurring within it, nor does an action give its name to the door. Rather, that very door gives its name to the action, and the action, even while occurring in another door, takes the name of its own door. Thus, the mutual distinction is established. Previously, however, the non-binding of actions to the doors was stated with reference only to the movement of actions to other doors, not with reference to this distinction.

Tatthāti tesu dvārakammesu. Kāyakammassa uppajjanaṭṭhānanti taṃsahajātā viññattiyeva vuccati. Kiñcāpi hi sā tassa kenaci pakārena paccayo na hoti, tathāpi kammassa visesikā viññatti taṃsahajātā hotīti tassa uppattiṭṭhānabhāvena vuttā yathāvuttaniyamena aññavisesanassa kammassa visesanantare uppattiabhāvā. Kāyena pana katattāti kāyaviññattiṃ janetvā tāya jīvitindriyupacchedādinipphādanato attano nipphattivasena ‘‘kāyena kataṃ kamma’’nti vuttaṃ. Kāraṇabhūto hi panettha kāyoti.

The word `Tattha` refers to 'among those door-actions'. By 'the place of arising of bodily kamma', the co-arisen intimation itself is meant. For although that intimation is not a condition for it in any way, nevertheless, because the co-arisen intimation distinguishes the kamma, it is spoken of as its place of arising because, according to the stated rule, for a kamma that is distinguished by one thing, there is no arising of another distinguishing feature. As for 'done by the body', it is so called because, having generated bodily intimation and by means of that having accomplished the cutting off of the life faculty and so forth, it is done by way of its own accomplishment. For here, the bodily intimation is indeed the instrumental cause.

Aññamaññaṃ [Pg.75] vavatthitāti ettha kammunā kāyo kāyakammadvāranti evaṃ vavatthito, na kāyo icceva. Yathā sūcikammunā sūcikammakaraṇanti vavatthitā, na sūci icceva, tathā idampi daṭṭhabbaṃ. Aññamaññaṃ vavatthitāti ca aññamaññaṃ visesitāti attho. Evaṃ santeti yathāvuttaṃ vavatthānaniyamaṃ aggahetvā ‘‘dvāre caranti kammānī’’tiādivacanameva gahetvā codeti. Tattha evaṃ santeti kammānaṃ dvāracaraṇe aññamaññena ca vavatthāne nāmalābhe visesane satīti attho.

Here, 'mutually established' means that the body is established by kamma as 'the door of bodily kamma', not merely as 'the body'. Just as a needle, by its action of sewing, is established as 'the instrument for sewing', not merely as 'a needle', so too should this be understood. 'Mutually established' also means 'mutually distinguished'. This being so, not grasping the aforesaid rule of establishment, one raises an objection by taking only the saying, 'kammas proceed through the doors', and so forth. Therein, 'this being so' means: when kammas proceed through the doors and are mutually established, and when there is a distinction in the acquisition of a name.

Kāyakammadvārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the discourse on the door of bodily kamma is concluded.

Vacīkammadvārakathāvaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Door of Verbal Kamma

Catūhi, bhikkhave, aṅgehi samannāgatāti ettha subhāsitabhāsanasaṅkhātā apisuṇavācā, dhammabhāsanasaṅkhāto asamphappalāpo, piyabhāsanasaṅkhātā apharusavācā, saccabhāsanasaṅkhāto amusāvādo cāti etā vācā tathāpavattā cetanā daṭṭhabbā. Sahasaddā panāti tassa vikārassa saddena saha sambhūtattā vuttaṃ. Cittānuparivattitāya pana so na yāva saddabhāvīti daṭṭhabbo, vitakkavipphārasaddo na sotaviññeyyoti pavattena mahāaṭṭhakathāvādena cittasamuṭṭhānasaddo vināpi viññattighaṭṭanena uppajjatīti āpajjati. ‘‘Yā tāya vācāya viññattī’’ti (dha. sa. 636) hi vacanato asotaviññeyyasaddena saha viññattiyā uppatti natthīti viññāyatīti.

Here, in the passage “Endowed with four factors, bhikkhus,” these kinds of speech and the volition that thus occurs should be understood: non-divisive speech, reckoned as well-spoken speech; non-frivolous chatter, reckoned as speech connected with the Dhamma; non-harsh speech, reckoned as pleasant speech; and non-false speech, reckoned as truthful speech. The phrase “with a sound,” however, is said because that alteration, that is, intimation, has arisen together with sound. However, because it follows in sequence with the mind, it should be understood that that intimation does not last as long as the sound. For, by the prevailing view of the Great Commentary, it follows that sound originated from the mind can arise even without the impact of intimation, since the sound of the expansion of thought is not cognizable by the ear. For, because of the statement, “Whatever intimation by that speech” (Dhs §636), it is understood that the arising of intimation does not occur together with a sound not cognizable by the ear.

Cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ saddāyatananti ettha ca na koci cittasamuṭṭhāno saddo asaṅgahito nāma atthīti adhippāyena mahāaṭṭhakathāvādaṃ paṭisedheti. Chabbidhena rūpasaṅgahādīsu hi ‘‘sotaviññeyya’’nti ‘‘diṭṭhaṃ suta’’nti ettha ‘‘suta’’nti ca na koci saddo na saṅgayhatīti. Mahāaṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana viññattisahajameva jivhātālucalanādikaravitakkasamuṭṭhitaṃ sukhumasaddaṃ ‘‘dibbasotena sutvā ādisatī’’ti sutte paṭṭhāne ca oḷārikasaddaṃ sandhāya ‘‘sotaviññāṇassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti vuttanti iminā adhippāyena asotaviññeyyatā vuttā siyā. Saddo [Pg.76] ca asotaviññeyyo cāti viruddhametanti pana paṭikkhepo veditabbo. Viññattipaccayā ghaṭṭanā viññattighaṭṭanā. Viññatti eva vā. Ghaṭṭanākārappavattabhūtavikāro hi ‘‘ghaṭṭanā’’ti vutto. Saṅghaṭṭanena saheva saddo uppajjati, na pubbāparabhāvena. Pathavīdhātuyāti idaṃ vāyodhātuyā viya cālanaṃ pathavīdhātuyā saṅghaṭṭanaṃ kiccaṃ adhikanti katvā vuttaṃ, vikārassa ca tappaccayabhāvo vuttanayeneva veditabbo. Tabbikārānañhi bhūtānaṃ aññamaññassa paccayabhāvoti. Aññampi sabbaṃ vidhānaṃ kāyaviññattiyaṃ viya veditabbaṃ.

And here, in the phrase 'the sound-base originating from consciousness,' the view of the Mahā-aṭṭhakathā is rejected with the intention that 'there is no sound originating from consciousness whatsoever that is not included.' For, in the sixfold classification of matter and so on, by the term 'cognizable by the ear,' and in the phrase 'seen, heard,' by the term 'heard,' there is no sound that is not included. In the Mahā-aṭṭhakathā, however, the state of not being cognizable by the ear might have been stated with this intention: that in the Suttas it is said, 'having heard with the divine ear a subtle sound that arises from the thought which causes the movement of the tongue, palate, etc., and which is exclusively co-nascent with intimation, one points it out'; and in the Paṭṭhāna, referring to a gross sound, it is said, 'it is a condition for ear-consciousness by way of object-condition.' However, the rejection should be understood thus: 'This is a contradiction, that it is a sound and yet not cognizable by the ear.' Friction conditioned by intimation is 'intimation-friction.' Or, it is just intimation itself. Indeed, the alteration of the primary elements occurring in the mode of friction is called 'friction.' Sound arises simultaneously with collision, not in sequence. The phrase 'of the earth element' is stated having considered that, just as motion is the principal function of the air element, so collision is the principal function of the earth element. And the fact of alteration being conditioned by that should be understood in the manner already stated, for of the primary elements possessing that alteration, there is the state of being a condition for one another. Every other procedure should be understood as in the case of bodily intimation.

Tisamuṭṭhānikakāyaṃ…pe… na labbhati. Na hi cālanaṃ upādinnaghaṭṭananti. Cālanañhi desantaruppādanaparamparatā, ghaṭṭanaṃ paccayavisesena bhūtakalāpānaṃ āsannataruppādoti. Upatthambhanakiccampi natthīti upatthambhanena vinā paṭhamacittasamuṭṭhānāpi ghaṭṭanākārena pavattatīti ghaṭṭanatthaṃ upatthambhanena payojanaṃ natthi, laddhāsevanena citteneva ghaṭṭanassa balavabhāvato cāti adhippāyo. Upatthambhanaṃ natthi atthīti vicāretvā gahetabbaṃ.

The passage 'one moves or does not move the body originating from three causes...' is not found here, for motion is not the friction of appropriated matter. For motion is a succession of productions in another location, while friction is the very proximate production of groups of primary elements due to a specific condition. As to the statement 'there is also no function of supporting,' the intention is this: because even what originates from the first consciousness proceeds in the manner of friction without support, there is no purpose for support for the sake of friction, and also because the friction becomes strong through the consciousness that has gained repetition. It should be grasped after investigating whether supporting exists or does not exist.

Vacīkammadvārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the discourse on the door of verbal kamma is concluded.

Manokammadvārakathāvaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Door of Mental Kamma

Ayaṃ nāma cetanā kammaṃ na hotīti na vattabbāti idaṃ yassa dvāraṃ mano, taṃdassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Kappetīti ‘‘tvaṃ phusanaṃ karohi, tvaṃ vedayita’’nti evaṃ kappentaṃ viya pavattatīti attho. Pakappanañca tadeva. Kiṃ piṇḍaṃ karotīti āyūhanatthavasena pucchati. Phassādidhamme hi avippakiṇṇe katvā sakiccesu pavattanaṃ āyūhanaṃ, tattheva byāpāraṇaṃ cetayanaṃ, tathākaraṇaṃ abhisaṅkharaṇanti. Tebhūmakasseva gahaṇaṃ lokuttarakammassa kammakkhayakarattā.

This was said to show that the mind is the door of that cetanā about which it should not be said, 'This cetanā is not kamma.' 'It arranges' (kappeti) means it proceeds as if arranging, 'You perform the contacting; you perform the experiencing'; such is the meaning. And 'arranging' (pakappana) is just that. By 'What does it make into a lump?' he asks by way of the meaning of 'accumulation' (āyūhana). For indeed, causing the dhammas such as contact, etc., having been made unscattered, to proceed in their respective functions is 'accumulation' (āyūhana); exertion right therein is 'intending' (cetayana); and the doing so is 'forming' (abhisaṅkharaṇa). The grasping is only of that which belongs to the three planes, because supramundane kamma has the nature of causing the destruction of kamma.

Manokammadvārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the discourse on the door of mental kamma is concluded.

Kammakathāvaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Discourse on Kamma

Cetayitvā [Pg.77] kammaṃ karotīti ettha yasmā purimacetanāya cetayitvā sanniṭṭhānakammaṃ karoti, tasmā cetanāpubbakaṃ kammaṃ taṃcetanāsabhāvamevāti cetanaṃ ahaṃ kammaṃ vadāmīti attho. Atha vā samānakālattepi kāraṇakiriyā pubbakālā viya vattuṃ yuttā, phalakiriyā ca aparakālā viya. Yasmā ca cetanāya cetayitvā kāyavācāhi copanakiriyaṃ manasā ca abhijjhādikiriyaṃ karoti, tasmā tassā kiriyāya kārikaṃ cetanaṃ ahaṃ kammaṃ vadāmīti attho. Kāye vāti kāyaviññattisaṅkhāte kāye vā. Satīti dharamāne, anirodhite vā. Kāyasamuṭṭhāpikā cetanā kāyasañcetanā. Ettha ca sukhadukkhuppādakena kammena bhavitabbaṃ, cetanā ca sukhadukkhuppādikā vuttāti tassā kammabhāvo siddho hoti. Sañcetaniyanti sañcetanasabhāvavantaṃ. Samiddhittherena ‘‘sañcetaniyaṃ, āvuso…pe… manasā sukhaṃ so vedayatī’’ti (ma. ni. 3.300; kathā. 539) avibhajitvā byākato. Sukhavedanīyantiādinā pana vibhajitvā byākātabbo so pañho, tasmā sammā byākato nāma na hoti. Itaradvayepi eseva nayo. Yathā pana suttāni ṭhitāni, tathā copanakiriyānissayabhūtā kāyavācā abhijjhādikiriyānissayo ca manodvārāni, yāya pana cetanāya tehi kāyādīhi karaṇabhūtehi copanābhijjhādikiriyaṃ karonti vāsiādīhi viya chedanādiṃ, sā cetanā kammanti dvārappavattiyampi kammadvārābhedanañca kammadvāravavatthānañca dissati, evañca sati ‘‘kāyena ce kataṃ kamma’’ntiādigāthāyo (dha. sa. aṭṭha. 1 kāyakammadvāra) ativiya yujjanti.

‘Having intended, one performs kamma’—in this context, because having been impelled by a prior volition, one performs a decisive kamma, therefore kamma has volition as its forerunner and has the very nature of that volition; for this reason, ‘I say that volition is kamma’ is the meaning. Alternatively, even when they are simultaneous, the causal action is fit to be spoken of as if prior in time, and the resultant action as if subsequent. And because, having been impelled by volition, one performs the impelling action with body and speech, and with the mind performs actions such as covetousness, therefore, ‘I say that the volition which is the agent of that action is kamma’ is the meaning. ‘In the body’ means in the body which is designated as bodily intimation. ‘Existing’ means while it is present, or while it has not ceased. The volition that originates the body is bodily volition. And here, kamma must be that which produces pleasure and pain, and since volition is said to be a producer of pleasure and pain, its nature as kamma is established. ‘To be intended’ means possessing the nature of volition. The Elder Samiddhi answered without analysis: ‘To be intended, friend… with the mind, he experiences pleasure’ (MN 3.300; Kathā. 539). But that question should be answered by analyzing it with reference to ‘productive of pleasant feeling,’ etc.; therefore, it is not what is called a correct answer. In the other two cases, this is the same method. However, just as the suttas stand, so the body and speech, which are the support for the impelling action, and the mind, which is the support for actions such as covetousness, are the doors. But the volition by which, with that body, etc., as instruments, they perform the impelling action and actions such as covetousness—like performing actions such as cutting with an axe, etc.—that volition is kamma. Thus, even in the functioning of the doors, the distinction between kamma and the doors and the determination of kamma and the doors are seen. This being so, the verses beginning with ‘If kamma is done by the body…’ (Dhs-a. 1, Kāyakammadvāra) are exceedingly fitting.

Lokuttaramaggo idha lokiyakammakathāyaṃ anadhippetopi bhajāpiyamāno tīṇi kammāni bhajati. Manena dussīlyanti kāyikavācasikavītikkamavajjaṃ sabbaṃ akusalaṃ saṅgaṇhāti, micchādiṭṭhisaṅkappavāyāmasatisamādhiṃ vā. Tampi cetaṃ ‘‘manasā saṃvaro sādhū’’ti (saṃ. ni. 1.116; dha. pa. 361) vuttassa saṃvarassa paṭipakkhavasena vuttaṃ, na sīlavipattivasena. Na hi sā mānasikā atthīti maggasseva bhajāpanaṃ mahāvisayattā. Bojjhaṅgā hi manokammameva bhajeyyuṃ, na ca na sakkā maggabhajāpaneneva tesaṃ bhajāpanaṃ viññātunti.

The supramundane path, though not intended here in the discourse on worldly kamma, when it is made to be included, pertains to the three kammas. By 'misconduct by mind' is included all that is unwholesome, excluding the transgression of bodily and verbal faults, or wrong view, wrong thought, wrong effort, wrong mindfulness, and wrong concentration. And this is stated by way of being the opposite of the restraint spoken of as 'restraint by mind is good,' not by way of a corruption of virtue. For that which is mental does not exist. Thus, the inclusion of the path itself is due to its vast scope. For the factors of enlightenment would pertain only to mental kamma, and it is indeed possible to understand their inclusion by the very inclusion of the path.

Kammapathaṃ [Pg.78] appattānampi taṃtaṃdvāre saṃsandanaṃ avarodhanaṃ dvārantare kammantaruppattiyampi kammadvārābhedanañca dvārasaṃsandanaṃ nāma. ‘‘Tividhā, bhikkhave, kāyasañcetanā akusalaṃ kāyakamma’’ntiādinā (kathā. 539) kammapathappattāva sanniṭṭhāpakacetanā kammanti vuttāti purimacetanā sabbā kāyakammaṃ na hotīti vuttaṃ. Āṇāpetvā…pe… alabhantassāti āṇattehi amāritabhāvaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, vacīduccaritaṃ nāma hoti akammapathabhāvatoti adhippāyo. ‘‘Ime sattā haññantū’’ti pavattabyāpādavasena cetanāpakkhikā vā bhavanti kāyakammavohāralābhā. Abbohārikā vā manokammavohāravirahā. Sasambhārapathavīādīsu āpādayo ettha nidassanaṃ.

Even for kammas that have not reached the course of action, the connecting at the respective doors—the containment, even when another kamma arises at another door—and the non-breaching of the kamma-doors, is called 'connecting of the doors.' By the text beginning, 'Threefold, O monks, is bodily volition, unwholesome bodily kamma,' etc. (Kathā. 539), it is said that only the completing volition that has reached the course of action is called kamma; therefore, it is said that all prior volitions do not constitute bodily kamma. The phrase 'Having commanded... not obtaining' is said with reference to the state of not being killed by those who were commanded. The intention is: it is not called verbal misconduct because of its not being a course of action. Or, by way of the malevolence that proceeds as 'Let these beings be killed!', they are on the side of volition because of gaining the designation of bodily kamma. Or they are without designation, due to the absence of the designation 'mental kamma.' In things like the earth together with its components, water and so on are an example here.

Kulumbassāti gabbhassa, kulasseva vā. Tissopi saṅgītiyo āruḷhatāya ananujānanato ‘‘tava suttassā’’ti vuttaṃ. Dasavidhā iddhi paṭisambhidāmagge iddhikathāya gahetabbā. Bhāvanāmayanti adhiṭṭhāniddhiṃ sandhāya vadati. Ghaṭabhedo viya parūpaghāto, udakavināso viya iddhivināso ca hotīti upamā saṃsandati. Tava pañhoti bhāvanāmayāya parūpaghāto hotīti vutto ñāpetuṃ icchito attho. Āthabbaṇiddhi vijjāmayiddhi hoti. Sattame padeti maṇḍalādito sattame pade.

“Of the womb” means of the embryo, or of the family. Because of not approving of its having been included in the three Councils, it was said, “your sutta.” The ten kinds of psychic power should be taken from the discussion on psychic power in the Paṭisambhidāmagga. “Born of development” is said with reference to the psychic power of determination. Just as there is the breaking of a pot, so there is the harming of another; and just as there is the destruction of water, so there is the destruction of psychic power—thus the simile corresponds. “Your question”—the intended meaning is to make known that the harming of another occurs by means of development-born psychic power. The Āthabbaṇa psychic power is knowledge-born psychic power. “In the seventh step” means in the seventh step from the circle, etc.

Vacanantarena gametabbatthaṃ neyyatthaṃ, sayameva gamitabbatthaṃ nītatthaṃ. Kiriyato samuṭṭhāti, udāhu akiriyatoti tenādhippetaṃ sampajānamusāvādaṃ sandhāya pucchati, na uposathakkhandhake vuttaṃ. Tattha avuttameva hi so anariyavohāraṃ vuttanti gahetvā voharatīti. Vācāgiranti vācāsaṅkhātaṃ giraṃ, vācānuccāraṇaṃ vā.

A teaching whose meaning is to be understood through another statement is one “requiring interpretation” (neyyattha); a teaching whose meaning is to be understood from the text itself is one with “explicit meaning” (nītattha). “Does it arise from action, or from inaction?”—this he asks with reference to the intentional false speech intended by him, not that which was spoken of in the Uposathakkhandhaka. For there, he speaks by taking up an ignoble expression that was not stated as if it were stated. “Vācāgiraṃ” means the sound designated as speech, or the utterance of speech.

Khandasivādayo seṭṭhāti khandāti kumārā. Sivāti mahessarā, micchādiṭṭhiyā nidassanatthamidaṃ vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Natthikadiṭṭhādayo eva hi kammapathappattā kammanti. Cetanā panettha abbohārikāti kāyadvāre vacīdvāre ca samuṭṭhitāpi kāyakammaṃ vacīkammanti ca vohāraṃ na labhati abhijjhādippadhānattā. ‘‘Tividhā, bhikkhave, manosañcetanā akusalaṃ manokamma’’nti pana vacanato sabhāveneva sā manokammaṃ, na abhijjhādipakkhikattāti ‘‘abhijjhādipakkhikāvā’’ti na vuttaṃ. Imasmiṃ pana ṭhāne kāyaṅgavācaṅgāni acopetvā cintanakāle cetanāpi cetanāsampayuttadhammāpi manodvāre [Pg.79] eva samuṭṭhahanti, tasmā cetanāya abbohārikabhāvo kathañci natthīti adhippāyo.

In the phrase “Khanda, Siva, and others are the best,” “Khanda” means the Kumāras. “Siva” means the Mahessaras. This should be understood as stated for the purpose of illustrating wrong view. Indeed, only nihilistic views and the like, having reached the course of action, are kamma. Here, volition is “not conventionally designated” because, although it has arisen at the body-door and the speech-door, it does not receive the designation “bodily kamma” or “verbal kamma” due to the predominance of covetousness and so forth. However, according to the text, “Monks, threefold is mental volition, unwholesome mental kamma,” that volition, by its very own nature, is mental kamma, not because it belongs to the side of covetousness and so forth. Therefore, it was not said “or belonging to the side of covetousness and so forth.” But in this case, without impelling the bodily and verbal members, at the time of thinking, both volition and the mental factors associated with volition arise only at the mind-door. Therefore, the state of volition being “not conventionally designated” does not exist in any way whatsoever—this is the intended meaning.

‘‘Tividhā, bhikkhave, kāyasañcetanā kusalaṃ kāyakamma’’ntiādivacanato (kathā. 539) pāṇātipātādipaṭipakkhabhūtā tabbirativisiṭṭhā cetanāva pāṇātipātaviratiādikā hontīti ‘‘cetanāpakkhikā vā’’ti vuttaṃ, na ‘‘viratipakkhikā’’ti. Rakkhatīti avināsetvā katheti. Bhindatīti vināsetvā katheti.

Because of the statement, “Monks, threefold is wholesome bodily volition, wholesome bodily kamma,” etc. (Kv 539), volitions themselves, being the opposite of killing living beings, etc., and characterized by abstention from that, are abstention from killing living beings, etc. Thus, it is said to be “on the side of volition,” and not “on the side of abstention.” “Protects” means one speaks without destroying. “Breaks” means one speaks having destroyed.

Kammakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Kamma is concluded.

Cakkhuviññāṇadvāranti cakkhuviññāṇassa dvāraṃ. Cakkhu ca taṃ viññāṇadvārañcāti vā cakkhuviññāṇadvāraṃ. Cakkhu viññāṇadvāranti vā asamāsaniddeso. Taṃ pana cakkhumeva. Esa nayo sesesupi. ‘‘Cakkhunā saṃvaro sādhū’’tiādikāya (dha. pa. 360) gāthāya pasādakāyacopanakāyasaṃvare ekajjhaṃ katvā kāyena saṃvaro vutto, taṃ idha bhinditvā aṭṭha saṃvarā, tappaṭipakkhabhāvena asaṃvarā aṭṭha kathitā. Sīlasaṃvarādayopi pañceva saṃvarā sabbadvāresu uppajjamānāpi, tappaṭipakkhabhāvena dussīlyādīni asaṃvarāti vuttāni. Tattha dussīlyaṃ pāṇātipātādicetanā. Muṭṭhassaccaṃ satipaṭipakkhā akusalā dhammā. Pamādanti keci. Sītādīsu paṭigho akkhanti. Thinamiddhaṃ kosajjaṃ.

“The door of eye-consciousness” means the door of eye-consciousness. Or, “the eye and that door of consciousness” is the door of eye-consciousness. Or, “the eye, the door of consciousness” is an uncompounded explanation. But that is just the eye. This method applies to the rest as well. In the verse beginning “Restraint with the eye is good” (Dhp. 360), restraint of the sensitive body and restraint of the impelling body are combined, and “restraint by way of the body” is spoken of. Here, by dividing that, eight restraints are spoken of, and by way of being their opposites, eight non-restraints are spoken of. The restraints beginning with virtue-restraint, although arising at all doors, are just five restraints. By way of being their opposites, the states beginning with immorality are called non-restraints. Therein, immorality is the volition for killing living beings, etc. Forgetfulness means unwholesome states that are the opposite of mindfulness. Some say it is heedlessness. Aversion on account of cold, etc., is impatience. Sloth and torpor are laziness.

Vinā vacīdvārena suddhaṃ kāyadvārasaṅkhātanti idaṃ vacīdvārasallakkhitassa musāvādādinopi kāyadvāre pavattisabbhāvā asuddhatā atthīti taṃnivāraṇatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Na hi taṃ kāyakammaṃ hoti. Suddhavacīdvāropalakkhitaṃ pana vacīkammameva hotīti. Ettha asaṃvaroti etena suddhakāyadvārena upalakkhito asaṃvaro dvārantare uppajjamānopi vutto. Dvārantarānupalakkhitaṃ sabbaṃ taṃdvārikākusalañceti veditabbaṃ. Evañca katvā kammapathasaṃsandane ‘‘copanakāyaasaṃvaradvāravasena uppajjamāno asaṃvaro akusalaṃ kāyakammameva hotī’’tiādi ‘‘akusalaṃ kāyakammaṃ copanakāyaasaṃvaradvāravasena vacīasaṃvaravasena ca uppajjatī’’tiādinā saha aviruddhaṃ hoti. Asaṃvaro hi dvārantare [Pg.80] uppajjamānopi sadvāre evāti vuccati, sadvāravasena uppannoti ca, kammaṃ aññadvāre aññadvāravasena cāti evaṃ aviruddhaṃ.

The phrase 'what is called the pure bodily door, without the verbal door' is stated to prevent the conclusion of impurity, which exists because even falsehood, etc., characterized by the verbal door, can actually occur through the bodily door. For that is not bodily kamma. However, what is characterized by the pure verbal door is solely verbal kamma. Here, by 'non-restraint' is meant the non-restraint characterized by the pure bodily door, even when it arises in another door. And it should be known that all unwholesomeness occurring through that door, not being characterized by another door, is also stated. And because of this, in the Correlation of the Courses of Action, the statement beginning with, 'The non-restraint arising by way of the impelling bodily non-restraint door is only unwholesome bodily kamma,' is not contradictory with the statement beginning with, 'Unwholesome bodily kamma arises by way of the impelling bodily non-restraint door and by way of verbal non-restraint.' For non-restraint, even when arising in another door, is said to be only in its own door and to have arisen by way of its own door; and kamma, even when arising in one door, is said to have arisen by way of another door. In this way, there is no contradiction.

Atha vā etthāti suddhaṃ asuddhanti etaṃ avicāretvā etasmiṃ copaneti vuttaṃ hoti. Evaṃ sati dvārantaropalakkhitaṃ kammapathabhāvappattatāya vacīmanokammaṃ copanakāyaasaṃvaradvāre uppannaṃ, sesaṃ sabbaṃ taṃdvāruppannākusalaṃ viya ‘‘copanakāyaasaṃvaro’’ti vuccati. Kammapathabhāvappattiyā dvārantaruppannaṃ kāyakammañca tathā na vuccatīti kammapathasaṃsandanavirodho siyā, tadavirodhaṃ tattheva vakkhāma. Sīlasaṃvarādayo pañca nikkhepakaṇḍe āvi bhavissanti. Tattha ñāṇasaṃvare paccayasannissitasīlassa, vīriyasaṃvare ca ājīvapārisuddhiyā antogadhatā daṭṭhabbā.

Alternatively, here, without investigating 'pure' and 'impure,' it is said to mean 'in this impelling [door].' This being the case, verbal and mental kamma—which is characterized by another door and has arisen in the impelling bodily non-restraint door, due to having reached the state of a course of action—is called 'impelling bodily non-restraint,' just like all other unwholesomeness that has arisen in that door. And because it has reached the state of a course of action, bodily kamma that has arisen in another door is not called thus; therefore, there would be a contradiction with the Correlation of the Courses of Action. We will explain the non-contradiction of that right there [in that section]. The five [restraints] beginning with virtue-restraint will become clear in the chapter on classification. Therein, the inclusion of the virtue dependent on requisites in knowledge-restraint, and the inclusion of the purity of livelihood in effort-restraint, should be seen.

Akusalakammapathakathāvaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Discourse on the Unwholesome Courses of Action

Saraseneva ca patanasabhāvassa pāṇassa antarā eva atīva pātanaṃ atipāto, saṇikaṃ patituṃ adatvāva sīghaṃ pātananti attho. Atikkamma vā satthādīhi abhibhavitvā pātanaṃ atipāto. Payogavatthumahantatādīhi mahāsāvajjatā tehi paccayehi uppajjamānāya cetanāya balavabhāvato. Yathāvuttapaccayavipariyāyepi taṃtaṃpaccayehi uppajjamānāya cetanāya balavābalavavaseneva appasāvajjamahāsāvajjatā veditabbā. Iddhimayo kammavipākajiddhimayo dāṭhākoṭikādīnaṃ viya.

Causing a being, whose nature is to fall, to fall very swiftly even within its lifespan is atipāta (killing); the meaning is causing to fall quickly, without allowing it to fall slowly. Or, overpowering with weapons and the like and causing to fall is atipāta. Great blameworthiness arises from the greatness of the effort, the object, and so on, because of the strength of the volition arising from those conditions. Even when the aforesaid conditions are reversed, minor blameworthiness and great blameworthiness should be understood according to the strength or weakness of the volition arising from those respective conditions. Iddhimayo (produced by psychic power) means produced by psychic power that is the result of kamma, like that of Dāṭhākoṭika and others.

Gottarakkhitā sagottehi rakkhitā. Dhammarakkhitā sahadhammikehi rakkhitā. Sasāmikā sārakkhā. Yassā gamane raññā daṇḍo ṭhapito, sā saparidaṇḍā. Atthabhañjakoti kammapathappattaṃ vuttaṃ. Kammapathakathā hesāti. Attano santakaṃ adātukāmatāyātiādi musāvādasāmaññato vuttaṃ. Hasādhippāyena visaṃvādanapurekkhārasseva musāvādo. Suññabhāvanti pītivirahitatāya rittataṃ. Atthavipannatāya na hadayaṅgamā. Aggaṇhanteti asaddahante kammapathabhedo na hoti. Yo koci pana samphappalāpo dvīhi sambhārehi sijjhatīti. Attano pariṇāmanaṃ cittenevāti veditabbaṃ. Micchā passatīti vitathaṃ passati.

One protected by her clan (gottarakkhitā) means one protected by her kinsmen. One protected by the Dhamma (dhammarakkhitā) means one protected by her fellow practitioners. One who has a master (sasāmikā) is one who is guarded (sārakkhā). She for whom the king has established a penalty for going about is one subject to penalty (saparidaṇḍā). By atthabhañjako ('one who destroys the benefit') is meant the deception that constitutes a course of action (kammapatha). For this is a discussion on the courses of action. The passage beginning 'due to unwillingness to give what belongs to oneself' is stated because of its general similarity to false speech. False speech occurs only for one who has the aim of deceiving, even with an intention of jesting. 'Emptiness' (suññabhāva) means voidness due to being devoid of joy. Because its meaning is corrupt, it is not heart-captivating. Regarding 'when they do not accept' (aggaṇhante): when they do not believe, there is no breach of the course of action. However, any frivolous talk is accomplished through two requisites. It should be understood that diverting [it] to oneself is by mind only. 'He sees wrongly' (micchā passati) means he sees falsely.

Koṭṭhāsatoti [Pg.81] phassapañcamakādīsu cittaṅgakoṭṭhāsesu ye koṭṭhāsā honti, tatoti attho. Nanu ca cetanā kammapathesu na vuttāti paṭipāṭiyā sattannaṃ kammapathabhāvo na yuttoti? Na, avacanassa aññahetuttā. Na hi cetanāya akammapathattā kammapatharāsimhi avacanaṃ, kadāci pana kammapatho hoti, na sabbadāti kammapathabhāvassa aniyatattā avacanaṃ. Yadā pana kammapatho hoti, tadā kammapatharāsisaṅgaho na nivāritoti. ‘‘Pañca sikkhāpadā parittārammaṇā evā’’ti etena adinnādānādīnaṃ sattārammaṇabhāvavirodhaṃ ‘‘sattasaṅkhāte saṅkhāre eva ārabbha pavattito’’ti sayameva pariharissati. ‘‘Natthi sattā opapātikā’’ti pavattamānā diṭṭhi tebhūmakadhammavisayāvāti saṅkhārārammaṇatā vuttā. Vipākanissandaphalāni yathākkamaṃ nirayādivipākaduggatatādīni.

As to 'portion' (koṭṭhāsa): this means those portions that exist among the divisions that are constituents of the mind, such as the group of five beginning with contact. Is it not so that volition (cetanā) is not mentioned in the paths of kamma (kammapatha), and therefore, the state of being a path of kamma for the seven [unwholesome actions], in sequence, is not suitable? No, because its non-mentioning has another reason. Indeed, its non-mentioning in the collection of paths of kamma is not because volition is not a path of kamma; rather, its non-mentioning is because its state as a path of kamma is not fixed—sometimes it is a path of kamma, and not always. But when it is a path of kamma, its inclusion in the collection of paths of kamma is not prevented. By this [statement], 'The five training precepts have only limited objects,' the commentator himself will resolve the contradiction of the state of having a living being as an object for [actions] such as taking what is not given, with [the explanation] 'because it arises in regard to formations designated as a "living being."' The view that arises, 'There are no spontaneously arisen beings,' has as its object only the phenomena of the three planes; therefore, its state of having formations as its object is stated. The resultant-fruits and flowing-on-fruits are, respectively, the resultant-consciousness of hell, etc., and the state of being ill-favored, etc.

Akusalakammapathakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Unwholesome Paths of Kamma is concluded.

Kusalakammapathakathāvaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Wholesome Paths of Kamma

Pāṇātipātādīhi pana viratiyoti etaṃ yāhi viratīhi sampayuttā cetanā ‘‘kāyavacīkammānī’’ti vuccanti, tāsañca kammapathabhāvo yuttoti katvā vuttaṃ. Tathā hi vakkhati ‘‘paṭipāṭiyā satta cetanāpi vaṭṭanti viratiyopī’’ti. Allasasamaṃsanti jīvamānakasasamaṃsaṃ. Voropetā hutvā nābhijānāmi. Dussīlyādārammaṇā tadārammaṇā. Jīvitindriyādiārammaṇā kathaṃ dussīlyādīni pajahantīti taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘yathā panā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Anabhijjhā…pe… viramantassāti abhijjhaṃ pajahantassāti attho. Na hi manoduccaritā virati atthi anabhijjhādīheva tappahānato.

This phrase, 'abstinence from killing living beings, etc.,' was stated having considered that the volitions associated with whichever abstinences are called 'bodily and verbal kamma,' and that their state as a path of kamma is also suitable. For this reason, it will be said: 'In sequence, seven volitions also apply, and the abstinences also.' As to 'fresh hare's flesh' (allasasamaṃsaṃ): it means the flesh of a still-living hare. 'Having deprived [of life], I do not know.' They have unvirtuousness, etc., as their object (dussīlyādārammaṇā), meaning they have those same objects (tadārammaṇā). How can [the wholesome paths of kamma], which have the life-faculty, etc., as their object, abandon unvirtuousness, etc.? To show this, the passage beginning 'As for how...' was stated. The phrase 'for one abstaining... from non-covetousness...' means 'for one who is abandoning covetousness.' Indeed, there is no abstinence from mental misconduct, because it is abandoned by non-covetousness, etc., themselves.

Kammapathasaṃsandanakathāvaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Alignment of the Paths of Kamma

Kammapathappattānaṃ dussīlyādīnaṃ asaṃvarānaṃ tathā duccaritānañca akusalakammapathehi kammapathappattānameva ca susīlyādīnaṃ saṃvarānaṃ tathā sucaritānañca kusalakammapathehi atthato nānattābhāvadassanaṃ. Atha vā tesaṃ phassadvārādīhi avirodhabhāvena dīpanaṃ kammapathasaṃsandananti keci vadanti[Pg.82], tadetaṃ vicāretabbaṃ. Na hi pañcaphassadvārapañcaasaṃvaradvārapañcasaṃvaradvāresu uppannānaṃ asaṃvarānaṃ saṃvarānañca kammapathatā atthi pāṇātipātādīnaṃ parasantakavatthulobhaparasattārammaṇabyāpādaahetukadiṭṭhiādīnañca tesu dvāresu anuppattito. Tividhakaāyaduccaritādīni ca kammapathāti pākaṭā evāti kiṃ tesaṃ kammapathehi nānattābhāvadassanena, na ca duccaritānaṃ sucaritānañca phassadvārādivasena uppatti dīpitā, nāpi asaṃvarānaṃ saṃvarānañca yato tesaṃ phassadvārādīhi avirodhabhāvena dīpanā siyā, kevalaṃ pana phassadvārādivasena uppannānaṃ asaṃvarānaṃ saṃvarānañca kāyakammāditā dīpitā. Yadi ca ettakaṃ kammapathasaṃsandanaṃ, ‘‘akusalaṃ kāyakammaṃ pañcaphassadvāravasena nuppajjatī’’tiādi kammapathasaṃsandanaṃ na siyā. Esāpi chaphassadvārādīhi avirodhadīpanāti ce, vuttameva pakārantarena dassetuṃ ‘‘atha vā’’ti na vattabbaṃ. Samuccayatthe ca atha vā-sadde kammapathappattāneva dussīlyādīni kāyakammādināmehi vadantehi manokammassa chaphassadvāravasena uppatti na vattabbā. Na hi taṃ cakkhudvārādivasena uppajjatīti. Yadi ca kammapathappattā eva asaṃvarādayo gahitā, duccaritehi aññesaṃ asaṃvarānaṃ abhāvā tesañca taṃtaṃkammabhāvassa vuttattā ‘‘copanakāyaasaṃvaradvāravasena uppanno asaṃvaro akusalaṃ kāyakammameva hotī’’tiādi na vattabbaṃ siyā. Vuccamāne hi tasmiṃ saṅkaro siyā, vacīmanokammānipi hi kāyadvāre uppajjanti, tathā sesadvāresupi kammantarānīti.

It is the demonstration that, in essence, there is no difference between non-restraints such as immorality, etc., and misconducts that have reached the course of action, and the unwholesome courses of action; and likewise, that there is no difference between restraints such as good morality, etc., and good conducts that have indeed reached the course of action, and the wholesome courses of action. Alternatively, some say that the demonstration of their non-opposition with the doors of contact, etc., is the alignment of the courses of action. That should be examined. For there is no state of being a course of action for the non-restraints and restraints arising in the five doors of contact, the five doors of non-restraint, or the five doors of restraint, because killing living beings, etc., covetousness for others' property, ill will with other beings as its object, groundless view, etc., do not arise in those doors. And since the threefold bodily misconduct, etc., are indeed well-known as courses of action, what is the use of demonstrating their non-difference from the courses of action? Neither is the arising of misconducts or good conducts by way of the doors of contact, etc., demonstrated, nor that of non-restraints or restraints, such that there could be a demonstration of their non-opposition with the doors of contact, etc. Rather, only the state of being bodily action, etc., of non-restraints and restraints arising by way of the doors of contact, etc., is demonstrated. And if this much is the alignment of the courses of action, the statement beginning with 'unwholesome bodily action does not arise by way of the five doors of contact' would not be an alignment of the courses of action. If it is said that this too is a demonstration of non-opposition with the six doors of contact, etc., then 'alternatively' should not be said in order to show in another way what has already been said. And when the word 'alternatively' has the meaning of combination, those who say that immorality, etc., that have reached the course of action are designated only by the names of bodily action, etc., should not state that mental action arises by way of the six doors of contact. For it does not arise by way of the eye-door, etc. And if only non-restraints, etc., that have reached the course of action are taken, then because of the absence of other non-restraints apart from misconducts, and because their state as this or that action has been stated, it should not be said that 'Moreover, the non-restraint arisen by way of the body-door of non-restraint is itself unwholesome bodily action,' etc. For if that were said, there would be confusion, since verbal and mental actions also arise in the body-door, and likewise other actions arise in the remaining doors.

Atha pana dvārantare uppajjamānaṃ kammantarampi taṃdvārikakammameva siyā, ‘‘tividhaṃ kāyaduccaritaṃ akusalaṃ kāyakammamevā’’tiādi, ‘‘akusalaṃ kāyakammaṃ copanakāyaasaṃvaradvāravasena vācāasaṃvaradvāravasena ca uppajjatī’’tiādi ca virujjheyya. Duccaritānañhi aññadvāracaraṇaṃ atthi, na cassa dvārantaruppannaṃ kammantaraṃ hotīti. Tasmā heṭṭhā kammapathappattānaṃ eva kāyakammādibhāvassa vuttattā sesānañca taṃtaṃdvāruppannānaṃ kusalākusalānaṃ dvārasaṃsandane taṃtaṃdvārapakkhikabhāvassa katattā idha kammapathaṃ appattānañca cetanābhāvato akammānañca asaṃvarānaṃ saṃvarānañca bhajāpiyamānānaṃ kammapathānaṃ viya kāyakammāditādīpanaṃ, kammapathappattānaṃ tividhakāyaduccaritādīnaṃ tividhakāyasucaritādīnañca dvārantaracaraṇepi kāyakammādibhāvāvijahanadīpanaṃ, yathāpakāsitānañca kammapathabhāvaṃ pattānaṃ [Pg.83] apattānañca akusalakāyakammādīnañca kusalakāyakammādīnañca phassadvārādīhi uppattipakāsanañca kammapathasaṃsandanaṃ nāma. Kasmā? Akammapathānaṃ kammapathesu kammapathānañca akammapathesu samānanāmatāvasena, kammapathānaṃ kammapathesu sāmaññanāmāvijahanavasena, ubhayesañca uppattivasena dvāresu ettha saṃsanditattā.

Or, if even another kamma arising in another door were only a kamma of that door, the statement beginning with, ‘The threefold bodily misconduct is unwholesome bodily kamma,’ and the statement beginning with, ‘Unwholesome bodily kamma… arises,’ would be contradicted. For misconducts do occur in another door, yet it does not become another kamma when arisen in another door. Therefore, because it has been stated below that the state of being bodily kamma, etc., belongs only to those that have reached the course of kamma, and because for the remaining wholesome and unwholesome states arising in their respective doors, their belonging to those respective doors has been established in the Correlation of Doors, the ‘Correlation of the Courses of Kamma’ is so called for the following: the exposition here of being bodily kamma, etc.—like the courses of kamma—for those that have not reached the course of kamma, for non-kammas due to the absence of volition, and for non-restraints and restraints that are being included; the exposition of the non-abandonment of the state of being bodily kamma, etc., for the threefold bodily misconducts, etc., and the threefold bodily good conducts, etc., that have reached the course of kamma, even when they occur in another door; and the explanation of the arising through the doors of contact, etc., of the unwholesome bodily kammas, etc., and the wholesome bodily kammas, etc., as have been shown, whether they have reached the state of a course of kamma or have not. Why? Because here, those that are not courses of kamma are correlated with courses of kamma, and courses of kamma with those that are not courses of kamma, by way of having a similar name; because courses of kamma are correlated with courses of kamma by way of not abandoning the general name; and because both are correlated by way of their arising in the doors.

Tattha tividhakammadvāravasena uppannānaṃ kammānaṃ ñātakammabhāvatāya taṃtaṃkammabhāvassa avacanīyattā kammadvāresu tesaṃ uppattiyā ca vuttattā pañcaviññāṇadvāravasena asaṃvarādīnaṃ uppattipariyāyavacanābhāvato ca kammadvāraviññāṇadvārāni virajjhitvā ‘‘pañcaphassadvāravasena hi uppanno’’tiādi vuttaṃ. ‘‘Yampidaṃ cakkhusamphassapaccayā uppajjati sukhaṃ vā’’tiādinā ‘‘cakkhusamphassapaccayā vedanākkhandho atthi kusalo’’tiādinā ca pañcaphassadvāravasena asaṃvarādīnaṃ uppattipariyāyo vutto, na ca ‘‘yamidaṃ cakkhuviññāṇapaccayā’’tiādivacanaṃ atthīti. Vuttampi cetaṃ ‘‘cakkhuviññāṇasahajāto hi phasso cakkhusamphasso’’tiādi (dha. sa. 1 kammakathā; mahāni. aṭṭha. 86). Tena hi asaṃvarānaṃ saṃvarānañca cakkhusamphassādīhi asahajātattā manosamphassasahajātānañca cakkhusamphassadvārādivasena uppatti dīpitāti. ‘‘So hi kāyadvāre copanaṃ patto akusalaṃ kāyakammaṃ hotī’’tiādinā ‘‘copanakāyaasaṃvaradvāravasena uppanno akusalaṃ kāyakammameva hotī’’tiādinā ca vacīkammādīnañca kammapathappattānaṃ asaṃvarabhūtānaṃ kāyakammādibhāve āpanne ‘‘catubbidhaṃ vacīduccaritaṃ akusalaṃ vacīkammameva hotī’’tiādinā apavādena nivatti daṭṭhabbā. Evañca katvā pubbe dassitesu asaṃvaravinicchayesu dutiyavinicchayesu ca na koci virodho. Na hi vacīkammādibhūto copanakāyaasaṃvaro kāyakammādi hotīti.

Here, regarding the actions that have arisen by way of the three action-doors: because of their nature as known actions, and because their respective natures as those actions are not fit to be stated, and because their arising in the action-doors has already been stated, and also because there is no statement explaining the mode of arising of non-restraint and so on by way of the five consciousness-doors, having avoided the action-doors and the consciousness-doors, it is said, “Indeed, it arises by way of the five contact-doors,” and so on. By the words beginning with, “Whatever feeling arises conditioned by eye-contact, whether pleasant,” and by the words beginning with, “Conditioned by eye-contact, there is a wholesome feeling aggregate,” the mode of arising of non-restraint and so on by way of the five contact-doors is stated; and there is no statement such as, “whatever is conditioned by eye-consciousness.” And this is also stated: “For contact co-arisen with eye-consciousness is eye-contact,” and so on. Therefore, because non-restraints and restraints are not co-arisen with eye-contact and so on, the arising by way of the eye-contact-door and so on of those that are co-arisen with mind-contact only is explained. By the words beginning with, “For that, having reached impulsion at the body-door, becomes unwholesome bodily action,” and by the words beginning with, “Arisen by way of the door of non-restraint of bodily impulsion, it becomes unwholesome bodily action itself,” when verbal actions and so on, which have reached the path of action and have become non-restraint, have attained the state of bodily actions and so on, the prevention of this by way of refutation with statements such as, “The fourfold verbal misconduct becomes unwholesome verbal action itself,” should be understood. This being the case, there is no contradiction in the determinations of non-restraint and in the second determinations shown previously. For the non-restraint of bodily impulsion, which has become verbal action and so on, is not bodily action and so on.

Akusalaṃ manokammaṃ pana chaphassadvāravasena uppajjati, taṃ kāyavacīdvāresu copanaṃ pattaṃ akusalaṃ kāyavacīkammaṃ hotīti ettha kiṃ taṃ akusalaṃ manokammaṃ nāma, heṭṭhā dassitanayena ca kāyavacīdvāresu uppannaṃ tividhaṃ manoduccaritaṃ copanaṃ appattaṃ sabbākusalañca. Yadi evaṃ tassa kāyavacīkammabhāvo natthīti ‘‘copanappattaṃ kāyavacīkammaṃ hotī’’ti na yujjatīti[Pg.84]? No na yujjati copanappattaṃ kāye vācāya ca akusalaṃ kammaṃ hotīti atthasiddhito. Kammaṃ pana hontaṃ kiṃ kammaṃ hotīti? Manokammameva hotīti. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – copanappattaṃ akusalaṃ kāyadvāre vacīdvāre ca manokammaṃ hotīti. Atha vā taṃ-saddassa manokammena sambandhaṃ akatvā chaphassadvāravasena yaṃ uppajjati, tanti yathāvuttauppādamattaparicchinnena sambandho kātabbo. Kiṃ pana tanti? Kammakathāya pavattamānattā kammanti viññāyati, tañca manosamphassadvāre uppajjamānampi tividhaṃ kammaṃ hotīti. Yathā taṃ hoti, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘kāyavacīdvāresu copanaṃ patta’’ntiādimāha. Tattha niyamassa akatattā copanappatti upalakkhaṇabhāvena kāyavacīkammanāmasādhikāva, na pana sabbampi copanappattaṃ kāyavacīkammameva, nāpi kusalapakkhe copanaṃ appattaṃ kāyavacīkammaṃ na hotīti ayamattho siddhova hotīti.

Regarding the statement, “Unwholesome mental action, however, arises by way of the six contact-doors; when it has reached impulsion in the bodily and verbal doors, it becomes unwholesome bodily and verbal action”: here, what is that which is called unwholesome mental action? It is, by the method shown below, the threefold mental misconduct that has arisen in the bodily and verbal doors, and all unwholesome states that have not reached impulsion. If so, since this does not have the nature of bodily or verbal action, is the statement, “what reaches impulsion becomes bodily or verbal action,” not fitting? No, it is not unfitting; it is fitting because the meaning is established that what reaches impulsion becomes unwholesome action in body or speech. But when it becomes action, what kind of action does it become? It becomes mental action only. This is what is said: the unwholesome state that has reached impulsion in the bodily door and the verbal door is mental action. Alternatively, without connecting the word “that” with mental action, the phrase “that which arises by way of the six contact-doors” should be connected with that which is defined merely by the arising as stated. But what is “that”? Because the discourse on action is proceeding, it is understood as action. And that action, even though it arises in the mind-contact door, is threefold action. To show how that is so, it is said, “when it has reached impulsion in the bodily and verbal doors,” and so on. There, since no strict rule has been made, the reaching of impulsion, by way of being a characteristic mark, merely establishes the name ‘bodily action’ and ‘verbal action.’ However, not all action that reaches impulsion is necessarily bodily or verbal action, nor, on the wholesome side, is it the case that what has not reached impulsion is not bodily or verbal action. This meaning is already established.

Atha vā tanti taṃ chaphassadvāravasena uppajjamānaṃ manokammanti sabbaṃ manasāpi nipphajjamānaṃ kammaṃ manokammanti codakādhippāyena gahetvā vadati, na pubbe dassitamanokammanti. Yo hi parassa adhippāyo ‘‘manasā nipphattito sabbena manokammeneva bhavitabbaṃ, na kāyavacīkammenā’’ti, taṃ nivattetvā kammattayaniyamaṃ dassetuṃ idamāraddhaṃ ‘‘taṃ kāyavacīdvāresu copanaṃ patta’’ntiādi. Ettha ca saṅkarābhāvo purimanayeneva veditabbo. Atha vā kammanti avisesena kammasaddamattena sambandhaṃ katvā yathāvutto kammappabhedo yathā hoti, taṃ pakāraṃ dasseti. Asaṅkaro ca vuttanayova. Yaṃ pana vadanti ‘‘kāyavacīkammasahajātā abhijjhādayo yadā cetanāpakkhikā honti, tadā tāni manokammāni kāyavacīkammāni hontī’’ti, tañca na, cetanāpakkhikānaṃ manokammattābhāvā. Abbohārikatte ca manokammatā suṭṭhutaraṃ natthi. Vuttampi cetaṃ ‘‘abbohārikā vā’’ti. Tasmā manokammassa kāyavacīkammatā na vattabbā. Abhijjhādikiriyākārikāya eva cetanāya sampayuttā abhijjhādayo manokammaṃ, na pāṇātipātādikāyavacīkiriyākārikāyāti bhiyyopi tesaṃ manokammatāti na tesaṃ manokammānaṃ sataṃ kāyavacīkammatā vattabbāti. Evaṃ kammānaṃ dvāresu dvārānañca kammesu aniyatattā dvāranibandhanaṃ na kataṃ. Idāni akatepi ca dvāranibandhane yesaṃ dvārānaṃ vasena idaṃ cittaṃ uppajjati, tesaṃ taṃtaṃdvārakammapathānañca vasena uppattiyā yathābhaṭṭhapāḷiyā vuttāya [Pg.85] ca dīpanatthaṃ ‘‘tattha kāmāvacara’’ntiādimāha. Cittaṃ tividhakammadvāravasena uppajjatīti idaṃ manokammadvārabhūtassa tena sabhāvena uppattiṃ gahetvā vuttaṃ. Yathā vā cittaṃ cittādhipateyyanti sampayuttavasena vuccati, evamidhāpīti veditabbaṃ. Copanadvayarahitassa manopabandhassa manokammadvārabhāve pana vattabbameva natthi.

Alternatively, taking 'that' as mental action arising by way of the six sense-doors, and also taking all action accomplished even by the mind as mental action—this is stated according to the intention of the questioner, not as the mental action shown previously. For, as to the view of another that “since it is produced by the mind, all of it must be mental action alone, not bodily or verbal action,” to refute that and to show the determination of the three types of action, this was begun with “that which has reached impulsion in the bodily and verbal doors,” and so on. Here, the absence of confusion should be understood as in the previous method. Alternatively, by connecting it generally with the mere term “action” (kamma), it shows the classification of action as it has been explained, and the absence of confusion is as stated. But as for what some say, “When covetousness, etc., co-nascent with bodily and verbal action, belong to the side of volition, then those mental actions become bodily and verbal actions,” that is not so, because those belonging to the side of volition lack the state of being mental action. And when they are unexpressed, the state of being mental action is even more absent. This is also stated: “or they are unexpressed.” Therefore, the state of mental action being bodily or verbal action should not be stated. Covetousness, etc., are mental action only when associated with volition that is the very doer of actions like covetousness, etc., not with volition that is the doer of bodily and verbal actions like killing, etc. Thus, their state as mental action is even more so. Therefore, for them, being mental actions, their state as bodily or verbal action should not be stated. Thus, because actions are not fixed in the doors, and the doors are not fixed in the actions, a binding by the doors was not made. Now, even though a binding by the doors was not made, in order to clarify by which doors this consciousness arises, and the arising by way of the respective courses of action at those doors, and as stated in the cited Pāḷi, he said, “Therein, sense-sphere…” and so on. This statement, 'Consciousness arises by way of the three action-doors,' was stated by taking into account the arising, through its own nature, of that which has become the mental-action-door. Or, it should be understood that just as consciousness is called 'mind-dominated' by way of association, so it is here also. As for the mental continuum devoid of the two impulsions, there is nothing at all to be said about its state as a mental-action-door.

Kammapathasaṃsandanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discourse on the conjunction of courses of action is finished.

Dvārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discourse on doors is finished.

Ayaṃ yojanāti ‘‘rūpārammaṇaṃ vā…pe… dhammārammaṇaṃ vā’’ti etena saha ‘‘yaṃ yaṃ vā panā’’ti etassa ayaṃ sambandhoti attho. Ko panāyaṃ sambandhoti? Yena vacanāni aññamaññaṃ sambajjhanti, taṃ pubbāparavacane payojanaṃ sambandho. Idha ca sabbārammaṇatādidassanaṃ ‘‘rūpārammaṇaṃ vā…pe… dhammārammaṇaṃ vā’’ti etassa anantaraṃ ‘‘yaṃ yaṃ vā panā’’ti etassa vacane payojanaṃ yojanā daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tattha ‘‘rūpārammaṇaṃ vā…pe… dhammārammaṇaṃ vā ārabbhā’’ti ettakena āpannaṃ dosaṃ dassetvā tannivattanavasena ‘‘yaṃ yaṃ vā panā’’ti etassa payojanaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘heṭṭhā’’tiādimāha. Dutiye atthavikappe ‘‘yaṃ yaṃ vāpanā’’ti etena appadhānampi rūpādiṃ ākaḍḍhati. Na hi padhānassa cittassa attanoyeva ārammaṇabhāvo atthīti. Heṭṭhā vuttanayenāti sabbārammaṇatādinayena. ‘‘Heṭṭhā gahitameva gahitanti vatvā tassa vacane payojanaṃ dassetuṃ ‘rūpaṃ vā…pe… idaṃ vā idaṃ vā ārabbhā’ti kathetuṃ idaṃ vutta’’nti vuttaṃ. Tattha idaṃ vā idaṃ vāti etaṃ sabbārammaṇatādiṃ sandhāya kathitanti veditabbaṃ.

This is the explanation of the connection: the meaning is that this is the connection of “whether the object is form… or the object is mental phenomena” with “whatever else.” But what is this connection? That by which statements are connected to each other, that is the purpose, the connection, in the preceding and following statements. Here, the indication of all-object-ness, etc., should be understood as the purpose, the explanation of the connection, in the statement “whatever else” immediately following “whether the object is form… or the object is mental phenomena.” Therein, after showing the fault that arises from stating “whether the object is form… or the object is mental phenomena is taken up,” to avert that fault, the purpose of the statement “whatever else” is shown by saying “below,” and so on. In the second alternative meaning, “whatever else” draws in even the non-primary form, etc. For indeed, the primary consciousness does not have the nature of being an object for itself. By “in the manner stated below” is meant by the method of all-object-ness, etc. It is said [in the Great Commentary]: “Having stated, ‘What was taken up below is indeed what was taken up,’ this was said in order to show the purpose in that statement, to explain ‘form or… this or that is taken up.’” Therein, it should be known that this phrase “this or that” was said in reference to all-object-ness, etc.

Dhammuddesavārakathā

The Discourse on the Chapter of the Exposition of the Dhamma

Phassapañcamakarāsivaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Aggregate of the Five beginning with Contact

Ācariyānanti revatācariyassa. Na panetaṃ sārato daṭṭhabbaṃ. Na hi phassādīnaṃ kāmāvacarādibhāvadassanatthaṃ idamāraddhaṃ, kintu tasmiṃ samaye phassādisabhāvadassanatthanti.

By 'the teachers' is meant the teacher Revata. However, this should not be regarded as the essence. For this was not undertaken to show the state of contact, etc., as belonging to the sense-sphere and other realms, but rather to show the intrinsic nature of contact, etc., at that very time.

Cittassa paṭhamābhinipātattāti sabbe cetasikā cittāyattā cittakiriyābhāvena vuccantīti phasso ‘‘cittassa paṭhamābhinipāto’’ti vutto. Kāmaṃ [Pg.86] uppannaphasso puggalo cittacetasikarāsi vā ārammaṇena phuṭṭho phassasahajātāya vedanāya taṃsamakālameva vedeti, phasso pana obhāsassa padīpo viya vedanādīnaṃ paccayaviseso hotīti purimakālo viya vutto. Gopānasīnaṃ upari tiriyaṃ ṭhapitakaṭṭhaṃ pakkhapāso. Kaṭṭhadvayādi viya ekadesena ekapassena anallīyamānopi rūpena saha phassassa sāmaññaṃ anallīyamānaṃ saṅghaṭṭanameva, na visayabhāvo, saṅghaṭṭanañca phassassa cittārammaṇānaṃ sannipatanabhāvo eva. Vatthārammaṇasannipātena sampajjatīti saṅghaṭṭanasampattiko phasso. Pāṇidvayassa sannipāto viya cittārammaṇasannipāto phasso cittassa ārammaṇe sannipatitappavattiyā paccayo hotīti kiccaṭṭheneva rasena saṅghaṭṭanaraso. Tathā paccayabhāvo hi tassa phassassa saṅghaṭṭanakiccanti. Yathā hi pāṇiyā pāṇimhi saṅghaṭṭanaṃ tabbisesabhūtā rūpadhammā, evaṃ cittassa ārammaṇe saṅghaṭṭanaṃ tabbisesabhūto eko cetasikadhammo daṭṭhabbo. Citteyevāti etena cetasikasabhāvataṃ vatthārammaṇehi asaṃsaṭṭhaṃ saṅghaṭṭanaṃ vedanāya dasseti, na pana vatthunissayataṃ paṭikkhipati. Tassa phassassa kāraṇabhūto tadanurūpo samannāhāro tajjāsamannāhāro. Indriyassa tadabhimukhabhāvo āvajjanāya ca ārammaṇakaraṇaṃ visayassa parikkhatatā abhisaṅkhatatā viññāṇassa visayabhāvakaraṇanti attho.

Because it is the initial impact of the mind, all mental factors are said to have their activity dependent on the mind; therefore, contact is called 'the initial impact of the mind.' Indeed, a person with arisen contact—or the aggregate of mind and mental factors—being touched by an object, feels by means of the feeling co-arisen with contact at that very same time. However, just as a lamp is a special condition for light, so too is contact a distinctive condition for feeling and other states; therefore, it is spoken of as if it were prior in time. A piece of wood placed horizontally atop the rafters is a 'pakkhapāsa.' Like two pieces of wood and so on, even though not adhering in one part or on one side, the commonality of contact with form is precisely the non-adhering striking, not the state of being an object. And the striking of contact is just the state of the coming together of mind and object. Because it is accomplished through the coming together of base and object, contact has the accomplishment of striking as its characteristic. Like the coming together of two hands, contact—the coming together of mind and object—is a condition for the mind's occurrence in converging upon the object. Therefore, in the sense of its function, it has striking as its characteristic. Indeed, that state of being a condition is the function of striking for that contact. For, just as the striking of one palm on another consists of distinct material phenomena that are its cause, so too the striking of the mind on an object should be seen as one distinct mental factor that is its cause. By the phrase 'in the mind itself,' it shows that striking, which has the nature of a mental factor, is unmixed with base and object, in relation to feeling; but it does not reject its dependence on a physical basis. The appropriate attention that is the cause of that contact, being in accordance with it, is 'attention born of that.' The faculty's state of facing that object and the making of an object for adverting is the object's state of being delimited and fashioned, which is the making of it into a domain for consciousness. This is the meaning.

Sukhavedanāyameva labbhati assādabhāvatoti adhippāyo. Vissavitāyāti arahatāya. Anekatthattā hi dhātūnaṃ arahattho vipubbo susaddo. Vissavaṃ vā sajanaṃ vasitā kāmakāritā vissavitā. Ārammaṇarasekadesameva anubhavantīti idaṃ phusanādikiccaṃ ekadesānubhavanamiva hotīti katvā vuttaṃ. Vedayitasabhāvo eva hi anubhavananti. Phusanādibhāvena vā ārammaṇaggahaṇaṃ ekadesānubhavanaṃ, vedayitabhāvena gahaṇaṃ yathākāmaṃ sabbānubhavanaṃ. Evaṃ sabhāvāneva tāni gahaṇānīti na vedanāya viya phassādīnampi yathāsakakiccakaraṇena sāmibhāvānubhavanaṃ codetabbaṃ. Ayaṃ idhāti etena pañcasu vedanāsu imasmiṃ citte adhippetaṃ somanassavedanaṃ vadati, tasmā asomanassavedanaṃ apanetvā gahitāya somanassavedanāya samānā iṭṭhākārasambhogarasatā vuttāti veditabbā.

The intention of the ancient teachers is that it is obtained only in pleasant feeling. Why? Because of its nature of being enjoyable. As for `vissavitāya`, it means by the state of being worthy. Indeed, because roots have many meanings, the root `su` preceded by `vi` has the meaning of `araha` (worthy). Alternatively, `vissava` means capability; or, `vasitā` (mastery), the state of being able to act at will (`kāmākāritā`), is called `vissavitā`. It is said on the grounds that 'they experience only a part of the object's flavor,' that this function of contact and so on is like a partial experience. For indeed, the state of being felt is 'experiencing.' Alternatively, the grasping of an object by way of contact and so on is the experiencing of a part, whereas the grasping by way of being felt is the complete experiencing, as desired. Those graspings have just such a nature; therefore, one should not object that contact and so on, like feeling, have an experience of mastery through the performance of their own respective functions. By this phrase 'this here,' it speaks of the feeling of mental pleasure intended in this consciousness among the five feelings. Therefore, it should be understood that, having set aside the feelings that are not mental pleasure, for the feeling of mental pleasure that is taken, the characteristic of enjoying a desirable form is said to be the same.

Nimittena [Pg.87] punasañjānanakiccā paccābhiññāṇarasā. Punasañjānanassa paccayo punasañjānanapaccayo, tadeva nimittaṃ puna…pe… nimittaṃ, tassa karaṇaṃ puna…pe… karaṇaṃ. Punasañjānanapaccayabhūtaṃ vā nimittakaraṇaṃ puna…pe… karaṇaṃ, tadassā kiccanti attho. Punasañjānanapaccayanimittakaraṇaṃ nimittakārikāya nimittena sañjānantiyā ca sabbāya saññāya samānaṃ veditabbaṃ. Ñāṇameva anuvattati, tasmā abhinivesakārikā viparītaggāhikā ca na hotīti adhippāyo. Etenupāyena samādhisampayuttāya aciraṭṭhānatā ca na hotīti daṭṭhabbā.

Having the function of recognizing again by means of a sign, [perception] has the characteristic of re-cognition. The condition for recognizing again is `punasañjānanapaccayo`; that very condition is the sign. The making of that sign is... Alternatively, the making of a sign which has become the condition for recognizing again is...; that is its function—this is the meaning. The making of a sign that is the condition for recognizing again should be understood as the same function for all perception, which both makes a sign and recognizes by means of a sign. Only knowledge follows; therefore, the intention is that [such perception] is not a maker of adherence nor a grasper of the perverse. By this method, it should be seen that for perception associated with concentration, the state of not lasting long also does not occur.

Abhisandahatīti pabandhati pavatteti. Cetanābhāvo byāpārabhāvo. Diguṇussāhāti na diguṇaṃ vīriyayogaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, attano eva pana byāpārakiccassa mahantabhāvaṃ dīpeti. Ussāhanabhāvenāti ādarabhāvena. Sā hi sayaṃ ādarabhūtā sampayutte ādarayatīti.

It binds, it causes to occur. The state of volition is the state of activity. The phrase 'with double effort' is not said with reference to the application of double energy, but rather it indicates the greatness of its own function of activity. By 'the state of exertion' is meant by the state of respect. Indeed, that volition, being itself respectful, makes the associated states respectful.

Vijānanaṃ ārammaṇassa upaladdhi. Sandahanaṃ cittantarassa anuppabandhanaṃ. Cakkhunā hi diṭṭhanti cakkhunā daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yathā ‘‘diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mutaṃ viññāta’’nti daṭṭhabbādi vuccati, evamidhāpi veditabbaṃ. Cakkhunā hītiādīsu cakkhunā…pe… manasā dvārenāti attho. Nagaraguttikassa viya cittassa ārammaṇavibhāvanamattaṃ upadhāraṇamattaṃ upaladdhimattaṃ kiccaṃ, ārammaṇapaṭivedhanapaccābhiññāṇādi pana kiccaṃ paññāsaññādīnanti veditabbaṃ. Purimaniddiṭṭhanti samayavavatthāne niddiṭṭhaṃ. Bhāvento viya na na uppajjati, kintu uppajjatīti dassetuṃ ‘‘cittaṃ hotī’’ti vuttanti etaṃ hoti-saddassa uppajjati-saddassa ca samānatthatte sati yujjeyya, tadatthatte ca tattha uppannaṃ hotīti na vucceyya. Na hi yuttaṃ uppannaṃ uppajjatīti vattuṃ. Cittassa ca uppannatā samayavavatthāne vuttā evāti kiṃ tassa puna uppattidassanena. Yena ca samayavavatthānaṃ kataṃ, tassa niddeso na na sakkā kātunti kiṃ taṃ niddesatthaṃ uddesena dutiyena, niddeseneva ca phassādīhi ca aññattaṃ cittassa sijjhatīti kiṃ tadatthena puna vacanena, aññappayojanattā pana purimassa cittavacanassa pacchimaṃ vuttaṃ. Purimañhi samayavavatthānatthameva vuttaṃ, na vavatthitasamaye vijjamānadhammadassanatthaṃ, itarañca tasmiṃ samaye vijjamānadhammadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ, na samayavavatthānatthaṃ, na ca aññadatthaṃ vacanaṃ aññadatthaṃ vadati, na ca lesena vuttoti katvā mahākāruṇiko atthaṃ pākaṭaṃ na karotīti.

Cognition is the apprehension of an object. Connecting is the uninterrupted binding of another mind-moment. 'Seen with the eye' means what is to be seen with the eye. Just as 'what is to be seen', etc., is expressed by 'seen, heard, sensed, cognized', so too should it be understood here. In 'by the eye', etc., the meaning is 'by the eye-door... by the mind-door'. Like a city guard, the function of the mind is merely making the object manifest, merely noting it, and merely apprehending it; but the function of penetrating the object, re-cognition, and so on, belongs to wisdom, perception, and the like—thus it should be understood. 'Previously indicated' means indicated in the determination of the moment. To show that it is not that the mind does not arise—like one who is developing—but that it does indeed arise, it was said, 'mind is'. This interpretation would be tenable if the word 'is' (hoti) and the word 'arises' (uppajjati) had the same meaning. And if they had that meaning, it would not be said there, 'it has arisen'. For it is not right to say, 'what has arisen, arises'. And the fact that the mind has arisen has already been stated in the determination of the moment, so what is the use of showing its arising again? Furthermore, regarding that by which the determination of the moment was made, it is not that its exposition cannot be made; therefore, what is the use of a second topic summary for the purpose of its exposition? And by the exposition itself, the otherness of mind from contact, etc., is established, so what is the use of a further statement for that purpose? However, the latter statement was made because the former statement about mind has a different purpose. For the former was stated only for the purpose of determining the moment, not for the purpose of showing the phenomena existing in the determined moment. And the other was stated for the purpose of showing the phenomena existing in that moment, not for the purpose of determining the moment. And a statement with one purpose does not state another purpose; and it is not that the Greatly Compassionate One, thinking, 'It was stated concisely,' does not make the meaning clear.

Phassapañcamakarāsivaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Fivefold Group of Contact is concluded.

Jhānaṅgarāsivaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Group of Jhāna Factors

Vitakketīti [Pg.88] dhammato aññassa kattunivattanatthaṃ dhammameva kattāraṃ niddisati. Tassa pana vasavattibhāvanivāraṇatthaṃ ‘‘vitakkanaṃ vā’’ti bhāvaniddeso. Rūpaṃ rūpanti pathavī pathavīti vā ākoṭento viya hotīti ākoṭanalakkhaṇo. Ādito, abhimukhaṃ vā hananaṃ āhananaṃ, parito, parivattetvā vā āhananaṃ pariyāhananaṃ. Vicārato oḷārikaṭṭhena vicārasseva pubbaṅgamaṭṭhena anuravato oḷāriko tassa ca pubbaṅgamo ghaṇṭābhighāto viya hoti vitakko. So yathā ghaṇṭābhighāto paṭhamābhinipāto hoti, evaṃ ārammaṇābhimukhaniropanaṭṭhena paṭhamābhinipāto hoti. Vipphāravāti vicalanayutto. Anuppabandhena pavattiyanti upacāre vā appanāyaṃ vā santānena pavattiyaṃ. Tattha hi vitakko niccalo hutvā ārammaṇaṃ anupavisitvā pavattati. Maṇḍalanti khalamaṇḍalaṃ.

By the text 'vitakketi', it indicates the dhamma, that is, vitakka, itself as the agent, for the purpose of precluding another agent from the dhamma. However, for the purpose of preventing the state of its exercising control, the indication by the abstract noun, 'vitakkanaṃ vā' (or, the act of thinking), is given. Because it is as if striking, as in 'form, form' or 'earth, earth', it has the characteristic of striking. Striking from the beginning or directly is 'āhanana'; striking all around or after turning around is 'pariyāhanana'. Vitakka is like the initial striking of a bell, which is grosser than the reverberation and is its forerunner; this is because it is grosser than vicāra and is the forerunner of vicāra itself. Just as the striking of a bell is the first impact, so too, vitakka is the first impact in the sense of directing the mind towards the object. 'Vipphāravā' means endowed with movement. 'Proceeding without interruption' means in the state of occurring in a continuum, whether in access or in absorption. For in that state, vitakka, having become motionless, enters into the object and proceeds. 'Maṇḍala' means a threshing floor.

Piṇayatīti tappeti, vaḍḍheti vā. Pharaṇarasāti paṇītarūpehi kāyassa byāpanarasā. Udaggabhāvo odagyaṃ. Khuddikā lahuṃ lomahaṃsanamattaṃ katvā bhinnā na puna uppajjati. Khaṇikā bahulaṃ uppajjati. Ubbegato pharaṇā niccalattā ciraṭṭhitikattā ca paṇītatarā. Passaddhiyā nimittabhāvena gabbhaṃ gaṇhantī. Appanāsampayuttāva pīti appanāsamādhipūrikāti katvā sā ṭhapitā. Itarā dve khaṇikopacārasamādhipūrikā pītī.

'Piṇayati' means it satisfies, or it increases. 'Pharaṇarasā' means it has the function of pervading the body with sublime forms. The state of having an uplifted mind is 'odagya'. Minor joy (khuddikā), having quickly caused mere bristling of the hairs, ceases and does not arise again. Momentary joy (khaṇikā) arises many times. Compared to uplifting joy (ubbegā), pervading joy (pharaṇā) is more sublime because of its motionlessness and its long-lasting nature. By being the cause for tranquility, it becomes established. Joy that is associated only with absorption fulfills absorption-concentration; thus considering, that joy is set aside. The other two joys fulfill momentary concentration and access concentration.

Samādhicittenāti samādhisahitacittena. Avisāro attano eva avisaraṇasabhāvo. Avikkhepo sampayuttānaṃ avikkhittatā. Yena sampayuttā avikkhittā honti, so dhammo avikkhepoti. Visesatoti yebhuyyena. Sukhavirahitopi hi atthi samādhīti. Padīpanidassanena santānaṭṭhitibhāvaṃ samādhissa dasseti.

'Samādhicittena' means by a mind accompanied by concentration. 'Avisāra' is the nature of not scattering of oneself alone. 'Avikkhepa' is the non-distraction of associated states. That dhamma with which associated states are not scattered is 'avikkhepa'. 'Visesato' means for the most part. For there is also concentration devoid of pleasure. By showing the simile of the lamp, he shows the state of concentration as the foundation for the mental continuum.

Jhānaṅgarāsivaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition on the Group of Jhāna Factors is concluded.

Indriyarāsivaṇṇanā

Exposition on the Group of Faculties

Saddahanti etāyāti saddahanakiriyāya pavattamānānaṃ dhammānaṃ tattha ādhipaccabhāvena saddhāya paccayataṃ dasseti. Tassā hi dhammānaṃ tathāpaccayabhāve [Pg.89] sati ‘‘puggalo saddahatī’’ti vohāro hoti. Pasādanīyaṭṭhānesu pasādassa paṭipakkhabhūtaṃ akusalaṃ assaddhiyaṃ micchādhimokkho ca. Pasādabhūto nicchayo vatthugato adhimokkhalakkhaṇaṃ, na yevāpanakādhimokkhoti. Indaṭṭhaṃ kāretīti ‘‘maṃ antarena tumhākaṃ adhimuccanaṃ natthi, mayā saddahathā’’ti viya attānaṃ anuvatteti sampayuttadhamme. Evaṃ sesesupi. Pakkhandananti saṃsīdanaṃ. Paṅko kaddamato ghanībhūto hoti. Paṇakaṃ picchilaṃ udakamalaṃ. Pītaṃ udakaṃ. Okappanalakkhaṇāti anupavisitvā evametanti kappanalakkhaṇā. Akalusabhāvo akālusiyaṃ, anāvilabhāvoti attho. Buddhādivatthūni saddheyyāni. Sappurisūpasevanasaddhammasavanayonisomanasikāradhammānudhammapaṭipattiyo sotāpattiyaṅgāni. Kusaladhammānaṃ ādāne hattho viya, sabbasampattinipphādane vittaṃ viya, amatakasiphalaphalane bījaṃ viya daṭṭhabbā.

The text 'They believe by this' shows the conditionality of faith, by way of its dominance over the associated states that are occurring in the act of believing. For indeed, when faith is a condition for its associated states in such a way, the designation 'a person believes' comes to be. In bases that inspire confidence, the unwholesome state which is the opposite of confidence is lack of faith, and also wrong resolution. The determination which has the nature of confidence and is grounded in its object has the characteristic of resolution; it is not the provisional resolution of 'yevāpanaka'. 'It exercises lordship' means it makes the associated states follow itself, as if saying, 'Without me, there is no conviction for you; you must believe through me.' So too in the remaining cases. 'Plunging in' means sinking down thoroughly. Mud is more solidified than slime. Water-moss is a slimy impurity of water. Potable water. The characteristic of placing faith is the characteristic of determining, after having entered into the objects of faith, 'It is just so.' The state of being unstained is 'akālusiya'; the meaning is the state of being unclouded. The objects of faith are the Buddha and so forth. Association with good people, hearing the true Dhamma, wise attention, and practice in accordance with the Dhamma are the factors of stream-entry. Faith should be seen as like a hand for taking up wholesome states, like wealth for accomplishing all attainments, and like a seed for bringing to fruit the fruit of the deathless from cultivation.

Vīrabhāvoti yena vīro nāma hoti, so dhammoti attho. Anubalappadānaṃ paggaho. Maggo gantabbo hoti, maggo gato, kammaṃ kattabbaṃ, kammaṃ kataṃ, appamattako ābādho uppanno, gilānā vuṭṭhito hoti aciravuṭṭhito gelaññā, gāmaṃ vā nigamaṃ vā piṇḍāya caranto na labhati lūkhassa vā paṇītassa vā bhojanassa yāvadatthaṃ pāripūriṃ, labhati…pe… pāripūrinti etāni anurūpapaccavekkhaṇāsahitāni aṭṭha vīriyārambhavatthūni taṃmūlakāni vā paccavekkhaṇāni.

The state of being a hero: the meaning is that quality by which one is called a hero. Exertion is the provision of supporting strength. The path is to be travelled. The path has been travelled. The work is to be done. The work has been done. A slight illness has arisen. One has recently recovered from sickness. While wandering for alms in a village or town, one does not get coarse or fine food to the desired amount, to a state of fullness. One does get it... to a state of fullness. These eight, together with suitable reflections, are the grounds for arousing energy; or, they are the reflections that are rooted in them.

Cirakatādiārammaṇaṃ upagantvā ṭhānaṃ, anissajjanaṃ vā ārammaṇassa upaṭṭhānaṃ. Udake alābu viya ārammaṇaṃ pilavitvā gantuṃ appadānaṃ pāsāṇassa viya niccalassa ārammaṇassa ṭhapanaṃ sāraṇaṃ asammuṭṭhatākaraṇaṃ apilāpanaṃ. Apilāpe karoti apilāpeti. Gatiyoti nipphattiyo sambhavato phalato ca. Aparo nayoti rasādidassanatthaṃ āraddhaṃ. Sammosapaccanīkaṃ kiccaṃ asammoso, na sammosābhāvamattaṃ. Satiyā vatthubhūtā kāyādayo kāyādisatipaṭṭhānā, satiyoyeva vā purimā pacchimānaṃ padaṭṭhānaṃ.

Having approached an object, etc., that has been attended to for a long time, the remaining there, or the not abandoning of the object, is upaṭṭhāna (presence). Not giving the object a chance to float away and go, like a gourd in water; the placing of the object as immovable, like a stone; the causing to remember; the making of the state of not being forgotten, is apilāpana (not letting float away). He makes it not float away; he causes it to not float away. 'Gati' (outcome) means the accomplishments, both from the standpoint of its arising cause and from the standpoint of its fruit. The phrase 'another method' is undertaken for the purpose of showing the function, etc. The function which is the opposite of forgetfulness is asammosa (non-forgetfulness), not merely the absence of forgetfulness. The body, etc., which have become the objective basis for mindfulness, are the foundations of mindfulness regarding the body, etc.; or, the preceding states of mindfulness themselves are the proximate cause of the succeeding ones.

Vikkhepassa uddhaccassa. Paññāpetīti pakārehi jānāpeti. Ekālokā hotīti vipassanupakkilesobhāsaṃ sandhāyāha. Manate vijānāti etenāti vā mano, evañca katvā ‘‘manañca paṭicca dhamme cā’’ti (ma. ni. 1.204, 400; 3.421, 425) kāraṇabhāvena [Pg.90] mano vutto. Sabbo hi mano attano anantarassa viññāṇassa kāraṇanti. Vijānātīti paricchinnopaladdhivasena jānāti, na saññāpaññā viya sañjānanapaṭivijjhanavasena.

Of restlessness, which is distraction. 'It makes known' means it makes known through various modes. 'It becomes one light' is said with reference to the radiance that is a corruption of insight. Or, it is mano (mind) because 'by this (etena) one knows (vijānāti)' in a special manner (manate); and this being the case, in the phrase 'dependent on mind and on phenomena,' mano is spoken of in its capacity as a cause. For indeed, all mano is the cause of its own immediately succeeding consciousness. 'It knows' means it knows by way of obtaining a demarcated object; it does not know by way of recognizing, like perception, or by way of penetrating, like wisdom.

Pītisomanassasampayogatoti vutte yena yogā sumano hoti, taṃ somanassanti vuccatīti pītiyā ca somanassabhāvo āpajjati, tasmā vināpi kāyena vatthunā sātavedanāsampayogatoti yojetabbaṃ. Evañca nippītikaṃ somanassañca saṅgahitaṃ hoti, pītiupalakkhitaṃ vā somanassaṃ sappītikaṃ nippītikañca somanassanti attho daṭṭhabbo.

When it is said 'due to association with joy and mental pleasure,' it means that by association with which one becomes glad of mind (sumano), that is called mental pleasure (somanassa). And thus, for joy (pīti) also, the state of being mental pleasure occurs. Therefore, it should be connected as 'due to association with pleasant feeling' even without a physical basis. And in this way, mental pleasure without joy is also included. Or, it is mental pleasure characterized by joy; the meaning should be understood as mental pleasure that is both with joy and without joy.

Pavattasantatādhipateyyanti pavattasaṅkhātāya santatiyā adhipatibhūtaṃ. Jīvitindriyassa hi attano vijjamānakkhaṇe anupālentassa anantarañca sānupālanānaṃ uppattiyā hetubhūtassa vasena pavattaṃ ciraṭṭhitikaṃ hoti, taṃtaṃkammavisesena visesayuttaṃ yāva cuti avisesena vā yāva parinibbānaṃ avicchinnaṃ pavattati jīvamānatāvisesayuttañcāti rūpārūpajīvitindriyānaṃ samānalakkhaṇādiṃ vattuṃ ‘‘attanā avinibhuttadhammāna’’nti āha. Anupāletabbānaṃ atthikkhaṇeyeva. Asati hi anupāletabbe uppalādimhi kiṃ udakaṃ anupāleyyāti. Tassa tassāti anupālanādikassa. Sādhanatoti sādhanena. Taṃsādhanañca jīvamānavisesapaccayabhāvato.

‘Dominance over the continuity of the ongoing process’ means being the chief of the continuity called the ongoing process. For, by the power of the life faculty—which sustains [itself] in its own existing moment and is the cause for the arising of [dhammas] that are to be sustained immediately after—the ongoing process becomes long-lasting. Endowed with a special quality due to this or that specific kamma, it continues uninterruptedly until death; or, without a specific [kamma], it continues uninterruptedly until Parinibbāna, and is endowed with the special quality of being alive. Thus, to state the common characteristic, etc., of the material and immaterial life faculties, he said, 'of dhammas inseparable from itself.' [It sustains] only in the existing moment of those things that are to be sustained. For, when there is nothing to be sustained, such as a lotus, etc., what could water sustain? 'Of that and that' means of sustaining, etc. 'By accomplishment' means by the means of accomplishment. And that accomplishment is due to its being the condition for the special quality of being alive.

Indriyarāsivaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of the Group of Faculties is concluded.

Maggaṅgarāsivaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Group of Path Factors.

Sammāti aviparītaniyyānikabhāvena. Pasatthatā ca evameva daṭṭhabbā.

‘Right’ (sammā) means by way of its unperverted, leading-out nature. And its praiseworthiness should be understood in the same way.

Balarāsivaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Group of Powers.

Assaddhiyeti assaddhiyakāraṇā. Ubhayapadavasenāti saddhāpadaṃ balapadanti evamādipadadvayavasena. Niyakajjhattaṃ jātiādisamuṭṭhānaṃ etissāti ajjhattasamuṭṭhānā. Garunā kismiñci vutte gāravavasena patissavanaṃ patissavo, saha patissavena sappatissavaṃ, patissavabhūtaṃ taṃsabhāgañca yaṃkiñci [Pg.91] gāravanti attho. Jātiādimahattapaccavekkhaṇena uppajjamānā ca hirī tattha gāravavasena pavattatīti ‘‘sappatissavalakkhaṇā’’ti vuccati. Vajjaṃ bhāyati tañca bhayato passatīti vajjabhīrukabhayadassāvī. Evaṃsabhāvaṃ ottappaṃ. Hirī pāpadhamme gūthaṃ viya passati, ottappaṃ uṇhaṃ viya. Dāyajjaṃ navalokuttaradhammādi. Ajjhattasamuṭṭhānāditā ca hirīottappānaṃ tattha tattha pākaṭabhāvena vuttā, na pana tesaṃ kadāci aññamaññaṃ vippayogā. Na hi lajjanaṃ nibbhayaṃ pāpabhayaṃ vā alajjanaṃ hotīti.

‘Assaddhiye’ti: due to the cause of faithlessness. ‘Ubhayapadavasenā’ti: by way of a pair of terms, such as the term ‘faith’ and the term ‘strength’. ‘Ajjhattasamuṭṭhānā’ means that its origin, such as birth, is one's own internal state; thus, it is internally arisen. When something is said by a teacher, attentive listening out of respect is ‘patissavo’; that which is together with attentive listening is ‘sappatissavaṃ’. The meaning is: any respect whatsoever that has become attentive listening and is of a similar nature. And shame, arising from reflecting on the greatness of one's birth and so on, proceeds there by way of respect; thus, it is called ‘characterized by respectful compliance’. One fears wrongdoing and sees it as a danger; thus, one is called ‘fearful of wrongdoing and one who sees danger’. Such is the nature of moral dread. Shame sees evil qualities as like excrement, while moral dread sees them as like a hot ember. The inheritance is the nine supramundane Dhammas, and so on. The internal arising and so on of shame and moral dread are stated in their respective contexts because of their clear manifestation, but not because they are sometimes dissociated from one another. For indeed, there is no shame that is fearless, nor fear of wrongdoing that is shameless.

Mūlarāsivaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Group of Roots.

Agedho anabhijjhanaṃ anabhikaṅkhanaṃ. Anallīno bhāvo adhippāyo etassāti anallīnabhāvo, evañhi upamāya sameti. Anukūlamitto anuvattako. Vinayarasoti vinayanaraso. Adoso dussīlyamalassāti idaṃ dussīlyassa dosasamuṭṭhānataṃ dosūpanissayatañca sandhāya vuttaṃ. Abhāvanāyāti ‘‘tattha jātānaṃ dhammānaṃ anativattanaṭṭhena bhāvanāindriyānaṃ ekarasaṭṭhena bhāvanā tadupagavīriyavāhanaṭṭhena bhāvanā āsevanaṭṭhena bhāvanā’’ti evaṃ vuttāya paññāsādhanāya bhāvanāya appavatti, tappaṭipakkhabhūtā vā akusalā abhāvanā. Nigguṇepi guṇaggahaṇaṃ adhikaggahaṇaṃ. Vijjamānampi guṇaṃ viddhaṃsetvā gahaṇaṃ ūnaggahaṇaṃ. Catuvipallāsaggahaṇaṃ viparītaggahaṇaṃ.

‘Agedho’ is non-coveting, non-desiring. ‘Anallīnabhāvo’ means its intention is non-clinging; for in this way, it accords with the simile. An agreeable friend is one who is compliant. ‘Vinayaraso’ti: it has the function of dispelling. Regarding ‘Non-aversion for the stain of immoral conduct,’ this was said with reference to immoral conduct having aversion as its origin and having aversion as its strong supporting condition. ‘Abhāvanāyā’ti: the non-occurrence of the development that accomplishes wisdom, which is described as, “development in the sense of not transgressing the states that have arisen therein; development in the sense of the faculties having a single taste; development in the sense of conveying the energy that approaches them; and development in the sense of cultivation.” Alternatively, the unwholesome states that are its counterpart are ‘abhāvanā’. Grasping for virtues even in one who is without virtue is excessive grasping. Grasping after having destroyed even an existing virtue is deficient grasping. Grasping the four distortions is perverse grasping.

Yāthāvasabhāveti ‘‘ettako etassa guṇo, ettako doso’’ti guṇadosānaṃ sabhāve ‘‘jarādhammo jīrati, taṃ kutettha labbhā mā jīrī’’ti evamādipaccavekkhaṇasambhavato. Alobhena ca gahaṭṭhānaṃ khettavatthādīsu vivādābhāvato. Amohena pabbajitānaṃ diṭṭhigatavivādābhāvato. Kāmarāgābhinivesavinibandhā hi gahaṭṭhā gahaṭṭhehi vivadanti, diṭṭhirāgābhinivesavinibandhā samaṇā samaṇehīti. Rāgavasena mittasanthavo dosavasena virodho ca tabbisesena upagamāpagamā, ārammaṇe vā rūpādimhi anurodhavirodhā. Amajjhattabhāvassa paṭighānunayasaṅkhātassa mohena pavatti. Sukhavipariṇāme dukkhasamāyoge ca paṭighapavattiyaṃ vedanāpariggaho na sijjhatīti adosānubhāvena vedanāsatipaṭṭhānaṃ sijjhati. Dibbavihārassāti catunnaṃ jhānānaṃ. Ariyavihāro phalasamāpatti. Mohena avicārento udāsīnapakkhesupi sattasaṅkhāresu sabbesu [Pg.92] abhisaṅgaṃ karotīti amūḷhassa tadabhāvo veditabbo. Dukkhadassanassa āsannapaṭipakkhattā dosassa tappaṭipakkhena adosena dukkhadassanaṃ hoti.

‘In the nature as it really is’ means: in the nature of virtues and faults, as in ‘This much is its virtue, this much its fault’; this is because of the possibility of reflection such as, ‘A thing of an aging nature ages. How could it be obtained here that it may not age?’. And due to non-greed, there is an absence of disputes among householders concerning fields, properties, and so on. Due to non-delusion, there is an absence of disputes among renunciants concerning wrong views. For householders, bound by the adherence that is sensual passion, dispute with householders; ascetics, bound by the adherence that is passion for views, dispute with ascetics. By the power of passion, there is the forming of friendships, and by the power of hatred, there is opposition; by that distinction, there are approachings and withdrawings. Or, in an object such as a form-object, there are conformity and opposition. Due to delusion, there is the occurrence of the state of non-equanimity, which is designated as aversion and approval. At the time of the arising of aversion due to the changing of pleasure and the encountering of pain, the full understanding of feeling is not accomplished. Thus, through the power of non-aversion, the establishment of mindfulness of feelings is accomplished. As for ‘of the divine abiding,’ it refers to the four jhānas. The noble abiding is the attainment of fruition. Due to delusion, one who does not investigate makes a strong attachment to all conditioned things of beings, even to those in the indifferent party; thus, it should be known that for one who is not deluded, there is an absence of that. Because the seeing of suffering is the near opponent of hatred, through non-aversion, which is its opponent, there is the seeing of suffering.

Kammapatharāsivaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Group of Paths of Action

Sukhādīni attano na byāpādeti na vināseti parassa cāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Kammapathatātaṃsabhāgatāhi kammapathavasena.

It should be understood thus: it does not harm or destroy the happiness and so on of oneself and of another. By way of being a path of action, due to its being a path of action and its having a similar nature to that.

Passaddhādiyugalavaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Pair Beginning with Tranquility

Daratho sārambho, dukkhadomanassapaccayānaṃ uddhaccādikānaṃ kilesānaṃ catunnaṃ vā khandhānaṃ etaṃ adhivacanaṃ. Uddhaccappadhānā kilesā uddhaccādikilesā, uddhaccaṃ vā ādiṃ katvā sabbakilese saṅgaṇhāti. Suvaṇṇavisuddhi viyāti yathā suvaṇṇavisuddhi alaṅkāravikativiniyogakkhamā, evaṃ ayampi hitakiriyāviniyogakkhamā.

Distress (daratha) is impetuosity (sārambha); this is a designation for the defilements, such as restlessness and so on, which have pain and displeasure as their cause, or for the four aggregates. Defilements that have restlessness as their principal are 'defilements such as restlessness'; or, having taken restlessness as the beginning, it includes all defilements. As for 'like the purity of gold': just as pure gold is suitable for application in specially made ornaments, so too is this suitable for application in beneficial actions.

Samaṃ, samantato vā pakārehi jānanaṃ sampajaññaṃ. Cetiyavandanādiatthaṃ abhikkamādīsu atthānatthapariggaṇhanaṃ sātthakasampajaññaṃ. Sati ca atthe sappāyāsappāyarūpādipariggaṇhanaṃ sappāyasampajaññaṃ. Gocaragāmābhikkamanādīsu kammaṭṭhānāvijahanaṃ gocarasampajaññaṃ. Abhikkamanādīnaṃ dhātuādivasena pavicayo asammohasampajaññaṃ. Sabbakammaṭṭhānabhāvanānuyuttānaṃ sabbayogīnaṃ sabbadā upakārakā ime dve dhammā pāripanthakaharaṇato bhāvanāvaḍḍhanato ca. Yathāha ‘‘dve dhammā bahukārā sati ca sampajaññañcā’’ti (dī. ni. 3.352). Yuge naddhā viyāti yuganaddhā, aññamaññaṃ nimittabhāvena samaṃ pavattāti attho. ‘‘Puna caparaṃ, āvuso, bhikkhu samathavipassanaṃ yuganaddhaṃ bhāvetī’’ti (a. ni. 4.170; paṭi. ma. 2.1) hi sutte etesaṃ yuganaddhatā vuttā. Sabbakusaladhammesu līnuddhaccābhāvo etehi dvīhi samaṃ yuttehīti ‘‘vīriyasamādhiyojanatthāyā’’ti āha, yogavacanatthāyāti attho.

Knowing evenly, or all around through various modes, is clear comprehension. In activities such as going forward for the purpose of venerating a cetiya, the grasping of what is beneficial and not beneficial is clear comprehension with purpose. And, when there is a purpose, the grasping of suitable and unsuitable forms, etc., is clear comprehension of suitability. In activities such as going to an alms-resort village, the non-abandoning of the meditation subject is clear comprehension of the resort. The investigation of activities such as going forward by way of the elements, etc., is clear comprehension of non-delusion. These two states are always helpful to all yogis devoted to the development of all meditation subjects, because they remove obstacles and enhance the development. As it is said: ‘Two states are of great help: mindfulness and clear comprehension’ (cf. AN 2.12). Like those bound to a yoke, thus they are ‘yoked together’ (yuganaddhā); the meaning is that they proceed evenly by way of being a mutual condition. Indeed, in the sutta, “Furthermore, friends, a monk develops serenity and insight yoked together” (AN 4.170; Paṭis I 96), their state of being yoked together is stated. In all wholesome states, the absence of sluggishness and restlessness is due to these two—energy and concentration—being evenly yoked; thus it is said, ‘for the purpose of yoking energy and concentration,’ the meaning of which is, for the purpose of stating the yoking.

Yevāpanakavaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Supplementary Section

Rūpābhāvenāti ruppanābhāvena. Dhammāti etassa attho sabhāvato upalabbhamānāti. Mettāpubbabhāgoti appanāppattāya mettāya pubbabhāgo[Pg.93], parikammamettā etasmiṃ citte atthīti attho. Virativasenāti vacīpavattiyā na pūreti, kintu viratiyogenāti attho. Apaṇṇakaṅgānīti aviraddhaṅgāni. Yathā tathā vā ārammaṇe vinicchayanaṃ adhimuccanaṃ. Na hi anadhimuccanto pāṇātipātādīsu dānādīsu vā pavattati, saddhā pana pasādanīyesu pasādādhimokkhoti ayametesaṃ viseso. Dārakassa viya ito cito ca saṃsappanassa karissāmi na karissāmīti avinicchayassa paṭipakkhakiriyā asaṃsappanaṃ. Purimamanatoti bhavaṅgato. Visadisaṃ vīthijavanaṃ manaṃ karotīti manasikārasāmaññena vīthijavanapaṭipādake dasseti. Tesu dhammesūti cittacetasikadhammesu. Atadārammaṇattepi hi tesu samappavattesu udāsīnabhāvato tatramajjhattatāti vuccati. Alīnānuddhatappavattipaccayattā ūnādhikanivāraṇarasā. Kāyaduccaritādivatthūnanti pāṇādīnaṃ. Amaddanā maddanapaṭipakkhabhāvova.

"Due to the absence of form" means due to the absence of affliction. "Dhamma" here means that which is discernible by its intrinsic nature. "Preceded by loving-kindness" means the preliminary stage of loving-kindness that has reached absorption; the meaning is that preparatory loving-kindness is present in this consciousness. "By way of abstinence" means it is not fulfilled through verbal occurrence, but rather through association with abstinence; this is the meaning. "Unerring factors" means unfailing factors. Determination is the deciding upon an object in whatever way. For one who is not decisive does not engage in acts such as killing living beings or in acts such as giving; faith, however, is the determination which is confidence in things that inspire confidence—this is the distinction between them. Like a child's moving about from here and there, non-wavering is the opposite action of the indecision of "Shall I do it? Shall I not do it?". "From the previous mind" means from the bhavaṅga. Because it makes the mind, which is the cognitive-process-impulsion, dissimilar, it thereby indicates the producers of the cognitive-process-impulsion through the commonality of attention. "In those states" means in the states of consciousness and mental factors. For even when it does not have them as its object, because of its state of being an onlooker towards them as they occur evenly, it is called `tatramajjhattatā` (equanimity towards them). Because it is a condition for an occurrence that is neither sluggish nor restless, its function is to prevent deficiency and excess. "The objects of bodily misconduct, etc." means living beings, etc. "Non-crushing" is simply the state of being the opposite of crushing.

Taṃtaṃrāsikiccavasena vibhāgarahitā avibhattikā. Etthāti etesu savibhattikesu dutiyaṭṭhānādīsupi bhājiyamānesu apubbaṃ natthīti attho. Padaṃ pūritanti jhānādipadaṃ pañcakādivasena pūritaṃ. Pañca hi aṅgāni jhānapadassa attho, tesu ekasmiñca ūne jhānapadaṃ ūnaṃ hotīti. Padasamūho padakoṭṭhāso vā taṃ tameva vā padaṃ, avuttaṃ hāpitaṃ nāma hotīti vuttaṃ ‘‘pūrita’’nti. Vuttasmiññeva vuccamāne anekesaṃ purisasaddānaṃ viya koci sambandho natthīti maññamāno āha ‘‘ananusandhikā kathā’’ti. Antarantarā vuttasmiññeva vuccamāne anukkamena dhammā kathitā na hontīti āha ‘‘uppaṭipāṭiyā’’ti. Phassapañcamakarāsi sabbacittuppādasādhāraṇavasena catukkhandhatappaccayasaṅgahavasena ca vutto. Yathāvuttesu pana rāsīsu ekarāsikiccassapi abhāvā chandādayo yevāpanakavasena vuttā. Vuttānampi ca dhammānaṃ yathā vedanādīnaṃ jhānaṅgādibhāvo vutto, na evaṃ sovacassatākalyāṇamittatādiviseso vuttoti tassa saṅgaṇhanatthaṃ keci dhamme visuṃ ṭhapetvā te ca tañca visesaṃ ‘‘ye vā panā’’ti āha. Veneyyajjhāsayavasena vā sāvasese dhamme vatvā ‘‘ye vā panā’’ti vuttaṃ.

By way of the function of each respective group, phenomena that are devoid of division are called `avibhattikā` (indivisible). Here, among these divisible phenomena, even when the second position and so on are being divided, there is nothing new—this is the meaning. The term is fulfilled: the term `jhāna`, etc., is fulfilled by way of the fivefold, etc. For the five factors are the meaning of the term `jhāna`; when even one of them is lacking, the term `jhāna` is deficient. A collection of terms, or a section of terms, or that very term itself is a `pada`. What is unstated is called 'omitted'; therefore, it is stated as 'fulfilled'. When what has already been stated is stated again, thinking there is no connection, like the voices of many people, he said, 'a disconnected discourse'. When what has already been stated is spoken of intermittently, the phenomena are not taught in sequence—so he said, 'out of order'. The group of five beginning with contact is stated both by way of being common to all arisings of consciousness and by way of the inclusion of the four aggregates and their conditions. However, in the groups that have been stated, because there is an absence of the function of even one group, factors like intention are stated by way of the supplementary section. And, just as the nature of stated phenomena—such as feeling, etc.—as jhāna factors, etc., is stated, the distinction of names such as being easy to admonish, good friendship, etc., is not stated in the same way. Therefore, for the purpose of their inclusion, having set aside certain phenomena separately, he stated both those phenomena and that distinction with 'Or whatever phenomena...'. Alternatively, having spoken of the remaining phenomena according to the disposition of those to be trained, it is stated as 'Or whatever phenomena...'.

Yevāpanakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Supplementary Section is concluded.

Dhammuddesavārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section on the Exposition of States is concluded.

Kāmāvacarakusalaṃ

Wholesome Consciousness of the Sense Sphere

Niddesavārakathāvaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Section on Detailed Exposition

2. Phusanakavasenāti [Pg.94] sante asantepi visaye āpāthagate cittassa sannipatanavasena ‘‘cittaṃ mano’’tiādīsu (dha. sa. 6, 17) viya kiccavisesaṃ, ‘‘mānasa’’ntiādīsu (dha. sa. 6, 17) viya samāne atthe saddavisesaṃ, ‘‘paṇḍara’’ntiādīsu (dha. sa. 6, 17) viya guṇavisesaṃ, ‘‘cetasikaṃ sāta’’ntiādīsu (dha. sa. 2, 18) viya nissayavisesaṃ, ‘‘cittassa ṭhitī’’tiādīsu (dha. sa. 15, 24) viya aññassa avatthābhāvavisesaṃ, ‘‘alubbhanā’’tiādīsu (dha. sa. 32) viya aññassa kiriyābhāvavisesaṃ, ‘‘alubbhitatta’’ntiādīsu (dha. sa. 32) viya aññassa kiriyābhāvabhūtatāvisesantiādikaṃ anapekkhitvā dhammamattadīpanaṃ sabhāvapadaṃ. Phusantassa hi cittassa phusanakiriyā phusanākāro. Samphusanāti ārammaṇasamāgamaphusanā, na paṭilābhasamphusanā. Samphusitassa ārammaṇena samāgatassa cittassa bhāvo samphusitattaṃ. Yasmiṃ sati cittaṃ samphusitanti vuccati, so tassa bhāvo. Evaṃ aññesupi bhāvaniddesesu daṭṭhabbaṃ.

2. By way of contact: when an object, whether existing or non-existing, has come into range, by way of the mind's falling upon it, a term of intrinsic nature (`sabhāvapada`) is an indication of the mere phenomenon, without regard to such distinctions as: a specific function, as in 'consciousness, mind' (Dhs. 6, 17); a specific word with the same meaning, as in 'mental' (Dhs. 6, 17); a specific quality, as in 'pure' (Dhs. 6, 17); a specific support, as in 'mental pleasure' (Dhs. 2, 18); the specific non-existence of a state of another, as in 'stability of mind' (Dhs. 15, 24); the specific state of the action of another, as in 'non-coveting' (Dhs. 32); or the specific reality of the state of another's action, as in 'the state of non-covetousness' (Dhs. 32), and so on. Indeed, for the mind that contacts, `samphusanā` (contacting) is the contacting that is the meeting with an object, not the contacting that is attainment. The state of the mind that has contacted—that has met with an object—is `samphusitattaṃ` (the state of having contacted). That, on account of which the mind is said 'to have contacted,' is its state. Thus it should be understood in other expositions of states as well.

Aparassa vevacanassa, aparena vā purimatthassa dīpanā aparadīpanā. ‘‘Paṇḍiccaṃ kosalla’’nti evamādayo paññāvisesā nānākāle labbhamānāpi ekasmiṃ citte labbhanti. Ekasmiñca visese itarepi anugatā hontīti dassetuṃ tathā vibhatti atthato vibhatti hoti atthanānattena katattā. Atha vā yathā ‘‘kodho kujjhanā kujjhitatta’’nti (dha. sa. 1066) sabhāvākārabhāvaniddesehi kodhoti evamākārova attho vutto, na evamidha, idha pana paṇḍitādibhāvākārabhinno attho vuttoti idaṃ vibhattigamanaṃ atthavasena hoti. Samphusitattanti etthāpi na ‘‘phasso’’ti evamākārova attho vutto. Samphassoti evamākāro pana vuttoti atthato vibhattigamananti vuttaṃ.

The explanation of another synonym, or the clarification of a previous meaning by another, is called `aparadīpanā`. 'Sagacity, skill,' and so on—these distinctions of wisdom, though obtainable at different times, are obtained in a single consciousness. And in one distinction, the others are also included. To show this, that analysis is an analysis by way of meaning, because it is made due to the diversity of meaning. Alternatively, just as in the case of, 'Anger, the act of being angry, the state of being angry' (Dhs 1066), where by the expositions of intrinsic nature, mode, and state, the meaning is stated only as the mode 'anger', it is not so here. Here, however, a meaning is stated that is distinct by way of the mode of the state of being wise, and so forth; therefore, this progression to analysis is by way of meaning. In the case of `samphusitattaṃ` also, the meaning is not stated only as the mode 'contact' (`phassa`). Rather, the mode 'contact' (`samphassa`) is stated. Therefore, it is said that this is a progression to analysis by way of meaning.

Doso byāpādoti uddesepi nāmanānattena nānābhūto uddiṭṭho. Niddesepi teneva nānattena niddiṭṭho. Ekova khandho hotīti ekena khandhasaddena vattabbataṃ sandhāyāha. Cetanāti saṅkhārakkhandhaṃ dasseti tappamukhattā. Asaddhammāti asataṃ, asanto vā dhammā, na vā saddhammāti asaddhammāti asaddhammavacanīyabhāvena ekībhūtopi asaddhammo kodhagarutādivisiṭṭhena saddhammagarutāpaṭikkhepanānattena nānattaṃ gatoti ‘‘cattāro’’ti [Pg.95] vuttaṃ. Na saddhammagarutāti vuccamānā vā asaddhammagarutā asaddhammagarutābhāvena ekībhūtāpi kodhādivisiṭṭhapaṭikkhepanānattena nānattaṃ gatā. Paṭipakkho vā paṭikkhipīyati tena, sayaṃ vā paṭikkhipatīti paṭikkhepoti vuccatīti saddhammagarutāpaṭikkhepanānattena asaddhammagarutā asaddhammā vā nānattaṃ gatā. Alobhotiādīnaṃ phassādīhi nānattaṃ lobhādivisiṭṭhena paṭikkhepena lobhādipaṭipakkhena vā veditabbaṃ. Alobhādosāmohānaṃ aññamaññanānattaṃ yathāvuttena paṭikkhepanānattena yojetabbaṃ. Padatthassa padantarena vibhāvanaṃ padatthuti. Tena hi taṃ padaṃ mahatthanti dīpitaṃ hoti alaṅkatañcāti. Atthavisesābhāvepi ābharaṇavasena ca ādaravasena ca puna vacanaṃ daḷhīkammaṃ.

‘Hatred as ill will’ is pointed out in the summary as being different due to the difference in name. Also in the detailed explanation, it is explained in detail with that very same difference. With reference to its expressibility by the single word 'aggregate', he says, 'It is one aggregate'. The word 'volition' indicates the aggregate of formations because that is its chief. As for `asaddhamma`, it means the states of the unvirtuous, or unpraiseworthy states, or they are not the true Dhamma, thus they are `asaddhamma`. Thus, although the `asaddhamma` is unified by being expressible by the word `asaddhamma`, it has reached diversity due to the difference which is the rejection of reverence for the true Dhamma, specified by reverence for anger, etc. Therefore, 'four' is said. Alternatively, the irreverences for the true Dhamma, which are spoken of as 'not reverence for the true Dhamma', although unified by being irreverence for the true Dhamma, have reached diversity due to the difference of rejection specified by anger, etc. Alternatively, it is called 'rejection' because the opponent is rejected by it, or it rejects by itself. Thus, due to the difference which is the rejection of reverence for the true Dhamma, the irreverences for the true Dhamma, or the `asaddhammas`, have reached diversity. The difference of non-greed, etc., from contact, etc., should be understood either by the rejection specified by greed, etc., or by being the opposite of greed, etc. The mutual difference of non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion should be connected by the difference of rejection as stated before. The clarification of a word's meaning by another word is `padatthuti` (praise of the word). Indeed, by that, that word is shown to have great meaning and is adorned. Even when there is no special meaning, the repetition of the statement is for strengthening, by way of an ornament and by way of respect.

3. Tajjanti tassa phalassa anucchavikaṃ. Na kevalaṃ niddisiyamānaṃ sātameva adhikataṃ, atha kho yathāniddiṭṭhāni ārammaṇānipīti ‘‘tehi vā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tassa vā jātā kāraṇabhāvena phassatthaṃ pavattāti tajjā. Taṃsamaṅgīpuggalaṃ, sampayuttadhamme vā attani sādayatīti sātaṃ da-kārassa ta-kāraṃ katvā. Suṭṭhu khādati, khaṇati vā dukkhanti sukhaṃ.

3. `Tajjā` means suitable for that result. Not only is the pleasant feeling which is being pointed out under consideration, but indeed also the objects as explained. Therefore, 'or by those,' etc., is said. Alternatively, it is `tajjā` because it arises from that and occurs for the sake of contact by being a cause. It is `sātaṃ` (pleasantness) because it causes the person endowed with it, or the associated states, to delight in oneself, having changed the letter 'da' to 'ta'. It is `sukhaṃ` (happiness) because it consumes well, or digs up, suffering.

5. Pāsoti rāgapāso. So hi nirāvaraṇattā antalikkhacaro. Akusalampi paṇḍaranti vuttaṃ, ko pana vādo kusalanti adhippāyo. Tañhi paṇḍarato nikkhantaṃ sayañca paṇḍaranti. Atha vā sabbampi cittaṃ sabhāvato paṇḍarameva, āgantukopakkilesavodānehi pana sāvajjānavajjānaṃ upakkiliṭṭhavisuddhataratā hontīti. Dāruppamāṇesu silādīsu khandhapaññattiyā abhāvā kiñci nimittaṃ anapekkhitvā dārumhi pavattā khandhapaññattīti ‘‘paṇṇattimattaṭṭhenā’’ti vuttaṃ. Taṃ-saddena manoviññāṇadhātuyeva vucceyya niddisitabbattāti na tassā tajjatā. Tehi ārammaṇehi jātā tajjāti ca vuccamāne samphassajatā na vattabbā. Na hi so ārammaṇaṃ, nāpi visesapaccayo. ‘‘Tiṇṇaṃ saṅgati phasso’’ti viññāṇameva phassassa visesapaccayoti vuttoti tasmā na viññāṇaṃ visesapaccayabhūtaṃ samphassajatāya tajjāmanoviññāṇadhātusamphassajāpaññattiṃ labhati, na ca tadeva tassa kāraṇabhāvena phalabhāvena ca vuccamānaṃ suviññeyyaṃ hotīti. Kiṃ vā etena, yathā bhagavatā vuttā taṃsabhāvāyeva te dhammāti na evaṃvidhesu kāraṇaṃ maggitabbaṃ.

5. The snare is the snare of lust. For it, being unobstructed, moves through the sky. Even the unwholesome is called 'white,' so what need is there to speak of the wholesome? This is the meaning. For that wholesome state emerges from the white and is itself white. Or alternatively, all mind is by nature purely white, but due to adventitious defilements and purifying factors, the states of being defiled and more purified of the blameworthy and blameless come to be. Because of the absence of the designation 'aggregate' in reference to stones and so forth which are the size of a log, without depending on any sign, the designation 'aggregate' occurs in reference to a log; therefore, it is said to be 'for the sake of being merely a concept'. By the word 'that', only the mind-consciousness element should be stated, because it is to be indicated; thus, its state of being 'produced from that' is not established. And if it were said that `tajjā` means 'produced from those objects', then the state of being 'born of contact' should not be stated. For that contact is not the object, nor is it a specific condition. Because it is said, 'The meeting of the three is contact,' and that consciousness itself is the specific condition for contact, therefore consciousness, which is the specific condition, does not obtain the designation `tajjā-manoviññāṇadhātu-samphassajā` by way of being 'born of contact'. And that same thing, being spoken of as both its cause and its result, is not easily understood. Or, what is the use of this? Those phenomena are just of such a nature as was stated by the Blessed One; therefore, in such cases, a cause should not be sought.

7. Evaṃ [Pg.96] takkanavasena lokasiddhenāti adhippāyo. Evañcevañca bhavitabbanti vividhaṃ takkanaṃ kūpe viya udakassa ārammaṇassa ākaḍḍhanaṃ vitakkanaṃ.

7. Thus, by way of 'drawing' (reasoning), as established in the world—this is the meaning. 'It must be thus and thus'—this various 'drawing' (`takkanaṃ`) is `vitakkanaṃ`, the drawing of an object, like the drawing of water from a well.

8. Samantato caraṇaṃ vicaraṇaṃ.

8. Moving about all around is `vicaraṇa`.

9. Attamanatāti ettha atta-saddena na cittaṃ vuttaṃ. Na hi cittassa mano atthīti. Attamanassa pana puggalassa bhāvo attamanatāti vatvā puna puggaladiṭṭhinisedhanatthaṃ ‘‘cittassā’’ti vuttaṃ.

9. In the word `attamanatā` (gladness), 'mind' is not meant by the word `atta`. For a mind does not have a mind. But, having stated the analysis that `attamanatā` is the state of a person who has a pleased mind, then, for the purpose of rejecting the personality-view, it was said, 'of the mind'.

11. Na balavatī, kasmā avaṭṭhiti vuttāti? Ekaggacittena pāṇavadhādikaraṇe tathā avaṭṭhānamattabhāvato. Virūpaṃ, vividhaṃ vā saṃharaṇaṃ vikiraṇaṃ visāhāro, saṃharaṇaṃ vā sampiṇḍanaṃ, tadabhāvo visāhāro.

11. Regarding 'not strong': Why is such one-pointedness called 'unsteadiness' (avaṭṭhiti)? Because, with a one-pointed mind in the act of killing living beings and so forth, it is merely a state of establishment in such a way as to accomplish the act. `Visāhāra` means distorted (`virūpaṃ`) or various (`vividhaṃ`) gathering (`saṃharaṇaṃ`) or scattering (`vikīraṇaṃ`). Or, `saṃharaṇa` is consolidating; its absence is `visāhāra`.

12. Aññasmiṃ pariyāyeti aññasmiṃ kāraṇe. Samānādhikaraṇabhāvo dvinnaṃ bahūnaṃ vā padānaṃ ekasmiṃ atthe pavatti.

12. 'In another sense' (`aññasmiṃ pariyāye`) means: in another reason (`aññasmiṃ kāraṇe`). The state of having a common referent (`samānādhikaraṇabhāvo`) is the occurrence of two or many words in one meaning.

13. Ārambhati cāti āpajjati ca. Uddhaṃ yamanaṃ uyyāmo. Dhuranti nipphādetuṃ āraddhaṃ kusalaṃ, paṭiññaṃ vā.

13. 'And undertakes' (`ārambhati ca`) means: and incurs (`āpajjati ca`). `Uyyāmo` (exertion) is striving (`yamanaṃ`) upwards (`uddhaṃ`). 'Burden' (`dhuraṃ`) means: wholesome action (`kusalaṃ`) undertaken (`āraddhaṃ`) in order to accomplish, or a promise (`paṭiññaṃ`).

14. Tiṇṇanti buddhādīnaṃ. Citte ārammaṇassa upaṭṭhānaṃ jotanañca satiyevāti tassā etaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ.

14. 'Of the three' (`tiṇṇaṃ`) means: of the Three Jewels beginning with the Buddha. The establishing of an object in the mind and its illumination are mindfulness itself; therefore, this establishing and illuminating is its characteristic.

16. Pāsāṇasakkharavālikādirahitā bhūmi saṇhāti ‘‘saṇhaṭṭhenā’’ti vuttaṃ.

16. Ground devoid of stones, gravel, sand, and so forth, is smooth (`saṇhā`); therefore, it is said, 'by way of smoothness' (`saṇhaṭṭhena`).

19. Ayantīti ekakammanibbattamanussādisantatiavicchedavasena pavattanti. Kusalākusalesupi hi jīvitaṃ indriyapaccayabhāvena sampayutte pavattayamānameva tadavicchedassa paccayo hoti.

19. 'They proceed' (`ayanti`) means: they proceed by way of the unbroken continuity of the lineage of humans and so forth produced by a single kamma. Indeed, even in wholesome and unwholesome states, the life faculty, by being a faculty-condition, while causing associated states to proceed, becomes a condition for the unbroken continuity of those states.

30. Yaṃ hirīyatīti hirīyati-saddena vutto bhāvo yaṃ-saddena vuccatīti yanti bhāvanapuṃsakaṃ vā etaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Hiriyitabbenāti ca hetuatthe karaṇavacanaṃ yujjati.

30. In 'that by which one is ashamed' (`yaṃ hirīyati`), the state expressed by the word `hirīyati` is expressed by the word `yaṃ`. Therefore, this `yaṃ` should be understood as a verbal neuter. And in `hiriyitabbena`, the instrumental case is suitable in the sense of cause.

32. Alubbhanakavasenāti [Pg.97] ettha alubbhanameva alubbhanakanti bhāvaniddeso daṭṭhabbo.

32. Herein, in 'by way of non-greed' (`alubbhanakavasena`), non-greed itself (`alubbhanaṃ`) is `alubbhanakaṃ`. This should be understood as a designation of the state (`bhāvaniddeso`).

33. Abyāpajjoti byāpādena dukkhena domanassasaṅkhātena dosena viya na byāpādetabbotipi attho yujjati.

33. Regarding `abyāpajjho`: this meaning is also suitable: not to be afflicted (`na byābādhetabbo`) by affliction (`byāpādena`)—the suffering (`dukkhena`) called displeasure (`domanassasaṅkhātena`)—as one would be by hatred (`dosena viya`).

42-43. Thinamiddhādipaṭipakkhabhāvena kusaladhamme aniccādimanasikāre ca sīghaṃ sīghaṃ parivattanasamatthatā lahupariṇāmatā, avijjānīvaraṇānañhi taṇhāsaṃyojanānaṃ sattānaṃ akusalappavatti pakatibhūtāti na tattha lahupariṇāmatāya attho. Tesañca bhāvo garutāyevāti tabbidhurasabhāvānaṃ lahutā daṭṭhabbā. Sā hi pavattamānā sīghaṃ bhavaṅgavuṭṭhānassa paccayo hoti.

Lightness of transformation (`lahupariṇāmatā`) is the capability to arise very swiftly in wholesome states and in attention to impermanence and so forth, due to being the counterpart to sloth, torpor, and the like. Indeed, for beings with the hindrance of ignorance and the fetter of craving, the occurrence of the unwholesome is their natural state; therefore, there is no purpose for lightness of transformation in that context. And the nature of those unwholesome states is heaviness itself. Therefore, lightness should be understood as pertaining to the states that are the opposite of that heaviness. For when that lightness occurs, it becomes a condition for swift emergence from the life-continuum.

44-45. Ye ca dhammā mohasampayuttā viya avipannalahutā, tesañca kusalakaraṇe appaṭighāto mudutā. Appaṭighātena mudutādirūpasadisatāya arūpadhammānampi mudutā maddavatātiādi vuttaṃ.

And for whatever states that, like those associated with delusion, possess unimpaired lightness, their non-impingement in the doing of the wholesome is pliancy (`mudutā`). Due to non-impingement, because of the similarity to material qualities such as pliancy, it is said of immaterial states also that they have 'pliancy, malleability,' and so on.

46-47. Sinehavasena kilinnaṃ atimudukaṃ cittaṃ akammaññaṃ hoti vilīnaṃ viya suvaṇṇaṃ, mānādivasena atithaddhañca atāpitaṃ viya suvaṇṇaṃ, yaṃ panānurūpamudutāyuttaṃ, taṃ kammaññaṃ hoti yuttamaddavaṃ viya suvaṇṇaṃ. Tasseva mudukassa yo kammaññākāro, sā kammaññatāti mudutāvisiṭṭhā kammaññatā veditabbā.

By the power of craving (`sineha`), a mind that is drenched and exceedingly soft becomes unsuitable for wholesome work, like molten gold. And by the power of conceit and so on, a mind that is exceedingly stiff also becomes unsuitable for wholesome work, like unheated gold. However, a mind that possesses suitable pliancy becomes suitable for wholesome work, like suitably malleable gold. Of that very pliant mind, whatever aspect is its suitability for work, that is workability (`kammaññatā`). Thus, workability should be understood as being qualified by pliancy.

50-51. Paccosakkanabhāvena pavattaṃ akusalameva paccosakkanaṃ. Ekavīsati anesanā nāma vejjakammaṃ karoti, dūtakammaṃ karoti, pahiṇakammaṃ karoti, gaṇḍaṃ phāleti, arumakkhanaṃ deti, uddhaṃvirecanaṃ deti, adhovirecanaṃ deti, natthutelaṃ pacati, cakkhutelaṃ pacati, veḷudānaṃ deti, paṇṇadānaṃ deti, pupphadānaṃ deti, phaladānaṃ deti, sinānadānaṃ deti, dantakaṭṭhadānaṃ deti, mukhodakadānaṃ deti, cuṇṇadānaṃ deti, mattikādānaṃ deti, cāṭukakammaṃ karoti, muggasūpiyaṃ, pāribhaṭyaṃ, jaṅghapesaniyaṃ dvāvīsatimaṃ dūtakammena sadisaṃ, tasmā ekavīsati. Cha agocarā vesiyāgocaro, vidhavā, thullakumārī, paṇḍaka, pānāgāra, bhikkhunīagocaroti. Saṅkhepatoti sarūpena anuddiṭṭhattā ‘‘tattha katamo chando’’tiādi na [Pg.98] sakkā vattunti ‘‘yo chando chandikatā’’tiādiniddesaṃ saṅkhipitvā ‘‘ye vā panā’’ti niddeso katoti attho.

The unwholesome state itself that arises with the nature of shrinking back is 'shrinking back' (paccosakkana). The twenty-one kinds of wrong livelihood (anesanā) are: one practices medicine; one acts as a messenger; one does errands; one lances a boil; one gives ointment for a wound; one gives an emetic; one gives a purgative; one prepares oil for the nose; one prepares oil for the eyes; one gives bamboo; one gives leaves; one gives flowers; one gives fruit; one gives bathing soap; one gives a tooth-stick; one gives water for washing the face; one gives face powder; one gives clay; one practices flattery; speaking like a half-cooked bean soup; acting as an attendant. Going on errands on one's own legs is the twenty-second, but it is similar to acting as a messenger; therefore, there are twenty-one. The six improper resorts are: the resort of a prostitute, a widow, an old maid, a eunuch, a tavern, and the resort of a bhikkhunī. As to 'in brief': because it was not pointed out by its intrinsic nature, it is not possible to say, 'Therein, what is desire?' and so on. Therefore, having abbreviated the exposition beginning 'Whatever desire, the state of being desirous...', the exposition was made as 'Or whatever...'. This is the meaning.

Niddesavārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Exposition Section is finished.

Koṭṭhāsavāravaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Section on Divisions

58-120. Niddesavāre pucchādīnaṃ paccekaṃ anekattepi pucchādibhāvena ekattaṃ upanetvā catuparicchedatā vuttā. Cattāro dveti evamādikaṃ saṅkhipitvā saha vā gahaṇaṃ saṅgaho. Ṭhapetvā yevāpanaketi saṅgahetabbe sandhāya vuttaṃ. Te hi visuṃ visuṃ uddiṭṭhattā niddiṭṭhattā ca vippakiṇṇāti saṅgahetabbā honti, na yevāpanakā saṅgahagamaneneva tathā avippakiṇṇattā. Yasmā pana saṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannā honti, tasmā taṃniddese akhandhabhāvanivāraṇatthaṃ yevāpanātveva vuttāti na yevāpanakā ṭhapetabbāti. Paccayasaṅkhātenāti āhārapaccayasaṅkhātenāti vuttaṃ hoti. Atha vā ‘‘hetu paccayo’’ti etesu dvīsu janako hetu upatthambhako paccayoti evaṃ visesavantesu paccayasaṅkhātena. Yathā hi kabaḷīkārāhāro ojaṭṭhamakarūpāharaṇena rūpakāyaṃ upatthambheti, evamimepi vedanādiāharaṇena nāmakāyanti. Tathā ca hontīti sādhāraṇe sahajātādipaccaye sandhāyāha. Aññathā cāti aññena ca ekenākārena paccayā hontiyevāti āhārāti vuccantīti attho. Tasmā āharaṇakiccarahitānaṃ hetuadhipatiādīnaṃ natthi āhārabhāvappasaṅgo. Tisso ca vedanā āharatītiādi yathāsambhavavasena vuttaṃ, na imasmiṃyeva citte phassādivasena. Tayo ca bhaveti kāmādibhavabhūtaṃ viññāṇaṃ visesena, avisesena ca pañcupādānakkhandhe.

In the Exposition Section, although questions and the like are individually multiple, having brought them to a state of oneness by their nature of being questions and the like, the state of having four divisions is stated. `Saṅgaha` (inclusion) is the taking of dhammas by summarizing them as 'four, two,' and so on, or by taking them together. The statement 'except for the yevāpanaka' is said with reference to what should be included. For, because those dhammas are designated and explained separately, they are scattered; therefore, they should be gathered. The yevāpanaka, however, are not scattered in that way, by the very fact of their inclusion as yevāpanaka. However, because they are included in the aggregate of formations, therefore, in the exposition of that aggregate, they were spoken of as 'yevāpanaka' indeed, for the purpose of preventing the state of their not being an aggregate. Therefore, the yevāpanaka should not be excluded. The phrase 'designated as a condition' means 'designated as a nutriment-condition.' Alternatively, between these two—'hetu' (root-cause) and 'paccaya' (condition)—the producer is 'hetu' and the supporter is 'paccaya.' Thus, among these distinct causes, it is by the designation 'paccaya' as a supporter that the nutriments are so called. For, just as edible food supports the physical body by bringing about the nutritive-essence-octad, so too do these mental nutriments support the mental body by bringing about feeling and other results. The phrase 'And so they are' is said with reference to the common conditions, such as conascence-condition and so on. The meaning of 'And in another way' is: they are called 'nutriments' because they are indeed conditions also in another, single mode. Therefore, for those dhammas such as root-cause, predominance, etc., which are devoid of the function of bringing about results, there is no application of their being nutriments. The statement 'It brings the three feelings,' etc., was said according to what is possible, not merely in this one mind by way of contact, etc. And the phrase 'the three existences' means that it brings about: specifically, the rebirth-linking consciousness that has become the sensual existence, etc., and generally, the five aggregates subject to clinging.

Ārammaṇaṃ upagantvā nijjhāyanaṃ cintanaṃ upanijjhāyanaṃ. Hetvaṭṭhenāti upāyatthena, na mūlatthena. Pubbabhāge gato paṭipanno nānākkhaṇiko aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo lokuttarakkhaṇeva saha pavatto yathāgatamaggoti vutto. Vipassanākkhaṇato pubbeva kāyakammādīnaṃ suparisuddhatāya aṭṭhaṅgikamaggupanissayassa ‘‘ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo bhāvanāpāripūriṃ gacchatī’’ti [Pg.99] (ma. ni. 3.431) evaṃ vuttena pariyāyena pubbabhāgamaggassa aṭṭhaṅgikatā yathāgatavacanena dīpitā, na ekakkhaṇe aṭṭhannaṃ aṅgānaṃ sabbhāvāti evamassapi pariyāyadesanatā veditabbā. Vijānanameva cittavicittatāti ‘‘cittavicittaṭṭhena ekova dhammo viññāṇakkhandho’’ti āha. Cattāro khandhā hontītiādīsu vedanākkhandhādīnaṃ saṅgahe katepi puna ‘‘eko vedanākkhandho hotī’’tiādivacanaṃ na aneke vedanākkhandhādayo jātiniddesena idha vuttāti dassanatthaṃ. Indriyesu ca ekassa jātiniddesabhāve paṭikkhitte aññesaṃ indriyānaṃ āhārādīnañca tappaṭikkhepo kato hotīti pubbaṅgamassa manindriyasseva katoti daṭṭhabbo.

Having approached the object, pondering (nijjhāyana), which is thinking (cintana), is contemplation (upanijjhāyana). 'In the sense of a cause' means in the sense of a means, not in the sense of a root. The eightfold path of various moments, practiced in the preliminary stage, is said to have arisen together only at the supramundane moment as the 'path as it has come.' Even before the moment of insight, due to the utter purity of bodily actions, etc., the eightfold nature of the preliminary-stage path is shown by the phrase 'as it has come' through the indirect method spoken thus: 'The noble eightfold path, which is a strong supporting condition for the eightfold path, reaches the fulfillment of development'; it is not shown on account of the existence of the eight factors in a single moment. Thus, it should be known that this too is a teaching by way of an indirect method. Knowing itself is the diversity of the mind; thus, it is said, 'In terms of the diversity of the mind, there is only one phenomenon: the aggregate of consciousness.' Even when the aggregates of feeling, etc., are included in statements like 'there are four aggregates,' the subsequent statement 'there is one aggregate of feeling,' etc., is for the purpose of showing that here, multiple aggregates of feeling, etc., are not spoken of by way of class-indication. And regarding the faculties, when the class-indication for the one mind-faculty is rejected, the rejection of that for the other faculties and for nutriments, etc., is also accomplished. Therefore, it should be understood that this is done only for the mind-faculty, which is the forerunner.

Koṭṭhāsavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section on Divisions is completed.

Suññatavāravaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Section on Emptiness

121-145. Etthāti etasmiṃ yathāvutte samaye, etesu vā dhammesu. Bhāvoti satto, yo koci vā attho.

'Here' (ettha) means in this collection of phenomena as spoken of, or in these phenomena. 'Being' (bhāvo) means a being, or any entity whatsoever.

Dutiyacittādivaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Second Consciousness, etc.

146. Sappayogenāti līnassa cittassa ussāhanapayogasahitena. Saupāyenāti kusalassa karaṇākaraṇesu ādīnavānisaṃsapaccavekkhaṇaṃ parehi ussāhananti evamādiupāyasahitena.

146. 'With appropriate application' (sappayogena) means accompanied by the application of exertion to a sluggish mind. 'With skillful means' (saupāyena) means accompanied by such means as these: reflecting on the drawbacks and advantages regarding what is wholesome to do or not to do, and encouragement from others.

156-159. Mahāaṭṭhakathāyaṃ anuññātā nātisamāhitāya bhāvanāyāti yevāpanakehipi nibbisesataṃ dasseti.

In the Mahā-aṭṭhakathā, it is allowed for development that is not overly concentrated; by this allowance, it is shown that there is no distinction even with regard to the yevāpanaka.

Puññakiriyavatthādikathāvaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Bases of Meritorious Action, etc.

Apaciti eva apacitisahagataṃ puññakiriyāvatthu yathā ‘‘nandirāgasahagatā’’ti. Apaciti vā cetanāsampayuttakadhammā kāyavacīkiriyā vā, taṃsahitā cetanā apacitisahagataṃ. Hitapharaṇenāti desake mettāpharaṇena, ‘‘evaṃ me hitaṃ bhavissatī’’ti pavattena hitacittena vā. Kammassakatāñāṇaṃ [Pg.100] diṭṭhijukammaṃ. Niyamalakkhaṇanti mahapphalatāniyamassa lakkhaṇaṃ. Sīlamaye saṅgahaṃ gacchanti cārittavasena. Anavajjavatthuṃ pariccajanto viya abbhanumodamānopi parassa sampattiyā modatīti abbhanumodanā dānamaye saṅgahitā. Bhāventopīti asamattabhāvanaṃ sandhāyāha. Samattā hi appanā hotīti. Aṭṭheva koṭṭhāse katvāti ekassa sattassa ekasmiṃ khaṇe uppannamekaṃ paṭhamacittaṃ dassetvā aññāni tādisāni adassentena sabbāni tāni sarikkhaṭṭhena ekīkatāni honti, tathā sesānipīti evaṃ aṭṭha katvā.

Reverence itself is the basis of meritorious action called 'accompanied by reverence', just as in 'accompanied by delight and passion'. Alternatively, states associated with the volition that is the cause of reverence are called 'reverence'; or, bodily and verbal actions are 'reverence'. The volition accompanied by those [associated states or actions] is called 'accompanied by reverence'. Herein, "by the suffusion of benefit" means by the suffusion of loving-kindness towards the teacher, or with a mind concerned with welfare that has arisen thus: "In this way, my benefit will be." The knowledge of the ownership of kamma is the straightening of view. Herein, `niyamalakkhaṇaṃ` is the characteristic of the determination of great fruitfulness. By way of conduct, they are included in the basis of meritorious action consisting of virtue. Just as one giving away a blameless object [rejoices], one who greatly rejoices also rejoices because of another's accomplishment; therefore, great rejoicing is included in [the category of] giving. "Even while developing" is said in reference to incomplete development. Indeed, completed development is absorption. Herein, "having made exactly eight portions": having shown one first consciousness that has arisen in one being at one moment, and by not showing other similar ones, all those are made as one by the meaning of being similar. Similarly, the remaining ones are also [treated as one]; thus, having made eight portions.

Kāmāvacarakusalavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of Sense-Sphere Wholesome States is concluded.

Rūpāvacarakusalaṃ

Form-Sphere Wholesome States

Catukkanayo

The Fourfold Method

Paṭhamajjhānakathāvaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Discourse on the First Jhāna

160. Uttarapadalopaṃ katvā rūpabhavo rūpanti vutto. Jhānassa amaggabhāvepi sati maggavacanaṃ aññamaggabhāvanivāraṇatthanti imasmiṃ atthe maggaggahaṇassa payojanaṃ vuttaṃ, na sabbassa kusalajjhānassa maggabhāvoti. Tattha maggassa bhāvanāya samayavavatthānassa katattā amaggabhāvanāsamaye pavattānaṃ phassādīnaṃ kusalabhāvo na dassito siyā, tasmā sabbassa maggabhāvo dassetabboti. Ito añño maggo natthīti evaṃ aññabhūmikavidhuro sati paccayantare rūpūpapattijanakasabhāvo vipākadhammasabhāvo viya vipākadhammavasena sabbasamāno maggasaddena vuttoti dassetīti veditabbaṃ. Kusalaṃ dānanti alobho daṭṭhabbo. Atha vā cetanā dānaṃ, taṃ vajjetvā itare dve cetanāsampayuttakāti vuttā. Vaṭṭantīti maggabhāvato jhānavacanena saṅgahetvā maggoti vattuṃ vaṭṭantīti attho. Okappanāti saddahanā. Aññattha diṭṭhaṃ atthaṃ pariccajitvā ‘‘janeti vaḍḍhetī’’ti ayamattho kasmā vuttoti nirupasaggassa aññattha evamatthasseva diṭṭhattāti imamatthaṃ vibhāvetuṃ ‘‘puna caparaṃ udāyī’’ti (ma. ni. 2.246 ādayo) suttamāhaṭaṃ. Kesañci ariyānaṃ ariyamaggena siddhāni aññāni ca jhānāni bhāvanāsabhāvānevāti tesupi bhāventena samayavavatthānaṃ ijjhatīti.

160. Having omitted the latter word, form-existence is called 'form.' Even when the jhāna is not the path, the term 'path' is used for the purpose of preventing [the positing of] another path; in this sense, the purpose of using the term 'path' has been stated, not that the path-nature of every wholesome jhāna [is thereby asserted]. In that regard, because the demarcation of time is made by the development of the path, the wholesome nature of contact and so on, arising during the time of developing what is not the path, might not be shown. Therefore, the path-nature of all [such jhānas] must be shown. There is no other path beyond this—thus, it should be understood that it shows that that which is devoid of other planes and, when another condition is present, has the nature of producing rebirth in the form realm—this nature, being common to all [jhānas]—is stated by the term 'path', just as the nature of a resultant phenomenon is spoken of by way of being a resultant phenomenon. As 'wholesome giving', non-greed should be understood. Alternatively, volition is giving; excluding that, the other two are said to be associated with volition. The meaning of 'vaṭṭanti' is that because of its path-nature, having been included by the term 'jhāna', it is appropriate to call it 'path'. Okappanā is conviction. Having abandoned the meaning seen elsewhere, why is this meaning of 'it generates, it increases' stated? Because for the verb without a prefix, this very meaning is seen elsewhere. To clarify this meaning, the Sutta beginning with 'Again, further, Udāyī' (Majjhima Nikāya 2.246, etc.) is cited. For some noble ones, both the jhānas accomplished by the noble path and other jhānas are indeed of the nature of development; therefore, in their case too, the demarcation of time succeeds for one who develops them.

Nissaranti [Pg.101] niggacchanti etena, ettha vāti nissaraṇaṃ. Ke niggacchanti? Kāmā. Tesaṃ kāmānaṃ nissaraṇaṃ pahānanti attho. Evañhi ‘‘kāmāna’’nti kattari sāmivacanaṃ yujjati. Vatthukāmehipīti vatthukāmehi viviccevātipi attho yujjatīti evaṃ yujjamānatthantarasamuccayattho pi-saddo, na kilesakāmasamuccayattho. Kasmā? Imasmiṃ atthe kilesakāmānaṃ dutiyapadena vivekassa vuttattā. Akusalasaddena yadipi kilesakāmā, athāpi sabbākusalā gahitā, sabbathā pana kilesakāmehi viveko vuttoti āha ‘‘dutiyena kilesakāmehi vivekavacanato’’ti. Kāmaguṇādhigamahetupi pāṇātipātādiasuddhappayogo hotīti tabbivekena payogasuddhi vibhāvitā. Taṇhāsaṃkilesasodhanena āsayaposanaṃ.

They escape, they depart by means of this [jhāna], or in this [jhāna]; therefore, it is [called] 'escape'. What escapes? Sensual pleasures. The meaning is the escape from and abandonment of those sensual pleasures. For thus, the genitive case in 'kāmānaṃ' (of sensual pleasures) is fitting in the agentive sense. Regarding 'vatthukāmehipi' (also from the objects of sensual pleasure), the meaning 'secluded from the objects of sensual pleasure' is also fitting. Thus, the particle 'pi' has the meaning of including another fitting sense, not the meaning of including the defilements of sensual pleasure. Why? Because in this sense, seclusion from the defilements of sensual pleasure has been stated by the second phrase. Although by the word 'unwholesome' the defilements of sensual pleasure are included, and indeed all unwholesome states are included, seclusion from the defilements of sensual pleasure is nevertheless stated in every way; therefore, he [the author] said, '[this is so] due to the second phrase, which is the statement of seclusion from the defilements of sensual pleasure.' Because the attainment of sensual qualities is also a cause for impure application such as killing living beings, the purity of application is clarified by that seclusion. By the cleansing of the defilements of craving, the purification of the underlying tendency [is clarified].

Aññesampi cāti diṭṭhimānādīnaṃ phassādīnañca. Upari vuccamānāni jhānaṅgāni uparijjhānaṅgāni, tesaṃ attano vipaccanīkānaṃ paṭipakkhabhāvadassanatthaṃ tappaccanīkanīvaraṇavacanaṃ. Byāpādavivekavacanena ‘‘anatthaṃ me acarī’’tiādiāghātavatthubhedavisayassa dosassa mohādhikānaṃ thinamiddhādīnaṃ vivekavacanena paṭicchādanavasena dukkhādipubbantādibhedavisayassa mohassa vikkhambhanaviveko vutto. Kāmarāgabyāpādatadekaṭṭhathinamiddhādivikkhambhanakañcedaṃ sabbākusalapaṭipakkhasabhāvattā sabbakusalānaṃ tena sabhāvena sabbākusalānaṃ pahānaṃ hontampi kāmarāgādivikkhambhanasabhāvamevāti taṃsabhāvattā avisesetvā nīvaraṇākusalamūlādīnaṃ vikkhambhanaviveko vutto hotīti āha.

And of others too—that is, of views, conceit, and so on, and of contact and so on. The jhāna factors to be mentioned later are the higher jhāna factors. To show their nature as counteracting their own opposites, the statement about the hindrances, which are their opposites, is made. By the statement of seclusion from ill will, the suppression-seclusion of hatred is stated, which has as its object the various grounds for resentment such as, 'He did me harm.' By the statement of seclusion from sloth and torpor, etc., which are dominated by delusion, the suppression-seclusion of delusion is stated, which has as its object various subjects such as suffering, the past, etc., and acts by way of concealing. And this [jhāna] is a suppressor of sensual lust, ill will, and sloth and torpor, etc., that share their object. Because all wholesome states have the nature of counteracting all unwholesome states, and by that nature, although it is an abandonment of all unwholesome states, it is precisely of the nature of suppressing sensual lust and so on. Therefore, because it has that nature, by making a special mention, the suppression-seclusion of the hindrances, unwholesome roots, and so on is stated. Thus it is said.

Vitakkassa kiccavisesena thirabhāvappatte paṭhamajjhānasamādhimhi paccanīkadūrībhāvakatena thirabhāvena taṃsadisesu vitakkarahitesu dutiyajjhānādisamādhīsu ca appanāti aṭṭhakathāvohāroti vitakkassa appanāyogo vutto, aññathā vitakkova appanāti tassa taṃsampayogo na siyāti. Attho…pe… daṭṭhabbo jhānasamaṅgino vitakkavicārasamaṅgitādassanena jhānasseva savitakkasavicārabhāvassa vuttattā.

The connection of vitakka with appanā is stated thus: 'appanā' is a commentary usage [that applies] both in the first jhāna concentration, which has reached a state of stability through the specific function of vitakka, and in the concentrations of the second jhāna and so on, which are similar to it and devoid of vitakka, due to the stability created by being made distant from opposing factors. Otherwise, if vitakka itself were appanā, its association with that [appanā] would not be possible. The meaning... should be understood in this very way even there, because by showing that a person endowed with jhāna is endowed with vitakka and vicāra, it is stated that the jhāna itself has the state of being with vitakka and with vicāra.

Vivekajaṃ pītisukhanti ettha purimasmiṃ atthe vivekajanti jhānaṃ. Pītisukhasaddato ca atthiatthavisesavato assa, asmiṃ vāti ettha a-kāro vutto. Dutiye pītisukhameva vivekajaṃ. Vivekajaṃpītisukhanti ca aññapadatthe samāso paccattaniddesassa ca alopo kato, lope vā [Pg.102] sati ‘‘vivekajapītisukha’’nti pāṭhoti ayaṃ viseso. Gaṇanānupubbatāti gaṇanānupubbatāya, gaṇanānupubbatāmattaṃ vā paṭhamanti vacananti attho. Niccādivipallāsappahānena maggo asammohato aniccādilakkhaṇāni paṭivijjhatīti lakkhaṇūpanijjhānaṃ. Asammosadhammaṃ nibbānaṃ aviparītalakkhaṇattā anaññathābhāvato tathalakkhaṇaṃ.

Herein, in the phrase 'vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ', in the first meaning, 'vivekajaṃ' is the jhāna. And after the word 'pītisukha', the 'a' suffix is stated in the specific sense of 'possessing' [as in] 'assa' (of it) or 'asmiṃ' (in it). In the second meaning, joy and happiness itself is 'vivekajaṃ'. And 'vivekajaṃ pītisukhaṃ' is a compound in the sense of referring to another term, and the non-elision of the nominative case ending is made; or, if there is elision, the reading is 'vivekajapītisukha'—this is the difference. The word 'paṭhamaṃ' (first) means 'by way of numerical sequence' or 'merely numerical sequence'. Because the path, through the abandoning of the perversions of permanence and so on, penetrates the characteristics of impermanence and so on through non-delusion, it is 'lakkhaṇūpanijjhāna' (contemplation of characteristics). Nibbāna, having the nature of not being lost, has the characteristic of truth because of its non-perverted characteristic and its state of not becoming otherwise.

Dutiyajjhānakathāvaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Discourse on the Second Jhāna

161-2. Vitakkavicārānaṃ vūpasamāti etena yehi vitakkavicārehi paṭhamajjhānassa oḷārikatā, tesaṃ samatikkamā dutiyajjhānassa samadhigamo, na sabhāvato anoḷārikānaṃ phassādīnaṃ samatikkamāti ayamattho dīpito hoti. Evaṃ ‘‘pītiyā ca virāgā’’tiādīsu nayo. Tasmā vitakkavicārapītisukhasamatikkamavacanāni oḷārikoḷārikaṅgasamatikkamā dutiyādiadhigamaparidīpakānīti tesaṃ ekadesabhūtaṃ vitakkavicārasamatikkamavacanaṃ taṃdīpakanti vuttaṃ. Atha vā vitakkavicāravūpasamavacaneneva taṃsamatikkamā dutiyādhigamadīpakena pītivirāgādivacanānaṃ pītiyādisamatikkamā tatiyādiadhigamadīpakatā hotīti tassa taṃdīpakatā vuttā.

“With the stilling of applied and sustained thought”: By this, it is shown that the attainment of the second jhāna is due to the overcoming of that applied and sustained thought, by which the first jhāna has its coarseness, and not due to the overcoming of contact and other factors which are not coarse by their intrinsic nature. Thus, this meaning is illuminated. In this way, the principle applies in such cases as “and with the fading away of rapture.” Therefore, the statements about overcoming applied thought, sustained thought, rapture, and bliss are indicators of the attainment of the second jhāna and so on, through the overcoming of each respective coarse jhāna factor. Thus, the statement about overcoming applied and sustained thought, being a part of them, is said to be an indicator of that. Alternatively, by the very statement about the stilling of applied and sustained thought, which indicates the attainment of the second jhāna through their overcoming, the statements such as “the fading away of rapture” become indicators of the attainment of the third jhāna and so on through the overcoming of rapture and so on. Thus, its state of being an indicator of that is stated.

Nīlavaṇṇayogato nīlavatthaṃ viyāti nīlayogato vatthaṃ nīlaṃ viyāti adhippāyo. Yena sampasādanena yogā jhānaṃ sampasādanaṃ, tasmiṃ dassite ‘‘sampasādanaṃ jhāna’’nti samānādhikaraṇaniddeseneva taṃyogā jhāne taṃsaddappavatti dassitāti avirodho yutto. Ekodibhāve kathanti ekodimhi dassite ‘‘ekodibhāvaṃ jhāna’’nti samānādhikaraṇaniddeseneva jhānassa ekodivaḍḍhanatā vuttā hotīti. Ekodibhāvanti panidaṃ uddharitvā ekodissa niddeso na kattabbo siyāti ekodibhāvasaddo eva samādhimhi pavatto sampasādanasaddo viya jhānamhi pavattatīti yuttaṃ.

The intention is: just as a cloth is blue due to its association with blue. Due to association with which serene confidence the jhāna is called ‘serene confidence,’ when that is shown, by the very co-referential designation “serene confidence is jhāna,” the occurrence of that word in relation to jhāna due to that association is shown; thus, the non-contradiction is fitting. How is it in the case of one-pointedness? When one-pointedness is shown, by the very co-referential designation “one-pointedness is jhāna,” the state of the jhāna as that which enhances one-pointedness is stated. But, having extracted this term “one-pointedness,” should not a detailed explanation of one-pointedness be made? The very word “one-pointedness,” which occurs in the sense of concentration, occurs in the sense of jhāna, just like the word “serene confidence.” Thus, it is fitting.

Appitāti gamitā vināsaṃ. Dutiyajjhānādiadhigamupāyadīpakena ajjhattasampasādanatāya cetaso ekodibhāvatāya ca hetudīpakena avitakkāvicārabhāvahetudīpakena ca vitakkavicāravūpasamavacaneneva vitakkavicārābhāvo dīpitoti kiṃ puna avitakkaavicāravacanena katenāti? Na, adīpitattā. Na hi vitakkavicāravūpasamavacanena vitakkavicārānaṃ appavatti vuttā hoti. Vitakkavicāresu hi taṇhāpahānañca etesaṃ [Pg.103] vūpasamanaṃ. Ye ca saṅkhāresu taṇhāpahānaṃ karonti, tesu maggesu pahīnataṇhesu phalesu ca saṅkhārappavatti hoti, evamidhāpi vikkhambhitavitakkavicārataṇhassa dutiyajjhānassa vitakkavicārasampayogo purimena na nivārito siyāti taṃnivāraṇatthaṃ āvajjitukāmatādiatikkamova tesaṃ vūpasamoti dassanatthañca ‘‘avitakkaṃ avicāra’’nti vuttaṃ.

The term `appitā` means 'brought to destruction.' An objection is raised: By the statement indicating the means to attain the second jhāna and so on, which indicates the cause as internal confidence and the unification of mind, and which indicates the cause of the state of being without applied and sustained thought, is the absence of applied and sustained thought not indicated by the very statement 'the stilling of applied and sustained thought'? So what is achieved by the statement 'without applied thought, without sustained thought'? The reply is: No, because it has not been indicated. Indeed, by the statement 'the stilling of applied and sustained thought,' the non-occurrence of applied and sustained thought is not stated. For the abandoning of craving for applied and sustained thought is their stilling. And, in those paths that effect the abandoning of craving for formations, and in the fruits wherein craving has been abandoned, the occurrence of formations still happens. Similarly here too, for the second jhāna in which craving for applied and sustained thought has been suppressed by suspension, the association with applied and sustained thought might not be prevented by the preceding statement. Therefore, to prevent that, and to show that their stilling is precisely the overcoming of the desire to advert, etc., it was said, 'without applied thought, without sustained thought'.

Tatiyajjhānakathāvaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Discourse on the Third Jhāna

163. Parisuddhapakati khīṇāsavapakati nikkilesatā. Upekkhānimittanti ettha līnuddhaccapakkhapātarahitaṃ majjhattaṃ vīriyaṃ ‘‘upekkhā’’ti vuttaṃ, tadeva taṃ ākāraṃ gahetvā pavattetabbassa tādisassa vīriyassa nimittabhāvato upekkhānimittaṃ. Paṭhamajjhānappaṭilābhatthāya nīvaraṇe…pe… nevasaññānāsaññāyatanasamāpattipaṭilābhatthāya ākiñcaññāyatanasaññaṃ paṭisaṅkhāsantiṭṭhanāpaññāsaṅkhārupekkhāsu ñāṇanti imā aṭṭha samāpattivasena uppajjanti. Sotāpattimaggapaṭilābhatthāya uppādaṃ pavattaṃ nimittaṃ āyūhanaṃ paṭisandhiṃ gatiṃ nibbattiṃ upapattiṃ jātiṃ jarāmaraṇasokaparidevadukkhadomanassaupāyāse. Sotāpattiphalasamāpattatthāya uppādaṃ…pe… upāyāse…pe… arahattamaggapaṭilābhatthāya uppādaṃ…pe… upāyāse. Arahattaphalasamāpattatthāya…pe… suññatavihārasamāpattatthāya…pe… animittavihārasamāpattatthāya uppādaṃ pavattaṃ āyūhanaṃ paṭisandhiṃ…pe… paṭisaṅkhāsantiṭṭhanā paññā saṅkhārupekkhāsu ñāṇanti imā dasa vipassanāvasena uppajjanti.

163. The natural state of the pure, the natural state of one whose taints are destroyed, is the state of being without defilements. Regarding 'the sign of equanimity': here, the balanced energy devoid of inclination towards sluggishness and restlessness is called 'equanimity'; that very energy, having taken on that characteristic, is 'the sign of equanimity' because it is the cause for such subsequent energy that is to be made to arise. For the purpose of attaining the first jhāna, [there is] knowledge in equanimity towards formations—which is the wisdom of reflecting and well-establishing—regarding the hindrances… and so on… up to, for the purpose of attaining the attainment of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, [knowledge] regarding the perception of the base of nothingness; thus, these eight arise by way of attainment. For the purpose of attaining the path of stream-entry, [there is knowledge regarding] arising, occurrence, sign, accumulation, relinking, destination, production, rebirth, birth, aging-and-death, sorrow, lamentation, pain, grief, and despair. For the purpose of attaining the fruition of stream-entry… and so on… up to… for the purpose of attaining the path of Arahantship… and so on… up to… for the purpose of attaining the fruition of Arahantship… and so on… for the purpose of attaining the attainment of dwelling in emptiness… and so on… for the purpose of attaining the attainment of dwelling in the signless, [there is] knowledge in equanimity towards formations—which is the wisdom of reflecting and well-establishing—regarding arising, occurrence, accumulation, relinking… and so on; thus, these ten arise by way of insight.

Yadatthi yaṃ bhūtanti khandhapañcakaṃ, taṃ muñcitukamyatāñāṇena pajahati. Diṭṭhasovatthikattayassa sappalakkhaṇavicinane viya diṭṭhalakkhaṇattayassa bhūtassa saṅkhāralakkhaṇavicinane upekkhaṃ paṭilabhati. Anābhogarasāti paṇītasukhepi tasmiṃ avanati paṭipakkhakiccāti attho. Nāmakāyena cetasikasukhaṃ kāyikasukhahetu rūpasamuṭṭhāpanena kāyikasukhañca jhānasamaṅgī paṭisaṃvedetīti vuccati. Phuṭattā byāpitattā. Yathā hi udakena phuṭasarīrassa tādise nātipaccanīke vātādike phoṭṭhabbe phuṭṭhe sukhaṃ uppajjati, evaṃ etehi phuṭasarīrassapi.

Whatever exists, whatever has come to be—that is, the five aggregates—one abandons that through the knowledge of the desire for release. Just as one obtains equanimity in investigating the characteristics of a snake whose three coils have been seen, so too one obtains equanimity in investigating the characteristic of formations of that which has come to be and has the three characteristics that have been seen. Its function is non-inclination: the meaning is that it has the function of counteracting inclination even towards that refined happiness. It is said that one endowed with jhāna experiences mental happiness by means of the mental body, and physical happiness by the production of refined matter which is the cause of physical happiness. Because of being pervaded and spread throughout. Just as when the body is pervaded by water, happiness arises upon contact with a tactile object, like wind, that is not too adverse, so too for one whose body is pervaded by these [refined material qualities].

Catutthajjhānakathāvaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Discourse on the Fourth Jhāna

165. Avibhūtapaccupaṭṭhānāti [Pg.104] sukhadukkhāni viya avibhūtākārā piṭṭhipāsāṇagatamigamaggo viya tadanumātabbāvibhūtākāropaṭṭhānā.

165. As for avibhūtapaccupaṭṭhānā (having an unclear manifestation): like pleasure and pain, it has an unclear characteristic; like the track of a deer that has gone over a stone slab, it presents itself as having an indistinct characteristic that is to be inferred by means of them.

Catukkanayavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the fourfold method is completed.

Pañcakanayavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Fivefold Method

167. Yassā pana dhammadhātuyāti sabbaññutaññāṇassa. Tena hi dhammānaṃ ākārabhedaṃ ñatvā tadanurūpaṃ desanaṃ niyāmetīti. Ettha ca pañcakanaye dutiyajjhānaṃ catukkanaye dutiyajjhānapakkhikaṃ katvā vibhattaṃ ‘‘yasmiṃ…pe… maggaṃ bhāveti avitakkaṃ vicāramattaṃ samādhijaṃ pītisukhaṃ dutiyajjhānaṃ upasampajja viharatī’’ti. Kasmā? Ekattakāyanānattasaññīsattāvāsaphalatāya dutiyajjhānena samānaphalattā paṭhamajjhānasamādhito jātattā ca. Paṭhamajjhānameva hi kāmehi akusalehi ca vivittanti tadabhāvā na idha ‘‘vivicceva kāmehi vivicca akusalehī’’ti sakkā vattuṃ, nāpi ‘‘vivekaja’’nti. Suttantadesanāsu ca pañcakanaye dutiyatatiyajjhānāni dutiyajjhānameva bhajanti vitakkavūpasamā vicāravūpasamā avitakkattā avicārattā cāti.

167. As for the phrase yassā pana dhammadhātuyā, this refers to the knowledge of omniscience. Indeed, by means of that knowledge, having known the various distinctions in the characteristics of phenomena, he determines the teaching that is in accordance with them. And here, in the fivefold method, the second jhāna is analyzed by making it part of the second jhāna section in the fourfold method, as in: '…he develops the path… having attained and abiding in the second jhāna, which is without initial thought but with sustained thought, born of concentration, with rapture and happiness.' Why? Because it has the fruit of the plane of existence of beings with unified bodies and diverse perceptions, because it has the same fruit as the second jhāna [of the fourfold method], and because it is born from the concentration of the first jhāna. For it is the first jhāna that is 'secluded from sensual pleasures and from unwholesome states'; due to their absence [in the second jhāna], it is not possible to say here, 'secluded from sensual pleasures, secluded from unwholesome states,' nor 'born of seclusion.' Furthermore, in the Suttanta teachings, in the fivefold method, the second and third jhānas are included in the second jhāna [of the fourfold method] because of the stilling of initial thought and the stilling of sustained thought, and because of the absence of initial thought and the absence of sustained thought.

Paṭipadācatukkavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Fourfold Course of Practice

176-180. Tassa tassa jhānassa upacāranti nīvaraṇavitakkavicāranikantiyādīnaṃ vūpasamā thirabhūto kāmāvacarasamādhi. Tadanudhammatāti tadanurūpatābhūtā, sā pana tadassādasaṅkhātā tadassādasampayuttakkhandhasaṅkhātā vā micchāsatīti vadanti. Avigatanikantikā taṃtaṃpariharaṇasatītipi vattuṃ vaṭṭatīti evañca katvā ‘‘satiyā vā nikantiyā vā’’ti vikappo kato. Āgamanavasenāpi ca paṭipadā hontiyevāti idaṃ kadāci dutiyādīnaṃ paṭhamādiāgamanakatapaṭipadataṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Api-saddo hi anekantikataṃ dīpeti, etassa anekantikattā eva ca pāḷiyaṃ ekekasmiṃ jhāne catasso paṭipadā cattāri ārammaṇāni soḷasakkhattukañca visuṃ visuṃ yojitaṃ. Aññathā ekekasmiṃ paṭipadādimhi nava nava jhānāni yojetabbāni siyunti.

Access concentration for each respective jhāna is the stable sense-sphere concentration that arises due to the calming of the hindrances, craving that delights in initial application, craving that delights in sustained application, and so on. 'That which is in conformity with it' means the state of being in conformity with that jhāna. But the ancient teachers say that this is wrong mindfulness, designated as 'delighting in that' or as 'the four mental aggregates associated with the craving that delights in that'. It is also suitable to say that it is right mindfulness which attends to those respective states but which has unabandoned craving (nikanti). And for this reason, the alternative 'by mindfulness or by craving' is made. And indeed, paths of practice occur by way of approach; this is sometimes said with reference to the state of having the path of practice for the second jhāna and so on, which is made by the approach from the first jhāna and so on. For the word api indicates indefiniteness. And precisely because of this indefiniteness, in the Pāḷi text, for each single jhāna, four paths of practice, four objects, and the collection of jhānas occurring sixteen times are applied separately. Otherwise, for each one, such as the path of practice and so on, nine jhānas each would have to be applied.

Ārammaṇacatukkavaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Tetrad on Objects

181. Appaguṇanti [Pg.105] pañcahi vasitāhi avasīkataṃ.

181. 'Of inferior quality' means not mastered by means of the five masteries.

Ārammaṇapaṭipadāmissakavaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Mixture of Object and Path of Practice

186. Heṭṭhāti soḷasakkhattukato pubbe. Ye keci jhānaṃ uppādenti nāmāti vacanena ye katādhikārā sekkhā maggeneva uppāditajjhānā, tesaṃ jhānāni maggapaṭibaddhatāya suddhikanavakasaṅgahitānīti veditabbāni. Na hi te uppādenti nāmāti.

186. 'Below' means before the method of sixteen occurrences. By the words, 'Whoever produces jhāna by name,' it should be understood thus: for those trainees who have made their aspiration and whose jhānas are produced by the path itself, their jhānas, because of being connected to the path, are included in the pure nonad. For they are not, by name, producers of jhāna.

Kasiṇakathāvaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Discourse on Kasiṇa

203. Nirodhapādakatāvacanena āruppapādakatā ca dassitā. Khippadassanaṃ khippābhiññatā khippanisantibhāvo.

203. By the words stating it is a basis for the attainment of cessation, its being a basis for the formless attainments is also shown. Quick seeing is quick direct knowledge, the state of quick continuation.

Abhibhāyatanakathāvaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Discourse on the Bases of Overcoming

204. Aññampīti kevalaṃ kasiṇāyatanasaṅkhātameva ahutvā abhibhāyatanasaṅkhātampi pavattatīti satipi abhibhāyatanānaṃ kasiṇāyatanatte kasiṇāyatanabhāvato añño abhibhāyatanabhāvo kasiṇanimittābhibhavanakabhāvanānimittanānattatoti dasseti. Tattha abhibhavatīti abhibhu, parikammaṃ, ñāṇaṃ vā. Abhibhu āyatanaṃ etassāti abhibhāyatanaṃ, jhānaṃ. Abhibhavitabbaṃ vā ārammaṇasaṅkhātaṃ āyatanaṃ etassāti abhibhāyatanaṃ, jhānaṃ. Ārammaṇābhibhavanato abhibhu ca taṃ āyatanañca yogino sukhavisesānaṃ adhiṭṭhānabhāvato manāyatanadhammāyatanabhāvato cātipi sasampayuttaṃ jhānaṃ abhibhāyatanaṃ. Maggappaṭibaddhatāya tadā samāpattito vuṭṭhitassa ābhogo pubbabhāgabhāvanāvasena jhānakkhaṇe pavattaṃ abhibhavanākāraṃ gahetvā pavatto vuttoti daṭṭhabbo. Āgamesu pana ‘‘ajjhattaṃ rūpasaññī eko bahiddhā rūpāni passati parittāni suvaṇṇadubbaṇṇāni. Appamāṇāni suvaṇṇadubbaṇṇāni. Ajjhattaṃ arūpasaññī eko…pe… parittāni suvaṇṇadubbaṇṇāni. Appamāṇāni suvaṇṇadubbaṇṇānī’’ti (dī. ni. 2.173; ma. ni. 2.249; a. ni. 8.65) imesaṃ catunnaṃ abhibhāyatanānaṃ āgatattā āgamaṭṭhakathāsu [Pg.106] (dī. ni. aṭṭha. 2.173; ma. ni. aṭṭha. 2. 249-250; a. ni. aṭṭha. 3.8.65) ‘‘vaṇṇavasena ābhoge vijjamānepi parittaappamāṇavaseneva imāni abhibhāyatanāni desitānī’’ti vuttaṃ. Parittaappamāṇatā hi abhibhavanassa kāraṇaṃ vaṇṇābhoge satipi asatipi. Tattha ca vaṇṇābhogarahitāni sahitāni ca sabbāni parittāni ‘‘suvaṇṇadubbaṇṇānī’’ti vuttāni, tathā appamāṇānīti daṭṭhabbāni. Atthi hi eso pariyāyo parittāni abhibhuyya tāni ce kadāci vaṇṇavasena ābhujitāni honti suvaṇṇadubbaṇṇāni abhibhuyyāti. Idha pana nippariyāyadesanattā vaṇṇābhogarahitāni visuṃ vuttāni sahitāni ca. Atthi hi ubhayattha abhibhavanavisesoti.

204. By the word Aññampi (also another), it is shown that: not being merely what is designated as a kasiṇa-sphere, it also occurs as what is designated as a sphere of mastery. Thus, although the spheres of mastery have the nature of a kasiṇa-sphere, the state of being a sphere of mastery is different from the state of being a kasiṇa-sphere due to the difference of the development-sign that overcomes the kasiṇa-sign. Therein, 'it overcomes' (abhibhavati), therefore it is an 'overcomer' (abhibhu); this is the preliminary work, or the knowledge. Of this (jhāna), the 'overcomer' is its cause (āyatana), therefore it is a 'sphere of mastery' (abhibhāyatana); this is the jhāna. Alternatively, of this (jhāna), the object to be overcome, designated as the object, is its cause (āyatana), therefore it is a 'sphere of mastery' (abhibhāyatana); this is the jhāna. Also, because it overcomes the object, it is an 'overcomer' (abhibhu), and that (overcomer) is also a 'sphere/basis' (āyatana) because it is the foundation for the yogī's special states of happiness and because it has the nature of the mind-sphere and the dhamma-sphere; thus, the jhāna together with its associated states is a 'sphere of mastery' (abhibhāyatana). Because of its connection to the path, the attention of one who has arisen from that attainment should be understood as being said to have occurred by grasping the mode of overcoming that occurred at the moment of jhāna by the power of the preliminary-part development. However, in the Āgamas, since these four spheres of mastery have come down—'One perceiving form internally sees external forms, limited, of good and bad color... immeasurable, of good and bad color. One not perceiving form internally... limited, of good and bad color... immeasurable, of good and bad color'—it is said in the commentaries on the Āgamas: 'Although there is attention by way of color, these spheres of mastery are taught only by way of the limited and the immeasurable.' For the state of being limited and immeasurable is the cause of overcoming, whether there is attention to color or not. And therein, all limited objects, both those without and with attention to color, are spoken of as 'of good and bad color'; likewise, the immeasurable objects should be understood. For this alternative explanation exists: having overcome the limited objects, if they are sometimes adverted to by way of color, this means 'having overcome those of good and bad color.' But here, in the Abhidhamma, because the teaching is direct, those without attention to color and those with it are spoken of separately. For indeed, in both cases there is a distinction in the overcoming.

Tattha ca pariyāyadesanattā vimokkhānampi abhibhavanapariyāyo atthīti ‘‘ajjhattaṃ rūpasaññī’’ti abhibhāyatanadvayaṃ vuttaṃ, tatiyacatutthaabhibhāyatanesu dutiyavimokkho vaṇṇābhibhāyatanesu tatiyavimokkho ca abhibhavanappavattito saṅgahito, idha pana nippariyāyadesanattā vimokkhābhibhāyatanāni asaṅkarato dassetuṃ vimokkhe vajjetvā abhibhāyatanāni kathitāni. Sabbāni ca vimokkhakiccāni vimokkhadesanāya vuttāni, tadetaṃ ‘‘ajjhattaṃ rūpasaññī’’ti āgatassa abhibhāyatanadvayassa abhibhāyatanesu avacanato ‘‘rūpī rūpāni passatī’’tiādīnañca sabbavimokkhakiccasādhāraṇavacanabhāvato vavatthānaṃ katanti viññāyati.

And there, because the teaching is figurative, there is also a figurative way of overcoming for the liberations; thus, the two spheres of mastery, 'perceiving form internally,' etc., are stated. In the third and fourth spheres of mastery, the second liberation is included, and in the color spheres of mastery, the third liberation is included due to the occurrence of overcoming. Here, however, because the teaching is direct, in order to show the liberations and spheres of mastery without confusion, the spheres of mastery are taught by excluding the liberations. And all the functions of the liberations are stated in the teaching on the liberations. Thus, it is to be understood that this distinction was made because of the non-statement among the spheres of mastery of the two spheres of mastery that come as 'perceiving form internally,' and because statements such as 'one with form sees forms' are common to all the functions of the liberations.

Ajjhattarūpānaṃ anabhibhavanīyatoti idaṃ katthacipi ‘‘ajjhattaṃ rūpāni passatī’’ti avatvā sabbattha yaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘bahiddhā rūpāni passatī’’ti, tassa kāraṇavacanaṃ. Tena yaṃ aññahetukaṃ, taṃ tena hetunā vuttaṃ. Yaṃ pana desanāvilāsahetukaṃ ajjhattaṃ arūpasaññitāya eva idha vacanaṃ, na tassa aññaṃ kāraṇaṃ maggitabbanti dasseti. Ajjhattarūpānaṃ anabhibhavanīyatā ca bahiddhārūpānaṃ viya avibhūtattā, desanāvilāso ca yathāvuttavavatthānavasena veditabbo. Suvaṇṇadubbaṇṇānīti eteneva siddhattā nīlādiabhibhāyatanāni na vattabbānīti ce? Na, nīlādīsu katādhikārānaṃ nīlādibhāvasseva abhibhavanakāraṇattā. Na hi tesaṃ parisuddhāparisuddhavaṇṇaparittatā tadappamāṇatā vā abhibhavanakāraṇaṃ, atha kho nīlādibhāvo evāti.

This [phrase], 'the unovercomability of internal forms,' is the statement of the reason why, without ever saying 'one sees internal forms,' it is said everywhere, 'one sees external forms.' By this, it is shown that what has another cause is stated by that cause, but for the statement here, 'perceiving formlessness internally,' which is caused by the elegance of the teaching, another reason should not be sought. And the unovercomability of internal forms is due to their lack of clarity, like external forms; and the elegance of the teaching should be understood by way of the aforesaid distinction. If it is said: 'Since it is accomplished by this very [phrase] "beautiful and ugly," should the spheres of mastery of blue, etc., not be stated?' No, because for those who have made an aspiration regarding blue, etc., the very nature of blue, etc., is the cause of overcoming. For, the limitedness of their pure and impure color or their immeasurableness is not the cause of overcoming; but rather, it is the very nature of blue, etc.

Abhibhāyatanakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the discourse on the spheres of mastery is finished.

Vimokkhakathāvaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Discourse on Liberation

248. Rūpīti [Pg.107] yenāyaṃ sasantatipariyāpannena rūpena samannāgato, taṃ yassa jhānassa hetubhāvena visiṭṭhaṃ rūpaṃ hoti. Yena visiṭṭhena rūpīti vucceyya, tadeva sasantatipariyāpannarūpanimittaṃ jhānamiva paramatthato rūpībhāvasādhakanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Kasiṇadesanā jhānānameva kasiṇabhāvena pavattā abhidhamme, sutte pana ārammaṇānanti ‘‘abhidhammavasenā’’ti vuttaṃ.

248. Regarding ‘Possessing form’ (rūpī): this yogī is endowed with a certain kasiṇa-form included in his own continuity, and that form becomes a distinguished form by being the cause of a certain jhāna. It is by that distinguished form that he would be called ‘possessing form.’ It should be understood that that very sign, the kasiṇa-form included in one's own continuity, like the jhāna itself, accomplishes the state of ‘possessing form’ in the ultimate sense. In the Abhidhamma, the teaching of kasiṇas proceeds by way of the jhānas themselves being kasiṇas, but in the Suttas, it proceeds by way of the objects. Therefore, it is said, ‘according to the Abhidhamma method.’

Vimokkhakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Liberation is concluded.

Brahmavihārakathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Divine Abodes

251. Somanassadomanassarahitaṃ aññāṇameva aññāṇupekkhā. Kilesodhīnaṃ maggodhīhi ajitattā anodhijinassa. Sattamabhavādito uddhaṃ pavattavipākassa ajitattā avipākajinassa. Niddosabhāvenāti nippaṭighabhāvena. Ekassapi sattassa appaṭibhāganimittattā paricchedaggahaṇaṃ natthi, na ca sammutisaccavasena pavattaṃ sattaggahaṇaṃ paricchinnarūpādiggahaṇaṃ hotīti appanāppattiyāpi aparāmāsasattaggahaṇamuddhabhūtānaṃ mettādīnaṃ ekasattārammaṇānampi appamāṇagocaratā vuttāti veditabbā.

251. Equanimity based on ignorance (aññāṇupekkhā) is simply ignorance devoid of joy and sorrow. Of one who has not conquered the divisions (anodhijinassa): because the divisions of defilements are not conquered by the divisions of the path. Of one who has not conquered the resultants (avipākajinassa): because the resultant that occurs above, from the seventh existence onwards, is not conquered. ‘By the state of being faultless’ (niddosabhāvena) means by the state of non-aversion (nippaṭighabhāvena). Because there is no counterpart sign even for a single being, there is no grasping of a boundary; and the grasping of ‘a being,’ which proceeds by way of conventional truth, is not a grasping of delimited form and so on. Therefore, it should be known that also by the attainment of absorption, for loving-kindness and so on—which are supreme in the grasping of a being without misapprehension—the state of having an immeasurable range is stated, even when they have a single being as their object.

Brahmavihārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Divine Abodes is concluded.

Asubhakathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Foul

263. Uddhaṃ dhumātattā uddhumātaṃ. Setarattehi paribhinnaṃ vimissitaṃ nīlaṃ vinīlaṃ, purimavaṇṇavipariṇāmabhūtaṃ vā nīlaṃ vinīlaṃ. Saṅghāṭo aṅgānaṃ susambaddhatā. Ārammaṇassa dubbalatā paṭipakkhabhāvena cittaṃ ṭhapetuṃ asamatthatā. Attani ānisaṃsadassananīvaraṇarogavūpasamānaṃ yathākkamaṃ pupphachaḍḍakavamanavirecanaupamā yojetabbā. Paṭikūlamanasikārasāmaññena asubhehi kesādīhi paṭikūlajjhānassa gahaṇaṃ sivathikāvaṇṇajjhānassa ca. Tampi hi paṭikūlamanasikāravaseneva uppajjatīti, sivathikappakārāni vā sivathikāvaṇṇāni.

263. ‘Bloated’ (uddhumātaṃ) is so called because of being swollen up. ‘Livid’ (vinīlaṃ) means blue mixed with white and red, having been broken up; or, it means blue that has become a transformation of its former color. ‘A skeleton’ (saṅghāṭo) means the good connection of the limbs. The weakness of the object is the inability to place the mind due to its being an opposing factor. The similes of the discarded flowers and of vomiting and purging should be applied respectively to seeing the benefit in oneself and the pacification of the disease of the hindrances. Due to the commonality of repulsive attention, there is the grasping of the jhāna on the repulsive by means of foul things such as hair, etc., and also of the jhāna on the appearance of the charnel ground. For that too arises only by the power of repulsive attention. Alternatively, the kinds of things in the charnel ground are what is meant by ‘charnel ground appearances’ (sivathikāvaṇṇāni).

Asubhakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Foul is concluded.

Rūpāvacarakusalakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Wholesome Fine-Material Sphere States is concluded.

Arūpāvacarakusalakathāvaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Discourse on Wholesome Formless Sphere States

265. Sabbākārenāti [Pg.108] evaṃ rūpanimittaṃ daṇḍādānasambhavadassanādinā sabbena rūparūpanimittesu tadārammaṇajjhānesu dosadassanākārena, rūpādīsu nikantippahānaanāvajjitukāmatādinā vā. Virāgāti jigucchanā. Āneñjābhisaṅkhāravacanādīhi āneñjatā ‘‘santā ime cunda ariyassa vinaye vimokkhā’’tiādinā santavimokkhatā ca vuttā. Dosadassanapaṭipakkhabhāvanāvasena paṭighasaññānaṃ suppahīnattā mahatāpi saddena arūpasamāpattito na vuṭṭhāti. Tathā pana na suppahīnattā sabbarūpasamāpattito vuṭṭhānaṃ siyā, paṭhamajjhānaṃ pana appakampi saddaṃ na sahatīti taṃ samāpannassa saddo kaṇṭakoti vuttaṃ.

265. ‘In every way’ (sabbākārenāti): Thus, by way of seeing the fault in every way in material form, the sign of form, and the jhānas that have them as their object—for instance, perceiving the possibility of taking up a stick because of the sign of form—or, alternatively, by way of abandoning craving for forms, etc., and the state of not wishing to advert to them. ‘Dispassion’ (virāgāti) is disgust. The state of being imperturbable (āneñjatā) is stated through such expressions as ‘imperturbable formations,’ and the state of being peaceful liberations (santavimokkhatā) is stated through such as, “These, Cunda, are peaceful liberations in the discipline of the Noble One.” Because perceptions of resistance are well abandoned by the power of seeing the fault in form and cultivating its opposite, one does not emerge from a formless attainment even with a loud sound. However, because they are not well abandoned in that way, emergence from any form attainment might occur. But the first jhāna cannot endure even a slight sound; thus it is said that for one who has attained it, sound is a thorn.

Āruppabhāvanāya abhāve cutito uddhaṃ uppattirahānaṃ rūpasaññāpaṭighasaññānaṃ yāva attano vipākappavatti, tāva anuppattidhammatāpādanena samatikkamo atthaṅgamo ca vutto. Nānattasaññāsu pana yā tasmiṃ bhave na uppajjanti, tā anokāsatāya na uppajjanti, na āruppabhāvanāya nivāritattā. Anivāritattā ca kāci uppajjanti. Tasmā tāsaṃ amanasikāro anāvajjanaṃ apaccavekkhaṇaṃ, javanapaṭipādakena vā bhavaṅgamanassa antare akaraṇaṃ appavesanaṃ vuttaṃ, tena ca nānattasaññāmanasikārahetūnaṃ rūpānaṃ samatikkamā samādhissa thirabhāvaṃ dasseti. Rūpasamatikkamābhāveneva hi rūpasamāpattīsu ‘‘nānattasaññānaṃ amanasikārā’’ti ekassa avacananti. Ko ānisaṃso, na hi sabbassādavatthurahite ākāse pavattitasaññāya ānisaṃso dissatīti vuttaṃ hoti. Rūpasaññāsamatikkamanādikaṃ vacanaṃ ānisaṃsassa pakāsanaṃ, na attho.

The transcending and cessation of perceptions of form and perceptions of resistance—which are fit to arise after passing away from this life in the absence of the cultivation of the formless—is spoken of as bringing them to a state of non-arising for as long as the result of that formless jhāna itself occurs. As for diverse perceptions, however, those that do not arise in that formless existence do not arise because it is not the place for them to arise, not because they are prevented by the cultivation of the formless. And because they are not prevented, some do arise. Therefore, non-attention to them, non-adverting, and non-reviewing is spoken of; or, alternatively, it is spoken of as the non-producing and non-inserting of diverse perceptions in the interval of the life-continuum stream by that which generates the javana process. And by that, it shows the stability of the concentration, which is due to the transcending of forms that are the cause for attending to diverse perceptions. For indeed, the non-stating of the single phrase, ‘non-attention to diverse perceptions,’ in the case of the form attainments is precisely because of the absence of the transcending of forms. What is the benefit? For indeed, it is said that no benefit is seen in a perception occurring in space that is devoid of all delightful objects. The statement about transcending the perception of form, etc., is a declaration of the benefit; it is not the primary meaning.

Aññatthāti suttesu. Tattha hi parittakasiṇugghāṭanepi rūpavivekamattaggahaṇena paricchedassa aggahaṇato anantapharaṇatā ca vuttā, idha pana anantapharaṇatāsabbhāvepi ugghāṭitakasiṇavasena parittānantatā hotīti dassanatthaṃ ‘‘ananto ākāso’’ti na vuttanti adhippāyo. Samayavavatthāpanajhānavisesanenevettha attho, na paṭipattiyāti tadavacanaṃ.

‘Elsewhere’ means in the Suttas. For there, indeed, even in the removal of a limited kasiṇa, the state of infinite pervasion is also stated due to not taking the boundary as object by taking as object merely the seclusion from form. But here, the intention is that, in order to show that even though the state of infinite pervasion is present, by way of the removed kasiṇa there is limitedness and infinitude, ‘infinite space’ is not stated. Here, the meaning is only by way of the distinction of jhāna through the determination of the occasion, not by way of the practice. Therefore, that is not stated.

266. Paṭhamāruppaviññāṇaṃ [Pg.109] attano pharaṇākāreneva anantanti manasikātabbattā ‘‘ananta’’nti vuttaṃ. Ugghāṭabhāvo ugghāṭimaṃ.

266. The first formless consciousness is stated as ‘infinite’ because it is fit to be attended to as ‘infinite’ only by the mode of its own pervasion. The state of being removed is ‘the removed’.

267. Akiñcananti viññāṇassa kiñci pakāraṃ aggahetvā sabbena sabbaṃ vibhāvanaṃ āha.

267. By ‘nothingness,’ He has stated the complete non-existence in every way, without taking any kind of distinction of the consciousness.

268. Yāyāti saṅkhārāvasesasaññāya. Taṃ tāva paṭipattiṃ. Āvajjissāmītiādinā tanninnāvajjanādipavattiyā abhāvaṃ dasseti, na tadatikkamanatthāya āvajjanabhāvanāpavattiyā. Nāsaññāti saññābhāvo ca etissā atthīti attho. Samūhagahaṇavasena pavattaṃ kalāpasammasanaṃ. Phassādiekekadhammagahaṇavasena pavattā anupadadhammavipassanā.

268. ‘Yāyā’ refers to the perception that remains from the formations. ‘Taṃ tāva paṭipattiṃ’ refers to that much of that practice. By ‘I will advert,’ etc., it shows the absence of the occurrence of the mastery of adverting and so on, which inclines towards that; it does not show the absence of the occurrence of the development of adverting for the purpose of transcending that. ‘Nāsaññā’ means: for this perception, there is also the state of being perception. Comprehension by groups is that which occurs by way of taking a group. Insight into dhammas one by one is the vipassanā that occurs by way of taking as object each individual dhamma, such as contact, etc.

Ākāse pavattitaviññāṇātikkamato tatiyā. Tadatikkamato hi tasseva vibhāvanaṃ hoti. Dutiyāruppaviññāṇavibhāvane hi tadeva atikkantaṃ siyā, na tassa ārammaṇaṃ, na cārammaṇe dosaṃ disvā anārammaṇassa vibhāvanātikkamo yujjati. Pāḷiyañca ‘‘viññāṇañcāyatanasamāpattiṃ sato samāpajjitvā tato vuṭṭhahitvā taññeva viññāṇaṃ abhāvetī’’ti (cūḷani. upasīvamāṇavapucchāniddesa 39) ttaṃ, na vuttaṃ ‘‘taññeva viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ abhāvetī’’ti, ‘‘taññeva abhāvetī’’ti vā. ‘‘Anantaṃ viññāṇanti viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ upasampajjā’’ti (vibha. 508) ettha pana dvayaṃ vuttaṃ ārammaṇañca viññāṇaṃ viññāṇañcāyatanañca. Tasmiṃ dvaye yena kenaci yato vā vuṭṭhito, teneva paṭṭhānaniddiṭṭhena taṃsaddassa sambandhe āpanne viññāṇañcāyatanassa nivattanatthaṃ viññāṇavacanaṃ, tasmā paṭhamāruppaviññāṇasseva abhāvanātikkamo vutto. Tannissitanti tena nissitaṃ. Taṃ maṇḍapalaggaṃ anissāya tena vinābhūte vivitte bahi okāse ṭhānaṃ viya ākāsalaggaviññāṇassa viveke tadapagame tatiyāruppassa ṭhānaṃ.

The third attainment arises by transcending the consciousness that has occurred in relation to space. For by transcending that, the very removal of that object occurs. Indeed, in the removal of the second formless consciousness, that very consciousness would be transcended, not its object. And it is not fitting to transcend by removal that which is not the object after seeing a fault in the object. And in the Pāḷi it is said: ‘Having mindfully entered the attainment of the base of infinite consciousness, and having emerged from it, one causes that very consciousness to cease.’ It is not said, ‘one causes that very base of infinite consciousness to cease,’ nor ‘one causes that very thing to cease.’ However, in the passage, ‘Having attained the base of infinite consciousness, perceiving “consciousness is infinite,”’ two are mentioned: the object, which is consciousness, and the base of infinite consciousness itself. Between these two, from whichever one has emerged, when the word ‘that’ is connected with that which is indicated as the basis, the word ‘consciousness’ is used to preclude the base of infinite consciousness. Therefore, the transcending by causing to cease is stated of the first formless consciousness alone. ‘Dependent on that’ means supported by it. Like the standing in a secluded place outside, separate from and not depending on the one clinging to the pavilion, so is the standing of the third formless attainment in the seclusion from, the departure from, the consciousness clinging to space.

Arūpāvacarakusalakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse of Formless-Sphere Wholesome States is concluded.

Tebhūmakakusalavaṇṇanā

The Exposition of Wholesome States Pertaining to the Three Planes

269. Ime [Pg.110] tāva chandādhipateyye pañca nayāti chandādhipateyyanaye ante purimanayānaṃ taṃnayābhimukhappavattiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, ayaṃ pana pakāro na pāḷianugato. Na hi pāḷiyaṃ suddhikanayādayo vatvā vīriyādhipateyyādinayā vuttāti. Mahāpakaraṇe sattahi mahāvārehi anulomādinayavicittehi hīnattiko vibhatto. Tattha ca majjhimadhammekadesabhūtā ime vīsati lokiyamahānayāti katvā ‘‘tattha vibhattā’’ti vuttaṃ, na etena kamena imesaṃ nayānaṃ tattha āgatattā.

269. The statement 'These five are the methods in the desire-predominance section,' made at the end in the desire-predominance method, was said in reference to the progression of the previous methods towards that method. This type of explanation, however, is not in accordance with the Pāḷi. For it is not that in the Pāḷi, having stated the simple method and so on, the methods of energy-predominance and so on are stated. In the Great Book, the inferior triad is analyzed by seven great sections, variegated with methods such as the conformity method and so on. And it was said that 'they are analyzed therein' because these twenty worldly great methods are a part of the middle states, not because these methods appear therein in this same sequence.

Evametesaṃ vibhattaṭṭhānaṃ dassetvā idāni etasmiṃ tebhūmakakusalakathāvasānaṭṭhāne aṭṭhārasakammadvāradassanatthaṃ ‘‘imasmiṃ pana ṭhāne’’tiādimāha. Atha vā hīnapaṇītehi vinivattetvā majjhimarāsiantogadhabhāvaṃ dassentena etesaṃ tebhūmakakusalanayānaṃ hīnattike vibhāgo kato. ‘‘Imasmiṃ pana ṭhāne’’tiādikassa yathāvuttova sambandho. Hīnattike majjhimarāsimhi ye savipākā vaṭṭanissiteneva dānādivasena pavattitā, te hīnāti kātabbā. Ye vivaṭṭanissitena dānādivasena pavattitā, te paṇītāti kātabbā. Avipākā majjhimāti kātabbā. Avipākattā ca tesu majjhimarāsiṃ ṭhapetvā itare dve ekantavaṭṭanissitā nava, vivaṭṭupanissayabhūtā ca navāti aṭṭhārasa kammadvārāni, kammāni ca tāni tassa tassa phalassa kāraṇabhāvena dvārāni cāti kammadvārāni. Tattha tattha vā cittāni kammadvārānīti āha. Taṃtaṃdvārāni vā kāyādīni. Aṭṭhārasa khattiyā ca abhabbā hīnahīnattayādayo nava, bhabbā ca paṇītapaṇītattayādayo navāti kammānurūpeneva veditabbā. Evaṃ brāhmaṇādayo devā ca yojetabbā. Aṭṭhacattālīsa gottacaraṇāni tesaññeva khattiyādīnaṃ bhedā. ‘‘Kāmāvacaraṃ kusalaṃ cittaṃ uppannaṃ hoti…pe… cittādhipateyya’’nti (dha. sa. 269-270) evaṃ vutto cittassa cittādhipateyyabhāvo, cittacetasikasamudāye samayavavatthāpako cittasaddo pavattoti ‘‘sampayuttadhammānaṃ vasena vutto’’ti āha.

Having thus shown the classified arrangement of these methods, now, at the conclusion of the discussion on wholesome states pertaining to the three planes, in order to show the eighteen kamma-doors, the author begins with, 'But in this case,' etc. Alternatively, having turned away from the inferior and superior, and showing the state of being included in the intermediate group, the Blessed One has made a division of these methods of wholesome states pertaining to the three planes in the inferior triad. The connection of the passage beginning with 'But in this case' is just as has been stated. In the inferior triad, those states which, being accompanied by result and dependent only on the round of existence, proceed by way of giving and so forth, are to be considered 'inferior.' Those which, being dependent on disengagement from the round of existence, proceed by way of giving and so forth, are to be considered 'superior.' Those without result are to be considered 'intermediate.' And because they are without result, among these, having set aside the intermediate group, the other two are the nine that are exclusively dependent on the round of existence and the nine that have become a strong supporting condition for disengagement from the round of existence—thus, there are eighteen kamma-doors. They are both actions (kamma) and, because they are the cause of their respective results, they are also doors (dvāra); hence, they are kamma-doors. Alternatively, the author states that in each respective case, the consciousnesses are the kamma-doors. Or, the respective doors are the body and so forth. The eighteen types of khattiyas should be understood only in accordance with their kamma: nine who are incapable (of realizing the Truths), beginning with the inferior-inferior triad, and nine who are capable, beginning with the superior-superior triad. In this way, brahmins, devas, and so forth should also be applied. The forty-eight lineages and practices are the distinctions of those very khattiyas and so forth. 'When wholesome consciousness belonging to the sense sphere has arisen…the dominance of consciousness' (Dhammasaṅgaṇi 269–270). Thus is stated the state of consciousness being the dominant factor. Because the word 'consciousness' occurs in the collection of consciousness and mental factors as a designator of a moment, the author states, 'It is spoken of by way of the associated phenomena.'

Tebhūmakakusalavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of Wholesome States Pertaining to the Three Planes is completed.

Lokuttarakusalavaṇṇanā

The Exposition of Supramundane Wholesome States

277. Lokaṃ [Pg.111] taratīti etena lokasamatikkamapaṭipattimāha. Uttaratīti etena lokassantagamanaṃ phale patiṭṭhānaṃ phalaṃ. Samatikkammātiādinā nibbānaṃ. Samatikkammāti hi nissaritvā. Abhibhuyyāti visaṃyuttaṃ hutvāti attho. Tividhopi cattho maggādīsu ekekasmiṃ yojetabbo, maggeyeva vā idha tassa adhippetattā. Ekacittakkhaṇikanti ekamaggassa dve vāre anuppattiṃ sandhāyāha. Aññamaññaṃ dhammānaṃ anativattanādisādhikāya paññāya vaḍḍheti. ‘‘Niyyātīti niyyānīya’’nti vattabbe ī-kārassa rassattaṃ ya-kārassa ca ka-kāraṃ katvā ‘‘niyyānika’’nti vuttaṃ. Niyyāti etenāti niyyānaṃ, niyyānameva niyyānikaṃ venayiko viya. Ettha ‘‘neyyānika’’nti vattabbe i-kārassa e-kārattaṃ akatvā vuttaṃ.

277. By 'one crosses the world,' he indicates the path, which is the practice for transcending the world. By 'one goes beyond,' he indicates the fruition, which is the establishment in the result of reaching the end of the world. 'Having transcended' and so on refers to Nibbāna. For 'having transcended' means 'having gone forth.' 'Having overcome' means 'having become detached.' This threefold meaning should be applied to each of the path, fruition, and Nibbāna individually, or only to the path, since that is what is intended here. 'Of a single mind-moment' is said with reference to the non-arising of a single path a second time. One develops it by means of the wisdom that establishes the non-transgression, etc., of associated states towards one another. Where 'niyyātīti niyyānīya' should be said, 'niyyānika' is stated by shortening the ī-vowel and changing the ya-consonant to a ka-consonant. 'One is led out by this,' thus it is 'leading out' (niyyāna); 'leading out' itself is 'niyyānika,' like 'venayika.' Here, where 'neyyānika' should be said, it is stated without changing the i-vowel to an e-vowel.

Phalanti cittacetasikarāsi vuccati, taṃ aññamaññaṃ sampayuttānaṃ dhammānaṃ attano avayavabhūtānaṃ nissayo hoti. Phalañāṇaṃ vā phalaṃ, sammādiṭṭhiādayo aṅgāni vā. Lokuttarabhāveti lokaṃ uttiṇṇabhāve. Tena phalanibbānāni saṅgaṇhāti. Tesu yaṃ bhavati phalaṃ, taṃ ‘‘bhūmī’’ti vuccati. Yathā vā kammanibbattā kāmabhavādayo taṃsamaṅgino nissayabhāvena ‘‘bhūmī’’ti vuccanti, evaṃ maggena nibbattaṃ phalaṃ ariyasāvakassa kālena kālaṃ samāpajjitabbatāya nissayabhāvato ‘‘bhūmī’’ti vuccati, tatoyeva ariyā cirataraṃ tiṭṭhanti. Samucchedavivekavasenāti ettha apāyagamanīyānaṃ accantasamucchedo itaresañca vijjutobhāsena viya tamassa samucchedo daṭṭhabbo. Lokiyajjhānampi puthujjanassa ariyassa ca akatādhikārassa na vinā paṭipadāya ijjhati, katādhikārassa pana ariyassa maggeneva samijjhanato vipākānaṃ viya kusalena tathā samiddhassa ariyamaggena sadisatāya abhāvato atabbipākattā ca na maggapaṭipadā tassa jhānassa paṭipadāti sakkā vattunti tattha tathā garuṃ katvā paṭipadāhi eva desanā na katā, yathāvuttajjhānasaṅgahatthaṃ suddhikadesanāpi katā.

The aggregate of consciousness and mental factors is called 'fruit'; it is a support for its own constituent phenomena which are mutually associated. Or, fruit-knowledge is the fruit; or, the factors such as right view and so forth are the fruit. 'In the state of being supramundane' (lokuttarabhāve) means in the state of having transcended the world. By this, it includes the fruits and Nibbāna. Among these, whatever is the fruit is called a 'plane' (bhūmi). Or, just as the sensual existences and so forth, produced by kamma, are called 'planes' because they are a support for the person endowed with them, so too the fruit produced by the path is called a 'plane' for the noble disciple because it is fit to be attained from time to time, or because it is a support. For that very reason, the noble ones abide for a very long time. Regarding 'by the mode of severance and detachment' (samucchedavivekavasena)—here, the utter severance of states that lead to the lower realms and the severance of the others, like the destruction of darkness by a flash of lightning, should be understood. Even mundane jhāna does not succeed for an ordinary person or for a noble one who has not fulfilled the prerequisites, without the practice. But for a noble one who has fulfilled the prerequisites, because it succeeds only through the path—just as results succeed through wholesome kamma—and because that mundane jhāna which has thus succeeded is not similar to the noble path, and because it is not its result, it cannot be said that the path-practice is the practice for that jhāna. Therefore, regarding that as such a weighty matter, the teaching was not given only with the practices; for the purpose of including the jhāna as stated, a bare teaching was also given.

Idha pana kassaci vinā paṭipadāya asiddhito garuṃ katvā dassetuṃ ‘‘dukkhapaṭipada’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. Yo koci vāroti sakiṃ dvikkhattuṃ tikkhattuṃ catukkhattuṃ anekakkhattunti evamādīsu vikkhambhanavāresu yo koci. Sakiṃ dvikkhattuñca vikkhambhanavārā sukhā paṭipadā eva, na ca tato uddhaṃ sukhā paṭipadā [Pg.112] hotīti tikkhattuṃ vikkhambhanavāraṃ dukkhā paṭipadāti rocesuṃ aṭṭhakathācariyā. Tasmiṃ tathārocite tato paresu catukkhattuṃ vikkhambhanavārādīsu vattabbameva natthīti. Rūpārūpānaṃ lakkhaṇādīhi paricchinditvā gahaṇaṃ rūpārūpapariggaho, nāmarūpamattametaṃ, na añño koci sattādikoti vavatthāpanaṃ nāmarūpavavatthāpanaṃ. Pariggahitarūpārūpassa maggapātubhāvadandhatā ca nāmarūpavavatthāpanādīnaṃ kicchasiddhito siyāti na rūpārūpapariggahakicchatāya eva dukkhapaṭipadatā vattabbāti ce? Taṃ na, nāmarūpavavatthāpanādīnaṃ paccanīkakilesamandatāya sukhasiddhiyampi tathāsiddhavipassanāsahagatānaṃ indriyānaṃ mandatāya maggapātubhāvadandhabhāvato.

Here, however, in this supramundane teaching, because it is not accomplished for anyone without the practice, the Blessed One has spoken 'difficult practice,' and so forth, to show it as a weighty matter. As for 'any occasion,' it means any one among the occasions of suppression, such as once, twice, thrice, four times, or many times. The occasions of suppression of once and twice are indeed the pleasant practice. And because beyond that there is no longer a pleasant practice, the commentators have approved of the third occasion of suppression as the difficult practice. When that is so approved, in the occasions beyond it, such as the fourth occasion of suppression and so forth, there is nothing at all to be said. The grasping of materiality and immateriality after having defined them by their characteristics and so forth is the comprehension of materiality and immateriality. The determination that 'This is merely name-and-form; there is no other being or the like' is the determination of name-and-form. If it is objected: For one who has comprehended materiality and immateriality, the slowness of the path's manifestation might be due to the difficult accomplishment of the determination of name-and-form and so forth; therefore, the state of difficult practice should not be spoken of as being solely due to the difficulty of the comprehension of materiality and immateriality. That is not so. For, even when there is easy accomplishment of the determination of name-and-form and so forth due to the weakness of the opposing defilements, the path's manifestation is slow because of the weakness of the faculties associated with the insight of one who has thus accomplished it.

Rūpārūpaṃ pariggahetvāti akicchenapi pariggahetvā. Kicchena pariggahite vattabbameva natthi. Evaṃ sesesupi. Imaṃ vāraṃ rocesunti kalāpasammasanāvasāne udayabbayānupassanāya vattamānāya uppannassa vipassanupakkilesassa tikkhattuṃ vikkhambhanena kicchatāvāraṃ dukkhā paṭipadāti rocesuṃ etadantattā paṭipadāya. Etassa akicchattepi purimānaṃ kicchatte dukkhapaṭipadatā vuttanayāvāti na paṭisiddhāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yathāvuttaṃ vā sabbaṃ rūpārūpapariggahādikicchataṃ tikkhattuṃ vikkhambhanavāratāvasena ‘‘imaṃ vāra’’nti āha. Yassa pana sabbattha akicchatā, tassa sukhā paṭipadā veditabbā.

'Having comprehended materiality and immateriality' (Rūpārūpaṃ pariggahetvā) means having comprehended it even without difficulty. When it is comprehended with difficulty, there is nothing more to be said. Likewise in the remaining knowledges. They preferred this stage (Imaṃ vāraṃ rocesunti): at the conclusion of the comprehension of groups, while the knowledge of contemplation of rise and fall is occurring, by the suppression of the arisen corruptions of insight three times, they preferred to call the stage of difficulty 'the difficult progress' (dukkhā paṭipadā), because the progress has this as its end. It should be understood that even when this stage is without difficulty, if the preceding stages are difficult, the state of being a difficult progress is not rejected, just as has been explained. Or, he said 'this stage' (imaṃ vāraṃ) referring to all the aforementioned difficulty in the comprehension of materiality and immateriality, etc., by way of it being the stage of suppressing three times. But for one for whom there is no difficulty in all cases, the easy progress (sukhā paṭipadā) should be understood.

Musāvādādīnaṃ visaṃvādanādikiccatāya lūkhānaṃ apariggāhakānaṃ paṭipakkhabhāvato pariggāhakasabhāvā sammāvācā. Sā siniddhabhāvato sampayuttadhamme pariggaṇhāti sammāvācāpaccayasubhāsitasotārañca janaṃ. Kāyikakiriyākiccaṃ kattabbaṃ samuṭṭhāpeti, sayañca samuṭṭhahanaṃ ghaṭanaṃ hotīti sammākammantasaṅkhātā viratipi samuṭṭhānasabhāvāti vuttā. Sampayuttadhammānaṃ vā ukkhipanaṃ samuṭṭhahanaṃ kāyikakiriyāya bhārukkhipanaṃ viya, jīvamānassa sattassa, sampayuttadhammānaṃ vā suddhi vodānaṃ ājīvasseva vā jīvitindriyavuttiyā.

Because it is the opposite of false speech and so on—which have the function of deceiving, etc., are rough, and are non-embracing—Right Speech has an embracing nature. Due to its smooth nature, it embraces associated states and also people who are listeners to well-spoken words conditioned by Right Speech. It originates the task of bodily action that should be done, and it is itself an arising, an effort; thus, the abstinence called Right Action is also said to have the nature of originating. Or, the uplifting of associated states is origination (samuṭṭhahana), like the lifting of a burden by bodily action. Or, for a living being, the purity of associated states is cleansing (vodāna). Or, the purity of livelihood itself for the functioning of the life faculty is cleansing (vodāna).

283. Maggasannissitanti paramatthamaggasabhāvattā maggāvayavabhāvena samudāyasannissitanti attho.

283. 'Dependent on the path' (maggasannissitaṃ) means: because it has the nature of the ultimate path, it is dependent on the aggregate (samudāya) by way of being a component of the path. This is the meaning.

285. Patiṭṭhānaṃ kilesavasena, āyūhanaṃ abhisaṅkhāravasena. Taṇhāvasena vā patiṭṭhānaṃ, diṭṭhivasena āyūhanaṃ. Bodhīti yā ayaṃ dhammasāmaggī vuccatīti yojetabbā. Senaṅgarathaṅgādayo viyāti etena [Pg.113] puggalapaññattiyā avijjamānapaññattibhāvaṃ dasseti. Aṅga-saddo kāraṇatthopi hotīti catusaccabodhāya saṃvattantīti bojjhaṅgā. Bujjhantīti bodhiyo, bodhiyo eva aṅgāti ‘‘anubujjhantīti bojjhaṅgā’’ti vuttaṃ. Vipassanādīnaṃ kāraṇānaṃ bujjhitabbānañca saccānaṃ anurūpaṃ paccakkhabhāvena paṭimukhaṃ aviparītatāya sammā ca bujjhantīti evamatthavisesadīpakehi upasaggehi ‘‘anubujjhantī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Bodhi-saddo hi sabbavisesayuttaṃ bujjhanaṃ sāmaññena saṅgaṇhātīti.

285. Establishment is by the power of defilements; exertion is by the power of volitional formations. Alternatively, establishment is by the power of craving; exertion is by the power of views. It should be connected thus: 'Bodhi' (enlightenment) is what this harmony of dhammas is called. By this, it shows that the designation of a person is a non-existent designation. The word 'aṅga' (factor) also has the meaning of 'cause'; therefore, because they conduce to the understanding of the Four Truths, they are called 'bojjhaṅgā' (factors of enlightenment). They understand, thus they are 'bodhiyo' (enlightenments); the enlightenments themselves are the causes (aṅga). Hence it is said, 'They understand accordingly, thus they are factors of enlightenment.' Because they understand the causes, which are insight and so on, and the truths to be understood, in a fitting manner, by way of direct experience, face-to-face, unerringly, and rightly—thus, with prefixes that indicate specific meanings, it is said, 'anubujjhanti' (they understand accordingly), and so on. Indeed, the word 'bodhi' generally includes the act of understanding that is endowed with all specific qualities.

299. Tiṇṇanti rāgādīnaṃ. Karoti nāma kiṃ duccaritāni anuvattamānāni.

299. Of 'tiṇṇa' (crossed over): [it means crossed over] from lust and so on. What does 'karoti' (he does) mean? [It means he does] the misdeeds that follow.

301. Pāṇātipātādinipphāditapaccayānaṃ niccasevanaṃ dhuvapaṭisevanaṃ. Sakiccakoti visuṃ attano kiccavā. Na hotīti atthantarabhāvaṃ paṭikkhipati. Paccayapaṭisevanasāmantajappanairiyāpathappavattanāni pāpicchatānibbattāni tīṇi kuhanavatthūnīti.

301. The constant partaking of requisites produced by killing living beings and so on is 'habitual indulgence'. 'Sakiccako' means having one's own separate task. 'Na hoti' (it is not) rejects the state of being a separate essence. The three grounds of deceit—partaking of requisites, suggestive talk, and conduct of postures—are produced from evil desire.

343. Vuṭṭhānagāminīvipassanā saṅkhārupekkhā sānulomā, sā suññato passantī ‘‘suññatā’’ti vuccati, dukkhato passantī taṇhāpaṇidhisosanato ‘‘appaṇihita’’nti. Sā āgamanīyaṭṭhāne maggādhigamatthaṃ āgamanapaṭipadāṭhāne ṭhatvā suññatāppaṇihitanti nāmaṃ deti. Āgamanato nāme laddhe saguṇato ārammaṇato ca nāmaṃ siddhameva hoti, na pana saguṇārammaṇehi nāmalābhe sabbattha āgamanato nāmaṃ siddhaṃ hotīti paripuṇṇanāmasiddhihetuttā saguṇārammaṇehi sabbesampi nāmattayayogo, na āgamanatoti vavatthānakarattā ca nippariyāyadesanāya āgamanatova idha nāmaṃ labhati, na itarehīti vuttaṃ.

343. The insight leading to emergence—equanimity towards formations together with adaptation knowledge—when seeing formations as void of self, is called 'voidness'; when seeing them as suffering, it is called 'desireless' because it dries up the craving that aspires. That insight, having stood in the position which is the cause for the path to arise—for the purpose of attaining the path, in the position of the practice which is the cause for arising—gives the names 'voidness' and 'desireless' to the supramundane jhāna. When a name is obtained in the path on account of the approach, the name is indeed established on account of its own quality and on account of its object, which is Nibbāna. But, in the acquisition of a name on account of its own quality and its object, the name is not everywhere in all the paths of liberation established on account of the approach. Therefore, because of being the cause for the complete establishment of the name, the connection with the three names for all the paths of liberation is on account of their own quality and their object, and not on account of the approach. And because of making a distinction, and because in the Abhidhamma, which is the teaching without alternative meanings, here in this supramundane path the name is obtained only on account of the approach and not on account of the others, thus it was said.

350. Animittavipassananti aniccānupassanaṃ. Nimittadhammesūti samūhādighanavasena ca sakiccaparicchedatāya ca sapariggahesu khandhesu. Animittavimokkhoti aniccānupassanamāha. Evaṃsampadamidanti kathamidha upamāsaṃsandanaṃ hoti. Na hi chandacittānaṃ maggasaṅkhātaadhipatibhāvābhāvo viya saddhindriyādhikassa animittavimokkhassa animittabhāvābhāvo atthi, na ca amaggādhipatīnaṃ maggādhipatināmadānābhāvo viya animittassa animittanāmadānābhāvoti sakkā vattuṃ animittavimokkhassa ananimittatāya abhāvato[Pg.114]. Maggo adhipati etesanti ca maggādhipatinoti yutto tattha chandacittehi taṃsampayuttānaṃ maggādhipatibhāvābhāvo. Idha pana maggo animittaṃ etassāti maggānimittoti ayamattho na sambhavatīti na tena amaggena maggassa animittabhāvo na yujjati, kiṃ vā ettha sāmaññaṃ adhippetanti. Amaggaṅgamagganāmābhāvo. Yathā satipi adhipatibhāve chandacittānaṃ na maggādhipatīti magganāmaṃ, na ca tehi maggassa tesaṃ amaggaṅgattā, tathā satipi saddhāya āgamanabhāvena tassā animittanti magganāmaṃ, na ca tāya maggassa tassā amaggaṅgattā. Evaṃ animittavipassanāyapi animittabhāvo nippariyāyena natthīti dīpito hoti.

350. ‘Signless insight’ (animittavipassanā) is contemplation of impermanence. ‘In phenomena with signs’ (nimittadhammesu) refers to the aggregates, which have substance, both by way of their compactness as a mass and by their delimitation according to their respective functions. He taught contemplation of impermanence as ‘signless liberation’ (animittavimokkha). In this context, how is the connection of the simile established here? For indeed, it is not that there is an absence of the signless nature for the signless liberation predominated by the faculty of faith, like the absence of the state of predominance called 'path' for desire and mind. Nor can it be said that there is an absence of giving the name ‘signless’ to the signless, like the absence of giving the name ‘path-predominant’ to those not predominated by the path, because of the absence of a non-signless state for the signless liberation. And, 'The path is predominant for these,' thus they are 'path-predominated' (maggādhipatino); therefore, in that case, the absence of the state of path-predominance for desire and mind and their associated states is fitting. Here, however, the meaning 'The path is the signless for this,' thus `maggānimitta`, is not possible. Therefore, the signless nature of the path on account of that which is not the path is indeed fitting. Alternatively, what commonality is intended here? The absence of the name 'path' for a non-path-factor. Just as, although there is a state of predominance for desire and mind, they do not have the name 'path' as in 'path-predominated,' and the path does not get its name from them, because they are not path factors; similarly, although faith is a condition for the arising of the path, it does not have the path-name 'signless,' and the path does not get its name from it, because it is not a path factor. Thus, it is shown that even for signless insight, the state of being 'signless' does not exist in a direct sense.

Nanu ca idha jhānaṃ suññatādināmena vuttaṃ, na maggoti ce? Na, maggasampayogato jhānassa suññatādināmakattā. Suttantapariyāyena saguṇārammaṇehi idha abhidhammepi nāmaṃ labhatīti āhaṃsu. Tasmā paṭikkhittā ‘‘na pana labhantī’’ti. Kiṃ kāraṇā? Abhidhamme sarasaṃ anāmasitvā paccanīkatova nāmalābhāti adhippāyo. Yo hi saguṇārammaṇehi nāmalābho, so sarasappadhāno hoti. Saraseneva ca nāmalābhe sabbamaggānaṃ suññatādibhāvoti vavatthānaṃ na siyā. Tasmā abhidhamme satipi dvīhi nāmalābhe paccanīkato nāmavavatthānakaraṃ gahitanti saguṇārammaṇehi suññatāppaṇihitamaggā nāmaṃ na labhantīti āha. Atha vā na pana labhantīti aññanirapekkhehi saguṇārammaṇehi na labhanti. Kiṃ kāraṇā? Abhidhamme sarasapaccanīkehi sahitehi nāmalābhāti attho. Paccanīkañhi vavatthānakaraṃ anapekkhitvā kevalassa sarasassa nāmahetubhāvo abhidhamme natthi avavatthānāpattito. Tasmā attābhinivesapaṇidhipaṭipakkhavipassanānulomā maggā satipi sarasantare paccanīkasahitena sarasena nāmaṃ labhanti. Animittamaggassa pana vipassanā nimittapaṭipakkhā na hoti sayaṃ nimittaggahaṇato nimittaggahaṇānivāraṇāti tadanulomamaggopi na nimittassa paṭipakkho. Yadi siyā, nimittagatavipassanāyapi paṭipakkho siyāti. Tasmā vijjamānopi saraso vavatthānakarapaccanīkābhāvā abhidhamme animittanti nāmadāyako na gahito. Aniccānupassanānulomo pana maggo suddhikapaṭipadānayeyeva saṅgahitoti daṭṭhabbo. Tasmā eva ca so nayo vuttoti. Evanti yaṃ [Pg.115] vakkhati ‘‘aniccato vuṭṭhahantassa maggo animitto hotī’’ti (dha. sa. aṭṭha. 350), evaṃ āharitvā aṭṭhakathācariyehi so animittamaggo dīpitoti attho.

Is it not so that here jhāna is spoken of by the name ‘voidness’, etc., and not the path? If so, no. Because of its association with the path, jhāna comes to be named ‘voidness’, etc. They said that by the Suttanta method, on account of objects with qualities, here in the Abhidhamma also, it obtains a name. Therefore, they were rejected with the statement, ‘But they do not obtain.’ What is the reason? The intention is that in the Abhidhamma, without considering its own nature (sarasa), the obtaining of a name is only from the opposing factor (paccanīka). For the obtaining of a name on account of objects with qualities has its own nature as primary. And if the obtaining of a name were by its own nature alone, the distinction that all paths have the nature of voidness, etc., would not be possible. Therefore, in the Abhidhamma, although a name is obtained in two ways, that which determines the distinction of the name is taken from the opposing factor. Thus, he says that on account of objects with qualities, the voidness and desireless paths do not obtain a name. Alternatively, ‘but they do not obtain’ means they do not obtain a name on account of objects with qualities that are independent of another factor. What is the reason? The meaning is that in the Abhidhamma, the obtaining of a name is due to its own nature and the opposing factor together. For in the Abhidhamma, without regard for the distinguishing opposing factor, its own nature alone is not the cause for a name, because a distinction would not be reached. Therefore, paths that are in accordance with insight that is the counterpart to adherence to self and to aspiration obtain their name through their own nature which is together with the opposing factor, even though another factor, its own nature, exists. However, the insight of the signless path is not the counterpart to the sign, because it itself grasps the sign or does not prevent the grasping of the sign; thus, the path in accordance with it is also not the counterpart to the sign. If it were, insight concerned with the sign would also be a counterpart. Therefore, although its own nature exists, due to the absence of a distinguishing opposing factor, in the Abhidhamma its own nature is not taken as the giver of the name ‘signless’. The path in accordance with the contemplation of impermanence, however, should be understood as included only in the method of the path of purification. And for that very reason, that method is stated. Thus, just as it will be said, ‘For one emerging from the contemplation of impermanence, the path is signless’ (DhsA. 350), having brought this forth, the commentators have explained that signless path. This is the meaning.

Vuṭṭhāna…pe… kimārammaṇāti aniccādito vuṭṭhahantassa vuṭṭhānagāminiyā lakkhaṇārammaṇatte sati saṅkhārehi vuṭṭhānaṃ na siyā, saṅkhārārammaṇatte ca lakkhaṇapaṭivedhoti maññamāno pucchati. ‘‘Anicca’’ntiādinā saṅkhāresu pavattamānena ñāṇena lakkhaṇānipi paṭividdhāni honti tadākārasaṅkhāragahaṇatoti āha ‘‘lakkhaṇārammaṇā’’ti. Saṅkhārārammaṇā eva yathāvuttādhippāyena ‘‘lakkhaṇārammaṇā’’ti vuttāti dassento ‘‘lakkhaṇaṃ nāmā’’tiādimāha. Aniccatā dukkhatā anattatāti hi visuṃ gayhamānaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ paññattigatikaṃ paramatthato avijjamānaṃ, avijjamānattā eva parittādivasena navattabbadhammabhūtaṃ. Tasmā visuṃ gahetabbassa lakkhaṇassa paramatthato abhāvā ‘‘aniccaṃ dukkhamanattā’’ti saṅkhāre sabhāvato sallakkhentova lakkhaṇāni sallakkheti nāmāti āha ‘‘yo pana aniccaṃ dukkhamanattāti tīṇi lakkhaṇāni sallakkhetī’’ti. Yasmā ca aniccantiādinā saṅkhārāva dissamānā, tasmā te kaṇṭhe baddhakuṇapaṃ viya paṭinissajjanīyā honti.

‘Emergence… etc.… What is the object?’ Thinking that if the insight leading to emergence for one emerging from impermanence, etc., had the characteristic as its object, there would be no emergence from formations, and if it had formations as its object, there would be no penetration of the characteristic, he asks. He says that it has the characteristic as its object because by the knowledge occurring in the formations with ‘impermanent’, etc., the characteristics are also penetrated, due to the grasping of formations in that aspect. Showing that insight having formations as its object is indeed called ‘having the characteristic as its object’ in the sense explained above, he says, ‘The characteristic, namely…’ and so on. For the characteristic, when taken separately as the state of impermanence, the state of suffering, and the state of non-self, is of the nature of a concept, ultimately non-existent, and because it is non-existent, it becomes a state not to be spoken of by way of being limited, etc. Therefore, since the characteristic, when taken separately, does not exist ultimately, one who discerns the formations according to their intrinsic nature as ‘impermanent, suffering, non-self,’ is said to discern the characteristics. Thus, he said: ‘But one who discerns the three characteristics: impermanent, suffering, non-self…’. And because it is the formations themselves that are seen as ‘impermanent’, etc., they are to be relinquished like a carcass tied around the neck.

Lokuttarakusalaṃ

The Supramundane Wholesome

Pakiṇṇakakathāvaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Miscellaneous Discourse

Tatrāti lokuttarajjhāne. Ajjhattañcāti upaḍḍhagāthāya abhinivisitabbaṃ vuṭṭhātabbaṃ vipassanābhūmiṃ pañcadhā uddisati. Sattaaṭṭhādīni aṅgāni sattaṭṭhaṅgānīti ādisaddassa lopo daṭṭhabbo. Nimittanti yato vuṭṭhānaṃ, tāni nimittapavattāni nimittavacaneneva uddisati. Saṅkhārupekkhāñāṇameva ariyamaggassa bojjhaṅgādivisesaṃ niyameti. Kasmā? Tato tato dutiyādipādakajjhānato uppannassa sasaṅkhārupekkhāñāṇassa pādakajjhānātikkantānaṃ aṅgānaṃ asamāpajjitukāmatāvirāgabhāvanābhāvato itarassa ca atabbhāvato. Tesampi vādesu…pe… vipassanāva niyametīti veditabbā. Kasmā? Vipassanāniyameneva hi paṭhamattheravādepi apādakapaṭhamajjhānapādakamaggā paṭhamajjhānikāva honti, itare ca pādakajjhānavipassanāniyamehi taṃtaṃjhānikā. Evaṃ sesavādesupi vipassanāniyamo yathāsambhavaṃ yojetabbo.

‘Therein’ (tatra) means in the supramundane jhāna. By the half-verse beginning with ‘And internally’ (ajjhattañca), he indicates concisely the ground for insight—that which should be firmly contemplated and that from which one should emerge—in five ways. In the phrase ‘seven or eight factors’ (sattaṭṭhaṅgāni), the elision of the word ‘etc.’ (ādi) from ‘seven, eight, etc., factors’ (sattaaṭṭhādīni aṅgāni) should be understood. As for ‘sign’ (nimitta): that from which emergence occurs, those occurrences related to the sign, he indicates concisely by the very word ‘sign’. It is only the knowledge of equanimity towards formations that determines the distinction of the enlightenment factors, etc., of the noble path. Why? Because for the insight knowledge accompanied by equanimity towards formations, which has arisen from this or that base jhāna beginning with the second, there exists the development of dispassion—which is the state of not wishing to attain—towards the factors that have transcended the base jhāna; and because for other knowledge, that state does not exist. In the views of those elders as well... it should be known that insight alone determines. Why? Because it is only by the determination of insight that, even in the view of the first elder, the paths without a base and the paths with the first jhāna as a base are only of the first jhāna; and the other paths are of this or that jhāna by the determinations of the base jhāna and of insight. Thus, in the remaining views as well, the determination of insight should be applied as is possible.

Pakiṇṇakasaṅkhāreti [Pg.116] pādakajjhānato aññasaṅkhāre. Tena pādakajjhānasaṅkhāresu sammasitesu vattabbameva natthīti dasseti. Tatrāpīti dutiyattheravādepi. Taṃtaṃjhānikatā taṃtaṃsammasitasaṅkhāravipassanāniyamehi hoti. Tatrāpi hi vipassanā taṃtaṃvirāgāvirāgabhāvanābhāvena somanassasahagatā upekkhāsahagatā ca hutvā jhānaṅgādiniyamaṃ maggassa karotīti evaṃ vipassanāniyamo vuttanayeneva veditabbo.

‘Miscellaneous formations’ (pakiṇṇakasaṅkhāra) means formations other than those of the base jhāna. By that, he shows that when the formations of the base jhāna are contemplated, there is indeed nothing to be said. ‘Even there’ (tatrāpi) means even in the view of the second elder. The state of being of this or that jhāna occurs because of the determinations concerning this or that contemplated formation and the determination of insight. For in that view as well, insight, by its state of being the development of dispassion or non-dispassion towards this or that, becomes accompanied by joy or accompanied by equanimity, and it makes the determination of the jhāna factors, etc., for the path. Thus, the determination of insight should be understood in the very manner already stated.

Tanti taṃtaṃjhānasadisabhavanaṃ. Svāyamattho pādakajjhānasammasitajjhānupanissayehi vinā ajjhāsayamattena asijjhanā upanissayena vinā saṅkappamattena sakadāgāmiphalādīnaṃ asijjhanadīpakena nandakovādena (ma. ni. 3.398 ādayo) dīpetabbo. Tattha hi sotāpannāyapi paripuṇṇasaṅkappabhāvaṃ vadantena bhagavatā yassa yassa upanissayo atthi, tassa tasseva ajjhāsayo niyāmako, nāññassāti tena tena paripuṇṇasaṅkappatā hoti, na tato paraṃ saṅkappasabbhāvepi asijjhanatoti ayamattho dīpito hoti. Evamidhāpi yassa yassa dutiyādijhānikassa maggassa yathāvutto upanissayo atthi, tassa tasseva ajjhāsayo niyāmako, nāññassa satipi tasmiṃ asijjhanato. Imasmiṃ pana vāde pādakasammasitajjhānupanissayasabbhāve ajjhāsayo ekantena hoti, taṃtaṃphalūpanissayasabbhāve taṃtaṃsaṅkappo viyāti tadabhāvābhāvato ajjhāsayo niyametīti vuttaṃ.

That state of being similar to the respective jhāna. This meaning should be clarified by the Nandakovāda Sutta (M. iii. 398 ff.), which illustrates the non-accomplishment of the fruit of the once-returner and so on by mere intention without a supporting condition, and the non-accomplishment by mere disposition without the supporting conditions of the base jhāna and the contemplated jhāna. Indeed, in that Sutta, the Blessed One, when speaking of the state of having a complete intention even for a stream-enterer, clarified this meaning: for whichever path there is a supporting condition, for that very path the disposition is decisive, not for another. Thus, through that respective path, there is completeness of intention, but not beyond it, because even when the intention is present, there is no accomplishment. This is the meaning that is thereby clarified. Similarly here, for whichever path associated with the second jhāna and so on there is the aforesaid supporting condition, for that very path the disposition is decisive, not for another, because even when that disposition is present, there is no accomplishment through it. However, in this discussion, when the supporting conditions of the base and contemplated jhānas are present, the disposition certainly arises, just as the respective intention arises when the supporting condition for the respective fruit is present. Therefore, because of the non-arising of the path in the absence of that disposition, it is said that the disposition is decisive.

Yasmiṃ pana pādakajjhānaṃ natthīti catutthajjhānikavajjānaṃ pādakāni lokiyajjhānāni sandhāya vuttaṃ. Appanāppatti ca oḷārikaṅgātikkamanupanissayābhāve pañcahi aṅgehi vinā na hotīti ‘‘somanassasahagatamaggo hotī’’ti āha. Upekkhāsahagatamaggoti etena catutthajjhānikatāpi samānā anusayasamugghāṭanasamatthassa na saṅkhārāvasesatāti dasseti. Te ca vādā na virujjhanti ajjhāsayavasena pañcamajjhānikatāya paṭhamādijjhānikatāya ca sambhavatoti adhippāyo. Ajjhāsayo ca sātthako hoti, aññathā pādakasammasitajjhāneheva niyamassa siddhattā ajjhāsayo niyāmako vuccamāno niratthako siyāti. Idha pana aṭṭhasāliniyā niyāmane ekantikaṃ vipassanāsaṅkhātaṃ atthameva uddharitvā ‘‘tesampi vādesu ayaṃ…pe… vipassanāva niyametī’’ti vadantena [Pg.117] tayopete vāde vipassanāva niyametīti dassitaṃ. Taṃtaṃvādānañhi vipassanāsahitānameva siddhi, nāññathāti dassitanti.

The statement, 'Wherein, however, there is no base jhāna,' is said with reference to the worldly jhānas that are the bases for paths excluding that of the fourth jhāna. And, since the attainment of absorption does not occur without the five factors in the absence of the supporting condition for transcending the gross factors, he said, 'The path is accompanied by joy.' By the phrase, 'the path accompanied by equanimity,' it is shown that although the fourth-jhāna state of the path, which is capable of eradicating the latent tendencies, is similar [to the highest jhāna], it is not a state of residual formations. And those assertions do not conflict, for the intention is that the path can occur as a state of the fifth jhāna or as a state of the first and subsequent jhānas, depending on one's disposition. And disposition is purposeful; otherwise, because the determination would be accomplished by the base and contemplated jhānas alone, the disposition, being called the determiner, would be meaningless. Here in the Aṭṭhasālinī, however, by the commentator who, in order to determine the matter, extracted only the definitive meaning known as insight and said, 'Even in their assertions... insight alone determines,' it is shown that in these three assertions, insight alone determines. For it is shown that the accomplishment of those respective assertions occurs only when they are accompanied by insight, and not otherwise.

Pavedhatīti gotrabhussa paccayo bhavituṃ na sakkotīti attho. Yadi pañcamacittakkhaṇe javanaṃ patitaṃ nāma hoti, kathaṃ tadā gotrabhu tadanantarañca maggo javanassa patitakkhaṇe uppajjatīti? Apubbassa javanantarassa patitatābhāvato. Tadeva hi javanaṃ anekakkhattuṃ pavattamānaṃ patitaṃ siyāti, gotrabhu pana ārammaṇantare uppannaṃ apubbaṃ javanaṃ, tathā maggo bhūmantarato cāti. Nanu ca sattamajavanacetanāya balavatāya upapajjavedanīyabhāvo hoti ānantariyatāpīti, tatthāyaṃ adhippāyo siyā ‘‘paṭisandhiyā anantarapaccayabhāvino vipākasantānassa anantarapaccayabhāvena antimajavanacetanāya susaṅkhatattā sā sattamajavanacetanā upapajjavedanīyā ānantarikā ca hoti, na apatitajavanacetanā viya balavatāyā’’ti.

‘It trembles’ means that it cannot be a condition for the change-of-lineage. If, in the fifth mind-moment, the impulsion is said to have ‘fallen,’ how then can the change-of-lineage, and immediately afterward the path, arise in the moment the impulsion has fallen? Because of the absence of a fallen state for a new, different impulsion. For that very impulsion, occurring many times, might be said to have ‘fallen,’ but the change-of-lineage is a new impulsion that has arisen in relation to a different object, and likewise the path, from a different plane. Furthermore, is it not so that due to the strength of the seventh impulsion-volition, the state of being experienceable in the next existence and the state of being an immediately consecutive kamma occur? Herein, this might be the intended meaning: ‘That seventh impulsion-volition becomes experienceable in the next existence and immediately consecutive due to the final impulsion-volition being well-prepared as the immediate condition for the continuum of resultants, which is the immediate condition for rebirth-linking; it is not so due to its strength, like an impulsion-volition that has not fallen.’

Puna anulomaṃ taṃ anubandheyyāti gotrabhussa hi saṅkhārārammaṇatte sati tadapi anulomamevāti purimaanulomaṃ viya taṃ tadapi aññaṃ anulomaṃ anubandheyya, na maggoti maggavuṭṭhānameva ca na bhaveyya attano sadisālambanassa āvajjanaṭṭhāniyassa paccayassa alābhā. Appahīnabhāvena pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu anusayitā kilesā sā bhūmi etehi laddhāti katvā bhūmiladdhā. Vaṭṭaṃ sinonti bandhantīti katvā vaṭṭasetū ca, tesaṃ samugghātakaraṇantipi etadevassa lobhakkhandhādipadālanaṃ vuccati. Tanti pavattaṃ. Ekaṃ bhavanti anāgāmino anekakkhattuñca tattheva upapajjantassa heṭṭhā anāgamanavasena eko bhavoti gahetvā vuttaṃ.

Again, it should follow in conformity. For if change-of-lineage has formations as its object, then it too is just conformity. Thus, just as it follows the preceding conformity, it should also follow another conformity, and the path would not arise. Indeed, the very emergence of the path would not occur, due to the lack of a condition—which stands in the place of adverting—that has an object similar to its own. Because they are not abandoned, the defilements lie latent in the five aggregates of clinging; since that plane is obtained by them, they are called ‘plane-obtainers’ (bhūmiladdhā). Because they bind the round of existence, they are called ‘dams of the round’ (vaṭṭasetū). Their utter destruction is also this very thing: it is called the splitting of the mass of greed, etc. That is the process. The phrase ‘one existence’ (ekaṃ bhavaṃ) is spoken by taking it in this way: for a non-returner who is reborn right there many times, it is ‘one existence’ by virtue of not returning below.

Imassa panatthassāti yathāvuttassa upādinnakapavattato vuṭṭhānassa. Apāyesu sattamabhavato uddhaṃ sugatiyañca vipākadāyakassa abhisaṅkhāraviññāṇassa paccayaghāto sotāpattimaggañāṇena abhisaṅkhāraviññāṇassa nirodho daṭṭhabbo. Dvīsu bhavesūti anāgāmimagge abhāvite sakadāgāmissa kāmadhātuyaṃ ye dve bhavā uppajjeyyuṃ, tesūti attho. Calatīti etena calanasabhāvameva dasseti, na acalanābhāvaṃ, tasmā acalanaṃ dassetvā puna calanaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘tathāgatassa hī’’tiādimāha. Yepi vā katthaci cattāropi magge samānapaṭipade disvā sabhāvato acalanameva [Pg.118] gaṇheyyuṃ, tesaṃ taṃgahaṇanivāraṇatthaṃ ‘‘calatī’’ti vuttaṃ, na calanāvadhāraṇatthanti yuttaṃ ubhayadassanaṃ. Atha vā yadipi kesañci cattāropi maggā samānapaṭipadā, tathāpi kilesindriyehi sijjhamānā paṭipadā tesaṃ vasena calanapakatikā evāti ‘‘calati’’cceva vuttaṃ, na ‘‘na calatī’’ti.

Now, as for the meaning of this: it refers to the emergence from the clung-to process as described. The destruction of the conditions for the volitional consciousness—which gives result in the woeful states and in the happy destinies upwards from the seventh existence—by the knowledge of the path of stream-entry, should be understood as the cessation of that volitional consciousness. 'In two existences' means that for a once-returner, if the path of non-returning is undeveloped, two existences might arise in the sense-sphere; this is the meaning. By 'It wavers,' it shows only the nature of wavering, not the state of non-wavering. Therefore, after showing non-wavering, to then show wavering, it is stated, 'For the Tathāgata...' and so on. Or, for those who, having seen in some case that all four paths have a similar practice, might grasp them as inherently non-wavering, the statement 'it wavers' is made to prevent that grasping, not for the purpose of determining wavering. Thus, the showing of both is proper. Alternatively, although for some all four paths may have a similar practice, nevertheless, the practice, being accomplished by means of the faculties of defilements, is by their power indeed of a wavering nature. Hence, it was said only 'it wavers,' and not 'it does not waver.'

Lokuttarakusalapakiṇṇakakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Miscellaneous Supramundane Wholesome States is concluded.

Paṭhamamaggavīsatimahānayavaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Twenty Great Methods of the First Path

357. Yassa pubbabhāge ‘‘maggaṃ bhāvemī’’ti ajjhāsayo pavatto, so maggaṃ bhāveti. Evaṃ sabbattha ajjhāsayavisesena taṃtaṃbhāvanāviseso daṭṭhabbo.

357. For one in whom the inclination, 'I will develop the path,' has arisen in a preliminary stage, that person develops the path. Thus, in all cases, the particular distinction in development should be understood according to the specific inclination.

358. Chandādhipateyyantiādīsu ekacittakkhaṇe vattamānesu dhammesu kathaṃ chandassa taṃsahajātassa adhipatibhāvo vīriyādīnañcāti? Upanissayavasena. Yassa hi sace chandavato kusalaṃ nipphajjati, ‘‘ahaṃ nipphādessāmī’’ti pavattamānassa kusalaṃ nipphannaṃ, tassa taṃsahajāto chando tena purimupanissayena visiṭṭho sahajātadhamme attano vase vatteti. Tasmiñca pavattamāne te pavattanti, nivattamāne nivattanti, tadanurūpabalā ca honti rājapurisā viyāti. Evaṃ vīriyādīsu. Sesadhammānaṃ pana katthaci vuttappakārappavattisabbhāvepi ataṃsabhāvattā adhipatibhāvo natthīti daṭṭhabbo.

358. Regarding such as 'dominance of will' (chandādhipateyya), among phenomena occurring in a single mind-moment, how does will (chanda) attain a state of dominance over its co-nascent phenomena, and likewise for energy (vīriya), etc.? By way of decisive support condition (upanissaya). Indeed, for one who has will, if a wholesome state is to be accomplished, it is accomplished for one who proceeds with the thought, 'I will accomplish it.' For that person, the will co-nascent with that wholesome state, being distinguished by that prior decisive support condition, brings the co-nascent phenomena under its own power. And when it is occurring, they occur; when it ceases, they cease. And they have strength corresponding to it, like the king's men. Likewise for energy, etc. As for the remaining phenomena, however, even though there may be somewhere an occurrence of the kind described, because they lack the nature of bringing co-nascent phenomena under their power, it should be understood that they have no state of dominance.

Dutiyamaggavaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Second Path

361. Ā-kārassa rassattaṃ katvā aññindriyaṃ vuttaṃ, ā-kāro ca dhammamariyādattho.

361. Having shortened the letter 'ā', 'aññindriya' is stated; and the letter 'ā' has the meaning of delimiting the Dhamma.

Tatiyacatutthamaggavaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Third and Fourth Paths

362. Maggaṅgāni na pūrenti akiccakattā sammādiṭṭhiyāti adhippāyo. Mārento gacchatīti hi maggo, na cetāya māretabbaṃ atthīti. Mānassa diṭṭhisadisā [Pg.119] pavatti ahamasmīti pavattamānassa diṭṭhiṭṭhāne ṭhānaṃ. Ālokasseva pavattikālo viyāti cirappavattiṃ sandhāyāha. Ekadesasāmaññena hi yathādhippetena upamā hotīti. Khāre vāti kaṭṭhādīnaṃ khāracchārikāyaṃ. Sammadditvāti kiledetvā. Chandoti taṇhā. Anusayoti taṇhā mānānusayo ca. Etasmiñca sutte asamūhatassa gandhassa samugghāṭanaṃ viya asamūhatamānādisamugghātaṃ dassentena aññamaññe kilese pajahatīti dassitanti ānītaṃ, na yathāvuttanayena upamāya vuttattāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Nirantaraṃ pavattamāne citte tassa saṃkilesavodānakarā sāvajjānavajjā cetasikā uppajjamānā tassaṅgabhūtā avayavā viya hontīti ‘‘cittaṅgavasenā’’ti vuttaṃ.

362. The intended meaning is: 'The path factors are not fulfilled because right view has no function to perform.' Indeed, 'path' (magga) is so called because it proceeds while destroying (mārento), but for this right view, there is nothing to be destroyed. The occurrence of conceit similar to view is the standing in the place of view of that conceit which occurs as 'I am.' Referring to its long-lasting occurrence, he said, 'like the duration of light.' For a simile can be made by way of partial similarity according to what is intended. 'Or in alkaline ash' (khāre vā) means in the alkaline ash of wood, etc. 'Having thoroughly mixed' (sammadditvā) means having moistened. 'Will' (chando) is craving (taṇhā). 'Latent tendency' (anusayo) is the latent tendency of craving and the latent tendency of conceit. And in this sutta, by showing the eradication of un-eradicated conceit, etc., like the removal of an un-removed scent, it is shown that one abandons various other defilements. Therefore, it is cited; it is not cited because the simile is stated in the way mentioned, this should be understood. When the mind occurs uninterruptedly, the blameworthy and blameless mental factors that arise, which cause its defilement and purification, become its constituents, like limbs; therefore, it is said 'by way of the mind's constituents.'

Lokuttarakusalavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of supramundane wholesome states is completed.

Kusalakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of the discourse on the wholesome is completed.

Akusalapadaṃ

Section on the Unwholesome

Dhammuddesavāro

The Section on the Exposition of Dhammas

Paṭhamacittakathāvaṇṇanā

Commentary on the First Discourse on Mind

365. Kusale vuttanayaṃ anugantvā yathānurūpaṃ veditabbatāya ‘‘vuttanayenā’’ti āha. Gantabbābhāvatoti bujjhitabbābhāvato. Diṭṭhiyā gatamattanti diṭṭhiyā gatimattaṃ gahaṇamattaṃ. Āsannakāraṇattā ayonisomanasikārassa visuṃ gahaṇaṃ ekantakāraṇattā ca. Satisaṃvaroti idha sītādīhi phuṭṭhassa appamajjanaṃ khamanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Pahānasaṃvaroti vīriyasaṃvaro.

365. Following the method stated regarding the wholesome, it is said 'by the stated method' because it should be understood as is appropriate. 'Due to the absence of what is to be gone to' means due to the absence of what is to be understood. 'Merely gone to by view' means merely the state of being of the view, merely the grasping. Unwise attention is taken up separately due to its being a proximate cause and also due to its being a decisive cause. Here, 'restraint by mindfulness' should be understood as the non-negligent endurance of one who is touched by cold and so forth. 'Restraint by abandoning' is restraint through energy.

Assādadassananti assādadiṭṭhi. Phalaṭṭhena paccupaṭṭhānena asammāpaṭipattipaccupaṭṭhānomoho, sammāpaṭipattipaṭipakkhabhāvaggahaṇākāro vā. Sabbassa lobhassa abhijjhābhāve satipi visesayuttāya abhijjhāya kammapathappattāya idhuppajjamānāya lakkhaṇādiṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘sā parasampattīna’’ntiādimāha. Attano pariṇāmanassa purecārikā taṇhābhirati abhirati.

'Seeing gratification' is the view of gratification. Delusion has wrong practice as its manifestation, in the sense of a result; or, it has the characteristic of being grasped as the opposite of right practice. Although all greed has the nature of covetousness, in order to show the characteristic, etc., of the covetousness that arises here, which is endowed with a special quality and has reached the course of action, it is said, 'That covetousness regarding the success of others...'. Extreme delight in craving, which is the forerunner of inclining things towards oneself, is delight (abhirati).

Anupaparikkhā [Pg.120] moho. Mohavasena hi diṭṭhivasena vā avatthusmiṃ sānunayo adhimokkho uppajjatīti. Asatiyacitteti ahirikādīhi ārakkharahitacitte. Satirahitattā satipaṭipakkhattā cāti etena satirahitā satipaṭipakkhā ca akusalā khandhā eva micchāsatīti dasseti. Te pana upanāhādippavattiyaṃ cirakatādisallakkhaṇe paṭusaññāsampayuttā daṭṭhabbā. Sadarathādibhāvo avisesena kilesasampayogato vutto lahutādiekantapaṭipakkhānaṃ thinamiddhādīnaṃ kesañci idha abhāvā. Avūpasamoti asannisinnasabbhāvamāha. Anavaṭṭhānarasanti calanakiccaṃ. Cetaso avūpasameti nipphādetabbe payojane bhummaṃ, avūpasamapaccayabhūtaṃ ārammaṇaṃ vā ‘‘avūpasamo’’ti vuttaṃ.

Non-investigation is delusion. For, through the power of delusion or through the power of view, wrong conviction accompanied by attachment arises in regard to an unreliable object. 'In a mind without mindfulness' means in a mind devoid of protection due to shamelessness and so forth. By 'due to being devoid of mindfulness and being the opposite of mindfulness', it is shown that the unwholesome aggregates themselves, being devoid of mindfulness and being the opposite of mindfulness, are 'wrong mindfulness'. But those aggregates should be understood as being associated with sharp perception during the occurrence of hostility, etc., and in the remembering of things done long ago, etc. The state of being agitated, etc., is spoken of generally due to association with defilements, because of the absence here of certain states such as sloth and torpor, which are the direct opposites of lightness, etc. By 'unsettled', it refers to the state of not being settled down. 'Having the characteristic of instability' means having the function of agitation. In the phrase 'in the non-settling of the mind', the locative case is in the sense of the purpose to be accomplished; or, the object which is a condition for non-settling is called 'non-settling'.

Dhammuddesavārakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the discourse on the Section of the Exposition of Dhammas is completed.

Niddesavārakathāvaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Discourse of the Exposition Section

377. Sahajātadhammesu akampanaṃ na kosajjesu akampanaṃ viya tappaṭipakkhabhāvato daṭṭhabbaṃ, taṃtaṃpāpakiriyāya ussahanavasena pana thiratā tattha akampanaṃ.

377. Unshakability regarding co-arisen states should not be understood as being like unshakability regarding laziness, by way of being its opposite. Rather, steadfastness by way of striving in this or that evil action is unshakability therein.

381. Diṭṭhiyā virūpaṃ phanditanti tathā tathā sassatādivasena pavattā diṭṭhi eva vuccati. Tarantīti titthe viya pilavanti. Vipariyesatoti vatthussa viparītato.

381. A view that has arisen in this or that way, by way of eternalism and so on, is itself called 'the distorted fluctuation of view'. As for 'crossing', they float as if at a ford. As for 'perversion', it is due to the contrariness of the object.

390. Sabhāvapaṭicchādanavasena pakatiattādiasantagahaṇassa aniccādīnaṃ niccādivisamagahaṇassa ca saññādivipariyesassa nissayattā ‘‘asantaṃ asamañca bujjhatī’’ti vuttaṃ.

390. It is said, 'One perceives the unreal and the discordant,' because it is a support for the perversion of perception and so on, which, by way of concealing the true nature, consists of grasping the non-existent, such as nature and self, etc., and the discordant grasping of impermanence, etc., as permanence, etc.

Dutiyacittavaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Second Mind

399. Kiñcāpi…pe… parāmasantassa uppajjatīti purimacittena avisesaṃ dasseti. Anussāhanāvasīdanabhāvena saṃhatabhāvo thinaṃ.

399. Although... and so on... it arises for one who is grasping—this shows no difference from the preceding mind. Compactness by way of lack of energy and sinking is sloth.

Tatiyacittavaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Third Mind

400. Idha mānena saddhiṃ pañca apaṇṇakaṅgānīti avirajjhanakaṅgāni uppattiarahaṅgāni hontīti attho daṭṭhabbo. Mānassa aniyatattā na niyatayevāpanakāti[Pg.121]. Paṭṭhāne hi ‘‘saṃyojanaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca saṃyojano dhammo uppajjati hetupaccayā’’ti (paṭṭhā. 3.4.1) ettha ‘‘catukkhattuṃ kāmarāgena tikkhattuṃ paṭighena ca māno vicikicchā bhavarāgo tayopete sakadāgāmino saṃyojanānaṃ saṃyojanehi dasavidhā yojanā’’ti dassitāya dasavidhāya yojanāya ‘‘kāmarāgasaṃyojanaṃ paṭicca mānasaṃyojanaṃ avijjāsaṃyojana’’nti vatvā ‘‘kāmarāgasaṃyojanaṃ paṭicca avijjāsaṃyojana’’nti ‘‘mānasaṃyojanaṃ paṭicca bhavarāgasaṃyojanaṃ avijjāsaṃyojana’’nti ca vatvā ‘‘bhavarāgasaṃyojanaṃ paṭicca avijjāsaṃyojana’’nti vuttāhi yojanāhi mānassa aniyatabhāvo pakāsito, tathā kilesadukepi. Idha ca vakkhati ‘‘dasavidhā saṃyojanānaṃ yojanā, tathā dasavidhā kilesāna’’nti ca. Unnamanavaseneva sampaggaharaso, na vīriyaṃ viya taṃtaṃkiccasādhane abbhussāhanavasena. Omānassapi attānaṃ avaṃkatvā gahaṇaṃ sampaggahoti daṭṭhabbo.

400. Here, the meaning should be understood thus: along with conceit, the five are 'unfailing factors' (apaṇṇakaṅgāni), meaning they are unerring factors, factors fit to arise. Because of the unfixed nature of conceit, it is not one of the invariably associated (niyata-yevāpanaka) factors. Indeed, in the Paṭṭhāna, in the passage, 'Conditioned by a fetter-phenomenon, a fetter-phenomenon arises due to the hetu-condition,' in the tenfold connection shown thus: 'Four times with sensual lust, three times with aversion; conceit, doubt, and craving for existence—these three also come once. The tenfold connection of the fetters is with the fetters,' the unfixed nature of conceit is revealed by the connections stated thus: having said, 'Conditioned by the fetter of sensual lust, the fetter of conceit and the fetter of ignorance arise,' and 'Conditioned by the fetter of sensual lust, the fetter of ignorance arises,' and having said, 'Conditioned by the fetter of conceit, the fetter of craving for existence and the fetter of ignorance arise,' and 'Conditioned by the fetter of craving for existence, the fetter of ignorance arises.' Likewise, it is revealed in the Duka on Defilements. And here it will be said: 'The tenfold connection of the fetters, and likewise the tenfold of the defilements.' Its characteristic of extolling (sampaggaha) is merely by way of exaltation, not like energy, which is by way of exertion in accomplishing various tasks. It should be understood that even in the case of self-deprecation (omāna), the taking of oneself by placing oneself lower is extolling (sampaggaha).

Catutthacittavaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Fourth Consciousness

402. Pariharaṇatthaṃ vikkhittā hutvā ussāhaṃ janentā ‘‘pariharaṇatthaṃ saussāhā’’ti vuttā, tesaṃ.

402. Those who, having become distracted, generate effort for the purpose of avoiding are called 'those with effort for the purpose of avoiding'. Of them...

Navamacittavaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Ninth Consciousness

413. Visappanaaniṭṭharūpasamuṭṭhānavasena attano pavattiākāravasena ca visappanaraso. Doso upayogaphalesu aniṭṭhattā visasaṃsaṭṭhapūtimuttaṃ viya daṭṭhabbo. Anabhiratirasāti evaṃpakāresu paṭikkhepena rasavacanesu taṃtaṃpaṭipakkhakiccagahaṇaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Kaṭukākāragati kaṭukañcukatā, attasampatti āvāsādi, parāyattatāya dāsabyaṃ viya daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yathā hi dāsabye sati dāso parāyatto hoti, evaṃ kukkucce sati taṃsamaṅgī. Na hi so attano dhammatāya pavattituṃ sakkoti kusaleti. Atha vā katākatākusalakusalānusocane āyattatāya tadubhayavasena kukkuccena taṃsamaṅgī hotīti dāsabyaṃ viya taṃ hoti.

413. It has the characteristic of spreading, by way of being the cause of undesirable form that spreads, and by way of the mode of its own occurrence. Hatred, because of its undesirability in its application and results, should be understood as like putrid urine mixed with poison. In such statements about characteristics by way of rejection, such as 'the characteristic of non-delight,' the taking up of the function of the respective opposites should be understood. A bitter mode of being is bitterness. Self-possession is a dwelling, etc. Because of being dependent on another, it should be understood as like slavery. For just as, when there is slavery, a slave is dependent on another, so too, when there is worry, one who is endowed with it is dependent. Indeed, that person is not able to proceed in what is wholesome according to their own nature. Alternatively, because of dependence on sorrowing over the unwholesome that was done and the wholesome that was not done, by the power of both of these, through worry, one becomes endowed with it; therefore, that worry is like slavery.

418. Viruddhākāroti [Pg.122] viruddhassa puggalassa, cittassa vā ākāro viruddhabhāvo. Tena virujjhanaṃ virodhoti dasseti. Vacananti etaṃ nidassanamattaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Sabbameva hi kiccaṃ etena kariyamānaṃ suropitaṃ sujanitaṃ na hotīti. Ropasaddavacanatthameva keci vaṇṇenti. Taṃ appamāṇanti kodhassa tathāpavattanasabhāvābhāvā aññena kenaci kāraṇena paripuṇṇatā siyāti sandhāya vuttaṃ.

418. 'The mode of opposition' means: the mode of an opposing person, or of a mind, is the state of being opposed. By that, it shows that opposing is opposition. This word 'speech' should be understood as a mere example. For indeed, any action whatsoever being done by this [anger] is not well-established or well-produced. Some explain the word 'ropa' as having only the meaning of 'vacana' [speech]. That is not authoritative. It is said with this in mind: because anger lacks the nature to cause such [perfect speech] to occur, completeness [of speech] might occur due to some other cause.

Ekādasamacittavaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Eleventh Consciousness

422. Vigatā cikicchāti cikicchituṃ dukkaratāya vuttaṃ, na sabbathā cikicchābhāvā vicikicchāyāti tadatthaṃ dasseti.

422. The phrase 'devoid of cure' (vigatā cikicchā) is said because of the difficulty of curing it, not because of a complete absence of a cure for doubt (vicikicchā); thus it shows that meaning.

424. Nicchayābhāvā asaṇṭhahanato cetaso pavattipaccayamattatāya ‘‘pavattiṭṭhitimatta’’nti vuttaṃ.

424. Because of the absence of decision, because of non-establishment, and due to being merely a condition for the mind's occurrence, it is called 'merely occurrence and duration'.

425. Ekaṃ ākāraṃ gantuṃ asamatthatāya attano āmukhaṃ sappanato osakkati.

425. Because of its inability to grasp a single mode, it withdraws from the object.

Dvādasamacittavaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Twelfth Consciousness

429. Uddhaccaṃ attano gahitākāre eva ṭhatvā bhamatīti ekārammaṇasmiṃyeva vipphandanaṃ hoti. Vicikicchā pana yadipi rūpādīsu ekasmiññevārammaṇe uppajjati, tathāpi ‘‘evaṃ nu kho, idaṃ nu kho’’ti uppajjamānā ‘‘nanu kho, aññaṃ nu kho’’ti aññaṃ gahetabbākāraṃ apekkhatīti nānārammaṇe calanaṃ hoti.

429. Restlessness, remaining only in the mode of its own grasped object, is agitated; thus, its agitation is with respect to a single object. Doubt, on the other hand, even if it arises with respect to a single object such as form, etc., nevertheless, arising as 'Is it thus? Is it this?', it anticipates another mode to be grasped, thinking, 'Is it not thus, or is it another mode?'; thus, its wavering occurs in relation to various objects.

‘‘Evaṃsampadamidaṃ veditabba’’nti ettāvatā imasmiṃ cittadvaye vuttapakiṇṇakaṃ dassetvā dvādasasu dassetuṃ ‘‘sabbesupī’’tiādimāha. Kusalesupi ārammaṇādhipatiṃ anuddharitvā sahajātādhipatino eva uddhaṭattā idhāpi so eva uddharitabbo siyāti ‘‘sahajātādhipati labbhamānopi na uddhaṭo’’ti vuttaṃ nārammaṇādhipatino alabbhamānattā. Sopi hi aṭṭhasu lobhasahagatesu labbhatīti. Sesopīti vīmaṃsato aññopi sahajātādhipati natthi, yo uddharitabbo siyā. Ārammaṇādhipatimhi vattabbameva natthi. Kañci dhammanti chandādīsu ekampi sahajātaṃ. Kusalattike tāva paṭiccavārādīsu ‘‘na hetupaccayā adhipatipaccayā’’ti ekassapi pañhassa [Pg.123] anuddhaṭattā paṭṭhāne paṭisiddhatā veditabbā. Aññathā hi ‘‘akusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca akusalo dhammo uppajjati na hetupaccayā adhipatipaccayā’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.86) etassa vasena ‘‘eka’’nti vattabbaṃ siyā.

By the passage, 'Thus this excellence should be understood,' having thus far shown the miscellaneous points stated concerning this pair of consciousness, in order to show them for the twelve unwholesome states, he said, 'In all...' and so on. Since even in wholesome states object-predominance is not extracted and only coexistent-predominance is extracted, it might be thought that here also only the latter should be extracted. Therefore, it is said, 'coexistent-predominance, though obtainable, is not extracted.' This is not said because object-predominance is unobtainable, for that too is obtainable in the eight states of consciousness accompanied by greed. As for the rest, apart from investigation, there is no other coexistent-predominance that could be extracted. Regarding object-predominance, there is nothing at all to be said. By 'any phenomenon' is meant any single coexistent factor among desire, etc. First, in the wholesome triad, in the sections on conditional relations, etc., its prohibition in the Paṭṭhāna should be understood from the fact that not even a single question of the form 'not by way of root-condition, by way of predominance-condition' is extracted. For otherwise, on the basis of the statement, 'Dependent on an unwholesome phenomenon, an unwholesome phenomenon arises not by way of root-condition, by way of predominance-condition,' it would have to be said 'one'.

Dassanena pahātabbābhāvatoti dassanena pahātabbassa abhāvato, dassanena pahātabbesu vā abhāvato. Etena paṭisandhianākaḍḍhanato dassanena pahātabbesu anāgamananti tattha anāgamanena paṭisandhianākaḍḍhanaṃ sādheti. Anākaḍḍhanato anāgamanaṃ pana sādhetuṃ ‘‘tesu hī’’tiādimāha. Ettheva paṭisandhidānaṃ bhaveyya. Tathā ca sati dassanena pahātabbaṃ siyā apāyagamanīyassa dassanena pahātabbabhāvato. Na cetaṃ dassanena pahātabbaṃ siyā, tasmā dassanena pahātabbavibhaṅge nāgatanti adhippāyo.

'Due to the absence of what is to be abandoned by seeing' means: due to the absence of that which is to be abandoned by seeing, or due to its non-inclusion among the things to be abandoned by seeing. By this, he establishes the non-drawing of rebirth-linking through its non-arrival among those things to be abandoned by seeing. However, to establish its non-arrival from its non-drawing of rebirth, he said, 'For in them,' etc. The giving of rebirth-linking would occur only in these woeful states. And if it were so, it would be something to be abandoned by seeing, because all that leads to the woeful planes is to be abandoned by seeing. But this is not something to be abandoned by seeing; therefore, the intention is that it is not included in the Analysis of Things to be Abandoned by Seeing.

Kathaṃ panetaṃ ñāyati ‘‘paṭisandhianākaḍḍhanato dassanena pahātabbesu anāgamana’’nti? Dassanena pahātabbānaññeva nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayabhāvassa vuttattā. Duvidhā hi akusalā dassanena pahātabbā bhāvanāya pahātabbāti. Tattha bhāvanāya pahātabbacetanānaṃ nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayabhāvo na vutto, itarāsaññeva vutto. ‘‘Bhāvanāya pahātabbo dhammo neva dassanena na bhāvanāya pahātabbassa dhammassa kammapaccayena paccayo’’ti ettha hi sahajātameva vibhattaṃ, na nānākkhaṇikanti. Tathā paccanīyepi ‘‘bhāvanāya pahātabbo dhammo neva dassanena na bhāvanāya pahātabbassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo…pe… sahajātapaccayena…pe… upanissayapaccayena…pe…. Pacchājātapaccayena paccayo’’ti ettakameva vuttaṃ, na vuttaṃ ‘‘kammapaccayena paccayo’’ti. Itarattha ca vuttaṃ. Uddhaccasahagatā ca cetanā bhāvanāya pahātabbesu eva āgatāti nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayo na siyāti. Yadi siyā, bhāvanāya pahātabbacetanāya ca nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayabhāvo vucceyya, na tu vutto. Tasmā uddhaccasahagatā nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayabhāve sati dassanena pahātabbesu vattabbā siyā, tadabhāvā na vuttāti. Paṭisandhianākaḍḍhanato tattha anāgatāti ayametthādhippāyo. Nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayāvacanena pana bhāvanāya pahātabbānaṃ pavattivipākatā paṭikkhittā. Pavattivipākassapi hi nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayatā na sakkā nivāretuṃ. Vuttañca [Pg.124] ‘‘sukhāya vedanāya sampayutto dhammo dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttassa dhammassa kammapaccayena paccayo, nānākkhaṇikā’’tiādi (paṭṭhā. 1.3.56-57). Yadi bhāvanāya pahātabbānaṃ vipākadānaṃ natthi, kathaṃ te vipākadhammadhammā hontīti? Abhiññācittādīnaṃ viya vipākārahasabhāvattā. Yaṃ pana vuttaṃ ‘‘yasmiṃ samaye akusalaṃ cittaṃ uppannaṃ hoti upekkhāsahagataṃ uddhaccasampayuttaṃ…pe… avikkhepo hoti, imesu dhammesu ñāṇaṃ dhammapaṭisambhidā, tesaṃ vipāke ñāṇaṃ atthapaṭisambhidā’’ti (vibha. 730-731) idampi tesaṃ vipākārahataññeva sandhāya vuttaṃ siyā. Idaṃ pana ṭhānaṃ suṭṭhu vicāretabbaṃ. Atthi hi ettha vacanokāso. Na hi vipāketi vacanaṃ vipākadhammavacanaṃ viya vipākārahataṃ vadatīti.

How then is it known that 'there is non-inclusion among those to be abandoned by seeing due to not bringing about rebirth-linking'? Because it is stated that the state of being a kamma-condition at a different moment applies only to states to be abandoned by seeing. For unwholesome states are twofold: those to be abandoned by seeing and those to be abandoned by development. Therein, for volitions to be abandoned by development, the state of being a kamma-condition at a different moment is not stated; it is stated only for the others. For in the passage, “A state to be abandoned by development is a condition by way of kamma-condition for a state to be abandoned neither by seeing nor by development,” only conascent kamma is analyzed, not kamma at a different moment. Similarly, in the negative section, only this much is stated: “A state to be abandoned by development is a condition for a state to be abandoned neither by seeing nor by development by way of object-condition… by way of conascence-condition… by way of decisive-support-condition… by way of postnascence-condition”; it is not stated, “by way of kamma-condition.” But for the other class, it is stated. And since volition accompanied by restlessness is included only among those to be abandoned by development, it cannot be a kamma-condition at a different moment. If it were, the state of being a kamma-condition at a different moment would also be stated for volition to be abandoned by development, but it is not stated. Therefore, if volition accompanied by restlessness possessed the state of being a kamma-condition at a different moment, it would have to be stated among those to be abandoned by seeing. Due to the absence of this, it is not stated. The intended meaning here is that it is not included there because it does not bring about rebirth-linking. However, by the non-statement of kamma-condition at a different moment, the capacity to produce a resultant during the course of existence is rejected for those states to be abandoned by development. For the state of being a kamma-condition at a different moment cannot be denied even for a resultant in the course of existence. And it is said: “A state associated with pleasant feeling is a condition for a state associated with painful feeling by way of kamma-condition, at a different moment,” and so on. If states to be abandoned by development do not give a resultant, how can they be states that possess the nature of producing a resultant? Because they have the nature of being worthy of a resultant, like the consciousnesses of direct knowledge and so on. As for what was said: “At the time when an unwholesome consciousness arises, accompanied by equanimity and associated with restlessness… there is non-distraction; knowledge of these states is the discrimination of phenomena, knowledge of their resultant is the discrimination of meaning,” this too may have been said with reference to their being merely worthy of a resultant. This point, however, should be thoroughly investigated. For there is an opportunity for discussion here. Indeed, the word ‘vipāke’ (in the resultant) does not denote worthiness of a resultant in the same way as the expression ‘vipākadhamma’ does.

Akusalapadavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of Unwholesome Terms is Completed.

Abyākatapadaṃ

The Indeterminate Term

Ahetukakusalavipākavaṇṇanā

Explanation of Rootless Wholesome Resultants

431. Tesu vipākābyākatantiādīnaṃ ‘‘bhājetvā dassetuṃ katame dhammā abyākatātiādi āraddha’’nti etena sambandho. Tassāpīti etassa ‘‘uppattiṃ dīpetuṃ kāmā…pe… ādi vutta’’nti etena sambandho. Upacitattāti yathā aññassa vipākaṃ paṭibāhitvā attano vipākābhimukhaṃ hoti tathā vaḍḍhitattā. Rūpādīnaṃ paccayānaṃ aññaviññāṇasādhāraṇattā asādhāraṇena vatthunā cakkhuviññāṇaṃ sotaviññāṇanti nāmaṃ uddhaṭaṃ. Cakkhādīnaṃ tikkhamandabhāve viññāṇānaṃ tikkhamandabhāvā visesapaccayattā ca.

Among them, for the terms beginning with ‘resultant-indeterminate,’ the connection is with the text: ‘In order to show by dividing, “Which states are indeterminate?” and so on, was begun.’ For the term ‘tassāpi,’ the connection is with the text: ‘Wishing to show the arising… and so on… was said.’ As for ‘upacitattā,’ it means ‘because of having been developed’ in such a way that, having obstructed the result of another kamma, it becomes oriented towards its own result. Because the conditions, such as form, are common to other consciousnesses, the names ‘eye-consciousness,’ ‘ear-consciousness,’ and so on, are specified by the uncommon physical basis. And also because the sharpness or dullness of the eye, etc., is a specific condition for the sharpness or dullness of the consciousnesses.

Cakkhusannissitañca taṃ rūpavijānanañcāti cakkhusannissitarūpavijānanaṃ. Evaṃlakkhaṇaṃ cakkhuviññāṇaṃ. Tattha cakkhusannissitavacanena rūpārammaṇaṃ aññaviññāṇaṃ paṭikkhipati. Rūpavijānanavacanena cakkhunissaye phassādayo nivatteti. Cakkhurūpavacanehi ca nissayato ārammaṇato ca vijānanaṃ vibhāveti. Rūpamattassa ārammaṇassa gahaṇaṃ kiccametassāti rūpamattārammaṇarasaṃ. Jhānaṅgavasenāti idaṃ dvipañcaviññāṇavajjesu vijjamānānaṃ upekkhāsukhadukkhekaggatānaṃ jhānaṅgikattā idhāpi taṃsadisānaṃ tadupacāraṃ [Pg.125] katvā vuttaṃ. Na hi jhānapaccayattābhāve jhānaṅgatā atthi. Vuttañhi ‘‘jhānaṅgāni jhānasampayutta…pe… rūpānaṃ jhānapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.3.112). Etesañca jhānapaccayabhāvo paṭikkhitto. Yathāha ‘‘abyākataṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca abyākato dhammo uppajjati na jhānapaccayā. Pañcaviññāṇasahagataṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭicca tayo khandhā’’tiādi (paṭṭhā. 1.1.98). Jhānapaccayattābhāvepi vedanācittaṭṭhitīnaṃ upekkhādibhāvato tathābhūtānaṃ vacane aññaṭṭhānābhāvato ca dutiyarāsiniddeso.

431. It is eye-dependent and it is the knowing of form—thus, eye-dependent knowing of form. Eye-consciousness has such a characteristic. Herein, by the term 'eye-dependent,' it rejects other consciousnesses that have form as their object. By the term 'knowing of form,' it excludes contact and other states that are dependent on the eye. And by the terms 'eye' and 'form,' it clarifies knowing by way of support and by way of object. Its function is the grasping of an object that is merely form; thus, its characteristic is having merely form as its object. As for 'by way of jhāna factors': this is said by making a metaphorical application to things similar to them here also, because equanimity, pleasure, pain, and one-pointedness, which exist in states apart from the two sets of five consciousnesses, are jhāna factors. For indeed, the state of being a jhāna factor does not exist in the absence of the state of being a jhāna condition. For it is said: 'The jhāna factors... are a condition for jhāna-associated... form by way of jhāna condition.' And for these, the state of being a jhāna condition is rejected. As it is said: 'Dependent on an indeterminate phenomenon, an indeterminate phenomenon arises, not by way of jhāna condition. Dependent on one aggregate associated with the five consciousnesses, three aggregates arise,' and so on. Even in the absence of the state of being a jhāna condition, the exposition in the second group is given because feeling and mental stability are of the nature of equanimity and so on, and because there is no other place for speaking of such things.

436. Vatthupaṇḍarattāti sayaṃ kaṇhadhammānaṃ appaṭipakkhattā sabhāvaparisuddhānaṃ pasādahadayavatthunissayānaṃ vasena paṇḍarasabhāvaṃ jātanti adhippāyo. Ayaṃ pana nayo catuvokāre na labbhatīti tattha bhavaṅgassa tato nikkhantākusalassa ca paṇḍaratā na siyā, tasmā tattha paṇḍaratāya kāraṇaṃ vattabbaṃ. Sabhāvo vāyaṃ cittassa paṇḍaratāti.

As for 'purity of the basis' (vatthupaṇḍarattā), the intended meaning is this: since matter itself is not the opposite of dark states, it has become pure in nature by means of its supports—the sensitive matter and the heart-basis—which are naturally pure. However, this method is not applicable in the four-constituent existence, for there the purity of the life-continuum (bhavaṅga) and of the unwholesome that has arisen from it would not be possible. Therefore, the reason for purity there should be stated. Or, this purity is the very nature of the mind.

439. Idampīti pi-saddo ṭhitimattasahitaṃ pubbe vuttaṃ vicikicchāsahagataṃ apekkhitvā vutto. Pakatiyāti anatikkamanena. Sopi viseso. Kāyappasādaṃ ghaṭṭetvā pasādapaccayesu mahābhūtesu paṭihaññatīti āpāthaṃ gantvā paṭihaññatīti attho. Yathā ca ‘‘rūpaṃ ārabbha uppanna’’nti vutte na ārammaṇuppādānaṃ pubbāparakālatā hoti, evamidhāpi ghaṭṭanapaṭihananesu daṭṭhabbaṃ. Upamāpi ubhayaghaṭṭanadassanatthaṃ vuttā, na nissitanissayaghaṭṭanānaṃ pubbāparatādassanatthaṃ. Ettha ca bahiddhāti etaṃ nidassanamattaṃ. Ajjhattampi hi ārammaṇaṃ hotīti. Viññāṇadhātunissayabhūtehi vā aññaṃ ‘‘bahiddhā’’ti vuttaṃ. Paṭighaṭṭanānighaṃso balavā hoti, tato eva iṭṭhāniṭṭhaphoṭṭhabbasamāyoge sukhadukkhapaccayā dhātuanuggahadhātukkhobhā ciraṃ anuvattanti.

439. In `idampīti`, the particle `pi` is said with regard to what was previously stated, which was accompanied by doubt, along with mere persistence. As for `pakatiyā`, it means 'not by transcending'. That distinction also. As for the phrase 'having struck the bodily sensitivity, it is struck against the great elements which are the conditions for the sensitivity,' the meaning is: having come into range, it is struck. And just as when it is said, 'arisen taking a form-object as support,' there is no state of before and after for the taking of the object and the arising, so too here it should be understood regarding the striking and the being struck. The simile also is stated for the purpose of showing the striking of both, not for the purpose of showing the before-and-after state of the striking of the supported and the support. And here, this word `bahiddhā` is a mere indication, for an internal object also can be an object. Or alternatively, what is other than the great elements which are the support for the consciousness-element is called 'external'. The friction of impact is strong; for that very reason, upon contact with desirable and undesirable tangible objects, the supporting of the elements and the agitation of the elements, which are the causes of pleasure and pain, continue for a long time.

455. Aññesaṃ cittānaṃ sabhāvasuññatasabbhāvā manodhātubhāvo āpajjatīti ce? Na, visesasabbhāvā. Cakkhuviññāṇādīnañhi cakkhādinissitatā cakkhādīnaṃ savisayesu dassanādippavattibhāvatā ca viseso. Manoviññāṇassa pana anaññanissayamanopubbaṅgamatāya aññanissayaviññāṇassa anantarapaccayattābhāvena manodvāraniggamanamukhabhāvābhāvato ca sātisayavijānanakiccatā viseso. Tabbisesavirahā manomattā dhātu [Pg.126] manodhātūti tividhā manodhātu eva vuccati, na visesamano. Tasmā ettha mano eva dhātu manodhātūti eva-saddo mattasaddattho daṭṭhabbo. Visesanivattanattho hi so viññāṇassāti. Manodvāraniggamanapavesamukhabhāvato pana manodhātuyā vijānanavisesaviraho daṭṭhabbo, tato eva manoviññāṇantipi na vuccati. Na hi taṃ viññāṇaṃ manato pavattaṃ manaso paccayo, nāpi manaso paccayabhūtaṃ manato pavattaṃ, dassanādīnaṃ pana paccayo, tehi ca pavattaṃ tesaṃ purecaraṃ anucarañcāti. Sammāsaṅkappoti avacanaṃ mahāvipākānaṃ viya janakasadisattābhāvato. Tattha hi tihetukato duhetukampi uppajjamānaṃ sammāsaṅkappatādīhi sadisaṃ sahetukatāyāti. Pañcaviññāṇasoteti ettha yathā paguṇaṃ ganthaṃ sajjhāyanto sajjhāyasote patitaṃ kañci kañci vācanāmaggaṃ na sallakkheti, evaṃ tathāgatassa asallakkhaṇā nāma natthi, na ca pañcaviññāṇasote jhānaṅgābhāvo idha avacanassa kāraṇaṃ. Yadi tadanantaraṃ niddeso taṃsotapatitatā, ito paresaṃ dvinnaṃ manoviññāṇadhātūnaṃ taṃsotapatitatā na siyā. Tasmā pañcaviññāṇānaṃ viya ahetukatāya maggapaccayavirahā ca vijjamānesupi vitakkavicāresu jhānaṅgadhammānaṃ dubbalattā pañcaviññāṇesu viya agaṇanupagabhāvā ca pañcaviññāṇasotapatitatā. Tato eva hi ahetukakiriyattayepi jhānaṅgāni balāni ca saṅgahavāre na uddhaṭāni, jhānapaccayakiccamattato pana paṭṭhāne dubbalānaṃ ettha vitakkādīnaṃ jhānapaccayatā vuttā.

455. If it is asked: For other minds, because of the existence of their own nature, which is devoid of special qualities, does the state of being the mind-element arise? No, because of the existence of a special quality. For the five consciousnesses beginning with eye-consciousness, their dependence on the eye and so forth, and their function of seeing and so forth with regard to their respective objects, is their special quality. For mind-consciousness, however, its special quality is its superior cognitive function, due to its being preceded by the mind which does not have another support, its not being an immediate condition for another consciousness with a different support, and its not being an exit-opening from the mind-door. Devoid of such a special quality, the element that is mere mind is called the mind-element. Thus, the threefold mind-element is so called, not a 'special mind'. Therefore, herein, in the phrase 'mano eva dhātu manodhātu', the word 'eva' should be understood as having the meaning of 'matta' (mere/only). For that word serves to negate a special quality of consciousness. Moreover, because it is the opening for exiting and entering through the mind-door, the mind-element's lack of a special cognitive function should be understood. For that very reason, it is not called 'mind-consciousness'. Indeed, that consciousness does not proceed from the mana and is not a condition for the mana; nor, having become a condition for the mana, does it proceed from the mana. Rather, it is a condition for seeing and so forth, and it proceeds from them, being their forerunner and follower. The non-statement of 'Right Thought' is, as with the great resultant consciousnesses, due to the absence of similarity to the generating wholesome consciousness. For among them, even when a two-rooted resultant consciousness arises from a three-rooted wholesome one, it is similar by way of being rooted, through factors such as the state of Right Thought. Herein, regarding 'the stream of the five consciousnesses': just as one reciting a well-practiced text does not notice some particular passage that falls within the stream of recitation, for the Tathāgata, there is no such thing as not noticing. And the absence of jhāna factors in the stream of the five consciousnesses is not the reason for their non-statement here. If being designated immediately after them constitutes falling into that stream, then for the two subsequent mind-consciousness-elements, falling into that stream would not occur. Therefore, because of being rootless and devoid of the path condition like the five consciousnesses, and because, although initial and sustained thought are present, the jhāna-factor states are weak, the state of not being reckoned among the jhāna factors, just as in the case of the five consciousnesses, is what is meant by 'falling into the stream of the five consciousnesses'. Indeed, for that very reason, even in the triad of rootless functional consciousnesses, the jhāna factors and the powers are not enumerated in the Compendium section. But in the Paṭṭhāna, merely because of the function of the jhāna condition, the state of being a jhāna condition is stated for the weak initial thought and so forth herein.

469. Samānavatthukaṃ anantarapaccayaṃ labhitvā uppajjamānaṃ santīraṇaṃ manodhātuto balavataraṃ hotīti taṃ yathārammaṇaṃ ārammaṇarasaṃ anubhavantaṃ iṭṭhe somanassasahagataṃ hoti, iṭṭhamajjhatte upekkhāsahagataṃ sātisayānubhavattā, tasmā ‘‘ayañhi iṭṭhārammaṇasmiṃ yevā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Voṭṭhabbanaṃ pana satipi balavabhāve vipākappavattiṃ nivattetvā visadisaṃ manaṃ karontaṃ manasikārakiccantarayogato vipāko viya anubhavanameva na hotīti sabbattha upekkhāsahagatameva hoti, tathā pañcadvārāvajjanaṃ manodvārāvajjanañca kiccavasena apubbattā.

469. Having obtained the immediate condition which has the same physical basis, the arising investigating consciousness is stronger than the mind-element. Therefore, while experiencing the flavor of the object according to the object, it is accompanied by joy in the case of a desirable object and by equanimity in the case of a desirable-neutral object, due to its experience being of a surpassing intensity. Therefore, the passage beginning, 'This indeed is only in the case of a desirable object,' was stated. However, the determining consciousness, although it is strong, by causing the occurrence of the resultant process to cease, creates a dissimilar impulsion. Due to its connection with this different function of attention, it is not mere experiencing like a resultant. Therefore, in all cases, it is only accompanied by equanimity. Similarly, the five-door adverting consciousness and the mind-door adverting consciousness are also only accompanied by equanimity, due to their function and their unprecedented nature.

Ahetukakusalavipākavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of rootless wholesome resultant has been concluded.

Aṭṭhamahāvipākacittavaṇṇanā

The Description of the Eight Great Resultant Consciousnesses.

498. Alobho [Pg.127] abyākatamūlantiādīsu kusalapakkhe tāva alobhādosānaṃ niddesesu ‘‘yo tasmiṃ samaye alobho alubbhanā…pe… alobho kusalamūla’’nti (dha. sa. 32), ‘‘yo tasmiṃ samaye adoso adussanā…pe… adoso kusalamūla’’nti (dha. sa. 33) ca vuttattā idhāpi taṃniddesesu ‘‘alobho abyākatamūla’’nti ‘‘adoso abyākatamūla’’nti vacanaṃ yujjeyya. Paññindriyādiniddesesu pana ‘‘paññāratanaṃ amoho dhammavicayo sammādiṭṭhī’’ti (dha. sa. 34, 37) evaṃ tatthapi vuttaṃ, na vuttaṃ ‘‘amoho kusalamūla’’nti. Tasmā idhāpi ‘‘amoho abyākatamūla’’nti pāṭhena na bhavitabbaṃ siyā. Alobhādosānaṃ viya amohassapi abyākatamūladassanatthaṃ panetaṃ vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Aviññattijanakatoti kāyavacīkammadvāranivāraṇaṃ karoti. Avipākadhammatoti manokammadvāranivāraṇañca. Vipākadhammānañhi kammadvāraṃ vuttanti. Tathā appavattitoti dānādipuññakiriyabhāvena appavattito. Etena puññakiriyavatthubhedameva nivāreti.

498. In the sections on 'non-greed is an indeterminate root,' etc., first, in the wholesome section, in the explanations of non-greed and non-hatred, because it is said: 'At that time, whatever is non-greed, non-covetousness… etc.… non-greed is a wholesome root' (Dhs. 32), and 'At that time, whatever is non-hatred, non-aversion… etc.… non-hatred is a wholesome root' (Dhs. 33), here also, in the explanations of them, the statement 'non-greed is an indeterminate root' and 'non-hatred is an indeterminate root' would be fitting. However, in the explanations of the faculty of wisdom, etc., it is said thus there also: 'The jewel of wisdom, non-delusion, investigation of the Dhamma, right view' (Dhs. 34, 37), but it is not said 'non-delusion is a wholesome root.' Therefore, here also, the reading 'non-delusion is an indeterminate root' should not be. However, it should be understood that this is stated for the purpose of showing that non-delusion, like non-greed and non-hatred, is also an indeterminate root. By 'because it does not generate intimation,' is meant that it prevents the doors of bodily and verbal action. By 'because it is a state that does not produce a result,' is meant that it also prevents the door of mental action, for the door of action is stated for states that produce a result. By 'similarly, it is not in operation,' is meant that it is not in operation in the manner of meritorious actions such as giving. By this, it prevents only the varieties of the bases for meritorious action.

Balavapaccayehīti payogena vinā nipphannehi ārammaṇādipaccayehi. Asaṅkhārikādīsu hi yena kenaci cittena kamme āyūhite asaṅkhārena appayogena kammakammanimittagatinimittapaccupaṭṭhāne paṭisandhi uppajjamānā asaṅkhārikā hoti, sasaṅkhārena sappayogena kammādipaccupaṭṭhāne sasaṅkhārikā. Bhavaṅgacutiyo pana paṭisandhisadisāva. Tadārammaṇañca kusalākusalāni viya asaṅkhārikaṃ sasaṅkhārikañca daṭṭhabbanti. Etesu balavaṃ dubbalañca vicāretuṃ ‘‘tattha sabbepi sabbaññubodhisattā’’tiādimāha. Kālavasena pana pariṇamatīti appāyukasaṃvattanikakammabahule kāle taṃkammasahitasantānajanitasukkasoṇitapaccayānaṃ taṃmūlakānaṃ candasūriyavisamaparivattādijanitautāhārādivisamapaccayānañca vasena pariṇamati.

‘By strong conditions’ means by conditions such as the object, which are accomplished without effort. For, among the unprompted and so on, when kamma is exerted by any consciousness without prompting, without effort, and rebirth-linking arises at the time of the manifestation of kamma, kamma-nimitta, or gati-nimitta, it is unprompted. When it arises with prompting and with effort at the time of the manifestation of kamma and other signs, it is prompted. Bhavaṅga and cuti, however, are just like rebirth-linking. And tadārammaṇa should be understood as unprompted and prompted, like wholesome and unwholesome states. To investigate which among these is strong and which is weak, it is said, “Therein, all, even the omniscient Bodhisattas…” and so on. As for the phrase, 'it inclines by the power of time,' this means that at a time when kamma that produces a short lifespan is abundant, it inclines by the power of the conditions of semen and blood produced in the bodily continuum together with that kamma, and of the irregular conditions of climate, food, and so on, which have that kamma as their root cause and are produced by the irregular revolution of the moon and sun, and so on.

Vipākuddhārakathāvaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Discourse on the Extraction of Results

Yato yattako ca vipāko hoti, yasmiñca ṭhāne vipaccati, taṃ dassetuṃ vipākuddhārakathā āraddhā. Etthevāti ekāya cetanāya kamme āyūhiteyeva. Duhetukapaṭisandhivasena dvādasakamaggopi hoti[Pg.128], dvādasakappakāropīti attho. Ahetukapaṭisandhivasena ahetukaṭṭhakampi. Asaṅkhārikasasaṅkhārikānaṃ sasaṅkhārikaasaṅkhārikavipākasaṅkaraṃ anicchanto dutiyatthero ‘‘dvādasā’’tiādimāha. Purimassa hi paccayatosasaṅkhārikaasaṅkhārikabhāvo, itaresaṃ kammato. Tatiyo tihetukato duhetukampi anicchanto ‘‘dasā’’tiādimāha.

The Discourse on the Extraction of Results is begun in order to show from what kamma, how much result there is, and in what place it ripens. 'Herein' means: when kamma has been exerted by a single volition. By way of two-rooted rebirth-linking, there is also a group of twelve results; this is the meaning of 'a type of twelve'. By way of rootless rebirth-linking, there is also the group of eight rootless resultants. Not wishing for the mixing of prompted and unprompted results arising from unprompted and prompted kammas, the second elder said, “twelve,” and so on. For, in the view of the first elder, the state of being prompted or unprompted is due to conditions; for the other elders, it is due to kamma. The third elder, not wishing for even a two-rooted resultant to arise from a three-rooted kamma, said, “ten,” and so on.

Imasmiṃ vipākuddhāraṭṭhāne kammapaṭisandhivavatthānatthaṃ sāketapañhaṃ gaṇhiṃsu. Kammavasena vipākassa taṃtaṃguṇadosussadanimittataṃ dassetuṃ ussadakittanaṃ gaṇhiṃsu. Hetukittanaṃ idha paṭhamattherassa adhippāyena vuttaṃ. Dutiyattheravādādīsu visesaṃ tattha tattheva vakkhāmi. Ñāṇassa jaccandhādivipattinimittapaṭipakkhabhāvato tihetukaṃ atidubbalampi samānaṃ paṭisandhiṃ ākaḍḍhantaṃ duhetukaṃ ākaḍḍheyyāti ‘‘ahetukā na hotī’’ti āha. Yaṃ pana paṭisambhidāmagge sugatiyaṃ jaccandhabadhirādivipattiyā ahetukaupapattiṃ vajjetvā gatisampattiyā sahetukopapattiṃ dassentena ‘‘gatisampattiyā ñāṇasampayutte katamesaṃ aṭṭhannaṃ hetūnaṃ paccayā upapatti hoti’’cceva (paṭi. ma. 1.232) vuttaṃ. Tena ñāṇavippayuttena kammunā ñāṇasampayuttapaṭisandhi na hotīti dīpitaṃ hoti. Aññathā ‘‘sattannaṃ hetūnaṃ paccayā upapatti hotī’’ti idampi vucceyya. Tathā hi ‘‘gatisampattiyā ñāṇasampayutte katamesaṃ aṭṭhannaṃ hetūnaṃ paccayā upapatti hoti? Kusalassa kammassa javanakkhaṇe tayo hetū kusalā tasmiṃ khaṇe jātacetanāya sahajātapaccayā honti. Tena vuccati kusalamūlapaccayāpi saṅkhārā. Nikantikkhaṇe dve hetū akusalā tasmiṃ khaṇe jātacetanāya sahajātapaccayā honti. Tena vuccati akusalamūlapaccayāpi saṅkhārā. Paṭisandhikkhaṇe tayo hetū abyākatā tasmiṃ khaṇe jātacetanāya sahajātapaccayā honti. Tena vuccati nāmarūpapaccayāpi viññāṇaṃ, viññāṇapaccayāpi nāmarūpa’’nti vissajjitaṃ ñāṇasampayuttopapattiyaṃ.

In this place of extracting the result, the Sāketa question was taken up for the purpose of defining kamma and rebirth-linking. To show, by the power of kamma, that the result has as its cause the preponderance of its respective qualities and faults, the mention of preponderance was taken up. The mention of roots here was spoken according to the intention of the first elder. Regarding the views of the second elder and others, I will explain the distinctions in their respective places. Because knowledge is of a nature that is the opposite of the cause of defects such as being born blind, etc., even a very weak triple-rooted kamma, when drawing a rebirth-linking, would draw a double-rooted one; therefore, he said: “There is no rootless rebirth-linking.” However, in the Paṭisambhidāmagga, the Venerable Sāriputta, showing a rooted arising in a fortunate rebirth by excluding rootless arising with defects such as being born blind or deaf, said only this: “For a fortunate rebirth accompanied by knowledge, conditioned by which of the eight roots does arising occur?” Therefore, it is shown that rebirth-linking accompanied by knowledge does not occur through kamma dissociated from knowledge. Otherwise, it would also be said: “Arising occurs conditioned by seven roots.” For it is explained: “For a fortunate rebirth accompanied by knowledge, conditioned by which of the eight roots does arising occur? At the moment of wholesome kamma’s javana, three wholesome roots serve as conascent conditions for the volition born in that moment. Hence, it is said that formations also are conditioned by wholesome roots. At the moment of craving, two unwholesome roots serve as conascent conditions for the volition born in that moment. Hence, it is said that formations also are conditioned by unwholesome roots. At the moment of rebirth-linking, three indeterminate roots serve as conascent conditions for the volition born in that moment. Hence, it is said that consciousness is conditioned by name-and-form, and name-and-form is conditioned by consciousness.” This was the detailed reply regarding arising accompanied by knowledge.

Evaṃ ñāṇavippayuttato ñāṇasampayuttupapattiyā ca vijjamānāya ‘‘gatisampattiyā ñāṇasampayutte katamesaṃ sattannaṃ hetūnaṃ paccayā upapatti hoti? Kusalassa kammassa javanakkhaṇe dve hetū kusalā’’ti vatvā aññattha ca pubbe vuttanayeneva sakkā vissajjanaṃ kātunti. Yathā [Pg.129] pana ‘‘ñāṇasampayutte sattannaṃ hetūnaṃ paccayā’’ti avacanato ñāṇavippayuttato ñāṇasampayuttā paṭisandhi na hoti, evaṃ ‘‘gatisampattiyā ñāṇavippayutte channaṃ hetūnaṃ paccayā upapatti hoti’’cceva (paṭi. ma. 1.233) vatvā ‘‘sattannaṃ hetūnaṃ paccayā’’ti avacanato ñāṇasampayuttato ñāṇavippayuttāpi paṭisandhi na hotīti āpannaṃ. Etthāpi hi na na sakkā kammanikantikkhaṇesu tayo ca dve ca hetū yojetvā paṭisandhikkhaṇe dve yojetunti. Imassa pana therassa ayamadhippāyo siyā ‘‘kammasarikkhakavipākadassanavasena idha pāṭho sāvaseso kathito’’ti. ‘‘Ñāṇasampayutte aṭṭhannaṃ hetūnaṃ paccayā’’ti etthāpi pāṭhassa sāvasesatāpattīti ce? Na, dubbalassa duhetukakammassa ñāṇasampayuttavipākadāne asamatthattā. Tihetukassa pana ahetukavipaccane viya duhetukavipaccanepi natthi samatthatāvighātoti. Ārammaṇena vedanā parivattetabbāti santīraṇatadārammaṇe sandhāya vuttaṃ. Vibhāgaggahaṇasamatthatābhāvato hi cakkhuviññāṇādīni iṭṭhaiṭṭhamajjhattesu upekkhāsahagatāneva honti, kāyaviññāṇañca sukhasahagatameva paṭighaṭṭanāvisesenāti.

Thus, if an arising associated with knowledge could occur from a kamma dissociated from knowledge, it would have been possible to give the answer in the manner previously explained, after stating: ‘For a fortunate rebirth accompanied by knowledge, conditioned by which of the seven roots does arising occur? At the moment of the javana of wholesome kamma, two roots are wholesome,’ and so on for the other moments. Just as, from the non-statement ‘by the condition of seven roots for association with knowledge,’ rebirth-linking associated with knowledge does not occur from (kamma) dissociated from knowledge, similarly, having stated ‘for a fortunate rebirth dissociated from knowledge, it occurs by the condition of six roots’ (Paṭis. Ma. 1.233), and from the non-statement ‘by the condition of seven roots,’ it follows that rebirth-linking dissociated from knowledge does not occur from (kamma) associated with knowledge. Here too, it is not impossible to apply three and two roots at the moments of kamma and craving, and to apply two at the moment of rebirth-linking. However, this elder’s intention might be: ‘Here, the passage is stated incompletely, with a view to showing a result similar to the kamma.’ If it is asked whether there would be a fault of incompleteness in the passage ‘by the condition of eight roots for association with knowledge,’ (the answer is) no, because a weak double-rooted kamma is incapable of producing a result associated with knowledge. But for a triple-rooted kamma, just as there is no impairment of capacity in producing a rootless result, similarly there is no impairment of capacity in producing a double-rooted result. ‘Feeling should be transformed by the object’—this is stated with reference to the investigating-consciousness and registering-consciousness. For, due to the inability to grasp distinctions, eye-consciousness and the like are only accompanied by equanimity regarding desirable and moderately desirable objects, while body-consciousness is only accompanied by pleasure due to the specific nature of impact.

Visesavatā kālena tadārammaṇapaccayasabbajavanavatā vipākappavattiṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘saṃvarāsaṃvare…pe… upagatassā’’ti vuttaṃ aññakāle pañcaviññāṇādiparipuṇṇavipākappavattiabhāvā. Kakkaṭaka…pe… bhavaṅgotaraṇanti etena idaṃ dasseti – kedāre pūretvā nadīpavesanamaggabhūtaṃ mātikaṃ appavisitvā kakkaṭakamaggādinā amaggena nadīotaraṇaṃ viya cittassa javitvā bhavaṅgappavesanamaggabhūte tadārammaṇe anuppanne maggena vinā bhavaṅgotaraṇanti.

To show the occurrence of resultant consciousness by means of a special time and by all javanas having tadārammaṇa as their condition, it is said: ‘With restraint and non-restraint… having approached,’ because at other times there is no full occurrence of resultant consciousness, such as the five sense-consciousnesses. ‘The crab… crossing the life-continuum’—by this, it is shown: just as, having filled a field, one crosses a river by an improper path such as a crab's path, without entering the main channel which is the path for entering the river; so too, the mind, after having impulsed, crosses into the life-continuum without a path when the registering-consciousness, which is the path for entering the life-continuum, has not arisen.

Etesu tīsu moghavāresu dutiyo upaparikkhitvā gahetabbo. Yadi hi anulome vedanāttike paṭiccavārādīsu ‘‘āsevanapaccayā na magge dve’’ti ‘‘na maggapaccayā āsevane dve’’ti ca vuttaṃ siyā, sopi moghavāro labbheyya. Yadi pana voṭṭhabbanampi āsevanapaccayo siyā, kusalākusalānampi siyā. Na hi āsevanapaccayaṃ laddhuṃ yuttassa āsevanapaccayabhāvī dhammo āsevanapaccayoti avutto atthi. Voṭṭhabbanassa pana kusalākusalānaṃ āsevanapaccayabhāvo avutto. ‘‘Kusalaṃ [Pg.130] dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjati nāsevanapaccayā. Akusalaṃ dhammaṃ…pe… nāsevanapaccayā’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.93) vacanato paṭikkhittova. Athāpi siyā ‘‘asamānavedanānaṃ vasena evaṃ vutta’’nti, evamapi yathā ‘‘āvajjanā kusalānaṃ khandhānaṃ akusalānaṃ khandhānaṃ anantarapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.417) vuttaṃ, evaṃ ‘‘āsevanapaccayena paccayoti’’pi vattabbaṃ siyā, jātibhedā na vuttanti ce? Bhūmibhinnassa kāmāvacarassa rūpāvacarādīnaṃ āsevanapaccayabhāvo viya jātibhinnassapi bhaveyyāti vattabbo eva siyā. Abhinnajātikassa ca vasena yathā ‘‘āvajjanā sahetukānaṃ khandhānaṃ anantarapaccayena paccayo’’ti vuttaṃ, evaṃ ‘‘āsevanapaccayena paccayo’’tipi vattabbaṃ siyā, na tu vuttaṃ. Tasmā vedanāttikepi saṅkhittāya gaṇanāya ‘‘āsevanapaccayā na magge ekaṃ, na maggapaccayā āsevane eka’’nti evaṃ gaṇanāya niddhāriyamānāya voṭṭhabbanassa āsevanapaccayattassa abhāvā yathāvuttappakāro dutiyo moghavāro vīmaṃsitabbo.

Among these three futile occasions, the second should be taken after examination. For if, in the forward order of the feeling triad, in sections like the causal relation, it were said, "By way of repetition condition, two are not on the path," and "By way of path condition, two are not in repetition," then that too would be a futile occasion. But if even the determining consciousness (voṭṭhabbana) were a repetition condition, it would also be so for wholesome and unwholesome states. For indeed, there is no phenomenon which, being by nature a repetition condition for a state fit to receive it, is unstated as 'repetition condition'. However, the repetition conditionality of the determining consciousness for wholesome and unwholesome states is not stated. From the statement, "A wholesome phenomenon arises dependent on a wholesome phenomenon, not by way of repetition condition. An unwholesome phenomenon... not by way of repetition condition" (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.93), it is indeed rejected. Even if one were to say, "It was said this way due to dissimilar feelings," still, just as it is said, "Advertence is a condition for the wholesome aggregates and the unwholesome aggregates by way of contiguity condition" (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.417), so too should it be said, "It is a condition by way of repetition condition." If it is argued that it is not stated due to a difference of type, then just as the repetition condition applies to the sense-sphere and the form-sphere, which differ by plane, so too might it apply to those differing by type—this should indeed be stated. And regarding those of the same type, just as it is said, "Advertence is a condition for the rooted aggregates by way of contiguity condition," so too should it be said, "It is a condition by way of repetition condition," but it is not stated. Therefore, even in the feeling triad, when the counting is thus determined in the concise enumeration, "By way of repetition condition, one is not on the path; by way of path condition, one is not in repetition," due to the absence of the determining consciousness being a repetition condition, the second futile occasion of the kind described should be examined.

Voṭṭhabbanaṃ pana vīthivipākasantatiyā āvaṭṭanato āvajjanā, tato visadisassa javanassa karaṇato manasikāro ca. Evañca katvā paṭṭhāne ‘‘voṭṭhabbanaṃ kusalānaṃ khandhānaṃ anantarapaccayena paccayo’’tiādi na vuttaṃ, ‘‘āvajjanā’’icceva vuttaṃ. Tasmā voṭṭhabbanato catunnaṃ vā pañcannaṃ vā javanānaṃ ārammaṇapurejātaṃ bhavituṃ asakkontaṃ rūpādiāvajjanādīnaṃ paccayo bhavituṃ na sakkoti, ayametassa sabhāvoti javanāpāripūriyā dutiyo moghavāro dassetuṃ yutto siyā, ayampi aṭṭhakathāyaṃ anāgatattā suṭṭhu vicāretabbo. Bhavaṅgassa javanānubandhanabhūtattā ‘‘tadārammaṇaṃ bhavaṅga’’nti vuttaṃ. Paṭṭhāne (paṭṭhā. 3.1.102) ca vuttaṃ ‘‘sahetukaṃ bhavaṅgaṃ ahetukassa bhavaṅgassa anantarapaccayena paccayo’’ti, ‘‘ahetukaṃ bhavaṅgaṃ sahetukassa bhavaṅgassa anantarapaccayena paccayo’’ti ca. Kusalākusalānaṃ sukhadukkhavipākamatto vipāko na iṭṭhāniṭṭhānaṃ vibhāgaṃ karoti, javanaṃ pana rajjanavirajjanādivasena iṭṭhāniṭṭhavibhāgaṃ karotīti ‘‘ārammaṇarasaṃ javanameva anubhavatī’’ti vuttaṃ.

Voṭṭhabbana, however, is called āvajjanā because it causes the resultant continuity—that is, the continuity of bhavaṅga—to turn; and it is also called manasikāra because it causes the dissimilar javana to arise from that resultant continuity. For this reason, in the Paṭṭhāna, it is not stated, “Voṭṭhabbana is a condition for wholesome aggregates by way of contiguity condition,” etc., but only, “Āvajjanā…” is stated. Therefore, an object such as a form-object, being unable to serve as an object-prenascence condition for four or five javanas from the time of voṭṭhabbana, cannot be a condition for āvajjanā and so on; this is the nature of this object. Thus, it would be suitable to show the second futile occasion by way of the non-completion of javana. This method also, because it is not mentioned in the commentary, should be well considered. Since bhavaṅga is that which follows after javana, it is said: 'Tadārammaṇa is bhavaṅga.' And in the Paṭṭhāna it is stated: “Rooted bhavaṅga is a condition for rootless bhavaṅga by way of contiguity condition,” and “Rootless bhavaṅga is a condition for rooted bhavaṅga by way of contiguity condition.” The resultant, which is merely the pleasant or painful result of wholesome and unwholesome actions, does not make a distinction between desirable and undesirable objects. Javana, however, by way of attachment, detachment, and so on, makes a distinction between desirable and undesirable. Therefore, it is said: “Only javana experiences the flavor of the object.”

Avijjamāne kārake kathaṃ āvajjanādibhāvena pavatti hotīti taṃ dassetuṃ pañcavidhaṃ niyāmaṃ nāma gaṇhiṃsu. Niyāmo ca dhammānaṃ sabhāvakiccapaccayabhāvavisesova. Taṃtaṃsadisaphaladānanti tassa tassa attano anurūpaphalassa [Pg.131] dānaṃ. Sadisavipākadānanti ca anurūpavipākadānanti attho. Idaṃ vatthunti ekavacananiddeso ekagāthāvatthubhāvena kato. Jagatippadesoti yathāvuttato aññopi lokappadeso. Kālagatiupadhipayogapaṭibāḷhañhi pāpaṃ na vipacceyya, na padesapaṭibāḷhanti. Sabbaññutaññāṇapadaṭṭhānapaṭisandhiyādidhammānaṃ niyāmo dasasahassikampanapaccayabhāvo dhammaniyāmo. Ayaṃ idha adhippetoti etena niyāmavasena āvajjanādibhāvo, na kārakavasenāti etamatthaṃ dasseti.

When there is no agent, how does occurrence take place through the state of advertence and so on? To demonstrate this, they took up what is called the fivefold regulation. And regulation is precisely that specific state of phenomena whereby, through their own intrinsic nature and function, they act as a condition. 'Giving a result similar to each respective one' is the giving of a result appropriate to each of its own. And 'giving a similar result' means giving an appropriate result. The indication 'This is the topic' is made in the singular because it is the subject matter of a single verse. 'A region of the world' is another region of the world besides what has been mentioned. Indeed, evil obstructed by time, destiny, personal constitution, and effort would not ripen; but it is not obstructed by a region. The regulation concerning phenomena such as rebirth-linking—the proximate cause of the knowledge of omniscience—is the state of being a condition for the trembling of the ten-thousandfold world-system; this is the regulation of phenomena (dhammaniyāma). This is what is intended here; thus, it is shown that the state of advertence and so on occurs by way of regulation, not by way of an agent.

Imasmiṃ ṭhāneti soḷasavipākakathāṭhāne. Dvādasahi vāhetabbā nāḷiyantopamā na dvādasannaṃ cittānaṃ ekasmiṃ dvāre ekārammaṇe saha kiccakaraṇavasena vuttā, atha kho dvādasannaṃ ekasmiṃ dvāre sakiccakaraṇamattavasena. Ahetukapaṭisandhijanakasadisajavanānantaraṃ ahetukatadārammaṇaṃ dassento ‘‘catunnaṃ pana duhetukakusalacittānaṃ aññatarajavanassa…pe… patiṭṭhātī’’ti āha. Ahetukapaṭisandhikassa pana tihetukajavane javite paṭisandhidāyakena kammena ahetukassa tadārammaṇassa nibbatti na paṭisedhitā. Evaṃ duhetukapaṭisandhikassapi tihetukānantaraṃ duhetukatadārammaṇaṃ appaṭisiddhaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Paripuṇṇavipākassa ca paṭisandhijanakakammassa vasenāyaṃ vipākavibhāvanā tassā mukhanidassanamattamevāti pavattivipākassa ca ekassa tihetukādikammassa soḷasavipākacittādīni vuttanayena yojetabbāni. Tasmā yena kenaci kammunā ekena anekaṃ tadārammaṇaṃ pavattamānaṃ kammavisesābhāvā yesaṃ taṃ anubandhabhūtaṃ, tesaṃ javanasaṅkhātānaṃ paccayānaṃ visesena visiṭṭhaṃ hotīti javanenāyaṃ tadārammaṇaniyāmo vutto, na nānākammunā nibbattamānassa vasena. Evañca katvā paṭṭhāne (paṭṭhā. 3.1.98) ‘‘sahetuke khandhe aniccato dukkhato anattato vipassati. Kusalākusale niruddhe ahetuko vipāko tadārammaṇatā uppajjatī’’ti ñāṇānantaraṃ ahetukatadārammaṇaṃ, ‘‘kusalākusale niruddhe sahetuko vipāko tadārammaṇatā uppajjatī’’ti akusalānantarañca sahetukatadārammaṇaṃ vuttaṃ, na ca ‘‘taṃ etena therena adassita’’nti katvā tassa paṭisedho kato hotīti.

In this place, that is, in the section on the sixteen resultant consciousnesses. The simile of the sugarcane-press to be driven by twelve men was not stated in the sense of twelve consciousnesses performing their function together at a single door with a single object, but rather, it was stated in the sense of the twelve merely performing their own function at a single door. Wishing to show that a rootless tadārammaṇa arises immediately after a javana similar to the kamma that produces a rootless rebirth-linking, he said, “But for any one of the four two-rooted wholesome consciousnesses of the javana… it becomes established.” However, for one with a rootless rebirth-linking, when a three-rooted javana has occurred, the arising of a rootless tadārammaṇa by the kamma that gives rebirth-linking is not prohibited. Similarly, for one with a two-rooted rebirth-linking, a two-rooted tadārammaṇa immediately after a three-rooted javana should be understood as not prohibited. And this explanation of the resultants by way of the rebirth-producing kamma that has a complete result is merely an introductory indication of that matter. And the sixteen resultant consciousnesses, etc., of a single three-rooted, etc., kamma that has a result in the course of life should be connected in the manner stated. Therefore, when many a tadārammaṇa occurs from any single kamma, due to the absence of a special kamma, that tadārammaṇa, being subsequent to them, becomes distinguished by the distinction of those conditions called javanas. Thus, this rule of tadārammaṇa is stated by way of the javana, not by way of that which arises from various kammas. And for this reason, in the Paṭṭhāna it is said: “One contemplates the rooted aggregates as impermanent, suffering, and non-self. When the wholesome and unwholesome have ceased, a rootless resultant arises as tadārammaṇa.” Thus, a rootless tadārammaṇa immediately after knowledge is stated. And it is also said: “When the wholesome and unwholesome have ceased, a rooted resultant arises as tadārammaṇa.” Thus, a rooted tadārammaṇa immediately after an unwholesome state is stated. And it is not that a prohibition of it is made, thinking, “That was not shown by this elder.”

Yaṃ [Pg.132] pana javanena…pe… taṃ kusalaṃ sandhāya vuttanti idaṃ kusalassa viya akusalassa sadiso vipāko natthīti katvā vuttaṃ. Sasaṅkhārikāsaṅkhārikaniyamanaṃ pana sandhāya tasmiṃ vutte akusalepi na taṃ na yujjatīti. Aṭṭhānametanti idaṃ niyamitādivasena yoniso ayoniso vā āvaṭṭite ayoniso yoniso vā vavatthāpanassa abhāvaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ.

As for what was said... with reference to the wholesome, this was stated considering that for the unwholesome javana, there is no similar resultant tadārammaṇa as there is for the wholesome. However, when that was said with reference to the determination of being prompted or unprompted, it is not that it is unsuitable even for the unwholesome; it is indeed suitable. The statement, 'This is an impossible occasion,' was said with reference to the absence of determining—either inappropriately or appropriately—when the bhavaṅga has been made to turn by way of being determined, etc., either appropriately or inappropriately.

Paṭisiddhanti avacanameva paṭisedhoti katvā vuttaṃ. Kāmataṇhānibbattena kammunā mahaggatalokuttarānubhavanavipāko na hotīti tattha tadārammaṇābhāvo veditabbo. Āpāthagate visaye tanninnaṃ bhavaṅgaṃ āvajjanaṃ uppādetīti āvajjanaṃ visaye ninnattā uppajjati. Bhavaṅgaṃ pana sabbadā savisaye ninnamevāti visayantaraviññāṇassa paccayo hutvāpi tadabhāvā vinā āvajjanena savisaye ninnattāva uppajjati. Ciṇṇattāti āvajjanena vinā bahulaṃ uppannapubbattā. Samudācārattāti āpāthagate visaye paṭisandhivisaye ca bahulaṃ uppāditapubbattā. Ciṇṇattāti vā puggalena āsevitabhāvo vutto. Samudācārattāti sayaṃ bahulaṃ pavattabhāvo. Nirodhassa anantarapaccayaṃ nevasaññānāsaññāyatananti idaṃ tadanantarameva nirodhaphusanaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, na arūpakkhandhānaṃ viya nirodhassa anantarapaccayabhāvaṃ. Nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ pana kiñci parikammena vinā uppajjamānaṃ natthi. Parikammāvajjanameva tassa āvajjananti aññassa viya etassapi sāvajjanatāya bhavitabbaṃ.

The word 'prohibited' was stated considering that the very non-speaking is the prohibition. Due to sense-sphere kamma produced by craving for sensual pleasures, a tadārammaṇa-resultant that experiences an exalted or supramundane object does not arise; therefore, the absence of tadārammaṇa in that case should be understood. When an object has come into range, the bhavaṅga, being inclined towards it, produces advertence; thus, advertence arises due to its inclination towards the object. The bhavaṅga, however, is always inclined only towards its own object. Therefore, even though it is a condition for a consciousness with a different object (i.e., advertence), in the absence of that advertence, it arises without advertence, solely due to its inclination towards its own object. 'Due to being practiced' means because of having arisen many times before without advertence. 'Due to occurring' means because of having been produced many times in regard to an object that has come into range and in regard to the object of rebirth-linking. Alternatively, 'due to being practiced' refers to the state of having been repeatedly cultivated by a person. 'Due to occurring' refers to the state of having occurred many times by itself. The statement, 'The base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception is the proximate condition for cessation,' was said with reference to the attainment of cessation only immediately after that, not with reference to the state of being the proximate condition for cessation in the way the immaterial aggregates are. However, there is no base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception whatsoever that arises without preliminary work. The advertence for the preliminary work is itself the advertence for it. Therefore, like any other [jhāna], this too must possess an advertence.

Ayaṃ panetthādhippāyo daṭṭhabbo – nevasaññānāsaññāyatanassa na nirodhassa anantarapaccayabhāve ninnāditā aññattha diṭṭhā atadatthaparikammabhāve ca uppattiyā, atha ca taṃ tassa anantarapaccayo hoti, tathā ca uppajjati. Evaṃ yathāvuttā manoviññāṇadhātu asatipi nirāvajjanuppattiyaṃ ninnādibhāve nirāvajjanā uppajjatīti. Evañca katvā ‘‘ariyamaggacittaṃ maggānantarāni phalacittānī’’ti idaṃ vuttaṃ. Yadi hi nibbānārammaṇāvajjanābhāvaṃ sandhāyetaṃ vuttaṃ siyā, gotrabhuvodānāni nidassanāni siyuṃ teheva etesaṃ nirāvajjanatāsiddhito. Phalasamāpattikāle ca ‘‘parittārammaṇaṃ mahaggatārammaṇaṃ anulomaṃ phalasamāpattiyā [Pg.133] anantarapaccayena paccayo’’ti vacanato samānārammaṇāvajjanarahitattā ‘‘maggānantarāni phalacittānī’’ti evaṃ phalasamāpatticittāni na vajjetabbāni siyuṃ, gotrabhuvodānāni pana yadipi nibbāne ciṇṇāni samudācārāni ca na honti, ārammaṇantare ciṇṇasamudācārāneva. Phalasamāpatticittāni ca maggavīthito uddhaṃ tadatthaparikammasabbhāvāti tesaṃ gahaṇaṃ na kataṃ, anulomānantarañca phalasamāpatticittaṃ ciṇṇaṃ samudācāraṃ, na nevasaññānāsaññāyatanānantaraṃ maggānantarassa viya tadatthaparikammābhāvāti ‘‘nirodhā vuṭṭhahantassā’’ti tañca nidassanaṃ. Ārammaṇena pana vinā nuppajjatīti idaṃ etassa mahaggatārammaṇattābhāvā pucchaṃ kāretvā ārammaṇaniddhāraṇatthaṃ vuttaṃ.

Moreover, here this intention should be understood: For the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, its inclination in being an immediate condition for the attainment of cessation is not seen elsewhere, because it arises even when there is preliminary work not for that purpose. And yet, that [base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception] is an immediate condition for that [cessation], and thus it [cessation] arises. In this way, the aforesaid mind-consciousness-element, even though there is no state of inclination etc. in the case of arising without adverting, arises without adverting. And for this reason, this was said: 'The noble path-consciousness, the fruition-consciousnesses immediately after the path.' For if this were said with reference to the absence of adverting with Nibbāna as its object, then change-of-lineage and purification would be the examples, because the state of being without adverting of these [path and fruition consciousnesses] is established by them indeed. And, at the time of the attainment of fruition, because of the statement, 'Conformity with a sense-sphere object or a sublime object is a condition for the attainment of fruition by way of immediate condition,' and because they are devoid of adverting with a similar object, the consciousnesses of the attainment of fruition should not be excluded from the statement 'fruition-consciousnesses immediately after the path.' But as for change-of-lineage and purification, although they are not practiced and made to occur repeatedly with Nibbāna as object, they are indeed practiced and made to occur repeatedly with another object. And as for the consciousnesses of the attainment of fruition, because there is the existence of preliminary work for that purpose after the path-process, their inclusion was not made. And the consciousness of the attainment of fruition immediately after conformity is practiced and made to occur repeatedly, but not the one immediately after the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, because, like the [fruition] immediately after the path, there is an absence of preliminary work for that purpose. Therefore, that too was made an example with the words 'for one emerging from cessation.' The statement, 'But it does not arise without an object,' was said for the purpose of determining the object, having caused a question to be raised because this [consciousness] does not have a sublime object.

Tatthāti vipākakathāyaṃ. Jaccandhapīṭhasappiupamānidassanaṃ vipākassa nissayena vinā appavattidassanatthaṃ. Visayaggāhoti idaṃ cakkhādīnaṃ savisayaggahaṇena cakkhuviññāṇādivipākassa dassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Upanissayato cakkhādīnaṃ dassanādiatthato ca tasseva vipākassa dassanatthaṃ ‘‘upanissayamatthaso’’ti vuttaṃ. Hadayavatthumevāti yathā purimacittāni hadayavatthunissitāni ca pasādavatthuanugatāni ca aññārammaṇāni honti, na evaṃ bhavaṅgaṃ, taṃ panetaṃ vatthārammaṇantararahitaṃ kevalaṃ hadayavatthumeva nissāya pavattatīti vuttaṃ hoti. Hadayarūpavatthukanti idhāpi aññavatthānugatanti adhippāyo veditabbo. Makkaṭakassa hi suttārohaṇaṃ viya pasādavatthukaṃ cittaṃ, suttena gamanādīni viya tadanugatāni sesacittānīti. Suttaghaṭṭanamakkaṭakacalanāni viya pasādaghaṭṭanabhavaṅgacalanāni saha hontīti dīpanato ‘‘ekekaṃ…pe… āgacchatī’’tipi dīpeti.

Herein, in the discussion of resultants. The pointing out of the simile of the one born blind, the stool, and the ghee is for the purpose of showing that resultant consciousness cannot occur without a physical base to depend on. This phrase, 'the grasping of an object,' is said for the purpose of showing the resultants, such as eye-consciousness, by means of the physical bases such as the eye grasping their own objects. The phrase ‘in terms of strong dependence and function’ is stated to show that very resultant consciousness both by way of strong dependence on the eye, etc., and by way of the function of seeing, etc. As for 'only the heart-base': just as the preceding consciousnesses are dependent on the heart-base, follow in sequence to the sensitive physical base, and have other objects, the bhavaṅga is not so. But it is said that that bhavaṅga, being devoid of another base and object, proceeds depending merely on the heart-base alone. Here also, in the case of 'having the heart-base as its physical base,' the intention should be understood as 'following in sequence to another base.' For, like a spider's climbing onto a thread is the consciousness that has the sensitive physical base as its support; like the going, etc., by the thread are the remaining consciousnesses that follow in sequence to that sensitive physical base. Because it explains that, just like the striking of the thread and the movement of the spider, the striking at the sensitive base and the vibration of the bhavaṅga occur simultaneously, it also explains this by the phrase, 'one by one... it comes.'

Bhavaṅgassa āvaṭṭitakāloti idaṃ dovārikasadisānaṃ cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ pādaparimajjakasadisassa āvajjanassa saññādānasadiso anantarapaccayabhāvo eva bhavaṅgāvaṭṭananti katvā vuttaṃ. Vipākamanodhātuādīnaṃ adisvāva sampaṭicchanādikaraṇaṃ gāḷhaggahaṇamattaputhulacaturassabhāvavijānanamattakahāpaṇabhāvavijānanamattakammopanayanamattasāmaññavasena vuttaṃ, na gāḷhaggāhakādīnaṃ kahāpaṇadassanassa abhāvo taṃsamānabhāvo ca sampaṭicchanādīnaṃ adhippetoti veditabbo.

This statement, 'the time of the bhavaṅga's turning,' is said having considered thus: for the eye-consciousness, etc., which are like a doorkeeper, and for the adverting-consciousness, which is like a foot-massager, the state of being an immediate condition, which is like giving a signal, is itself the turning of the bhavaṅga. The performing of receiving, etc., by the resultant mind-element, etc., without seeing the object, is stated by way of a general similarity to merely grasping firmly, merely knowing the state of being broad and square, merely knowing the state of being a coin, and merely presenting it for the transaction. It is not stated because of an absence of seeing the coin on the part of the firm-grasper, etc.; and it should be understood that the similarity to that [firm grasping] is intended for receiving, etc.

Paṇḍaraṃ [Pg.134] etanti paṇḍararūpadassanasāmaññato cakkhuviññāṇameva dassanakiccaṃ sādhetīti dīpanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Evaṃ sotadvārādīsupi yojetabbaṃ savanādivasena. Santāpanavasena guḷasīlo guḷappayojano vā goḷiyako. Upanissayatoti na upanissayapaccayaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Yasmiṃ pana asati yo na hoti, so idha ‘‘upanissayo’’ti adhippeto. Ālokasannissitanti idampi āloke sati sabbhāvaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, na upanissayapaccayataṃ. Mandathāmagataṃ nāma kiriyacittassa paccayabhāvaṃ anupagantvā sayameva pavattamānaṃ.

The phrase `paṇḍaraṃ etaṃ` should be understood as an explanation that eye-consciousness alone accomplishes the function of seeing, due to the commonality of seeing a white form. Similarly, this should be applied to the ear-door and others, by way of hearing and so on. By way of heating, a `goḷiyaka` is one whose practice is molasses or one whose purpose is molasses. The phrase `upanissayato` is not stated with reference to the `upanissaya` condition. But here, `upanissaya` is intended to mean that in the absence of which, something else does not come to be. The phrase 'dependent on light' (`ālokasannissitaṃ`) is also stated with reference to the actual existence [of eye-consciousness] when there is light, not with reference to its being the `upanissaya` condition. `Mandathāmagata` is the name for the `bhavaṅga` that occurs by itself, without having reached the state of being a condition for the functional (adverting) consciousness.

Asaṅkhārikasasaṅkhārikesu dosaṃ disvāti na kammassa viruddhasabhāvena vipākena bhavitabbanti asaṅkhārikakammassa sasaṅkhārikavipākesu, sasaṅkhārikakammassa ca asaṅkhārikavipākesu dosaṃ disvā. Ahetukānaṃ pana rūpādīsu abhinipātamattādikiccānaṃ na sasaṅkhārikaviruddho sabhāvoti asaṅkhārikatā natthi, asaṅkhārikaviruddhasabhāvābhāvā nāpi sasaṅkhārikatāti ubhayāvirodhā ubhayenapi tesaṃ nibbattiṃ anujānāti. Cittaniyāmanti tadārammaṇaniyāmaṃ. Kiriyato pañcāti imesaṃ…pe… patiṭṭhātīti kiriyajavanānantarañca tadārammaṇaṃ vuttaṃ. Paṭṭhāne (paṭṭhā. 1.3.94) pana ‘‘kusalākusale niruddhe vipāko tadārammaṇatā uppajjatī’’ti vipākadhammadhammānameva anantarā tadārammaṇaṃ vuttaṃ. Kusalattike ca ‘‘sekkhā vā puthujjanā vā kusalaṃ aniccato’’tiādinā (paṭṭhā. 1.1.406) kusalākusalajavanameva vatvā tadanantaraṃ tadārammaṇaṃ vuttaṃ, na abyākatānantaraṃ, na ca katthaci kiriyānantaraṃ tadārammaṇassa vuttaṭṭhānaṃ dissati. Vijjamāne ca tasmiṃ avacane kāraṇaṃ natthi, tasmā upaparikkhitabbo eso theravādo. Vipphārikañhi javanaṃ nāvaṃ viya nadīsoto bhavaṅgaṃ anubandhatīti yuttaṃ, na pana chaḷaṅgupekkhavato santavuttiṃ kiriyajavanaṃ paṇṇapuṭaṃ viya nadīsototi.

The phrase 'having seen a fault in the unprompted and the prompted' means this: because the result should not be of a nature opposed to the kamma, a fault is seen in the prompted results of unprompted kamma, and in the unprompted results of prompted kamma. However, for the rootless results, which have the function of merely falling upon forms, etc., there is no nature opposed to the prompted; hence, there is no unprompted nature. And due to the absence of a nature opposed to the unprompted, there is also no prompted nature. Thus, due to non-opposition to both, their arising is allowed by both. The regulation of consciousness (cittaniyāma) refers to the regulation of tadārammaṇa. With regard to the functional... it is established—meaning that tadārammaṇa is stated to occur immediately after the functional javana. In the Paṭṭhāna, however, it is stated: 'When wholesome or unwholesome has ceased, the result, the state of tadārammaṇa, arises.' Here, tadārammaṇa is stated immediately after only resultant phenomena. And in the Kusalattika, after stating only wholesome and unwholesome javana, such as 'Whether a trainee or an ordinary person, the wholesome [is seen as] impermanent,' etc., tadārammaṇa is stated immediately after it, not after indeterminate phenomena. Nor is there found anywhere a place where tadārammaṇa is stated to occur after functional javana. And if it did exist, there would be no reason for not stating it; therefore, this view of the Elder should be examined. For it is fitting that the life-continuum (bhavaṅga) follows an agitated javana, just as a river's current follows a boat; but it does not follow the peaceful functional javana of one possessing six-factored equanimity, just as a river's current does not follow a leaf-cup.

Piṇḍajavanaṃ javatīti kusalākusalakiriyajavanāni piṇḍetvā kathitānīti tathā kathitāni javanāni piṇḍitāni viya vuttāni, ekasmiṃ vā tadārammaṇe piṇḍetvā dassitāni hutvā javitāneva vuttāni. Imañca pana piṇḍajavanaṃ vadantena akusalato cattāriyeva upekkhāsahagatāni gahetvā dvādasupekkhāsahagatajavanāni piṇḍitāni viya vuttāni. Paṭṭhāne pana ‘‘kusalaṃ assādeti abhinandati, taṃ ārabbha rāgo uppajjati. Diṭṭhi, vicikicchā[Pg.135], uddhaccaṃ, domanassaṃ uppajjati. Akusale niruddhe vipāko tadārammaṇatā uppajjatī’’ti vuttattā itarāni dve iṭṭhārammaṇe pavattavicikicchuddhaccasahagatānipi kusalavipāke tadārammaṇe piṇḍetabbāni siyuṃ. Tesaṃ pana anantaraṃ ahetukavipākeneva tadārammaṇena bhavitabbaṃ, so ca santīraṇabhāveneva gahitoti apubbaṃ gahetabbaṃ natthi. Ahetuke ca piṇḍetabbaṃ nārahantīti adhippāyena na piṇḍetīti.

The phrase 'the grouped javana impels' (piṇḍajavanaṃ javati) means that the wholesome, unwholesome, and functional javanas are spoken of as having been grouped together; therefore, the javanas spoken of in that manner are said to be as if grouped. Or, having been shown as grouped in a single registering consciousness, they are spoken of as having impelled. Moreover, by the one who speaks of this grouped javana, having taken only the four unwholesome javanas accompanied by equanimity, the twelve javanas accompanied by equanimity are spoken of as if grouped. However, in the Paṭṭhāna, since it is stated, 'One relishes and delights in the wholesome; based on that, lust arises. Wrong view, doubt, restlessness, and displeasure arise. When the unwholesome ceases, a resultant arises as a registering consciousness,' the other two—those accompanied by doubt and restlessness occurring with a desirable object—should also be grouped in the registering consciousness that is a wholesome resultant. However, immediately after these, the registering consciousness must be only a rootless resultant, and since that is taken only in its state as investigating consciousness (santīraṇa), there is nothing new to be included. And with the intention that they are not fit to be grouped in a rootless [resultant], he does not group them.

Tihetukajavanāvasāne panetthāti etasmiṃ dutiyavāde tihetukajavanāvasāne tihetukatadārammaṇaṃ yuttanti dassetuṃ yuttaṃ vadati javanasamānattā, nālabbhamānattā aññassa. Paṭhamattherena akusalānantaraṃ vuttassa ahetukatadārammaṇassa, kusalānantaraṃ vuttassa ca sahetukatadārammaṇassa akusalānantaraṃ uppattiṃ vadantassa hi paṭisandhijanakaṃ tihetukakammaṃ duhetukāhetukaṃ vipākaṃ janayantampi tihetukajavanānantaraṃ na janetīti na ettha kāraṇaṃ dissatīti evaṃ yuttaṃ gahetabbaṃ avuttampīti adhippāyo. Atha vā tasmiṃ tasmiṃ theravāde yena adhippāyena sasaṅkhārāsaṅkhāravidhānādi vuttaṃ, taṃ teneva adhippāyena yuttaṃ gahetabbaṃ, na adhippāyantaraṃ adhippāyantarena āloḷetabbanti attho. Hetusadisamevāti janakakammahetusadisameva. Mahāpakaraṇe āvi bhavissatīti mahāpakaraṇe āgatapāḷiyā pākaṭaṃ uppattividhānaṃ āvi bhavissatīti adhippāyena vadati.

As for Tihetukajavanāvasāne panetthāti: in this second doctrine, in order to show that a triple-rooted registering consciousness is suitable at the end of a triple-rooted javana, he states what is suitable. This is because of its similarity to the javana, and not because another is unobtainable. For, regarding the first elder who states that a rootless registering consciousness arises after an unwholesome javana and a rooted registering consciousness after a wholesome javana, and who also states that the latter can arise after an unwholesome javana—in this doctrine, no reason is seen why triple-rooted kamma that generates rebirth-linking, although it generates a double-rooted or rootless resultant, would not generate a resultant immediately after a triple-rooted javana. Therefore, the intention is that what is suitable should be understood thus, even if unstated. Alternatively, in each respective elder's doctrine, with whatever intention the classification of prompted and unprompted, etc., was stated, that suitable registering consciousness should be understood with that very same intention. The meaning is that one intention should not be mixed up with another. Hetusadisamevāti means 'similar only to the root of the generative kamma.' As for Mahāpakaraṇe āvi bhavissatīti, he speaks with the intention that 'the method of arising, which is evident through the Pāḷi that comes in the Great Treatise, will become manifest.'

Kāmāvacarakusalavipākakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Sense-Sphere Wholesome Resultants is concluded.

Rūpāvacarārūpāvacaravipākakathāvaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Discourse on the Resultants of the Form-Sphere and Formless-Sphere

499. Anantarāyenāti parihānipaccayavirahena. Paṭipadādibhedoti paṭipadārammaṇabhedo. Tathā hi dukkhapaṭipadaṃ dandhābhiññaṃ jhānaṃ uppādetvā punappunaṃ samāpajjantassa taṃ jhānaṃ taṃpaṭipadameva hoti. Etasmiṃ aparihīne tassa vipāko nibbattamāno tappaṭipadova bhavituṃ arahatīti. Chandādhipateyyādibhāvo pana tasmiṃ khaṇe vijjamānānaṃ chandādīnaṃ adhipatipaccayabhāvena hoti, na āgamanavasena. Tathā hi ekameva [Pg.136] jhānaṃ nānākkhaṇesu nānādhipateyyaṃ hoti. Catutthajjhānasseva hi caturiddhipādabhāvena bhāvanā hoti, tasmā vipākassa āgamanavasena chandādhipateyyāditā na vuttā.

499. Anantarāyenāti means 'due to the absence of a cause for decline.' Paṭipadādibhedoti means 'the distinction of path and object.' Indeed, for one who, having generated a jhāna of difficult practice and slow direct knowledge, repeatedly enters into it, that jhāna is of that very same path. When this jhāna has not declined, its resultant, when it arises, is fit to be of that very same path. However, the state of having zeal, etc., as dominance occurs due to zeal, etc., being present at that moment as a dominant condition; it is not by way of the path of practice. Indeed, one and the same jhāna can, at different moments, have different dominances. For it is only the fourth jhāna that is developed by way of the four bases of spiritual power. Therefore, for the resultant, the state of having zeal, etc., as dominance is not stated to be by way of the path of practice.

Rūpāvacarārūpāvacaravipākakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Resultants of the Form and Formless Spheres is concluded.

Lokuttaravipākakathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Supramundane Resultant

505. Yathā vaṭṭaṃ ācinati, tathā taṇhādīhi abhisaṅkhataṃ lokiyakammaṃ upacitanti vuccati. Lokuttaraṃ pana evaṃ na hotīti tathā na vuttaṃ. Suddhāgamanavasenāti animittāppaṇihitanāmadāyakehi saguṇārammaṇehi vijjamānehipi phalassa suññatanāmadānadīpane aggahitabhāveneva avomissenāti attho. Āgamanato suññatāppaṇihitanāmavato maggassa āgamanīyaṭṭhāne ṭhatvā attano phalassa nāmattayadānaṃ yojitaṃ, itarassapi pana tatheva yojetabbaṃ. Nayamattadassanañhetaṃ. Saguṇārammaṇehi pana nāmattayavato aniccānupassanānantarassapi maggassa āgamanīyaṭṭhāne ṭhatvā attano phalassa nāmattayadānaṃ na nivāritanti. Vaḷañjanakaphalasamāpattiyā ca vipassanāgamanavasena nāmalābhe maggassa viya animittanāmalābho na siyā. Yathā pana maggānantarassa viya vaḷañjanakaphalasamāpattiyāpi jhānapaṭipadābhedo hoti, evaṃ suññatādināmalābhe sati animittanāmañca labhatīti. Avūpasantāyāti idaṃ kenaci aññena anantaritattā tādisāya eva saddhāya…pe… paññāya ca anantarapaccayabhāvaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tena chandādayopi attano anantarasadisānaṃ chandādīnaṃ uppādakā adhipatibhūtā adhipatibhūte eva uppādentīti imamatthaṃ dīpeti.

505. Just as one accumulates the round of existence, so too is worldly kamma, conditioned by craving and so forth, said to be 'accumulated'. But the supramundane is not so, therefore it is not spoken of in that manner. Suddhāgamanavasenāti means 'by way of pure arrival'; the meaning is: unmixed with objects with qualities that give the names 'signless' and 'undirected'—even though they are present—precisely because of the state of not being taken as an object in the exposition of giving the name 'emptiness' to the fruit. By way of its arising, for the path possessing the names 'emptiness' and 'undirected', having stood in the position that is the cause for the arising of the fruit, the giving of the set of three names to its own fruit has been applied. However, for the other path as well, it should be applied in the very same way. Indeed, this is merely the showing of a method. For the path that arises immediately after the contemplation of impermanence, which possesses the set of three names on account of objects with qualities, the giving of the set of three names to its own fruit, having stood in the position that is the cause for the arising of the fruit, is not prevented. And for the attainment of fruition for common use, when there is the gaining of a name by the power of insight, the gaining of the name 'signless' would not occur as it does for the path. However, just as for the attainment of fruition for common use there is a distinction of jhāna and path of practice, like for the fruit that is immediately after the path, so too, when there is the gaining of names such as 'emptiness', it also gains the name 'signless'. This phrase avūpasantāya was said in reference to the state of being an immediate condition for such faith... and for wisdom, because of their not being interrupted by any other thing. By that, it explains this meaning: desire and so forth, being dominant factors, are producers of desire and so forth that are similar and immediately proximate to themselves, and they produce only dominant factors.

555. Kilesasamucchedakassa maggassa sammādiṭṭhiādikassa niyyānikasabhāvassa phalenapi paṭippassaddhakilesena niyyānasabhāveneva bhavitabbaṃ, tasmā phalepi ‘‘maggaṅgaṃ maggapariyāpanna’’nti vuttaṃ. Evañca katvā maggavibhaṅge phalesu ca aṭṭhaṅgiko pañcaṅgiko ca maggo uddhaṭo, evaṃ bojjhaṅgāpīti. Maggaṃ upādāyāti maggasadisatāya maggoti imamatthaṃ sandhāyāha.

555. The fruit of the path—which has right view and so forth, has the nature of leading out, and completely severs the defilements—must also indeed have the nature of leading out, with defilements pacified. Therefore, even regarding the fruit, it is said, 'a path factor, included in the path.' And having done so, in the Analysis of the Path and in the fruits, the eight-factored and five-factored path is extracted, and likewise the enlightenment factors. Regarding the phrase maggaṃ upādāya, he says it with this meaning in mind: it is called 'path' because of its similarity to the path.

Lokuttaravipākakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Supramundane Resultant is concluded.

Akusalavipākakathāvaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Discourse on Unwholesome Resultants

556. Iṭṭhaiṭṭhamajjhattesu [Pg.137] viya na aniṭṭhaaniṭṭhamajjhattesu santīraṇaviseso atthi, aniṭṭhārammaṇameva pana adhimattaṃ mandañca evaṃ dvidhā vuttaṃ.

556. Just as there is a distinction of investigating consciousness in the case of desirable and desirable-neutral objects, there is no such distinction in the case of undesirable and undesirable-neutral objects. However, the undesirable object itself is spoken of in two ways: as excessive and as slight.

Akusalavipākakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Unwholesome Resultants is concluded.

Kiriyābyākataṃ

Functional and Indeterminate

Manodhātucittavaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Mind-Element Consciousness

566. Vātapupphanti moghapupphaṃ. Taṃ acchinnepi rukkhe na phalati, chinnarukkhapupphaṃ pana acchinne phaleyya. Evaṃ acchinnabhavamūlassapi pavattamānaṃ yaṃ na phalati, taṃ vātapupphasadisaṃ. Itarasseva pana pavattamānaṃ chinnarukkhapupphasadisaṃ. Tañhi acchinne bhavamūle phaleyyāti.

566. Vātapupphanti means a barren flower. Even on an uncut tree, it does not bear fruit, but a flower from a cut tree would bear fruit if the tree were not cut. Similarly, that which, although arising in one whose root of existence is uncut, does not bear fruit, is like the wind-flower. However, that which arises only in the other is like a flower from a cut tree, for that would bear fruit if the root of existence were not cut.

Kiriyamanoviññāṇadhātucittavaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Consciousness of the Functional Mind-Consciousness-Element

568. Loluppataṇhā pahīnāti imassa cittassa paccayabhūtā purimā pavatti dassitā. Idaṃ pana cittaṃ vicāraṇapaññārahitanti kevalaṃ somanassamattaṃ uppādentassa hotīti. Evaṃ cetiyapūjādīsupi daṭṭhabbaṃ. Vattaṃ karontoti idaṃ vattaṃ karontassa phoṭṭhabbārammaṇe kāyadvāracittappavattiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Pañcadvārānugataṃ hutvā labbhamānaṃ sandhāya pañcadvāre eva vā loluppataṇhāpahānādipaccavekkhaṇahetubhūtaṃ idameva pavattiṃ sandhāya tattha tattha ‘‘iminā cittena somanassito hotī’’ti vuttanti ‘‘evaṃ tāva pañcadvāre labbhatī’’ti āha. Atītaṃsādīsu appaṭihataṃ ñāṇaṃ vatvā ‘‘imehi tīhi dhammehi samannāgatassa buddhassa bhagavato sabbaṃ kāyakammaṃ ñāṇānuparivattī’’tiādivacanato (mahāni. 156 atthato samānaṃ) ‘‘bhagavato idaṃ uppajjatī’’ti vuttavacanaṃ vicāretabbaṃ. Ahetukassa mūlābhāvena suppatiṭṭhitatā natthīti balabhāvo aparipuṇṇo, tasmā uddesavāre ‘‘samādhibalaṃ hoti, vīriyabalaṃ hotī’’ti na vuttaṃ. Tato eva hi ahetukānaṃ saṅgahavāre jhānaṅgāni ca na uddhaṭāni. Teneva imasmimpi ahetukadvaye balāni anuddesāsaṅgahitāni. Yasmā pana vīriyassa vijjamānattā sesāhetukehi [Pg.138] balavaṃ, yasmā ca ettha vitakkādīnaṃ jhānapaccayamattatā viya samādhivīriyānaṃ balamattatā atthi, tasmā niddesavāre ‘‘samādhibalaṃ vīriyabala’’nti vatvā ṭhapitaṃ. Yasmā pana neva kusalaṃ nākusalaṃ, tasmā sammāsamādhi micchāsamādhīti, sammāvāyāmo micchāvāyāmoti ca na vuttanti adhippāyo. Evaṃ sati mahākiriyacittesu ca etaṃ na vattabbaṃ siyā, vuttañca, tasmā sammā, micchā vā niyyānikasabhāvābhāvato maggapaccayabhāvaṃ appattā samādhivāyāmā idha tathā na vuttāti daṭṭhabbā.

568. By the text 'frivolous craving has been abandoned' is shown the prior occurrence which was the condition for this consciousness. However, this consciousness, being devoid of reflective wisdom, arises for one who produces merely joy. This should be understood similarly in cases such as the worship of a cetiya. The phrase 'while performing a duty' was said in reference to the occurrence of consciousness at the body-door with a tangible object for one performing a duty. Alternatively, this was said in reference to the obtainable (hasituppāda-citta) that arises following the five doors; or, in reference to this very occurrence which is the cause for reflecting on the abandonment of frivolous craving, etc., at the five doors themselves, it is said in those respective contexts, 'With this consciousness, one becomes joyful.' Therefore, he says, 'Thus, it is obtainable at the five doors.' Having stated that knowledge is unobstructed in regard to objects such as the past, and from the statement beginning with 'Endowed with these three qualities... all bodily actions of the Buddha, the Blessed One, are preceded by knowledge,' the statement that was said, 'this arises in the Blessed One,' should be investigated. Because a rootless consciousness, due to the absence of a root, is not well-established, its state of being a power is incomplete. Therefore, in the summary section (uddesavāra), it was not said, 'there is the power of concentration, there is the power of energy.' For that very reason, in the combination section (saṅgahavāra) concerning the rootless consciousnesses, the jhāna factors also were not extracted. For that same reason, in this pair of rootless consciousnesses as well, the powers were neither shown in the summary section nor included in the combination section. However, because it is stronger than the remaining rootless consciousnesses due to the presence of energy, and because herein, just as there is a state of being merely a condition for jhāna for initial thought, etc., there is a state of being merely a power for concentration and energy, therefore, in the detailed section (niddesavāra), it was stated and established as, 'the power of concentration, the power of energy.' However, because it is neither wholesome nor unwholesome, it was not said as 'right concentration' or 'wrong concentration,' and 'right effort' or 'wrong effort'—this is the intention. If this were so, this should not be said in the case of the great functional consciousnesses either, but it was said. Therefore, it should be understood that concentration and effort are not spoken of here in that way because, due to the absence of a nature that leads out, they do not attain the state of being a path-condition.

574. Indriyaparopariyattaāsayānusayasabbaññutānāvaraṇañāṇāni imassānantaraṃ uppajjamānāni yamakapāṭihāriyamahākaruṇāsamāpattiñāṇāni ca imassa anantaraṃ uppannaparikammānantarāni iminā āvajjitārammaṇeyeva pavattantīti āha ‘‘cha…pe… gaṇhantī’’ti. Mahāvisayattā mahāgajo viya mahantanti mahāgajaṃ.

574. The knowledge of the faculties of others, the knowledge of dispositions and latent tendencies, omniscience, and unobstructed knowledge, which arise immediately after this mind-door adverting consciousness; and the knowledge of the twin miracle and the knowledge of the attainment of great compassion, which arise immediately after the preliminary actions that have arisen, occur only in the object adverted to by this adverting consciousness. Therefore, he says, “Six... grasp.” Because of having a vast scope, it is great like a great tusker elephant; therefore, it is called ‘Mahāgaja’ (the great elephant).

Rūpāvacarārūpāvacarakiriyacittavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Functional Consciousness Pertaining to the Form and Formless Realms

577. Idāni yāni kiriyāni jātāni, tāni veditabbānīti evaṃ yojanā kātabbā. Attabhāvoti pañcakkhandhā vuccanti.

577. Now, whatever functional states have arisen, they should be understood; thus the connection should be made. ‘Individual existence’ means the five aggregates.

Cittuppādakaṇḍavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section on the Arising of Consciousness is Completed.

2. Rūpakaṇḍaṃ

2. The Section on Form

Uddesavaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Outline

Idāni [Pg.139] rūpamabyākataṃ bhājetabbaṃ, tañca kenaci samayavavatthānaṃ katvā na sakkā bhājetuṃ. Na hi rūpassa cittuppādena samayavavatthānaṃ sakkā kātuṃ acittasamuṭṭhānasabbhāvato, cittasamuṭṭhānassa ca anekacittasamuṭṭhānatāya rūpasamuṭṭhāpakacittānañca kesañci katthaci asamuṭṭhāpanatāya vavatthānābhāvato, viññattidvayavajjitassa rūpassa acittasahabhubhāvato ca, na ca rūpānaṃ upasampajja viharaṇena samayavavatthānaṃ yujjati mahaggatappamāṇānaṃ jhānānaṃ viya rūpānaṃ upasampajja vihātabbatābhāvā, upādārūpehi ca na yujjati tesaṃ sahajātādipaccayabhāvena appavattanato, nāpi mahābhūtehi yujjati kesañci mahābhūtānaṃ kehici upādārūpehi vinā pavattito asamānakālānañca sabbhāvato. Na hi ‘‘yasmiṃ samaye pathavīdhātu uppannā hoti, tasmiṃ samaye cakkhāyatanaṃ hotī’’ti sakkā vattuṃ sotādinissayabhūtāya pathaviyā cittādisamuṭṭhānāya ca saha cakkhāyatanassa abhāvā. Evaṃ sotāyatanādīsupi yojetabbaṃ.

Now, indeterminate matter is to be analyzed. And it cannot be analyzed by making a temporal determination by means of any phenomenon. For it is not possible to make a temporal determination of matter by the arising of consciousness, because of the existence of matter not originated by consciousness; and because consciousness-originated matter is originated by many different consciousnesses; and because some of the consciousnesses that originate matter do not originate it in certain planes of existence, there is an impossibility of determination; and because matter, excluding the two intimations, does not co-arise with consciousness. And a temporal determination of matter by means of attaining and abiding is not suitable, because, like the sublime and immeasurable jhānas, matter does not have the nature of being attainable and abided in. And it is not suitable to make a determination by means of derived matter, because they do not occur by way of being conditions such as co-nascence. Nor is it suitable to make a determination by means of the great elements, because some great elements occur without certain derived material forms, and because of the existence of matter having non-simultaneous time. For it is not possible to say, “At the time when the earth element has arisen, at that time the eye-base exists,” because of the non-existence of the eye-base together with the earth element that is the support for the ear, etc., and is originated by consciousness, etc. Similarly, this should be applied to the ear-base and so on.

Mahābhūtehi asamānakālāni viññattiupacayādīnipi tasmiṃ samaye hontīti na sakkā vattunti. Ekasmiñca kāle anekāni kalāpasahassāni uppajjanti pavattanti ca, na arūpadhammānaṃ viya rūpānaṃ kalāpadvayasahābhāvo atthi. Ekasmiñca kalāpe vattamāne eva aññassa nirodho, aññassa cuppatti hotīti sabbathā rūpābyākataṃ samayavavatthānaṃ katvā na sakkā vibhajituṃ. Ekakādīhi pana nayehi na hetuādinā sabhāvena vibhajituṃ sakkāti tathā vibhajanatthaṃ cittuppādakaṇḍe tāva avibhattaṃ abyākataṃ atthīti dassetuṃ samayavavatthānena vinā abyākatassa sabhāvatoyeva niddese ekadesaṃ niddisitvā nigamanakaraṇassa anupapattito ca vibhattañca avibhattañca sabbaṃ saṅgaṇhanto āha ‘‘katame dhammā abyākatā? Kusalā…pe… asaṅkhatā ca dhātu. Ime dhammā abyākatā’’ti. Avibhatte hi vibhajitabbe dassite vibhajanaṃ yuttaṃ ñātuṃ icchāya uppāditāyāti. Ettha pana vipākakiriyābyākataṃ vibhattattā [Pg.140] na vibhajitabbaṃ, asaṅkhatā ca dhātu bhedābhāvato. Yaṃ panettha bhedayuttattā avibhattattā ca vibhajitabbaṃ, taṃ vibhajanto āha ‘‘tattha katamaṃ sabbaṃ rūpa’’ntiādi. Ayamettha pāḷiyojanā.

It is not possible to say that intimation, accumulation, and so on, which are not simultaneous with the great elements, occur at that moment. And at one time, many thousands of material clusters arise and continue, but unlike immaterial phenomena, the co-existence of two material clusters does not exist. Furthermore, while one cluster is occurring, the cessation of another and the arising of yet another occurs. Therefore, it is not possible in any way to analyze indeterminate material phenomena by making a temporal determination. However, it is possible to analyze them by methods such as the single-item method, etc., and by their intrinsic nature as 'not-cause', etc. For the purpose of such analysis, and in order to show that in the chapter on the arising of consciousness there is, first of all, the unanalyzed indeterminate; and because it is unsuitable to make a conclusion after indicating only a part in the exposition of the indeterminate by its intrinsic nature alone, without temporal determination; and wishing to encompass all—both the analyzed and the unanalyzed—He said: “Which phenomena are indeterminate? … the unconditioned element. These phenomena are indeterminate.” For when the unanalyzed, which ought to be analyzed, is shown, and the desire to know has been generated, analysis is suitable. Here, however, the resultant and functional indeterminate phenomena, having been analyzed, are not to be analyzed further; and the unconditioned element is not to be analyzed because it has no divisions. But analyzing that which here ought to be analyzed, due to its suitability for division and its being unanalyzed, He said: “Therein, what is all material form?” and so on. This here is the application to the Pāḷi text.

Nayaṃ dassetvāti ettha heṭṭhā gahaṇameva nayadassanaṃ. Taṃ vipākesu katvā viññātattā kiriyābyākatesu nissaṭṭhaṃ. Kāmāvacarādibhāvena vattabbassa kiriyābyākatassa vā dassanaṃ, taṃ katvā kāmāvacarātiādikaṃ gahetvā vuttattā nissaṭṭhaṃ. Pañcavīsati rūpānīti pāḷiyaṃ vuttāni dasāyatanāni pañcadasa ca sukhumarūpāni, upacayasantatiyo vā ekanti katvā hadayavatthuñca. Channavutīti cakkhādidasakā satta utusamuṭṭhānādayo tayo aṭṭhakā utucittajā dve saddā ca. Kalāpabhāvena pavattarūparūpāni ‘‘rūpakoṭṭhāsā’’ti vuttāni rūpakalāpakoṭṭhāsabhāvato. Koṭṭhāsāti ca aṃsā, avayavāti attho. Koṭṭhanti vā sarīraṃ, tassa aṃsā kesādayo koṭṭhāsāti aññepi avayavā koṭṭhāsā viya koṭṭhāsā. Nibbānaṃ nippadesato gahitanti sopādisesanirupādisesarāgakkhayādiasaṅkhatādivacanīyabhāvena bhinnaṃ nippadesato gahitaṃ. Atthato hi ekāva asaṅkhatā dhātūti.

In the phrase 'having shown the method,' the very grasping in the resultant consciousness below is the showing of the method. Having done that in the resultants, it is dismissed in the case of the functional-indeterminate states because it is already understood. Alternatively, the showing of the functional-indeterminate, which is to be spoken of by way of the sense-sphere and so on, is the showing of the method; having done that, and because it has been stated by taking 'sense-sphere' and so on, it is dismissed. As for 'twenty-five forms': these are the ten bases and fifteen subtle forms stated in the Pāḷi; alternatively, the number is reached by treating growth and continuity as one, and also including the heart-base. As for 'ninety-six': these are the seven decads beginning with the eye, the three octads beginning with that originated by temperature, and the two sounds originated by temperature and consciousness. Material phenomena that occur by way of groups are called 'sections of matter' because of their nature as sections of material groups. And 'sections' means parts, components; this is the meaning. Alternatively, 'koṭṭha' is the body; its parts, such as hair and so on, are 'koṭṭhāsā'. Therefore, other components, being like parts (koṭṭhāsā), are also called 'koṭṭhāsā'. As for 'Nibbāna is taken without remainder': though distinguished by way of being expressible as 'with remainder,' 'without remainder,' 'destruction of lust,' 'the unconditioned,' and so on, it is taken without remainder. For in terms of its essence, it is just the one unconditioned element.

584. Sabbanti sakalaṃ cakkavāḷaṃ. Parimaṇḍalaṃ parimaṇḍalasaṇṭhānaṃ, parikkhepato chattiṃsa satasahassāni dasa ceva sahassāni aḍḍhacatutthāni ca yojanasatāni hontīti attho. Ettha ca vaṭṭaṃ ‘‘parimaṇḍala’’nti vuttaṃ. Cattāri nahutānīti cattālīsa sahassāni. Nagavhayāti nagāti avhātabbā nagasaddanāmāti attho.

584. As for 'Sabbaṃ': it means the entire world-system. 'Parimaṇḍalaṃ' means having a perfectly round shape. In circumference, it is three million, six hundred and ten thousand, three hundred and fifty yojanas; this is the meaning. And here, 'vaṭṭaṃ' (round) is called 'parimaṇḍalaṃ' (perfectly round). As for 'cattāri nahutāni': it means forty thousand. As for 'nagavhayā': it means 'to be called naga,' that is, having the name of the word 'naga'; this is the meaning.

Devadānavādīnaṃ tigāvutādisarīravasena mahantāni pātubhūtāni. Tatthāyaṃ vacanattho – bhūtāni jātāni nibbattāni mahantāni mahābhūtānīti. Anekacchariyadassanena anekābhūtavisesadassanavasena ca māyākāro mahanto bhūtoti mahābhūto. Yakkhādayo jātivaseneva mahantā bhūtāti mahābhūtā. Niruḷho vā ayaṃ mahābhūtasaddo tesu daṭṭhabbo. Pathaviyādayo pana mahābhūtā viya mahābhūtā. Bhūtasaddassa ubhayaliṅgattā napuṃsakatā katā. Mahāparihāratoti ettha vacanatthaṃ vadanto āha ‘‘mahantehi bhūtāni, mahāparihārāni [Pg.141] vā bhūtānī’’ti. Tattha pacchimatthe purimapade uttarapadassa parihārasaddassa lopaṃ katvā ‘‘mahābhūtānī’’ti vuccanti.

Great forms manifested for devas, dānavas, and others by means of their bodies being three gāvutas and so on in size. Herein, this is the meaning of the word: `bhūtāni` means born (jātāni), arisen (nibbattāni); being great (mahantāni), they are `mahābhūtāni` (great manifested beings). By showing many wonders and by means of showing various unreal phenomena, a magician is a great being (mahanto bhūto); therefore, he is called a `mahābhūta`. Yakkhas and others, by their very birth, are great beings; thus, they are `mahābhūtā`. Or, this word `mahābhūta` should be understood as a conventional term for them. The earth element and so on, however, are called `mahābhūtā` because they are like the great beings. Because the word `bhūta` has both genders, it is made neuter. Here, explaining the meaning of the word in the phrase `mahāparihārāni`, he said: 'Manifested by the great ones (mahantehi bhūtāni), or manifested with great attendance (mahāparihārāni vā bhūtāni).' Therein, in the latter meaning, from the compound `mahāparihārāni`, having elided the latter part, the word `parihāra`, they are called `mahābhūtāni`.

Accimatoti aggissa. Koṭisatasahassaṃ ekaṃ koṭisatasahassekaṃ. Cakkavāḷanti taṃ sabbaṃ āṇākkhettavasena ekaṃ katvā voharanti. Vilīyati khārodakena. Vikīratīti viddhaṃsati. Upādinnakesu vikāraṃ dassento ‘‘patthaddho’’tiādimāha. Kaṭṭhamukhena vāti vā-saddo upamattho. Yathā kaṭṭhamukhasappena daṭṭho patthaddho hoti, evaṃ pathavīdhātuppakopena so kāyo kaṭṭhamukheva hoti, kaṭṭhamukhamukhagato viya patthaddho hotīti attho. Atha vā vā-saddo evasaddassatthe. ‘‘Pathavīdhātuppakopenā’’ti etassa ca parato āharitvā veditabbo. Tatrāyamattho – ‘‘kaṭṭhamukhena daṭṭhopi kāyo pathavīdhātuppakopeneva patthaddho hoti, tasmā pathavīdhātuyā aviyutto so kāyo sabbadā kaṭṭhamukhamukhagato viya hotī’’ti. Atha vā aniyamattho vā-saddo. Tatrāyamattho – ‘‘kaṭṭhamukhena daṭṭho kāyo patthaddho hoti vā na vā hoti mantāgadavasena, pathavīdhātuppakopena pana mantāgadarahito so kāyo kaṭṭhamukhamukhagato viya hoti ekantapatthaddho’’ti. Pūtiyoti kuthito. Mahāvikārāni bhūtānīti mahāvikārāni jātāni, vijjamānānīti vā attho. Ettha ca purimapade uttarapadassa vikārasaddassa lopaṃ katvā ‘‘mahābhūtānī’’ti vuttāni.

“Accimato” means of fire. “Koṭisatasahassaṃ ekaṃ” becomes “koṭisatasahassekaṃ” by means of sandhi. As “cakkavāḷa”: having made all of that one by way of the sphere of authority, they refer to it thus. It dissolves because of salt water. “Vikīrati” means it is destroyed. Showing the alteration in appropriated elements, he said, “stiffened,” etc. In “kaṭṭhamukhena vā,” the word “vā” has the meaning of a simile. Just as one bitten by a kaṭṭhamukha snake becomes stiff, so too, due to the affliction of the earth element, that body becomes as if in the mouth of a kaṭṭhamukha; the meaning is, it becomes stiff as if it had entered the mouth of a kaṭṭhamukha. Alternatively, the word “vā” is in the sense of the word “eva” (indeed). And this phrase, “pathavīdhātuppakopena,” should be understood by supplying it after the words that follow. In that case, this is the meaning: “Even a body bitten by a kaṭṭhamukha becomes stiff only due to the affliction of the earth element. Therefore, that body, not separate from the earth element, is always as if it had entered the mouth of a kaṭṭhamukha.” Alternatively, the word “vā” has an indefinite meaning. In that case, this is the meaning: “A body bitten by a kaṭṭhamukha may or may not become stiff, due to the power of mantras and antidotes; but due to the affliction of the earth element, that body, devoid of mantras and antidotes, becomes completely stiff, as if it had entered the mouth of a kaṭṭhamukha.” “Pūtiyo” means putrid. “Mahāvikārāni bhūtāni” means things that have arisen with great alteration, or existing things; this is the meaning. And here, having elided the word “vikāra” from the latter part of the first word, they are called “mahābhūtāni.”

Pathavītiādinā sabbalokassa pākaṭānipi vipallāsaṃ muñcitvā yathāsabhāvato pariggayhamānāni mahantena vāyāmena vinā na pariggayhantīti pākaṭānipi duviññeyyasabhāvattā ‘‘mahantānī’’ti vuccanti. Tāni hi suviññeyyāni amahantānīti gahetvā ṭhito tesaṃ duppariggahitataṃ disvā ‘‘aho mahantāni etānī’’ti pajānāti. Upādāyāti etena viññāyamānā pacchimakālakiriyā pavattīti katvā ‘‘pavattarūpa’’nti vuttaṃ. Evañhi ‘‘upādāyā’’ti etena paṭiccasamuppannatā vuttā hotīti. Atha vā upādāyati nissayatīti upādāyaṃ, upādāyameva rūpaṃ upādāyarūpaṃ, aññanissayassa ekantanissitassa rūpassetaṃ adhivacanaṃ. Taṃ pana na sattassa, nāpi vedanādino tadabhāvepi bhāvatoti dassetuṃ ‘‘catunnaṃ mahābhūtāna’’ntiādimāha. Bhavati hi nissayarūpānaṃ sāmibhāvoti.

By the words 'earth,' and so on: although they are evident to all the world, when being comprehended according to their true nature after abandoning perversion, they are not comprehended without great effort. Therefore, although evident, because they have a nature that is difficult to be known, they are called 'great.' Indeed, one who stands having grasped them as 'easily known and not great,' upon seeing their quality of being difficult to be comprehended, understands, 'Oh, how great these are!' By this word `upādāya`, because the subsequent action that is known is 'occurrence' (`pavatti`), it is called 'occurring form' (`pavattarūpa`). For thus, by this word `upādāya`, the state of being dependently arisen is stated. Alternatively, `upādāyaṃ` means 'it depends, it relies on.' The form that is itself dependent is `upādāyarūpaṃ` (derived form). This is a designation for form that has another support, that is entirely dependent. To show that this, however, is not of a being, nor of feeling and so on—because of its existence even in their absence—he said, 'of the four great elements,' and so on. For the supporting forms are indeed the masters.

Tividharūpasaṅgahavaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Threefold Compendium of Matter

585. Pakiṇṇakadukesu [Pg.142] ajjhattikadukaṃ muñcitvā añño sabbadukehi tikavasena yojanaṃ gacchanto natthi, viññattiduko ca yojanaṃ na gacchatīti sabbadukayogīsu ādibhūtaṃ ajjhattikadukameva gahetvā sesehi sabbadukehi yojetvā tikā vuttā. Sakkā hi etena nayena aññesampi dukānaṃ dukantarehi labbhamānā tikayojanā viññātunti.

585. In the miscellaneous dyads, excluding the internal dyad, there is no other dyad that proceeds to form a triad by combining with all other dyads. And the intimation dyad does not combine. Therefore, among the dyads that combine with all others, having taken only the internal dyad, which is the first, and having combined it with all the remaining dyads, the triads are stated. For indeed, by this method, the formation of triads for other dyads, obtainable through combination with other dyads, can be known.

Catubbidhādirūpasaṅgahavaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Compendium of Form, Beginning with the Fourfold

586. Catukkesu ekantacittasamuṭṭhānassa viññattidvayabhāvato viññattidukādīhi samānagatiko cittasamuṭṭhānadukoti tena saha upādādukassa yojanāya labbhamānopi catukko na vutto, tathā sanidassanadukādīnaṃ tena tassa ca oḷārikadūradukehi yojanāya labbhamānā na vuttā, dhammānaṃ vā sabhāvakiccāni bodhetabbākārañca yāthāvato jānantena bhagavatā tena aññesaṃ tassa ca aññehi yojanā na katāti kiṃ ettha kāraṇapariyesanāya, addhā sā yojanā na kātabbā, yato bhagavatā na katāti veditabbā. Aññe pana pakiṇṇakadukā aññehi pakiṇṇakadukehi yojetuṃ yuttā, tehi yojitā eva. Vatthudukādīsu pana sotasamphassārammaṇadukādayo vajjetvā aññehi ārammaṇabāhirāyatanādilabbhamānadukehi upādinnakadukassa upādinnupādāniyadukassa ca yojanāya catukkā labbhanti, cittasamuṭṭhānadukassa ca sabbārammaṇabāhirāyatanādilabbhamānadukehi. Avasesehi pana tesaṃ aññesañca sabbavatthudukādīhi yojanāya na labbhantīti veditabbā.

586. In the tetrads, because the two intimations are of an exclusively mind-originated nature, the mind-originated dyad has a similar course to the intimation dyad and others. Therefore, even though a tetrad is obtainable by combining that mind-originated dyad with the derived matter dyad, it is not stated. Similarly, the obtainable tetrads from the combination of the visible dyad and others with that mind-originated dyad, and of that mind-originated dyad with the gross and distant dyads, are not stated. Or, since the Blessed One, who knows as they truly are the intrinsic natures and functions of phenomena and the manner in which they should be understood, did not make a combination of that dyad of the two intimations with others, nor of that with others, what is the use of searching for a reason here? Assuredly, that combination is not to be made; since it was not made by the Blessed One, it should be so understood. Other miscellaneous dyads, however, are fit to be combined with other miscellaneous dyads, and they are indeed so combined. But in the basis dyad and others, excluding the ear-contact-object dyad and others, tetrads are obtained by the combination of the appropriated dyad and the appropriated-and-serving-as-basis-for-clinging dyad with other obtainable dyads such as the object dyad, the external sense-base dyad, and so on; and tetrads are also obtained for the mind-originated dyad by combination with all obtainable dyads such as the object dyad, the external sense-base dyad, and so on. But it should be understood that by combination of those aforementioned dyads and others with the remaining dyads and with all the basis dyads and so on, tetrads are not obtained.

Uddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Summary is concluded.

Rūpavibhatti

The Analysis of Form

Ekakaniddesavaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Single Exposition

594. Avijjamānavibhāgassa vibhāgābhāvadassanameva niddeso nicchayakaraṇato, tasmā ‘‘sabbaṃ rūpaṃ na hetumevā’’tiādinā vibhāgābhāvāvadhāraṇena [Pg.143] eva-saddena niddesaṃ karoti. Hetuhetūti mūlahetu, hetupaccayahetūti vā ayamattho. Mahābhūtā hetūti ayamevattho mahābhūtā paccayoti etenapi vuttoti. Hetupaccayasaddānaṃ samānatthattā paccayo eva hetu paccayahetu. Yo ca rūpakkhandhassa hetu, so eva tassa paññāpanāya hetūti vutto tadabhāve abhāvato. Atītānāgatapaccuppannānaṃ kammasamādānānaṃ ṭhānaso hetuso vipākanti ettha vijjamānesupi aññesu paccayesu iṭṭhāniṭṭhavipākaniyāmakattā uttamaṃ padhānaṃ kusalākusalaṃ gatiupadhikaālapayogasampattivipattiṭṭhānanipphāditaṃ iṭṭhāniṭṭhārammaṇañca kammamiva padhānattā ‘‘hetū’’ti vuttanti iminā adhippāyena kammārammaṇāni ‘‘uttamahetū’’ti vuttāni. Vakkhati ca ‘‘gatiupadhikālapayogā vipākassa ṭhānaṃ, kammaṃ hetū’’ti. Idha pana kammamiva uttamattā ārammaṇampi hetuvacanaṃ arahatīti ‘‘uttamahetū’’ti vuttaṃ. Saṅkhārānanti puññābhisaṅkhārādīnaṃ avijjā sādhāraṇapaccayattā ‘‘hetū’’ti vuttā. Pharatīti gacchati pāpuṇāti. Paṭikkhepaniddesoti idaṃ mātikāya āgatapaṭikkhepavasena vuttaṃ. Idha pana mātikāya na hetupadādisaṅgahitatā ca rūpassa vuttā taṃtaṃsabhāvattā, avadhāritatā ca anaññasabhāvato.

For that which has no existing division, the exposition is precisely the showing of the absence of division, because it establishes certainty. Therefore, the exposition is made with the word 'eva', which determines the absence of division, as in 'all form is indeed not a cause,' etc. 'Hetuhetu' means 'root cause' or 'causal condition.' The meaning here is that the great elements are causes; this very meaning is also stated by 'the great elements are conditions.' Since the words 'hetu' and 'paccaya' are synonymous, the condition itself is the cause, the causal condition. And that which is the cause of the form aggregate is called 'hetu' for its designation, because in its absence, there is absence. Herein, regarding the result of past, future, and present actions undertaken, by way of basis and cause: even though other conditions exist, the supreme and principal wholesome and unwholesome kamma is called 'cause' because it determines desirable and undesirable results; and the desirable and undesirable object—produced by the accomplishment and failure of destiny, basis, time, and application—is also called 'cause' because of its pre-eminence, like kamma. With this intention, kamma and objects are called 'supreme causes.' And it will be said: 'Destiny, basis, time, and application are the basis for the result; kamma is the cause.' Here, however, because an object is supreme like kamma, it too deserves the term 'cause'; hence, it is termed a 'supreme cause.' Regarding 'formations' (saṅkhārā), ignorance is called 'cause' because it is a common condition for meritorious formations, etc. 'Pharati' means it goes, it reaches. This 'exposition of exclusion' was stated by way of excluding what is found in the mātikā. Here, however, the non-inclusion of form in the mātikā under terms such as 'not a cause', etc., has been stated because of its particular nature; and its determination has been stated because it has no other nature.

Rūpīduke rūpīpadameva idha ‘‘rūpa’’nti vuttaṃ. Tena rūpīrūpapadānaṃ ekatthatā siddhā hoti ruppanalakkhaṇayuttasseva rūpīrūpabhāvato. Uppannaṃ chahi viññāṇehi viññeyyanti arūpato vidhuraṃ rūpassa sabhāvaṃ dasseti. Na hi arūpaṃ uppannaṃ chahi viññāṇehi viññeyyaṃ yathā rūpaṃ, tena rūpaṃ uppannaṃ chahi viññāṇehi viññeyyaṃ, na arūpanti arūpato nivattetvā rūpe eva etaṃ sabhāvaṃ niyameti, na rūpaṃ etasmiṃ sabhāve. Atthi hi rūpaṃ atītānāgataṃ yaṃ uppannaṃ chahi viññāṇehi viññeyyasabhāvaṃ na hotīti. Etameva ca niyamaṃ puna evasaddena niyameti ‘‘yathāvutto niyamo rūpe atthi eva, arūpe viya na natthī’’ti. Atha vā sabbaṃ rūpanti bhūtupādāyarūpaṃ kālabhedaṃ anāmasitvā ‘‘sabba’’nti vuttaṃ, taṃ sabbaṃ arūpehi samānaviññeyyasabhāvaṃ atītānāgataṃ nivattetuṃ uppannanti etena viseseti, taṃ uppannaṃ sabbaṃ rūpaṃ chahi viññāṇehi viññeyyamevāti attho.

In the 'form-possessing' dyad, the term 'form-possessing' itself is here called 'form.' Thus, the unity of meaning between the terms 'form-possessing' and 'form' is established, because the state of being 'form-possessing' or 'form' belongs only to that which possesses the characteristic of alteration. 'What has arisen is to be cognized by the six types of consciousness'—this shows the intrinsic nature of form as distinct from the formless. For the formless, when arisen, is not cognized by the six types of consciousness as form is. Therefore, form, when arisen, is cognized by the six types of consciousness, and not the formless. By excluding the formless, this nature is definitively restricted to form alone, and not to all form in this nature. Indeed, there is past and future form which, unlike arisen form, does not have the nature of being cognizable by the six consciousnesses. And this very restriction is further specified by the word 'eva': 'The stated restriction indeed exists for form; it is not non-existent as it is for the formless.' Alternatively, 'all form' refers to primary and derived form without reference to distinctions of time. By saying 'what is arisen,' it specifies this 'all' to exclude past and future form which has the same nature of being cognizable as the formless. The meaning is that all form that has arisen is to be cognized only by the six types of consciousness.

Nanu evaṃ rūpāyatanassapi sotaviññāṇādīhi viññeyyatā āpajjatīti? Nāpajjati rūpaṃ sabbaṃ sampiṇḍetvā ekantalakkhaṇadassanavasena ekībhāvena [Pg.144] gahetvā arūpato vidhurassa chahi viññāṇehi viññeyyasabhāvassa dassanato. Paccuppannarūpameva chahi viññāṇehi viññeyyanti etasmiṃ pana niyame ‘‘sabbaṃ rūpa’’nti etthāyaṃ viññeyyabhāvaniyamo na vutto, atha kho paccuppannanti sabbarūpassa ekantalakkhaṇaniyamo dassito na siyā. Pāḷiyañca viññeyyamevāti eva-kāro vutto, na uppannamevāti. Tasmā uppannasseva manoviññeyyaniyamāpatti natthīti kiṃ sotapatitattena, tasmā vuttanayenattho yojetabbo.

594. But does it not follow that the visible form base would also become cognizable by ear-consciousness and so on? It does not follow, because all form is taken as a whole, as a single entity, by way of showing a single characteristic, and the nature of form as distinct from the formless—being cognizable by the six types of consciousness—is shown. However, in this restriction that 'only present form is cognizable by the six types of consciousness,' this restriction concerning cognizability is not stated in relation to 'all form.' Rather, it is not the case that the word 'present' shows a restriction of the single characteristic for all form. And in the Pāḷi, the word 'eva' is used with 'cognizable,' not with 'arisen.' Therefore, there is no implication that only arisen form is restricted to being cognizable by mind-consciousness, so what is the point of introducing what falls within the range of the ear? Thus, the meaning should be connected according to the method stated.

Kathaṃvidhanti guṇehi kathaṃ saṇṭhitaṃ. Ñāṇameva ñāṇavatthu. Samānajātikānaṃ saṅgaho, samānajātiyā vā saṅgaho sajātisaṅgaho. Sañjāyanti etthāti sañjāti, sañjātiyā saṅgaho sañjātisaṅgaho, sañjātidesena saṅgahoti attho. Aññamaññopakāravasena avippayogena ca samādhidese jātā sammāsatiādayo samādhikkhandhe saṅgahitā. Yattha ca satiādisahāyavato samādhissa attano kiccakaraṇaṃ, so cittuppādo samādhideso. Sammāsaṅkappassa ca appanābhāvato paṭivedhasadisaṃ kiccanti samānena paṭivedhakiccena diṭṭhisaṅkappā paññakkhandhe saṅgahitā.

How is it? By what qualities is it well-established? Prior knowledge itself is the basis of knowledge. The inclusion of those of a similar kind, or the inclusion by means of a similar kind, is 'inclusion with its own kind' (sajātisaṅgaho). 'They arise well here' (sañjāyanti ettha), thus it is called sañjāti; the inclusion by means of sañjāti is sañjātisaṅgaho. The meaning is inclusion by way of the place of arising well. By the power of mutual assistance and by non-separation, Right Mindfulness and so on, having arisen in the section of concentration, are included in the aggregate of concentration. And that mind-moment wherein concentration, having mindfulness and so on as its companions, performs its own function, is the section of concentration. And, for Right Thought, due to its state of absorption, its function is similar to penetration; thus, by the similar function of penetration, Right View and Right Thought are included in the aggregate of wisdom.

Rūpavibhattiekakaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Single Designation in the Analysis of Form is concluded.

Dukaniddeso

The Exposition of the Dyad

Upādābhājanīyakathāvaṇṇanā

The Exposition of the Discourse for Analysis on Clinging

596. Apparajakkhādisattasamūhadassanaṃ buddhacakkhu, chasu asādhāraṇañāṇesu indriyaparopariyattañāṇaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Sabbasaṅkhatāsaṅkhatadassanaṃ samantacakkhu. ‘‘Dukkhaṃ pariññeyyaṃ pariññāta’’nti (saṃ. ni. 5.1081; mahāva. 15) evamādinā ākārena pavattaṃ ñāṇadassanaṃ ñāṇacakkhu, tampi purimadvayamiva kāmāvacaraṃ. Catusaccadhammadassanaṃ dhammacakkhu. Upatthambhabhūtā catusamuṭṭhānikarūpasantatiyo sambhārā. Saha sambhārehi sasambhāraṃ, sambhāravantaṃ. Sambhavoti āpodhātumeva sambhavasambhūtamāha. Saṇṭhānanti vaṇṇāyatanameva parimaṇḍalādisaṇṭhānabhūtaṃ. Tesaṃ pana visuṃ vacanaṃ tathābhūtānaṃ atathābhūtānañca āpodhātuvaṇṇāyatanānaṃ [Pg.145] yathāvutte maṃsapiṇḍe vijjamānattā. Cuddasasambhāro hi maṃsapiṇḍo. Sambhavassa catudhātunissitehi saha vuttassa dhātuttayanissitatā yojetabbā. Āpodhātuvaṇṇāyatanānameva vā sambhavasaṇṭhānābhāvā visuṃ vuttāti catudhātunissitatā ca na virujjhati. Yaṃ maṃsapiṇḍaṃ setādinā sañjānanto na pasādacakkhuṃ sañjānāti, patthiṇṇatādivisesaṃ vattukāmo ‘‘pathavīpi atthī’’tiādi vuttampi vadati.

596. The Buddha-eye is the knowledge that sees the group of beings with little dust of defilements and so forth; among the six special knowledges, it should be understood as the knowledge of the disposition of the faculties of others. The all-round eye is the seeing of all conditioned and unconditioned phenomena. The knowledge-eye is the knowledge and vision that occurs in such a manner as, “Suffering is to be fully understood; it has been fully understood.” This, too, like the preceding two, pertains to the sense-sphere. The Dhamma-eye is the seeing of the Dhamma of the Four Truths. The continuities of material phenomena arisen from four causes that serve as supports are the constituents. `Sasambhāraṃ` means 'together with the constituents'; `sambhāravantaṃ` means 'possessing the constituents'. By ‘origin’ (sambhava), he speaks of the water element itself, which is well-arisen as the origin. By ‘shape’ (saṇṭhāna) is meant the visible-form-base itself, which has become a shape such as roundness and so on. Furthermore, their separate mention is due to the existence of the water element and the visible-form-base—both those that have become such and those that have not—in the lump of flesh as described. Indeed, the lump of flesh has fourteen constituents. For the origin, when spoken of together with phenomena dependent on the four great elements, its dependence on the three elements should be connected. Alternatively, because the water element and the visible-form-base by themselves are not origin and shape, they are mentioned separately; thus, their dependence on the four great elements is not contradicted. When one perceives the lump of flesh by way of its whiteness and so on, one does not perceive the sensitive eye. Wishing to speak of the specific quality of being spread out and so on, although it has been said, he says again, “There is also earth,” and so on.

Sarīrasaṇṭhānuppattidesabhūteti etena avasesaṃ kaṇhamaṇḍalaṃ paṭikkhipati. Snehamiva sattakkhipaṭalāni byāpetvā ṭhitāheva attano nissayabhūtāhi catūhi dhātūhi katūpakāraṃ taṃnissitehi eva āyuvaṇṇādīhi anupālitaparivāritaṃ tisantatirūpasamuṭṭhāpakehi utucittāhārehi upatthambhiyamānaṃ tiṭṭhati. Sattakkhipaṭalānaṃ byāpanavacanena ca anekakalāpagatabhāvaṃ cakkhussa dasseti. Pamāṇato ūkāsiramattanti ūkāsiramatte padese pavattanato vuttaṃ. Rūpāni manupassatīti ma-kāro padasandhikaro. Atha vā manūti macco. Upakārabhūtehi saṅgahito. Pariyāyenāti catunnaṃ pasādo tesu ekassa dvinnañcātipi vattuṃ yutto samānadhanānaṃ dhanaṃ viyāti etena pariyāyena. Sarīraṃ rūpakkhandho eva. Paṭighaṭṭanameva nighaṃso paṭighaṭṭanānighaṃso. Rūpābhimukhabhāvena cakkhuviññāṇassa nissayabhāvāpattisaṅkhāto paṭighaṭṭanato jāto vā nighaṃso paṭighaṭṭanānighaṃso.

By this statement that it is the place for the arising of the body's shape, the remaining black circle is rejected. Like oil that pervades the seven layers of the eye and remains, so too does it stand, having had service rendered to it by the four elements which are its own support, being guarded and surrounded by life, complexion, and so forth, which are dependent on them, and being upheld by temperature, mind, and nutriment, which cause the arising of the three continuities of form. And by the statement of 'pervading the seven layers of the eye,' it indicates that the eye-sensitivity is situated in many units (kalāpas). As for the measure, it is said to be the size of a louse's head because it functions in a space of that size. In rūpāni manupassati, the letter 'ma' is for connecting words. Alternatively, 'manu' means a mortal. It is supported by those which are beneficial. By way of implication, it is also appropriate to speak of it as the sensitivity of the four great elements, or of one or two among them, just like the wealth of those with shared wealth. 'Sarīra' is only the aggregate of form. Contact itself is friction; contact-friction. Or, it is friction arisen from contact, designated as the attainment of the state of being a support for eye-consciousness by way of facing a form-object; this is contact-friction.

Parikappavacanaṃ ‘‘sace āpāthaṃ āgaccheyyā’’ti hetukiriyaṃ, ‘‘passeyyā’’ti phalakiriyañca parikappetvā tena parikappena vacanaṃ. Ettha ca hetukiriyā anekattā avuttāpi viññāyatīti daṭṭhabbā. ‘‘Passe vā’’ti iminā vacanena tīsupi kālesu cakkhuviññāṇassa nissayabhāvaṃ anupagacchantaṃ cakkhuṃ saṅgaṇhāti. Dassane pariṇāyakabhāvo dassanapariṇāyakaṭṭho. Yathā hi issaro ‘‘idañcidañca karothā’’ti vadanto tasmiṃ tasmiṃ kicce sapurise pariṇāyati pavattayati, evamidampi cakkhusamphassādīnaṃ nissayabhāvena te dhamme dassanakicce āṇāpentaṃ viya pariṇāyatīti cakkhūti vuccati. Cakkhatīti hi cakkhu, yathāvuttena nayena ācikkhati pariṇāyatīti attho. Atha vā samavisamāni rūpāni cakkhati ācikkhati, pakāsetīti vā cakkhu. Sañjāyanti etthāti sañjāti. Ke sañjāyanti? Phassādīni[Pg.146]. Tathā samosaraṇaṃ. Cakkhusamphassādīnaṃ attano tikkhamandabhāvānupavattanena indaṭṭhaṃ kāretīti. Niccaṃ dhuvaṃ attāti gahitassapi lujjanapalujjanaṭṭhena. Vaḷañjanti pavisanti etenāti vaḷañjanaṃ, taṃdvārikānaṃ phassādīnaṃ vaḷañjanaṭṭhena.

The statement of supposition is the utterance made by supposing the causal action, ‘If it were to come into range,’ and the resultant action, ‘one would see.’ Here, it should be understood that even though the causal action is unstated, it is understood due to its manifoldness. By this phrase, ‘or one might see,’ the eye is included, which does not attain the state of being a basis for eye-consciousness in all three times. The state of being a leader in seeing is the meaning of ‘leader in seeing.’ Just as a master, saying, ‘Do this and that,’ directs and sets his men in motion in their respective tasks, so too this eye, by serving as the basis for eye-contact and so on, directs those phenomena in the task of seeing as if commanding them—thus it is called the ‘eye.’ For ‘it leads’ (cakkhati) is the eye; the meaning is that it makes known or leads in the manner described. Alternatively, it is the eye because it makes known or reveals both even and uneven forms. They arise here—thus it is ‘arising’ (sañjāti). What arises? Contact and so on. Similarly, it is a ‘confluence’ (samosaraṇa). By making eye-contact and so on conform to its own state of sharpness or dullness, it causes the state of being a lord (indaṭṭha). Though taken as permanent, stable, and self, [it is a world] in the sense of breaking up and crumbling. They use it, they enter through it—thus it is a ‘means of use’ (vaḷañjana); [it is a door] in the sense of being a means of use for contact and so on, which are dependent on that door.

597. Pubbe vutto parikappo eva vikappanattho. Ghaṭṭayamānamevāti pasādassa abhimukhabhāvavisesaṃ gacchantameva.

597. The ‘supposition’ (parikappa) mentioned earlier is indeed in the sense of presenting an alternative. By ‘just as it impinges’ (ghaṭṭayamānameva) is meant just as it is going to a special state of facing the sensitivity.

599. Rūpaṃ ārabbha cakkhusamphassādīnaṃ uppattivacaneneva tesaṃ taṃdvārikānaṃ aññesañca rūpaṃ ārabbha uppatti vuttā hoti. Yathā ca tesaṃ rūpaṃ paccayo hoti, tena paccayena uppatti vuttā hotīti adhippāyena ‘‘iminā’’tiādimāha. Tattha cakkhupasādavatthukānaṃ phassādīnanti iminā vacanena tadālambanarūpārammaṇatāya taṃsadisānaṃ manodhātuādīnañca purejātapaccayena uppatti dassitāti daṭṭhabbā. Yattha pana viseso atthi, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘cakkhudvārajavanavīthipariyāpannāna’’ntiādimāha. Tāni hi rūpaṃ garuṃ katvā pavattamānassādanābhinandanabhūtāni taṃsampayuttāni ca ārammaṇādhipatiārammaṇūpanissayehi uppajjanti, aññāni ārammaṇapurejātenevāti evaṃ ‘‘ārabbhā’’ti vacanaṃ ārammaṇapaccayato aññapaccayabhāvassapi dīpakaṃ, ārammaṇavacanaṃ ārammaṇapaccayabhāvassevāti ayametesaṃ viseso.

599. By the very statement of the arising of eye-contact and so forth, which takes form as its object, the arising of those states, of others occurring at that door, and of yet others, which take form as their object, is stated. And with the intention that, 'In whatever way form is a condition for them, by that very conditionality their arising is stated,' he (the author) says, 'by this,' etc. Herein, by this statement, 'of contact and so forth having the eye-sensitivity as their physical basis,' it should be understood that the arising of the mind-element and so forth—which are similar to them and have that form as their object—by way of the pre-nascence condition is shown. But where there is a distinction, to show that, he says, 'of those included in the eye-door javana-process,' etc. For those javanas, being states of relishing and delighting that proceed by taking form as weighty, and the states associated with them, arise through object-dominance and object-decisive support conditions; other states arise only through the object pre-nascence condition. Thus, the word 'ārabbha' is also indicative of the state of being another condition apart from the object condition, whereas the word 'ārammaṇa' is indicative of the state of being the object condition only. This is the distinction between them.

600. Suṇātīti sotaviññāṇassa nissayabhāvena suṇāti. Jivhāsaddena viññāyamānā kiriyā sāyananti katvā ‘‘sāyanaṭṭhenā’’ti āha. Kucchitānaṃ dukkhasampayuttaphassādīnaṃ āyoti kāyo, dukkhadukkhavipariṇāmadukkhānaṃ vā. Kāyāyatanassa byāpitāya cakkhupasāde kāyapasādabhāvopi atthi, tena cakkhupasādassa anuviddhattā no byāpitā ca na siyā, vuttā ca sā. Tasmā cakkhupasādassa phoṭṭhabbāvabhāsanaṃ kāyapasādassa ca rūpāvabhāsanaṃ āpannanti lakkhaṇasammissataṃ codeti. Cakkhukāyānaṃ aññanissayattā kalāpantaragatatāya ‘‘aññassa aññattha abhāvato’’ti āha. Rūparasādinidassanaṃ samānanissayānañca aññamaññasabhāvānupagamena aññamaññasmiṃ abhāvo, ko pana vādo asamānanissayānanti dassetuṃ vuttaṃ.

600. 'One hears' means one hears by way of the ear-organ being a support for ear-consciousness. Having understood that the action indicated by the word 'tongue' is tasting, he says, 'in the sense of tasting.' 'Kāya' (body) is so called because it is a source (āya) of contemptible states such as contact associated with suffering; or, it is a source of suffering-as-suffering and suffering-due-to-change. Due to the pervasiveness of the body-base, the state of body-sensitivity also exists in the eye-sensitivity, for if the eye-sensitivity were not interpenetrated by it, then there would be no pervasiveness. And that pervasiveness has been stated. Therefore, one raises the objection of a confusion of characteristics, arguing that it would follow that tangible objects would be manifest to the eye-sensitivity and forms would be manifest to the body-sensitivity. Because the eye-sensitivity and body-sensitivity have different supports and are located in different material groups (kalāpas), he says, 'because of the non-existence of one in the other.' This is stated to show the following: The illustration of form, taste, etc., shows that even for things with a common support, there is non-existence in one another because they do not take on each other's intrinsic nature. What then needs to be said of things with uncommon supports?

Rūpābhighātāraho [Pg.147] ca so bhūtappasādo cāti rūpābhighātārahabhūtappasādo. Evaṃlakkhaṇaṃ cakkhu. Rūpābhighātoti ca rūpe, rūpassa vā abhighātoti attho. Paripuṇṇāparipuṇṇāyatanattabhāvanibbattakassa kammassa nidānabhūtā kāmataṇhā rūpataṇhā ca tadāyatanikabhavapatthanābhāvato daṭṭhukāmatādivohāraṃ arahatīti dutiyo nayo sabbattha vutto. Tattha daṭṭhukāmatānidānaṃ kammaṃ samuṭṭhānametesanti daṭṭhukāmatānidānakammasamuṭṭhānāni, evaṃvidhānaṃ bhūtānaṃ pasādalakkhaṇaṃ cakkhu, evaṃvidho vā bhūtappasādo daṭṭhukāmatāni…pe… pasādo. Evaṃlakkhaṇaṃ cakkhu. Rūpesu puggalassa vā viññāṇassa vā āviñchanarasaṃ.

And it is worthy of impingement by form, and it is a clarification of the primary elements; thus, it is 'a clarification of the primary elements worthy of impingement by form'. Such is the characteristic of the eye. And 'impingement by form' means impingement on form, or of form. The craving for sensual pleasures and the craving for form, being the cause of the kamma that produces a state of existence with complete or incomplete sense-spheres, is worthy of the designation 'desire to see', etc., because of the state of desiring existence in those sense-spheres—this second method is stated in all cases of sensitivity. Therein, kamma which has the desire to see as its cause is the origin of these [primary elements], thus they are 'originated from kamma which has the desire to see as its cause'. The eye has the characteristic of clarifying the primary elements of such a kind; or, such a clarification of the primary elements is [called] the desire to see... clarification. Such is the characteristic of the eye. It has the function of attracting a person or consciousness towards forms.

Kāyo sabbesanti ko ettha viseso, nanu tejādiadhikānañca bhūtānaṃ pasādā sabbesaṃyevāti? Saccametaṃ, idaṃ pana ‘‘sabbesa’’nti vacanaṃ ‘‘samānāna’’nti imamatthaṃ dīpeti anuvattamānassa ekadesādhikabhāvassa nivāraṇavasena vuttattā. Tejādīnanti padīpasaṅkhātassa tejassa obhāsena vāyussa saddena pathaviyā gandhena kheḷasaṅkhātassa udakassa rasenāti purimavāde pacchimavāde ca yathāyogaṃ taṃtaṃbhūtaguṇehi anuggayhabhāvato rūpādiggahaṇe upakaritabbatoti attho. Rūpādīnaṃ adhikabhāvadassanatoti aggimhi rūpassa pabhassarassa vāyumhi saddassa sabhāvena suyyamānassa pathaviyā surabhiādino gandhassa āpe ca rasassa madhurassa visesayuttānaṃ dassanato ‘‘rūpādayo tesaṃ guṇā’’ti paṭhamavādī āha. Tasseva ca ‘‘iccheyyāmā’’tiādinā uttaramāha. Imināvupāyena dutiyavādissapi niggaho hotīti.

The body is of all—what is the distinction here? Are not the sensitivities of the predominant primary elements, such as fire, also of all indeed? This is true. However, this word 'of all' (sabbesaṃ) indicates the meaning 'of those that are similar' (samānānaṃ), because it is stated by way of preventing the state of one part being predominant which follows in sequence. Regarding 'fire, etc.' (tejādīnaṃ), the meaning is that in both the former view and the latter view, as is appropriate, the grasping of form, etc., is to be assisted by the light of fire (called a lamp), the sound of wind, the scent of earth, and the taste of water (called saliva), because of being supported by the qualities of those respective primary elements. Because of showing the predominance of form, etc.—by showing the luminous form in fire, the sound naturally heard in wind, the fragrant, etc., scent in earth, and the sweet taste in water, which are endowed with special properties—the first proponent said, 'Form, etc., are their qualities'. And to that very one, the respondent gave the answer with 'iccheyyāma', etc. By this very method, the refutation of the second proponent is also accomplished.

Atha vā rūpādivisesaguṇehi tejaākāsapathavīāpavāyūhi cakkhādīni katānīti vadantassa kaṇādassa vādaṃ tatiyaṃ uddharitvā taṃ niggahetuṃ ‘‘athāpi vadeyyu’’ntiādi vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Āsave upalabbhamānopi gandho pathaviyā āposaṃyuttāya kappāsato visadisāyāti na kappāsagandhassa adhikabhāvāpattīti ce? Na, anabhibhūtattā. Āsavehi udakasaṃyuttā pathavī udakena abhibhūtā, na kappāsapathavīti tassāyeva adhikena gandhena bhavitabbanti. Uṇhodakasaññutto ca aggi upalabbhanīyo mahantoti katvā tassa phasso viya vaṇṇopi pabhassaro upalabbhitabboti uṇhodakavaṇṇato agginā anabhisambandhassa sītudakassa vaṇṇo parihāyetha. Tasmāti etassubhayassa abhāvā. Tadabhāvena hi [Pg.148] rūpādīnaṃ tejādivisesaguṇatā nivattitā, taṃnivattanena ‘‘tejādīnaṃ guṇehi rūpādīhi anuggayhabhāvato’’ti idaṃ kāraṇaṃ nivattitanti. Evaṃ paramparāya ubhayābhāvo visesakappanappahānassa kāraṇaṃ hotīti āha ‘‘tasmā pahāyetheta’’ntiādi. Ekakalāpepi rūparasādayo visadisā, ko pana vādo nānākalāpe cakkhādayo bhūtavisesābhāvepīti dassetuṃ rūparasādinidassanaṃ vuttaṃ.

Alternatively, it should be understood that the passage beginning with, “But even if they were to say so,” was spoken in order to take up for the third time and refute the doctrine of Kaṇāda, who says that the sensitive faculties such as the eye are made by the special qualities, such as form, of fire, space, earth, water, and air. If it is said: The odor of the earth element conjoined with water, perceivable in liquor, is dissimilar to that from cotton; therefore, the odor of cotton should not attain a state of excessiveness. It should not be said so, because of the state of not being overpowered. For in liquor, the earth conjoined with water is overpowered by water, but the earth of cotton is not. Therefore, it is of that very cotton-earth that there should be a more excessive odor. Furthermore, because the fire conjoined with hot water is perceived as great, just as its contact is, its color also should be perceived as radiant. Therefore, the color of cold water, which is not connected with fire, would be inferior to the color of hot water. The word `Tasmā` (Therefore) is stated because of the absence of both of these. For, due to their absence, the state of form, etc., being the special qualities of fire, etc., is negated. By that negation, this reason—'because of being supported by the qualities of those respective primary elements'—is negated. Thus, in succession, the absence of both is the reason for abandoning the contriving of distinctions. Therefore, he said the passage beginning with, “Therefore, this should be abandoned.” The illustration of form, taste, etc., was spoken in order to show this: Even in a single kalāpa, form, taste, etc., are dissimilar; what then is to be said of the sensitive faculties such as the eye in various kalāpas being dissimilar, even when there is an absence of distinction in the primary elements?

Yadi bhūtaviseso natthi, kiṃ pana cakkhādivisesassa kāraṇanti taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘yaṃ aññamaññassā’’tiādimāha. Ekampi kammaṃ pañcāyatanikattabhāvapatthanānipphannaṃ cakkhādīnaṃ visesahetuttā ‘‘aññamaññassa asādhāraṇa’’nti ca ‘‘kammaviseso’’ti ca vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Na hi taṃ yena visesena cakkhussa paccayo, teneva sotassa hoti indriyantarābhāvappattito. ‘‘Paṭisandhikkhaṇe mahaggatā ekā cetanā kaṭattārūpānaṃ kammapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.12.78) vacanena paṭisandhikkhaṇe vijjamānānaṃ sabbesaṃ kaṭattārūpānaṃ ekā cetanā kammapaccayo hotīti viññāyati. Nānācetanāya hi tadā indriyuppattiyaṃ sati parittena ca mahaggatena ca kammunā nibbattitaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ āpajjeyyāti na cekā paṭisandhi anekakammanibbattā hotīti siddhamekena kammena anekindriyuppatti hotīti. Anallīno nissayo etassāti anallīnanissayo, rūpasaddasaṅkhāto visayo. Gandharasānaṃ nissayā ghānajivhānissaye allīyantīti te nissayavasena allīnā, phoṭṭhabbaṃ sayaṃ kāyanissayaallīnaṃ bhūtattayattā. Dūre…pe… sampatto eva nāma paṭighaṭṭananighaṃsajanakatoti adhippāyo. Saddo pana dhātuparamparāya vāyu viya āgantvā nissayavasena sotanissaye allīyitvā sotaṃ ghaṭṭetvā vavatthānaṃ gacchanto saṇikaṃ vavatthānaṃ gacchatīti vutto. Evaṃ pana saticittasamuṭṭhānaṃ saddāyatanaṃ sotaviññāṇassa kadācipi ārammaṇapaccayo na siyā. Na hi bahiddhā cittasamuṭṭhānuppatti upapajjatīti.

If there is no distinction of the great elements, then what is the cause for the distinction of the eye and so forth? To explain this, he said, beginning with 'That which is mutual...'. Even a single kamma, produced by the aspiration for an existence with five sense bases, due to being the distinct cause for the eye and so forth, it is to be understood that it is said to be 'unshared by one another' and 'a distinct kamma'. For that kamma is not a condition for the ear by the very same distinction by which it is a condition for the eye, due to its having attained the state of being a different faculty. By the statement, 'At the moment of rebirth-linking, a single sublime volition is a condition for kamma-originated material phenomena by way of kamma-condition' (Paṭṭhāna 2.12.78), it is understood that a single volition is the kamma-condition for all kamma-originated material phenomena present at the moment of rebirth-linking. For if the arising of faculties at that time were from various volitions, kamma-originated material phenomena produced by both sense-sphere and sublime kamma would result. And since a single rebirth-linking is not produced by multiple kammas, it is established that the arising of multiple faculties is from a single kamma. That which has an unattached support is so called because its support is unattached; this refers to the object designated as visible form and sound. The supports of scents and tastes cling to the supports of the nose and tongue; thus they are 'attached by way of support'. The tangible object, being the three primary elements, is itself attached to the body-support. 'Far away... etc... it is indeed called "arrived" because it produces striking and friction'—this is the intention. Sound, however, like wind through a series of elements, arrives and, clinging by way of support to the ear-support, strikes the ear; in becoming determined, it is said to become determined gradually. This being so, however, the mind-originated sound-base could never be an object-condition for ear-consciousness. For external mind-originated arising does not occur.

Cirena suyyeyyāti kasmā etaṃ vuttaṃ, nanu dūre ṭhitehi rajakādisaddā cirena suyyantīti? Na, dūrāsannānaṃ yathāpākaṭe sadde gahaṇavisesato. Yathā hi dūrāsannānaṃ vacanasadde yathā pākaṭībhūte gahaṇavisesato ākāravisesānaṃ aggahaṇaṃ gahaṇañca hoti, evaṃ rajakādisaddepi āsannassa ādito pabhuti yāvāvasānā kamena pākaṭībhūte [Pg.149] dūrassa cāvasāne majjhe vā piṇḍavasena pavattipākaṭībhūte nicchayagahaṇānaṃ sotaviññāṇavīthiyā parato pavattānaṃ visesato lahukaṃ suto cirena sutoti abhimāno hoti. So pana saddo yattha uppanno, taṃ nissitova attano vijjamānakkhaṇe sotassa āpāthamāgacchati. Dūre ṭhito pana saddo aññattha paṭighosuppattiyā bhājanādicalanassa ca ayokanto viya ayocalanassa paccayo hotīti daṭṭhabbo. Yathā vā ghaṇṭābhighātānujāni bhūtāni anuravassa nissayabhūtāni ghaṭṭanasabhāvāni, evaṃ ghaṭṭanānujāni yāva sotappasādā uppattivasena āgatāni bhūtāni ghaṭṭanasabhāvānevāti taṃnissito saddo nissayavasena dhātuparamparāya ghaṭṭetvā saṇikaṃ vavatthānaṃ gacchatīti vutto. Asukadisāya nāmāti na paññāyeyya. Kasmā? Sotappadesasseva saddassa gahaṇato.

Why is this said: 'It would be heard after a long time'? Is it not that the sounds of washermen and others are heard after a long time by those at a distance? No, this is due to the difference in grasping the sound as it becomes manifest for those far and near. For just as, with the sound of speech for those far and near, according to how it becomes manifest, there is non-grasping and grasping of specific features due to the difference in the grasping process, so too with the sounds of washermen and others. For one who is near, the sound becomes manifest sequentially from beginning to end, while for one who is far, it becomes manifest at the end or in the middle as a single mass. Due to the difference in the determining graspings that occur after the ear-consciousness process, the notion arises that 'it was heard quickly' or 'it was heard after a long time.' However, that sound, dependent on the very place where it has arisen, comes into the range of the ear only at the moment of its own existence. Furthermore, it should be understood that a distant sound is a condition for the arising of an echo elsewhere and for the vibration of bowls and so on, just as a magnet is a condition for the movement of iron. Or, just as the material elements born subsequent to the striking of a bell are a support for the resonance and have the nature of impact, so too the material elements born subsequent to impact, having come by way of successive arising as far as the ear-sensitivity, have the very nature of impact. Therefore, it is said that the sound depending on them, impacting through a succession of elements by way of support, slowly reaches a state of determination. It would not be known from which direction the sound comes. Why? Because the sound is grasped only in the region of the ear.

Visame ajjhāsayo etassāti visamajjhāsayo, ajjhāsayarahitampi cakkhu visamaninnattā visamajjhāsayaṃ viya hotīti ‘‘visamajjhāsaya’’nti vuttaṃ. Cakkhumato vā puggalassa ajjhāsayavasena cakkhu ‘‘visamajjhāsaya’’nti vuttaṃ.

Its inclination is towards the uneven, thus it is called 'one with an uneven inclination'. Although the eye itself is devoid of inclination, because it is inclined towards the uneven, it is as if it has an uneven inclination; therefore, it is so called. Or, the eye is called 'one with an uneven inclination' by way of the inclination of the person who possesses the eye.

Kaṇṇakūpachiddeyeva pavattanato ārammaṇaggahaṇahetuto ca tattheva ‘‘ajjhāsayaṃ karotī’’ti vuttaṃ. Tassa sotassa sotaviññāṇanissayabhāvena saddasavane. Ajaṭākāsopi vaṭṭatīti etassa aṭṭhakathādhippāyena atthaṃ vadanto ‘‘antoleṇasmi’’ntiādimāha. Attano adhippāyena vadanto ‘‘kiṃ etāya dhammatāyā’’tiādimavoca.

Because it occurs only in the ear-cavity which is a hole, and because it is the cause for grasping the object, it is said, 'it makes its inclination' right there. In the hearing of sound, by means of that ear-sensitivity being the support for ear-consciousness. Stating the meaning of 'Ajaṭākāsopi vaṭṭati' according to the intention of the commentary, he said the words beginning with 'antoleṇasmiṃ'. Stating the meaning according to his own intention, he spoke the words beginning with 'kiṃ etāya dhammatāyā'.

Vātūpanissayo gandho gocaro etassāti vātūpanissayagandhagocaraṃ. Ettha ca gandhaggahaṇassa vāto upanissayo, tabbohārena pana gandho ‘‘vātūpanissayo’’ti vutto. Atha vā vāto eva upanissayo vātūpanissayo. Kassāti? Ghānaviññāṇassa. So sahakārīpaccayantarabhūto etassa atthīti vātūpanissayo, gandho paccayo.

For this nose-sensitivity, odor is the object and wind is the strong support; thus it is called 'that which has odor as its object and wind as its strong support'. And here, wind is the strong support for the grasping of odor; however, by that usage, odor is called 'that which has wind as its strong support'. Alternatively, wind itself is the strong support, hence 'vātūpanissayo'. For what? For nose-consciousness. That wind exists for this odor as another cooperating condition, therefore the odor is called 'vātūpanissayo'; odor is a condition.

Āpo ca sahakārīpaccayantarabhūto kheḷādiko. Tathā pathavī. Gahetabbassa hi phoṭṭhabbassa uppīḷiyamānassa ādhārabhūtā pathavī kāyassa ca phoṭṭhabbena uppīḷiyamānassa nissayabhūtānaṃ ādhārabhūtā sabbadā [Pg.150] phoṭṭhabbagahaṇassa upanissayoti. Uppīḷanena pana vinā phoṭṭhabbagahaṇe kāyāyatanassa nissayabhūtā pathavī upanissayoti daṭṭhabbā. Sabbadāpi ca tassā upanissayabhāvo yutto eva.

Water, such as saliva and so on, is also another cooperating condition. Likewise, earth. Indeed, earth—being the support for a tangible object to be grasped that is being pressed, and also the support for the great elements that are the support of the body being pressed by the tangible object—is the strong support for the grasping of the tangible object. However, in the grasping of a tangible object without pressing, the earth, which is the support for the body-base, should be seen as the strong support. And its state as a strong support is always indeed fitting.

Pañcavaṇṇānanti vacanaṃ tadādhārānaṃ suttānaṃ nānattadassanatthaṃ. Pañcappakārā pañcavaṇṇā. Ekantatoti idaṃ sabbadā uppīḷanena vinibbhujjituṃ asakkuṇeyyānaṃ kalāpantararūpānaṃ sabbhāvā tesaṃ nivattanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Na hi tāni ekantena avinibhuttāni kalāpantaragatattāti.

The statement 'of five colors' is for the purpose of showing the diversity of the threads that are their support. The five kinds are the five colors. The word 'absolutely' is stated to negate the existence of material phenomena in other clusters that can never be distinguished by pressure. For they are not absolutely inseparable, because they belong to other clusters.

616. Vaṇṇanibhāti rūpāyatanameva niddiṭṭhanti tadeva apekkhitvā ‘‘sanidassana’’nti napuṃsakaniddeso kato. Tasmāti nippariyāyarūpānaṃ nīlādīnaṃ phusitvā ajānitabbato dīghādīnañca phusitvā jānitabbato na nippariyāyena dīghaṃ rūpāyatanaṃ. Taṃ taṃ nissāyāti dīghādisannivesaṃ bhūtasamudāyaṃ nissāya. Tathā tathā ṭhitanti dīghādisannivesena ṭhitaṃ vaṇṇasamudāyabhūtaṃ rūpāyatanameva dīghādivohārena bhāsitaṃ. Aññamaññaparicchinnaṃ ekasmiṃ itarassa abhāvā. Visayagocarānaṃ viseso anaññatthabhāvo tabbahulacāritā ca cakkhuviññāṇassa.

616. By the text `vaṇṇanibhā`, only the visible-data base is indicated. Therefore, having regard to that very visible-data base, the designation in the neuter gender, `sanidassana`, was made. As for `tasmā`: because non-figurative forms such as blue, etc., are not to be known by touching, and because forms such as long, etc., are to be known by touching, a long object is not the visible-data base in a primary sense. As for 'depending on this and that', it means depending on the aggregate of primary elements which is the composition of long, etc. As for 'thus and thus established', it is the visible-data base itself—which has become an aggregate of colors established by the composition of long, etc.—that is spoken of by the conventional term 'long', etc. They are mutually delimited due to the absence of the other in one. The distinction of domain and resort for eye-consciousness is its non-occurrence in another object and its frequenting of that object.

620. Bherisaddādīnañca vāditasaddattā ‘‘vuttāvasesāna’’nti āha. Amanussavacanena na manussehi aññe pāṇino eva gahitā, atha kho kaṭṭhādayopīti adhippāyena ‘‘seso sabbopī’’ti āha. Evaṃ santepi vatthuvisesakittanavasena pāḷiyaṃ anāgato tathā kittetabbo ye vā panāti vuttoti adhippāyo.

620. And because sounds such as the sound of a great drum are sounds of things that are struck, he said, 'the remainder of what has been stated'. With the intention that by the word 'non-human', not only other living beings than humans are taken, but indeed also things like firewood, he said, 'the rest is all included'. Even though it is so, the intention is this: whatever has not come in the Pāḷi should be mentioned in that way, by way of stating the specific basis of the sound, and so it was said, 'or whatever else'.

624. Vissagandhoti virūpo maṃsādigandho. Lambilanti madhurambilaṃ.

624. `Vissagandha` is the disagreeable smell of flesh and the like. `Lambila` is a sweet-sour taste.

632. Sañjānanti etenāti sañjānanaṃ, upalakkhaṇaṃ. Sakena sakena kammacittādinā paccayena samuṭṭhitānipi itthiliṅgādīni indriyasahite sarīre uppajjamānāni taṃtadākārāni hutvā uppajjantīti ‘‘itthindriyaṃ paṭicca samuṭṭhahantī’’ti vuttāni. Itthiliṅgādīsu eva ca adhipatibhāvā etassa indriyatā vuttā, indriyasahite santāne itthiliṅgādiākārarūpapaccayānaṃ aññathā anuppādanato itthiggahaṇassa ca tesaṃ rūpānaṃ paccayabhāvato. Yasmā pana bhāvadasakepi rūpānaṃ itthindriyaṃ na janakaṃ, nāpi anupālakaṃ upatthambhakaṃ vā, na ca aññakalāparūpānaṃ, tasmā taṃ jīvitindriyaṃ viya sakalāparūpānaṃ āhāro [Pg.151] viya vā kalāpantararūpānañca indriyaatthiavigatapaccayoti na vuttaṃ. Esa nayo purisindriyepi. Liṅgādiākāresu rūpesu rūpāyatanassa cakkhuviññeyyattā liṅgādīnaṃ cakkhuviññeyyatā vuttā.

632. One recognizes by this, thus it is recognition (sañjānana); a mark (upalakkhaṇa). Although female characteristics and so on have arisen from their own respective causes such as kamma and consciousness, when arising in a body accompanied by the female faculty, they arise having taken on that particular form; therefore, it is said, 'they arise in dependence on the female faculty.' And its nature as a faculty is stated because of its dominance over the female characteristics and so on, because in a continuum accompanied by the faculty, it does not allow the conditions for the forms with the appearance of female characteristics and so on to arise otherwise, and because the apprehension of 'female' is a condition for those forms. Moreover, since even within the bhāva-decad the female faculty is not a generator, nor a sustainer or supporter for the other material phenomena of the same kalāpa, nor for material phenomena in other kalāpas, therefore, it is not said to be an indriya (faculty), atthi (presence), and avigata (non-disappearance) condition for the material phenomena in its own kalāpa like the life faculty, or for material phenomena in other kalāpas like nutriment. This same method applies also to the male faculty. Among the forms that have the appearance of gender characteristics and so on, because the visible-data base is cognizable by eye-consciousness, the cognoscibility of the gender characteristics and so on by eye-consciousness is stated.

633. Ubhayampi…pe… kusalena patiṭṭhātīti sugatiṃ sandhāya vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Duggatiyañhi paṭisandhi akusalenevāti tadā uppajjamāno bhāvopi akusaleneva bhaveyya, paṭisandhiyaṃ viya pavattepīti. Tayidaṃ dvayaṃ yasmā santāne saha na pavattati ‘‘yassa itthindriyaṃ uppajjati, tassa purisindriyaṃ uppajjatīti? No’’tiādivacanato (yama. 3.indriyayamaka.188), tasmā ubhatobyañjanakassapi ekamevindriyaṃ hotīti vuttaṃ.

633. The statement, 'Both... are established by the wholesome,' should be understood as being said in reference to a good destination. For in a bad destination, rebirth-linking is only by the unwholesome; thus, the sex-materiality (bhāva) arising at that time would also be only by the unwholesome, in the course of existence as at rebirth-linking. Since these two do not exist together in a continuum—because of the saying beginning with, 'For whom the female faculty arises, does the male faculty arise? No'—therefore, it is said that even for one with both sexual characteristics (ubhatobyañjanaka), there is only one faculty.

635. Ekantaṃ kāyaviññattiyaṃ kāyavohārassa pavattidassanatthaṃ ‘‘kāyena saṃvaro sādhū’’ti (dha. pa. 361; saṃ. ni. 1.116) sādhakasuttaṃ āhaṭaṃ. Bhāvassa gamanaṃ pakāsanaṃ copanaṃ. Thambhanāti vāyodhātuadhikānaṃ bhūtānaṃ thambhanākāro viññattīti attho. Uddhaṅgamavātādayo viya hi yo vātādhiko kalāpo, tattha bhūtānaṃ viññattiākāratā hotīti. Teneva ‘‘kāyaṃ thambhetvā thaddhaṃ karotīti thambhanā’’ti vāyodhātukiccavasena viññatti vuttā. Tato eva ca ‘‘vāyodhātuyā ākāro kāyaviññattī’’ti ca vattuṃ vaṭṭati, tathā ‘‘pathavīdhātuyā vacīviññattī’’ti pathavīdhātuadhikabhūtavikārato.

635. Exclusively, for the purpose of showing the occurrence of bodily convention within bodily intimation, the supporting sutta, 'Restraint by body is good,' has been brought forth. That which conveys and manifests the intention is called `copana` (impelling). As for `thambhanā` (stiffening): the meaning is that the mode of supporting of the primary elements in which the wind element is predominant is intimation. For, just as in the case of upward-going winds and so forth, in a material group where the wind element is predominant, there exists for the primary elements the characteristic of being an intimation. For that very reason, intimation is spoken of by way of the function of the wind element thus: 'It is `thambhanā` (stiffening) because it supports the body and makes it rigid.' And for that very reason, it is also suitable to say, 'The particular mode of the wind element is bodily intimation,' and similarly, '[The particular mode] of the earth element is verbal intimation,' because it is an alteration of the primary elements in which the earth element is predominant.

636. Pabhedagatā vācā evāti tissa phussāti pabhedagatā. Atha vā vacīsaṅkhārehi vitakkavicārehi pariggahitā savanavisayabhāvaṃ anupanītatāya abhinnā tabbhāvaṃ nīyamānā vācā ‘‘vacībhedo’’ti vuccati. Iriyāpathampi upatthambhentīti yathāpavattaṃ iriyāpathaṃ upatthambhenti. Yathā hi abbokiṇṇe bhavaṅge vattamāne aṅgāni osīdanti paviṭṭhāni viya honti, na evaṃ ‘‘dvattiṃsa chabbīsā’’ti vuttesu jāgaraṇacittesu vattamānesu. Tesu pana vattamānesu aṅgāni upatthaddhāni yathāpavattiriyāpathabhāveneva pavattantīti. Khīṇāsavānaṃ cuticittanti visesetvā vuttaṃ, ‘‘kāmāvacarānaṃ pacchimacittassa uppādakkhaṇe yassa cittassa anantarā kāmāvacarānaṃ pacchimacittaṃ uppajjissati, rūpāvacare arūpāvacare pacchimabhavikānaṃ, ye ca rūpāvacaraṃ arūpāvacaraṃ upapajjitvā parinibbāyissanti, tesaṃ cavantānaṃ [Pg.152] tesaṃ vacīsaṅkhāro nirujjhissati, no ca tesaṃ kāyasaṅkhāro nirujjhissatī’’ti (yama. 2.saṅkhārayamaka.88) pana vacanato aññesampi cuticittaṃ rūpaṃ na samuṭṭhāpetīti viññāyati. Na hi rūpasamuṭṭhāpakacittassa gabbhagamanādivinibaddhābhāvena kāyasaṅkhārāsamuṭṭhāpanaṃ atthi, na ca yuttaṃ ‘‘cuto ca cittasamuṭṭhānañcassa pavattatī’’ti, nāpi ‘‘cuticittaṃ rūpaṃ samuṭṭhāpetī’’ti pāḷi atthīti.

636. Speech that has reached division is speech such as 'Tissa' or 'Phussa'. Alternatively, speech that is governed by the verbal formations, vitakka and vicāra, and, due to not having been brought to the state of being an object for hearing, is unbroken and is being led to that state, is called 'vacībheda'. They also support the postures; that is, they support the posture as it occurs. For just as when the uninterrupted bhavaṅga is occurring, the limbs sink down and are as if withdrawn, it is not so when the waking consciousnesses, spoken of as 'thirty-two' or 'twenty-six', are occurring. But when these are occurring, the limbs remain firm and continue to function in their natural postures. Although it was said specifically, 'the death-consciousness of the Arahants', yet from the passage in the Yamaka—'At the arising-moment of the consciousness of those in the sense sphere, immediately after which their final consciousness will arise; for those in the form sphere and formless sphere who are in their final existence; and for those who, having been reborn in the form sphere or formless sphere, will attain final Nibbāna—for these beings at the time of their passing away, the verbal formation ceases, but not the bodily formation'—it is understood that for others as well, the death-consciousness does not generate material form. For a consciousness that generates material form also generates bodily formations, since it is not restricted by conditions such as entering a womb. And it is not right to say, 'He has passed away, and for him, matter originated by consciousness continues,' nor is there a Pāḷi text that says, 'The death-consciousness generates material form'.

637. Na kassatīti na vilekhiyati. Gatanti viññātaṃ. Asamphuṭṭhaṃ catūhi mahābhūtehīti yasmiṃ kalāpe bhūtānaṃ paricchedo, teheva asamphuṭṭhaṃ. Vijjamānepi hi kalāpantarabhūtānaṃ kalāpantarabhūtasamphuṭṭhabhāve taṃtaṃbhūtavivittatā rūpapariyanto ākāsoti yesaṃ yo paricchedo, tehi so asamphuṭṭhova, aññathā paricchinnabhāvo na siyā tesaṃ bhūtānaṃ byāpitabhāvāpattito. Abyāpitā hi asamphuṭṭhatāti.

637. 'It is not ploughed' means it is not scratched. 'Gone' means known. 'Untouched by the four great elements' means: in whichever material group (kalāpa) there is a delimitation of the great elements, by those very elements it is untouched. For even though there exists the state of being touched by the great elements of another material group, the state of being distinct from those respective great elements, which is the boundary of the material groups, is space. Therefore, of whichever great elements there is a delimitation, by those great elements that delimitation is indeed untouched. Otherwise, the state of being delimited would not be, due to those great elements attaining a state of pervasiveness. For non-pervasiveness is the state of being untouched.

638. Lahutādīnaṃ aññamaññāvijahanena dubbiññeyyanānattatā vuttāti taṃtaṃvikārādhikarūpehi taṃtaṃnānattappakāsanatthaṃ ‘‘evaṃ santepī’’tiādimāha. Yathāvuttā ca paccayā taṃtaṃvikārassa visesapaccayabhāvato vuttā, avisesena pana sabbe sabbesaṃ paccayāti.

638. Because it is said that the state of having a diversity that is difficult to discern arises from the mutual non-abandonment of lightness and so on, in order to show the respective diversity by means of the material phenomena that are predominant in each respective alteration, he also said, 'Even though it is so,' and so on. And the conditions, as they have been stated, were stated because of their being specific conditions for each respective alteration. However, in a general sense, all are conditions for all.

641. Ādito cayo ācayo, paṭhamuppatti. Upari cayo upacayo. Pabandho santati. Tattha uddese avuttopi ācayo upacayasaddeneva viññāyatīti ‘‘yo āyatanānaṃ ācayo punappunaṃ nibbattamānānaṃ, sova rūpassa upacayo’’ti āha. Pāḷiyaṃ pana upa-saddo paṭhamattho upariattho ca hotīti ‘‘ādicayo upacayo, uparicayo santatī’’ti ayamattho viññāyatīti. Aññathā hi ācayasaṅkhātassa paṭhamuppādassa avuttatā āpajjeyya.

641. Accumulation from the beginning is ācaya (increase); it is the first arising. Subsequent accumulation is upacaya (growth). A continuous series is santati (continuity). Therein, in the summary section, even though ācaya is not mentioned, it is understood by the very word upacaya; thus, he said: 'That which is the ācaya of the bases of continually arising phenomena, is itself the upacaya of material form.' However, in the Pāḷi, since the prefix upa- has the meaning of 'first' as well as 'on top', this meaning is understood: 'initial accumulation is upacaya, and subsequent accumulation is santati.' For otherwise, it would result in the non-statement of the first arising, which is called ācaya.

Evanti ‘‘yo āyatanānaṃ ācayo’’tiādiniddesena kiṃ kathitaṃ hoti? Āyatanena ācayo kathito. Ācayūpacayasantatiyo hi nibbattibhāvena ācayo evāti āyatanehi ācayādīnaṃ pakāsitattā tehi ācayo kathito. Āyatanānaṃ ācayādivacaneneva ācayasabhāvāni uppādadhammāni āyatanānīti ācayena taṃpakatikāni [Pg.153] āyatanāni kathitāni. Lakkhaṇañhi uppādo, na rūparūpanti. Tenevādhippāyenāha ‘‘āyatanameva kathita’’nti. Ācayañhi lakkhaṇaṃ kathayantena taṃlakkhaṇāni āyatanāneva kathitāni hontīti. Evampi kiṃ kathitaṃ hotīti āyatanācayehi ācayāyatanehi ācayameva āyatanameva kathentena uddese niddese ca ācayoti idameva avatvā upacayasantatiyo uddisitvā tesaṃ vibhajanavasena āyatanena ācayakathanādinā kiṃ kathitaṃ hotīti adhippāyo. Ācayoti upacayamāha, upacayoti ca santatiṃ. Tadevubhayaṃ yathākkamaṃ vivaranto ‘‘nibbatti vaḍḍhi kathitā’’ti āha. Upacayasantatiyo hi atthato ekattā ācayovāti taduddesavibhajanavasena āyatanena ācayakathanādinā nibbattivaḍḍhiākāranānattaṃ ācayassa kathitanti attho. Imamevatthaṃ vibhāvetuṃ ‘‘atthato hī’’tiādimāha. Yasmā ca ubhayampi etaṃ jātirūpassevādhivacanaṃ, tasmā jātirūpassa lakkhaṇādivisesesu ācayādīsu pavattiādīsu ca ācayādilakkhaṇādiko upacayo, pavattiādilakkhaṇādikā santatīti veditabbāti attho.

Thus, what is taught by the exposition beginning with 'whatever is the accumulation of the sense-bases'? Accumulation is taught by the term 'sense-base'. Indeed, since accumulation, increment, and continuity are simply accumulation due to their nature of arising, and because accumulation and so on are made manifest by the sense-bases, accumulation is taught by them. Precisely by the mention of 'accumulation' and so on in relation to the sense-bases, the sense-bases are understood as things that have the nature of accumulation and are phenomena of arising. Thus, by the term 'accumulation,' the sense-bases having that nature are taught. For arising is a characteristic, not intrinsic form. With that very intention, he said, 'It is the sense-base itself that is taught.' For by one who teaches accumulation as the characteristic, it is the sense-bases themselves, which possess that characteristic, that are taught. This is the intention of the question, 'Even so, what is taught?': When one teaches either accumulation itself or the sense-base itself by means of 'accumulations that are sense-bases' and 'sense-bases that are accumulations'—in both the summary statement and the detailed exposition—without stating just the word 'accumulation', but having pointed out 'increment' and 'continuity' and analyzing them, and by teaching accumulation through the sense-base, and so on, what is taught? By 'accumulation' he speaks of 'increment', and by 'increment' of 'continuity'. Explaining both of these in sequence, he said, 'Arising and growth are taught.' Indeed, since increment and continuity are one in meaning, they are simply accumulation. Therefore, by way of the summary statement and analysis of them, and by teaching accumulation through the sense-base and so on, the diversity in the manner of arising and growth of accumulation is taught. This is the meaning. To clarify this very meaning, he stated the passage beginning 'For in meaning...' And since both of these are a designation for arising-form itself, therefore, among the distinctions of characteristics and so on of arising-form—such as accumulation and so on, and occurrence and so on—it should be understood that 'increment' has the characteristic of accumulation and so on, and 'continuity' has the characteristic of occurrence and so on. This is the meaning.

643. Pakatiniddesāti phalavipaccanapakatiyā niddesā, jarāya pāpuṇitabbaṃ phalameva vā pakati. Na ca khaṇḍiccādīneva jarāti kalalakālato pabhuti purimarūpānaṃ jarāpattakkhaṇe uppajjamānāni pacchimarūpāni paripakkarūpānurūpāni pariṇatapariṇatāni uppajjantīti anukkamena supariṇatarūpaparipākakāle uppajjamānāni khaṇḍiccādisabhāvāni uppajjanti. Tāni udakādimaggesu tiṇarukkhasaṃbhaggatādayo viya paripākagatamaggasaṅkhātesu paripakkarūpesu uppannāni jarāya gatamaggoicceva vuttāni, na jarāti. Aviññāyamānantarajarā avīcijarā. Maraṇe upanayanarasā.

643. As for 'pakatiniddesa' (indication of nature): these are words that indicate the nature of bringing about a result. Or, 'pakati' (nature) is the very result that is to be reached due to aging. And it is not merely such things as the state of having broken teeth that is aging. From the time of the embryo onwards, at the moment the earlier material phenomena reach aging, subsequent material phenomena arise in conformity with the ripened earlier material phenomena; having become ripened and further ripened, they arise. Thus, successively, at the time of the ripening of the extremely ripened material phenomena, those phenomena arise having the nature of such things as the state of having broken teeth. Those phenomena, having arisen in the ripened material phenomena—which are designated as the path gone by ripening, like the breaking of grass and trees in the paths of water and so on—are said to be merely 'the path gone by aging,' not aging itself. Aging with an unperceivable distinction is 'avīci-jarā' (uninterrupted aging). It has the function of leading to death.

644. Taṃ patvāti taṃ attano eva khayavayasaṅkhātaṃ sabhāvaṃ patvā rūpaṃ khīyati veti bhijjati. Pothetvā pātitassa dubbalatā parādhīnatā sayanaparāyaṇatā ca hoti, tathā jarābhibhūtassāti pothakasadisī jarā.

644. As for 'taṃ patvā' (having reached that): having reached that nature of its own which is reckoned as exhaustion and cessation, material phenomenon is exhausted, it ceases, it is destroyed. Just as for one who has been struck and made to fall, there is weakness, dependence on others, and having bed as one's final resort, so it is for one overcome by aging. Therefore, aging is like one who strikes.

645. Kattabbatoti kattabbasabhāvato. Visāṇādīnaṃ taracchakheḷatemitānaṃ pāsāṇānaṃ viya thaddhabhāvābhāvato ahivicchikānaṃ viya [Pg.154] savisattābhāvato ca sukhumatā vuttā. Ojālakkhaṇoti ettha aṅgamaṅgānusārino rasassa sāro upatthambhabalakāro bhūtanissito eko viseso ojāti.

645. As for 'kattabbato' (from what is to be done): from the nature of what is to be done. Subtlety is spoken of due to the absence of rigidity—like that of horns and so on, or stones, that have been moistened by the saliva of hyenas—and due to the absence of being poisonous, like snakes and scorpions. Herein, regarding the characteristic of nutritive essence ('ojā'): the essence of the sap that flows throughout the major and minor limbs, which creates supporting strength and is dependent on the primary elements, is a certain distinct material phenomenon called 'ojā' (nutritive essence).

Upādābhājanīyakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Classification of Derived Matter is Concluded.

Noupādābhājanīyakathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Discussion of Non-Derived Matter

646. Na upādiyatevāti na nissayati eva, kintu nissayati ca nissīyati cāti attho.

646. As for 'na upādiyateva' (it is not merely derived): it does not merely depend upon; but indeed, it both depends upon and is depended upon—this is the meaning.

647. Purimā panāti pañcavidhasaṅgahe pathavīdhātuāpodhātutejodhātuvāyodhātūnaṃ purimuddesavasena vuttaṃ. Phoṭṭhabbāyatananiddese vā vuttānaṃ pathavīdhātuādīnaṃ purimā uddese vuttā āpodhātūti adhippāyo, vuttassa vā phoṭṭhabbāyatanassa atītatāya pacchimatā, anāgatatāya ca āpodhātuyā purimatā vuttāti daṭṭhabbā. Āyūti jīvitindriyaṃ. Kammajatejaṃ usmā. Yaṃ kiñci dhātuṃ…pe… ekappahārena nuppajjatīti ekasmiṃ khaṇe anekāsu pathavīsu āpāthagatāsu tāsu tāsu saha nuppajjati, tathā tejavāyūsu cāti attho. Anekesu ārammaṇesu sannipatitesu ābhujitavasena ārammaṇapasādādhimattatāvasena ca paṭhamaṃ katthaci uppatti dassitā, aññattha ca pana uppatti atthi eva. Sāyaṃ ārammaṇato ārammaṇantarasaṅkanti yena upāyena hoti, tassa vijānanatthaṃ pucchati ‘‘kathaṃ pana cittassa ārammaṇato saṅkanti hotī’’ti.

647. By 'the former' (purimā pana), it is said in the fivefold classification by way of being pointed out first—before the fire and air elements—among the earth, water, fire, and air elements. Or, in the exposition of the tangible sense-base, the intention is that the water element mentioned in the initial exposition is 'the former' among the earth element and so forth that were mentioned; or, it should be understood that the tangible sense-base that was mentioned, being past, is said to be posterior, and the water element, being future, is said to be anterior. By 'life' (āyu) is meant the life faculty. Kamma-born heat is warmth. By 'whatever element... does not arise all at once' is meant that in a single moment, it does not arise simultaneously in those various instances of the earth element that have come into range; the same is true for the fire and air elements. When many objects converge, arising is first shown somewhere by way of inclining the mind and by way of the predominance of the object and the intensity of the sensitivity, but arising certainly occurs elsewhere as well. In order to know by what means that transition from one object to another object occurs, he asks: 'How then does the mind's transition from an object occur?'

651. Ayapiṇḍiādīsu pathavīdhātu tādisāya āpodhātuyā anābaddhā santī visareyya, tasmā ‘‘tāni āpodhātu ābandhitvā baddhāni karotī’’ti vuttaṃ. Yathā hi yuttappamāṇaṃ udakaṃ paṃsucuṇṇāni ābandhitvā mattikāpiṇḍaṃ katvā ṭhapeti, evaṃ ayopiṇḍiādīsupi tadanurūpapaccayehi tattheva uppannā āpodhātu tathā ābandhitvā ṭhapetīti daṭṭhabbā.

651. In lumps of iron and so forth, if the earth element were unbound by a water element of such a kind, it would scatter. Therefore it is said, 'The water element binds them and makes them bound.' For just as water of appropriate quantity binds dust and powders, and having made a lump of clay, keeps it so, in the same way it should be understood that in lumps of iron and the like, the water element that has arisen right there through suitable conditions binds them and keeps them so in that way.

Aphusitvā patiṭṭhā hotīti āpodhātuyā aphoṭṭhabbabhāvato vuttaṃ, tathā ‘‘aphusitvāva ābandhatī’’ti. Na hi yathā phoṭṭhabbadhātūnaṃ phoṭṭhabbabhāvena [Pg.155] aññamaññanissayatā, evaṃ phoṭṭhabbāphoṭṭhabbadhātūnaṃ hotīti adhippāyo veditabbo. Avinibbhogavuttīsu hi bhūtesu aññamaññanissayatā aññamaññapaccayabhūtesu na sakkā nivāretuṃ, nāpi sahajātesu avinibbhogatāya ekībhūtesu phusanāphusanāni vicāretuṃ yuttānīti. Na uṇhā hutvā jhāyatīti tejosabhāvataṃyeva paṭikkhipati, na sītattaṃ anujānāti, tejosabhāvapaṭikkhepeneva ca sītattañca paṭikkhittaṃ hoti. Tejo eva hi sītaṃ himapātasamayādīsu sītassa paripācakatādassanato, sītuṇhānañca aññamaññapaṭipakkhabhāvato uṇhena saha na sītaṃ bhūtantaraṃ pavattatīti yujjati. Uṇhakalāpe pana sītassa appavatti sītakalāpe ca uṇhassa dvinnaṃ aññamaññapaṭipakkhattā tejovisesabhāve yujjatīti. Bhāvaññathattanti kharānaṃ guḷādīnaṃ davatā mudutā rasādīnañca davānaṃ kharatā paccayavisesehi omattādhimattapathavīdhātuādikānaṃ uppatti. Lakkhaṇaññathattaṃ kakkhaḷādilakkhaṇavijahanaṃ, taṃ etesaṃ na hoti, omattādhimattatāsaṅkhātaṃ bhāvaññathattaṃyeva hotīti attho.

The statement, 'It is a support without touching,' is said because of the water element's state of being non-tangible; similarly for 'without touching, it binds.' For the mutual dependence of tangible and non-tangible elements is not in the same way as the mutual dependence of tangible elements through their tangible nature. This is the intention that should be understood. Indeed, among elements that have an inseparable occurrence, mutual dependence cannot be prevented in those that are mutual conditions; nor is it proper to investigate touching and non-touching in co-nascent things that have become one due to inseparability. The statement 'it does not burn by becoming hot' rejects only the nature of the heat element; it does not permit coldness. And by the very rejection of the nature of the heat element, coldness is also rejected. For the heat element itself is cold, as is seen from the ripening nature of the cold [element] during times of snowfall and so on. And because cold and heat are mutually opposed, it is fitting that another primary element called 'cold' does not exist together with heat. However, the non-occurrence of cold in a heat-predominant material group and the non-occurrence of heat in a cold-predominant material group is fitting in the case of the specific nature of the heat element, due to the mutual opposition of the two. 'Alteration of state' means the arising of liquidity and softness in hard things such as jaggery, and the arising of hardness in liquids such as juices, due to specific conditions; that is, the arising of the earth element and so forth in deficient or excessive measure. 'Alteration of characteristic' is the abandoning of the characteristic of hardness and so on. That does not happen for these [four great elements]; only the alteration of state, known as being deficient or excessive, occurs. This is the meaning.

652. Anupādinnādīnaṃyevāti ekantaanupādinnaekantanacittasamuṭṭhānādīnaṃ niddesesu gahaṇesu gahitāti attho. Yaṃ vā panaññampīti pana vacanena purimānampi nakammassakatattābhāvādikaṃ dīpeti. Tā hi anupādinnādinakammassakatattādivacanānaṃ samānatthattā ekena avattabbatte itarenapi avattabbā siyuṃ, vattabbatte vā vattabbā. Tasmā ekantākammajādīsveva gahetabbattā tā anekantesu na gahitāti daṭṭhabbā.

652. By 'only of the unappropriated and so forth' is meant that [aging and impermanence] are included in the expositions and categories of what is entirely unappropriated, entirely not mind-produced, and so forth; this is the meaning. However, by the phrase 'or whatever else too,' it also indicates for the preceding items the state of not being owned by kamma, and so on. For since those terms—such as 'unappropriated' and 'not owned by kamma'—have the same meaning, if one were unstatable, the others would also be unstatable; or if one were statable, they would also be statable. Therefore, since they should be taken only in the case of what is entirely not kamma-born and so forth, it should be understood that those [properties] are not included in the case of the indeterminate ones.

666. Ekanta …pe… paññāyati tesaṃ vikārattā, anipphannattā pana tassa uppādo na kenaci sakkā vattunti adhippāyo.

666. It is made known... because of their distinctive behavior. But, on account of its being an unproduced phenomenon, its arising cannot be spoken of in any way—this is the intention.

Dukaniddesavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Dyads is Concluded.

Catukkaniddesavaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Tetrads

966. Pacchimapadassāti viññātapadassa. Sabbameva hi rūpaṃ viññātanti tassa abhinditabbattā viññātato aññaṃ diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mutañca na hotīti pucchaṃ akatvāva vissajjitaṃ. Na hi sakkā viññātato aññaṃ ‘‘katamaṃ rūpaṃ diṭṭha’’nti [Pg.156] pucchitunti adhippāyo. Yathā hi dvīsu uddiṭṭhesu nopādato aññattaṃ sandhāya ‘‘katamaṃ taṃ rūpaṃ upādā’’ti pucchitaṃ, evaṃ diṭṭhādīsu catūsu uddiṭṭhesu sutādīhi tīhipi aññattaṃ sandhāya ‘‘katamaṃ taṃ rūpaṃ diṭṭha’’nti pucchitabbaṃ siyā, tadabhāvo na pucchitaṃ, evaṃ sutādīsupīti. Dassanādiggahaṇavisesato pana diṭṭhādīhi aññassa viññātassa sabbhāvato ca catukko vutto.

966. ‘Of the last term’ means of the term ‘known’. For indeed, all form is known. Because it is not to be distinguished, there is no seen, heard, or sensed that is other than the known. Thus, the answer was given without a question being asked. For it is not possible to ask, ‘What form is “seen” that is other than the “known”?’—this is the intention. For just as when two terms were set forth, the question, ‘What is that form, “derivative”?’ was asked in reference to its otherness from the non-derivative, so too, when the four terms beginning with ‘seen’ were set forth, the question, ‘What is that form, “seen”?’ should have been asked in reference to its otherness from the three beginning with ‘heard’. Due to the absence of that otherness, it was not asked. So too for those beginning with ‘heard’. But, because of the specific ways of grasping, such as seeing, and because of the actual existence of the ‘known’ which is other than those beginning with ‘seen’, the tetrad was stated.

Pañcakaniddesavaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Pentads

969. Tejobhāvaṃ gatanti sabhāveneva tejobhāvaṃ pattanti attho. Vuttassapi aññena pakārena saṅgahārahassa saṅgaṇhanaṃ nayakaraṇaṃ idha daṭṭhabbaṃ, tayidaṃ ‘‘viññāta’’nti catukkapadepi yojetabbaṃ. Phoṭṭhabbassa bhedasabbhāvo aṭṭhake nayo.

969. ‘Having gone to the state of the heat element’ means having reached the state of the heat element by its own intrinsic nature—this is the meaning. The inclusion of that which is fit to be included, though already stated, in another way, should be seen here as the establishing of a method. And that method should be applied also to the term in the tetrad, ‘known’. The actual existence of the division of the tangible is the method in the octad.

Pakiṇṇakakathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Discourse on Miscellaneous Topics

975. Natthi nīvaraṇāti vacanena middhassapi nīvaraṇassa pahānaṃ vuttaṃ, na ca rūpaṃ pahātabbaṃ, na ca rūpakāyagelaññaṃ munino natthīti sakkā vattuṃ ‘‘piṭṭhi me āgilāyati, tamahaṃ āyamissāmī’’ti (ma. ni. 2.22) vacanato. Saviññāṇakasaddoti viññāṇena pavattito vacīghosādisaddo. Na hi etāni jāyantīti paripaccamānassa rūpassa paripaccanaṃ jarā, khīyamānassa khayo aniccatāti rūpabhāvamattāni etāni, na sayaṃ sabhāvavantānīti sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tathā jāyamānassa jananaṃ jāti, sā ca rūpabhāvova, na sayaṃ sabhāvavatīti ‘‘na pana paramatthato jāti jāyatī’’ti vuttaṃ.

975. By the statement, ‘There are no hindrances,’ the abandonment of the hindrance of sloth is also stated. And form is not to be abandoned, nor can it be said that the Sage has no illness of the physical body, because of the statement, ‘My back is aching; I will stretch it’ (MN 2.22). ‘Sound with consciousness’ is sound such as vocal utterance, etc., produced by consciousness. Regarding the statement, ‘For these do not arise’: the maturing of form that is maturing is aging, and the perishing of that which is perishing is impermanence. Thus, these are merely the state of form; they are not themselves entities possessing an intrinsic nature. It is with reference to this that it was said. Similarly, the arising of that which is arising is birth, and that too is merely the state of form, not itself an entity possessing an intrinsic nature. Thus it is said, ‘But in an ultimate sense, birth is not born.’

Tesaṃ paccayo etissāti tappaccayā, tappaccayāya bhāvo tappaccayabhāvo, tappaccayabhāvena pavatto vohāro tappaccayabhāvavohāro, taṃ labhati. Abhinibbattitadhammakkhaṇasminti abhinibbattiyamānadhammakkhaṇasminti adhippāyo. Na hi tadā te dhammā na jāyantīti jāyamānabhāvova jātīti yuttā tassā kammādisamuṭṭhānatā taṃnibbattatā ca, na pana tadā te dhammā jīyanti khīyanti ca, tasmā na tesaṃ te jīraṇabhijjanabhāvā cittādisamuṭṭhānā taṃnibbattā cāti vacanaṃ arahanti. Evamapi upādinna-saddo upetena kammunā ādinnataṃ vadati, na nibbattinti upādinnapākabhedānaṃ upādinnatā tesaṃ vattabbāti ce? Na, ādinna-saddassa nibbattivācakattā. Upetena [Pg.157] nibbattañhi upādinnanti paccayānubhāvakkhaṇañca nibbattiñca gahetvāva pavatto ayaṃ vohāro tadā abhāvā jarāmaraṇe na pavattatīti. Paṭiccasamuppannānaṃ dhammānaṃ jarāmaraṇattā tesaṃ uppāde sati jarāmaraṇaṃ hoti, asati na hoti. Na hi ajātaṃ paripaccati bhijjati vā, tasmā jātipaccayataṃ sandhāya ‘‘jarāmaraṇaṃ paṭiccasamuppanna’’nti vuttaṃ.

The cause of those phenomena is this birth, thus it is `tappaccayā`. The state of having that as its cause is `tappaccayabhāvo`. The designation that proceeds by the state of having that as its cause is `tappaccayabhāvavohāro`; it obtains this designation. ‘At the moment of phenomena that have been produced’ means ‘at the moment of phenomena that are being produced’—this is the intention. Indeed, at that time, it is not that those phenomena do not arise. Therefore, the very state of arising is birth. Thus, its state of originating from kamma, etc., and its state of being produced by that are suitable. However, at that time, those phenomena do not age or decay. Therefore, those states of their aging and breaking up are not worthy of the statement that they originate from mind, etc., and are produced by that. Even so, the word `upādinna` speaks of the state of being taken (`ādinnataṃ`) by kamma that is approached by craving and views; it does not speak of production (`nibbattiṃ`). If it is objected: 'Therefore, should not the state of being `upādinna` be stated for those aging and death, which are the divisions of the ripening of what is `upādinna`?' No, because the word `ādinna` is expressive of production. For what is produced by that which is approached by craving and views is `upādinna`. This designation, which proceeds only after having taken into account both the moment of the condition's power and the production, does not apply in the case of aging and death due to their absence at that time. Because aging and death pertain to dependently arisen phenomena, when their arising occurs, aging and death occur; when it does not, they do not occur. Indeed, what is unborn does not ripen or break up. Therefore, with reference to its state of having birth as its condition, it was said, 'Aging and death are dependently arisen'.

Nissayapaṭibaddhavuttitoti jāyamānaparipaccamānabhijjamānānaṃ jāyamānādibhāvamattattā jāyamānādinissayapaṭibaddhavuttikā jātiādayoti vuttaṃ hoti. Yadi evaṃ upādāyarūpānañca cakkhāyatanādīnaṃ uppādādisabhāvabhūtā jātiādayo taṃnissitā hontīti bhūtanissitānaṃ tesaṃ lakkhaṇānaṃ upādāyabhāvo viya upādāyarūpanissitānaṃ upādāyupādāyabhāvo āpajjatīti ce? Na, bhūtapaṭibaddhaupādāyarūpalakkhaṇānañca bhūtapaṭibaddhabhāvassa avinivattanato. Apica ekakalāpapariyāpannānaṃ rūpānaṃ saheva uppādādippavattito ekassa kalāpassa uppādādayo ekekāva hontīti yathā ekekassa kalāpassa jīvitindriyaṃ kalāpānupālakaṃ ‘‘upādāyarūpa’’nti vuccati, evaṃ kalāpuppādādisabhāvā jātiādayo ‘‘upādāyarūpāni’’cceva vuccanti. Evaṃ vikāraparicchedarūpāni ca yojetabbāni.

This is what is meant by 'having an occurrence bound to a support': birth, etc., have an occurrence bound to the support of that which is arising, etc., because they are merely the state of the arising, maturing, and dissolving of material phenomena. If it is so, then for derived matter such as the eye-base, etc., their birth and similar states—being the nature of arising, etc.—are dependent on those forms. If it is objected that, just as there is the state of being derived matter for those characteristics dependent on the primary elements, would the state of being derived-from-derived matter not consequently arise for those characteristics dependent on derived matter? No, because for the characteristics of derived matter that are bound to the primary elements, their state of being bound to the primary elements does not cease. Furthermore, for forms included within a single kalāpa, since their arising and so on occur simultaneously, the arising, etc., of a single kalāpa are each singular. Just as the life faculty of each kalāpa, which preserves the kalāpa, is called ‘derived matter,’ so too birth and similar states, being the nature of the kalāpa’s arising, are indeed called ‘derived matter.’ In this way, the mutable and delimited forms should also be connected.

Kammasamuṭṭhānasambandhaṃ utusamuṭṭhānaṃ kammavisesena suvaṇṇadubbaṇṇasusaṇṭhitadussaṇṭhitādivisesaṃ hotīti ‘‘kammapaccaya’’nti vuttaṃ. Kammavipākānubhavanassa kāraṇabhūtaṃ bāhirautusamuṭṭhānaṃ kammapaccayautusamuṭṭhānaṃ. Kammasahāyo paccayo, kammassa vā sahāyabhūto paccayo kammapaccayo, sova utu kammapaccayautu, so samuṭṭhānaṃ etassāti kammapaccayautusamuṭṭhānanti vacanattho. Sīte uṇhe vā kismiñci utumhi samāgate tato suddhaṭṭhakaṃ uppajjati, tassa so utu samuṭṭhānaṃ. Dutiyassa suddhaṭṭhakassa utusamuṭṭhānikapaṭibandhakassa so eva purimo utu paccayo. Tatiyaṃ pana suddhaṭṭhakaṃ purimautusahāyena utunā nibbattattā pubbe vuttanayeneva ‘‘utupaccayautusamuṭṭhāna’’nti vuttaṃ. Evamayaṃ purimo utu tisso santatiyo ghaṭṭeti, tato paraṃ aññautusamāgame aññasantatittayaṃ, tato ca aññena aññanti evaṃ pavatti daṭṭhabbā. Tadetaṃ sītuṇhānaṃ appabahubhāve taṃsamphassassa acirappavattiyā cirappavattiyā [Pg.158] ca veditabbaṃ, anupādinnena dīpanā na santatittayavasena, atha kho meghasamuṭṭhāpakamūlautuvasena pakārantarena daṭṭhabbā, taṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘utusamuṭṭhāno nāma valāhako’’tiādimāha. Rūparūpānaṃ vikārādimattabhāvato aparinipphannatā vuttā. Tesañhi rūpavikārādibhāvato rūpatāti adhippāyo. Rūpavikārādibhāvato eva pana rūpe sati santi, asati na santīti asaṅkhatabhāvanivāraṇatthaṃ parinipphannatā vuttāti.

Matter originated by temperature, being connected with that originated by kamma, becomes distinguished by specific kamma as having good or bad color, being well-formed or ill-formed, and so on; therefore, it is called 'kamma-conditioned'. Matter originated by external temperature, which is the cause for experiencing the result of kamma, is kamma-conditioned temperature-originated matter. A condition that is a companion to kamma, or a condition that has become a companion to kamma, is a kamma-condition. That very condition is temperature, hence 'kamma-conditioned temperature'. That is the origin of this matter, therefore it is 'kamma-conditioned temperature-originated'—such is the meaning of the term. When any temperature, whether cold or hot, occurs, the pure octad originates from it, and that temperature is its origin. For the second pure octad, which connects the series of temperature-originated matter, that very same previous temperature is the condition. But the third pure octad, because it is produced by the second temperature which has the previous temperature as its companion, is called 'temperature-conditioned temperature-originated' in the same way as stated before. Thus, this initial temperature connects three continuities. After that, upon the occurrence of another temperature, there is another triad of continuities; and after that, by another temperature, another triad. Thus the process should be understood. This should be understood through the short-lived or long-lived occurrence of that contact, depending on the small or large amount of cold and heat. The explanation by way of unappropriated matter is not to be understood in terms of the triad of continuities; rather, it should be understood in another way, in terms of the root-temperature that produces clouds. To show this, it is said, 'The rain-cloud is originated by temperature,' and so on. The unproduced nature of characteristics is stated on account of their being merely a state of alteration, etc., of produced material phenomena. For it is intended that their designation as 'matter' is due to their being an alteration, etc., of material phenomena. However, since they exist only when produced matter exists and do not exist when it is absent, their produced nature is stated in order to preclude the state of being unconditioned.

Rūpakaṇḍavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Chapter of Matter is concluded.

3. Nikkhepakaṇḍaṃ

3. The Chapter of Summary

Tikanikkhepakathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Discourse of the Triad Summary

985. Sabbesanti [Pg.159] cittuppādavasena rūpāsaṅkhatavasena ca bhinnānaṃ sabbesaṃ phassādicakkhādipadabhājananayena vitthārito. Tattha pana asaṅkhatassa bhedābhāvato asaṅkhatā dhātūtveva padabhājanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yevāpanakānaṃ pana sukhumupādāyarūpassa ca indriyavikāraparicchedalakkhaṇarūpupatthambhakabhāvarahitassa hadayavatthussa paduddhārena idha niddesānarahattā niddeso na katoti daṭṭhabbo. Na hi tathāgatassa dhammesu ācariyamuṭṭhi atthīti. Nikkhipitvāti vitthāradesanaṃ ṭhapetvā, apanetvāti attho, vitthāradesanaṃ antogadhaṃ katvāti vā. Gāthāttho nidāne vutto eva.

985. For all [dhammas], which are differentiated by way of the classification of consciousness-arisings and by way of matter and the unconditioned, [the analysis] has been expounded in detail by the method of the analysis of terms such as contact, etc., and the eye, etc. However, among these, since there is no division in the unconditioned, the analysis of terms should be understood simply as 'the unconditioned element'. Furthermore, it should be understood that for the yevāpanaka dhammas, and for the heart-base—which is subtle derived matter and is devoid of the state of being faculty-matter, alteration-matter, limitation-matter, characteristic-matter, and that which supports matter—no exposition is made here by way of extracting the terms, because they are unworthy of exposition. For indeed, the Tathāgata has no teacher’s closed fist in regard to the Dhamma. “Having laid aside” means having set aside the detailed exposition, that is, having removed it; or it means having made the detailed exposition implicit. The meaning of the verse has already been stated in the introduction.

Mūlavasena paccayabhāvo hetupaccayattho. Pabhavati etasmāti pabhavo, so eva ‘‘janako’’ti visesito. Samuṭṭhāti etenāti samuṭṭhānaṃ, tassa visesanaṃ nibbattakanti. Sabbāni vā etāni pariyāyavacanāni. Atthavasenāti kasmā vuttaṃ, nanu kusalamūlānaṃ hetubhāvato dhammavasenāti yuttanti? Saccametaṃ, alobhādīnaṃ pana tiṇṇaṃ samānassa mūlaṭṭhassa vasena dassitataṃ sandhāya ‘‘atthavasenā’’ti vuttaṃ. Iminā dhammoti bhāvo, atthoti dhammakiccaṃ adhippetanti viññāyati. ‘‘Alobho nidānaṃ kammānaṃ samudayāyā’’tiādivacanato (a. ni. 3.34) tāni kusalamūlāni samuṭṭhānaṃ etassātipi taṃsamuṭṭhānaṃ. Taṃ pana tehi samuṭṭhitaṃ hotīti ‘‘alobhādīhi samuṭṭhita’’nti āha. Te kusalamūlataṃsampayuttā samuṭṭhānaṃ etassātipi attho sambhavati. Ettha pana cetanaṃ ṭhapetvā aññe ‘‘taṃsampayuttā’’ti samuṭṭhānabhāve vattabbā. Tattha mūlehi attano paccayato kusale pariyādiyati, khandhehi sabhāvato, kammehi aññassa nibbattanakiccato. Mūlehi ca kusalānaṃ anavajjatāya hetuṃ dasseti, khandhehi taṃsampayogakataṃ anavajjasabhāvaṃ, kammehi sukhavipākataṃ. Mūlehi vā nidānasampattiyā ādikalyāṇataṃ, khandhehi sabhāvasampattiyā majjhekalyāṇataṃ, kammehi nibbattisampattiyā pariyosānakalyāṇataṃ.

The meaning of root condition is the state of being a condition by way of a root. From this it arises, thus it is the source; it is specifically called “the producer.” By this it originates, thus it is origination; its specification is “the generator.” Or, all these are alternative expressions. Why is it said “by way of meaning”? Is it not appropriate to say “by way of the Dhamma” because of the wholesome roots’ nature as a cause? This is true, but regarding the three—non-greed and so on—it is said “by way of meaning” with reference to it being shown by way of the common root-meaning. By this, it is understood that ‘Dhamma’ is intended to mean intrinsic nature, and ‘meaning’ is intended to mean the function of the Dhamma. From statements such as, “Non-greed is the source for the arising of kamma…” (cf. AN 3.34), those wholesome roots are the origination of this kamma, thus it is also called ‘origination from them.’ Moreover, that kamma is originated by them, thus it is said, “originated by non-greed and so on.” It is also a possible meaning that those wholesome roots and the aggregates associated with them are the origination of this kamma. Here, however, excluding volition, the other [associated factors] are to be spoken of as 'those associated with them' in the state of origination. Therein, by the roots, the wholesome is comprehended by way of being its own condition; by the aggregates, by way of its intrinsic nature; by kamma, by way of the function of producing another result. And by the roots, it shows the cause for the blamelessness of wholesome states; by the aggregates, the blameless nature produced by association with them; by kamma, their pleasant result. Alternatively, by the roots, it shows excellence in the beginning through the perfection of the source; by the aggregates, excellence in the middle through the perfection of their nature; by kamma, excellence in the end through the perfection of production.

986. Taṃ [Pg.160]…pe… uddhaṃ akusalaṃ nāma natthīti kasmā vuttaṃ, nanu vicikicchuddhaccasahagatamoho atthīti? Saccametaṃ, tena pana vinā taṃsampayuttatā natthīti taṃsampayuttesu gahitesu moho gahito evāti katvā ‘‘tato uddhaṃ natthī’’ti vuttaṃ aññattha abhāvā. Ekasmiṃ ṭhitaṃ ekaṭṭhaṃ, sahajabhāvena ekaṭṭhaṃ sahajekaṭṭhaṃ. Pahātabbanti pahānaṃ, pahānabhāvena ekaṭṭhaṃ pahānekaṭṭhaṃ. Yena hi yaṃ saha pahātabbaṃ, tena taṃ ekasmiṃ puggale ṭhitaṃ hoti, ekasmiṃ samucchinne asamucchinne ca itarassa samucchinnatāya asamucchinnatāya ca vasena aññamaññāvirahitato.

986. Why is it said that beyond that there is no unwholesome state, when delusion accompanied by doubt and restlessness exists? This is true. However, without that delusion, there is no state of being associated with it. Therefore, having considered that when those associated with it are taken, delusion is indeed taken, it is said, 'Beyond that, there is none,' due to its absence elsewhere. Established in one is 'unified' (ekaṭṭha); unified by the state of co-arising is 'co-arisingly unified' (sahajekaṭṭha). Because it is 'to be abandoned' (pahātabbaṃ), it is 'abandonment' (pahāna); unified by the state of being fit to be abandoned is 'abandonment-unified' (pahānekaṭṭha). For with whatever a thing is to be abandoned, with that it is established in one person, because of their inseparability from each other, by way of the other's state of being eradicated or not being eradicated when one is eradicated or not eradicated.

987. Tīṇi lakkhaṇānīti aniccadukkhaanattatā. Nāmakasiṇasattapaññattiyo tisso paññattiyo. Paramatthe amuñcitvā vohariyamānā vihāramañcādikā upādāpaññatti sattapaññattiggahaṇena gahitāti veditabbā, etāni ca lakkhaṇādīni heṭṭhā dvīsu kaṇḍesu viññattiādīni viya na vuttāni, na ca sabhāvadhammāti katvā na labbhantīti vuttāni. Na hi koci sabhāvo kusalattikāsaṅgahitoti vattuṃ yuttanti.

987. The three characteristics are the state of impermanence, suffering, and non-self. The three designations are name-designation, kasiṇa-designation, and being-designation. It should be understood that derived designations such as ‘monastery’ and ‘couch’, which are conventionally used without abandoning ultimate realities, are included by the taking of ‘being-designation.’ And these characteristics, etc., like the intimations, etc., in the two sections below, are not stated; and it is said that they are not found on the grounds that they are not intrinsic realities. For it is right to say that there is no intrinsic nature whatsoever that is not included in the wholesome triad.

988. Sukhabhūmīti kāmāvacarādayopi yujjanti. Sukhasahagatā hi kāmāvacarādibhūmi sukhabhūmi. Kāmāvacarādibhūmīti ca kāmāvacarāditāya dhammā eva vuccantīti kāmāvacarādicittuppādesūti atthato viññāyati. Evañca katvā ‘‘sukhabhūmiya’’nti vatvā tassā eva vibhāgadassanatthaṃ ‘‘kāmāvacare’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Bhūmi-saddo ca abhidhamme kāmāvacarādīsu niruḷhoti ‘‘catūsu bhūmīsu kusala’’ntiādīsu (dha. sa. 1384) aññabhūmiggahaṇaṃ na hotīti. Pāḷito cāti ‘‘visiṭṭhānaṃ pākāti vipākā’’tiādivacanatthavibhāvanena pāḷito. ‘‘Vipakkabhāvamāpannānaṃ arūpadhammānametaṃ adhivacana’’ntiādinā bhāsitatthavibhāvanena atthato ca. Nāmaparicchedādīhi tikadukānaṃ vavatthānadassanena vā pāḷito, tadatthaviññāpanena atthato.

988. In the text 'plane of happiness,' even sense-sphere consciousness-arisings and so on are appropriate. Indeed, the plane of sense-sphere consciousness-arisings and so on, when accompanied by pleasant feeling, is called the plane of happiness. And in the phrase 'plane of the sense-sphere and so on,' because they are the sphere of sense-desire and so on, only the states of consciousness-arisings are spoken of. Therefore, it is understood in terms of meaning as 'in the sense-sphere consciousness-arisings and so on.' And for this reason, after saying 'plane of happiness,' the words 'in the sense-sphere,' etc., were spoken for the purpose of showing the divisions of that very plane of happiness. And because the word 'bhūmi' in the Abhidhamma is well-known in reference to sense-sphere consciousness-arisings and so on, in texts such as 'wholesome in the four planes,' etc., the taking of another plane [other than that of consciousness-arisings] does not occur. And [it is understood] from the Pāḷi text by means of clarifying the meaning of the statement such as, 'Because they are the ripening of distinguished [kamma], they are “results” (vipāka)'; and from the meaning by means of clarifying the meaning of what was spoken, such as, 'This is a designation for the immaterial states that have reached the state of maturity.' Alternatively, [it is understood] from the Pāḷi text by means of showing the determination of the triads and dyads through the defining of names, etc., and from the meaning by means of making their meaning known.

991. Sāliphalanti sālipākamāha.

991. By 'fruit of rice' (sāliphala), he means cooked rice (sālipāka).

994. Amhākaṃ mātulattheroti puggalārammaṇassapi upādānassa upādānakkhandhā eva paccayo, na lokuttarā, ko pana vādo khandhārammaṇassa. Tenāha ‘‘aggahitānī’’ti.

994. Regarding 'our maternal uncle, the elder': for clinging that has a person-concept as its object, only the worldly aggregates subject to clinging are the condition, not the supramundane [dhammas]. What then is to be said of [clinging] that has the aggregates as its object? Therefore, he said, 'not grasped.'

998. Yathā [Pg.161] upādānehi aggahetabbā anupādāniyā, evaṃ saṃkilesehi aggahetabbā asaṃkilesikāti katvā ‘‘asaṃ…pe… eseva nayo’’ti āha.

998. Just as that which should not be grasped by clinging is 'not subject to clinging' (anupādāniyā), so that which should not be grasped by defilements is 'not subject to defilement' (asaṃkilesikā). Having considered thus, he said, 'not subject to defilement… this is the same method.'

1006. Diṭṭhiyā gahito attā na vijjati. Yesu pana vipallatthagāho, te upādānakkhandhāva vijjanti. Tasmā yasmiṃ avijjamānaniccādivipariyāsākāragahaṇaṃ atthi, sova upādānakkhandhapañcakasaṅkhāto kāyo. Tattha niccādiākārassa avijjamānatādassanatthaṃ ruppanādisabhāvasseva ca vijjamānatādassanatthaṃ vijjamāno kāyoti visesetvā vutto, lokuttarā pana na kadāci avijjamānākārena gayhantīti na idaṃ visesanaṃ arahanti. Sakkāye diṭṭhi, satī vā kāye diṭṭhi sakkāyadiṭṭhi. Attanā gahitākārassa avijjamānatāya sayameva satī, na tāya gahito attā attaniyaṃ vāti attho. Ayaṃ panattho sambhavatīti katvā vutto, purimo eva pana padhāno. Dutiye hi diṭṭhiyā vatthu avisesitaṃ hoti. Kāyoti hi khandhapañcake vuccamāne lokuttarāpanayanaṃ natthi. Na hi lokuttaresu kāya-saddo na vattati. Kāyapassaddhiādīsu hi lokuttaresu kāya-saddopi lokuttarakkhandhavācakoti. Sīlenāti suddhiyā ahetubhūtena sīlena. Gahitasamādānanti uppāditaparāmāsova. So hi samādiyanti etena kukkurasīlavatādīnīti ‘‘samādāna’’nti vutto. Tattha avītikkamanīyatāya sīlaṃ, bhattivasena satataṃ caritabbatāya vataṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ.

1006. The self grasped by a view does not exist. However, in whichever aggregates of clinging there is a distorted grasping, those very aggregates of clinging exist. Therefore, that in which there is the grasping of the aspect of perversion, such as of a non-existent permanence, is itself the body, which is designated as the pentad of the aggregates of clinging. Therein, to show the non-existence of the aspect of permanence and so on, and to show the existence of the very nature of being afflicted and so on, it is stated with the specification 'the existing body'. However, the supramundane states are never grasped with an aspect of non-existence; therefore, they are not fit for this qualifier. The view in the existing body (sakkāya) is identity view (sakkāyadiṭṭhi); or, the existing view in the body is identity view. Due to the non-existence of the aspect grasped as 'self', only the view itself exists; the self or what belongs to a self grasped by that view does not exist. This is the meaning. This latter meaning is stated because it is possible, but the former one is indeed primary. For in the second alternative, the basis of the view is not specified as 'existing'. For when 'kāya' is said to refer to the five aggregates, there is no exclusion of the supramundane aggregates. For it is not that the word 'kāya' does not apply to the supramundane states. For in references to the supramundane such as 'tranquility of body', the word 'kāya' is also expressive of the supramundane aggregates. 'By virtue' means by conduct that is not a cause of purification. ‘Grasped undertaking’ is simply the wrong grasping that has been produced. For by this they undertake the practices and vows of dogs and the like; therefore, it is called an 'undertaking'. Therein, 'virtue' (sīla) should be understood as such due to its non-transgressible nature, and 'vow' (vata) should be understood as such due to its nature of having to be constantly practiced out of devotion.

1007. Idheva tiṭṭhamānassāti imissāyeva indasālaguhāyaṃ tiṭṭhamānassa. Vācuggatakaraṇaṃ uggaho. Atthaparipucchanaṃ paripucchā. Kusalehi saha codanāpariharaṇavasena vinicchayakaraṇaṃ vinicchayo. Bahūnaṃ nānappakārānaṃ sakkāyadiṭṭhīnaṃ avihatattā tā janenti, tāhi janitāti vā puthujjanā. Avighātameva vā jana-saddo vadati. Puthu satthārānaṃ mukhullokikāti ettha puthū janā etesanti puthujjanāti vacanattho. Puthu…pe… avuṭṭhitāti ettha janetabbā, jāyanti vā etthāti janā, gatiyo. Puthū janā etesanti puthujjanā. Ito pare jāyanti etehīti janā, abhisaṅkhārādayo. Te etesaṃ puthū vijjantīti puthujjanā. Abhisaṅkharaṇādiattho eva vā jana-saddo daṭṭhabbo. Rāgaggiādayo santāpā. Te eva sabbepi vā kilesā pariḷāhā. Puthu pañcasu [Pg.162] kāmaguṇesūti ettha jāyatīti jano, ‘‘rāgo gedho’’ti evamādiko. Puthu jano etesanti puthujjanā. Puthūsu vā janā jātā rattāti evaṃ rāgādiattho eva jana-saddo daṭṭhabbo. Palibuddhāti sambaddhā upaddutā vā. Assutavāti etena andhatā vuttāti ‘‘andhaputhujjano vutto’’ti āha.

1007. “Idheva tiṭṭhamānassāti” means standing right here in this very Indasāla cave. “Vācuggatakaraṇaṃ” is learning by verbal recitation. “Atthaparipucchanaṃ” is questioning the meaning. “Vinicchayo” is judgment, the act of making a decision by way of accusation and refutation in conjunction with the skillful. Because many and various identity views have not been abandoned, they generate them; or they are called ‘ordinary people’ (puthujjanā) because they are generated by them. Alternatively, the word ‘jana’ signifies non-abandonment itself. Here, the word-meaning of ‘puthujjana’ is ‘they have many teachers (janā).’ Here, ‘janā’ refers to destinies (gatiyo), because they are to be generated or because one is born in these states. ‘Puthujjanā’ means they have many destinies. Further on, ‘janā’ refers to formations (abhisaṅkhāra), etc., because beings are born from them. They are called ‘puthujjanā’ because these are widely found in them. Alternatively, the word ‘jana’ should be understood as having the meaning of ‘forming,’ etc. The fires of lust, etc., are torments. They themselves, or alternatively all defilements, are burnings. Here, ‘jano’ is so called because it arises, such as ‘lust, greed,’ and so on. ‘Puthujjanā’ are those who have manifold ‘jano’ (i.e., lust, greed, etc.). Or, the word ‘jana’ should be understood as having the meaning of lust, etc., in the sense that ‘janā’ are those who are born and attached to many things. “Palibuddhā” means bound or afflicted. By this word “assutavā,” blindness is stated; therefore, it is said, “the blind ordinary person is spoken of.”

Anayeti avaḍḍhiyaṃ. Sabbattha niruttilakkhaṇena padasiddhi veditabbā. Anekesu ca kappasatasahassesu kataṃ jānanti, pākaṭañca karonti upakāraṃ satijananaāmisapaṭiggahaṇādinā paccekasambuddhā, tatheva dukkhitassa sakkaccaṃ kātabbaṃ karonti. Sammāsambuddho pana asaṅkhyeyyaappameyyesupi kataṃ upakāraṃ maggaphalānaṃ upanissayañca jānāti, pākaṭañca karoti, sīho viya ca javaṃ sabbattha sakkaccameva dhammadesanaṃ karoti. Ariyabhāvoti yehi yogato ariyā vuccanti, te maggaphaladhammā daṭṭhabbā. Ariyakaradhammā aniccadassanādayo, vipassiyamānā vā aniccādayo.

Decline means non-growth. Everywhere, the derivation of words should be understood by the characteristics of etymology. And Paccekabuddhas know what was done over many hundreds of thousands of eons, and they make the favor manifest by means of generating mindfulness, accepting material offerings, and so forth; likewise, they carefully do what should be done for one who is suffering. The Perfectly Self-Enlightened One, however, knows a favor done even in incalculable and immeasurable eons, and the strong supporting condition for the paths and fruits, and makes it manifest; and like a lion with its swiftness, he everywhere teaches the Dhamma only with care. The state of being noble should be understood as those path and fruition states, by connection with which beings are called 'noble ones'. The qualities that make one noble are the perception of impermanence and so forth, or impermanence and so forth when being contemplated.

Sotānīti taṇhādiṭṭhikilesaduccaritaavijjāsotāni. ‘‘Sotānaṃ saṃvaraṃ brūmī’’ti vatvā ‘‘paññāyete pidhīyare’’ti vacanena sotānaṃ saṃvaro pidahanaṃ samucchedañāṇanti viññāyati. Khantīti adhivāsanā, sā ca tathāpavattā khandhā. Paññāti eke, adoso eva vā. Kāyaduccaritādīnanti dussīlyasaṅkhātānaṃ kāyavacīduccaritānaṃ muṭṭhassaccasaṅkhātassa pamādassa abhijjhādomanassānaṃ pāpakānaṃ akkhantiaññāṇakosajjānañca. Anupekkhā saṅkhārehi avivaṭṭanaṃ, sālayatāti attho. Dhammaṭṭhitiyaṃ paṭiccasamuppāde paṭilomabhāvo sassatucchedagāho, tappaṭicchādakamoho vā. Nibbāne paṭilomabhāvo saṅkhāresu rati, nibbānapaṭicchādako moho vā. Saṅkhāranimittaggāhoti yādisassa kilesassa appahīnattā vipassanā saṅkhāranimittaṃ na muñcati, so kileso daṭṭhabbo. Saṅkhāranimittaggahaṇassa atikkamanaṃ vā pahānaṃ.

The streams are the streams of craving, views, the remaining defilements, misconduct, and ignorance. Having said, 'I declare the restraint of the streams,' by the statement 'these are closed off by wisdom,' it is understood that the restraint of the streams is their blocking, which is the knowledge of eradication. Patience is endurance, and that is the mental aggregates that have occurred in such a way. Some say it is wisdom, or it is simply non-aversion. Regarding bodily misconduct and the like: this refers to bodily and verbal misconduct, reckoned as immorality; covetousness and dejection, reckoned as forgetfulness, which are evil states; and impatience, ignorance, and laziness. Disregard is not turning away from formations, meaning attachment. In dependent origination, which is the stability of phenomena, the contrary state is the grasp of eternalism and annihilationism, or the delusion that conceals it. In regard to Nibbāna, the contrary state is delight in formations, or the delusion that conceals Nibbāna. The grasping of the sign of formations should be understood as that defilement due to which, being unabandoned, insight does not release the sign of formations. Or it is the overcoming or abandoning of the grasping of the sign of formations.

Catunnaṃ ariyamaggānaṃ bhāvitattā accantaṃ appavattibhāvena yaṃ pahānanti yojanā veditabbā. Kena pana pahānanti? Ariyamaggehevāti viññāyamāno ayamattho tesaṃ bhāvitattā appavattivacanena. Samudayapakkhikassāti ettha cattāropi maggā catusaccābhisamayāti katvā tehi pahātabbena [Pg.163] tena tena samudayena saha pahātabbattā samudayasabhāgattā ca saccavibhaṅge ca sabbakilesānaṃ samudayabhāvassa vuttattā ‘‘samudayapakkhikā’’ti diṭṭhiādayo vuccanti. Kāyavācācittānaṃ virūpappavattiyā nayanaṃ apayāpanaṃ, kāyaduccaritādīnaṃ vināsanayanaṃ vā vinayo, tesaṃ vā jimhappavattiṃ vicchinditvā ujukanayanaṃ vinayanaṃ. Eseseti eso so eva, atthato anaññoti attho. Tajjāteti atthato taṃsabhāvova. Sappuriso ariyasabhāvo, ariyo ca sappurisabhāvoti attho.

The connection of words should be understood thus: that which is abandoned is abandoned through the state of utter non-arising on account of the development of the four noble paths. But by what is it abandoned? This meaning, 'by the noble paths themselves,' is understood from the statement 'non-arising due to their development.' Regarding 'belonging to the side of the origin': here, considering that all four paths are the realization of the four truths, and because what is to be abandoned by them is to be abandoned together with each respective origin, and due to sharing the nature of the origin, and also because in the Analysis of the Truths the state of all defilements being of the nature of the origin is stated, therefore views and so on are called 'belonging to the side of the origin.' Discipline (vinaya) is the removal or elimination of the perverse occurrence of body, speech, and mind; or, it is the leading to the destruction of misconduct such as that of the body; or, having cut off their crooked occurrence, the leading to straightness is discipline. 'This very one' means this is that very one; the meaning is that, in essence, it is not other. 'Of that nature' means that, in essence, it has that very nature. A good person has a noble nature, and a noble one has the nature of a good person; this is the meaning.

Advayanti dvayatārahitaṃ, vaṇṇameva ‘‘accī’’ti gahetvā acciṃ vā ‘‘vaṇṇo evā’’ti tesaṃ ekattaṃ passanto viya yathātakkitaṃ attānaṃ ‘‘rūpa’’nti, yathādiṭṭhaṃ vā rūpaṃ ‘‘attā’’ti gahetvā tesaṃ ekattaṃ passanto daṭṭhabbo. Ettha ca ‘‘rūpaṃ attā’’ti imissā pavattiyā abhāvepi rūpe attaggahaṇaṃ pavattamānaṃ acciyaṃ vaṇṇaggahaṇaṃ viya. Upamāyo ca anaññattādiggahaṇanidassanavaseneva vuttā, na vaṇṇādīnaṃ viya attano vijjamānattassa, attano viya vā vaṇṇādīnaṃ avijjamānattassa dassanatthaṃ.

'Non-dual' means free from duality. It is like one who, taking color itself as 'flame,' or the flame as 'just color,' sees their oneness. Similarly, one should be understood as seeing their oneness by taking the self conjectured in some way as 'form,' or by taking form seen in some way as 'self.' And here, regarding the view 'form is self,' even though there is no self separate from form, the grasping of a self in form occurs, just like the grasping of color in a flame. The similes are stated only by way of illustrating the grasping of identity and so on, not for the purpose of showing the existence of a self as being like the existence of color and so on, nor for showing the non-existence of color and so on as being like the non-existence of a self.

1008. Sarīranipphattiyāti sarīrapāripūriyā. Nicchetuṃ asakkonto vicinanto kicchatīti vicikicchā. Idappaccayānaṃ bhāvoti jātiādisabhāvameva āha, jātiādīnaṃ vā jarāmaraṇādiuppādanasamatthataṃ. Sā pana jātiādivinimuttā natthīti tesaṃyevādhivacanaṃ hoti ‘‘idappaccayatā’’ti.

1008. 'Completion of the body' means the full perfection of the body. 'Doubt' (vicikicchā) is so called because, being unable to decide, one becomes weary while investigating. 'The state of these as conditions' means He spoke of the very nature of birth and so on, or the capability of birth and so on to produce aging, death, and so on. But that capability does not exist apart from birth and so on; therefore, 'specific conditionality' (idappaccayatā) is a designation for those very things.

1009. Idha anāgatakilesā ‘‘tadekaṭṭhā kilesā’’ti vuccantīti te dassetuṃ ‘‘imissā ca pāḷiyā’’tiādi āraddhaṃ. Sahajekaṭṭhavasenāti tattha uppannadiṭṭhiyā sahajekaṭṭhavasenāti atthato viññāyati. Taṃsampayuttoti tehi saṃyojanakilesehi sampayuttotipi attho yujjati. Tathā te saṃyojanakilesā samuṭṭhānaṃ etassāti taṃsamuṭṭhānanti vā. Saṃyojanarahitehi ca pana kilesehi sampayuttānaṃ samuṭṭhitānañca sabbhāvato kileseheva yojanā katā.

1009. Here, future defilements are called 'defilements sharing a single basis'; therefore, to show them, the passage beginning 'and in this Pali text' is introduced. 'By way of a co-arisen single basis' is understood in meaning as 'by way of a co-arisen single basis with the view that has arisen therein.' 'Associated with that' is also suitably understood to mean 'associated with those fetters and defilements.' Similarly, an alternative explanation for 'having that as its origin' is 'that of which those fetters and defilements are the origin.' Furthermore, because of the actual existence of aggregates associated with, and kamma arisen from, defilements that are free from being fetters, the connection of the terms is made only with the defilements.

1011. Saṃyojanādīnaṃ viyāti saṃyojanatadekaṭṭhakilesādīnaṃ yathāvuttānaṃ viya. Tehīti dassanabhāvanāmaggehi. Abhisaṅkhāraviññāṇaṃ kusalākusalaṃ, [Pg.164] nāmarūpañca vipākanti katvā ‘‘kusalādīnampi pahānaṃ anuññāta’’nti āha.

1011. 'Like the fetters, etc.' means like the state of being fit to be abandoned of the aforementioned fetters, defilements sharing a single basis, and so on. 'By them' means by the paths of seeing and development. Having considered that volitional consciousness is wholesome and unwholesome, and that name-and-form is resultant, he said, 'the abandonment of wholesome states, etc., is also permitted.'

1013. Hetū cevāti ‘‘pahātabbahetukā’’ti etasmiṃ samāsapade ekadesena samāsapadatthaṃ vadati. Ettha ca purimanayena ‘‘ime dhammā dassanenapahātabbahetukā’’ti imeyeva dassanenapahātabbahetukā, na ito aññeti ayaṃ niyamo paññāyati, na ime dassanenapahātabbahetukāyevāti. Tasmā imesaṃ dassanenapahātabbahetukabhāvo aniyato vicikicchāsahagatamohassa ahetukattāti purimanayo vivaraṇīyatthavā hoti. Tasmā purimanayena dhammato dassanenapahātabbahetuke nikkhipitvā atthato nikkhipituṃ dutiyanayo vutto.

1013. As for 'and roots,' he states the meaning of the compound word by one part of that compound word, 'having causes to be abandoned by seeing.' And here, by the first method, from the phrase 'these states have causes to be abandoned by seeing,' this restriction is apparent: 'only these states have causes to be abandoned by seeing, not others.' But this restriction is not apparent: 'these states only have causes to be abandoned by seeing.' Therefore, their state of having causes to be abandoned by seeing is not fixed, because delusion accompanied by doubt is without associated causes. Thus, the first method has a meaning that requires explanation. Therefore, after setting aside the states having causes to be abandoned by seeing in terms of phenomena by the first method, the second method was stated in order to set them aside in terms of meaning.

1029. Mahaggatā vā iddhividhādayo. Appamāṇārammaṇā mahaggatā cetopariyapubbenivāsānāgataṃsañāṇasampayuttā.

1029. Or, the exalted states are the various kinds of psychic power and so forth. The exalted states that have an immeasurable object are those associated with the knowledge of others' minds, the recollection of past lives, and the knowledge of the future.

1035. Anantare niyuttāni, anantaraphalappayojanāni, anantaraphalakaraṇasīlāni vā ānantarikāni. Tāni pana paṭipakkhena anivāraṇīyaphalattā antarāyarahitānīti ‘‘anantarāyena phaladāyakānī’’ti vuttaṃ. Anantarāyāni vā ānantarikānīti niruttivasena padasiddhi veditabbā. Ekasmimpīti pi-saddena anekasmimpi āyūhite vattabbamevanatthīti dasseti. Na ca tesaṃ aññamaññapaṭibāhakattaṃ atthi appaṭipakkhattā, appaṭipakkhatā ca samānaphalattā anubalappadānato ca. ‘‘Natthi hetu natthi paccayo sattānaṃ saṃkilesāyā’’ti (dī. ni. 1.168) evamādiko ahetukavādo. ‘‘Karoto kho kārayato chindato chedāpayato…pe… karoto na karīyati pāpa’’nti (dī. ni. 1.166) evamādiko akiriyavādo. ‘‘Natthi dinna’’nti (dī. ni. 1.171; ma. ni. 2.94; 3.91) evamādiko natthikavādo. Etesu purimavādo bandhamokkhānaṃ hetuṃ paṭisedheti, dutiyo kammaṃ, tatiyo vipākanti ayametesaṃ viseso. Tañhīti ahetukādiniyatamicchādiṭṭhiṃ, na pana niyatabhāvaṃ appattaṃ.

1035. Kammas that are connected with the immediate result after death, that have the purpose of an immediate result after death, or that have the nature of producing an immediate result after death, are called ānantarika. Furthermore, because their result is unpreventable by an opposing kamma, they are free from obstruction; therefore, it is said, 'they are givers of fruit without obstruction'. Alternatively, the formation of the word ānantarika should be understood by way of etymology as 'those without obstruction'. Regarding 'in even one instance,' the particle 'pi' shows that even when many such kammas have been undertaken, there is nothing further to be said. And there is no mutual obstruction among them because they are not opposed to each other; and they are not opposed to each other because they have the same result and because they give corresponding support. The doctrine that 'there is no cause, no condition for the defilement of beings' and so forth is the doctrine of causelessness. The doctrine that 'for one who acts, for one who causes to act, for one who cuts, for one who causes to cut... for one who acts, no evil is done' and so forth is the doctrine of non-action. The doctrine that 'There is nothing given' and so forth is the nihilistic doctrine. Among these, the first doctrine denies the cause of bondage and liberation, the second denies kamma, and the third denies the result—this is their distinction. 'That' refers to the fixed wrong view of causelessness and so forth, but not to that which has not attained a fixed state.

1039. Paccayaṭṭhenāti maggapaccayasaṅkhātena sampayogavisiṭṭhena paccayabhāvenāti veditabbaṃ. Ettha ca maggaṅgānaṃ ṭhapanaṃ maggapaccayabhāvarahite maggahetuke [Pg.165] dassetuṃ, tena maggahetuke asaṅkarato vavatthapeti. Sace pana koci vadeyya ‘‘ekekaṃ aṅgaṃ ṭhapetvā taṃtaṃsampayuttānaṃ maggahetukabhāvepi ‘maggaṅgāni ṭhapetvā’ti idaṃ vacanaṃ yujjatī’’ti. Evañhi sati tatiyanaye viya idhāpi ‘‘ṭhapetvā’’ti na vattabbaṃ siyā, vuttañcetaṃ, tasmā vuttanayenevattho veditabbo. Maggaṅgāmaggaṅgānañhi sampayuttānaṃ visesadassanattho ayaṃ nayoti. Sesamaggaṅgānaṃ pubbe ṭhapitānanti adhippāyo. Phassādīnañhi purimanayepi maggahetukatā siddhāti.

1039. ‘By the meaning of condition’ should be understood as: by the state of being a condition, designated as a path condition and distinguished by association. And here, the setting aside of the path factors is to show the path-cause states that are devoid of the state of being a path condition; by this, He defines the path-cause states without confusion. But if someone were to say, ‘Having set aside each individual factor, even with respect to the state of being a path-cause for those states associated with it, this phrase, “having set aside the path factors,” is suitable.’ Indeed, if this were so, as in the third method, here also the word ‘ṭhapetvā’ should not have been spoken. And yet, it has been spoken. Therefore, the meaning should be understood precisely by the method that has been stated. Indeed, this method is for the purpose of showing the distinction between associated path factors and non-path-factor states. The intention is: ‘of the remaining path factors previously set aside.’ For indeed, in the case of contact and other states, their nature as path-causes is already established even in the previous method.

Sammādiṭṭhiyā dutiyanayepi ṭhapitāya tatiyanaye sahetukabhāvo dassito. Kathaṃ dassito, nanu ariyamaggasamaṅgissa ‘‘alobho adoso ime dhammā maggahetū’’ti (dha. sa. 1039) avatvā ‘‘alobho adoso amoho ime dhammā maggahetū’’ti visuṃ sammādiṭṭhiādike maggahetū dassetvā ‘‘taṃsampayutto…pe… viññāṇakkhandho’’ti (dha. sa. 1039) visuṃ maggahetukānaṃ dassitattā ‘‘maggahetūsu amoho’’ti (dha. sa. 1039) vuttāya sammādiṭṭhiyā maggahetukatā na dassitā siyā? No na dassitā. Yathā hi tīṇi saṃyojanāni dassetvā ‘‘tadekaṭṭho lobho doso moho, ime dhammā dassanena pahātabbahetū’’ti (dha. sa. 1017) visuṃ pahātabbahetū niyametvā ‘‘tadekaṭṭhā ca kilesā’’tiādivacanena (dha. sa. 1017) lobhadosamohā ca aññamaññasahajekaṭṭhā aññamaññasampayuttā saṅkhārakkhandhabhūtā ca dassanenapahātabbahetukāti dassitā honti, evamidhāpi ‘‘alobhādayo ime dhammā maggahetū’’ti nigamitāpi aññamaññasampayuttasaṅkhārakkhandhabhāvato taṃsampayuttasaṅkhārakkhandhavacanena ‘‘maggahetukā’’ti dassitā evāti siddhaṃ hoti, sammādiṭṭhiyāpi amohoti vuttāya maggahetukabhāvadassanaṃ. Sace pana yo dutiyanaye maggo ceva hetu cāti vutto, tato aññasseva aññena asādhāraṇena pariyāyena maggahetubhāvaṃ dassetvā taṃsampayogato sammādiṭṭhiyā maggahetukabhāvadassanattho tatiyanayo siyā. ‘‘Ariyamaggasamaṅgissa alobho adoso ime dhammā maggahetū’’tiādi vattabbaṃ siyā. Yasmā pana ‘‘maggahetū’’ti iminā aññena sādhāraṇena pariyāyena yesaṃ maggahetubhāvo sambhavati, te sabbe ‘‘maggahetū’’ti dassetvā taṃsampayuttānaṃ [Pg.166] tesaṃ aññesañca maggahetukabhāvadassanattho tatiyanayo, tasmā tattha ‘‘amoho’’tipi vuttaṃ. Na hi so maggahetu na hotīti. Ime pana tayopi nayā atthavisesavasena nikkhittattā atthato nikkhepā daṭṭhabbā. Atha vā sarūpena vacanaṃ dhammato nikkhepo, atthena atthatoti evampi yojanā sambhavati. Tattha dutiyatatiyanayā sarūpato hetuhetumantudassanavasena dhammato nikkhepo. Paṭhamanayo tathāadassanato atthena ca maggaṅgataṃsampayuttānaṃ hetuhetumantubhāvāvagamanato atthato nikkhepoti.

For the right view that was set aside in the second method, its state of being with a cause is shown in the third method. How is it shown? Is it not so? Since the path-causes, including right view, were shown separately as 'non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion—these states are path-causes', and then those things conditioned by the path-causes were shown separately with the words 'the aggregate of consciousness associated with that...', would it not be that the state of being conditioned by the path-cause for right view—which was called 'non-delusion' among the path-causes—was not shown? No, it was not that it was not shown. For just as, having shown the three fetters, and having separately determined the causes to be abandoned as 'Greed, hatred, and delusion, which have that as their single basis—these states are causes to be abandoned by seeing', then by the words beginning with 'And the defilements which have that as their single basis...', greed, hatred, and delusion—being mutually co-arisen with a single basis, mutually associated, and having become the aggregate of formations—are shown as being conditioned by causes to be abandoned by seeing; so too here, even though it was concluded that 'Non-greed and the others—these states are path-causes', because of their state as the aggregate of formations mutually associated with one another, by the words 'the aggregate of formations associated with that', they are indeed shown as 'conditioned by the path-cause'. Thus, the showing of the state of being conditioned by the path-cause for the right view, which was called 'non-delusion', is established. But if the third method were for the purpose of showing the state of being a path-cause for something else entirely by another, uncommon method—different from that which in the second method was called 'both path and cause'—and through association with that, showing the state of being conditioned by the path-cause for right view, then it should have been said, 'For one endowed with the noble path, non-greed and non-hatred—these states are path-causes,' and so on. But since the third method is for the purpose of showing, by this other, general method called 'path-causes', all those for whom the state of being a path-cause is possible as 'path-causes', and then showing the state of being conditioned by the path-cause for those states associated with them, for them themselves, and for others, therefore 'non-delusion' was also stated there. For it is not that it is not a path-cause. These three methods, however, because they are set forth according to a distinction of meaning, should be seen as expositions according to meaning. Alternatively, a statement by way of its own nature is an exposition by way of the Dhamma, and a statement by way of meaning is an exposition by way of meaning; such a connection is also possible. Therein, the second and third methods are an exposition by way of the Dhamma, in the sense of showing the cause and the possessor of the cause according to their own nature. The first method, because it does not show them in that way and because the state of being cause and possessor of cause for the path factors and their associated states is understood by way of meaning, is an exposition by way of meaning.

1040. Yasmiṃ sabhāvadhamme ninnapoṇapabbhārabhāvena cittaṃ pavattati, so tassa ārammaṇādhipati veditabbo. Cetopariyañāṇena jānitvā paccavekkhamāno tena paccavekkhamānoti vutto. Etthāpīti etasmimpi aṭṭhakathāvacane, ettha vā paṭṭhāne maggādīni ṭhapetvā aññesaṃ adhipatipaccayabhāvassa avacaneneva paṭikkhepapāḷiyaṃ. Ayamevatthoti attano maggaphalaṃ ṭhapetvāti attho. Vīmaṃsādhipateyyanti padhānena adhipatinā sahajātādhipati nidassito, tayidaṃ nayadassanamattameva hotīti aññopi evaṃpakāro sahajāto maggādhipati nidassito hoti, tasmā vīriyādhipateyyanti ca yojetabbaṃ. Idampi hi atthato vuttamevāti.

1040. That intrinsic phenomenon in which the mind proceeds with a state of inclination, bending, and sloping, should be known as the object-dominance for that mind. Having known by means of the knowledge of others' minds, one who reviews is said to be 'one who reviews by means of that'. Here too—in this commentary statement, or here in the Paṭṭhāna—in the Pāḷi of rejection, the rejection is conveyed by the very non-statement of the state of being a dominance-condition for others, excluding the path and so forth. This is the meaning: 'excluding one's own path and fruition'. By 'investigation-dominance,' co-nascent dominance is indicated by means of the principal dominant factor. This is merely an illustration of the method; thus, another co-nascent path-dominance of this kind is also indicated. Therefore, 'energy-dominance' should also be connected. For this too is indeed stated by way of meaning.

1041. Attano sabhāvo attabhāvo. Laddhokāsassa kammassa vipāko kappasahassātikkame uppajjati anekakappasahassāyukānaṃ sattānaṃ, kappasahassātikkamepi vā laddhokāsaṃ yaṃ bhavissati, tadapi laddhokāsamevāti attano vipākaṃ sandhāya vuccati. Natthi nāma na hotīti anuppanno nāma na hotīti adhippāyo. Uppādīsu antogadhattā ‘‘uppādino dhammā’’ti etena vacanena vuccatīti katvā āha ‘‘uppādino dhammā nāma jāto’’ti. Arūpasaṅkhāto attāti arūpabhavaṅgaṃ āha. Tattha ākāsānañcāyatanasaññādimayo attāti hi atthato vohāro pavattoti.

1041. One's own intrinsic nature is self-existence. For beings with lifespans of many thousands of aeons, the result of kamma that has obtained an opportunity arises after the lapse of a thousand aeons. Or, whatever kamma that has obtained an opportunity will be, even after the lapse of a thousand aeons, that too is indeed one that has obtained an opportunity; thus, this is said with reference to one's own result. “It is not that it does not exist”; the intention is: “It is not that it is what is called ‘non-arisen’.” Because of being included in arising and so forth, it is stated by this statement, 'arising phenomena'; for this reason, he said: '“Arising phenomena” means “born”'. By 'the self reckoned as formless,' he speaks of the formless life-continuum. For there, the conventional designation proceeds by way of meaning as 'the self consisting of the perception of the base of infinite space and so forth'.

Yadi pana āyū…pe… sabbaṃ vipākaṃ dadeyya, aladdhokāsañca vipākaṃ detīti katvā vipakkavipākañca dadeyya, tato ekasseva kammassa sabbavipākena bhavitabbanti aññassa kammassa okāso na bhaveyya niratthakattā[Pg.167], uppattiyāyeva okāso na bhaveyya, uppannassa vā phaladāne. Atha vā aladdhokāsassa vipākadāne paccayantararahitassapi vipākadānaṃ āpannanti avijjātaṇhādipaccayantarakhepakassa aññassa apacayagāmikammassa kammakkhayakarassa okāso na bhaveyya. Bhāvitepi magge avijjādipaccayantararahitassa ca kammassa vipaccanato samatthatā na siyāti attho. Sabbadā vā vipākappavattiyā eva bhavitabbattā vipākato aññassa pavattiokāso na bhaveyya. Taṃ panāti āyūhitaṃ kammaṃ. Idaṃ pana dhuvavipākassa vipākena adhuvavipākassapi laddhokāsassa vipākaṃ uppādīti dassetuṃ āraddhanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Aṭṭha samāpattiyo ca balavavirahe aggamaggabhāvanāvirahe ca appahīnasabhāvato dhuvaṃ vipaccantīti dhuvavipākāti vuttā. Āyūhitakamme vuccamāne anuppannaṃ kasmā vuttanti? Yaṃ āyūhitaṃ bhavissati, tatthāpi āyūhita-saddappavattisabbhāvā.

Furthermore, if accumulated kamma... were to give all its result, and, because it gives a result even to kamma that has not obtained an opportunity, it were also to give a result that has already ripened, then for one kamma alone, all results would have to be produced. Thus, there would be no opportunity for other kamma, because of its being meaningless. Or, in the giving of fruit by what has arisen, there would be no opportunity for the arising of other kamma. Alternatively, if there is the giving of a result for kamma that has not obtained an opportunity, it would follow that even kamma devoid of other conditions could give a result. Therefore, there would be no opportunity for other kamma which leads to the waning of kamma, which brings about the destruction of kamma, and which eradicates other conditions such as ignorance and craving. Even when the path is developed, because of the ripening of kamma that is devoid of other conditions like ignorance, the capability to bring kamma to an end would not exist; this is the meaning. Or, because the occurrence of result must always be, there would be no opportunity for the occurrence of anything other than result. 'That, however' means accumulated kamma. However, it should be understood that this is begun to show that by the result of kamma with a fixed result, the result of kamma with an unfixed result that has obtained an opportunity is called `uppādi`. The eight attainments, in the absence of other strong kamma and in the absence of the development of the supreme path, ripen with certainty because their nature is not abandoned; thus they are called 'having a fixed result'. When speaking of accumulated kamma, why is the unarisen mentioned? Because for that which will be accumulated kamma, there too, the application of the word 'accumulated' is possible.

1050. Upādinnāti ettha na upetena ādinnāti ayamattho, upasaddo pana upasaggamattameva, tasmā upādānārammaṇā upādānehi, aññe ca anabhinivesena ‘‘ahaṃ maggaṃ bhāvayiṃ, mama maggo uppanno’’tiādikena gahaṇena ādinnā icceva upādinnā. Upādinna-saddena vā amaggaphaladhammāyeva vuttā, itarehi maggaphaladhammā cāti veditabbaṃ.

1050. Here, in `upādinna`, the meaning is not 'taken by that which is approached by craving and views'; rather, the word `upa` is merely a prefix. Therefore, worldly phenomena which are objects of clinging are taken by the clingings; and other phenomena, that is, path and fruit, are also taken by the taking, which is the reviewing knowledge, without adherence, such as 'I have developed the path, my path has arisen.' For this very reason, they are called `upādinna`. Alternatively, it should be understood that by the word `upādinna`, only phenomena that are not path and fruit are spoken of, while path and fruit phenomena are spoken of by other terms such as `ajjhattaṃ`, `paccattaṃ`, etc.

Tikanikkhepakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Triplets is concluded.

Dukanikkhepakathāvaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Exposition of the Couplets

1062. Mettāyanavasenāti mettāpharaṇavasena. ‘‘Mettayanavasenā’’ti vattabbe dīghaṃ katvā vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Mettā, medanaṃ vā mettāyanaṃ, tañca sinehavasena. Anudayatīti anudāti vattabbe ‘‘anuddā’’ti da-kārāgamanaṃ katvā vuttaṃ. Anuddāyanākāroti anurakkhaṇākāro. Rakkhaṇañhi dāyanā. Anuddāyitassāti anuddāya ayitassa. ‘‘Jātipi dukkhā’’tiādiṃ suṇantassa savane, aniccādito sammasantassa sammasane, maggenettha sammohaṃ viddhaṃsentassa paṭivedhe, paṭivijjhitvā paccavekkhantassa paccavekkhaṇeti catūsu kālesu dukkhe ñāṇaṃ vattati.

1062. `Mettāyanavasenāti` means by way of the pervasion of loving-kindness. It should be understood that although it should be said as 'mettayanavasenā,' it is spoken with a long vowel. Alternatively, the loving (`medanaṃ`) of mettā is `mettāyana`, and that is by way of affection. Because it protects (`anudayati`), it is called `anudā`; although it should be said thus, it is said as 'anuddā' by making an insertion of the letter 'd'. `Anuddāyanākāro` means the mode of protecting; indeed, protection (`rakkhaṇa`) is `dāyanā`. `Anuddāyitassa` means: of the mind that has occurred through protection. For one hearing 'Birth is suffering,' and so forth, in the act of hearing; for one comprehending from impermanence onwards, in the act of comprehension; for one dispelling delusion herein by the path, in the act of penetration; and for one reviewing after having penetrated, in the act of reviewing—thus in these four periods, knowledge of suffering operates.

1065. Cittassa [Pg.168] saṃrañjanaṃ cittassa sārāgo. Gijjhantīti abhikaṅkhanti. Sañjaṃntīti bandhanti. Lagganaṭṭhenāti saṃvaraṇaṭṭhena, olambanaṭṭhena vā. Tassa tasseva bhavassāti kāmabhavādisaṅkhātassa vipākakaṭattārūpassa abhinibbattiatthaṃ paṭisandhiyā paccayabhāvavasena parikaḍḍhati. Cittamassa bhavantare vidhāvati nibbattati. Taṇhāvipphanditaniveso aṭṭhasatataṇhāvicaritādibhāvena taṇhāpavattiyeva.

1065. The intense clinging (`saṃrañjanaṃ`) of the mind is the mind's strong attachment (`cittassa sārāgo`). `Gijjhanti` means they greatly desire. `Sañjanti` means they bind. In the sense of clinging (`lagganaṭṭhena`) means in the sense of restraining, or alternatively, in the sense of hanging down. 'For that very existence' means it drags the mind by way of being a condition for rebirth-linking, for the purpose of the arising of the resultant mental aggregates and kamma-born matter, designated as existence in the desire realm, and so forth. This being's mind runs about and arises in another existence. The trembling and settling of craving is simply the occurrence of craving by way of the one hundred and eight permutations of craving, and so forth.

Saritānīti rāgavasena allāni. Taṃsampayuttapītivasena siniddhāni sinehitāni. Visatāti vitthatā. Rūpādīsu tebhūmakadhammesu byāpanavasena visaṭā. Purimavacanameva ta-kārassa ṭa-kāraṃ katvā vuttaṃ. Visālāti vipulā. Visakkatīti parisappati, sahati vā. Ratto hi rāgavatthunā pādena tāliyamānopi sahatīti. Osakkanaṃ, vipphandanaṃ vā visakkananti vadanti. Aniccādiṃ niccādito gaṇhantī visaṃvādikā hoti. Visaṃharatīti tathā tathā kāmesu ānisaṃsaṃ passantī vividhehākārehi nekkhammābhimukhappavattito cittaṃ saṃharati saṅkhipati. Visaṃ vā dukkhaṃ, taṃ harati vahatīti attho. Dukkhanibbattakassa kammassa hetubhāvato visamūlā, visaṃ vā dukkhavedanāmūlaṃ etissāti visamūlā. Dukkhasamudayattā visaṃ phalaṃ etissāti visaphalā. Taṇhāya rūpādikassa dukkhasseva paribhogo hoti, na amatassāti sā ‘‘visaparibhogā’’ti vuttā. Sabbattha niruttivasena padasiddhi veditabbā. Yo panettha padhāno attho, taṃ dassetuṃ puna ‘‘visatā vā panā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Itthabhāvaññathābhāvanti manussabhāvadevādibhāvabhūtaṃ.

They are wet (`saritāni`) means they are wet by the power of lust. By the power of the delight associated with it, they are smooth and clinging. 'Spread out' (`visatā`) means extensive. They are widespread in forms and other phenomena of the three planes by the power of pervasion. The very previous word is spoken having made the letter 'ta' into the letter 'ṭa'. 'Vast' (`visālā`) means extensive. 'Wanders' (`visakkati`) means it creeps about, or it endures. For indeed, a lustful person, even when struck by the foot by an object of lust, endures. Alternatively, they say that retreating or struggling is 'wandering' (`visakkanaṃ`). Taking the impermanent, etc., as permanent, etc., it is deceptive. It 'withdraws' (`visaṃharati`) means that seeing the benefits in sensual pleasures in this and that way, with various aspects it withdraws and contracts the mind from proceeding towards renunciation. Alternatively, `visaṃ` is suffering; it carries or bears that—this is the meaning. It is 'poison-rooted' (`visamūlā`) because of being the cause of kamma that produces suffering, or because for it, the root is poison, that is, painful feeling. It is 'poison-fruited' (`visaphalā`) because for it, the fruit is poison, due to being the origin of suffering. Since through craving there is enjoyment only of suffering, such as forms, etc., and not of the deathless, it is called 'poison-enjoying' (`visaparibhogā`). In all instances, the formation of the word should be understood by way of etymology. However, to show which meaning here is primary, it is further stated: 'spread out, indeed...' and so on. 'This state and another state' (`itthabhāvaññathābhāvaṃ`) refers to having become the state of a human, the state of a deva, and so on.

Paṇidhānakavasenāti cittassa rūpādīsu ṭhapanakavasena. Aññopi bandhu taṇhāya eva hoti, so pana abandhupi hoti. Taṇhā pana niccasannissitāti ‘‘pāṭiyekko bandhū’’ti vuttā. Asanatoti byāpanato bhuñjanato ca. Tadubhayaṃ dasseti ‘‘ajjhottharaṇato’’tiādinā. Āsīsanavasenāti icchanavasena. Aññenākārenāti jappanājappitattānaṃ jappāya anaññattadassanākārena. Cittaṃ pariyuṭṭhātīti cittaṃ mūsati. Mārapāsoti mārena gahitatāya rāgo mārapāso.

By way of resolve (`paṇidhāna`) means by way of placing the mind on forms, and so forth. Another kinsman, too, exists only because of craving; however, that one can also be a non-kinsman. But craving is a constantly relied-upon kinsman; therefore, it is called 'the unique kinsman' (`pāṭiyekko bandhu`). 'From consuming' (`asanato`) means because of pervading and because of eating. It shows both these meanings by the text beginning with 'from overwhelming' (`ajjhottharaṇato`). By way of wishing (`āsīsana`) means by way of desire. 'The mind is beset' (`cittaṃ pariyuṭṭhāti`) means it robs the wholesome mind. 'The snare of Māra' (`mārapāso`) means that because it is seized by Māra, lust is called the snare of Māra.

1066. Saṅkhāresu uppanno kammapathabhedaṃ na karotīti etena sattesu uppanno aṭṭhānakopo karotīti viññāyati. ‘‘Atthaṃ me nācari[Pg.169], na carati, na carissati, piyassa me manāpassa atthaṃ nācari, na carati, na carissati, appiyassa me amanāpassa anatthaṃ nācari, na carati, na carissatī’’ti uppajjamānopi hi kopo avatthusmiṃ uppannattā aṭṭhānakopo eva bhavituṃ yutto. Āghātentoti hananto. Punaruttidoso paṭisedhitoti dosa-padassa paṭivirodha-padassa ca dvikkhattuṃ āgatattā vuttaṃ. Paṭighassa vā visesanatthaṃ pubbe ‘‘paṭivirodho’’ti, padosādivisesanatthaṃ ‘‘doso’’ti ca vuttaṃ, dussanādivisesanatthaṃ pacchā ‘‘doso’’ti, virodhavisesanatthañca ‘‘paṭivirodho’’ti vuttanti natthi punaruttidoso.

1066. By the statement '[Anger] arising in formations does not cause a breach of the course of action,' it is understood that inappropriate anger arising in beings does cause it. For even when anger arises with thoughts such as, 'He did not act for my benefit, does not act, and will not act; he did not act for the benefit of one dear and pleasing to me, does not act, and will not act; he did not act for the detriment of one disliked and displeasing to me, does not act, and will not act,' since it arises without a valid cause, it is fitting that it be only inappropriate anger. `Āghātento` means tormenting. The statement 'the fault of repetition is refuted' is said because the term `dosa` and the term `paṭivirodha` have appeared twice. Alternatively, to specify `paṭigha`, it was said earlier as `paṭivirodho`; and to specify `padosa` and so on, it was said as `doso`. Later, to specify `dussana` and so on, it was said as `doso`; and to specify `virodha`, it was said as `paṭivirodho`. Thus, there is no fault of repetition.

1091. Aniddhāritaparicchede dhammānaṃ atthitāmattadīpake mātikuddese aparicchedena bahuvacanena uddeso katoti bahuvacaneneva pucchati – ‘‘katame dhammā appaccayā’’ti. Sabhāvasaṅkhāparicchedādivasena hi dhamme ajānantassa vasena uddeso pucchā ca karīyatīti. Tasmā paricchedaṃ akatvā uddiṭṭhā pucchitā ca. Imeti asaṅkhatadhātuto uddhaṃ natthīti dīpanatthaṃ ekampi taṃ niddisitvā bahuvacaneneva nigamanaṃ kataṃ niddesato pubbe bodhaneyyassa ajānanakālaṃ upādāya.

1091. In the mātikā-summary, which has an undetermined division and merely indicates the existence of dhammas, the summary was made with an indefinite plural; therefore, the question is asked with the plural: 'Which dhammas are without condition?' For indeed, the summary and the question are made for the sake of one who does not know the dhammas by way of division by intrinsic nature, number, and so forth. Therefore, without making a division, they were pointed out and questioned. To show that there is nothing beyond the unconditioned element, the conclusion 'These...' (`ime`) is made with the plural—even after pointing out that one unconditioned element—with reference to the time of ignorance of the person to be taught before the exposition.

1101. Kiṃ pana natthi, kiṃ tena na vuttāti yojanā kātabbā. Idameva manoviññeyyanti niyamābhāvo vavatthānābhāvo. Cakkhuviññāṇādiviññeyyameva cakkhādiviññeyyanti pāḷiyaṃ vuttanti manoviññāṇaviññeyyenapi manoviññeyyena bhavitabbanti katvā aṭṭhakathāya ‘‘kiṃ pana manoviññāṇenā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Kehici viññeyyā kehici aviññeyyāti idaṃ kāmāvacaraṃ manoviññāṇaṃ ārammaṇādivasena bhinditvā yojetabbaṃ. Rūpāvacarādiārammaṇena hi kāmāvacaramanoviññāṇena rūparāgādisampayuttena ca kāmāvacaradhammā na viññeyyā, itarena ca viññeyyā. Evaṃ kāmāvacarānameva ārammaṇānaṃ kesañci saddādīnaṃ rūpārammaṇādīhi aviññeyyatā viññeyyatā ca yojetabbā, tathā dvārabhedavasena. Atha vā somanassasahagatasantīraṇaṃ iṭṭhārammaṇamevāti itaraṃ tena na viññeyyaṃ. Evaṃ upekkhāsahagate kusalavipāke akusalavipāke cāti sabbattha yathāyogaṃ yojetabbaṃ. Rūpāvacarādayo kāmāvacaravipākādīhi aviññeyyā, kecideva viññeyyā [Pg.170] arūpāvacarehīti yojetabbaṃ anuvattamānattā. Nibbānena aviññeyyattāti ‘‘kehici aviññeyyā’’ti imassa padassa atthasambhavamattaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, na nibbānassa anuvattamānamanoviññāṇabhāvato.

1101. Why then do they not exist? Why, for that reason, are they not mentioned? Thus, the connection of words should be made. The absence of the restriction, 'Only this is cognizable by mind-consciousness,' is the absence of determination. Because it is stated in the Pāḷi, 'What is cognizable by eye-consciousness and so on is cognizable by the eye and so on,' and thinking, 'That which is cognizable by mind-consciousness should also be a mind-cognizable object,' it is stated in the commentary, 'What then of that which is cognizable by mind-consciousness?' and so on. This statement, 'By some they are cognizable, by some they are not cognizable,' should be applied by analyzing the sense-sphere mind-consciousness according to its object and so on. Indeed, by the sense-sphere mind-consciousness that has a form-sphere object, etc., and by that which is associated with lust for form, etc., sense-sphere phenomena are not cognizable; but by the other type, they are cognizable. Similarly, among the sense-sphere objects themselves, the non-cognizability and cognizability of some, such as sounds, etc., by mind-consciousness having form-objects, etc., should be applied; likewise, according to the distinction of doors. Alternatively, because the investigating-consciousness accompanied by joy has only a desirable object, the other types of objects are not cognizable by it. Similarly, in the case of the wholesome resultant and unwholesome resultant investigating-consciousness accompanied by equanimity, this should be applied everywhere as is appropriate. Form-sphere phenomena, etc., are not cognizable by sense-sphere resultants, etc.; only some formless-sphere phenomena are cognizable by formless-sphere consciousnesses. Thus it should be applied, because of the sequence. The phrase 'because of being non-cognizable by Nibbāna' refers to the statement 'by some they are not cognizable'; this is said with reference to the mere possibility of the meaning of this phrase, not because Nibbāna has the nature of a sequential mind-consciousness.

1102. Pañcakāmaguṇikarāgoti ukkaṭṭhavasena vuttaṃ. Bhavāsavaṃ ṭhapetvā sabbo lobho kāmāsavoti yuttaṃ siyā. Sassatadiṭṭhisahagato rāgo bhavadiṭṭhisampayuttattā ‘‘bhavāsavo’’ti aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vutto. Bhavāsavo pana ‘‘diṭṭhigatavippayuttesu eva uppajjatī’’ti pāḷiyaṃ vutto. Sopi rāgo kāmāsavo bhavituṃ yutto. Diṭṭhadhammikasamparāyikadukkhānaṃ kāraṇabhūtā kāmāsavādayopi dvidhā vuttā.

1102. The statement 'greed related to the five strands of sensual pleasure' is said by way of pre-eminence. Setting aside the taint of existence, it would be correct to say that all greed is the taint of sensuality. The greed associated with the view of eternalism, because of its connection with the view of existence, is called the 'taint of existence' in the commentary. However, the taint of existence is said in the Pāḷi to arise only in states dissociated from views. That greed, too, should rightly be the taint of sensuality. The taints of sensuality, and so forth, which are the cause of suffering in the present life and in future lives, are also said to be twofold.

1103. Kāmāsavaniddese ca kāmesūti kāmarāgadiṭṭhirāgādiārammaṇabhūtesu tebhūmakesu vatthukāmesūti attho sambhavati. Tattha hi uppajjamānā sā taṇhā sabbāpi na kāmacchandādināmaṃ na labhatīti. Kattukamyatāchando akusalepi uppajjati, na pana dhammacchando.

1103. And in the explanation of the taint of sensuality, the meaning of 'in sensual pleasures' (`kāmesu`) is suitably 'in the objective sense-pleasures belonging to the three realms, which are the objects of sensual lust, lust for views, and so on.' For, therein, it is not that all that craving which arises does not obtain the name 'sensual desire,' and so on; it does indeed obtain it. The desire-to-do arises even in the unwholesome, but the desire for the Dhamma does not.

1105. Aññaṃ jīvanti gahaṇaṃ yadipi upādānakkhandhesveva pavattati, rūpe…pe… viññāṇe vā pana na patiṭṭhāti. Tato aññaṃ katvā jīvaṃ gaṇhātīti sassatadiṭṭhi hotīti. Brahmādiṃ ekaccaṃ attānaṃ ‘‘hotī’’ti niccato aññañca ‘‘na hotī’’ti aniccato gaṇhantassa ‘‘hoti ca na ca hotī’’ti ekaccasassatadiṭṭhi. ‘‘Hotī’’ti ca puṭṭhe ‘‘nevā’’ti, ‘‘na hotī’’ti ca puṭṭhe ‘‘na’’iti sabbattha paṭikkhipantassa amarāvikkhepadiṭṭhi, amarā anupacchedā, amaramacchasadisī vā vikkhepadiṭṭhīti attho.

1105. Although the grasping 'the soul is something other' occurs only in relation to the five aggregates of clinging, yet it is not established in form... or in consciousness. Taking the soul as something other than that, one grasps it; thus, this is the eternalist view. For one who grasps a certain self, such as Brahmā, as 'it exists after death' eternally, and another as 'it does not exist after death' non-eternally, there is the partial-eternalist view of 'it both exists and does not exist.' For one who rejects in all cases—when asked, 'Does it exist after death?' saying, 'It is not so,' and when asked, 'Does it not exist after death?' saying, 'It is not that it is not so'—this is the view of endless equivocation. The meaning is: the view of equivocation is endless (`amarā`), without cessation (`anupacchedā`); or, it is a view of equivocation similar to the amara-fish.

Pañcakāmaguṇiko rāgo kāmāsavoti vuttoti katvā brahmānaṃ vimānādīsu rāgassa diṭṭhirāgassa ca kāmāsavabhāvaṃ paṭikkhipati. Yadi pana lobho kāmāsavabhavāsavavinimutto atthi, so yadā diṭṭhigatavippayuttesu uppajjati, tadā tena sampayutto avijjāsavo āsavavippayuttoti domanassavicikicchuddhaccasampayuttassa viya tassapi āsavavippayuttatā vattabbā siyā ‘‘catūsu diṭṭhigatavippayuttesu lobhasahagatesu cittuppādesu uppanno moho siyā āsavasampayutto siyā āsavavippayutto’’ti. ‘‘Kāmāsavo aṭṭhasu lobhasahagatesu cittuppādesu uppajjatī’’ti, ‘‘kāmāsavaṃ paṭicca diṭṭhāsavo avijjāsavo’’ti [Pg.171] (paṭṭhā. 3.3.1) ca vacanato diṭṭhisahagato rāgo kāmāsavo na hotīti na sakkā vattuṃ. Kilesapaṭipāṭiyāpi āharituṃ vaṭṭatīti āsavānaṃ vacanaṃ pahātabbadassanatthanti katvā te pahāne āhariyamānā pahātabbānampi tesaṃ kilesānaṃ uddesakkamena āharituṃ vaṭṭanti pajahanakānaṃ maggānampīti attho.

Because it has been stated, 'Lust related to the five strands of sensual pleasure is the taint of sensuality,' he rejects the nature of being the taint of sensuality for the lust and the lust associated with views that are in the abodes of the Brahmās and so forth. However, if there is greed freed from the taint of sensuality and the taint of becoming, when it arises in states dissociated from views, then the taint of ignorance associated with it is dissociated from the taints. Just as for the delusion associated with displeasure, doubt, and restlessness, its state of being dissociated from the taints has been stated, so too for that delusion dissociated from views, its state of being dissociated from the taints should be stated, as in: 'In the four types of consciousness dissociated from views and accompanied by greed, the delusion that arises might be associated with taints or might be dissociated from taints.' Because of the statements, 'The taint of sensuality arises in eight types of consciousness accompanied by greed,' and 'Dependent on the taint of sensuality, the taint of views and the taint of ignorance arise' (Paṭṭhāna 3.3.1), it cannot be said that lust accompanied by views is not the taint of sensuality. Since it is also appropriate to present them according to the sequence of defilements, and since the teaching on the taints is for the purpose of showing what is to be abandoned, when they are presented for abandonment, it is appropriate to present those defilements, which are also to be abandoned, in the order of their enumeration, and likewise the paths that abandon them. This is the meaning.

1121. Paṭhamakamānabhājanīyeti ‘‘seyyohamasmī’’ti mānassa niddese. Tattha hi ‘‘ekacco jātiyā vā gottena vā kolaputtiyena vā vaṇṇapokkharatāya vā dhanena vā ajjhenena vā kammāyatanena vā sippāyatanena vā vijjāṭṭhānena vā sutena vā paṭibhānena vā aññataraññatarena vā vatthunā mānaṃ jappeti, yo evarūpo māno maññanā…pe… ketukamyatā cittassā’’ti (vibha. 866) seyyassa sadisassa hīnassa ca pavattamāno puggalavisesaṃ anāmasitvā seyyamāno vibhattoti imamatthaṃ sandhāya ‘‘eko māno tiṇṇaṃ janānaṃ uppajjatīti kathito’’ti āha. Na kevalañcāyaṃ paṭhamakamānabhājanīye eva evaṃ kathito, dutiyakatatiyakamānabhājanīyepi kathito evāti nidassanamatthaṃ etaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Atha vā puggale anissāya vuttānaṃ tiṇṇampi mānānaṃ bhājanīyaṃ ‘‘paṭhamakamānabhājanīye’’ti āha. Seyyassa ‘‘seyyohamasmīti māno’’tiādīnañhi puggalaṃ āmasitvā vuttānaṃ navannaṃ mānānaṃ bhājanīyaṃ dutiyakamānabhājanīyaṃ hoti, tassa mānarāsissa puggalaṃ anāmasitvā vuttamānarāsito dutiyatatiyakattāti, athāpi ca yathāvutte dutiyakamānabhājanīye ‘‘ekekassa tayo tayo mānā uppajjantīti kathita’’nti idha vuttāya atthavaṇṇanāya samānadassanatthaṃ ‘‘paṭhamakamānabhājanīye’’ti vuttaṃ. So eva māno idhāgatoti tattha kathito eva attho yujjatīti adhippāyo. Mānakaraṇavasenāti ‘‘seyyo’’tiādikiccakaraṇavasena. Aparāpare upādāyāti idaṃ purimapurimā mānā aparāpare upanissayabhāvena te uppādentā accuggacchantīti imamatthaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Ketukamyatācittaṃ accuggatabhāvaṃ gacchatīti katvā citteneva visesitaṃ.

1121. In the section on the first kind of conceit, in the exposition of the conceit 'I am better.' Herein, indeed, 'a certain person generates conceit based on birth, or clan, or family status, or perfection of complexion, or wealth, or learning, or sphere of work, or sphere of craft, or basis of knowledge, or what has been heard, or ready wit, or some other reason. Whatever conceit of such a kind, this conceiving... (etc.)... is the desire for prominence of the mind' (Vibh. 866). The conceit 'I am better' (seyyamāna), which arises with regard to a superior, an equal, and an inferior, is expounded without touching upon a specific individual. With reference to this meaning, he said: 'It is said that one conceit arises for three kinds of people.' And this is not stated thus only in the section on the first kind of conceit; it is also stated in the sections on the second and third kinds of conceit. Therefore, this should be seen as an example. Alternatively, he called the section for all three conceits stated without depending on individuals 'the section on the first kind of conceit.' For the section on the nine conceits stated by touching upon an individual—such as 'for a superior, the conceit "I am better"' and so on—is the section on the second kind of conceit, because that aggregate of conceit is the second relative to the aggregate of conceit stated without touching upon an individual. Moreover, since it is stated in the aforementioned section on the second kind of conceit, 'for each one, three conceits arise,' it is called 'the section on the first kind of conceit' for the purpose of showing similarity with the explanation given here. The intention is that that very conceit has come here, so the meaning stated there is indeed applicable. `Mānakaraṇavasena` means by way of performing the function of 'better' and so forth. The phrase `Aparāpare upādāya` is stated with reference to this meaning: earlier conceits, by being a strong supporting condition for later ones, produce them and rise up exceedingly. Because the mind with the desire for prominence reaches a state of being exceedingly uplifted, it is specified by 'mind' alone.

1126. Akkhamanabhāvappakāsanaṃ khiyyanaṃ. Manena piyakaraṇanti evaṃpakāraṃ pūjanaṃ mānananti vuccatīti attho. Issākaraṇavasenāti lābhādiakkhamanakiccavasena.

1126. Khiyyana is the manifestation of the state of not enduring. The meaning is that 'making dear with the mind' refers to such a kind of honoring, which is called mānana. Issākaraṇavasena means by way of the function of not enduring gain and so forth.

1127. Ariyasāvakāti [Pg.172] vacanaṃ ‘‘ariyasāvakānaṃyeva paṭivedho atthi, te ca taṃ na maccharāyantī’’ti paṭivedhadhamme macchariyābhāvadassanatthaṃ. Ganthoti pāḷi. Kathāmaggoti aṭṭhakathāpabandho. Dhammantaranti kusalādidhammaṃ bhinditvā akusalādiṃ attano lolatāya tathāgatabhāsitaṃ titthiyabhāsitaṃ vā karonto ālolessati. Attānaṃ āvikatvāti attānaṃ aññathā santaṃ aññathā pavedayitvā. Yo panāti titthiyo gahaṭṭho vā attano samayassa sadosabhāvaṃ daṭṭhuṃ anicchanto aññāṇena abhinivesena vā.

1127. The phrase 'noble disciples' is used to show the absence of stinginess regarding the Dhamma of penetration, with the meaning that 'only noble disciples have penetration, and they are not stingy about it.' Gantho means the Pāḷi. Kathāmaggo means the sequence of the commentary. Dhammantara means that one will confuse things by destroying wholesome dhammas, etc., and making them unwholesome, etc., or, due to one's own frivolity, by making what was spoken by the Tathāgata into what was spoken by sectarians. Attānaṃ āvikatvā means having made known oneself, who is one way, as being another way. Yo pana refers to a sectarian or a householder who, being unwilling to see the faulty nature of their own doctrine, through ignorance or firm adherence.

Byāpitumanicchoti viviccho, tassa bhāvo vevicchaṃ. Anādaroti macchariyena dāne ādararahito. Kaṭacchunā gāho bhattassa kaṭacchuggāho, kaṭacchuggāho viya kaṭacchuggāho. Yathā hi kaṭacchuggāho yathāvutte bhatte na saṃpasārayati, evaṃ macchariyampi āvāsādīsūti. Gayhati etenāti vā gāho, kaṭacchu eva gāho kaṭacchuggāho. So yathā saṅkuṭitaggo na saṃpasārayati, evaṃ macchariyampīti. Āvaritvā gahitaṃ aggahitaṃ, tassa bhāvo aggahitattaṃ, macchariyaṃ. ‘‘Āvāsādi parehi sādhāraṇamasādhāraṇaṃ vā mayheva hotū’’ti pavattivasena attasampattiggahaṇalakkhaṇatā, ‘‘mā aññassā’’ti pavattivasena attasampattinigūhaṇalakkhaṇatā ca yojetabbā. Yaṃ pana ‘‘parasantakaṃ gaṇhitukāmo’’ti vuttaṃ, taṃ macchariyassa parasantakalobhassa upanissayabhāvaṃ dassetuṃ vuttanti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Yadi hi taṃ macchariyappavattidassanaṃ, parasampattiggahaṇalakkhaṇatā ca vattabbā siyāti.

Byāpitumaniccho means being unwilling to cause to pervade, which is viviccha; its state is veviccha. Anādaro means being devoid of respect in giving due to stinginess. Kaṭacchuggāho is the taking of food with a ladle; it is like the taking with a ladle. For just as the taking with a ladle does not spread out in the aforementioned food, so too stinginess does not spread out in regard to dwellings and so forth. Or, gāho is that by which one takes; a ladle itself is a gāho, hence kaṭacchuggāho. Just as that ladle, with its constricted tip, does not spread out, so too is stinginess. Aggahitaṃ is what is grasped by obstructing; its state is aggahitattaṃ, which is stinginess. It should be connected with the characteristic of grasping one's own property, by way of the occurrence, 'Let dwellings and so forth, whether common to others or not, be mine alone,' and with the characteristic of concealing one's own property, by way of the occurrence, 'Let it not be another's.' However, what is stated as 'desirous of taking what belongs to others' should be understood as having been said to show that stinginess is a decisive support condition for greed for others' property. For if that were a description of the occurrence of stinginess, then it would also have to be said to have the characteristic of grasping the property of others.

1140. Abhijjhākāmarāgānaṃ viseso āsavadvayaekāsavabhāvo siyā, naabhijjhāya noāsavabhāvo cāti noāsavalobhassa sabbhāvo vicāretabbo. Na hi atthi ‘‘āsavo ca noāsavo ca dhammā āsavassa dhammassa āsavassa ca noāsavassa ca dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo’’ti sattamo ca navamo ca pañho. Gaṇanāya ca ‘‘hetuyā sattā’’ti vuttaṃ, na ‘‘navā’’ti. Diṭṭhisampayutte pana lobhe noāsave vijjamāne sattamanavamāpi pañhavissajjanaṃ labheyyuṃ, gaṇanā ca ‘‘hetuyā navā’’ti vattabbā siyā. Diṭṭhivippayutte ca lobhe noāsave vijjamāne pubbe dassito dosoti.

1140. The distinction between covetousness and sensual lust might be the state of being a combination of two taints or a single taint; and since for covetousness there is no state of not being a taint, the actual existence of greed that is not a taint should be investigated. For the seventh and ninth questions do not exist, such as: 'Tainted and non-tainted phenomena are a condition for a tainted phenomenon and for a tainted and non-tainted phenomenon by way of root condition.' And in the enumeration, it is said, 'seven by way of root,' not 'nine.' However, if greed that is not a taint and is associated with wrong view were to exist, the seventh and ninth questions would also obtain an answer, and the enumeration would be fit to be stated as 'nine by way of root.' And if greed that is not a taint and is dissociated from wrong view were to exist, the fault previously shown applies.

1159. Kāmacchandanīvaraṇaniddese [Pg.173] kāmesūti tebhūmakesu sāsavesu sabbesu vatthukāmesu. Sabbo hi lobho kāmacchandanīvaraṇaṃ. Teneva tassa āruppe uppatti vuttā ‘‘nīvaraṇaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca nīvaraṇo dhammo uppajjati na purejātapaccayā. Āruppe kāmacchandanīvaraṇaṃ paṭicca uddhaccanīvaraṇaṃ avijjānīvaraṇaṃ. Āruppe kāmacchandanīvaraṇaṃ paṭicca thinamiddhanīvaraṇaṃ uddhaccanīvaraṇaṃ avijjānīvaraṇa’’nti (paṭṭhā. 3.8.1).

1159. In the exposition of the hindrance of sensual desire, 'in sensual pleasures' (kāmesu) means in all object-sensual pleasures in the three planes that are with the taints. Indeed, all greed is the hindrance of sensual desire. For that very reason, its arising in the formless realm is stated: 'A hindrance phenomenon arises in dependence on a hindrance phenomenon, not by way of pre-nascence condition. In the formless realm, in dependence on the hindrance of sensual desire, the hindrance of restlessness and the hindrance of ignorance arise. In the formless realm, in dependence on the hindrance of sensual desire, the hindrance of sloth and torpor, the hindrance of restlessness, and the hindrance of ignorance arise' (Paṭṭhāna 3.8.1).

1162. Iriyāpathikacittanti iriyāpathūpatthambhakaṃ aṭṭhapaññāsavidhaṃ cittaṃ. Tattha pana balavathinamiddhasahagataṃ cittaṃ ‘‘iriyāpathaṃ sandhāretuṃ asakkonta’’nti vuttaṃ. Olīyatīti olambati.

1162. 'Consciousness related to posture' (iriyāpathikacitta) means the fifty-eight types of consciousness that support the bodily postures. Among those, however, the consciousness accompanied by strong sloth and torpor is said to be 'unable to maintain the posture.' Olīyati means it hangs down.

1163. Onayhatīti chādeti, avattharati vā. Nānārammaṇesu pavattinivāraṇena, vipphārikatānivāraṇeneva vā antosamorodho. Ekaccānanti sirīsādirukkhānaṃ. Rūpakāyeneva siyuṃ, tena sukhappaṭisaṃvedananibbānasacchikiriyānaṃ rūpatāpatti siyāti adhippāyo. Tasmāti ‘‘kāyassā’’ti vacanassa rūpattāsādhakattā. Na hi nāmakāyo supatīti idaṃ thinamiddhasamuṭṭhitarūpehi rūpakāyassa garubhāvappattaṃ aṅgapaccaṅgādīnaṃ saṃsīdanaṃ soppanti sandhāya vuttaṃ, na jāgaraṇacittarahitaṃ bhavaṅgasantatinti. Tassa phalattāti phalūpacārena indriyaṃ viya middhaṃ dassetuṃ middhassa phalattā indriyaniddese viya liṅgādīni middhaniddesepi soppādīni vuttānīti attho.

1163. Onayhati means to cover, or to overspread. Internal obstruction is the prevention of the arising of consciousness in various objects, or simply the prevention of its diffusion. Ekaccānaṃ refers to trees such as the sirīsa and so forth. The intention is that they might exist by means of the material body alone, and because of that, the attainment of the state of materiality would apply to the experiencing of pleasant feeling and the realization of Nibbāna. Therefore, it is because the word 'kāyassa' does not establish its material nature. For this was stated with reference to sleep (soppa)—which is the sinking of the major and minor limbs and so forth of the material body that has attained a state of heaviness due to material phenomena arisen from sloth and torpor—and not with reference to the continuum of the life-continuum (bhavaṅga) which is devoid of waking consciousness. The meaning of 'tassa phalattā' is this: in order to show torpor as being like a faculty by way of a metaphorical usage of its fruit, just as signs and so forth are stated in the exposition of the faculties, so too, because torpor is a fruit, things such as sleep are stated in the exposition of torpor.

Rūpakāyassa antosamorodho natthīti so nāmakāye vuttoti viññāyati. Tena saha vuttā onāhapariyonāhā ca. Rūpakāyassa vā vipphārikāvipphārikabhāvo nāma attano sabhāvena natthi, nāmakāyassa nāmakāye vipphārike lahuko, avipphārike garukoti avipphārikabhāvena onāhanādi nāmakāyasseva hotīti onāhanādayopi nāmakāye viññāyanti. Tenāha ‘‘na hi rūpaṃ nāmakāyassa onāho…pe… hotī’’ti. Āvaraṇabhāvo viya hi onāhanādibhāvopi nāmakāyasseva hotīti. Itaro adhippāyaṃ ajānanto meghādīhi rūpehi rūpānaṃ onāhanādiṃ passanto ‘‘nanu cā’’tiādimāha. Yadi evanti yadi rūpassa onāhanāditā siddhā, arūpassa na siyā[Pg.174], setubandhādīsu rūpassa āvaraṇaṃ diṭṭhanti āvaraṇampi arūpassa na bhaveyyāti attho.

Internal obstruction of the material body does not exist; therefore, it is understood that this was stated in relation to the mental body. Together with that, covering (onāha) and enveloping (pariyonāha) were also stated. Alternatively, for the material body, the state of being diffused or not diffused does not exist by its own nature. When the mental body is diffused, the material body is light; when it is not diffused, it is heavy. Therefore, by means of the state of non-diffusion, covering and so forth belong only to the mental body. Thus, covering and so forth are also understood in relation to the mental body. For that reason, he said: 'For material form is not a covering... etc. ...for the mental body.' For just as the state of obstruction belongs only to the mental body, so too does the state of covering and so forth. The other, not knowing the intention and seeing the covering, etc., of material forms by other material forms such as clouds, said, 'But is it not so?' and so on. The meaning is this: If it were so—that is, if the nature of covering and so forth were established for material form—it would not be for the immaterial; since the obstruction by material form is seen in the case of dams and so forth, obstruction also would not be for the immaterial.

Surāmerayapānaṃ akusalanti katvā yutto tassa upakkilesabhāvo, surā…pe… pamādaṭṭhānānuyogassa ca akusalattā paññāya dubbalīkaraṇabhāvo yutto, tathāpi parassa adhippāyaṃ anujānitvā surāmerayassa upakkilesatā paññāya dubbalīkaraṇatā ca upakkilesānaṃ paññāya dubbalīkaraṇānañca paccayattā phalavohārena vuttāti dassento āha ‘‘na, paccayaniddesato’’ti. Evameva khoti yathā jātarūpassa ayo lohaṃ tipu sīsaṃ sajjanti pañcupakkilesehi upakkiliṭṭhaṃ jātarūpaṃ na ceva mudu hoti, na ca kammaniyaṃ, na ca pabhassaraṃ pabhaṅgu ca, na ca sammā upeti kammāya, evameva. Paccayaniddesatoti upakkilesapaññādubbalīkaraṇānaṃ paccayabhāvaniddesato, paccaye phalaniddesatoti attho. Sayameva kileso upakkilesaniddesesu niddiṭṭhoti adhippāyo.

Because the drinking of intoxicants and liquor is unwholesome, its state as an impurity is fitting. And because devotion to the state of heedlessness caused by intoxicants and spirits is unwholesome, its state as that which weakens wisdom is fitting. Nevertheless, having conceded another's intention, and showing that the state of intoxicants and liquor as an impurity and as that which weakens wisdom are spoken of figuratively as the result—due to their being a condition for impurities and for the weakening of wisdom—he said, 'Not from the exposition of the condition.' Just so indeed, as gold sullied by these five impurities—iron, copper, tin, lead, and silver—is neither soft, nor workable, nor radiant, and is brittle, and does not properly serve for work; just so. 'From the exposition of the condition' means from the exposition of the state of being a condition for impurities and the weakening of wisdom; the meaning is 'from the exposition of the result within the condition.' The intention is that the defilement itself is pointed out in the expositions of impurities.

Nīvaraṇaṃ hutvāva nīvaraṇasampayutte dassiyamāne na nīvaraṇatādassanattho ārambho, atha kho siddhanīvaraṇabhāvassa nīvaraṇasampayuttatādassanatthoti yathālābhavasena ca asampayuttassa vacanaṃ na yujjati. Yathā hi tiṭṭhantampi carantampīti sippisambukādīsu yathālābhasambhavaṃ taṃ dvayaṃ vuttaṃ, na evaṃ ‘‘thinamiddhanīvaraṇaṃ sampayuttampi asampayuttampī’’ti vacanaṃ atthi, yaṃ yathālābhaṃ sambhaveyyāti. Cittajassāsambhavavacanatoti ‘‘cattattā’’tiādivacanassa jhānakkhaṇe cittajassa thinamiddhassa asambhavavacanabhāvatoti attho, ‘‘cattattā’’tiādivacanena vā asambhavassa vacanato pakāsanatoti attho.

When that which is associated with a hindrance is shown, it having already become a hindrance, the discourse is not for the purpose of showing its state as a hindrance. But rather, it is for the purpose of showing the state of being associated with a hindrance for that which has an already established state as a hindrance. Therefore, by way of yathālābha (according to how it is obtained), the statement about it being unassociated is not suitable. For, just as that pair—'standing' and 'moving'—is spoken of in the case of oysters, conches, and so on, as is possible according to yathālābha, in the same way, there is no statement such as 'the hindrance of sloth and torpor is both associated and unassociated,' which would be possible according to yathālābha. 'From the statement about the impossibility of the mind-born' means: due to the statement 'because of being abandoned,' etc., being a statement that speaks of the impossibility of the arising of mind-born sloth and torpor in the moment of jhāna. Or alternatively, the meaning is: because the impossibility is made clear by the statement 'because of being abandoned,' etc.

Kāmesu kho pana…pe… sudiṭṭhoti iminā kāmādīnave aññāṇassa pahānamāha. Taṃ tattha pahānanti taṃ tattha rūpe pahānanti pahānaṃ apekkhitvā ‘‘ta’’nti vuttaṃ, taṃ vinayananti vā attho. Tena rūpassa appahātabbattameva dasseti, na pana ‘‘cha dhamme pahāyā’’tiādīsu middhassa appahātabbatādassanato añño pakāro vutto. Na yathā…pe… vuttanti cha dhammā pañca nīvaraṇāni ca yathā pahātabbāneva hontāni [Pg.175] ‘‘pahātabbānī’’ti vuttāni, na evaṃ rūpaṃ pahātabbameva hontaṃ ‘‘pahātabba’’nti vuttanti attho.

Regarding sensual pleasures... indeed, it is well seen—by this, He speaks of the abandoning of ignorance concerning the danger of sensual pleasures. As for 'That abandonment there,' it means 'that abandonment there in form.' With reference to 'abandonment,' it is said as 'that.' Or, the meaning is 'that subduing.' By this, He shows only that form is not something to be abandoned. However, in passages such as 'having abandoned six things,' another method showing that sloth is not something to be abandoned was not stated. The meaning is this: it is not that form, being something that is indeed to be abandoned, was spoken of as 'to be abandoned' in the same way that the six things and the five hindrances, being things that are indeed to be abandoned, were spoken of as 'to be abandoned.'

Aññehi ca suttehīti vuttasuttānaṃ dassanatthaṃ ‘‘tathā hī’’tiādimāha. Kusalappavattiṃ āvarantīti āvaraṇā. Nīvārentīti nīvaraṇā. Cittaṃ abhibhavantā ārohantīti cetaso ajjhāruhā. Āvaraṇādikiccañca arūpasseva yujjati, tathā andhakaraṇādikiccaṃ. Tattha catūsu padesu purimapurimassa pacchimapacchimo attho. Saṃsāradukkhaṃ vighāto, taṃjanakatāya vighātapakkhikaṃ. Cetaso pariyuṭṭhānaṃ ayonisomanasikārato uppatti akusalarāsibhāvo ca arūpasseva hotīti arūpameva middhaṃ.

To show the suttas mentioned in the phrase 'and by other suttas,' he says 'Thus indeed,' etc. Because they obstruct the arising of the wholesome, they are called obstructions (āvaraṇā). Because they prevent, they are called hindrances (nīvaraṇā). Because, overpowering the mind, they ascend upon it, they are called 'ascendings upon the mind' (cetaso ajjhāruhā). And the function of obstructing and so on is suitable only for the immaterial; similarly, the function of causing blindness and so on. There, among the four terms, each succeeding term is the meaning of each preceding term. The suffering of saṃsāra is annoyance (vighāta); because it generates that, it is on the side of annoyance. The assault on the mind, its arising from unwise attention, and its state as a mass of the unwholesome occur only for the immaterial; therefore, sloth is only immaterial.

1166. Gaṇabhojanādiakappiyabhojanaṃ kappiyasaññī bhuñjitvā puna jānitvā koci vippaṭisārī hoti, anavajjañca bhikkhudassanacetiyavandanādiṃ vajjasaññī akatvā katvā ca koci assaddho vippaṭisārī hoti. Vatthunti mūlaṃ. Evarūpanti mūlavasena evaṃpakāranti attho. Kukkuccapadaṃ yevāpanakesu ‘‘kucchitaṃ kataṃ kukataṃ, tassa bhāvo’’ti vuttatthameva. Kukkuccāyanākāroti kukkuccabhāvanākāro kukkuccakaraṇākāro kukkuccagamanākāro vā. Etena kukkuccaṃ kiriyabhāvena dasseti. ‘‘Kappati na kappatī’’ti pavattacittuppādova vinayakukkuccaṃ.

1166. Having eaten improper food, such as a group meal, while perceiving it as proper, and then knowing it later, someone becomes remorseful. And perceiving a blameless act, such as seeing a monk or venerating a cetiya, as faulty, one becomes remorseful for not having done it; or having done it, some faithless person becomes remorseful. As for 'basis' (vatthu), it means root-cause. As for 'of such a form' (evarūpaṃ), the meaning is 'of such a kind' by way of the root-cause. The term 'kukkucca,' in the yevāpanakas, has only the meaning already stated as: 'A contemptible deed is a bad deed (kukata); the state of that is kukkucca.' The 'manner of scrupulousness' (kukkuccāyanākāro) is the manner of causing scrupulousness to arise, the manner of performing scrupulousness, or the manner of the arising of scrupulousness. By this, it shows scrupulousness as a state of activity. The very arising of a thought that proceeds as, 'Is it allowable? Is it not allowable?' is scrupulousness regarding the Vinaya.

1176. Cittavikkhipanakiccasāmaññena uddhaccaṃ kukkuccañca saha vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Kāmacchandassa anāgāmimaggena pahānaṃ ukkaṭṭhanīvaraṇavasena vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Yadi hi lobho nonīvaraṇo siyā, ‘‘nonīvaraṇo dhammo nīvaraṇassa dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo’’tiādi vattabbaṃ siyā, na cetaṃ vuttaṃ. Gaṇanāya ca ‘‘hetuyā cattārī’’ti vuttaṃ, na ‘‘navā’’ti. Tasmā sabbo lobho kāmacchandanīvaraṇanti arahattamaggenassa pahānavacanaṃ yuttaṃ.

1176. It should be understood that restlessness and worry are mentioned together because of their shared function of distracting the mind. The abandoning of sensual desire by the path of the non-returner should be understood as being stated by way of the pre-eminent hindrance. For if greed were not a hindrance, it would have to be stated, “a non-hindrance phenomenon is a condition for a hindrance phenomenon by way of root condition,” and so on, but this is not stated. And in the enumeration, it is stated, “in the root, four,” not “nine.” Therefore, all greed is the hindrance of sensual desire, and thus the statement of its abandonment by the path of Arahantship is fitting.

1219. Kāmo cāti kilesakāmo ca. Purimadiṭṭhiṃ uttaradiṭṭhi upādiyatīti purimadiṭṭhiṃ ‘‘sassato’’ti gaṇhantī upādiyati, purimadiṭṭhiākāreneva vā uppajjamānā uttaradiṭṭhi teneva purimadiṭṭhiṃ daḷhaṃ karontī taṃ upādiyatīti vuttaṃ. Gosīlagovatādīnīti tathābhūtaṃ diṭṭhimāha. Abhinivesatoti [Pg.176] abhinivesabhāvato, abhinivisanato vā. Attavādamattamevāti attassa abhāvā ‘‘attā’’ti idaṃ vacanamattameva. Upādiyanti daḷhaṃ gaṇhanti. Kathaṃ? Attāti. Attāti hi abhinivisantā vacanameva daḷhaṃ katvā gaṇhantīti attho. Evaṃ attavādamattameva upādiyantīti vuttaṃ. ‘‘Attavādamatta’’nti vā vācāvatthumattamāha. Vācāvatthumattameva hi ‘‘attā’’ti upādiyanti atthassa abhāvāti.

1219. And 'desire' (kāmo) means defilement-desire (kilesakāmo). 'The later view clings to the earlier view' means: taking the earlier view as 'eternal', it clings to it. Or, it is said that the later view, arising in the very manner of the earlier view, thereby makes the earlier view firm and clings to it. The phrase 'the practice of cattle, the observance of cattle, and so on' refers to a view of such a nature. 'From firm adherence' (abhinivesato) means because of the state of firm adherence, or from firmly adhering. 'Merely the theory of self' (attavādamattameva) means: because of the non-existence of a self, this is merely the word 'self'. They cling, they grasp firmly. How? As 'self'. Indeed, those who firmly adhere to 'self' make just the word firm and grasp it; this is the meaning. Thus it is said, 'they cling merely to the theory of self'. Alternatively, 'merely the theory of self' refers to merely the basis for speech. Indeed, they cling to merely the basis for speech as 'self' because of the non-existence of its substance.

1221. Dinnanti dānamāha, taṃ aphalattā rūpaṃ viya dānaṃ nāma na hotīti paṭikkhipati. Mahāvijitayaññasadiso yañño mahāyāgo. Āmantetvā havanaṃ dānaṃ āhunaṃ, pāhunānaṃ atithīnaṃ atithikiriyā pāhunaṃ, āvāhādīsu maṅgalatthaṃ dānaṃ maṅgalakiriyā. Paraloke ṭhito imaṃ lokaṃ ‘‘natthī’’ti gaṇhātīti imaṃ lokaṃ avekkhitvā paraloko, parañca avekkhitvā ayaṃ loko hoti gantabbato āgantabbato cāti paralokato idhāgamanassa abhāvā tattheva ucchijjanato cittena paraloke ṭhito imaṃ lokaṃ ‘‘natthī’’ti gaṇhātīti attho veditabbo. Na hi ayaṃ diṭṭhi paraloke nibbattasseva hotīti. Idhaloke ṭhitoti etthāpi ayameva nayo. Ayaṃ vā ettha attho ‘‘saṃsaraṇappadeso idhaloko ca paraloko ca nāma koci natthi saṃsaraṇassa abhāvā tattha tattheva ucchijjanato’’ti. Purimabhavato pacchimabhave upapatanaṃ upapāto, so yesaṃ sīlaṃ, te opapātikā. Te pana cavanakā upapajjanakā hontīti katvā āha ‘‘cavanakaupapajjanakasattā natthīti gaṇhātī’’ti. Anulomappaṭipadanti nibbānānukūlaṃ sīlādippaṭipadaṃ.

1221. By the term 'given' (dinnaṃ), he speaks of giving (dāna). He rejects it, saying that because it is fruitless, it is not what is called giving, just like form. A sacrifice similar to the Mahāvijita sacrifice is a great sacrifice (mahāyāga). An offering made after invitation is an 'āhuna'; performing the duties for guests is a 'pāhuna'; giving for the sake of auspiciousness in events such as weddings is a 'maṅgalakiriyā'. The meaning of 'One stationed in the other world grasps this world as "non-existent"' should be understood thus: because there is no coming here from the other world and because of being cut off right there, one who is mentally stationed in the other world grasps this world as 'non-existent'. For this view is not only for one who has been reborn in the other world. In the case of 'one stationed in this world', this same method applies. Or, the meaning here is this: 'There is no such thing as this world or the other world, which are realms of wandering, because there is no wandering, due to being cut off in each respective existence.' 'Upapāta' (rebirth) is arising in a subsequent existence from a previous existence. Those for whom this is their nature are 'opapātikā' (spontaneously arisen beings). Furthermore, since they are beings who pass away and arise, he says, 'He grasps that there are no beings who pass away and arise.' 'The practice in accordance' (anulomappaṭipadā) is the practice beginning with virtue that is conducive to Nibbāna.

1236. Nippadesatova gahitoti iminā yaṃ āsavagocchake brahmānaṃ kapparukkhādīsu rāgassa ca diṭṭhirāgassa ca asaṅgahaṇena nīvaraṇagocchake ca kāmacchandassa anāgāmimaggena pahātabbatādassanena sappadesattaṃ vuttaṃ, taṃ nivāritaṃ hoti. Arahattamaggenāti vacanena catūhi maggehi pahātabbatā vuttāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Na hi purimehi atanukatā mohādayo arahattamaggena pahīyantīti.

1236. By this phrase 'taken unreservedly' (nippadesato'va gahito), that state of being partial (sappadesattaṃ) which was stated—namely, in the cluster of cankers, by the non-inclusion of lust and lust associated with views regarding the Brahmās' celestial trees, and so on, and in the cluster of hindrances, by showing that sensual desire is to be abandoned by the path of the non-returner—is prevented. By the words 'by the path of Arahantship', it should be understood that their abandonability by the four paths is stated. For delusion and so on, which have not been attenuated by the preceding paths, are not abandoned by the path of Arahantship.

1287. Niratiatthenāti pītivirahena, balavanikantivirahena vā. Na hi dukkhāya vedanāya rajjantīti. Ava-saddena avagāhattho adhoattho cāti dvidhā ava-saddassa attho vutto.

1287. 'In the sense of no delight' (niratiatthenāti) means being devoid of joy, or devoid of strong longing. For one does not become attached to painful feeling. The meaning of the word 'ava-' is stated in two ways: having the sense of plunging in and the sense of 'downward'.

1301. Vicikicchāsahagato [Pg.177] moharaṇo pahānekaṭṭhena diṭṭhisampayuttena rāgaraṇena saraṇo, uddhaccasahagato rūparāgaarūparāgasaṅkhātena. Araṇavibhaṅgasutte (ma. ni. 3.333) pana ‘‘yo kāmapaṭisandhisukhino somanassānuyogo hīno gammo pothujjaniko anariyo anatthasaṃhito, sadukkho eso dhammo saupaghāto saupāyāso sapariḷāho micchāpaṭipadā. Tasmā eso dhammo saraṇo’’tiādivacanato phalabhūtadukkhaupaghātaupāyāsapariḷāhasabhāvabhūto micchāpaṭipadābhāvova ‘‘saraṇo’’ti viññāyatīti tehi sabbākusalānaṃ saraṇatā siddhā hotīti.

1301. The delusion-dust associated with doubt is 'with dust' (saraṇa) by means of the passion-dust associated with wrong view, as they are to be abandoned by the same path; the delusion-dust associated with restlessness is 'with dust' by means of the passion-dust designated as form-lust and formless-lust. Furthermore, in the Araṇavibhaṅga Sutta it is said: 'Whatever indulgence in mental pleasure for one who delights in the pleasure connected with sensuality is low, vulgar, of the common folk, ignoble, not connected with benefit; this state is with suffering, with affliction, with distress, with torment, it is the wrong practice. Therefore, this state is with dust (saraṇa).' Because of this and other statements, it is understood that only the state of being the wrong practice, which is of the nature of resultant suffering, affliction, distress, and torment, is called 'with dust' (saraṇa). Thus, by these, the state of being 'with dust' for all unwholesome states is established.

Suttantikadukanikkhepakathāvaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Exposition of the Dyads in the Suttantas

1303. Vivecitattāti visuṃ katattā pakāsitattā. Asesetvā khepetīti vajiraṃ attanā patitaṭṭhānaṃ asesetvā khepeti puna apākatikatāāpādanena.

1303. “Vivecitattā” (analyzedness) is so called because of being made separate and because of being made manifest. “Asesetvā khepeti” (it exhausts without remainder): just as a diamond, by itself, exhausts the place where it has fallen without remainder by means of rendering it non-existent again.

1311. Tappatīti vippaṭisārī hoti, anusocati vā.

1311. “Tappatīti” means one is remorseful, or one grieves.

1313. Ahanti iti-saddaparena ahaṃ-saddena hetubhūtena yo attho viññāyati, so saṃkathīyati, udīrīyatīti attho. Aññathā hi vuccamānassa vacanena pakāsiyamānassa padatthassa saṅkhādibhāve sabbesaṃ kusalādidhammānaṃ adhivacanāditā siyāti. Bhāvoti sattavevacananti bhaṇanti, dhātuyā vā etaṃ adhivacanaṃ. Dattoti ettāvatā sattapaññattiṃ dassetvā aññampi upādāpaññattiṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘mañco’’tiādimāha. Ahanti ca pavattaṃ adhivacanaṃ vadantena suṇantena ca pubbe gahitasaññena atthappakāsanabhāvena viññāyati. Na hi tasmiṃ aviññāte tadatthavijānanaṃ atthīti visesena adhivacanaṃ ‘‘ñāyatīti samaññā’’ti vuttaṃ. Etassatthassa ahanti idaṃ adhivacananti evaṃ vā saññāgahaṇavasena ñāyati samaññāyati pākaṭā hotīti samaññā. Paññāpīyatīti ahanti idaṃ etassa adhivacananti evaṃ ṭhapīyatīti attho. Voharīyatīti vuccati. Uddheyyanti uddharitabbaṃ. Api nāmasahassatoti anekehipi nāmasahassehīti attho. Sayameva upapatanasīlaṃ nāmaṃ ‘‘opapātikanāma’’nti vuccati.

1313. The meaning that is understood by the word 'ahaṃ', which is followed by the word 'iti' and has become the cause, is well-spoken of, is uttered; this is the meaning. Indeed, otherwise, if the meaning of the word being expressed by the utterance were to be a convention (saṅkhā), etc., then for all wholesome states and so on, there would be the state of being a designation, etc. They say that 'bhāvo' is a synonym for 'satta' (a being), or it is a designation for an element. By this much, 'Datto', having shown the concept of a being, in order to show another derived concept, he said 'a bed,' etc. And the designation that occurs as 'ahaṃ' is understood by both the speaker and the listener, who has a previously acquired perception, by way of revealing the meaning. For, when that designation is not understood, there is no understanding of its meaning. Therefore, it is said: 'Because the designation is known (ñāyati) specifically, it is a convention (samaññā).' Or, because it is known, conventionally known, and becomes manifest by means of grasping the perception thus: 'This word "ahaṃ" is the designation for this meaning,' it is a 'samaññā' (convention). 'It is made known' (paññapīyati) means it is established thus: 'This word "ahaṃ" is the designation for this.' 'It is used in communication' (voharīyati) means it is spoken. 'It should be drawn out' (uddheyyaṃ) means it should be derived. 'Even by a thousand names' (api nāmasahassato) means even by many thousands of names. A name that has the nature of arising by itself is called an 'opapātika-nāma' (a spontaneously arisen name).

Karīyatīti [Pg.178] kammaṃ, nāmameva kammaṃ nāmakammaṃ. Tathā nāmadheyyaṃ. Karaṇaṭhapanasaddāpi hi kammatthā hontīti. Atha karaṇatthā, karīyati ca ṭhapīyati ca etena attho evaṃnāmoti paññāpīyatīti karaṇaṃ ṭhapanañca nāma hoti. Atha bhāvatthā, ñāpanamattameva karaṇaṃ ṭhapananti ca vuttaṃ. Nāmanirutti nāmabyañjananti nāmamicceva vuttaṃ hoti. Na hi pathavīsaṅkhātaṃ atthappakāramattaṃ nivadati byañjayati vā pathavīti nāmaṃ nivadati byañjayati vā, tasmā anāmassa niruttibyañjanabhāvanivāraṇatthaṃ ‘‘nāmanirutti nāmabyañjana’’nti vuttaṃ. Evaṃ nāmābhilāpoti etthāpi nayo. Ettha pana saṅkhā samaññā paññatti vohāroti catūhi padehi paññāpitabbato paññatti vuttā, itarehi paññāpanato.

It is done (karīyati), thus it is action (kamma); name itself is action, thus name-action. Similarly, designation (nāmadheyya). For indeed, the words 'making' (karaṇa) and 'establishing' (ṭhapana) also have the meaning of action. Now, in the sense of instrument: because by this the meaning is designated as 'having such a name', it is made and established, 'making' and 'establishing' become 'name'. Now, in the sense of state: it is said that mere making known is 'making' and 'establishing'. 'Name-utterance' and 'name-expression' are simply called 'name'. For the name 'earth' does not describe or express the mere mode of meaning designated as 'earth'; rather, it describes or expresses the name 'earth' itself. Therefore, to prevent the state of being an utterance and expression for that which is nameless, it is said: 'name-utterance, name-expression'. The same method applies here also to 'name-expression' (nāmābhilāpo). Here, however, 'designation' (paññatti) is so called because something is to be designated by these four terms—concept (saṅkhā), convention (samaññā), designation (paññatti), and usage (vohāro); the other terms are so called because they are means of designating.

Tattha ca ‘‘purimā upādāpaññatti uppādavayakiccarahitā lokasaṅketasiddhā, pacchimā nāmapaññatti, yāya purimā paññatti rūpādayo ca sotadvāraviññāṇasantānānantaramuppannena gahitapubbasaṅketena manodvāraviññāṇasantānena gahitāya paññāpīyantī’’ti ācariyā vadanti. Etasmiṃ pana imissā pāḷiyā aṭṭhakathāya ca atthe sati yaṃ vuttaṃ mātikāyaṃ ‘‘vacanamattameva adhikāraṃ katvā pavattā adhivacanā nāma, sahetukaṃ katvā vuccamānā abhilāpā nirutti nāma, pakārena ñāpanato paññatti nāmā’’ti (dha. sa. aṭṭha. 101-108), tena virodho siyā. Na hi uppādavayakiccarahitassa vacanamattaṃ adhikāraṃ katvā pavatti atthi uppādādisahitasseva pavattisabbhāvato, na ca vacanavacanatthavimuttassa nāmassa niddhāretvā sahetukaṃ katvā vuccamānatā atthi, nāpi aniddhāritasabhāvassa padatthassa tena tena pakārena ñāpanaṃ atthīti.

Here, the teachers say: 'The earlier derived concept is devoid of the functions of arising and ceasing, and is established by worldly convention. The later name-concept is that by which the earlier concept and forms, etc., are designated, being grasped by the mind-door consciousness continuum that arises immediately after the ear-door consciousness continuum, having previously grasped the convention.' However, if this is the meaning of this Pāḷi and its commentary, a contradiction would arise with what was said in the Mātikā commentary: 'Terms (adhivacana) are those that proceed based on mere speech as authority; expressions (abhilāpa) or language (nirutti) are those spoken of with a cause; designation (paññatti) is so called from making known in a specific manner' (DhsA. 101-108). For indeed, that which is devoid of the function of arising and ceasing cannot proceed by taking mere speech as its authority, because proceeding truly exists only for that which is accompanied by arising, etc. Furthermore, a name that is free from both the word and its meaning cannot be specified and spoken of with a cause, nor can the meaning of a word whose nature is unspecified be made known in various ways.

Duvidhā cāyaṃ paññatti yathāvuttappakārāti aṭṭhakathāvacanañca na dissati, aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana vijjamānapaññattiādayo cha paññattiyova vuttā. Tattha ‘‘rūpaṃ vedanā’’tiādikā vijjamānapaññatti. ‘‘Itthī puriso’’tiādikā avijjamānapaññatti. ‘‘Tevijjo chaḷabhiñño’’tiādikā vijjamānena avijjamānapaññatti. ‘‘Itthisaddo purisasaddo’’tiādikā avijjamānena vijjamānapaññatti. ‘‘Cakkhuviññāṇaṃ sotaviññāṇa’’ntiādikā vijjamānena vijjamānapaññatti. ‘‘Khattiyakumāro brāhmaṇakumāro’’tiādikā avijjamānena avijjamānapaññatti. Na cettha yathāvuttappakārā duvidhā paññatti vuttāti [Pg.179] sakkā viññātuṃ. Vijjamānassa hi saṅkhā…pe… abhilāpo vijjamānapaññatti. Avijjamānassa ca saṅkhādikā avijjamānapaññatti. Tesaṃyeva visesanavisesitabbabhāvena pavattā saṅkhādayo itarāti.

And the statement from the commentary, 'This designation is twofold, of the kind as stated,' is not found. However, in the commentary, only six designations, beginning with 'designation of the existent,' are stated. Therein: designations such as 'form, feeling' are 'designation of the existent'; designations such as 'woman, man' are 'designation of the non-existent'; designations such as 'one with the three knowledges, one with the six supernormal powers' are 'designation of the non-existent by means of the existent'; designations such as 'the sound of a woman, the sound of a man' are 'designation of the existent by means of the non-existent'; designations such as 'eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness' are 'designation of the existent by means of the existent'; designations such as 'a Khattiya youth, a Brahmin youth' are 'designation of the non-existent by means of the non-existent.' And it is not possible to know that herein a twofold designation of the kind as stated has been spoken of. For the term... and so on... the expression for what is existent is 'designation of the existent.' And the term, and so on, for what is non-existent is 'designation of the non-existent.' The others are the terms, and so on, which proceed by way of being the qualifier and the qualified of those very two.

Avijjamānapaññattivacanena paññāpitabbā upādāpaññatti, tassā paññāpanabhūtā nāmapaññatti ca vuttā, itarehi nāmapaññattiyeva yathāvuttāti ce? Na, asiddhattā. Sati hi ujuke purime pāḷianugate atthe ayamattho imāya aṭṭhakathāya vuttoti asiddhametaṃ. Yadi ca sattarathaghaṭādidisākālakasiṇaajaṭākāsakasiṇugghāṭimākāsaākiñcaññāyatanavisayanirodhasamāpattiādippakārā upādāpaññatti avijjamānapaññatti, eteneva vacanena tassā avijjamānatā vuttāti na sā atthīti vattabbā. Yathā ca paññāpitabbato avijjamānānaṃ sattādīnaṃ avijjamānapaññattibhāvo, evaṃ rūpādīnaṃ vijjamānānaṃ paññapetabbato vijjamānapaññattibhāvo āpajjati. Tato ‘‘sabbe dhammā paññattī’’ti paññattipathehi avisiṭṭho paññattidhammaniddeso vattabbo siyā. Athāpi paññāpitabbapaññāpanavisesadassanattho saṅkhādiniddeso, tathāpi ‘‘ekadhammo sabbadhammesu nipatati, sabbadhammā ekadhammasmiṃ nipatantī’’tiādinā paññāpitabbānaṃ paññattipathabhāvassa dassitattā paññāpitabbānaṃ paññattibhāve paññattipathā paññattisaddeneva vuttāti paññattipathapadaṃ na vattabbaṃ siyā, nāpi sakkā paññāpitabbapaññāpanavisesadassanattho saṅkhādiniddesoti vattuṃ saṅkhādisaddānaṃ samānatthattā. Vuttañhi ‘‘maraṇenapi taṃ pahīyati, yaṃ puriso mamidanti maññatī’’ti (mahāni. 41) ettha ‘‘purisoti saṅkhā samaññā…pe… abhilāpo’’ti (mahāni. 41). Tathā ‘‘māgaṇḍiyoti tassa brāhmaṇassa nāmaṃ saṅkhā samaññā’’tiādi (mahāni. 73). Na ca ‘‘ayaṃ itthannāmo’’ti saṅketaggahaṇaṃ ‘‘rūpaṃ tisso’’tiādivacanaggahaṇañca muñcitvā aññassa asiddhasabhāvassa atthapaññāpane samatthatā sambhavati, tesañca asamatthatā. Yadi hi tesaṃ vinā paññattiyā atthapaññāpane asamatthatā siyā, paññattipaññāpane ca asamatthatāti tassā aññā paññatti vattabbā siyā, tassā tassāti anavatthānaṃ, tato atthavijānanameva na siyā, nāpi saṅketaggahaṇaṃ saṅketassa paññattibhāve ‘‘ayaṃ imassa bhāsitassa attho’’ti vā, ‘‘imassatthassa idaṃ vacanaṃ jotaka’’nti vā. Saññuppādamatte pana saṅketaggahaṇe vacanassa vacanatthavinimuttassa [Pg.180] kappane payojanaṃ natthi. ‘‘Buddhassa bhagavato vohāro lokiye sote paṭihaññati’’ (kathā. 347), ‘‘abhijānāsi no tvaṃ ānanda ito pubbe evarūpaṃ nāmadheyyaṃ sutaṃ yadidaṃ janavasabho’’ti (dī. ni. 2.280), ‘‘nāmañca sāveti koṇḍañño ahaṃ bhagavā’’tiādīhi (saṃ. ni. 1.217) ca paññattiyā vacanabhāvo siddho. Tasmā pāḷiyā aṭṭhakathāya ca aviruddho attho vicāretvā gahetabbo.

If one were to object: By the term 'non-existent designation' (avijjamānapaññatti), is it not so that both the dependent designation (upādāpaññatti), which is to be made known, and the name-designation (nāmapaññatti), which is the means of making it known, are stated; and that by the other terms, only the name-designation is stated as has been said? No, because that is unestablished. For, when a straightforward, earlier meaning that accords with the Pāḷi exists, this assertion that 'this meaning is stated by this commentary' is unestablished. And if the dependent designation—which has various types such as 'being,' 'chariot,' 'pot,' etc.; 'direction,' 'time,' 'kasiṇa,' 'unentangled space,' 'space revealed by the removal of a kasiṇa,' the object of the sphere of nothingness, the attainment of cessation, and so on—is a non-existent designation, then by this very term its non-existence is stated. Therefore, it should not be said that it exists. And just as, because they are things to be made known, non-existent things like beings and so on come to be non-existent designations, so too, because they are designable, existent things like form and so on would come to be existent designations. Therefore, the exposition of designated phenomena, as 'all phenomena are designations,' should be stated as being indistinguishable from the paths of designation. Furthermore, even if the exposition of terms like 'saṅkhā' is for the purpose of showing the distinction between that which is to be designated and the means of designation, still, since it has been shown by such passages as 'one phenomenon falls within all phenomena, and all phenomena fall within one phenomenon' that things to be designated are themselves paths of designation, then when things to be designated are designations, the paths of designation are stated by the very word 'designation.' Therefore, the term 'path of designation' should not be stated. Nor is it possible to say that the exposition of terms like 'saṅkhā' is for the purpose of showing the distinction between that which is to be designated and the means of designation, because terms like 'saṅkhā' have the same meaning. For it has been said, 'Even by death is that abandoned which a person thinks, "This is mine."' Here, it is stated: 'A "person" is a term (saṅkhā), a convention (samaññā)... a verbal expression (abhilāpo).' Likewise: 'Māgaṇḍiya is that brahmin's name, term (saṅkhā), convention (samaññā),' and so on. And without the grasping of a convention such as 'this has such-and-such a name' and the grasping of a statement such as 'form is threefold,' it is not possible for there to be a capability to make known the meaning of another thing whose nature is unestablished, nor is their incapability possible. For if, without a designation, they were incapable of making known a meaning, they would also be incapable of making known a designation. Therefore, another designation would have to be stated for that first designation, and for that one, another, and so on, leading to an infinite regress. Consequently, the understanding of meaning itself would not occur, nor, if a convention were a designation, would the grasping of a convention such as 'this is the meaning of this utterance' or 'this word illuminates this meaning' be possible. However, when the grasping of a convention is merely the arising of a perception, there is no purpose in conceiving of a convention that is separate from the word and the meaning of the word. The verbal nature of designation is established by such passages as: 'The speech of the Buddha, the Blessed One, strikes the worldly ear'; 'Ānanda, do you recognize having previously heard such a name as this: Janavasabha?'; and 'He makes his name heard: "I am Koṇḍañña, O Blessed One."'. Therefore, a meaning that does not contradict the Pāḷi and the Commentary should be investigated and grasped.

Yadi sattādayo avijjamānapaññatti na honti, kā pana avijjamānapaññatti nāmāti? Pakāsito ayamattho ‘‘avijjamānānaṃ sattādīnaṃ saṅkhā…pe… abhilāpo avijjamānapaññattī’’ti. Sattādīnañca avijjamānattā atthitā neva vattabbā, ye ca vadeyyuṃ ‘‘rūpādīni viya avijjamānattā avijjamānatā vuttā, na natthibhāvato’’ti, ayañca vādo hevatthikathāya paṭisiddho, na ca rūpaṃ vedanā na hotīti avijjamānaṃ nāma hoti. Evaṃ sattādayopi yadi atthi, rūpādayo na hontīti avijjamānāti na vattabbā. Yasmā pana yesu rūpādīsu cakkhādīsu ca tathā tathā pavattamānesu ‘‘satto itthī ratho ghaṭo’’tiādikā vicittasaññā uppajjati, saññānulomāni ca adhivacanāni, tehi rūpacakkhādīhi añño sattarathādisaññāvalambito vacanattho vijjamāno na hoti, tasmā sattarathādiabhilāpā ‘‘avijjamānapaññattī’’ti vuccanti, na ca te ‘‘musā’’ti vuccanti lokasamaññāvasena pavattattā. Tato eva te abhilāpā ‘‘sammutisacca’’nti vuccanti. So ca vacanattho sayaṃ avijjamānopi vijjamānassa vacanasseva vasena paññattivohāraṃ labhati, ‘‘sammutisacca’’nti ca vuccati yathāgahitasaññāvasena pavattavacanatthabhāvato. ‘‘Sammutiñāṇaṃ saccārammaṇameva, nāññārammaṇa’’nti (kathā. 434) kathāya ca ‘‘pathavīkasiṇādi cīvarādi ca sammutisaccamhī’’ti imināva adhippāyena vuttanti viññāyati. Yasmā rūpādīsu santānena pavattamānesu ekattaggahaṇavasena te amuñcitvā pavattaṃ sattādiggahaṇaṃ cakkhuviññāṇādīni viya rūpādīsu tesu khandhesu cakkhādīsu ca asantaṃ avijjamānaṃ sattarathādiṃ gaṇhāti, tasmā taṃ parittārammaṇādibhāvena na vattabbanti vuttaṃ. Tathā yaṃ khandhasamūhasantānaṃ ekattena gahitaṃ upādāya ‘‘kalyāṇamitto pāpamitto [Pg.181] puggalo’’ti gahaṇaṃ paññatti ca pavattati, taṃ tadupādānabhūtaṃ puggalasaññāya sevamānassa kusalākusalānaṃ uppatti hotīti ‘‘puggalopi upanissayapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.9) vuttaṃ. Yasmā pana puggalo nāma koci bhāvo natthi, tasmā yathā āpodhātuādīni cittena vivecetvā pathavīdhātu upalabbhati, na evaṃ rūpādayo khandhe vivecetvā puggalo upalabbhati. Paṭisedhitā ca puggalakathāya puggaladiṭṭhi. Vajirāya ca bhikkhuniyā vuttaṃ –

If beings and so on are not designations of what is non-existent, then what is called a designation of what is non-existent? This meaning has been explained thus: 'The reckoning… the expression of non-existent beings and so on is a designation of what is non-existent.' And because beings and so on are non-existent, their existence should not be asserted at all. As for those who would say, 'Their non-existence is stated on account of their being non-existent, just as form and so on are existent, not on account of their utter non-existence,' this doctrine is refuted in the Hevatthikathā. And form is not called 'non-existent' simply because it is not feeling. Similarly, if beings and so on exist, they should not be called 'non-existent' simply because they are not form and so on. However, because when material forms, eye faculties, and so on are occurring in various ways, diverse perceptions such as 'a being, a woman, a chariot, a pot' arise, along with expressions corresponding to the perceptions, and apart from that form, eye faculty, and so on, no existent referent dependent on the perception of a being, chariot, and so on is found, therefore, expressions such as 'being,' 'chariot,' and so on are called 'designations of what is non-existent.' Yet they are not called 'false' because they occur by way of worldly convention. For this very reason, these expressions are called 'conventional truth.' And that referent, although itself non-existent, obtains the usage of 'designation' by means of the existent expression itself, and is called 'conventional truth' because it is the referent of an expression that occurs by way of a perception that is grasped in a certain way. It is understood that in the discussion (Kathāvatthu 434), 'Conventional knowledge has a true object only, not another object,' the statement 'the earth-kasiṇa, etc., and robes, etc., are conventional truths' was said with this very intention. Because when material forms and so on are occurring as a continuum, the grasping of a being, and so on—which occurs by way of grasping as a unity without relinquishing those aggregates—grasps a non-existent, unreal being, chariot, and so on in those aggregates of form, etc., and in the eye, etc., just as eye-consciousness and so on grasp their objects. Therefore, it is said that this object cannot be described as having a limited object and so on. Similarly, depending on the continuum of the aggregate-group that is grasped as a unity, the grasping and designation 'a good friend, a bad friend, a person' occurs. For one who cultivates with the perception of a person that continuum which is the basis for that grasping, the arising of wholesome and unwholesome states occurs. Thus, it is said (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.9), 'A person is also a condition by way of decisive support condition.' However, since there is no real entity whatsoever called a 'person', therefore, just as the earth element is found when one has mentally distinguished the water element and so on, a person is not likewise found when one has distinguished the aggregates of form and so on. And the view of a person has been refuted in the Puggalakathā. And it was said by the bhikkhunī Vajirā—

‘‘Kaṃ nu sattoti paccesi, māra diṭṭhigataṃ nu te;

Suddhasaṅkhārapuñjoyaṃ, nayidha sattupalabbhatī’’ti. (saṃ. ni. 1.171;

mahāni. 186;

kathā. 233);

What do you take to be a 'being,' Māra? Is this your wrong view? This is a mere heap of formations; here, a 'being' is not found.

Sattoti pana vacanassa paññattiyā pavattiṃ dassetuṃ sā evamāha –

But to show the occurrence of the designation 'being,' she spoke thus:

‘‘Yathāpi aṅgasambhārā, hoti saddo ratho iti;

Evaṃ khandhesu santesu, hoti sattoti sammutī’’ti. (saṃ. ni. 1.171;

mahāni. 186;

kathā. 233);

Just as with an assembly of parts, the word 'chariot' comes to be; so too, when the aggregates are present, there is the convention 'being'.

Yadi puggalo na vijjati, kathaṃ puggalaggahaṇassa sārammaṇatā siyāti? Avijjamānassapi ārammaṇassa gahaṇato. Avijjamānampi hi parikappitaṃ lokasaññātaṃ vā vijjamānaṃ vā sabhāvabhūtaṃ ārammaṇaṃ gahetvāva uppajjanato sārammaṇatā vuttā. Sārammaṇāti hi vacanaṃ cittacetasikānaṃ ārammaṇena vinā appavattiññeva dīpeti, na tehi gahitassa ārammaṇassa vijjamānataṃ avijjamānataṃ vāti. Ayaṃ saṅkhatāsaṅkhatavinimuttassa atthitāpaṭisedhaṃ sabbathā anuvattantānaṃ vinicchayo.

If a person does not exist, how could the grasping of a person have an object? Because of the grasping of an object that is also non-existent. For because consciousness arises only after taking as an object that which is non-existent and conceptualized, or conventionally known in the world, or an existing, real phenomenon, it is said to have an object. Indeed, the term 'having an object' only indicates that mind and mental factors do not occur without an object; it does not indicate whether the object grasped by them exists or does not exist. This is the judgment of those who in every way follow the denial of the existence of that which is free from the conditioned and the unconditioned.

1316. Nāmakaraṇaṭṭhenāti aññaṃ anapekkhitvā sayameva attano nāmakaraṇasabhāvatoti attho. Yañhi parassa nāmaṃ karoti, tassa ca tadapekkhattā aññāpekkhaṃ nāmakaraṇanti nāmakaraṇasabhāvatā na hoti. Tasmā mahājanassa ñātīnaṃ guṇānañca sāmaññanāmādikārakānaṃ nāmabhāvo nāpajjati. Yassa ca aññehi nāmaṃ karīyati, tassa ca nāmakaraṇasabhāvatā natthīti natthiyeva nāmabhāvo, vedanādīnaṃ pana sabhāvasiddhattā vedanādināmassa nāmakaraṇasabhāvato nāmatā vuttā. Pathavīādinidassanena nāmassa sabhāvasiddhataṃyeva nidasseti, na nāmabhāvasāmaññaṃ, niruḷhattā pana nāmasaddo arūpadhammesu eva vutto, na pathavīādīsūti na tesaṃ nāmabhāvo. Mātikāya ca pathavīādīnaṃ nāmatānāpatti [Pg.182] vuttāva. Na hi pathavīādināmaṃ vijahitvā kesādināmehi rūpadhammānaṃ viya vedanādināmaṃ vijahitvā aññena nāmena arūpadhammānaṃ voharitabbena piṇḍākārena pavatti atthīti.

1316. 'By the meaning of naming' means: due to its own intrinsic nature of naming, by itself, without depending on another. For, that which makes the name of another, its naming depends on another because it is dependent on that other; thus, it is not the intrinsic nature of naming. Therefore, the state of being a name does not arise for the great populace, relatives, and qualities, which are the makers of common names and so on. And for that which is named by others, it does not have the intrinsic nature of naming; therefore, it indeed has no state of being a name. However, for feelings and so on, because their name is established by its own nature, their status as 'name' is said to be due to the intrinsic nature of naming. The example of earth and so on illustrates only that the name is established by its own nature, not a commonality in the state of being a name. Furthermore, due to established usage, the word 'name' is spoken only in reference to immaterial phenomena, not to earth and so on; thus, for these latter, there is no state of being a name. And in the Mātikā, the non-attainment of the status of 'name' for earth and so on is indeed stated. For there is no occurrence for immaterial phenomena of being designated in a collective manner by another name after abandoning the name 'feeling' and so on, like there is for material phenomena, which can be designated by names such as 'hair' after abandoning the name 'earth' and so on.

Atha vā rūpadhammā cakkhādayo rūpādayo ca tesaṃ pakāsakapakāsitabbabhāvato vinā nāmena pākaṭā honti, na evaṃ arūpadhammāti adhivacanasamphasso viya nāmāyattagahaṇīyabhāvena ‘‘nāma’’nti vuttā, paṭighasamphassopi na cakkhādīni viya nāmena vinā pākaṭoti ‘‘nāma’’nti vutto. Arūpatāya vā aññanāmasabhāgattā saṅgahitoyaṃ, aññaphassasabhāgattā vā. Vacanatthopi hi ‘‘rūpayatīti rūpaṃ, nāmayatīti nāma’’nti idha pacchimapurimānaṃ sambhavati. Rūpayatīti vināpi nāmena attānaṃ pakāsayatīti attho, nāmayatīti nāmena vinā apākaṭabhāvato attano pakāsakaṃ nāmaṃ karotīti attho. Ārammaṇādhipatipaccayatāyāti satipi rūpassa ārammaṇādhipatipaccayabhāve na paramassāsabhūtaṃ nibbānaṃ viya sātisayaṃ taṃnāmanasabhāvena paccayoti nibbānameva ‘‘nāma’’nti vuttaṃ.

Alternatively, material phenomena—such as the eye, etc., and forms, etc.—are manifest without a name due to their nature of being that which reveals and that which is to be revealed. It is not so for immaterial phenomena. Therefore, like verbal contact, they are called 'nāma' due to having a nature that is to be grasped dependent on a name. Impingement contact, too, is not manifest without a name like the eye, etc., and is therefore called 'nāma'. Or, this is included due to its immaterial nature or due to having a nature similar to other nāma, or due to having a nature similar to other contact. For the etymological meaning, 'it manifests, therefore it is rūpa; it causes inclination, therefore it is nāma,' is also possible here for the latter and the former respectively. 'It manifests' means that it reveals itself even without a name. 'It causes inclination' means that because it is not manifest without a name, it makes a name its revealer. As for 'by way of object-dominance conditionality': although there is for rūpa the state of being an object-dominance condition, it is not, like Nibbāna which is the supreme solace, a condition exceedingly by way of its nature of causing inclination towards it. Therefore, only Nibbāna is called 'nāma'.

1318. Vaṭṭamūlasamudācāradassanatthanti sattānaṃ vaṭṭamūlasamudācāro nāma avijjā ca bhavataṇhā ca, taṃdassanatthanti attho. Tattha samudācaratīti samudācāro, vaṭṭamūlameva samudācāro vaṭṭamūlasamudācāro, vaṭṭamūladassanena vaṭṭamūlānaṃ pavatti dassitā hotīti vaṭṭamūlānaṃ samudācārassa dassanatthantipi attho.

1318. As for 'for the purpose of showing the process of the root of the cycle': for beings, what is called the process of the root of the cycle is ignorance and craving for existence; the meaning is 'for the purpose of showing that.' Therein, 'it proceeds repeatedly,' thus it is 'process' (samudācāra). The root of the cycle itself is the process; hence, 'the process of the root of the cycle' (vaṭṭamūlasamudācāro). By showing the roots of the cycle, the process of the roots of the cycle is shown; therefore, the meaning is also 'for the purpose of showing the process of the roots of the cycle'.

1320. Ekekasmiñca attāti ca lokoti ca gahaṇavisesaṃ upādāya ‘‘attā ca loko cā’’ti vuttaṃ. Ekaṃ vā khandhaṃ attato gahetvā aññaṃ attano upabhogabhūto lokoti gaṇhantassa attano attānaṃ ‘‘attā’’ti gahetvā parassa attānaṃ ‘‘loko’’ti gaṇhantassa vā vasena ‘‘attā ca loko cā’’ti vuttaṃ. Taṃ bhavissatīti taṃ dvidhāpi gahitaṃ khandhapañcakaṃ bhavissatīti niviṭṭhā parāmasantīti attho.

1320. And depending on the particular way of grasping each aggregate as 'self' and as 'world,' it is said, 'self and world.' Or, it is said 'self and world' by way of one who, having grasped one aggregate as self, grasps another as 'the world which is for one's own enjoyment'; or by way of one who, having grasped one's own self as 'self,' grasps another's self as 'world.' As for 'That will be,' the meaning is: it is the misapprehending view, being settled thus: 'That pentad of aggregates, grasped in these two ways, will be.'

1332. Saha sikkhitabbo dhammo sahadhammo, tattha bhavaṃ sahadhammikaṃ. Kammatthe vattamānato dovacassasaddato āya-saddaṃ anaññatthaṃ katvā ‘‘dovacassāya’’nti vuttanti adhippāyena ‘‘dubbacassa kamma’’nti āha. Dovacassassa vā ayanaṃ pavatti dovacassāyaṃ. Vacanassa paṭiviruddhavacanaṃ paṭāṇikagahaṇaṃ[Pg.183]. Guṇehi garūsu gāravena vasanaṃ garuvāso. Jātiādīhi jeṭṭhakesu paṭissuṇitabbesu vasanaṃ sajeṭṭhakavāso. Ottappitabbā vā garuno. Hiriyitabbā jeṭṭhakā. Yāya cetanāya dubbaco hoti, sā dovacassatā bhavituṃ arahatīti ‘‘saṅkhārakkhandhoyevā’’ti āha.

1332. The Dhamma that should be practiced together is the 'sahadhammo'; being therein is 'sahadhammikaṃ'. With the intention that, because it occurs in the sense of an object, by taking the word 'āya' after the word 'dovacassa' to have no other meaning, it is said 'dovacassāya', he says, 'the action of one who is difficult to speak to'. Or, the arising or occurrence of being difficult to speak to is 'dovacassāyaṃ'. Speaking in contradiction to what is said is 'paṭāṇikagahaṇaṃ' (obstinate grasping). Dwelling with reverence among those worthy of respect due to their qualities is 'garuvāso' (dwelling with the venerable). Dwelling among elders who should be heeded due to birth and so on is 'sajeṭṭhakavāso' (dwelling with elders). Or, the venerable are those toward whom one should have moral dread. The elders are those toward whom one should have moral shame. With the thought that the intention by which one becomes difficult to speak to deserves to be the state of being difficult to speak to, he says, 'it is just the aggregate of formations'.

1333. Du-saddena yuttaṃ nāmaṃ dunnāmaṃ. Anupasaṅkamantassapi anusikkhanaṃ sevanāti adhippāyena ‘‘bhajanāti upasaṅkamanā’’ti āha. Sabbatobhāgenāti kāyavācācittehi āvi ceva raho ca.

1333. A name connected with the word 'du' is a 'dunnāmaṃ' (a bad name). With the intention that practicing in imitation even of one who is not approached is 'sevanā' (association), he says, 'bhajanā is upasaṅkamanā' (cultivating is approaching). 'In every way' means by body, speech, and mind, both openly and in secret.

1336. Vinayoti vibhaṅgakhandhakā vuttā. Vatthuvītikkamato pubbe parato ca āpattiṃ āpajjanto nāma na hotīti saha vatthunā āpattiṃ paricchindati. Tenāha ‘‘saha vatthunā…pe… āpattikusalatā nāmā’’ti. Saha kammavācāyāti abbhānatiṇavatthārakakammavācāya ‘‘ahaṃ, bhante, itthannāmaṃ āpattiṃ āpajji’’ntiādikāya ca. Saheva hi kammavācāya āpattivuṭṭhānañca paricchindatīti. Āpattiyā vā kāraṇaṃ vatthu, vuṭṭhānassa kāraṇaṃ kammavācāti kāraṇena saha phalassa jānanavasena ‘‘saha vatthunā saha kammavācāyā’’ti vuttaṃ.

1336. As 'Vinaya', the Vibhaṅga and the Khandhakas are spoken of. Because one is not called one who falls into an offense before or after the transgression of the basis, one defines the offense together with the basis. Therefore, he said, 'together with the basis... is called skill in offenses'. 'Together with the formal act' means with the formal act of rehabilitation, etc., and with the words 'Venerable sir, I have committed such-and-such an offense', etc. For it is precisely together with the formal act that one also defines the emergence from an offense. Or, the cause of an offense is the basis, and the cause of emergence is the formal act; thus, in the sense of knowing the effect together with the cause, it is said, 'together with the basis, together with the formal act'.

1338. Ayamevattho saha parikammenāti ettha vutto. Vuṭṭhānakapaññāyāti vuṭṭhānassa kāraṇabhūtāya parikammapaññāya.

1338. This very meaning is stated here in 'together with the preliminary action'. 'By the wisdom of emergence' means by the wisdom of preliminary action, which is the cause of emergence.

1340. Dhātuvisayā sabbāpi paññā dhātukusalatā, tadekadesā manasikārakusalatāti adhippāyena purimapadepi uggahamanasikārajānanapaññā vuttā. Purimapade vā vācuggatāya dhātupāḷiyā manasikaraṇaṃ ‘‘manasikāro’’ti vuttaṃ. Tattha uggaṇhantī manasikarontī dhātupāḷiyā atthaṃ suṇantī ganthato ca atthato ca dhārentī ‘‘ayaṃ cakkhudhātu nāmā’’tiādinā sabhāvato aṭṭhārasevāti gaṇanato ca paricchedaṃ jānantī ca paññā uggahapaññādikā vuttā. Pacchimapade pañcavidhāpi sā paññā uggahoti tato ca pavatto aniccādimanasikāro ‘‘uggahamanasikāro’’ti vutto, tassa jānanaṃ pavattanameva, yathā pavattaṃ vā uggahaṃ, evameva pavatto uggahoti jānanaṃ uggahajānanaṃ. Manasikāropi ‘‘evaṃ pavattetabbo evañca pavatto’’ti jānanaṃ manasikārajānanaṃ. Tadubhayampi manasikārakosallanti [Pg.184] vuttaṃ. Uggahopi hi manasikārasampayogato manasikāraniruttiṃ laddhuṃ yuttoti yo ca manasi kātabbo, yo ca manasikaraṇupāyo, sabbo so manasikāroti vattuṃ vaṭṭatīti. Tattha ca kosallaṃ manasikārakusalatāti.

1340. All wisdom that has the elements as its object is skill in the elements. With the intention that a portion of that is skill in attention, the wisdom of knowing learning and attention is stated even in the former phrase. Alternatively, in the former phrase, attending to the Dhātupāḷi that has been learned by heart is called 'attention.' Therein, the wisdom of one who is learning, attending, listening to the meaning of the Dhātupāḷi, retaining it by way of both text and meaning, and knowing the distinction by way of intrinsic nature—such as, 'this is called the eye-element'—and by way of enumeration—that there are just eighteen—is called learning-wisdom and so on. In the latter phrase, that fivefold wisdom is called 'learning,' and the attention to impermanence and so on that proceeds from that is called 'learning-attention'; the knowing of that is simply its occurrence. Alternatively, just as learning has occurred, the knowing 'learning has occurred in just this way' is 'learning-knowing.' As for attention, the knowing 'it should be made to occur in this way, and it has occurred in this way' is 'attention-knowing.' Both of these are called skill in attention. For learning, too, because of its connection with attention, is fit to receive the designation 'attention'; and whatever should be attended to, and whatever is the means for attention, all of that is fit to be called 'attention.' And skill therein is skill in attention.

1342. Tīsupi vā…pe… vaṭṭatīti tassā ca uggahādibhāvo vutto. Sammasanaṃ paññā, sā maggasampayuttā aniccādisammasanakiccaṃ sādheti niccasaññādipajahanato. Manasikāro sammasanasampayutto tatheva aniccādimanasikārakiccaṃ maggasampayutto sādheti. Tenāha ‘‘sammasanamanasikārā lokiyalokuttaramissakā’’ti. Iminā pana paccayena idaṃ hotīti evaṃ avijjādīnaṃ saṅkhārādipaccayuppannassa paccayabhāvajānanaṃ paṭiccasamuppādakusalatāti dasseti.

1342. By the text 'Or even in the three... it is appropriate,' the state of that skill as being learning and so on is stated. Comprehension is wisdom; associated with the path, it accomplishes the function of comprehending impermanence, etc., by abandoning the perception of permanence, etc. Attention, associated with comprehension and associated with the path, likewise accomplishes the function of attending to impermanence, etc. Therefore, it is said, 'Comprehension and attention are a mixture of the mundane and supramundane.' By the phrase 'With this as condition, this comes to be,' he thus shows that skill in dependent origination is the knowledge of the conditionality of ignorance, etc., for that which has arisen from conditions, such as formations.

1344. Ambabījādīni anupādinnakadassanatthaṃ vuttāni. Sotaviññāṇādīnaṃ visabhāgā ananurūpā anuppādakāyeva cakkhādayo ‘‘visabhāgapaccayā’’ti vuttā, tehi anuppajjamānāneva ca sotaviññāṇādīni ‘‘visabhāgapaccayasamuppannadhammā’’ti. Sotaviññāṇena vā visabhāgassa cakkhuviññāṇassa paccayoti visabhāgapaccayo, cakkhāyatanassa visabhāgena sotāyatanena paccayena samuppanno visabhāgapaccayasamuppanno.

1344. The examples of mango seeds, etc., are stated to show a non-appropriated object. The eye, etc., being incompatible, unsuitable, and indeed non-producers for ear-consciousness, etc., are called 'incompatible conditions.' And ear-consciousness, etc., which indeed do not arise from them, are called 'phenomena arisen from an incompatible condition.' Or, it is an 'incompatible condition' because it is a condition for eye-consciousness, which is incompatible with ear-consciousness. That which has arisen from the ear-base as a condition, which is incompatible with the eye-base, is 'arisen from an incompatible condition.'

1346. Ajjavaniddese ajjavo ajjavatāti ujutā ujukatā icceva vuttaṃ hotīti ajjavamaddavaniddesesu ujukatāmudutāniddesehi visesaṃ maddavaniddese vuttaṃ ‘‘nīcacittatā’’tipadamāha. Tattha ‘‘nīcacittatā mudutā’’ti puna mudutāvacanaṃ nīcacittatāya visesanatthaṃ. Omānopi hi nīcacittatā hoti, na pana mudutāti.

1346. In the exposition of honesty, 'honesty' and 'being honest' mean only straightness and uprightness—thus it is said. In the expositions of honesty and gentleness, he states the word 'lowliness of mind' mentioned in the exposition of gentleness as a distinction from the expositions of uprightness and softness. There, the repetition of the word 'gentleness' in 'lowliness of mind is gentleness' is for the purpose of specifying 'lowliness of mind.' For self-deprecation, too, is lowliness of mind, but it is not gentleness.

1348. Paresaṃ dukkaṭaṃ duruttañca paṭivirodhākaraṇena attano upari āropetvā vāsenti. Cittassa sakamanatāti cittassa abyāpanno sako manobhāvoti attho. Cittanti vā cittappabandhaṃ ekattena gahetvā tassa antarā uppannena pītisahagatamanena sakamanattaṃ āha. Attamano vā puggalo, tassa bhāvo attamanatā. Sā na sattassāti puggaladiṭṭhinivāraṇattaṃ ‘‘cittassā’’ti vuttaṃ.

1348. By not opposing others' wrongdoing and ill-spoken words, they place them upon themselves and dwell. 'The mind's own mental state' means the mind's own uncorrupted mental state. Or, taking 'mind' as the continuum of consciousness as a unity, he speaks of 'one's own mental state' by way of the mind accompanied by joy arising within it. Or, a person is pleased; the state of that is 'being pleased.' That is not of a being; thus, 'of the mind' is said to prevent the view of a personality.

1349. Kāyavācāhi [Pg.185] kattabbassa akaraṇena asādiyitabbassa sādiyanena ca manasāpi ācarati eva, indriyasaṃvarādibhedanavasena vā etaṃ vuttanti veditabbaṃ.

1349. One acts even mentally by not doing what should be done by body and speech, and by delighting in what should not be delighted in. Or, this should be understood as stated by way of the breaking of sense restraint and so on.

1350. Sadosavaṇe rukkhe niyyāsapiṇḍiyo, ahicchattakāni vā uṭṭhitāni ‘‘aṇḍakānī’’ti vadanti. Pheggurukkhassa pana kuthitassa aṇḍāni viya uṭṭhitā cuṇṇapiṇḍiyo gaṇṭhiyo vā ‘‘aṇḍakānī’’ti veditabbā. Padumanāḷaṃ viya sotaṃ ghaṃsayamānā viya pavisantī kakkasā daṭṭhabbā. Kodhena nibbattā tassa parivārabhūtā kodhasāmantā. Pure saṃvaḍḍhanārī porī, sā viya sukumārā mudukā vācā porī viyāti porī. Tatthāti ‘‘bhāsitā hotī’’ti vuttāya kiriyāyātipi yojanā sambhavati, tattha vācāyāti vā. Saṇhavācatātiādinā taṃ vācaṃ pavattayamānaṃ cetanaṃ dasseti.

1350. On a flawed, wounded tree, they call clumps of resin or mushroom-buds that have sprung up 'aṇḍakāni.' However, on a decayed soft-wood tree, powdery clumps or knots that have appeared like eggs are to be understood as 'aṇḍakāni.' Harsh speech should be understood as that which enters as if scraping the ear like a lotus stalk. Speech born of anger, being its retinue, is 'bordering on anger.' A maiden raised in a city is called 'porī'; like her, speech that is very delicate and soft is like a 'porī,' thus it is 'porī.' As for 'therein,' a connection is also possible with the action stated as 'it is spoken'; or it means 'in that speech.' By the text beginning with 'gentleness of speech,' it shows the volition that causes that speech to arise.

1351. Āmisālābhena yaṃ chiddaṃ hoti, taṃ āmisālābhena ‘‘chidda’’nti vuttaṃ. Dveyeva hīti yathāvuttāni āmisadhammālābhehi pavattamānāni chiddāni āha. Gamanasabhāgenāti gamanamaggassa anucchavikadisābhāgena. Saṅgahapakkhe ṭhatvāti saṅgahaṃ karomicceva kathetabbaṃ, na lābhasakkārakāmatādīhīti attho. Avassaṃ kātabbaṃ kiccaṃ, itaraṃ karaṇīyaṃ. Abbhānato aññaṃ āpattivuṭṭhānaṃ ‘‘vuṭṭhāna’’nti vuttaṃ.

1351. The breach that occurs through the non-receipt of material things is called a 'breach' due to the non-receipt of material things. By 'indeed only two,' it states the breaches, as mentioned, that arise from the non-receipt of material things and the non-receipt of the Dhamma. 'By a suitable direction for going' means by a direction suitable for the path of movement. 'Having stood on the side of rendering assistance' means that one should speak only with the thought, 'I will render assistance'; the meaning is that one should not speak from a desire for gain, honor, and so on. What must certainly be done is a 'duty'; the other is a 'task.' A rising from an offense other than rehabilitation is called 'rising up.'

1352. Sasambhārakathāti dassanassa kāraṇasahitāti attho, sasambhārassa vā dassanassa kathā sasambhārakathā. Yassa cakkhundriyāsaṃvarassa hetūti vatvā puna ‘‘tassa cakkhundriyassa satikavāṭena pidahanatthāyā’’ti vuttaṃ, na asaṃvarassāti. Tadidaṃ yaṃ cakkhundriyāsaṃvarassa hetu abhijjhādianvāssavanaṃ dassitaṃ, taṃ asaṃvutacakkhundriyasseva hetupavattaṃ dassitanti katvā vuttanti veditabbaṃ, yatvādhikaraṇanti hi yassa cakkhundriyassa kāraṇāti attho. Kassa ca kāraṇāti? Asaṃvutassa. Kiñca asaṃvutaṃ? Yassa cakkhundriyāsaṃvarassa hetu anvāssavanti tadupalakkhitaṃ, tassa saṃvarāyāti ayamatthayojanā.

1352. The term 'discourse with requisites' means 'together with the cause of seeing'; or, 'discourse with requisites' is the discourse on seeing together with its requisites. Having said, 'the cause of which non-restraint of the eye-faculty,' it is again said, 'for the purpose of closing that eye-faculty with the gate of mindfulness,' and not 'of the non-restraint.' This should be understood as said because it has been shown that the influx of covetousness and so on, which was indicated as the cause of the non-restraint of the eye-faculty, occurs because of the unrestrained eye-faculty itself. Indeed, 'on account of which' means 'because of which eye-faculty.' And because of what? Because of the unrestrained. And what is 'unrestrained'? It is that which is characterized by the fact that defilements flow in because of the non-restraint of that eye-faculty. 'For the restraint of that'—this is the connection of the meaning.

Javanakkhaṇe pana dussīlyaṃ vātiādi puna avacanatthaṃ idheva sabbaṃ vuttanti chasu dvāresu yathāsambhavaṃ yojetabbaṃ. Na hi pañcadvāre kāyavacīduccaritasaṅkhātaṃ dussīlyaṃ atthīti. Yathā kintiādinā nagaradvāre asaṃvare sati [Pg.186] taṃsambandhānaṃ gharādīnaṃ asaṃvutatā viya javane asaṃvare sati taṃsambandhānaṃ dvārādīnaṃ asaṃvutatāti evaṃ aññesaṃ saṃvare, aññesaṃ saṃvutatāsāmaññameva nidasseti, na pubbāparasāmaññaṃ anto bahi sāmaññaṃ vā. Sati vā dvārabhavaṅgādike puna uppajjamānaṃ javanaṃ bāhiraṃ viya katvā nagaradvārasamānaṃ vuttaṃ, itarañca antonagaradvārasamānaṃ. Javane vā asaṃvare uppanne tato paraṃ dvārabhavaṅgādīnaṃ asaṃvarahetubhāvāpattito nagaradvārasadisena javanena pavisitvā dussīlyādicorānaṃ dvārabhavaṅgādimūsanaṃ kusalabhaṇḍavināsanaṃ kathitanti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

Regarding the phrase 'immorality at the moment of javana,' and so on, all this has been stated here so that it need not be stated again; therefore, it should be connected with the six doors as is appropriate. For indeed, the immorality known as misconduct of body and speech does not exist in the five doors. By the passage beginning with 'Just as,' it is shown that just as when there is no restraint at the city gate, the houses and so on connected with it are unrestrained, so too when there is no restraint in the javana, the doors and so on connected with it are unrestrained. Thus, it illustrates only the commonality that when some things are restrained, other things are also restrained; it does not illustrate a commonality of before and after, or a commonality of inside and outside. Or, when there are the door, bhavaṅga, and so on, the javana that arises again is treated as if it were external and is said to be like the city gate, while the other factors are like the inner city gate. Or, it should be understood that when non-restraint has arisen in the javana, it is said that thereafter—because the door, bhavaṅga, and so on have reached a state that is a cause for non-restraint—thieves such as immorality, having entered through the javana which is like a city gate, plunder the door, bhavaṅga, and so on, and destroy the goods of wholesomeness.

1353. Iminā āhārena nittharaṇatthena atthikabhāvo idamatthikatā. Āhāraparibhoge asantussanāti āhāraparibhogakkhaṇe pavattā asantussanā, davatthādiabhilāsoti attho. Ettha ca asantuṭṭhitā lobho, amattaññutā appaṭisaṅkhā ca mohoti ime dve dhammā ‘‘bhojane amattaññutā’’ti veditabbā.

1353. The state of having a purpose for the sake of deliverance by means of this food is idamatthikatā. 'Dissatisfaction in consuming food' means the dissatisfaction that arises at the moment of consuming food, the craving for delicacies and so on; this is the meaning. And here, dissatisfaction is greed, while immoderation and lack of reflection are delusion; these two states should be understood as 'immoderation in eating.'

1355. ‘‘Seyyohamasmī’’tiādinā pavattamānova mānamado. Asaddhammasevanāsamatthataṃ nissāya pavatto māno, rāgo eva vā purisamado. Sakkarasappikhīrādīni yojetvā bahalapakkaṃ bhojanaṃ piṇḍarasabhojanaṃ, bahalapakkaṃ vā maṃsarasādibhojanaṃ. Mandanti appaṃ. Ṭhitiyāti ṭhitatthaṃ. Tadatthañca bhuñjanto yasmā ‘‘kāyaṃ ṭhapessāmī’’ti bhuñjati, tasmā ‘‘ṭhapanatthāyā’’ti vuttaṃ. Abhuttapaccayā uppajjanakāti idaṃ khudāya visesanaṃ yassā appavatti bhojanena kātabbā, tassā dassanatthaṃ. Sakalaṃ sāsananti pāḷidhammampi sabbakusalepi saṅgaṇhāti. Abhuttapaccayā uppajjanakavedanā, bhuttapaccayā na uppajjanakavedanāti etāsaṃ ko viseso? Purimā yathāpavattā jighacchānimittā vedanā. Sā hi abhuñjantassa bhiyyo pavattanavasena uppajjatīti. Pacchimāpi khudānimittāva aṅgadāhasūlādivedanā appavattā. Sā hi bhuttapaccayā pubbe anuppannāva na uppajjissati. Vihiṃsānimittatā cetāsaṃ vihiṃsāya viseso.

1355. The intoxication of conceit is the very conceit that arises from such thoughts as, 'I am better.' The conceit that arises depending on the ability to engage in the practice of the unvirtuous is the intoxication of a man (purisamado); or, lust itself is the intoxication of a man. Food that is thickly cooked after combining sugar, ghee, milk, and so on, is food with a condensed flavor (piṇḍarasabhojana); or, it is thickly cooked food with meat broth and so on. 'Mandaṃ' means a little. 'Ṭhitiyā' means for the purpose of maintenance. And because one who eats for that purpose eats thinking, 'I will maintain the body,' it is therefore said, 'for the purpose of maintaining.' This phrase, 'arising from the condition of not having eaten,' is a qualifier for hunger, stated to show that hunger whose non-arising is to be brought about by food. 'The entire teaching' includes the Dhamma of the Pali texts and also all wholesome states. What is the difference between the feeling that arises from the condition of not having eaten and the feeling that does not arise from the condition of having eaten? The former is the normally occurring feeling that has hunger as its sign. For it arises in one who has not eaten by way of occurring more intensely. The latter, too, has hunger as its sign; it is the feeling of burning in the limbs, sharp pains, and so on, that has not yet arisen. For, conditioned by having eaten, having not arisen before, it will not arise. And having harm as its sign is their difference, arising from the hunger that is harm.

Yātrāti yāpanā vuttā, pubbepi ‘‘yāpanāyā’’ti vuttaṃ, ko ettha viseso? Pubbe ‘‘yāpanāyāti jīvitindriyayāpanatthāyā’’ti vuttaṃ, idha pana catunnaṃ iriyāpathānaṃ avicchedasaṅkhātā yāpanā yātrāti ayamettha viseso[Pg.187]. Dāyakadeyyadhammānaṃ attano ca pamāṇaṃ ajānitvā paṭiggahaṇaṃ, saddhādeyyavinipātanatthaṃ vā paṭiggahaṇaṃ adhammikapaṭiggahaṇaṃ, yena vā āpattiṃ āpajjeyya. Apaccavekkhitaparibhogo adhammena paribhogo. Anavajje aninditabbe paccaye sāvajjaṃ sanindaṃ paribhogena attānaṃ karoti. Anavajjatā ca bhavissatīti attano pakatiaggibalādiṃ jānitvā ‘‘evaṃ me agarahitabbatā ca bhavissatī’’ti pamāṇayuttaṃ āhāretīti attho.

“Yātrā” is said to be sustenance. Previously it was said “for sustenance.” What is the difference here? Previously it was said, “for sustenance” means “for the sake of sustaining the life faculty.” But here, sustenance, which is described as the uninterruptedness of the four postures, is called “yātrā”—this is the difference here. Accepting offerings without knowing the measure of the donor, the things to be given, and of oneself; or accepting for the purpose of causing the ruin of what is given in faith, is unrighteous acceptance; or it is that by which one would fall into an offense. Consuming without reflection is unrighteous consumption. By means of consumption, one makes oneself blameworthy and censurable with a blameless, uncensurable requisite. And “there will be unblameworthiness” means: knowing one’s own natural constitution, digestive fire, and so on, and thinking, “Thus my unblameworthiness will be,” one partakes of food in proper measure—this is the meaning.

Sukho iriyāpathavihāro phāsuvihāro. Ettakañhi bhuñjitvā…pe… pavattantīti iriyāpathānaṃ sukhappavattiyā kāraṇabhūtaṃ bhuñjanaṃ pivanañca iriyāpathehi kāraṇabhāvena gahitattā tehi sādhitaṃ viya vuttaṃ. ‘‘Abhutvā udakaṃ pive’’ti likhanti, ‘‘bhutvānā’’ti pana pāṭho. Punapi hi appasseva anujānanavasena –

A pleasant abiding in the postures is a comfortable abiding. For, having eaten just this much… and so on… they proceed—thus, eating and drinking, being the cause for the pleasant proceeding of the postures, are said to be as if accomplished by them, because they are taken as a cause by the postures. They write, “Without having eaten, one should drink water,” but the reading is “having eaten.” Again, by way of allowing just a little:

‘‘Kappiyaṃ taṃ ce chādeti, cīvaraṃ idamatthikaṃ;

Alaṃ phāsuvihārāya.

“If it is allowable and it covers, this robe is for its purpose; it is sufficient for a comfortable abiding.”

‘‘Pallaṅkena nisinnassa, jaṇṇuke nābhivassati;

Alaṃ phāsuvihārāyā’’ti. (theragā. 984-985) –

“For one seated cross-legged, it does not rain on the knees; it is sufficient for a comfortable abiding.” (Theragāthā 984–985)—

Āha.

He said:

Bhojanānisaṃsoti yathāvuttehi aṭṭhahaṅgehi samannāgatassa bhojanassa agarahitabbatā sukhavihāro ca ānisaṃsoti attho. Yuttassa niddosassa bhojanassa parimāṇassa ca vasena jānanaṃ yuttapamāṇajānanaṃ nāma.

“The benefits of food”: The meaning is that the unblameworthiness and comfortable abiding from eating food endowed with the eight factors as mentioned are the benefits. Knowing suitable and faultless food and its measure is called “knowing proper measure.”

1356. Vināsaṃ pattiyā naṭṭhā, paṭipakkhehi abhibhūtattā muṭṭhā ca sati yassa, so naṭṭhamuṭṭhassati, tassa bhāvo naṭṭhamuṭṭhassatitā.

1356. One whose mindfulness is lost due to reaching destruction, and forgotten due to being overcome by opposing states, is ‘one of lost and forgotten mindfulness.’ The state of such a one is ‘the state of lost and forgotten mindfulness.’

1368. Visuddhippattanti maggaphalasīlaṃ vuccati. Lokuttaradhammāvāti lokuttarasatiādidhammāva. Sīlasampadā pana rūpārūpāvacarā natthīti sambhavato yojetabbā.

1368. By 'the attainment of purity' is meant the morality of the path and fruition. By 'supramundane states' is meant only the supramundane states beginning with mindfulness. As for the perfection of virtue, since it does not exist in the form and formless realms, it should be applied according to what is possible.

1373. Bhogūpakaraṇehi [Pg.188] sabhogo. Catunnaṃ saccānaṃ anulomanti catusaccappaṭivedhassa anulomanti attho. ‘‘Saccāna’’nti hi paṭivijjhitabbehi paṭivedho vutto, catusaccappaṭivedhassa vā upanissayabhūtaṃ paṭivijjhitabbānaṃ catunnaṃ saccānaṃ anulomanti vuttaṃ.

1373. One is endowed with wealth by means of the requisites for enjoyment. 'In conformity with the four truths' means in conformity with the penetration of the four truths. For by 'of the truths' is meant the penetration by means of the truths that are to be penetrated. Or, it is said to be the insight-knowledge which is a strong supporting condition for the penetration of the four truths and is in conformity with the four truths that are to be penetrated.

1378. ‘‘Mama gharaṃ dhuraṃ katvā bhikkhaṃ pavisathā’’ti diyyamānaṃ dhurabhattanti vadanti. Niccabhattādi vā aññepi āṇāpetvā sayaṃ dhuraṃ hutvā dinnaṃ dhurabhattaṃ.

1378. When food is given with the words, 'Having made my house the primary place, enter for alms,' they call it a 'primary-place meal.' Or, having instructed others regarding perpetual alms and so on, and oneself having taken the lead, the food that is given is a 'primary-place meal.'

1379. Paṭivāseti nāmāti nivatteti nāma osakketi nāma.

1379. 'Paṭivāseti' means to cause to turn back, to cause to withdraw.

1380. Pubbe nivutthakkhandhāti purimajātīsu santatipariyāpanne khandhe āha. Khandhapaṭibaddhanti vatthābharaṇayānagāmajanapadādi. Khayasamayeti maggakkhaṇaṃ āha.

1380. By 'the aggregates previously dwelt in' is meant the aggregates included in the continuity in former lives. By 'connected to the aggregates' is meant clothing, ornaments, vehicles, villages, districts, and so on. By 'at the time of destruction' is meant the moment of the path.

1381. Adhimuccanaṭṭhenāti aniggahitapakkhandanasaṅkhātena yathāsukhaṃ pavattanaṭṭhena.

1381. By 'in the sense of resolve' is meant in the sense of proceeding at will, which is designated as 'rushing forward uninhibitedly'.

1382. Khīṇānaṃ anto avasānaṃ niṭṭhitabhāvo khīṇanto, khīṇānaṃ vā ādikālo, tasmiṃ khīṇante. Esa nayo niruddhantetiādīsu.

1382. The end of the destroyed defilements—their cessation, their state of being concluded—is 'khīṇanto'. Or, it is the beginning time of the destroyed defilements. [This is applied in the phrase] 'at that end of the destroyed defilements'. This is the method in such cases as 'niruddhanta' and so on.

Dukanikkhepakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Dyads is concluded.

Nikkhepakaṇḍavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Chapter of Exposition is concluded.

4. Aṭṭhakathākaṇḍaṃ

4. The Commentary Section

Tikaatthuddhāravaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Extraction of Meaning of the Triads

1384. Nayamagganti [Pg.189] suttantabhājanīyādinayagamanaṃ anulomādinayagamanañca. Tampi hi ettha atthesu nicchitesu sukhaṃ samānenti. Pañhuddhāranti ekūnapaññāsāya ekūnapaññāsāya navasu navasu ca pañhesu labbhamānassa uddharaṇaṃ, tesuyeva labbhamānānaṃ gaṇanānaṃ ṭhapanaṃ gaṇanācāro. Atthuddhāranti ‘‘ime nāma cittuppādādayo atthā kusalādikā’’ti uddharaṇaṃ. Kaṇṇikaṃ kaṇṇikanti cittuppādakaṇḍarūpakaṇḍesu vibhatte pasaṭe dhamme ‘‘catūsu bhūmīsu kusalaṃ dvādasākusalacittuppādā’’tiādinā rāsirāsivasena saha ganthetvāti attho. Ghaṭagocchakā kaṇṇikavevacanāneva. Ettha pana catūsu bhūmīsu kusalanti ekavacananiddeso catubhūmakānaṃ kusalaphassādīnaṃ kusalabhāve ekattūpagamanato. Cittuppādakaṇḍarūpakaṇḍesu catubhūmicittuppādādivasena viññātadhammassa vasenāyaṃ atthuddhāradesanā āraddhāti tattha yaṃ catūsu bhūmīsu kusalaṃ vibhattaṃ yāva viññātaṃ, ime dhammā kusalāti attho.

1384. ‘The method of the path’ means the course of the method of the Suttanta Bhājanīya, etc., and the course of the method of conformity, etc. For here, when the meanings are determined, they easily harmonize that method of the path. ‘Extraction of questions’ means the extraction of what is obtainable in the forty-nine by forty-nine and nine by nine questions, and the practice of calculation, which is the establishing of the numbers obtained in those very questions. ‘Extraction of meanings’ means the extraction thus: ‘These so-called meanings, such as the arising of consciousness, are wholesome, etc.’ ‘The core, the core’ means having strung together the divided and scattered phenomena in the Section on the Arising of Consciousness and the Section on Form by way of heaps and heaps, with the phrase beginning ‘wholesome in the four planes, twelve unwholesome consciousness-arisings...’; this is the meaning. The terms `ghaṭa` and `gocchaka` are simply synonyms for `kaṇṇikā`. Here, however, the singular designation ‘wholesome in the four planes’ is due to the wholesome contact, etc., pertaining to the four planes, converging into a single state in being wholesome. In the Section on the Arising of Consciousness and the Section on Form, this exposition on the extraction of meanings was undertaken for one who has understood the Dhamma by way of the arising of consciousness, etc., pertaining to the four planes. Thus, the meaning is that therein, that which was analyzed as ‘wholesome in the four planes’ up to what is understood, is ‘these phenomena are wholesome.’

Yadipi kusalattikavitthāro pubbe viññāto, tathāpi tattha dhammā samayavasena phassādisabhāvavasena ca vibhattā bhinnā viññātā, na pana ekasmiṃ lakkhaṇe samānetvā, tasmā tattha vuttaṃ samayādibhedaṃ vajjetvā sabbabhedabhinnānaṃ ekasmiṃ kusalādilakkhaṇe samānetvā bodhanatthaṃ idha kusalattikaniddeso puna vibhatto. Ettha ca ekavacanena kusalaniddesaṃ katvā bahuvacanena nigamanassa kāraṇaṃ vuttameva. Yadi dhammānaṃ kusalatte ekattūpagamanaṃ, kasmā ekavacanena pucchāpi na katā? Uddese kusala-saddassa dhammavisesanabhāvato tabbisesanānaṃ dhammānaṃ pucchitattā tesañca aniddhāritasaṅkhāvisesattā, niddese pana catūhi bhūmīhi vitthārato viññātāhi kusale visesetvā dassetīti yuttaṃ ‘‘catūsu bhūmīsu kusala’’nti ekattaṃ netvā vacanaṃ. Kusalapadañhi ettha padhānaṃ, tañca visesitabbānapekkhaṃ kusalākārameva attano sabhāve ṭhitaṃ gahetvā pavattamānaṃ ekattameva upādāya pavattati, na bhedanti.

Although the detailed explanation of the wholesome triad was understood previously, nevertheless, there the phenomena were understood as analyzed and distinguished by way of occasion and by way of the nature of contact and so forth. However, they were not understood by being brought together under a single characteristic. Therefore, having excluded the distinctions of occasion and so forth stated there, for the purpose of making known by unifying all wholesome states, though distinguished by all divisions, under a single characteristic of wholesomeness and so forth, here the exposition of the wholesome triad is analyzed again. And here, the reason for making the exposition of the wholesome in the singular and the conclusion in the plural has already been stated. If there is a convergence to oneness in the wholesomeness of phenomena, why was the question also not made in the singular? In the Uddesa, it is because the word ‘kusala’ is a qualifier of ‘dhamma,’ because the phenomena having that qualifier were asked about, and because their specific number had not yet been determined. In the Niddesa, however, since it is taught by specifying the wholesome with reference to the four planes which are understood in detail, the statement, having led to oneness, ‘wholesome in the four planes,’ is suitable. For here the word ‘kusalaṃ’ is primary. And it, not depending on what is to be qualified, proceeds by taking up what is established in its own nature—the very mode of wholesomeness—and thus it proceeds by taking up only oneness, not division.

1385. Dvādasa [Pg.190] akusalacittuppādāti etthāpi paṭhamākusalacittuppādo samayaphassādivasena bhedaṃ anāmasitvā somanassasahagatadiṭṭhigatasampayuttacittuppādabhāve ekattaṃ netvā vutto, evaṃ yāva dvādasamoti ‘‘dvādasa akusalacittuppādā’’ti vuttaṃ. Evaṃ catūsu bhūmīsu vipākotiādīsupi yathāyogaṃ yojetabbaṃ. Cittuppādāti ettha uppajjati etthāti uppādo, kiṃ uppajjati? Cittaṃ, cittassa uppādo cittuppādoti evaṃ avayavena samudāyopalakkhaṇavasena attho sambhavati. Evañhi sati cittacetasikarāsi cittuppādoti siddho hoti. Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana ‘‘cittameva uppādo cittuppādo’’ti aññassuppajjanakassa nivattanatthaṃ cittaggahaṇaṃ kataṃ, cittassa anuppajjanakabhāvanivattanatthaṃ uppādaggahaṇaṃ, cittuppādakaṇḍe vā ‘‘cittaṃ uppannaṃ hotī’’ti cittassa uppajjanakabhāvo pākaṭoti katvā ‘‘cittameva uppādo’’ti vuttaṃ, cittassa anuppajjanakassa nivattetabbassa sabbhāvā uppādaggahaṇaṃ katanti veditabbaṃ. Ayañcattho ‘‘dvepañcaviññāṇānī’’tiādīsu viya cittappadhāno niddesoti katvā vuttoti daṭṭhabbo.

1385. “Twelve unwholesome consciousness-arisings”—here also, the first unwholesome consciousness-arising is stated by bringing it to unity in the state of a consciousness-arising accompanied by joy and associated with wrong view, without considering distinctions by way of occasion, contact, and so on. Thus, up to the twelfth, it is said, “twelve unwholesome consciousness-arisings.” In the same way, this should be applied as is appropriate in phrases such as “resultant in the four planes.” In the term “consciousness-arising” (cittuppāda), “it arises herein” (uppajjati etthā), thus it is an arising-place (uppādo). What arises? Consciousness (cittaṃ). The arising-place of consciousness (cittassa uppādo) is a cittuppādo. In this way, the meaning is possible by way of designating the whole by a part. Indeed, this being so, the aggregate of consciousness and mental factors is established as “consciousness-arising.” In the commentary, however, it is said, “Consciousness itself is the arising, thus cittuppādo.” The term ‘consciousness’ (citta) is used for the purpose of excluding another thing that arises. The term ‘arising’ (uppāda) is used for the purpose of excluding the state of consciousness not arising. Or, in the Section on the Arising of Consciousness, because the nature of consciousness as something that arises is evident from the statement “consciousness has arisen,” it is said, “Consciousness itself is the arising.” It should be understood that the term ‘arising’ is used because of the existence of that which is to be excluded, namely, the non-arising of consciousness. And this meaning should be seen as stated because it is an exposition where consciousness is primary, just as in cases such as “the two sets of fivefold consciousnesses.”

1420. Chasu dvāresūti ettha pañcadvāre vattabbameva natthi, manodvārepi parittārammaṇameva javanaṃ tadārammaṇasaṅkhātaṃ bhavaṅgaṃ anubandhati. Tañhi parittassa kammassa vipāko, vipāko ca iṭṭhāniṭṭhārammaṇānubhavanaṃ, kammānurūpo ca vipāko hotīti parittakammavipāko parittārammaṇasseva anubhavanaṃ hoti. Tasmā sabbaṃ tadārammaṇaṃ ‘‘parittārammaṇa’’nti vuttaṃ. Yadi evaṃ mahaggatavipākopi mahaggatānubhavanameva āpajjatīti ce? Na, samādhippadhānassa kammassa appanāppattassa saññāvasārammaṇassa tādiseneva vipākena bhavitabbattā. Tasmā samādhi sukhānubhavanabhūto, sopi kammānurūpatoyeva kammārammaṇo hotīti daṭṭhabbo. Kammānurūpato eva ca tadārammaṇaṃ parittārammaṇampi mahaggatajavanaṃ nānubandhati. Tato eva paṭisandhiādibhūto kāmāvacaravipāko kammanimittampi parittameva ārammaṇaṃ karoti, na mahaggataṃ appamāṇaṃ vā. Yasmā pana vuttaṃ ‘‘mahaggatārammaṇo dhammo parittārammaṇassa dhammassa kammapaccayena paccayo, appamāṇārammaṇo dhammo parittārammaṇassa dhammassa kammapaccayena paccayo’’ti, na ca mahaggatappamāṇavipāko parittārammaṇo atthi, idha ca sabbakāmāvacaravipākānaṃ parittārammaṇatāva vuttā, tasmā kammānurūpato mahaggatappamāṇārammaṇampi [Pg.191] parittakammaṃ yadi paṭisandhiṃ deti, kammagatinimittārammaṇameva deti. Pavattivipākampi rūpādiparittārammaṇamevāti veditabbaṃ. Khīṇāsavānaṃ vāsanāvasena sativippayuttahasanaṃ pavattamānaṃ parittesveva pavattati, na itaresu kilesavirahe tādisahasanapaccayabhāvābhāvato. Tasmā tassa parittārammaṇatā vuttā. Khīṇāsavānaṃ asakkaccadānādīni ādarākaraṇavaseneva veditabbāni, na kosajjādiakusalavasena. Paṭippassaddhasabbussukkā hi te uttamapurisāti. Tesaṃ ādarākaraṇañca nirussukkatā evāti veditabbā.

1420. Regarding “at the six sense doors,” here there is nothing to be said about the five sense doors; but at the mind-door, the life-continuum, known as the registering consciousness, follows an impulsion that has only a limited object. For that is the result of limited kamma, and the result is the experience of desirable or undesirable objects. Since the result corresponds to the kamma, the result of limited kamma is the experience of only a limited object. Therefore, all that registering consciousness is said to have a “limited object.” If this is so, would the result of sublime kamma also experience only a sublime object? No, because the kamma that is primarily based on concentration, having reached absorption, must produce a result corresponding to that kamma, whose object is under the control of perception. Thus, that resultant consciousness, being the experience of the bliss of concentration, should be understood as having the kamma as its object, only because it corresponds to the kamma. And precisely because it corresponds to kamma, the registering consciousness, even if it has a limited object, does not follow a sublime impulsion. Hence, the sense-sphere resultant consciousness, such as rebirth-linking, takes as its object only a limited kamma-sign, not a sublime or boundless one. However, it has been said: “A phenomenon with a sublime object is a condition for a phenomenon with a limited object by way of kamma-condition. A phenomenon with a boundless object is a condition for a phenomenon with a limited object by way of kamma-condition.” Yet, there is no result of sublime or boundless kamma that takes a limited object. And here, all sense-sphere results are said to take only limited objects. Therefore, corresponding to the kamma, if a limited kamma that has a sublime or boundless object gives rise to rebirth-linking, it produces a rebirth-linking that has only kamma or a destiny-sign as its object. And the results in the course of existence should be understood as taking only limited objects like forms, etc. As for the laughter of the arahants, which arises due to residual habits, dissociated from mindfulness, it occurs only in relation to limited objects, not others, because of the absence of a condition for such laughter in the absence of defilements. Thus, it is said to have a limited object. The giving without respect, etc., of the arahants should be understood as due to their lack of concern, not due to laziness or other unwholesome states. For they are supreme persons, whose every agitation has subsided. Their lack of concern should be understood as mere absence of agitation.

1421. Atipaguṇānanti vacanaṃ nirādarassa ñāṇavippayuttapaccavekkhaṇassa visayadassanaṃ, na tassevāti visayaniyamanaṃ. Ñāṇasampayuttassapi hi atipaguṇānaṃ visayatā suṭṭhutaraṃ hoti eva. Yathā paguṇaṃ ganthaṃ sajjhāyanto dve tayo vācanāmagge gatepi na sallakkheti ñāṇavippayuttasatimantena sajjhāyitattā, evaṃ paguṇajjhānesupi pavatti hotīti āha ‘‘atipaguṇāna’’ntiādi. Kasiṇanimittādipaññattīti pubbe dassitaṃ sabbaṃ upādāpaññattimāha. Taṃ pana rūpādayo viya avijjamāno vijjamāno ca atthoti ācariyā vadanti. Sammutisacce pana vuccamānānaṃ kasiṇanimittādi vācāvatthumattato vacanavohāreneva paññattīti vuccati. Tassa hi paññāpanaṃ avijjamānapaññattīti tassa avijjamānattaṃ aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttanti. Avijjamānampi pana taṃ vijjamānamiva gahetvā pavattamānāya saññāya parittādīsu ‘‘ayaṃ nāma dhammo ārammaṇa’’nti na sakkā vattuṃ te eva dhamme upādāya pavattamānāyapi dhammesveva aṭṭhānato. Tasmā sā sasampayuttā parittādiārammaṇāti na vattabbāti vuttā. Navattabbārammaṇāti idaṃ pana vacanaṃ yathāgahitākārassa saññāvisayassa navattabbataṃ sandhāya navattabbaṃ ārammaṇaṃ etesanti navattabbārammaṇā, cittuppādāti aññapadatthasamāsaṃ katvā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaṃ.

1421. The statement `Atipaguṇānaṃ` indicates the object of heedless reviewing dissociated from knowledge; it is not a restriction of the object to that alone. For indeed, even for consciousness associated with knowledge, the state of very proficient jhānas being its object is exceedingly more so. Just as one reciting a proficiently studied text does not notice having passed over two or three passages, due to reciting with mindfulness dissociated from knowledge, so too, in the case of proficient jhānas, does the arising of reviewing dissociated from knowledge occur. Hence, it is said, `atipaguṇānaṃ`, etc. The phrase `Kasiṇanimittādipaññatti` refers to all previously shown derivative concepts. However, the teachers say that this, like form, etc., is a thing that is both non-existent and existent. But in the sphere of conventional truth, what is spoken of as 'kasiṇa-sign,' etc., is called a 'concept' merely from being the basis of speech and by verbal convention alone. For indeed, its designation is a non-existent concept; thus, its non-existence is stated in the commentary. Furthermore, even though it is non-existent, it is not possible for the perception that occurs by grasping it as if it were existent to say, concerning limited dharmas, etc., 'This particular dharma is the object.' This is because even though that perception occurs by taking those very dharmas as its basis, it is not established in those dharmas themselves. Therefore, it is said that that perception, together with its associated states, should not be said to have the limited, etc., as its object. However, this statement `navattabbārammaṇā` is stated in the commentary with reference to the unutterability of the object of perception in its grasped aspect, by forming a relative compound (bahubbīhi) thus: `navattabbaṃ ārammaṇaṃ etesanti navattabbārammaṇā, cittuppādā`—'Their object should not be spoken of; therefore, they are consciousness-arisings with an object that should not be spoken of.'

Catupaññāsacittuppādānaṃ rūpassa ca vasena pañcapaṇṇāsāya. Kevalanti vinā parāmasanena. Aniṭṭhaṅgatavasenāti anicchayagamanavasena, anicchayaṃ vā dveḷhaṃ gato cittuppādo aniṭṭhaṅgato, tenākārena pavatti ‘‘aniṭṭhaṅgatavasena pavattī’’ti vuttā. Nānārammaṇesu cittassa vikkhipanaṃ vikkhepo. Anavaṭṭhānaṃ avūpasamo. Gotrabhuvodāne gotrabhūti gahetvā ‘‘gotrabhukāle’’ti āha.

By way of the fifty-four consciousnesses and by way of form, it is fifty-five. `Kevalam` means without misapprehension. `Aniṭṭhaṅgatavasena` means by way of not reaching a conclusion; alternatively, a consciousness that has gone to indecision or to a dilemma is `aniṭṭhaṅgato`, and an occurrence in that manner is called 'an occurrence by way of not reaching a conclusion.' The scattering of the mind onto various objects is distraction. Instability is non-pacification. In the section on `gotrabhū` and `vodāna`, having taken `gotrabhū`, he says, 'at the time of `gotrabhū`'.

Sabbatthapādakacatutthanti [Pg.192] idha sabbattha-saddo sāmiattho daṭṭhabbo, sabbesu vā vipassanādīsu pādakaṃ kāraṇaṃ sabbatthapādakanti phalassa visayabhāvena niddeso. Ākāsakasiṇacatutthanti paricchedākāsakasiṇacatutthamāha. Tañhi rūpāvacaraṃ, na itaranti. Kusalatopi dvādasavidhaṃ kiriyatopīti catuvīsatividhatā vuttā hoti. Vaṭṭassapi pādakaṃ hotiyevāti kusalaṃ kiriyañca ekato katvā sabbatthapādakaṃ vuttanti kiriyajjhānassa avaṭṭapādakattā sāsaṅkaṃ vadati. Mahaggatacitte samodahatīti idaṃ ‘‘so evaṃ samāhite citte’’tiādinā nayena vuttaṃ pākaṭaṃ pādakajjhānacittaṃ parikammehi gahetvā citte rūpakāyaṃ adhiṭṭhānacittena samodahatīti katvā vuttaṃ. Pādakajjhānacittaṃ rūpakāye samodahatīti idampi yathāvuttaṃ pādakajjhānacittaṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā cittasantānaṃ rūpakāye samodahitaṃ tadanugatikaṃ katvā adhiṭṭhātīti katvā vuttaṃ, idaṃ pana adhiṭṭhānadvayaṃ adissamānakāyataṃ dissamānakāyatañca āpādeti. Gantukāmatāparikammavasena taṃsampayuttāya saññāya sukhasaññālahusaññābhāvato gamanampi nipphādetīti daṭṭhabbaṃ.

‘The fourth that is a basis everywhere’—here the word ‘everywhere’ should be understood in the sense of possession, or as a basis, a cause, in all instances of insight, etc.; thus, ‘a basis everywhere’ is a designation of the fruit by way of its being the object. ‘The fourth space kasiṇa’ refers to the fourth limited-space kasiṇa. For that is of the fine-material sphere, not the other. Because it is twelvefold from the standpoint of the wholesome and also from the standpoint of the functional, its twenty-fourfold nature is stated. Regarding the statement, 'It is a basis even for the round [of rebirth],' because the wholesome and the functional are combined into one and called 'a basis everywhere', and because the functional jhāna is not a basis for the round, he speaks with doubt. The phrase 'unifies with the exalted mind' is stated because, having taken the clearly stated basis-jhāna consciousness—spoken of in the manner of 'with the mind thus concentrated,' etc.—along with the preliminary preparations, one unifies the form-body in the mind with the consciousness of determination. The phrase 'unifies the basis-jhāna consciousness in the form-body' is also stated because, having taken the aforesaid basis-jhāna consciousness as the object, and having made the mental continuum—which is well-placed in the form-body—conform to that [form-body], one makes a determination. Now, this pair of determinations brings about both the state of having an invisible body and the state of having a visible body. It should be understood that by way of the preliminary work of the desire to go, and because of the perception associated with it being a perception of ease and a perception of lightness, it also accomplishes movement.

Sotāpannassa cittanti sotāpannassa pāṭipuggalikaṃ maggaphalacittanti veditabbaṃ. Mārādīnañhi bhagavato cittajānanaṃ vuttanti cetopariyañāṇalābhī kasmā sāsavacittaṃ na jānissatīti. Chinnavaṭumakā chinnasaṃsāravaṭṭā buddhā. Maggaphalanibbānapaccavekkhaṇatopīti ettha maggaphalapaccavekkhaṇāni tāva pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇena maggaphalesu ñātesu pavattanti, nibbānapaccavekkhaṇañca nibbānārammaṇesu appamāṇadhammesu ñātesūti maggādipaccavekkhaṇāni pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇassa appamāṇārammaṇataṃ sādhentīti veditabbāni. ‘‘Appamāṇā khandhā pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’icceva (paṭṭhā. 2.12.58) hi vuttaṃ, na nibbānanti. Tasmā pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇena eva maggaphalapaccavekkhaṇakicce vuccamānepi nibbānapaccavekkhaṇatā na sakkā vattuṃ, aṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana tassapi nibbānārammaṇatā anuññātāti dissati. Kāmāvacarenibbattissatīti nibbattakkhandhajānanamāha. Nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyissatīti nibbānārammaṇehi maggaphalehi kilesaparinibbānabhūtehi parinibbāyissatīti attho sambhavati.

The mind of a stream-enterer should be understood as the individual path and fruition consciousness of a stream-enterer. For it is said that the Blessed One knew the minds of Māra and others; therefore, why would one who has obtained the knowledge of others' minds not know a mind accompanied by cankers? `Chinnavaṭumakā` are the Buddhas who have cut off the round of saṃsāra. And regarding the reflection on the path, fruition, and Nibbāna—here, the reflections on the path and fruition arise, in the first place, through the knowledge of recollecting past lives when the path and fruition are known. And the reflection on Nibbāna arises when the supramundane states which have Nibbāna as their object are known. Thus, it should be understood that the reflections on the path and so forth establish that the knowledge of recollecting past lives has a supramundane object. For it is indeed said, ‘The supramundane aggregates are a condition for the knowledge of recollecting past lives by way of object-condition,’ but Nibbāna is not. Therefore, although the function of reflecting on the path and fruition is stated to be by the knowledge of recollecting past lives alone, the reflection on Nibbāna cannot be spoken of in the same way; however, in the commentary, it is seen that having Nibbāna as its object is also permitted for that knowledge. By ‘will arise in the sense-sphere,’ he speaks of knowing the aggregates that will arise. Regarding ‘will attain final Nibbāna in the Nibbāna-element,’ the meaning is possible that one will attain final Nibbāna by means of the path and fruition, which have Nibbāna as their object and which are the final quenching of the defilements.

1429. Asahajātattāti [Pg.193] asampayuttattāti attho. Na hi arūpadhammānaṃ arūpadhammehi sahajātatā sampayogato aññā atthīti. ‘‘Aññadhammārammaṇakāle’’ti vuttaṃ, maggārammaṇakālepi pana garuṃ akaraṇe maggādhipatibhāvena navattabbatā yojetabbā.

1429. ‘Because of not being co-nascent’ means because of not being associated. For, for immaterial states, there is no co-nascence with other immaterial states apart from association. It is stated, ‘at the time of having another state as object’; however, even at the time of having the path as object, the unsuitability of being stated, due to the predominance of the path, should be applied in the context of not giving it weight.

1433. Niyogāti niyogatoti imamatthaṃ sandhāya ‘‘niyamenā’’ti āha, niyogavanto vā niyogā, niyatāti attho. Cittuppādakaṇḍe hi bodhitesu cittuppādesu ekantena anāgatārammaṇo koci natthīti.

1433. Regarding `niyoga`: referring to the meaning 'by way of fixed connection' (`niyogato`), he said 'by rule' (`niyamena`). Or, those possessing fixed connection are `niyoga`; the meaning is 'fixed.' For, in the section on the arising of consciousness, among the consciousnesses that have been made known, there is not any that has an exclusively future object.

1434. Kammaṃ vā kammanimittaṃ vā ārabbha pavattiyaṃ atītārammaṇāvāti vuttaṃ, kammanimittaṃ pana ārabbha pavattiyaṃ paccuppannārammaṇabhāvañca paṭisandhiyā paṭiccasamuppādavibhaṅgavaṇṇanāyaṃ vakkhati. Tasmā idaṃ manodvāracutiyaṃ atītakammanimittaṃ manodvāre āpāthagataṃ sandhāya vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Satadārammaṇāya cutiyā pañcacittakkhaṇāvasiṭṭhāyuke gatinimitte paṭisandhiyā pavattāya cattāri bhavaṅgāni paccuppannārammaṇāni, itarattha ca cha sandhāyāha ‘‘tato paraṃ bhavaṅgakāle cā’’ti. Yadā hi gatinimittārammaṇe javane pavatte anuppanne eva tadārammaṇe cuti hoti rūpāvacarārūpāvacarasattassa viya kāmadhātuṃ upapajjantassa, tadā paṭisandhito parāni cha bhavaṅgāni paccuppannārammaṇāni hontīti. Diṭṭhisampayuttehi assādanādīni saparāmāsāneva daṭṭhabbāni. Paṇṇattinibbānārammaṇānañca javanānaṃ purecārikakāleti yesaṃ purecārikakāle ekantena āvajjanāya atītādiārammaṇabhāvena navattabbatā, tesaṃ vasena nayaṃ dasseti. Nibbānārammaṇānampi javanānaṃ purecārikakāle sā tathā na vattabbā, na pana ekantena maggaphalavīthīsu tassā anibbānārammaṇattā.

1434. Although it is said that when occurring with kamma or a kamma-sign as object, it has a past object, however, that rebirth-linking, when occurring with a kamma-sign as object, has the nature of a present object will be explained in the commentary on the Analysis of Dependent Origination. Therefore, it should be understood that this was said in reference to a past kamma-sign that has come into range at the mind-door during a mind-door death. When rebirth-linking has occurred with a destiny-sign as object during a death with tadārammaṇa that has a remaining lifespan of five mind-moments, four bhavaṅgas have a present object; and in the other case, six. In reference to this, he said, “and thereafter during the bhavaṅga period.” For when javanas with a destiny-sign as object have occurred for a being who is being reborn into the desire sphere, and death occurs even before tadārammaṇa has arisen—just as for a being of the form or formless sphere—then the six bhavaṅgas after rebirth-linking have a present object. Enjoying, etc., by minds associated with wrong view should be seen as being accompanied by grasping. By the phrase “and of javanas having concept or Nibbāna as object, at the time of the precursor,” he shows the method by way of those javanas for which, at the time of the precursor, it cannot be said that the adverting invariably has the nature of a past, etc., object. Even for javanas having Nibbāna as object, at the time of the precursor, that adverting cannot be described thus. However, it is not that it absolutely cannot be described thus, because in the path and fruition processes, that adverting does not have Nibbāna as its object.

Ime gandhāti nanu paccuppannā gandhā gahitā, kathaṃ ettha anāgatārammaṇatā hotīti? ‘‘Aṭṭhārasavassādhikāni dve vassasatāni mā sussiṃsū’’ti pavattito, anāgate mā sussiṃ sūti hi anāgataṃ gandhaṃ gahetvā pavattatīti adhippāyo. Cittavasena kāyaṃ pariṇāmento abhimukhībhūtaṃ tadā vijjamānameva kāyaṃ ārammaṇaṃ karotīti paccuppannārammaṇaṃ adhiṭṭhānacittaṃ hoti. Tathā attano kāyassa dīgharassāṇuthūlanīlādibhāvāpādanavasena aññassa ca pāṭihāriyassa karaṇe yojetabbaṃ[Pg.194]. Etthantare ekadvesantativārā veditabbāti etthantare pavattā rūpasantatiarūpasantativārā ekadvesantativārā nāmāti veditabbāti attho. Atiparittasabhāvautuādisamuṭṭhānā vā ‘‘ekadvesantativārā’’ti vuttā. Ubhayametaṃ paccuppannanti addhāpaccuppannaṃ hontaṃ etaṃ ubhayaṃ hotīti attho. Saṃhīratīti taṇhādiṭṭhābhinandanāhi ākaḍḍhīyati.

Are not these presently arisen scents grasped? How then does it have a future object here? Because it arises with the thought, 'For two hundred and eighteen years, may they not dry up,' indeed, it proceeds by taking the future scent as its object with the thought, 'May they not dry up in the future'; this is the intention. By transforming the body through the mind, one makes the presently existing body, which is facing one, the object; thus, the mind of determination has a present object. Similarly, this should be applied to producing for one's own body the state of being long, short, subtle, coarse, blue, and so on, and to the performance of another miracle. Regarding 'Herein, occasions of one or two continuities should be understood': the meaning is that the occasions of material and immaterial continuity occurring herein are called 'occasions of one or two continuities' and should be so understood. Or, they are called 'occasions of one or two continuities' because they arise from extremely subtle nature, temperature, and so on. Regarding 'Both of these are present': the meaning is that both of these occur while being temporally present. Regarding 'It is constricted': it is drawn in by delights, namely craving and views.

Kecīti abhayagirivāsinoti vadanti, te pana cittassa ṭhitikkhaṇaṃ na icchantīti ‘‘ṭhitikkhaṇe vā paṭivijjhatī’’ti na vattabbaṃ siyā. Tathā ye ‘‘iddhimassa ca parassa ca ekakkhaṇe vattamānaṃ cittaṃ uppajjatī’’ti vadanti, tesaṃ ‘‘ṭhitikkhaṇe vā bhaṅgakkhaṇe vā paṭivijjhatī’’ti vacanaṃ na sameti. Na hi tasmiṃ khaṇadvaye uppajjamānaṃ paracittena saha ekakkhaṇe uppajjati nāmāti. Ṭhitibhaṅgakkhaṇesu ca uppajjamānaṃ ekadesaṃ paccuppannārammaṇaṃ, ekadesaṃ atītārammaṇaṃ āpajjati. Yañca vuttaṃ ‘‘parassa cittaṃ jānissāmīti rāsivasena mahājanassa citte āvajjite’’ti, ettha ca mahājano attanā pare aneke puggalāti paresaṃ cittaṃ jānissāmīti āvajjanappavatti vattabbā siyā. Athāpi parassāti mahājanassāti attho sambhaveyya, tathāpi tassa puggalasseva vā cittarāsiṃ āvajjitvā ekassa paṭivijjhanaṃ ayuttaṃ. Na hi rāsiāvajjanaṃ ekadesāvajjanaṃ hotīti. Tasmā tehi ‘‘mahājanassa citte āvajjite’’tiādi na vattabbaṃ.

Some say this refers to the Abhayagirivāsins, but since they do not accept the moment of stability of the mind, it should not be said, “he penetrates at the moment of stability.” Furthermore, for those who say, “The mind of the one with psychic power and of the other person arises in a single moment,” their statement, “he penetrates at the moment of stability or at the moment of dissolution,” is not consistent. For a mind arising in that pair of moments is not, in fact, arising in a single moment together with the other's mind. Moreover, a mind arising in the moments of stability and dissolution becomes, in one part, one with a present object, and in another part, one with a past object. And as for what was said, “Having adverted to the mind of a great multitude as a mass, with the thought, ‘I will know another's mind,’”—here, ‘a great multitude’ means many individuals other than oneself. Therefore, the occurrence of adverting should be stated as, “I will know the minds of others.” Even if the meaning of ‘of another’ as ‘of a great multitude’ were possible, even so, having adverted to the mass of thoughts of that multitude, or of a single individual, the penetration of a single one is improper. For adverting to a mass is not adverting to a part. Therefore, the statement beginning with, “having adverted to the mind of a great multitude,” should not be made by them.

Yaṃ pana te vadanti ‘‘yasmā iddhimassa ca parassa ca ekakkhaṇe cittaṃ uppajjatī’’ti, tatthāyaṃ adhippāyo siyā – cetopariyañāṇalābhī parassa cittaṃ ñātukāmo pādakajjhānaṃ samāpajjitvā vuṭṭhāya atītādivibhāgaṃ akatvā cittasāmaññena ‘‘imassa cittaṃ jānāmī’’ti parikammaṃ katvā puna pādakajjhānaṃ samāpajjitvā vuṭṭhāya sāmaññeneva cittaṃ āvajjitvā tiṇṇaṃ catunnaṃ vā parikammānaṃ anantarā cetopariyañāṇena paracittaṃ paṭivijjhati vibhāveti rūpaṃ viya dibbacakkhunā. Tato paraṃ pana kāmāvacaracittehi sarāgādivavatthānaṃ hoti nīlādivavatthānaṃ viya. Tattha dibbacakkhunā diṭṭhahadayavatthurūpassa sattassa abhimukhībhūtassa cittasāmaññena cittaṃ āvajjayamānaṃ āvajjanaṃ abhimukhībhūtaṃ vijjamānaṃ cittaṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā cittaṃ āvajjeti. Parikammāni ca taṃ taṃ vijjamānaṃ cittaṃ cittasāmaññeneva ārammaṇaṃ [Pg.195] katvā cittajānanaparikammāni hutvā pavattanti. Cetopariyañāṇaṃ pana vijjamānaṃ cittaṃ paṭivijjhantaṃ vibhāventaṃ tena saha ekakkhaṇe eva uppajjati. Tattha yasmā santānassa santānaggahaṇato ekattavasena āvajjanādīni cittantveva pavattāni, tañca cittameva, yaṃ cetopariyañāṇena vibhāvitaṃ, tasmā samānākārappavattito na aniṭṭhe maggaphalavīthito aññasmiṃ ṭhāne nānārammaṇatā āvajjanajavanānaṃ hoti. Paccuppannārammaṇañca parikammaṃ paccuppannārammaṇassa cetopariyañāṇassa āsevanapaccayoti siddhaṃ hoti. Atītattiko ca evaṃ abhinno hoti. Aññathā santatipaccuppanne addhāpaccuppanne ca paccuppannanti idha vuccamāne atītānāgatānañca paccuppannatā āpajjeyya, tathā ca sati ‘‘paccuppanno dhammo paccuppannassa dhammassa anantarapaccayena paccayo’’tiādi vattabbaṃ siyā, na ca taṃ vuttaṃ. ‘‘Atīto dhammo paccuppannassa dhammassa anantarapaccayena paccayo, purimā purimā atītā khandhā pacchimānaṃ pacchimānaṃ paccuppannānaṃ khandhānaṃ anantara…pe… anulomaṃ gotrabhussā’’tiādivacanato (paṭṭhā. 2.18.5) pana addhāsantatipaccuppannesveva anantarātītā cattāro khandhā atītāti viññāyanti, na ca abhidhammamātikāya āgatassa paccuppannapadassa addhāsantatipaccuppannapadatthatā katthaci pāḷiyaṃ vuttā. Tasmā tehi iddhimassa ca parassa ca ekakkhaṇe cittuppattiyā cetopariyañāṇassa paccuppannārammaṇatā vuttā. Yadā pana ‘‘yaṃ imassa cittaṃ pavattaṃ, taṃ jānāmi. Yaṃ bhavissati, taṃ jānissāmī’’ti vā ābhogaṃ katvā pādakajjhānasamāpajjanādīni karoti, tadā āvajjanaparikammāni cetopariyañāṇañca atītānāgatārammaṇāneva honti āvajjaneneva vibhāgassa katattā.

As for what they say, “Because the mind of one with psychic power and of another arises in a single moment,” in that statement, this might be the intended meaning: A person who has obtained the knowledge of others' minds, wishing to know another's mind, having entered the foundational jhāna and emerged, without making a distinction of past, etc., and by way of mind-in-general, having made the preliminary act with the thought, “I will know this person's mind,” and again having entered the foundational jhāna and emerged, having adverted to the mind just by way of mind-in-general, immediately after three or four preliminary impulsions, penetrates and makes clear the other's mind with the knowledge of others' minds, just as one makes clear a form with the divine eye. Then, after that, by means of sense-sphere consciousnesses, there is the determination of a mind with lust, etc., just as there is the determination of blue, etc. Therein, the adverting consciousness, adverting to the mind of a being whose heart-base form is seen by the divine eye and is directly present, takes the directly present, existing mind as its object by way of mind-in-general and adverts to that mind. And the preliminary impulsions, having taken that very existing mind as their object by way of mind-in-general, proceed, having become preliminary acts for knowing the mind. The knowledge of others' minds, however, while penetrating and making clear the existing mind, arises in the very same moment together with it. Therein, because, due to grasping the continuum as a continuum, adverting and so forth proceed by way of oneness as just 'mind,' and that which is made clear by the knowledge of others' minds is also just mind, therefore, due to occurring in a similar manner, there is no state of having different objects for the adverting and the impulsion moments in any other instance apart from the undesirable path and fruition process. And it is established that the preliminary impulsion, which has a present object, is a repetition condition for the knowledge of others' minds, which has a present object. And in this way, the past triad is unbroken. Otherwise, if the continuity-present and the duration-present were spoken of here as 'present,' then the past and future would also attain the state of being present. And that being so, it would have to be said, “A present phenomenon is a condition for a present phenomenon by way of proximity condition,” etc., but that was not said. However, from the saying, “A past phenomenon is a condition for a present phenomenon by way of proximity condition; the preceding, preceding past aggregates are a condition for the succeeding, succeeding present aggregates by way of proximity… etc... conformity for change-of-lineage,” it is understood that within the duration-present and continuity-present themselves, the four immediately past aggregates are 'past.' And nowhere in the Pāḷi is it stated that the term 'present' that comes in the Abhidhamma Mātikā has the meaning of the terms 'duration-present' or 'continuity-present'. Therefore, it was stated by them that the knowledge of others' minds has a present object because of the arising of the mind of the one with psychic power and of the other in a single moment. When, however, one performs the attainment of the foundational jhāna, etc., having made the reflection, “I will know what mind of this person has occurred. Or, I will know what mind will occur,” then the adverting and preliminary impulsions, as well as the knowledge of others' minds, have only past and future objects, because the distinction has been made by the adverting itself.

Ye pana ‘‘iddhimā parassa cittaṃ jānitukāmo āvajjeti, āvajjanaṃ khaṇapaccuppannaṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā teneva saha nirujjhati, tato cattāri pañca vā javanāni. Yesaṃ pacchimaṃ iddhicittaṃ, sesāni kāmāvacarāni, tesaṃ sabbesampi tadeva niruddhaṃ cittamārammaṇaṃ hoti, na ca tāni nānārammaṇāni honti, addhāvasena paccuppannārammaṇattā’’ti idaṃ vacanaṃ nissāya ‘‘āvajjanajavanānaṃ paccuppannātītārammaṇabhāvepi nānārammaṇattābhāvo viya ekadviticatupañcacittakkhaṇānāgatesupi cittesu āvajjitesu āvajjanajavanānaṃ yathāsambhavaṃ anāgatapaccuppannātītārammaṇabhāvepi nānārammaṇatā na [Pg.196] siyā, tena catupañcacittakkhaṇānāgate āvajjite anāgatārammaṇaparikammānantaraṃ khaṇapaccuppannārammaṇaṃ cetopariyañāṇaṃ siddha’’nti vadanti, tesaṃ vādo ‘‘anāgatārammaṇo dhammo paccuppannārammaṇassa dhammassa āsevanapaccayena paccayo, paccuppannārammaṇo dhammo atītārammaṇassa dhammassa āsevanapaccayena paccayo’’ti imesaṃ pañhānaṃ anuddhaṭattā gaṇanāya ca ‘‘āsevane tīṇī’’ti vuttattā na sijjhati. Na hi kusalakiriyamahaggataṃ anāsevanaṃ atthīti.

However, some teachers, relying on this statement—'A person with psychic power, wishing to know another's mind, adverts; the adverting consciousness, taking a momentarily present object, ceases together with it. Then four or five impulsions arise, of which the last is psychic consciousness and the rest are of the sense sphere. For all of them, that same ceased consciousness is the object, and they do not have different objects because they take a present object in terms of duration'—argue thus: 'Just as there is an absence of different objects even when adverting and impulsion have present and past objects, likewise, even when adverting to minds that have not yet arisen by one, two, three, four, or five mind-moments, there would not be a difference of objects for adverting and impulsion, even though they may have future, present, or past objects, according to what is possible. Therefore, when adverting to a mind that has not yet arisen by four or five mind-moments, the knowledge of others' minds, having a momentarily present object, is established immediately after the preliminary impulsion with a future object.' Their doctrine does not hold because these questions—'A phenomenon with a future object is a condition for a phenomenon with a present object by way of repetition condition; a phenomenon with a present object is a condition for a phenomenon with a past object by way of repetition condition'—have not been brought up, and because in the enumeration it is said, 'In repetition, three.' For there is no wholesome, functional, or sublime consciousness that is without repetition.

Etassa ca vādassa nissayabhāvo āvajjanajavanānaṃ khaṇapaccuppannaniruddhārammaṇatāvacanassa na sijjhati, yaṃ pavattaṃ yaṃ pavattissatīti vā visesaṃ akatvā gahaṇe āvajjanassa anāgataggahaṇabhāvaṃ, tadabhāvā javanānampi vattamānaggahaṇābhāvañca sandhāyeva tassa vuttattā. Tadā hi bhavaṅgacalanānantaraṃ abhimukhībhūtameva cittaṃ ārabbha āvajjanā pavattatīti. Jānanacittassapi vattamānārammaṇabhāve āvajjanajānanacittānaṃ sahaṭṭhānadosāpattiyā rāsiekadesāvajjanapaṭivedhe sampattasampattāvajjanajānane ca aniṭṭhe ṭhāne āvajjanajavanānaṃ nānārammaṇabhāvadosāpattiyā ca yaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘khaṇapaccuppannaṃ cittaṃ cetopariyañāṇassa ārammaṇaṃ hotī’’ti, taṃ ayuttanti paṭikkhipitvā yathāvuttadosānāpattikālavaseneva addhāsantatipaccuppannārammaṇattā nānārammaṇatābhāvaṃ disvā āvajjanajavanānaṃ vattamānataṃ niruddhārammaṇabhāvo vuttoti, tampi vacanaṃ purimavādino nānujāneyyuṃ. Tasmiñhi sati āvajjanā kusalānantiādīsu viya aññapadasaṅgahitassa anantarapaccayavidhānato ‘‘paccuppannārammaṇā āvajjanā atītārammaṇānaṃ khandhānaṃ anantarapaccayena paccayo’’ti vattabbaṃ siyā, na ca vuttanti.

And the state of being a basis for this argument is not established for the statement that adverting and impulsion have a momentarily present and ceased object. For that statement is made with reference to the fact that if one grasps without distinguishing between 'what has occurred' and 'what will occur,' then adverting does not grasp a future object, and due to that absence, impulsions also do not grasp a present object. For at that time, immediately after the vibration of the life-continuum, adverting arises taking as its object the mind that has just become manifest. Having rejected as incorrect the statement, 'A momentarily present mind is the object of the knowledge of others' minds,' on account of the fault of the co-occurrence of the adverting and knowing consciousnesses when the knowing consciousness has a present object, and on account of the fault of adverting and impulsion having different objects in the case of adverting to and penetrating a part of a mass, and in adverting to and knowing each object as it arrives in an undesirable situation; and then, having seen that there is no difference of object because the object is present in terms of duration and continuity solely by the power of the time when the aforementioned faults do not occur, it was stated that adverting has a present object and impulsion has a ceased object. But even that statement would not be accepted by the earlier proponents. For if that were the case, just as in instances like 'adverting, wholesome aggregates,' where the immediacy condition is prescribed for that which is included in another term, it would have to be said: 'Adverting with a present object is a condition by way of immediacy for the aggregates with a past object.' But this was not said.

Kasmā panevaṃ cetopariyañāṇassa paccuppannārammaṇatā vicāritā, nanu ‘‘atīto dhammo paccuppannassa dhammassa, anāgato dhammo paccuppannassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti etesaṃ vibhaṅgesu ‘‘atītā khandhā iddhividhañāṇassacetopariyañāṇassa pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇassa yathākammūpagañāṇassa āvajjanāya ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.18.2), ‘‘anāgatā khandhā iddhividhañāṇassa cetopariyañāṇassa anāgataṃsañāṇassa āvajjanāya ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.17.3-4), uppannattike ca ‘‘anuppannākhandhā, uppādino [Pg.197] khandhā iddhividhañāṇassa cetopariyañāṇassa anāgataṃsañāṇassa āvajjanāya ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti cetopariyañāṇaggahaṇaṃ katvā ‘‘paccuppanno dhammo paccuppannassā’’ti etassa vibhaṅge ‘‘paccuppannā khandhā iddhividhañāṇassa āvajjanāya ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.18.3), uppannattike ca ‘‘uppannā khandhā iddhividhañāṇassa āvajjanāya ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.17.2) ettakasseva vuttattā ‘‘paccuppannacitte cetopariyañāṇaṃ nappavattatī’’ti viññāyati. Yadi hi pavatteyya, purimesu viya itaresu ca cetopariyañāṇaggahaṇaṃ kattabbaṃ siyāti? Saccaṃ kattabbaṃ, nayadassanavasena panetaṃ saṃkhittanti aññāya pāḷiyā viññāyati. ‘‘Atītārammaṇo dhammo paccuppannārammaṇassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo (paṭṭhā. 2.19.20), anāgatārammaṇo dhammo paccuppannārammaṇassa. Paccuppannārammaṇo dhammo paccuppannārammaṇassā’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.19.22) etesañhi vibhaṅgesu ‘‘cetopariyañāṇena atītārammaṇapaccuppannacittasamaṅgissa cittaṃ jānāti. Atītārammaṇā paccuppannā khandhā cetopariyañāṇassa āvajjanāya ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.19.22), ‘‘cetopariyañāṇena anāgatārammaṇapaccuppannacittasamaṅgissa cittaṃ…pe… cetopariyañāṇena paccuppannārammaṇapaccuppannacittasamaṅgissa cittaṃ jānāti. Paccuppannārammaṇā paccuppannā khandhā cetopariyañāṇassa āvajjanāya ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.19.21) cetopariyañāṇassa paccuppannārammaṇe pavatti vuttāti. Tenevāyaṃ vicāraṇā katāti veditabbā.

But why, then, is the state of the knowledge of others' minds having a present object investigated so extensively? Is it not the case that in the analyses of the statements, “A past phenomenon is a condition for a present phenomenon by way of object condition,” and “A future phenomenon is a condition for a present phenomenon by way of object condition,” it is stated: “Past aggregates are a condition by way of object condition for the adverting of the knowledge of psychic powers, the knowledge of others’ minds, the knowledge of past lives, and the knowledge of the destiny of beings according to their actions”; and “Future aggregates are a condition by way of object condition for the adverting of the knowledge of psychic powers, the knowledge of others’ minds, and the knowledge of future events”; and in the triad of the arisen, “Unarisen aggregates and arising aggregates are a condition by way of object condition for the adverting of the knowledge of psychic powers, the knowledge of others’ minds, and the knowledge of future events”? Having included the knowledge of others’ minds in these cases, in the analysis of “A present phenomenon is a condition for a present phenomenon,” it is stated: “Present aggregates are a condition by way of object condition for the adverting of the knowledge of psychic powers”; and in the triad of the arisen, “Arisen aggregates are a condition by way of object condition for the adverting of the knowledge of psychic powers.” Since only this much is stated, it is understood that “the knowledge of others’ minds does not occur regarding a present mind.” For if it were to occur, then, as in the former cases, should not the inclusion of the knowledge of others’ minds also be made in the other cases? Indeed, it should be made. But this was abridged by way of showing the method; this is understood from another Pāḷi text. For in the analyses of these statements—“A phenomenon with a past object is a condition for a phenomenon with a present object by way of object condition; a phenomenon with a future object is a condition for a phenomenon with a present object; a phenomenon with a present object is a condition for a phenomenon with a present object”—it is stated: “By the knowledge of others’ minds, one knows the mind of one who possesses a present mind that takes a past object. Present aggregates that have a past object are a condition by way of object condition for the adverting of the knowledge of others’ minds”; “By the knowledge of others’ minds, one knows the mind of one who possesses a present mind that takes a future object… and so on… By the knowledge of others’ minds, one knows the mind of one who possesses a present mind that takes a present object. Present aggregates that have a present object are a condition by way of object condition for the adverting of the knowledge of others’ minds.” Thus, the occurrence of the knowledge of others’ minds regarding a present object is stated. It should be understood that this investigation was made for that very reason.

Tesanti tesu dvīsu ñāṇesūti niddhāraṇe sāmivacanaṃ. Kusalā khandhāti iddhividhapubbenivāsānāgataṃsañāṇāpekkho bahuvacananiddeso, na cetopariyañāṇayathākammūpagañāṇāpekkhoti. Tesaṃ catukkhandhārammaṇabhāvassa asādhakoti ce? Na, aññattha ‘‘avitakkavicāramattā khandhā ca vicāro ca cetopariyañāṇassa pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇassa anāgataṃsañāṇassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.6.72) ‘‘savitakkasavicārā khandhā ca vitakko ca cetopariyañāṇassa pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇassa anāgataṃsañāṇassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 2.6.69) ca vuttattā cetopariyañāṇāpekkhopi bahuvacananiddesoti imassatthassa siddhito. Evamapi [Pg.198] yathākammūpagañāṇassa ‘‘avitakkavicāramattā khandhā ca vicāro cā’’tiādīsu avuttattā catukkhandhārammaṇatā na sijjhatīti? Na, tattha avacanassa aññakāraṇattā. Yathākammūpagañāṇena hi kammasaṃsaṭṭhā cattāro khandhā kammappamukhena gayhanti. Tañhi yathā cetopariyañāṇaṃ purimaparikammavasena savitakkādivibhāgaṃ sarāgādivibhāgañca cittaṃ vibhāveti, na evaṃ savibhāgaṃ vibhāveti, kammavaseneva pana samudāyaṃ vibhāvetīti ‘‘avitakkavicāramattā khandhā ca vicāro cā’’tiādike vibhāgakaraṇe taṃ na vuttaṃ, na catukkhandhānārammaṇatoti. Idaṃ pana avacanassa kāraṇanti. Keci tatthāpi ‘‘pubbenivāsānussatiñāṇassa yathākammūpagañāṇassa anāgataṃsañāṇassā’’ti paṭhanti eva. Na hi taṃ kusalākusalavibhāgaṃ viya savitakkādivibhāgaṃ kammaṃ vibhāvetuṃ asamatthaṃ. Duccaritasucaritabhāvavibhāvanampi hi lobhādialobhādisampayogavisesavibhāvanaṃ hotīti.

The word `tesaṃ` means 'of those,' referring to those two knowledges; it is the genitive case used for specification. The plural designation 'wholesome aggregates' refers to the knowledge of psychic powers, the knowledge of past abodes, and the knowledge of future events, but not to the knowledge of others' minds or the knowledge of the destiny of beings according to their actions. If it is asked whether this does not establish that their object is the four aggregates? No, because elsewhere it is stated: 'Aggregates that are without initial thought and only with sustained thought, and sustained thought itself, are a condition for the knowledge of others' minds, the knowledge of past abodes, and the knowledge of future events by way of object condition' (Paṭṭhāna 2.6.72). And: 'Aggregates with initial and sustained thought, and initial thought itself, are a condition for the knowledge of others' minds, the knowledge of past abodes, and the knowledge of future events by way of object condition' (Paṭṭhāna 2.6.69). Thus, the meaning that the plural designation also refers to the knowledge of others' minds is established. Even so, since the knowledge of the destiny of beings according to their actions is not mentioned in statements like 'aggregates that are without initial thought and only with sustained thought...', does it not follow that its object is not the four aggregates? No, because its non-mention there is due to another reason. For the knowledge of the destiny of beings according to their actions grasps the four aggregates associated with kamma, with kamma as the principal factor. For, just as the knowledge of others' minds discerns the mind with its distinctions—such as being accompanied by initial thought and so on, and being accompanied by lust and so on—by means of prior preliminary practice, that knowledge does not discern kamma with such distinctions in the same way. Instead, it discerns the collection of aggregates only by way of kamma. Thus, in the classification such as 'aggregates that are without initial thought and only with sustained thought...', it is not mentioned—not because its object is not the four aggregates. This, then, is the reason for its non-mention. Some, however, do indeed read there: 'for the knowledge of past abodes, the knowledge of the destiny of beings according to their actions, and the knowledge of future events.' For that knowledge is not incapable of discerning kamma with distinctions, such as being accompanied by initial thought and so on, just as it discerns the distinction between wholesome and unwholesome. Indeed, the discernment of the state of misconduct and good conduct is also a discernment of the specific association with factors such as greed and with factors such as non-greed.

1435. Niyakajjhattapariyāyassa abhāvenāti sabhāvadhammattā kenaci pariyāyena niyakajjhattaṃ ahontaṃ sabbathā bahiddhābhāveneva ‘‘ekantabahiddhā’’ti vuttaṃ, na asabhāvadhammattā bahiddhāpi ahontaṃ kasiṇādi viya niyakajjhattamattassa asambhavato. Asabhāvadhammattā eva hi kasiṇādiajjhattadhammabhūto ca koci bhāvo na hotīti ajjhattattike na vuttanti adhippāyo. Taṃ sabbaṃ ākiñcaññāyatanādi atītārammaṇattike ‘‘navattabbārammaṇa’’nti vuttanti sambandho. Ettha ca vuttanti anuññātattā vacanatoti etehi kāraṇehi pakāsitanti attho.

1435. Because it is a real phenomenon, it cannot be 'one's own internal' in any way; and precisely because it is entirely external, it is called 'absolutely external'. It is not called this due to the impossibility of it being merely 'one's own internal'—like a kasiṇa concept, which, because it is not a real phenomenon, is also not external. Indeed, precisely because it is not a real phenomenon, a concept like kasiṇa, although it becomes an internal phenomenon, is not any ultimate reality; therefore, it is not mentioned in the internal triad—this is the intention. All that, such as the sphere of nothingness, is said in the past-object triad as 'having an object that should not be designated'; thus is the connection. And here, the meaning is that the term 'is stated' is clarified by these reasons, namely, because it is a statement of what is permitted.

Idāni tanti ‘‘etañhi ākiñcaññāyatana’’nti vuttaṃ ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ taṃ-saddena ākaḍḍhitvā vadati. Yo panāyamettha attho vutto ‘‘ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ ekampi idha vuccamānaṃ atītārammaṇattike tena sahekārammaṇatampi sandhāya kāmāvacarakusalādīnaṃ navattabbārammaṇatāya vuttattā idhāpi tesaṃ navattabbārammaṇabhāvaṃ dīpetīti katvā tasmiṃ vutte tānipi vuttāneva honti, tasmā visuṃ na vuttānī’’ti, tamaññe nānujānanti. Na hi īdisaṃ lesavacanaṃ aṭṭhakathākaṇḍe atthi. Yadi siyā, parittārammaṇattike yesaṃ samānārammaṇānaṃ parittādiārammaṇatā navattabbatā ca vuttā. Puna atītārammaṇattike tesu ekameva vatvā aññaṃ na vattabbaṃ siyā. Tathā vedanāttike samānavedanānaṃ yesaṃ sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttatā [Pg.199] vuttā, tesu ekameva pītittike sukhasahagataniddese vatvā aññaṃ na vattabbaṃ siyā. Evaṃ upekkhāsahagataniddesādīsu yojetabbaṃ. Lesena pana vinā aṭṭhakathākaṇḍe atthuddhārassa katattā ākiñcaññāyatanassa viya kāmāvacarakusalādīnampi ajjhattārammaṇattike navattabbatāya sati tānipi navattabbānīti vattabbāni, na pana vuttāni. Tasmā abhāvanāsāmaññepi yāya abhāvanāniṭṭhappavattiyā ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ pavattamānaṃ navattabbaṃ jātaṃ, tassā pavattiyā abhāvena tāni navattabbānīti na vuttāni. Gahaṇavisesanimmitāneva hi kasiṇādīni sabhāvato avijjamānānīti tadārammaṇānaṃ bahiddhāgahaṇavasena bahiddhārammaṇatā vuttā. Ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ pana na bahiddhāgahaṇabhāvena pavattati, nāpi ajjhattaggahaṇabhāvena pavattatīti navattabbanti vuttaṃ. Yena pana gahaṇākārena ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ pavattati, na tena sabbaññutaññāṇampi pavattati. Yadi pavatteyya, tampi ākiñcaññāyatanameva bhaveyya. Yathā hi kilesānaṃ gocaraṃ pavattivisesañca sabbaṃ jānantaṃ sabbaññutaññāṇaṃ na yathā te gaṇhanti, tathā gaṇhāti tassapi kilesabhāvāpattito, evaṃ ākiñcaññāyatanassa ca pavattanākāraṃ yathāsabhāvato jānantaṃ taṃ ākiñcaññāyatanamiva na gaṇhāti, kimaṅgaṃ pana aññanti. Tena kāmāvacarakusalānaṃ navattabbatā na vuttāti. Ayaṃ ‘‘ākiñcaññāyatanassa visayabhūto apagamo nāma eko attho atthī’’ti anicchantānaṃ ācariyānaṃ vinicchayo.

Now, having drawn in with the word `taṃ` ('that') the base of nothingness which was stated as 'for this is the base of nothingness,' the text speaks. However, as for the meaning stated here—'Although the base of nothingness is mentioned alone here, by considering also its having the same object as that in the past-object triad, and because the sense-sphere wholesome states, etc., have been stated as having an object that is 'not to be stated,' here too it indicates their state of having an object that is 'not to be stated.' Thus, when that is stated, those too are considered stated. Therefore, they are not stated separately'—this, other teachers do not approve. For such an allusive statement is not found in the section of the commentary. If it were so, in the limited-object triad, where the nature of having a limited, etc., object and the 'not to be stated' nature have been stated for states having similar objects, then in the past-object triad, having stated only one among them, the others should not be stated. Likewise, in the feeling triad, where the association with pleasant feeling has been stated for states having the same feeling, then in the joy triad, in the exposition of states accompanied by happiness, having stated only one among them, the others should not be stated. Thus it should be applied to the expositions of states accompanied by equanimity, and so on. However, since the extraction of meaning in the section of the commentary is done without allusion, if, like the base of nothingness, the sense-sphere wholesome states, etc., also had the nature of 'not to be stated' in the internal-object triad, then they too should be stated as 'not to be stated.' But they are not so stated. Therefore, although there is a commonality of non-existence, it is due to its occurrence being the culmination of non-existence that the base of nothingness, when it occurs, becomes 'not to be stated.' Because those other states lack that kind of occurrence, they are not stated as 'not to be stated.' Indeed, kasiṇas, etc., are merely created by a special mode of apprehension and are non-existent by their intrinsic nature; therefore, for the states having them as object, their nature as external-object states is stated by way of apprehending an external object. The base of nothingness, however, does not occur by way of external apprehension, nor does it occur by way of internal apprehension; therefore, it is said to be 'not to be stated.' Moreover, the omniscient knowledge does not occur in the same mode of apprehension by which the base of nothingness occurs. If it were to occur thus, it too would be nothing other than the base of nothingness. For just as the omniscient knowledge, while knowing the entire domain and specific occurrence of the defilements, does not grasp them in the same way that they grasp—lest it too attain the state of a defilement—so too, that omniscient knowledge, while knowing the mode of occurrence of the base of nothingness as it truly is, does not grasp it like the base of nothingness itself. What need is there to speak of any other consciousness? For that reason, the 'not to be stated' nature of sense-sphere wholesome states is not stated. This is the determination of those teachers who do not accept the view that: 'There is one meaning, called removal, which is the object of the base of nothingness.'

Vipākaṃ pana na kassaci ārammaṇaṃ hotīti vipākaṃ ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ vipākādīsu viññāṇañcāyatanesu na kassaci ārammaṇaṃ hotīti attho, tathā ākiñcaññāyatanañca nevasaññānāsaññāyatanassa. Yathā hi vipākattike vipākadhammadhammanevavipākanavipākadhammadhammamūlakesu pañhesu ‘‘ākāsānañcāyatanakusalaṃ viññāṇañcāyatanakusalassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo, ākiñcaññāyatanakusalaṃ nevasaññānāsaññāyatanakusalassa, tathā vipākassa kiriyassa. Ākāsānañcāyatanakiriyaṃ viññāṇañcāyatanakiriyassa. Ākiñcaññāyatanakiriyaṃ nevasaññānāsaññāyatanakiriyassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti (paṭṭhā. 1.1.406, 410) vuttaṃ, na [Pg.200] tathā vipākadhammamūlakesu ‘‘ākāsānañcāyatanaākiñcaññāyatanavipākā viññāṇañcāyatananevasaññānāsaññāyatanavipākakusalakiriyānaṃ ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti vuttā. Vipākato vuṭṭhahitvā cittassa abhinīhārāsambhavatoti vipākaṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā abhinīhārāsambhavatoti attho. Vipākassa hi ārammaṇaṃ katvā natthi abhinīhāroti.

However, a result (vipāka) is not an object for any state. This means that the resultant base of the infinity of space is not an object for any of the resultant states of the base of the infinity of consciousness, and so on; similarly, the resultant base of nothingness is not an object for the resultant base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. For, just as in the Vipāka Triplet, in the questions rooted in states that are of the nature of result (vipākadhammadhamma) and states that are neither result nor of the nature of result (nevavipākanavipākadhammadhamma), it is said: “The wholesome base of the infinity of space is a condition for the wholesome base of the infinity of consciousness by way of object condition; the wholesome base of nothingness is a condition for the wholesome base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception; similarly for the resultant and the functional. The functional base of the infinity of space is a condition for the functional base of the infinity of consciousness; the functional base of nothingness is a condition for the functional base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception by way of object condition” (Paṭṭhāna 1.1.406, 410). But it is not similarly stated in the questions rooted in states of the nature of result that “the resultant bases of the infinity of space and nothingness are conditions for the resultant, wholesome, and functional states of the bases of the infinity of consciousness and neither-perception-nor-non-perception by way of object condition.” This is because the directing of the mind (abhinīhāra) is not possible after emerging from a result; that is, directing is not possible by taking a result as an object. For there is no directing by taking a result as an object.

Attano khandhādīnīti arūpakkhandhe ‘‘khandhā’’ti gahetvā ādi-saddena rūpaṃ gaṇhāti. Ajjhattaṃ vā gayhamānaṃ ahanti paññattiṃ ādi-saddena gaṇhāti. Esa nayo paresaṃ khandhādiggahaṇe ca. Puna paññattiggahaṇena kasiṇavihārādianindriyabaddhupādāyapaññattimāha. Ādi-saddena vā ahaṃ paraṃ paṇṇattiggahaṇe sabbaṃ upādāyapaññattiṃ. Kammādīsu kammaṃ ajjhattaṃ, kammanimittaṃ ubhayaṃ, gatinimittaṃ bahiddhāti daṭṭhabbaṃ. Attano sarīre eva kimi hutvā nibbattamānassa gatinimittampi ajjhattaṃ siyā. Mallikāya kummāsaṃ dadamānāya rañño aggamahesiṭṭhānalābhaṃ, santatimahāmattassa hatthikkhandhagatassa arahattappattiṃ, sumanamālākārassa ca pupphamuṭṭhinā pūjentassa paccekabodhisacchikiriyaṃ nissāya bhagavā sitaṃ pātvākāsi.

Regarding 'one’s own aggregates, etc.': having taken the formless aggregates as 'aggregates,' by the word 'etc.' one includes form. Or, by the word 'etc.' one includes the concept 'I' which is being grasped internally. This is also the method in the case of grasping the aggregates, etc., of others. Again, by the grasping of concept, he speaks of concepts not bound to the sense faculties, such as kasiṇa, etc., and derivative concepts. Or, by the word 'etc.', when grasping the concepts 'I' and 'other', one includes all derivative concepts. Among kamma, etc., kamma is internal; the sign of kamma is both internal and external; and the sign of rebirth is external—thus it should be understood. For one who is to be reborn as a worm in one's own body, the sign of rebirth may also be internal. The Blessed One made a smile manifest, relying on [the foreknowledge of]: Mallikā, who was giving a half-cooked barley-cake, attaining the position of chief queen to the king; the great minister Santati, who was on an elephant's back, attaining Arahantship; and the garland-maker Sumana, who was worshipping with a handful of flowers, realizing Paccekabodhi.

Imasmiṃ tike okāsaṃ labhantīti parittārammaṇātītārammaṇattikesu aladdhokāsāni navattabbānīti vuttāni, idha pana navattabbāni na honti, ajjhattādīsu ekārammaṇataṃ labhantīti attho. Etāni hi pañca sabbatthapādakākāsālokakasiṇacatutthānaṃ kasiṇārammaṇattā, brahmavihāracatutthassa paññattiārammaṇattā, ānāpānacatutthassa nimittārammaṇattā bahiddhārammaṇānīti. Sakāyacittānanti sakakāyacittānaṃ, tena payojanaṃ natthi, tasmā na taṃ ajjhattārammaṇanti attho. Anindriyabaddhassa vā rūpassāti ettha ‘‘tissannaṃ vā paññattīna’’nti idampi vā-saddena āharitabbaṃ, nayadassanaṃ vā etaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Īdise hi kāle bahiddhārammaṇanti.

Since [certain dhammas] find an opportunity in this triad, those that did not find an opportunity in the triads of limited-object, past-object, and so on, are said to be 'not to be spoken of' (navattabbāni). But here, the 'not to be spoken of' [dhammas] do not apply, for they obtain the state of having a single object among the internal, etc.; this is the meaning. Indeed, these five jhānas have external objects: the fourth jhānas that are the basis for all, the space-kasiṇa, and the light-kasiṇa, because they have a kasiṇa as their object; the fourth jhāna of the divine abidings, because it has the concept of beings as its object; and the fourth ānāpāna-jhāna, because it has a sign as its object. Regarding 'of one's own body and mind': there is no purpose served by that [knowledge of others' minds]. Therefore, that [knowledge] does not have an internal object; this is the meaning. Here, in the phrase 'or of form not bound to the sense faculties,' the phrase 'or of the three concepts' should also be brought in by the word 'or.' Or, this should be seen as an indication of the method. Indeed, at such a time, i.e., when taking as object the future aggregates, etc., of another person, it has an external object.

Tikaatthuddhāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Extraction of Meaning in the Triads is completed.

Dukaatthuddhāravaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Extraction of Meaning in the Dyads

1473. Māno [Pg.201] …pe… ekadhāvāti idaṃ avuttappakāradassanavasena vuttaṃ, aññathā māno kāmarāgāvijjāsaññojanehi ekato uppajjatīti dvidhāti vattabbo siyā. Esa nayo bhavarāgādīsu. Tathā vicikicchāti ettha tathāti etassa ekadhāvāti attho.

1473. Conceit... (and so on)... is said to be single-fold; this is stated by way of showing an unstated type. Otherwise, since conceit arises together with the fetter of sensual craving and the fetter of ignorance, it would be stated as twofold. This same principle applies to craving for existence and so on. Similarly, regarding doubt, here the meaning of 'similarly' is 'single-fold'.

1511. Sasaṅkhārikesūti idaṃ kāmacchandanīvaraṇassa tīhi nīvaraṇehi saddhiṃ uppajjanaṭṭhānadassanamattaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ, na niyamato tattha tassa tehi uppattidassanatthaṃ thinamiddhassa aniyatattā. Heṭṭhimaparicchedenāti uddhaccassa sabbākusale uppajjanato uddhaccasahagate dve, aññesu thinamiddhakukkuccavirahe tīṇi heṭṭhimantato uppajjantīti katvā ‘‘dve tīṇī’’ti vuttanti attho. Yattakānaṃ pana ekato uppattiyaṃ nīvaraṇā ceva nīvaraṇasampayuttā cāti ayamattho sambhavati, heṭṭhimantena tesaṃ dassanatthaṃ ‘‘dve’’ti vuttaṃ. Tato uddhampi pavattiyaṃ ayamattho sambhavati evāti dassanatthaṃ ‘‘tīṇī’’ti vuttaṃ. Dve tīṇīti ca dve vā tīṇi vāti aniyamaniddesoti cattāri vā pañca vātipi viññāyati. Yattha sahuppatti, tattha nīvaraṇā ceva nīvaraṇasampayuttā ca hontīti etassa vā lakkhaṇassa dassanametanti. Yattha cattāri pañca ca uppajjanti, tattha cāyamattho sādhito hoti. Evañca katvā kilesagocchake ca ‘‘dve tayo’’ti vuttaṃ. Lakkhaṇadassanavasena hi kilesā ceva kilesasampayuttā ca vuttā, na sabbesaṃ sambhavantānaṃ sarūpena dassanavasenāti.

1511. Regarding 'in prompted [consciousness]' (sasaṅkhārikesu), this should be seen merely as indicating the place of arising for the hindrance of sensual desire along with three [other] hindrances, not for the purpose of showing its arising there with them as a fixed rule, due to the unfixed nature of sloth and torpor. 'By the lower limit' means that since restlessness arises in all unwholesome states, two [hindrances] arise in states associated with restlessness, while in others, in the absence of sloth-torpor and worry, three arise. Considering that they arise from the lower limit, 'two or three' is stated—this is the meaning. However, in the simultaneous arising of however many hindrances, this meaning—'hindrances and things associated with hindrances'—is possible. To show them by the lower limit, 'two' is stated. To show that this meaning is indeed possible in an occurrence even higher than that, 'three' is stated. And 'two or three' is an indefinite statement meaning 'two or three', thus 'four or five' may also be understood. Or, this is a showing of this characteristic: where there is co-arising, there are both hindrances and things associated with hindrances. And where four and five arise, there too this meaning is established. And for this reason, in the section on defilements too, 'two or three' is stated. For, by way of showing the characteristic, both defilements and things associated with defilements are stated, not by way of showing in their own nature all that are possible.

Yadi uddhaccaṃ sabbākusale uppajjati, kasmā vuttaṃ ‘‘uddhaccanīvaraṇaṃ uddhaccasahagate cittuppāde uppajjatī’’ti? Suttante vuttesu pañcasu nīvaraṇesu aññanīvaraṇarahitassa uddhaccassa visayavisesadassanatthaṃ. Chaṭṭhaṃ pana nīvaraṇaṃ abhidhamme itarehi sahagatanti tassa aññanīvaraṇarahitassa na koci visayaviseso atthi, attanā sahagatehi vinā uppajjanaṭṭhānābhāvā tadupalakkhitassa cittuppādassa abhāvā ca nattheva visayaviseso, tasmā ‘‘taṃ sabbākusale uppajjatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Uddhaccasahagato pana vuttacittuppādo sesadhammānaṃ uddhaccānuvattanabhāvena tadupalakkhito uddhaccassa visayaviseso, tasmā sabbākusale uppajjamānaṃ uddhaccaṃ sāmaññena ‘‘uddhaccanīvaraṇa’’nti [Pg.202] gahetvāpi taṃ attano visayavisesena pakāsetuṃ ‘‘uddhaccasahagate cittuppāde uppajjatī’’ti āha. Evañca pakāsanaṃ visayavisesesu lobhadomanassasahagatasasaṅkhārikavicikicchuddhaccasahagatesu pañca nīvaraṇāni vavatthapetvā tesaṃ byāpakabhāvena chaṭṭhaṃ pakāsetuṃ katanti veditabbaṃ.

If restlessness arises in all unwholesome states, why is it said, ‘The hindrance of restlessness arises in a mental state accompanied by restlessness’? It is to show the specific domain of restlessness—among the five hindrances mentioned in the Suttas—when it is devoid of other hindrances. However, the sixth hindrance in the Abhidhamma is co-nascent with the others; therefore, for it, when devoid of other hindrances, there is no specific domain whatsoever. Because it has no place of arising apart from its co-nascent states, and because there is no mental state characterized by it, there is indeed no specific domain. Therefore, it is said, ‘It arises in all unwholesome states.’ But the aforementioned mental state accompanied by restlessness is characterized by that restlessness because the remaining states conform to it, and thus it is the specific domain of restlessness. Therefore, even while taking restlessness arising in all unwholesome states generally as the ‘hindrance of restlessness,’ in order to clarify it by its own specific domain, it was said, ‘It arises in a mental state accompanied by restlessness.’ And it should be understood that this explanation is made in order to show the sixth hindrance as pervading them, after having established the five hindrances within their respective specific domains—in mental states accompanied by greed, displeasure, those that are prompted, and those accompanied by doubt and restlessness.

Keci pana ‘‘uddhaccasahagateti sāmaññena sabbaṃ uddhaccaṃ ‘uddhacca’nti gahetvā tena sahagate cittuppāde’’ti vadanti, ayaṃ panattho na bahumato dvādasamacittuppādassa viya sabbākusalacittuppādānaṃ uddhaccena anupalakkhitattā, sati ca upalakkhitatte ‘‘aṭṭhasu lobhasahagatesū’’tiādīsu viya aññesaṃ cittuppādānaṃ nivattanatthaṃ ‘‘dvādasasu uddhaccasahagatesū’’ti vattabbattā. Uddhaccānupalakkhitattā pana sabbākusalānaṃ avijjānīvaraṇaṃ viya idampi ‘‘sabbākusalesu uppajjatī’’ti vattabbaṃ siyā, na pana vuttaṃ, tasmā vuttanayeneva attho veditabbo. Yasmā ca avijjānīvaraṇaṃ viya uddhaccanīvaraṇañca sabbākusalesu uppajjati, tasmā nikkhepakaṇḍe ‘‘kāmacchandanīvaraṇaṃ uddhaccanīvaraṇena nīvaraṇañceva nīvaraṇasampayuttañcā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tena ekasmiṃyeva cittuppāde uddhaccanīvaraṇaṃ uppajjatīti aggahetvā adhippāyo maggitabboti.

Some, however, say: 'In the phrase "accompanied by restlessness," having generally taken all restlessness as "restlessness," it arises in the mental states accompanied by that.' But this meaning is not widely accepted, because all unwholesome mental states are not marked by restlessness, unlike the twelfth mental state; and if they were so marked, for the purpose of excluding other mental states, it would have to be stated, 'in the twelve states accompanied by restlessness,' just as in such phrases as, 'in the eight states accompanied by greed.' However, because all unwholesome states are not marked by restlessness, it should have been stated of this hindrance also, like the hindrance of ignorance, that it 'arises in all unwholesome states'; but it was not so stated. Therefore, the meaning should be understood only by the method that has been explained. And because the hindrance of restlessness, like the hindrance of ignorance, does arise in all unwholesome states, it is therefore said in the Nikkhepakaṇḍa: 'The hindrance of sensual desire, with the hindrance of restlessness, is both a hindrance and associated with a hindrance,' and so on. By this, the intended meaning should be sought without grasping that the hindrance of restlessness arises in only one mental state.

Kilesagocchake lobhādīni dasa kilesavatthūni iminā anukkamena idheva abhidhamme āgatāni. Tasmā idheva vuttassa uddhaccakilesassa attanā saha vuttehi kilesehi rahitassa visayaviseso natthīti visayavisesena pakāsanaṃ akatvā ‘‘uddhaccañca ahirikañca anottappañca sabbākusalesu uppajjatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Kilesā ceva saṃkiliṭṭhapadaniddese yasmā saṃkiliṭṭhapadaṃ kilesasampayuttapadena asamānatthaṃ kevalaṃ malena upatāpitataṃ vibādhitatañca dīpeti, tasmā kilesā ceva kilesasampayuttapadaniddesena samānaṃ niddesaṃ akatvā ‘‘teva kilesā kilesā ceva saṃkiliṭṭhā cā’’ti vuttaṃ.

In the Kilesagocchaka (Section on Defilements), the ten bases of defilement beginning with greed are given here in the Abhidhamma in this sequence. Therefore, because the defilement of restlessness mentioned herein has no specific domain when devoid of the defilements mentioned along with it, without making a clarification by way of a specific domain, it was said: 'Restlessness, shamelessness, and moral recklessness arise in all unwholesome states.' And in the explanation of the term 'defilements and defiled,' because the term 'defiled' has a meaning not the same as the term 'associated with defilements'—as it indicates merely being tormented and afflicted by impurity—therefore, without giving an explanation the same as the explanation for 'defilements and associated with defilements,' it was said: 'Those very defilements are both defilements and defiled.'

1577. Dve tayo kilesāti ettha ‘‘dve tayoti hetugocchakādīsu vuttādhikāravasena ruḷhiyā vutta’’nti keci vadanti. Yadi atthaṃ anapekkhitvā ruḷhiyā vucceyya, ganthagocchake ca ‘‘yattha dve tayo ganthā [Pg.203] ekato uppajjantī’’ti vattabbaṃ siyā. Yañca vadanti ‘‘yattha dve tayo aññehi ekato uppajjantīti imassatthassa sambhavato ekato-saddo kilesagocchake sātthako, na hetugocchakādīsu tena vināpi adhippāyavijānanato’’ti, tampi na, hetugocchakādīsupi nānāuppattiyaṃ hetū ceva hetusampayuttādiggahaṇanivāraṇatthattā ekato-saddassa, tasmā ruḷhīanvatthakathāropanañca vajjetvā yathāvutteneva nayena attho veditabboti. Lobho chadhātiādinā lobhapaṭighamohānaṃ aññehi ekato uppattidassaneneva tesampi lobhādīhi ekato uppatti dassitāti veditabbā. Sesaṃ uttānatthamevāti.

1577. Here, regarding 'two or three defilements,' some say that the phrase 'two or three' is spoken by conventional usage (ruḷhi) according to the governing section in the Hetugocchaka (Root-Cause Section) and so forth. If it were spoken by conventional usage without regard to the meaning, then in the Ganthagocchaka (Section on Fetters) also, it should be said, 'where two or three fetters arise together.' And what they say—'Because of the possibility of this meaning, "where two or three arise together with others," the word "together" (ekato) is meaningful in the Kilesagocchaka, but not in the Hetugocchaka and so forth, since the intention can be known even without it'—that too is not correct. For even in the Hetugocchaka and so forth, in the case of separate arising, the word 'together' has the meaning of preventing the inclusion of 'root-causes and factors associated with the root-cause,' etc. Therefore, having avoided the superimposition of conventional (ruḷhi) and etymological (anvattha) interpretations, the meaning should be understood by the method just as it was stated. By the statement beginning with 'Greed is sixfold...', through the very showing of the arising of greed, aversion, and delusion together with others, it should be known that the arising of those others together with greed and so forth is also shown. The remainder is of clear meaning.

Aṭṭhakathākaṇḍavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Commentary Section is concluded.

Cattāri ca sahassāni, puna tīṇi satāni ca;

Aṭṭhasāliniyā ete, padā līnatthajotakā.

Four thousand and again three hundred: these are the words in the Aṭṭhasālinī that illuminate hidden meanings.

Dhammamittoti nāmena, sakkaccaṃ abhiyācito;

Ānandoiti nāmena, katā ganthā subuddhināti.

Having been earnestly requested by one named Dhammamitta, these texts were composed by one of good intellect named Ānanda.

Iti aṭṭhasāliniyā līnatthapadavaṇṇanā

Thus, the Explanation of Words with Hidden Meanings of the Aṭṭhasālinī.

Dhammasaṅgaṇī-mūlaṭīkā samattā.

The Dhammasaṅgaṇī Root Subcommentary is completed.