Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa

Homage to the Blessed One, the Arahant, the Perfectly Enlightened One.

Abhidhammapiṭake

In the Abhidhamma Piṭaka

Pañcapakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā

The Commentary on the Five Treatises

Dhātukathā-aṭṭhakathā

Commentary on the Discourse on Elements

Aṭṭhārasahi [Pg.1] bhedehi, vibhaṅgaṃ mārabhañjano;

Desayitvā mahāvīro, yaṃ tasseva anantaraṃ.

The Great Hero, the destroyer of Māra, having expounded the Analysis in eighteen ways, immediately thereafter...

Adesayi dhātukathaṃ, dhātubhedappakāsano;

Tassatthaṃ dīpayissāmi, taṃ suṇātha samāhitāti.

He taught the Discourse on Elements, revealing the distinctions of elements; I will explain its meaning, listen with collected minds.

1. Mātikāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Mātikā

1. Nayamātikāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Naya Mātikā

1. Saṅgaho asaṅgahotiādīnañhi vasena idaṃ pakaraṇaṃ cuddasavidhena vibhattanti vuttaṃ. Taṃ sabbampi uddesaniddesato dvidhā ṭhitaṃ. Tattha mātikā uddeso. Sā pañcavidhā – nayamātikā, abbhantaramātikā, nayamukhamātikā, lakkhaṇamātikā, bāhiramātikāti. Tattha saṅgaho asaṅgaho…pe… vippayuttena saṅgahitaṃ asaṅgahitanti – ayaṃ cuddasahi padehi nikkhittā nayamātikā nāma. Ayañhi iminā saṅgahādikena nayena dhātukathā dhammā vibhattāti dassetuṃ ṭhapitattā nayamātikāti vuccati. Etesaṃ padānaṃ mūlabhūtattā mūlamātikātipi vattuṃ vaṭṭati.

1. Indeed, it has been said that this treatise is classified in fourteen ways in terms of inclusion, non-inclusion, and so forth. All of that stands in two ways: as summary and detailed explanation. Therein, the mātikā is the summary. It is fivefold: the mātikā of methods, the internal mātikā, the mātikā of method entrances, the mātikā of characteristics, and the external mātikā. Therein, 'inclusion, non-inclusion... included by the dissociated and not included'—this, laid down in fourteen terms, is called the mātikā of methods. For this is called the mātikā of methods because it is established to show that the phenomena of the Dhātukathā are classified by this method beginning with inclusion. Since these terms are fundamental, it is also proper to call it the root mātikā.

2. Abbhantaramātikāvaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Internal Mātikā

2. Pañcakkhandhā [Pg.2] …pe… manasikāroti ayaṃ pañcavīsādhikena padasatena nikkhittā abbhantaramātikā nāma. Ayañhi ‘‘sabbāpi dhammasaṅgaṇī dhātukathāya mātikā’’ti evaṃ avatvā saṅgahādinā nayena vibhajitabbe khandhādidhamme sarūpato dassetvā dhātukathāya abbhantareyeva ṭhapitattā abbhantaramātikāti vuccati. Khandhādipadānaṃ dhammasaṅgaṇīmātikāya asaṅgahitattā pakiṇṇakamātikātipi vattuṃ vaṭṭati.

2. ‘The five aggregates …pe… attention’—this, set forth in one hundred and twenty-five terms, is called the internal mātikā. For this is called the internal mātikā because, without saying, “the entire Dhammasaṅgaṇī is the mātikā for the Dhātukathā,” it shows the aggregates and other phenomena that are to be analyzed by the method of inclusion and so on in their own nature, and because it is placed within the Dhātukathā itself. Since the terms for the aggregates and so on are not included in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī mātikā, it is also fitting to call it the miscellaneous mātikā.

3. Nayamukhamātikāvaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of the Mātikā of Method Entrances

3. Tīhi saṅgaho, tīhi asaṅgaho; catūhi sampayogo, catūhi vippayogoti ayaṃ catūhi padehi nikkhittā nayamukhamātikā nāma. Ayañhi sabbesupi pañcakkhandhādīsu ceva kusalattikādīsu ca mātikādhammesu, tīhi khandhāyatanadhātupadeheva saṅgaho ca asaṅgaho ca yojetabbo. Tathā catūhi arūpakkhandhehi sampayogo ca vippayogo ca. Etāni imesaṃ saṅgahāsaṅgahādīnaṃ nayānaṃ mukhānīti dassetuṃ ṭhapitattā nayamukhamātikāti vuccati.

3. ‘Inclusion by three, non-inclusion by three; association by four, dissociation by four’—this, laid out in four terms, is called the mātikā of method entrances. For in all mātikā phenomena—such as the five aggregates and so forth, and the wholesome triad and so forth—inclusion and non-inclusion should be connected precisely by means of the three terms of aggregates, sense bases, and elements. Similarly, association and dissociation by means of the four immaterial aggregates. Because these are established to show the entrances to these methods of inclusion, non-inclusion, and so on, it is called the mātikā of method entrances.

4. Lakkhaṇamātikāvaṇṇanā

4. Explanation of the Mātikā of Characteristics

4. Sabhāgo, visabhāgoti ayaṃ dvīhi padehi nikkhittā lakkhaṇamātikā nāma. Ayañhi sabhāgalakkhaṇehi dhammehi saṅgahanayo, visabhāgalakkhaṇehi asaṅgahanayo, tathā sampayogavippayoganayo yojetabboti sabhāgavisabhāgalakkhaṇavasena saṅgahādilakkhaṇaṃ dassetuṃ ṭhapitattā lakkhaṇamātikāti vuccati.

4. ‘Similar, dissimilar’—this, set forth in two terms, is called the mātikā of characteristics. For the method of inclusion is to be applied through phenomena with similar characteristics, the method of non-inclusion through phenomena with dissimilar characteristics, and likewise the method of association and dissociation. Because it is established to show the characteristics of inclusion and so forth by way of the characteristics of similarity and dissimilarity, it is called the mātikā of characteristics.

5. Bāhiramātikāvaṇṇanā

5. Explanation of the External Mātikā

5. Sabbāpi dhammasaṅgaṇī dhātukathāya mātikāti ayaṃ chasaṭṭhi tikapadāni, dve ca dukapadasatāni saṅkhipitvā nikkhittā bāhiramātikā nāma. Ayañhi ‘‘pañcakkhandhā…pe… manasikāro’’ti evaṃ dhātukathāya abbhantare avatvā ‘‘sabbāpi dhammasaṅgaṇī’’ti evaṃ dhātukathāya mātikato bahi ṭhapitattā bāhiramātikāti vuccati.

5. ‘The entire Dhammasaṅgaṇī is the mātikā of the Dhātukathā’—this, summarizing sixty-six triad terms and two hundred dyad terms, is set forth as what is called the external mātikā. For, not stating internally in the Dhātukathā, ‘the five aggregates...attention,’ but stating, ‘the entire Dhammasaṅgaṇī,’ it is called the external mātikā because it is placed outside the mātikā of the Dhātukathā.

Evaṃ [Pg.3] mātikāya pañcadhā ṭhitabhāvaṃ viditvā idāni ‘saṅgaho asaṅgaho’tiādīsu saṅgaho tāva jātisañjātikiriyāgaṇanavasena catubbidho. Tattha – ‘‘sabbe khattiyā āgacchantu, sabbe brāhmaṇā, sabbe vessā, sabbe suddā āgacchantu’’, ‘‘yā cāvuso visākha, sammāvācā, yo ca sammākammanto, yo ca sammāājīvo, ime dhammā sīlakkhandhe saṅgahitā’’ti ayaṃ jātisaṅgaho nāma. ‘‘Ekajātikā āgacchantū’’ti vuttaṭṭhāne viya hi idha sabbepi jātiyā ekasaṅgahaṃ gatā. ‘‘Sabbe kosalakā āgacchantu, sabbe māgadhakā, sabbe bhārukacchakā āgacchantu’’, ‘‘yo cāvuso visākha, sammāvāyāmo; yā ca sammāsati, yo ca sammāsamādhi, ime dhammā samādhikkhandhe saṅgahitā’’ti (ma. ni. 1.462) ayaṃ sañjātisaṅgaho nāma. ‘‘Ekaṭṭhāne jātā saṃvaḍḍhā āgacchantū’’ti vuttaṭṭhāne viya hi idha sabbepi sañjātiṭhānena nivutthokāsena ekasaṅgahaṃ gatā. ‘‘Sabbe hatthārohā āgacchantu, sabbe assārohā, sabbe rathikā āgacchantu’’, ‘‘yā cāvuso visākha, sammādiṭṭhi, yo ca sammāsaṅkappo, ime dhammā paññākkhandhe saṅgahitā’’ti (ma. ni. 1.462) ayaṃ kiriyāsaṅgaho nāma. Sabbeva hete attano kiriyākaraṇena ekasaṅgahaṃ gatā. ‘‘Cakkhāyatanaṃ katamakkhandhagaṇanaṃ gacchatīti? Rūpakkhandhagaṇanaṃ gacchatī’’ti. Hañci cakkhāyatanaṃ rūpakkhandhagaṇanaṃ gacchati, tena vata re vattabbe – ‘cakkhāyatanaṃ rūpakkhandhena saṅgahita’’nti (kathā. 471), ayaṃ gaṇanasaṅgaho nāma. Ayamidha adhippeto. Tappaṭipakkhena asaṅgaho veditabbo. Tesaṃ vikappato saṅgahitena asaṅgahitādīni. Ekuppādekanirodhaekavatthukaekārammaṇatāvasena sampayogo, tappaṭipakkhato vippayogo. Tesaṃ vikappato sampayuttena vippayuttādīni. Tadubhayasaṃsaggavikappato saṅgahitena sampayuttaṃ vippayuttantiādīni. Pañcakkhandhātiādīni pana khandhavibhaṅgādīsu vuttanayeneva veditabbāni. Phassādayo panettha sanniṭṭhānavasena vuttasabbacittuppādasādhāraṇato vuttāti.

Having thus understood the fivefold nature of the matrix, now, regarding ‘inclusion, exclusion,’ and so on, inclusion is, in the first place, of four kinds: by way of birth, origin, action, and enumeration. Herein: “Let all Khattiyas come, all Brāhmaṇas, all Vessas, all Suddas come,” and “Friend Visākha, right speech, right action, and right livelihood—these states are included in the aggregate of virtue”—this is called inclusion by birth. For here, all are included as one by birth, just as in the case where it is said, ‘Let those of one birth come.’ “Let all Kosalans come, all Magadhans, all Bhārukacchakas come,” and “Friend Visākha, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration—these states are included in the aggregate of concentration”—this is called inclusion by origin. For here, all are included as one by way of their place of origin and place of residence, just as in the case where it is said, ‘Let those born and raised in one place come.’ “Let all elephant-riders come, all horse-riders, all charioteers come,” and “Friend Visākha, right view and right intention—these states are included in the aggregate of wisdom”—this is called inclusion by action. For all these are included as one by their own actions. “To which aggregate-count does the eye-base belong? It belongs to the aggregate-count of form.” “If the eye-base belongs to the aggregate-count of form, then it must be said, ‘The eye-base is included with the aggregate of form’”—this is called inclusion by enumeration. This is what is intended here. By its opposite, exclusion is to be understood. From the alternatives of these, there are [pairs such as] included with excluded, and so on. Association is by way of arising together, ceasing together, having one basis, and having one object; by its opposite, dissociation. From the alternatives of these, there are [pairs such as] associated with dissociated, and so on. From the alternatives of the combination of both, there are [triplets such as] included with associated, included with dissociated, and so on. As for the five aggregates, and so on, they should be understood in the very way stated in the Analysis of the Aggregates, and so on. Here, contact and so on are stated by way of conclusion because they are common to all the stated arisings of consciousness.

Mātikāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Matrix.

2. Niddesavaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Exposition

1. Paṭhamanayo saṅgahāsaṅgahapadavaṇṇanā

1. First Method: Explanation of the Terms of Inclusion and Non-inclusion

1. Khandhapadavaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Term 'Aggregates'

6. Idāni [Pg.4] pañcakkhandhādivasena nikkhittamātikaṃ ‘saṅgaho asaṅgaho’tiādīhi nayamātikāpadehi saddhiṃ yojetvā dassetuṃ rūpakkhandho katihi khandhehītiādinā nayena niddesavāro āraddho. Tattha yasmā ‘‘saṅgaho asaṅgahotiādikāya nayamātikāya ‘‘tīhi saṅgaho, tīhi asaṅgaho’’ti nayamukhamātikā ṭhapitā, tasmā rūpakkhandhādīnaṃ saṅgahaṃ dassetuṃ katihi khandhehi katihāyatanehi katihi dhātūhīti tīṇi khandhāyatanadhātupadāneva uddhaṭāni. ‘Cattāri saccānī’tiādīsu ekampi na parāmaṭṭhaṃ. Yasmā ca ‘‘sabhāgo visabhāgo’’ti evaṃ lakkhaṇamātikā ṭhapitā, tasmā imassa pañhassa vissajjane rūpakkhandho ekena khandhenātiādi vuttaṃ. Sabhāgā hi tassa ete khandhādayoti. Tattha ekena khandhenāti rūpakkhandheneva. Yañhi kiñci rūpaṃ rūpakkhandhasabhāgattā rūpakkhandhotveva saṅgahaṃ gacchatīti rūpakkhandheneva gaṇitaṃ, taṃ rūpakkhandheneva paricchinnaṃ. Ekādasahāyatanehīti manāyatanavajjehi. Sabbopi hi rūpakkhandho dasāyatanāni dhammāyatanekadeso ca hoti, tasmā ekādasahāyatanehi gaṇito, paricchinno. Ekādasahi dhātūhīti sattaviññāṇadhātuvajjāhi ekādasahi etāsu hi apariyāpannaṃ rūpaṃ nāma natthi.

6. Now, the section of exposition has begun with the method of 'the form aggregate, by how many aggregates,' and so on, in order to show the matrix, which was laid out in terms of the five aggregates and so on, by connecting it with the methodical matrix terms such as 'inclusion and non-inclusion.' Herein, because the methodical opening matrix, 'threefold inclusion, threefold non-inclusion,' has been established by the methodical matrix beginning with 'inclusion and non-inclusion,' therefore, to show the inclusion of the form aggregate and so on, only three terms—aggregates, bases, and elements—have been taken up. Not even one term in 'the four truths,' and so on, has been touched upon. And because the characteristic matrix has been established as 'similar and dissimilar,' therefore, in answering this question, it is said, 'the form aggregate by one aggregate,' and so on. For these aggregates, and so on, are similar to it. Herein, 'by one aggregate' means by the form aggregate itself. For whatever form there is, because it is of the same nature as the form aggregate, it is included only as the form aggregate; thus, it is reckoned only by the form aggregate and is defined only by the form aggregate. 'By eleven bases' means excluding the mind base. For the entire form aggregate consists of the ten bases and a part of the mental-object base; therefore, it is reckoned and defined by eleven bases. 'By eleven elements' means excluding the seven consciousness elements, for there is no form that is not included in these.

Asaṅgahanayaniddese katihi asaṅgahitoti saṅkhepeneva pucchā katā. Vissajjane panassa yasmā rūpakkhandhassa visabhāgā cattāro arūpakkhandhā, ekaṃ manāyatanaṃ, satta viññāṇadhātuyo; tasmā catūhi khandhehītiādi vuttaṃ. Iminā nayena sabbapadesu saṅgahāsaṅgaho veditabbo. Imasmiṃ pana khandhaniddese – ‘‘rūpakkhandho katihi khandhehī’’tiādimhi tāva ekamūlake saṅgahanaye sarūpeneva dassitā pañca pucchā, pañca vissajjanāni. Asaṅgahanaye saṅkhepena dassitā pañca pucchā, pañca vissajjanāni. Iminā upāyena dukamūlakādīsupi pucchāvissajjanāni veditabbāni. Rūpakkhandhamūlakāyeva cettha dukatikacatukkā dassitā. Pañcake pana ‘‘rūpakkhandho [Pg.5] ca…pe… viññāṇakkhandho cā’’ti evaṃ bhedato ca, ‘‘pañcakkhandhā katihi khandhehī’’ti evaṃ abhedato cāti dvidhā pucchāvissajjanāni katāni. Evaṃ pāḷinayo veditabboti.

In the exposition of the method of non-inclusion, the question "by how many is it not included?" is asked concisely. But in answering, because the four immaterial aggregates, one mind base, and seven consciousness elements are dissimilar to the form aggregate, therefore, it is said, "by four aggregates," and so on. By this method, inclusion and non-inclusion should be understood in all instances. However, in this exposition of the aggregates—"the form aggregate, by how many aggregates," and so on—first, in the method of inclusion based on a single root, five questions and five answers are shown explicitly. In the method of non-inclusion, five questions and five answers are shown concisely. By this approach, the questions and answers based on two roots, and so on, should also be understood. Herein, only the dyads, triads, and tetrads based on the form aggregate are shown. But in the pentad, the questions and answers are made in two ways: both divided, as "the form aggregate and... the consciousness aggregate," and so on, and undivided, as "the five aggregates, by how many aggregates," and so on. Thus, the method of the Pāḷi should be understood.

2. Āyatanapadādivaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Terms 'Bases', and so on

22. Āyatanapadaniddesādīsu āyatanapadaniddese tāva cakkhāyatanaṃ ekena khandhenāti ekena rūpakkhandheneva, ekena cakkhāyataneneva ekāya cakkhudhātuyāva saṅgahitanti veditabbaṃ. Sotāyatanādīsupi imināva nayena saṅgahāsaṅgaho veditabbo. Asaṅkhataṃ khandhato ṭhapetvāti ettha pana yasmā asaṅkhataṃ dhammāyatanaṃ nāma nibbānaṃ, tañca khandhasaṅgahaṃ na gacchati; tasmā ‘khandhato ṭhapetvā’ti vuttaṃ. Catūhi khandhehīti rūpavedanāsaññāsaṅkhārakkhandhehi. Nibbānavajjañhi dhammāyatanaṃ etehi saṅgahitaṃ. Viññāṇakkhandhena pana ṭhapetvā dhammāyatanadhammadhātuyo sesāyatanadhātūhi ca taṃ na saṅgayhati. Tena vuttaṃ – ‘‘ekena khandhena, ekādasahāyatanehi, sattarasahi dhātūhi asaṅgahita’’nti. Yathā ca te heṭṭhā rūpakkhandhamūlakā, evamidhāpi cakkhāyatanamūlakāva nayā veditabbā. Dukamattameva pana pāḷiyaṃ dassetvā ‘‘dvādasāyatanānī’’ti abhedatova pucchāvissajjanaṃ kataṃ. Dhātuniddesepi eseva nayo.

22. In the exposition of the sense-base terms and so on, first, regarding the exposition of the sense-base terms, the eye-base is to be understood as included in one aggregate, namely the form aggregate alone; in one sense-base, the eye-base itself; and in one element, the eye-element alone. The ear-base and others should be understood in the same way regarding inclusion and exclusion. As for 'the unconditioned is excluded from the aggregates,' here, because the unconditioned, namely Nibbāna, is the mental-object base, and it is not included in the aggregates, therefore it is said 'excluded from the aggregates.' By four aggregates—that is, by the form, feeling, perception, and mental-formations aggregates—the mental-object base, except for Nibbāna, is included. By the consciousness aggregate, however, it is not included; nor is it included by the remaining sense-bases and elements, excepting the mental-object base and mental-object element. Hence it is said: 'Not included by one aggregate, eleven sense-bases, and seventeen elements.' Just as those below are rooted in the form aggregate, so here too the methods should be understood as rooted in the eye-base. But in the Pāli text, only a pair is shown, and the question and answer are given without distinction as 'twelve sense-bases.' The same method applies in the exposition of the elements.

40. Saccaniddese – sabbepi dukatikacatukkā pāḷiyaṃ dassitā. Yasmā ca dukatikesu samudayasaccasadisameva maggasaccepi vissajjanaṃ, tasmā taṃ samudayānantaraṃ vuttaṃ.

40. In the exposition of the Truths, all the dyads, triads, and tetrads are shown in the Pāli. And since in the dyads and triads, the explanation of the Path Truth is similar to that of the Origin Truth, it is therefore stated immediately after the Origin.

50. Indriyaniddese – jīvitindriyaṃ dvīhi khandhehīti rūpajīvitindriyaṃ rūpakkhandhena, arūpajīvitindriyaṃ saṅkhārakkhandhena saṅgahitaṃ. Sesaṃ vuttanayānusāreneva veditabbaṃ. Pāḷivavatthānaṃ panettha āyatanadhātuniddesasadisameva.

50. In the exposition of the faculties, the life faculty is included in two aggregates: the material life faculty is included in the aggregate of form, and the immaterial life faculty is included in the aggregate of mental formations. The rest should be understood just as previously explained. Here, the Pāli classification is similar to that in the exposition of the sense-bases and elements.

6. Paṭiccasamuppādavaṇṇanā

6. The Elucidation of Dependent Origination

61. Paṭiccasamuppādaniddese – ‘‘avijjā katihi khandhehī’’ti pucchaṃ anārabhitvā avijjā ekena khandhenāti evaṃ vissajjanameva dassitaṃ. Tattha saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇanti paṭisandhiyaṃ pavatte ca sabbampi vipākaviññāṇaṃ. Tenevāha [Pg.6] – ‘‘sattahi dhātūhi saṅgahita’’nti. Nāmarūpampi paṭisandhipavattivaseneva veditabbaṃ. Tenevettha saddāyatanampi saṅgahetvā ekādasahāyatanehi saṅgaho dassito. Phassādīsu khandhabhedo veditabbo. Aññeneva hi ekena khandhena phasso saṅgahito, aññena vedanā, taṇhāupādānakammabhavā pana saṅkhārakkhandheneva saṅgahitā. Bhavapadañcettha kammabhavādīnaṃ vasena ekādasadhā vibhattaṃ. Tattha kammabhavo phassādīhi sadisavisajjanattā tehi saddhiṃ ekato dassito. Upapattibhavakāmabhavasaññābhavapañcavokārabhavā aññamaññasadisavissajjanattā ekato dassitā. Yasmā cete upādinnakadhammāva tasmā ‘‘ekādasahāyatanehi sattarasahi dhātūhī’’ti vuttaṃ. Saddāyatanañhi anupādinnaṃ, taṃ ettha na gahitaṃ.

61. In the exposition of dependent origination—without raising the question, "By how many aggregates is ignorance included?"—the answer alone is shown: that ignorance is included in one aggregate. There, "consciousness conditioned by volitional formations" refers to all resultant consciousness, both at rebirth-linking and during the course of existence. Hence it is said: "Included by seven elements." Name-and-form should also be understood in terms of rebirth-linking and the course of existence. Therefore, here the inclusion is shown by eleven bases, having also included the sound-base. Regarding contact and so on, the division of aggregates should be understood. For contact is included by one aggregate and feeling by another, while craving, clinging, and kamma-existence are included only in the aggregate of volitional formations. Here, the term "existence" is analyzed in eleven ways, based on kamma-existence and so on. Among these, kamma-existence is shown together with contact and so on, because they share similar explanations. The types of existence—rebirth existence, sensual existence, perception existence, and five-aggregate existence—are shown together because they share similar explanations. Since these are all clung-to phenomena, it is said: "By eleven bases and seventeen elements." The sound-base, however, is not clung-to and thus is not included here.

68. Rūpabhavaniddese – pañcahāyatanehīti cakkhusotamanarūpadhammāyatanehi. Aṭṭhahi dhātūhīti cakkhusotacakkhuviññāṇasotaviññāṇarūpadhammamanodhātumanoviññāṇadhātūhi. Arūpabhavādayopi tayo sadisavissajjanattāva ekato dassitā. Tathā asaññābhavaekavokārabhavā. Tattha dvīhāyatanehīti rūpāyatanadhammāyatanehi. Dhātūsupi eseva nayo. Ekatalavāsikānañhi sesabrahmānaṃ cakkhusabbhāvato tassārammaṇattā tattha rūpāyatanaṃ uddhaṭaṃ.

68. In the exposition of the form-realm—by five bases: the eye, ear, mind, form, and mental-phenomena bases. By eight elements: the eye, ear, eye-consciousness, ear-consciousness, form, mental-phenomena, mind-element, and mind-consciousness element. The three types of existence beginning with the formless realm are also shown together because they share similar explanations. Similarly, the non-percipient existence and the one-constituent existence. There, by two bases: the form-base and the mental-phenomena base. The same method applies to the elements. Indeed, the form-base is mentioned there because for the other Brahmās dwelling on the same plane, the eye exists, and that form serves as its object.

71. Jāti dvīhi khandhehīti rūpajāti rūpakkhandhena, arūpajāti saṅkhārakkhandhena. Jarāmaraṇesupi eseva nayo. Sokādīsupi ekena khandhenāti sokadukkhadomanassāni vedanākkhandhena, paridevo rūpakkhandhena, upāyāsādayo saṅkhārakkhandhenāti evaṃ khandhaviseso veditabbo.

71. Birth by two aggregates: material birth by the form aggregate, immaterial birth by the formations aggregate. The same principle applies to aging and death. In sorrow and the like, by one aggregate: sorrow, suffering, and displeasure belong to the feeling aggregate; lamentation to the form aggregate; despair and the like to the formations aggregate. Thus, the distinction among aggregates should be understood.

73. Iddhipādo dvīhīti saṅkhāraviññāṇakkhandhehi, manāyatanadhammāyatanehi, dhammadhātumanoviññāṇadhātūhi ca. Jhānaṃ dvīhīti vedanākkhandhasaṅkhārakkhandhehi. Appamaññādayo sadisavissajjanattā ekato niddiṭṭhā. Cittaṃ pana cetanānantaraṃ nikkhittampi asadisavissajjanattā pacchā gahitaṃ. Tattha appamaññādīsu ekena khandhenāti vedanā vedanākkhandhena, saññā saññākkhandhena, sesā saṅkhārakkhandhena saṅgahitāti evaṃ khandhaviseso veditabbo.

73. The basis of psychic power by two: the formations and consciousness aggregates; the mind-base and mental-phenomena base; and the mental-phenomena element and mind-consciousness element. Jhāna by two: the feeling and formations aggregates. The immeasurables and others are shown together because they share similar explanations. But the mind, although placed immediately after volition, is taken up later because its explanation is dissimilar. There, among the immeasurables and others, "by one aggregate" means: feeling is included in the feeling aggregate, perception in the perception aggregate, and the rest are included in the formations aggregate. Thus, the distinction among aggregates should be understood.

7. Tikapadavaṇṇanā

7. Explanation of the Triad-Terms

77. Evaṃ [Pg.7] abbhantaramātikāya saṅgahaṃ dassetvā idāni bāhiramātikāya saṅgahaṃ dassetuṃ kusalā dhammātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha vedanāttike tīhi dhātūhīti kāyaviññāṇamanoviññāṇadhammadhātūhi. Sattahi dhātūhīti cakkhusotaghānajivhāviññāṇadhātūhi ceva manodhātudhammadhātumanoviññāṇadhātūhi ca. Vipākattike aṭṭhahi dhātūhīti kāyaviññāṇadhātuyā saddhiṃ tāhiyeva. Vipākadhammadhammā pana saṃkiliṭṭhasaṃkilesikehi saddhiṃ sadisavissajjanattā ekato gahitā. Yathā cete, evaṃ sabbatikadukapadesu yaṃ yaṃ padaṃ yena yena padena saddhiṃ sadisavissajjanaṃ hoti, taṃ taṃ uppaṭipāṭiyāpi tena tena saddhiṃ gahetvā vissajjitaṃ. Tattha vuttānusāreneva saṅgahāsaṅgahanayo veditabboti.

77. Having thus shown the summary of the internal matrix, now, to present the summary of the external matrix, the section beginning with "Wholesome phenomena, etc." is commenced. There, in the feeling triad, by three elements: the body-consciousness, mind-consciousness, and mental-phenomena elements. By seven elements: the eye-, ear-, nose-, and tongue-consciousness elements, as well as the mind-element, mental-phenomena element, and mind-consciousness element. In the resultant triad, by eight elements: those very seven elements together with the body-consciousness element. But 'resultant-dhammas that are dhammas' are taken together with 'the defiled and defiling' due to their similar exposition. And just as these, so in all triad and dyad sections, whatever term has a similar exposition to another term, that is taken together with it and expounded, even out of sequence. There, the method of inclusion and exclusion should be understood according to what has been stated.

Saṅgahāsaṅgahapadavaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Terms of Inclusion and Non-inclusion.

2. Dutiyanayo saṅgahitenaasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

2. The Second Method: Explanation of the Terms Not Included by the Included.

171. Idāni saṅgahitena asaṅgahitapadaṃ bhājetuṃ cakkhāyatanenātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tatridaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ – imasmiñhi vāre yaṃ khandhapadena saṅgahitaṃ hutvā āyatanadhātupadehi asaṅgahitaṃ, khandhāyatanapadehi vā saṅgahitaṃ hutvā dhātupadena asaṅgahitaṃ, tassa khandhādīhi asaṅgahaṃ pucchitvā vissajjanaṃ kataṃ. Taṃ pana rūpakkhandhādīsu na yujjati. Rūpakkhandhena hi rūpakkhandhova saṅgahito. So ca aḍḍhekādasahi āyatanadhātūhi asaṅgahito nāma natthi. Vedanākkhandhena ca vedanākkhandhova saṅgahito. Sopi dhammāyatanadhammadhātūhi asaṅgahito nāma natthi. Evaṃ asaṅgahitatāya abhāvato etāni aññāni ca evarūpāni manāyatanadhammāyatanādīni padāni imasmiṃ vāre na gahitāni. Yāni pana padāni rūpekadesaṃ arūpena asammissaṃ, viññāṇekadesañca aññena asammissaṃ dīpenti, tāni idha gahitāni. Pariyosāne ca –

171. Now, to analyze the terms not included by what is included, the section beginning 'by the eye-base,' etc., is commenced. Herein is the characteristic: in this section, that which, having been included by the aggregate-term, is not included by the sense-base and element terms; or that which, having been included by the aggregate and sense-base terms, is not included by the element-term—its non-inclusion by the aggregates, etc., is questioned and an explanation is given. This, however, does not apply to the form aggregate and so on. For by the form aggregate, only the form aggregate is included. And it is not the case that this is not included by the ten and a half sense-bases and elements. And by the feeling aggregate, only the feeling aggregate is included. And it is not the case that this is not included by the mind-object base and mind-object element. Thus, due to the absence of non-inclusion, these and other such terms—like the mind-base, mind-object base, etc.—are not taken up in this section. But those terms which indicate a portion of form unmixed with the formless, and a portion of consciousness unmixed with another—these are taken up here. And at the conclusion—

‘‘Dasāyatanā [Pg.8] sattarasa dhātuyo,Sattindriyā asaññābhavo ekavokārabhavo;

Paridevo sanidassanasappaṭighaṃ,Anidassanaṃ punadeva sappaṭighaṃ upādā’’ti.

The ten sense-bases, the seventeen elements, the seven faculties, the realm of non-perception, the realm of one constituent; lamentation, the visible and resistant, the unseen and also resistant, and clinging.

Evaṃ uddānagāthāya dassitāneva. Tasmā tesaṃ vaseneva saṅgahāsaṅgaho veditabbo. Pañhavasena hi imasmiṃ vāre āyatanadhātuvaseneva sadisavissajjane vīsati dhamme samodhānetvā eko pañho kato, satta viññāṇadhātuyo samodhānetvā eko, sattindriyāni samodhānetvā eko, dve bhave samodhānetvā eko, paridevena ca sanidassanasappaṭighehi ca eko, anidassanasappaṭighehi eko, sanidassanehi eko, sappaṭighehi ca upādādhammehi ca ekoti aṭṭha pañhā katā. Tesu khandhādivibhāgo evaṃ veditabbo seyyathidaṃ – paṭhamapañhe tāva catūhi khandhehīti arūpakkhandhehi, dvīhāyatanehīti cakkhāyatanādīsu ekekena saddhiṃ manāyatanena, aṭṭhahi dhātūhīti cakkhudhātuādīsu ekekāya saddhiṃ sattahi viññāṇadhātūhi.

Thus, they are shown by the summary verse. Therefore, their inclusion and non-inclusion should be understood by means of them. Indeed, in this section, by way of questions, one question was made by combining twenty phenomena which have similar answers regarding the sense-bases and elements; one by combining the seven consciousness elements; one by combining the seven faculties; one by combining the two existences; one by combining lamentation with the visible and resistant phenomena; one by combining the invisible and resistant phenomena; one by combining the visible phenomena; and one by combining the resistant and the clinging phenomena—thus, eight questions were made. Among them, the division of aggregates and so on should be understood as follows: in the first question, 'by four aggregates' means the formless aggregates; 'by two sense-bases' means each of the eye sense-base and so on, together with the mind-base; and 'by eight elements' means each of the eye element and so on, together with the seven consciousness elements.

Tatrāyaṃ nayo – cakkhāyatanena hi khandhasaṅgahena rūpakkhandho saṅgahito. Tasmiṃ saṅgahite rūpakkhandhe āyatanasaṅgahena cakkhāyatanamevekaṃ saṅgahitaṃ. Sesāni dasa āyatanāni asaṅgahitāni. Dhātusaṅgahenapi tena cakkhudhātuyevekā saṅgahitā. Sesā dasa dhātuyo asaṅgahitā. Iti yāni tena asaṅgahitāni dasāyatanāni, tāni cakkhāyatanamanāyatanehi dvīhi asaṅgahitāni. Yāpi tena asaṅgahitā dasa dhātuyo, tā cakkhudhātuyā ceva sattahi ca viññāṇadhātūhi asaṅgahitāti. Rūpāyatanādīsupi eseva nayo.

Herein is the method: By the eye sense-base, the form aggregate is included by way of aggregate inclusion. When that form aggregate is included, only the eye sense-base is included by way of sense-base inclusion. The remaining ten sense-bases are not included. And by way of element inclusion, only the eye element is included by that. The remaining ten elements are not included. Thus, those ten sense-bases not included by that are also not included by the two sense-bases, namely the eye sense-base and the mind sense-base. And those ten elements not included by that are also not included by the eye element and the seven consciousness elements. The same method applies to the form sense-base and so on.

172. Dutiyapañhe – yasmā yāya kāyaci viññāṇadhātuyā saṅgahito viññāṇakkhandho manāyatanena asaṅgahito nāma natthi, tasmā āyatanasaṅgahena saṅgahitāti vuttaṃ. Ettha pana catūhi khandhehīti rūpādīhi catūhi. Ekādasahāyatanehīti manāyatanavajjehi. Dvādasahi dhātūhīti yathānurūpā cha viññāṇadhātuyo apanetvā sesāhi dvādasahi. Cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyā hi cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyeva saṅgahitā, itarā asaṅgahitā. Sotaviññāṇadhātuādīsupi eseva nayo.

172. In the second question, since the consciousness aggregate, when included by any consciousness element whatsoever, is never not included by the mind-base, it is therefore said to be 'included by way of sense-base inclusion.' Here, however, 'by the four aggregates' means by the four, beginning with form. 'By the eleven sense-bases' means excluding the mind-base. 'By the twelve elements' means by the remaining twelve, after removing the six corresponding consciousness elements. For by the eye-consciousness element, only the eye-consciousness element itself is included; the others are not included. The same method applies in the case of the ear-consciousness element, and so on.

173. Tatiyapañhe [Pg.9] – cakkhundriyādīnaṃ vissajjanaṃ cakkhāyatanādisadisameva. Itthindriyapurisindriyesu pana dhammāyatanena saddhiṃ dve āyatanāni, dhammadhātuyā ca saddhiṃ aṭṭha dhātuyo veditabbā.

173. In the third question, the explanation for the eye faculty, etc., is similar to that for the eye-base, etc. However, in the case of the female faculty and male faculty, two sense-bases, together with the mind-object base, and eight elements, together with the mind-object element, should be understood.

174. Catutthapañhe – tīhāyatanehīti rūpāyatanadhammāyatanamanāyatanehi. Tesu hi bhavesu rūpāyatanadhammāyatanavasena dveva āyatanāni tehi saṅgahitāni. Sesāni nava rūpāyatanāni teheva ca dvīhi, manāyatanena cāti tīhi asaṅgahitāni nāma honti. Navahi dhātūhīti rūpadhātudhammadhātūhi saddhiṃ sattahi viññāṇadhātūhi.

174. In the fourth question, 'by three sense-bases' means by the form sense-base, the mind-object sense-base, and the mind sense-base. For in those existences, only two sense-bases are included by them, namely the form sense-base and the mind-object sense-base. The remaining nine physical sense-bases are not included by those very two, and also by the mind sense-base; thus they are not included by these three. 'By nine elements' means by the form element and the mind-object element, together with the seven consciousness elements.

175. Pañcamapañhe – dvīhāyatanehīti paṭhamapadaṃ sandhāya saddāyatanamanāyatanehi. Dutiyapadaṃ sandhāya rūpāyatanamanāyatanehi. Dhātuyopi tesaṃyeva ekekena saddhiṃ satta viññāṇadhātuyo veditabbā.

175. In the fifth question, 'by two sense-bases' means, with reference to the first term, by the sound sense-base and the mind-base. With reference to the second term, it means by the form sense-base and the mind-base. The elements, too, should be understood as the seven consciousness elements together with each of those.

176. Chaṭṭhapañhe – dasahāyatanehīti rūpāyatanadhammāyatanavajjehi. Soḷasahi dhātūhīti rūpadhātudhammadhātuvajjeheva. Kathaṃ? Anidassanasappaṭighā hi dhammā nāma nava oḷārikāyatanāni. Tehi khandhasaṅgahena saṅgahite rūpakkhandhe, āyatanasaṅgahena tāneva navāyatanāni saṅgahitāni. Rūpāyatanadhammāyatanāni asaṅgahitāni. Dhātusaṅgahenapi tā eva nava dhātuyo saṅgahitā. Rūpadhātudhammadhātuyo asaṅgahitā. Iti yāni tehi asaṅgahitāni dve āyatanāni, tāni rūpāyatanavajjehi navahi oḷārikāyatanehi, manāyatanena cāti dasahi asaṅgahitāni. Yāpi tehi asaṅgahitā dve dhātuyo, tā rūpadhātuvajjāhi navahi oḷārikadhātūhi, sattahi ca viññāṇadhātūhīti soḷasahi asaṅgahitāti veditabbā.

176. In the sixth question, 'by ten sense-bases' means those excluding the form sense-base and the mind-object sense-base. 'By sixteen elements' means those excluding the form element and the mind-object element. How so? For the unseen and resistant phenomena are the nine gross sense-bases. When the form aggregate is included by them by way of aggregate inclusion, then by way of sense-base inclusion, those very nine sense-bases are included. The form sense-base and the mind-object sense-base are not included. And by way of element inclusion, those same nine elements are included. The form element and the mind-object element are not included. Thus, the two sense-bases not included by them are not included by the nine gross sense-bases which exclude the form sense-base, and by the mind sense-base—thus by ten. And the two elements not included by them are to be understood as not included by the nine gross elements which exclude the form element, and by the seven consciousness elements—thus by sixteen.

177. Sattamapañhe – dvīhāyatanehīti rūpāyatanamanāyatanehi. Aṭṭhahi dhātūhīti rūpadhātuyā saddhiṃ sattahi viññāṇadhātūhi.

177. In the seventh question – "by two sense-bases" means by the form sense-base and the mind sense-base. "By eight elements" means by the form element together with the seven consciousness elements.

178. Aṭṭhamapañhe – ekādasahāyatanehīti sappaṭighadhamme sandhāya dhammāyatanavajjehi, upādādhamme sandhāya phoṭṭhabbāyatanavajjehi. Dhātūsupi eseva nayo. Atthayojanā panettha heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbāti.

178. In the eighth question – "by eleven sense-bases" means referring to phenomena with impact, excluding the mental-object sense-base; referring to clung-to phenomena, excluding the tangible sense-base. The same principle applies to the elements. The meaning here should be understood according to the method stated below.

Saṅgahitenaasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Section on 'Not Included by the Included'.

3. Tatiyanayo asaṅgahitenasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

3. The Third Method: Explanation of the Section on 'Included by the Unincluded'.

179. Idāni [Pg.10] asaṅgahitenasaṅgahitapadaṃ bhājetuṃ vedanākkhandhenātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tatridaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ – imasmiñhi vāre yaṃ khandhapadena asaṅgahitaṃ hutvā āyatanadhātupadehi saṅgahitaṃ, tassa khandhādīhi saṅgahaṃ pucchitvā vissajjanaṃ kataṃ. Taṃ pana rūpakkhandhaviññāṇakkhandhacakkhāyatanādīsu na yujjati. Rūpakkhandhena hi cattāro khandhā khandhasaṅgahena asaṅgahitā. Tesu tena ekadhammopi āyatanadhātusaṅgahena saṅgahito nāma natthi. Nanu ca vedanādayo dhammāyatanena saṅgahitāti? Saṅgahitā. Na pana rūpakkhandhova dhammāyatanaṃ, rūpakkhandhato hi sukhumarūpamattaṃ dhammāyatanaṃ bhajati. Tasmā ye dhammāyatanena saṅgahitā, na te rūpakkhandhena saṅgahitā nāma. Viññāṇakkhandhenapi itare cattāro khandhā asaṅgahitā. Tesu tena ekopi āyatanadhātusaṅgahena saṅgahito nāma natthi. Evaṃ saṅgahitatāya abhāvato etāni aññāni ca evarūpāni cakkhāyatanādīni padāni imasmiṃ vāre na gahitāni. Yāni pana padāni viññāṇena vā oḷārikarūpena vā asammissaṃ dhammāyatanekadesaṃ dīpenti, tāni idha gahitāni. Tesaṃ idamuddānaṃ –

179. Now begins the explanation of the section on 'Included by the Unincluded', starting with "by the aggregate of feeling," etc. Herein is the characteristic: In this section, that which is not included by the term 'aggregate' but is included by the terms 'sense-base' and 'element,' has been questioned and answered regarding its inclusion by aggregates, etc. However, this does not apply to the aggregate of form, the aggregate of consciousness, the eye-base, etc. For, by the aggregate of form, the other four aggregates are not included by way of aggregate-inclusion. Among them, not even a single phenomenon is included by way of sense-base or element-inclusion. But are not feeling, etc., included by the mind-object base? They are included. Yet, the aggregate of form is not the mind-object base, for only subtle form from the aggregate of form belongs to the mind-object base. Therefore, what is included by the mind-object base is not included by the aggregate of form. Similarly, the other four aggregates are not included by the aggregate of consciousness. Among them, not even one is included by way of sense-base or element-inclusion. Thus, due to the absence of such inclusion, these and other similar terms—such as the eye-base, etc.—are not taken up in this section. However, those terms that indicate a part of the mind-object base without being mixed with consciousness or gross form are included here. This is the summary of them—

‘‘Tayo khandhā tathā saccā, indriyāni ca soḷasa;

Padāni paccayākāre, cuddasūpari cuddasa.

Three aggregates, likewise the truths, and sixteen faculties; Terms in the mode of conditionality, fourteen upon fourteen.

‘‘Samatiṃsa padā honti, gocchakesu dasasvatha;

Duve cūḷantaradukā, aṭṭha honti mahantarā’’ti.

There are thirty-two terms, and ten in the clusters; Two are minor internal dyads, eight are major internal ones.

Etesu pana padesu sadisavissajjanāni padāni ekato katvā sabbepi dvādasa pañhā vuttā. Tesu evaṃ khandhavibhāgo veditabbo. Āyatanadhātūsu pana bhedo natthi. Tattha paṭhamapañhe tāva – tīhi khandhehīti rūpasaññāsaṅkhārakkhandhehi. Āyatanadhātuyo pana dhammāyatanadhammadhātuvasena veditabbā.

Among these terms, grouping together those that have similar explanations, all twelve questions have been stated. Among them, the division by aggregates should be understood thus. However, there is no distinction in the sense-bases and elements. There, in the first question, "by three aggregates" refers to the aggregates of form, perception, and mental formations. The sense-bases and elements, however, should be understood as the mind-object base and the mind-object element.

Tatrāyaṃ nayo – vedanākkhandhena hi nibbānañca sukhumarūpasaññāsaṅkhārā ca khandhasaṅgahena asaṅgahitā hutvā āyatanadhātusaṅgahena saṅgahitā. Tesu nibbānaṃ khandhasaṅgahaṃ na gacchati, sesā rūpasaññāsaṅkhārakkhandhehi saṅgahaṃ gacchanti. Āyatanadhātusaṅgahaṃ pana nibbānampi gacchateva. Tena vuttaṃ [Pg.11] – ‘‘asaṅkhataṃ khandhato ṭhapetvā tīhi khandhehi, ekenāyatanena, ekāya dhātuyā saṅgahitā’’ti. Saññākkhandhapakkhe panettha saññaṃ apanetvā vedanāya saddhiṃ tayo khandhā saṅkhārādīsu saṅkhārakkhandhaṃ apanetvā rūpavedanāsaññāvasena tayo khandhā veditabbā.

Herein is the method: By the feeling aggregate, Nibbāna and subtle form, perception, and mental formations, though not included by way of aggregate-inclusion, are included by way of sense-base and element-inclusion. Among these, Nibbāna is not included by aggregates, while the remaining—subtle form, perception, and mental formations—are included by the aggregates of form, perception, and mental formations. However, Nibbāna is indeed included by way of sense-bases and elements. Therefore, it is said: "Having excluded the unconditioned from the aggregates, it is included by three aggregates, one sense-base, and one element." And here, in the case of the perception aggregate, having excluded perception, the three aggregates should be understood as form, feeling, and mental formations; and in cases such as the mental formation aggregate, having excluded the mental formation aggregate, the three aggregates should be understood as form, feeling, and perception.

180. Dutiye – catūhi khandhehīti viññāṇavajjehi. Te hi nirodhena khandhasaṅgahena asaṅgahitā hutvā āyatanadhātusaṅgahena saṅgahitā.

180. In the second, "by four aggregates" refers to those excluding consciousness. For they, by way of cessation, though not included by way of aggregate-inclusion, are included by way of sense-base and element-inclusion.

181. Tatiye – dvīhīti vedanāsaññākkhandhehi. Rūpārūpajīvitindriyena hi vedanāsaññāviññāṇakkhandhā ca khandhasaṅgahena asaṅgahitā. Tesu pana vedanāsaññāva āyatanadhātusaṅgahena saṅgahitā. Tena vuttaṃ – ‘‘vedanāsaññākkhandhehī’’ti. Iminā upāyena sabbattha khandhabhedo veditabbo. Ito parañhi khandhānaṃ nāmamattameva vakkhāma.

181. Thirdly – by two, meaning by the aggregates of feeling and perception. For, by the life faculty, the aggregates of feeling, perception, and consciousness are not included by way of aggregate-inclusion. Among these, however, feeling and perception alone are included by way of sense-base and element-inclusion. Therefore, it is said: "by the aggregates of feeling and perception." By this method, the distinction of aggregates should be understood everywhere. For from here onwards, we will speak only of the mere names of the aggregates.

182. Catutthe – tīhi khandhehīti itthindriyapurisindriyesu vedanāsaññāsaṅkhārehi, vedanāpañcake rūpasaññāsaṅkhārehi; saddhindriyādīsu phassapariyosānesu rūpavedanāsaññākkhandhehi. Vedanāya vedanākkhandhasadisova taṇhupādānakammabhavesu saṅkhārakkhandhasadisova vinicchayo.

182. In the fourth—by three aggregates: in the faculties of femininity and masculinity, by feeling, perception, and formations; in the fivefold feeling, by form, perception, and formations; in the faculties of faith, etc., ending with contact, by the aggregates of form, feeling, and perception. As for feeling, the determination is similar to that of the feeling aggregate; and in the case of craving, clinging, and kamma-becoming, the determination is similar to that of the mental formation aggregate.

183. Pañcame – jātijarāmaraṇesu jīvitindriyasadisova. Jhānena pana nibbānaṃ sukhumarūpaṃ saññā ca khandhasaṅgahena asaṅgahitā hutvā āyatanadhātusaṅgahena saṅgahitā. Tasmā taṃ sandhāya rūpakkhandhasaññākkhandhānaṃ vasena dve khandhā veditabbā.

183. In the fifth—in the case of birth, aging, and death, it is similar to the life faculty. However, with regard to jhāna, Nibbāna, subtle form, and perception, though not included by way of aggregate-inclusion, are included by way of sense-base and element-inclusion. Therefore, with reference to that, two aggregates should be understood by way of the aggregate of form and the aggregate of perception.

184. Chaṭṭhe – sokādittaye vedanāya sadiso. Upāyāsādīsu saṅkhārasadiso. Puna vedanāya vedanākkhandhasadiso, saññāya saññākkhandhasadiso, cetanādīsu saṅkhārakkhandhasadiso vinicchayo. Iminā upāyena sattamapañhādīsupi saṅgahāsaṅgaho veditabboti.

184. In the sixth—in the triad beginning with sorrow, it is similar to feeling. In despair, etc., it is similar to formations. Further, the determination for feeling is similar to that of the feeling aggregate; for perception, it is similar to that of the perception aggregate; and in the case of volition, etc., it is similar to that of the formation aggregate. By this method, inclusion and non-inclusion should also be understood in the seventh question, etc.

Asaṅgahitenasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Section on 'Included by the Unincluded'.

4. Catutthanayo saṅgahitenasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

4. The Fourth Method: Explanation of the Section on 'Included by the Included'.

191. Idāni [Pg.12] saṅgahitenasaṅgahitapadaṃ bhājetuṃ samudayasaccenātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha yaṃ khandhādīhi saṅgahitena khandhādivasena saṅgahitaṃ, puna tasseva khandhādīhi saṅgahaṃ pucchitvā vissajjanaṃ kataṃ. Taṃ khandhāyatanadhātūsu ekampi sakalakoṭṭhāsaṃ gahetvā ṭhitapadesu na yujjati. Sakalena hi khandhādipadena aññaṃ khandhādivasena saṅgahitaṃ nāma natthi, yaṃ attano saṅgāhakaṃ saṅgaṇhitvā puna teneva saṅgahaṃ gaccheyya. Tasmā tathārūpāni padāni imasmiṃ vāre na gahitāni. Yāni pana padāni saṅkhārekadesaṃ vā aññena asammissaṃ dīpenti – vedanekadesaṃ vā sukhumarūpaṃ vā saddekadesaṃ vā, tāni idha gahitāni. Tesaṃ idamuddānaṃ –

191. Now, to analyze the term 'included by the included,' the section beginning with 'by the truth of origin' and so forth is undertaken. Herein, that which is included by the aggregates and so forth, is included in terms of the aggregates and so forth; then, having been questioned again about its inclusion by those same aggregates and so forth, a reply is given. This does not apply to terms that stand for even a single complete portion of the aggregates, sense bases, or elements. For by a complete term for aggregates and so forth, there is nothing else included in terms of aggregates and so forth, which, having included its own includer, would again be included by that same one. Therefore, such terms are not taken in this section. But those terms that indicate a part of formations, or—unmixed with anything else—a part of feeling, or subtle form, or a part of sound, are taken here. Their summary is as follows:

‘‘Dve saccā pannarasindriyā, ekādasa paṭiccapadā;

Uddhaṃ puna ekādasa, gocchakapadamettha tiṃsavidha’’nti.

“Two truths, fifteen faculties, eleven factors of dependent origination; further, again eleven; here the collective term is thirtyfold.”

Pañhā panettha dveyeva honti. Tattha yaṃ pucchāya uddhaṭaṃ padaṃ, tadeva yehi dhammehi khandhādivasena saṅgahitaṃ, te dhamme sandhāya sabbattha ekena khandhenātiādi vuttaṃ. Tatrāyaṃ nayo – samudayasaccena hi taṇhāvajjā sesā saṅkhārā khandhādisaṅgahena saṅgahitā. Puna tehi taṇhāva saṅgahitā. Sā taṇhā puna saṅkhāreheva khandhādisaṅgahena saṅgahitāti. Eseva nayo sabbattha. Arūpadhammapucchāsu panettha saṅkhārakkhandho vā vedanākkhandho vā eko khandho nāma. Rūpadhammapucchāsu rūpakkhandho. Paridevapucchāya saddāyatanaṃ ekaṃ āyatanaṃ nāma. Saddadhātu ekā dhātu nāma, sesaṭṭhānesu dhammāyatanadhammadhātuvaseneva attho veditabboti.

Here, there are only two questions. Herein, with reference to those phenomena by which the term extracted in the question is included in terms of aggregates and so forth, it is said everywhere, 'by one aggregate,' and so on. Herein, this is the method: by the truth of origin, the remaining formations, excluding craving, are included by the inclusion of aggregates and so forth. Again, by them, craving is included. That craving is again included by those very formations through the inclusion of aggregates and so forth. This is the method everywhere. In questions about immaterial phenomena, the aggregate of formations or the aggregate of feeling is called 'one aggregate.' In questions about material phenomena, the aggregate of form. In the question about lamentation, the sound base is called 'one sense base.' The sound element is 'one element.' In the remaining instances, the meaning should be understood by way of the mind-object base and the mind-object element.

Saṅgahitenasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Term 'Included by the Included'.

5. Pañcamanayo asaṅgahitenaasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

5. The Fifth Method: The Explanation of the Term 'Unincluded by the Unincluded'.

193. Idāni asaṅgahitena asaṅgahitapadaṃ bhājetuṃ rūpakkhandhenātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha yaṃ khandhādīhi asaṅgahitena khandhādivasena asaṅgahitaṃ, puna tasseva khandhādīhi asaṅgahaṃ pucchitvā vissajjanaṃ kataṃ. Taṃ pañcakkhandhaggāhakesu dukkhasaccādīsu [Pg.13] viññāṇena saddhiṃ sukhumarūpaggāhakesu anidassanaappaṭighādīsu ca padesu na yujjati. Tādisena hi padena nibbānaṃ khandhasaṅgahamattaṃ na gaccheyya. Sesā khandhādīhi asaṅgahitadhammā nāma natthi. Tasmā tathārūpāni padāni imasmiṃ vāre na gahitāni. Yāni pana pañcakkhandhe viññāṇañca sukhumarūpena saddhiṃ ekato na dīpenti, tāni idha gahitāni. Tesaṃ idamuddānaṃ –

193. Now, to analyze the term 'unincluded by the unincluded,' the section beginning with 'by the aggregate of form' and so forth is undertaken. Herein, that which is unincluded by the aggregates and so forth, is unincluded in terms of the aggregates and so forth; then, when questioned again regarding its non-inclusion by those same aggregates and so forth, a reply is given. This does not apply to terms that grasp the five aggregates, such as the truth of suffering and so forth, nor to terms that grasp subtle form together with consciousness, such as the invisible and non-resistant and so forth. For by such a term, Nibbāna would not be merely included among the aggregates. There are no other phenomena that are unincluded by the aggregates and so forth. Therefore, such terms are not taken in this section. But those terms which do not indicate the five aggregates and consciousness together with subtle form as one, are taken here. Their summary is as follows:

‘‘Sabbe khandhā tathāyatanadhātuyo saccato tayo;

Indriyānipi sabbāni, tevīsati paṭiccato.

“All aggregates, likewise sense bases and elements; three by way of truths; all faculties too; twenty-three by way of dependent origination.”

‘‘Parato soḷasa padā, tecattālīsakaṃ tike;

Gocchake sattati dve ca, satta cūḷantare padā.

“Sixteen terms from the other section, forty-three in the triads; seventy-two in the groups, and seven terms in the minor intermediate sections.”

‘‘Mahantare padā vuttā, aṭṭhārasa tato paraṃ;

Aṭṭhāraseva ñātabbā, sesā idha na bhāsitā’’ti.

“In the major intermediate sections, eighteen terms are stated; beyond that, eighteen alone should be known, the rest are not spoken of here.”

Pañhā panettha sadisavissajjanānaṃ vasena samodhānetvā katihi saddhiṃ sabbepi catuttiṃsa honti. Tattha yaṃ pucchāya uddhaṭaṃ padaṃ, tadeva yehi khandhādīhi asaṅgahitaṃ, te dhamme sandhāya ekena khandhenātiādi vuttaṃ.

Here, the questions, when harmonized by way of their similar answers, amount to thirty-four in all. Herein, with reference to those phenomena by which the term extracted in the question is unincluded by the aggregates and so forth, it is said, 'by one aggregate,' and so on.

Tatrāyaṃ nayo – rūpakkhandhena hi cattāro khandhā nibbānañca khandhasaṅgahena asaṅgahitā. Āyatanadhātusaṅgahena pana ṭhapetvā viññāṇaṃ avasesā saṅgahitāti viññāṇameva tīhipi khandhasaṅgahādīhi asaṅgahitaṃ nāma. Puna tena viññāṇena saddhiṃ nibbānena cattāro khandhā khandhādisaṅgahena asaṅgahitā. Te sabbepi puna viññāṇeneva khandhādisaṅgahena asaṅgahitāti ekena khandhena, ekenāyatanena, sattahi dhātūhi asaṅgahitā nāma honti. Atha vā – yadetaṃ rūpakkhandhena viññāṇameva tīhi khandhādisaṅgahehi asaṅgahitaṃ, tehipi viññāṇadhammehi te rūpadhammāva tīhi saṅgahehi asaṅgahitā. Puna te rūpadhammā viññāṇeneva tīhi saṅgahehi asaṅgahitā. Viññāṇañca khandhato eko viññāṇakkhandho hoti, āyatanato ekaṃ manāyatanaṃ, dhātuto satta viññāṇadhātuyo. Tasmā ‘‘ekena khandhenā’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Iminā upāyena sabbattha yaṃ pucchāya uddhaṭaṃ padaṃ, tadeva yehi dhammehi khandhādivasena asaṅgahitaṃ, tesaṃ dhammānaṃ vasena khandhādayo veditabbā. Tattha dutiyapañhe tāva – rūpaviññāṇānaṃ vasena [Pg.14] veditabbā. Vedanādayo hi rūpaviññāṇeheva khandhādisaṅgahena asaṅgahitā. Te ca dve khandhā ekādasāyatanāni sattarasa dhātuyo honti.

Herein, this is the method: By the aggregate of form, the four aggregates and Nibbāna are unincluded by the inclusion of aggregates. However, by the inclusion of sense bases and elements, setting aside consciousness, the remainder are included; thus, consciousness alone is what is called 'unincluded' by the three—the inclusion of aggregates and so forth. Again, together with that consciousness and Nibbāna, the four aggregates are unincluded by the inclusion of aggregates and so forth. All of them, again, are unincluded by the inclusion of aggregates and so forth through consciousness alone. Thus, they are said to be unincluded by one aggregate, one sense base, and seven elements. Alternatively, just as by the aggregate of form, consciousness alone is unincluded by the three inclusions of aggregates and so forth, so too by those consciousness-phenomena, those very form-phenomena are unincluded by the three inclusions. Again, those form-phenomena are unincluded by the three inclusions through consciousness alone. And consciousness, from the perspective of aggregates, is the one aggregate of consciousness; from the perspective of sense bases, it is the one mind base; and from the perspective of elements, it is the seven consciousness elements. Therefore, it is said, 'by one aggregate,' and so on. By this method, in all cases, the aggregates and so forth should be understood in terms of those phenomena by which the very term extracted in the question is unincluded. Therein, in the second question, for instance, they should be understood in terms of form and consciousness. For feeling and the rest are unincluded by the inclusion of aggregates and so forth through form and consciousness alone. And these are two aggregates, eleven sense bases, and seventeen elements.

195. Tatiyapañhe – viññāṇaṃ rūpādīhi catūhi asaṅgahitanti tesaṃ vasena khandhādayo veditabbā.

195. In the third question, consciousness is unincluded by the four beginning with form; in terms of these, the aggregates and so forth should be understood.

196. Catutthapañhe – cakkhāyatanaṃ vedanādīhi catūhīti iminā nayena sabbattha khandhādayo veditabbā. Pariyosāne – rūpañca dhammāyatananti uddānagāthāya dassitadhammāyeva aññenākārena saṅkhipitvā dassitāti.

196. In the fourth question—the eye-base is unincluded by the four beginning with feeling—by this method the aggregates and so forth should be understood everywhere. At the conclusion—'and form and the mind-object base'—the very phenomena shown in the summary verse are presented concisely in another manner.

Asaṅgahitenaasaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Term 'Unincluded by the Unincluded'.

6. Chaṭṭhanayo sampayogavippayogapadavaṇṇanā

6. The Sixth Method: The Explanation of the Terms 'Association' and 'Dissociation'.

228. Idāni sampayogavippayogapadaṃ bhājetuṃ rūpakkhandhotiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha yaṃ labbhati yañca na labbhati taṃ sabbaṃ pucchāya gahitaṃ. Vissajjane pana yaṃ na labbhati, taṃ natthīti paṭikkhittaṃ. Catūhi sampayogo, catūhi vippayogo; sabhāgo visabhāgoti hi vacanato catūhi arūpakkhandheheva sabhāgānaṃ ekasantānasmiṃ ekakkhaṇe uppannānaṃ arūpakkhandhānaṃyeva aññamaññaṃ sampayogo labbhati. Rūpadhammānaṃ pana rūpena nibbānena vā, nibbānassa ca rūpena saddhiṃ sampayogo nāma natthi. Tathā rūpanibbānānaṃ arūpakkhandhehi, visabhāgā hi te tesaṃ. Yathā ca arūpakkhandhānaṃ rūpanibbānehi, evaṃ bhinnasantānehi nānākkhaṇikehi arūpadhammehipi saddhiṃ natthiyeva. Tepi hi tesaṃ santānakkhaṇavisabhāgatāya visabhāgāyeva. Ayaṃ pana visabhāgatā saṅgahaṭṭhena virujjhanato saṅgahanaye natthi. Gaṇanūpagamattañhi saṅgahaṭṭho. Sampayoganaye pana atthi, ekuppādatādilakkhaṇañhi sampayogaṭṭhoti. Evamettha yassa ekadhammenapi sampayogalakkhaṇaṃ na yujjhati, tassa pucchāya saṅgahaṃ katvāpi natthīti paṭikkhepo kato. Yassa vippayogalakkhaṇaṃ yujjati, tassa vippayogo dassito. Yāni pana padāni sattasu viññāṇadhātūsu ekāyapi avippayutte rūpena nibbānena vā missakadhamme dīpenti, tāni sabbathāpi idha na yujjantīti na gahitāni. Tesaṃ idamuddānaṃ –

228. Now, in order to analyze the terms 'association' and 'dissociation', the section beginning with 'the form aggregate', etc., has been commenced. Herein, whatever is obtainable and whatever is not obtainable—all that is included in the question. But in the answer, whatever is not obtainable is rejected as 'it does not exist'. Association is with four, dissociation is with four. For, according to the statement 'homogeneous and heterogeneous', association is obtained only among the four immaterial aggregates themselves, which are homogeneous, having arisen in a single moment within a single continuum. However, there is no such thing as association of material phenomena with matter or Nibbāna, nor of Nibbāna with matter. Similarly, there is no association of matter and Nibbāna with the immaterial aggregates, for they are heterogeneous to them. Just as the immaterial aggregates do not associate with matter or Nibbāna, so too they do not associate with immaterial phenomena from different continuums or arising in different moments. These too are heterogeneous to them due to the difference in their continuum and moment. But this heterogeneity is not relevant in the method of inclusion because it conflicts with the meaning of inclusion. For the meaning of inclusion is merely being subject to counting. In the method of association, however, it is relevant, because the meaning of association is characterized by having a single arising, etc. Thus, here, in respect of whatever does not fit the characteristic of association even with a single phenomenon, although it is included in the question, its existence is rejected. Whatever fits the characteristic of dissociation is shown as dissociated. But the terms that indicate phenomena mixed with matter or Nibbāna, which are not dissociated from even one of the seven consciousness elements, are entirely unsuitable here and thus are not included. Their summary is as follows:

‘‘Dhammāyatanaṃ [Pg.15] dhammadhātu, dukkhasaccañca jīvitaṃ;

Saḷāyatanaṃ nāmarūpaṃ, cattāro ca mahābhavā.

The mental-objects base, the mental-objects element, the truth of suffering, and life; the six sense bases, name-and-form, and the four great primary elements.

‘‘Jātijarā ca maraṇaṃ, tikesvekūnavīsati;

Gocchakesu ca paññāsa, aṭṭha cūḷantare padā.

Birth, aging, and death; nineteen in the triads; fifty in the groups; and eight terms in the minor section.

‘‘Mahantare pannarasa, aṭṭhārasa tato pare;

Tevīsa padasataṃ etaṃ, sampayoge na labbhatī’’ti.

Fifteen in the great section, eighteen thereafter; these one hundred and twenty-three terms are not obtainable in association.

Dhammāyatanañhi rūpanibbānamissakattā tasmiṃ apariyāpannena viññāṇenapi na sakkā sampayuttanti vattuṃ. Yasmā panettha vedanādayo viññāṇena sampayuttā, tasmā vippayuttantipi na sakkā vattuṃ. Sesesupi eseva nayo. Evaṃ sabbatthāpi etāni na yujjantīti idha na gahitāni. Sesāni khandhādīni yujjantīti tāni gahetvā ekekavasena ca samodhānena ca pañhavissajjanaṃ kataṃ. Tesu pañhesu, paṭhame – ekenāyatanenāti manāyatanena. Kehicīti dhammāyatanadhammadhātupariyāpannehi vedanāsaññāsaṅkhārehi.

For the mental-objects base, owing to its being mixed with matter and Nibbāna, it cannot be said to be associated even with consciousness not included within it. But since here feeling, etc., are associated with consciousness, they cannot be said to be dissociated either. The same method applies to the rest. Thus, these are entirely unsuitable everywhere and are not included here. The remaining aggregates, etc., are suitable, so they are included, and the answers to the questions are given individually and collectively. Among these questions, in the first—'with one base'—means with the mind base. 'With some' means with feeling, perception, and formations included in the mental-objects base and the mental-objects element.

229. Dutiye – tīhīti pucchitaṃ pucchitaṃ ṭhapetvā sesehi. Kehici sampayuttoti vedanākkhandho saññāsaṅkhārehi. Itarepi attānaṃ ṭhapetvā itarehi. Kehici vippayuttoti rūpanibbānehi. Evaṃ sabbattha rūpassa vippayoge dhammāyatanadhammadhātūsu arūpaṃ, arūpassa vippayoge rūpaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tatiyapañho uttānatthova.

229. In the second [question]—'with three' means with the remaining items, after excluding the one asked about. 'Associated with some' means the feeling aggregate is associated with perception and formations. The others also, excluding themselves, are associated with the others. 'Dissociated with some' means with matter and Nibbāna. Thus, everywhere, in the dissociation of matter, the immaterial part of the mental-objects base and mental-objects element should be understood; in the dissociation of the immaterial, matter should be understood. The meaning of the third question is straightforward.

231. Catutthe – ‘katihi khandhehī’tiādiṃ avatvā sampayuttanti natthīti vuttaṃ. Taṃ pana khandhādīnaṃyeva vasena veditabbaṃ. Paratopi evarūpesu pañhesu eseva nayo. Ādipañhasmiñhi sarūpato dassetvā parato pāḷi saṃkhittā. Iminā nayena sabbattha atthayojanā veditabbā. Yattha pana nātipākaṭā bhavissati, tattha naṃ pākaṭaṃ katvāva gamissāma.

231. In the fourth [question]—without stating 'with how many aggregates?' and so forth, it is stated, 'there is no association.' However, this is to be understood in terms of the aggregates, etc., themselves. This same method applies to similar questions thereafter. For in the first question the meaning is shown in its own form, but subsequently the Pāli is abbreviated. By this method, the application of the meaning should be understood everywhere. But where it is not very clear, we shall proceed only after making it manifest.

234. Soḷasahi dhātūhīti cakkhuviññāṇadhātu tāva attānaṃ ṭhapetvā chahi viññāṇadhātūhi, dasahi ca rūpadhātūhi. Sesāsupi eseva nayo.

234. 'With sixteen elements' means: the eye-consciousness element, excluding itself, is dissociated from the six other consciousness elements and the ten material elements. The same method applies to the rest.

235. Tīhi [Pg.16] khandhehīti saṅkhārakkhandhaṃ ṭhapetvā sesehi. Ekāya dhātuyāti manoviññāṇadhātuyā. Samudayamaggānañhi aññāya dhātuyā sampayogo natthi. Ekena khandhenāti saṅkhārakkhandhena. Ekenāyatanenāti dhammāyatanena. Ekāya dhātuyāti dhammadhātuyā. Etesu hi taṃ saccadvayaṃ kehici sampayuttaṃ.

235. 'With three aggregates' means with the remaining [aggregates], excluding the formations aggregate. 'With one element' means with the mind-consciousness element. For there is no association of the truths of origin and path with any other element. 'With one aggregate' means with the formations aggregate. 'With one base' means with the mental-objects base. 'With one element' means with the mental-objects element. For in these, those two truths are associated with some [of their components].

238. Sukhindriyādipañhe – tīhīti saññāsaṅkhāraviññāṇehi. Ekāya dhātuyāti kāyaviññāṇadhātuyā, manoviññāṇadhātuyā ca. Chahi dhātūhīti kāyaviññāṇadhātuvajjāhi.

238. In the question on the faculty of pleasure, etc.—'with three' means with perception, formations, and consciousness. 'With one element' means with the body-consciousness element and the mind-consciousness element. 'With six elements' means with those excluding the body-consciousness element.

245. Rūpabhavapañhe – sabbesampi arūpakkhandhānaṃ arūpāyatanānañca atthitāya na kehicīti vuttaṃ. Ghānajivhākāyaviññāṇadhātūnaṃ pana natthitāya tīhi dhātūhi vippayuttoti vuttaṃ.

245. In the question on the form realm—since all immaterial aggregates and immaterial bases exist, it is said that they are not associated 'with any'. However, because the nose-consciousness, tongue-consciousness, and body-consciousness elements do not exist [there], it is said that they are 'dissociated from three elements'.

256. Adhimokkhapañhe – dvīhi dhātūhīti manodhātumanoviññāṇadhātūhi. Pannarasahīti sesāhi dasahi rūpadhātūhi, pañcahi ca cakkhuviññāṇādīhi.

256. In the question on resolution—'with two elements' means with the mind element and the mind-consciousness element. 'With fifteen' means with the ten material elements and the five [sense] consciousnesses beginning with eye-consciousness.

257. Kusalapañhe – kusalehi catunnampi khandhānaṃ gahitattā sampayogo paṭikkhitto.

257. In the question on the wholesome, association is rejected because all four [immaterial] aggregates are included in the wholesome.

258. Vedanāttikapañhe – ekena khandhenāti vedanākkhandheneva. Pannarasahīti cakkhusotaghānajivhāviññāṇadhātumanodhātūhi ceva rūpadhātūhi ca. Ekādasahīti kāyaviññāṇadhātuyā saddhiṃ rūpadhātūhi.

258. In the question on the triad of feeling—'with one aggregate' means only with the feeling aggregate. 'With fifteen' means with the eye-, ear-, nose-, and tongue-consciousness elements, the mind element, and the ten material elements. 'With eleven' means with the body-consciousness element together with the ten material elements.

262. Nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammapañhe – pañcahīti cakkhuviññāṇādīhi. Anupādinnaanupādāniyapañhe – chahīti manoviññāṇadhātuvajjāhi. Savitakkasavicārapañhe – pannarasahīti pañcahi viññāṇehi saddhiṃ rūpadhātūhi. Avitakkavicāramattapañhe – ekena khandhenātiādi saṅkhārakkhandhavaseneva veditabbaṃ. Dutiyajjhānavicārañhi ṭhapetvā sesā avitakkavicāramattā nāma. Pītiṃ ṭhapetvā sesā pītisahagatā. Tattha vicāro vicārena, pīti ca pītiyā na sampayuttāti saṅkhārakkhandhadhammāyatanadhammadhātūsu kehici sampayuttā nāma. Soḷasahīti dhammadhātumanoviññāṇadhātuvajjāheva. Avitakkaavicārapañhe [Pg.17] – ekāya dhātuyāti manodhātuyā. Sukhasahagatā upekkhāsahagatā ca vedanāttike vuttāva. Dassanenapahātabbādayo kusalasadisāva.

262. In the questions concerning phenomena that are neither resultant nor productive of result—'five' means the eye-consciousness, etc. In the questions concerning the non-grasped and not to be grasped—'six' means those excluding the mind-consciousness element. In the questions concerning the states with initial and sustained thought—'fifteen' means the five consciousnesses together with the form elements. In the questions concerning the states without initial thought but with only sustained thought—'with one aggregate', etc., should be understood in terms of the formations aggregate. For, excepting the sustained thought of the second jhāna, the remaining are designated as 'without initial thought but with only sustained thought'. Excluding joy, the remaining are accompanied by joy. There, sustained thought is not associated with sustained thought, and joy is not associated with joy; thus, they are associated with some in the formations aggregate, the mental-objects base, and the mental-objects element. 'Sixteen' means those excluding the mental-objects element and the mind-consciousness element. In the questions concerning the states without initial and without sustained thought—'one element' means the mind element. States accompanied by pleasure and by equanimity are as stated in the triad on feelings. Those to be abandoned by vision, and so forth, are similar to the wholesome.

271. Parittārammaṇaṃ vipākadhammasadisaṃ. Ekāya dhātuyāti dhammadhātuyā. Kehicīti ye tattha parittārammaṇā na honti, tehi. Dhammadhātu pana parittārammaṇānaṃ channaṃ cittuppādānaṃ vasena catūhi khandhehi saṅgahitattā paṭhamapaṭikkhepameva bhajati. Mahaggatārammaṇādayo kusalasadisāva.

271. The question on limited objects is similar to that on resultant phenomena. 'With one element' means with the mental-objects element. 'With some' means with those that do not have a limited object. The mental-objects element, however, being included by four aggregates in respect of the six arisings of consciousness with limited objects, partakes of the first negation. The questions on exalted objects, etc., are just like those on the wholesome.

273. Anuppannesu – pañcahi dhātūhīti cakkhuviññāṇādīhi. Tāni hi ekantena uppādidhammabhūtāneva, uppannakoṭṭhāsampi pana bhajanti. Paccuppannārammaṇādayo parittārammaṇasadisāva. Hetuādayo samudayasadisāva. Sahetukā ceva na ca hetūpi pītisahagatasadisāva. Tathā parāmāsasampayuttā. Anupādinnā anuppannasadisāva. Sesaṃ sabbattha uttānatthamevāti.

273. In the question on the unarisen—'by five elements' means eye-consciousness and so forth. These are indeed entirely phenomena whose nature is to arise, yet they also partake of the arisen portion. The questions on present objects, and so forth, are similar to those on limited objects. The questions on conditions, and so forth, are similar to those on origination. States that are with a root condition and yet are not themselves root conditions are similar to those accompanied by joy. Similarly, those associated with clinging. The ungrasped are similar to the unarisen. The remainder is clear in meaning everywhere.

Sampayogavippayogapadavaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Terms 'Conjoined' and 'Disjoined'.

7. Sattamanayo sampayuttenavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā

7. The Seventh Method: Explanation of the Term 'Disjoined from the Conjoined'.

306. Idāni sampayuttenavippayuttapadaṃ bhājetuṃ vedanākkhandhenātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tatridaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ – imasmiñhi vāre pucchāya uddhaṭapadena ye dhammā sampayuttā, tehi ye dhammā vippayuttā, tesaṃ khandhādīhi vippayogaṃ pucchitvā vissajjanaṃ kataṃ. Taṃ pana rūpakkhandhādīsu na yujjati. Rūpakkhandhena hi sampayuttā nāma natthi. Tasmā tañca aññāni ca evarūpāni padāni imasmiṃ vāre na gahitāni. Yāni pana padāni dhammadhātuyā sampayutte dhamme viññāṇañca aññena asammissaṃ dīpenti, tāni idha gahitāni. Tesaṃ idamuddānaṃ –

306. Now, in order to analyze the term 'disjoined from the conjoined,' the exposition beginning 'by the feeling aggregate,' etc., is undertaken. Here is the characteristic: in this section, concerning the term extracted for the question, an answer is given about the disjunction from aggregates, etc., of those phenomena that are disjoined from the phenomena conjoined with that term. This, however, does not apply in the case of the form aggregate, and so forth. For indeed, there are no phenomena conjoined with the form aggregate. Therefore, that and other such terms are not included in this section. But those terms are included here which indicate phenomena conjoined with the phenomena-element, and consciousness unmixed with anything else. Their summary is as follows:

‘‘Cattāro [Pg.18] khandhāyatanañca ekaṃ,Dve indriyā dhātupadāni satta;

Tayo paṭiccā atha phassasattakaṃ,Tike tayo satta mahantare ca.

Four aggregates, and one base; Two faculties, seven element-terms; Three [factors of] dependent origination, then the heptad of contact; Three triads, and seven great pairs.

‘‘Ekaṃ savitakkaṃ, savicāramekaṃ;

Yuttaṃ upekkhāya ca ekamevā’’ti.

One with initial thought; one with sustained thought; and one conjoined with equanimity, just one.

Pariyosāne – khandhā caturotiādināpi ayamevattho saṅgahito. Tattha yāni padāni sadisavissajjanāni, tāni uppaṭipāṭiyāpi samodhānetvā tattha vedanākkhandhādikā pañhā katā. Tesu evaṃ khandhādivibhāgo veditabbo. Vedanākkhandhādipañhe tāva – ekenāti manāyatanena. Sattahīti viññāṇadhātūhi. Kehicīti dhammāyatane vedanādīhi. Viññāṇadhātupañhe – te dhammā na kehicīti te pucchāya uddhaṭapadaṃ viññāṇadhātuṃ ṭhapetvā sesā cha viññāṇadhātudhammā, rūpaṃ, nibbānañca. Tehi sabbesaṃ khandhāyatanānaṃ saṅgahitattā na kehici khandhehi āyatanehi vā vippayuttā. Ekāya dhātuyāti yā yā pucchāya uddhaṭā hoti tāya tāya.

At the conclusion, this same meaning is encompassed by the phrase 'the four aggregates,' and so forth. Herein, terms that have similar answers are to be coordinated, even in reverse order, and in that way questions concerning the feeling aggregate, and so forth, are formulated. Among these, the division of aggregates, and so forth, should be understood thus. In the question on the feeling aggregate, and so forth: 'by one' means by the mind-base; 'by seven' means by the consciousness-elements; 'by some' means by feeling, etc., within the phenomena-base. In the question on the consciousness-element, regarding the answer 'those phenomena are not disjoined from any': 'those phenomena' refers to the remaining six consciousness-elements, form, and Nibbāna, after setting aside the consciousness-element extracted for the question. Since all aggregates and bases are included by these, they are not disjoined from any aggregates or bases. 'By one element' refers to whichever element has been extracted for the question.

309. Upekkhindriyapañhe – pañcahīti upekkhāsampayuttāhi cakkhuviññāṇadhātuādīhi. Iminā nayena sabbattha pucchāya uddhaṭapadeneva saddhiṃ vippayuttānaṃ vasena attho veditabboti.

309. In the question on the equanimity faculty, 'by five' means by the five [consciousness-elements] associated with equanimity, namely the eye-consciousness element, and so forth. By this method, the meaning should be understood everywhere in terms of the phenomena that are disjoined from the very term extracted for the question.

Sampayuttenavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Term 'Disjoined from the Conjoined'.

8. Aṭṭhamanayo vippayuttenasampayuttapadavaṇṇanā

8. The Eighth Method: Explanation of the Term 'Conjoined with the Disjoined'.

317. Idāni vippayuttenasampayuttapadaṃ bhājetuṃ rūpakkhandhenātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha sabbāpi pucchā moghapucchāva. Rūpakkhandhena hi vippayuttā nāma cattāro khandhā, tesaṃ aññehi sampayogo natthi. Vedanākkhandhena vippayuttaṃ rūpaṃ nibbānañca, tassa ca kenaci sampayogo natthi. Evaṃ sabbapadesu. Vippayuttānaṃ pana sampayogābhāvo veditabbo. Iti pucchāya moghattā sabbavissajjanesu natthi natthiicceva vuttanti.

317. Now, to analyze the term 'conjoined with the disjoined,' the exposition beginning 'by the form aggregate,' etc., is undertaken. Herein, every question is a futile question. For the four [mental] aggregates are what is disjoined from the form aggregate, and they have no conjunction with others. What is disjoined from the feeling aggregate is form and Nibbāna, and that has no conjunction with anything. Thus it is in all cases. The absence of conjunction for what is disjoined should be understood. Therefore, because the questions are futile, in all the answers it is said, 'There is not, there is not.'

Vippayuttenasampayuttapadavaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Term 'Conjoined with the Disjoined'.

9. Navamanayo sampayuttenasampayuttapadavaṇṇanā

9. The Ninth Method: Explanation of the Term 'Conjoined with the Conjoined'.

319. Idāni [Pg.19] sampayuttenasampayuttapadaṃ bhājetuṃ vedanākkhandhenātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha yaṃ khandhādivasena sampayuttaṃ, puna tasseva khandhādīhi sampayogaṃ pucchitvā vissajjanaṃ kataṃ. Taṃ rūpena vā rūpamissakehi vā sabbarūpakkhandhasaṅgāhakehi vā padehi saddhiṃ na yujjati. Rūpena hi rūpamissakena vā aññesaṃ sampayogo natthi. Sabbarūpakkhandhasaṅgāhakehi sabbesaṃ sampayogārahānaṃ khandhādīnaṃ gahitattā aññaṃyeva natthi, yaṃ tena saha sampayogaṃ gaccheyya. Tasmā tathārūpāni padāni idha na gahitāni. Yāni pana padāni rūpena asammissaṃ arūpekadesaṃ dīpenti, tāni idha gahitāni. Tesaṃ idamuddānaṃ –

319. Now, to analyze the term 'associated by the associated,' the exposition beginning with 'with the aggregate of feeling,' etc., has been commenced. Herein, concerning that which is associated by way of the aggregates, etc., after inquiring again about its association with those very aggregates, etc., a reply has been given. That does not accord with terms related to form, or mixed with form, or inclusive of the entire aggregate of form. For there is no association of others with form or with what is mixed with form. Since by the terms inclusive of the entire aggregate of form all the aggregates, etc., suitable for association have been included, there is nothing else which could enter into association with it. Therefore, such terms have not been taken up here. But those terms that indicate a portion of the immaterial, unmixed with form, have been taken up here. This is their summary:

‘‘Arūpakkhandhā cattāro, manāyatanameva ca;

Viññāṇadhātuyo satta, dve saccā cuddasindriyā.

The four immaterial aggregates, and the mind-base alone; Seven consciousness-elements, two truths, and fourteen faculties.

‘‘Paccaye dvādasa padā, tato upari soḷasa;

Tikesu aṭṭha gocchake, tecattālīsameva ca.

Twelve terms in the Conditions, and sixteen thereafter; In the Triads, eight clusters, and forty-three as well.

‘‘Mahantaraduke satta, padā piṭṭhidukesu cha;

Navamassa padassete, niddese saṅgahaṃ gatā’’ti.

Seven terms in the Great Dyads; six in the Subsidiary Dyads. These terms are included in the exposition of the ninth term.

Sabbapañhesu pana ye dhammā pucchāya uddhaṭā, te yehi sampayuttā honti, tesaṃ vasena khandhādibhedo veditabbo. Vedanākkhandhena hi itare tayo khandhā sampayuttā, puna tehi vedanākkhandho sampayutto. So tehi saññādīhi tīhi khandhehi, ekena manāyatanena, sattahi viññāṇadhātūhi, ekasmiṃ dhammāyatane, dhammadhātuyā ca, kehici saññāsaṅkhāreheva sampayutto. Eseva nayo sabbatthāti.

Now, in all questions, the division into aggregates, etc., of the phenomena raised in the inquiry should be understood according to those with which they are associated. For the other three aggregates are associated with the aggregate of feeling, and in turn, the aggregate of feeling is associated with them. It is associated with those three aggregates beginning with perception, with one mind-base, with seven consciousness-elements, and, within the one mind-object base and mind-object element, with certain perceptions and formations only. This same method applies in all cases.

Sampayuttenasampayuttapadavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Term 'Associated by the Associated'.

10. Dasamanayo vippayuttenavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā

10. The Tenth Method: The Explanation of the Term 'Dissociated by the Dissociated'.

353. Idāni vippayuttenavippayuttapadaṃ bhājetuṃ rūpakkhandhenātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha ye sampayogavippayogapadaniddese rūpakkhandhādayo dhammā uddhaṭā, sabbapucchāsu teyeva uddhaṭā. Sadisavissajjanānaṃ pana ekato gahitattā [Pg.20] padāni aññāya paṭipāṭiyā āgatāni. Tattha yaṃ padaṃ pucchāya uddhaṭaṃ, taṃ yehi dhammehi vippayuttaṃ, tesaṃ vasena khandhādivibhāgo veditabbo. Rūpakkhandhena hi vedanādayo vippayuttā, tehi ca rūpakkhandho vippayutto. Nibbānaṃ pana sukhumarūpagatikameva. So rūpakkhandho catūhi khandhehi, ekena manāyatanena sattahi viññāṇadhātūhi, dhammāyatanadhammadhātūsu, kehici vedanādīhi dhammeheva vippayutto. Eseva nayo sabbatthāti.

353. Now, to analyze the term 'dissociated by the dissociated,' the exposition beginning with 'with the aggregate of form,' etc., has been commenced. Herein, the phenomena such as the aggregate of form, etc., which were raised in the exposition of the terms of association and dissociation, are the very same ones raised in all the questions. However, as similar answers are taken together, the terms appear in a different order. Herein, whichever term is raised in the question, the classification into aggregates, etc., should be understood according to those phenomena with which it is dissociated. For the aggregates of feeling, etc., are dissociated from the aggregate of form, and the aggregate of form is dissociated from them. Nibbāna, however, is only of a subtle nature. That aggregate of form is dissociated from the four aggregates, one mind-base, seven consciousness-elements, and, within the mind-object base and mind-object element, from certain phenomena such as feeling, etc., only. This same method applies everywhere.

Vippayuttenavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Term 'Dissociated by the Dissociated'.

11. Ekādasamanayo saṅgahitenasampayuttavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā

11. The Eleventh Method: The Explanation of the Term 'Associated and Dissociated by What Is Included'.

409. Idāni saṅgahitenasampayuttavippayuttapadaṃ bhājetuṃ samudayasaccenātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha ye saṅgahitenasaṅgahitapadaniddese samudayasaccādayova dhammā uddhaṭā, sabbapucchāsu teyeva uddhaṭā. Sadisavissajjanānaṃ pana ekato gahitattā padāni aññāya paṭipāṭiyā āgatāni. Tattha ye dhammā pucchāya uddhaṭapadena khandhādisaṅgahena saṅgahitā, tesaṃ yehi sampayogo vā vippayogo vā hoti, tesaṃ vasena khandhādivibhāgo veditabbo.

409. Now, to analyze the term 'associated and dissociated by what is included,' the section beginning with 'with the truth of origination,' etc., is commenced. Here, in the exposition of the term 'included by what is included,' the very phenomena such as the truth of origination, etc., are raised, and these same ones are raised in all the questions. However, because similar answers are taken together, the terms have come in a different order. Here, for those phenomena that are included by way of inclusion as aggregates, etc., by the term raised in the question, the division into aggregates, etc., should be understood according to those with which they are associated or dissociated.

Tatrāyaṃ nayo – samudayasaccena tāva saṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannā dhammā khandhādisaṅgahena saṅgahitā. Te ca sesehi tīhi khandhehi, ekena manāyatanena, sattahi viññāṇadhātūhi, saṅkhārakkhandhe dhammāyatanadhammadhātūsu ca ṭhapetvā taṇhaṃ sesehi sampayuttattā kehici sampayuttā nāma. Ekena pana rūpakkhandhena, dasahi rūpāyatanehi, rūpadhātūhi ca vippayuttā, ekasmiṃ dhammāyatane dhammadhātuyā ca, rūpanibbānehi vippayuttattā kehici vippayuttā nāma. Iminā upāyena sabbattha attho veditabboti.

Here is the method: First, by the truth of origination, phenomena comprised within the aggregate of formations are included by way of inclusion as aggregates, etc. And these, because they are associated with the remaining three aggregates, the one mind-base, the seven consciousness-elements, and with the remaining phenomena (excepting craving) within the aggregate of formations in the mind-object base and mind-object element, are called ‘associated with some’. However, because they are dissociated from the one aggregate of form, the ten form bases, and the ten form elements, and from form and Nibbāna within the one mind-object base and mind-object element, they are called ‘dissociated with some’. By this method, the meaning should be understood everywhere.

Saṅgahitenasampayuttavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Term 'Associated and Dissociated by What Is Included'.

12. Dvādasamanayo sampayuttenasaṅgahitāsaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

12. The Twelfth Method: The Explanation of the Term 'Included and Not Included by What Is Associated'.

417. Idāni [Pg.21] sampayuttenasaṅgahitāsaṅgahitapadaṃ bhājetuṃ vedanākkhandhenātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha ye sampayuttenasampayuttapadaniddese vedanākkhandhādayo dhammā uddhaṭā, sabbapucchāsu teyeva uddhaṭā. Tattha ye dhammā pucchāya uddhaṭapadena sampayuttā, tesaṃ yehi saṅgaho vā asaṅgaho vā hoti, tesaṃ vasena khandhādibhedo veditabbo.

417. Now, to analyze the term 'included and not included by what is associated,' the section beginning with 'with the aggregate of feeling,' etc., is commenced. Herein, those phenomena, such as the aggregate of feeling, etc., that were raised in the exposition of the term 'associated by what is associated', are the very same ones raised in all the questions. Herein, for those phenomena associated with the term raised in the question, the division into aggregates, etc., should be understood according to those with which there is inclusion or non-inclusion.

Tatrāyaṃ nayo – vedanākkhandho hi saññādīhi sampayutto. Te saññādayo tīhi saññādikkhandhehi, dvīhi dhammāyatanamanāyatanehi, dhammadhātuyā ceva, sattahi ca viññāṇadhātūhīti aṭṭhahi dhātūhi saṅgahitā, sesāhi khandhāyatanadhātūhi asaṅgahitā. Iminā upāyena sabbattha attho veditabboti.

Here is the method: The aggregate of feeling is associated with perception and so on. Those perceptions and so on are included by the three aggregates beginning with perception, by the two bases—the mind-object base and the mind base—and by eight elements—namely, the mind-object element and the seven consciousness-elements. They are not included by the remaining aggregates, bases, and elements. By this method, the meaning should be understood everywhere.

Sampayuttenasaṅgahitāsaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Term 'Included and Not Included by What Is Associated'.

13. Terasamanayo asaṅgahitenasampayuttavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā

13. The Thirteenth Method: The Explanation of the Term 'Associated and Dissociated by What Is Not Included'.

448. Idāni asaṅgahitenasampayuttavippayuttapadaṃ bhājetuṃ rūpakkhandhenātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha ye pañcame asaṅgahitenaasaṅgahitapadaniddese rūpakkhandhena sadisapañhā dhammā, ye ca arūpabhavena sadisā, teyeva uddhaṭā. Sesā pana na ruhantīti na uddhaṭā. Vedanākkhandhena hi khandhādivasena pana rūpārūpadhammā asaṅgahitā honti. Tesañca sampayogo nāma natthi. Tasmā yāni padāni ruhanti, tāneva sadisavissajjanehi saddhiṃ samodhānetvā uddhaṭāni. Tattha ye dhammā pucchāya uddhaṭadhammehi khandhādivasena asaṅgahitā, te yehi sampayuttā ca vippayuttā ca, tesaṃ vasena khandhādivibhāgo veditabbo.

448. Now, to analyze the terms 'associated and dissociated by way of non-inclusion,' the section beginning with 'by the aggregate of form,' and so on, is commenced. Herein, in the fifth exposition of the term 'not included by what is not included,' those phenomena that have questions similar to the aggregate of form, and those that are similar by way of being formless, are the ones extracted. The rest, however, do not apply, hence they are not extracted. For by the aggregate of feeling, material and immaterial phenomena are not included by way of aggregates, etc. And for them, there is no such thing as association. Therefore, only those terms that apply are extracted, after being combined with similar answers. Herein, for those phenomena that are not included by way of aggregates, etc., by the phenomena extracted in the question, the division into aggregates, etc., should be understood according to those with which they are associated and dissociated.

Tatrāyaṃ nayo – rūpakkhandhena tāva viññāṇameva tīhi saṅgahehi asaṅgahitaṃ. Taṃ vedanādīhi tīhi khandhehi, dhammāyatanadhammadhātūsu ca vedanādīheva sampayuttaṃ. Ekena rūpakkhandhena, dasahi rūpāyatanarūpadhātūhi, dhammāyatanadhammadhātūsu [Pg.22] ca rūpanibbānadhammehi vippayuttaṃ. Taṃ sandhāya te dhammā tīhi khandhehītiādi vuttaṃ. Iminā nayena sabbattha attho veditabboti.

Herein, this is the method: Consciousness itself is not included by the aggregate of form by way of three inclusions. It is associated with the three aggregates beginning with feeling, and with feeling, etc., within the mind-object base and mind-object element. It is dissociated from the one aggregate of form, from the ten material bases and ten material elements, and from material phenomena and Nibbāna within the mind-object base and mind-object element. In reference to this, it is said, 'those phenomena by the three aggregates,' and so on. By this method, the meaning is to be understood everywhere.

Asaṅgahitenasampayuttavippayuttapadavaṇṇanā.

The explanation of the terms 'associated and dissociated by way of non-inclusion'.

14. Cuddasamanayo vippayuttenasaṅgahitāsaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā

14. The Fourteenth Method: The Explanation of the Terms 'Included and Not Included' by way of Dissociation.

456. Idāni vippayuttenasaṅgahitāsaṅgahitapadaṃ bhājetuṃ rūpakkhandhenātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha yesaṃ padānaṃ vippayogo na ruhati, tāni imasmiṃ vāre na gahitāni. Kāni pana tānīti? Dhammāyatanādīni. Dhammāyatanassa hi khandhādīsu ekenāpi vippayogo na ruhati. Dhammadhātuādīsupi eseva nayo. Tesaṃ idamuddānaṃ –

456. Now, to analyze the terms 'included and not included' by way of dissociation, the section beginning with 'by the aggregate of form,' etc., is commenced. Herein, those terms for which dissociation is not applicable are not taken up in this section. Which are those? The mind-object base, etc. For the mind-object base, dissociation is not applicable with even one of the aggregates, etc. The same method applies to the mind-object element, etc. This is their summary:

‘‘Dhammāyatanaṃ dhammadhātu, jīvitindriyameva ca;

Nāmarūpapadañceva, saḷāyatanameva ca.

The mind-object base, the mind-object element, and the life faculty; the term 'name-and-form,' and the six sense bases as well.

‘‘Jātiādittayaṃ ekaṃ, padaṃ vīsatime tike;

Tikāvasānikaṃ ekaṃ, satta cūḷantare padā.

The triad beginning with birth is one term; one term in the twentieth triad; one term concluding the triads; and seven terms in the minor intermediate section.

‘‘Daseva gocchake honti, mahantaramhi cuddasa;

Cha padāni tato uddhaṃ sabbānipi samāsato;

Padāni ca na labbhanti, cattālīsañca satta cā’’ti.

Ten are in the cluster, fourteen in the major intermediate section; six terms beyond that, all in brief; and the terms not found are forty-seven.

Pariyosāne ca – dhammāyatanaṃ dhammadhātūti gāthāpi imamevatthaṃ dīpetuṃ vuttā. Imāni pana ṭhapetvā sesāni sabbānipi labbhanti. Tesu khandhādivibhāgo vuttanayānusāreneva veditabboti.

And at the conclusion, the verse beginning 'mind-object base, mind-object element' was also spoken to illuminate this very meaning. But excluding these, all the remaining terms are found. Among them, the classification into aggregates, etc., should be understood according to the method already explained.

Vippayuttenasaṅgahitāsaṅgahitapadavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Terms 'Included and Not Included by way of Dissociation'.

Nigamanakathā

The Concluding Discourse

Ettāvatā [Pg.23] ca –

And thus far:

Dhātuppabhedakusalo, yaṃ dhātukathaṃ tathāgato āha;

Tassā nayamukhabheda-ppakāsanaṃ niṭṭhitaṃ hoti.

The Tathāgata, skilled in the analysis of elements, spoke the Dhātukathā; the exposition of the divisions of its methods and approaches is now completed.

Iminā nayamukhabheda-ppakāsanena hi vibhāvinā sakkā;

Ñātuṃ sabbepi nayā, saṅkhepakathāva iti vuttā.

For by this exposition of the divisions of its methods and approaches, a discerning person is able to understand all the methods, as it is said to be a concise discourse.

Ekekassa pana sace, padassa vitthārameva bhāseyyaṃ;

Vacanañca ativiya bahuṃ, bhaveyya attho ca aviseso.

But if I were to speak in detail about each and every term, the text would become exceedingly long, and the meaning undifferentiated.

Iti ūnabhāṇavāradvayāya, yaṃ tantiyā mayā etaṃ;

Kurunā pattaṃ puññaṃ, sukhāya taṃ hotu lokassāti.

Thus, whatever merit has been attained by me in composing this treatise of less than two recitation sections, may that be for the happiness of the world.

Dhātukathā-aṭṭhakathā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary to the Dhātukathā is concluded.

Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa

Homage to the Blessed One, the Arahant, the Perfectly Enlightened One.

Abhidhammapiṭake

In the Abhidhamma Piṭaka

Puggalapaññatti-aṭṭhakathā

The Commentary to the Puggalapaññatti

Nipuṇatthaṃ [Pg.25] pakaraṇaṃ, dhātubhedappakāsano;

Satthā dhātukathaṃ nāma, desayitvā surālaye.

Having taught in the abode of the gods the discourse named Dhātukathā—a treatise of subtle meaning, revealing the distinctions of elements—the Teacher,

Anantaraṃ tassa jino, paññattibhedadīpanaṃ;

Āha puggalapaññattiṃ, yaṃ loke aggapuggalo.

the Victor, who is the foremost person in the world, immediately thereafter spoke the Puggalapaññatti, which illuminates the distinctions of designations.

Tassā saṃvaṇṇanokāso, yasmā dāni upāgato;

Tasmā naṃ vaṇṇayissāmi, taṃ suṇātha samāhitāti.

Since the occasion for its commentary has now arrived, therefore I shall expound upon it; listen to that attentively.

1. Mātikāvaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Mātikā

1. Cha paññattiyo – khandhapaññatti…pe… puggalapaññattīti ayaṃ tāva puggalapaññattiyā uddeso. Tattha chāti gaṇanaparicchedo. Tena ye dhamme idha paññapetukāmo tesaṃ gaṇanavasena saṃkhepato paññattiparicchedaṃ dasseti. Paññattiyoti paricchinnadhammanidassanaṃ. Tattha ‘‘ācikkhati deseti paññapeti paṭṭhapetī’’ti (saṃ. ni. 2.20) āgataṭṭhāne paññāpanā dassanā pakāsanā paññatti nāma. ‘‘Supaññattaṃ mañcapīṭha’’nti (pārā. 269) āgataṭṭhāne ṭhapanā nikkhipanā paññatti nāma. Idha ubhayampi vaṭṭati. Cha paññattiyoti hi cha paññāpanā, cha dassanā pakāsanātipi; cha ṭhapanā nikkhipanātipi idha adhippetameva. Nāmapaññatti hi te te dhamme dassetipi, tena tena koṭṭhāsena ṭhapetipi.

1. 'Six designations: the designation of aggregates… and so on… the designation of persons.' This, to begin with, is the table of contents of the Puggalapaññatti. Herein, 'six' is a numerical delimitation. By this, it shows a brief delimitation by way of number for the phenomena to be designated here. 'Designations' means the demonstration of delimited phenomena. Herein, in the context of the passage 'he points out, he teaches, he designates, he establishes' (Saṃ. Ni. 2.20), 'designation' (paññatti) means designating, showing, and making known. In the context of the passage 'a well-arranged bed and chair' (Pārā. 269), 'designation' (paññatti) means placing and setting down. Here, both are applicable. For 'six designations' indeed means six acts of designating, six acts of showing and making known; and six acts of placing and setting down are also intended here. For a name-designation both demonstrates those respective phenomena and places them in their respective categories.

Khandhapaññattītiādi pana saṃkhepato tāsaṃ paññattīnaṃ sarūpadassanaṃ. Tattha khandhānaṃ ‘khandhā’ti paññāpanā dassanā pakāsanā ṭhapanā nikkhipanā khandhapaññatti nāma. Āyatanānaṃ āyatanānīti, dhātūnaṃ dhātuyoti, saccānaṃ saccānīti, indriyānaṃ indriyānīti, puggalānaṃ puggalāti paññāpanā dassanā pakāsanā ṭhapanā nikkhipanā puggalapaññatti nāma.

The phrase 'designation of aggregates,' etc., is a brief demonstration of the nature of those designations. Herein, the designating, showing, making known, placing, and setting down of aggregates as 'aggregates' is called the 'designation of aggregates.' Similarly, the designating, showing, making known, placing, and setting down of sense bases as 'sense bases' is the 'designation of sense bases'; of elements as 'elements' is the 'designation of elements'; of truths as 'truths' is the 'designation of truths'; of faculties as 'faculties' is the 'designation of faculties'; and of persons as 'persons' is the 'designation of persons'.

Pāḷimuttakena [Pg.26] pana aṭṭhakathānayena aparāpi cha paññattiyo – vijjamānapaññatti, avijjamānapaññatti, vijjamānena avijjamānapaññatti, avijjamānena vijjamānapaññatti, vijjamānena vijjamānapaññatti, avijjamānena avijjamānapaññattīti. Tattha kusalākusalasseva saccikaṭṭhaparamatthavasena vijjamānassa sato sambhūtassa dhammassa paññāpanā vijjamānapaññatti nāma. Tathā avijjamānassa lokaniruttimattasiddhassa itthipurisādikassa paññāpanā avijjamānapaññatti nāma. Sabbākārenapi anupalabbhaneyyassa vācāvatthumattasseva pañcamasaccādikassa titthiyānaṃ aṇupakatipurisādikassa vā paññāpanāpi avijjamānapaññattiyeva. Sā pana sāsanāvacarā na hotīti idha na gahitā. Iti imesaṃ vijjamānāvijjamānānaṃ vikappanavasena sesā veditabbā. ‘Tevijjo’, ‘chaḷabhiñño’tiādīsu hi tisso vijjā cha abhiññā ca vijjamānā, puggalo avijjamāno. Tasmā tisso vijjā assāti tevijjo, cha abhiññā assāti chaḷabhiññoti evaṃ vijjamānena avijjamānassa paññāpanato evarūpā vijjamānena avijjamānapaññatti nāma. ‘Itthirūpaṃ’, ‘purisarūpa’ntiādīsu pana itthipurisā avijjamānā, rūpaṃ vijjamānaṃ. Tasmā itthiyā rūpaṃ itthirūpaṃ, purisassa rūpaṃ purisarūpanti evaṃ avijjamānena vijjamānassa paññāpanato evarūpā avijjamānena vijjamānapaññatti nāma. Cakkhusamphasso, sotasamphassotiādīsu cakkhusotādayopi phassopi vijjamānoyeva. Tasmā cakkhumhi samphasso, cakkhuto jāto samphasso, cakkhussa vā phalabhūto samphasso cakkhusamphassoti evaṃ vijjamānena vijjamānassa paññāpanato evarūpā vijjamānena vijjamānapaññatti nāma. Khattiyaputto, brāhmaṇaputto, seṭṭhiputtotiādīsu khattiyādayopi avijjamānā, puttopi. Tasmā khattiyassa putto khattiyaputtoti evaṃ avijjamānena avijjamānassa paññāpanato evarūpā avijjamānena avijjamānapaññatti nāma. Tāsu imasmiṃ pakaraṇe purimā tissova paññattiyo labbhanti. ‘‘Khandhapaññatti…pe… indriyapaññattī’’ti imasmiñhi ṭhāne vijjamānasseva paññāpitattā vijjamānapaññatti labbhati. ‘‘Puggalapaññattī’’ti pade avijjamānapaññatti. Parato pana ‘tevijjo’, ‘chaḷabhiñño’tiādīsu vijjamānena avijjamānapaññatti labbhatīti.

But according to the commentary method outside the Pāḷi, there are six other designations: designation of the existent, designation of the non-existent, designation of the non-existent by the existent, designation of the existent by the non-existent, designation of the existent by the existent, and designation of the non-existent by the non-existent. Herein, the designating of wholesome and unwholesome phenomena, which are existent, real, and manifest in the ultimate sense, is called a designation of the existent. Similarly, the designating of what does not exist—such as conventional terms like 'woman' or 'man,' which are established merely by worldly convention—is called a designation of the non-existent. Even the designating of what is entirely unobtainable in all respects, merely a basis for speech, such as the 'fifth truth' of the sectarians or their concepts of atom, primal nature, and spirit, is also a designation of the non-existent. However, since that does not fall within the Dispensation, it is not taken up here. Thus, the remaining designations should be understood as variations based on these existent and non-existent ones. For instance, in terms like 'possessor of the threefold knowledge' or 'possessor of the sixfold direct knowledge,' the three knowledges and the six direct knowledges exist, but the person does not. Thus, 'one who has the three knowledges is a possessor of the threefold knowledge,' and 'one who has the six direct knowledges is a possessor of the sixfold direct knowledge'—such a designation of the non-existent by the existent is called a designation of the non-existent by the existent. In phrases like 'a woman’s form' or 'a man’s form,' however, the woman and man do not exist, but the form does. Thus, 'the form of a woman is a woman’s form,' and 'the form of a man is a man’s form'—such a designation of the existent by the non-existent is called a designation of the existent by the non-existent. In terms like 'eye-contact' or 'ear-contact,' both the eye, ear, etc., and the contact exist. Thus, 'contact in the eye is eye-contact,' 'contact arisen from the eye is eye-contact,' or 'contact that is the fruit of the eye is eye-contact'—such a designation of the existent by the existent is called a designation of the existent by the existent. In phrases like 'a khattiya’s son,' 'a brahmin’s son,' or 'a merchant’s son,' neither the khattiya, brahmin, etc., nor the son exists. Thus, 'the son of a khattiya is a khattiya’s son'—such a designation of the non-existent by the non-existent is called a designation of the non-existent by the non-existent. Among these, in this treatise, only the first three designations are found. For in the passage 'designation of aggregates… designation of faculties,' since what is designated exists, a designation of the existent is found. In the phrase 'designation of a person,' it is a designation of the non-existent. Furthermore, in terms like 'possessor of the threefold knowledge' or 'possessor of the sixfold direct knowledge,' a designation of the non-existent by the existent is found.

Aṭṭhakathāmuttakena pana ācariyanayena aparāpi cha paññattiyo – upādāpaññatti, upanidhāpaññatti, samodhānapaññatti, upanikkhittapaññatti, tajjāpaññatti, santatipaññattīti[Pg.27]. Tattha yo rūpavedanādīhi ekattena vā aññattena vā rūpavedanādayo viya saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena anupalabbhasabhāvopi rūpavedanādibhede khandhe upādāya nissāya kāraṇaṃ katvā sammato satto. Tāni tāni aṅgāni upādāya ratho gehaṃ muṭṭhi uddhananti ca; te teyeva rūpādayo upādāya ghaṭo paṭo; candasūriyaparivattādayo upādāya kālo, disā; taṃ taṃ bhūtanimittañceva bhāvanānisaṃsañca upādāya nissāya kāraṇaṃ katvā sammataṃ tena tenākārena upaṭṭhitaṃ uggahanimittaṃ paṭibhāganimittanti ayaṃ evarūpā upādāpaññatti nāma. Paññapetabbaṭṭhena cesā paññatti nāma, na paññāpanaṭṭhena. Yā pana tassatthassa paññāpanā, ayaṃ avijjamānapaññattiyeva.

According to the teachers' method, outside the commentaries, there are six other designations: designation by grasping (upādāpaññatti), designation by comparison (upanidhāpaññatti), designation by combination (samodhānapaññatti), sequential designation (upanikkhittapaññatti), designation of its nature (tajjāpaññatti), and designation of continuity (santatipaññatti). Among these, that which—though its own nature is unobtainable in the ultimate sense, whether as one with or different from the aggregates of form, feeling, etc.—is conventionally regarded as a being by grasping, relying on, and taking as a cause those very aggregates. For example, a chariot, a house, a fist, or a furnace are designated by grasping their various parts; a pot or a cloth are designated by grasping those same forms and other elements; time and directions are designated by grasping the revolutions of the moon and sun, etc.; the learning sign and the counterpart sign, which appear in such and such a manner, are conventionally regarded as such by grasping, relying on, and taking as a cause that specific elemental sign and the benefits of meditation—this is called designation by grasping. It is called a designation in the sense of that which is to be designated, not in the sense of the act of designating. The designating of that object, however, is itself a designation of the non-existent.

Yā paṭhamadutiyādīni upanidhāya dutiyaṃ tatiyantiādikā, aññamaññañca upanidhāya dīghaṃ rassaṃ, dūraṃ, santikantiādikā paññāpanā; ayaṃ upanidhāpaññatti nāma. Apicesā upanidhāpaññatti – tadaññāpekkhūpanidhā, hatthagatūpanidhā, sampayuttūpanidhā, samāropitūpanidhā, avidūragatūpanidhā, paṭibhāgūpanidhā, tabbahulūpanidhā, tabbisiṭṭhūpanidhātiādinā bhedena anekappakārā.

The designation of 'second,' 'third,' and so on, by comparing with 'first,' 'second,' etc., and designations like 'long,' 'short,' 'far,' 'near,' etc., by comparing with each other—this is called designation by comparison (upanidhāpaññatti). Moreover, this designation by comparison is of many kinds, such as: designation depending on something else (tadaññāpekkhūpanidhā), designation within reach (hatthagatūpanidhā), designation associated with (sampayuttūpanidhā), designation imputed (samāropitūpanidhā), designation of what is not far (avidūragatūpanidhā), designation of a counterpart (paṭibhāgūpanidhā), designation of what is abundant in that (tabbahulūpanidhā), and designation of what is distinguished by that (tabbisiṭṭhūpanidhā).

Tattha dutiyaṃ tatiyantiādikāva tadaññaṃ apekkhitvā vuttatāya tadaññāpekkhūpanidhā nāma. Chattapāṇi, satthapāṇītiādikā hatthagataṃ upanidhāya vuttatāya hatthagatūpanidhā nāma. Kuṇḍalī, sikharī, kiriṭītiādikā sampayuttaṃ upanidhāya vuttatāya sampayuttūpanidhā nāma. Dhaññasakaṭaṃ, sappikumbhotiādikā samāropitaṃ upanidhāya vuttatāya samāropitūpanidhā nāma. Indasālaguhā, piyaṅguguhā, serīsakantiādikā avidūragataṃ upanidhāya vuttatāya avidūragatūpanidhā nāma. Suvaṇṇavaṇṇo, usabhagāmītiādikā paṭibhāgaṃ upanidhāya vuttatāya paṭibhāgūpanidhā nāma. Padumassaro, brāhmaṇagāmotiādikā tabbahulaṃ upanidhāya vuttatāya tabbahulūpanidhā nāma. Maṇikaṭakaṃ, vajirakaṭakantiādikā tabbisiṭṭhaṃ upanidhāya vuttatāya tabbisiṭṭhūpanidhā nāma.

Here, 'second,' 'third,' and so on are called designation depending on something else (tadaññāpekkhūpanidhā) because they are stated in dependence on something else. 'Umbrella-bearer' (chattapāṇi), 'sword-bearer' (satthapāṇi), and similar terms are called designation within reach (hatthagatūpanidhā) because they are stated in dependence on what is held in the hand. 'Wearing earrings' (kuṇḍalī), 'wearing a crest' (sikharī), 'wearing a crown' (kiriṭī), and similar terms are called designation associated with (sampayuttūpanidhā) because they are stated in dependence on what is connected. 'Grain cart' (dhaññasakaṭaṃ), 'ghee pot' (sappikumbho), and similar terms are called designation imputed (samāropitūpanidhā) because they are stated in dependence on what is loaded. 'Indasāla cave' (indasālaguhā), 'Piyangu cave' (piyaṅguguhā), 'Serīsaka' (serīsakaṃ), and similar terms are called designation of what is not far (avidūragatūpanidhā) because they are stated in dependence on what is not far away. 'Golden-colored' (suvaṇṇavaṇṇo), 'bull-like gait' (usabhagāmī), and similar terms are called designation of a counterpart (paṭibhāgūpanidhā) because they are stated in dependence on what is comparable. 'Lotus pond' (padumassaro), 'Brahmin village' (brāhmaṇagāmo), and similar terms are called designation of what is abundant in that (tabbahulūpanidhā) because they are stated in dependence on what is abundant there. 'Jeweled bracelet' (maṇikaṭakaṃ), 'diamond bracelet' (vajirakaṭakaṃ), and similar terms are called designation of what is distinguished by that (tabbisiṭṭhūpanidhā) because they are stated in dependence on what is especially distinguished there.

Yā pana tesaṃ tesaṃ samodhānamapekkhitvā tidaṇḍaṃ, aṭṭhapadaṃ, dhaññarāsi, puppharāsītiādikā paññāpanā, ayaṃ samodhānapaññatti nāma. Yā purimassa purimassa upanikkhipitvā dve, tīṇi, cattārītiādikā paññāpanā, ayaṃ [Pg.28] upanikkhittapaññatti nāma. Yā taṃ taṃ dhammasabhāvaṃ apekkhitvā pathavī, tejo, kakkhaḷatā, uṇhatātiādikā paññāpanā, ayaṃ tajjāpaññatti nāma. Yā pana santativicchedābhāvaṃ apekkhitvā āsītiko, nāvutikotiādikā paññāpanā, ayaṃ santatipaññatti nāma. Etāsu pana tajjāpaññatti vijjamānapaññattiyeva. Sesā avijjamānapakkhañceva, avijjamānena avijjamānapakkhañca bhajanti.

The designation that considers the combination of various things, such as 'the three sticks,' 'the chessboard,' 'the heap of grain,' 'the heap of flowers,' and so forth—this is called designation by combination (samodhānapaññatti). The designation that places one thing after another, such as 'two,' 'three,' 'four,' and so on—this is called sequential designation (upanikkhittapaññatti). The designation that considers the intrinsic nature of phenomena, such as 'earth,' 'fire,' 'hardness,' 'heat,' and so forth—this is called designation of its nature (tajjāpaññatti). The designation that considers the absence of interruption in continuity, such as 'an eighty-year-old,' 'a ninety-year-old,' and so forth—this is called designation of continuity (santatipaññatti). Among these, the designation of its nature is a designation of what exists. The rest belong to the category of the non-existent, and by means of the non-existent, they are classified as non-existent.

Aṭṭhakathāmuttakena ācariyanayeneva aparāpi cha paññattiyo – kiccapaññatti, saṇṭhānapaññatti, liṅgapaññatti, bhūmipaññatti, paccattapaññatti, asaṅkhatapaññattīti. Tattha bhāṇako, dhammakathikotiādikā kiccavasena paññāpanā kiccapaññatti nāma. Kiso, thūlo, parimaṇḍalo, caturassotiādikā saṇṭhānavasena paññāpanā saṇṭhānapaññatti nāma. Itthī, purisotiādikā liṅgavasena paññāpanā liṅgapaññati nāma. Kāmāvacarā, rūpāvacarā, arūpāvacarā, kosalakā, mādhurātiādikā bhūmivasena paññāpanā bhūmipaññatti nāma. Tisso, nāgo, sumanotiādikā paccattanāmakaraṇamattavasena paññāpanā paccattapaññatti nāma. Nirodho, nibbānantiādikā asaṅkhatadhammassa paññāpanā asaṅkhatapaññatti nāma. Tattha ekaccā bhūmipaññatti asaṅkhatapaññatti ca vijjamānapaññattiyeva, kiccapaññatti vijjamānena avijjamānapakkhaṃ bhajati. Sesā avijjamānapaññattiyo nāma.

According to the teachers' method, beyond the commentaries, there are six other designations: functional designation (kiccapaññatti), shape designation (saṇṭhānapaññatti), gender designation (liṅgapaññatti), plane designation (bhūmipaññatti), individual designation (paccattapaññatti), and unconditioned designation (asaṅkhatapaññatti). Among these, designations such as 'reciter' and 'Dhamma preacher' based on function are called functional designation. Designations such as 'thin,' 'fat,' 'round,' and 'square' based on shape are called shape designation. Designations such as 'female' and 'male' based on gender are called gender designation. Designations such as 'sensuous plane,' 'form plane,' 'formless plane,' 'Kosala country,' and 'Madhura city' based on plane are called plane designation. Designations such as 'Tissa,' 'Nāga,' and 'Sumana' merely based on individual naming are called individual designation. Designations of the unconditioned Dhamma such as 'cessation' and 'Nibbāna' are called unconditioned designation. Among these, some plane designations and the unconditioned designation are designations of what exists; functional designation is a designation of the non-existent based upon the existent. The rest are designations of what does not exist.

2. Idāni yāsaṃ paññattīnaṃ uddesavāre saṅkhepato sarūpadassanaṃ kataṃ, saṅkhepatoyeva tāva tāsaṃ vatthuṃ vibhajitvā dassanavasena tā dassetuṃ kittāvatātiādimāha. Tattha pucchāya tāva evamattho veditabbo – yā ayaṃ khandhānaṃ ‘khandhā’ti paññāpanā, dassanā, ṭhapanā, sā kittakena hotīti kathetukamyatāpucchā. Parato kittāvatā āyatanānantiādīsupi eseva nayo. Vissajjanepi evamattho veditabbo – yattakena paññāpanena saṅkhepato pañcakkhandhāti vā pabhedato ‘‘rūpakkhandho…pe… viññāṇakkhandho’’ti vā; tatrāpi rūpakkhandho kāmāvacaro, sesā catubhūmikāti vā evarūpaṃ paññāpanaṃ hoti; ettakena khandhānaṃ ‘khandhā’ti paññatti hoti.

2. Now, since a brief overview of the nature of these designations has been given in the enumeration section, to show them by dividing their basis, even briefly, he states 'To what extent?' and so on. Here, the meaning of the question should first be understood thus: 'This designation of the aggregates as 'aggregates'—how much is involved in its presentation, description, or establishment?' The same method applies to questions like 'To what extent are the sense bases?' and so on. In the answer, the meaning should be understood thus: To the extent that there is a designation, either briefly as 'the five aggregates,' or in detail as 'the form aggregate... the consciousness aggregate,' and further, even within that, as 'the form aggregate belongs to the sensuous sphere, while the remaining four belong to the four planes'—to that extent, the designation of the aggregates as 'aggregates' is established.

3. Tathā yattakena paññāpanena saṅkhepato dvādasāyatanānīti vā, pabhedato ‘‘cakkhāyatanaṃ…pe… dhammāyatana’’nti vā; tatrāpi dasāyatanā kāmāvacarā[Pg.29], dvāyatanā catubhūmikāti vā, evarūpaṃ paññāpanaṃ hoti; ettakena āyatanānaṃ āyatanānīti paññatti hoti.

3. Similarly, to the extent that there is a designation, either briefly, such as 'the twelve sense bases,' or in detail, such as 'the eye base... the mind-object base,' and within that, further distinctions like 'ten bases belong to the sensuous sphere, while two belong to the four planes'—to that extent, the designation of the sense bases as 'sense bases' is established.

4. Yattakena paññāpanena saṅkhepato aṭṭhārasa dhātuyoti vā, pabhedato ‘‘cakkhudhātu…pe… manoviññāṇadhātū’’ti vā; tatrāpi soḷasa dhātuyo kāmāvacarā, dve dhātuyo catubhūmikāti vā evarūpaṃ paññāpanaṃ hoti; ettakena dhātūnaṃ dhātūti paññatti hoti.

4. To the extent that a designation is made, either concisely as 'the eighteen elements,' or in detail as 'the eye element...the mind-consciousness element,' or even with further distinctions such as 'sixteen elements are of the sensuous sphere, while two elements are of the four planes'—to that extent, the designation of the elements as 'elements' is established.

5. Yattakena paññāpanena saṅkhepato cattāri saccānīti vā, pabhedato ‘‘dukkhasaccaṃ…pe… nirodhasacca’’nti vā; tatrāpi dve saccā lokiyā, dve saccā lokuttarāti vā evarūpaṃ paññāpanaṃ hoti; ettakena saccānaṃ ‘saccānī’ti paññatti hoti.

5. To the extent that a designation is made, either in brief, such as 'the four truths,' or in detail, such as 'the truth of suffering...the truth of cessation,' and therein further distinctions like 'two truths are mundane, two truths are supramundane'—to this extent, the designation of the truths as 'truths' is established.

6. Yattakena paññāpanena saṅkhepato bāvīsatindriyānīti vā, pabhedato ‘‘cakkhundriyaṃ…pe… aññātāvindriya’’nti vā; tatrāpi dasindriyāni kāmāvacarāni, navindriyāni missakāni, tīṇi indriyāni lokuttarānīti vā evarūpaṃ paññāpanaṃ hoti; ettakena indriyānaṃ indriyānīti paññatti hoti. Ettāvatā saṅkhepato vatthuṃ vibhajitvā dassanavasena pañca paññattiyo dassitā honti.

6. To the extent that a designation is made, either in brief, as 'the twenty-two faculties,' or in detail, as 'the eye-faculty... up to... the faculty of final knowledge'; and therein, ten faculties are of the sense sphere, nine are mixed, and three are supramundane—such a designation occurs. To this extent, the designation of the faculties as 'faculties' is established. Thus far, five designations have been shown by briefly analyzing their basis.

7. Idāni vitthārato vatthuṃ vibhajitvā dassanavasena puggalapaññattiṃ dassetuṃ samayavimutto asamayavimuttotiādimāha. Sammāsambuddhena hi tile visārayamānena viya, vāke hīrayamānena viya ca, heṭṭhā vibhaṅgappakaraṇe imāsaṃ pañcannaṃ paññattīnaṃ vatthubhūtā khandhādayo nippadesena kathitāti tena te idha ekadeseneva kathesi. Chaṭṭhā puggalapaññatti heṭṭhā akathitāva. Idhāpi uddesavāre ekadeseneva kathitā; tasmā taṃ vitthārato kathetukāmo samayavimutto asamayavimuttoti ekakato paṭṭhāya yāva dasakā mātikaṃ ṭhapesīti.

7. Now, to explain the designation of persons in detail by analyzing its basis, it is said: 'one liberated on occasion, one liberated out of season,' and so on. For just as the Perfectly Self-Enlightened One scattered sesame seeds or sifted husks from rice, in the earlier Vibhaṅga exposition, the aggregates and so forth—which are the basis for these five designations—were spoken of without remainder. Therefore, here He explained them only in part. The sixth, the designation of persons, was not explained at all earlier. Here too, in the enumeration section, it is explained only in part. Thus, wishing to explain it in detail, starting from the section of ones with 'one liberated on occasion, one liberated out of season,' He established the matrix up to the section of tens.

Mātikāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Matrix.

2. Niddesavaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Exposition.

1. Ekakaniddesavaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Exposition of Ones.

1. Idāni [Pg.30] yathāṭhapitaṃ mātikaṃ ādito paṭṭhāya vibhajitvā dassetuṃ – katamo ca puggalo samayavimuttotiādimāha. Tattha idhāti imasmiṃ sattaloke. Ekacco puggaloti eko puggalo. Kālena kālanti ettha bhummavasena attho veditabbo. Ekekasmiṃ kāleti vuttaṃ hoti. Samayena samayanti idaṃ purimasseva vevacanaṃ. Aṭṭha vimokkheti rūpāvacarārūpāvacaraaṭṭhasamāpattiyo. Tāsañhi paccanīkadhammehi vimuccanato vimokkhoti nāmaṃ. Kāyenāti vimokkhasahajātena nāmakāyena. Phusitvā viharatīti paṭilabhitvā iriyati. Katamasmiṃ panesa kāle vimokkhe phusitvā viharatīti? Samāpattiṃ samāpajjitukāmassa hi kālo nāma atthi, akālo nāma atthi. Tattha pātova sarīrapaṭijagganakālo, vattakaraṇakālo ca samāpajjanassa akālo nāma. Sarīraṃ pana paṭijaggitvā vattaṃ katvā vasanaṭṭhānaṃ pavisitvā nisinnassa yāva piṇḍāya gamanakālo nāgacchati, etasmiṃ antare samāpajjanassa kālo nāma.

1. Now, to explain the matrix as it was laid out, beginning from the start by analyzing it, it is said: 'And what sort of person is liberated on occasion?' and so on. Herein, 'here' means in this world of beings. 'A certain person' means one individual. 'From time to time' should be understood here in the sense of the locative case. It means 'at each and every time.' 'On occasion' is just a synonym for the previous term. 'The eight liberations' are the eight attainments of the form and formless realms. For they are called 'liberations' because one is liberated from opposing states. 'With the body' means with the mental body co-arisen with the liberation. 'Touches and dwells' means having attained, one abides. But at what time does one touch and dwell in these liberations? For one wishing to enter an attainment, there is indeed a proper time and an improper time. Herein, the time for attending to the body in the morning and the time for performing duties is called an improper time for entering an attainment. But after attending to the body and performing duties, having entered the dwelling place and sat down, until the time for going on alms round arrives—in this interval, it is called a proper time for entering an attainment.

Piṇḍāya gamanakālaṃ pana sallakkhetvā nikkhantassa cetiyavandanakālo, bhikkhusaṅghaparivutassa vitakkamāḷake ṭhānakālo piṇḍāya gamanakālo gāme caraṇakālo; āsanasālāya yāgupānakālo vattakaraṇakāloti ayampi samāpajjanassa akālo nāma. Āsanasālāya pana vivitte okāse sati yāva bhattakālo nāgacchati, etasmimpi antare samāpajjanassa kālo nāma. Bhattaṃ pana bhuñjanakālo, vihāragamanakālo, pattacīvarapaṭisāmanakālo, divāvattakaraṇakālo, paripucchādānakāloti ayampi samāpajjanassa akālo nāma. Yo akālo, sveva asamayo. Taṃ sabbampi ṭhapetvā avasese kāle kāle, samaye samaye vuttappakāre aṭṭha vimokkhe sahajātanāmakāyena paṭilabhitvā viharanto, ‘‘idhekacco puggalo…pe… viharatī’’ti vuccati.

And having noted the time for going on alms round, for one who has gone forth, the time for paying homage at the shrine, the time for standing on the meditation terrace surrounded by the Saṅgha, the time for going on alms round, the time for walking in the village, the time for drinking rice gruel in the assembly hall, and the time for performing duties—this too is called an improper time for entering an attainment. But in the assembly hall, if there is a secluded spot, until the meal time arrives—in this interval too, it is called a proper time for entering an attainment. The time for eating the meal, the time for going to the monastery, the time for putting away the bowl and robes, the time for performing daytime duties, and the time for inquiry—this too is called an improper time for entering an attainment. Whatever is an improper time is also an improper occasion. Setting all that aside, during the remaining proper times and occasions, one who, having attained with the co-arisen mental body, dwells in the aforementioned eight liberations is called: 'Here, a certain person... dwells.'

Apicesa [Pg.31] saphassakehi sahajātanāmadhammehi sahajātadhamme phusatiyeva nāma, upacārena appanaṃ phusatiyeva nāma. Purimāya appanāya aparaṃ appanaṃ phusatiyeva. Yena hi saddhiṃ ye dhammā sahajātā, tena te paṭiladdhā nāma honti. Phassenāpi phuṭṭhāyeva nāma honti. Upacārampi appanāya paṭilābhakāraṇameva, tathā purimā appanā aparaappanāya. Tatrāssa evaṃ sahajātehi sahajātānaṃ phusanā veditabbā – paṭhamajjhānañhi vitakkādīhi pañcaṅgikaṃ. Tasmiṃ ṭhapetvā tāni aṅgāni sesā atirekapaṇṇāsadhammā cattāro khandhā nāma honti. Tena nāmakāyena paṭhamajjhānasamāpattivimokkhaṃ phusitvā paṭilabhitvā viharati. Dutiyaṃ jhānaṃ pītisukhacittekaggatāhi tivaṅgikaṃ, tatiyaṃ sukhacittekaggatāhi duvaṅgikaṃ, catutthaṃ upekkhācittekaggatāhi duvaṅgikaṃ, tathā ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ…pe… nevasaññānāsaññāyatanañca. Tattha ṭhapetvā tāni aṅgāni sesā atirekapaṇṇāsadhammā cattāro khandhā nāma honti. Tena nāmakāyena nevasaññānāsaññāyatanasamāpattivimokkhaṃ phusitvā paṭilabhitvā viharati.

Moreover, with the co-arisen mental states that have contact, one indeed contacts the co-arisen states; by way of access concentration, one indeed contacts absorption. By means of a previous absorption, one contacts a subsequent absorption. For, the states that are co-arisen with a certain factor are said to be obtained by means of that factor. They are indeed contacted by contact. Access concentration is also a cause for obtaining absorption, and likewise a previous absorption is for a subsequent absorption. Herein, the contacting of co-arisen states by co-arisen factors should be understood as follows: The first jhāna is fivefold, with initial application and so on. Having set aside those factors, the remaining fifty-plus states are called the four aggregates. With that mental body, one contacts, obtains, and dwells in the liberation of the first jhāna attainment. The second jhāna is threefold, with joy, happiness, and one-pointedness of mind; the third is twofold, with happiness and one-pointedness of mind; the fourth is twofold, with equanimity and one-pointedness of mind. Similarly, the base of infinite space... up to... the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. Therein, having set aside those factors, the remaining fifty-plus states are called the four aggregates. With that mental body, one contacts, obtains, and dwells in the liberation of the attainment of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception.

Paññāya cassa disvāti vipassanāpaññāya saṅkhāragataṃ, maggapaññāya catusaccadhamme passitvā. Ekacce āsavā parikkhīṇā hontīti upaḍḍhupaḍḍhā paṭhamamaggādivajjhā āsavā parikkhīṇā honti. Ayaṃ vuccati puggalo samayavimuttoti ettha aṭṭhasamāpattilābhī puthujjano tena nāmakāyena phusitvā viharatīti vattuṃ vaṭṭati. Pāḷiyaṃ pana ‘‘ekacce āsavā parikkhīṇā’’ti vuttaṃ. Puthujjanassa ca khīṇā āsavā nāma natthi, tasmā so na gahito. Aṭṭhasamāpattilābhī khīṇāsavopi tena nāmakāyena phusitvā viharatīti vattuṃ vaṭṭati. Tassa pana aparikkhīṇāsavā nāma natthi, tasmā sopi na gahito. Samayavimuttoti pana tiṇṇaṃ sotāpannasakadāgāmianāgāmīnaṃyevetaṃ nāmanti veditabbaṃ.

And 'having seen with wisdom' means having seen conditioned phenomena with insight-wisdom, and the phenomena of the four truths with path-wisdom. 'Some taints are destroyed' means the taints to be abandoned by the first path and so on are destroyed in part. This is called a person liberated on occasion. Here, it would be possible to say that an ordinary person who is an attainer of the eight attainments dwells having contacted them with that mental body. However, in the Pāli text, it is said, 'some taints are destroyed.' And since an ordinary person has no destroyed taints, such a one is not included. It would also be possible to say that even an attainer of the eight attainments whose taints are destroyed dwells having contacted them with that mental body. But since for such a one there are no undestroyed taints, that one too is not included. The term 'liberated on occasion,' however, should be understood as a name for only these three: the stream-enterer, the once-returner, and the non-returner.

2. Asamayavimuttaniddese – purimasadisaṃ vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Asamayavimuttoti panettha sukkhavipassakakhīṇāsavassetaṃ nāmaṃ. Sukkhavipassakā pana sotāpannasakadāgāmianāgāmino aṭṭhasamāpattilābhino ca khīṇāsavā puthujjanā ca imasmiṃ duke na labbhanti, dukamuttakapuggalā [Pg.32] nāma honti. Tasmā satthā attano buddhasubuddhatāya heṭṭhā gahite ca aggahite ca saṅkaḍḍhitvā saddhiṃ piṭṭhivaṭṭakehi tantiṃ āropento sabbepi ariyapuggalātiādimāha. Tattha ariye vimokkheti kilesehi ārakattā ariyeti saṅkhaṃ gate lokuttaravimokkhe. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – bāhirānañhi aṭṭhannaṃ samāpattīnaṃ samāpajjantassa samayopi atthi asamayopi. Maggavimokkhena vimuccanassa samayo vā asamayo vā natthi. Yassa saddhā balavatī, vipassanā ca āraddhā, tassa gacchantassa tiṭṭhantassa nisīdantassa nipajjantassa khādantassa bhuñjantassa maggaphalapaṭivedho nāma na hotīti natthi. Iti maggavimokkhena vimuccanassa samayo vā asamayo vā natthīti heṭṭhā gahite ca aggahite ca saṅkaḍḍhitvā imaṃ piṭṭhivaṭṭakaṃ tantiṃ āropesi dhammarājā. Samāpattilābhī puthujjano imāyapi tantiyā aggahitova. Bhajāpiyamāno pana samāpattivikkhambhitānaṃ kilesānaṃ vasena samayavimuttabhāvaṃ bhajeyya.

2. In the explanation of 'timeless liberation' (asamayavimutta), it should be understood in the same way as previously stated. Here, 'timeless liberation' is a name for the dry-insight arahant. However, dry-insight stream-enterers, once-returners, non-returners, arahants who have attained the eight attainments, and ordinary people are not found in this pair; they are called individuals excluded from the pair. Therefore, the Teacher, by virtue of his own supreme Buddhahood, having gathered both those included and those not included from below, and establishing the enumeration along with the supplementary sections, stated, 'all noble individuals,' and so on. Here, this refers to the supramundane liberation, which is designated 'noble' because it is far from defilements. This is what is meant: for one who enters the eight external attainments, there is both a time and a non-time. But for liberation by the path, there is neither a time nor a non-time. For one whose faith is strong and insight is initiated, it is not the case that there is no realization of the path and fruition, whether one is walking, standing, sitting, lying down, eating, or consuming. Thus, stating that for liberation by the path there is neither a time nor a non-time, the King of Dhamma, having gathered both those included and those not included from below, established this supplementary enumeration. An ordinary person who is an obtainer of the attainments is not included in this enumeration. However, when considered, by means of the defilements suppressed by the attainments, he may partake of the state of temporal liberation.

3. Kuppadhammākuppadhammaniddesesu – yassa adhigato samāpattidhammo kuppati nassati, so kuppadhammo. Rūpasahagatānanti rūpanimittasaṅkhātena rūpena sahagatānaṃ. Tena saddhiṃ pavattānaṃ na vinā rūpārammaṇānaṃ catunnaṃ rūpāvacarajjhānānanti attho. Arūpasahagatānanti rūpato aññaṃ, na rūpanti arūpaṃ. Arūpena sahagatānaṃ tena saddhiṃ pavattānaṃ na vinā arūpārammaṇānaṃ catunnaṃ arūpāvacarajjhānānanti attho. Na nikāmalābhīti pañcahākārehi aciṇṇavasitāya icchitākārena aladdhattā na nikāmalābhī. Appaguṇasamāpattikoti attho. Na akicchalābhīti kicchalābhī dukkhalābhī. Yo āgamanamhi kilese vikkhambhento upacāraṃ pāpento appanaṃ pāpento cittamañjūsaṃ labhanto dukkhena kicchena sasaṅkhārena sappayogena kilamanto taṃ sampadaṃ pāpuṇituṃ sakkoti, so na akicchalābhī nāma. Na akasiralābhīti avipulalābhī. Samāpattiṃ appetvā addhānaṃ pharituṃ na sakkoti. Ekaṃ dve cittavāre vattetvā sahasāva vuṭṭhātīti attho.

3. In the explanation of 'liable to fall' (kuppadhamma) and 'unshakable' (akuppadhamma): one whose attained state of attainment is liable to fall and perish is called 'liable to fall.' 'Associated with form' (rūpasahagatāni) means those associated with form, which is designated as a form-sign. This means the four form-sphere jhānas that arise together with, and not without, a form object. 'Associated with the formless' (arūpasahagatāni) means that which is other than form, that is, not form, is formless. This means the four formless-sphere jhānas that arise together with, and not without, a formless object. 'Not one who obtains at will' (na nikāmalābhī) means one who, due to not having practiced mastery in the five ways, does not obtain it in the desired manner, and is thus not one who obtains at will. This means one of weak attainment. 'Not one who obtains without difficulty' (na akicchalābhī) means one who obtains with difficulty, obtains painfully. One who, while suppressing defilements in the approach, bringing the mind to access concentration, bringing it to absorption, obtaining the casket of the mind, is able to reach that attainment only with difficulty, painfully, with effort, with exertion, becoming weary, is called 'not one who obtains without difficulty.' 'Not one who obtains without trouble' (na akasiralābhī) means one who does not obtain extensively. He is not able to pervade a period of time after having attained absorption. This means he arises suddenly after one or two thought-processes have occurred.

Yatthicchakanti yasmiṃ okāse samāpattiṃ appetvā nisīdituṃ icchati. Yadicchakanti kasiṇajjhānaṃ vā ānāpānajjhānaṃ vā brahmavihārajjhānaṃ vā asubhajjhānaṃ [Pg.33] vāti yaṃ yaṃ samāpattiṃ appetvā nisīdituṃ icchati. Yāvaticchakanti addhānaparicchedena yattakaṃ kālaṃ icchati. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – yattha yattha yaṃ yaṃ samāpattiṃ yattakaṃ addhānaṃ samāpajjitumpi vuṭṭhātumpi icchati, tattha tattha taṃ taṃ samāpattiṃ tattakaṃ addhānaṃ samāpajjitumpi vuṭṭhātumpi na sakkoti. Candaṃ vā sūriyaṃ vā ulloketvā ‘imasmiṃ cande vā sūriye vā ettakaṃ ṭhānaṃ gate vuṭṭhahissāmī’ti paricchinditvā jhānaṃ samāpanno yathāparicchedena vuṭṭhātuṃ na sakkoti, antarāva vuṭṭhāti; samāpattiyā appaguṇatāyāti.

Wherever one wishes—in whatever place one wishes to sit after attaining absorption. Whatever one wishes—whether it be a kasiṇa-jhāna, ānāpāna-jhāna, brahmavihāra-jhāna, or asubha-jhāna—whatever absorption one wishes to attain and sit in. For as long as one wishes—for whatever length of time one desires. This is what is meant: one is unable to attain whatever absorption one wishes, in whatever place one wishes, for as long as one wishes, and to emerge from it accordingly. Even if one gazes at the moon or sun and determines, 'When this moon or sun has reached such a position, I will emerge,' and enters absorption, one cannot emerge at the predetermined time but emerges prematurely—due to the weakness of the absorption.

Pamādamāgammāti pamādaṃ paṭicca. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evaṃvidho puggalo kuppadhammoti vuccati. Idaṃ pana aṭṭhasamāpattilābhino puthujjanassa sotāpannassa sakadāgāminoti tiṇṇaṃ puggalānaṃ nāmaṃ. Etesañhi samādhipāribandhakā vipassanāpāribandhakā ca dhammā na suvikkhambhitā, na suvikkhālitā, tena tesaṃ samāpatti nassati parihāyati. Sā ca kho neva sīlabhedena, nāpattivītikkamena. Na garukamokkhadhammo panesa appamattakenapi kiccakaraṇīyena vā vattabhedamattakena vā nassati.

By falling into heedlessness means: on account of heedlessness. This is said: this kind of person is called 'liable to fall.' This term, however, applies to three types of individuals: an ordinary person who has attained the eight attainments, a stream-enterer, and a once-returner. For these, the factors that obstruct concentration and the factors that obstruct insight are not well suppressed or well cleansed; therefore, their attainment is lost or deteriorates. And this is not through a breach of moral conduct or transgression of an offense. But this is not a weighty state of liberation; it is lost even by a slight task to be done or by a mere breach of duty.

Tatridaṃ vatthu – eko kira thero samāpattiṃ vaḷañjeti. Tasmiṃ piṇḍāya gāmaṃ paviṭṭhe dārakā pariveṇe kīḷitvā pakkamiṃsu. Thero āgantvā ‘pariveṇaṃ sammajjitabba’nti cintetvā asammajjitvā vihāraṃ pavisitvā ‘samāpattiṃ appessāmī’ti nisīdi. So appetuṃ asakkonto, ‘kiṃ nu kho āvaraṇa’nti sīlaṃ āvajjanto appamattakampi vītikkamaṃ adisvā ‘vattabhedo nu kho atthī’ti olokento pariveṇassa asammaṭṭhabhāvaṃ ñatvā sammajjitvā pavisitvā nisīdanto samāpattiṃ appentova nisīdi.

Here is an account: It is said that a certain elder was practicing attainment. When he had gone to the village for alms, children played in his monastic precinct and then left. Upon returning, the elder thought, 'The monastic precinct should be swept,' but without sweeping it, he entered his dwelling and, sitting down, thought, 'I will enter into attainment.' Unable to enter, he reflected, 'What, I wonder, is the hindrance?' Reviewing his moral conduct, he saw no transgression, however minor. Then, considering, 'Could there be a breach of duty?', he realized that the monastic precinct had not been swept. After sweeping it and entering, as he was sitting down, he entered into attainment.

4. Akuppadhammaniddeso vuttapaṭipakkhavaseneva veditabbo. Akuppadhammoti idaṃ pana aṭṭhasamāpattilābhino anāgāmissa ceva khīṇāsavassa cāti dvinnaṃ puggalānaṃ nāmaṃ. Tesañhi samādhipāribandhakā vipassanāpāribandhakā ca dhammā suvikkhambhitā suvikkhālitā; tena tesaṃ bhassasaṅgaṇikārāmādikiccena vā aññena vā yena kenaci attano anurūpena pamādena vītināmentānampi samāpatti na kuppati, na nassati. Sukkhavipassakā pana sotāpannasakadāgāmianāgāmikhīṇāsavā imasmiṃ duke [Pg.34] na labbhanti; dukamuttakapuggalā nāma honti. Tasmā satthā attano buddhasubuddhatāya heṭṭhā gahite ca aggahite ca saṅkaḍḍhitvā imasmimpi duke saddhiṃ piṭṭhivaṭṭakehi tantiṃ āropento sabbepi ariyapuggalātiādimāha. Aṭṭhannañhi samāpattīnaṃ kuppanaṃ nassanaṃ bhaveyya, lokuttaradhammassa pana sakiṃ paṭividdhassa kuppanaṃ nassanaṃ nāma natthi, taṃ sandhāyetaṃ vuttaṃ.

4. The explanation of 'unshakable' (akuppadhamma) should be understood based on the opposing factors already stated. 'Unshakable' is a term for two types of individuals: non-returners who have attained the eight attainments and arahants. For them, the factors obstructive to concentration and obstructive to insight are fully suppressed and dispelled; therefore, even if they spend time in idle talk, socializing, enjoying parks and the like, or by any other suitable negligence of their own, their attainment does not waver, it is not lost. However, dry-insight practitioners—stream-enterers, once-returners, non-returners, and arahants—are not found in this pair; they are called individuals excluded from the pair. Thus, the Teacher, through his own perfect enlightenment, drawing together both those included and those not included from below, when establishing the enumeration even in this pair along with those counted in the category, says, 'all noble individuals,' and so on. For the eight attainments, there could be wavering and loss, but for the supramundane Dhamma, once penetrated, there is no such thing as wavering or loss; this is what is meant here.

5. Parihānadhammāparihānadhammaniddesāpi kuppadhammākuppadhammaniddesavaseneva veditabbā. Kevalañhi idha puggalassa pamādaṃ paṭicca dhammānaṃ parihānampi aparihānampi gahitanti idaṃ pariyāyadesanāmattameva nānaṃ. Sesaṃ sabbattha tādisameva.

5. The exposition on the qualities subject to decline and the qualities not subject to decline should also be understood in the same way as the exposition on qualities liable to fall and qualities unshakable. The only difference here is that this is merely a teaching by way of explanation, which takes into account both the decline and non-decline of qualities depending on a person's negligence. The rest is just the same in every respect.

7. Cetanābhabbaniddese – cetanābhabboti cetanāya aparihāniṃ āpajjituṃ bhabbo. Sace anusañcetetīti, sace samāpajjati. Samāpattiñhi samāpajjanto anusañceteti nāma. So na parihāyati, itaro parihāyati.

7. In the exposition on 'fit for intention' (cetanābhabbā): 'fit for intention' means fit to avoid decline by means of intention. 'If one intends repeatedly' means if one attains absorption. For one who attains absorption is said to intend repeatedly. Such a one does not decline; the other declines.

8. Anurakkhaṇābhabbaniddese – anurakkhaṇābhabboti anurakkhaṇāya aparihāniṃ āpajjituṃ bhabbo. Sace anurakkhatīti sace anupakāradhamme pahāya upakāradhamme sevanto samāpajjati. Evañhi paṭipajjanto anurakkhati nāma. So na parihāyati, itaro parihāyati.

8. In the exposition on 'fit for guarding' (anurakkhaṇābhabbā): 'fit for guarding' means fit to avoid decline by means of guarding. 'If one guards' means if one abandons unbeneficial qualities and cultivates beneficial qualities, thereby attaining. For one who practices in this way is said to guard. Such a one does not decline, while the other declines.

Ime dvepi samāpattiṃ ṭhapetuṃ thāvaraṃ kātuṃ paṭibalā. Cetanābhabbato pana anurakkhaṇābhabbova balavataro. Cetanābhabbo hi upakārānupakāre dhamme na jānāti. Ajānanto upakāradhamme nudati nīharati, anupakāradhamme sevati. So te sevanto samāpattito parihāyati. Anurakkhaṇābhabbo upakārānupakāre dhamme jānāti. Jānanto anupakāradhamme nudati nīharati, upakāradhamme sevati. So te sevanto samāpattito na parihāyati.

These two are both capable of establishing and making the attainment firm. However, the one fit for guarding is more powerful than the one fit for intention. For the one fit for intention does not know qualities that are helpful or unhelpful. Not knowing, he rejects and eliminates helpful qualities, and cultivates unhelpful qualities. Cultivating these, he falls away from the attainment. The one fit for guarding knows qualities that are helpful or unhelpful. Knowing, he rejects and eliminates unhelpful qualities, and cultivates helpful qualities. Cultivating these, he does not fall away from the attainment.

Yathā hi dve khettapālā eko paṇḍurogena sarogo akkhamo sītādīnaṃ, eko arogo sītādīnaṃ saho. Sarogo heṭṭhākuṭiṃ na otarati, rattārakkhaṃ divārakkhaṃ vijahati. Tassa divā sukamorādayo khettaṃ otaritvā sālisīsaṃ khādanti, rattiṃ migasūkarādayo pavisitvā khalaṃ [Pg.35] tacchi taṃ viya chetvā gacchanti. So attano pamattakāraṇā puna bījamattampi na labhati. Itaro rattārakkhaṃ divārakkhaṃ na vijahati. So attano appamattakāraṇā ekakarīsato cattāripi aṭṭhapi sakaṭāni labhati.

For example, just as there are two field keepers: one diseased with paleness, sickly, incapable of enduring cold and such, and the other healthy, capable of enduring cold and such. The sickly one does not go down to the lower hut, and abandons guarding by night and guarding by day. For him, during the day, birds such as parrots and peacocks descend on the field and eat the rice heads. At night, animals such as deer and boars enter and, as if carving out the threshing floor, cut and depart. He, because of his own negligence, does not even obtain seed. The other does not abandon guarding by night and guarding by day. He, because of his own non-negligence, obtains four or even eight cartloads from just one karisa.

Tattha sarogakhettapālo viya cetanābhabbo, arogo viya anurakkhaṇābhabbo daṭṭhabbo. Sarogassa attano pamādena puna bījamattassapi alabhanaṃ viya cetanābhabbassa upakārānupakāre dhamme ajānitvā upakāre pahāya anupakāre sevantassa samāpattiyā parihānaṃ. Itarassa attano appamādena ekakarīsamattato catuaṭṭhasakaṭauddharaṇaṃ viya anurakkhaṇābhabbassa upakārānupakāre dhamme jānitvā anupakāre pahāya upakāre sevantassa samāpattiyā aparihānaṃ veditabbaṃ. Evaṃ cetanābhabbato anurakkhaṇābhabbova samāpattiṃ thāvaraṃ kātuṃ balavataroti veditabbo.

Here, the sickly field guard should be seen as like the one fit for intention, and the healthy one as like the one fit for guarding. Just as the sickly one, due to his own negligence, fails to obtain even a seed, so too the one fit for intention, not knowing helpful and unhelpful qualities, abandoning the helpful and cultivating the unhelpful, experiences decline from the attainment. The other, due to his diligence, obtains four or eight cartloads from just one karisa—this should be understood as like the one fit for guarding, who, knowing helpful and unhelpful qualities, abandons the unhelpful and cultivates the helpful, resulting in no decline from the attainment. Thus, it should be understood that the one fit for guarding is more powerful than the one fit for intention in making the attainment firm.

9. Puthujjananiddese – tīṇi saṃyojanānīti diṭṭhisaṃyojanasīlabbataparāmāsasaṃyojanavicikicchāsaṃyojanāni. Etāni hi phalakkhaṇe pahīnāni nāma honti. Ayaṃ pana phalakkhaṇepi na hotīti dasseti. Tesaṃ dhammānanti tesaṃ saṃyojanadhammānaṃ. Maggakkhaṇasmiñhi tesaṃ pahānāya paṭipanno nāma hoti. Ayaṃ pana maggakkhaṇepi na hoti. Ettāvatā vissaṭṭhakammaṭṭhāno thūlabālaputhujjanova idha kathitoti veditabbo.

9. In the explanation of the ordinary person—the three fetters are the fetter of views, the fetter of clinging to rites and observances, and the fetter of doubt. These are indeed abandoned at the moment of fruition. But this shows that this person is not even at the moment of fruition. “Of those phenomena” refers to those phenomena of the fetters. For at the moment of the path, one is said to be practicing for their abandonment. But this person is not even at the moment of the path. To this extent, it should be understood that here only a gross, foolish ordinary person who has abandoned his meditation subject is being discussed.

10. Gotrabhuniddese – yesaṃ dhammānanti yesaṃ gotrabhuñāṇena saddhiṃ uppannānaṃ paropaṇṇāsakusaladhammānaṃ. Ariyadhammassāti lokuttaramaggassa. Avakkanti hotīti okkanti nibbatti pātubhāvo hoti. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ nibbānārammaṇena ñāṇena sabbaṃ puthujjanasaṅkhaṃ puthujjanagottaṃ puthujjanamaṇḍalaṃ puthujjanapaññattiṃ atikkamitvā ariyasaṅkhaṃ ariyagottaṃ ariyamaṇḍalaṃ ariyapaññattiṃ okkamanato gotrabhūpuggalo nāma vuccati.

10. In the explanation of the lineage-breaker—“of which qualities” refers to the wholesome qualities, over fifty in number, that arise together with the lineage-breaker knowledge. “The noble quality” refers to the supramundane path. “There is entry” means there is descent, production, manifestation. This person is called a lineage-breaker individual because, by means of knowledge that has Nibbāna as its object, he has transcended all the multitude of ordinary people, the lineage of ordinary people, the sphere of ordinary people, and the designation of ordinary people, and has entered into the multitude of noble ones, the lineage of noble ones, the sphere of noble ones, and the designation of noble ones.

11. Bhayūparataniddese – bhayena uparatoti bhayūparato. Sattapi sekkhā puthujjanā ca bhāyitvā pāpato oramanti pāpaṃ na karonti[Pg.36]. Tattha puthujjanā duggatibhayaṃ, vaṭṭabhayaṃ, kilesabhayaṃ, upavādabhayanti cattāri bhayāni bhāyanti. Tesu bhāyitabbaṭṭhena duggatiyeva bhayaṃ duggatibhayaṃ. Sesesupi eseva nayo. Tattha puthujjano ‘sace tvaṃ pāpaṃ karissasi, cattāro apāyā mukhaṃ vivaritvā ṭhitacchātaajagarasadisā, tesu dukkhaṃ anubhavanto kathaṃ bhavissasī’ti duggatibhayaṃ bhāyitvā pāpaṃ na karoti. Anamataggasaṃsāravaṭṭaṃyeva pana vaṭṭabhayaṃ nāma. Sabbampi akusalaṃ kilesabhayaṃ nāma. Garahā pana upavādabhayaṃ nāma. Tānipi bhāyitvā puthujjano pāpaṃ na karoti. Sotāpannasakadāgāmianāgāmino pana tayo sekkhā duggatiṃ atītattā sesāni tīṇi bhayāni bhāyitvā pāpaṃ na karonti. Maggaṭṭhakasekkhā āgamanavasena vā asamucchinnabhayattā vā bhayūparatā nāma honti. Khīṇāsavo imesu catūsu bhayesu ekampi na bhāyati. So hi sabbaso samucchinnabhayo; tasmā abhayūparatoti vuccati. Kiṃ pana so upavādampi na bhāyatīti? Na bhāyati. Upavādaṃ pana rakkhatīti vattuṃ vaṭṭati. Doṇuppalavāpigāme khīṇāsavatthero viya.

11. In the explanation of one restrained by fear: ‘restrained by fear’ means one who is restrained out of fear. The seven trainees and ordinary people, being afraid, abstain from evil and do not commit evil. Therein, ordinary people fear four kinds of fear: fear of a bad destination, fear of the round of rebirth, fear of defilements, and fear of blame. Among these, the bad destination itself is fear because it is to be feared; the same applies to the rest. Herein, an ordinary person, fearing the fear of a bad destination, thinks, “If you do evil, the four woeful states will open their mouths like hungry pythons standing ready; how will you be, experiencing suffering there?” and thus does not commit evil. The beginningless cycle of rebirth is called the fear of the round. All that is unwholesome is called the fear of defilements. Reproach is called the fear of blame. Fearing these, an ordinary person does not commit evil. The three trainees—stream-enterers, once-returners, and non-returners—having transcended the bad destination, abstain from evil out of fear of the remaining three fears. Those trainees who are on the path are called ‘restrained by fear’ either in relation to their potential return or because their fear is not fully eradicated. The one whose cankers are destroyed does not fear even one of these four fears. For he is entirely free from fear; thus, he is called ‘not restrained by fear.’ But does such a one not fear blame either? He does not fear it. However, it is fitting to say that he is careful regarding blame, like the elder whose cankers were destroyed in the village of Doṇuppalavāpi.

12. Abhabbāgamananiddese – sammattaniyāmāgamanassa abhabboti abhabbāgamano. Kammāvaraṇenāti pañcavidhena ānantariyakammena. Kilesāvaraṇenāti niyatamicchādiṭṭhiyā. Vipākāvaraṇenāti ahetukaduhetukapaṭisandhiyā. Assaddhāti buddhadhammasaṅghesu saddhārahitā. Acchandikāti kattukamyatākusalacchandarahitā. Te ṭhapetvā jambudīpaṃ itaradīpattayavāsino veditabbā. Tesu hi manussā acchandikabhāvaṃ paviṭṭhā nāma. Duppaññāti bhavaṅgapaññārahitā. Abhabbāti appaṭiladdhamaggaphalūpanissayā. Niyāmanti magganiyāmaṃ, sammattaniyāmaṃ. Okkamitunti etaṃ kusalesu dhammesu sammattasaṅkhātaṃ niyāmaṃ okkamituṃ pavisituṃ tattha patiṭṭhātuṃ abhabbā.

12. In the explanation of ‘incapable of progress’: one who is incapable of entering the fixed course of rightness is ‘incapable of progress.’ By the obstacle of kamma: through the fivefold kamma with immediate result. By the obstacle of defilements: through fixed wrong view. By the obstacle of result: through rebirth-linking without root-causes or with two root-causes. Without faith: lacking faith in the Buddha, Dhamma, and Saṅgha. Without desire: devoid of the wholesome desire to act. Except for those in Jambudīpa, the inhabitants of the other three continents should be understood as such. For indeed, the people there are said to have entered a state of lacking desire. Unwise: lacking fundamental wisdom. Incapable: without having attained the decisive support for the path and fruition. Fixed course: the fixed course of the path, the fixed course of rightness. To enter: they are incapable of entering, penetrating, or establishing themselves in that fixed course called rightness among wholesome states.

13. Bhabbāgamananiddeso vuttapaṭipakkhanayena veditabbo. Evamimasmiṃ duke ye ca puggalā pañcānantariyakā, ye ca niyatamicchādiṭṭhikā, yehi ca ahetukaduhetukapaṭisandhi gahitā, ye ca buddhādīnaṃ na saddahanti, yesañca kattukamyatāchando natthi, ye ca aparipuṇṇabhavaṅgapaññā, yesañca maggaphalānaṃ upanissayo natthi, te sabbepi sammattaniyāmaṃ okkamituṃ abhabbā, viparītā bhabbāti vuttā.

13. The explanation of ‘capable of progress’ should be understood by the opposite method to what has been stated. Thus, in this dyad, those individuals who have committed the five deeds with immediate result, those with fixed wrong view, those who have taken a rebirth-linking without root-causes or with two root-causes, those who do not have faith in the Buddha and so forth, those who lack the wholesome desire to act, those with undeveloped fundamental wisdom, and those without the decisive support for the paths and fruits—all these are incapable of entering the fixed course of rightness. The opposite are said to be capable.

14. Niyatāniyataniddese [Pg.37] – ānantarikāti āntarikakammasamaṅgino. Micchādiṭṭhikāti niyatamicchādiṭṭhisamaṅgino. Sabbepi hete nirayassa atthāya niyatattā niyatā nāma. Aṭṭha pana ariyapuggalā sammābhāvāya uparūparimaggaphalatthāya ceva anupādāparinibbānatthāya ca niyatattā niyatā nāma. Avasesapuggalā pana anibaddhagatikā. Yathā ākāse khittadaṇḍo pathaviyaṃ patanto ‘aggena vā majjhena vā mūlena vā patissatī’ti na ñāyati; evameva ‘asukagatiyā nāma nibbattissantī’ti niyamābhāvā aniyatā nāmāti veditabbā. Yā pana uttarakurukānaṃ niyatagatikatā vuttā, na sā niyatadhammavasena. Micchattasammattaniyatadhammāyeva hi niyatā nāma. Tesañca vasenāyaṃ puggalaniyamo kathitoti.

14. In the explanation of 'fixed and unfixed': 'Those with kamma with immediate result' are persons endowed with such kamma. 'Those with wrong view' are persons endowed with fixed wrong view. All these are called 'fixed' because they are destined for hell. However, the eight noble individuals are called 'fixed' because they are destined for rightness, for the attainment of successively higher paths and fruits, and for final Nibbāna without clinging. The remaining individuals are of unfixed destination. Just as a stick thrown into the air, as it falls to the earth, it is not known whether it will fall on its tip, or its middle, or its base; even so, because there is no certainty as to which destination they will be reborn in, they are to be known as 'unfixed.' The fixed destination of the Uttarakuru beings, however, is not in terms of fixed principles. Only those principles fixed in wrongness or rightness are called 'fixed,' and this classification of individuals is spoken of based on them.

15. Paṭipannakaniddese – maggasamaṅginoti maggaṭṭhakapuggalā. Te hi phalatthāya paṭipannattā paṭipannakā nāma. Phalasamaṅginoti phalapaṭilābhasamaṅgitāya phalasamaṅgino. Phalapaṭilābhato paṭṭhāya hi te phalasamāpattiṃ asamāpannāpi phale ṭhitāyeva nāma.

15. In the explanation of ‘those practicing the path’: ‘those endowed with the path’ are individuals standing on the path. They are called ‘those practicing the path’ because they are practicing for the sake of the fruit. ‘Those endowed with the fruit’ are so called because they are endowed with the acquisition of the fruit. From the moment of attaining the fruit, even if they have not entered a fruition attainment, they are still considered to be established in the fruit.

16. Samasīsīniddese – apubbaṃ acarimanti apure apacchā, ekappahārenevāti attho. Pariyādānanti parikkhayo. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ puggalo samasīsī nāma vuccati. So panesa tividho hoti – iriyāpathasamasīsī, rogasamasīsī, jīvitasamasīsīti. Tattha yo caṅkamantova vipassanaṃ paṭṭhapetvā arahattaṃ patvā caṅkamantova parinibbāti padumatthero viya; ṭhitakova vipassanaṃ paṭṭhapetvā arahattaṃ patvā ṭhitakova parinibbāti koṭapabbatavihāravāsītissatthero viya; nisinnova vipassanaṃ paṭṭhapetvā arahattaṃ patvā nisinnova parinibbāti, nipannova vipassanaṃ paṭṭhapetvā arahattaṃ patvā nipannova parinibbāti – ayaṃ iriyāpathasamasīsī nāma.

16. In the explanation of 'samasīsī': 'apubbaṃ acarimanti' means 'not before, not after'; the meaning is 'at a single stroke.' 'Pariyādānaṃ' means 'complete ending.' This person is called 'samasīsī.' This person is of three kinds: samasīsī in posture, samasīsī in illness, and samasīsī in life. Herein, one who establishes insight while walking and attains arahantship, then attains final Nibbāna while still walking, like the Elder Paduma; one who establishes insight while standing and attains arahantship, then attains final Nibbāna while still standing, like the Elder Tissa who dwelt at Koṭapabbata Monastery; one who establishes insight while sitting and attains arahantship, then attains final Nibbāna while still sitting; or one who establishes insight while lying down and attains arahantship, then attains final Nibbāna while still lying down—this is called 'samasīsī in posture.'

Yo pana ekaṃ rogaṃ patvā antorogeyeva vipassanaṃ paṭṭhapetvā arahattaṃ patvā teneva rogena parinibbāti – ayaṃ rogasamasīsī nāma.

One who, having contracted a disease, establishes insight while still afflicted by that disease, attains arahantship, and then attains final Nibbāna by means of that very illness—this is called 'samasīsī in illness.'

Kataro [Pg.38] jīvitasamasīsī nāma? ‘‘Sīsanti terasa sīsāni – palibodhasīsañca taṇhā, vinibandhanasīsañca māno, parāmāsasīsañca diṭṭhi, vikkhepasīsañca uddhaccaṃ, saṃkilesasīsañca avijjā, adhimokkhasīsañca saddhā, paggahasīsañca vīriyaṃ, upaṭṭhānasīsañca sati, avikkhepasīsañca samādhi, dassanasīsañca paññā, pavattasīsañca jīvitindriyaṃ, gocarasīsañca vimokkho, saṅkhārasīsañca nirodho’’ti (paṭi. ma. 1.87). Tattha kilesasīsaṃ avijjaṃ arahattamaggo pariyādiyati. Pavattasīsaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ cuticittaṃ pariyādiyati. Avijjāpariyādāyakaṃ cittaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ pariyādātuṃ na sakkoti. Jīvitindriyapariyādāyakaṃ cittaṃ avijjaṃ pariyādātuṃ na sakkoti. Avijjāpariyādāyakaṃ cittaṃ aññaṃ, jīvitindriyapariyādāyakaṃ cittaṃ aññaṃ. Yassa cetaṃ sīsadvayaṃ samaṃ pariyādānaṃ gacchati, so jīvitasamasīsī nāma.

Who is one called 'one with life and head equal'? 'A "head" means thirteen heads: the head of obstruction, namely craving; the head of bondage, namely conceit; the head of grasping, namely wrong view; the head of scattering, namely restlessness; the head of defilement, namely ignorance; the head of conviction, namely faith; the head of striving, namely energy; the head of establishing, namely mindfulness; the head of non-scattering, namely concentration; the head of seeing, namely wisdom; the head of continuing, namely the life-faculty; the head of range, namely liberation; the head of formations, namely cessation' (Patisambhidamagga 1.87). Here, the path of arahantship completely ends the head of defilement, which is ignorance. The death-consciousness completely ends the head of continuing, which is the life-faculty. The consciousness that completely ends ignorance cannot completely end the life-faculty. The consciousness that completely ends the life-faculty cannot completely end ignorance. The consciousness that completely ends ignorance is one, the consciousness that completely ends the life-faculty is another. One for whom these two heads come to an equal ending is called 'one with life and head equal'.

Kathamidaṃ samaṃ hotīti? Vārasamatāya. Yasmiñhi vāre maggavuṭṭhānaṃ hoti – sotāpattimagge pañca paccavekkhaṇāni, sakadāgāmimagge pañca, anāgāmimagge pañca, arahattamagge cattārīti ekūnavīsatiyā paccavekkhaṇañāṇe patiṭṭhāya bhavaṅgaṃ otaritvā parinibbāyati. Imāya vārasamatāya idaṃ ubhayasīsapariyādānaṃ samaṃ hoti nāma. Tenāyaṃ puggalo jīvitasamasīsīti vuccati. Ayameva ca idha adhippeto.

How is this equal? By the equality of occasions. For in whichever occasion the path arises – in the stream-entry path, five reviewing cognitions; in the once-returner path, five; in the non-returner path, five; in the arahant path, four – thus, based on nineteen reviewing cognitions, having descended into the life-continuum, one attains final Nibbāna. By this equality of occasions, this complete ending of both heads is called equal. Therefore, this person is called 'one with life and head equal.' And this is precisely what is meant here.

17. Ṭhitakappīniddese – ṭhito kappoti ṭhitakappo, ṭhitakappo assa atthīti ṭhitakappī. Kappaṃ ṭhapetuṃ samatthoti attho. Uḍḍayhanavelā assāti jhāyanakālo bhaveyya. Neva tāvāti yāva esa maggasamaṅgī puggalo sotāpattiphalaṃ na sacchikaroti, neva tāva kappo jhāyeyya. Jhāyamānopi ajjhāyitvāva tiṭṭheyya. Kappavināso hi nāma mahāvikāro mahāpayogo koṭisatasahassacakkavāḷassa jhāyanavasena mahālokavināso. Ayampi evaṃ mahāvināso tiṭṭheyya vāti vadati. Sāsane pana dharamāne ayaṃ kappavināso nāma natthi. Kappavināse sāsanaṃ natthi. Gatakoṭike hi kāle kappavināso nāma hoti. Evaṃ santepi satthā antarāyābhāvaṃ dīpetuṃ idaṃ kāraṇaṃ āhari – ‘‘idampi bhaveyya, maggasamaṅgino pana phalassa antarāyo na sakkā kātu’’nti. Ayaṃ pana puggalo kappaṃ ṭhapento kittakaṃ kālaṃ ṭhapeyyāti? Yasmiṃ [Pg.39] vāre maggavuṭṭhānaṃ hoti, atha bhavaṅgaṃ āvaṭṭentaṃ manodvārāvajjanaṃ uppajjati. Tato tīṇi anulomāni, ekaṃ gotrabhucittaṃ, ekaṃ maggacittaṃ, dve phalacittāni, pañca paccavekkhaṇañāṇānīti ettakaṃ kālaṃ ṭhapeyya. Imaṃ panatthaṃ bāhirāya āgantukūpamāyapi evaṃ dīpayiṃsu. Sace hi sotāpattimaggasamaṅgissa matthakūpari yojanikaṃ ekagghanaselaṃ tivaṭṭāya rajjuyā bandhitvā olambeyya, ekasmiṃ vaṭṭe chinne dvīhi olambeyya, dvīsu chinnesu ekena olambeyyeva, tasmimpi chinne abbhakūṭaṃ viya ākāse tiṭṭheyya, na tveva tassa puggalassa maggānantaraphalassa antarāyaṃ kareyyāti. Ayaṃ pana dīpanā parittā, purimāva mahantā. Na kevalaṃ pana sotāpattimaggaṭṭhova kappaṃ ṭhapeti, itare maggasamaṅginopi ṭhapentiyeva. Tena bhagavā heṭṭhā gahitañca aggahitañca sabbaṃ saṅkaḍḍhitvā saddhiṃ piṭṭhivaṭṭakapuggalehi imaṃ tantiṃ āropesi – ‘‘sabbepi maggasamaṅgino puggalā ṭhitakappino’’ti.

17. In the explanation of 'one who keeps the aeon stable' (ṭhitakappī) – ṭhito kappo means 'a stable aeon'; 'one who has a stable aeon' is a ṭhitakappī. The meaning is 'one who is capable of keeping the aeon stable.' Uḍḍayhanavelā assā means 'the time for its burning up.' 'Not yet' means: as long as this individual endowed with the path has not realized the fruit of stream-entry, the aeon would not yet burn up. Even if it were burning up, it would remain without having burned. For the destruction of an aeon is a great calamity, a tremendous undertaking – the great destruction of a hundred thousand million world-systems through burning. It is said that even such a great destruction as this would remain. However, as long as the Dispensation endures, there is no such thing as the destruction of an aeon. When an aeon is destroyed, there is no Dispensation. For the destruction of an aeon occurs only when an incalculable period has passed. Even so, the Teacher cited this reason to show the absence of obstacles: 'This too might happen, but for one endowed with the path, no obstacle can be made to the fruit.' Now, for how long would this individual keep the aeon stable? At the moment when there is an arising from the path, then the mind-door adverting cognition arises, turning away from the life-continuum. Then follow three conformity cognitions, one change-of-lineage cognition, one path cognition, two fruition cognitions, and five reviewing cognitions – for that length of time, one would keep it stable. This meaning was also illustrated by an external simile. For if a solid rock a league in size were tied with a three-stranded rope and suspended above the head of one endowed with the stream-entry path, and if one strand were cut, it would hang by two; if two were cut, it would hang by one; and if that too were cut, it would remain in the sky like a cloud peak – yet even that would not create an obstacle to the fruit immediately following the path of that individual. This illustration is minor; the previous one is major. Not only does one standing on the stream-entry path keep the aeon stable, but those endowed with the other paths also keep it stable. Therefore, the Blessed One, gathering all that was taken below and not taken, along with those with rounded shoulders, established this teaching: 'All individuals endowed with the path are those who keep the aeon stable.'

18. Ariyaniddese – kilesehi ārakattā ariyā. Sadevakena lokena araṇīyattā ariyā. Ariyaṭṭho nāma parisuddhaṭṭhoti parisuddhattāpi ariyā. Sesā aparisuddhatāya anariyā.

18. In the explanation of 'noble' (ariya) – they are noble because they are far from defilements. They are noble because they are worthy of veneration by the world with its devas. The meaning of 'noble' is 'pure'; thus, they are noble because of their purity. The rest, being impure, are ignoble.

19. Sekkhaniddese – maggasamaṅgino maggakkhaṇe, phalasamaṅgino ca phalakkhaṇe, adhisīlasikkhādikā tissopi sikkhā sikkhantiyevāti sekkhā. Arahatā pana arahattaphalakkhaṇe tisso sikkhā sikkhitā. Puna tassa sikkhanakiccaṃ natthīti asekkhā. Iti satta ariyā sikkhantīti sekkhā. Khīṇāsavā aññassa santike sīlādīnaṃ sikkhitattā sikkhitaasekkhā nāma. Buddhapaccekabuddhā sayambhūtatāya asikkhitaasekkhā nāma. Sesapuggalā neva sikkhanti na sikkhitāti nevasekkhānāsekkhā.

19. In the explanation of "trainee" (sekkha) — those endowed with the path at the moment of the path, and those endowed with the fruit at the moment of the fruit, are trainees because they are still training in all three trainings of higher virtue, etc. But for the Arahant, at the moment of the fruit of arahantship, the threefold training has been fully trained. Since there is no further training to be done, they are "beyond training" (asekkha). Thus, the seven noble ones are called trainees (sekkhā) because they are still training. Those with destroyed taints are called "trained beyond training" (sikkhitaasekkhā) because they have trained in virtue, etc., under another. The Buddhas and Paccekabuddhas are called "untrained beyond training" (asikkhitaasekkhā) because they are self-enlightened. The remaining individuals neither train nor are trained, thus called "neither-trainee-nor-beyond-training" (nevasekkhānāsekkhā).

20. Tevijjaniddese – paṭhamaṃ pubbenivāsadibbacakkhuñāṇāni nibbattetvā pacchā arahattaṃ pattopi, paṭhamaṃ arahattaṃ patvā pacchā pubbenivāsadibbacakkhuñāṇanibbattakopi tevijjoyeva nāma. Suttantakathā pana pariyāyadesanā abhidhammakathā nippariyāyadesanāti imasmiṃ ṭhāne āgamanīyameva dhuraṃ. Tasmā paṭhamaṃ dve vijjā nibbattetvā pacchā arahattaṃ pattova idha adhippeto. Chaḷabhiññepi eseva nayo.

20. In the exposition of the Three Knowledges—one who first develops the knowledge of past lives and the divine eye, and afterwards attains arahantship; or one who first attains arahantship and afterwards develops the knowledge of past lives and the divine eye—is still called one with the Three Knowledges. However, Suttanta discourse is teaching by way of implication, while Abhidhamma discourse is teaching directly. In this connection, the authoritative tradition is what must be followed. Therefore, in this context, the intended meaning is one who first develops the two knowledges and afterwards attains arahantship. The same principle applies to one with the six superknowledges.

22. Sammāsambuddhaniddese [Pg.40] – pubbe ananussutesūti pacchimabhave saccappaṭivedhato pubbe aññassa kassaci santike assutapubbesu. Tato purimapurimesu pana bhavesu sabbaññubodhisattā buddhasāsane pabbajitvā tīṇi piṭakāni uggahetvā gatapaccāgatavattaṃ āruyha kammaṭṭhānaṃ anulomaṃ gotrabhuṃ āhacca ṭhapenti. Tasmā pacchimabhavasmiṃyeva anācariyakabhāvaṃ sandhāyetaṃ vuttaṃ. Tadā hi tathāgato pūritapāramittā aññassa santike sāmaṃ ananussutesu saṅkhatāsaṅkhatadhammesu ‘‘idaṃ dukkhaṃ…pe… ayaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā’’ti attapaccakkhena ñāṇena cattāri saccāni abhisambujjhati.

22. In the exposition of the Perfectly Enlightened One—"previously unheard of" means that in the final existence, prior to the penetration of the truths, they were not previously heard from anyone else. However, in previous existences, the Bodhisattas aspiring to omniscience, having gone forth in the dispensation of a Buddha, learned the three Piṭakas, undertook the practice of coming and going, cultivated meditation subjects in forward order, and having reached the change-of-lineage, established it. Therefore, this statement refers only to the final existence, intending the state of having no teacher. For then, the Tathāgata, by virtue of having fulfilled the perfections, by himself with direct personal knowledge in regard to conditioned and unconditioned phenomena previously unheard of from anyone else, awakens to the four truths: "This is suffering... This is the path leading to the cessation of suffering."

Tattha cāti tasmiñca catusaccasambodhisaṅkhāte arahattamagge. Sabbaññutaṃ pāpuṇāti balesu ca vasībhāvanti sabbaññutaññāṇañceva balesu ca ciṇṇavasībhāvaṃ pāpuṇāti. Buddhānañhi sabbaññutaññāṇassa ceva dasabalañāṇassa ca adhigamanato paṭṭhāya aññaṃ kātabbaṃ nāma natthi. Yathā pana ubhatosujātassa khattiyakumārassa abhisekappattito paṭṭhāya ‘idaṃ nāma issariyaṃ anāgata’nti na vattabbaṃ, sabbaṃ āgatameva hoti. Evameva buddhānaṃ arahattamaggassa āgamanato paṭṭhāya ‘ayaṃ nāma guṇo na āgato, na paṭividdho, na paccakkho’ti na vattabbo, sabbepi sabbaññuguṇā āgatā paṭividdhā paccakkhakatāva honti. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evaṃ pāramīpūraṇasiddhānubhāvena ariyamaggena paṭividdhasabbaññuguṇo puggalo sammāsambuddhoti vuccati.

Here, "and there" refers to the path of arahantship, which is the full enlightenment of the four truths. He attains omniscience and mastery over the powers—that is, he attains both the knowledge of omniscience and mastery over the powers perfected through long practice. For Buddhas, from the attainment of the knowledge of omniscience and the ten powers onward, there is nothing further to be done. Just as for a well-born khattiya prince, from the time of his consecration, it cannot be said, "This sovereignty is yet to come," for all has already come—so too for Buddhas, from the attainment of the path of arahantship onward, it cannot be said, "This quality has not yet come, been penetrated, or been directly experienced," for all the qualities of omniscience have come, been penetrated, and been made directly present. This is called—this very person, whose qualities of omniscience have been penetrated by the noble path through the power of the accomplishment of the perfections, is called a Perfectly Enlightened One.

23. Paccekabuddhaniddesepi – pubbe ananussutesūti pade pubbe vuttanayeneva attho veditabbo. Paccekabuddhopi hi pacchimabhave anācariyako attukkaṃsikañāṇeneva paṭividdhasacco sabbaññutaññāṇañceva balesu ca ciṇṇavasībhāvaṃ na pāpuṇāti.

23. In the exposition of the Paccekabuddha as well—in the phrase "previously unheard of," the meaning should be understood in the same way as previously explained. For a Paccekabuddha, in his final existence, without a teacher, realizes the truth through his own superior knowledge, but does not attain the knowledge of omniscience or mastery of the powers perfected through long practice.

24. Ubhatobhāgavimuttaniddese – aṭṭha vimokkhe kāyena phusitvā viharatīti aṭṭha samāpattiyo sahajātanāmakāyena paṭilabhitvā viharati. Paññāya cassa disvāti vipassanāpaññāya saṅkhāragataṃ, maggapaññāya cattāri saccāni passitvā cattāropi āsavā khīṇā honti. Ayaṃ vuccatīti [Pg.41] ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo ubhatobhāgavimutto nāmāti vuccati. Ayañhi dvīhi bhāgehi dve vāre vimuttoti ubhatobhāgavimutto. Tatrāyaṃ theravādo – tipiṭakacūḷanāgatthero tāva āha – ‘‘samāpattiyā vikkhambhanavimokkhena, maggena samucchedavimokkhena vimuttoti ubhatobhāgehi dve vāre vimutto’’ti. Tipiṭakamahādhammarakkhitatthero ‘‘nāmanissitako eso’’ti vatvā –

24. In the exposition of one liberated in both ways—"He dwells having touched the eight liberations with the body" means he attains and dwells in the eight attainments along with the co-arisen mental body. "And having seen with wisdom" means that having seen the conditioned formations with insight wisdom, and the four truths with path wisdom, his four taints are destroyed. This is called—such a person is called one liberated in both ways. For he is liberated by two parts, on two occasions, thus he is 'liberated in both ways.' Herein, this is the Theravāda view—first, the Elder Tipiṭaka Cūḷanāga said: "He is liberated by the suppression-liberation through the attainment and by the cutting-off-liberation through the path, thus liberated by both parts, on two occasions." The Elder Tipiṭaka Mahādhammarakkhita, saying "This is dependent on name," and then—

‘‘Accī yathā vātavegena khittā, (upasīvāti bhagavā;

)Atthaṃ paleti na upeti saṅkhaṃ;

Evaṃ munī nāmakāyā vimutto,Atthaṃ paleti na upeti saṅkha’’nti. (su. ni. 1080);

"Just as a flame, struck by the force of the wind, (Upasīva," said the Blessed One,) Goes to its end and cannot be reckoned; So too the sage, freed from the mental body, Goes to his end and cannot be reckoned." (Snp 1074)

Vatvā suttaṃ āharitvā ‘‘nāmakāyato ca rūpakāyato ca suvimuttattā ubhatobhāgavimutto’’ti āha. Tipiṭakacūḷābhayatthero panāha – ‘‘samāpattiyā vikkhambhanavimokkhena ekavāraṃ vimutto maggena samucchedavimokkhena ekavāraṃ vimuttoti ubhatobhāgavimutto’’ti. Ime pana tayopi therā paṇḍitā, ‘tiṇṇampi vāde kāraṇaṃ dissatī’ti tiṇṇampi vādaṃ tantiṃ katvā ṭhapayiṃsu.

Having recited the sutta, he said, "Because of being well-liberated from the mental body and the form body, he is liberated in both ways." The Elder Tipiṭakacūḷābhaya, however, said, "Liberated once through liberation by suppression with attainment, and liberated once through liberation by cutting off with the path—thus, he is liberated in both ways." These three elders were wise, and seeing reason in all three statements, they established all three views as the teaching.

Saṅkhepato pana arūpasamāpattiyā rūpakāyato vimutto, maggena nāmakāyato vimuttoti ubhohi bhāgehi vimuttattā ubhatobhāgavimutto. So catunnaṃ arūpasamāpattīnaṃ ekekato vuṭṭhāya saṅkhāre sammasitvā arahattaṃ pattānaṃ catunnaṃ, nirodhā vuṭṭhāya arahattaṃ pattassa anāgāmino ca vasena pañcavidho hoti. Tattha purimā cattāro samāpattisīsaṃ nirodhaṃ na samāpajjantīti pariyāyena ubhatobhāgavimuttā nāma. Aṭṭhasamāpattilābhī anāgāmī taṃ samāpajjitvā tato vuṭṭhāya vipassanaṃ vaḍḍhetvā arahattaṃ pattoti nippariyāyena ubhatobhāgavimuttaseṭṭho nāma. Nanu ca arūpāvacarajjhānampi upekkhācittekaggatāhi duvaṅgikaṃ rūpāvacaracatutthajjhānampi, tasmā tampi padaṭṭhānaṃ katvā arahattaṃ pattena ubhatobhāgavimuttena bhavitabbanti? Na bhavitabbaṃ. Kasmā? Rūpakāyato avimuttattā. Tañhi kilesakāyatova vimuttaṃ, na rūpakāyato; tasmā tato vuṭṭhāya arahattaṃ patto ubhatobhāgavimutto nāma na hoti[Pg.42]. Arūpāvacaraṃ pana nāmakāyato ca vimuttaṃ rūpakāyato cāti tadeva pādakaṃ katvā arahattaṃ patto ubhatobhāgavimutto hotīti veditabbo.

In brief, one is liberated from the form body through the formless attainments and liberated from the mental body through the path; thus, being liberated in both aspects, one is called 'liberated in both ways.' He is of five types: the four who attain arahantship by emerging from each of the four formless attainments and contemplating the formations, and the non-returner who attains arahantship by emerging from cessation. Herein, the first four, since they do not enter cessation, which is the peak of attainments, are called 'liberated in both ways' in a figurative sense. A non-returner who masters the eight attainments, enters cessation, emerges from it, develops insight, and attains arahantship is called the foremost 'liberated in both ways' in a literal sense. But is not the formless sphere jhāna also twofold, consisting of equanimity and one-pointedness, like the fourth jhāna of the form sphere? Therefore, should not one who attains arahantship based on that also be considered 'liberated in both ways'? No, it should not be so. Why? Because one is not liberated from the form body. That arahant is liberated from the body of defilements, not from the form body; thus, one who emerges from that and attains arahantship is not called 'liberated in both ways.' However, since the formless attainment entails liberation from the mental body and the form body, one who attains arahantship having made that very attainment the basis is to be understood as 'liberated in both ways'.

25. Paññāvimuttaniddese – paññāya vimuttoti paññāvimutto. So sukkhavipassako catūhi jhānehi vuṭṭhāya arahattaṃ pattā cattāro cāti pañcavidho hoti. Etesu hi ekopi aṭṭhavimokkhalābhī na hoti. Teneva na heva kho aṭṭha vimokkhetiādimāha. Arūpāvacarajjhānesu pana ekasmiṃ sati ubhatobhāgavimuttoyeva nāma hotīti.

25. In the exposition of one liberated by wisdom – one liberated by wisdom is called 'wisdom-liberated.' He is of five types: the dry-insight practitioner, and the four who attain arahantship having emerged from the four jhānas. Among these, not even one is a master of the eight liberations. Therefore, it is said, "not indeed the eight liberations," and so on. However, when one of the formless jhānas is present, he is simply called 'liberated in both ways'.

26. Kāyasakkhiniddese – ekacce āsavāti heṭṭhimamaggattayavajjhā. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo kāyasakkhīti vuccati. So hi phuṭṭhantaṃ sacchikarotīti kāyasakkhī. Jhānaphassaṃ paṭhamaṃ phusati, pacchā nirodhaṃ nibbānaṃ sacchikarotītipi kāyasakkhī. So sotāpattiphalaṭṭhaṃ ādiṃ katvā yāva arahattamaggaṭṭhā chabbidho hoti.

26. In the exposition of the bodily witness: 'Some taints' refers to those abandoned by the three lower paths. 'This is called' means that such a person is called a bodily witness. For he directly experiences the tangible; thus, a bodily witness. He first touches the contact of jhāna, and later realizes cessation, Nibbāna; thus, he is also a bodily witness. He is of six kinds, beginning from the one standing in the fruit of stream-entry up to the one standing in the path of arahantship.

27. Diṭṭhippattaniddese – idaṃ dukkhanti idaṃ dukkhaṃ, ettakaṃ dukkhaṃ, na ito uddhaṃ dukkhaṃ. Dukkhasamudayādīsupi eseva nayo. Yathābhūtaṃ pajānātīti ṭhapetvā taṇhaṃ pañcupādānakkhandhe ‘dukkhasacca’nti yāthāvasarasato pajānāti. Taṇhā pana dukkhaṃ janeti nibbatteti, pabhāveti, tato taṃ dukkhaṃ samudeti; tasmā naṃ ayaṃ ‘dukkhasamudayo’ti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti. Yasmā pana idaṃ dukkhañca samudayo ca nibbānaṃ patvā nirujjhanti vūpasammanti appavattiṃ gacchanti; tasmā naṃ ‘ayaṃ dukkhanirodho’ti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti. Ariyo pana aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, taṃ dukkhanirodhaṃ gacchati; tena taṃ ‘ayaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadā’ti yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti. Ettāvatā nānākkhaṇe saccavavatthānaṃ dassitaṃ. Idāni ekakkhaṇe dassetuṃ tathāgatappaveditātiādimāha. Tattha tathāgatappaveditāti mahābodhimaṇḍe nisīdatvā tathāgatena paṭividdhā viditā pākaṭīkatā. Dhammāti catusaccadhammā. Vodiṭṭhā hontīti sudiṭṭhā honti. Vocaritāti sucaritā. Tesu anena paññā suṭṭhu carāpitā hotīti attho. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo diṭṭhippattoti vuccati. Ayañhi diṭṭhantaṃ patto. ‘‘Dukkhā saṅkhārā, sukho nirodho’’ti ñāṇaṃ hoti[Pg.43]. Diṭṭhaṃ viditaṃ sacchikataṃ passitaṃ paññāyāti diṭṭhappatto. Ayampi kāyasakkhī viya chabbidhova hoti.

27. In the exposition of the one attained to view: 'This is suffering' means this is suffering, this much is suffering, there is no suffering beyond this. The same principle applies to the origin of suffering, and so forth. 'He understands as it actually is' means that, setting aside craving, he understands the five aggregates of clinging as the 'truth of suffering' according to their true nature. But craving generates suffering, produces it, brings it into being; from that, suffering originates. Therefore, he understands this as the 'origin of suffering' as it actually is. But because this suffering and its origin cease, subside, and come to non-occurrence upon attaining Nibbāna, he therefore understands this as the 'cessation of suffering' as it actually is. And the Noble Eightfold Path leads to that cessation of suffering; by this, he understands it as the 'path leading to the cessation of suffering' as it actually is. So far, the determination of the truths at different moments has been shown. Now, to show it at a single moment, it is said, 'proclaimed by the Tathāgata,' and so forth. Here, 'proclaimed by the Tathāgata' means penetrated, known, and made manifest by the Tathāgata while seated at the great Bodhi-maṇḍala. 'Dhammas' refers to the dhammas of the four truths. 'Clearly seen' means well-seen. 'Well practiced' means well-practiced. The meaning is that wisdom is made to function excellently in them by him. 'This is called' means that such a person is called one attained to view. For he has attained what is seen. The knowledge arises: 'Conditioned things are suffering, cessation is happiness.' He is one attained to view because he has attained that which is seen, known, realized, and perceived by wisdom. This one, like the bodily witness, is also of six kinds.

28. Saddhāvimuttaniddese – no ca kho yathā diṭṭhippattassāti yathā diṭṭhippattassa āsavā parikkhīṇā, na evaṃ saddhāvimuttassāti attho. Kiṃ pana nesaṃ kilesappahāne nānattaṃ atthīti? Natthi. Atha kasmā saddhāvimutto diṭṭhippattaṃ na pāpuṇātīti? Āgamanīyanānattena. Diṭṭhippato hi āgamanamhi kilese vikkhambhento appadukkhena appakasirena akilamantova vikkhambhetuṃ sakkoti. Saddhāvimutto pana dukkhena kasirena kilamanto hutvā vikkhambhetuṃ sakkoti, tasmā diṭṭhippattaṃ na pāpuṇāti. Apica nesaṃ paññāyapi nānattaṃ atthiyeva. Diṭṭhippattassa hi upari tiṇṇaṃ maggānaṃ vipassanāñāṇaṃ tikkhaṃ sūraṃ pasannaṃ hutvā vahati. Saddhāvimuttassa vipassanāñāṇaṃ no tikkhaṃ sūraṃ pasannaṃ hutvā vahati, tasmāpi so diṭṭhippattaṃ na pāpuṇāti.

28. In the exposition of the faith-liberated: 'But not as for one attained to view' means that the taints of the faith-liberated are not destroyed in the same way as those of one attained to view. Is there, then, a difference in the abandoning of their defilements? There is not. Why then does the faith-liberated not reach the level of one attained to view? Due to a difference in the way of progress. For one attained to view, while suppressing defilements in the course of progress, is able to suppress them with little pain, little effort, and without fatigue. The faith-liberated, however, is able to suppress them only with pain, effort, and fatigue; thus, he does not reach the level of one attained to view. Moreover, there is indeed a difference in their wisdom. For one attained to view, the insight-knowledge for the three higher paths flows sharply, heroically, and clearly. The insight-knowledge of the faith-liberated does not flow sharply, heroically, or clearly; for that reason also, he does not reach the level of one attained to view.

Yathā hi dvīsu taruṇesu sippaṃ dassentesu ekassa hatthe tikhiṇo asi, ekassa kuṇṭho. Tikhiṇena asinā kadalī chijjamānā saddaṃ na karoti. Kuṇṭhena asinā chijjamānā ‘kaṭakaṭā’ti saddaṃ karoti. Tattha tikhiṇena asinā saddaṃ akarontiyā eva kadaliyā chedanaṃ viya diṭṭhippattassa tiṇṇaṃ maggānaṃ vipassanāñāṇassa tikhiṇasūravippasannabhāvo. Kuṇṭhena asinā saddaṃ karontiyāpi kadaliyā chedanaṃ viya saddhāvimuttassa tiṇṇaṃ maggānaṃ vipassanāñāṇassa atikhiṇaasūraappasannabhāvo veditabbo. Imaṃ pana nayaṃ ‘no’ti paṭikkhipitvā, āgamanīyanānatteneva saddhāvimutto diṭṭhippattaṃ na pāpuṇātīti sanniṭṭhānaṃ kataṃ.

Just as when two young men are demonstrating their skill, one has a sharp sword in his hand, the other a blunt one. A banana tree being cut by the sharp sword makes no sound. The one being cut by the blunt sword makes a 'kaṭakaṭā' sound. Therein, the cutting of the banana tree by the sharp sword, which makes no sound, is like the sharp, heroic, and clear nature of the insight-knowledge of the three paths for one attained to view. The cutting of the banana tree by the blunt sword, which makes a sound, should be understood as being like the not-sharp, not-heroic, and not-clear nature of the insight-knowledge of the three paths for one liberated by faith. However, having rejected this reasoning with 'no,' the conclusion is made that the faith-liberated does not reach the one attained to view solely due to the difference in their way of progress.

Āgamaṭṭhakathāsu pana vuttaṃ – ‘‘etesu hi saddhāvimuttassa pubbabhāgamaggakkhaṇe saddahantassa viya okappentassa viya adhimuccantassa viya ca kilesakkhayo hoti. Diṭṭhippattassa pubbabhāgamaggakkhaṇe kilesacchedakañāṇaṃ adandhaṃ tikhiṇaṃ sūraṃ hutvā vahati. Tasmā yathā nāma atikhiṇena asinā kadaliṃ chindantassa chinnaṭṭhānaṃ na maṭṭhaṃ hoti, asi na sīghaṃ vahati, saddo suyyati, balavataro vāyāmo kātabbo hoti[Pg.44]; evarūpā saddhāvimuttassa pubbabhāgamaggabhāvanā. Yathā pana sunisiteneva asinā kadaliṃ chindantassa chinnaṭṭhānaṃ maṭṭhaṃ hoti, asi sīghaṃ vahati, saddo na suyyati, balavavāyāmakiccaṃ na hoti; evarūpā diṭṭhippattassa pubbabhāgamaggabhāvanā veditabbā’’ti. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo saddhāvimuttoti vuccati. Ayañhi saddahanto vimuttoti saddhāvimutto. Ayampi kāyasakkhī viya chabbidhova hoti.

But in the commentaries on the Āgamas, it is said: 'Among these, for one liberated by faith, at the moment of the preliminary path, the destruction of defilements occurs as if believing, as if approving, and as if resolving. For one attained to view, at the moment of the preliminary path, the knowledge that cuts off defilements proceeds unhesitatingly, sharply, and heroically. Therefore, just as when one cuts a banana tree with a blunt sword, the cut is not smooth, the sword does not move quickly, a sound is heard, and a stronger effort must be made—such is the development of the preliminary path for one liberated by faith. But just as when one cuts a banana tree with a well-sharpened sword, the cut is smooth, the sword moves swiftly, no sound is heard, and there is no need for strong effort—such should the development of the preliminary path for one attained to view be understood.' 'This is called' means that such a person is called one liberated by faith. For he is liberated while believing; thus, he is faith-liberated. This one, like the bodily witness, is also of six kinds.

29. Dhammānusārīniddese – paṭipannassāti iminā sotāpattimaggaṭṭho dassito. Adhimattanti balavaṃ. Paññaṃ vāhetīti paññāvāhī. Paññā imaṃ puggalaṃ vahatīti paññāvāhītipi vuttaṃ hoti. Paññāpubbaṅgamanti paññaṃ purecārikaṃ katvā. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo dhammānusārīti vuccati. So hi paññāsaṅkhātena dhammena sarati anussaratīti dhammānusārī. Sotāpattimaggaṭṭhassevetaṃ nāmaṃ. Phale pana patte diṭṭhippatto nāma hoti.

29. In the exposition of the Dhamma-follower: 'For one practicing' indicates one standing in the stream-entry path. 'Intense' means strong. 'He carries wisdom' means he is wisdom-led. It is also said that wisdom carries this person; thus, he is wisdom-led. 'With wisdom as the forerunner' means having made wisdom the precedent. 'This is called' means that such a person is called a Dhamma-follower. For he follows along with, recollects, the Dhamma, which is characterized by wisdom; thus, he is a Dhamma-follower. This is the name for one standing in the stream-entry path. But upon attaining the fruit, he is called one attained to view.

30. Saddhānusārīniddesepi – saddhaṃ vāhetīti saddhāvāhī. Saddhā imaṃ puggalaṃ vahatīti saddhāvāhītipi vuttameva. Saddhāpubbaṅgamanti saddhaṃ purecārikaṃ katvā. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo saddhānusārīti vuccati. So hi saddhāya sarati. Anussaratīti saddhānusārī. Sotāpattimaggaṭṭhassevetaṃ nāmaṃ. Phale pana patte saddhāvimutto nāma hoti. Lokuttaradhammañhi nibbattentānaṃ dve dhurāni nāma, dve abhinivesā nāma, dve sīsāni nāma. Tattha saddhādhuraṃ paññādhuranti – dve dhurāni nāma. Eko pana bhikkhu samathābhinivesena abhinivisati, eko vipassanābhinivesenāti – ime dve abhinivesā nāma. Eko ca matthakaṃ pāpuṇanto ubhatobhāgavimutto hoti, eko paññāvimuttoti – imāni dve sīsāni nāma. Ye keci hi lokuttaradhammaṃ nibbattenti, sabbe te ime dve dhamme dhuraṃ katvā imesu dvīsu ṭhānesu abhinivisitvā imehi dvīhi ṭhānehi vimuccanti. Tesu yo bhikkhu aṭṭhasamāpattilābhī paññaṃ dhuraṃ katvā samathavasena abhiniviṭṭho aññataraṃ arūpasamāpattiṃ padaṭṭhānaṃ katvā vipassanaṃ paṭṭhapetvā arahattaṃ pāpuṇāti, so sotāpattimaggakkhaṇe dhammānusārī nāma. Parato pana chasu ṭhānesu kāyasakkhī nāma. Arahattaphale patte ubhatobhāgavimutto nāma.

30. In the exposition of the faith-follower: 'He carries faith' means he is faith-led. It is also said that faith carries this person; thus, he is faith-led. 'With faith as the forerunner' means having made faith the precedent. 'This is called' means that such a person is called a faith-follower. For he follows by faith, recollects; thus, he is a faith-follower. This is the name for one standing in the stream-entry path. But upon attaining the fruit, he is called one liberated by faith. For those who bring about the supramundane Dhamma, there are what are called two leading principles, two resolutions, and two summits. Herein, the leading principle of faith and the leading principle of wisdom—these are the two leading principles. One monk resolves upon serenity, another resolves upon insight—these are the two resolutions. And one reaching the summit becomes liberated in both ways, and one becomes liberated by wisdom—these are the two summits. Indeed, all who bring about the supramundane Dhamma, having made these two qualities their leading principle and having resolved upon these two standpoints, are liberated by these two standpoints. Among them, that monk who is a gainer of the eight attainments, having taken wisdom as his leading principle, being resolved by way of serenity, having made one of the immaterial attainments the basis, establishes insight and attains arahantship—he is called a Dhamma-follower at the moment of the stream-entry path. But subsequently, in the six instances, he is called a bodily witness. Upon attaining the fruit of arahantship, he is called one liberated in both ways.

Aparo [Pg.45] paññameva dhuraṃ katvā vipassanāvasena abhiniviṭṭho suddhasaṅkhāre vā rūpāvacarajjhānesu vā aññataraṃ sammasitvā arahattaṃ pāpuṇāti, ayampi sotāpattimaggakkhaṇeyeva dhammānusārī nāma. Parato pana chasu ṭhānesu diṭṭhippatto nāma. Arahatte patte paññāvimutto nāma. Idha dve nāmāni apubbāni, tāni purimehi saddhiṃ pañca honti. Aparo aṭṭhasamāpattilābhī saddhaṃ dhuraṃ katvā samādhivasena abhiniviṭṭho aññataraṃ arūpasamāpattiṃ padaṭṭhānaṃ katvā vipassanaṃ paṭṭhapetvā arahattaṃ pāpuṇāti – ayaṃ sotāpattimaggakkhaṇe saddhānusārī nāma. Parato chasu ṭhānesu kāyasakkhīyeva nāma. Arahatte patte ubhatobhāgavimuttoyeva nāma. Idha ekameva nāmaṃ apubbaṃ. Tena saddhiṃ purimāni pañca cha honti. Aparo saddhameva dhuraṃ katvā vipassanāvasena abhiniviṭṭho suddhasaṅkhāre vā rūpāvacarajjhānesu vā aññataraṃ sammasitvā arahattaṃ pāpuṇāti. Ayampi sotāpattimaggakkhaṇe saddhānusārī nāma. Parato chasu ṭhānesu saddhāvimutto nāma. Arahatte patte paññāvimutto nāma. Idhāpi ekameva nāmaṃ apubbaṃ. Tena saddhiṃ purimāni cha satta honti. Ime satta puggalā loke aggadakkhiṇeyyā nāmāti.

Another, making wisdom his leading principle and devoting himself to insight, having contemplated either the bare formations or one of the form-realm jhānas, attains Arahantship. At the moment of the path of stream-entry, he is called a "Dhamma-follower." Subsequently, in the six stages, he is called "one attained to view." Upon attaining Arahantship, he is called "one liberated by wisdom." Here, two names are new, making five in total with the preceding ones. Another, who has gained the eight attainments, making faith his leading principle and devoting himself to concentration, making one of the formless attainments his basis, establishes insight and attains Arahantship. At the moment of the path of stream-entry, he is called a "faith-follower." Subsequently, in the six stages, he is called "a body-witness." Upon attaining Arahantship, he is called "one liberated in both ways." Here, only one name is new, making six in total with the preceding ones. Another, making faith his leading principle and devoting himself to insight, having contemplated either the bare formations or one of the form-realm jhānas, attains Arahantship. At the moment of the path of stream-entry, he is called a "faith-follower." Subsequently, in the six stages, he is called "one liberated by faith." Upon attaining Arahantship, he is called "one liberated by wisdom." Here too, only one name is new, making seven in total with the preceding ones. These seven persons are called the foremost of those worthy of offerings in the world.

31. Sattakkhattuparamaniddese – sattakkhattunti sattavāre. Sattakkhattuparamā bhavūpapatti attabhāvaggahaṇaṃ assa, tato paraṃ aṭṭhamaṃ bhavaṃ nādiyatīti sattakkhattuparamo. Sotāpanno hotīti ettha sototi ariyamaggo, tena samannāgato sotāpanno nāma. Yathāha –

31. In the exposition of 'one with a maximum of seven existences': 'Seven times' means seven occasions. For him, the taking up of existence, the grasping of individuality, is at most seven times; thereafter he does not take up an eighth existence. Thus, he is called 'one with a maximum of seven existences.' 'He is a stream-enterer'—here, 'stream' means the noble path; one endowed with that is called a stream-enterer. As it is said:

‘‘Soto sototi hidaṃ, sāriputta, vuccati. Katamo nu kho, sāriputta, sototi? Ayameva hi, bhante, ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo soto, seyyathidaṃ – sammādiṭṭhi…pe… sammāsamādhīti. Sotāpanno sotāpannoti, hidaṃ, sāriputta, vuccati. Katamo nu kho, sāriputta, sotāpannoti? Yo hi, bhante, iminā ariyena aṭṭhaṅgikena maggena samannāgato ayaṃ vuccati sotāpanno, svāyaṃ āyasmā evaṃnāmo evaṃgotto iti vā’’ti (saṃ. ni. 5.1001).

“‘Stream, stream,’ it is said, Sāriputta. What, Sāriputta, is the stream?” “Indeed, venerable sir, this Noble Eightfold Path is the stream, namely: right view … right concentration.” “‘Stream-enterer, stream-enterer,’ it is said, Sāriputta. What, Sāriputta, is a stream-enterer?” “Whoever, venerable sir, is endowed with this Noble Eightfold Path is called a stream-enterer, such as this venerable one of such a name and such a clan.”

Evaṃ [Pg.46] maggakkhaṇepi sotāpanno nāma hoti. Idha pana maggena phalassa nāmaṃ dinnanti phalakkhaṇe sotāpanno adhippeto.

Thus, even at the moment of the path, one is called a stream-enterer. Here, however, since the name for the fruit is given by way of the path, a stream-enterer at the moment of fruition is intended.

Avinipātadhammoti vinipātasaṅkhātaṃ apāyaṃ upapattivasena anāgamanasabhāvo. Niyatoti magganiyāmena niyato. Sambodhiparāyaṇoti bujjhanakabhāvaparāyaṇo. So hi paṭiladdhamaggena bujjhatīti sambodhiparāyaṇo. Upari tīhi maggehi avassaṃ bujjhissatīti sambodhiparāyaṇo. Deve ca manusse cāti devalokañca manussalokañca. Sandhāvitvā saṃsaritvāti paṭisandhivasena aparāparaṃ gantvā. Dukkhassantaṃ karotīti vaṭṭadukkhassa pariyantaṃ parivaṭumaṃ karoti. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo sattakkhattuparamo nāma vuccati. Ayaṃ pana kālena devalokassa kālena manussalokassa vasena missakabhavena kathitoti veditabbo.

“Not subject to falling away” means one whose nature it is not to return to the states of woe, called the lower realms, by way of rebirth. “Destined” means fixed by the certainty of the path. “Bound for enlightenment” means having awakening as his final goal. For he is to awaken by means of the path he has attained; thus he is bound for enlightenment. He is bound for enlightenment because he will certainly awaken by means of the three higher paths. “Among gods and humans” means in the divine realm and the human realm. “Wandering on and transmigrating” means going again and again by way of re-linking. “Makes an end of suffering” means he makes an end, a complete cessation, of the suffering of the round. “This is called” means this kind of person is called 'one with a maximum of seven existences.' It should be understood, however, that this is spoken of in terms of a mixed existence, at one time in the divine realm and at another time in the human realm.

32. Kolaṃkolaniddese – kulato kulaṃ gacchatīti kolaṃkolo. Sotāpattiphalasacchikiriyato hi paṭṭhāya nīce kule upapatti nāma natthi, mahābhogakulesuyeva nibbattatīti attho. Dve vā tīṇi vā kulānīti devamanussavasena dve vā tayo vā bhave. Iti ayampi missakabhaveneva kathito. Desanāmattameva cetaṃ – ‘dve vā tīṇi vā’ti. Yāva chaṭṭhabhavā saṃsarantopi pana kolaṃkolova hoti.

32. In the exposition of ‘kolaṅkola’—one who goes from family to family is called ‘kolaṅkola.’ From the realization of the fruit of stream-entry onwards, there is no rebirth in a low family; one is reborn only in wealthy families—this is the meaning. “Two or three families” means two or three existences, as gods or humans. Thus, this too is spoken of in terms of mixed existences. This is merely a designation—‘two or three.’ Even if one wanders until the sixth existence, one is still a ‘kolaṅkola.’

33. Ekabījiniddese – khandhabījaṃ nāma kathitaṃ. Yassa hi sotāpannassa ekaṃyeva khandhabījaṃ atthi, ekaṃ attabhāvaggahaṇaṃ, so ekabījī nāma. Mānusakaṃ bhavanti idaṃ panettha desanāmattameva. Devabhavaṃ nibbattetītipi pana vattuṃ vaṭṭatiyeva. Bhagavatā gahitanāmavaseneva cetāni etesaṃ nāmāni. Ettakaṃ ṭhānaṃ gato sattakkhattuparamo nāma hoti, ettakaṃ kolaṃkolo, ettakaṃ ekabījīti bhagavatā etesaṃ nāmaṃ gahitaṃ. Niyamato pana ayaṃ sattakkhattuparamo, ayaṃ kolaṃkolo, ayaṃ ekabījīti natthi.

33. In the exposition of ‘one-seeder’—the seed of the aggregates is spoken of. For a stream-enterer who has only one seed of the aggregates, one more grasping of individuality, is called a ‘one-seeder’. “Human existence” is merely a designation here. It is also proper to say that one produces rebirth in a divine existence. These names are simply terms taken by the Blessed One. The Blessed One took these names for them: one who has gone this far is called 'one with a maximum of seven existences,' this far 'a kolaṅkola,' this far 'a one-seeder'. But there is no fixed rule that this one is 'one with a maximum of seven existences,' this one is 'a kolaṅkola,' this one is 'a one-seeder'.

Ko [Pg.47] pana tesaṃ etaṃ pabhedaṃ niyametīti? Keci tāva therā ‘pubbahetu niyametī’ti vadanti, keci ‘paṭhamamaggo’, keci ‘upari tayo maggā’, keci ‘tiṇṇaṃ maggānaṃ vipassanā’ti. Tattha ‘pubbahetu niyametī’ti vāde ‘paṭhamamaggassa upanissayo kato nāma hoti, upari tayo maggā nirupanissayā uppannā’ti vacanaṃ āpajjati. ‘Paṭhamamaggo niyametī’ti vāde upari tiṇṇaṃ maggānaṃ niratthakatā āpajjati. ‘Upari tayo maggā niyamentī’ti vāde ‘aṭṭhamamagge anuppanneyeva upari tayo maggā uppannā’ti āpajjati. ‘Tiṇṇaṃ maggānaṃ vipassanā niyametī’ti vādo pana yujjati. Sace hi upari tiṇṇaṃ maggānaṃ vipassanā balavatī hoti, ekabījī nāma hoti; tato mandatarāya kolaṃkolo; tato mandatarāya sattakkhattuparamoti.

But who determines this distinction among them? Some elders say, “A prior cause determines it.” Some say, “The first path.” Others say, “The three higher paths.” And some say, “The insight into the three paths.” In the view that “a prior cause determines it,” the implication arises that “the first path has a supporting condition, while the three higher paths arise without a supporting condition.” In the view that “the first path determines,” the three higher paths become pointless. In the view that “the three higher paths determine,” it follows that “the three higher paths have arisen even before the eighth path has arisen.” However, the view that “the insight into the three paths determines” is reasonable. For if the insight into the three higher paths is strong, one is called a ‘one-seeder’; if somewhat weaker, a ‘kolaṅkola’; and if still weaker, 'one with a maximum of seven existences'.

Ekacco hi sotāpanno vaṭṭajjhāsayo hoti, vaṭṭābhirato, punappunaṃ vaṭṭasmiṃyeva vicarati sandissati. Anāthapiṇḍiko seṭṭhi, visākhā upāsikā, cūḷarathamahārathā devaputtā, anekavaṇṇo devaputto, sakko devarājā, nāgadatto devaputtoti ime hi ettakā janā vaṭṭajjhāsayā vaṭṭābhiratā ādito paṭṭhāya cha devaloke sodhetvā akaniṭṭhe ṭhatvā parinibbāyissanti, ime idha na gahitā. Na kevalañcime; yopi manussesuyeva sattakkhattuṃ saṃsaritvā arahattaṃ pāpuṇāti, yopi devaloke nibbatto devesuyeva sattakkhattuṃ aparāparaṃ saṃsaritvā arahattaṃ pāpuṇāti, imepi idha na gahitā. Missakabhavavaseneva panettha sattakkhattuparamakolaṃkolā mānusakabhavanibbattakoyeva ca ekabījī gahitoti veditabbo. Tattha ekeko dukkhāpaṭipadādivasena catubbidhabhāvaṃ āpajjati. Saddhādhureneva cattāro sattakkhattuparamā, cattāro kolaṃkolā, cattāro ekabījinoti dvādasa honti. Sace paññāya sakkā nibbattetuṃ, ‘ahaṃ lokuttaraṃ dhammaṃ nibbattessāmī’ti evaṃ paññaṃ dhuraṃ katvā sattakkhattuparamādibhāvaṃ pattāpi paṭipadāvasena dvādasevāti ime catuvīsati sotāpannā ihaṭṭhakanijjhānikavaseneva imasmiṃ ṭhāne kathitāti veditabbā.

For a certain stream-enterer has a tendency toward the round of existence, delights in the round, and repeatedly wanders and lingers in the round itself. The merchant Anāthapiṇḍika, the laywoman Visākhā, the devaputtas Cūḷaratha and Mahāratha, the devaputta Anekavaṇṇa, Sakka, king of the devas, and the devaputta Nāgadatta—these many people, inclined toward the round and delighting in it, will, after purifying the six deva worlds from the start, establish themselves in the Akaniṭṭha heaven and attain final Nibbāna. These are not included here. Not only these, but also one who, having wandered among humans seven times, attains Arahantship, or one who, having been reborn in the divine worlds, wanders among the devas again and again for seven existences and attains Arahantship—these too are not included here. It should be understood that here, by way of mixed existences, are included the 'one with a maximum of seven existences,' the 'kolaṅkola,' and only that 'one-seeder' who is reborn in the human realm. Among them, each attains a fourfold state by means of painful practice and so forth. With faith as their leading principle, there are four 'ones with a maximum of seven existences,' four 'kolaṅkolas,' and four 'one-seeders'—thus making twelve. And if, by making wisdom their leading principle with the thought, 'I will bring about the supramundane Dhamma,' they attain the state of 'one with a maximum of seven existences' and so forth, these too, by way of practice, are twelve. Thus, it should be understood that these twenty-four stream-enterers are discussed in this section by way of the classification of those who abide here.

34. Sakadāgāminiddese – paṭisandhivasena sakiṃ āgacchatīti sakadāgāmī. Sakidevāti ekavāraṃyeva. Imaṃ lokaṃ āgantvāti iminā pañcasu [Pg.48] sakadāgāmīsu cattāro vajjetvā ekova gahito. Ekacco hi idha sakadāgāmiphalaṃ patvā idheva parinibbāyati, ekacco idha patvā devaloke parinibbāyati, ekacco devaloke patvā tattheva parinibbāyati, ekacco devaloke patvā idhūpapajjitvā parinibbāyati – ime cattāropi idha na gahitā. Yo pana idha patvā devaloke yāvatāyukaṃ vasitvā puna idhūpapajjitvā parinibbāyati – ayaṃ ekova idha gahitoti veditabbo. Sesamettha yaṃ vattabbaṃ siyā taṃ sabbaṃ heṭṭhā dhammasaṅgahaṭṭhakathāyaṃ lokuttarakusalaniddese vuttameva. Imassa pana sakadāgāmino ekabījinā saddhiṃ kiṃ nānākaraṇanti? Ekabījissa ekāva paṭisandhi, sakadāgāmissa dve paṭisandhiyo – idaṃ nesaṃ nānākaraṇanti.

34. In the explanation of the Once-Returner—'He comes back once by way of rebirth,' thus he is called a once-returner. 'Only once' means just one time. 'Having come to this world'—by this, among the five kinds of once-returners, four are excluded, and only one is included here. For some, having attained the fruit of a once-returner here, attain final Nibbāna right here. Some, having attained it here, attain final Nibbāna in the deva world. Some, having attained it in the deva world, attain final Nibbāna right there. Some, having attained it in the deva world, are reborn here and then attain final Nibbāna—these four are not included here. But the one who, having attained it here, lives out their lifespan in the deva world and is then reborn here before attaining final Nibbāna—this one alone is included here. Whatever else should be said here has all been said below in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī commentary in the section on supramundane wholesome states. Now, what is the difference between this once-returner and the one-seeder? The one-seeder has only one rebirth, while the once-returner has two rebirths—this is their difference.

35. Anāgāminiddese – orambhāgiyānaṃ saṃyojanānanti oraṃ vuccati kāmadhātu. Yassa imāni pañca bandhanāni appahīnāni honti, so bhavagge nibbattopi gilitabaḷiso maccho viya dīghasuttakena pāde baddhakāko viya tehi bandhanehi ākaḍḍhiyamāno kāmadhātuyaṃyeva pavattatīti pañca bandhanāni orambhāgiyānīti vuccanti. Heṭṭhābhāgiyāni heṭṭhākoṭṭhāsikānīti attho. Parikkhayāti tesaṃ bandhanānaṃ parikkhayena. Opapātikoti upapātayoniko. Imināssa gabbhaseyyā paṭikkhittā. Tattha parinibbāyīti tattha suddhāvāsaloke parinibbāyitā. Anāvattidhammo tasmā lokāti paṭisandhiggahaṇavasena tasmā lokā idha anāvattanasabhāvo. Buddhadassanatheradassanadhammassavanānaṃ panatthāyassa āgamanaṃ anivāritaṃ. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evaṃvidho puggalo paṭisandhivasena puna anāgamanato anāgāmī nāma vuccati.

35. In the explanation of the Non-Returner: Regarding 'the lower fetters,' 'ora' is said to be the sense-sphere realm. For one who has not abandoned these five bonds, even if reborn in the highest existence, he is dragged back by those bonds—like a fish that has swallowed a baited hook or a crow with its foot tied by a long string—and continues in the sense-sphere realm. Thus, these five bonds are called 'the lower fetters.' This means they belong to the lower part, that is, they are of the lower portion. 'By the destruction' means by the destruction of those bonds. 'Spontaneously born' means born of spontaneous birth; by this, womb-birth is rejected for him. 'Attains final Nibbāna there' means he is one who attains final Nibbāna in that Pure Abode world. 'One whose nature is not to return from that world' means his nature is not to return here from that world by way of taking rebirth. However, his coming for the sake of seeing the Buddha, the elders, or hearing the Dhamma is not prevented. 'This is called' means this kind of person, on account of not coming again by way of rebirth, is called a 'Non-Returner'.

36. Antarāparinibbāyiniddese – upapannaṃ vā samanantarāti upapannasamanantarā vā hutvā. Appattaṃ vā vemajjhaṃ āyuppamāṇanti āyuppamāṇaṃ vemajjhaṃ appattaṃ vā hutvā ariyamaggaṃ sañjanetīti attho. Vāsaddavikappato pana vemajjhaṃ pattantipi attho veditabbo. Evaṃ tayo antarāparinibbāyino siddhā honti. Upariṭṭhimānaṃ saṃyojanānanti upari pañcannaṃ uddhambhāgiyasaṃyojanānaṃ aṭṭhannaṃ vā kilesānaṃ. Pahānāyāti etesaṃ pajahanatthāya [Pg.49] maggaṃ sañjaneti. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo āyuvemajjhassa antarāyeva parinibbāyanato antarāparinibbāyīti vuccati.

36. In the explanation of the One Who Attains Final Nibbāna in the Interval: 'Having been reborn or immediately after' means having been reborn or immediately thereafter. 'Before reaching the midpoint of the lifespan' means that he generates the noble path before having reached the midpoint of the lifespan. However, from the alternative indicated by the word 'or,' it should be understood that it can also mean having reached the midpoint. Thus, three types of those who attain final Nibbāna in the interval are established. Regarding 'the higher fetters,' this means the five higher fetters or the eight defilements above. 'For abandoning' means he generates the path for the sake of abandoning these. 'This is called' means this kind of person, because he attains final Nibbāna in the interval of the lifespan, is called an 'antarāparinibbāyī'.

37. Upahaccaparinibbāyiniddese – atikkamitvā vemajjhaṃ āyuppamāṇanti āyuppamāṇaṃ vemajjhaṃ atikkamitvā. Upahacca vā kālakiriyanti upagantvā kālakiriyaṃ. Āyukkhayassa āsanne ṭhatvāti attho. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo avihesu tāva kappasahassappamāṇassa āyuno pañcakappasatasaṅkhātaṃ vemajjhaṃ atikkamitvā chaṭṭhe vā kappasate sattamaṭṭhamanavamānaṃ vā aññatarasmiṃ dasameyeva vā kappasate ṭhatvā arahattaṃ patvā kilesaparinibbānena parinibbāyanato upahaccaparinibbāyīti vuccati.

37. In the explanation of the One Who Attains Final Nibbāna Upon Approach: 'Having surpassed the midpoint of the lifespan' means having surpassed the midpoint of the lifespan's measure. 'Or upon approaching death' means having come near to death. The meaning is standing near the exhaustion of the lifespan. 'This is called' means this kind of person—in the Aviha realm, for instance, having surpassed the midpoint, reckoned as five hundred eons, of a lifespan measuring a thousand eons, and then, while in the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth, or even the tenth hundred eons, having attained Arahantship—is called an 'upahaccaparinibbāyī' because he attains final Nibbāna by extinguishing the defilements.

38. Asaṅkhārasasaṅkhāraparinibbāyiniddesesu – asaṅkhārena appadukkhena adhimattapayogaṃ akatvāva kilesaparinibbānena parinibbānadhammoti asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī. Sasaṅkhārena dukkhena kasirena adhimattapayogaṃ katvāva kilesaparinibbānena parinibbāyanadhammoti sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī.

38. In the explanations of the asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī and sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī—one whose nature is to attain final Nibbāna through the extinction of defilements without effort, without suffering, and without making excessive exertion, is called an asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī. One whose nature is to attain final Nibbāna through the extinction of defilements with effort, with difficulty, and only after making excessive exertion, is called a sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī.

40. Uddhaṃsotaniddese – uddhaṃ vāhibhāvena uddhamassa taṇhāsotaṃ vaṭṭasotaṃ vāti uddhaṃsoto. Uddhaṃ vā gantvā paṭilabhitabbato uddhamassa maggasotanti uddhaṃsoto. Akaniṭṭhaṃ gacchatīti akaniṭṭhagāmī. Avihā cuto atappaṃ gacchatītiādīsu avihe kappasahassaṃ vasanto arahattaṃ pattuṃ asakkuṇitvā atappaṃ gacchati. Tatrāpi dve kappasahassāni vasanto arahattaṃ pattuṃ asakkuṇitvā sudassaṃ gacchati. Tatrāpi cattāri kappasahassāni vasanto arahattaṃ pattuṃ asakkuṇitvā sudassiṃ gacchati. Tatrāpi aṭṭha kappasahassāni vasanto arahattaṃ pattuṃ asakkuṇitvā akaniṭṭhaṃ gacchati. Tattha vasanto ariyamaggaṃ sañjanetīti attho.

40. In the explanation of the Upward-Streamer (uddhaṃsota): He is an 'uddhaṃsota' because his stream of craving, the stream of the cycle of existence, flows upwards. Or, he is an 'uddhaṃsota' because his path-stream is upwards, as it is to be attained by going upwards. 'Going to Akaniṭṭha' is why one is called an 'akaniṭṭhagāmī.' For example, a being dwelling in Avihā for a thousand eons and being unable to attain Arahantship goes to Atappa. There too, dwelling for two thousand eons and being unable to attain Arahantship, he goes to Sudassa. There too, dwelling for four thousand eons and being unable to attain Arahantship, he goes to Sudassī. There too, dwelling for eight thousand eons and being unable to attain Arahantship, he goes to Akaniṭṭha. The meaning is that, dwelling there, he generates the noble path.

Imesaṃ pana anāgāmīnaṃ pabhedajānanatthaṃ uddhaṃsoto akaniṭṭhagāmīcatukkaṃ veditabbaṃ. Tattha yo avihato paṭṭhāya cattāro devaloke sodhetvā akaniṭṭhaṃ gantvā parinibbāyati ayaṃ uddhaṃsoto akaniṭṭhagāmī nāma. Yo pana heṭṭhā tayo devaloke sodhetvā sudassīdevaloke ṭhatvā parinibbāyati – ayaṃ uddhaṃsoto, na akaniṭṭhagāmī nāma[Pg.50]. Yo pana ito akaniṭṭhameva gantvā parinibbāyati, ayaṃ na uddhaṃsoto, akaniṭṭhagāmī nāma. Yo pana heṭṭhā catūsu devalokesu tattha tattheva parinibbāyati, ayaṃ na uddhaṃsoto, na akaniṭṭhagāmī nāmāti. Evamete aṭṭhacattālīsa anāgāmino honti.

Now, to understand the distinctions among these Non-Returners, the fourfold classification of the Upward-Streamer (uddhaṃsota) and the One Who Goes to Akaniṭṭha (akaniṭṭhagāmī) should be understood. Among them, one who, beginning from Avihā, traverses the four deva-worlds and goes to Akaniṭṭha to attain final Nibbāna is called an 'uddhaṃsota akaniṭṭhagāmī.' One who traverses the three lower deva-worlds and, staying in the Sudassī deva-world, attains final Nibbāna is called an 'uddhaṃsota,' but not an 'akaniṭṭhagāmī.' One who goes from here directly to Akaniṭṭha and attains final Nibbāna is not an 'uddhaṃsota,' but is called an 'akaniṭṭhagāmī.' One who attains final Nibbāna right there in each of the four lower deva-worlds is neither an 'uddhaṃsota' nor an 'akaniṭṭhagāmī.' Thus, there are forty-eight types of Non-Returners.

Kathaṃ? Avihe tāva tayo antarāparinibbāyino, eko upahaccaparinibbāyī, eko uddhaṃsoto te asaṅkhāraparinibbāyino pañca, sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyino pañcāti dasa honti. Tathā atappāsudassāsudassīsūti cattāro dasakā cattālīsaṃ. Akaniṭṭhe pana uddhaṃsoto natthi. Tayo pana antarāparinibbāyino, eko upahaccaparinibbāyī. Te asaṅkhāraparinibbāyino cattāro, sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyino cattāroti aṭṭha. Evaṃ aṭṭhacattālīsaṃ honti.

How? In Avīha, there are three antarāparinibbāyīs, one upahaccaparinibbāyī, and one uddhaṃsota; these are five asaṅkhāraparinibbāyīs and five sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyīs, making ten. Similarly, in Atappa, Sudassa, and Sudassī, there are four sets of ten, totaling forty. In Akaniṭṭha, however, there is no uddhaṃsota. There are three antarāparinibbāyīs and one upahaccaparinibbāyī. These are four asaṅkhāraparinibbāyīs and four sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyīs, making eight. Thus, there are forty-eight in total.

Te sabbepi papaṭikopamāya dīpitā – divasaṃ santattānampi hi ārakaṇṭakavipphalikanakhacchedanānaṃ ayomukhe haññamāne papaṭikā uppajjitvāva nibbāyati – evarūpo paṭhamo antarāparinibbāyī veditabbo. Kasmā? Uppannasamanantarāva kilesaparinibbānena parinibbāyanato. Tato mahantatare ayomukhe haññamāne papaṭikā ākāsaṃ ullaṅghitvā nibbāyati – evarūpo dutiyo antarāparinibbāyī daṭṭhabbo. Kasmā? Vemajjhaṃ appatvā parinibbāyanato. Tato mahantatare ayomukhe haññamāne papaṭikā ākāsaṃ ullaṅghitvā nivattamānā pathaviyaṃ anupahaccatalā hutvā parinibbāyati – evarūpo tatiyo antarāparinibbāyī daṭṭhabbo. Kasmā? Vemajjhaṃ patvā anupahacca parinibbāyanato. Tato mahantatare ayomukhe haññamāne papaṭikā ākāsaṃ ullaṅghitvā pathaviyaṃ patitvā upahaccatalā hutvā nibbāyati – evarūpo upahaccaparinibbāyī veditabbo. Kasmā? Kālakiriyaṃ upagantvā āyugatiṃ khepetvā parinibbāyanato. Tato mahantatare ayomukhe haññamāne papaṭikā paritte tiṇakaṭṭhe patitvā taṃ parittaṃ tiṇakaṭṭhaṃ jhāpetvā nibbāyati – evarūpo asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī veditabbo. Kasmā? Appayogena lahusāya gatiyā parinibbāyanato. Tato mahantatare ayomukhe haññamāne papaṭikā vipule tiṇakaṭṭhapuñje patitvā taṃ vipulaṃ tiṇakaṭṭhapuñjaṃ jhāpetvā nibbāyati – evarūpo sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī veditabbo. Kasmā? Sappayogena alahusāya [Pg.51] gatiyā parinibbāyanato. Aparā mahantesu tiṇakaṭṭhapuñjesu patati, tattha mahantesu tiṇakaṭṭhapuñjesu jhāyamānesu vītaccitaṅgāro vā jālā vā uppatitvā kammārasālaṃ jhāpetvā gāmanigamanagararaṭṭhaṃ jhāpetvā samuddantaṃ patvā nibbāyati – evarūpo uddhaṃsoto akaniṭṭhagāmī daṭṭhabbo. Kasmā? Anekabhavabījavipphāraṃ phussa phussa byantīkatvā parinibbāyanato. Yasmā pana ārakaṇṭakādibhedaṃ khuddakampi mahantampi ayokapālameva, tasmā sutte sabbavāresu ayokapālantveva vuttaṃ (a. ni. 7.55). Yathāha –

All these are illustrated by the simile of sparks. For even when struck from an iron pan that has been heated all day, a spark arises and is immediately extinguished—such is to be understood as the first antarāparinibbāyī. Why? Because they attain Nibbāna by the extinction of defilements immediately upon arising. Then, when struck from a larger iron pan, a spark leaps into the air and is extinguished—such is to be seen as the second antarāparinibbāyī. Why? Because they attain Nibbāna without reaching the midpoint of their lifespan. Then, when struck from an even larger iron pan, a spark leaps into the air, turns back, and is extinguished without striking the ground—such is to be seen as the third antarāparinibbāyī. Why? Because they attain Nibbāna having reached the midpoint but without striking the ground. Then, when struck from a still larger iron pan, a spark leaps into the air, falls to the ground, strikes the ground, and then is extinguished—such is to be understood as the upahaccaparinibbāyī. Why? Because they attain Nibbāna having reached the time of death and exhausted their lifespan. Then, when struck from an even larger iron pan, a spark falls onto a small pile of grass or sticks, burns that small pile, and then is extinguished—such is to be understood as the asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī. Why? Because they attain Nibbāna with little exertion and swift progress. Then, when struck from a still larger iron pan, a spark falls onto a large pile of grass or sticks, burns that large pile, and then is extinguished—such is to be understood as the sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī. Why? Because they attain Nibbāna with exertion and slow progress. Another spark falls onto even larger piles of grass or sticks, and while those great piles are burning, a glowing ember or flame leaps up, burns the blacksmith’s workshop, burns villages, towns, cities, and districts, reaches the ocean’s edge, and then is extinguished—such is to be seen as the uddhaṃsoto akaniṭṭhagāmī. Why? Because they attain Nibbāna having exhausted the proliferation of seeds of many existences, one by one. Since the various kinds of iron objects, whether small or large, are essentially an iron pan, therefore in the Sutta, in all instances, it is simply called an 'iron pan' (A. Ni. 7.55). As it is said—

‘‘Idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu evaṃ paṭipanno hoti – ‘no cassa, no ca me siyā, na bhavissati, na me bhavissati, yadatthi yaṃ bhūtaṃ, taṃ pajahāmī’’’ti upekkhaṃ paṭilabhati. So bhave na rajjati, sambhave na rajjati, atthuttari padaṃ santaṃ sammappaññāya passati. Tañca khvassa padaṃ na sabbena sabbaṃ sacchikataṃ hoti. Tassa na sabbena sabbaṃ mānānusayo pahīno hoti, na sabbena sabbaṃ bhavarāgānusayo pahīno hoti, na sabbena sabbaṃ avijjānusayo pahīno hoti. So pañcannaṃ orambhāgiyānaṃ saṃyojanānaṃ parikkhayā antarāparinibbāyī hoti. Seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, divasaṃ santatte ayokapāle haññamāne papaṭikā nibbattitvā nibbāyeyya; evameva kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhu evaṃ paṭipanno hoti – no cassa…pe… antarāparinibbāyī hoti.

Here, monks, a monk practices thus: 'May it not be, may it not be mine; it will not be, it will not be mine; what exists, what has come to be, that I abandon.' Thus he attains equanimity. He does not delight in being, he does not delight in becoming. He sees with right wisdom the supreme peaceful state, yet that state is not fully realized by him in every respect. Not all of his underlying tendency to conceit is abandoned in every respect, not all of his underlying tendency to craving for being is abandoned in every respect, not all of his underlying tendency to ignorance is abandoned in every respect. With the destruction of the five lower fetters, he is an antarāparinibbāyī. Just as, monks, when a red-hot iron pan is struck during the day, a spark arises and is extinguished; in the same way, monks, a monk practices thus: 'May it not be...' and is an antarāparinibbāyī.

‘‘Idha pana, bhikkhave, bhikkhu evaṃ paṭipanno hoti – no cassa…pe… antarāparinibbāyī hoti. Seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, divasaṃ santatte ayokapāle haññamāne papaṭikā nibbattitvā uppatitvā nibbāyeyya; evameva kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhu evaṃ paṭipanno hoti – no cassa…pe… antarāparinibbāyī hoti.

Here, monks, a monk practices thus: 'May it not be...' and is an antarāparinibbāyī. Just as, monks, when a red-hot iron pan is struck during the day, a spark arises, flies up, and is extinguished; in the same way, monks, a monk practices thus: 'May it not be...' and is an antarāparinibbāyī.

‘‘Idha pana, bhikkhave, bhikkhu evaṃ paṭipanno hoti – no cassa…pe… antarāparinibbāyī hoti. Seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, divasaṃ santatte ayokapāle haññamāne papaṭikā nibbattitvā uppatitvā anupahacca [Pg.52] talaṃ nibbāyeyya; evameva kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhu evaṃ paṭipanno hoti – no cassa…pe… antarāparinibbāyī hoti.

Here, monks, a monk practices thus: 'May it not be...' and is an antarāparinibbāyī. Just as, monks, when a red-hot iron pan is struck during the day, a spark arises, flies up, and is extinguished without striking the ground; in the same way, monks, a monk practices thus: 'May it not be...' and is an antarāparinibbāyī.

‘‘Idha pana, bhikkhave, bhikkhu evaṃ paṭipanno hoti – no cassa…pe… upahaccaparinibbāyī hoti. Seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, divasaṃ santatte ayokapāle haññamāne papaṭikā nibbattitvā uppatitvā upahacca talaṃ nibbāyeyya; evameva kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhu evaṃ paṭipanno hoti – no cassa…pe… upahaccaparinibbāyī hoti.

Here, monks, a monk practices thus: 'May it not be...' and is an upahaccaparinibbāyī. Just as, monks, when a red-hot iron pan is struck during the day, a spark arises, flies up, strikes the ground, and is extinguished; in the same way, monks, a monk practices thus: 'May it not be...' and is an upahaccaparinibbāyī.

‘‘Idha pana, bhikkhave, bhikkhu evaṃ paṭipanno hoti – no cassa…pe… parikkhayā asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti. Seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, divasaṃ santatte ayokapāle haññamāne papaṭikā nibbattitvā uppatitvā paritte tiṇapuñje vā kaṭṭhapuñje vā nipateyya, sā tattha aggimpi janeyya, dhūmampi janeyya, aggimpi janetvā dhūmampi janetvā tameva parittaṃ tiṇapuñjaṃ vā kaṭṭhapuñjaṃ vā pariyādiyitvā anāhārā nibbāyeyya; evameva kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhu evaṃ paṭipanno hoti – no cassa…pe… parikkhayā asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti.

Here, monks, a monk practices thus: 'May it not be...' and, with the destruction of the fetters, is an asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī. Just as, monks, when a red-hot iron pan is struck during the day, a spark arises, flies up, and lands on a small heap of grass or wood. There, it may produce fire and smoke, and after producing fire and smoke, it consumes that small heap of grass or wood, and, being without fuel, is extinguished; in the same way, monks, a monk practices thus: 'May it not be...' and, with the destruction of the fetters, is an asaṅkhāraparinibbāyī.

‘‘Idha pana, bhikkhave, bhikkhu evaṃ paṭipanno hoti – no cassa…pe… sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti. Seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, divasaṃ santatte ayokapāle haññamāne papaṭikā nibbattitvā uppatitvā vipule tiṇapuñje vā kaṭṭhapuñje vā nipateyya, sā tattha aggimpi janeyya…pe… tameva vipulaṃ tiṇapuñjaṃ vā kaṭṭhapuñjaṃ vā pariyādiyitvā anāhārā nibbāyeyya; evameva kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhu evaṃ paṭipanno hoti – no cassa…pe… sasaṅkhāraparinibbāyī hoti.

Here, monks, a monk practices thus: 'May it not be...' and is one who attains final Nibbāna with exertion. Just as, monks, when a red-hot iron pan is struck during the day, a spark arises, flies up, and falls on a large heap of grass or wood, it might produce fire there... and after consuming that large heap of grass or wood, being without fuel, it would be extinguished; in the same way, monks, a monk practices thus: 'May it not be...' and is one who attains final Nibbāna with exertion.

‘‘Idha pana, bhikkhave, bhikkhu evaṃ paṭipanno hoti – no cassa…pe… parikkhayā uddhaṃsoto hoti akaniṭṭhagāmī. Seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, divasaṃ santatte ayokapāle haññamāne papaṭikā nibbattitvā uppatitvā mahante tiṇapuñje vā kaṭṭhapuñje vā nipateyya, sā tattha aggimpi janeyya…pe… tameva mahantaṃ tiṇapuñjaṃ vā kaṭṭhapuñjaṃ vā pariyādiyitvā gacchampi daheyya, dāyampi daheyya[Pg.53], gacchampi dahitvā dāyampi dahitvā haritantaṃ vā pathantaṃ vā selantaṃ vā udakantaṃ vā ramaṇīyaṃ vā bhūmibhāgaṃ āgamma anāhārā nibbāyeyya; evameva kho, bhikkhave, bhikkhu evaṃ paṭipanno hoti – no cassa…pe… parikkhayā uddhaṃsoto hoti akaniṭṭhagāmī’’ti (a. ni. 7.55).

Here, monks, a monk practices thus: 'May it not be...' and, with the destruction of the five lower fetters, is an upstream-bound one, going to the Akaniṭṭha realm. Just as, monks, when a red-hot iron pan is struck during the day, a spark arises, flies up, and lands on a great heap of grass or wood. There, it may produce fire... and after consuming that great heap of grass or wood, it may burn up the undergrowth or the forest. Having burned up the undergrowth or the forest, it may reach the edge of a green area, a road, a rocky place, a watery place, or a delightful stretch of land, and there, being without fuel, it would be extinguished; in the same way, monks, a monk practices thus: 'May it not be...' and, with the destruction of the five lower fetters, is an upstream-bound one, going to the Akaniṭṭha realm.

41-44. Sotāpattiphalasacchikiriyāya paṭipannādiniddesā uttānatthāva. Ayaṃ vuccati puggalo arahāti ettha pana dvādasa arahanto veditabbā. Kathaṃ? Tayo hi vimokkhā – suññato, animitto, appaṇihitoti. Tattha suññatavimokkhena vimuttakhīṇāsavo paṭipadāvasena catubbidho hoti; tathā animittaappaṇihitavimokkhehīti – evaṃ dvādasa arahanto veditabbā. Iti ime dvādasa arahanto viya dvādaseva sakadāgāmino, catuvīsati sotāpannā, aṭṭhacattālīsa anāgāminoti ettakā puggalā ito muccitvā bahiddhā nuppajjanti, imasmiññeva sabbaññubuddhasāsane uppajjantīti.

41-44. The exposition of those practicing for the realization of the fruit of stream-entry and so forth is clear in meaning. But concerning "this person is called an arahant," here twelve arahants should be understood. How? There are three liberations: liberation through emptiness, liberation through signlessness, and liberation through wishlessness. Among these, a taint-destroyed one liberated through the liberation of emptiness is fourfold according to the mode of practice; similarly for the liberations of signlessness and wishlessness—thus twelve arahants should be understood. Thus, just as there are these twelve arahants, so too there are twelve once-returners, twenty-four stream-enterers, and forty-eight non-returners. So many persons, having been freed from here, are not produced elsewhere but are produced only in this dispensation of the Omniscient Buddha.

Ekakaniddesavaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Exposition of Singles.

2. Dukaniddesavaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Exposition of Pairs.

45. Dukaniddese kodhanoti kujjhanasīlo mahākodho. Evaṃ puggalaṃ pucchitvāpi dhammena puggalaṃ dassetuṃ tattha katamo kodhotiādimāha. Upanāhīniddesādīsupi eseva nayo. Kodho kujjhanātiādīni heṭṭhā vuttatthāneva. Tathā upanāhīniddesādīsu pubbakālaṃ kodhotiādīni. Ayaṃ kodho appahīnoti ayaṃ ettako kodho vikkhambhanappahānena vā tadaṅgappahānena vā samucchedappahānena vā appahīno. Parato upanāhādīsupi eseva nayo.

45. In the exposition of the pairs, "one who is angry" means one of a wrathful nature, greatly angry. Thus, even when asked about such a person, to show the person in terms of the Dhamma, it is said, "Here, what is anger?" and so on. The same method applies in the expositions on resentment and so forth. "Anger, wrath," and so on have the meanings stated previously. Likewise, in the expositions on resentment and so on, "formerly, anger" and so forth. "This anger is not abandoned" means this much anger has not been abandoned by abandonment through suppression, by abandonment by substitution, or by abandonment through eradication. The same method applies to resentment and so on that follow.

53. Ahirikaniddesādīsu – iminā ahirikenāti iminā evaṃpakārena ahirikadhammena samannāgato. Iminā anottappenātiādīsupi eseva nayo.

53. In the expositions on shamelessness and so forth, "with this shamelessness" means endowed with such a quality of shamelessness. The same principle applies to "with this lack of moral dread" and so on.

63. Ajjhattasaṃyojanoti [Pg.54] ajjhattabandhano. Bahiddhāsaṃyojanoti bahiddhābandhano. Te ubhopi vacchakasālūpamāya dīpetabbā. Vacchakasālāya hi anto baddho antoyeva sayitavacchako viya idhaṭṭhakasotāpannasakadāgāmino. Tesañhi bandhanampi idheva, sayampi idheva. Anto baddho pana bahi sayitavacchako viya rūpārūpabhave sotāpannasakadāgāmino. Tesañhi bandhanameva idha, sayaṃ pana brahmaloke ṭhitā. Bahi baddho bahi sayitavacchako viya rūpārūpabhave anāgāmī. Tassa hi bandhanampi bahiddhā, sayampi bahiddhāva. Bahi baddho pana antosayitavacchako viya idhaṭṭhakaanāgāmī. Tassa hi bandhanaṃ rūpārūpabhavesu, sayaṃ pana idha ṭhito.

63. "Internal fetter" means internal bondage. "External fetter" means external bondage. Both should be illustrated by the simile of the calf pen. Just as a calf tied inside the pen lies inside, so too with stream-enterers and once-returners established here. For them, the bondage is here, and they themselves are here. But one tied inside yet lying down outside is like stream-enterers and once-returners in the realms of form and the formless realms. For them, bondage is here, but they themselves are in the Brahma realms. One tied outside yet lying down outside is like non-returners in the realms of form and the formless realms. For them, bondage is external, and they themselves are external. One tied outside yet lying down inside is like non-returners established here. For them, bondage is in the realms of form and the formless realms, but they themselves are here.

65. Akkodhananiddesādīsu – pahīnoti vikkhambhanappahānena vā, tadaṅgappahānena vā, samucchedappahānena vā pahīno.

65. In the expositions on non-anger and so forth, "abandoned" means abandoned by suppression, by abandonment by substitution, or by eradication.

83. Dullabhaniddese – dullabhāti na sulabhā. Pubbakārīti paṭhamameva kārako. Katavedīti kataṃ vedeti, viditaṃ pākaṭaṃ karoti. Te agāriyānagāriyehi dīpetabbā. Agāriyesu hi mātāpitaro pubbakārino nāma. Puttadhītaro pana mātāpitaro paṭijaggantā abhivādanādīni tesaṃ kurumānā katavedino nāma. Anagāriyesu ācariyupajjhāyā pubbakārino nāma. Antevāsikasaddhivihārikā ācariyupajjhāye paṭijaggantā abhivādanādīni tesaṃ kurumānā katavedino nāma. Tesaṃ āvibhāvatthāya upajjhāyaposakasoṇattherādīnaṃ vatthūni kathetabbāni.

83. In the exposition on the hard to find, "hard to find" means not easy to find. "One who does good first" means one who is the first to act. "One who is grateful" means one who makes known what has been done, making it evident. These should be illustrated with reference to householders and the homeless. Among householders, parents are called those who do good first. Sons and daughters who attend to their parents, performing acts of reverence and so forth for them, are called grateful ones. Among the homeless, teachers and preceptors are called those who do good first. Resident disciples and co-residents who attend to their teachers and preceptors, performing acts of reverence and so forth for them, are called grateful ones. To make this clear, stories should be told, such as those of Elder Soṇa who supported his preceptor.

Aparo nayo – parena akateyeva upakāre attani kataṃ upakāraṃ anapekkhitvā kārako pubbakārī, seyyathāpi mātāpitaro ceva ācariyupajjhāyā ca. So dullabho; sattānaṃ taṇhābhibhūtattā. Parena katassa upakārassa anurūpappavattiṃ attani kataṃ upakāraṃ upakārato jānanto, vediyanto, kataññukatavedī. Seyyathāpi mātāpituācariyupajjhāyesu sammā paṭipanno. Sopi dullabho; sattānaṃ avijjābhibhūtattā.

Another way: one who acts first is a doer who helps without expecting a service done to oneself, even when no service has been done by another, just as parents, teachers, and preceptors. Such a person is rare, because beings are overwhelmed by craving. A grateful and thankful person is one who knows and acknowledges a service done to them as a service, and whose conduct is in accordance with the service done by another. Just as one who conducts oneself properly towards parents, teachers, and preceptors. That person too is rare, because beings are overwhelmed by ignorance.

Apica – akāraṇavacchalo pubbakārī, sakāraṇavacchalo kataññukatavedī. ‘Karissati me’ti evamādikāraṇanirapekkhakiriyo pubbakārī. ‘Karissati [Pg.55] me’ti evamādikāraṇasāpekkhakiriyo kataññukatavedī. Tamojotiparāyaṇo pubbakārī, jotijotiparāyaṇo kataññukatavedī. Desetā pubbakārī, paṭipajjitā kataññukatavedī. Sadevake loke arahaṃ sammāsambuddho pubbakārī, ariyasāvako kataññukatavedīti. Dukanipātaṭṭhakathāyaṃ (a. ni. aṭṭha. 2.2.120) pana – ‘‘‘pubbakārī’ti paṭhamaṃ upakārassa kārako, ‘kataññukatavedī’ti tena kataṃ ñatvā pacchā kārako. Tesu pubbakārī iṇaṃ demīti saññaṃ karoti, pacchākārako ‘iṇaṃ jīrāpemī’ti saññaṃ karotī’’ti ettakameva vuttaṃ.

Moreover, one who is affectionate without a reason is a benefactor, while one who is affectionate with a reason is grateful and thankful. The benefactor is one whose action is independent of such reasons as, 'They will do something for me.' The grateful and thankful one is one whose action is dependent on such reasons as, 'They will do something for me.' The benefactor is one whose destination is light from darkness, while the grateful and thankful one is one whose destination is light from light. The benefactor is the teacher, while the practitioner is grateful and thankful. In the world with its gods, the Arahant, the Perfectly Self-Enlightened One, is the benefactor, while the noble disciple is grateful and thankful. But in the commentary to the Book of Twos (Aṅguttara Nikāya Aṭṭhakathā 2.2.120) it is said: “'A benefactor' is one who first performs a helpful act; 'one who is grateful and thankful' is one who, knowing what was done, acts afterwards. Among them, the benefactor has the perception, 'I am giving a loan,' while the one who acts afterwards has the perception, 'I am paying off the loan.'” Only this much is said.

84. Duttappayaniddese – duttappayāti atappayā, na sakkā kenaci tappetuṃ. Yo hi upaṭṭhākakulaṃ vā ñātikulaṃ vā nissāya vasamāno cīvare jiṇṇe tehi dinnaṃ cīvaraṃ nikkhipati, na paribhuñjati. Punappunaṃ dinnampi gahetvā nikkhipateva. Yo ca teneva nayena laddhaṃ laddhaṃ vissajjeti parassa deti. Punappunaṃ laddhampi tatheva karoti. Ime dve puggalā sakaṭehipi paccaye upanentena tappetuṃ na sakkāti duttappayā nāma.

84. In the explanation of 'Hard to Satisfy': 'Hard to satisfy' means insatiable; they cannot be satisfied by anyone. For instance, there is one who, living in dependence on a supporter's family or a relative's family, when his robe is worn out, puts aside the robe given by them and does not use it. Even when given it repeatedly, he takes it and just puts it aside. And there is another who, in the same way, gives away whatever he has received, offering it to others. Even when receiving things repeatedly, he does the same. These two persons, even when requisites are brought to them by the cartload, cannot be satisfied—thus they are called 'hard to satisfy.'

85. Sutappayaniddese – na vissajjetīti attano akatvā parassa na deti. Atireke pana sati na nikkhipati parassa deti. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – yo pana bhikkhu upaṭṭhākakulā vā ñātikulā vā jiṇṇacīvaro sāṭakaṃ labhitvā cīvaraṃ katvā paribhuñjati, na nikkhipati; aggaḷaṃ datvā pārupantopi puna diyyamāne sahasā na paṭiggaṇhāti. Yo ca laddhaṃ laddhaṃ attanā paribhuñjati, paresaṃ na deti. Ime dvepi sukhena sakkā tappetunti sutappayā nāmāti.

85. In the explanation of 'easy to satisfy': 'He does not give it away' means he does not give to another what he has not made for his own use. But when there is an excess, he does not put it aside; he gives it to another. This is what is said: There is a monk whose robe is worn out who, having received a cloth from a supporter's family or a relative's family, makes it into a robe and uses it; he does not put it aside. Even while wearing it fastened, if another is offered, he does not accept it hastily. And there is another person who uses for himself whatever he receives and does not give it to others. These two persons can be satisfied with ease, thus they are called 'easy to satisfy'.

86. Āsavāti kilesā. Na kukkuccāyitabbaṃ kukkuccāyatīti na kukkuccāyitabbayuttakaṃ kukkuccāyati. Sūkaramaṃsaṃ labhitvā acchamaṃsanti kukkuccāyati, migamaṃsaṃ, labhitvā dīpimaṃsanti kukkuccāyati. Kāle santeyeva ‘kālo natthī’ti, appavāretvāva ‘pavāritosmī’ti, patte rajasmiṃ apatiteyeva ‘patita’nti, attānaṃ uddissa macchamaṃse akateyeva ‘maṃ uddissa kata’nti kukkuccāyati. Kukkuccāyitabbaṃ na kukkuccāyatīti kukkuccāyitabbayuttakaṃ na kukkuccāyati. Acchamaṃsaṃ labhitvā sūkaramaṃsanti na [Pg.56] kukkuccāyati…pe… attānaṃ uddissa macchamaṃse kate ‘maṃ uddissa kata’nti na kukkuccāyati. Aṅguttaraṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana – ‘‘‘na kukkuccāyitabba’nti saṅghabhogassa apaṭṭhapanaṃ avicāraṇaṃ na kukkuccāyitabbaṃ nāma, taṃ kukkuccāyati. ‘Kukkuccāyitabba’nti tasseva paṭṭhapanaṃ vicāraṇaṃ, taṃ na kukkuccāyatī’’ti ettakameva vuttaṃ. Imesanti imesaṃ dvinnaṃ puggalānaṃ subhūmiyaṃ tiṇalatādīni viya rattimpi divāpi āsavā vaḍḍhantiyeva. Sukkapakkhe kappiyamaṃsaṃ labhitvā kappiyamaṃsantveva gaṇhanto na kukkuccāyitabbaṃ na kukkuccāyati nāmāti iminā nayena attho veditabbo.

86. `Āsavas` means defilements. 'He feels remorse where one should not feel remorse' means he feels remorse about something that is not a matter for remorse. Having received pork, he feels remorse, thinking it is bear meat; having received deer meat, he feels remorse, thinking it is leopard meat. When it is the proper time, he thinks, 'It is not the proper time.' Without having been invited to take more, he thinks, 'I have been invited.' When dust has not fallen into his bowl, he thinks, 'It has fallen.' When fish and meat have not been prepared specifically for him, he feels remorse, thinking, 'It was prepared for me.' 'He does not feel remorse where one should feel remorse' means he does not feel remorse about something that is a matter for remorse. Having received bear meat, he does not feel remorse, thinking it is pork... and so on... When fish and meat have been prepared specifically for him, he does not feel remorse, thinking, 'It was prepared for me.' But in the commentary to the Aṅguttara Nikāya it is said: “'What one should not be remorseful about' refers to not setting up or not investigating the Saṅgha's property; this is something one should not be remorseful about, but he feels remorse. 'What one should be remorseful about' refers to the very act of setting it up and investigating it; this is something one should be remorseful about, but he does not feel remorse.” Only this much is said. For these two persons, the āsavas grow day and night, like grass and vines in fertile soil. The meaning should be understood by this method: for instance, one who, having received allowable meat during the bright fortnight, takes it as just allowable meat, is called 'one who is not remorseful about what is not a matter for remorse'.

88. Hīnādhimuttoti hīnajjhāsayo. Dussīloti nissīlo. Pāpadhammoti lāmakadhammo.

88. One with a low inclination means one with a base disposition. An immoral one means one without morality. One of evil qualities means one of base qualities.

89. Paṇītādhimuttoti paṇītajjhāsayo. Kalyāṇadhammoti bhaddakadhammo, sucidhammo, sundaradhammo.

89. One with a refined inclination means one with a refined disposition. One of wholesome qualities means one of auspicious qualities, pure qualities, and beautiful qualities.

90. Tittoti suhito pariyosito. Tappetāti aññesampi tittikaro. Paccekasambuddhā ye ca tathāgatasāvakāti ettha paccekabuddhā navahi lokuttaradhammehi sayaṃ tittā paripuṇṇā. Aññe pana tappetuṃ na sakkonti. Tesañhi dhammakathāya abhisamayo na hoti. Sāvakānaṃ pana dhammakathāya aparimāṇānampi devamanussānaṃ abhisamayo hoti. Evaṃ santepi yasmā pana te dhammaṃ desentā na attano vacanaṃ katvā kathenti, buddhānaṃ vacanaṃ katvā kathenti. Sotuṃ nisinnaparisāpi ‘ayaṃ bhikkhu na attanā paṭividdhadhammaṃ katheti, buddhehi paṭividdhadhammaṃ kathetī’ti cittīkāraṃ karoti. Iti so cittīkāro buddhānaṃyeva hoti. Evaṃ tattha sammāsambuddhova tappetā nāma. Yathā hi ‘asukassa nāma idañcidañca dethā’ti raññā āṇattā kiñcāpi ānetvā denti, atha kho rājāva tattha dāyako. Yehipi laddhaṃ hoti, te ‘raññā amhākaṃ ṭhānantaraṃ dinnaṃ, issariyavibhavo dinno’tveva gaṇhanti, na rājapurisehīti. Evaṃsampadamidaṃ veditabbaṃ. Sesaṃ sabbattha uttānatthamevāti.

90. `Titto` means satisfied, fulfilled. `Tappetā` means one who satisfies others. Regarding 'Paccekabuddhas and the Tathāgata's disciples,' here the Paccekabuddhas are themselves satisfied and complete with the nine supramundane qualities, but they cannot satisfy others. For through their teaching of the Dhamma, there is no realization. However, through the teaching of the Dhamma by the disciples, there is realization for countless gods and humans. Even so, when they teach the Dhamma, they do not speak it as their own words, but speak it as the words of the Buddhas. The assembly seated to listen also pays respect, thinking: 'This monk does not speak a Dhamma he has himself penetrated, but speaks the Dhamma penetrated by the Buddhas.' Thus, that respect belongs solely to the Buddhas. Therefore, in this context, only the Perfectly Self-Enlightened One is called the satisfier. It is like when a king commands, 'Give this and that to so-and-so'; even though others bring and give it, the king alone is the giver there. Those who have received it consider, 'The king has given us this position, the king has granted us power and wealth,' not that the king’s men have. This matter should be understood in this way. The rest is clear in meaning everywhere.

Dukaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Niddesa on Pairs.

3. Tikaniddesavaṇṇanā

3. The Explanation of the Niddesa on Triads.

91. Tikaniddese [Pg.57] – dussīloti nissīlo. Pāpadhammoti lāmakadhammo. Sīlavipattiyā vā dussīlo, diṭṭhivipattiyā pāpadhammo. Kāyavacīsaṃvarabhedena dussīlo, sesasaṃvarabhedena pāpadhammo. Asuddhapayogatāya dussīlo, asuddhāsayatāya pāpadhammo. Kusalasīlavirahena dussīlo; akusalasīlasamannāgamena pāpadhammo. Asucīti asucīhi kāyakammādīhi samannāgato. Saṅkassarasamācāroti saṅkāya parehi saritabbasamācāro. Kiñcideva asāruppaṃ disvā ‘idaṃ iminā kataṃ bhavissatī’ti evaṃ parehi āsaṅkanīyasamācāro, attanoyeva vā saṅkāya saritabbasamācāro – sāsaṅkasamācāroti attho. Tassa hi divāṭṭhānādīsu sannipatitvā kiñcideva mantayante bhikkhū disvā ‘ime ekato hutvā mantenti, kacci nu kho mayā katakammaṃ jānitvā mantentī’ti evaṃ sāsaṅkasamācāro hoti.

91. In the Tikaniddesa – 'Dussīla' means one who is without virtue. 'Pāpadhamma' means one of evil qualities. 'Dussīla' is due to a failure in virtue, while 'pāpadhamma' is due to a failure in view. 'Dussīla' is due to the breaking of bodily and verbal restraint, while 'pāpadhamma' is due to the breaking of other restraints. 'Dussīla' is due to impure application, while 'pāpadhamma' is due to impure intention. 'Dussīla' is due to the absence of wholesome virtue; 'pāpadhamma' is due to being endowed with unwholesome virtue. 'Asuci' means endowed with impure bodily actions and so forth. 'Saṅkassara-samācāra' means behavior that is to be recalled with suspicion by others. Seeing something improper, others may think, 'This must have been done by him'—such is behavior to be suspected by others, or it is behavior to be recalled with suspicion by oneself. This is the meaning of 'sāsaṅka-samācāra' (behavior arousing suspicion). For when he sees monks gathered in their day-quarters and discussing something, he thinks, 'They are gathered together discussing—could it be that they are discussing something they have learned about what I have done?' Thus his behavior is 'sāsaṅka-samācāra'.

Paṭicchannakammantoti paṭicchādetabbayuttakena pāpakammena samannāgato. Assamaṇo samaṇapaṭiññoti assamaṇo hutvāva samaṇapatirūpakatāya ‘samaṇo aha’nti evaṃ paṭiñño. Abrahmacārī brahmacāripaṭiññoti aññe brahmacārino sunivatthe supārute sumbhakapattadhare gāmanigamajanapadarājadhānīsu piṇḍāya caritvā jīvikaṃ kappente disvā sayampi tādisena ākārena tathā paṭipajjanato ‘ahaṃ brahmacārī’ti paṭiññaṃ dento viya hoti. ‘Ahaṃ bhikkhū’ti vatvā uposathaggādīni pavisanto pana brahmacāripaṭiñño hotiyeva, tathā saṅghikaṃ lābhaṃ gaṇhanto. Antopūtīti pūtinā kammena anto anupaviṭṭho, nigguṇatāya vā guṇasāravirahitattā antopūti. Avassutoti rāgādīhi tinto. Kasambujātoti sañjātarāgādikacavaro. Atha vā kasambu vuccati tintakuṇapagataṃ kasaṭaudakaṃ. Imasmiñca sāsane dussīlo nāma jigucchanīyattā tintakuṇapakasaṭaudakasadiso. Tasmā kasambu viya jātoti kasambujāto.

'Paṭicchanna-kammanta' means one who is endowed with evil deeds that ought to be concealed. 'Assamaṇo samaṇa-paṭiñña' means one who, being a non-ascetic, claims 'I am an ascetic' because he resembles an ascetic. 'Abrahmacārī brahmacārī-paṭiñña' means that when he sees other celibates who are well-dressed, well-robed, carrying a polished bowl, and making a living by wandering for alms in villages, towns, districts, and royal cities, he too behaves in a similar manner, as if making the claim, 'I am a celibate.' Furthermore, by saying 'I am a bhikkhu' and entering the Uposatha hall and so forth, he is indeed one who claims to be a celibate, and likewise when he receives a share of the Sangha's gains. 'Antopūti' means inwardly penetrated by putrid deeds, or he is rotten inside due to being without virtue, being devoid of the essence of virtue. 'Avassuta' means stained by lust and so forth. 'Kasambujāta' means one in whom the rubbish of lust and so forth has arisen. Or, 'kasambu' is said to be the foul water from a putrid corpse. And in this dispensation, an immoral person, due to being repulsive, is like the foul water from a putrid corpse. Therefore, he is 'kasambujāta' because he is born like 'kasambu'.

Tassa na evaṃ hotīti kasmā na hoti? Yattha patiṭṭhitena sakkā bhaveyya arahattaṃ laddhuṃ, tassā patiṭṭhāya bhinnattā. Yathā hi caṇḍālakumārakassa [Pg.58] ‘asuko nāma khattiyakumāro rajje abhisitto’ti sutvāpi, yasmiṃ kule paccājātā abhisekaṃ pāpuṇanti, tasmiṃ kule apaccājātattā na evaṃ hoti – ‘kudāssu nāmāhampi so khattiyakumāro viya abhisekaṃ pāpuṇeyya’nti; evameva dussīlassa ‘asuko nāma bhikkhu arahattaṃ patto’ti sutvāpi, yasmiṃ sīle patiṭṭhitena arahattaṃ pattabbaṃ, tassa abhāvato ‘kudāssu nāmāhampi so sīlavā viya arahattaṃ pāpuṇeya’nti na evaṃ hoti. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo arahattāsāya abhāvā nirāsoti vuccati.

For him, it is not so. Why is that? Because the foundation upon which one could attain arahantship is broken. Just as when a young outcaste hears, 'So-and-so, a noble youth, has been anointed king,' but since he was not born in a family where coronation is attained, he does not think, 'When will I too attain anointment like that noble youth?' Even so, when an immoral one hears, 'So-and-so, a monk, has attained arahantship,' but since the virtue upon which one must be established to attain arahantship is lacking, he does not think, 'When will I too attain arahantship like that virtuous one?' This is called: such a person, due to the absence of aspiration for arahantship, is said to be 'nirāsa' (without hope).

92. Tassa evaṃ hotīti kasmā hoti? Yasmiṃ patiṭṭhitena sakkā bhaveyya arahattaṃ pāpuṇituṃ, tassā patiṭṭhāya thirattā. Yathā hi sujātassa khattiyakumārassa ‘asuko nāma khattiyakumāro rajje abhisitto’ti sutvāva yasmiṃ kule paccājātā abhisekaṃ pāpuṇanti, tasmiṃ paccājātassa evaṃ hoti – ‘kudāssu nāmāhampi, so kumāro viya abhisekaṃ pāpuṇeyya’nti evameva sīlavato ‘asuko nāma bhikkhu arahattaṃ patto’ti sutvāva yasmiṃ sīle patiṭṭhitena arahattaṃ pattabbaṃ, tassā patiṭṭhāya thirattā – ‘kudāssu nāmāhampi so bhikkhu viya arahattaṃ pāpuṇeyya’nti evaṃ hoti. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo āsaṃso nāma vuccati. So hi arahattaṃ āsaṃsati patthetīti āsaṃso.

92. Why is that so for him? Because the foundation upon which one could attain arahantship is firm. Just as when a well-born noble youth hears, 'So-and-so, a noble youth, has been anointed king,' since he was born in a family where coronation is attained, he thinks, 'When will I too attain anointment like that noble youth?' Even so, when a virtuous one hears, 'So-and-so, a monk, has attained arahantship,' since the virtue upon which arahantship is to be attained is firm, he thinks, 'When will I too attain arahantship like that monk?' This is called: such a person is called 'āsaṃsa' (one with aspiration). For he aspires to arahantship, he desires it, therefore he is 'āsaṃsa'.

93. Yā hissa pubbe avimuttassāti yā tassa khīṇāsavassa pubbe arahattavimuttiyā avimuttassa vimuttāsā ahosi, sā paṭippassaddhā, tasmā na evaṃ hoti. Yathā hi abhisittassa khattiyassa ‘asuko nāma khattiyakumāro rajje abhisitto’ti sutvā ekassa rañño dvinnaṃ rajjābhisekānaṃ dvinnaṃ setacchattānaṃ abhāvā na evaṃ hoti – ‘‘kudāssu nāmāhampi so kumāro viya abhisekaṃ pāpuṇeyya’’nti; evameva khīṇāsavassa ‘asuko nāma bhikkhu arahattaṃ patto’ti sutvā, dvinnaṃ arahattānaṃ abhāvā – ‘kudāssu nāmāhampi so bhikkhu viya arahattaṃ pāpuṇeyya’nti [Pg.59] na evaṃ hoti. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo arahattāsāya vigatattā vigatāsoti vuccati.

93. 'Yā hissa pubbe avimuttassā' means: whatever hope for liberation existed for that one whose taints are destroyed, back when he was not yet liberated by the liberation of arahantship, that hope has now subsided; therefore, it is not so for him. Just as when an anointed king hears, 'So-and-so, a noble youth, has been anointed king,' because there cannot be two coronations or two white parasols for one king, he does not think, 'When will I too attain anointment like that noble youth?' Even so, when one whose taints are destroyed hears, 'So-and-so, a monk, has attained arahantship,' because there cannot be two arahantships, he does not think, 'When will I too attain arahantship like that monk?' This is called: such a person is called 'vigatāsa' (one who is free from aspiration), because his aspiration for arahantship has departed.

94. Gilānūpamaniddese – yāya upamāya te gilānūpamāti vuccanti, taṃ tāva upamaṃ dassetuṃ tayo gilānātiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha sappāyānīti hitāni vuddhikarāni. Patirūpanti anucchavikaṃ. Neva vuṭṭhāti tamhā ābādhāti iminā atekicchena vātāpamārādinā rogena samannāgato niṭṭhappatto gilāno kathito. Vuṭṭhāti tamhā ābādhāti iminā khipitakacchutiṇapupphakajarādippabhedo appamattakābādho kathito.

94. In the Exposition on the Simile of the Sick, to illustrate the simile by which they are called 'like the sick,' the passage beginning 'three sick persons' is stated. Therein, 'sappāyāni' means beneficial and conducive to growth. 'Patirūpa' means suitable. By 'he does not recover from that illness,' a critically ill person is meant, one afflicted by an incurable disease such as a severe wind disorder. By 'he recovers from that illness,' one with a minor ailment is meant, of a type such as sneezing, itching, or hay fever.

Labhanto sappāyāni bhojanāni no alabhantoti iminā pana yesaṃ paṭijagganena phāsukaṃ hoti, sabbepi te ābādhā kathitā. Ettha ca patirūpo upaṭṭhāko nāma gilānupaṭṭhākaaṅgehi samannāgato paṇḍito dakkho analaso veditabbo.

'Obtaining suitable food or not obtaining it' refers to all those illnesses for which comfort is achieved through tending to them. Here, a suitable attendant should be understood as one endowed with the qualities of a sick-nurse: wise, skillful, and not lazy.

Gilānupaṭṭhāko anuññātoti ‘bhikkhusaṅghena dātabbo’ti anuññāto. Tasmiñhi gilāne attano dhammatāya yāpetuṃ asakkonte bhikkhusaṅghena tassa bhikkhuno ‘eko bhikkhu ca sāmaṇero ca imaṃ paṭijaggathā’ti apaloketvā dātabbā. Yāva pana te taṃ paṭijagganti, tāva gilānassa ca tesañca dvinnaṃ yenattho sabbaṃ bhikkhusaṅghasseva bhāro. Aññepi gilānā upaṭṭhātabbāti itarepi dve gilānā upaṭṭhātabbā. Kiṃ kāraṇā? Yopi hi niṭṭhappattagilāno, so anupaṭṭhiyamāno ‘sace maṃ paṭijaggeyyuṃ, phāsukaṃ me bhaveyya, na kho pana maṃ paṭijaggantī’ti manopadosaṃ katvā apāye nibbatteyya. Paṭijaggiyamānassa pana evaṃ hoti – ‘bhikkhusaṅghena yaṃ kattabbaṃ taṃ sabbaṃ kataṃ, mayhaṃ pana kammavipāko īdiso’ti so bhikkhusaṅghe mettaṃ paccupaṭṭhapetvā sagge nibbattati. Yo pana appamattakena byādhinā samannāgato labhantopi alabhantopi vuṭṭhātiyeva, tassa vināpi bhesajjena vūpasamanakabyādhi bhesajje kate khippataraṃ vūpasammati. Tato so buddhavacanaṃ [Pg.60] vā uggaṇhituṃ samaṇadhammaṃ vā kātuṃ sakkhissati. Iminā kāraṇena aññepi gilānā upaṭṭhātabbāti vuttaṃ.

The attendant to the sick is permitted—this means 'permitted to be assigned by the Saṅgha of bhikkhus.' For when a sick bhikkhu is unable to sustain himself due to his condition, the Saṅgha should assign to that bhikkhu, having announced, 'One bhikkhu and a novice, attend to him.' As long as they are caring for him, all the needs of the sick bhikkhu and those two are the responsibility of the Saṅgha. 'Other sick bhikkhus should also be attended to'—this means the other two types of sick bhikkhus should be cared for. Why is that? Even one who is terminally ill, if not attended to, might develop resentment, thinking, 'If they had cared for me, I would have been comfortable, but they do not attend to me,' and thus be reborn in a lower realm. But if he is cared for, he thinks, 'The Saṅgha has done all that should be done; this is the result of my own kamma,' and with loving-kindness toward the Saṅgha, he is reborn in a heavenly realm. As for one afflicted with a minor illness, whether he receives treatment or not, he will recover. Even without medicine, his illness, which would subside on its own, will subside more quickly if medicine is administered. Then he will be able to learn the Buddha’s teachings or practice the ascetic duties. For this reason, it is said that other sick bhikkhus should also be attended to.

Neva okkamatīti neva pavisati. Niyāmaṃ kusalesu dhammesu sammattanti kusalesu dhammesu magganiyāmasaṅkhātaṃ sammattaṃ. Iminā padaparamo puggalo kathito. Dutiyavārena ugghaṭitaññū gahito sāsane nāḷakattherasadiso. Buddhantare ekavāraṃ paccekabuddhānaṃ santike ovādaṃ labhitvā paṭividdhapaccekabodhiñāṇo ca. Tatiyavārena vipañcitaññū puggalo kathito. Neyyo pana tannissitova hoti.

'Does not enter' means does not go in. 'Fixedness in wholesome qualities' means rightness, designated as the fixed course of the path in wholesome qualities. With this, the person limited to words is described. In the second instance, the one who understands upon a brief utterance is referred to, like the Elder Nāḷaka in the Dispensation. And in an interval between Buddhas, having received advice once from the Paccekabuddhas, he penetrated the knowledge of a Paccekabuddha. In the third instance, the person who understands through elaboration is described. The one to be guided, however, is dependent on that.

Dhammadesanā anuññātāti māsassa aṭṭha vāre dhammakathā anuññātā. Aññesampi dhammo desetabboti itaresampi dhammo kathetabbo. Kiṃ kāraṇā? Padaparamassa hi imasmiṃ attabhāve dhammaṃ paṭivijjhituṃ asakkontassāpi anāgate paccayo bhavissati. Yo pana tathāgatassa rūpadassanaṃ labhantopi alabhantopi dhammavinayañca savanāya labhantopi alabhantopi dhammaṃ abhisameti; so alabhanto na tāva abhisameti, labhanto pana khippameva abhisamessatīti iminā kāraṇena tesaṃ dhammo desetabbo. Tatiyassa pana punappunaṃ desetabbova. Kāyasakkhidiṭṭhappattasaddhāvimuttā heṭṭhā kathitāyeva.

'The teaching of the Dhamma is permitted'—this means that a Dhamma talk is permitted eight times a month. 'The Dhamma should also be taught to others'—this means the Dhamma should be spoken to others. Why is that? For one limited to words, even if unable to penetrate the Dhamma in this very existence, it will become a condition for the future. But as for one who, whether or not they gain the sight of the Tathāgata’s form, and whether or not they gain the opportunity to hear the Dhamma and Vinaya, comprehends the Dhamma—if they do not gain it, they do not yet comprehend it, but if they gain it, they will quickly comprehend it. For this reason, the Dhamma should be taught to them. For the third type, however, it should be taught repeatedly. The body-witness, the view-attainer, and the faith-liberated have already been described earlier.

98. Gūthabhāṇīādīsu – sabhaggatoti sabhāyaṃ ṭhito. Parisaggatoti gāmaparisāya ṭhito. Ñātimajjhagatoti dāyādānaṃ majjhe ṭhito. Pūgamajjhagatoti seṇīnaṃ majjhe ṭhito. Rājakulamajjhagatoti rājakulassa majjhe mahāvinicchaye ṭhito. Abhinītoti pucchanatthāya nīto. Sakkhipuṭṭhoti sakkhiṃ katvā pucchito. Ehambho purisāti ālapanametaṃ. Attahetu vā parahetu vāti attano vā parassa vā hatthapādādihetu vā dhanahetu vā. Āmisakiñcikkhahetu vāti ettha āmisanti lābho adhippeto. Kiñcikkhanti yaṃ vā taṃ vā appamattakaṃ. Antamaso tittiravaṭṭakasappipiṇḍanavanītapiṇḍādiappamattakassāpi lañjassa hetūti attho. Sampajānamusā bhāsitā hotīti jānantoyeva musāvādaṃ kattā hoti. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo gūthasadisavacanattā gūthabhāṇīti vuccati. Yathā hi gūthaṃ nāma mahājanassa aniṭṭhaṃ [Pg.61] hoti akantaṃ; evameva imassa puggalassa vacanaṃ devamanussānaṃ aniṭṭhaṃ hoti akantaṃ.

98. In the case of 'filth-speaker' and so on—'gone to an assembly' means standing in an assembly hall. 'Gone to a company' means standing in a village assembly. 'Gone among relatives' means standing among heirs. 'Gone amidst a guild' means standing among a guild. 'Gone into the royal court' means standing in the midst of the royal family during a great inquiry. 'Brought forward' means brought forth for questioning. 'Questioned as a witness' means questioned after being made a witness. 'Come now, good man' is an address. 'For one's own sake or another's sake' means either for one's own or another's sake, whether for the sake of limbs like hands and feet, or for wealth. 'For the sake of some trifling material thing' means here, by 'material thing' gain is intended. 'Some trifle' means any small thing whatsoever. The meaning is, even for the sake of a small bribe, such as a lump of ghee from a partridge or quail, or a lump of fresh butter. 'Knowingly speaks falsely' means one knowingly tells a lie. 'This one is called' means such a person is called a 'filth-speaker' because their speech is like filth. Just as filth is disagreeable and unpleasant to the populace, so too is this person's speech disagreeable and unpleasant to gods and humans.

99. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo pupphasadisavacanattā pupphabhāṇīti vuccati. Yathā hi phullāni vassikāni vā adhimuttakāni vā mahājanassa iṭṭhāni kantāni honti; evameva imassa puggalassa vacanaṃ devamanussānaṃ iṭṭhaṃ hoti kantaṃ.

99. 'This one is called' means such a person is called a 'flower-speaker' because their speech is like flowers. Just as blooming jasmine or adhimuttaka flowers are desirable and pleasing to the populace, so too is this person's speech desirable and pleasing to gods and humans.

100. Nelāti elaṃ vuccati doso. Nāssā elanti nelā. Niddosāti attho, ‘‘nelaṅgo setapacchādo’’ti (udā. 65) ettha vuttanelaṃ viya. Kaṇṇasukhāti byañjanamadhuratāya kaṇṇānaṃ sukhā. Sūcivijjhanaṃ viya kaṇṇasūlaṃ na janeti. Atthamadhuratāya sakalasarīre kopaṃ ajanetvā pemaṃ janetīti pemanīyā. Hadayaṃ gacchati appaṭihaññamānā sukhena cittaṃ pavisatīti hadayaṅgamā. Guṇaparipuṇṇatāya pure bhavāti porī. Pure saṃvaḍḍhanārī viya sukumārātipi porī. Purassa esātipi porī. Nagaravāsīnaṃ kathāti attho. Nagaravāsino hi yuttakathā honti. Pitimattaṃ pitāti, mātimattaṃ mātāti, bhātimattaṃ bhātāti vadanti. Evarūpī kathā bahuno janassa kantā hotīti bahujanakantā. Bahujanassa kantabhāveneva bahuno janassa manāpā cittavuddhikarāti bahujanamanāpā. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo madhubhāṇīti vuccati. Mudubhāṇītipi pāṭho. Ubhayatthāpi madhuravacanoti attho. Yathā hi catumadhuraṃ nāma madhuraṃ paṇītaṃ; evameva imassa puggalassa vacanaṃ devamanussānaṃ madhuraṃ hoti.

100. ‘Nela’—‘ela’ is said to mean fault. ‘Without ela’ means ‘nela,’ faultless—this is the meaning, as in the ‘nela’ mentioned in the phrase ‘nelaṅgo setapacchādo’ (Udāna 65). ‘Pleasing to the ear’ means sweet in expression, delightful to the ears. It does not cause an earache like a needle's prick. Because the meaning is sweet, it does not provoke anger but instead generates affection throughout the body—thus, it is endearing. ‘Heart-reaching’ means it enters the mind without obstruction, effortlessly entering the heart. ‘Porī’—this means it is foremost due to its fullness of qualities. It is also ‘porī’ because it is delicate like a woman brought up in the city. It is also ‘porī’ because it belongs to the city. This means it is the speech of city-dwellers. For city-dwellers’ speech is fitting. They speak of one who is like a father as ‘father,’ of one who is like a mother as ‘mother,’ of one who is like a brother as ‘brother.’ Such speech is pleasing to many—thus, it is ‘beloved by many.’ Because it is beloved by many, it is delightful to many and causes the mind to grow—thus, it is ‘delightful to many.’ ‘This is called’—such a person is called a ‘honeyed speaker.’ There is also a variant reading, ‘gentle speaker.’ In both cases, the meaning is sweet speech. Just as the ‘fourfold honey’ is sweet and excellent, so too is this person's speech sweet to gods and humans.

101. Arukūpamacittādīsu – abhisajjatīti laggati. Kuppatīti kopavasena kuppati. Byāpajjatīti pakatibhāvaṃ pajahati, pūtiko hoti. Patitthīyatīti thinabhāvaṃ thaddhabhāvañca āpajjati. Kopanti dubbalakodhaṃ. Dosanti dussanavasena tato balavataraṃ. Appaccayanti atuṭṭhākāraṃ domanassaṃ. Duṭṭhārukoti purāṇavaṇo. Kaṭṭhenāti daṇḍakakoṭiyā. Kaṭhalāyāti kapālena. Āsavaṃ detīti aparāparaṃ savati. Purāṇavaṇo hi attano dhammatāya eva pubbaṃ lohitaṃ yūsanti imāni tīṇi savati[Pg.62], ghaṭṭito pana tāni adhikataraṃ savati. Evamevaṃ khoti ettha idaṃ opammasaṃsandanaṃ, duṭṭhāruko viya hi kodhano puggalo. Tassa attano dhammatāya savanaṃ viya kodhanassapi attano dhammatāya uddhumātakassa viya caṇḍikatassa caraṇaṃ. Kaṭṭhena vā kaṭhalāya vā ghaṭṭanaṃ viya appamattakampi vacanaṃ bhiyyoso mattāya savanaṃ viya ‘mādisaṃ nāma esa evaṃ vadatī’ti bhiyyoso mattāya uddhumāyanabhāvo daṭṭhabbo. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo arukūpamacittoti vuccati. Purāṇavaṇasadisacittoti attho.

101. In the simile of the mind like a festering sore, etc.—‘abhisajjati’ means it adheres or clings. ‘Kuppati’ means it becomes agitated due to anger. ‘Byāpajjati’ means it abandons its natural state and becomes putrid. ‘Patitthīyati’ means it becomes stiff and rigid. ‘Kopa’ refers to weak anger. ‘Dosa’ refers to stronger anger arising from resentment. ‘Appaccaya’ refers to discontentment, displeasure. ‘Duṭṭhāruko’ means an old sore. ‘Kaṭṭhena’ means with the tip of a stick. ‘Kaṭhalāya’ means with a potsherd. ‘Āsavaṃ deti’ means it oozes repeatedly. An old sore, by its own nature, oozes pus, blood, and serum, but when struck, it oozes even more. So too, here, is the application of the simile: an angry person is like a festering sore. The sore’s natural oozing is like the angry person's naturally fierce conduct, like one puffed up with rage. Being struck with a stick or potsherd is like being provoked by even a slight word; the sore oozing all the more is like the anger swelling all the more, as one thinks, ‘How dare someone like this speak to me like that!’ This is called a person with a mind like a festering sore. The meaning is that their mind resembles an old sore.

102. Rattandhakāratimisāyāti rattiṃ cakkhuviññāṇuppattinivāraṇena andhabhāvakaraṇe bahalatame. Vijjantarikāyāti vijjuppattikkhaṇe. Idhāpi idaṃ opammasaṃsandanaṃ – cakkhumā puriso viya hi yogāvacaro daṭṭhabbo. Andhakāraṃ viya sotāpattimaggavajjhā kilesā. Vijjusañcaraṇaṃ viya sotāpattimaggañāṇassa uppattikālo. Vijjantarikāya cakkhumato purisassa sāmantā rūpadassanaṃ viya sotāpattimaggakkhaṇe nibbānadassanaṃ. Puna andhakārāvattharaṇaṃ viya sakadāgāmimaggavajjhā kilesā. Puna vijjusañcaraṇaṃ viya sakadāgāmimaggañāṇassa uppādo. Vijjantarikāya cakkhumato purisassa sāmantā rūpadassanaṃ viya sakadāgāmimaggakkhaṇe nibbānadassanaṃ. Puna andhakārāvattharaṇaṃ viya anāgāmimaggavajjhā kilesā. Puna vijjusañcaraṇaṃ viya anāgāmimaggañāṇassa uppādo. Vijjantarikāya cakkhumato purisassa sāmantā rūpadassanaṃ viya anāgāmimaggakkhaṇe nibbānadassanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo vijjūpamacittoti vuccati. Ittarakālobhāsena vijjusadisacittoti attho.

102. ‘Rattandhakāratimisāya’ refers to the thickest darkness of night, which prevents the arising of eye-consciousness and causes blindness. ‘Vijjantarikāya’ means at the moment when lightning arises. Here too, this simile should be understood: the meditator should be regarded as a person with eyesight. The darkness is like the defilements to be abandoned by the path of stream-entry. The flash of lightning is like the time of the arising of the knowledge of the path of stream-entry. Just as a person with eyesight sees forms all around in the interval of the lightning, so too is the seeing of Nibbāna in the moment of the path of stream-entry. Again, the darkness covering over is like the defilements to be abandoned by the path of once-returning. Again, the flash of lightning is like the arising of the knowledge of the path of once-returning. Just as a person with eyesight sees forms all around in the interval of the lightning, so too is the seeing of Nibbāna in the moment of the path of once-returning. Again, the darkness covering over is like the defilements to be abandoned by the path of non-returning. Again, the flash of lightning is like the arising of the knowledge of the path of non-returning. Just as a person with eyesight sees forms all around in the interval of the lightning, so too should the seeing of Nibbāna in the moment of the path of non-returning be understood. ‘This is called’—this means that such a person is called ‘one whose mind is like lightning.’ The meaning is that his mind is like lightning due to its brief illumination.

103. Vajirūpamacittatāyapi idaṃ opammasaṃsandanaṃ – vajiraṃ viya hi arahattamaggañāṇaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Maṇigaṇṭhipāsāṇagaṇṭhi viya arahattamaggavajjhā kilesā. Vajirassa maṇigaṇṭhiṃ vā pāsāṇagaṇṭhiṃ vā vinivijjhitvā agamanabhāvassa natthibhāvo viya arahattamaggañāṇena acchejjānaṃ kilesānaṃ natthibhāvo. Vajirena nibbiddhavedhassa puna apaṭipūraṇaṃ viya arahattamaggena chinnānaṃ kilesānaṃ puna anuppādo daṭṭhabbo. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo [Pg.63] vajirūpamacittoti vuccati. Kilesānaṃ mūlaghātakaraṇasamatthatāya vajirena sadisacittoti attho.

103. In the simile of the diamond-like mind, this comparison should be understood: the knowledge of the path of arahantship should be regarded as the diamond. The defilements to be abandoned by the path of arahantship are like knots of jewels or knots of stones. Just as a diamond, having pierced a jewel-knot or stone-knot, invariably passes through, so too there is no defilement that is not cut by the knowledge of the path of arahantship. Just as a hole pierced by a diamond cannot be filled again, so too, the defilements cut off by the path of arahantship should be understood as not arising again. ‘This is called’—this means that such a person is called ‘one whose mind is like a diamond.’ The meaning is that his mind is similar to a diamond in its ability to strike at the root of the defilements.

104. Andhādīsu tathārūpaṃ cakkhu na hotīti tathājātikaṃ tathāsabhāvaṃ paññācakkhu na hoti. Phātiṃ kareyyāti phītaṃ vaḍḍhitaṃ kareyya. Sāvajjānavajjeti sadosaniddose. Hīnappaṇīteti adhamuttame. Kaṇhasukkasappaṭibhāgeti kaṇhasukkāyeva aññamaññapaṭibāhanato paṭipakkhavasena sappaṭibhāgāti vuccanti. Ayaṃ panettha saṅkhepo – kusale dhamme ‘kusalā dhammā’ti yena paññācakkhunā jāneyya, akusale dhamme ‘akusalā dhammā’ti, sāvajjādīsupi eseva nayo. Kaṇhasukkasappaṭibhāgesu pana kaṇhadhamme ‘sukkasuppaṭibhāgā’ti, sukkadhamme ‘kaṇhasappaṭibhāgā’ti yena paññācakkhunā jāneyya. Tathārūpampissa cakkhu na hotīti iminā nayena sesaṭṭhānesupi attho veditabbo. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo diṭṭhadhammikabhogasaṃharaṇapaññācakkhuno ca samparāyikatthasodhanapaññācakkhuno ca abhāvā andhoti vuccati. Dutiyo diṭṭhadhammikabhogasaṃharaṇapaññācakkhuno bhāvā, samparāyikatthasodhanapaññācakkhuno pana abhāvā ekacakkhūti vuccati. Tatiyo dvinnampi bhāvā dvicakkhūti vuccati.

104. In 'blind' and so on, 'there is no such eye' means there is no wisdom-eye of such a kind, of such a nature. 'May he make it abundant' means may he make it plentiful, developed. 'Faulty and faultless' means with fault and without fault. 'Inferior and superior' means base and excellent. 'Having dark and bright counterparts' means that dark and bright qualities are called 'counterparts' because of their mutual opposition, by way of being opposites. Here, this is the summary: by which wisdom-eye one would know wholesome states as 'wholesome states', unwholesome states as 'unwholesome states'—and this is the method for 'faulty' and so on as well. But regarding 'having dark and bright counterparts', it is by which wisdom-eye one would know dark states as 'having bright counterparts' and bright states as 'having dark counterparts'. The meaning of 'there is no such eye for him' should be understood by this method in the remaining instances as well. 'This is called' means: such a person is called 'blind' due to the absence of both the wisdom-eye for acquiring wealth in the present life and the wisdom-eye for purifying the goal for the future life. The second person is called 'one-eyed' due to the presence of the wisdom-eye for acquiring wealth in the present life, but the absence of the wisdom-eye for purifying the goal for the future life. The third is called 'two-eyed' due to the presence of both.

107. Avakujjapaññādīsu dhammaṃ desentīti upāsako dhammassavanatthāya āgatoti attano kammaṃ pahāya dhammaṃ desenti. Ādikalyāṇanti ādimhi kalyāṇaṃ bhaddakaṃ anavajjaṃ niddosaṃ katvā desenti. Sesapadesupi eseva nayo. Ettha pana ādīti pubbapaṭṭhapanā. Majjhanti kathāvemajjhaṃ. Pariyosānanti sanniṭṭhānaṃ. Itissa dhammaṃ kathentā pubbapaṭṭhapanepi kalyāṇaṃ bhaddakaṃ anavajjameva katvā kathenti, vemajjhepi, pariyosānepi. Ettha ca atthi desanāya ādimajjhapariyosānāni, atthi sāsanassa. Tattha desanāya tāva – catuppadikagāthāya paṭhamapadaṃ ādi, dve padāni majjhaṃ, avasānapadaṃ pariyosānaṃ. Ekānusandhikasuttassa – nidānaṃ ādi, anusandhi majjhaṃ, idamavocāti appanā pariyosānaṃ. Anekānusandhikassa – paṭhamo anusandhi ādi, tato paraṃ eko vā anekā vā majjhaṃ, pacchimo pariyosānaṃ. Ayaṃ tāva desanāya nayo.

107. In 'one with wisdom bent down' and so on, 'they teach the Dhamma' means that when a lay follower comes to listen to the Dhamma, they set aside their own work and teach the Dhamma. 'Good in the beginning' means they teach it, making it good, auspicious, faultless, and blameless in the beginning. This is the method in the remaining phrases as well. Here, 'beginning' refers to the initial establishment. 'Middle' refers to the heart of the talk. 'End' refers to the conclusion. Thus, those who teach the Dhamma teach it, making it good, auspicious, and blameless in the initial establishment, in the middle, and in the conclusion. Here, there are beginnings, middles, and ends of a teaching, and there are also of the Dispensation. Therein, regarding a teaching: for a four-line verse, the first line is the beginning, the two middle lines are the middle, and the final line is the end. For a sutta with a single connection, the introduction is the beginning, the connection is the middle, and the concluding statement 'Thus he spoke' is the end. For one with multiple connections, the first connection is the beginning, one or many subsequent connections are the middle, and the last is the end. This, for a start, is the method regarding a teaching.

Sāsanassa [Pg.64] pana sīlaṃ ādi, samādhi majjhaṃ, vipassanā pariyosānaṃ. Samādhi vā ādi, vipassanā majjhaṃ, maggo pariyosānaṃ. Vipassanā vā ādi, maggo majjhaṃ, phalaṃ pariyosānaṃ. Maggo vā ādi, phalaṃ majjhaṃ, nibbānaṃ pariyosānaṃ. Dve dve vā kariyamāne sīlasamādhayo ādi, vipassanāmaggā majjhaṃ, phalanibbānāni pariyosānaṃ. Sātthanti sātthakaṃ katvā desenti. Sabyañjananti akkharapāripūriṃ katvā desenti. Kevalaparipuṇṇanti sakalaparipuṇṇaṃ anūnaṃ katvā desenti. Parisuddhanti parisuddhaṃ nijjaṭaṃ niggaṇṭhiṃ katvā desenti. Brahmacariyaṃ pakāsentīti evaṃ desentā ca seṭṭhacariyabhūtaṃ sikkhattayasaṅgahitaṃ ariyaṃ aṭṭhaṅgikaṃ maggaṃ pakāsenti. Neva ādiṃ manasi karotīti neva pubbapaṭṭhapanaṃ manasi karoti. Kumbhoti ghaṭo. Nikkujjoti adhomukho ṭhapito. Evamevanti ettha kumbho nikkujjo viya avakujjapañño puggalo daṭṭhabbo. Udakāsiñcanakālo viya dhammadesanāya laddhakālo. Udakassa vivaṭṭanakālo viya tasmiṃ āsane nisinnassa uggahetuṃ asamatthakālo. Udakassa asaṇṭhānakālo viya uṭṭhahitvā asallakkhaṇakālo veditabbo. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo avakujjapaññoti vuccati. Adhomukhapaññoti attho.

For the Dispensation, however, virtue is the beginning, concentration is the middle, and insight is the end. Or, concentration is the beginning, insight is the middle, and the path is the end. Or, insight is the beginning, the path is the middle, and the fruit is the end. Or, the path is the beginning, the fruit is the middle, and Nibbāna is the end. Or, when taken two by two, virtue and concentration are the beginning, insight and the path are the middle, and the fruit and Nibbāna are the end. 'With meaning' means they teach it, making it meaningful. 'With phrasing' means they teach it, making the letters complete. 'Wholly complete' means they teach it, making it entirely complete and without deficiency. 'Purified' means they teach it, making it pure, untangled, and without knots. 'They make manifest the holy life' means: thus teaching, they make manifest the noble eightfold path, which is the supreme conduct, included in the threefold training. 'He does not attend to the beginning' means he does not attend to the initial establishment. 'Pot' means a water jar. 'Overturned' means placed face-down. 'Just so' means: here, a person with wisdom bent down should be seen as like an overturned pot. Like the time of pouring water is the time when the Dhamma teaching is received. Like the time of the water flowing away is the time when one sitting in that seat is unable to grasp it. Like the time of the water not settling is to be understood as the time when, having stood up, one does not comprehend it. 'This is called' means: such a person is called 'one with wisdom bent down'. The meaning is 'one with downward-facing wisdom'.

108. Ākiṇṇānīti pakkhittāni. Satisammosā pakireyyāti muṭṭhassatitāya vikireyya. Evamevanti ettha ucchaṅgo viya ucchaṅgapañño puggalo daṭṭhabbo. Nānākhajjakāni viya nānappakāraṃ buddhavacanaṃ. Ucchaṅge nānākhajjakāni khādantassa nisinnakālo viya tasmiṃ āsane nisinnassa uggahaṇakālo. Vuṭṭhahantassa satisammosā vikiraṇakālo viya tasmā āsanā vuṭṭhāya gacchantassa asallakkhaṇakālo veditabbo. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo ucchaṅgapaññoti vuccati. Ucchaṅgasadisapaññoti attho.

108. 'Filled' (ākiṇṇāni) means 'put in'. 'He would scatter them through confusion of mindfulness' (satisammosā pakireyya) means he would spill them due to lapsed mindfulness. 'Just so' means: here, a person with lap-wisdom should be seen as like a lap. The diverse word of the Buddha is like various snacks. The time of grasping while sitting in that seat is like the time of sitting and eating various snacks from one's lap. The time of not comprehending when getting up from that seat and leaving is to be understood as like the time of spilling them through confusion of mindfulness when standing up. 'This is called' means: such a person is called 'one with lap-wisdom'. The meaning is 'one with wisdom like a lap'.

109. Ukkujjoti uparimukho ṭhapito. Saṇṭhātīti patiṭṭhahati. Evameva khoti ettha uparimukho ṭhapito kumbho viya puthupañño puggalo daṭṭhabbo. Udakassa āsittakālo viya desanāya laddhakālo. Udakassa saṇṭhānakālo viya tattha nisinnassa uggahaṇakālo. No vivaṭṭanakālo [Pg.65] viya uṭṭhāya gacchantassa sallakkhaṇakālo veditabbo. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo puthupaññoti vuccati. Vitthārikapaññoti attho.

109. 'Set upright' means placed with the opening upward. 'It settles' means it becomes established. 'Just so indeed' means: here, a person with broad wisdom should be seen as like a pot placed with its opening upward. Like the time of pouring in water is the time when the teaching is received. Like the time of the water settling is the time of grasping while seated there. The time of comprehending when one rises to leave is to be understood as like the time of the water not flowing away. 'This is called' means: such a person is called 'one with broad wisdom'. The meaning is 'one with extensive wisdom'.

110. Avītarāgādīsu – yathā sotāpannasakadāgāmino, evaṃ puthujjanopi pañcasu kāmaguṇesu, tīsu ca bhavesu avītarāgo. Adabbatāya pana na gahito. Yathā hi cheko vaḍḍhakī dabbasambhāratthaṃ vanaṃ paviṭṭho na ādito paṭṭhāya sampattasampattarukkhe chindati, ye panassa dabbasambhārūpagā honti, teyeva chindati; evamidhāpi bhagavatā dabbajātikā ariyāva gahitā, puthujjanā pana adabbatāya na gahitāti veditabbā. Kāmesu vītarāgoti pañcasu kāmaguṇesu vītarāgo. Bhavesu avītarāgoti rūpārūpabhavesu avītarāgo.

110. Regarding those not free from lust, etc.: Just as the stream-enterer and once-returner, so too the ordinary person is not free from lust for the five strands of sensual pleasure and the three realms of existence. However, they are not included because they are unsuitable material. For example, a skilled carpenter entering a forest to gather timber does not, from the start, cut down every tree he comes across, but only those that are suitable for his timber needs. Similarly, here the Blessed One has included only the noble ones, who are of the nature of suitable material, while ordinary persons are to be understood as not included because they are unsuitable material. 'Free from lust for sensual pleasures' means free from lust for the five strands of sensual pleasure. 'Not free from lust for the realms of existence' means not free from lust for the realms of form and formless existence.

113. Pāsāṇalekhūpamādīsu – anusetīti appahīnatāya anuseti. Na khippaṃ lujjatīti na antarā nassati, kappuṭṭhāneneva nassati. Evamevanti evaṃ tassāpi puggalassa kodho na antarā punadivase vā aparadivase vā nibbāti, addhaniyo pana hoti. Maraṇeneva nibbātīti attho. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo pāsāṇalekhā viya kujjhanabhāvena ciraṭṭhitikato pāsāṇalekhūpamoti vuccati.

113. In the simile of a line on a rock, etc.: 'It persists' (anuseti) means it persists because it has not been relinquished. 'It does not quickly disappear' (na khippaṃ lujjati) means it does not vanish in between; it disappears only when the eon ends. 'In the same way,' the anger of such a person does not subside in between, not on the next day or the day after, but lasts a long time. The meaning is that it subsides only with death. 'This is called'—such a person, because of the enduring nature of their anger like a line on a rock, is called 'one comparable to a line on a rock.'

114. So ca khvassa kodhoti so appamattakepi kāraṇe sahasā kuddhassa kodho. Na ciranti aciraṃ appahīnatāya nānuseti. Yathā pana pathaviyaṃ ākaḍḍhitvā katalekhā vātādīhi khippaṃ nassati, evamassa sahasā uppannopi kodho khippameva nibbātīti attho. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo pathaviyaṃ lekhā viya kujjhanabhāvena aciraṭṭhitikato pathavīlekhūpamoti vuccati.

114. 'And indeed, their anger' (so ca khvassa kodho)—this refers to the anger of one who suddenly becomes angry even for a trivial reason. 'Not long' (na ciraṃ) means it does not persist for long because it is not abandoned. Just as a line drawn on the ground quickly disappears due to wind and such, so too does their suddenly arisen anger quickly subside—this is the meaning. 'This is called'—such a person, due to the short-lived nature of their anger, being comparable to a line on the ground, is called 'one comparable to a line on the ground.'

115. Āgāḷhenāti atigāḷhena mammacchedakena thaddhavacanena. Pharusenāti na sotasukhena. Amanāpenāti na cittasukhena. Saṃsandatīti ekībhavati. Sandhiyatīti ghaṭayati. Sammodatīti nirantaro hoti. Atha vā – saṃsandatīti cittakiriyādīsu cittena samodhānaṃ gacchati. Khīrodakaṃ viya ekībhāvaṃ upetīti attho. Sandhiyatīti ṭhānagamanādīsu kāyakiriyādīsu [Pg.66] kāyena samodhānaṃ gacchati. Tilataṇḍulā viya missībhāvaṃ upetīti attho. Sammodatīti uddesaparipucchādīsu vacīkiriyāsu vācāya samodhānaṃ gacchati. Vippavāsagatopi piyasahāyako viya piyatarabhāvaṃ upetīti attho. Apica – kiccakaraṇīyesu tehi saddhiṃ āditova ekakiriyabhāvaṃ upagacchanto saṃsandati. Yāva majjhā pavattanto sandhiyati, yāva pariyosānā anivattanto sammodatītipi veditabbo. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo udakalekhā viya khippaṃ saṃsandanato udakalekhūpamoti vuccati.

115. 'Harshly' (āgāḷhena) means with excessively harsh, cutting, and stiff words. 'Roughly' (pharusena) means not pleasant to hear. 'Disagreeable' (amanāpena) means not pleasing to the mind. 'Merges' (saṃsandati) means becomes one. 'Bonds' (sandhiyati) means connects. 'Reconciles' (sammodati) means becomes continuous. Alternatively: 'Merges' means the mind comes into harmony in mental activities and so forth, attaining unity like milk and water—this is the meaning. 'Bonds' means the body comes into harmony in bodily activities like standing and going and so forth, attaining a state of mixture like sesame seeds and rice—this is the meaning. 'Reconciles' means speech comes into harmony in verbal activities like recitation and questioning and so forth, attaining a state of even greater affection like a beloved friend after separation—this is the meaning. Furthermore: by undertaking shared activities with them from the very beginning and attaining a state of unified action, one 'merges.' By continuing through the middle, one 'bonds.' By not turning back until the end, one 'reconciles'—this should also be understood. 'This is called'—such a person, because of quickly merging like a line drawn on water, is called 'one comparable to a line on water.'

116. Potthakūpamesu – yāya upamāya te potthakūpamāti vuccanti, taṃ tāva upamaṃ dassetuṃ tayo potthakātiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha navoti navavāyimo. Potthakoti sāṇavākasāṭako. Dubbaṇṇoti vivaṇṇo. Dukkhasamphassoti kharasamphasso. Appagghoti atibahuṃ agghanto kahāpaṇagghanako hoti. Majjhimoti paribhogamajjhimo. So hi navabhāvaṃ atikkamitvā jiṇṇabhāvaṃ appatto majjhe paribhogakālepi dubbaṇṇo ca dukkhasamphasso ca appagghoyeva ca hoti. Atibahuṃ agghanto aḍḍhaṃ agghati. Jiṇṇakāle pana aḍḍhamāsakaṃ vā kākaṇikaṃ vā agghati. Ukkhaliparimajjananti kāḷukkhaliparipuñchanaṃ.

116. In the similes of coarse cloth: First, to show the simile by which they are called 'like coarse cloth,' 'three types of coarse cloth' and so forth are mentioned. There, 'new' (nava) means newly woven. 'Coarse cloth' (potthaka) means a hempen or bark-fiber cloth. 'Of poor color' (dubbaṇṇa) means discolored. 'Unpleasant to the touch' (dukkhasamphassa) means rough to the touch. 'Of little value' (appaggha) means that, when valued at the very most, it is worth a kahāpaṇa. 'Middle' (majjhima) means in the middle of its use. For having passed its new state but not yet reached its worn-out state, even in the middle of its use, it is of poor color, rough to the touch, and still of little value. When valued at the very most, it is worth half (a kahāpaṇa). But in its worn-out state, it is worth only half a māsaka or a kākaṇika. 'Mortar-wiping' (ukkhaliparimajjana) means wiping the black mortar.

Navoti upasampadāya pañcavassakālato heṭṭhā jātiyā saṭṭhivassopi navoyeva. Dubbaṇṇatāyāti sarīravaṇṇenapi guṇavaṇṇenapi dubbaṇṇatāya. Dussīlassa hi parisamajjhe nisinnassa nittejatāya sarīravaṇṇopi na sampajjati, guṇavaṇṇe vattabbameva natthi. Ye kho panassāti ye kho pana tassa upaṭṭhākā vā ñātimittādayo vā etaṃ puggalaṃ sevanti. Tesaṃ tanti tesaṃ puggalānaṃ cha satthāre sevantānaṃ micchādiṭṭhikānaṃ viya, devadattaṃ sevantānaṃ kokālikādīnaṃ viya ca taṃ sevanaṃ dīgharattaṃ ahitāya dukkhāya hoti. Majjhimoti pañcavassakālato paṭṭhāya yāva navavassakālā majjhimo nāma. Theroti dasavassakālato paṭṭhāya thero nāma. Evamāhaṃsūti evaṃ vadanti. Kiṃ nu kho tuyhanti tuyhaṃ bālassa bhaṇitena ko atthoti vuttaṃ hoti. Tathārūpanti tathājātikaṃ tathāsabhāvaṃ ukkhepanīyakammassa kāraṇabhūtaṃ.

'New' (nava) means one who has been ordained for less than five years, even if one is sixty years old by birth. 'Due to poor appearance' (dubbaṇṇatāya) means due to poor appearance in both physical complexion and virtuous qualities. For an immoral person sitting in an assembly, their physical complexion does not shine due to their lack of luster, and there is nothing to be said of their virtuous qualities. 'But those who associate with him' (ye kho panassa) means those attendants, relatives, or friends and so forth who associate with that person. 'For them, that' (tesaṃ taṃ) means that for those persons, that association leads to their long-term harm and suffering, just as for those with wrong views who follow the six teachers, or like Kokālika and others who followed Devadatta. 'Middle' (majjhima) refers to one from five years up to nine years after ordination. 'Elder' (thera) refers to one from ten years onward. 'Thus they spoke' (evamāhaṃsu) means thus they say. 'What is it to you?' (kiṃ nu kho tuyhaṃ) means 'What use is the talk of a fool like you?' 'Of such a kind' (tathārūpa) means one of such a kind, of such a nature, being a cause for an act of suspension.

117. Kāsikavatthūpamesu [Pg.67] – kāsikavatthaṃ nāma tayo kappāsaṃsū gahetvā kantitasuttena vāyitaṃ sukhumavatthaṃ. Taṃ navavāyimaṃ anagghaṃ hoti. Paribhogamajjhimaṃ vīsampi tiṃsampi sahassāni agghati. Jiṇṇakāle pana aṭṭhapi dasapi sahassāni agghati.

117. In the similes of Kāsī cloth: Kāsī cloth is a fine fabric woven with thread spun from three cotton fibers. When newly woven, it is priceless. In its prime for use, it is worth twenty or thirty thousand. But when worn out, it is worth eight or ten thousand.

Tesaṃ taṃ hotīti tesaṃ sammāsambuddhādayo sevantānaṃ viya taṃ sevanaṃ dīgharattaṃ hitāya sukhāya hoti. Sammāsambuddhañhi ekaṃ nissāya yāvajjakālā muccanakasattānaṃ pamāṇaṃ natthi. Tathā sāriputtattheramahāmoggallānatthere avasese ca asītimahāsāvake nissāya saggaṃ gatasattānaṃ pamāṇaṃ natthi. Yāvajjakālā tesaṃ diṭṭhānugatiṃ paṭipannasattānampi pamāṇaṃ natthiyeva. Ādheyyaṃ gacchatīti tassa mahātherassa taṃ atthanissitaṃ vacanaṃ yathā gandhakaraṇḍake kāsikavatthaṃ ādhātabbataṃ ṭhapetabbataṃ gacchati, evaṃ uttamaṅge sirasmiṃ hadaye ca ādhātabbataṃ ṭhapetabbatampi gacchati. Sesamettha heṭṭhā vuttānusāreneva veditabbaṃ.

“For them, that occurs” (tesaṃ taṃ hoti) means that for those who attend upon the Perfectly Self-Enlightened Ones and so forth, that association is for their long-term welfare and happiness. For there is no measure of beings who, relying on just one Perfectly Self-Enlightened One, are liberated up to the present day. Similarly, there is no measure of beings who have gone to heaven relying on the Venerable Sāriputta, the Venerable Mahāmoggallāna, and the remaining eighty great disciples. Indeed, there is no measure even of beings who undertake their way of seeing up to the present day. “It goes to a place of deposit” (ādheyyaṃ gacchati) means that this statement of the great elder, being rooted in meaning, becomes fit to be deposited and kept, like Kāsī cloth in a scent-box; so too, it becomes fit to be deposited and kept on the crown of the head and in the heart. The rest here should be understood in accordance with what has been stated below.

118. Suppameyyādīsu – sukhena pametabboti suppameyyo. Idhāti imasmiṃ sattaloke. Uddhatoti uddhaccena samannāgato. Unnaḷoti uggatanaḷo; tucchamānaṃ ukkhipitvā ṭhitoti attho. Capaloti pattamaṇḍanādinā cāpallena samannāgato. Mukharoti mukhakharo. Vikiṇṇavācoti asaṃyatavacano. Asamāhitoti cittekaggatārahito. Vibbhantacittoti bhantacitto, bhantagāvībhantamigīsappaṭibhāgo. Pākaṭindriyoti vivaṭindriyo. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo ‘suppameyyo’ti vuccati. Yathā hi parittassa udakassa sukhena pamāṇaṃ gayhati; evameva imehi aguṇaṅgehi samannāgatassa sukhena pamāṇaṃ gayhati. Tenesa ‘suppameyyo’ti vutto.

118. Regarding 'suppameyya' and so forth: one who is easily measured is 'suppameyya'. 'Here' (idha) means in this world of beings. 'Uddhato' means endowed with agitation. 'Unnaḷo' means one whose pride is uplifted; the meaning is one who stands having raised up empty conceit. 'Capalo' means endowed with frivolity, such as adorning bowls and so forth. 'Mukharo' means harsh-mouthed. 'Vikiṇṇavāco' means one with unrestrained speech. 'Asamāhito' means lacking concentration. 'Vibbhantacitto' means one whose mind is bewildered, like a bewildered cow, a frightened deer, or a snake. 'Pākaṭindriyo' means one whose faculties are manifest. This is called: such a person is called 'suppameyya'. Just as a small amount of water is easily measured, so too is the measure of one endowed with these unwholesome qualities easily taken. Therefore, he is called 'suppameyya'.

119. Dukkhena pametabboti duppameyyo. Anuddhatādīni vuttapaṭipakkhavasena veditabbāni. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo ‘duppameyyo’ti vuccati. Yathā hi mahāsamuddassa dukkhena pamāṇaṃ gayhati; evameva imehi guṇaṅgehi samannāgatassa dukkhena pamāṇaṃ gayhati. Tādiso ‘anāgāmī nu kho, khīṇāsavo nu kho’ti vattabbataṃ gacchati, tenesa ‘duppameyyo’ti vutto.

119. 'Duppameyyo' means difficult to measure. Unagitated and so forth should be understood in terms of the opposites of what was stated before. This is called: such a person is called 'duppameyyo'. Just as it is difficult to gauge the measure of the great ocean, so too is it difficult to gauge the measure of one endowed with these qualities. Such a one becomes a subject for speculation: 'Is he a non-returner? Is he one whose taints are destroyed?' Therefore, he is called 'duppameyyo'.

120. Na [Pg.68] sakkā pametunti appameyyo. Yathā hi ākāsassa na sakkā pamāṇaṃ gahetuṃ, evaṃ khīṇāsavassa. Tenesa ‘appameyyo’ti vutto.

120. 'Appameyyo' means that which cannot be measured. Just as it is impossible to take the measure of space, so too is it impossible to take the measure of one whose taints are destroyed. Therefore, he is called 'appameyyo'.

121. Na sevitabbādīsu – na sevitabboti na upasaṅkamitabbo. Na bhajitabboti na allīyitabbo. Na payirupāsitabboti na santike nisīdanavasena punappunaṃ upāsitabbo. Hīno hoti sīlenātiādīsu upādāyupādāya hīnatā veditabbā. Yo hi pañca sīlāni rakkhati, so dasa sīlāni rakkhantena na sevitabbo. Yo pana dasa sīlāni rakkhati, so catupārisuddhisīlaṃ rakkhantena na sevitabbo. Aññatra anuddayā aññatra anukampāti ṭhapetvā anuddayañca anukampañca. Attano atthāya eva hi evarūpo puggalo na sevitabbo. Anuddayānukampāvasena pana taṃ upasaṅkamituṃ vaṭṭati.

121. Regarding 'should not be associated with' and so forth: 'Na sevitabbo' means one should not approach. 'Na bhajitabbo' means one should not become attached. 'Na payirupāsitabbo' means one should not repeatedly attend upon him by sitting near. 'Inferior in virtue' and so forth should be understood as indicating inferiority in one aspect after another. For one who observes the ten precepts should not associate with one who observes the five precepts. Likewise, one who observes the fourfold purified virtue should not associate with one who observes the ten precepts—except out of pity and compassion. For one’s own sake, such a person should not be associated with. However, it is permissible to approach him out of pity and compassion.

122. Sadiso hotīti samāno hoti. Sīlasāmaññagatānaṃ satanti sīlena samānabhāvaṃ gatānaṃ santānaṃ. Sīlakathā ca no bhavissatīti evaṃ samānasīlānaṃ amhākaṃ sīlameva ārabbha kathā bhavissati. Sā ca no phāsu bhavissatīti sā ca sīlakathā amhākaṃ phāsuvihāro sukhavihāro bhavissati. Sā ca no pavattinī bhavissatīti sā ca amhākaṃ kathā divasampi kathentānaṃ pavattinī bhavissati, na paṭihaññissati. Dvīsu hi sīlavantesu ekena sīlassa vaṇṇe kathite itaro anumodati; tena tesaṃ kathā phāsu ceva hoti, pavattinī ca. Ekasmiṃ pana dussīle sati dussīlassa sīlakathā dukkathāti neva sīlakathā hoti, na phāsu hoti, na pavattinī. Samādhipaññākathāsupi eseva nayo. Dve hi samādhilābhino samādhikathaṃ, sappaññā ca paññākathaṃ kathentā, rattiṃ vā divasaṃ vā atikkantampi na jānanti.

122. 'Sadiso hoti' means he is equal. 'Among those equal in virtue' (sīlasāmaññagatānaṃ sataṃ) means among good people who have attained similarity in virtue. 'There will be talk of virtue among us' (sīlakathā ca no bhavissati) means that for us who are equal in virtue, talk will arise concerning virtue itself. 'And it will be comfortable for us' (sā ca no phāsu bhavissati) means that talk about virtue will be a comfortable and happy abiding for us. 'And it will be continuous for us' (sā ca no pavattinī bhavissati) means that our talk, even if we speak for a whole day, will be continuous and not obstructed. For when among two virtuous people, one speaks in praise of virtue, the other approves; thus, their talk is both comfortable and continuous. But if there is one unvirtuous person, talk of virtue is bad talk for the unvirtuous, so there is no talk of virtue, no comfort, and no continuity. The same method applies to talk about concentration and wisdom. For two who have gained concentration, talking about concentration, or those with wisdom, talking about wisdom, do not know even that the night or day has passed.

123. Sakkatvā garuṃ katvāti sakkārañceva garukārañca karitvā. Adhiko hotīti atireko hoti. Sīlakkhandhanti sīlarāsiṃ. Paripūressāmīti taṃ atirekasīlaṃ puggalaṃ nissāya attano aparipūraṃ sīlarāsiṃ paripūraṃ karissāmi. Tattha tattha paññāya anuggahessāmīti ettha sīlassa [Pg.69] asappāye anupakāradhamme vajjetvā sappāye upakāradhamme sevanto tasmiṃ tasmiṃ ṭhāne sīlakkhandhaṃ paññāya anuggaṇhāti nāma. Samādhipaññākkhandhesupi eseva nayo.

123. 'Having honored and respected' (sakkatvā garuṃ katvā) means having shown both honor and reverence. 'Adhiko hoti' means he is superior. 'The aggregate of virtue' (sīlakkhandhaṃ) refers to the mass of virtue. 'I will fulfill it' (paripūressāmi) means, relying on that person of superior virtue, I will complete my own incomplete mass of virtue. 'Therein, I will support it with wisdom' (tattha tattha paññāya anuggahessāmi) means that by avoiding things unsuitable and unhelpful for virtue and cultivating things suitable and helpful, one supports the aggregate of virtue with wisdom in each and every instance. The same method applies to the aggregates of concentration and wisdom as well.

124. Jigucchitabbādīsu – jigucchitabboti gūthaṃ viya jigucchitabbo. Atha kho nanti atha kho assa. Kittisaddoti kathāsaddo. Evamevanti ettha gūthakūpo viya dussīlyaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Gūthakūpe patitvā ṭhito dhamanīahi viya dussīlapuggalo. Guthakūpato uddhariyamānena tena ahinā purisassa sarīraṃ āruḷhenāpi adaṭṭhabhāvo viya dussīlaṃ sevamānassāpi tassa kiriyāya kāraṇabhāvo sarīraṃ gūthena makkhetvā ahino gatakālo viya dussīlaṃ sevamānassa pāpakittisaddassa abbhuggamanakālo veditabbo.

124. Regarding 'to be disgusted by' and so forth: 'Jigucchitabbo' means one should be disgusted as with feces. 'Atha kho naṃ' means 'but for him'. 'Sound of reputation' (kittisaddo) means spoken word. 'In the same way' (evamevaṃ): here, unvirtuousness should be regarded as like a cesspit. An immoral person is like one who has fallen into a cesspit and is standing among dhamanī creepers. Just as there is the state of not being bitten by a snake even when it is pulled out of a cesspit and has climbed onto a person's body, so for one associating with an immoral person the causal nature of that action is not immediately apparent. And just as the time when the snake departs, having smeared the body with feces, so should the time when the sound of a bad reputation arises for one associating with an immoral person be understood.

125. Tindukālātanti tindukarukkhaalātaṃ. Bhiyyoso mattāya cicciṭāyatīti tañhi jhāyamānaṃ pakatiyāpi papaṭikāyo muñcantaṃ cicciṭāyati ciṭiciṭāti saddaṃ karoti. Ghaṭṭitaṃ pana adhimattaṃ karotīti attho. Evamevanti evamevaṃ kodhano attano dhammatāyapi uddhato caṇḍikato hutvā carati. Appamattakaṃ pana vacanaṃ vuttakāle ‘mādisaṃ nāma evaṃ vadatī’ti atirekataraṃ uddhato caṇḍikato hutvā carati. Gūthakūpoti gūthapuṇṇakūpo, gūtharāsiyeva vā. Opammasaṃsandanaṃ panettha purimanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Tasmā evarūpo puggalo ajjhupekkhitabbo, na sevitabboti yasmā kodhano atiseviyamānopi atiupasaṅkamiyamānopi kujjhatiyeva, ‘kiṃ iminā’ti paṭikkamantopi kujjhatiyeva, tasmā palālaggi viya ajjhupekkhitabbo, na sevitabbo. Kiṃ vuttaṃ hoti? Yo hi palālaggiṃ atiupasaṅkamitvā tappati, tassa sarīraṃ jhāyati. Yo atipaṭikkamitvā tappati, tassa sītaṃ na vūpasammati. Anupasaṅkamitvā apaṭikkamitvā pana majjhattabhāvena tappentassa sītaṃ vūpasammati, kāyopi na ḍayhati. Tasmā palālaggi viya kodhano puggalo majjhattabhāvena ajjhupekkhitabbo, na sevitabbo, na bhajitabbo, na payirupāsitabbo.

125. 'Tindukālātaṃ' means a firebrand from a tinduka tree. 'Bhiyyoso mattāya cicciṭāyati' means it crackles with even greater intensity. For when burning, it naturally emits sparks and makes a crackling, 'ciṭiciṭā,' sound. When struck, it makes an even louder noise; this is the meaning. 'In the same way' (evamevaṃ): similarly, an angry person, by their very nature, behaves in an agitated and fierce manner. But when even a slight word is spoken, thinking, 'How dare they speak to someone like me thus,' they become even more agitated and fierce. 'Cesspit' (gūthakūpo) means a pit full of feces or simply a heap of feces. The connection of the simile here should be understood in the same way as before. Therefore, such a person should be regarded with equanimity, not associated with. Because an angry person gets angry even when served excessively or approached excessively, and gets angry even when one withdraws thinking, 'What is the use of this?'; therefore, like a fire of straw, they should be regarded with equanimity, not associated with. What is meant by this? For one who warms themselves by approaching a fire of straw too closely, their body is scorched. One who warms themselves by staying too far away does not have their cold allayed. But for one who warms themselves with a neutral attitude, neither approaching nor withdrawing, their cold is allayed and their body is not burned. Therefore, like a fire of straw, an angry person should be regarded with equanimity—not associated with, not befriended, not attended upon.

126. Kalyāṇamittoti sucimitto. Kalyāṇasahāyoti sucisahāyo. Sahāyoti sahagāmī saddhiṃcaro. Kalyāṇasampavaṅkoti kalyāṇesu [Pg.70] sucipuggalesu sampavaṅko, tanninnatappoṇatappabbhāramānasoti attho.

126. 'Kalyāṇamitto' means a virtuous friend. 'Kalyāṇasahāyo' means a virtuous companion. 'Sahāyo' means one who travels together, one who fares along with. 'Kalyāṇasampavaṅko' means one who is inclined towards virtuous, pure individuals—that is, one whose mind is inclined, disposed, and leans towards them; this is the meaning.

127. Sīlesu paripūrakārītiādīsu – sīlesu paripūrakārinoti ete ariyasāvakā yāni tāni maggabrahmacariyassa ādibhūtāni, ādibrahmacariyakāni, pārājikasaṅkhātāni cattāri mahāsīlasikkhāpadāni, tesaṃ avītikkamanato yāni khuddānukhuddakāni āpajjanti, tehi ca vuṭṭhānato sīlesu yaṃ kattabbaṃ, taṃ paripūraṃ samattaṃ karontīti ‘sīlesu paripūrakārino’ti vuccanti. Samādhipāribandhakānaṃ pana kāmarāgabyāpādānaṃ, paññāpāribandhakassa ca saccapaṭicchādakassa mohassa asamūhatattā, samādhiṃ paññañca bhāventāpi samādhipaññāsu yaṃ kattabbaṃ taṃ mattaso pamāṇena padesamattameva karontīti samādhismiṃ paññāya ca mattaso kārinoti vuccanti. Iminā upāyena itaresupi dvīsu nayesu attho veditabbo.

127. Regarding 'one who fulfills virtuous conduct' and so forth: 'Sīlesu paripūrakārino' means that these noble disciples, regarding the four great training rules known as the pārājikas, which are fundamental to the holy life, pertaining to the beginning of the holy life, do not transgress them. Even if they commit minor and lesser offenses, they recover from them. Thus, they fully and completely accomplish what should be done in terms of virtue; hence, they are called 'fulfillers of virtuous conduct'. But because sensual desire and ill-will, which hinder concentration, and delusion which conceals the truth and hinders wisdom, have not been eradicated, even though they develop concentration and wisdom, they only partially accomplish what should be done in terms of concentration and wisdom; hence, they are called 'partial doers in concentration and wisdom'. In this way, the meaning in the other two cases should also be understood.

Tatrāyaṃ aparopi suttantanayo –

Herein is also another method according to the suttas:

‘‘Idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu sīlesu paripūrakārī hoti, samādhismiṃ mattaso kārī, paññāya mattaso kārī. So yāni tāni khuddānukhuddakāni sikkhāpadāni tāni āpajjatipi, vuṭṭhātipi. Taṃ kissa hetu? Na hi mettha, bhikkhave, abhabbatā vuttā. Yāni ca kho tāni sikkhāpadāni ādibrahmacariyakāni brahmacariyasāruppāni, tattha dhuvasīlo ca hoti, ṭhitasīlo ca, samādāya sikkhati sikkhāpadesu. So tiṇṇaṃ saṃyojanānaṃ parikkhayā sotāpanno hoti, avinipātadhammo niyato sambodhiparāyaṇo. Idha pana, bhikkhave, bhikkhu sīlesu…pe… so tiṇṇaṃ saṃyojanānaṃ parikkhayā, rāgadosamohānaṃ tanuttā, sakadāgāmī hoti; sakideva imaṃ lokaṃ āgantvā dukkhassantaṃ karoti. Idha pana, bhikkhave, bhikkhu sīlesu paripūrakārī hoti, samādhismiṃ paripūrakārī, paññāya mattaso kārī. So yāni tāni…pe… sikkhati sikkhāpadesu. So pañcannaṃ orambhāgiyānaṃ…pe… anāvattidhammo tasmā lokā. Idha pana, bhikkhave[Pg.71], bhikkhu sīlesu paripūrakārī, samādhismiṃ paripūrakārī, paññāya paripūrakārī. So yāni tāni khuddānukhuddakāni…pe… sikkhati sikkhāpadesu. So āsavānaṃ khayā…pe… upasampajja viharatī’’ti (a. ni. 3.87).

“Here, monks, a monk is accomplished in virtue, one who practices moderately in concentration, and one who practices moderately in wisdom. He falls into and rises out of minor and subsidiary training rules. Why is that? Because, monks, no inability has been declared here. But as for those training rules that are fundamental to the holy life, suitable for the holy life—there he is constant in virtue, firm in virtue, and having undertaken them, he trains in the training rules. With the destruction of the three fetters, he is a stream-enterer, no longer subject to downfall, fixed in destiny, with enlightenment as his destination. Here, monks, a monk is accomplished in virtue… With the destruction of the three fetters and the attenuation of greed, hatred, and delusion, he becomes a once-returner; having come back to this world just once, he makes an end of suffering. Here, monks, a monk is accomplished in virtue, accomplished in concentration, and one who practices moderately in wisdom. He falls into and rises out of minor and subsidiary training rules… but as for those training rules that are fundamental to the holy life, suitable for the holy life—there he is constant in virtue, firm in virtue, and having undertaken them, he trains in the training rules. With the destruction of the five lower fetters… he is a non-returner, not liable to return from that world. Here, monks, a monk is accomplished in virtue, accomplished in concentration, and accomplished in wisdom. He falls into and rises out of minor and subsidiary training rules… but as for those training rules that are fundamental to the holy life, suitable for the holy life—there he is constant in virtue, firm in virtue, and having undertaken them, he trains in the training rules. With the destruction of the taints… he enters and dwells in the taintless liberation of mind, liberation by wisdom, having realized it for himself with direct knowledge.”

130. Satthāraniddese – pariññaṃ paññapetīti pahānaṃ samatikkamaṃ paññapeti. Tatrāti tesu tīsu janesu. Tena daṭṭhabboti tena paññāpanena so satthā rūpāvacarasamāpattiyā lābhīti daṭṭhabboti attho. Dutiyavārepi eseva nayo. Sammāsambuddho satthā tena daṭṭhabboti tena titthiyehi asādhāraṇena paññāpanena ayaṃ tatiyo satthā sabbaññubuddho daṭṭhabbo. Titthiyā hi kāmānaṃ pariññaṃ paññapentā rūpabhavaṃ vakkhanti. Rūpānaṃ pariññaṃ paññapentā arūpabhavaṃ vakkhanti. Vedanānaṃ pariññaṃ paññapentā asaññabhavaṃ vakkhanti. Sammā paññapentā ‘evaṃ paññapeyyuṃ’, no ca sammā paññapetuṃ sakkonti. Sammāsambuddho pana kāmānaṃ pariññaṃ pahānaṃ anāgāmimaggena paññapeti. Rūpavedanānaṃ pariññaṃ pahānaṃ arahattamaggena paññapeti. Ime tayo satthāroti ime dve janā bāhirakā, eko sammāsambuddhoti – imasmiṃ loke tayo satthāro nāma.

130. In the Explanation of Teachers: 'He declares full understanding' means he declares abandonment and overcoming. 'Therein' means among those three kinds of people. 'By that, it should be seen' means: by that declaration, that teacher should be seen as one who has attained the form-sphere meditative attainments; this is the meaning. The same applies to the second instance. The Perfectly Self-Enlightened One is the Teacher; 'by that, it should be seen': by that declaration, which is not common to sectarians, this third teacher should be seen as the All-Knowing Buddha. For sectarians, while declaring the full understanding of sensual pleasures, will speak of form existence. While declaring the full understanding of forms, they will speak of formless existence. While declaring the full understanding of feelings, they will speak of perceptionless existence. If they were to declare correctly, they would declare thus, but they are not able to declare correctly. However, the Perfectly Self-Enlightened One declares the full understanding of sensual pleasures as abandonment by means of the path of non-returning. He declares the full understanding of forms and feelings as abandonment by means of the path of arahantship. 'These three teachers' means: these two persons are outsiders, and one is the Perfectly Self-Enlightened One. Thus, in this world, there are these three called 'teachers'.

131. Dutiye satthāraniddese – diṭṭhe ceva dhammeti imasmiṃ attabhāve. Attānaṃ saccato thetato paññapetīti ‘‘attā nāmeko atthi nicco dhuvo sassato’’ti bhūtato thirato paññapeti. Abhisamparāyañcāti aparasmiṃ attabhāve evameva paññapeti. Sesamettha vuttanayeneva veditabbanti.

131. In the second exposition on the Teacher – 'In this very life' means in this present existence. He declares the self as true and substantial, saying: 'There is indeed a self that is permanent, stable, everlasting,' thus declaring it as real and firm. 'And in the next life' means he similarly proclaims it in a future existence. The rest should be understood in the same way as previously explained.

Tikaniddesavaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Exposition of the Triad.

4. Catukkaniddesavaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Exposition of the Tetrad.

132. Catukkaniddese – asappurisoti lāmakapuriso. Pāṇaṃ atipātetīti pāṇātipātī. Adinnaṃ ādiyatīti adinnādāyī. Kāmesu micchā caratīti kāmesumicchācārī. Musā vadatīti musāvādī. Surāmerayamajjapamāde tiṭṭhatīti surāmerayamajjapamādaṭṭhāyī.

132. In the exposition of the tetrad – 'asappuriso' means an inferior person. 'Pāṇaṃ atipātetīti' means 'he destroys life'; thus he is a 'destroyer of life' (pāṇātipātī). 'Adinnaṃ ādiyatīti' means 'he takes what is not given'; thus he is a 'taker of what is not given' (adinnādāyī). 'Kāmesu micchā caratīti' means 'he engages in misconduct in sensual pleasures'; thus he is 'one who engages in misconduct in sensual pleasures' (kāmesumicchācārī). 'Musā vadatīti' means 'he speaks falsely'; thus he is a 'speaker of falsehood' (musāvādī). 'Surāmerayamajjapamāde tiṭṭhatīti' means 'he abides in heedlessness due to distilled and fermented intoxicants'; thus he is 'one who abides in heedlessness due to distilled and fermented intoxicants' (surāmerayamajjapamādaṭṭhāyī).

133. Pāṇātipāte [Pg.72] samādapetīti yathā pāṇaṃ atipāteti, tathā naṃ tattha gahaṇaṃ gaṇhāpeti. Sesesupi eseva nayo. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo yasmā sayaṃ katena ca dussīlyena samannāgato yañca samādapitena kataṃ, tato upaḍḍhassa dāyādo, tasmā asappurisena asappurisataroti vuccati. Sappurisoti uttamapuriso.

133. 'He instigates the destruction of life' means that just as he himself destroys life, so he causes another to undertake it. The same method applies to the rest. 'This is said' means this kind of person, because he is endowed with immorality through what he has done himself and through what was done by his instigation, is an heir to half of that. Therefore, he is called 'worse than an inferior person' (asappurisena asappurisataro). 'Sappuriso' means a superior person.

135. Sappurisena sappurisataroti attanā katena susīlyena samannāgatattā yañca samādapito karoti. Tato upaḍḍhassa dāyādattā uttamapurisena uttamapurisataro.

135. 'Better than a good person' means that because he is endowed with morality through what he has done himself and through what one he has instigated does, and is thus an heir to half of that, he is 'more superior than a superior person' (uttamapurisena uttamapurisataro).

136. Pāpoti akusalakammapathasaṅkhātena dasavidhena pāpena samannāgato.

136. 'Pāpo' means one who is endowed with the ten kinds of evil, reckoned as the paths of unwholesome action.

138. Kalyāṇoti kusalakammapathasaṅkhātena dasavidhena kalyāṇadhammena samannāgato suddhako bhadrako. Sesamettha heṭṭhā vuttanayattā uttānatthameva.

138. 'Kalyāṇo' means one who is endowed with the ten kinds of virtuous qualities, reckoned as the paths of wholesome action—pure and excellent. The rest here is of obvious meaning, because it follows the method stated below.

140. Pāpadhammādīsu – pāpo dhammo assāti pāpadhammo. Kalyāṇo dhammo assāti kalyāṇadhammo. Sesamettha uttānatthameva.

140. Regarding 'one with evil qualities' and so on—'pāpo dhammo assāti' means 'his qualities are evil'; thus he is 'one with evil qualities' (pāpadhammo). 'Kalyāṇo dhammo assāti' means 'his qualities are good'; thus he is 'one with good qualities' (kalyāṇadhammo). The rest here is of obvious meaning.

144. Sāvajjādīsu – sāvajjoti sadoso. Sāvajjena kāyakammenāti sadosena pāṇātipātādinā kāyakammena. Itaresupi eseva nayo. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo tīhi dvārehi āyūhanakammassa sadosattā, gūthakuṇapādibharito padeso viya sāvajjoti vuccati.

144. Regarding 'blameworthy' and so on—'sāvajjoti' means 'blameworthy', that is, 'with fault' (sadoso). 'Sāvajjena kāyakammenāti' means 'by blameworthy bodily action', that is, 'by bodily action with fault, such as the destruction of life and so on'. The same method applies to the others. 'This is said' means this kind of person is called 'blameworthy' (sāvajjo), because his accumulating action through the three doors is faulty, like a place filled with dung, carcasses, and so on.

145. Sāvajjena bahulanti yassa sāvajjameva kāyakammaṃ bahu hoti, appaṃ anavajjaṃ; so sāvajjena bahulaṃ kāyakammena samannāgato, appaṃ anavajjenāti vuccati. Itaresupi eseva nayo. Ko pana evarūpo hotīti? Yo gāmadhammatāya vā nigamadhammatāya vā kadāci karahaci uposathaṃ samādiyati, sīlāni pūreti. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ evarūpo puggalo [Pg.73] tīhi dvārehi āyūhanakammesu sāvajjasseva bahulatāya anavajjassa appatāya vajjabahuloti vuccati.

145. 'Sāvajjena bahulanti' means one for whom blameworthy bodily action is abundant, and blameless action is scarce; he is called 'one endowed with bodily action that is mostly blameworthy and little that is blameless'. The same method applies to the others. But who is such a person? One who, due to village custom or town custom, occasionally undertakes the Uposatha and fulfills the precepts. 'This is said' means this kind of person, because among the accumulating actions through the three doors, the blameworthy are abundant and the blameless are scarce, is called 'one for whom faults are abundant' (vajjabahulo).

Yathā hi ekasmiṃ padese dubbaṇṇāni duggandhāni pupphāni rāsikatānassu, tesaṃ upari tahaṃ tahaṃ atimuttakavassikapāṭalāni patitāni bhaveyyuṃ. Evarūpo ayaṃ puggalo veditabbo. Yathā pana ekasmiṃ padese atimuttakavassikapāṭalāni rāsikatānassu, tesaṃ upari tahaṃ tahaṃ dubbaṇṇaduggandhāni badarapupphādīni patitāni bhaveyyuṃ. Evarūpo tatiyo puggalo veditabbo. Catuttho pana tīhipi dvārehi āyūhanakammassa niddosattā, catumadhurabharitasuvaṇṇapāti viya daṭṭhabbo. Tesu paṭhamo andhabālaputhujjano. Dutiyo antarantarā kusalassa kārako lokiyaputhujjano. Tatiyo sotāpanno sakadāgāmianāgāminopi eteneva saṅgahitā. Catuttho khīṇāsavo. So hi ekantena anavajjoyeva. Ayaṃ aṅguttaraṭṭhakathāyo.

For example, in one place there might be a heap of ill-colored, foul-smelling flowers, and on top of them, here and there, atimuttaka, vassika, and pāṭalā flowers might have fallen. This kind of person should be understood thus. Or, just as in one place there might be a heap of atimuttaka, vassika, and pāṭalā flowers, and on top of them, here and there, ill-colored, foul-smelling flowers like jujube blossoms and so on might have fallen. The third kind of person should be understood thus. The fourth, however, because his accumulating action through the three doors is faultless, should be seen as like a golden bowl filled with the four sweet things. Among these, the first is a blind, foolish ordinary person. The second is a worldly ordinary person who performs wholesome deeds from time to time. The third is a stream-enterer; once-returners and non-returners are also included by this. The fourth is one whose taints are destroyed. He is indeed entirely blameless. This is from the Aṅguttara commentary.

148. Ugghaṭitaññūādīsu – ugghaṭitaññūti ettha ugghaṭitaṃ nāma ñāṇugghāṭanaṃ, ñāṇe ugghaṭitamatteyeva jānātīti attho. Saha udāhaṭavelāyāti udāhāre udāhaṭamatteyeva. Dhammābhisamayoti catusaccadhammassa ñāṇena saddhiṃ abhisamayo. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ ‘cattāro satipaṭṭhānā’tiādinā nayena saṃkhittena mātikāya ṭhapiyamānāya desanānusārena ñāṇaṃ pesetvā arahattaṃ gaṇhituṃ samattho puggalo ugghaṭitaññūti vuccati.

148. Among those like 'one who understands upon utterance' and so on—here, 'ugghaṭita' means the opening of knowledge; the meaning is that one understands as soon as knowledge is opened. 'Saha udāhaṭavelāyāti' means 'at the very moment of utterance', that is, as soon as it is uttered. 'Dhammābhisamayo' means the realization of the Dhamma of the Four Truths together with knowledge. 'This is said' means this person, who is capable of attaining arahantship by directing knowledge according to the teaching when a brief matrix is laid out in the manner of 'the four foundations of mindfulness' and so forth, is called 'one who understands upon utterance' (ugghaṭitaññū).

149. Vipañcitaṃ vitthāritameva atthaṃ jānātīti vipañcitaññū. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ saṅkhittena mātikaṃ ṭhapetvā vitthārena atthe bhājiyamāne arahattaṃ pāpuṇituṃ samattho puggalo vipañcitaññūti vuccati.

149. 'Vipañcitaṃ vitthāritameva atthaṃ jānātīti' means 'one who understands the meaning only when it is made clear and elaborated'; thus he is 'one who understands by elaboration' (vipañcitaññū). 'This is said' means this person who, when a matrix is set forth briefly and then the meaning is analyzed in detail, is capable of attaining arahantship, is called 'one who understands by elaboration' (vipañcitaññū).

150. Uddesādīhi netabboti neyyo. Anupubbena dhammābhisamayo hotīti anukkamena arahattappatti.

150. 'Uddesādīhi netabboti' means 'to be guided by instruction and so on'; thus he is 'one who is to be guided' (neyyo). 'Anupubbena dhammābhisamayo hotīti' means 'there is a gradual realization of the Dhamma', that is, the gradual attainment of arahantship.

151. Byañjanapadameva [Pg.74] paramaṃ assāti padaparamo. Na tāya jātiyā dhammābhisamayo hotīti na tena attabhāvena jhānaṃ vā vipassanaṃ vā maggaṃ vā phalaṃ vā nibbattetuṃ sakkotīti attho.

151. 'Byañjanapadameva paramaṃ assāti' means 'for whom the mere letter of the text is supreme'; thus he is 'one for whom the letter is supreme' (padaparamo). 'Na tāya jātiyā dhammābhisamayo hotīti' means 'there is no realization of the Dhamma in that birth'; the meaning is that with that existence one is incapable of producing jhāna, insight, path, or fruition.

152. Yuttapaṭibhānādīsu – paṭibhānaṃ vuccati ñāṇampi, ñāṇassa upaṭṭhitavacanampi. Taṃ idha adhippetaṃ. Atthayuttaṃ kāraṇayuttañca paṭibhānamassāti yuttappaṭibhāno. Pucchitānantarameva sīghaṃ byākātuṃ asamatthatāya no muttaṃ paṭibhānamassāti no muttappaṭibhāno. Iminā nayena sesā veditabbā. Ettha pana paṭhamo – kiñci kālaṃ vīmaṃsitvā yuttameva pekkhati, tipiṭakacūḷanāgatthero viya. So kira pañhaṃ puṭṭho pariggahetvā yuttapayuttakāraṇameva katheti.

152. Among those like 'one with fitting readiness of mind' and so on—'paṭibhāna' is said to be both knowledge and speech that is ready because of knowledge. The latter is intended here. 'Atthayuttaṃ kāraṇayuttañca paṭibhānamassāti' means 'whose readiness of mind is connected with meaning and reason'; thus he is 'one with fitting readiness of mind' (yuttappaṭibhāno). 'Pucchitānantarameva sīghaṃ byākātuṃ asamatthatāya no muttaṃ paṭibhānamassāti' means 'whose readiness of mind is not quick, due to being incapable of answering swiftly immediately after being questioned'; thus he is 'one whose readiness of mind is not quick' (no muttappaṭibhāno). The rest should be understood in this way. Here, the first—after reflecting for some time, considers only what is fitting, like the Elder Tipiṭaka Cūḷanāga. It is said that when asked a question, he would grasp it and speak only of what was reasonable and fitting.

Dutiyo – pucchānantarameva yena vā tena vā vacanena paṭibāhati, vīmaṃsitvāpi ca yuttaṃ na pekkhati catunikāyikapaṇḍitatissatthero viya. So kira pañhaṃ puṭṭho pañhapariyosānampi nāgameti, yaṃ vā taṃ vā kathetiyeva. Vacanatthaṃ panassa vīmaṃsiyamānaṃ katthaci na laggati.

The second—immediately after being questioned, rebuts with some speech or another, and even upon reflection does not see what is fitting, like the Elder Catunikāyika Paṇḍita Tissa. It is said that when asked a question, he would not even wait for the question to be finished, and would just say whatever. However, when the meaning of his words was examined, it did not apply anywhere.

Tatiyo – pucchāsamakālameva yuttaṃ pekkhati, taṅkhaṇaññeva vacanaṃ byākaroti tipiṭakacūḷābhayatthero viya. So kira pañhaṃ puṭṭho sīghameva katheti, yuttapayuttakāraṇo ca hoti.

The third—at the very moment of being questioned, sees what is fitting and answers immediately, like the Elder Tipiṭaka Cūḷābhaya. It is said that when asked a question, he would speak quickly, and his explanation would be fitting and reasoned.

Catuttho – puṭṭho samāno neva yuttaṃ pekkhati, na yena vā tena vā paṭibāhituṃ sakkoti tibbandhakāranimuggo viya hoti lāḷudāyitthero viya.

The fourth—when questioned, neither sees what is fitting nor is able to retort in any way; he is like one submerged in dense darkness, like the Elder Lāḷudāyi.

156. Dhammakathikesu – appañca bhāsatīti sampattaparisāya thokameva katheti. Asahitañcāti kathento ca pana na atthayuttaṃ kāraṇayuttaṃ katheti. Parisā cassa na kusalā hotīti sotuṃ nisinnaparisā cassa yuttāyuttaṃ kāraṇākāraṇaṃ siliṭṭhāsiliṭṭhaṃ na jānātīti attho. Evarūpoti ayaṃ evaṃjātiko bāladhammakathiko. Evaṃjātikāya bālaparisāya dhammakathikotveva nāmaṃ labhati. Iminā nayena sabbattha attho veditabbo. Ettha ca dveyeva janā sabhāvadhammakathikā, itare pana dhammakathikānaṃ antare paviṭṭhattā evaṃ vuttā.

156. Among Dhamma speakers—"he speaks little" means he speaks only a little to the assembled company. "And it is disconnected" means that while speaking, he does not speak what is connected with meaning and reason. "And his assembly is not skilled" means the assembly sitting to listen does not know what is fitting or unfitting, reasonable or unreasonable, elegant or inelegant—that is the meaning. "Such a one" means this kind of foolish Dhamma speaker. For such a foolish assembly, he gains merely the name of 'Dhamma speaker'. The meaning should be understood in this way in all cases. Here, only two persons are Dhamma speakers by nature; the others, however, are described thus because they are included among Dhamma speakers.

157. Valāhakūpamesu [Pg.75] valāhakāti meghā. Gajjitāti thanitā. Tattha gajjitvā no vassanabhāvo nāma pāpako. Manussā hi yathā devo gajjati ‘suvuṭṭhikā bhavissatī’ti bījāni nīharitvā vapanti. Atha deve avassante khette bījāni khetteyeva nassanti, gehe bījāni geheyeva nassantīti dubbhikkhaṃ hoti. No gajjitvā vassanabhāvopi pāpakova. Manussā hi ‘imasmiṃ kāle dubbuṭṭhikā bhavissatī’ti ninnaṭṭhānesuyeva vappaṃ karonti. Atha devo vassitvā sabbabījāni mahāsamuddaṃ pāpeti, dubbhikkhameva hoti. Gajjitvā vassanabhāvo pana bhaddako. Tadā hi subhikkhaṃ hoti. No gajjitvā no vassanabhāvo ekantapāpakova.

157. In the similes of clouds, "valāhakā" means clouds. "Gajjitā" means thunderers. There, the state of thundering without raining is indeed bad. For when the sky thunders, people, thinking, "There will be good rain," bring out seeds and sow them. But if the sky does not rain, the seeds in the field perish right there in the field, and the seeds in the house perish right there in the house; thus, a famine occurs. The state of raining without thundering is also bad. For people, thinking, "There will be poor rain this season," sow only in low-lying areas. Then, when the sky rains, it carries all the seeds to the great ocean, and a famine occurs. But the state of thundering and then raining is good, for then there is abundance. The state of neither thundering nor raining is utterly bad.

Bhāsitā hoti no kattāti ‘idāni ganthadhuraṃ pūressāmi, vāsadhuraṃ pūressāmī’ti kathetiyeva, na pana uddesaṃ gaṇhāti, na kammaṭṭhānaṃ bhāveti.

One who is a speaker but not a doer: he only says, "Now I will fulfill the burden of study, I will fulfill the burden of dwelling," but he does not take up the lesson, nor does he cultivate the meditation subject.

Kattā hoti no bhāsitāti ‘ganthadhuraṃ vā pūressāmi vāsadhuraṃ vā’ti na bhāsati. Sampatte pana kāle tamatthaṃ sampādeti. Iminā nayena itarepi veditabbā. Sabbaṃ panetaṃ paccayadāyakeneva kathitaṃ. Eko hi ‘asukadivase nāma dānaṃ dassāmī’ti saṅghaṃ nimanteti, sampattakāle no karoti. Ayaṃ puggalo puññena parihāyati, bhikkhusaṅghopi lābhena parihāyati. Aparo saṅghaṃ animantetvāva sakkāraṃ katvā ‘bhikkhū ānessāmī’ti na labhati, sabbe aññattha nimantitā honti. Ayampi puññena parihāyati, saṅghopi tena lābhena parihāyati. Aparo paṭhamaṃ saṅghaṃ nimantetvā, pacchā sakkāraṃ katvā dānaṃ deti, ayaṃ kiccakārī hoti. Aparo neva saṅghaṃ nimanteti, na dānaṃ deti, ayaṃ ‘pāpapuggalo’ti veditabbo.

One who is a doer but not a speaker: he does not say, "I will fulfill the burden of study or the burden of dwelling." Yet when the time comes, he accomplishes that purpose. The others should also be understood in this way. All this, however, has been said with reference to the giver of requisites. For one person invites the Saṅgha, saying, "On such and such a day, I will give a donation," but when the time arrives, he does not do it. This person declines in merit, and the Bhikkhu Saṅgha also declines in gain. Another, without inviting the Saṅgha, having prepared an offering, does not succeed in bringing the monks, for all have been invited elsewhere. This one also declines in merit, and the Saṅgha also declines in that gain. Another first invites the Saṅgha, and afterward, having prepared an offering, gives a donation; this one is a doer of what is to be done. Yet another neither invites the Saṅgha nor gives a donation; this one should be known as "a wicked person."

158. Mūsikūpamesu – gādhaṃ kattā no vasitāti attano āsayaṃ bilaṃ kūpaṃ khaṇati, no tattha vasati, kismiñcideva ṭhāne vasati, evaṃ biḷārādiamittavasaṃ gacchati. Khattātipi pāṭho. Vasitā no gādhaṃ kattāti sayaṃ na khaṇati, parena khate bile vasati, evaṃ jīvitaṃ rakkhati. Tatiyā dvepi karontī, jīvitaṃ rakkhati. Catutthā dvepi akarontī amittavasaṃ gacchati. Imāya pana upamāya upamitesu puggalesu [Pg.76] paṭhamo yathā sā mūsikā gādhaṃ khaṇati, evaṃ navaṅgaṃ satthusāsanaṃ uggaṇhāti. Yathā pana sā tattha na vasati, kismiñcideva ṭhāne vasantī, amittavasaṃ gacchati; tathā ayampi pariyattivasena ñāṇaṃ pesetvā catusaccadhammaṃ na paṭivijjhati, lokāmisaṭṭhānesuyeva caranto maccumārakilesamāradevaputtamārasaṅkhātānaṃ amittānaṃ vasaṃ gacchati. Dutiyo yathā sā mūsikā gādhaṃ na khaṇati, evaṃ navaṅgaṃ satthusāsanaṃ na uggaṇhāti. Yathā pana parena khatabile vasantī jīvitaṃ rakkhati; evaṃ parassa kathaṃ sutvā catusaccadhammaṃ paṭivijjhitvā tiṇṇaṃ mārānaṃ vasaṃ atikkamati. Iminā nayena tatiyacatutthesupi opammasaṃsandanaṃ veditabbaṃ.

158. In the similes of mice—one who digs deep but does not dwell there: a mouse digs a burrow, a pit, for its own shelter, but does not live there, instead dwelling in some other place; thus it falls under the power of enemies like cats and others. There is also the reading 'khattā'. One who dwells but does not dig deep: it does not dig itself, but lives in a burrow dug by another; thus it preserves its life. The third does both, and preserves its life. The fourth does neither, and falls under the power of enemies. However, among the individuals compared by this simile, the first, just as that mouse digs deep, so too does this person learn the ninefold teaching of the Teacher. But just as that mouse does not dwell there, instead living in some other place and falling under the power of enemies, so too does this person, having sent forth knowledge through study, fail to penetrate the Dhamma of the Four Noble Truths. Wandering in the realm of worldly gains, they fall under the power of enemies known as Death-Māra, Defilement-Māra, and Devaputta-Māra. The second, just as that mouse does not dig deep, so too does this person not learn the ninefold teaching of the Teacher. But just as that mouse lives in a burrow dug by another and preserves its life, so too does this person, hearing the words of another, penetrate the Dhamma of the Four Noble Truths and transcend the power of the three Māras. In this way, the connection of the simile should be understood for the third and fourth types as well.

159. Ambūpamesu – āmaṃ pakkavaṇṇīti anto āmaṃ bahi pakkasadisaṃ. Pakkaṃ āmavaṇṇīti anto pakkaṃ bahi āmasadisaṃ. Sesadvayesupi eseva nayo. Tattha yathā ambe apakkabhāvo āmatā hoti, evaṃ puggalepi puthujjanabhāvo āmatā, ariyabhāvo pakkatā. Yathā ca tattha pakkasadisatā pakkavaṇṇitā; evaṃ puggalepi ariyānaṃ abhikkamanādisadisatā pakkavaṇṇitāti – iminā nayena upamitapuggalesu opammasaṃsandanaṃ veditabbaṃ.

159. In the similes of mangoes—'unripe with the appearance of ripe' means unripe inside but resembling the ripe on the outside. 'Ripe with the appearance of unripe' means ripe inside but resembling the unripe on the outside. The same principle applies to the remaining two cases as well. Here, just as the state of unripeness in a mango is its rawness, so too in a person, the state of an ordinary person is rawness, while the state of a noble one is ripeness. And just as the resemblance to ripeness there is called 'the appearance of ripe,' so too in a person, resemblance to the noble ones in their deportment and so on is called 'the appearance of ripe.' In this way, the connection between the simile and the individuals being compared should be understood.

160. Kumbhūpamesu – kumbhoti ghaṭo. Tucchoti anto ritto. Pihitoti pidahitvā ṭhapito. Puroti anto puṇṇo. Vivaṭoti vivaritvā ṭhapito. Upamitapuggalesu panettha anto guṇasāravirahito tuccho bāhirasobhanatāya pihito puggalo veditabbo. Sesesupi eseva nayo.

160. Among the examples of pots—'pot' means a jar. 'Hollow' means empty inside. 'Covered' means closed and set aside. 'Full' means filled inside. 'Open' means opened and set aside. Here, among the individuals being compared, a person who is hollow, being devoid of the essence of virtue within, and covered by outward beauty, is to be understood. The same principle applies to the remaining cases as well.

161. Udakarahadūpamesu – udakarahado tāva jaṇṇumattepi udake sati paṇṇarasasambhinnavaṇṇattā vā bahalattā vā udakassa apaññāyamānatalo uttāno gambhīrobhāso nāma hoti. Tiporisa catuporisepi pana udake sati acchattā udakassa paññāyamānatalo gambhīro uttānobhāso nāma hoti. Ubhayakāraṇasambhāvato pana itare dve veditabbā. Puggalopi kilesussadabhāvato guṇagambhīratāya ca abhāvato guṇagambhīrānaṃ sadisehi abhikkamādīhi yutto uttāno gambhīrobhāso nāma. Iminā nayena sesāpi veditabbā.

161. Among the examples of water pools—first, a water pool: even with water only up to the knee, because its bottom is not seen due to the mingling of colors or the thickness of the water, it is shallow but has the appearance of being deep; this is called 'shallow appearing deep.' But with water reaching the height of three or four men, because its bottom is seen due to the clarity of the water, it is deep but has the appearance of being shallow; this is called 'deep appearing shallow.' The other two, however, are to be understood from the combination of both these causes. Similarly, a person who, due to an abundance of defilements and an absence of depth in virtue, is endowed with conduct such as deportment that resembles those with depth in virtue, is called 'shallow appearing deep.' In this way, the rest are also to be understood.

162. Balībaddūpamesu [Pg.77] – balībaddo tāva yo attano gogaṇaṃ ghaṭṭeti ubbejeti, paragogaṇe pana sorato sukhasīlo hoti – ayaṃ sakagavacaṇḍo no paragavacaṇḍo nāma. Puggalopi attano parisaṃ ghaṭṭento vijjhanto pharusena samudācaranto, paraparisāya pana soraccaṃ nivātavuttitaṃ āpajjanto sakagavacaṇḍo hoti no paragavacaṇḍo nāmāti. Iminā nayena sesāpi veditabbā. Niddesavāre panettha ubbejitā hotīti ghaṭṭetvā vijjhitvā ubbegappattaṃ karoticceva attho.

162. Among the examples of bulls—first, the bull who disturbs and agitates his own herd, but is docile and of pleasant behavior among other herds, is called 'fierce with his own, not with others.' Similarly, a person who harasses, afflicts, and behaves harshly towards their own group, but adopts docility and humble conduct towards other groups, is called 'fierce with his own, not with others.' In this way, the rest should also be understood. Here, in the section on explanation, 'agitates' means to disturb, afflict, and cause to reach a state of agitation—this is the meaning.

163. Āsīvisūpamesu – āsīviso tāva yassa visaṃ āsuṃ āgacchati sīghaṃ pharati; ghoraṃ pana na hoti, cirakālaṃ na pīḷeti – ayaṃ āgataviso no ghoraviso. Sesapadesupi eseva nayo. Puggalavibhājanaṃ pana uttānatthameva.

163. Among the examples of snakes—first, a snake: one whose venom comes quickly and spreads swiftly, but is not severe and does not torment for long; this is called 'quick-venomed, not deadly.' The same principle applies to the remaining instances as well. The classification of individuals, however, is straightforward in meaning.

164. Ananuvicca apariyogāhetvā avaṇṇārahassa vaṇṇaṃ bhāsitā hotītiādīsu ananuviccāti atulayitvā, apariggaṇhitvā. Apariyogāhetvāti paññāya guṇe anogāhetvā.

164. In the phrases 'praising one undeserving of praise without examination or scrutiny,' and so forth, 'without examination' means without weighing or without estimating. 'Without scrutiny' means without plunging into the qualities by wisdom.

166. Bhūtaṃ tacchanti vijjamānato bhūtaṃ, aviparītato tacchaṃ. Kālenāti yuttapayuttakālena. Tatra kālaññū hotīti yamidaṃ kālenāti vuttaṃ. Tatra yo puggalo kālaññū hoti, kālaṃ jānāti, tassa pañhassa veyyākaraṇatthāya ‘‘imasmiṃ kāle pucchitenāpi mayā na kathetabbā, imasmiṃ kāle kathetabbā’’ti – ayaṃ kālena bhaṇati nāma. Upekkhako viharatīti majjhattabhūtāya upekkhāya ṭhito hutvā viharati. Sesaṃ sabbattha uttānatthameva.

166. ‘Actual’ (bhūtaṃ) is so because it exists; ‘true’ (tacchaṃ) is so because it is not contrary to fact. 'In due time' means at the fitting and proper time. In this context, 'one is a knower of time' refers to what was stated as 'in due time.' There, the person who knows the time, who understands the time, for the purpose of answering a question, thinks: 'At this time, even if asked, I should not speak; at this time, I should speak'—this one is called 'one who speaks in due time.' 'Dwells equanimous' means one dwells established in impartial equanimity. The rest is straightforward in meaning everywhere.

167. Uṭṭhānaphalūpajīvītiādīsu – yo uṭṭhānavīriyeneva divasaṃ vītināmetvā tassa nissandaphalamattaṃ kiñcideva labhitvā jīvikaṃ kappeti, taṃ pana uṭṭhānaṃ āgamma kiñci puññaphalaṃ na paṭilabhati, taṃ sandhāya yassa puggalassa uṭṭhahatotiādi vuttaṃ. Tatūpari devāti tato upari brahmakāyikādayo devā. Tesañhi uṭṭhānavīriyena kiccaṃ nāma natthi. Puññaphalameva upajīvanti. Puññavato cāti idaṃ puññavante khattiyabrāhmaṇādayo ceva bhummadeve ādiṃ katvā nimmānaratipariyosāne deve ca sandhāya [Pg.78] vuttaṃ. Sabbepi hete vāyāmaphalañceva puññaphalañca anubhavanti. Nerayikā pana neva uṭṭhānena ājīvaṃ uppādetuṃ sakkonti, nāpi nesaṃ puññaphalena koci ājīvo uppajjati.

167. Regarding 'one who lives by the fruits of exertion' and so on: This refers to one who spends the day solely by exertion and energy, sustaining a livelihood by obtaining only a little, a mere residue of the results of that exertion. However, relying on that exertion, they do not receive any fruit of merit. It is with reference to such a person that the statement beginning, 'of the person who exerts,' was made. Regarding 'devas above that': This refers to the Brahmā-realm devas and others above them. For them, there is no need for exertion or energy; they live solely by the fruits of merit. Regarding 'the meritorious': This was stated with reference to meritorious individuals such as nobles, brahmins, and so on, as well as devas, beginning with the terrestrial devas and extending up to the Nimmānarati devas. All of these experience both the fruit of exertion and the fruit of merit. However, hell-beings can neither produce a livelihood through exertion, nor does any livelihood arise for them through the fruit of merit.

168. Tamādīsu – ‘‘nīce kule paccājāto’’tiādikena tamena yuttoti tamo. Kāyaduccaritādīhi puna nirayatamūpagamanato tamaparāyaṇo. Nesādakuleti migaluddakādīnaṃ kule. Venakuleti vilīvakārakule. Rathakārakuleti cammakārakule. Pukkusakuleti pupphachaḍḍakakule. Kasiravuttiketi dukkhavuttike. Dubbaṇṇoti paṃsupisācako viya jhāmakhāṇuvaṇṇo. Duddasikoti vijātamātuyāpi amanāpadassano. Okoṭimakoti lakuṇḍako. Kāṇoti ekakkhikāṇo vā ubhayakkhikāṇo vā. Kuṇīti ekahatthakuṇī vā ubhayahatthakuṇī vā. Khañjoti ekapādakhañjo vā ubhayapādakhañjo vā. Pakkhahatoti hatapakkho pīṭhasappī. Padīpeyyassāti telakapallakādino padīpūpakaraṇassa. Evaṃ puggalo tamo hoti tamaparāyaṇoti ettha eko puggalo bahiddhā ālokaṃ adisvā mātukucchismiññeva kālaṃ katvā apāyesu nibbattanto sakalepi kappe saṃsarati. Sopi tamo tamaparāyaṇova. So pana kuhakapuggalo bhaveyya. Kuhakassa hi evarūpā nibbatti hotīti vuttaṃ.

168. Regarding 'darkness' and so on: 'Darkness' (tamo) means one who is endowed with darkness, as in 'born in a low family' and so on. Again, one is 'destined for darkness' (tamaparāyaṇo) due to misconduct of body and so on, leading to falling into the darkness of hell. 'Nesāda family' refers to the families of deer hunters and the like. 'Vena family' refers to the families of basket weavers. 'Rathakāra family' refers to the families of leather workers. 'Pukkusa family' refers to the families of flower scavengers. 'Kasiravuttika' means one who lives with difficulty. 'Dubbaṇṇa' means one with a repulsive color, like a dust-demon or a charred stump. 'Duddasika' means one whose appearance is displeasing even to his own mother. 'Okoṭimaka' means a hunchback. 'Kāṇa' means one-eyed or blind in both eyes. 'Kuṇī' means one with a crippled hand or both hands. 'Khañja' means one with a crippled foot or both feet. 'Pakkhahata' means paralyzed on one side, one who crawls on his buttocks. 'Padīpeyya' refers to lamp equipment, such as oil lamps and so on. Thus, a person is darkness and destined for darkness. Here, a person, not seeing the light outside, dies while still in the mother's womb and is reborn in the lower realms, wandering through entire aeons. Even he is darkness and destined for darkness. But that person might be a deceitful person. For a deceitful person, such a rebirth is said to occur.

Ettha ca nīce kule paccājāto hoti caṇḍālakule vātiādīhi āgamanavipatti ceva pubbuppannapaccayavipatti ca dassitā. Daliddetiādīhi pavattipaccayavipatti. Kasiravuttiketiādīhi ājīvupāyavipatti. Dubbaṇṇotiādīhi rūpavipatti. Bahvābādhotiādīhi dukkhakāraṇasamāyogo. Na lābhītiādīhi sukhakāraṇavipatti ceva upabhogavipatti ca. Kāyena duccaritantiādīhi tamaparāyaṇabhāvassa kāraṇasamāyogo. Kāyassa bhedātiādīhi samparāyikatamūpagamo. Sukkapakkho vuttapaṭipakkhanayena veditabbo.

Here, being reborn in a low family, such as a caṇḍāla family, shows both the misfortune of birth and the misfortune of previously arisen conditions. Being poor, etc., shows the misfortune of conditions for continuance. Having a difficult livelihood, etc., shows the misfortune of the means of livelihood. Being ugly, etc., shows the misfortune of appearance. Being frequently ill, etc., shows association with the causes of suffering. Not gaining, etc., shows both the misfortune of the causes of happiness and the misfortune of enjoyment. Misconduct by body, etc., shows association with the cause of being destined for darkness. Upon the breakup of the body, etc., shows going to darkness in the next world. The bright side should be understood by the method of the opposite of what has been stated.

Apicettha tividhāya kulasampattiyā paccājātiādikena jotinā yuttato joti, ālokabhūtoti vuttaṃ hoti. Kāyasucaritādīhi pana saggūpapattijotibhāvūpagamanato jotiparāyaṇo. Khattiyamahāsālakule vātiādīsu khattiyamahāsālāti khattiyā mahāsārā [Pg.79] mahāsārappattā khattiyā. Yesañhi khattiyānaṃ heṭṭhimantena koṭisataṃ nidhānagataṃ hoti, tayo kahāpaṇakumbhā vaḷañjanatthāya gehamajjhe rāsiṃ katvā ṭhapitā honti, te khattiyamahāsālā nāma. Yesaṃ brāhmaṇānaṃ asītikoṭidhanaṃ nihitaṃ hoti, diyaḍḍho kahāpaṇakumbho vaḷañjanatthāya gehamajjhe rāsiṃ katvā ṭhapito hoti, te brāhmaṇamahāsālā nāma. Yesaṃ gahapatīnaṃ cattālīsakoṭidhanaṃ nihitaṃ hoti, kahāpaṇakumbho vaḷañjatthāya gehamajjhe rāsiṃ katvā ṭhapito hoti, te gahapatimahāsālā nāma. Tesaṃ kuleti attho. Aḍḍheti issare. Nidhānagatadhanassa mahantatāya mahaddhane. Suvaṇṇarajatabhājanādīnaṃ upabhogabhaṇḍānaṃ mahantatāya mahābhoge. Nidhānagatassa jātarūparajatassa pahūtatāya pahūtajātarūparajate. Vittūpakaraṇassa tuṭṭhikaraṇassa pahūtatāya pahūtavittūpakaraṇe. Godhanādīnañca sattavidhadhaññānañca pahūtatāya pahūtadhanadhaññe. Abhirūpoti sundararūpo. Dassanīyoti aññaṃ kammaṃ pahāya divasampi passitabbayutto. Pāsādikoti dassaneneva cittapasādāvaho. Paramāyāti uttamāya. Vaṇṇapokkharatāyāti pokkharavaṇṇatāya. Pokkharaṃ vuccati sarīraṃ. Tassa vaṇṇasampattiyāti attho. Samannāgatoti upeto.

Furthermore, here, 'light' (joti) is said because one is endowed with light through the threefold family prosperity, rebirth, and so on, meaning one is light-like. Moreover, one is 'destined for light' (jotiparāyaṇo) because one attains the state of light of rebirth in heaven through bodily good conduct and the like. In the phrases 'either in a noble great-family' and so on, 'noble great-family' refers to nobles who are greatly prosperous, having attained great essence. For among those nobles, those who have at least one hundred crores of buried treasures, and three pots of coins are heaped up in the middle of the house for daily use—these are called 'noble great-families.' Among brahmins, those who have eighty crores in buried wealth, with one and a half pots of coins heaped up in the middle of the house for daily use, are called 'brahmin great-families.' Among householders, those who have forty crores in buried wealth, with a pot of coins heaped up in the middle of the house for daily use, are called 'householder great-families.' This is the meaning of 'of such a family.' 'Wealthy' means powerful. 'With great riches' means having great wealth, due to the greatness of buried wealth. 'With great possessions' means having great enjoyments, due to the greatness of gold, silver vessels, and other goods for enjoyment. 'With abundant gold and silver' means having abundant gold and silver, due to the abundance of buried gold and silver. 'With abundant wealth and means' means having abundant wealth and means, due to the abundance of wealth and means that cause contentment. 'With abundant wealth and grain' means having abundant wealth and grain, due to the abundance of cattle and so on, and the seven kinds of grain. 'Handsome' means having a beautiful form. 'Pleasing to behold' means one is worthy of being looked at even for a day, abandoning other work. 'Inspiring confidence' means one brings serenity to the mind merely by being seen. 'Of the highest' means supreme. 'With lotus-like complexion' means having a lotus-like hue. 'Pokkhara' is said to be the body, so the meaning is the accomplishment of its complexion. 'Endowed' means possessed.

169. Oṇatoṇatādīsu – diṭṭhadhammikāya vā samparāyikāya vā sampattiyā virahito oṇato. Nīco, lāmakoti attho. Tabbipakkhato uṇṇato. Ucco, uggatoti attho. Sesamettha tamādīsu vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Apica – oṇatoṇatoti idāni nīco, āyatimpi nīcova bhavissati. Oṇatuṇṇatoti idāni nīco, āyatiṃ ucco bhavissati. Uṇṇatoṇatoti idāni ucco, āyatiṃ nīco bhavissati. Uṇṇatuṇṇatoti idāni ucco, āyatimpi uccova bhavissatīti.

169. Regarding the terms 'low and low' and so on: one who is deprived of attainment in this life or the next is called 'low' (oṇato). It means inferior, base. In contrast, one is called 'high' (uṇṇato). It means lofty, elevated. The rest here should be understood by the method stated in the section on 'darkness' and so on. Furthermore: 'low and low' means one is presently low and will remain low in the future. 'Low and high' means one is presently low but will become high in the future. 'High and low' means one is presently high but will become low in the future. 'High and high' means one is presently high and will remain high in the future.

170. Rukkhūpamesu – rukkho tāva pheggusāraparivāroti vanajeṭṭhakarukkho sayaṃ pheggu hoti, parivārarukkhā panassa sārā honti. Iminā nayena sesā veditabbā. Puggalesu pana sīlasāravirahato pheggutā, sīlācārasamannāgamena ca sāratā veditabbā.

170. Regarding the tree similes: a tree, for instance, is 'sapwood with a retinue of heartwood' (pheggusāraparivāro), meaning the chief tree of the forest is itself sapwood, while its surrounding trees are heartwood. The rest should be understood in this way. Among individuals, however, being sapwood should be understood as arising from the absence of virtue as heartwood, and being heartwood as arising from being endowed with virtuous conduct.

171. Rūpappamāṇādīsu [Pg.80] – sampattiyuttaṃ rūpaṃ pamāṇaṃ karotīti rūpappamāṇo. Tattha pasādaṃ janetīti rūpappasanno. Kittisaddabhūtaṃ ghosaṃ pamāṇaṃ karotīti ghosappamāṇo. Ārohaṃ vātiādīsu pana – ārohanti uccattanaṃ. Pariṇāhanti kisathūlabhāvāpagataṃ parikkhepasampattiṃ. Saṇṭhānanti aṅgapaccaṅgānaṃ dīgharassavaṭṭatādiyuttaṭṭhānesu tathābhāvaṃ. Pāripūrinti yathāvuttappakārānaṃ anūnataṃ, lakkhaṇaparipuṇṇabhāvaṃ vā. Paravaṇṇanāyāti parehi parammukhā nicchāritāya guṇavaṇṇanāya. Parathomanāyāti parehi thutivasena gāthādiupanibandhanena vuttāya thomanāya. Parapasaṃsanāyāti parehi sammukhā vuttāya pasaṃsāya. Paravaṇṇahārikāyāti paramparathutivasena parehi pavattitāya vaṇṇaharaṇāya.

171. Regarding 'measuring by form' and so on: 'one who measures by form' (rūpappamāṇo) means one who makes form endowed with attainment the measure. 'One who is pleased by form' (rūpappasanno) means one who generates pleasure therein. 'One who measures by sound' (ghosappamāṇo) means one who makes sound, which is fame or reputation, the measure. As for 'height' and so on: 'height' (āroha) means elevation. 'Proportion' (pariṇāha) means perfect proportion, free from thinness or thickness. 'Figure' (saṇṭhāna) refers to the state of limbs and features being long, short, round, etc., in their respective appropriate positions. 'Completeness' (pāripūri) means the completeness of the aforementioned aspects, or the perfection of characteristics. 'Praise by others' (paravaṇṇanā) means praise of virtues uttered by others behind one's back. 'Eulogy by others' (parathomanā) means praise spoken by others in the form of eulogy, composed in verses and so on. 'Commendation by others' (parapasaṃsanā) means praise spoken by others directly to one's face. 'Carrying of praise by others' (paravaṇṇahārikā) means the carrying of praise, transmitted by others through successive eulogies.

172. Cīvaralūkhanti cīvarassa dubbaṇṇādibhāvena lūkhataṃ. Pattalūkhanti bhājanassa vaṇṇasaṇṭhānavatthūhi lūkhataṃ. Senāsanalūkhanti nāṭakādisampattivirahena senāsanassa lūkhataṃ. Vividhanti acelakādibhāvena anekappakāraṃ. Dukkarakārikanti sarīratāpanaṃ.

172. ‘Roughness of robes’ (cīvaralūkha) means the roughness of robes due to their poor colour, etc. ‘Roughness of the bowl’ (pattalūkha) means the roughness of the bowl due to its colour, shape, or material. ‘Roughness of the lodging’ (senāsanalūkha) means the roughness of the lodging due to the absence of such amenities as theatrical performances. ‘Various’ (vividha) means of many kinds, such as being naked. ‘Performing what is hard to do’ (dukkarakārika) means the mortification of the body.

Aparo nayo – imesu hi catūsu puggalesu rūpe pamāṇaṃ gahetvā pasanno rūpappamāṇo nāma. Rūpappasannoti tasseva atthavacanaṃ. Ghose pamāṇaṃ gahetvā pasanno ghosappamāṇo nāma. Cīvaralūkhapattalūkhesu pamāṇaṃ gahetvā pasanno lūkhappamāṇo nāma. Dhamme pamāṇaṃ gahetvā pasanno dhammappamāṇo nāma. Itarāni tesaṃyeva atthavacanāni. Sabbasatte ca tayo koṭṭhāse katvā dve koṭṭhāsā rūpappamāṇā, eko na rūpappamāṇo. Pañca koṭṭhāse katvā cattāro koṭṭhāsā ghosappamāṇā, eko na ghosappamāṇo. Dasa koṭṭhāse katvā nava koṭṭhāsā lūkhappamāṇā, eko na lūkhappamāṇo. Satasahassaṃ koṭṭhāse katvā pana eko koṭṭhāsova dhammappamāṇo, sesā na dhammappamāṇā. Evamayaṃ catuppamāṇo lokasannivāso.

Another method: among these four types of individuals, one who is pleased by taking form as a standard is called ‘one who measures by form’ (rūpappamāṇo). ‘Pleased by form’ (rūpappasanno) is another expression for the same meaning. One who is pleased by taking sound as a standard is called ‘one who measures by sound’ (ghosappamāṇo). One who is pleased by taking rough robes and bowls as a standard is called ‘one who measures by roughness’ (lūkhappamāṇo). One who is pleased by taking the Dhamma as a standard is called ‘one who measures by Dhamma’ (dhammappamāṇo). The other terms are just expressions for the same meaning. Moreover, having divided all beings into three parts, two parts are those who measure by form, and one is not one who measures by form. Having divided them into five parts, four parts are those who measure by sound, and one is not one who measures by sound. Having divided them into ten parts, nine parts are those who measure by roughness, and one is not one who measures by roughness. But having divided them into a hundred thousand parts, only one part is one who measures by Dhamma; the rest are not ones who measure by Dhamma. Thus, this population of the world has four standards of measurement.

Etasmiṃ catuppamāṇe lokasannivāse buddhesu appasannā mandā, pasannāva bahukā. Rūpappamāṇassa hi buddharūpato uttari pasādāvahaṃ rūpaṃ nāma natthi. Ghosappamāṇassa buddhānaṃ kittighosato uttari pasādāvaho ghoso nāma natthi. Lūkhappamāṇassa kāsikāni vatthāni mahārahāni [Pg.81] kañcanabhājanāni tiṇṇaṃ utūnaṃ anucchavike sabbasampattiyutte pāsādavare pahāya paṃsukūlacīvaraselamayapattarukkhamūlādisenāsanasevino buddhassa bhagavato lūkhato uttari pasādāvahaṃ aññaṃ lūkhaṃ nāma natthi. Dhammappamāṇassa sadevake loke asādhāraṇasīlādiguṇassa tathāgatassa sīlādiguṇato uttari pasādāvaho añño sīlādiguṇo nāma natthi. Iti bhagavā imaṃ catuppamāṇikaṃ lokasannivāsaṃ muṭṭhinā gahetvā viya ṭhitoti.

In this world-assembly with its four standards, those who are not pleased with the Buddhas are few, while those who are pleased are many. For one who measures by form, there is no form more inspiring of confidence than the Buddha’s form. For one who measures by sound, there is no sound more inspiring of confidence than the Buddhas’ voice of fame. For one who measures by roughness, having relinquished priceless Kāsika garments, golden vessels, and a splendid mansion furnished with all luxuries suitable for the three seasons, the Blessed One dwells wearing rag-robes, using a stone bowl, and frequenting lodgings such as the foot of a tree—there is no austerity more inspiring of confidence than that of the Blessed One. For one who measures by Dhamma, there is no virtue or quality more inspiring of confidence than the virtues and qualities of the Tathāgata, which are unique in the world with its gods. Thus, the Blessed One stands as if holding this world-assembly with its four standards in his fist.

173. Attahitāya paṭipannādīsu – sīlasampannoti sīlena sampanno samannāgato. Samādhisampannotiādīsupi eseva nayo. Ettha ca sīlaṃ lokiyalokuttaraṃ kathitaṃ. Tathā samādhipaññā ca. Vimutti arahattaphalavimuttiyeva. Ñāṇadassanaṃ ekūnavīsatividhaṃ paccavekkhaṇañāṇaṃ. No parantiādīsu – parapuggalaṃ ‘‘tayāpi sīlasampannena bhavituṃ vaṭṭatī’’ti vatvā yathā sīlaṃ samādiyati, evaṃ na samādapeti, na gaṇhāpeti. Eseva nayo sabbattha. Etesu pana catūsu paṭhamo vakkalittherasadiso hoti. Dutiyo upanandasakyaputtasadiso. Tatiyo sāriputtamoggallānattherasadiso. Catuttho devadattasadisoti veditabbo.

173. In the passage beginning ‘practicing for one’s own welfare’ (attahitāya paṭipanna), ‘endowed with virtue’ (sīlasampanno) means one who is accomplished and possessed of virtue. The same principle applies to ‘endowed with concentration’ (samādhisampanno), etc. Here, virtue is spoken of as both mundane and supramundane. Likewise, concentration and wisdom. Liberation refers specifically to the liberation of the fruit of arahantship. Knowledge and vision refer to the nineteen kinds of reviewing knowledge. In the passage beginning ‘not for others’ (no para), one does not encourage or persuade another person to undertake virtue by saying, “You too should become endowed with virtue,” so that they do so. The same principle applies in all cases. Among these four, the first is like the Elder Vakkali. The second is like Upananda the Sakyan. The third is like the Elders Sāriputta and Moggallāna. The fourth should be understood as like Devadatta.

174. Attantapādīsu – attānaṃ tapati dukkhāpetīti attantapo. Attano paritāpanānuyogaṃ attaparitāpanānuyogaṃ. Acelakoti niccelo, naggo. Muttācāroti visaṭṭhācāro. Uccārakammādīsu lokiyakulaputtācārena virahito ṭhitakova uccāraṃ karoti, passāvaṃ karoti, khādati, bhuñjati ca. Hatthāpalekhanoti hatthe piṇḍamhi niṭṭhite jivhāya hatthaṃ apalekhati. Uccāraṃ vā katvā hatthasmiññeva daṇḍakasaññī hutvā hatthena apalekhatīti dasseti. Te kira daṇḍakaṃ sattoti paññapenti. Tasmā tesaṃ paṭipadaṃ pūrento evaṃ karoti. Bhikkhāgahaṇatthaṃ ‘ehi bhaddante’ti vutto, na etīti naehibhaddantiko. Tena hi ‘tiṭṭha bhaddante’ti vuttopi na tiṭṭhatīti natiṭṭhabhaddantiko. Tadubhayampi hetaṃ titthiyā ‘‘etassa vacanaṃ kataṃ bhavissatī’’ti na karonti. Abhihaṭanti puretaraṃ gahetvā āhaṭaṃ bhikkhaṃ. Uddissakatanti ‘‘imaṃ tumhe uddissa kata’’nti evaṃ ārocitabhikkhaṃ. Na nimantananti ‘‘asukaṃ nāma kulaṃ vā vīthiṃ vā gāmaṃ vā paviseyyāthā’’ti evaṃ nimantitabhikkhampi na sādiyati, na gaṇhāti.

174. In the passage beginning ‘self-mortifiers’ (attantapa), ‘self-mortifier’ (attantapo) means one who torments and afflicts oneself. ‘The practice of self-torment’ (attaparitāpanānuyoga) is the pursuit of self-affliction. ‘Naked ascetic’ (acelako) means without clothes, nude. ‘Unrestrained in conduct’ (muttācāro) means unrestrained in behaviour. In the passage beginning ‘defecating’ (uccārakamma), he performs bodily functions like defecating, urinating, eating, and drinking while standing, devoid of the manners of ordinary sons of good family. ‘Licking the hands’ (hatthāpalekhano) means licking the hand with the tongue after the food in the hand is finished. Or, after defecating, he licks his hand, perceiving it as a stick—this illustrates his practice. They declare that a stick is a sentient being. Therefore, one who fulfills their practice does this. For alms collection, if told, “Come, venerable,” he does not come—hence, ‘not one who comes when told “Come, venerable”’ (naehibhaddantiko). Similarly, if told, “Stay, venerable,” he does not stay—hence, ‘not one who stays when told “Stay, venerable”’ (natiṭṭhabhaddantiko). Indeed, sectarians do not do both of these, thinking, “His word will have been followed.” ‘Pre-offered food’ (abhihaṭaṃ) refers to alms brought, having been taken previously. ‘Specially prepared food’ (uddissakataṃ) means alms announced as, “This was prepared especially for you.” ‘Not accepting invitations’ (na nimantanaṃ) means not accepting alms even when invited with, “You should enter such-and-such family, street, or village.”

Na [Pg.82] kumbhimukhāti kumbhito uddharitvā diyyamānaṃ bhikkhaṃ na gaṇhāti. Na kaḷopimukhāti kaḷopīti ukkhali, pacchi vā. Tatopi na gaṇhāti. Kasmā? Kumbhī kaḷopiyo kaṭacchunā pahāraṃ labhantīti. Na eḷakamantaranti ummāraṃ antaraṃ katvā diyyamānaṃ na gaṇhāti. Kasmā? Ayaṃ maṃ nissāya antarakaraṇaṃ labhatīti. Daṇḍamusalesupi eseva nayo. Dvinnanti dvīsu bhuñjamānesu ekasmiṃ uṭṭhāya dente na gaṇhati. Kasmā? Kabaḷantarāyo hotīti. Na gabbhiniyātiādīsu pana gabbhiniyā kucchiyaṃ dārako kilamati. Pāyantiyā dārakassa khīrantarāyo hoti. Purisantaragatāya ratiantarāyo hotīti na gaṇhāti na saṅkittīsūti saṅkittetvā katabhattesu. Dubbhikkhasamaye kira acelakasāvakā acelakānaṃ atthāya tato tato taṇḍulādīni samādapetvā bhattaṃ pacanti, ukkaṭṭhācelako tato na paṭiggaṇhāti. Na yattha sāti yattha sunakho ‘piṇḍaṃ labhissāmī’ti upaṭṭhito hoti, tattha tassa adatvā āhaṭaṃ na gaṇhāti. Kasmā? Etassa piṇḍantarāyo hotīti.

‘Not from a pot’s mouth’ (na kumbhimukhā) means he does not accept almsfood taken from a pot and given to him. ‘Not from a mortar’s mouth’ (na kaḷopimukhā) means he does not accept from a kaḷopī, which is a cooking pot or a basket. Why? Because pots and kaḷopīs receive blows from a ladle. ‘Not across an intermediary’ (na eḷakamantaraṃ) means he does not accept almsfood given across a threshold. Why? Because he thinks, “On my account, this is being made an intermediary.” The same applies to sticks and pestles. ‘Not from two’ (dvīnaṃ) means when two are eating, he does not accept almsfood given by one who stands up. Why? Because it would interrupt their meal. In the passage beginning ‘not from a pregnant woman’ (na gabbhiniyā), he does not accept from them because the child in a pregnant woman’s womb may be afflicted; a nursing woman’s child’s milk may be interrupted; and the pleasure of a woman who is with a man may be interrupted. ‘Not from collected food’ (na saṅkittīsu) means from meals prepared by collection. In times of famine, the disciples of naked ascetics gather rice and other provisions from here and there to cook meals for the ascetics, but the strict naked ascetic does not accept from them. ‘Not where a dog is present’ (na yattha sā) means where a dog is present, expecting to get a morsel, he does not accept almsfood brought from there without giving to the dog. Why? Because it would be an obstacle to its morsel.

Saṇḍasaṇḍacārinīti samūhasamūhacārinī. Sace hi acelakaṃ disvā ‘imassa bhikkhaṃ dassāmā’ti mānussakā bhattagehaṃ pavisanti, tesu ca pavisantesu kaḷopimukhādīsu nilīnā makkhikā uppatitvā saṇḍasaṇḍā caranti, tato āhaṭaṃ bhikkhaṃ na gaṇhāti. Kasmā? Maṃ nissāya makkhikānaṃ gocarantarāyo jātoti. Thusodakanti sabbasassasambhārehi kataṃ sovīrakaṃ. Ettha ca surāpānameva sāvajjaṃ. Ayaṃ pana etasmimpi sāvajjasaññī. Ekāgārikoti yo ekasmiṃyeva gehe bhikkhaṃ labhitvā nivattati. Ekālopikoti yo ekeneva ālopena yāpeti. Dvāgārikādīsupi eseva nayo. Ekissāpi dattiyāti ekāya dattiyā. Datti nāma ekā khuddakapāti hoti, yattha aggabhikkhaṃ pakkhipitvā ṭhapenti.

‘Where flies swarm in groups’ (saṇḍasaṇḍacārinī) means moving in group after group. For instance, if people see a naked ascetic and think, “We will give alms to him,” they enter a refectory. As they enter, flies hiding in places like the rim of a pot fly up and move about in swarms. He does not accept the alms brought from there. Why? Because he thinks, “On my account, the flies’ feeding has been obstructed.” ‘Chaff-water’ (thusodakaṃ) refers to a sour gruel made from all kinds of grain, called sovīraka. In this context, only the drinking of liquor is blameworthy, but this one perceives even this as blameworthy. ‘One-house-goer’ (ekāgāriko) refers to one who obtains alms at just one house and then returns. ‘One-morsel-eater’ (ekālopiko) refers to one who sustains himself with just a single morsel. The same principle applies to ‘two-house-goer’ (dvāgāriko) and so on. ‘From a single serving’ (ekissāpi dattiyā) means from a single serving. A ‘serving’ (datti) here refers to a small bowl in which the choicest alms are placed and kept.

Ekāhikanti ekadivasantarikaṃ. Aḍḍhamāsikanti aḍḍhamāsantarikaṃ. Pariyāyabhattabhojananti vārabhattabhojanaṃ. Ekāhavārena dvīhavārena sattāhavārena aḍḍhamāsavārenāti – evaṃ divasavārena ābhatabhattabhojanaṃ. Sākabhakkhoti allasākabhakkho. Sāmākabhakkhoti sāmākataṇḍulabhakkho. Nīvārādīsu – nīvārā nāma tāva araññe sayaṃ jātā vīhijāti. Daddulanti cammakārehi cammaṃ vilikhitvā chaḍḍitakasaṭaṃ. Haṭaṃ vuccati [Pg.83] silesopi, sevālopi kaṇikārādirukkhaniyyāsopi. Kaṇanti kuṇḍakaṃ. Ācāmoti bhattaukkhalikāya laggo jhāmodano. Taṃ chaḍḍitaṭṭhāne gahetvā khādati. ‘‘Odanakañjiya’’ntipi vadanti. Piññākādayo pākaṭā eva. Pavattaphalabhojīti patitaphalabhojī.

‘Eating once a day’ (ekāhika) means eating on alternate days. ‘Eating every half-month’ (aḍḍhamāsika) means eating on alternate half-months. ‘Eating by turns for alms’ (pariyāyabhattabhojana) means eating almsfood by rotation: by a one-day rotation, a two-day rotation, a seven-day rotation, or a half-month rotation—thus, eating almsfood brought according to a rotation of days. ‘Eating only greens’ (sākabhakkha) means consuming fresh greens. ‘Eating millet’ (sāmākabhakkha) means consuming millet grains. Among ‘wild rice’ (nīvāra), etc., nīvāra refers to a type of rice that grows naturally in the forest. ‘Daddula’ refers to the scraps or refuse discarded by leatherworkers after scraping hides. ‘Haṭa’ is said to mean phlegm, moss, or the sap of trees like the kaṇikāra. ‘Kaṇa’ refers to rice bran. ‘Ācāma’ is scorched rice adhering to the cooking pot. It is taken from where it has been discarded and eaten. Some also call it ‘rice gruel’ (odanakañjiya). Things like ‘oilcake’ (piññāka) are well-known. ‘Eating fallen fruits’ (pavattaphalabhojī) means consuming fruits that have dropped naturally.

Sāṇānīti sāṇavākacelāni. Masāṇānīti missakacelāni. Chavadussānīti matasarīrato chaḍḍitavatthāni. Erakatiṇādīni vā ganthetvā katanivāsanāni. Paṃsukūlānīti pathaviyaṃ chaḍḍitanantakāni. Tirīṭānīti rukkhattacavatthāni. Ajinanti ajinamigacammaṃ. Ajinakkhipanti tadeva majjhe phālitaṃ. Sakhurakantipi vadanti. Kusacīranti kusatiṇāni ganthetvā katacīrakaṃ. Vākacīraphalakacīresupi eseva nayo. Kesakambalanti manussakesehi katakambalaṃ. Yaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ – ‘‘seyyathāpi, bhikkhave, yāni kānici tantāvutānaṃ vatthānaṃ kesakambalo tesaṃ patikuṭṭho akkhāyatī’’ti (a. ni. 3.138). Vāḷakambalanti assavāḷādīhi katakambalaṃ. Ulūkapakkhanti ulūkapattāni ganthetvā katanivāsanaṃ. Ubbhaṭṭhakoti uddhaṃ ṭhitako.

‘Hemp cloth’ (sāṇa) means garments made of hemp fiber. ‘Mixed cloth’ (masāṇa) means garments made of mixed fibers. ‘Discarded cloth’ (chavadussa) means clothes discarded from a corpse, or lower garments made by stringing together eraka grass and so on. ‘Rag-robes’ (paṃsukūla) refer to cloths discarded on the ground without an owner. ‘Tree bark cloth’ (tirīṭa) means garments made from the bark of trees. ‘Hide’ (ajina) means the skin of an antelope. ‘A hide cloak’ (ajinakkhipa) is the same, split in the middle. Some also call it ‘with hoofs’ (sakhuraka). ‘A grass garment’ (kusacīra) is a garment made by stringing together kusa grass. The same method applies to bark garments (vākacīra) and leaf garments (phalakacīra). ‘A hair blanket’ (kesakambala) is a blanket made from human hair. Regarding this, it is said: “Just as, bhikkhus, among all woven fabrics, a hair blanket is considered the worst” (AN 3.138). ‘A horsehair blanket’ (vāḷakambala) is a blanket made from the hair of horses, etc. ‘An owl’s wing garment’ (ulūkapakkha) is a lower garment made by stringing together owl feathers. ‘Standing upright’ (ubbhaṭṭhaka) means standing erect.

Ukkuṭikappadhānamanuyuttoti ukkuṭikavīriyaṃ anuyutto. Gacchantopi ukkuṭikova hutvā uppatitvā uppatitvā gacchati. Kaṇṭakāpassayikoti ayakaṇṭake vā pakatikaṇṭake vā bhūmiyaṃ koṭṭetvā tattha cammaṃ attharitvā ṭhānacaṅkamādīni karoti. Seyyanti sayantopi tattheva seyyaṃ kappeti. Sāyaṃ tatiyamassāti sāyatatiyakaṃ. ‘‘Pāto, majjhanhike, sāyanti divasassa tikkhattuṃ pāpaṃ pavāhessāmī’’ti udakorohanānuyogaṃ anuyutto viharati.

‘Devoted to the practice of squatting’ (ukkuṭikappadhānamanuyutta) means devoted to the exertion of squatting. Even while walking, he goes by squatting, jumping up and jumping up. ‘A thorn-bed ascetic’ (kaṇṭakāpassayika) means one who, having fixed iron thorns or natural thorns into the ground, spreads a hide there and performs standing and walking meditation, etc. As for ‘lying down’ (seyya): even when lying down, he arranges his lying down right there. ‘The practice with the evening as the third’ (sāyatatiyakaṃ) means that the evening is his third time. Thinking, “In the morning, at midday, and in the evening, I will wash away evil three times a day,” he dwells devoted to the practice of descending into water.

175. Paraṃ tapatīti parantapo. Paresaṃ paritāpanānuyogaṃ paraparitāpanānuyogaṃ. Orabbhikādīsu – urabbhā vuccanti eḷakā. Urabbhe hanatīti orabbhiko. Sūkarikādīsupi – eseva nayo. Luddoti dāruṇo kakkhaḷo. Macchaghātakoti macchabandho kevaṭṭo. Bandhanāgārikoti bandhanāgāragopako. Kurūrakammantāti dāruṇakammantā.

175. ‘One who torments others’ (parantapa) means one who torments others. ‘The practice of tormenting others’ (paraparitāpanānuyoga) means engagement in tormenting others. Among ‘sheep-butchers’ (orabbhika) and the like: urabbhā are called sheep. One who kills sheep is an orabbhika. The same method applies to pig-butchers (sūkarika) and the like. ‘A cruel one’ (ludda) means fierce and rough. ‘A fish-killer’ (macchaghātaka) means a fisherman (macchabandha), a kevaṭṭa. ‘A prison-keeper’ (bandhanāgārika) means a prison guard (bandhanāgāragopaka). ‘Kurūrakammanta’ refers to cruel actions.

176. Muddhāvasittoti khattiyābhisekena muddhani abhisitto. Puratthimena nagarassāti nagarato puratthimadisāya. Sandhāgāranti yaññasālaṃ[Pg.84]. Kharājinaṃ nivāsetvāti sakhuraṃ ajinacammaṃ nivāsetvā. Sappitelenāti sappinā ca telena ca. Ṭhapetvā hi sappiṃ avaseso yo koci sneho telanti vuccati. Kaṇḍuvamānoti nakhānaṃ chinnattā kaṇḍuvitabbakāle tena kaṇḍuvamāno. Anantarahitāyāti asanthatāya. Sarūpavacchāyāti sadisavacchāya. Sace gāvī setā hoti, vacchopi setakova sace kabarā vā, rattā vā, vacchopi tādisovāti – evaṃ sarūpavacchāya. So evamāhāti so rājā evaṃ vadeti. Vacchatarāti taruṇavacchakabhāvaṃ atikkantā balavavacchā. Vacchatarīsupi eseva nayo. Barihisatthāyāti parikkhepakaraṇatthāya ceva yaññabhūmiyaṃ attharaṇatthāya ca.

176. ‘One anointed on the head’ (muddhāvasitta) means one whose head is anointed with the royal anointment of a warrior. ‘To the east of the city’ (puratthimena nagarassa) means in the eastern direction from the city. ‘The assembly hall’ (sandhāgāra) means the sacrificial hall. ‘Wearing a rough hide’ (kharājinaṃ nivāsetvā) means wearing an animal skin with the hoofs attached. ‘With ghee and oil’ (sappitela) means with clarified butter and oil. Indeed, setting aside ghee, any other fat is called oil. ‘Scratching’ (kaṇḍuvamāna) means scratching with it when it is time to scratch, because the nails are cut. ‘Without a gap’ (anantarahita) means not spread out. ‘With a calf of similar appearance’ (sarūpavacchā) means with a similar calf. If the cow is white, the calf is also white; if speckled or red, the calf is likewise. Thus, with a calf of similar appearance. ‘He speaks thus’ (so evamāha) means the king says this. ‘Young bullocks’ (vacchatarā) are strong young calves that have passed beyond the state of being a young calf. The same principle applies to young heifers (vacchatarī). ‘For spreading grass’ (barhisatthāya) means both for the purpose of making a boundary and for spreading on the sacrificial ground.

177. Diṭṭheva dhammeti imasmiṃyeva attabhāve. Nicchātoti chātaṃ vuccati taṇhā, sā assa natthīti nicchāto. Sabbakilesānaṃ nibbutattā nibbuto. Anto tāpanakilesānaṃ abhāvā sītalo jātoti sītībhūto. Jhānamaggaphalanibbānasukhāni paṭisaṃvedetīti sukhappaṭisaṃvedī. Brahmabhūtena attanāti seṭṭhabhūtena attanā.

177. ‘In this very life’ (diṭṭheva dhamme) means in this present existence. ‘Free from craving’ (nicchāta) means that craving is called thirst, and he has none of it, thus he is free from craving. ‘Extinguished’ (nibbuta) means extinguished because all defilements are extinguished. ‘Cool’ (sītībhūta) means become cool due to the absence of defilements that cause burning within. ‘Experiencing bliss’ (sukhappaṭisaṃvedī) means experiencing the bliss of jhana, path, fruition, and Nibbāna. ‘With a self become Brahma’ (brahmabhūtena attanā) means with a self become supreme.

Imaṃ pana puggalaṃ buddhuppādato paṭṭhāya dassetuṃ – idha tathāgatotiādimāha. Tattha tathāgatoti aṭṭhahi kāraṇehi bhagavā tathāgato – tathā āgatoti tathāgato, tathā gatoti tathāgato, tathalakkhaṇaṃ āgatoti tathāgato, tathadhamme yāthāvato abhisambuddhoti tathāgato, tathadassitāya tathāgato, tathāvāditāya tathāgato, tathākāritāya tathāgato, abhibhavanaṭṭhena tathāgatoti. Arahaṃ sammāsambuddhotiādīni visuddhimagge vitthāritāneva. Taṃ dhammanti taṃ vuttappakārasampadaṃ dhammaṃ. Suṇāti gahapati vāti kasmā paṭhamaṃ gahapatiṃ niddisati? Nihatamānattā ussannattā ca. Yebhuyyena hi khattiyakulato pabbajitā jātiṃ nissāya mānaṃ karonti. Brāhmaṇakulā pabbajitā mante nissāya mānaṃ karonti. Hīnajaccakulā pabbajitā attano vijātitāya patiṭṭhātuṃ na sakkonti. Gahapatidārakā pana kacchehi sedaṃ muñcantehi piṭṭhiyā loṇaṃ pupphamānāya bhūmiṃ kasitvā tādisassa mānassa abhāvato nihatamānadappā honti. Te pabbajitvā mānaṃ vā dappaṃ vā akatvā yathābalaṃ buddhavacanaṃ [Pg.85] uggahetvā vipassanāya kammaṃ karontā sakkonti arahatte patiṭṭhātuṃ. Itarehi ca kulehi nikkhamitvā pabbajitā nāma na bahukā, gahapatikāva bahukā. Iti nihatamānattā ussannattā ca paṭhamaṃ gahapatiṃ niddisatīti.

To explain this person from the arising of the Buddha onwards, it begins with ‘Here, the Tathāgata…’. Herein, the Blessed One is called ‘Tathāgata’ for eight reasons: because he has come thus (tathā āgato); because he has gone thus (tathā gato); because he has arrived at the true characteristic (tathalakkhaṇaṃ āgato); because he has fully awakened to the true dhammas as they are (tathadhamme yāthāvato abhisambuddho); because he sees what is true (tathadassitāya); because he speaks what is true (tathāvāditāya); because he does what is true (tathākāritāya); and because of overcoming (abhibhavanaṭṭhena). ‘Arahant, perfectly enlightened’ (arahaṃ sammāsambuddha), etc., are explained in detail in the Visuddhimagga. ‘That Dhamma’ (taṃ dhamma) refers to the Dhamma endowed with the qualities as described. ‘A householder… hears’ (suṇāti gahapati vā): Why is the householder mentioned first? Because of their subdued pride and their abundance. For, generally, those gone forth from warrior families take pride in their birth. Those gone forth from brahmin families take pride in their mantras. Those gone forth from low-born families cannot establish themselves because of their inferior lineage. But the sons of householders, sweating from their armpits, with salt blossoming on their backs, plow the fields, and thus, due to the absence of such pride, they are free from pride and arrogance. Having gone forth, without pride or arrogance, they grasp the Buddha’s word according to their ability, practice insight, and are able to be established in arahantship. Moreover, those who have gone forth from other families are not many, while those from householder families are many. Thus, because of their subdued pride and their abundance, the householder is mentioned first.

Aññatarasmiṃ vāti itaresaṃ vā kulānaṃ aññatarasmiṃ. Paccājātoti patijāto. Tathāgate saddhaṃ paṭilabhatīti parisuddhaṃ dhammaṃ sutvā dhammassāmimhi tathāgate ‘‘sammāsambuddho vata so bhagavā’’ti saddhaṃ paṭilabhati. Iti paṭisañcikkhatīti evaṃ paccavekkhati. Sambādho gharāvāsoti sacepi saṭṭhihatthe ghare yojanasatantarepi vā dve jāyampatikā vasanti, tathāpi nesaṃ sakiñcanasapalibodhaṭṭhena gharāvāso sambādhoyeva. Rajopathoti rāgarajādīnaṃ uṭṭhānaṭṭhānanti mahāaṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttaṃ. Āgamanapathotipi vattuṃ vaṭṭati. Alagganaṭṭhena abbhokāso viyāti abbhokāso. Pabbajito hi kūṭāgāraratanapāsāde ca devavimānādīsu ca supihitadvāravātapānesu paṭicchannesu vasantopi neva laggati, na sajjati, na bajjhati. Tena vuttaṃ – ‘‘abbhokāso pabbajjā’’ti.

‘In one or another family’ (aññatarasmiṃ) means in one or another of the other families. ‘Reborn’ (paccājāta) means born. ‘He gains faith in the Tathāgata’ (tathāgate saddhaṃ paṭilabhati) means after hearing the purified Dhamma, he gains faith in the Tathāgata, the master of the Dhamma, thinking, “Indeed, that Blessed One is perfectly enlightened.” ‘Thus reflecting’ (iti paṭisañcikkhati) means considering in this way. ‘Living in a house is crowded’ (sambādho gharāvāso): even if two people, husband and wife, live in a house sixty cubits wide or a hundred yojanas apart, still, because of their possessions and attachments, living in a house is indeed crowded. ‘The path of dust’ (rajopatha) means the place of arising of the dust of passion and so on, as stated in the Great Commentary. It can also be called ‘the path of coming’ (āgamanapatha). ‘Open space’ (abbhokāsa) means like the sky in the sense of non-attachment. For one gone forth, even dwelling in a peaked house, a jeweled palace, or divine mansions with well-sealed doors and windows shut, he does not cling, is not attached, is not bound. Therefore, it is said: “Going forth is open space” (abbhokāso pabbajjā).

Apica – sambādho gharāvāso kusalakiriyāya okāsābhāvato. Rajopatho asaṃvutasaṅkāraṭṭhānaṃ viya rajānaṃ kilesarajānaṃ sannipātaṭṭhānato. Abbhokāso pabbajjā kusalakiriyāya yathāsukhaṃ okāsasambhāvato. Nayidaṃ sukaraṃ…pe… pabbajeyyanti ettha ayaṃ saṅkhepakathā – yadetaṃ sikkhattayabrahmacariyaṃ ekampi divasaṃ akhaṇḍaṃ katvā carimakacittaṃ pāpetabbatāya ekantaparipuṇṇaṃ. Ekadivasampi ca kilesamalena amalinaṃ katvā carimakacittaṃ pāpetabbatāya ekantaparisuddhaṃ. Saṅkhalikhitaṃ likhitasaṅkhasadisaṃ dhotasaṅkhasappaṭibhāgaṃ caritabbaṃ. Idaṃ na sukaraṃ agāraṃ ajjhāvasatā agāramajjhe vasantena ekantaparipuṇṇaṃ…pe… carituṃ – ‘‘yaṃnūnāhaṃ kese ca massuñca ohāretvā kasāyarasapītatāya kāsāyāni brahmacariyaṃ carantānaṃ anucchavikāni vatthāni acchādetvā paridahitvā agārasmā nikkhamitvā anagāriyaṃ pabbajeyya’’nti. Ettha ca yasmā agārassa hitaṃ kasivāṇijjādikammaṃ ‘‘agāriya’’nti vuccati, tañca pabbajjāya natthi, tasmā pabbajjā ‘‘anagāriya’’nti ñātabbā. Taṃ anagāriyaṃ. Pabbajeyyanti [Pg.86] paṭipajjeyyaṃ. Appaṃ vāti sahassato heṭṭhā bhogakkhandho appo nāma hoti, sahassato paṭṭhāya mahā. Abandhanaṭṭhena ñātiyeva ñātiparivaṭṭo. Sopi vīsatiyā heṭṭhā appo hoti, vīsatiyā paṭṭhāya mahā.

Moreover, the household life is crowded, there being no opportunity for wholesome deeds. ‘The path of dust’ is so called because, like an unrestrained refuse heap, it is a gathering place for the dust of defilements. The homeless life is an open space, there being ample opportunity for wholesome deeds as one pleases. Concerning the passage, ‘This is not easy… I should go forth,’ here is the summary: that threefold training and holy life, even for a single day, should be practiced unbroken, to be brought to the final thought, making it utterly complete. Even for a single day, it should be made unstained by the stain of defilements, to be brought to the final thought, making it utterly pure. It should be practiced like a polished conch, resembling a washed conch. This is not easy for one dwelling in a house, living amidst household life, to practice it as utterly complete… “Why don’t I shave off my hair and beard, put on the saffron robes dyed with astringent flavors, suitable for those living the holy life, and, leaving home, go forth into the homeless life?” Here, because work beneficial to the house, such as farming and trade, is called ‘of the household,’ and this does not exist in the homeless life, therefore the going forth should be understood as ‘the homeless life.’ That is the homeless life. ‘I should go forth’ means ‘I should undertake it.’ ‘Little’ means a heap of possessions below a thousand; from a thousand upwards it is much. In the sense of a bond, the circle of relatives consists of one's kin. Even that, below twenty, is little; from twenty upwards it is much.

178. Bhikkhūnaṃ sikkhāsājīvasamāpannoti yā bhikkhūnaṃ adhisīlasaṅkhātā sikkhā, tañca. Yattha cete saha jīvanti, ekajīvikā sabhāgavuttino honti, taṃ bhagavatā paññattasikkhāpadasaṅkhātaṃ sājīvañca. Tattha sikkhanabhāvena samāpannoti bhikkhūnaṃ sikkhāsājīvasamāpanno. Samāpannoti sikkhaṃ paripūrento sājīvañca avītikkamanto hutvā tadubhayaṃ upagatoti attho. Pāṇātipātaṃ pahāyātiādīsu pāṇātipātādikathā heṭṭhā vitthāritā eva. Pahāyāti imaṃ pāṇātipātacetanāsaṅkhātaṃ dussīlyaṃ pajahitvā. Paṭivirato hotīti pahīnakālato paṭṭhāya tato dussīlyato orato viratova hoti. Nihitadaṇḍo nihitasatthoti parūpaghātatthāya daṇḍaṃ vā satthaṃ vā ādāya avattanato nikkhittadaṇḍo ceva nikkhittasattho cāti attho. Ettha ca ṭhapetvā daṇḍaṃ, sabbampi avasesaṃ upakaraṇaṃ sattānaṃ vināsanabhāvato ‘sattha’nti veditabbaṃ. Yaṃ pana bhikkhū kattaradaṇḍaṃ vā dantakaṭṭhavāsiṃ vā pipphalikaṃ vā gahetvā vicaranti, na taṃ parūpaghātatthāya. Tasmā nihitadaṇḍā nihitasatthātveva saṅkhaṃ gacchanti. Lajjīti pāpajigucchanalakkhaṇāya lajjāya samannāgato. Dayāpannoti dayaṃ mettacittataṃ āpanno. Sabbapāṇabhūtahitānukampīti sabbe pāṇabhūte hitena anukampako. Tāya dayāpannatāya sabbesaṃ pāṇabhūtānaṃ hitacittakoti attho. Viharatīti iriyati, pāleti.

178. Bhikkhūnaṃ sikkhāsājīvasamāpanno (one who has entered upon the training and livelihood of the bhikkhus) means the training of the bhikkhus, which is called higher virtue, and that livelihood. And wherever they live together, having a single way of life, having a similar mode of conduct, that is the livelihood, which is called the training rules laid down by the Blessed One. There, 'entered upon the training and livelihood of the bhikkhus' means one who has entered upon it by way of training. Samāpanno (entered upon) means one who, fulfilling the training and not transgressing the livelihood, has thus attained both. In phrases such as 'having abandoned the destruction of life,' the discussion on the destruction of life and so on has already been elaborated below. Pahāya (having abandoned) means having given up this unwholesome conduct, which is the intention to destroy life. Paṭivirato hoti (abstains) means that from the time of abandoning onwards, one is indeed restrained, withdrawn from that unwholesome conduct. Nihitadaṇḍo nihitasattho (laying down the rod, laying down the knife) means one who does not wield a rod or a knife for harming others, that is, one who has discarded both rod and knife. Here, apart from the rod, all other implements that destroy beings should be understood as 'knife.' However, when bhikkhus carry a knife for cutting robes, a small adze for tooth-wood, or a fan, it is not for harming others. Therefore, they are still reckoned as having laid down the rod and the knife. Lajjī (conscientious) means endowed with shame, which has the characteristic of disgust at evil. Dayāpanno (compassionate) means one who has attained compassion, a mind of loving-kindness. Sabbapāṇabhūtahitānukampī (sympathetic toward the welfare of all living beings) means one who is compassionate toward all living beings with a mind directed towards welfare. The meaning is that through that compassion, one has a mind of welfare for all living beings. Viharati (dwells) means one lives, maintains.

Dinnameva ādiyatīti dinnādāyī. Cittenapi dinnameva paṭikaṅkhatīti dinnapāṭikaṅkhī. Thenetīti theno. Na thenena athenena. Athenattāyeva sucibhūtena. Attanāti attabhāvena. Athenaṃ sucibhūtaṃ attabhāvaṃ katvā viharatīti vuttaṃ hoti.

Dinnameva ādiyatīti dinnādāyī (he takes only what is given, thus he is one who takes only what is given). Cittenapi dinnameva paṭikaṅkhatīti dinnapāṭikaṅkhī (even in his mind, he anticipates only what is given, thus he is one who anticipates only what is given). Thenetīti theno (he steals, thus he is a thief). Na thenena athenena (not by thieving, but by non-thieving). Athenattāyeva sucibhūtena (by the very fact of not stealing, he has become pure). Attanāti attabhāvena (attanā means by one's own being). Athenaṃ sucibhūtaṃ attabhāvaṃ katvā viharatīti vuttaṃ hoti (it is said that he dwells having made his own being non-thieving and pure).

Abrahmacariyanti [Pg.87] aseṭṭhacariyaṃ. Brahmaṃ seṭṭhaṃ ācāraṃ caratīti brahmacārī. Ārācārīti abrahmacariyato dūracārī. Methunāti rāgapariyuṭṭhānavasena sadisattā methunakāti laddhavohārehi paṭisevitabbato methunāti saṅkhaṃ gatā asaddhammā. Gāmadhammāti gāmavāsīnaṃ dhammā.

Abrahmacariyanti aseṭṭhacariyaṃ (abrahmacariya means inferior conduct). Brahmaṃ seṭṭhaṃ ācāraṃ caratīti brahmacārī (one who practices the supreme conduct, the Brahma-conduct, is called a brahmacārī). Ārācārīti abrahmacariyato dūracārī (ārācārī means one who keeps far from non-celibacy). Methunāti rāgapariyuṭṭhānavasena sadisattā methunakāti laddhavohārehi paṭisevitabbato methunāti saṅkhaṃ gatā asaddhammā (methuna refers to unwholesome practices which, because they are practiced by those who have received the designation 'methunaka' due to being similar in nature and being overwhelmed by lust, have thus gained the designation 'methuna'). Gāmadhammāti gāmavāsīnaṃ dhammā (gāmadhammā means the practices of village dwellers).

Saccaṃ vadatīti saccavādī. Saccena saccaṃ sandahati ghaṭetīti saccasandho. Na antarantarā musā vadatīti attho. Yo hi puriso kadāci musā vadati, kadāci saccaṃ, tassa musāvādena antaritattā saccaṃ saccena na ghaṭīyati, tasmā na so saccasandho. Ayaṃ pana na tādiso. Jīvitahetupi musā avatvā saccena saccaṃ sandahatiyevāti saccasandho. Thetoti thiro, thirakathoti attho. Eko hi puggalo haliddirāgo viya, thusarāsimhi nikhātakhāṇuko viya, assapiṭṭhe ṭhapitakumbhaṇḍamiva ca, na thirakatho hoti. Eko pāsāṇalekhā viya, indakhīlo viya ca thirakatho hoti. Asinā sīse chindantepi dve kathā na katheti. Ayaṃ vuccati theto. Paccayikoti pattiyāyitabbako, saddhāyikoti attho. Ekacco hi puggalo na paccayiko hoti. ‘Idaṃ kena vuttaṃ? Asukenā’ti vutte ‘mā tassa vacanaṃ saddahathā’ti vattabbataṃ āpajjati. Eko paccayiko hoti. ‘Idaṃ kena vuttaṃ? Asukenā’ti vutte ‘yadi tena vuttaṃ, idameva pamāṇaṃ, idāni upaparikkhitabbaṃ natthi, evameva ida’nti vattabbataṃ āpajjati. Ayaṃ vuccati paccayiko. Avisaṃvādako lokassāti tāya saccavāditāya lokaṃ na visaṃvādetīti attho.

Saccaṃ vadatīti saccavādī (he speaks truth, thus he is a truth-speaker). Saccena saccaṃ sandahati ghaṭetīti saccasandho (he connects truth with truth, binds truth with truth, thus he is a truth-binder). The meaning is that he does not speak falsehood intermittently. Indeed, a person who sometimes speaks falsehood and sometimes truth, for him, truth is not bound with truth due to being interrupted by falsehood; therefore, he is not a truth-binder. But this one is not like that. Even for the sake of his life, he does not speak falsehood, but indeed binds truth with truth; thus he is a truth-binder. Thetoti thiro, thirakathoti attho (theto means firm, resolute in speech). Indeed, one person is like turmeric dye, like a post sunk in a heap of chaff, and like a gourd placed on a horse's back—he is not resolute in speech. Another is like an inscription on stone, and like an Inda pillar—he is resolute in speech. Even if his head is cut off with a sword, he does not speak two different things. Such a one is called theto. Paccayikoti pattiyāyitabbako, saddhāyikoti attho (paccayiko means one who is to be trusted, reliable). Indeed, some people are not trustworthy. When it is said, 'Who said this? So-and-so,' they become subject to the statement, 'Do not believe his words.' Another is trustworthy. When it is said, 'Who said this? So-and-so,' they become subject to the statement, 'If he said it, this is the proof; now there is no need for further investigation; it is indeed so.' Such a one is called paccayiko. Avisaṃvādako lokassāti tāya saccavāditāya lokaṃ na visaṃvādetīti attho (avisaṃvādako lokassa means that by his truthfulness, he does not deceive the world).

Imesaṃ bhedāyāti yesaṃ ito sutvāti vuttānaṃ santike sutaṃ, tesaṃ bhedāya. Bhinnānaṃ vā sandhātāti dvinnaṃ mittānaṃ vā samānupajjhāyakādīnaṃ vā kenacideva kāraṇena bhinnānaṃ ekamekaṃ upasaṅkamitvā – ‘tumhākaṃ īdise kule jātānaṃ, evaṃ bahussutānaṃ idaṃ na yutta’ntiādīni vatvā sandhānaṃ kattā. Anuppadātāti sandhānānuppadātā. Dve jane samagge disvā – ‘tumhākaṃ evarūpe kule jātānaṃ, evarūpehi guṇehi samannāgatānaṃ [Pg.88] anucchavikameta’ntiādīni vatvā daḷhīkammaṃ kattāti attho. Samaggo ārāmo assāti samaggārāmo. Yattha samaggā natthi, tattha vasitumpi na icchatīti attho. Samaggarāmotipi pāḷi. Ayameva attho. Samaggaratoti samaggesu rato. Te pahāya aññatra gantumpi na icchatīti attho. Samagge disvāpi sutvāpi nandatīti samagganandī. Samaggakaraṇiṃ vācaṃ bhāsitāti yā vācā satte samaggeyeva karoti, taṃ sāmaggīguṇaparidīpakameva vācaṃ bhāsati, na itaranti.

Imesaṃ bhedāyāti yesaṃ ito sutvāti vuttānaṃ santike sutaṃ, tesaṃ bhedāya ('for the division of these' means for the division of those from whom he has heard, who are indicated by the phrase 'having heard from here'). Bhinnānaṃ vā sandhātāti dvinnaṃ mittānaṃ vā samānupajjhāyakādīnaṃ vā kenacideva kāraṇena bhinnānaṃ ekamekaṃ upasaṅkamitvā – ‘tumhākaṃ īdise kule jātānaṃ, evaṃ bahussutānaṃ idaṃ na yutta’ntiādīni vatvā sandhānaṃ kattā (or a reconciler of the divided means one who, when two friends or fellow disciples and so on are divided for some reason, approaches each individually and says, 'For you, born in such a family, so learned, this is not fitting,' and so brings about reconciliation). Anuppadātāti sandhānānuppadātā (anuppadātā means one who promotes reconciliation). Dve jane samagge disvā – ‘tumhākaṃ evarūpe kule jātānaṃ, evarūpehi guṇehi samannāgatānaṃ anucchavikameta’ntiādīni vatvā daḷhīkammaṃ kattāti attho (seeing two people in harmony, he strengthens their bond by saying, 'For you, born in such a family, endowed with such virtues, this is fitting,' and so on—this is the meaning). Samaggo ārāmo assāti samaggārāmo (samaggārāmo means one for whom harmony is his pleasure-garden). Yattha samaggā natthi, tattha vasitumpi na icchatīti attho (the meaning is that he does not even wish to live where there is no harmony). Samaggarāmotipi pāḷi. Ayameva attho (Samaggarāmo is also a reading. The meaning is the same). Samaggaratoti samaggesu rato (samaggarato means delighting in those who are harmonious). Te pahāya aññatra gantumpi na icchatīti attho (the meaning is that he does not even wish to leave them and go elsewhere). Samagge disvāpi sutvāpi nandatīti samagganandī (samagganandī means he rejoices upon seeing or hearing of harmony). Samaggakaraṇiṃ vācaṃ bhāsitāti yā vācā satte samaggeyeva karoti, taṃ sāmaggīguṇaparidīpakameva vācaṃ bhāsati, na itaranti (he speaks words that promote harmony means he speaks only words that illuminate the virtue of harmony, words that make beings harmonious, not otherwise).

Kālena vadatīti kālavādī. Vattabbayuttakālaṃ sallakkhetvā vadatīti attho. Bhūtaṃ tathaṃ tacchaṃ sabhāvameva vadatīti bhūtavādī. Diṭṭhadhammikasamparāyikatthasannissitameva katvā vadatīti atthavādī. Navalokuttaradhammasannissitaṃ katvā vadatīti dhammavādī. Saṃvaravinayapahānavinayasannissitaṃ katvā vadatīti vinayavādī. Nidhānaṃ vuccati ṭhapanokāso. Nidhānamassa atthīti nidhānavatī. Hadaye nidhātabbayuttakaṃ vācaṃ bhāsitāti attho. Kālenāti evarūpiṃ bhāsamānopi ca ‘‘ahaṃ nidhānavatiṃ vācaṃ bhāsissāmī’’ti na akālena bhāsati. Yuttakālaṃ pana sallakkhetvāva bhāsatīti attho. Sāpadesanti saupamaṃ, sakāraṇanti attho. Pariyantavatinti paricchedaṃ dassetvā. Yathāssā paricchedo paññāyati, evaṃ bhāsatīti attho. Atthasaṃhitanti anekehipi nayehi vibhajantena pariyādātuṃ asakkuṇeyyatāya atthasampannaṃ bhāsati. Yaṃ vā so atthavādī atthaṃ vadati, tena atthena saṃhitattā atthasaṃhitaṃ vācaṃ bhāsati. Na aññaṃ nikkhipitvā aññaṃ bhāsatīti vuttaṃ hoti.

He speaks at the proper time, thus he is a speaker in season. The meaning is that he speaks after considering the appropriate time to speak. He speaks what is factual, true, and in accordance with reality, thus he is a speaker of fact. He speaks after basing his words on the benefit connected with this life and the next, thus he is a speaker of benefit. He speaks after basing his words on the ninefold supramundane Dhamma, thus he is a speaker of the Dhamma. He speaks after basing his words on the discipline of restraint and the discipline of abandonment, thus he is a speaker of the Discipline. A treasure is called a place for storing. It has a treasure, thus it is speech with a treasure. The meaning is that he speaks words that should be stored in the heart. 'At the proper time'—even while speaking such speech, he does not speak out of season, thinking, 'I will speak words worth storing.' Rather, he speaks only after considering the appropriate time. 'With an illustration' means with a simile, with a reason. 'With a limit' means showing a boundary. He speaks in such a way that its limit is discernible. 'Connected with the benefit'—he speaks what is endowed with benefit, because it is impossible for one analyzing it in many ways to exhaust it. Alternatively, since that speaker of benefit speaks the benefit, his speech is connected with that benefit. This means it is said that he does not set aside one thing and speak of another.

179. Bījagāmabhūtagāmasamārambhāti mūlabījaṃ, khandhabījaṃ, phaḷubījaṃ, aggabījaṃ bījabījanti pañcavidhassa bījagāmassa ceva yassa kassaci nīlatiṇarukkhādikassa bhūtagāmassa ca samārambhā. Chedanabhedanapacanādibhāvena vikopanā paṭiviratoti attho. Ekabhattikoti pātarāsabhattaṃ, sāyamāsabhattanti dve bhattāni. Tesu pātarāsabhattaṃ antomajjhanhikena paricchinnaṃ. Itaraṃ majjhanhikato uddhaṃ antoaruṇena. Tasmā antomajjhanhike dasakkhattuṃ [Pg.89] bhuñjamānopi ekabhattikova hoti. Taṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ – ekabhattikoti. Rattiyā bhojanaṃ ratti, tato uparatoti rattūparato. Atikkante majjhanhike yāva sūriyasatthaṅgamanā bhojanaṃ vikālabhojanaṃ nāma, tato viratattā virato vikālabhojanā. Sāsanassa ananulomattā visūkaṃ paṭāṇībhūtaṃ dassananti visūkadassanaṃ. Attanā naccananaccāpanādivasena naccā ca gītā ca vāditā ca antamaso mayūranaccanāpanādivasenapi pavattānaṃ naccādīnaṃ visūkabhūtā dassanā cāti naccagītavāditavisūkadassanā. Naccādīni hi attanā payojetuṃ vā parehi payojāpetuṃ vā yuttāni passituṃ vā neva bhikkhūnaṃ na bhikkhunīnaṃ vaṭṭanti. Mālādīsu – mālāti yaṃkiñci pupphaṃ. Gandhanti yaṃkiñci gandhajātaṃ. Vilepananti chavirāgakaraṇaṃ. Tattha piḷandhanto dhāreti nāma. Ūnaṭṭhānaṃ pūrento maṇḍeti nāma. Gandhavasena chavirāgavasena ca sādiyanto vibhūseti nāma. Ṭhānaṃ vuccati kāraṇaṃ. Tasmā yāya dussīlyacetanāya tāni mālādhāraṇādīni mahājano karoti, tato paṭiviratoti attho. Uccāsayanaṃ vuccati pamāṇātikkantaṃ. Mahāsayanaṃ akappiyasanthataṃ, tato paṭiviratoti attho. Jātarūpanti suvaṇṇaṃ. Rajatanti kahāpaṇo, lohamāsako, jatumāsako, dārumāsakoti ye vohāraṃ gacchanti. Tassa ubhayassāpi paṭiggahaṇā paṭivirato, neva naṃ uggaṇhāti, na uggaṇhāpeti, na upanikkhittaṃ sādiyatīti attho.

179. Abstaining from the destruction of seed and plant life—this refers to the destruction of the five kinds of seeds: root seeds, stem seeds, joint seeds, bud seeds, and seed seeds; and any plant life such as green grass, trees, etc. The meaning is refraining from causing their destruction by cutting, breaking, cooking, and so forth. One who eats a single meal—there are two meals: the morning meal and the evening meal. Of these, the morning meal is defined as ending by midday. The other is from midday until dawn. Therefore, even if one eats ten times before midday, they are still considered to be one who eats a single meal. This is what is meant by 'one who eats a single meal.' Refraining from eating at night—eating at night is 'ratti'; one who has ceased from that is 'rattūparato'. Food eaten after midday until sunset is called untimely food; because one abstains from it, one is called 'one who abstains from untimely food.' Avoiding shows—this refers to seeing performances that are contrary to the teachings. Dancing, singing, and music—whether performed by oneself or arranged by others, even displays like peacock dances—are considered inappropriate spectacles. Indeed, it is not proper for monks or nuns to engage in, arrange, or watch such performances. Regarding garlands, perfumes, and cosmetics—'garland' refers to any kind of flower. 'Perfume' means any fragrant substance. 'Cosmetics' are substances that color the skin. In this context, wearing them is called 'adorning,' applying them to fill in deficiencies is called 'embellishing,' and enjoying them for their fragrance or skin-coloring properties is called 'decorating.' 'Occasion' means reason. Therefore, the meaning is to refrain from wearing garlands and so on, which ordinary people do with immoral volition. High and luxurious beds—this refers to beds that exceed the proper measure or are spread with unallowable coverings. The meaning is to refrain from such beds. Gold and silver—'gold' is suvaṇṇa. 'Silver' refers to kahāpaṇas, copper māsakas, lac māsakas, and wooden māsakas that are in circulation. The meaning is to refrain from accepting both—one neither takes them oneself, nor has others take them, nor consents to them being set aside for one’s use.

Āmakadhaññapaṭiggahaṇāti sālivīhiyavagodhumakaṅguvarakakudrūsakasaṅkhātassa sattavidhassāpi āmakadhaññassa paṭiggahaṇā. Na kevalañca etesaṃ paṭiggahaṇameva, āmasanampi bhikkhūnaṃ na vaṭṭatiyeva. Āmakamaṃsapaṭiggahaṇāti ettha aññatra odissa anuññātā āmakamacchamaṃsānaṃ paṭiggahaṇameva bhikkhūnaṃ na vaṭṭati, no āmasanaṃ. Itthikumārikapaṭiggahaṇāti ettha itthīti purisantaragatā. Itarā kumārikā nāma. Tāsaṃ paṭiggahaṇampi āmasanampi akappiyameva. Dāsidāsapaṭiggahaṇāti ettha dāsidāsavaseneva tesaṃ paṭiggahaṇaṃ na vaṭṭati. ‘Kappiyakārakaṃ dammi’, ‘ārāmikaṃ dammī’ti evaṃ vutte pana vaṭṭati. Ajeḷakādīsupi khettavatthupariyosānesu kappiyākappiyanayo vinayavasena upaparikkhitabbo. Tattha khettaṃ nāma yasmiṃ pubbaṇṇaṃ ruhati. Vatthu nāma yasmiṃ aparaṇṇaṃ ruhati. Yattha vā ubhayampi [Pg.90] ruhati taṃ khettaṃ. Tadatthāya akatabhūmibhāgo vatthu. Khettavatthusīsena cettha vāpitaḷākādīnipi saṅgahitāneva.

Accepting raw grain—this refers to receiving any of the seven kinds of raw grain: rice, paddy, barley, wheat, millet, beans, and kodo millet. Not only is the acceptance of these prohibited for monks, but even touching them is not allowed. Accepting raw meat—here, except for what is specifically allowed, the acceptance of raw fish and meat is not permitted for monks, but touching them is not prohibited. Accepting women and girls—here, 'women' refers to those who have gone to another man. Others are called 'girls.' Both accepting them and touching them is improper. Accepting male and female slaves—here, the acceptance of them as male and female slaves is not allowed. However, if it is said, 'I give you an allowable attendant,' or 'I give you a monastery attendant,' then it is permissible. Regarding goats, sheep, etc., up to fields and properties—the permissibility or impermissibility should be examined according to the Vinaya rules. Here, a 'field' refers to land where early-season crops grow. 'Property' refers to land where late-season crops grow. Or, where both grow, that is a field. Land unprepared for that purpose is considered property. In this context, even things like sown fields and reservoirs are included under the terms 'field' and 'property.'

Dūteyyaṃ vuccati dūtakammaṃ. Gihīnaṃ pahitaṃ paṇṇaṃ vā sāsanaṃ vā gahetvā tattha tattha gamanaṃ. Pahīṇagamanaṃ vuccati paragharaṃ pesitassa khuddakagamanaṃ. Anuyogo nāma tadubhayakaraṇaṃ. Tasmā dūteyyapahīṇagamanānaṃ anugoti evamettha attho daṭṭhabbo. Kayavikkayāti kayā ca vikkayā ca. Tulākūṭādīsu – kūṭanti vañcanaṃ. Tattha tulākūṭaṃ nāma rūpakūṭaṃ, aṅgakūṭaṃ gahaṇakūṭaṃ, paṭicchannakūṭanti catubbidhaṃ hoti. Tattha rūpakūṭaṃ nāma dve tulā samarūpā katvā gaṇhanto mahatiyā gaṇhāti, dadanto khuddikāya deti. Aṅgakūṭaṃ nāma gaṇhanto pacchābhāge hatthena tulaṃ akkamati, dadanto pubbabhāge. Gahaṇakūṭaṃ nāma gaṇhanto mūle rajjuṃ gaṇhāti, dadanto agge. Paṭicchannakūṭaṃ nāma tulaṃ susiraṃ katvā anto ayacuṇṇaṃ pakkhipitvā gaṇhanto taṃ pacchābhāge karoti, dadanto aggabhāge.

Messenger duty is called the task of a messenger: taking a letter or message sent by householders and going here and there. Going after being sent is called the minor going of one dispatched to another's house. Practice means performing both of these tasks. Therefore, the meaning here should be understood as the practice of messenger duty and going after being sent. Buying and selling—both buying and selling. In the case of false scales and such—'false' means deception. There, false scales are of four kinds: false in appearance, false in parts, false in handling, and false in concealment. False in appearance means making two scales look alike, then taking with the large one and giving with the small one. False in parts means when taking, pressing down on the scale with the hand at the back part, but when giving, doing so at the front part. False in handling means when taking, holding the rope at the base, but when giving, holding it at the tip. False in concealment means making the scale hollow, filling it inside with iron powder, and when taking, tilting it toward the back part, but when giving, tilting it toward the front part.

Kaṃso vuccati suvaṇṇapāti. Tāya vañcanaṃ kaṃsakūṭaṃ. Kathaṃ? Ekaṃ suvaṇṇapātiṃ katvā aññā dve tisso lohapātiyo suvaṇṇavaṇṇā karonti, tato janapadaṃ gantvā kiñcideva aḍḍhakulaṃ pavisitvā suvaṇṇabhājanāni kiṇathā’ti vatvā agghe pucchite samagghataraṃ dātukāmā honti. Tato tehi ‘kathaṃ imesaṃ suvaṇṇabhāvo jānitabbo’ti vutte ‘vīmaṃsitvā gaṇhathā’ti suvaṇṇapātiṃ pāsāṇe ghaṃsitvā sabbapātiyo datvā gacchanti.

A kaṃsa is called a golden bowl. Deception using it is called kaṃsakūṭa. How? They make one golden bowl and two or three iron bowls colored like gold. Then they go to a district, enter a somewhat wealthy household, and say, "Buy these golden vessels." When asked the price, they wish to give them for a higher price. Then, when asked, "How can we know these are truly golden?" they reply, "Test them and take them." They rub the golden bowl on a stone, give all the bowls, and leave.

Mānakūṭaṃ nāma hadayabhedasikhābhedarajjubhedavasena tividhaṃ hoti. Tattha hadayabhedo sappitelādiminanakāle labbhati. Tāni hi gaṇhanto heṭṭhā chiddena mānena ‘saṇikaṃ āsiñcā’ti vatvā antobhājane bahuṃ paggharāpetvā gaṇhāti. Dadanto chiddaṃ pidhāya sīghaṃ pūretvā deti. Sikhābhedo tilataṇḍulādiminanakāle labbhati. Tāni hi gaṇhanto saṇikaṃ sikhaṃ ussāpetvā gaṇhāti. Dadanto vegena pūretvā sikhaṃ chindanto deti. Rajjubhedo khettavatthuminanakāle labbhati. Lañjaṃ alabhantā hi khettaṃ amahantampi mahantaṃ katvā minanti.

Measuring fraud is of three kinds: by breaking the bottom, by breaking the heap, and by breaking the rope. Here, 'breaking the bottom' occurs when measuring ghee, oil, and the like. For when taking these, one uses a measure with a hole at the bottom, says, 'Pour slowly,' and causes much to flow into an inner vessel before taking it. When giving, however, one covers the hole, fills it quickly, and gives it. 'Breaking the heap' occurs when measuring sesame, rice, and the like. For when taking these, one slowly raises the heap and takes it. When giving, however, one fills it quickly, cutting off the heap, and gives it. 'Breaking the rope' occurs when measuring fields and plots of land. For, not receiving a bribe, they measure even a small field as if it were large.

Ukkoṭanādīsu [Pg.91] – ukkoṭananti assāmike sāmike kātuṃ lañjaggahaṇaṃ. Vañcananti tehi tehi upāyehi paresaṃ vañcanaṃ. Tatridamekaṃ vatthu – eko kira luddako migañca migapotakañca gahetvā āgacchati. Tameko dhutto – ‘‘kiṃ bho migo agghati, kiṃ migapotako’’ti āha. ‘‘Migo dve kahāpaṇe, migapotako eka’’nti ca vutte kahāpaṇaṃ datvā migapotakaṃ gahetvā thokaṃ gantvā nivatto, ‘‘na me bho migapotakena attho, migaṃ me dehī’’ti āha. Tena hi ‘‘dve kahāpaṇe dehī’’ti. So āha – ‘‘nanu te, bho, mayā paṭhamaṃ eko kahāpaṇo dinno’’ti? ‘‘Āma dinno’’ti. Idampi migapotakaṃ gaṇha, evaṃ so ca kahāpaṇo ayañca kahāpaṇagghaṇako migapotakoti dve kahāpaṇā bhavissantīti. So ‘‘kāraṇaṃ vadatī’’ti sallakkhetvā migapotakaṃ gahetvā migaṃ adāsīti.

Regarding extortion and so forth: Extortion means taking a bribe to make what belongs to a non-owner belong to an owner. Deception means deceiving others by various means. Here is one case: Once, a certain hunter caught a deer and a fawn and was bringing them back. A certain rogue asked him, 'Sir, what is the deer worth, and what is the fawn?' When told, 'The deer is two kahāpaṇas, the fawn one,' he gave one kahāpaṇa, took the fawn, went a short distance, then turned back and said, 'Sir, I have no need for the fawn; give me the deer instead.' Then the hunter said, 'Then give me two kahāpaṇas.' He replied, 'Sir, did I not already give you one kahāpaṇa earlier?' 'Yes, you did,' the hunter said. He then said, 'Take this fawn as well; in this way, that kahāpaṇa and this fawn, which is worth a kahāpaṇa, will become two kahāpaṇas.' Realizing that he was making a valid point, the hunter took the fawn and gave him the deer.

Nikatīti yogavasena vā māyāvasena vā apāmaṅgaṃ pāmaṅganti, amaṇiṃ maṇīti, asuvaṇṇaṃ suvaṇṇanti katvā patirūpakena vañcanaṃ. Sāciyogoti kuṭilayogo. Etesaṃyeva ukkoṭanādīnametaṃ nāmaṃ. Tasmā ukkoṭanasāciyogo vañcanasāciyogo nikatisāciyogoti evamettha attho daṭṭhabbo. Keci aññaṃ dassetvā aññassa parivattanaṃ ‘sāciyogo’ti vadanti. Taṃ pana vañcaneneva saṅgahitaṃ.

Nikatī (deceit) means deceiving by means of a counterfeit, making something inferior appear superior, a false gem a genuine one, or base metal gold, whether by artifice or by trickery. Sāciyoga (fraudulent practice) means crooked dealing. This is merely another name for these very practices of extortion and so forth. Therefore, the meaning here should be understood as 'fraudulent practice of extortion,' 'fraudulent practice of deception,' and 'fraudulent practice of deceit.' Some, however, say that 'sāciyoga' is showing one thing and substituting another. But that is included within deception itself.

Chedanādīsu – chedananti hatthacchedanādi. Vadhoti māraṇaṃ. Bandhoti rajjubandhanādīhi bandhanaṃ. Viparāmosoti himaviparāmoso, gumbaviparāmosoti duvidho. Yañhi himapātasamaye himena paṭicchannā hutvā maggappaṭipannaṃ janaṃ musanti, ayaṃ himaviparāmoso. Yaṃ gumbādīhi paṭicchannā musanti, ayaṃ gumbaviparāmoso. Ālopo vuccati gāmanigamādīnaṃ vilopakaraṇaṃ. Sahasākāroti sāhasikakiriyā. Gehaṃ pavisitvā manussānaṃ ure satthaṃ ṭhapetvā icchitabhaṇḍaggahaṇaṃ. Evametasmā chedana…pe… sahasākārā paṭivirato hoti.

Regarding cutting off and so forth: 'Cutting off' means cutting off hands and so on. 'Killing' means murder. 'Binding' means binding with ropes and the like. Viparāmoso (robbery with violence) is of two kinds: snow robbery with violence and thicket robbery with violence. When, during snowfall, people concealed by snow rob those traveling on the road, this is snow robbery with violence. When people concealed in thickets and the like rob others, this is thicket robbery with violence. Ālopo (plundering) means the plundering of villages, towns, and so forth. Sahasākāro (violence) means a violent act. It is entering a house, placing a knife at people's chests, and seizing desired goods. Thus, one abstains from cutting off... up to... violence.

180. So santuṭṭho hotīti so catūsu paccayesu dvādasavidhena itarītarapaccayasantosena samannāgato hoti. Kāyaparihārikenāti kāyaṃ pariharaṇamattakena. Kucchiparihārikenāti kucchipariharaṇamattakena. Samādāyeva pakkamatīti aṭṭhavidhaṃ bhikkhu parikkhāramattakaṃ sabbaṃ gahetvāva kāyapaṭibaddhaṃ katvāva gacchati. ‘‘Mama [Pg.92] vihāro pariveṇaṃ upaṭṭhāko’’ti saṅgo vā baddho vā na hoti. So jiyā muttasaro viya yūthā pakkanto, mattahatthī viya icchiticchitaṃ senāsanaṃ vanasaṇḍaṃ rukkhamūlaṃ vanapatthaṃ pabbhāraṃ paribhuñjanto ekova tiṭṭhati, ekova nisīdati. Sabbiriyāpathesu ekova adutiyo.

180. 'He is content' means he is endowed with contentment regarding the four requisites in twelve ways, with contentment with whatever comes to hand. 'With only what is necessary to maintain the body' means with only so much as is needed to maintain the body. 'With only what is necessary to maintain the belly' means with only so much as is needed to maintain the belly. 'He departs, taking only what he has adopted' means the bhikkhu goes, taking all the eight kinds of requisites, having made them bound to his body. He has no attachment or bond, thinking, 'This is my dwelling, my enclosure, my attendant.' Like an arrow released from the bow, he departs from the herd; like a solitary elephant, he enjoys whatever dwelling place he wishes—a forest thicket, the foot of a tree, a forest wilderness, a mountain slope—he stands alone, he sits alone. In all his postures, he is alone, without a second.

‘‘Cātuddiso appaṭigho ca hoti,Santussamāno itarītarena;

Parissayānaṃ sahitā achambhī,Eko care khaggavisāṇakappo’’ti. (su. ni. 42);

He is friendly in all directions and unresisting, content with whatever comes to hand; enduring dangers, fearless, he wanders alone like a rhinoceros.

Evaṃ vaṇṇitaṃ khaggavisāṇakappataṃ āpajjati.

Thus he attains the state of one like a rhinoceros horn, as described.

Idāni tamatthaṃ upamāya sādhento, ‘‘seyyathāpī’’tiādimāha. Tattha pakkhī sakuṇoti pakkhayutto sakuṇo. Ḍetīti uppatati. Ayaṃ panettha saṅkhepattho – sakuṇo nāma ‘‘asukasmiṃ padese rukkho paripakkaphalo’’ti ñatvā nānādisāhi āgantvā nakhapakkhatuṇḍādīhi tassa phalāni vijjhantā vidhunantā khādanti. ‘‘Idaṃ ajjatanāya, idaṃ svātanāya bhavissatī’’ti tesaṃ na hoti. Phale pana khīṇe neva rukkhassa ārakkhaṃ ṭhapenti, na tattha pattaṃ vā nakhaṃ vā tuṇḍaṃ vā ṭhapenti. Atha kho tasmiṃ rukkhe anapekkho hutvā yo yaṃ disābhāgaṃ icchati, so tena sapattabhārova uppatitvā gacchati. Evameva ayaṃ bhikkhu nissaṅgo nirapekkhoyeva pakkamati, tena vuttaṃ samādāyeva pakkamatīti. Ariyenāti niddosena. Ajjhattanti sake attabhāve. Anavajjasukhanti niddosasukhaṃ.

Now, illustrating that meaning by means of a simile, he says, 'Just as,' and so forth. Here, 'pakkhī sakuṇo' means a winged bird. 'Ḍeti' means it flies up. The concise meaning here is this: A bird, knowing that 'in such-and-such a place there is a tree with ripe fruit,' comes from various directions and, with its claws, wings, beak, and so forth, pierces, shakes, and eats its fruits. They do not think, 'This is for today; this will be for tomorrow.' When the fruits are exhausted, they neither place a guard on the tree nor leave behind a leaf, claw, or beak there. Then, indifferent to that tree, each one flies away with its own wings to whatever direction it desires. In the same way, this bhikkhu departs unattached and indifferent. Therefore, it is said, 'He departs taking only his requisites.' 'By the noble one' means by the faultless one. 'Internally' means within one's own person. 'Blameless happiness' means happiness free from fault.

181. So cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvāti so iminā ariyena sīlakkhandhena samannāgato bhikkhu cakkhuviññāṇena rūpaṃ passitvāti attho. Sesapadesupi yaṃ vattabbaṃ, taṃ sabbaṃ heṭṭhā vuttameva. Abyāsekasukhanti kilesehi anavasittasukhaṃ. Avikiṇṇasukhantipi vuttaṃ. Indriyasaṃvarasukhañhi diṭṭhādīsu diṭṭhamattādivasena pavattatāya avikiṇṇaṃ hoti.

181. 'Having seen a form with the eye' means this bhikkhu, endowed with this noble aggregate of virtue, having seen a form with eye-consciousness. Whatever needs to be said regarding the remaining phrases has already been stated below. 'Abyāsekasukha' means happiness not saturated by defilements. It is also called 'avikiṇṇasukha' (unscattered happiness). For the happiness of sense restraint is unscattered because it proceeds in the case of sights and so on, merely with seeing, and so forth.

182. So [Pg.93] abhikkante paṭikkanteti so manacchaṭṭhānaṃ indriyānaṃ saṃvarena samannāgato bhikkhu imesu abhikkantapaṭikkantādīsu sattasu ṭhānesu satisampajaññavasena sampajānakārī hoti. Tattha yaṃ vattabbaṃ siyā, taṃ jhānavibhaṅge vuttameva.

182. 'When going forward and backward' means this bhikkhu, endowed with sense-restraint over the six sense faculties, acts with full awareness in these seven instances beginning with going forward and backward, through mindfulness and full comprehension. Whatever needs to be said about this has already been said in the exposition of jhāna.

So iminā cātiādinā kiṃ dasseti? Araññavāsassa paccayasampattiṃ dasseti. Yassa hi ime cattāro paccayā natthi, tassa araññavāso na ijjhati, tiracchānagatehi vā vanacarakehi vā saddhiṃ vattabbataṃ āpajjati. Araññe adhivatthā devatā ‘‘kiṃ evarūpassa pāpabhikkhuno araññavāsenā’’ti bheravaṃ saddaṃ sāventi. Hatthehi sīsaṃ paharitvā palāyanākāraṃ karonti. ‘‘Asuko bhikkhu araññaṃ pavisitvā idañcidañca pāpakammaṃ akāsī’’ti ayaso pattharati. Yassa panete cattāro paccayā atthi, tassa araññavāso ijjhati. So hi attano sīlaṃ paccavekkhanto kiñci kāḷakaṃ vā tilakaṃ vā apassanto pītiṃ uppādetvā taṃ khayato vayato sammasanto ariyabhūmiṃ okkamati. Araññe adhivatthā devatā attamanā vaṇṇaṃ bhāsanti. Itissa udake pakkhittatelabindu viya yaso vitthāriko hoti. Vivittantiādīni heṭṭhā vuttatthāneva. So evaṃ samāhite citte…pe… yathākammūpage satte pajānātīti ettake ṭhāne yaṃ vattabbaṃ siyā, taṃ sabbaṃ visuddhimagge vuttameva.

What does 'And with this...' and so forth indicate? It indicates the accomplishment of the conditions for forest dwelling. For one who lacks these four conditions, forest dwelling does not succeed; he is reduced to consorting with animals or forest dwellers. The deities dwelling in the forest utter terrifying sounds, saying, 'What use is forest dwelling for such a wicked bhikkhu?' They strike their heads with their hands and make gestures as if fleeing. The ill-fame spreads, 'That bhikkhu entered the forest and committed such and such evil deeds.' But for one who possesses these four conditions, forest dwelling succeeds. Reflecting on his own virtue and seeing no fault or blemish, he generates joy, and contemplating its decay and vanishing, he enters the noble ground. The deities dwelling in the forest, delighted, speak his praises. Thus his fame spreads widely like a drop of oil cast upon water. The terms beginning with 'vivitta' (secluded) have the meanings as stated earlier. Whatever should be said regarding the passage 'With his mind thus concentrated... he understands beings according to their deeds' is already stated in the Visuddhimagga.

185. Tatiyavijjāya so evaṃ samāhite citteti vipassanāpādakaṃ catutthajjhānacittaṃ veditabbaṃ. Āsavānaṃ khayañāṇāyāti arahattamaggañāṇatthāya. Arahattamaggo hi āsavānaṃ vināsanato āsavānaṃ khayoti vuccati. Tatra cetaṃ ñāṇaṃ tappariyāpannattāti. Cittaṃ abhininnāmetīti vipassanācittaṃ abhinīharati. So idaṃ dukkhanti evamādīsu – ‘‘ettakaṃ dukkhaṃ, na ito bhiyyo’’ti sabbampi dukkhasaccaṃ sarasalakkhaṇappaṭivedhena yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti, paṭivijjhati. Tassa ca dukkhassa nibbattikaṃ taṇhaṃ – ayaṃ dukkhasamudayoti; tadubhayampi yaṃ ṭhānaṃ patvā nirujjhati, taṃ tesaṃ appavattiṃ nibbānaṃ – ayaṃ dukkhanirodhoti; tassa ca sampāpakaṃ ariyamaggaṃ – ayaṃ dukkhanirodhagāminī paṭipadāti sarasalakkhaṇapaṭivedhena yathābhūtaṃ pajānāti, paṭivijjhatīti – evamattho veditabbo.

185. Regarding the third knowledge, 'with his mind thus concentrated,' this should be understood as the fourth jhāna consciousness, which is the basis for insight. 'For the knowledge of the destruction of the taints' means for the purpose of the knowledge of the path of arahantship. The path of arahantship is called the destruction of the taints because it destroys them, and this knowledge is included within it. 'He directs his mind' means he brings forth the mind towards insight. Thus, regarding 'This is suffering,' etc., he understands and penetrates the entire truth of suffering as it really is, through penetration of its characteristic and function, thinking: 'This much is suffering, no more than this.' He understands and penetrates the craving that produces that suffering—'This is the origin of suffering'—as it really is, through penetration of its characteristic and function; and that state where both of these cease, their non-occurrence, Nibbāna—'This is the cessation of suffering'—as it really is, through penetration of its characteristic and function; and the noble path that leads to that—'This is the path leading to the cessation of suffering'—as it really is, through penetration of its characteristic and function. This is how the meaning should be understood.

Evaṃ [Pg.94] sarūpato saccāni dassetvā idāni kilesavasena pariyāyato dassento ime āsavātiādimāha. Tassa evaṃ jānato evaṃ passatoti tassa evaṃ jānantassa evaṃ passantassa saha vipassanāya koṭippattaṃ maggaṃ katheti. Kāmāsavāti kāmāsavato. Vimuccatīti iminā maggakkhaṇaṃ dasseti. Vimuttasminti iminā phalakkhaṇaṃ dasseti. Maggakkhaṇe hi cittaṃ vimuccati, phalakkhaṇe vimuttaṃ hoti. Vimuttasmiṃ vimuttamiti ñāṇanti iminā paccavekkhaṇañāṇaṃ dasseti. Khīṇā jātītiādīhi tassa bhūmiṃ. Tena hi ñāṇena so paccavekkhanto ‘khīṇā jātī’tiādīni pajānāti. Vusitanti vuṭṭhaṃ parivuṭṭhaṃ kataṃ caritaṃ niṭṭhitanti attho. Brahmacariyanti maggabrahmacariyaṃ. Puthujjanakalyāṇakena hi saddhiṃ satta sekkhā brahmacariyavāsaṃ vasanti nāma. Khīṇāsavo vuṭṭhavāso. Tasmā so attano brahmacariyavāsaṃ paccavekkhanto vusitaṃ brahmacariyanti pajānāti. Kataṃ karaṇīyanti catūsu saccesu catūhi maggehi pariññāpahānasacchikiriyābhāvanāvasena soḷasavidhampi kiccaṃ niṭṭhāpitanti attho. Puthujjanakalyāṇakādayo hi taṃ kiccaṃ karonti; khīṇāsavo katakaraṇīyo. Tasmā so attano karaṇīyaṃ paccavekkhanto. ‘‘Kataṃ karaṇīya’’nti pajānāti. Nāparaṃ itthattāyāti ‘‘idāni puna etthabhāvāya evaṃ soḷasakiccabhāvāya kilesakkhayāya vā maggabhāvanākiccaṃ natthī’’ti pajānāti.

Having thus shown the truths in their own nature, he now shows them in a different way by means of defilements, beginning with 'these taints.' 'For one who knows thus, who sees thus'—for one knowing and seeing thus, he speaks of the path that has reached its culmination together with insight. 'From the taint of sensual desire' means from the taint of sensual desire. 'He is liberated'—this indicates the moment of the path. 'In one who is liberated'—this indicates the moment of fruition. For at the moment of the path, the mind is being liberated; at the moment of fruition, it is liberated. 'In one who is liberated, the knowledge arises: "I am liberated"'—this indicates the reviewing knowledge. 'Destroyed is birth,' etc.—this indicates his stage. For with that knowledge, while reviewing, he understands: 'Destroyed is birth,' etc. 'The holy life has been lived'—means it has been dwelt, fully dwelt, done, practiced, and completed. 'The holy life'—refers to the holy life of the path. For together with the virtuous worldling, the seven trainees are said to live the holy life. The one whose taints are destroyed has completed the living. Therefore, reviewing his own living of the holy life, he understands: 'The holy life has been lived.' 'What was to be done has been done'—means the sixteenfold task has been completed by way of full understanding, abandoning, realization, and development with regard to the four truths by the four paths. The virtuous worldling and others perform that task; the one whose taints are destroyed has done what was to be done. Therefore, reviewing his own task, he understands: 'What was to be done has been done.' 'There is nothing further for this state'—he understands: 'Now there is no further task of developing the path for this state, that is, for the state of the sixteen tasks, or for the destruction of defilements.'

186. Sarāgādīsu – appahīnoti vikkhambhanappahānena vā tadaṅgappahānena vā samucchedappahānena vā appahīno.

186. Regarding 'with lust,' etc.—'not abandoned' means not abandoned by suppression, by substitution of opposites, or by eradication.

187. Lābhī hotītiādīsu – lābhīti lābhavā paṭilabhitvā ṭhito. Ajjhattaṃ cetosamathassāti niyakajjhattasaṅkhāte attano citte uppannassa cetosamathassa. Adhipaññādhammavipassanāyāti adhipaññāsaṅkhātāya khandhadhammesu aniccādivasena pavattāya vipassanāya. Rūpasahagatānanti rūpanimittārammaṇānaṃ rūpāvacarasamāpattīnaṃ. Arūpasahagatānanti na rūpanimittārammaṇānaṃ arūpasamāpattīnaṃ. Ettha ca paṭhamo aṭṭhasamāpattilābhī puthujjano. Dutiyo sukkhavipassakaariyasāvako. Tatiyo aṭṭhasamāpattilābhī ariyasāvako. Catuttho lokiyamahājano veditabbo.

187. In 'is an obtainer,' etc.—'an obtainer' means one who possesses, having obtained and being established. 'Of internal serenity of mind'—refers to the serenity of mind arisen in one's own mind, which is designated as internal. 'Of insight into phenomena as higher wisdom'—refers to the insight, designated as higher wisdom, which proceeds by way of impermanence, etc., with regard to the phenomena of the aggregates. 'Accompanied by form'—refers to the form-sphere attainments that have a form-sign as their object. 'Accompanied by the formless'—refers to the formless attainments that do not have a form-sign as their object. Here, the first is a worldling who is an obtainer of the eight attainments. The second is a noble disciple who is a dry-insight meditator. The third is a noble disciple who is an obtainer of the eight attainments. The fourth should be understood as the great mass of worldly people.

188. Anusotagāmīādīsu – anusotagāmīti vaṭṭasotaṃ anugato, vaṭṭasote nimuggo puthujjano veditabbo. Paṭisotagāmīti paṭisotagamano[Pg.95]. Anusotaṃ agantvā paṭisotaṃ gacchantassetaṃ adhivacanaṃ. Pāpañca kammaṃ na karotīti paññattaṃ vītikkamanto na karoti. Sahāpi dukkhena sahāpi domanassenāti kilesapariyuṭṭhāne sati uppannena dukkhadomanassena saddhimpi. Paripuṇṇanti tissannaṃ sikkhānaṃ ekāyapi anūnaṃ. Parisuddhanti nirupakkilesaṃ. Brahmacariyanti seṭṭhacariyaṃ. Iminā vārena sotāpannasakadāgāmino kathitā. Kiṃ pana te rudantā brahmacariyaṃ carantīti? Āma. Kilesarodanena rudantā caranti nāma. Sīlasampanno puthujjanabhikkhupi ettheva saṅgahito.

188. Regarding 'one who goes with the stream' and so on—'one who goes with the stream' means one who follows the stream of the round of rebirths; a worldling submerged in the stream of the round should be understood. 'One who goes against the stream' means one who goes against the stream. This is a designation for one who does not go with the stream but goes against the stream. 'He does not do evil deeds' means he does not transgress what has been laid down. 'Even with suffering, even with sorrow' means even with the suffering and sorrow that arise when defilements beset him. 'Perfect' means not deficient in even one of the three trainings. 'Pure' means without defilements. 'The holy life' means the excellent conduct. By this section, the stream-enterer and the once-returner are spoken of. 'But do they practice the holy life while weeping?' Yes, they are said to practice it while weeping with the weeping of defilements. Even a virtuous worldling monk is included here.

Ṭhitattoti ṭhitasabhāvo. Anāgāmīti kāmarāgabyāpādehi akampanīyacittatāya ca tamhā lokā anāvattidhammatāya ca ṭhitasabhāvo nāma. Tiṇṇoti taṇhāsotaṃ uttiṇṇo. Pāraṅgatoti nibbānapāraṃ gato. Thale tiṭṭhatīti arahattaphalasamāpattithale tiṭṭhati. Cetovimuttinti phalasamādhiṃ. Paññāvimuttinti phalañāṇaṃ. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ khīṇāsavo ‘‘tiṇṇo pāraṅgato thale tiṭṭhati brāhmaṇo’’ti vuccati. Bāhitapāpatāya hi esa brāhmaṇo nāma.

'One of steadfast self' means one of steadfast nature. The non-returner is called one of steadfast nature because his mind is unshakeable by sensual desire and ill will, and because of his nature of not returning from that world. 'Crossed over' means he has crossed the stream of craving. 'Gone to the far shore' means he has gone to the far shore of Nibbāna. 'He stands on dry ground' means he stands on the dry ground of the fruition attainment of arahantship. 'Liberation of mind' refers to the fruition-concentration. 'Liberation by wisdom' refers to the fruition-knowledge. 'This one is called' means this one whose taints are destroyed is called 'one who has crossed over, gone to the far shore, stands on dry ground, a brahmin.' For he is indeed a brahmin by having banished evil.

189. Appassutādīsu – appakaṃ sutaṃ hotīti navaṅge satthusāsane kiñcideva thokaṃ sutaṃ hoti. Na atthamaññāya, na dhammamaññāya dhammānudhammapaṭipanno hotīti aṭṭhakathañca pāḷiñca jānitvā lokuttaradhammassa anurūpadhammaṃ pubbabhāgapaṭipadaṃ paṭipanno na hoti. Iminā nayena sabbattha attho veditabbo.

189. Regarding 'one of little learning' and so on—'he has little learning' means that in the ninefold teaching of the Teacher, he has heard only a little, just a trifle. 'Not having understood the meaning, not having understood the Dhamma, he is not one who practices in accordance with the Dhamma' means that, not knowing the commentary and the Pāli text, he has not entered upon the preliminary practice that is in conformity with the supramundane Dhamma. The meaning should be understood in this way in all cases.

190. Samaṇamacalādīsu – samaṇamacaloti samaṇaacalo, makāro padasandhikaro. Niccalasamaṇo, thirasamaṇoti attho. Ayaṃ vuccatīti ayaṃ sotāpanno sāsane mūlajātāya saddhāya patiṭṭhitattā ‘samaṇamacalo’ti vuccati. Sakadāgāmī pana rajjanakilesassa atthitāya samaṇapadumoti vutto. Rattaṭṭho hi idha padumaṭṭho nāmāti vuttaṃ. Anāgāmī kāmarāgasaṅkhātassa rajjanakilesassa natthitāya samaṇapuṇḍarīkoti vutto. Paṇḍaraṭṭho hi idha puṇḍarīkaṭṭho nāmāti vuttaṃ[Pg.96]. Khīṇāsavo ca thaddhabhāvakarānaṃ kilesānaṃ abhāvena samaṇesu samaṇasukhumālo nāmāti vutto. Appadukkhaṭṭhenapi cesa samaṇasukhumāloyevāti.

190. Regarding 'the steadfast ascetic' and so on—'the steadfast ascetic' means an unshaken ascetic, the letter 'm' being a euphonic link. The meaning is a steady ascetic, a firm ascetic. 'This is called' means this stream-enterer is called 'the steadfast ascetic' because he is established in faith that has taken root in the Dispensation. The once-returner, however, is called 'the ascetic lotus' because of the existence of the defilement of lust. For here the meaning of 'lotus' is said to be 'tinged with red.' The non-returner is called 'the ascetic white lotus' because there is no defilement of lust in the form of sensual desire. For here the meaning of 'white lotus' is said to be 'white.' And the one whose taints are destroyed is called 'the delicate ascetic among ascetics' because of the absence of defilements that cause rigidity. And also in the sense of having little suffering, he is indeed the delicate ascetic.

Catukkaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Fours.

5. Pañcakaniddesavaṇṇanā

5. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Fives.

191. Pañcake – tatrāti tesu ‘‘ārabhati ca vippaṭisārī ca hotī’’tiādinā nayena heṭṭhā uddiṭṭhapuggalesu. Yvāyanti yo ayaṃ. Ārabhatīti ettha ārambhasaddo kammakiriyāhiṃsanavīriyavikopanāpattivītikkamesu vattati. Tathā hesa ‘‘yaṃkiñci dukkhaṃ sambhoti, sabbaṃ ārambhapaccayā’’ti (su. ni. 748) kamme āgato. ‘‘Mahāyaññā mahārambhā, na te honti mahapphalā’’ti (a. ni. 4.39) kiriyāyaṃ. ‘‘Samaṇaṃ gotamaṃ uddissa pāṇaṃ ārabhantī’’ti (ma. ni. 2.51-52) hiṃsane. ‘‘Ārabhatha, nikkhamatha, yuñjatha buddhasāsane’’ti (saṃ. ni. 1.185) vīriye. ‘‘Bījagāmabhūtagāmasamārambhā paṭivirato hotī’’ti (dī. ni. 1.10, 194; ma. ni. 1.293) vikopane. ‘‘Ārabhati ca vippaṭisārī ca hotī’’ti (a. ni. 5.142) ayaṃ pana āpattivītikkame āgato. Tasmā āpattivītikkamavasena ārabhati ceva tappaccayā vippaṭisārī ca hotīti ayamettha attho.

191. In the Pentad – among them: Here, among those individuals previously mentioned in the passage 'he commits and feels remorse,' and so on. Yvāyanti: that is, 'whoever he is.' As for 'commits' (ārabhati): in this context, the word 'ārambha' applies to actions, deeds, harm, exertion, disruption, and transgression. Thus, it is said: 'Whatever suffering arises, all of it has committing as its cause' (Sutta Nipāta 748)—here it refers to action (kamma). 'Great sacrifices, great commitments, they do not bear great fruit' (Aṅguttara Nikāya 4.39)—here it refers to deeds (kiriya). 'They commit violence against living beings for the sake of the ascetic Gotama' (Majjhima Nikāya 2.51-52)—here it refers to harm (hiṃsana). 'Begin, strive, exert yourselves in the Buddha’s dispensation' (Saṃyutta Nikāya 1.185)—here it refers to exertion (vīriya). 'He abstains from damaging seed and plant life' (Dīgha Nikāya 1.10, 194; Majjhima Nikāya 1.293)—here it refers to disruption (vikopana). But in the phrase, 'He commits and feels remorse' (Aṅguttara Nikāya 5.142), this refers to transgression (āpattivītikkama). Therefore, the meaning here is: he commits by way of transgression, and because of that, he feels remorse.

Yathābhūtaṃ nappajānātīti anadhigatattā yathāsabhāvato na jānāti. Yatthassāti yasmiṃ assa, yaṃ ṭhānaṃ patvā etassa puggalassa uppannā pāpakā akusalā dhammā aparisesā nirujjhantīti attho. Kiṃ pana patvā te nirujjhantīti? Arahattamaggaṃ. Phalappattassa pana niruddhā nāma honti. Evaṃ santepi idha maggakiccavasena phalameva vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Ārambhajāti āpattivītikkamasambhavā. Vippaṭisārajāti vippaṭisārato jātā. Pavaḍḍhantīti punappunaṃ uppajjanena vaḍḍhanti. Sādhūti āyācanasādhu. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – yāva aparaddhañca vata āyasmatā, evaṃ santepi mayaṃ āyasmantaṃ yācāma – ‘‘desetabbayuttakassa desanāya, vuṭṭhātabbayuttakassa vuṭṭhānena, āvikātabbayuttakassa āvikiriyāya, ārambhaje āsave [Pg.97] pahāya, suddhante ṭhitabhāvapaccavekkhaṇena vippaṭisāraje āsave paṭivinodetvā nīharitvā vipassanācittañceva vipassanāpaññañca bhāvetū’’ti. Amunā pañcamena puggalenāti etena pañcamena khīṇāsavapuggalena. Samasamo bhavissatīti lokuttaraguṇehi samabhāveneva samo bhavissatīti evaṃ khīṇāsavena ovaditabboti attho.

He does not understand as it really is—because he has not comprehended it, he does not know according to its true nature. Where for him—in whatever place, having reached which, all the arisen unwholesome states of this person cease without remainder—this is the meaning. But having reached what do they cease? The path of arahantship. But for one who has attained the fruit, they are said to be ceased. Even so, here it should be understood that the fruit is spoken of in terms of the function of the path. Ārambhajā: born from the transgression of an offense. Vippaṭisārajā: born from remorse. They increase—they grow by arising again and again. 'Good'—this is an expression of request. This is what is meant: 'Even though the venerable one has indeed transgressed, still we entreat him: "Having abandoned the taints born of transgression by confessing what ought to be confessed, rising from what ought to be risen from, and disclosing what ought to be disclosed; and having dispelled and removed the taints born of remorse by reviewing his state of being established in purity, may he develop both the mind of insight and the wisdom of insight."' By this fifth person—that is, by this fifth person, the taint-destroyed one. He will become equal—he will become equal in supramundane qualities, thus he should be advised by a taint-destroyed one—this is the meaning.

Ārabhati na vippaṭisārī hotīti āpattiṃ āpajjati. Taṃ pana desetuṃ sabhāgapuggalaṃ pariyesati. Tasmā na vippaṭisārī hoti. Aṅguttaraṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana ‘‘vuṭṭhitattā na vippaṭisārī hotī’’ti vuttaṃ. Na ārabhati vippaṭisārī hotīti āpattiṃ nāpajjati, vinayapaññattiyaṃ pana akovidattā anāpattiyaṃ āpattisaññī hutvā vippaṭisārī hoti. Aṅguttaraṭṭhakathāyaṃ pana ‘‘sakiṃ āpattiṃ āpajjitvā tato vuṭṭhāya pacchā kiñcāpi nāpajjati, vippaṭisāraṃ pana vinodetuṃ na sakkotī’’ti vuttaṃ. Na ārabhati na vippaṭisārī hotīti neva āpattiṃ āpajjati, na vippaṭisārī hoti. Katamo panesa puggaloti? Ossaṭṭhavīriyapuggalo. So hi ‘‘kiṃ me imasmiṃ buddhakāle parinibbānena, anāgate metteyyasammāsambuddhakāle parinibbāyissāmī’’ti visuddhasīlopi paṭipattiṃ na pūreti. Sopi ‘‘kimatthaṃ āyasmā pamatto viharati puthujjanassa nāma gati anibaddhā. Āyasmā hi metteyyasammāsambuddhassa sammukhabhāvaṃ labheyyapi na labheyyāpīti arahattatthāya vipassanaṃ bhāvehī’’ti ovaditabbova. Sesaṃ sabbattha vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ.

He commits an offense and does not feel remorse—thus he incurs an offense. He seeks a suitable person to whom to declare it. Therefore, he does not feel remorse. In the Aṅguttara commentary, however, it is said, 'Because he has arisen from the offense, he does not feel remorse.' He does not commit an offense but feels remorse—thus he does not incur an offense. Yet, due to not being skilled in the Vinaya regulations, considering a non-offense as an offense, he feels remorse. In the Aṅguttara commentary, however, it is said, 'Having incurred an offense once and then arisen from it, even if he does not incur it again later, he is still unable to dispel his remorse.' He neither commits an offense nor feels remorse—thus he neither incurs an offense nor feels remorse. But who is this person? It is the person of slackened effort. For even though his virtue is pure, he does not fulfill the practice, thinking, 'What is the use of my attaining final Nibbāna in this Buddha-era? I will attain final Nibbāna in the future era of Metteyya, the Perfectly Self-Enlightened One.' He too should be advised: 'Why, venerable one, do you dwell heedlessly? The destiny of an ordinary person is unfixed. The venerable one might or might not obtain the presence of Metteyya, the Perfectly Self-Enlightened One; therefore, you should develop insight for the sake of arahantship.' The rest should be understood in the same way as explained everywhere else.

192. Datvā avajānātītiādīsu – eko bhikkhu mahāpuñño catupaccayalābhī hoti. So cīvarādīni labhitvā aññaṃ appapuññaṃ āpucchati. Sopi tasmiṃ punappunaṃ āpucchantepi gaṇhātiyeva. Athassa itaro thokaṃ kupito hutvā maṅkubhāvaṃ uppādetukāmo vadati – ‘‘ayaṃ attano dhammatāya cīvarādīni na labhati, amhe nissāya labhatī’’ti. Evaṃ puggalo datvā avajānāti nāma. Eko pana ekena saddhiṃ dve tīṇi vassāni vasanto pubbe taṃ puggalaṃ garuṃ katvā pacchā gacchante gacchante kāle cittīkāraṃ na karoti, āsanāpi na vuṭṭhāti, upaṭṭhānampi na gacchati. Evaṃ puggalo saṃvāsena avajānāti nāma.

192. In the cases of 'giving and then despising' and so on: One monk is of great merit and obtains the four requisites. Having obtained robes and other items, he offers them to another monk of little merit. And that monk, even when the other repeatedly offers, just accepts. Then, the first monk becomes slightly annoyed and, wishing to create discomfiture, says, 'This one does not obtain robes and other items through his own nature; he obtains them by relying on us.' Such a person is called one who gives and then despises. Another case: A monk who has lived together with another for two or three years, having previously respected that person, later, as time passes, no longer shows him respect, does not rise from his seat, and does not go to serve him. Such a person is called one who despises through association.

Ādheyyamukhoti [Pg.98] ādito dheyyamukho. Paṭhamavacanasmiṃyeva ṭhapitamukhoti attho. Adhimuccitā hotīti saddhātā hoti. Tatrāyaṃ nayo – eko puggalo sāruppaṃyeva bhikkhuṃ ‘asāruppo eso’ti katheti, taṃ sutvā esa niṭṭhaṃ gacchati. Puna aññena sabhāgena bhikkhunā ‘sāruppo aya’nti vuttepi tassa vacanaṃ na gaṇhāti ‘‘asukena nāma ‘asāruppo aya’nti amhākaṃ kathita’’nti purimabhikkhunova kathaṃ gaṇhāti. Aparopissa dussīlaṃ ‘sīlavā’ti katheti. Tassa vacanaṃ saddahitvā puna aññena ‘‘asāruppo esa bhikkhu, nāyaṃ tumhākaṃ santikaṃ upasaṅkamituṃ yutto’’ti vuttopi tassa vacanaṃ aggahetvā purimasseva kathaṃ gaṇhāti. Aparo vaṇṇampi kathitaṃ gaṇhāti, avaṇṇampi kathitaṃ gaṇhātiyeva. Ayampi ādheyyamukhoyeva nāma. Ādhātabbamukho yaṃ yaṃ suṇāti, tattha tattha ṭhapitamukhoti attho.

He is called 'credulous' because he is receptive from the start. The meaning is that his attention is fixed on the very first statement. 'He becomes convinced' (adhimuccitā hoti) means he becomes one who believes. Here is the method: One person speaks about a suitable monk, saying, 'He is unsuitable.' Hearing this, the other becomes settled in that view. Then, when another monk of the same disposition says, 'This monk is suitable,' he does not accept his words, thinking, 'A certain monk has already told us that this monk is unsuitable,' and he accepts only the first monk’s statement. Another declares an immoral person to be virtuous. Trusting that statement, even when someone else later says, 'This monk is unsuitable; he is not fit to approach you,' he does not accept those words and accepts the earlier statement. Another accepts both praise that is spoken and blame that is spoken. He too is called 'credulous.' 'Having a receptive mouth' means that whatever he hears, his attention is fixed on that; this is the meaning.

Loloti saddhādīnaṃ ittarakālaṭṭhitikattā assaddhiyādīhi lulitabhāvena lolo. Ittarasaddhoti parittasaddho, aparipuṇṇasaddho. Sesesupi eseva nayo. Ettha pana punappunaṃ bhajanavasena saddhāva bhatti. Pemaṃ saddhāpemaṃ gehasitapemampi vaṭṭati. Pasādo saddhāpasādova. Evaṃ puggalo lolo hotīti evaṃ ittarasaddhāditāya puggalo lolo nāma hoti. Haliddirāgo viya, thusarāsimhi koṭṭitakhāṇuko viya, assapiṭṭhiyaṃ ṭhapitakumbhaṇḍaṃ viya ca anibaddhaṭṭhāno muhuttena pasīdati, muhuttena kuppati.

One is called 'wavering' (lolo) because of the short duration of faith and other qualities, and because one is agitated by lack of faith and similar tendencies. 'Of little faith' (ittarasaddho) means one with limited faith, incomplete faith. The same principle applies to the rest. Here, however, devotion is faith in the sense of repeated engagement. Affection is faith-based affection; even household affection is applicable. Serene confidence is simply faith-based serene confidence. Thus, a person is called 'wavering' because of such limited faith and other qualities. Like the color of turmeric, like a stake pounded in a heap of chaff, and like a gourd placed on a donkey's back—such a person is unsteady, pleased in a moment, angered in a moment.

Mando momūhoti aññāṇabhāvena mando avisadatāya momūho. Mahāmūḷhoti attho.

'Dull and confused' (mando momūho): one is dull (mando) because of ignorance, and confused (momūho) because of a lack of clarity. The meaning is 'greatly deluded' (mahāmūḷho).

193. Yodhājīvūpamesu – yodhājīvāti yuddhūpajīvino. Rajagganti hatthiassādīnaṃ pādappahārabhinnāya bhūmiyā uggataṃ rajakkhandhaṃ. Na santhambhatīti santhambhitvā ṭhātuṃ na sakkoti. Sahati rajagganti rajakkhandhaṃ disvāpi adhivāseti. Dhajagganti hatthiassādipiṭṭhesu vā rathesu vā ussāpitānaṃ dhajānaṃ aggaṃ. Ussāraṇanti hatthiassarathādīnañceva balakāyassa ca uccāsaddamahāsaddaṃ. Sampahāreti samāgate appamattakepi pahāre. Haññatīti vihaññati, vighātaṃ āpajjati. Byāpajjatīti vipattiṃ āpajjati, pakatibhāvaṃ jahati. Sahati sampahāranti dve tayo pahāre patvāpi sahati, adhivāseti[Pg.99]. Tameva saṅgāmasīsanti tameva jayakhandhāvāraṭṭhānaṃ. Ajjhāvasatīti sattāhamattaṃ abhibhavitvā āvasati. Kiṃ kāraṇā? Laddhappahārānaṃ pahārajagganatthañceva katakammānaṃ visesaṃ ñatvā ṭhānantaradānatthañca issariyasukhānubhavanatthañca.

193. In the similes of the warrior: 'warriors' (yodhājīvā) means those who live by warfare. 'The cloud of dust' (rajaggaṃ) means the mass of dust arisen from the ground broken by the trampling of elephants, horses, and so forth. 'He does not stand firm' (na santhambhati) means he is unable to stand firm. 'He endures the cloud of dust' (sahati rajaggaṃ) means he tolerates it, even upon seeing the mass of dust. 'The banner-tip' (dhajaggaṃ) means the top of the banners raised on the backs of elephants and horses, or on chariots. 'The battle-cry' (ussāraṇaṃ) means the loud clamor and great noise of the elephants, horses, chariots, and the army. 'Blows' (sampahāraṃ) means even a small number of blows encountered. 'He is struck' (haññati) means he is afflicted, he comes to distress. 'He perishes' (byāpajjati) means he comes to ruin, he abandons his natural state. 'He endures the blows' (sahati sampahāraṃ) means he endures, he tolerates, even after receiving two or three blows. 'That very head of the battle' (tameva saṅgāmasīsaṃ) means that very place of the victory camp. 'He dwells there' (ajjhāvasati) means he dwells there for about a week, having conquered. For what reason? For the purpose of tending to the wounds of those who have been struck, for granting a higher position after recognizing the distinction of their deeds, and for experiencing the pleasure of sovereignty.

194. Idāni yasmā satthu yodhājīvehi kiccaṃ natthi, imasmiṃ pana sāsane tathārūpe pañca puggale dassetuṃ idaṃ opammaṃ ābhataṃ, tasmā te puggale dassento evamevantiādimāha.

194. Now, since the Teacher has no need for warriors, but this simile has been brought forth in this Dispensation to demonstrate five such individuals, therefore, pointing out those individuals, he spoke beginning with 'Just so...'

Tattha saṃsīdatīti micchāvitakkasmiṃ visīdati, anupavisati. Na sakkoti brahmacariyaṃ sandhāretunti brahmacariyavāsaṃ anupacchijjamānaṃ gopetuṃ na sakkoti. Sikkhādubbalyaṃ āvikatvāti sikkhāya dubbalabhāvaṃ pakāsetvā. Kimassa rajaggasminti kiṃ tassa puggalassa rajaggaṃ nāmāti vadati. Abhirūpāti abhirūpavatī. Dassanīyāti dassanayoggā. Pāsādikāti dassaneneva cittappasādāvahā. Paramāyāti uttamāya. Vaṇṇapokkharatāyāti sarīravaṇṇena ceva aṅgasaṇṭhānena ca.

Herein, 'he sinks down' (saṃsīdati) means he sinks into wrong thoughts, he enters into them. 'He is unable to maintain the holy life' (na sakkoti brahmacariyaṃ sandhāretuṃ) means he is unable to protect the practice of the holy life without interruption. 'Having declared his weakness in the training' (sikkhādubbalyaṃ āvikatvā) means having revealed the weakness of his training. As to 'What is his cloud of dust?': this means one asks, 'What is this person's cloud of dust called?' 'Well-formed' (abhirūpā) means possessing a beautiful form. 'Lovely' (dassanīyā) means worthy of being seen. 'Inspiring' (pāsādikā) means bringing serenity of mind just by being seen. 'Supreme' (paramāya) means highest. 'Beauty of complexion' (vaṇṇapokkharatāya) means by the complexion of the body and the proportion of the limbs.

196. Ūhasatīti avahasati. Ullapatīti katheti. Ujjagghatīti pāṇiṃ paharitvā mahāhasitaṃ hasati. Uppaṇḍetīti uppaṇḍanakathaṃ katheti.

196. 'Ūhasati' means one scoffs. 'Ullapati' means one speaks. 'Ujjagghati' means one laughs a great laugh, striking the hands. 'Uppaṇḍeti' means one speaks jesting talk.

197. Abhinisīdatīti abhibhavitvā santike vā ekāsane vā nisīdati. Dutiyapadepi eseva nayo. Ajjhottharatīti avattharati.

197. 'Abhinisīdati' means one sits down, having overcome, either close by or on the same seat. The same method applies to the second word. 'Ajjhottharati' means one covers over.

198. Viniveṭhetvā vinimocetvāti gahitaṭṭhānato tassa hatthaṃ viniveṭhetvā ceva, mocetvā ca. Sesamettha uttānatthameva.

198. 'Viniveṭhetvā vinimocetvā' means having unwrapped and released his hand from the place where it was grasped. The rest here is of straightforward meaning.

199. Piṇḍapātikesu – mandattā momūhattāti neva samādānaṃ jānāti, na ānisaṃsaṃ; attano pana mandattā momūhattā aññāṇeneva piṇḍapātiko hoti. Pāpiccho icchāpakatoti piṇḍapātikassa me sato ‘‘ayaṃ piṇḍapātiko’’ti catupaccayasakkāraṃ karissanti. Lajjī, appicchotiādīhi ca guṇehi sambhāvessantīti. Evaṃ pāpikāya icchāya ṭhatvā tāya pāpicchāya abhibhūto hutvā piṇḍapātiko hoti. Ummādavasena piṇḍāya caranto pana ummādā cittavikkhepā piṇḍapātiko [Pg.100] nāma hoti. Vaṇṇitanti idaṃ piṇḍapātikaṅgaṃ nāma buddhehi ca buddhasāvakehi ca vaṇṇitaṃ pasatthanti piṇḍapātiko hoti. Appicchataṃyeva nissāyātiādīsu – ‘‘iti appiccho bhavissāmi, idaṃ me piṇḍapātikaṅgaṃ appicchatāya saṃvattissati; ‘iti santuṭṭho bhavissāmi idaṃ me piṇḍapātikaṅgaṃ santuṭṭhiyā saṃvattissati’; ‘iti kilese saṃlikhissāmi’, idaṃ me piṇḍapātikaṅgaṃ kilesasallekhanatthāya saṃvattissatī’’ti piṇḍapātiko hoti. Idamatthitanti imāya kalyāṇāya paṭipattiyā atthikabhāvaṃ, iminā vā piṇḍapātamattena atthikabhāvaṃ. Yaṃ yaṃ laddhaṃ tena teneva yāpanabhāvaṃ nissāyāti attho. Aggoti jeṭṭhako. Sesāni tasseva vevacanāni.

199. Among alms-gatherers: 'due to dullness and delusion' means one neither understands the undertaking nor its benefits; but due to one's own dullness and delusion, one becomes an alms-gatherer simply out of ignorance. 'One with evil desires, hoping for gain' means thinking, 'When I am an alms-gatherer, people will offer me honor with the four requisites, and they will esteem me for qualities such as modesty and fewness of wishes.' Thus, abiding in such evil desire, and being overcome by that evil desire, one becomes an alms-gatherer. However, one who wanders for alms due to madness, due to mental derangement, is called an alms-gatherer. 'Praised' means this practice of gathering alms-food is praised and commended by the Buddhas and the disciples of the Buddha, so one becomes an alms-gatherer. In phrases such as 'relying on fewness of wishes': one becomes an alms-gatherer thinking, 'Thus I will be one of few wishes; this practice of gathering alms-food will lead me to fewness of wishes'; 'Thus I will be content; this practice of gathering alms-food will lead me to contentment'; 'Thus I will scour away the defilements; this practice of gathering alms-food will serve to scour away the defilements.' 'Having an interest in this' means having an interest in this wholesome practice, or having an interest merely in this alms-food. The meaning is: relying on whatever is obtained, one maintains oneself. 'Foremost' means chief. The rest are synonyms for that.

Gavā khīranti gāvito khīraṃ nāma hoti, na vinā gāviyā. Khīramhā dadhītiādīsupi eseva nayo. Evamevanti yathā etesu pañcasu gorasesu sappimaṇḍo aggo; evamevaṃ imesu pañcasu piṇḍapātikesu yvāyaṃ appicchatādīni nissāya piṇḍapātiko hoti. Ayaṃ aggo ca seṭṭho ca pāmokkho ca uttamo ca pavaro ca. Imesu pana pañcasu piṇḍapātikesu dveva janā piṇḍapātikā, tayo na piṇḍapātikā. Nāmamattena pana piṇḍapātikāti veditabbā. Khalupacchābhattikādīsupi eseva nayoti.

'Milk from a cow' means milk comes from a cow, not without a cow. The same method applies to 'curd from milk' and so forth. 'Just so' means just as among these five products of a cow, cream is the foremost; so too among these five alms-gatherers, the one who becomes an alms-gatherer relying on fewness of wishes and so forth, he is the foremost, the best, the chief, the highest, and the most excellent. However, among these five alms-gatherers, only two types of people are truly alms-gatherers, while three are not. Yet, they should be known as alms-gatherers in name only. The same method applies to those who refuse food offered subsequently, and so forth.

Pañcakaniddesavaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Exposition of the Fives.

6. Chakkaniddesavaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Exposition of the Six.

202. Chakke – tatrāti tesu chasu puggalesu. Sammāsambuddho tena daṭṭhabboti so puggalo tena anācariyakena attanā uppāditena sabbaññutaññāṇena sabbaññubuddho daṭṭhabbo.

202. In the group of six: 'therein' means among those six persons. 'The Perfectly Self-Enlightened One should be understood by that' means that person should be understood as the All-Knowing Buddha by means of the omniscience knowledge generated by himself, without a teacher.

Paccekasambuddho tenātiādīsupi tena paccekasambodhiñāṇena so puggalo paccekasambuddho. Tena sāvakapāramīñāṇena te puggalā sāriputtamoggallānā. Tena dukkhassa antakaraṇena te puggalā avasesā arahanto. Tena itthattaṃ anāgamanena so puggalo anāgāmī. Tena itthattaṃ āgamanena te puggalā sotāpannasakadāgāmino daṭṭhabbāti.

In 'the Solitary Buddha by that,' and so forth: that person is a Solitary Buddha by means of that knowledge of solitary enlightenment. By means of that knowledge of the perfection of disciples, those persons are Sāriputta and Moggallāna. By means of making an end to suffering, those persons are the remaining arahants. By means of not returning to this state of existence, that person is a non-returner. By means of returning to this state of existence, those persons should be understood as stream-enterers and once-returners.

Chakkaniddesavaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Exposition of the Six.

7. Sattakaniddesavaṇṇanā

7. Commentary on the Exposition of the Sevens.

203. Sattake [Pg.101] – sakiṃ nimuggoti ekavāraṃ nimuggo. Ekantakāḷakehīti ekanteneva kāḷakehi natthikavādaahetukavādaakiriyavādasaṅkhātehi niyatamicchādiṭṭhidhammehi. Evaṃ puggaloti iminā kāraṇena puggalo ekavāraṃ nimuggo tathā nimuggova hoti. Etassa hi puna bhavato vuṭṭhānaṃ nāma natthīti vadanti. Makkhaligosālādayo viya heṭṭhā narakaggīnaṃyeva āhāro hoti.

203. In the group of seven: 'sinks once' means he sinks one time. 'By what is entirely dark' means entirely by the dark doctrines—namely the nihilistic doctrine, the causeless doctrine, and the inaction doctrine—which are reckoned as fixed wrong views. 'Thus, the person' means that for this reason, the person sinks once and remains so sunk. For him, they say, there is no rising up again from existence. Like Makkhali Gosāla and others, he becomes fuel only for the fires of hell below.

Sāhu saddhā kusalesu dhammesūti kusaladhammesu saddhā nāma sādhuladdhikāti ummujjati. So tāvatakeneva kusalena ummujjati nāma. Sādhu hirītiādīsupi eseva nayo. Hāyatiyevāti caṅkavāre āsittaudakaṃ viya ekantena parihāyateva. Evaṃ puggaloti evaṃ sāhu saddhāti. Imesaṃ saddhādīnaṃ vasena ekavāraṃ ummujjitvā tesaṃ parihāniyā puna nimujjatiyeva, devadattādayo viya. Devadatto hi aṭṭha samāpattiyo, pañca ca abhiññāyo nibbattetvāpi puna buddhānaṃ paṭikaṇṭakatāya tehi guṇehi parihīno ruhiruppādakammaṃ saṅghabhedakammañca katvā kāyassa bhedā dutiyacittavārena niraye nibbatti. Kokāliko dve aggasāvake upavaditvā padumaniraye nibbatto.

'Excellent is faith in wholesome qualities' means that because faith in wholesome qualities is well-acquired, one emerges. By just that much which is wholesome, one is said to emerge. The same principle applies to 'excellent is moral shame,' and so on. 'It inevitably declines': just as water sprinkled on a walking path inevitably disappears entirely. 'Thus the person' means that in this way, having emerged once through these qualities like faith, one inevitably sinks again due to their decline, like Devadatta and others. For Devadatta, though he had produced the eight attainments and the five higher knowledges, later lost those qualities due to being an adversary to the Buddhas. He committed the deeds of causing the Buddha's blood to flow and causing schism in the Sangha, and upon the breakup of his body, he was reborn in hell at the second moment of consciousness. Kokālika, having slandered the two foremost disciples, was reborn in the Paduma hell.

Neva hāyati no vaḍḍhatīti appahonakakālepi na hāyati, pahonakakālepi na vaḍḍhati. Ubhayampi panetaṃ agārikenapi anagārikenapi dīpetabbaṃ. Ekacco hi agāriko appahonakakāle pakkhikabhattaṃ vā salākabhattaṃ vā vassāvāsikaṃ vā upanibandhāpeti. So pacchā pahonakakālepi pakkhikabhattādimattameva pavatteti. Anagārikopi ādimhi appahonakakāle uddesaṃ vā dhutaṅgaṃ vā gaṇhāti, medhābalavīriyasampattiyā pahonakakālepi tato uttariṃ na karoti. Evaṃ puggaloti evaṃ imāya saddhādīnaṃ ṭhitiyā puggalo ummujjitvā ṭhito nāma hoti.

'It neither declines nor does it increase' means it does not decline even in a time of scarcity, nor does it increase in a time of abundance. This should be illustrated with reference to both a householder and a monastic. A certain householder, in a time of scarcity, arranges for fortnightly meals, ticket meals, or rains-residence requisites. Later, even in a time of abundance, he continues only with the fortnightly meals and the like. A monastic, too, initially in a time of scarcity, undertakes recitation or an ascetic practice. But even when endowed with an abundance of wisdom, strength, and energy, he does not go beyond that. 'Thus the person' means that in this way, by the stability of faith and other such qualities, the person is said to have emerged and stands firm.

Ummujjitvā vipassati viloketīti sotāpanno puggalo uṭṭhahitvā gamanamaggaṃ gantabbaṃ disaṃ vā āloketi nāma.

'Having emerged, he sees clearly, he looks around' means the stream-enterer, having risen, is said to look toward the path to be traveled or the direction to be gone.

Ummujjitvā [Pg.102] pataratīti sakadāgāmipuggalo kilesatanutāya uṭṭhahitvā gantabbadisābhimukho patarati nāma.

'Having emerged, he crosses over' means the once-returner, due to the attenuation of defilements, having risen, is said to cross over facing the direction to be gone.

Patigādhappatto hotīti anāgāmipuggalo uṭṭhāya viloketvā pataritvā gantvā ekasmiṃ ṭhāne patiṭṭhāpatto nāma hoti, tiṭṭhati, na punāgacchati.

'He has reached a firm footing' means the non-returner, having risen up, looked around, crossed over, and gone, is said to have attained a firm footing in one place; he stands there and does not come back again.

Tiṇṇo pāraṅgato thale tiṭṭhatīti sabbakilesoghaṃ taritvā paratīraṃ gantvā nibbānathale ṭhito nāma hoti. Ime pana satta puggalā udakopamena dīpitā.

‘Having crossed over, gone to the far shore, standing on dry land’ means that having crossed the flood of all defilements and gone to the far shore, one is said to stand on the ground of Nibbāna. Now, these seven individuals are illustrated by the simile of water.

Satta kira jaṅghavāṇijā addhānamaggapaṭipannā antarāmagge ekaṃ puṇṇanadiṃ pāpuṇiṃsu. Tesu paṭhamaṃ otiṇṇo udakabhīruko puriso otiṇṇaṭṭhāneyeva nimujjitvā puna uṭṭhātuṃ nāsakkhi, antoyeva macchakacchapabhakkho jāto. Dutiyo otiṇṇaṭṭhāne nimujjitvā sakiṃ uṭṭhahitvā puna nimuggo uṭṭhātuṃ nāsakkhi, antoyeva macchakacchapabhakkho jāto. Tatiyo nimujjitvā uṭṭhahi. So majjhe nadiyā ṭhatvā neva orato āgantuṃ, na parato gantuṃ asakkhi. Catuttho uṭṭhāya ṭhito uttaraṇatitthaṃ olokesi. Pañcamo otaraṇatitthaṃ oloketvā patari. Chaṭṭho taritvā pārimatīraṃ gantvā kaṭippamāṇe udake ṭhito. Sattamo pārimatīraṃ gantvā gandhacuṇṇādīhi nhātvā varavatthāni nivāsetvā surabhivilepanaṃ vilimpitvā nīluppalādīni piḷandhitvā nānālaṅkārapaṭimaṇḍito mahānagaraṃ pavisitvā pāsādavaramāruyha uttamabhojanaṃ bhuñji.

Seven merchants traveling on foot, it is said, were journeying along a road when they came upon a full river along the way. Among them, the first man, being afraid of water, sank at the very place he entered and could not rise again—he was devoured by fish and turtles right there in the water. The second man sank at the place he entered, rose once, but then sank again and could not rise—he too was devoured by fish and turtles right there in the water. The third man sank and rose up, but he stood in the middle of the river, unable to return to this shore or to go to the far shore. The fourth man rose up and stood, looking for a ford to cross. The fifth man, having seen the ford, swam across. The sixth man, having crossed, reached the far shore and stood in water up to his waist. The seventh man, having reached the far shore, bathed with fragrant powders, dressed in fine garments, anointed himself with fragrant unguents, adorned himself with blue lotuses and other ornaments, entered the great city, ascended a splendid palace, and enjoyed an excellent meal.

Tattha satta jaṅghavāṇijā viya ime satta puggalā. Nadī viya vaṭṭaṃ. Paṭhamassa udakabhīrukassa purisassa otiṇṇaṭṭhāneyeva nimujjanaṃ viya micchādiṭṭhikassa vaṭṭe nimujjanaṃ. Ummujjitvā nimuggapuriso viya saddhādīnaṃ uppattimattakena ummujjitvā tesaṃ parihāniyā nimuggapuggalo. Majjhe nadiyā ṭhito viya saddhādīnaṃ ṭhitiyā ṭhitapuggalo. Uttaraṇatitthaṃ olokento viya gantabbamaggaṃ gantabbadisaṃ vā olokento sotāpanno. Pataritapuriso viya kilesatanutāya pataranto sakadāgāmī. Taritvā kaṭimatte udake ṭhitapuriso viya anāvattitadhammatāya ṭhito anāgāmī. Nhatvā pārimatīraṃ [Pg.103] uttaritvā thale ṭhitapuriso viya cattāro oghe atikkamitvā nibbānathale ṭhito khīṇāsavabrāhmaṇo. Thale ṭhitapurisassa nagaraṃ pavisitvā pāsādavaraṃ āruyha uttamabhojanabhuñjanaṃ viya khīṇāsavassa nibbānārammaṇaṃ phalasamāpattiṃ appetvā vītināmanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Ubhatobhāgavimuttādayo heṭṭhā pakāsitāyevāti.

Here, these seven individuals are like the seven merchants traveling on foot. The round of existence is like the river. The sinking of the first man, who is afraid of water, at the very place he entered is like the sinking of one with wrong view into the round of existence. The man who surfaces and then sinks again is like the person who surfaces by the mere arising of faith and so on, and then sinks due to their decline. The man standing in the middle of the river is like the person who is established due to the stability of faith and so on. The one looking for a ford to cross is like the stream-enterer looking for the path to be traversed or the direction to be taken. The man who swims across is like the once-returner, swimming across due to the attenuation of defilements. The one who crosses and stands in water up to his waist is like the non-returner, established due to his nature of not returning. The man who bathes, crosses to the far shore, and stands on dry land is like the taint-destroyed brahmin, the arahant, who has crossed the four floods and stands on the ground of Nibbāna. The man standing on dry land entering the city, ascending an excellent palace, and enjoying the finest food should be understood to be like the taint-destroyed one spending his time having entered into the attainment of fruition with Nibbāna as its object. The doubly liberated and others have indeed been explained previously.

Sattakaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Sevens.

207. Aṭṭhakanavakaniddesāpi heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbā.

207. The expositions of the Eights and Nines should also be understood in the very same way as explained previously.

10. Dasakaniddesavaṇṇanā

10. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Tens

209. Dasakaniddese – idhāti kāmāvacarabhūmiyaṃ. Kāmāvacarabhūmiyañhi sattakkhattuparamādīnaṃ kāmāvacarabhūmiyaññeva niṭṭhā hoti. Kāmāvacarattabhāveneva arahattappatti ca anupādisesanibbānappatti ca hotīti attho.

209. In the Exposition of the Tens—‘here’ (idha) means in the sense-sphere realm. For those who are seven-times-at-most and so forth, their culmination occurs only in the sense-sphere realm. The attainment of arahantship and the attainment of Nibbāna without residue (anupādisesa-nibbāna) occurs precisely through the state of existence in the sense-sphere—this is the meaning.

Idha vihāyāti idha kāmāvacare attabhāve vihāya suddhāvāsattabhāve ṭhitānaṃ niṭṭhā hotīti attho. Antarāparinibbāyiādayo hi idha anāgāmiphalaṃ patvā ito cutā suddhāvāsesu uppajjitvā tena attabhāvena arahattañceva anupādisesanibbānadhātuñca pāpuṇanti. Tena vuttaṃ – ‘‘imesaṃ pañcannaṃ idha vihāya niṭṭhā’’ti.

‘Having abandoned [existence] here’ (idha vihāya) means that for those established in the Pure Abodes, their culmination occurs after abandoning the sense-sphere existence here. For the one who attains parinibbāna in the interim and the others, having attained the fruit of non-returning here, and passing away from here, they are reborn in the Pure Abodes, and by that existence they attain arahantship and the Nibbāna-element without residue (anupādisesa-nibbānadhātu). Therefore it was said: ‘For these five, culmination occurs after abandoning [existence] here.’

Dasakaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Tens.

Nigamanakathā

Conclusion

Ettāvatā ca –

And thus far—

Yaṃ ve puggalapaññattiṃ, loke appaṭipuggalo;

Nātisaṅkhepato satthā, desesi tidasālaye.

The Teacher, without equal in the world, taught the Designation of Persons in the abode of the Thirty-three, not too concisely.

Tassā aṭṭhakathañceva, dīpabhāsāya saṅkhataṃ;

Āgamaṭṭhakathāyo ca, ogāhetvā asesato.

Its commentary, compiled in the language of the island, and having thoroughly immersed myself in all the traditional commentaries,

Suvibhatto [Pg.104] asaṃkiṇṇo, yo yo attho yahiṃ yahiṃ;

Tato tato taṃ gahetvā, pahāya ativitthāraṃ.

Well-divided and unmixed, whatever meaning is found wherever, taking that from each place, having abandoned excessive elaboration.

Visuddhimagge yaṃ vuttaṃ, taṃ anādāya saṅkhatā;

Nātisaṅkhepavitthāra-nayenaṭṭhakathā ayaṃ.

This commentary has been composed without drawing upon what was stated in the Visuddhimagga, following a method that is neither too concise nor too expanded.

Taṃ etaṃ sattamattehi, bhāṇavārehi tantiyā;

Ciraṭṭhitatthaṃ dhammassa, saṅkharontena yaṃ mayā.

This very commentary, which was compiled by me in the text by means of merely seven recitation sections, for the long endurance of the Dhamma.

Sampattaṃ kusalaṃ tena, saddhammaṃ sukhumaṃ sivaṃ;

Olokentu visuddhena, pāṇayo dhammacakkhunāti.

By the merit thus attained, may all beings behold, with the purified eye of Dhamma, the subtle, auspicious True Dhamma.

Puggalapaññatti-aṭṭhakathā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Designation of Persons is concluded.

Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa

Homage to the Blessed One, the Arahant, the Perfectly Enlightened One.

Abhidhammapiṭake

In the Abhidhamma Piṭaka

Kathāvatthu-aṭṭhakathā

The Commentary on the Kathāvatthu

Nisinno [Pg.105] devalokasmiṃ, devasaṅghapurakkhato;

Sadevakassa lokassa, satthā appaṭipuggalo.

Seated in the world of the devas, honored by the assembly of devas, the Teacher, an unequalled person in the world with its devas.

Sabbapaññattikusalo, paññattiparidīpanaṃ;

Vatvā puggalapaññattiṃ, loke uttamapuggalo.

The supreme person in the world, skilled in all designations, the illuminator of designations, having taught the Puggalapaññatti,

Yaṃ puggalakathādīnaṃ, kathānaṃ vatthubhāvato;

Kathāvatthuppakaraṇaṃ, saṅkhepena adesayī.

He briefly taught the treatise called the Kathāvatthu, because it is the basis of discussions such as the discussion of individuals.

Mātikāṭhapaneneva, ṭhapitassa surālaye;

Tassa moggaliputtena, vibhattassa mahītale.

Of that which was established in the abode of the devas by the mere laying down of the matrix, and which was analyzed by Moggalliputta on the great earth.

Idāni yasmā sampatto, atthasaṃvaṇṇanākkamo;

Tasmā naṃ vaṇṇayissāmi, taṃ suṇātha samāhitāti.

Now, because the turn for the exposition of the meaning has arrived, therefore I will explain it; listen to it attentively.

Nidānakathā

The Introductory Account

Yamakapāṭihīrāvasānasmiñhi bhagavā tidasapure pāricchattakamūle paṇḍukambalasilāyaṃ vassaṃ upagantvā mātaraṃ kāyasakkhiṃ katvā devaparisāya abhidhammakathaṃ kathento dhammasaṅgaṇīvibhaṅgadhātukathāpuggalapaññattippakaraṇāni desayitvā kathāvatthudesanāya vāre sampatte ‘‘anāgate mama sāvako mahāpañño moggaliputtatissatthero nāma uppannaṃ sāsanamalaṃ sodhetvā tatiyasaṅgītiṃ karonto bhikkhusaṅghassa majjhe nisinno sakavāde pañca suttasatāni paravāde pañcāti suttasahassaṃ samodhānetvā imaṃ pakaraṇaṃ bhājessatī’’ti tassokāsaṃ karonto yā cesā puggalavāde tāva catūsu pañhesu dvinnaṃ pañcakānaṃ vasena aṭṭhamukhā vādayutti, taṃ ādiṃ katvā sabbakathāmaggesu asampuṇṇabhāṇavāramattāya tantiyā mātikaṃ ṭhapesi. Athāvasesaṃ [Pg.106] abhidhammakathaṃ vitthāranayeneva kathetvā vutthavasso suvaṇṇarajatasopānamajjhe maṇimayena sopānena devalokato saṅkassanagare oruyha sattahitaṃ sampādento yāvatāyukaṃ ṭhatvā anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbāyi.

At the conclusion of the Twin Miracle, the Blessed One, having entered the rains retreat at the foot of the Pāricchattaka tree in the Tāvatiṃsa heaven, seated on the Paṇḍukambala stone, and making his mother a bodily witness, taught the Abhidhamma discourse to the assembly of devas. He expounded the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, Vibhaṅga, Dhātukathā, and Puggalapaññatti treatises. When it was time for the teaching of the Kathāvatthu, he foresaw: "In the future, my disciple named the Elder Moggalliputtatissa, a man of great wisdom, will arise, cleanse the impurities of the Dispensation, and convene the Third Council. Seated amidst the community of monks, he will combine a thousand discourses—five hundred from his own school and five hundred from others—and will analyze this treatise." Making an opportunity for him, he first laid down the matrix in the text for all the paths of discussion, only to the extent of an incomplete recitation section, beginning with that argumentative method which has eight openings by way of four questions and two pentads in the discussion of individuals. Then, having taught the remaining Abhidhamma discourse in detail, he emerged from the rains retreat. Descending from the world of devas to the city of Saṅkassa by a jeweled staircase between staircases of gold and silver, accomplishing the welfare of beings, he remained for the rest of his lifespan and then passed into final Nibbāna with the Nibbāna-element without residue.

Athassa mahākassapappamukho vasīgaṇo ajātasatturājānaṃ sahāyaṃ gahetvā dhammavinayasarīraṃ saṅgahaṃ āropesi. Tato vassasatassa accayena vajjiputtakā bhikkhū dasa vatthūni dīpayiṃsu. Tāni sutvā kākaṇḍakassa brāhmaṇassa putto yasatthero susunāgaputtaṃ kālāsokaṃ nāma rājānaṃ sahāyaṃ gahetvā dvādasannaṃ bhikkhusatasahassānaṃ antare sattatherasatāni uccinitvā tāni dasavatthūni madditvā dhammavinayasarīraṃ saṅgahaṃ āropesi.

Thereafter, the company of masters headed by Mahākassapa, with King Ajātasattu as their supporter, brought the body of the Dhamma and Vinaya into a compilation. After the lapse of a hundred years, the Vajjiputtaka monks proclaimed ten points. Hearing this, the Elder Yasa, son of the brahmin Kākaṇḍaka, with King Kālāsoka, son of Susunāga, as his supporter, selected seven hundred elders from among twelve hundred thousand monks, crushed those ten points, and brought the body of the Dhamma and Vinaya into a compilation.

Tehi pana dhammasaṅgāhakattherehi niggahitā dasasahassā vajjiputtakā bhikkhū pakkhaṃ pariyesamānā attano anurūpaṃ dubbalapakkhaṃ labhitvā visuṃ mahāsaṅghikācariyakulaṃ nāma akaṃsu. Tato bhijjitvā aparāni dve ācariyakulāni jātāni – gokulikā ca ekabyohārikā ca. Gokulikanikāyato bhijjitvā aparāni dve ācariyakulāni jātāni – paṇṇattivādā ca bāhuliyā ca. Bahussutikātipi tesaṃyeva nāmaṃ. Tesaṃyeva antare cetiyavādā nāma apare ācariyavādā uppannā. Evaṃ mahāsaṅghikācariyakulato dutiye vassasate pañcācariyakulāni uppannāni. Tāni mahāsaṅghikehi saddhiṃ cha honti.

However, the ten thousand Vajjiputtaka monks, having been expelled by the Elders who compiled the Dhamma, seeking a party, found a weak faction suitable for themselves and formed a separate school of teachers called the Mahāsaṅghika. Having split from this, two other schools of teachers arose—the Gokulikas and the Ekabyohārikas. Having split from the Gokulika sect, two more schools of teachers arose—the Paṇṇattivādins and the Bāhuliyas. Bahussutikas is also their name. Among them, another school of teachers called the Cetiyavādins arose. Thus, in the second century, five schools of teachers arose from the Mahāsaṅghika school. Together with the Mahāsaṅghikas, they are six.

Tasmiṃyeva dutiye vassasate theravādato bhijjitvā dve ācariyavādā uppannā – mahisāsakā ca vajjiputtakā ca. Tattha vajjiputtakavādato bhijjitvā apare cattāro ācariyavādā uppannā – dhammuttariyā, bhadrayānikā, channāgārikā, samitiyāti. Puna tasmiṃyeva dutiye vassasate mahisāsakavādato bhijjitvā sabbatthivādā dhammaguttikāti dve ācariyavādā uppannā. Puna sabbatthivādakulato bhijjitvā kassapikā nāma jātā. Kassapikesu bhinnesu apare saṅkantikā nāma jātā. Saṅkantikesu bhinnesu suttavādā nāma jātāti theravādato bhijjitvā ime ekādasa [Pg.107] ācariyavādā uppannā. Te theravādehi saddhiṃ dvādasa honti. Iti ime ca dvādasa, mahāsaṅghikānañca cha ācariyavādāti sabbeva aṭṭhārasa ācariyavādā dutiye vassasate uppannā. Aṭṭhārasa nikāyātipi, aṭṭhārasācariyakulānītipi etesaṃyeva nāmaṃ. Etesu pana sattarasa vādā bhinnakā, theravādo asambhinnakoti veditabbo. Vuttampi cetaṃ dīpavaṃse –

In that very second century, having split from the Theravāda, two schools of teachers arose—the Mahīśāsakas and the Vajjiputtakas. From the Vajjiputtaka school, four more schools of teachers arose—the Dhammuttariyas, the Bhadrayānikas, the Channāgārikas, and the Samitiyas. Again, in that same second century, having split from the Mahīśāsaka school, two more schools of teachers arose—the Sabbatthivādins and the Dhammaguttikas. Again, having split from the Sabbatthivāda lineage, those called Kassapikas arose. When the Kassapikas split, others called Saṅkantikas arose. And when the Saṅkantikas split, those called Suttavādins arose. Thus, having split from the Theravāda, these eleven schools of teachers arose. Together with the Theravāda, they are twelve. So these twelve, along with the six schools of teachers of the Mahāsaṅghikas, make a total of eighteen schools of teachers that arose in the second century. Eighteen Nikāyas and Eighteen Schools of Teachers are also their names. Among these, seventeen schools are split, and the Theravāda is to be understood as unsplit. And this is also stated in the Dīpavaṃsa—

‘‘Nikkaḍḍhitā pāpabhikkhū, therehi vajjiputtakā;

Aññaṃ pakkhaṃ labhitvāna, adhammavādī bahū janā.

"The wicked monks, the Vajjiputtakas, were expelled by the elders. Having gained another faction, many people spoke against the Dhamma."

‘‘Dasasahassā samāgantvā, akaṃsu dhammasaṅgahaṃ;

Tasmāyaṃ dhammasaṅgīti, mahāsaṅgīti vuccati.

"Ten thousand having come together, they made a Dhamma compilation; therefore this Dhamma compilation is called the Great Compilation."

‘‘Mahāsaṅgītikā bhikkhū, vilomaṃ akaṃsu sāsane;

Bhinditvā mūlasaṅgahaṃ, aññaṃ akaṃsu saṅgahaṃ.

"The Mahāsaṅgīti monks acted contrary to the Dispensation; having broken up the original compilation, they made another compilation."

‘‘Aññatra saṅgahitā suttaṃ, aññatra akariṃsu te;

Atthaṃ dhammañca bhindiṃsu, vinaye nikāyesu ca pañcasu.

"They rendered the compiled Sutta otherwise, and made it different; they broke apart the meaning and the Dhamma in the Vinaya and in the five Nikāyas."

‘‘Pariyāyadesitañcāpi, atho nippariyāyadesitaṃ;

Nītatthañceva neyyatthaṃ, ajānitvāna bhikkhavo.

"Both what was taught by implication and what was taught directly; both the explicit meaning and the implicit meaning—not knowing these, O monks,"

‘‘Aññaṃ sandhāya bhaṇitaṃ, aññaṃ atthaṃ ṭhapayiṃsu te;

Byañjanacchāyāya te bhikkhū, bahuṃ atthaṃ vināsayuṃ.

"What was spoken with one intention, they established another meaning. Those monks, by the shadow of the letter, destroyed much meaning."

‘‘Chaḍḍetvāna ekadesaṃ, suttaṃ vinayagambhīraṃ;

Patirūpaṃ suttaṃ vinayaṃ, tañca aññaṃ kariṃsu te.

"Having discarded a part of the profound Sutta and Vinaya, they made a counterfeit Sutta and Vinaya, and they made it otherwise."

‘‘Parivāraṃ atthuddhāraṃ, abhidhammaṃ chappakaraṇaṃ;

Paṭisambhidañca niddesaṃ, ekadesañca jātakaṃ.

"The Parivāra, the Atthuddhāra, the six treatises of the Abhidhamma; the Paṭisambhidā and the Niddesa, and a part of the Jātaka."

‘‘Ettakaṃ vissajjitvāna, aññāni akariṃsu te;

Nāmaṃ liṅgaṃ parikkhāraṃ, ākappakaraṇāni ca.

"Having abandoned so much, they made other things: name, sign, requisites, and modes of conduct."

‘‘Pakatibhāvaṃ jahitvā, tañca aññaṃ akaṃsu te;

Pubbaṅgamā bhinnavādā, mahāsaṅgītikārakā.

"Having abandoned their original state, they made it something else; they were the leaders of the schismatics, the conveners of the Great Council."

‘‘Tesañca [Pg.108] anukārena, bhinnavādā bahū ahu;

Tato aparakālamhi, tasmiṃ bhedo ajāyatha.

"And following their example, many schismatic views arose; then, at a later time, schism arose among them."

‘‘Gokulikā ekabyohāri, dvidhā bhijjittha bhikkhavo;

Gokulikānaṃ dve bhedā, aparakālamhi jāyatha.

"The Gokulikas, who were of one practice, split into two, O monks; two divisions of the Gokulikas arose at a later time."

‘‘Bahussutikā ca paññatti, dvidhā bhijjittha bhikkhavo;

Cetiyā ca punavādī, mahāsaṅgītibhedakā.

The Bahussutikas and the Paññattis, O monks, split into two; and the Cetiyas and the Punavādins, schismatics from the Mahāsaṅgīti.

‘‘Pañcavādā ime sabbe, mahāsaṅgītimūlakā;

Atthaṃ dhammañca bhindiṃsu, ekadesañca saṅgahaṃ.

All these five schools originated from the Great Council; they split the meaning and the Dhamma, and a part of the Collection.

‘‘Ganthañca ekadesañhi, chaḍḍetvā aññaṃ akaṃsu te;

Nāmaṃ liṅgaṃ parikkhāraṃ, ākappakaraṇāni ca.

Indeed, having discarded a part of the texts, they made others: name, sign, requisites, and modes of conduct.

‘‘Pakatibhāvaṃ jahitvā, tañca aññaṃ akaṃsu te;

Visuddhattheravādamhi, puna bhedo ajāyatha.

Having abandoned their original state, they made it something else; in the pure Theravāda doctrine, a further schism arose.

‘‘Mahisāsakā vajjiputtakā, dvidhā bhijjittha bhikkhavo;

Vajjiputtakavādamhi, catudhā bhedo ajāyatha.

The Mahisāsakas and the Vajjiputtakas, O monks, split into two; within the Vajjiputtaka school, a fourfold schism arose.

‘‘Dhammuttarikā bhaddayānikā, channāgārikā ca samiti;

Mahisāsakānaṃ dve bhedā, aparakālamhi ajāyatha.

The Dhammuttarikas, the Bhaddayānikas, and the Channāgārikas, along with the Sammitīyas; two divisions of the Mahisāsakas arose at a later time.

‘‘Sabbatthivādā dhammaguttā, dvidhā bhijjittha bhikkhavo;

Sabbatthivādānaṃ kassapikā, saṅkantikassapikena ca.

The Sabbatthivādins and the Dhammaguttas, O monks, split into two; from the Sabbatthivādins arose the Kassapikas, and also the Saṅkantikas.

‘‘Saṅkantikānaṃ suttavādī, anupubbena bhijjatha;

Ime ekādasa vādā, sambhinnā theravādato.

From the Saṅkantikas, the Suttavādins gradually split off; these eleven schools split off from the Theravāda.

‘‘Atthaṃ dhammañca bhindiṃsu, ekadesañca saṅgahaṃ;

Ganthañca ekadesañhi, chaḍḍetvā aññaṃ akaṃsu te.

They split the meaning and the Dhamma, and a part of the Collection; and having discarded a part of the texts, they made others.

‘‘Nāmaṃ liṅgaṃ parikkhāraṃ, ākappakaraṇāni ca;

Pakatibhāvaṃ jahitvā, tañca aññaṃ akaṃsu te.

Name, sign, requisites, and modes of conduct; having abandoned their original state, they made them something else.

‘‘Sattarasa bhinnavādā, ekavādo abhinnako;

Sabbevaṭṭhārasa honti, bhinnavādena te saha.

Seventeen are the schismatic schools, one is the undivided school; all together they are eighteen, together with the schismatic schools.

‘‘Nigrodhova [Pg.109] mahārukkho, thera vādānamuttamo;

Anūnaṃ anadhikañca, kevalaṃ jinasāsanaṃ.

Like a great banyan tree, the Theravāda is supreme among schools; neither deficient nor excessive, the Victor's teaching is complete.

‘‘Santakā viya rukkhamhi, nibbattā vādasesakā;

Paṭhame vassasate natthi, dutiye vassasatantare;

Bhinnā sattarasa vādā, uppannā jinasāsane’’ti.

Like offshoots on a tree, the remaining schools arose; in the first hundred years there were none, but in the second hundred years, seventeen schismatic schools arose in the Dispensation of the Conqueror.

Aparāparaṃ pana hemavatikā, rājagirikā, siddhatthikā, pubbaseliyā, aparaseliyā, vājiriyāti aññepi cha ācariyavādā uppannā. Te idha anadhippetā. Purimakānaṃ pana aṭṭhārasannaṃ ācariyavādānaṃ vasena pavattamāne sāsane paṭiladdhasaddho asoko dhammarājā divase divase buddhapūjāya satasahassaṃ, dhammapūjāya satasahassaṃ, saṅghapūjāya satasahassaṃ, attano ācariyassa nigrodhattherassa satasahassaṃ, catūsu dvāresu bhesajjatthāya satasahassanti pañcasatasahassāni pariccajanto sāsane uḷāraṃ lābhasakkāraṃ pavattesi.

Furthermore, later on, six other schools of teachers arose: the Hemavatikas, Rājagirikas, Siddhatthikas, Pubbaseliyas, Aparaseliyas, and Vājiriyas. These are not dealt with here. However, while the Dispensation was proceeding according to the eighteen earlier schools of teachers, King Asoka, the righteous king, having gained faith, donated five hundred thousand daily: one hundred thousand for offerings to the Buddha, one hundred thousand for offerings to the Dhamma, one hundred thousand for offerings to the Sangha, one hundred thousand for his teacher, the Elder Nigrodha, and one hundred thousand for medicine at the four gates. Thus, he caused splendid gain and honor to arise in the Dispensation.

Titthiyā hatalābhasakkārā antamaso ghāsacchādanamattampi alabhantā lābhasakkāraṃ patthayamānā bhikkhūsu pabbajitvā sakāni sakāni diṭṭhigatāni – ‘‘ayaṃ dhammo, ayaṃ vinayo, idaṃ satthusāsana’’nti dīpenti. Pabbajjaṃ alabhamānāpi sayameva kese chinditvā kāsāyāni vatthāni acchādetvā vihāresu vicarantā uposathakammādikaraṇakāle saṅghamajjhaṃ pavisanti. Te bhikkhusaṅghena dhammena vinayena satthusāsanena niggayhamānāpi dhammavinayānulomāya paṭipattiyā asaṇṭhahantā anekarūpaṃ sāsanassa abbudañca malañca kaṇṭakañca samuṭṭhāpenti. Keci aggiṃ paricaranti, keci pañcātape tapanti, keci ādiccaṃ anuparivattanti, keci ‘‘dhammañca vinayañca vobhindissāmā’’ti tathā tathā paggaṇhiṃsu. Tadā bhikkhusaṅgho na tehi saddhiṃ uposathaṃ vā pavāraṇaṃ vā akāsi. Asokārāme satta vassāni uposatho upacchijji.

The sectarians, deprived of gain and honor, not even obtaining the bare necessities of food and clothing, desiring gain and honor, went forth among the monks and proclaimed their own views: 'This is the Dhamma, this is the Vinaya, this is the Teacher's instruction.' Even without obtaining ordination, they cut off their own hair, put on ochre robes, and wandered about the monasteries. At the time of performing the Uposatha and other formal acts, they entered the midst of the Sangha. Though the community of monks rebuked them according to the Dhamma, the Vinaya, and the Teacher's instruction, they did not conform to the practice in line with the Dhamma and Vinaya. They created various kinds of growths, blemishes, and thorns for the Dispensation. Some tended the fire, some practiced the five austerities, some followed the sun's course, and some took up the view, 'We will corrupt the Dhamma and Vinaya,' and thus they persisted. At that time, the community of monks did not perform the Uposatha or Pavāraṇa with them. For seven years, the Uposatha was interrupted in the Asokārāma.

Rājā ‘‘āṇāya kāressāmī’’ti vāyamantopi kāretuṃ nāsakkhi, aññadatthu duggahitagāhinā bālena amaccena anekesu bhikkhūsu jīvitā voropitesu vippaṭisārī ahosi. So tañca vippaṭisāraṃ tañca sāsane uppannaṃ abbudaṃ vūpasametukāmo ‘‘ko nu kho imasmiṃ atthe paṭibalo’’ti [Pg.110] saṅghaṃ pucchitvā ‘‘moggaliputtatissatthero, mahārājā’’ti sutvā saṅghassa vacanena ahogaṅgāpabbatato theraṃ pakkosāpetvā iddhipāṭihāriyadassanena therassa ānubhāve nibbicikiccho attano kukkuccaṃ pucchitvā vippaṭisāraṃ vūpasamesi. Theropi taṃ rājuyyāneyeva vasanto satta divasāni samayaṃ uggaṇhāpesi. So uggahitasamayo sattame divase asokārāme bhikkhusaṅghaṃ sannipātāpetvā sāṇipākāraṃ parikkhipāpetvā sāṇipākārantare nisinno ekaladdhike ekaladdhike bhikkhū ekato ekato kāretvā ekamekaṃ bhikkhusamūhaṃ pakkosāpetvā pucchi – ‘‘bhante, kiṃvādī sammāsambuddho’’ti? Tato sassatavādino – ‘‘sassatavādī’’ti āhaṃsu. Ekaccasassatikā, antānantikā, amarāvikkhepikā, adhiccasamuppannikā, saññīvādā, asaññīvādā, nevasaññīnāsaññīvādā, ucchedavādā, diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādā – ‘‘diṭṭhadhammanibbānavādī’’ti āhaṃsu. Rājā paṭhamameva samayassa uggahitattā nayime bhikkhū aññatitthiyā imeti ñatvā tesaṃ setakāni vatthāni datvā uppabbājesi. Te sabbepi saṭṭhisahassā ahesuṃ.

The king, though striving with the thought, 'I will have it done by my command,' was unable to do so. Indeed, due to a foolish minister who had wrongly grasped the matter, many monks were deprived of their lives, and the king became remorseful. Desiring to pacify both that remorse and the growth that had arisen in the Dispensation, he asked the Sangha, 'Who is capable in this matter?' Hearing the reply, 'The Elder Moggaliputtatissa, O great king,' at the Sangha's word, he had the elder summoned from the Ahogaṅga mountain. Through witnessing the elder's supernormal powers, his doubts about the elder's power were dispelled, and he inquired about his own scruples, thus pacifying his remorse. The elder, residing in that royal park, had the king learn the doctrine for seven days. The king, having learned the doctrine, on the seventh day had the community of monks assembled in the Asokārāma, had a cloth curtain put up as an enclosure, and, seated within that enclosure, he had the monks of each single doctrine gathered together, group by group. Summoning each group of monks, he asked, 'Venerable sirs, what does the Perfectly Self-Enlightened One teach?' Then those who advocated eternalism said, 'He teaches eternalism.' The partial-eternalists, the finity-and-infinity theorists, the eel-wrigglers, the fortuitous-originists, the perceptionists, the non-perceptionists, the neither-perception-nor-non-perceptionists, the annihilationists, and the believers in Nibbāna in this very life said, 'He teaches Nibbāna in this very life.' The king, having already learned the doctrine from the start, knew, 'These are not monks, they are adherents of other sects.' He gave them white robes and had them disrobed. All of them numbered sixty thousand.

Athaññe bhikkhū pakkosāpetvā pucchi – ‘‘kiṃvādī, bhante, sammāsambuddho’’ti? ‘‘Vibhajjavādī, mahārājā’’ti. Evaṃ vutte rājā theraṃ pucchi – ‘‘vibhajjavādī, bhante, sammāsambuddho’’ti? ‘‘Āma, mahārājā’’ti. Tato rājā ‘suddhaṃ dāni, bhante, sāsanaṃ, karotu bhikkhusaṅgho uposatha’nti ārakkhaṃ datvā nagaraṃ pāvisi. Samaggo saṅgho sannipatitvā uposathaṃ akāsi. Tasmiṃ sannipāte saṭṭhibhikkhusatasahassāni ahesuṃ. Tasmiṃ samāgame moggaliputtatissatthero yāni ca tadā uppannāni vatthūni, yāni ca āyatiṃ uppajjissanti, sabbesampi tesaṃ paṭibāhanatthaṃ satthārā dinnanayavaseneva tathāgatena ṭhapitamātikaṃ vibhajanto sakavāde pañca suttasatāni paravāde pañcāti suttasahassaṃ āharitvā imaṃ parappavādamathanaṃ āyatilakkhaṇaṃ kathāvatthuppakaraṇaṃ abhāsi.

Then, having summoned the other monks, he asked, 'Venerable sirs, what does the Perfectly Enlightened One teach?' 'He is an analyst, O great king,' they replied. When this was said, the king asked the elder, 'Is the Perfectly Enlightened One an analyst, venerable sir?' 'Yes, O great king.' Then the king said, 'Now, venerable sir, the Dispensation is pure. Let the Sangha of monks perform the Uposatha.' Having provided protection, he entered the city. The united Sangha gathered and performed the Uposatha. In that gathering, there were sixty hundred thousand monks. In that assembly, the Elder Moggaliputtatissa, analyzing the matrix established by the Tathagata according to the method given by the Teacher for refuting all those points of controversy that had arisen then and that would arise in the future, and having brought forth five hundred suttas on his own doctrine and five hundred on the doctrines of others—a thousand suttas in all—recited this Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa, the crusher of others' views, marked for the future.

Tato saṭṭhisatasahassasaṅkhyesu bhikkhū uccinitvā tipiṭakapariyattidharānaṃ pabhinnapaṭisambhidānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ sahassamekaṃ gahetvā yathā mahākassapatthero ca yasatthero ca dhammañca vinayañca saṅgāyiṃsu; evameva saṅgāyanto [Pg.111] sāsanamalaṃ visodhetvā tatiyasaṅgītiṃ akāsi. Tattha abhidhammaṃ saṅgāyanto imaṃ yathābhāsitaṃ pakaraṇaṃ saṅgahaṃ āropesi. Tena vuttaṃ –

Then, having selected from the sixty hundred thousand monks, and having taken one thousand monks who were bearers of the scriptural learning of the Tipiṭaka and had attained the analytical knowledges, just as the Elder Mahākassapa and the Elder Yasa had recited the Dhamma and the Vinaya, so too, while reciting, he purified the defilements of the Dispensation and held the Third Council. There, while reciting the Abhidhamma, he included this treatise in the collection as it had been spoken. Therefore, it is said:

‘‘Yaṃ puggalakathādīnaṃ, kathānaṃ vatthubhāvato;

Kathāvatthuppakaraṇaṃ, saṅkhepena adesayī.

Because it is the basis of discussions such as the discussion of the person, he taught the Kathāvatthu treatise in brief.

‘‘Mātikāṭhapaneneva, ṭhapitassa surālaye;

Tassa moggaliputtena, vibhattassa mahītale.

Of that which was established in the abode of the gods by the laying down of the matrix, and analyzed on the great earth by Moggaliputta,

‘‘Idāni yasmā sampatto, atthasaṃvaṇṇanākkamo;

Tasmā naṃ vaṇṇayissāmi, taṃ suṇātha samāhitā’’ti.

Now, since the occasion for expounding the meaning has arrived, therefore I shall explain it. Listen to it with concentrated minds.

Nidānakathā niṭṭhitā.

The Introduction is concluded.

Mahāvaggo

The Great Division

1. Puggalakathā

1. Discussion of the Person

1. Suddhasaccikaṭṭho

1. The Purely True State

1. Anulomapaccanīkavaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Forward and Reverse Order

1. Tattha [Pg.112] puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti ayaṃ pucchā. Āmantāti ayaṃ paṭijānanā. Kassa panāyaṃ pucchā, kassa paṭijānanāti? Asukassāti na vattabbā. Bhagavatā hi imasmiṃ pakaraṇe nānappakārānaṃ laddhīnaṃ visodhanatthaṃ tantivasena mātikā ṭhapitā. Sā therena satthārā dinnanaye ṭhatvā tantivasena vibhattā. Na hi thero yattakā ettha vādamaggā dassitā, tattakehi vādīhi saddhiṃ vādena viggāhikakathaṃ kathesi. Evaṃ santepi pana tāsaṃ tāsaṃ kathānaṃ atthassa sukhāvadhāraṇatthaṃ sakavādīpucchā, paravādīpucchā, sakavādīpaṭiññā, paravādīpaṭiññāti evaṃ vibhāgaṃ dassetvāva atthavaṇṇanaṃ karissāma.

1. Therein, 'Is a person apprehended in the real and ultimate sense?'—this is the question. 'Yes'—this is the affirmation. But whose question is this, and whose affirmation? It should not be said, 'It is so-and-so's.' For in this treatise, the Blessed One established the matrix by way of a system for the purpose of purifying various views. That matrix was analyzed by the Elder, abiding by the method given by the Teacher, by way of a system. Indeed, the Elder did not engage in contentious debate with as many debaters as there are paths of debate shown here. Even so, for the easy comprehension of the meaning of those various discussions, we shall provide the explanation of the meaning only after showing the division thus: the question of the proponent, the question of the opponent, the affirmation of the proponent, and the affirmation of the opponent.

Puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti hi ayaṃ sakavādīpucchā. Tāya ‘‘ye atthi puggaloti evaṃladdhikā puggalavādino, te evaṃ pucchitabbā’’ti dīpeti. Ke pana puggalavādinoti? Sāsane vajjiputtakā ceva samitiyā ca bahiddhā ca bahū aññatitthiyā. Tattha puggaloti attā, satto jīvo. Upalabbhatīti paññāya upagantvā labbhati, ñāyatīti attho. Saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti ettha saccikaṭṭhoti māyāmarīciādayo viya abhūtākārena aggahetabbo bhūtaṭṭho. Paramatthoti anussavādivasena aggahetabbo uttamattho. Ubhayenāpi yo parato ‘‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, rūpañca upalabbhatī’’tiādinā khandhāyatanadhātuindriyavasena sattapaññāsavidho dhammappabhedo dassito. Yathā so bhūtena sabhāvaṭṭhena upalabbhati, evaṃ tava puggalo upalabbhatīti pucchati. Paravādī āmantāti paṭijānāti. Paṭijānanañhi katthaci ‘‘āma, bhante’’ti āgacchati, katthaci ‘‘āmo’’ti paṭijānanaṃ āgacchati. Idha pana ‘‘āmantā’’ti āgataṃ. Tatrāyaṃ adhippāyo – so hi yaṃ taṃ parato vuttaṃ bhagavatā – ‘‘atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’’ti suttaṃ [Pg.113] āgataṃ, taṃ gahetvā yasmā pana bhagavā saccavādī na visaṃvādanapurekkhāro vācaṃ bhāsati, nāpi anussavādivasena dhammaṃ deseti, sadevakaṃ pana lokaṃ sayaṃ abhiññā sacchikatvā pavedeti, tasmā yo tena vutto ‘‘atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’’ti, so saccikaṭṭhaparamattheneva atthīti laddhiṃ gahetvā ‘‘āmantā’’ti paṭijānāti.

Indeed, 'Is a person apprehended in the real and ultimate sense?'—this is the proponent's question. By this, it is indicated that 'those personalists who hold the view, "A person exists," should be questioned thus.' Who, then, are the personalists? Within the Dispensation, they are the Vajjiputtakas and the Sammitiyas, and outside, many other sectarians. Here, 'person' means self, being, life principle. 'Is apprehended' means it is obtained by approaching with wisdom; it is known—this is the meaning. Here, in 'in the real and ultimate sense': 'real sense' means the actual state, not to be grasped in an unreal form like a mirage or illusion. 'Ultimate sense' means the supreme meaning, not to be grasped by way of tradition or the like. By both is meant the fifty-sevenfold classification of phenomena in terms of aggregates, sense bases, elements, and faculties, which is shown further on with phrases like 'a person is apprehended in the real and ultimate sense, and form is apprehended.' Just as that is apprehended as actually existing by its intrinsic nature, so too is your person apprehended?—thus he asks. The opponent affirms, 'Yes.' For affirmation sometimes comes as 'Yes, venerable sir,' and sometimes as 'Yes.' Here, however, it comes as 'Yes.' The intention here is this: he takes the Sutta passage stated elsewhere by the Blessed One—'There is a person striving for his own welfare'—and since the Blessed One speaks truthfully, not uttering words with the intent to deceive, nor teaching the Dhamma based on tradition or the like, but having directly known and realized the world with its gods, he declares it, therefore, having adopted the view that what was said by him—'There is a person striving for his own welfare'—exists in the real and ultimate sense, he affirms, 'Yes.'

Athassa tādisassa lesavacanassa chalavādassa okāsaṃ adadamāno sakavādī yo saccikaṭṭhotiādimāha. Tatrāyaṃ adhippāyo – yvāyaṃ parato ‘‘sappaccayo appaccayo, saṅkhato asaṅkhato, sassato, asassato sanimitto animitto’’ti evaṃ paridīpito rūpādisattapaññāsavidho dhammappabhedo āgato; na sammutisaccavasena, nāpi anussavādivasena gahetabbo. Attano pana bhūtatāya eva saccikaṭṭho, attapaccakkhatāya ca paramattho. Taṃ sandhāyāha – ‘‘yo saccikaṭṭho paramattho, tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’’ti.

Then, not giving an opportunity for such quibbling and fraudulent talk, the proponent says, 'That which is the real sense...' and so on. The intention here is this: whatever fifty-sevenfold classification of phenomena beginning with form, which is set forth further on thus: 'with a cause, without a cause; conditioned, unconditioned; eternal, non-eternal; with a sign, without a sign,' should not be grasped by way of conventional truth, nor by way of tradition and so on. But by its own actual nature it is the real sense, and by one's own direct experience it is the ultimate sense. Referring to that, he says: 'That which is the real sense, the ultimate sense—is that person apprehended thereby in the real and ultimate sense?'

Tatoti karaṇavacanametaṃ, tasmā tena saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena so puggalo upalabbhatīti ayamettha attho. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – ruppanādibhedena vā sappaccayādibhedena vā ākārena yo saccikaṭṭhaparamattho upalabbhati, kiṃ te puggalopi tenākārena upalabbhatīti? Na hevaṃ vattabbeti avajānanā paravādissa. So hi tathārūpaṃ puggalaṃ anicchanto avajānāti. Tatrāyaṃ padacchedo – ‘na hi evaṃ vattabbe’ti, na hi evantipi vaṭṭati. Dvinnampi evaṃ na vattabboti attho.

‘Tato’ is an instrumental term. Therefore, ‘is that person apprehended by means of that ultimate reality?’—this is the meaning here. This is what is said: ‘That ultimate reality which is apprehended by way of distinctions such as disintegration or by way of distinctions such as being with conditions—is the person also apprehended by you in that same manner?’ ‘It should certainly not be said so’—this is the opponent's rejection. For, not desiring such a person, he rejects it. Here is the word division: ‘na hi evaṃ vattabbe’ (it should certainly not be said thus), or ‘na hi evaṃ’ (it is certainly not thus) will also do. The meaning in both cases is that it should not be said thus.

Ājānāhi niggahanti sakavādivacanaṃ. Yasmā te purimāya vattabbapaṭiññāya pacchimā navattabbapaṭiññā, pacchimāya ca purimā na sandhiyati, tasmāpi niggahaṃ patto. Taṃ niggahaṃ dosaṃ aparādhaṃ sampaṭicchāhīti attho. Evaṃ niggahaṃ ājānāpetvā idāni taṃ ṭhapanāya ceva anulomapaṭilomato pāpanāropanānañca vasena pākaṭaṃ karonto hañci puggalotiādimāha. Tattha hañci puggalo upalabbhatīti yadi puggalo upalabbhati, sace puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenāti attho. Ayaṃ tāva paravādīpakkhassa ṭhapanato niggahapāpanāropanānaṃ lakkhaṇabhūtā [Pg.114] anulomaṭhapanā nāma. Tena vata retiādi anulomapakkhe niggahassa pāpitattā anulomapāpanā nāma. Tattha tenāti kāraṇavacanaṃ. Vatāti okappanavacanaṃ. Reti āmantanavacanaṃ. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – tena, re vattabbe vata, re hambho, bhadramukha, tena kāraṇena vattabboyevāti. Yaṃ tattha vadesītiādi anulomapakkhe niggahassa āropitattā anulomaropanā nāma. Yaṃ tassa pariyosāne micchātipadaṃ tassa purato idaṃ te’ti āharitabbaṃ. Idaṃ te micchāti ayañhettha attho. Parato ca pāḷiyaṃ etaṃ āgatameva.

‘Acknowledge the refutation’—this is the statement of the proponent. Since your earlier affirmation of what should be said does not align with your later affirmation of what should not be said, and the later does not align with the former, you have therefore incurred refutation. The meaning is: ‘Accept that refutation, that fault, that offense.’ Having thus made the refutation known, now, making it evident by way of establishing, and by leading to and attributing it forward and backward, he says, ‘If indeed a person…’ and so on. Herein, ‘If indeed a person is apprehended’ means ‘if a person is apprehended, if a person is apprehended as an ultimate reality in the true sense.’ This, first of all, is called the ‘forward establishing,’ which is characteristic of establishing the opponent's position and of leading to and attributing the refutation. Then, ‘Therefore, indeed, O friend…’ and so on, is called the ‘forward leading-to,’ because the refutation is brought forward in the forward argument. Herein, ‘tena’ is a word of reason. ‘Vata’ is a word of affirmation. ‘Re’ is a word of address. This is what is said: ‘Therefore, O friend, it should indeed be said. O good sir, O gentle sir, for that reason it must indeed be said.’ ‘What you say there…’ and so on, is called the ‘forward attributing,’ because the refutation is attributed in the forward argument. At its conclusion, the word ‘wrong’ should be brought forward with ‘this is yours’ before it. The meaning here is: ‘This of yours is wrong.’ Moreover, this appears in the Pāli text later on.

No ce pana vattabbetiādi ‘‘na hevaṃ vattabbe’’ti paṭikkhittapakkhassa ṭhapitattā paṭilomato niggahapāpanāropanānaṃ lakkhaṇabhūtā paṭilomaṭhapanā nāma. No ca vata retiādi paṭilomapakkhe niggahassa pāpitattā paṭilomapāpanā nāma. Puna yaṃ tattha vadesītiādi paṭilomapakkhe niggahassa āropitattā paṭilomaropanā nāma. Idhāpi pariyosāne micchātipadassa purato idaṃ teti āharitabbameva. Paratopi evarūpesu ṭhānesu eseva nayo.

‘But if it should not be said…’ and so on, is called the ‘reverse establishing,’ as it is characteristic of establishing the rejected position, ‘it should not be said thus,’ and of leading to and attributing the refutation in reverse. ‘But not indeed, O friend…’ and so on, is called the ‘reverse leading-to,’ because the refutation is brought forward in the reverse argument. Again, ‘What you say there…’ and so on, is called the ‘reverse attributing,’ because the refutation is attributed in the reverse argument. Here too, at the conclusion, the word ‘wrong’ must indeed be brought forward with ‘this is yours’ before it. In other such instances hereafter, this same method applies.

Tatrāyaṃ ādito paṭṭhāya saṅkhepattho – yadi puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena, tena vata bho so upalabbhatīti vattabbo. Yaṃ pana tattha vadesi ‘‘vattabbo kho purimapañhe ‘saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena upalabbhatī’ti, no ca vattabbo dutiyapañhe ‘tato so puggalo upalabbhatī’’’ti, idaṃ te micchāti evaṃ tāva anulomato ṭhapanāpāpanāropanā honti. Atha na vattabbo dutiyapañhe ‘‘tato so upalabbhatī’’ti, purimapañhepi na vattabbova. Yaṃ panettha vadesi ‘‘vattabbo kho purimapañhe ‘saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena upalabbhatī’ti, no ca vattabbo dutiyapañhe ‘tato so puggalo upalabbhatī’’’ti, idaṃ te micchāti evaṃ paṭilomato ṭhapanāpāpanāropanā honti. Evametaṃ niggahassa ca anulomapaṭilomato catunnaṃ pāpanāropanānañca vuttattā upalabbhatītiādikaṃ anulomapañcakaṃ nāma. Ettha ca kiñcāpi anulomato pāpanāropanāhi eko, paṭilomato pāpanāropanāhi ekoti dve niggahā katā. ‘Ājānāhi niggaha’nti etasseva panettha [Pg.115] puggalo upalabbhatīti paṭhamaṃ vādaṃ nissāya paṭhamassa niggahassa dvīhākārehi āropitattā ekovāyaṃ niggahoti paṭhamo niggaho.

Here, the summary from the beginning is as follows: If a person is apprehended as an ultimate reality in the true sense, then indeed, good sir, it should be said, ‘He is apprehended by that means.’ But when you say, ‘It should be said in the first question, “He is apprehended as an ultimate reality in the true sense,” but it should not be said in the second question, “Therefore, that person is apprehended,”’ this of yours is wrong. Thus, first, the establishing, leading-to, and attributing occur in the forward order. Then, if it should not be said in the second question, ‘Therefore, he is apprehended,’ then in the first question too, it should not be said at all. But when you say here, ‘It should be said in the first question, “He is apprehended as an ultimate reality in the true sense,” but it should not be said in the second question, “Therefore, that person is apprehended,”’ this of yours is wrong. Thus, the establishing, leading-to, and attributing occur in the reverse order. In this way, because the refutation has been stated in both forward and reverse orders, and because the four instances of leading-to and attributing have been stated, the section beginning with ‘is apprehended’ is called the forward pentad. And here, although two refutations are made—one by the forward leading-to and attributing, and another by the reverse leading-to and attributing—this is considered one refutation. Because the first refutation, based on the first thesis ‘a person is apprehended’, is attributed in two ways, the statement ‘Acknowledge the refutation’ refers to this single refutation. This is the first refutation.

2. Idāni paccanīkanayo hoti. Tattha pucchā paravādissa. So hi ‘‘atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’’ti gahitattā ‘‘nupalabbhatī’’ti asampaṭicchanto evaṃ pucchati. Sakavādī yathā rūpādidhammā upalabbhanti, evaṃ anupalabbhanīyato āmantāti paṭijānāti. Puna itaro attanā adhippetaṃ saccikaṭṭhaṃyeva sandhāya yo saccikaṭṭhotiādimāha. Sammutisaccaparamatthasaccāni vā ekato katvāpi evamāha. Sakavādī ‘puggalo’ti upādāpaññattisabbhāvatopi dvinnaṃ saccānaṃ ekato katvā pucchitattāpi na hevanti paṭikkhipati.

2. Now comes the opposing method. Here, the question is from the opponent. For he, having accepted the view ‘There is a person practicing for his own welfare,’ and not accepting ‘is not apprehended,’ asks thus. The proponent professes, ‘Yes,’ on account of the person's not being apprehended in the same way that phenomena such as form are apprehended. Again, the other, referring only to what he himself intends as ultimate reality, says, ‘That which is ultimate reality…’ and so on. Or, having combined conventional truth and ultimate truth, he also speaks thus. The proponent rejects this, saying ‘Not so,’ because the question was asked by combining the two truths, and also because ‘person’ is merely a designation dependent on grasping.

Idāni kiñcāpi tena paṭhamaṃ paramatthasaccavasena nupalabbhanīyatā sampaṭicchitā, pacchā sammutisaccavasena vomissakavasena vā paṭikkhittā. Paravādī pana ‘nupalabbhatī’ti vacanasāmaññamattaṃ chalavādaṃ nissāya yaṃ tayā paṭhamaṃ paṭiññātaṃ, taṃ pacchā paṭikkhittanti bhaṇḍanassa paṭibhaṇḍanaṃ viya attano katassa niggahakammassa paṭikammaṃ karonto ājānāhi paṭikammanti āha. Idāni yathāssa anulomapañcake sakavādinā vādaṭṭhapanaṃ katvā anulomapaṭilomato pāpanāropanāhi niggaho pākaṭo kato, evaṃ paṭikammaṃ pākaṭaṃ karonto hañci puggalotiādimāha. Taṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva atthato veditabbaṃ. Yasmā panettha ṭhapanā nāma paravādīpakkhassa ṭhapanato ‘‘ayaṃ tava doso’’ti dassetuṃ ṭhapanamattameva hoti, na niggahassa vā paṭikammassa vā pākaṭabhāvakaraṇaṃ, pāpanāropanāhi panassa pākaṭakaraṇaṃ hoti. Tasmā idaṃ anulomapaṭilomato pāpanāropanānaṃ vasena catūhākārehi. Paṭikammassa katattā paṭikammacatukkaṃ nāmāti ekaṃ catukkaṃ veditabbaṃ.

Now, although initially the non-apprehensibility of a person was accepted in terms of ultimate reality, it was later rejected either in terms of conventional reality or in a mixed manner. The opponent, however, relying on the mere verbal similarity of the statement 'is not apprehended' as a sophistry, says: 'What you first acknowledged, you later rejected—this is like countering a dispute with a counter-dispute, or undoing the act of censure you yourself have performed. Understand this as a counter-action.' Now, just as in the direct-order pentad the proponent established his position and then, through leading forward and imputation in both direct and reverse orders, made the censure evident, so too, by making the counter-action evident, he says, 'If a person…,' and so forth. This should be understood in terms of its meaning in the same way as explained below. For here, 'establishment' (ṭhapanā) is merely the establishment of the opponent's position in order to show, 'This is your fault'; it is only an establishment and does not make the censure or the counter-action evident. Rather, it is made evident through leading forward and imputation. Therefore, because this counter-action is performed in four ways by means of leading forward and imputation in direct and reverse orders, it is called the 'counter-action tetrad.' Thus, this should be understood as one tetrad.

3. Evaṃ paṭikammaṃ katvā idāni yvāssa anulomapañcake sakavādinā niggaho kato, tassa tameva chalavādaṃ nissāya dukkaṭabhāvaṃ dassento tvañce pana maññasītiādimāha. Tattha tvaṃ ce pana maññasīti yadi tvaṃ maññasi. Vattabbe khoti idaṃ paccanīke āmantāti paṭiññaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ[Pg.116]. No ca vattabbeti idaṃ pana na hevāti avajānanaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tena tava tatthāti tena kāraṇena tvaṃyeva tasmiṃ nupalabbhatīti pakkhe – ‘‘hevaṃ paṭijānantanti āmantā’’ti evaṃ paṭijānanto. Hevaṃ niggahetabbeti puna na hevāti avajānanto evaṃ niggahetabbo. Atha taṃ niggaṇhāmāti athevaṃ niggahārahaṃ taṃ niggaṇhāma. Suniggahito ca hosīti sakena matena niggahitattā suniggahito ca bhavasi.

3. Having thus performed the counter-action, now, showing the faultiness of the censure made by the proponent in the direct-order pentad, relying on that very sophistry, he says, 'But if you think…,' and so forth. Herein, 'But if you think' means 'if you think so.' 'It should be said' is stated in reference to the admission 'yes' in the counter-position. 'But it should not be said' is stated in reference to the denial 'not so.' Therefore, 'your position there' means: for that reason, you yourself, in that position of 'is not apprehended'—acknowledging thus, 'yes'—are so acknowledging. 'One should be censured thus' means: denying again with 'not so,' one should be censured thus. 'Then we censure you' means: then we censure you who are deserving of censure. 'And you are well-censured' means: you are well-censured because you are refutable by your own view.

Evamassa niggahetabbabhāvaṃ dassetvā idāni taṃ niggaṇhanto hañcītiādimāha. Tattha ṭhapanāpāpanāropanā heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbā. Pariyosāne pana idaṃ te micchāti idaṃ tava vacanaṃ micchā hotīti attho. Idaṃ chalavādena catūhi ākārehi niggahassa katattā niggahacatukkaṃ nāma.

Having thus shown his state of being censurable, now, censuring him, he says, 'If…,' and so forth. Herein, the establishment, leading forward, and imputation should be understood in the same way as explained below. At the conclusion, however, 'this is wrong for you' means 'this statement of yours is false.' Because this censure is performed in four ways through sophistry, it is called the 'censure tetrad.'

4. Evaṃ niggahaṃ katvāpi idāni ‘‘yadi ayaṃ mayā tava matena kato niggaho dunniggaho, yo mama tayā heṭṭhā anulomapañcake kato niggaho, sopi dunniggaho’’ti dassento ese ce dunniggahitetiādimāha. Tattha ese ce dunniggahiteti eso ce tava vādo mayā dunniggahito. Atha vā eso ce tava mayā kato niggaho dunniggaho. Hevamevaṃ tattha dakkhāti tatthāpi tayā mama heṭṭhā kate niggahe evamevaṃ passa. Idāni yvāssa heṭṭhā sakavādinā niggaho kato, taṃ ‘‘vattabbe kho’’tiādivacanena dassetvā puna taṃ niggahaṃ aniggahabhāvaṃ upanento no ca mayaṃ tayātiādimāha. Tattha no ca mayaṃ tayā tattha hetāya paṭiññāyātiādīsu ayamattho – yasmā so tayā mama kato niggaho dunniggaho, tasmā mayaṃ tayā tattha anulomapañcake āmantāti etāya paṭiññāya evaṃ paṭijānantā puna na hevāti paṭikkhepe katepi ‘‘ājānāhi niggaha’’nti evaṃ na niggahetabboyeva. Evaṃ aniggahetabbampi maṃ niggaṇhāsi, īdisena pana niggahena dunniggahitā mayaṃ homa.

4. Even after having performed this censure, now, showing that 'if this censure I made according to your view is an ill-censure, then the censure you made against me below in the direct-order pentad is also an ill-censure,' he says, 'If this is ill-censured…,' and so forth. Herein, 'If this is ill-censured' means 'if this statement of yours is ill-censured by me.' Or, 'if this censure made by me against you is an ill-censure.' 'See it likewise there' means 'see it likewise in the censure made by you against me below.' Now, having shown the censure made below by the proponent with the words 'It should be said…,' and so forth, he then brings that censure to a state of non-censure, saying, 'But we are not by you…,' and so forth. Herein, in 'But we are not by you there by that admission…,' and so on, this is the meaning: because that censure you made against me is an ill-censure, therefore we, acknowledging thus with the admission 'yes' in the direct-order pentad, should not be censured by you with 'Acknowledge the censure,' even when a rejection of 'not so' is made again. Censuring me who am thus not to be censured, you do so; but by such a censure, we are ill-censured.

Idāni yaṃ niggahaṃ sandhāya ‘‘dunniggahitā ca homā’’ti avoca, taṃ dassetuṃ hañci puggalo…pe… idaṃ te micchātiāha. Evamidaṃ anulomapaṭilomato [Pg.117] catūhi pāpanāropanāhi niggahassa upanītattā upanayanacatukkaṃ nāma hoti.

Now, to show the censure with reference to which he said, 'we are ill-censured,' he says, 'If a person… this is wrong for you.' Thus, because the censure is presented by means of four instances of leading forward and imputation in direct and reverse orders, this is called the 'application tetrad.'

5. Idāni ‘‘na hevaṃ niggahetabbe’’tiādikaṃ niggamanacatukkaṃ nāma hoti. Tattha na hevaṃ niggahetabbeti yathāhaṃ tayā niggahito, na hi evaṃ niggahetabbo. Etassa hi niggahassa dunniggahabhāvo mayā sādhito. Tena hīti tena kāraṇena, yasmā esa niggaho dunniggaho, tasmā yaṃ maṃ niggaṇhāsi hañci puggalo…pe… idaṃ te micchāti, idaṃ niggaṇhanaṃ tava micchāti attho. Tena hi ye kate niggaheti yena kāraṇena idaṃ micchā, tena kāraṇena yo tayā niggaho kato, so dukkaṭo. Yaṃ mayā paṭikammaṃ kataṃ, tadeva sukataṃ. Yāpi cesā paṭikammacatukkādivasena kathāmaggasampaṭipādanā katā, sāpi sukatā. Evametaṃ puggalo upalabbhatītiādikassa anulomapañcakassa nupalabbhatītiādikānaṃ paṭikammaniggahopanayananiggamanacatukkānaṃ vasena anulomapaccanīkapañcakaṃ nāma niddiṭṭhanti veditabbaṃ. Ettāvatā sakavādino pubbapakkhe sati paravādino vacanasāmaññamattena chalavādena jayo hoti.

5. Now, what begins with 'One should not be censured thus' is called the 'conclusion tetrad.' Herein, 'one should not be censured thus' means: just as I have been censured by you, one should not be censured in this way. For the ill-censured nature of this censure has been demonstrated by me. 'Therefore' means 'for that reason'; because this censure is an ill-censure, therefore, when you censure me, saying, 'If a person… this is wrong for you,' this censuring of yours is wrong. 'Therefore, the censure made' means: for the reason that this is wrong, for that reason the censure you have made is ill-done. The counter-action I have made is well-done. And this exposition of the path of discourse that has been conducted by way of the counter-action tetrad and so on is also well-done. Thus, it should be understood that what begins with 'a person is apprehended' is designated as the 'direct and counter-position pentad,' by way of the direct-order pentad and the counter-action, censure, application, and conclusion tetrads, which begin with 'is not apprehended.' To this extent, when the proponent’s initial position is established, the opponent’s victory comes about merely through sophistry based on the general similarity of words.

2. Paccanīkānulomavaṇṇanā

2. The Explanation of the Counter-Position and the Direct-Position

6. Idāni yathā paravādino pubbapakkhe sati sakavādino dhammeneva tathena sujayo hoti, tathā vāduppattiṃ dassetuṃ puggalo nupalabbhatīti paccanīkānulomapañcakaṃ āraddhaṃ. Tattha paccanīke pucchā paravādissa, rūpādibhedaṃ saccikaṭṭhaparamatthaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā sakavādissa. Suddhasammutisaccaṃ vā paramatthamissakaṃ vā sammutisaccaṃ sandhāya yo saccikaṭṭhoti puna anuyogo paravādissa, sammutivasena nupalabbhatīti navattabbattā missakavasena vā anuyogassa saṃkiṇṇattā na hevanti paṭikkhepo sakavādissa. Paṭiññātaṃ paṭikkhipatīti vacanasāmaññamattena ājānāhi niggahantiādivacanaṃ paravādissa. Evamayaṃ puggalo nupalabbhatīti dutiyavādaṃ nissāya dutiyo niggaho hotīti veditabbo. Evaṃ tena chalena niggaho āropito.

6. Now, to show how, when the opponent’s initial position is present, the proponent achieves a good victory by means of the Dhamma and truth, the fivefold argument concerning opposition and accordance, beginning with 'a person is not found,' is introduced. Herein, in the opposition, the question is the opponent's, while the affirmation is the proponent's, with reference to the ultimate truth in the sense of reality, differentiated as form, etc. When the opponent again cross-examines with reference to pure conventional truth or conventional truth mixed with ultimate truth, asking 'is this in the sense of reality?', the proponent rejects it with 'no,' because it is not to be said that 'a person is not found' in the conventional sense, or because the cross-examination is confused due to its mixed nature. The opponent's statement, such as 'understand the refutation,' is merely based on the general wording, 'he rejects what was affirmed.' Thus, it should be understood that the second refutation occurs relying on the second statement, 'a person is not found.' In this way, a refutation is imposed through deception.

7-10. Idāni [Pg.118] dhammena samena attano vāde jayaṃ dassetuṃ anulomanaye pucchā sakavādissa, attano laddhiṃ nissāya paṭiññā paravādissa. Laddhiyā okāsaṃ adatvā paramatthavasena puna anuyogo sakavādissa, paramatthavasena puggalassa abhāvato paṭikkhepo paravādissa. Tato paraṃ dhammena samena attano jayadassanatthaṃ ājānāhi paṭikammantiādi sabbaṃ sakavādīvacanameva hoti. Tattha sabbesaṃ paṭikammaniggahopanayananiggamanacatukkānaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva attho veditabbo. Evamidaṃ puggalo nupalabbhatītiādikassa paccanīkapañcakassa upalabbhatītiādīnaṃ paṭikammaniggahopanayananiggamanacatukkānañca vasena paccanīkānulomapañcakaṃ nāma niddiṭṭhaṃ hoti. Evametāni paṭhamasaccikaṭṭhe dve pañcakāni niddiṭṭhāni. Tattha purimapañcake paravādissa sakavādinā kato niggaho suniggaho. Sakavādissa pana paravādinā chalavādaṃ nissāya paṭikammaṃ katvā attanā sādhito jayo dujjayo. Dutiyapañcake sakavādissa paravādinā kato niggaho dunniggaho. Paravādissa pana sakavādinā dhammavādaṃ nissāya paṭikammaṃ katvā attanā sādhito jayo sujayoti paṭhamasaccikaṭṭho. Tatthetaṃ vuccati –

Now, to demonstrate victory in one's own doctrine by means of the Dhamma and fairness, the question is the proponent's in the way of accordance, and the affirmation is the opponent's, relying on their own doctrine. Without granting an opportunity for that doctrine, the further questioning is the proponent's, based on ultimate truth; the rejection is the opponent's, due to the non-existence of a person in the ultimate sense. Thereafter, all statements made by the proponent—such as 'understand the counter-action' and so on—are for the purpose of showing victory by means of the Dhamma and fairness. Here, the meaning of all four aspects—counter-action, refutation, leading in, and leading out—should be understood in the manner explained before. Thus, by way of the fivefold argument of opposition beginning with 'a person is not found,' and the fourfold sequence of counter-action, refutation, leading in, and leading out beginning with 'is found,' this is designated as the fivefold argument concerning opposition and accordance. In this first sense of reality, these two fivefold sets have been presented. Herein, in the first fivefold set, the refutation of the opponent by the proponent is a good refutation. However, the counter-action performed by the opponent against the proponent, relying on a deceptive argument, and the victory thereby achieved is a wrongful victory. In the second fivefold set, the refutation of the proponent by the opponent is a poor refutation. But the counter-action performed by the proponent against the opponent, relying on the Dhamma-based argument, and the victory thereby achieved is a good victory. This is the first sense of reality. Herein, it is said:

‘‘Niggaho paravādissa, suddho paṭhamapañcake;

Asuddho pana tasseva, paṭikammajayo tahiṃ.

"The refutation of the opponent is faultless in the first pentad; but his victory through counter-action there is flawed."

‘‘Niggaho sakavādissa, asuddho dutiyapañcake;

Visuddho pana tasseva, paṭikammajayo tahiṃ.

"The refutation of the proponent is flawed in the second pentad; but his victory through counter-action there is faultless."

‘‘Tasmā dvīsupi ṭhānesu, jayova sakavādino;

Dhammena hi jayo nāma, adhammena kuto jayo.

"Therefore, in both situations, victory belongs to the proponent; for victory is indeed by the Dhamma—how can there be victory through non-Dhamma?"

‘‘Saccikaṭṭhe yathā cettha, pañcakadvayamaṇḍite;

Dhammādhammavaseneva, vutto jayaparājayo.

"Just as here in the sense of reality, adorned with the two pentads, victory and defeat are declared by way of Dhamma and non-Dhamma."

‘‘Ito paresu sabbesu, saccikaṭṭhesu paṇḍito;

Evameva vibhāveyya, ubho jayaparājaye’’ti.

"In all other senses of reality beyond this, the wise one should discern both victory and defeat in exactly the same way."

2. Okāsasaccikaṭṭho

2. The Sense of Reality concerning Location

1. Anulomapaccanīkavaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of Accordance and Opposition

11. Evaṃ [Pg.119] suddhikasaccikaṭṭhaṃ vitthāretvā idāni tameva aparehi okāsādīhi nayehi vitthāretuṃ puna puggalo upalabbhatītiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā paravādissa. Puna sabbatthāti sarīraṃ sandhāya anuyogo sakavādissa, rūpasmiṃ attānaṃ samanupassanādosañca ‘aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīra’nti āpajjanadosañca disvā paṭikkhepo paravādissa. Sesamettha anulomapaccanīkapañcake heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Pāṭho pana saṅkhitto. Tattha yasmā sarīraṃ sandhāya ‘‘sabbattha na upalabbhatī’’ti vutte sarīrato bahi upalabbhatīti āpajjati. Tasmā paccanīke paṭikkhepo sakavādissa, paṭhamaṃ anujānitvā pacchā avajānātīti chalavādassa vasena paṭikammaṃ paravādissa. Sesaṃ pākaṭameva.

11. Having thus elaborated the pure sense of reality, now, to elaborate the same by other methods such as location, etc., the argument beginning with 'is a person found?' is introduced. Herein, the question is the proponent's, the affirmation is the opponent's. Again, the proponent's questioning, 'everywhere?', is with reference to the body; the rejection is the opponent's, seeing the fault of regarding self in form and the fault of falling into the view 'the soul is one thing, the body another.' The rest here in the fivefold argument of accordance and opposition should be understood in the manner stated before. The text, however, is condensed. Herein, because when it is said 'is not found everywhere' with reference to the body, it follows that it is found outside the body. Therefore, in the opposition, the rejection is the proponent's; the opponent's counter-action is based on the deceptive argument that the proponent first agrees and then rejects. The rest is evident.

3. Kālasaccikaṭṭho

3. The Sense of Reality concerning Time

1. Anulomapaccanīkavaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of Accordance and Opposition

12. Dutiyanaye sabbadāti purimapacchimajātikālañca dharamānaparinibbutakālañca sandhāya anuyogo sakavādissa, sveva khattiyo so brāhmaṇotiādīnaṃ āpattidosañca dharamānaparinibbutānaṃ visesābhāvadosañca disvā paṭikkhepo paravādissa. Sesaṃ paṭhamanaye vuttasadisameva.

12. In the second method, the proponent's questioning, 'always?', is with reference to the time of the first and last birth and the time of being alive and of final extinguishment; the rejection is the opponent's, seeing the fault of incurring views such as 'that very khattiya is this brahmin,' and the fault of there being no distinction between the living and the finally extinguished. The rest is just like what was stated in the first method.

4. Avayavasaccikaṭṭho

4. The Sense of Reality concerning Parts

1. Anulomapaccanīkavaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of Accordance and Opposition

13. Tatiyanaye sabbesūti khandhāyatanādīni sandhāya anuyogo sakavādissa, rūpasmiṃ attā, cakkhusmiṃ attātiādidosabhayena paṭikkhepo paravādissa. Sesaṃ tādisamevāti.

13. In the third method, the proponent's questioning, 'in all?', is with reference to the aggregates, sense bases, and so on; the rejection is the opponent's, due to fear of the fault of such views as 'self in form' and 'self in the eye.' The rest is just the same.

Okāsadisaccikaṭṭhādi

The Senses of Reality concerning Location, etc.

2. Paccanīkānulomavaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of Opposition and Accordance

14. Evametāni [Pg.120] tīṇi anulomapaccanīkapañcake anulomamattavaseneva tāva paṭipāṭiyā bhājetvā puna paccanīkānulomapañcake paccanīkamattavaseneva bhājetuṃ puggalo nupalabbhatītiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha anulomapañcakassa pāḷiyaṃ saṅkhipitvā āgate paccanīke vuttanayeneva paccanīkassa ca pāḷiyaṃ saṅkhipitvā āgate anulome vuttanayeneva attho veditabbo. Ettāvatā suddhikassa ceva imesañca tiṇṇanti catunnaṃ saccikaṭṭhānaṃ ekekasmiṃ saccikaṭṭhe anulomapaccanīkassa paccanīkānulomassa cāti dvinnaṃ dvinnaṃ paccanīkānaṃ vasena ayaṃ aṭṭhamukhā nāma vādayutti niddiṭṭhā hotīti veditabbā. Yā ekekasmiṃ mukhe ekekassa niggahassa vasena aṭṭhakaniggahoti pāḷiyaṃ likhiyati. Tatthetaṃ vuccati –

14. Thus, it is begun with: 'These three pentads of forward-and-reverse are first divided in sequence by way of the forward method alone; then, to divide the pentads of reverse-and-forward by way of the reverse method alone, no person is found,' and so on. Therein, for the forward pentad, when the Pāli text is condensed, the meaning of the reverse section that follows is to be understood in the manner stated. And for the reverse pentad, when the Pāli text is condensed, the meaning of the forward section that follows is to be understood in the manner stated. Thus far, for the four grounds of reality—namely, the pure one and these three—in each ground of reality, by means of two pairs of reversals, that is, the forward-and-reverse and the reverse-and-forward, this logical argument named 'the eight-faced' has been set forth; it should be so understood. This, by means of one refutation for each face, is written in the Pāli as 'the eightfold refutation.' Therein, this is said:

‘‘Evaṃ catubbidhe pañhe, pañcakadvayabhedato;

Esā aṭṭhamukhā nāma, vādayutti pakāsitā.

"Thus, in the fourfold question, through the division into two pentads, this logical argument named 'the eight-faced' has been elucidated.

‘‘Aṭṭheva niggahā tattha, cattāro tesu dhammikā;

Adhammikā ca cattāro, sabbattha sakavādino;

Jayo parājayo ceva, sabbattha paravādino’’ti.

"There are indeed eight refutations therein; four of them are righteous, and four are unrighteous. In every case, they apply to one's own proponent; and victory and defeat, in every case, apply to the other proponent."

Saccikaṭṭhavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Ground of Reality is concluded.

5. Suddhikasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā

5. Explanation of the Simple Conjunction

17-27. Idāni rūpādīhi saddhiṃ saccikaṭṭhasaṃsandanaṃ hoti. Tattha rūpañcāti yathā rūpaṃ paramatthato upalabbhati, kiṃ te puggalopi tatheva upalabbhatīti sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, atthi puggaloti vacanamattaṃ gahetvā paṭiññā paravādissa. Yadi te rūpaṃ viya paramatthato puggalo atthi, rūpato vedanādīnaṃ viya puggalassāpi aññattaṃ āpajjatīti anuyogo sakavādissa, samayasuttavirodhaṃ disvā paṭikkhepo paravādissa. Sesaṃ atthato [Pg.121] pākaṭameva. Dhammato panettha sattapaññāsabhedassa saccikaṭṭhaparamatthassa vasena sakavādīpakkhamūlake anulomapaccanīke sattapaññāsa anulomapañcakāni dassitāni. Paṭikammacatukkādīni saṅkhittāni. Paravādīpakkhamūlakepi paccanīkānulome sattapaññāsa paṭilomapañcakāni dassitāni. Paṭikammacatukkādīni saṅkhittāni. Tattha ‘‘vuttaṃ bhagavatā’’ti vacanamattena puggalassa atthitaṃ rūpassa ca saccikaṭṭhaparamatthavasena upalabbhanīyataṃ dassetvā ubhinnaṃ aññattaṃ paṭijānāpanatthaṃ vuttaṃ bhagavatāti anuyogo paravādissa, sammutiparamatthānaṃ ekattanānattapañhassa ṭhapanīyattā paṭikkhepo sakavādissa. Sesamidhāpi atthato pākaṭamevāti.

Now, there is a conjunction of the ground of reality with form and so forth. Therein, with reference to 'And form,' the proponent's question is: 'Just as form is apprehended in an ultimate sense, is the person also apprehended by you in the same way?' The opponent's admission is made by taking merely the statement, 'a person exists.' The proponent's challenge is: 'If, for you, a person exists in an ultimate sense like form, then just as feeling and so forth are other than form, the person also would attain a state of otherness.' Seeing a contradiction with a doctrinal text, the opponent makes a rejection. The rest is clear in meaning. Here, from a doctrinal perspective, by way of the fifty-seven-fold ultimate ground of reality, fifty-seven forward pentads are shown in the forward-and-reverse section, which is rooted in the proponent's position. The preparatory tetrads and so forth are summarized. Also, in the reverse-and-forward section, which is rooted in the opponent's position, fifty-seven reverse pentads are shown. The preparatory tetrads and so forth are summarized. Therein, the opponent's challenge, 'It was spoken by the Blessed One,' is for the purpose of making the proponent admit the otherness of the two, having shown the existence of the person by that mere statement and the apprehendability of form by way of the ultimate ground of reality. The proponent's rejection is because the question of the oneness or otherness of conventional and ultimate realities is to be set aside. The rest here is also clear in meaning.

Suddhikasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Simple Conjunction.

6. Opammasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā

6. Explanation of the Conjunction by Way of Simile

28-36. Idāni rūpādīheva saddhiṃ opammavasena saccikaṭṭhasaṃsandanaṃ hoti. Tattha rūpavedanānaṃ upaladdhisāmaññena aññattapucchā ca puggalarūpānaṃ upaladdhisāmaññapucchā cāti pucchādvayampi sakavādissa, ubhopi paṭiññā paravādissa. Paravādinā anuññātena upaladdhisāmaññena rūpavedanānaṃ viya rūpapuggalānaṃ aññattānuyogo sakavādissa, paṭikkhepo itarassa. Sesamidhāpi atthato pākaṭameva. Dhammato panettha rūpamūlakādīnaṃ cakkānañca vasena sakavādīpakkhe vīsādhikāni nava niggahapañcakasatāni dassitāni. Kathaṃ? Khandhesu tāva rūpamūlake cakke cattāri, tathā vedanādimūlakesūti vīsati. Āyatanesu cakkhāyatanamūlake cakke ekādasa, tathā sesesūti dvattiṃsasataṃ. Dhātūsu cakkhudhātumūlake cakke sattarasa, tathā sesesūti chādhikāni tīṇi satāni. Indriyesu cakkhundriyamūlake cakke ekavīsati, tathā sesesūti dvāsaṭṭhādhikāni cattāri satāni. Evaṃ sabbānipi vīsādhikāni nava niggahapañcakasatāni honti.

Now, there is a conjunction of the ground of reality with form and so forth by way of simile. Therein, two questions are from the proponent: one concerning the otherness of form and feeling by way of their commonality of apprehension, and another concerning the commonality of apprehension of a person and form. Both admissions are from the opponent. When the commonality of apprehension is admitted by the opponent, the proponent challenges regarding the otherness of form and person, just as with form and feeling; the rejection is from the other. The rest here is also clear in meaning. Here, from a doctrinal perspective, in the proponent's position, nine hundred and twenty refutation-pentads are shown by way of the cycles rooted in form and so forth. How so? In the aggregates, first, in the cycle rooted in form, there are four; similarly, in the cycles rooted in feeling and so forth, there are twenty. In the sense bases, in the cycle rooted in the eye-base, there are eleven; similarly, in the rest, there are one hundred and thirty-two. In the elements, in the cycle rooted in the eye-element, there are seventeen; similarly, in the rest, there are three hundred and six. In the faculties, in the cycle rooted in the eye-faculty, there are twenty-one; similarly, in the rest, there are four hundred and sixty-two. Thus, all together, there are nine hundred and twenty refutation-pentads.

37-45. Paravādīpakkhepi rūpaṃ upalabbhatīti anulomavaseneva rūpavedanādīnaṃ aññattapaṭiññaṃ kāretvā puna atthi puggaloti suttaṃ nissāya chalavasena [Pg.122] puggalassa rūpādīhi upaladdhisāmaññaṃ āropetvā aññattānuyogo kato. Sesamidhāpi atthato uttānameva. Dhammatopi sakavādīpakkhe vuttanayena vīsādhikāni nava paṭikammapañcakasatāni dassitāni.

Also in the opponent's position, having caused an admission of the otherness of form, feeling, and so forth by way of the forward sequence, that is, 'form is apprehended,' then, relying on the text that says 'a person exists,' a challenge regarding otherness is made by deceitfully imposing a commonality of apprehension of the person with form and so forth. The rest here is also clear in meaning. From a doctrinal perspective as well, in the proponent's position, nine hundred and twenty preparatory pentads have been shown in the manner stated.

Rūpādīhi saddhiṃ opammavasena saccikaṭṭhasaṃsandanaṃ.

The Conjunction of the Ground of Reality with Form and so forth by Way of Simile.

7. Catukkanayasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā

7. Explanation of the Conjunction by the Fourfold Method

46-52. Idāni yaṃ saccikaṭṭhaparamatthena upalabbhati, tena yasmā rūpādīsu sattapaññāsāya saccikaṭṭhaparamatthesu aññatarena bhavitabbaṃ; rūpādinissitena vā, aññatra vā rūpādīhi, rūpādīnaṃ vā nissayena, tasmā iminā catukkanayena saccikaṭṭhasaṃsandanaṃ āraddhaṃ. Tattha rūpaṃ puggaloti anuyogo sakavādissa, ucchedadiṭṭhibhayena na hevāti paṭikkhepo paravādissa, niggahāropanaṃ sakavādissa. Kiṃ panetaṃ yuttaṃ, nanu rūpaṃ vedanāti vuttampi paṭikkhipitabbamevāti? Āma paṭikkhipitabbaṃ. Taṃ pana rūpato vedanāya aññasabhāvasabbhāvato, na aññattābhāvato. Ayañca rūpādīsu ekadhammatopi puggalassa aññattaṃ na icchati, tasmā yuttaṃ. Ayañca anuyogo rūpaṃ puggalo…pe… aññātāvindriyaṃ puggaloti sakalaṃ paramatthasaccaṃ sandhāya āraddho. Sakalaṃ pana paccattalakkhaṇavasena ekato vattuṃ na sakkāti tantivasena anuyogalakkhaṇamattametaṃ ṭhapitaṃ. Tena viññū atthaṃ vibhāventi. Vādakāmena pana imaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ gahetvā yathā yathā paravādissa okāso na hoti, tathā tathā vattabbaṃ. Iti tantivasena anuyogalakkhaṇassa ṭhapitattāpi yuttameva. Iminā nayena sabbānuyogesu attho veditabbo.

Now, since whatever is apprehended as ultimate reality must be one of the fifty-seven ultimate realities—either dependent on form, etc., or independent of form, etc., or the basis for form, etc.—therefore, this fourfold method is begun to establish the concordance with ultimate reality. Here, the proposition “form is the person” is by the proponent; the denial “it is not so” is the opponent’s rebuttal, fearing the annihilationist view; and the imposition of censure is by the proponent. But is this appropriate? Should not even the statement “form is feeling” be rejected? Indeed, it should be rejected. However, that is because of the distinct individual natures of form and feeling, not because of the absence of otherness. This proponent does not accept the distinctness of the person even from a single phenomenon among form, etc.; therefore, it is appropriate. This proposition—“form is the person… the faculty of one who will know is the person”—is begun with reference to all ultimate truths. However, since all of these cannot be stated together based on their individual characteristics, this is established as merely a characteristic of inquiry by way of the treatise. Thus, the wise discern the meaning. But one who desires to debate, having grasped this characteristic, should speak in whatever way leaves no opportunity for the opponent. Therefore, since the characteristic of inquiry is established by way of the treatise, it is entirely appropriate. In this way, the meaning should be understood in all such propositions.

Ayaṃ pana viseso – rūpasmiṃ puggalotiādīsu yathā ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ nissāya tayo mahābhūtā, vatthurūpaṃ nissāya viññāṇaṃ rūpasminti vattuṃ vaṭṭati, kiṃ te evaṃ rūpasmiṃ puggalo? Yathā ca sabhāgavinibbhogato vedanādayo sabbadhammā, arūpā vā pana cattāro khandhā, nibbānameva vā ‘‘aññatra rūpā’’ti vattuṃ vaṭṭati, kiṃ te evaṃ puggalo? Yathā [Pg.123] ca cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ rūpānaṃ nissayavasena ‘‘vedanāya rūpaṃ…pe… viññāṇasmiṃ rūpa’’nti vattuṃ vaṭṭati, kiṃ te evaṃ puggaloti? Sabbānuyogesu pana ucchedadiṭṭhibhayena ceva samayavirodhena ca paṭikkhepo paravādissa. Sesamettha atthato pākaṭameva. Dhammato panettha sattapaññāsāya saccikaṭṭhesu ekekasmiṃ cattāri cattāri katvā niggahavasena aṭṭhavīsādhikāni dve pañcakasatāni dassitāni. Paravādīpakkhepi paṭikammavasena tattakāneva. Yā panettha atthi puggaloti vutte sakavādissa paṭiññā, sā sutte āgatena sammutivasena. Yo rūpaṃ puggalotiādīsu paṭikkhepo, so sakkāyadiṭṭhipañhassa ṭhapanīyattā. Paravādissa paṭikammaṃ chalavasenevāti.

Here, however, is the distinction: In statements like “a person in form,” just as three great elements depend on one great element, and it is proper to say that consciousness is “in form” by depending on a physical basis, how then, for you, is a person “in form”? Similarly, just as it is proper to say that all phenomena, such as feeling and the rest, are “other than form” due to their classification by commonality and division, or the four immaterial aggregates, or even Nibbāna itself, how then, for you, is a person so? And just as it is proper to say “form by feeling… form in consciousness” by way of dependence for mind-originated material forms, how then, for you, is a person so? In all these inquiries, however, the refutation by the opponent is due to both the fear of annihilationist views and contradiction with the doctrine. The rest here is clear in meaning. From the standpoint of the Dhamma, in each of the fifty-seven ultimate realities, taking four each, two hundred and twenty-eight points are shown by way of censure. In the opponent’s position also, there are just as many by way of counter-attack. As for the assertion here—“there is a person”—when it is stated, this is the proponent’s assertion, based on conventional truth as found in the suttas. The rejection of statements like “form is a person” is because the question of identity view is one to be set aside. The opponent’s counter-attack is merely by way of stratagem.

Catukkanayasaṃsandanaṃ.

The Concordance of the Fourfold Method.

Niṭṭhitā ca saṃsandanakathā.

The Discussion on Concordance is concluded.

8. Lakkhaṇayuttivaṇṇanā

8. Explanation of the Consistency of Characteristics

53. Idāni lakkhaṇayutti nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā ṭhapetvā nibbānaṃ seso saccikaṭṭhaparamattho paccayapaṭibaddhatāya sappaccayo, paccayehi samāgamma katattā saṅkhato, uppajjitvā nirujjhanato sadā abhāvato asassato, uppattikāraṇasaṅkhātassa nimittassa atthitāya sanimitto, nibbānaṃ vuttappakārābhāvato appaccayaṃ asaṅkhataṃ sassataṃ animittanti idaṃ saccikaṭṭhassa lakkhaṇaṃ. Tasmā yadi puggalopi saccikaṭṭhaparamatthova tassāpi iminā lakkhaṇena bhavitabbanti sandhāya puggalo sappaccayotiādayo aṭṭhapi anuyogā sakavādissa, paṭikkhepo paravādissa. Ājānāhi niggahantiādi panettha saṅkhittaṃ. Evametāni sakavādīpakkhe anulomapaccanīke anulomamattavasena aṭṭha pañcakāni veditabbāni.

53. Now comes the explanation called the Consistency of Characteristics. Herein, except for Nibbāna, the rest of ultimate reality in its true sense is dependent on conditions, being tied to causes. Because it is made by coming together with conditions, it is conditioned. Since it arises and ceases, due to its constant non-existence, it is impermanent. Because there is the existence of a sign, which is called the cause of arising, it has a sign. Nibbāna, however, due to the absence of the aforementioned characteristics, is not dependent on conditions, unconditioned, permanent, and signless. This is the characteristic of ultimate reality. Therefore, if a person is also ultimate reality in the true sense, they too must possess these characteristics. Hence, the eight inquiries—such as “is a person dependent on conditions?”—are by the proponent, and the refutation is by the opponent. “Understand the censure,” etc., is abbreviated here. Thus, these eight groups of five should be understood in the proponent's side, in their consistent and contradictory aspects, specifically by way of the consistent aspect.

54. Paravādīpakkhepi paccanīkānulome paccanīkamattavasena aṭṭheva. Tattha yasmā paravādinā suttavasena sammutisaccaṃ sādhitaṃ, sammutiyā ca sappaccayādibhāvo [Pg.124] natthi, tasmā yāthāvato ca paṭikkhepo sakavādissa. Chalavasena pana vattabbaṃ ‘‘ājānāhi paṭikamma’’ntiādi sabbaṃ idhāpi saṅkhittameva.

54. From the opponent’s perspective also, in the contradictory and consistent aspects, there are eight points, specifically by way of the contradictory aspect. Herein, since the opponent has established conventional truth by way of the suttas, and conventional truth does not have the nature of being dependent on conditions, etc., therefore, the refutation by the proponent is in accordance with reality. But regarding what is to be said by way of stratagem, everything, such as “Understand the counter-action,” is also abbreviated here.

Lakkhaṇayuttikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on the Consistency of Characteristics is concluded.

9. Vacanasodhanavaṇṇanā

9. The Explanation of the Examination of Statements

55-59. Idāni vacanasodhanaṃ hoti. Tattha yadetaṃ puggalo upalabbhatīti vacanaṃ, taṃ sodhetuṃ puggalo upalabbhati, upalabbhati puggaloti. Pucchā sakavādissa. Tassattho – yadetaṃ puggalo upalabbhatīti padadvayaṃ, taṃ ekatthaṃ vā bhaveyya nānatthaṃ vā. Yadi tāva nānatthaṃ, yathā aññaṃ rūpaṃ, aññā vedanā, evaṃ añño puggalo, añño upalabbhatīti āpajjati. Athekatthaṃ, yathā yaṃ cittaṃ taṃ mano, evaṃ sveva puggalo, so upalabbhatīti āpajjati. Tena taṃ vadāmi ‘‘yadi te yo puggalo, so upalabbhati, evaṃ sante yo yo upalabbhati, so so puggaloti āpajjati, kiṃ sampaṭicchasi eta’’nti? Tato puggalavādī yasmā puggalassa upalabbhataṃ icchati, na upalabbhamānānampi rūpādīnaṃ puggalabhāvaṃ, tasmā puggalo upalabbhati, upalabbhati ke hi ci puggalo ke hi ci na puggalotiādimāha. Tassattho – mama puggalo atthi puggaloti satthu vacanato upalabbhati. Yo pana upalabbhati, na so sabbo puggalo, atha kho ke hi ci puggalo ke hi ci na puggaloti. Tattha ko-kāratthe ke-kāro, hi-kāro ca nipātamatto. Koci puggalo, koci na puggaloti ayaṃ panettha attho. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – puggalopi hi rūpādīsupi yo koci dhammo upalabbhatiyeva, tattha puggalova puggalo. Rūpādīsu pana kocipi na puggaloti. Tato taṃ sakavādī āha – puggalo ke hi ci upalabbhati ke hi ci na upalabbhatīti. Tassattho – puggalo upalabbhatīti padadvayassa atthato ekatte yadi upalabbhatīti anuññāto dhammo puggalato anaññopi koci puggalo koci na puggalo, puggalopi [Pg.125] te koci upalabbhati, koci na upalabbhatīti āpajjati, kiṃ sampaṭicchasi etanti? So puggalassa anupaladdhiṃ anicchanto na hevanti paṭikkhipati. Ito paraṃ ‘‘ājānāhi niggaha’’ntiādi sabbaṃ saṅkhittaṃ. Vitthārato pana veditabbaṃ. Puggalo saccikaṭṭhotiādīsupi eseva nayo. Sabbāni hetāni upalabbhativevacanāneva, apica yasmā ‘‘puggalo upalabbhatisaccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’’ti ayaṃ puggalavādino paṭiññā, tasmāssa yatheva puggalo upalabbhatīti laddhi, evamevaṃ puggalo saccikaṭṭhotipi āpajjati. Yā panassa puggalo atthīti laddhi, tassā vijjamānotivevacanameva, tasmā sabbānipetāni vacanāni sodhitāni.

Now comes the examination of statements. Herein, to examine the statement, “a person is apprehended,” [the question is posed]: “Is a person apprehended? Is what is apprehended a person?” The question is for the proponent of his own doctrine. Its meaning is this: do these two terms, “a person is apprehended,” have the same meaning or different meanings? If they have different meanings, it would follow that just as form is one thing and feeling another, so too a person is one thing and ‘is apprehended’ is another. But if they have the same meaning, it would follow that just as that which is mind is mentality, so too the very person is the one who is apprehended. Therefore, I say to you: “If for you the person is the one who is apprehended, then it follows that whatever is apprehended is a person. Do you accept this?” Then, because the personalist desires that a person be apprehended, but not that things which are apprehended, such as form, have the nature of a person, he says, “A person is apprehended; what is apprehended is in some cases a person, in some cases not a person.” Its meaning is this: my ‘person’ is apprehended in accordance with the Teacher’s statement, “a person exists.” But what is apprehended is not entirely a person; rather, in some cases it is a person, in some cases it is not a person. Here, the word ‘ke’ is in the sense of ‘ko,’ and ‘hi’ is merely a particle. The meaning here is: something is a person, something is not a person. This is what is said: a person is indeed apprehended, just as any phenomenon whatsoever, such as form, is apprehended. Therein, only the person is the person. But among things such as form, nothing at all is a person. Then the proponent of his own doctrine says to him: “A person is apprehended in some respects, and not apprehended in some respects?” Its meaning is this: if the two terms “a person is apprehended” are identical in meaning, and if the phenomenon acknowledged as ‘apprehended’ is not other than the person, and [you say] “something is a person, something is not a person,” then it follows that for you, the person itself is in some respects apprehended and in some respects not apprehended. Do you accept this? Not wishing for the non-apprehension of a person, he rejects this, saying, “Not so.” From here on, everything is summarized as “know the refutation,” and so on. But it should be understood in detail. The same method applies to statements such as “a person is a reality in the true sense.” All these are simply synonyms for “is apprehended.” Moreover, since the personalist’s assertion is, “a person is apprehended in the true and ultimate sense,” it follows that just as he holds the view that “a person is apprehended,” so too he holds the view that “a person is a reality in the true sense.” And as for his view that “a person exists,” that is simply a synonym for “is existent.” Thus, all these statements have been examined.

60. Tattha yaṃ avasāne ‘‘puggalo atthi, atthi na sabbo puggalo’’tiādi vuttaṃ, tatrāyamadhippāyo – yañhetaṃ paravādinā ‘‘puggalo atthi, atthi kehici puggalo, kehici na puggalo’’ti vuttaṃ, taṃ yasmā atthato puggalo atthi, atthi na sabbo puggaloti ettakaṃ hoti, tasmā naṃ sakavādī sampaṭicchāpetvā idāni naṃ evaṃ anuyuñjati. Tayā hi ‘‘atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’’ti vacanamattaṃ nissāya ‘‘puggalo atthī’’ti laddhi gahitā, yathā ca bhagavatā etaṃ vuttaṃ, tathā ‘‘suññato lokaṃ avekkhassu, mogharājā, sadā sato’’tiādinā (su. ni. 1125) nayena ‘‘natthī’’tipi vuttaṃ, tasmā yatheva te ‘‘puggalo atthi, atthi na sabbo puggalo’’ti laddhi, tathā puggalo natthi, natthi na sabbo puggalotipi āpajjati, kiṃ etaṃ sampaṭicchasīti? Atha naṃ asampaṭicchanto na hevāti paṭikkhipati. Sesamettha niggahādividhānaṃ vuttanayeneva veditabbanti.

60. Herein, regarding what was stated at the end, “A person exists; what exists is not entirely a person,” and so on, the intention is this: What the opponent said, “A person exists; what exists is in some cases a person, in some cases not a person,” amounts in meaning to this much: “A person exists; what exists is not entirely a person.” Therefore, the proponent of his own doctrine, having made him accept this, now interrogates him thus: “You, relying merely on the statement, ‘There is a person who is practicing for his own welfare,’ have adopted the view that ‘a person exists.’ But just as the Blessed One has said this, so too, by the method of ‘Look upon the world as empty, Mogharāja, ever mindful,’ and so on (Snp 5.15), it is also said that ‘there is not.’ Therefore, just as you hold the view, ‘A person exists; what exists is not entirely a person,’ so too it would follow that ‘A person does not exist; what does not exist is not entirely a person.’ Do you accept this?” Then, not accepting it, he rejects it, saying, “Not so.” The remainder here, the method of refutation and so on, should be understood in the manner already explained.

Vacanasodhanavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the examination of statements is concluded.

10. Paññattānuyogavaṇṇanā

10. Explanation of the Application of Designation

61-66. Idāni paññattānuyogo nāma hoti. Rūpadhātuyā hi puggalavādī rūpiṃ puggalaṃ paññapeti, tathā arūpadhātuyā arūpiṃ. Tassa taṃ laddhiṃ bhindituṃ sabbāpi pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā ca paṭikkhepo ca itarassa[Pg.126]. So hi rūpīti vutte rūpakāyasabbhāvato ceva tathārūpāya ca paññattiyā atthitāya paṭijānāti. Kāmīti vutte vītarāgasabbhāvato ceva tathārūpāya ca paññattiyā natthitāya paṭikkhipati. Arūpīti vuttepi arūpakkhandhasabbhāvato ceva tathārūpāya ca paññattiyā atthitāya paṭijānāti. Dvīsupi nayesu sattoti puggalassa vevacanavasena vuttaṃ.

61-66. Now, there is what is called the application of designation. For, in the form realm, the personalist designates a person as having form; similarly, in the formless realm, as formless. To break down this view of his, all the questions belong to the proponent of his own doctrine, while the affirmation and the denial belong to the other. For when it is said “has form,” he affirms it due to the existence of the form aggregate and the existence of such a designation. When it is said “has sensual desire,” he denies it due to the existence of freedom from passion and the non-existence of such a designation. When it is said “is formless,” he also affirms it due to the existence of the formless aggregates and the existence of such a designation. In both methods, “a being” is said as a synonym for “a person.”

67. Idāni yasmā so ‘‘kāye kāyānupassī’’ti āgataṭṭhāne añño kāyo añño puggaloti icchati, tasmā taṃ laddhiṃ bhindituṃ kāyoti vā sarīranti vātiādi sakavādīpucchā hoti. Tattha kāyaṃ appiyaṃ karitvāti kāyaṃ appetabbaṃ allīyāpetabbaṃ ekībhāvaṃ upanetabbaṃ avibhajitabbaṃ katvā pucchāmīti attho. Eseseti eso soyeva. Ese esetipi pāṭho. Eso esoyevāti attho. Ekaṭṭheti ekaṭṭho. Same samabhāge tajjāteti samo samabhāgo tajjātiko. Vacanamatteyevettha bhedo. Atthato pana kāyova esoti pucchati. Paravādī nānattaṃ apassanto āmantāti paṭijānāti. Puggaloti vā jīvoti vāti pucchāyapi eseva nayo. Añño kāyoti puṭṭho pana kāyānupassanāya evaṃladdhikattā paṭijānāti. Aññaṃ jīvanti puṭṭho pana āhacca bhāsitaṃ suttaṃ paṭikkhipituṃ asakkonto avajānāti. Tato paraṃ ‘‘ājānāhi niggaha’’ntiādi uttānatthameva.

67. Now, because he holds that in the passage 'contemplating the body in the body,' the body is one thing and the person another, therefore, to break down his position, the proponent asks, 'Is it body or is it physical body?' Here, the phrase kāyaṃ appiyaṃ karitvā means that I ask the question by treating the body as something to be reached, to be clung to, to be brought into oneness, not to be divided—this is the meaning. The term 'eseti' means 'that is that very one'. There is also the reading 'Ese eseti'. The meaning is 'this is that very one'. 'Ekaṭṭheti' means 'it is of one meaning/essence'. 'Same, similar, of the same kind' means equal, similar, of the same type. Here, the distinction is merely verbal. In essence, he asks, 'Is this the very body?' The opponent, not seeing a difference, agrees. The same method applies to the questions, 'Is it a person or is it a life-principle?' When asked, 'Is the body another?' he admits it because of his view regarding the contemplation of the body. When asked, 'Is the life-principle another?' unable to refute the explicitly stated sutta, he disregards it. Thereafter, 'Acknowledge the refutation,' etc., is clear in meaning.

68. Paravādīpakkhe pana añño kāyo añño puggaloti puṭṭho sakavādī ṭhapanīyapañhattā paṭikkhipati, paravādī chalavasena paṭikammaṃ karoti. Tampi uttānatthamevāti.

68. On the opponent's side, when asked, 'Is the body one thing and the person another?' the proponent, because it is a question to be set aside, rejects it; and the opponent makes a counter-attack by means of evasion. That too is clear in meaning.

Paññattānuyogavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Investigation into Designation is concluded.

11. Gatianuyogavaṇṇanā

11. Explanation of the Investigation into Destinations

69-72. Idāni gatiparivattanamukhena cutipaṭisandhianuyogo hoti. Tattha yasmā puggalavādī ‘‘sa sattakkhattuparamaṃ sandhāvitvāna puggalo’’tiādīni (saṃ. ni. 2.133; itivu. 24) suttāni nissāya puggalo sandhāvatīti laddhiṃ gahetvā voharati[Pg.127], tasmāssa taṃ laddhiṃ bhindituṃ sandhāvatīti pucchā sakavādissa. Tattha sandhāvatīti saṃsarati gamanāgamanaṃ karoti. Attano laddhivasena paṭiññā paravādissa. So puggalotiādayo anuyogopi sakavādissa, paṭikkhepo itarassa. Tattha soti soyevāti attho. Evaṃ pana anuyutto sassatadiṭṭhibhayena paṭikkhipati. Aññoti puṭṭho ucchedadiṭṭhibhayena. So ca añño cāti puṭṭho ekaccasassatadiṭṭhibhayena. Neva so na aññoti puṭṭho amarāvikkhepadiṭṭhibhayena. Puna cattāropi pañhe ekato puṭṭho catunnampi diṭṭhīnaṃ bhayena paṭikkhipitvā puna yānissa suttāni nissāya laddhi uppannā tāni dassento tena hi puggalo sandhāvatītiādimāha.

69-72. Now, the investigation into passing away and rebirth follows by way of the turning of destinations. Here, since the Personalist, relying on such suttas as 'A person, having transmigrated, is at most a seven-times-returner,' adopts and declares the doctrine that a person transmigrates, the proponent's question is, 'Does one transmigrate?' Here, 'transmigrates' means wanders on, goes and comes. The affirmation, according to his own doctrine, belongs to the opponent. The investigation beginning with 'Is that a person?' also belongs to the proponent, and the denial to the other. Here, 'that' means 'that very one'. When questioned thus, he denies it out of fear of the eternalist view. When asked, 'Another?' he denies it out of fear of the annihilationist view. When asked, 'Both the same and another?' he denies it out of fear of the partial eternalist view. When asked, 'Neither the same nor another?' he denies it out of fear of the view of the eel-wrigglers. Again, when all four questions are asked together, he denies them out of fear of all four views. Then, to show the suttas on which his doctrine is based, he says, 'Therefore, a person transmigrates,' and so on.

76. Puna sakavādinā ‘‘yvāyaṃ tava laddhiyā sandhāvati, kiṃ so asmiñca parasmiñca loke ekoyevā’’ti adhippāyena svevāti niyametvā puṭṭho sassatabhayā paṭikkhipitvā puna daḷhaṃ katvā tatheva puṭṭho yasmā so puggalova na añño bhāvo, ‘‘so tato cuto idhūpapanno’’tiādisuttampi (pārā. 12; dī. ni. 1.245) atthi, tasmā paṭijānāti. Sveva manussoti puṭṭho manussasseva devattābhāvato paṭikkhipati.

76. Again, when questioned by the proponent with the intention, 'According to your doctrine, the one who transmigrates—is he exactly the same in this world and the next?', the question being specified as 'Is it the very same one?', he denies it out of fear of eternalism. But when questioned firmly again in the same way, he acknowledges it, because it is that very person and not another being, and because there is also a sutta stating, 'That one, having passed away from there, is reborn here,' etc. (Pārā. 12; Dī. Ni. 1.245). When asked, 'Is it the very same human being?', he denies it, since a human being does not have the state of being a deva.

77. Puna puṭṭho ‘‘ahaṃ tena samayena sunetto nāma satthā ahosi’’ntiādisuttavasena (a. ni. 7.66 atthato samānaṃ) paṭijānāti. Athassa sakavādī devamanussupapattīnaṃ nānattato vacanaṃ micchāti pakāsento manusso hutvātiādimāha.

77. When asked again, he agrees, according to the sutta that says, 'At that time, I was the teacher named Sunetta,' and so on (A.N. 7.66, similar in meaning). Then the proponent, showing his statement to be wrong due to the diversity of rebirths among devas and humans, says, 'Having been a human...' and so forth.

78. Tattha hevaṃ maraṇaṃ na hehitīti evaṃ sante maraṇaṃ na bhavissatīti attho. Ito paraṃ yakkho petoti attabhāvanānattavasena anuyoganānattaṃ veditabbaṃ.

78. Here, 'death will not occur in this way' means that in such a case, death will not occur. Beyond this, one should understand the diversity of questioning due to the diversity of individual existences, such as yakkhas and petas.

82. Khattiyotiādīni jātivasena ceva aṅgavekallādivasena ca vuttāni.

82. The terms 'Khattiya' and so on are mentioned in terms of birth as well as physical defects and so on.

87. Puna [Pg.128] na vattabbanti paravādinā puṭṭho idhaṭṭhakassa upapattivasena paralokassa gamanābhāvato paṭiññā sakavādissa puna sotāpannassa bhavantarepi sotāpannabhāvāvijahanato dutiyapaṭiññāpi tasseva. Hañcītiādivacanaṃ paravādissa.

87. Again, when asked by the opponent, 'Should it not be said...?', the affirmation belongs to the proponent, because for one in this present existence, there is no going to the next world by way of rebirth. And again, because a stream-enterer does not abandon the state of a stream-enterer even in another existence, the second affirmation also belongs to him. The statement 'If so...' belongs to the opponent.

88. Puna devaloke upapannassa manussattābhāvadassanena anuyogo sakavādissa.

88. Again, the investigation belongs to the proponent, by showing the absence of the human state for one reborn in the deva-world.

89. Tato paraṃ anañño avigatoti ettha anaññoti sabbākārena ekasadiso. Avigatoti ekenāpi ākārena avigatoti attho. Na hevanti devaloke upapannassa manussabhāvābhāvato evamāha.

89. Beyond that, concerning 'not another, not departed', here 'not another' means completely identical in every way. 'Not departed' means not departed in any way. 'Not so'—thus it is said because one reborn in the deva-world lacks the state of being human.

90. Puna daḷhaṃ katvā anuyutto ‘‘sveva puggalo sandhāvatī’’ti laddhiyā anujānāti. Hatthacchinnotiādi ākāravigamanadassanena avigato sandhāvatīti laddhibhindanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Tattha aḷacchinnoti yassa aṅguṭṭhakā chinnā. Kaṇḍaracchinnoti yassa mahānhārū chinnā.

90. Again, when firmly questioned, he assents to the view that 'the same person transmigrates'. The phrase 'one whose hands are cut off' and so on is stated to break the view that one transmigrates without departing from one's characteristics, by showing the disappearance of those characteristics. Here, 'one whose fingers are cut off' refers to someone whose fingers are severed. 'One whose tendons are cut off' refers to someone whose major tendons are severed.

91. Sarūpotiādīsu paṭhame pañhe iminā rūpakāyena saddhiṃ agamanaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Dutiye antarābhavapuggalaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. So hi tassa laddhiyā sarūpova gantvā mātukucchiṃ pavisati. Athassa taṃ rūpaṃ bhijjati. Taṃ jīvanti yena rūpasaṅkhātena sarīrena saddhiṃ gacchati, kimassa tadeva jīvaṃ taṃ sarīranti pucchati. Paravādī idha sarīranikkhepā suttavirodhā ca paṭikkhipati.

91. In the first question regarding 'having the same form,' etc., he denies it, referring to not going together with this physical body. In the second, he agrees, referring to the intermediate-existence being. For according to his view, that being goes with the same form and enters the mother's womb. Then that form breaks apart. The proponent asks: 'That body designated as form, with which it goes—is that very body its life-principle?' The opponent denies this due to the contradiction with the suttas about the laying down of the body here.

Savedanotiādīsu asaññūpapattiṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, tadaññaṃ upapattiṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Taṃ jīvanti yena vedanādisaṅkhātena sarīrena saddhiṃ gacchati. Kimassa tadeva jīvaṃ taṃ sarīranti pucchati. Taṃ jīvaṃ taṃ sarīraṃ, aññaṃ jīvaṃ aññaṃ sarīranti etissā hi laddhiyā pañcapi khandhā sarīranti adhippetā. Paravādī suttavirodhā paṭikkhipati.

In the questions beginning 'with feeling,' and so on, he denies it with reference to rebirth in the non-percipient realm and affirms it with reference to another rebirth. 'That is the life' means that with which one goes along, together with the body characterized by feeling and so on. He asks, 'Is that very thing the life, that body?' For according to this view—'the life is that body, or the life is another and the body is another'—the five aggregates are intended as the body. The opponent denies this due to a contradiction with the Suttas.

92. Arūpotiādīsu paṭhame pañhe antarābhavaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Dutiye arūpā rūpaṃ upapajjamānaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Aññaṃ, jīvanti yaṃ [Pg.129] rūpasaṅkhātaṃ sarīraṃ pahāya arūpo sandhāvati, kiṃ te taṃ sarīraṃ aññaṃ, aññaṃ jīvanti pucchati. Itaro suttavirodhā paṭikkhipati.

92. In the questions beginning 'formless,' and so on, in the first question he denies it with reference to the intermediate existence. In the second, he affirms it with reference to a formless being being reborn into a form realm. He asks, 'Is the life another? That is, when the formless one transmigrates, having abandoned the body designated as form, is that body of yours another, and is the life another?' The other denies it due to a contradiction with the Suttas.

Avedanotiādīsu saññībhavaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, tadaññaṃ upapattiṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Aññaṃ jīvanti yaṃ vedanādisaṅkhātaṃ sarīraṃ pahāya avedano aviññāṇo sandhāvati, kiṃ te taṃ aññaṃ sarīraṃ, aññaṃ jīvanti pucchati. Itaro suttavirodhā paṭikkhipati.

In the questions beginning 'without feeling,' and so on, he denies it with reference to the percipient state of existence, and affirms it with reference to another rebirth. He asks: 'Is the life another? When one without feeling and without consciousness transmigrates, having abandoned the body designated as feeling and so on, is that body of yours another, and is the life another?' The other denies it due to a contradiction with the Suttas.

93. Rūpaṃ sandhāvatītiādīsu ye rūpādayo khandhe upādāya puggalaṃ paññapeti, kiṃ te tasmiṃ puggale sandhāvante tampi rūpaṃ sandhāvatīti pucchati. Paravādī ‘‘avijjānīvaraṇānaṃ sattānaṃ taṇhāsaṃyojanānaṃ sandhāvataṃ saṃsarata’’nti sattasseva sandhāvanavacanato paṭikkhipati. Puna puṭṭho yasmā rūpādidhamme vinā puggalo natthi, tasmā tasmiṃ sandhāvante tenapi rūpena sandhāvitabbanti saññāya paṭijānāti. Vedanādīsupi eseva nayo.

93. In the questions beginning 'Does form transmigrate?' and so on, he who designates a person in dependence on the aggregates such as form asks: 'When that person transmigrates, does that form also transmigrate?' The opponent denies this, because of the statement that only beings transmigrate, 'beings hindered by ignorance, fettered by craving, transmigrating and wandering on.' When questioned again, he acknowledges, with the understanding that since there is no person without the phenomena of form and so on, therefore, when that person transmigrates, form also must transmigrate. The same method applies to feeling and so on.

94. Rūpaṃ na sandhāvatītiādīsu yasmā te rūpaṃ puggalo na hoti, sveva ca sandhāvatīti vadesi, tasmā taṃ pucchāmi, kiṃ te rūpaṃ na sandhāvatīti attho. Itaro puggale sandhāvante na sakkā tassa upādānabhūtena rūpena sandhāvitunti saññāya paṭikkhipati. Puna puṭṭho sattānaññeva sandhāvanavacanato paṭijānāti. Sesamettha uttānameva.

94. In the questions beginning 'Does form not transmigrate?' and so on, the meaning is: 'Since for you form is not the person, and you say that the person himself transmigrates, therefore I ask you: Does form not transmigrate for you?' The other denies it, with the understanding that when the person transmigrates, it is not possible for form, which is the basis of clinging for that person, to transmigrate. When questioned again, he acknowledges it because of the statement that only beings transmigrate. The rest here is quite clear.

Gāthānaṃ pana ayamattho – āyasmato matena rukkhaṃ upādāya chāyā viya, indhanaṃ upādāya aggi viya ca, khandhe upādāya puggalo; rūpādīnaṃ sandhāvane asati tesu khandhesu bhijjamānesu so tava puggalo bhijjati ce, evaṃ sante ucchedā bhavati diṭṭhi, ucchedadiṭṭhi te āpajjati. Katarā yā buddhena vivajjitā akusaladiṭṭhi. Yā pana ‘‘ucchedavādī samaṇo gotamo’’ti pariyāyabhāsitā, na taṃ vadāmāti dasseti. Athāpi tesu khandhesu bhijjamānesu so puggalo na bhijjati, evaṃ sante sassato puggalo hoti. Tato so nibbānena samasamo āpajjati[Pg.130]. Samasamoti ativiya samo, samena vā samo, samabhāveneva samo. Yatheva nibbānaṃ nuppajjati na bhijjati, evaṃ te puggalopi tena samasamoti.

Now, the meaning of the verses is this: According to the venerable one's view, a person depends on the aggregates just as a shadow depends on a tree and fire depends on fuel. If, in the absence of the transmigration of form and so on, that person of yours breaks apart when those aggregates break apart, then in that case it becomes the view of annihilation; the annihilationist view befalls you. Which one? The unwholesome view rejected by the Buddha. He shows, 'We do not say that which was spoken of indirectly: "The ascetic Gotama is an annihilationist."' Furthermore, if that person does not break apart when those aggregates break apart, in that case, the person becomes eternal. Then that person becomes exactly equal to Nibbāna. 'Exactly equal' means exceedingly equal, or equal by equality, or equal in its very nature. Just as Nibbāna neither arises nor breaks apart, so too, according to you, is that person exactly equal to it.

Gatiparivattanamukhena cutipaṭisandhānuyogo niṭṭhito.

The investigation of decease and re-linking by way of the change of destinies is concluded.

Anuyogavaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Investigation.

12. Upādāpaññattānuyogavaṇṇanā

12. Commentary on the Investigation of Designations Based on Clinging.

95. Idāni upādāpaññattānuyogo hoti. Tattha pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññāpaṭikkhepo paravādissa. So hi rukkhaṃ upādāya chāyāya viya, indhanaṃ upādāya aggissa viya ca, rūpādīni upādāya puggalassa paññattiṃ paññāpanaṃ avabodhanaṃ icchati, tasmā ‘‘rūpaṃ upādāyā’’ti puṭṭho paṭijānāti. Puna yathā rukkhupādānā chāyā rukkho viya, indhanupādāno ca aggi indhanaṃ viya aniccādidhammo, evaṃ te rūpādiupādāno puggalo rūpādayo viya aniccoti imamatthaṃ puṭṭho attano laddhiyaṃ ṭhatvā paṭikkhipati.

95. Now comes the investigation of designations based on clinging. Here, the question is for the proponent, while the rejection of the admission is for the opponent. For he desires the designation, the making known, and the understanding of a person in dependence on form and so on, just as a shadow depends on a tree, and fire depends on fuel. Therefore, when asked, 'In dependence on form?' he admits it. Again, just as the shadow, depending on the tree, is like the tree, and the fire, depending on the fuel, is like the fuel—subject to impermanence and so on—so too, the person depending on form and so on is impermanent like form and so on. When asked about this meaning, he rejects it, standing firm in his own doctrine.

97. Nīlaṃ rūpaṃ upādāya nīlotiādīsu nīlarūpena saddhiṃ puggalassa ekattaṃ, ekasarīre nīlādīnaṃ bahūnaṃ vasena bahubhāvañca anicchanto paṭikkhipati.

97. In the questions beginning 'Is one blue, in dependence on blue form?' and so on, not wishing for the oneness of the person with blue form, nor for multiplicity by way of many things such as blue and so on in a single body, he denies it.

98. Kusalaṃ vedananti etthāpi vedanāya saddhiṃ ekattaṃ ekasantāne bahūnaṃ kusalavedanānaṃ vasena bahubhāvañca anicchanto paṭikkhipati. Dutiyanaye maggakusalotiādivacanasabbhāvato chekaṭṭhaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Saphalotiādīni puṭṭho tathārūpassa vohārassa abhāvato paṭikkhipati.

98. Regarding 'wholesome feeling,' here too, not wishing for oneness with feeling, nor for multiplicity by way of many wholesome feelings in a single continuum, he denies it. In the second method, because of the existence of expressions such as 'the path is wholesome,' and so on, he acknowledges it with reference to the meaning of 'skillful.' When questioned about 'fruitful' and so on, he rejects it due to the absence of such a usage.

99. Akusalapakkhe achekaṭṭhaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti.

99. In the case of the unwholesome, he acknowledges it with reference to the meaning of 'unskillful.'

100. Abyākatapakkhe sassatādivasena abyākatabhāvaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Sesamettha heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ.

100. In the case of the undeclared, he acknowledges its undeclared nature with reference to eternalism and so on. The rest here should be understood in the same way as stated above.

104. Cakkhuṃ [Pg.131] upādāyātiādīsu ‘‘cakkhumā visamānīva…pe… pāpāni parivajjaye’’ti(udā. 43) ādivohārasabbhāvato paṭijānāti. Cakkhumattādinirodhena puggalanirodhaṃ anicchanto paṭikkhipati.

104. In the questions beginning 'In dependence on the eye?' and so on, he acknowledges it because of the existence of conventional expressions such as, 'One with eyes, as if on uneven ground... should avoid evil deeds' (Udāna 43). Not wishing for the cessation of the person through the cessation of the mere eye and so on, he denies it.

107. Rūpaṃ upādāya vedanaṃ upādāyāti ettha aññepi rūpamūlakā dukatikacatukkā veditabbā. Yasmā pana khandhe upādāya puggalassa paññatti, tasmā dvepi tayopi cattāropi pañcapi upādāya paññattiṃ paṭijānāti. Ekasantāne pana dvinnaṃ pañcannaṃ vā abhāvā paṭikkhipati. Āyatanādīsupi eseva nayo.

107. In 'in dependence on form, in dependence on feeling,' here other dyads, triads, and tetrads rooted in form should also be understood. However, since the designation of a person is in dependence on the aggregates, he acknowledges designation based on two, three, four, or all five aggregates. But he denies it due to the absence of two or five in a single continuum. The same method applies to the sense bases and so on.

112. Idāni yaṃ upādāya yassa paññatti, yathā tassa aniccatāya tassāpi aniccatā, tato ca aññattaṃ siddhaṃ, evaṃ tassa puggalassāpi āpajjatīti dassetuṃ yathā rukkhantiādimāha. Tattha upādāyāti paṭicca āgamma, na vinā tanti attho. Paravādī pana tathā anicchanto laddhiyaṃ ṭhatvā paṭikkhipati.

112. Now, to show that just as the designation which depends on something is impermanent because that thing is impermanent, and from that, otherness is established, so too this applies to the person, he says 'like a tree' and so on. Herein, 'depending on' means 'dependent on, having come to,' meaning 'not without it.' But the opponent, not wishing for it to be so, stands firm in his doctrine and denies it.

115. Nigaḷoti saṅkhalikabandhanaṃ. Negaḷikoti tena bandhako yassa rūpaṃ so rūpavāti yasmā yassa rūpaṃ so rūpavā hoti, tasmā yathā na nigaḷo …pe… añño rūpavāti attho.

115. 'Nigaḷa' means a chain or bond. 'Negaḷika' means one who binds with it. The meaning is: 'Since he whose form exists is one with form, therefore, just as "not a chain" [...], so the one with form is different.'

116. Citte cittetiādīsu sarāgādicittavasena sarāgāditaṃ sandhāya cittānupassanāvasena paṭijānāti. Jāyatītiādinā nayena puṭṭho puggalassa khaṇikabhāvaṃ anicchanto paṭikkhipati. ‘‘So’’ti vā ‘‘añño’’ti vā puṭṭho sassatucchedabhayena paṭikkhipati. Puna na vattabbaṃ ‘‘kumārako’’ti vā ‘‘kumārikā’’ti vā puṭṭho lokavohārasamucchedabhayena vattabbanti paṭijānāti. Sesamettha pākaṭameva.

116. In 'mind, mind' and so on, he acknowledges it by way of the contemplation of mind, with reference to its being affected by lust and so on, as in the case of a mind affected by lust and so on. When asked in the manner of 'it arises' and so on, not wishing for the momentary nature of the person, he denies it. When asked 'Is it the same?' or 'Is it different?', he denies it out of fear of eternalism or annihilationism. Again, when asked 'Should it not be said "a boy" or "a girl"?', he acknowledges that it should be spoken of out of fear of destroying worldly convention. The rest here is quite clear.

118. Idāni paravādī aññenākārena laddhiṃ patiṭṭhāpetukāmo na vattabbaṃ puggalo upalabbhatītiādimāha. Tattha na vattabbanti kiṃ te iminā evaṃ bahunā upādāpaññattānuyogena, idaṃ tāva vadehi, kiṃ na vattabbaṃ ‘‘puggalo upalabbhati saccikaṭṭhaparamatthenā’’ti. Tato sakavādinā āmantāti vutte nanu yo passatītiādimāha. Tattha yoti puggalo[Pg.132]. Yanti rūpaṃ. Yenāti cakkhunā. Soti puggalo. Tanti rūpaṃ. Tenāti cakkhunā. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – nanu yo yaṃ rūpaṃ yena cakkhunā passati, so taṃ rūpaṃ tena cakkhunā passanto puggaloti. Sakavādī kiñcāpi cakkhuviññāṇassa nissayabhāvaṃ gacchantaṃ cakkhumeva rūpaṃ passati, tathā sotameva saddaṃ suṇāti…pe… viññāṇameva dhammaṃ vijānāti, ‘‘atthi arahato cakkhu, passati arahā cakkhunā rūpa’’ntiādisammutivasena pana āmantāti paṭijānāti.

118. Now, the opponent, wishing to establish his doctrine in another way, says 'It should not be said that a person is found' and so on. Herein, 'it should not be said' means: 'What use is this extensive investigation of designations based on clinging to you? First, tell me this: should it not be said that "a person is found in the real and ultimate sense"?' Then, when the proponent says 'Yes,' he says 'Is it not so that one sees?' and so on. Herein, 'who' refers to the person. 'What' refers to form. 'With which' refers to the eye. 'He' refers to the person. 'That' refers to form. 'With that' refers to the eye. This is what is said: 'Is not the one who sees a form with the eye, while seeing that form with that eye, a person?' Although the eye itself sees form, becoming the basis for eye-consciousness, and similarly the ear hears sound [...], and consciousness cognizes mental objects, yet the proponent acknowledges it conventionally, saying, 'The Arahant has an eye, the Arahant sees form with the eye,' and so on.

120. Tato chalavādaṃ nissāya paravādinā puggalassa vattabbatāya sādhitāya tameva vādaṃ parivattetvā puggalo upalabbhatītiādimāha. Tattha yo na passatīti andho asaññasatto arūpaṃ upapanno nirodhaṃ samāpanno, anandhopi ca aññatra dassanasamayā na passati nāma. Sesavāresupi eseva nayo. Sesaṃ pāḷivaseneva atthato veditabbaṃ.

120. Then, relying on sophistry, the opponent, having established the necessity of speaking about a person, turns the same argument around and says, 'a person is found,' and so on. Herein, 'who does not see' refers to a blind person, a non-percipient being, one reborn in the formless realm, or one who has attained cessation. And even a non-blind person does not see apart from the time of seeing. The same principle applies in the remaining instances. The rest should be understood according to the meaning of the Pāli text itself.

122. Suttasaṃsandanāyaṃ dibbassa cakkhuno rūpagocarattā rūpaṃ passatīti āha. Dutiyavāre ‘‘satte passāmī’’tivacanato puggalaṃ passatīti āha. Tatiyavāre ‘‘rūpaṃ disvā puggalaṃ vibhāvetī’’ti laddhito ubho passatīti āha. Yasmā pana passitabbaṃ nāma diṭṭhaṃ sutaṃ mutaṃ viññātanti catubbidhe rūpasaṅgahe rūpāyatanameva saṅgahitaṃ, tasmā sakavādī ‘‘rūpaṃ puggalo, puggalo rūpaṃ, ubho rūpa’’nti anuyogaṃ karoti. Tassattho pākaṭoyevāti.

122. In the correlation with the suttas, because the divine eye has form as its object-range, it is said that it sees form. In the second instance, from the statement 'I see beings,' it is said that it sees the person. In the third instance, from the doctrine that 'having seen form, one distinguishes the person,' it is said that it sees both. However, since the perceivable is fourfold—seen, heard, sensed, and cognized—but in the category of form, only the sense-object of form is included, therefore the proponent poses the question: 'Is form the person? Is the person form? Are both form?' The meaning of this is quite clear.

Upādāpaññattānuyogavaṇṇanā.

Exposition on the Inquiry into Designations Based on Clinging.

13. Purisakārānuyogavaṇṇanā

13. Exposition on the Inquiry into Personal Effort.

123. Idāni purisakārānuyogo hoti. Tattha kamme sati niyamato tassa kārakenapi bhavitabbanti laddhiyā pucchā paravādissa, tathārūpānaṃ kammānaṃ atthitāya paṭiññā sakavādissa. Puna kattā kāretāti pucchā paravādissa. Tattha kattāti tesaṃ kammānaṃ kārako. Kāretāti āṇattidesanādīhi upāyehi kārāpako. Idāni yasmā [Pg.133] paravādī puggalaṃ sandhāya kattāti pucchati, na karaṇamattaṃ, tasmā paṭikkhepo sakavādissa.

123. Now comes the inquiry into personal effort. Here, the opponent's question is based on the tenet that when an action exists, it must necessarily have a doer. The proponent acknowledges the existence of such actions. Then the opponent asks, 'Is there a doer? Is there an instigator?' Here, 'doer' refers to the performer of those actions. 'Instigator' means the one who causes them to be done through commands, instructions, and other such means. Now, since the opponent asks about the 'doer' with reference to a person, not merely the means of doing, the proponent rejects this.

124. Tassa kattā kāretāti ettha yadi yaṃ yaṃ upalabbhati, tassa tassa kattā puggalo te upalabbhati, kiṃ tassāpi kārako ca kārāpako ca añño puggalo upalabbhatīti attho. Paravādī tathā anicchanto issaranimmānavādabhayena paṭikkhipati. Puna puṭṭho yasmā puggalaṃ mātāpitaro janenti nāmaṃ karonti posenti, tasmāssa te kārakā. Ye ca pana taṃ kalyāṇamittā vā ācariyā vā tāni tāni vijjāṭṭhānasippāyatanāni sikkhāpenti, te kārāpakā nāmāti imamatthaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Purimakammameva tassa kattā ceva kārāpetā cāti adhippetaṃ.

124. Regarding 'its doer and instigator,' the meaning is this: if for whatever is apprehended, a person is apprehended by you as its doer, is another person also apprehended who is both the doer and the instigator of that person? The opponent, unwilling to accept this, rejects it out of fear of the doctrine of creation by a supreme being. When questioned again, they concede this meaning: since parents give birth to, name, and nurture a person, they are the doers. And since good friends or teachers teach various branches of knowledge, crafts, and skills, they are the instigators. The intended meaning is that past action itself is both its doer and its instigator.

125. Tassa tassevāti iminā idaṃ pucchati – yadi kammānaṃ kārakassa kattā tassāpi kattā tassāpi kattā attheva, evaṃ sante purimena purimena avassaṃ pacchā pacchā puggalo kātabboti imināpi te kammānaṃ kārakena puggalena āyatiṃ añño puggalo kātabbo, tenāpi aññoti natthi dukkhassa antakiriyā, natthi vaṭṭassa upacchedo, natthi appaccayaparinibbānaṃ. Paccayābhāvena paccayapaṭibaddhassa dukkhassa abhāvā yaṃ nibbānaṃ vuttaṃ, natthi te tanti. Atha vā tassa tassevāti yadi kammaṃ kammamattaṃ na hoti, tassa pana kārako puggalo, tassāpi kārako, tassāpi kārakoti evaṃ puggalaparamparā atthi. Evaṃ sante yā esā kammavaṭṭassa appavattikaraṇena dukkhassa antakiriyā vuttā, sā natthīti attho. Paravādī taṃ anicchanto paṭikkhipati. Ito aparāsupi upalabbhati sāmaññena kārakapucchāsu puggalaṃyeva sandhāya ‘‘kattā kāretā’’ti vuttaṃ, na paccaye. Na hi mahāpathavīādīnaṃ paccayā natthi.

125. By 'for that very one,' this is asked: if an action is not merely an action, but there is a person as its agent, and a doer of that one, and a doer of that one—thus there is a succession of persons. This being so, that making an end of suffering, which is spoken of as being brought about by the non-continuation of the cycle of action, would not exist—this is the meaning. The opponent, not wishing for this, rejects it. Hereafter as well, in general questions about the agent, it is found that 'doer and instigator' is said with reference to a person, not to conditions. For it is not that conditions such as the great earth element do not exist.

135. Añño kalyāṇapāpakānaṃ kammānaṃ kattāti pañho ‘‘saṅkhāravantaṃ vā attāna’’ntiādidiṭṭhibhayā paṭikkhitto.

135. The question, "Is another the doer of good and bad actions?" is rejected due to the fear of views such as "a self possessed of volitional formations," etc.

136. Vipāko upalabbhatītiādi vipākapaṭisaṃvedīvasena puggalaṃ dassentassa laddhibhindanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Tattha vipākapaṭisaṃvedīti anuyogo paravādissa[Pg.134], vipākapavattito aññassa vedakassa abhāvā paṭikkhepo sakavādissa. Puna pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa.

136. "The result is found," etc., is stated to refute the view of one who presents a person as experiencing the result. Here, "experiencer of the result" is the opponent's inquiry, while the proponent rejects it because, other than the arising of the result, there is no other experiencer. Then comes the proponent's question and the opponent's acknowledgement.

138. Tassa paṭisaṃvedīti tassa vipākapaṭisaṃvedakassa paṭisaṃvedī yasmā pana paṭisaṃveditabbo nāma vipāko, na ca puggalo vipāko, tasmā paṭikkhepo paravādissa. Puna puṭṭho yasmā puññavipāke ṭhitattā vipākapaṭisaṃvedī puttaṃ vā patiṃ vā mātā vā jāyā vā paricumbati parisajjati, tasmā tathārūpaṃ paṭisaṃveditaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti paravādī.

138. By 'an experiencer of that,' an experiencer of that experiencer of the result is meant. Since what is to be experienced is the result, and a person is not the result, therefore the opponent rejects it. When questioned again, because one is established in the result of merit, the experiencer of the result kisses or embraces a son, husband, mother, or wife. Therefore, with reference to such an experience, the opponent acknowledges it.

Tassa tassevāti yadi vipāko vipākamattaṃ na hoti, tassa pana paṭisaṃvedī puggalo, tassāpi paṭisaṃvedī tassāpi paṭisaṃvedīti evaṃ puggalaparamparā atthi. Evaṃ sante yā esā vipākavaṭṭassa appavattikaraṇena dukkhassa antakiriyā vuttā, sā natthīti attho. Ito paraṃ upalabbhatisāmaññena paṭisaṃvedīpucchāsu heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva attho veditabbo.

By 'for that very one,' if the result is not merely the result, but there is a person as its experiencer, and an experiencer of that one, and an experiencer of that one—thus there is a succession of persons. This being so, that making an end of suffering, which is spoken of as being brought about by the non-continuation of the cycle of results, would not exist—this is the meaning. From here on, in questions about the experiencer, the meaning should be understood in the same way as stated above, in accordance with the general term 'is found'.

142. Añño kalyāṇapāpakānaṃ kammānaṃ vipākapaṭisaṃvedīti pañho ‘‘vedanavantaṃ vā attāna’’ntiādidiṭṭhibhayā paṭikkhitto.

142. The question, "Is another the experiencer of the results of good and bad actions?" is rejected due to the fear of views such as "the self possesses feeling," etc.

143. Dibbaṃ sukhantiādi kalyāṇapāpakānaṃ kammānaṃ vipākaṃ bhājetvā dassanavasena āraddhaṃ. Taṃ sabbaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Sakavādino cettha puggalavaseneva paṭisaṃvedīpaṭikkhepo veditabbo, na vedayitavasena.

143. "Divine pleasure," etc., is begun by way of showing the classification of the results of good and bad actions. All this should be understood in the same way as previously stated. Here, the proponent's rejection of an experiencer should be understood as being on the basis of a person, not on the basis of what is felt.

148. Mahāpathavīādīni hi ārammaṇaṃ katvā vedayitānaṃ uppatti appaṭisiddhā.

148. For the arising of experiences, having taken objects such as the great earth element, is not denied.

170. Kattā kāretā vipākapaṭisaṃvedītiādi vomissakanayavasena āraddhaṃ. Tattha so karotīti yaṃ tvaṃ kattāti ca paṭisaṃvedīti ca vadesi, kiṃ soyeva karoti, so paṭisaṃvedeti. Ayamanuyogo sakavādissa, suttavirodhabhayena paṭikkhepo paravādissa.

170. 'The doer, the instigator, the experiencer of the result,' etc., is begun by way of the mixed method. Here, 'Does he act?' means: that which you call 'doer' and 'experiencer,' does that very one act, does that one experience? This inquiry is the proponent's; the opponent's rejection is due to fear of contradicting the suttas.

171. Puna [Pg.135] puṭṭho ‘‘idha nandati pecca nandatī’’tiādisuttavasena (dha. pa. 18) paṭiññā tasseva. Athassa vacanokāsaṃ paṭibāhanto sakavādī sayaṃkataṃ sukhadukkhanti āha.

171. When questioned again, his admission is based on the sutta beginning, 'Here he rejoices, hereafter he rejoices' (Dhammapada 18). Then, obstructing his opportunity to speak, the proponent states that pleasure and pain are self-made.

172. Tattha añño karotīti kārakavedakānaṃ aññattapucchāvasena vuttaṃ. Tato paravādī suttavirodhabhayena paṭikkhipitvā puna puṭṭho ‘‘manussabhūto katvā devabhūto paṭisaṃvedetī’’ti maññamāno paṭijānāti. Evaṃvādino pana paraṃkataṃ sukhadukkhaṃ āpajjatīti tassa vasena puṭṭho puna paṭikkhipati.

172. Here, 'Does another act?' is stated by way of a question about the otherness of the agent and the experiencer. Thereupon, the opponent, fearing contradiction with the suttas, rejects it. But when asked again, he concedes, thinking, 'Having acted as a human, one experiences as a deva.' However, for one who speaks thus, it follows that pleasure and pain are made by another. Questioned on that basis, he rejects it again.

174. So ca añño cāti kārakavedakānaṃ ekattaaññattapucchāvasena vuttaṃ. Tato paravādī suttavirodhabhayeneva paṭikkhipitvā puna puṭṭho purime dvepi naye ekato katvā paṭijānāti. Evaṃvādino pana sayaṃkatañca paraṃkatañca sukhadukkhaṃ āpajjatīti tassa vasena puṭṭho puna paṭikkhipati.

174. "Is it that one and another?" is stated by way of a question about the oneness and otherness of the agent and the experiencer. Thereupon, the opponent, fearing contradiction with the suttas, rejects it. But when questioned again, he combines the two previous methods and concedes. However, for one who speaks thus, it follows that pleasure and pain are both self-made and other-made. Questioned on that basis, he rejects it again.

176. Neva so karotīti kārakavedakānaṃ ekattaaññattapaṭikkhepavasena vuttaṃ. Tato paravādī suttavirodhavaseneva paṭikkhipitvā puna puṭṭho yasmā manusso devalokūpapattiyā kammaṃ katvā na manussabhūtova paṭisaṃvedeti, nāpi yena kammaṃ kataṃ, tato aññova paṭisaṃvedeti, tasmā kārakato vedako neva so hoti, na aññoti maññamāno paṭijānāti. Laddhimattamevetaṃ? Evaṃvādino pana asayaṃkāraṃ aparaṃkāraṃ adhiccasamuppannaṃ sukhadukkhaṃ āpajjatīti tassa vasena puṭṭho puna paṭikkhipati. Apica imasmiṃ vomissakanaye ādito paṭṭhāya imināpi nayena attho veditabbo. Yasmā hi ayaṃ puggalavādī kammānaṃ kārakañceva vedakañca icchati, tasmāssa yo kārako, teneva vā vedakena bhavitabbaṃ, aññena vā ubhohi vā bhavitabbaṃ, ubhohi vāpi na bhavitabbanti idamāpannaṃ hoti. Evamāpannameva anuyogaṃ anuyuñjanto sakavādī ‘‘so karotī’’tiādayo cattāropi vikappe āha. Sesaṃ vuttappakārameva.

176. "He does not act" is stated by way of rejecting the identity and difference of the doer and the experiencer of deeds. Then, the opponent, having refuted it precisely on the grounds of contradicting the suttas, when questioned again, asserts, thinking it to be so, that since a human, having performed deeds leading to rebirth in the heavenly world, does not experience it in the human state, nor does someone other than the one who performed the deeds experience it, therefore, from the perspective of the doer, the experiencer is neither the same nor another. Is this merely a view? However, proponents of this view, when further questioned on the basis that pleasure and pain arise without self-causation, without other-causation, or are accidentally produced, again reject it. Moreover, in this mixed method, the meaning should be understood from the beginning in this way as well. For since this personalist desires that there be both a doer and an experiencer of actions, it follows for him that the experiencer must either be the same as the doer, or another, or both, or neither—this dilemma arises. Engaging in this very dilemma, the proponent of his own doctrine states the four alternatives beginning with "he acts," etc. The rest is as previously explained.

Pariyosāne pana cattāropi pañhā ekato puṭṭhā. Tattha paṭikkhepo ca paṭijānanā ca sayaṃkatādidosappatti ca purimanayeneva veditabbā. Ito [Pg.136] paraṃ ‘‘kalyāṇapāpakānī’’ti avatvā heṭṭhā vuttanayā eva ‘‘kammaṃ atthī’’tiādinā vikappena dassitā. Tesampi heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva attho veditabbo.

At the conclusion, however, all four questions are asked together. There, the rejection, the assertion, and the arising of faults such as self-making are to be understood in the same way as before. From here onward, instead of stating "good and evil," the alternatives are shown by the method previously mentioned, with "there is kamma," etc. Their meaning should also be understood in the way previously explained.

Purisakārānuyogavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Inquiry into Human Effort.

Kalyāṇavaggotipi etasseva nāmaṃ.

The Chapter on the Good is also its name.

14. Abhiññānuyogavaṇṇanā

14. The Explanation of the Inquiry into Direct Knowledge.

193. Ito paraṃ abhiññānuyogādivasena arahattasādhanā hoti. Tattha āmantāti sakavādinā paṭiññāte paravādī ‘‘bahiddhā anindriyabaddharūpe iddhividhādivisesādhigamo natthi, ajjhattaṃ atthi, tasmā iddhādinibbattakena puggalena bhavitabba’’nti maññamāno nanu atthi koci iddhiṃ vikubbatītiādimāha. Taṃ sabbaṃ uttānatthameva.

193. From here onward, the attainment of arahantship is accomplished by way of the inquiry into direct knowledge, and so on. Here, when the proponent of his own doctrine affirms, 'Yes,' the opponent, thinking, "There is no attainment of special powers like psychic abilities, etc., in external forms not bound by the senses, but internally there is; therefore, there must be a person who produces psychic powers, etc.," asks, "Is there not someone who performs psychic powers?" etc. All this is clear in meaning.

Abhiññānuyogavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Inquiry into Direct Knowledge.

15-18. Ñātakānuyogādivaṇṇanā

15-18. The Explanation of the Inquiry into Relatives, and so on.

197. Idāni mātātiādiko ñātakānuyogo. Khattiyotiādiko jātianuyogo. Gahaṭṭho pabbajitoti paṭipattianuyogo. Devo manussoti upapattianuyogo. Sotāpannotiādiko paṭivedhānuyogo, ariyānuyogotipi vuccati. Te sabbe uttānatthāyeva. ‘‘Arahā hutvā na arahā’’ti panettha moghapañhattā na vuttaṃ.

197. Now, the inquiry into relatives begins with "mother," and so on. The inquiry into caste begins with "khattiya," and so on. The inquiry into practice is "householder or renunciate." The inquiry into rebirth is "deva or human being." The inquiry into penetration begins with "stream-enterer," and so on; it is also called the noble inquiry. All these are clear in meaning. Here, "having been an arahant, is not an arahant" is not stated because of it being a vain pronouncement.

206. Cattāro purisayugātiādi saṃghānuyogo, sopi uttānatthoyeva.

206. "The four pairs of persons," etc., is the inquiry into the Sangha, and its meaning is also clear.

209. Saṅkhatotiādi saccikaṭṭhasabhāvānuyogo. Tattha tatiyā koṭīti pucchā sakavādissa. Tathārūpassa saccikaṭṭhassa abhāvato paṭikkhepo paravādissa. Puna puṭṭho puggalaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā tasseva.

209. "Conditioned," etc., is the inquiry into the nature of ultimate reality. Here, the third category is a question for the proponent of his own doctrine. The rejection is by the opponent due to the absence of such an ultimate reality. When questioned again, the assertion is his, referring to the person.

211. Añño [Pg.137] puggalotipañhepi saṅkhatehi khandhehi aññattaṃ anicchanto paṭikkhepo tasseva.

211. In the question "is the person another?" as well, the rejection is his, as he does not desire difference from the conditioned aggregates.

212. Khandhā saṅkhatātiādi saṅkhatāsaṅkhatāni sarūpena dassetvā aññattapucchanatthaṃ vuttaṃ.

212. "The aggregates are conditioned," etc., is stated to show the conditioned and unconditioned in their own nature, for the purpose of asking about difference.

213. Rūpaṃ saṅkhatantiādi khandhe vibhāgato dassetvā aññattapucchanatthaṃ vuttaṃ.

213. "Form is conditioned," etc., is stated after showing the aggregates in detail, for the purpose of inquiring about difference.

214. Puggalassa uppādoti pucchā sakavādissa, ‘‘jātidhammā jarādhammā, atho maraṇadhammino’’tiādisuttavasena paṭiññā paravādissa. Saṅkhatabhāvaṃ panassa so na icchati, tasmā paṭikkhipati.

214. The question 'Is there the arising of a person?' is for the proponent of his own doctrine, while the opponent's assertion is by way of suttas such as, "Subject to birth, subject to aging, and also subject to death." But he does not desire its conditioned nature; therefore, he rejects it.

215. Puna na uppādo paññāyatītiādinā nayena puṭṭho ‘‘dukkhameva hi sambhoti, dukkhaṃ tiṭṭhati veti cā’’tiādivacanato (saṃ. ni. 1.171) puggalassa uppādādayo nāma na yujjantīti paṭijānāti.

215. Again, when questioned in the manner of "No arising is discerned," and so on, he declares, based on the statement, "Only suffering arises, suffering remains and passes away" (Saṃyutta Nikāya 1.171), that notions like the arising of a person, etc., are not tenable.

216. Atthatthamhīti atthaṃ vuccati nibbānaṃ. Tattha atthīti pucchati. Tassa atthitāya sassataṃ, natthitāya. Ucchedo āpajjati. Tadubhayampi anicchanto pacchā paṭikkhipati.

216. In 'Is there the goal?', 'goal' is said to be Nibbāna. Therein, one asks, 'Does it exist?' By its existence, eternalism follows; by its non-existence, annihilationism. Not desiring either of these two, one later rejects it.

Ñātakānuyogādivaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Inquiry into Relatives, and So On.

19. Paṭivedhānuyogādivaṇṇanā

19. The Explanation of the Inquiry into Penetration, and so forth.

217. Bhavaṃ nissāya pañhe bhavanti upapattibhavaṃ.

217. Dependent on existence—that is, rebirth-existence—questions arise.

218. Vedanaṃ vediyamānapañhe vedanaṃ vediyamāno pariggahitavedano yogāvacarova pajānāti, bālaputhujjano nappajānāti.

218. In the question about experiencing a feeling, only a practitioner who has comprehended feeling understands while experiencing a feeling; a foolish ordinary person does not understand.

224. Kāyānupassanādipañhā uttānatthāyeva.

224. The questions on the contemplation of the body, and so forth, are indeed straightforward in meaning.

226. Pārāyanagāthāya [Pg.138] suññato lokaṃ avekkhassūti sattasuññatavasena khandhalokaṃ olokehīti attho.

226. In the Pārāyana verses, "Look upon the world as empty" means: "Observe the world of aggregates by way of the seven kinds of emptiness."

228. Puggalo avekkhatīti sakavādipucchā. Paravādissa hi ‘‘suññato lokaṃ avekkhassū’’ti gāthāya yo avekkhati, so puggaloti laddhi, tasmā naṃ evaṃ pucchati. Saha rūpenāti rūpakāyena saddhiṃ. Tato anissaṭo hutvāti attho. Idaṃ pañcavokāravasena anujānitvā puna taṃ jīvanti puṭṭho suttavirodhabhayena paṭikkhipati. Vinā rūpenāti idaṃ catuvokāravasena anujānitvā puna aññaṃ jīvanti puṭṭho suttavirodhabhayeneva paṭikkhipati. ‘‘Abbhantaragato’’ti ca ‘‘bahiddhā nikkhamitvā’’ti ca idaṃ ‘‘saha rūpena vinā rūpenā’’ti heṭṭhā vuttassa lakkhaṇavacanaṃ. Tattha abbhantaragatoti rūpassa antogato, ito vā etto vā anikkhamitvā rūpaparicchedavaseneva ṭhito hutvāti attho. Nikkhamitvāti rūpaparicchedaṃ atikkamitvā. Rūpaṃ anissito hutvāti attho.

228. The question, 'Does a person observe?' is from the proponent of his own doctrine. For the opponent's view is that the one who observes in the verse 'Look upon the world as empty' is a person; therefore, he is asked thus. 'Together with form' means along with the body of form. The meaning is 'not having departed from it.' This is acknowledged in terms of the five-constituent existence, but when asked further, 'Is that the soul?' he rejects it out of fear of contradicting the suttas. 'Without form' is acknowledged in terms of the four-constituent existence, but when asked, 'Is the soul another?' he again rejects it for the same reason of fear of contradicting the suttas. 'Entered within' and 'gone outside' are descriptive terms for what was earlier stated as 'together with form' and 'without form.' Here, 'entered within' means having entered inside form, remaining within the confines of form without departing from here or there. 'Gone outside' means having transcended the confines of form—that is, being unsupported by form.

231. Anattāti attanā jīvena puggalena rahito. Ekadhammepi puggalo natthīti attho. Evaṃ sabbasuttānaṃ āgamaṭṭhakathāsu vuttanayeneva attho veditabbo. Idha pana sandhāyabhāsitamattameva vakkhāma.

231. "Not-self" means devoid of a self, a living soul, or a person. The meaning is that not even in a single phenomenon is there a person. Thus, the meaning should be understood in accordance with the method stated in the commentaries on all the suttas. Here, however, we will only speak of what is spoken with reference to something else.

237. Vuttaṃ bhagavatā sappikumbhotiādi ‘‘sabbāva desanā yathārutavaseneva atthato na gahetabbā’’ti dassanatthaṃ ābhataṃ. Yathā hi suvaṇṇaṃ gahetvā kato suvaṇṇavikāro kumbho suvaṇṇakumbhoti vuccati, na evaṃ sappiṃ gahetvā kato sappissa vikāro sappikumbho nāma atthi. Yasmiṃ pana kumbhe sappi pakkhittaṃ, so sappikumbho nāmāti ayamettha attho. Telakumbhādīsupi eseva nayo. Yathā ca nibbānaṃ niccaṃ dhuvaṃ, na evaṃ bhattaṃ vā yāgu vā atthi. Kālaparicchedaṃ pana akatvā divase divase dassāmāti paññattavasena ‘‘niccabhattaṃ dhuvayāgū’’ti vuccatīti ayamettha attho.

237. What was said by the Blessed One, "a pot of ghee," and so forth, is adduced to show that "the entire teaching should not be taken literally according to the words themselves." Just as a golden vessel made by taking gold, a transformation of gold, is called a golden vessel, so there is no such thing as a ghee vessel made by taking ghee, a transformation of ghee. But a vessel in which ghee is placed is called a ghee vessel—this is the meaning here. The same principle applies to oil vessels, and so forth. And just as Nibbāna is permanent and lasting, so food or gruel is not. However, without stipulating a time limit, but declaring, "We will give daily," it is conventionally called "permanent food, lasting gruel"—this is the meaning here.

‘‘Atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno’’tiādīsupi yathā rūpādayo dhammā paccattalakkhaṇasāmaññalakkhaṇavasena atthi, na evaṃ puggalo[Pg.139]. Rūpādīsu pana sati ‘evaṃnāmo’‘evaṃgotto’ti vohāro hoti. Iti iminā lokavohārena lokasammutiyā lokaniruttiyā atthi puggaloti ayamettha attho. Vuttampi cetaṃ bhagavatā – ‘‘imā kho citta, lokasamaññā lokaniruttiyo lokavohārā lokapaññattiyo’’ti (dī. ni. 1.440). Rūpādidhammā pana vināpi lokasammutiṃ paccattasāmaññalakkhaṇavasena paññāpanato atthīti ayamettha attho.

"There is a person who practices for their own welfare," and so forth—in such statements, just as phenomena like form and so forth exist by way of individual characteristic and general characteristic, the person does not exist in the same way. However, when there is form and so forth, conventional expressions like "so-and-so by name" or "of such-and-such clan" are used. Thus, in this context, the meaning is that a person exists by worldly expression, worldly convention, and worldly designation. This has also been stated by the Blessed One: "These, Citta, are worldly conventions, worldly designations, worldly expressions, worldly concepts" (DN 9). But phenomena like form and so forth are established as existing by their individual and general characteristics, even without worldly convention—this is the meaning here.

Buddhānaṃ pana dve kathā sammutikathā ca paramatthakathā ca. Tattha satto, puggalo, devo, brahmātiādikā sammutikathā nāma. Aniccaṃ, dukkhaṃ, anattā, khandhā, dhātuyo, āyatanāni, satipaṭṭhānā, sammappadhānātiādikā paramatthakathā nāma.

For the Buddhas, there are two kinds of discourse: conventional discourse and ultimate discourse. Of these, conventional discourse includes terms like "being," "person," "deva," "Brahmā," and so forth. Ultimate discourse includes terms like "impermanent," "suffering," "not-self," "aggregates," "elements," "sense bases," "foundations of mindfulness," "right exertions," and so forth.

Tattha yo sammutidesanāya sattoti vā…pe… brahmāti vāti vutte jānituṃ paṭivijjhituṃ niyyātuṃ arahattajayaggāhaṃ gahetuṃ sakkoti, tassa bhagavā āditova sattoti vā puggaloti vā posoti vā devoti vā brahmāti vā katheti. Yo paramatthadesanāya aniccanti vā dukkhanti vātiādīsu aññataraṃ sutvāva jānituṃ paṭivijjhituṃ niyyātuṃ arahattajayaggāhaṃ gahetuṃ sakkoti. Tassa aniccantiādīsu aññataraṃ katheti. Tathā sammutikathāya bujjhanakasattassa na paṭhamaṃ paramatthakathaṃ katheti. Sammutikathāya pana bodhetvā pacchā paramatthakathaṃ katheti. Paramatthakathāya bujjhanakasattassāpi na paṭhamaṃ sammutikathaṃ katheti. Paramatthakathāya pana bodhetvā pacchā sammutikathaṃ katheti. Pakatiyā pana paṭhamameva paramatthakathaṃ kathentassa desanā lūkhākārā hoti. Tasmā buddhā paṭhamaṃ sammutikathaṃ kathetvā pacchā paramatthakathaṃ kathenti. Te sammutikathaṃ kathentāpi saccameva sabhāvameva amusāva kathenti. Paramatthakathaṃ kathentāpi saccameva sabhāvameva amusāva kathenti. Ayañhi –

Here, if someone is capable of understanding, penetrating, emerging, and grasping the victory of arahantship when "being," or...or "Brahmā" is spoken in the conventional teaching, the Blessed One initially teaches them using terms like "being," "person," "individual," "deva," or "Brahmā." If someone is capable of understanding, penetrating, emerging, and grasping the victory of arahantship merely upon hearing one of the ultimate teachings, such as "impermanent" or "suffering," and so forth, the Blessed One teaches them one of these, such as "impermanent." Similarly, for a being who awakens through conventional discourse, the Buddha does not teach ultimate discourse first. Rather, after awakening them through conventional discourse, he later teaches ultimate discourse. Likewise, for a being who awakens through ultimate discourse, the Buddha does not teach conventional discourse first. Rather, after awakening them through ultimate discourse, he later teaches conventional discourse. By nature, if one teaches ultimate discourse first, the teaching becomes harsh in manner. Therefore, the Buddhas first teach conventional discourse and later ultimate discourse. Even when teaching conventional discourse, they speak only what is true, factual, and not false. Likewise, when teaching ultimate discourse, they speak only what is true, factual, and not false. For it is said:

‘‘Duve saccāni akkhāsi, sambuddho vadataṃ varo;

Sammutiṃ paramatthañca, tatiyaṃ nupalabbhati’’.

"The Fully Enlightened One, the best of speakers, proclaimed two truths: conventional truth and ultimate truth; a third is not found."

Tattha [Pg.140] –

Therein:

‘‘Saṅketavacanaṃ saccaṃ, lokasammutikāraṇaṃ;

Paramatthavacanaṃ saccaṃ, dhammānaṃ tathalakkhaṇa’’nti.

"Conventional speech is true, being the cause of worldly convention. Ultimate speech is true, being the actual characteristic of phenomena."

Aparo nayo – dve bhagavato desanā paramatthadesanā ca khandhādivasena, sammutidesanā ca sappikumbhādivasena. Na hi bhagavā samaññaṃ atidhāvati. Tasmā ‘‘atthi puggalo’’ti vacanamattato abhiniveso na kātabbo. Satthārā hi –

Another approach: The Blessed One's teaching is twofold—ultimate teaching, such as in terms of the aggregates and so forth, and conventional teaching, such as in terms of "a pot of ghee" and so forth. For the Blessed One does not transgress convention. Therefore, one should not form an attachment based on the mere statement "there is a person." For the Teacher has said:

‘‘Paññattiṃ anatikkamma, paramattho pakāsito;

Samaññaṃ nātidhāveyya, tasmā aññopi paṇḍito;

Paramatthaṃ pakāsento, samaññaṃ nātidhāvaye’’.

"Without transgressing convention, the ultimate is revealed. One should not overstep convention; therefore, another wise person, while revealing the ultimate, should not overstep convention."

Sesaṃ sabbattha uttānatthamevāti.

The rest is of clear meaning everywhere.

Puggalakathā niṭṭhitā.

The Discourse on the Person is concluded.

2. Parihānikathā

2. The Discourse on Decline

1. Vādayuttiparihānivaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of Decline in Argumentation

239. Idāni [Pg.141] parihānikathā hoti. Parihānidhammo aparihānidhammo, ‘‘dveme, bhikkhave, dhammā sekkhassa, bhikkhuno parihānāya saṃvattanti’’ (a. ni. 2.185), ‘‘pañcime, bhikkhave, dhammā samayavimuttassa bhikkhuno parihānāya saṃvattantī’’ti (a. ni. 5.149) evamādīni hi suttāni nissāya sammitiyā vajjiputtakā sabbatthivādino ekacce ca mahāsaṅghikā arahatopi parihāniṃ icchanti, tasmā te vā hontu aññeyeva vā, yesaṃ ayaṃ laddhi, tesaṃ laddhibhindanatthaṃ parihāyati arahā arahattāti pucchā sakavādissa. Tatra parihāyatīti dve parihāniyo pattaparihāni ca appattaparihāni ca. Tattha ‘‘dutiyampi kho āyasmā godhiko tamhā sāmayikāya cetovimuttiyā parihāyī’’ti (saṃ. ni. 1.159) ayaṃ pattaparihāni nāma. ‘‘Mā vo sāmaññatthikānaṃ sataṃ sāmaññattho parihāyī’’ti (ma. ni. 1.416-418) ayaṃ appattaparihāni. Tāsu idha pattaparihāni adhippetā. Tañhi sandhāya āmantāti paṭiññā paravādissa. Sakasamaye pana imaṃ pattaparihāniṃ nāma lokiyasamāpattiyāva icchanti, na arahattādīhi sāmaññaphalehi. Parasamayepi naṃ sabbasāmaññaphalesu sabbabhavesu sabbakālesu sabbesañca puggalānaṃ na icchanti. Taṃ pana tesaṃ laddhimattamevāti sabbaṃ laddhijālaṃ bhindituṃ puna sabbatthātiādinā nayena desanā vaḍḍhitā.

239. Now there is a discussion on decline. There is the quality of decline and the quality of non-decline. Based on such discourses as, “These two things, monks, lead to the decline of a bhikkhu in training” (A. 2.185), and “These five things, monks, lead to the decline of a bhikkhu liberated at times” (A. 5.149), the Sammityas, the Vajjiputtakas, the Sabbatthivādins, and some Mahāsaṅghikas hold that even an arahant can decline. Therefore, whether it be they or any others who hold this view, to shatter their view, the proponent's question is: “Does an arahant decline from arahantship?” Here, “decline” is of two kinds: decline from what has been attained and decline from what has not been attained. In this context, “For a second time, the Venerable Godhika declined from that temporary liberation of mind” (S. 1.159) is called decline from what has been attained. “May the goal of asceticism not decline for you who are seekers of the ascetic goal” (M. 1.416-418) is decline from what has not been attained. Of these, decline from what has been attained is intended here. In reference to this, the opponent's admission is 'Yes'. However, in our own doctrine, this 'decline from what has been attained' is accepted only with regard to mundane attainments, not with regard to the fruits of asceticism such as arahantship. And even in the opponent's doctrine, they do not accept it for all fruits of asceticism, in all states of existence, at all times, and for all individuals. But since this is merely their view, to dismantle this entire web of views, the discourse is further developed by the method beginning with “in all cases,” and so on.

Tattha yasmā paravādī kamena parihāyitvā sotāpattiphale ṭhitassa arahato parihāniṃ na icchati, upariphalesu ṭhitasseva icchati. Yasmā ca rūpārūpabhavesu ṭhitassa na icchati, kammārāmatādīnaṃ pana parihāniyadhammānaṃ bhāvato kāmabhave ṭhitasseva icchati, tasmā ‘‘sabbatthā’’ti puṭṭho paṭikkhipati. Puna daḷhaṃ katvā puṭṭho kāmabhavaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Sabbasmimpi hi kāmabhave parihānikarā kāmaguṇā atthi, tasmā tattha parihāyatīti tassa laddhi.

There, because the opponent does not accept that an arahant, who is established in the fruit of stream-entry, can decline from it, but accepts decline only for one established in the higher fruits; and because he does not accept decline for one established in the realms of form or formlessness, but accepts it only for one established in the realm of sensual existence—due to the presence of qualities conducive to decline, such as delight in activity—therefore, when asked “in all cases,” he denies it. When questioned firmly again, however, he admits it with reference to the realm of sensual existence. For in the entire realm of sensual existence there are sensual qualities that cause decline; thus, his view is that one declines there.

Tatiyapucchāya [Pg.142] parihānīti parihānikare dhamme pucchati. Tattha yasmā parihāni nāma kammārāmatādidhammā, visesato vā kāmarāgabyāpādā eva, te ca rūpārūpabhave natthi, tasmā ‘‘na heva’’nti paṭikkhepo paravādissa.

In the third question, by ‘decline,’ he asks about the factors that cause decline. Here, since decline refers to states such as delight in activity and the like, or specifically to sensual lust and ill-will, and these do not exist in the realms of form and formlessness, therefore the opponent’s rejection is, “Certainly not.”

Sabbadāti kālapucchā. Tattha paṭhamapañhe yonisomanasikārakāle aparihāyanato paṭikkhipati. Dutiye ayonisomanasikaroto rattibhāge vā divasabhāge vā sabbadā parihāyanato paṭijānāti. Tatiye parihānikaradhammasamāyoge sati muhuttameva parihāni nāma hoti, tato pubbe aparihīnassa pacchā parihīnassa ca parihāni nāma natthīti paṭikkhipati.

“Always” is a question about time. There, in the first question, he rejects it because one does not decline at a time of wise attention. In the second, he accepts it because one who applies unwise attention declines at all times, whether during the day or during the night. In the third, he rejects it, stating that decline occurs only for a moment when there is an association with qualities that cause decline, and that there is no such thing as decline for one before having declined or for one after having declined.

Sabbeva arahantoti pañhānaṃ paṭhamasmiṃ tikkhindriye sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Dutiyasmiṃ mudindriye sandhāya paṭijānāti. Tatiyasmimpi tikkhindriyāva adhippetā. Tesañhi sabbesampi parihāni na hotīti tassa laddhi.

Regarding the questions about ‘all arahants’: in the first, he rejects it, with reference to one with sharp faculties. In the second, he accepts it, with reference to one with dull faculties. In the third also, those with sharp faculties are intended. For his view is that for all of them, there is no decline.

Seṭṭhiudāharaṇe paṭhamapucchā paravādissa, dutiyā sakavādissa. Tatrāyaṃ adhippāyo – yaṃ maṃ tumhe pucchatha – ‘‘arahā arahattā parihāyanto catūhi phalehi parihāyatī’’ti, tatra vo paṭipucchāmi – ‘‘catūhi satasahassehi seṭṭhī seṭṭhittaṃ karonto satasahassehi parihīne seṭṭhī seṭṭhittā parihīno hotī’’ti. Tato sakavādinā ekadesena parihāniṃ sandhāya ‘‘āmantā’’ti vutte sabbasāpateyyā parihīno hotīti pucchati. Tathā aparihīnattā sakavādī na hevāti vatvā atha naṃ ‘‘evameva arahāpi parihāyati ca. Na ca catūhi phalehī’’ti uppannaladdhikaṃ dutiyaṃ bhabbapañhaṃ pucchati. Paravādī seṭṭhino abhabbatāya niyamaṃ apassanto paṭijānitvā arahato catūhi phalehi parihānibhabbataṃ puṭṭho ‘‘niyato sambodhiparāyaṇo’’ti (a. ni. 3.87) vacanassa ayoniso atthaṃ gahetvā laddhiyaṃ ṭhito sotāpattiphalato parihāyituṃ abhabbataṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Taṃ panassa laddhimattamevāti.

In the example of the wealthy man, the first question is the opponent's, the second is the proponent's. Here is the meaning: You ask me, “Does an arahant, in declining from arahantship, decline from the four fruits?” To that I ask you in return: “Does a wealthy man, being wealthy with four hundred thousand, become bereft of his wealth when he has lost one hundred thousand?” Then, when the proponent, referring to a partial decline, says, “Yes,” the opponent asks if he is bereft of all his property. Because he is not bereft in that way, the proponent says, “Certainly not,” and then asks him the second question, a question of possibility which arises from the established view: “In the same way, an arahant declines, but not from the four fruits?” The opponent, not seeing any fixed rule regarding the wealthy man’s impossibility of losing everything, concedes. Then, being asked about the possibility of an arahant declining from the four fruits, he, standing on his own view and having unwisely grasped the meaning of the statement, “He is certain, destined for enlightenment” (A. 3.87), rejects it, with reference to the impossibility of declining from the fruit of stream-entry. But this is merely his view.

Ettāvatā vādayutti nāma niṭṭhitā hoti.

With this, the section on the logic of the debate is concluded.

2. Ariyapuggalasaṃsandanaparihānivaṇṇanā

2. The Explanation of Decline and the Comparison of Noble Individuals.

240. Idāni [Pg.143] ariyapuggalasaṃsandanā āraddhā. Tattha yasmā keci arahatova parihāniṃ icchanti, keci anāgāminopi, keci sakadāgāmissapi. Sotāpannassa pana sabbepi na icchantiyeva. Ye arahattā parihāyitvā anāgāmisakadāgāmibhāve ṭhitā, tesaṃ parihāniṃ icchanti, na itaresaṃ anāgāmisakadāgāmīnaṃ. Sotāpannassa pana tepi sabbathāpi na icchantiyeva, tasmā peyyālamukhena pucchā katā. Tattha tesaṃ laddhivasena paṭiññā ca paṭikkhepo ca veditabbā. ‘‘Parihāyati anāgāmī anāgāmiphalā’’ti hi pañhasmiṃ ye anāgāmino parihāniṃ na icchanti, tesaṃ vasena paṭikkhepo. Ye pakatianāgāmino vā arahattā parihāyitvā ṭhitaanāgāmino vā parihāniṃ icchanti, tesaṃ vasena paṭiññāti idamettha nayamukhaṃ. Tassānusārena sabbapeyyālā atthato veditabbā.

240. Now the comparison of noble individuals is commenced. Herein, some posit the decline of only arahants, some of non-returners also, and some of once-returners also. However, all are agreed that a stream-enterer does not decline. They posit the decline of those who have fallen from arahantship and remain in the state of non-returners or once-returners, but not that of other non-returners or once-returners. As for a stream-enterer, even they do not posit their decline at all. Therefore, the question is posed by way of a repetitive series. Herein, their affirmation and denial should be understood according to their doctrine. In the question, “Does a non-returner decline from the fruit of non-returning?” the denial is from the perspective of those who do not posit the decline of non-returners. The affirmation is from the perspective of those who posit the decline of ordinary non-returners or those who have fallen from arahantship and remain as non-returners. This is the guiding principle here. Following this principle, all the repetitive series should be understood in terms of their meaning.

241. Yaṃ panettha ‘‘sotāpattiphalassa anantarā arahattaṃyeva sacchikarotī’’ti vuttaṃ, taṃ parihīnassa puna vāyamato arahattappattiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Itaro sotāpattiphalānantaraṃ arahattassa abhāvā paṭikkhipati.

241. However, the statement here, “Immediately after the fruit of stream-entry, one realizes arahantship,” was said with reference to the attainment of arahantship by one who has declined and strives again. The other rejects it because arahantship is not attained immediately after the fruit of stream-entry.

242. Tato paraṃ ‘‘parihāni nāmesā kilesappahānassa vā mandatāya bhaveyya, maggabhāvanādīnaṃ vā anadhimattatāya, saccānaṃ vā adassanenā’’ti evamādīnaṃ vasena anuyuñjituṃ kassa bahutarā kilesā pahīnātiādi vuttaṃ. Taṃ sabbaṃ uttānādhippāyameva suttānaṃ panattho āgamaṭṭhakathāsu vuttanayeneva veditabbo.

242. After that, in order to inquire by such means as, “This decline could be due to weakness in abandoning defilements, or to the insufficient development of the path and so on, or to the non-seeing of the truths,” and so forth, it was said, “For whom have more defilements been abandoned?” and so on. All of this is of plain intent. However, the meaning of the suttas should be understood according to the method stated in the commentaries on the scriptures.

262. Samayavimutto arahā arahattā parihāyatīti ettha mudindriyo samayavimutto, tikkhindriyo asamayavimuttoti tesaṃ laddhi. Sakasamaye pana avasippatto jhānalābhī samayavimutto, vasippatto jhānalābhī ceva sabbe ca ariyapuggalā ariye vimokkhe asamayavimuttāti sanniṭṭhānaṃ. So pana taṃ attano laddhiṃ gahetvā samayavimutto [Pg.144] parihāyati, itaro na parihāyatī’’ti āha. Sesamettha uttānatthameva.

262. In the question, “Does a temporarily liberated arahant fall away from arahantship?” their view is that an arahant with dull faculties is temporarily liberated, while one with sharp faculties is non-temporarily liberated. In our own doctrine, however, the established conclusion is that an attainer of jhāna who has not achieved mastery is temporarily liberated, while an attainer of jhāna who has achieved mastery, as well as all noble individuals, are non-temporarily liberated in the noble emancipations. But he, holding to his own view, says, “The temporarily liberated one falls away, while the other does not.” The rest here is of plain meaning.

Ariyapuggalasaṃsandanaparihānivaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Comparison of Noble Individuals with regard to Decline.

3. Suttasādhanaparihānivaṇṇanā

3. The Explanation of Proving Decline by means of the Suttas

265. Idāni suttasādhanā hoti. Tattha uccāvacāti uttamahīnabhedato uccā ca avacā ca. Paṭipādāti paṭipadā. Samaṇena pakāsitāti buddhasamaṇena jotitā. Sukhāpaṭipadā hi khippābhiññā uccā. Dukkhāpaṭipadā dandhābhiññā avacā. Itarā dve ekenaṅgena uccā, ekena avacā. Paṭhamaṃ vuttā eva vā uccā, itaro tissopi avacā. Tāya cetāya uccāvacāya paṭipadāya na pāraṃ diguṇaṃ yanti, ekamaggena dvikkhattuṃ nibbānaṃ na gacchantīti attho. Kasmā? Yena maggena ye kilesā pahīnā, tena tesaṃ puna appahātabbato. Etena parihānidhammābhāvaṃ dīpeti. Nayidaṃ ekaguṇaṃ mutanti tañca idaṃ pāraṃ ekavāraṃyeva phusanārahaṃ na hoti. Kasmā? Ekena maggena sabbakilesānaṃ appahānato. Etena ekamaggeneva arahattābhāvaṃ dīpeti.

265. Now the proof by means of the suttas is presented. Herein, “various” (uccāvacā) means both high (uccā) and low (avacā) by way of the distinction between superior and inferior. “Practice” (paṭipādā) means the path. “Declared by the ascetic” (samaṇena pakāsitā) means illuminated by the Buddha, the Ascetic. The pleasant practice with quick direct knowledge is high; the painful practice with slow direct knowledge is low. The other two are high in one aspect and low in another. Or, the first mentioned is high, and the other three are low. By these various practices, they do not go to the far shore twice; that is, they do not attain Nibbāna twice by one and the same path. Why? Because the defilements abandoned by a certain path are not to be abandoned again by it. By this, he indicates the absence of a nature of decline. “Nor is this understood as a single attainment” (nayidaṃ ekaguṇaṃ mutaṃ)—and this far shore is not something that can be attained in a single instance. Why? Because not all defilements are abandoned by a single path. By this, he indicates the absence of attaining Arahantship by one path alone.

Atthi chinnassa chediyanti chinnassa kilesavaṭṭassa puna chinditabbaṃ kiñci atthīti pucchati. Itaro tikkhindriyaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipitvā puna puṭṭho mudindriyaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Sakavādī suttaṃ āharitvā natthibhāvaṃ dasseti. Tattha oghapāsoti kilesogho ceva kilesapāso ca.

“Is there anything to be cut for one who has already cut?” (Atthi chinnassa chediyaṃ?) This asks if there is anything to be cut again for one who has severed the cycle of defilements. The other, referring to one with keen faculties, denies it, but when asked again, he affirms it, referring to one with dull faculties. The proponent of his own doctrine cites a sutta to show its non-existence. There, “flood and noose” (ogha-pāso) means both the flood of defilements and the noose of defilements.

266. Katassa paṭicayoti bhāvitassa maggassa puna bhāvanā. Idhāpi paṭikkhepapaṭijānanāni purimanayeneva veditabbāni.

266. “Accumulation of what has been done” (katassa paṭicayo) means further cultivation of the path that has been developed. Here too, the denials and affirmations should be understood in the same way as before.

267. Parihānāya saṃvattantīti paravādinā ābhate sutte pañca dhammā appattaparihānāya ceva lokiyasamāpattiparihānāya ca saṃvattanti. So pana pattassa arahattaphalassa parihānāya sallakkheti. Teneva atthi arahato kammārāmatāti āha. Itaropi asamayavimuttaṃ [Pg.145] sandhāya paṭikkhipitvā itaraṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Kāmarāgavasena vā pavattamānaṃ taṃ paṭikkhipitvā itarathā pavattamānaṃ paṭijānāti. Rāgādīnaṃ pana atthitaṃ puṭṭho paṭijānituṃ na sakkoti.

267. “Lead to decline” (parihānāya saṃvattanti)—in the sutta cited by the opponent, five things lead to the non-attainment of what has not been attained and to the decline from mundane attainments. But he considers them as leading to the decline from the fruit of Arahantship that has been attained. Therefore, he says, “There is delight in activity for an Arahant.” The other, denying this with reference to the non-temporarily liberated one, affirms it with reference to the other. Or, denying that which proceeds from sensual lust, he affirms that which proceeds otherwise. But when asked about the existence of lust and so on, he is unable to affirm it.

268. Kiṃ pariyuṭṭhitoti kena pariyuṭṭhito anubaddho ajjhotthato vā hutvāti attho. Anusayapucchāyapi tikkhindriyamudindriyavaseneva paṭikkhepapaṭijānanāni veditabbāni. Kalyāṇānusayoti vacanamattasāmaññena vā paṭijānāti. Rāgo upacayaṃ gacchatīti bhāvanāya pahīnaṃ sandhāyāha. Parato dosamohesupi eseva nayo. Sakkāyadiṭṭhiādīnaṃ pana dassanena pahīnattā upacayaṃ na icchati. Sesaṃ sabbattha uttānatthamevāti.

268. “Obsessed by what?” (Kiṃ pariyuṭṭhito?) means: by what is he obsessed, pursued, or overwhelmed? In the question on latent tendencies, the denials and affirmations should be understood as based on keen and dull faculties. “With wholesome latent tendencies” (kalyāṇānusayo)—he affirms this by the mere generality of the term. “Lust increases” (rāgo upacayaṃ gacchati)—he speaks with reference to that which is abandoned by cultivation. The same method applies also to hatred and delusion. But since personality belief and so on are abandoned by seeing, he does not accept their increase. The rest is of plain meaning in all instances.

Suttasādhanā.

The Proof by Means of the Suttas.

Parihānikathā niṭṭhitā.

The Discourse on Decline is Concluded.

3. Brahmacariyakathā

3. The Discourse on the Holy Life

1. Suddhabrahmacariyakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Discourse on the Pure Holy Life

269. Idāni [Pg.146] brahmacariyakathā hoti. Tattha dve brahmacariyavāsā, maggabhāvanā ca pabbajjā ca. Pabbajjā sabbadevesu natthi. Maggabhāvanā ṭhapetvā asaññasatte sesesu appaṭisiddhā. Tattha ye paranimmitavasavattideve upādāya taduparidevesu maggabhāvanampi na icchanti seyyathāpi sammitiyā, te sandhāya natthi devesūti pucchā sakavādissa. ‘‘Tīhi, bhikkhave, ṭhānehi jambudīpakā manussā uttarakuruke ca manusse adhiggaṇhanti deve ca tāvatiṃse. Katamehi tīhi? Sūrā satimanto idha brahmacariyavāso’’ti (a. ni. 9.21) idaṃ suttaṃ nissāya dvepi brahmacariyavāsā natthi devesūti uppannaladdhivasena paṭiññā paravādissa. Puna dvinnampi brahmacariyānaṃ antarāyikadhammavaseneva sabbe devā jaḷāti pucchā sakavādissa. Tattha hatthasaṃvācikāti mūgā viya hatthamuddhāya vattāro. Parato atthi devesūti pucchā paravādissa, maggabhāvanaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā sakavādissa. Paṭiññāya adhippāyaṃ asallakkhetvā pabbajjāvasena anuyogo paravādissa.

269. Now comes the discussion on the holy life. Herein, there are two ways of living the holy life: the cultivation of the path and the going forth. The going forth does not exist among any of the gods. The cultivation of the path, excepting among the non-percipient beings, is not prohibited among the remaining beings. Regarding this, it is with reference to those who, like the Sammitiyas, hold that beginning with the Paranimmitavasavatti devas, even the cultivation of the path is not desired among the gods above them, that the proponent of his own doctrine asks, 'Is there no holy life among the gods?' Based on this sutta, 'Monks, the people of Jambudīpa surpass the humans of Uttarakuru and the Tāvatiṃsa gods in three respects. What are the three? They are courageous, mindful, and here the holy life is lived' (AN 9.20), the opponent asserts, by way of a view that has arisen, that neither way of living the holy life exists among the gods. Again, the proponent of his own doctrine asks whether all gods are dull-witted on account of obstructive states concerning both ways of living the holy life. Here, 'those who communicate by gestures' refers to those who speak by means of hand-gestures, like the mute. From the other side, the opponent asks, 'Does it exist among the gods?', and the proponent's assertion is with reference to the cultivation of the path. Without discerning the intention behind the assertion, the opponent presses the point regarding the going forth.

270. Yattha natthi pabbajjāti pañhe gihīnañceva ekaccānañca devānaṃ maggapaṭilābhaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhepo tasseva. Puna puṭṭho paccantavāsino ceva asaññasatte ca sandhāya paṭiññā tasseva. Yo pabbajatītiādīsu pucchāsupi eseva nayo. Puna ‘‘atthi devesū’’ti pañhepi maggabhāvanaṃ sandhāyeva paṭiññā sakavādissa, ‘‘sabbadevesū’’ti vutte asaññasatte sandhāya paṭikkhepo tasseva.

270. In the question, 'Where is there no going forth?', the rejection by that same proponent is with reference to the attainment of the path by householders and certain devas. When asked again, the assertion by that same proponent is with reference to border-dwellers and non-percipient beings. The same method applies in questions such as, 'Who goes forth?' Again, in the question, 'Does it exist among the gods?', the proponent of his own doctrine's assertion is with reference to the cultivation of the path. When 'among all gods' is stated, the rejection by that same proponent is with reference to non-percipient beings.

271. Manussesūti pañhadvaye jambudīpake sandhāya paṭiññā. Paccantavāsino sandhāya paṭikkhepo veditabbo.

271. In the two questions concerning 'among humans', the assertion is with reference to the inhabitants of Jambudīpa. The rejection should be understood as referring to border-dwellers.

Atthi yattha atthīti atthi te devā, atthi vā so padeso, yattha atthīti evaṃ sattapadesavibhāgamukhena vissajjanaṃ sakavādissa. Iminā nayena sabbe ekantarikapañhā veditabbā.

In the question, 'Is there where there is?', the proponent of his own doctrine answers by way of a seven-term classification, explaining, 'There are those gods, or there is that place, where it exists.' In this manner, all one-sided questions should be understood.

272. Suttānuyoge [Pg.147] kuhiṃ phaluppattīti tassa anāgāmino arahattaphaluppatti kuhinti pucchā sakavādissa. Tatthevāti suddhāvāsesūti attho.

272. Regarding the application of the Suttas, the proponent of his own doctrine asks, 'Where does the fruit arise? Where does the fruit of arahantship arise for that non-returner?' The meaning of 'right there' is 'in the Pure Abodes'.

Handa hīti kāraṇatthe nipāto. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – yasmā anāgāmipuggalo idha loke bhāvitena maggena tattha suddhāvāsesu phalaṃ sacchikaroti, na tattha aññaṃ maggaṃ bhāveti, tasmā natthi devesu brahmacariyavāsoti.

'Handa hi' is a particle in the sense of a reason. This is what is meant: because the non-returner, by means of the path developed here in this world, realizes the fruit there in the Pure Abodes, and does not develop another path there, therefore there is no living of the holy life among the gods.

2. Saṃsandanabrahmacariyavaṇṇanā

2. The Explanation of the Comparison Regarding the Holy Life

273. Idāni yadi aññattha bhāvitena maggena aññattha phalasacchikiriyā hoti, sotāpannādīnampi siyāti etamatthaṃ dassetuṃ puna anāgāmītiādīnaṃ saṃsandanapucchā sakavādissa. Tattha anāgāmissa phalasacchikiriyāya paṭiññā, sesānaṃ phalasacchikiriyāya paṭikkhepo paravādissa. Idha bhāvitamaggo hi anāgāmī idhavihāyaniṭṭho nāma hoti. So idha anāgāmimaggaṃ bhāvetvā ‘‘opapātiko tatthaparinibbāyī’’ti vacanato ‘‘puna maggabhāvanaṃ vinā upapattivaseneva arahattaphalaṃ sacchikarotī’’ti tassa laddhi. Sotāpannasakadāgāmino pana tattha maggaṃ bhāvetvā tatrupapattikā nāma hontīti tesaṃ idhāgamanaññeva natthi. Iti so anāgāmissa phalasacchikiriyaṃ puṭṭho paṭijānāti. Itaresaṃ paṭikkhipati.

273. Now, to show this point—that if the realization of the fruit in one place occurs by a path developed in another, it could also apply to stream-enterers and others—the proponent of his own doctrine again raises a comparative question regarding the non-returner and others. There, the opponent acknowledges the realization of the fruit for the non-returner, but rejects the realization of the fruit for the others. For the non-returner whose path has been developed here is called 'one whose finality is established apart from this existence'. Having developed the non-returner's path here, his view is that, according to the statement 'one spontaneously reborn, attaining final Nibbāna there,' he realizes the fruit of arahantship by the power of that rebirth, without further path development. Stream-enterers and once-returners, however, having developed the path there, are called 'those who are reborn there,' and for them there is no coming here at all. Thus, when asked about the non-returner's realization of the fruit, he acknowledges it, but rejects it for the others.

Anāgāmī puggalo tattha bhāvitena maggenāti pañhe ‘‘anāgāmino tattha maggabhāvanāva natthī’’ti laddhiyā paṭikkhipati. Maggo ca bhāvīyati, na ca kilesā pahīyantīti pucchā sakavādissa, rūpāvacaramaggaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā itarassa. Rūpāvacaramaggena hi so idhavihāyaniṭṭho nāma jāto.

When asked, '[Does the non-returner attain the fruit] by a path developed there?', he rejects it with the view, 'There is no path development for the non-returner there.' The proponent of his own doctrine asks, 'Is the path developed, and yet the defilements are not abandoned?', and the other opponent acknowledges it with reference to the form-sphere path. For it is by the form-sphere path that he became one whose finality is established apart from this existence.

Anāgāmī puggalo katakaraṇīyoti pañhe ‘‘opapātiko tatthaparinibbāyī’’ti vacanato upapattiyāvassa katakaraṇīyādibhāvaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Arahāti pañhe idhaparinibbāyino arahato vaseneva paṭikkhipati. Puna puṭṭho tatthaparinibbāyino vasena paṭijānāti.

When asked, 'Is the non-returner a person who has done what was to be done?', he acknowledges it with reference to his state of having done what was to be done by the very fact of his rebirth, based on the statement, 'Being spontaneously reborn, he attains final Nibbāna there.' In the question, 'Is he an arahant?', he rejects it by way of the arahant who attains final Nibbāna here. When asked again, he acknowledges it by way of one who attains final Nibbāna there.

Atthi arahato punabbhavotiādīsupi tatthaparinibbāyī idhaparinibbāyīnaṃ vaseneva attho veditabbo. Appaṭividdhākuppova tatthaparinibbāyatīti puṭṭho [Pg.148] idheva bhāvitena maggena tassa akuppapaṭivedhaṃ icchanto paṭikkhipati.

Similarly, in questions like, 'Does the arahant have future rebirth?', the meaning should be understood by way of the one who attains final Nibbāna there and those who attain final Nibbāna here. When asked, 'Does one attain final Nibbāna there with the unshakable unpenetrated?', he rejects it, holding that the penetration of the unshakable for that person occurs only here through the path developed here.

Yathā migoti paṭhamaṃ udāharaṇaṃ paravādissa, dutiyaṃ sakavādissa. Sesaṃ sabbattha uttānatthamevāti.

The first example, 'like a deer,' is the opponent's, while the second is the proponent's. The rest is straightforward in meaning everywhere.

Brahmacariyakathā niṭṭhitā.

The Discussion on the Holy Life is concluded.

3. Odhisokathāvaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of the Discussion on the Partial

274. Idāni odhisokathā nāma hoti. Tattha ye sotāpannādīnaṃ nānābhisamayavasena dukkhadassanādīhi odhiso odhiso ekadesena ekadesena kilesappahānaṃ icchanti seyyathāpi etarahi sammitiyādayo, tesaṃ taṃ laddhiṃ bhindituṃ odhisoti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā paravādissa. Puna anuyogo sakavādissa, ekadesena sotāpannādibhāvassa abhāvato paṭikkhepo paravādissa. Iminā upāyena sabbavāresu attho veditabboti.

274. Now comes the discussion on the partial. Here, there are those who, like the Sammitiyas and others nowadays, hold that the abandoning of defilements occurs partially, bit by bit, through seeing suffering and so forth, by way of the various realizations of stream-entry and so on. To break their view, the proponent asks, 'Partially?', and the opponent admits it. Again, the cross-examination is from the proponent; the rejection by the opponent is due to the non-existence of the state of stream-entry and so forth in parts. By this method, the meaning should be understood in all instances.

Odhisokathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discussion on the Partial.

4. Jahatikathā

4. The Discussion on Abandoning

1. Nasuttāharaṇakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Discussion on Not Citing a Sutta

279. Idāni jahatikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘jhānalābhī puthujjano saha saccābhisamayā anāgāmī nāma hoti, tassa puthujjanakāleyeva kāmarāgabyāpādā pahīnā’’ti laddhi seyyathāpi etarahi sammitiyānaṃ, tesaṃ taṃ laddhiṃ bhindituṃ jahati puthujjanoti pucchā sakavādissa, jhānavikkhambhitānaṃ pana tesaṃ pariyuṭṭhānaṃ apassantassa paṭiññā paravādissa. Yasmā pana tesaṃ jhānavikkhambhitānampi anāgāmimaggeneva accantaṃ [Pg.149] pahānaṃ hoti, tasmā puna accantantiādianuyogo sakavādissa, tathārūpassa pahānassa abhāvato paṭikkhepo itarassa. Vikkhambhetīti accantavikkhambhanameva sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa. Tato paraṃ anāgāmimaggaṭṭhena saddhiṃ puthujjanasaṃsandanaṃ hoti. Taṃ uttānatthameva.

279. Now comes the discussion on abandoning. Here, to break the view of those—such as the Sammitiyas nowadays—who hold that "a worldling who attains jhāna becomes a non-returner upon the penetration of the truths, and for him, sensual desire and ill-will are abandoned even while still a worldling," the question 'Does a worldling abandon?' is posed by the proponent. But the admission is made by the opponent, who does not see the manifestation of those defilements suppressed by jhāna. However, since for them, even those defilements suppressed by jhāna are ultimately abandoned only by the path of non-returning, therefore, again, the cross-examination 'Ultimately?' and so forth is posed by the proponent; the rejection by the other is due to the non-existence of such an abandonment. The question 'Does it suppress?' is posed by the proponent, referring only to ultimate suppression. Thereafter, a comparison of the worldling is made with one established in the path of non-returning. That meaning is straightforward.

280. Tato paraṃ anāgāmiphale saṇṭhātīti puṭṭho jhānānāgāmitaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Arahatte saṇṭhātīti puṭṭho dassanamaggena uddhambhāgiyānaṃ pahānābhāvato paṭikkhipati.

280. Thereafter, when asked, 'Is one established in the fruition of non-returning?', he admits it, referring to the jhāna-non-returner. When asked, 'Is one established in arahantship?', he rejects it due to the non-abandonment of the higher fetters by the path of vision.

Apubbaṃ acarimaṃ tayo maggeti puṭṭho tathārūpāya bhāvanāya abhāvā paṭikkhipati. Puna puṭṭho tiṇṇaṃ maggānaṃ kiccasabbhāvaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Sāmaññaphalapucchāsupi eseva nayo. Katamena maggenāti puṭṭho anāgāmimaggenāti jhānānāgāmitaṃ sandhāya vadati. Puna saṃyojanappahānaṃ puṭṭho tiṇṇaṃ anāgāmimaggena tesaṃ kilesānaṃ appaheyyattā paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho paṭhamamaggasseva jhānānāgāmimaggabhāvaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

When asked, 'Are the three paths without prior and without subsequent?', he rejects it due to the absence of such a development. When asked again, he admits it with reference to the existence of the function of the three paths. This same method applies to questions about the fruits of recluseship. When asked, 'By which path?', he says, 'By the path of non-returning,' referring to the jhāna-non-returner. When asked again about the abandoning of fetters, he rejects it concerning the three, because those defilements are not to be abandoned by the path of non-returning. When asked a second time, he admits it, referring to the first path itself being the path of the jhāna-non-returner. The rest here is straightforward in meaning.

Jahatikathā.

The Discussion on Abandoning.

5. Sabbamatthītikathā

5. The Discussion on 'All Exists'.

1. Vādayuttivaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Method of Debate.

282. Idāni sabbamatthītivādakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘yaṃ kiñci rūpaṃ atītānāgatapaccuppannaṃ…pe… ayaṃ vuccati rūpakkhandho’’tiādivacanato (vibha. 2) ‘‘sabbepi atītādibhedā dhammā khandhasabhāvaṃ na vijahanti, tasmā sabbaṃ atthiyeva nāmā’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi sabbamatthivādānaṃ, tesaṃ laddhivisodhanatthaṃ sabbamatthīti pucchā sakavādissa, vuttappakārāya laddhiyā ṭhatvā paṭiññā itarassa. Sabbathāti sabbasmiṃ sarīre sabbamatthīti pucchati. Sabbadāti sabbasmiṃ kāle sabbamatthīti pucchati. Sabbena sabbanti sabbenākārena sabbamatthīti pucchati. Sabbesūti sabbesu dhammesu sabbamatthīti pucchati. Ayoganti [Pg.150] ayuttaṃ. Nānāsabhāvānañhi yogo hoti, na ekasabhāvassa. Iti imasmiṃ pañhe rūpaṃ vedanāya, vedanaṃ vā rūpena anānaṃ ekalakkhaṇameva katvā sabbamatthīti pucchati. Yampi natthi tampatthīti yampi chaṭṭhakhandhādikaṃ sasavisāṇādikaṃ vā kiñci natthīti siddhaṃ, tampi te atthīti pucchati. Sabbamatthīti yā diṭṭhi sā diṭṭhi micchādiṭṭhīti, yā diṭṭhi sā diṭṭhi sammādiṭṭhīti hevamatthīti iminā idaṃ pucchati – yā te esā sabbamatthīti diṭṭhi, sā diṭṭhi ayāthāvakattā micchādiṭṭhīti evaṃ yā amhākaṃ diṭṭhi, sā diṭṭhi yāthāvakattā sammādiṭṭhīti evaṃ tava samaye atthīti pucchati. Itaro sabbesupi etesu nayesu vuttappakārāya atthitāya abhāvato paṭikkhipati. Imesu pana sabbesupi nayesu ‘‘ājānāhi niggaha’’nti ādiṃ katvā sabbo kathāmaggabhedo vitthārato veditabboti ayaṃ tāvettha vādayutti.

282. Now comes the discussion on the 'All Exists' view. Here, there are those who hold the view—based on statements like "Whatever form, past, future, or present… this is called the aggregate of form" (Vibh. 2)—that "all phenomena, even those classified as past, etc., do not abandon the nature of aggregates; therefore, all indeed exists." Such are the present-day advocates of the 'All Exists' view. For the purpose of clarifying their view, the question 'Does all exist?' is posed by the proponent, while the other, standing on the described view, makes an admission. By 'In every way,' he asks whether all exists in every body. By 'At all times,' he asks whether all exists at every moment. By 'All with all,' he asks whether all exists in every manner. By 'In all,' he asks whether all exists in all phenomena. By 'Incongruous,' it is meant 'unsuitable.' For a connection applies to things of diverse natures, not to a single nature. Thus, in this question, treating form and feeling, or feeling and form, as non-diverse and having a single characteristic, he asks whether all exists. By 'Even what does not exist, that exists,' he asks whether even that which is established as non-existent, such as a sixth aggregate or a hare’s horn, exists for them. By the question, 'Is the view that "all exists" a wrong view, and is the [contrary] view a right view, thus does it exist?' he asks this: 'Is this view of yours, that "all exists," a wrong view because it is untrue? And is our view a right view because it is true? Thus, does this hold in your system?' The other rejects this in all these methods due to the non-existence of the described existence. However, in all these methods, starting with 'Acknowledge the refutation,' the entire course of the discussion should be understood in detail. This, for now, is the method of debate here.

2. Kālasaṃsandanavaṇṇanā

2. The Explanation of the Conjunction of Time.

283-284. Idāni atītaṃ atthīti kālasaṃsandanaṃ hoti. Tattha atītaṃ atthītiādikaṃ suddhikasaṃsandanaṃ. Atītaṃ rūpaṃ atthītiādikaṃ khandhavasena kālasaṃsandanaṃ.

Now, there is the conjunction of time with the statement 'the past exists.' Here, 'the past exists' and so on is a pure conjunction. 'Past form exists' and so on is the conjunction of time by way of the aggregates.

285. Paccuppannaṃ rūpaṃ appiyaṃ karitvāti atītānāgataṃ pahāya paccuppannarūpameva appiyaṃ avibhajitabbaṃ karitvā. Rūpabhāvaṃ jahatītipañhe niruddhassāpi rūpassa rūpakkhandhasaṅgahitattā paṭikkhipati. Rūpabhāvaṃ na jahatīti paṭilomapañhepi rūpakkhandhena saṅgahitattāva paṭijānāti. Odātaṃ vatthaṃ appiyaṃ karitvāti ettha kiñcāpi na sabbaṃ vatthaṃ odātaṃ, iminā pana vatthanti avatvā ‘‘odātaṃ vatthaṃ appiyaṃ karitvā’’ti vutte sakavādinā ekatthatā anuññātā. Odātabhāvaṃ jahatīti pañhe vaṇṇavigamaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā sakavādissa. Vatthabhāvaṃ jahatīti ettha pana paññattiyā avigatattā paṭikkhepo tasseva. Paṭilomepi eseva nayo.

285. Regarding the phrase 'having made the present form unlovely,' it means having abandoned the past and future, and having made only the indivisible present form unlovely. In the question, 'Does one abandon the state of form?', he denies it because even ceased form is included in the aggregate of form. In the reverse question, 'Does one not abandon the state of form?', he affirms it precisely because it is included in the aggregate of form. Regarding the statement, 'Having made the white cloth unlovely,' here, although not all cloth is white, by not saying 'this cloth' but stating 'having made the white cloth unlovely,' a unity of subject is conceded by the proponent. In the question, 'Does one abandon the state of whiteness?', the proponent acknowledges it with reference to the disappearance of color. But in the question, 'Does one abandon the state of cloth?', he denies it because the designation has not disappeared. The same method applies in the reverse case.

286. Atītaṃ atītabhāvaṃ na jahatīti puṭṭho ‘‘yadi jaheyya, anāgataṃ vā paccuppannaṃ vā siyā’’ti maññamāno paṭijānāti. Anāgataṃ anāgatabhāvaṃ na jahatīti puṭṭho pana ‘‘yadi na jaheyya, anāgatamevassa[Pg.151], paccuppannabhāvaṃ na pāpuṇeyyā’’ti maññamāno paṭikkhipati. Paccuppannapañhepi atītabhāvaṃ anāpajjanadoso siyāti paṭikkhipati. Anulomapañhesupi imināva nayena attho veditabbo.

286. When asked, 'Does the past not abandon its past state?', he affirms it, thinking, 'If it were to abandon it, it would become either future or present.' But when asked, 'Does the future not abandon its future state?', he denies it, thinking, 'If it did not abandon it, it would remain future and not attain the present state.' In the question about the present, he also denies it, considering that there would be the fault of not arriving at the past state. The meaning should be understood in this same way for the questions in direct order.

287. Evaṃ suddhikanayaṃ vatvā puna khandhavasena dassetuṃ atītaṃ rūpantiādi vuttaṃ. Taṃ sabbaṃ pāḷianusāreneva sakkā jānituṃ.

287. Having thus explained the pure method, 'past form' and so on is further stated to show by way of aggregates. All that can be understood by following the Pāli text itself.

Vacanasodhanavaṇṇanā

The Description of the Clarification of Statements

288. Idāni ‘‘atītaṃ nvatthī’’tiādi vacanasodhanā hoti. Tattha hañci atītaṃ nvatthīti yadi atītaṃ no atthīti attho. Atītaṃ atthīti micchāti atītañca taṃ atthi cāti micchā eva. Taññeva anāgataṃ taṃ paccuppannanti puṭṭho anāgatakkhaṇeyevassa paccuppannatāya abhāvaṃ sandhāya kālanānattena paṭikkhipati.

288. Now, the clarification of statements like 'the past does not exist' occurs. Here, if 'the past does not exist' means 'the past is not existent,' that is the meaning. To say 'the past exists' is wrong; and that it is past and exists is indeed wrong. When asked, 'Is that very future the present?', he rejects it with reference to the absence of presentness in the future moment itself, due to the difference in time.

Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho yaṃ uppādato pubbe anāgataṃ ahosi, tassa uppannakāle paccuppannattā paṭijānāti. Hutvā hoti hutvā hotīti yadetaṃ tayā ‘‘anāgataṃ hutvā paccuppannaṃ hotī’’ti vadatā taññeva anāgataṃ taṃ paccuppannanti laddhivasena ‘‘anāgataṃ vā paccuppannaṃ vā hutvā hotī’’ti vuttaṃ. Kiṃ te tampi hutvā hotīti? Itaro hutvā bhūtassa puna hutvā abhāvato na hevanti paṭikkhipati.

When asked a second time, he affirms it because that which was future before its arising becomes present at the time of its arising. When you say 'the future, having been, becomes present,' then by accepting 'that very future is the present,' it is said 'having been, it is,' whether future or present. Do you also say 'having been, it is' regarding that? The other denies it, saying, 'No, indeed,' because what has become, having been, does not exist again as having been.

Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho yasmā taṃ anāgataṃ hutvā paccuppannaṃ hontaṃ ‘‘hutvā hotī’’ti saṅkhaṃ gataṃ, tasmā paṭijānāti. Atha naṃ sakavādī ‘‘yadi te taṃ anāgataṃ hutvā paccuppannaṃ hontaṃ ‘hutvā hotī’ti saṅkhaṃ gataṃ, puna hutvā hoti, yaṃ anāgataṃ na hutvā paccuppannaṃ na hontaṃ ‘na hutvā na hotī’ti saṅkhaṃ gataṃ sasavisāṇaṃ, kiṃ te tampi puna na hutvā na hotī’’tiadhippāyena na hutvā na hoti na hutvā na hotīti pañhaṃ pucchati. Itaro ‘‘yaṃ natthi, taṃ natthitāya, eva anāgataṃ na hutvā paccuppannaṃ na hotīti nahutvānahoti nāma tāva hotu, puna nahutvānahotibhāvo panassa kuto’’ti maññamāno paṭikkhipati. Taññeva paccuppannaṃ taṃ atītanti pañhepi paccuppannakkhaṇeyevassa atītatāya abhāvaṃ sandhāya kālanānattā paṭikkhipati.

When asked a second time, he affirms it because that which is future, having been, becomes present, has attained the designation 'having been, it is.' Then his own proponent asks him, 'If, for you, that which is future, having been, becomes present, has attained the designation 'having been, it is,' does it again become 'having been, it is'? That which is future, not having been, not becoming present, has attained the designation 'not having been, it is not'—like a hare's horn—does that too again become 'not having been, it is not'?' With this intention, he asks the question, 'Not having been, it is not; not having been, it is not?' The other, thinking, 'What does not exist, by its non-existence, thus the future not having been does not become present—so let it first have the name 'not having been, it is not'; but whence comes its state of again not having been, it is not?', rejects it. Regarding the question, 'Is that very present the past?', he also rejects it with reference to its absence as past in the present moment itself, due to the difference in time.

Dutiyapañhe [Pg.152] puṭṭho yaṃ atītabhāvato pubbe paccuppannaṃ ahosi, tasseva atītattā paṭijānāti. Hutvā hoti hutvā hotīti yadetaṃ tayā ‘‘paccuppannaṃ hutvā atītaṃ hotī’’ti vadatā ‘‘taññeva paccuppannaṃ taṃ atīta’’nti laddhivasena ‘‘paccuppannaṃ vā atītaṃ vā hutvā hotī’’ti vuttaṃ, kiṃ te tampi hutvā hotīti? Itaro hutvā bhūtassa puna hutvā abhāvato na hevanti paṭikkhipati.

In the second question, when asked, he affirms it because that which was present before becoming past is itself past. When you say 'the present, having been, becomes past,' then by accepting 'that very present is the past,' it is said 'having been, it is,' whether present or past. Do you also say 'having been, it is' regarding that? The other denies it, saying, 'No, indeed,' because what has become, having been, does not exist again as having been.

Dutiyapañhe yasmā taṃ paccuppannaṃ hutvā atītaṃ hontaṃ ‘‘hutvā hotī’’ti saṅkhaṃ gataṃ, tasmā paṭijānāti. Atha naṃ sakavādī ‘‘yadi te taññeva paccuppannaṃ hutvā atītaṃ hontaṃ ‘hutvā hotī’ti saṅkhaṃ gataṃ, puna hutvā hoti, yaṃ paccuppannaṃ na hutvā atītaṃ na hontaṃ ‘na hutvā na hotī’ti saṅkhaṃ gataṃ sasavisāṇaṃ, kiṃ te tampi puna na hutvā na hotī’’ti adhippāyena na hutvā na hoti na hutvā na hotīti pañhaṃ pucchati. Itaro ‘‘yaṃ natthi, taṃ natthitāya eva paccuppannaṃ na hutvā atītaṃ na hotīti nahutvānahoti nāma tāva hotu. Puna nahutvānahotibhāvo panassa kuto’’ti maññamāno paṭikkhipati. Ubhayaṃ ekato katvā āgate tatiyapañhepi imināvupāyena yojanā kātabbā.

In the second question, he affirms it because that which is present, having been, becomes past, has attained the designation 'having been, it is.' Then his own proponent asks him, 'If, for you, that which is present, having been, becomes past, has attained the designation 'having been, it is,' does it again become 'having been, it is'? That which is present, not having been, not becoming past, has attained the designation 'not having been, it is not'—like a hare's horn—does that too again become 'not having been, it is not'?' With this intention, he asks the question, 'Not having been, it is not; not having been, it is not?' The other, thinking, 'What does not exist, by its non-existence, thus the present, not having been, does not become past—so let it first have the name 'not having been, it is not'; but whence comes its state of again not having been, it is not?', rejects it. Combining both, the third question should also be analyzed in this same way.

Aparo nayo – yadi taññeva anāgataṃ taṃ paccuppannaṃ, anāgatassa paccuppanne vutto hotibhāvo, paccuppannassa ca anāgate vutto hutvābhāvo āpajjati. Evaṃ sante anāgatampi hutvāhoti nāma. Paccuppannampi hutvāhotiyeva nāma. Tena taṃ pucchāma – ‘‘kiṃ te etesu ekekaṃ hutvā hoti hutvā hotī’’ti? Itaro – ‘‘taññeva anāgataṃ taṃ paccuppanna’’nti pañhe paṭikkhittanayeneva paṭikkhipitvā puna puṭṭho dutiye pañhe paṭiññātanayeneva paṭijānāti. Atha naṃ sakavādī ‘‘taññeva anāgataṃ taṃ paccuppanna’’nti pañhāvasena tesu ekekaṃ hutvā hoti hutvā hotīti paṭijānantaṃ purimaṃ paṭikkhittapañhaṃ parivattitvā pucchanto na hutvā na hoti na hutvā na hotīti pucchati. Tassattho – nanu ‘‘tayā taññeva anāgataṃ taṃ paccuppanna’’nti vutte paṭhamapañhaṃ paṭikkhipantena anāgatassa hotibhāvo paccuppannassa ca hutvābhāvo paṭikkhittoti. Tena anāgataṃ na hoti nāma, paccuppannaṃ na hutvā nāma.

Another approach: If that very future is the present, then the state of 'it is' for the future would be stated in the present, and the state of 'having been' for the present would be stated in the future. This being so, even the future would be called 'having been, it is.' And the present would also be called 'having been, it is.' Therefore, we ask you: 'Does each of these, individually, become 'having been, it is; having been, it is' for you?' The other, having rejected it by the very method of rejection in the question 'Is that very future the present?', when asked again in the second question, affirms it by the very method of affirmation. Then his own proponent, by way of the question 'Is that very future the present?', asks the one who acknowledges that each of these becomes 'having been, it is; having been, it is,' by reversing the previously rejected question: 'Not having been, it is not; not having been, it is not?' The meaning of that is: 'Indeed, when you said 'that very future is the present,' by rejecting the first question, the state of 'it is' for the future and the state of 'having been' for the present were rejected. Therefore, the future is called 'it is not,' and the present is called 'not having been.'

Dutiyapañhe [Pg.153] ca taññeva anāgataṃ taṃ paccuppannanti paṭiññātaṃ. Evaṃ sante anāgatampi na hutvā na hoti nāma. Paccuppannampi na hutvā na hotiyeva nāma. Tena taṃ pucchāma – ‘‘kiṃ te etesu ekekaṃ na hutvā na hoti na hutvā na hotī’’ti? Paravādī sabbato andhakārena pariyonaddho viya tesaṃ nahutvānahotibhāvaṃ apassanto na hevanti paṭikkhipati.

And in the second question, it is acknowledged that 'that very future is the present.' This being so, even the future is called 'not having been, it is not.' And the present is also called 'not having been, it is not.' Therefore, we ask you: 'Does each of these, individually, become 'not having been, it is not; not having been, it is not' for you?' The opponent, as if utterly enveloped in darkness, not seeing their state of 'not having been, it is not,' rejects it by saying, 'No, indeed.'

Dutiyavārepi yadi taññeva paccuppannaṃ taṃ atītaṃ, paccuppannassa atīte vutto hotibhāvo, atītassa ca paccuppanne vutto hutvābhāvo āpajjati, evaṃ sante paccuppannampi hutvāhoti nāma, atītampi hutvāhotiyeva nāma. Tena taṃ pucchāma – ‘‘kiṃ te etesu ekekaṃ hutvā hoti hutvā hotī’’ti? Itaro taññeva paccuppannaṃ taṃ atītantipañhe paṭikkhittanayeneva paṭikkhipitvā puna puṭṭho dutiyapañhe paṭiññātanayeneva paṭijānāti. Atha naṃ sakavādī ‘‘taññeva paccuppannaṃ taṃ atīta’’nti pañhāvasena tesu ekekaṃ hutvā hoti hutvā hotīti paṭijānantaṃ purimaṃ paṭikkhittapañhaṃ parivattitvā pucchanto na hutvā na hoti na hutvā na hotīti pucchati. Tassattho – nanu tayā taññeva paccuppannaṃ taṃ atītanti vutte paṭhamapañhaṃ paṭikkhipantena paccuppannassa hotibhāvo, atītassa ca hutvābhāvo paṭikkhittoti. Tena paccuppannaṃ nahoti nāma. Atītaṃ nahutvā nāma.

Also in the second turn, if that very present is that past, it would follow that the present's state of being is spoken of in the past, and the past's state of having been is spoken of in the present. Thus, in that case, even the present would be called 'has been and is', and the past would also be called 'has been and is'. Therefore, we ask you: 'Is each of these, for you, 'has been and is', 'has been and is'?' The opponent, having rejected the question 'that very present is that past' in the manner of rejection, when asked again, affirms the second question in the manner of affirmation. Then the proponent, seeing him affirm that each of these, one by one, 'has been and is', 'has been and is' in response to the question 'that very present is that past', turns the previously rejected question around and asks, 'has not been and is not', 'has not been and is not'. Its meaning is: When you said 'that very present is that past', did you not, in rejecting the first question, reject the present's state of being and the past's state of having been? Therefore, the present is called 'is not'. The past is called 'has not been'.

Dutiyapañhe ca te ‘‘taññeva paccuppannaṃ taṃ atīta’’nti paṭiññātaṃ. Evaṃ sante paccuppannampi na hutvā na hoti nāma, atītampi na hutvā na hotiyeva nāma. Tena taṃ pucchāma – ‘‘kiṃ te etesu ekekaṃ na hutvā na hoti, na hutvā na hotī’’ti. Paravādī sabbato andhakārena pariyonaddho viya tesaṃ nahutvānahotibhāvaṃ apassanto na hevanti paṭikkhipati.

And in the second question, you affirmed 'that very present is that past'. Thus, in that case, even the present would be called 'has not been and is not', and the past would also be called 'has not been and is not'. Therefore, we ask you: 'Is each of these, for you, 'has not been and is not', 'has not been and is not'?' The opponent, as if completely enveloped in darkness, not seeing their state of 'has not been and is not', denies it, saying, 'Not so'.

Tatiyavārepi yadi taññeva anāgataṃ taṃ paccuppannaṃ taṃ atītaṃ; anāgatapaccuppannānaṃ paccuppannātītesu vutto hotibhāvo, paccuppannātītānañca anāgatapaccuppannesu vutto hutvābhāvo āpajjati. Evaṃ sante anāgatampi hutvāhoti nāma. Paccuppannampi atītampi hutvā hotiyeva nāma. Tena taṃ pucchāma – ‘‘kiṃ te tīsupi etesu ekekaṃ hutvā hoti [Pg.154] hutvā hotī’’ti? Itaro ‘‘taññeva anāgataṃ, taṃ paccuppannaṃ, taṃ atīta’’ntipañhe paṭikkhittanayeneva paṭikkhipitvā puna puṭṭho dutiyapañhe paṭiññātanayeneva paṭijānāti. Atha naṃ sakavādī ‘‘taññeva anāgataṃ, taṃ paccuppannaṃ, taṃ atīta’’nti pañhāvasena tesu ekekaṃ hutvā hoti, hutvā hotīti paṭijānantaṃ purimaṃ paṭikkhittapañhaṃ parivattitvā pucchanto na hutvā na hoti na hutvā na hotīti pucchati. Tassattho – nanu tayā taññeva anāgataṃ, taṃ paccuppannaṃ, taṃ atītanti vutte paṭhamapañhaṃ paṭikkhipantena anāgatapaccuppannānaṃ hotibhāvo; paccuppannātītānañca hutvābhāvo paṭikkhittoti? Tena anāgataṃ paccuppannañca na hoti nāma. Paccuppannañca atītañca na hutvā nāma.

Also in the third turn, if that very future is that present and that past, it would follow that the state of being of the future and present is spoken of in relation to the present and past, and the state of having been of the present and past is spoken of in relation to the future and present. Thus, in that case, even the future would be called 'has been and is'. The present and past would also be called 'has been and is'. Therefore, we ask you: 'Is each of these three, for you, 'has been and is', 'has been and is'?' The opponent, having rejected the question 'that very future is that present, that past' in the manner of rejection, when asked again, affirms the second question in the manner of affirmation. Then the proponent, seeing him affirm that each of these, one by one, 'has been and is', 'has been and is' in response to the question 'that very future is that present, that past', turns the previously rejected question around and asks, 'has not been and is not', 'has not been and is not'. Its meaning is: When you said 'that very future is that present, that past', did you not, in rejecting the first question, reject the state of being of the future and present, and the state of having been of the present and past? Therefore, the future and present are called 'is not'. And the present and past are called 'has not been'.

Dutiyapañhe ca te ‘‘taññeva anāgataṃ, taṃ paccuppannaṃ, taṃ atīta’’nti paṭiññātaṃ. Evaṃ sante anāgatampi na hutvā na hoti nāma, paccuppannampi atītampi na hutvā na hotiyeva nāma. Tena taṃ pucchāma – ‘‘kiṃ te etesu ekekaṃ na hutvā na hoti na hutvā na hotī’’ti? Paravādī sabbato andhakārena pariyonaddho viya tesaṃ na hutvā na hotibhāvaṃ apassanto na hevanti paṭikkhipatīti. Niggahādīni panettha heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva yojetabbāni.

And in the second question, you affirmed 'that very future is that present, that past'. Thus, in that case, even the future would be called 'has not been and is not', and the present and past would also be called 'has not been and is not'. Therefore, we ask you: 'Is each of these, for you, 'has not been and is not', 'has not been and is not'?' The opponent, as if completely enveloped in darkness, not seeing their state of 'has not been and is not', denies it, saying, 'Not so'. Here, the refutations and so forth should be applied in the manner previously stated.

Vacanasodhanavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Clarification of Terms is concluded.

Atītacakkhurūpādikathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Discussion on Past Eye, Form, and So On

289. Atītaṃ cakkhu atthītiādīsupi cakkhādibhāvāvijahaneneva atthitaṃ paṭijānāti. Passatītiādīni puṭṭho pana tesaṃ viññāṇānaṃ kiccābhāvavasena paṭikkhipati.

289. Even in statements such as 'the past eye exists,' one acknowledges its existence precisely by not abandoning the nature of the eye, and so on. But when asked about 'sees,' and so on, one denies them on account of the absence of function of those consciousnesses.

Atītañāṇādikathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Discussion on Past Knowledge, and So On

290. Tena ñāṇena ñāṇakaraṇīyaṃ karotīti pañhe tassa ñāṇassa niruddhattā kiccabhāvamassa apassanto paṭikkhipati. Puna puṭṭho atītārammaṇaṃ paccuppannaṃ ñāṇaṃ atītānaṃ dhammānaṃ jānanato atītaṃ ñāṇanti [Pg.155] lesena paccuppannameva ‘‘atītaṃ ñāṇa’’nti katvā tena ñāṇena ñāṇakaraṇīyassa atthitāya paṭijānāti. Athassa sakavādī lesokāsaṃ adatvā tena ñāṇena dukkhaṃ parijānātītiādimāha. Itaro atītārammaṇeneva ñāṇena imesaṃ catunnaṃ kiccānaṃ abhāvā paṭikkhipati. Anāgatapañhepi eseva nayo. Paccuppannapañho ceva saṃsandanapañho ca uttānatthāyeva.

290. When asked, 'Does one perform with that knowledge what is to be done by knowledge?', one denies it, not seeing its function because that knowledge has ceased. When questioned again, one acknowledges the existence of what is to be done by that knowledge, by way of a pretext that present knowledge with a past object is 'past knowledge' because it knows past phenomena, thus treating the present knowledge itself as 'past knowledge.' Then the proponent, giving no opportunity for a pretext, says, 'By that knowledge one fully understands suffering,' and so on. The other denies this, because of the absence of these four functions for a knowledge with only a past object. The same method applies to questions about the future. The question about the present and the question of comparison are of plain meaning.

Arahantādikathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Discussion on the Arahant, and So On

291. Arahato atīto rāgo atthītiādīsupi rāgādibhāvāvijahanto evaṃ paṭijānāti. Sarāgotiādīsu suttavirodhabhayena ceva yuttivirodhabhayena ca paṭikkhipati.

291. Even in statements such as 'an arahant has past lust,' one acknowledges it precisely by not abandoning the nature of lust, and so on. But in cases such as 'one with lust,' one rejects it out of fear of contradicting the suttas and out of fear of contradicting reason.

Padasodhanakathāvaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Discussion on the Analysis of Terms

295. Evaṃ sabbampi pāḷianusāreneva viditvā parato atthi siyā atītaṃ, siyā nvātītanti ettha evamattho veditabbo. Yaṃ atītameva atthi, taṃ atītaṃ. Yaṃ paccuppannānāgataṃ atthi, taṃ no atthi, taṃ no atītaṃ. Tenātītaṃ nvātītaṃ, nvātītaṃ atītanti tena kāraṇena atītaṃ no atītaṃ, no atītaṃ atītanti. Anāgatapaccuppannapucchāsupi eseva nayo.

295. Having understood all this precisely in accordance with the Pāli, hereafter the meaning should be understood as follows regarding 'there may be something past, or there may be something not past.' What exists as past is the past. What exists as present or future, that does not exist as past, that is not past. Therefore, the past is not past, and the not-past is past. For that reason, the past is not past, and the not-past is past. The same method applies to questions about the future and the present.

Suttasādhanavaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Sutta Method

296. Na vattabbaṃ ‘‘atītaṃ atthi anāgataṃ atthī’’ti suttasādhanāya pucchā paravādissa, paṭiññā sakavādissa. Puna attano laddhiṃ nissāya yaṃkiñci, bhikkhave, rūpanti anuyogo paravādisseva. Dutiyanaye pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Evaṃ sabbattha pucchā ca paṭiññā ca veditabbā. Yaṃ panetaṃ paravādinā anāgatassa atthibhāvasādhanatthaṃ ‘‘nanu vuttaṃ bhagavatā kabaḷīkāre, ce, bhikkhave’’ti suttassa pariyosāne atthi tattha āyatiṃ punabbhavābhinibbattītiādi dassitaṃ na taṃ anāgatassa atthibhāvasādhakaṃ[Pg.156]. Tañhi hetūnaṃ pariniṭṭhitattā avassaṃ bhāvitaṃ sandhāya tattha vuttaṃ. Ayaṃ suttādhippāyo. Sesaṃ sabbattha uttānatthamevāti.

296. The question for the purpose of establishing the sutta that states, 'It should not be said, "The past exists, the future exists,"' belongs to the opponent, and the acknowledgement belongs to the proponent. Again, relying on his own view, the interrogation, 'Whatever, bhikkhus, is form?' belongs to the opponent himself. In the second method, the question belongs to the proponent, and the acknowledgement belongs to the other. Thus, in all cases, both the question and the acknowledgement should be understood. As for that which is shown by the opponent to prove the existence of the future by citing, 'Was it not said by the Blessed One, "Bhikkhus, in the case of edible food..."?' and so on, and at the conclusion of the sutta, '...therein is future rebirth and re-becoming,' and so on—this does not prove the existence of the future. For that was said there with reference to what must inevitably come to be due to the completion of its causes. This is the intended meaning of the sutta. The rest is everywhere of straightforward meaning.

Sabbamatthītikathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on 'All Exists' is concluded.

6. Atītakkhandhādikathā

6. The Discussion on the Past Aggregates, and so on.

1. Nasuttasādhanakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Discussion on Non-Establishment by Sutta.

297. Idāni ‘‘atītaṃ khandhā’’tiādikathā hoti. Tattha khandhādibhāvāvijahanato atītānāgatānaṃ atthitaṃ icchantassa atītaṃ khandhāti pucchā paravādissa, atītassa khandhasaṅgahitattā āmantāti paṭiññā sakavādissa. Puna atītaṃ natthīti pucchā paravādissa, tassa niruttipathasuttena atthitāya vāritattā paṭikkhepo sakavādissa. Āyatanadhātupucchāsupi anāgatapañhesupi paccuppannena saddhiṃ saṃsanditvā anulomapaṭilomato āgatapañhesupi ‘‘atītaṃ rūpa’’ntiādipañhesupi imināvupāyena attho veditabbo.

297. Now there is the discussion on 'Is the past aggregates?' and so on. Here, for one who desires the existence of past and future by not abandoning the nature of aggregates, and so on, the question 'Is the past aggregates?' belongs to the opponent, and the acknowledgment 'Yes' belongs to the proponent, because the past is included within the aggregates. Again, the question 'Does the past not exist?' belongs to the opponent, and the rejection belongs to the proponent because its existence is refuted by the Niruttipatha-sutta. Similarly, in questions about sense-bases and elements, in future questions, in questions that arise through direct and reverse comparison with the present, and in questions like 'Is form past?' and so on, the meaning should be understood by this method.

2. Suttasādhanavaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Proof by Sutta.

298. Suttasādhane pana na vattabbanti pucchā sakavādissa. Tattha natthi ceteti natthi ca ete dhammāti attho. Khandhādibhāve sati natthitaṃ anicchantassa āmantāti paṭiññā paravādissa, atha nesaṃ natthibhāvasādhanatthaṃ suttāharaṇaṃ sakavādissa. Dutiyapucchāpi paravādissa, paṭiññā sakavādissa, suttāharaṇaṃ paravādissa. Taṃ pana nesaṃ khandhādibhāvameva sādheti, na atthibhāvanti āhaṭampi anāhaṭasadisamevāti.

298. In the proof by sutta, however, the question, 'Should it not be said...?' belongs to the proponent. Here, the meaning of 'if these do not exist' is 'and these phenomena do not exist.' When the state of being aggregates, etc., is present, the opponent, not wishing for their non-existence, acknowledges this with 'Yes.' Then, the proponent cites a sutta to prove their non-existence. The second question also belongs to the opponent, the acknowledgment to the proponent, and the sutta citation to the opponent. However, that only proves their state as aggregates, etc., not their existence; thus, even when cited, it is as if it were not cited.

Atītaṃ khandhātiādikathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the discussion beginning with 'Is the past aggregates?'

7. Ekaccaṃatthītikathā

7. The Discussion on 'Some Exist'.

1. Atītādiekaccakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Discussion on the Past, etc., and 'Some Exist'.

299. Idāni [Pg.157] ekaccaṃ atthīti kathā hoti. Tattha ye ‘‘ekaccaṃ atītaṃ atthī’’ti maññanti, seyyathāpi kassapikā; tesaṃ laddhibhindanatthaṃ atītaṃ atthīti pucchā sakavādissa, ekaccaṃ atthīti vissajjanaṃ paravādissa. Ayañhi adhippāyo – avipakkavipākaṃ atthi, vipakkavipākaṃ natthīti. Ekaccaṃ niruddhanti anuyogo sakavādissa. Tassattho – yadi te atītaṃ ekaccaṃ atthi ekaccaṃ natthi, evaṃ sante ekaccaṃ atītaṃ niruddhaṃ, ekaccaṃ atītaṃ aniruddhaṃ, tatheva ṭhitanti āpajjati. Vigatantiādīsupi eseva nayo.

299. Now, there is a discussion on 'some exist.' Here, to refute the view of those who think 'some of the past exists,' such as the Kassapikas, the proponent asks, 'Does the past exist?' and the opponent replies, 'Some exists.' Indeed, the intention here is: 'What has not yet ripened into its result exists, but what has ripened into its result does not.' The proponent then poses the counter-question, 'Has some ceased?' Its meaning is: If for you some of the past exists and some does not, then it follows that some of the past has ceased, and some of the past has not ceased, thus remaining just as it was. The same principle applies to 'has vanished,' etc.

Avipakkavipākadhammā ekacceti idaṃ yasmā yesaṃ so avipakkavipākānaṃ atthitaṃ icchati, tepi atītāyeva. Tasmā yathā te atītaṃ ekaccaṃ atthi, kiṃ tathā avipakkavipākāpi dhammā ekacce atthī ekacce natthīti codetuṃ vuttaṃ. Vipakkavipākāti idaṃ yesaṃ so natthitaṃ icchati, tesaṃ vasena codetuṃ vuttaṃ. Avipākāti idaṃ abyākatānaṃ vasena codetuṃ vuttaṃ. Iti imesaṃ tiṇṇaṃ rāsīnaṃ vasena sabbesu anulomapaṭilomesu paṭiññā ca paṭikkhepo ca veditabbā. Atītā ekadesaṃ vipakkavipākā, ekadesaṃ avipakkavipākāti vippakatavipākā vuccanti. Yena hi kammena paṭisandhi nibbattitā, bhavaṅgampi cutipi tasseva vipāko. Tasmā paṭisandhito yāva cuti, tāva taṃ vippakatavipākaṃ nāma hoti. Tathārūpe dhamme sandhāyetaṃ vuttaṃ.

'Some phenomena that have not yet ripened into results': This is said because those whose existence he desires, namely, those that have not yet ripened into results, are also past. Therefore, just as some of the past exists for them, this is said to challenge them: 'Are some phenomena that have not yet ripened into results existent and some non-existent?' 'What has ripened into results': This is said to challenge them in terms of what he desires to be non-existent. 'Without result': This is said to challenge them in terms of indeterminate phenomena. Thus, in terms of these three categories, affirmation and denial should be understood in all forward and reverse arguments. The past, a portion of which has ripened into results and a portion of which has not ripened into results, is called 'results that have ripened in a divided way.' For by the kamma by which rebirth-linking is produced, the life-continuum and death are also its result. Therefore, from rebirth-linking until death, that is called 'results ripened in a divided way.' This is said in reference to such a phenomenon.

Vipaccissantīti katvā te atthīti pucchā sakavādissa. Yathā dhammadharassa puggalassa niddāyantassāpi bahupavattino dhammā atthīti vuccanti, evaṃ lokavohāravasena atthitaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā paravādissa. Vipaccissantīti katvā paccupannāti dutiyapañhe ‘‘kammānaṃ avināsasaṅkhāto kammūpacayo nāmeko atthī’’ti laddhiyaṃ ṭhatvā paṭiññā paravādissa.

Having considered that 'they will ripen,' the proponent asks, 'Do they exist?' Just as it is said that a person who upholds the Dhamma, even while sleeping, has many active qualities, so too the opponent's acknowledgment is made with reference to existence in terms of worldly convention. Having considered that 'they will ripen,' in the second question, 'Are they present?', the opponent's acknowledgment stands on the doctrine that 'there is a certain accumulation of kamma, designated as the non-perishing of kamma.'

2. Anāgatādiekaccakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Discussion on the Future, etc., and 'Some Exist'.

300. Anāgataṃ [Pg.158] atthītiādīsupi ekaccaṃ atthīti uppādino dhamme sandhāya vadati. Sesaṃ sabbattha heṭṭhā vuttanayattā uttānatthamevāti.

300. In statements such as, 'Does the future exist?' and so on, when he says 'some exist,' he speaks with reference to phenomena that are to arise. The rest, everywhere, is of straightforward meaning because of the method stated below.

Ekaccaṃatthītikathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discussion on 'Some Exists'.

8. Satipaṭṭhānakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Explanation of the Discussion on the Establishments of Mindfulness.

301. Idāni satipaṭṭhānakathā hoti. ‘‘Tattha – catunnaṃ, bhikkhave, satipaṭṭhānānaṃ samudayañca atthaṅgamañca desessāmī’’ti (saṃ. ni. 5.408) satipaṭṭhānasaṃyutte vuttanayeneva yesaṃ kāyādayo satiyā ārammaṇadhamme gahetvā ‘‘sabbe dhammā satipaṭṭhānā’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi andhakānaṃ. Andhakā nāma pubbaseliyā, aparaseliyā, rājagiriyā, siddhatthikāti ime pacchā uppannanikāyā. Tesaṃ laddhivivecanatthaṃ pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā paravādissa. Tattha yasmā ‘‘patiṭṭhāti etesūti paṭṭhānā. Kā patiṭṭhāti? Sati. Satiyā paṭṭhānā satipaṭṭhānā’’ti iminā atthena satigocarāpi satipaṭṭhānā. ‘‘Patiṭṭhahantīti paṭṭhānā. Kā patiṭṭhahanti? Satiyo. Satiyova paṭṭhānā satipaṭṭhānā’’ti iminā atthena satiyova satipaṭṭhānā. Tasmā dvepi vādā pariyāyena yujjanti. Ye pana taṃ pariyāyaṃ pahāya ekanteneva ‘‘sabbe dhammā satipaṭṭhānā’’ti vadanti, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, ārammaṇavasena paṭiññā paravādissa. Sabbe dhammā satīti anuyuttassa pana sabbesaṃ satisabhāvābhāvato paṭikkhepo tasseva. Tattha khayagāmītiādīni maggavisesanāni. Ekāyanamaggo hi kilesānaṃ khayabhūtaṃ nibbānaṃ gacchatīti khayagāmī. Cattāri saccāni bujjhanto gacchatīti bodhagāmī. Vaṭṭaṃ apacinanto gacchatīti apacayagāmī. Evametehi padehi ‘‘kiṃ te sabbe dhammā evarūpo te ekāyano maggo hotī’’ti pucchati. Anāsavā asaṃyojaniyātiādīnipi lokuttarabhāvaṃ pucchanatthāya vuttāni. Buddhānussatītiādīni pabhedapucchāvasena vuttāni.

301. Now there is the discussion on the foundations of mindfulness. Therein—'Bhikkhus, I shall teach you the arising and passing away of the four foundations of mindfulness' (SN 5.408). In accordance with the method stated in the Satipaṭṭhāna Saṃyutta, there is the view of those who, taking the body and so forth as the objective phenomena for mindfulness, hold that 'all phenomena are foundations of mindfulness,' such as the Andhakas nowadays. The Andhakas are the later schools, namely, the Pubbaseliyas, Aparaseliyas, Rājagiriyas, and Siddhatthikas. For the purpose of analyzing their view, the question is from the proponent, and the assertion is from the opponent. Herein, because 'one is established in these, thus they are foundations (paṭṭhānā). What is established? Mindfulness (sati). The foundations for mindfulness are the foundations of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhānā)'—by this meaning, even the objects of mindfulness are foundations of mindfulness. 'They are established, thus they are foundations. What are established? Mindfulnesses (satiyo). Mindfulnesses themselves are the foundations, thus foundations of mindfulness (satipaṭṭhānā)'—by this meaning, mindfulnesses themselves are the foundations of mindfulness. Therefore, both views are tenable by way of interpretation. But those who abandon that interpretation and categorically state that 'all phenomena are foundations of mindfulness'—with reference to them, the question is from the proponent, and the assertion, by way of the object, is from the opponent. However, for one who is questioned, 'Are all phenomena mindfulness?', the refutation is for that very one, due to the absence of the nature of mindfulness in all things. Herein, 'leading to destruction' and so forth are qualifiers of the path. For the one-way path goes to Nibbāna, which is the destruction of the defilements; thus it is 'leading to destruction.' It goes while awakening to the four truths; thus it is 'leading to awakening.' It goes while diminishing the round; thus it is 'leading to diminution.' Thus, with these terms, he asks: 'Are all those phenomena for you such a one-way path?' Terms like 'taintless,' 'not connected with the fetters,' and so forth, are also stated for the purpose of asking about the supramundane state. 'Recollection of the Buddha,' and so forth, are stated by way of asking about the classifications.

Cakkhāyatanaṃ [Pg.159] satipaṭṭhānantiādi sabbadhammānaṃ pabhedapucchāvasena vuttaṃ. Tatthāpi sativasena paṭikkhepo, ārammaṇavasena paṭiññāti. Evaṃ sabbapañhesu attho veditabbo. Suttasādhanā uttānatthāyevāti.

'The eye-base is a foundation of mindfulness,' and so forth, is stated by way of asking about the classifications of all phenomena. Therein too, the refutation is by way of mindfulness, and the assertion is by way of the object. Thus, the meaning should be understood in all questions. The adducing of the sutta is indeed of clear meaning.

Satipaṭṭhānakathāvaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of the Foundations of Mindfulness is concluded.

9. Hevatthikathāvaṇṇanā

9. The Commentary on the Hevatthika Discussion

304. Idāni hevatthikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘sabbepi atītādibhedā dhammā rūpādivasena atthi, atītaṃ anāgatapaccuppannavasena, anāgatapaccuppannāni vā atītādivasena natthi; tasmā sabbamevidaṃ evaṃ atthi evaṃ natthī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi vuttappabhedānaṃ andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya atītaṃ atthīti pucchā sakavādissa. Hevatthi heva natthīti vissajjanaṃ paravādissa. Tattha hevāti evaṃ. Atha naṃ sakavādī ‘‘yadi atītova evaṃ atthi, evaṃ natthīti laddhi, evaṃ sante soyeva atthi, soyeva natthi nāmā’’ti pucchanto sevatthi, seva natthīti āha. Itaro teneva sabhāvena atthitaṃ, teneva natthitaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho sakabhāveneva atthitaṃ, parabhāveneva natthitaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Tato paraṃ atthaṭṭho natthaṭṭhoti atthisabhāvo natthisabhāvo nāma hotīti pucchati. Imināvupāyena sabbavāresu attho veditabbo. Pariyosāne pana ‘‘tena hi atītaṃ hevatthi, heva natthī’’ti ca ‘‘tena hi rūpaṃ hevatthi, heva natthī’’ti cātiādīni vatvā kiñcāpi paravādinā laddhi patiṭṭhāpitā, ayoniso patiṭṭhāpitattā panesā appatiṭṭhāpitāyevāti.

304. Now there is the discussion called the Hevatthikathā. Herein, with reference to those who hold the view that 'all phenomena, distinguished as past and so forth, exist by way of form and so forth, but the past does not exist by way of the future and present, nor do the future and present exist by way of the past; therefore, all of this thus exists and thus does not exist'—such as the various kinds of Andhakas mentioned earlier—the question 'Does the past exist?' is from the proponent. The reply 'It thus exists, it thus does not exist' is from the opponent. Herein, `heva` means `evaṃ` (thus). Then the proponent, questioning him, said: 'If the past is thus existent and thus non-existent according to your view, then is it the very same thing that exists and the very same thing that does not exist?' The other refutes this, referring to its existence and non-existence by that same nature. When asked a second time, he agrees, referring to its existence by its own nature and its non-existence by another's nature. Thereafter, he asks whether 'the meaning of existence' and 'the meaning of non-existence' means there is a nature of existence and a nature of non-existence. By this method, the meaning should be understood in all sections of the debate. At the conclusion, however, although the opponent's view is established by stating, 'Therefore, the past thus exists and thus does not exist,' and 'Therefore, form thus exists and thus does not exist,' and so forth, because it is established unsystematically, it is in fact not established at all.

Hevatthikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Hevatthika Discussion.

Mahāvaggo niṭṭhito.

The Great Chapter is concluded.

2. Dutiyavaggo

2. The Second Chapter

1. Parūpahāravaṇṇanā

1. The Commentary on Derogation

307. Idāni [Pg.160] parūpahārakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ye arahattaṃ paṭijānantānaṃ appatte pattasaññīnaṃ adhimānikānaṃ kuhakānaṃ vā arahattaṃ paṭijānantānaṃ sukkavissaṭṭhiṃ disvā ‘‘mārakāyikā devatā arahato asuciṃ upasaṃharantī’’ti maññanti; seyyathāpi etarahi pubbaseliyā ca aparaseliyā ca; te sandhāya atthi arahatoti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Idāni yasmā sukkavissaṭṭhi nāma rāgasamuṭṭhānā hoti, tasmā atthi arahato rāgoti anuyogo āraddho. So sabbopi uttānatthoyeva.

307. Now there is the discussion called 'Derogation.' Herein, there are those who, seeing an emission of semen from some who claim arahantship—those with conceit who perceive attainment in what is not attained, or deceivers who claim arahantship—think, 'Deities of Māra's host are presenting impurity to the Arahant.' This is the view of the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas nowadays. With reference to them, the question 'Does an Arahant have an emission of semen?' is from the proponent, and the assertion is from the other. Now, because an emission of semen arises from lust, the cross-examination 'Does an Arahant have lust?' is begun. All of this is indeed of clear meaning.

Mārakāyikā devatā attanotiādipañhe yasmā tāsaṃ devatānaṃ sukkavissaṭṭhi nāma natthi, aññesampi sukkaṃ gahetvā na upasaṃharanti, arahato pana sukkameva natthi, tasmā na hevanti paṭikkhipati.

In the question beginning 'Do deities of Māra's host [present it] from themselves?', since those deities do not have what is called an emission of semen, nor do they take the semen of others and present it, and an Arahant, for his part, has no semen at all, therefore he refutes it, saying, 'It is not so.'

Neva attanotipañhe pana nimminitvā upasaṃharantīti laddhiyā paṭijānāti. Lomakūpehītipañhe sappitelānaṃ viya lomakūpehi upasaṃharaṇābhāvaṃ disvā paṭikkhipati.

However, in the question 'Not from themselves?', he agrees with the view that they present it after creating it. In the question 'Through the hair-pores?', seeing that there is no presentation through the hair-pores as there is for ghee and oil, he refutes it.

308. Handa hīti vacasāyatthe nipāto. ‘‘Arahā nu kho ahaṃ, no’’ti evaṃ vimatiṃ gāhayissāmāti evaṃ vacasāyaṃ katvā upasaṃharantīti attho. Atthi arahato vimatīti puṭṭho aṭṭhavatthukaṃ vicikicchaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, dutiyaṃ puṭṭho itthipurisānaṃ nāmagottādīsu sanniṭṭhānābhāvaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti.

308. `Handa hi` is a particle in the sense of verbal effort. The meaning is that they present it, making a verbal effort thus: 'We will cause him to have the doubt, "Am I an Arahant or not?"' When asked, 'Does an Arahant have doubt?', he refutes it, referring to the doubt concerning the eight objects (vicikicchā). When asked a second time, he agrees, referring to the absence of a firm conclusion regarding the names, clans, and so on, of men and women.

309. Atthi tassa āsayoti tassa sukkassa uccārapassāvānaṃ viya patiṭṭhānokāso atthīti pucchati.

309. 'Does he have a repository for it?' This asks whether there is a place of establishment for that semen, like there is for feces and urine.

312. Sadhammakusalassāti attano arahattadhammamatteyeva kusalassa. Paññāvimuttaṃ sandhāyevaṃ vadati. Paradhammakusalassāti sadhammato parasmiṃ [Pg.161] aṭṭhasamāpattidhammepi kusalassa. Ubhatobhāgavimuttaṃ sandhāyevaṃ vadati. Sesamettha pāḷianusāreneva veditabbanti.

312. 'Skilled in one's own Dhamma' means skilled only in one's own Dhamma, that is, the state of Arahantship. This is said with reference to one liberated by wisdom. 'Skilled in another's Dhamma' means skilled in the Dhamma other than one's own Dhamma, that is, in the eight attainments. This is said with reference to one liberated both ways. The rest here should be understood according to the Pāli text itself.

Parūpahārakathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discussion on Derogation.

2-3-4. Aññāṇādikathāvaṇṇanā

2-3-4. Explanation of the Discussions Beginning with Ignorance.

314. Idāni aññāṇaṃ, kaṅkhā, paravitaraṇāti tisso kathā nāma honti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘arahato itthipurisādīnaṃ nāmagottādīsu ñāṇappavattiyā abhāvena atthi aññāṇaṃ, tattheva sanniṭṭhānābhāvena atthi kaṅkhā. Yasmā ca nesaṃ tāni vatthūni pare vitaranti pakāsenti ācikkhanti, tasmā nesaṃ atthi paravitaraṇā’’ti imā laddhiyo, seyyathāpi etarahi pubbaseliyādīnaṃ; tesaṃ tā laddhiyo bhindituṃ tīsupi kathāsu pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā ca paṭikkhepo ca itarassa. Tattha sabbesupi pañhesu ceva vissajjanesu ca pāḷiṃ anugantvāva attho veditabboti.

314. Now, there are three discussions: ignorance, doubt, and 'dependence on others.' Here, for those who hold these views—just like the Pubbaseliyas and others at present—namely, that 'there is ignorance in an Arahant because there is no arising of knowledge regarding the names, clans, and so on, of men and women; there is doubt because there is no firm conviction in these matters; and there is dependence on others because others distribute, explain, and declare these things to them'—for them, these views are to be broken down in all three discussions through questions from one's own side, and admission and refutation from the other side. In all these questions and answers, the meaning should be understood only by following the Pāli text.

Aññāṇādikathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discussions Beginning with Ignorance.

5. Vacībhedakathāvaṇṇanā

5. Explanation of the Discourse on Speech Interruption.

326. Idāni vacībhedakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘sotāpattimaggakkhaṇe paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ samāpannassa dukkhanti vācā bhijjatī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi pubbaseliyādīnaṃ; te sandhāya samāpannassa atthi vacībhedoti pucchā sakavādissa, laddhiyaṃ ṭhatvā paṭiññā paravādissa. Puna sabbatthāti tayo bhave sandhāya puṭṭho arūpaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Sabbadāti kālavasena puṭṭho paṭhamamaggakkhaṇe paṭhamajjhānikasamāpattito aññaṃ sabbaṃ samāpattikālaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Sabbesaṃ samāpannānanti puṭṭho lokiyasamāpattiyo samāpanne sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Sabbasamāpattīsūti puṭṭho dutiyajjhānādikaṃ lokuttaraṃ sabbañca lokiyasamāpattiṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati.

326. Now there is the discourse called 'Speech Interruption.' Here, regarding those who hold the view that 'at the moment of the stream-entry path, for one who has attained the first jhāna, the utterance "suffering" is broken'—such as the Pubbaseliyas and others nowadays—the question 'Is there speech interruption for one in attainment?' is asked by one of their own school, and the opponent, standing by their view, acknowledges it. Furthermore, when asked about 'everywhere,' having been asked with reference to the three realms, they deny it with reference to the immaterial realm. When asked about 'always,' having been asked in terms of time, they deny all times of attainment other than the first moment of the path with the attainment of the first jhāna. When asked about 'all those who are in attainment,' they deny it with reference to those who have attained worldly attainments. When asked about 'all attainments,' they deny it with reference to the supramundane attainments beginning with the second jhāna, and all worldly attainments.

Kāyabhedoti [Pg.162] abhikkamādivasena pavattakāyaviññatti. Idaṃ ‘‘yāni cittāni vacīviññattiṃ samuṭṭhāpenti, tāneva kāyaviññattiṃ. Evaṃ sante kasmā kāyabhedopi na hotī’’ti codanatthaṃ pucchati. Itaro laddhivasena paṭikkhipati ceva paṭijānāti ca. Idāni yadi so maggakkhaṇe ‘‘dukkha’’nti vācaṃ bhāsati, ‘‘samudayo’’tiādikampi bhāseyya. Yadi vā taṃ na bhāsati, itarampi na bhāseyyāti codanatthaṃ dukkhanti jānantotiādayo pañhā vuttā. Itaro pana attano laddhivaseneva paṭijānāti ceva paṭikkhipati ca. Lokuttaraṃ paṭhamajjhānaṃ samāpanno dukkhadukkhanti vipassatīti hissa laddhi.

'Bodily interruption' refers to bodily intimation occurring through movements and so forth. This is questioned for the purpose of challenging: 'If those very same cittas that produce verbal intimation also produce bodily intimation, then why is there not also a bodily interruption?' The other side rejects and acknowledges based on their view. Now, if at the path moment one utters the word 'suffering,' one would also utter 'origin' and so forth. Or if one does not utter that, one would not utter the others either—thus, for the purpose of challenging, questions such as 'knowing suffering' are stated. The other side, however, acknowledges and rejects based on their own view. For their view is that one who has attained the supramundane first jhāna contemplates 'suffering as suffering'.

328. Ñāṇanti lokuttaraṃ catusaccañāṇaṃ. Sotanti sotaviññāṇaṃ adhippetaṃ, yena taṃ saddaṃ suṇāti. Dvinnaṃ phassānanti sotasamphassamanosamphassānaṃ.

328. 'Knowledge' refers to the supramundane knowledge of the four noble truths. 'Ear' here means ear-consciousness, by which one hears that sound. 'Two contacts' refers to ear-contact and mind-contact.

329. No vata re vattabbeti yadi avisesena yaṃkiñci samāpannassa natthi vacībhedo, na avisesena vattabbaṃ ‘‘samāpannassa atthi vacībhedo’’ti. Sesamettha uttānatthameva saddhiṃ suttasādhanāya. Yaṃ panetena ‘‘sikhissa ānanda, bhagavato’’ti pariyosāne suttaṃ ābhataṃ, tattha yena samāpatticittena so vacībhedo samuṭṭhito, kāyabhedopi tena samuṭṭhātiyeva, na ca taṃ lokuttaraṃ paṭhamajjhānacittaṃ, tasmā asādhakanti.

329. 'No, indeed, it should not be said'—if there is no speech interruption for one who has attained any state without distinction, then it should not be said without distinction that 'there is speech interruption for one who has attained.' The rest here is clear in meaning, along with the sutta's substantiation. But regarding the sutta brought up at the conclusion, 'Sikhi, O Ānanda, the Blessed One,' there, the speech interruption arises from that attainment-consciousness, and bodily interruption also arises from that very same consciousness. Yet that is not the supramundane first jhāna consciousness; therefore, it is not valid.

Vacībhedakathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discourse on Speech Interruption.

6. Dukkhāhārakathāvaṇṇanā

6. Explanation of the Discourse on Suffering as Nutriment.

334. Idāni dukkhāhārakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘dukkhaṃ dukkhanti vācaṃ bhāsanto dukkhe ñāṇaṃ āharati, taṃ dukkhāhāro nāma vuccati. Tañca panetaṃ maggaṅgaṃ maggapariyāpanna’’nti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi pubbaseliyānaṃ; te sandhāya dukkhāhāroti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā paravādissa. Ye kecīti paṭhamapañhe avipassake sandhāya paṭikkhipati, dutiyapañhe [Pg.163] vipassake sandhāya paṭijānāti, taṃ panassa laddhimattameva. Tasmā ‘‘sabbe te’’ti vādassa bhindanatthaṃ bālaputhujjanātiādimāha. Taṃ uttānatthamevāti.

334. Now there is the discourse called 'Suffering as Nutriment.' Here, regarding those who hold the view that 'by uttering the word "suffering" as "suffering," one brings forth knowledge of suffering, and that is called "suffering as nutriment," and moreover, that this is a path factor included within the path'—such as the Pubbaseliyas nowadays—the question 'Is suffering nutriment?' is asked by one of their own school, and the opponent acknowledges it. 'Whatever others'—in the first question, he rejects it with reference to non-insightful practitioners; in the second question, he affirms it with reference to insightful practitioners. But that is merely their own view. Therefore, for the purpose of breaking down the statement 'all of them,' he speaks of 'foolish ordinary people' and so forth. That is clear in meaning.

Dukkhāhārakathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discourse on Suffering as Nutriment.

7. Cittaṭṭhitikathāvaṇṇanā

7. Explanation of the Discourse on the Persistence of Mind.

335. Idāni cittaṭṭhitikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ samāpatticittañceva bhavaṅgacittañca anuppabandhena pavattamānaṃ disvā ‘‘ekameva cittaṃ ciraṃ tiṭṭhatī’’ti laddhi seyyathāpi etarahi heṭṭhā vuttappabhedānaṃ andhakānaṃ, taṃladdhivisodhanatthaṃ ekaṃ, cittaṃ divasaṃ tiṭṭhatīti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā paravādissa. Upaḍḍhadivaso uppādakkhaṇoti ettha ṭhitikkhaṇaṃ anāmasitvā ‘‘aniccā vata saṅkhārā, uppādavayadhammino’’ti (saṃ. ni. 1.186; 2.143) desanānayena uppādavayavaseneva pucchā katā.

335. Now comes the discourse called 'The Persistence of Mind.' Here, to clarify the view of those who, seeing the absorption mind and the life-continuum mind proceeding without interruption, hold the view that 'only one mind persists for a long time'—such as the Andhakas of the types mentioned previously—the question 'Does one mind persist for a day?' is posed by the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the affirmation is from the opponent. Regarding 'Half a day is the moment of arising,' here, without touching upon the moment of persistence, the question is posed only by way of arising and passing away, in accordance with the teaching method: 'Impermanent, indeed, are conditioned things, subject to arising and passing away' (Saṃ. Ni. 1.186; 2.143).

Te dhammā cittena lahuparivattāti puṭṭho cittato lahutaraparivattino dhamme apassanto paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho yassa cittassa dīghaṭṭhitiṃ icchati, taṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Yāvatāyukaṃ tiṭṭhatīti pañhe ‘‘cullāsītisahassāni, kappā tiṭṭhanti ye marū’’tiādivacanavasena (mahāni. 10) āruppato aññatra paṭikkhipati, āruppe paṭijānāti. Muhuttaṃ muhuttaṃ uppajjatīti pañhe paravādissa ‘‘uppādavayadhammino’’tiādisuttavirodhabhayena paṭijānāti. Ṭhitiṃ panassa laddhivasena icchati. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

When asked, 'Are those phenomena quick to change with the mind?' he denies it, not seeing phenomena that change quicker than the mind. When asked a second time, with reference to that mind whose long persistence he desires, he affirms it. To the question, 'Does it persist for a lifetime?' he denies it for those other than the formless attainments, by way of statements such as, 'Eighty-four thousand eons, the Maras persist,' but affirms it for the formless attainments. To the question, 'Does it arise moment by moment?' the opponent affirms it out of fear of contradicting sutta passages such as 'subject to arising and passing away.' But he desires its persistence in accordance with how it has been attained. The rest here is of obvious meaning.

Cittaṭṭhitikathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discourse on the Persistence of Mind.

8. Kukkuḷakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Explanation of the Discourse on Hot Ash.

338. Idāni kukkuḷakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘sabbaṃ, bhikkhave, ādittaṃ (saṃ. ni. 4.28; mahāva. 54) sabbe saṅkhārā dukkhā’’tiādīni (dha. pa. 278) suttāni ayoniso gahetvā [Pg.164] ‘‘nippariyāyeneva sabbe saṅkhārā kukkuḷā vītaccitaṅgārasammissā chārikanirayasadisā’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi gokulikānaṃ; tesaṃ nānappakārasukhasandassanena taṃ laddhiṃ vivecetuṃ pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā paravādissa. Tattha anodhiṃ katvāti odhiṃ mariyādaṃ koṭṭhāsaṃ akaritvā, avisesena sabbeyevāti attho. Sesaṃ sabbaṃ pāḷinayeneva veditabbaṃ saddhiṃ suttasādhanāyāti.

338. Now comes the discourse called 'Hot Ash.' Here, for those who, having improperly grasped suttas such as 'All is burning, monks' and 'All conditioned things are suffering,' hold the view that 'All conditioned things are, without exception, hot ash, like embers mixed with glowing coals, resembling the hell of cinders'—as is the case nowadays with the Gokulikas—to dispel that view by showing various kinds of happiness, the question is from the proponent, and the affirmation is from the opponent. Here, 'without setting a limit' means not making a boundary, a limit, or a division; the meaning is 'all without exception.' The rest should be understood entirely in accordance with the method of the canonical text, along with the sutta substantiation.

Kukkuḷakathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discourse on Hot Ash.

9. Anupubbābhisamayakathāvaṇṇanā

9. Explanation of the Discourse on Gradual Realization.

339. Idāni anupubbābhisamayakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ –

339. Now comes the discourse called 'Gradual Realization.' Here, for those who—

‘‘Anupubbena medhāvī, thokaṃ thokaṃ khaṇe khaṇe;

Kammāro rajatasseva, niddhame malamattano’’ti. (dha. pa. 239) –

‘Gradually, little by little, from moment to moment, a wise person should remove their own impurities, as a smith removes the dross from silver.’ (Dhp 239)

Ādīni suttāni ayoniso gahetvā ‘‘sotāpattiphalasacchikiriyāya paṭipanno ekacce kilese dukkhadassanena pajahati, ekacce samudayanirodhamaggadassanena, tathā sesāpīti evaṃ soḷasahi koṭṭhāsehi anupubbena kilesappahānaṃ katvā arahattapaṭilābho hotī’’ti evarūpā nānābhisamayaladdhi uppannā, seyyathāpi etarahi andhakasabbatthikasammitiyabhadrayānikānaṃ; tesaṃ laddhivivecanatthaṃ anupubbābhisamayoti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Anupubbena sotāpattimagganti puṭṭho pana ekassa maggassa bahubhāvāpattibhayena paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho dukkhadassanādivasena paṭijānāti. Tāni vā cattāripi ñāṇāni eko sotāpattimaggoyevāti paṭijānāti, phalaṃ pana ekameva icchati, tasmā paṭikkhipati. Sakadāgāmimaggādīsupi eseva nayo.

Having improperly grasped these and other suttas, a view of manifold realization has arisen, namely: 'One who has entered upon the path for the realization of the fruit of stream-entry abandons some defilements through the seeing of suffering, some through the seeing of the origin, cessation, and path, and so with the remaining defilements—in this way, having gradually abandoned the defilements through sixteen sections, the attainment of arahantship occurs'—just as it exists now among the Andhakas, Sarvāstivādins, Sammitīyas, and Bhadrayānikas. To refute their view, the question, 'Is there gradual realization?' is from the proponent, and the affirmation is from the other. However, when asked, 'Is the stream-entry path gradual?' he rejects it out of fear that the one path would become many. When asked a second time, he affirms it on the basis of the seeing of suffering and so on. Or, he affirms that those four knowledges are indeed the one stream-entry path, but he desires only a single fruit; therefore, he rejects it. The same method applies to the path of the once-returner and so on.

344. Magge diṭṭhe phale ṭhitoti pañhe yasmā dukkhadassanādīhi dassanaṃ apariniṭṭhitaṃ, maggadassanena pariniṭṭhitaṃ nāma hoti, tadā so phale ṭhitoti saṅkhaṃ gacchati, tasmā paṭijānāti.

344. To the question, 'When the path is seen, is one established in the fruit?' he affirms it, because the seeing by means of suffering and so on is incomplete, whereas it is called complete only through the seeing of the path. At that time, he is reckoned as one who is established in the fruit.

345. Dukkhe [Pg.165] diṭṭhe cattāri saccānīti pucchā paravādissa, ekābhisamayavasena paṭiññā sakavādissa. Puna dukkhasaccaṃ cattāri saccānīti anuyoge catunnampi nānāsabhāvattā paṭikkhepo tasseva.

345. The question, 'When suffering is seen, are the four truths seen?' is from the opponent, and the affirmation from the proponent is by way of a single realization. Again, upon the follow-up question, 'Is the truth of suffering the four truths?' the rejection is from that same proponent because of the distinct natures of the four.

Rūpakkhandhe aniccato diṭṭheti pucchā sakavādissa, samuddato ekabindussa rase paṭividdhe sesaudakassa paṭivedho viya ekadhamme aniccādito paṭividdhe sabbepi paṭividdhā hontīti laddhiyā paṭiññā paravādissa.

The question, 'When the form aggregate is seen as impermanent...?' is from the proponent. The affirmation from the opponent is based on the view that, just as when the taste of one drop from the ocean is penetrated, the taste of the remaining water is penetrated, so too when impermanence and so on are penetrated in one phenomenon, they are all penetrated.

Catūhi ñāṇehīti dukkhe ñāṇādīhi. Aṭṭhahi ñāṇehīti sāvakānaṃ sādhāraṇehi saccañāṇehi ceva paṭisambhidāñāṇehi ca. Dvādasahi ñāṇehīti dvādasaṅgapaṭiccasamuppādañāṇehi. Catucattārīsāya ñāṇehīti ‘‘jarāmaraṇe ñāṇaṃ, jarāmaraṇasamudaye ñāṇa’’nti evaṃ nidānavagge vuttañāṇehi. Sattasattatiyā ñāṇehīti ‘‘jarāmaraṇaṃ, bhikkhave, aniccaṃ saṅkhataṃ paṭiccasamuppannaṃ khayadhammaṃ vayadhammaṃ virāgadhammaṃ nirodhadhamma’’nti (saṃ. ni. 2.20) evaṃ tattheva vuttañāṇehi. Sesamettha pāḷinayeneva veditabbaṃ saddhiṃ suttasādhanenāti.

'With four knowledges' means with the knowledge of suffering and so on. 'With eight knowledges' means with the truth-knowledges and the analytical knowledges, which are common to the disciples. 'With twelve knowledges' means with the knowledges of the twelve-factored dependent origination. 'With forty-four knowledges' means with the knowledges stated in the Nidāna Vagga, such as 'knowledge in aging-and-death, knowledge in the origin of aging-and-death,' and so on. 'With seventy-seven knowledges' means with the knowledges stated in that same place, such as: 'Aging-and-death, monks, is impermanent, conditioned, dependently arisen, subject to decay, subject to vanishing, subject to fading away, and subject to cessation' (Saṃyutta Nikāya 2.20). The rest here should be understood in accordance with the method of the canonical text, along with the sutta substantiation.

Anupubbābhisamayakathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discourse on Gradual Realization.

10. Vohārakathāvaṇṇanā

10. Explanation of the Discourse on Conventional Usage.

347. Idāni vohārakathā nāma hoti. Tattha buddho bhagavā lokuttarena vohārena voharatīti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, laddhivasena paṭiññā paravādissa. Lokuttare sotetiādīni tassa ayuttavādībhāvadīpanatthaṃ vuttāni. Ayañhettha adhippāyo – ‘‘saddāyatanameva te lokuttaraṃ, udāhu sotādīnipī’’ti.

347. Now comes the discourse called 'Conventional Usage.' Here, for those whose view is that the Buddha, the Blessed One, speaks with supramundane conventional usage—as is the case with the Andhakas at present—with reference to them, the question is from the proponent, and the affirmation from the opponent is in accordance with their view. The words 'with the supramundane ear' and so on are stated to demonstrate that he is an exponent of an untenable doctrine. This is the intention here: 'Is only the sound-base supramundane for you, or are the ear and so on as well?'

Hañci buddhassa bhagavato vohāro lokiye sote paṭihaññatīti ettha yadi so lokuttare paṭihaññeyya. Lokuttaro siyāti evamattho na gahetabbo. Lokiye paṭihaññamānassa pana lokuttaratā nāma natthīti ayametthādhippāyo. Lokiyena viññāṇenāti etthāpi lokiyenevāti [Pg.166] attho. Itarathā anekantatā siyā. Lokuttarañhi lokiyenapi ñāṇena ñāyatī. Evaṃ sabbaṃ yathānurūpato veditabbaṃ. Sabbe te maggaṃ bhāventīti pañhesu ye maggaṃ nappaṭilabhanti, te sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Ye paṭilabhanti, te sandhāya paṭijānāti.

Here, regarding the statement, 'The conventional usage of the Buddha, the Blessed One, strikes the worldly ear': if it were to strike the supramundane ear, the meaning 'it would be supramundane' should not be taken. But for that which strikes the worldly ear, there is no such thing as a supramundane nature—this is the intention here. 'By worldly consciousness'—here too, the meaning is 'only by the worldly.' Otherwise, it would not be conclusive. For the supramundane is indeed known even by worldly knowledge. Thus, everything should be understood as is appropriate. In the questions, 'Do all those develop the path?' he rejects it with reference to those who do not attain the path, and he affirms it with reference to those who do attain it.

351. Sovaṇṇamayāyāti suvaṇṇamayāya. Idaṃ paravādissa udāharaṇaṃ.

351. 'Sovaṇṇamayāya' means 'suvaṇṇamayāya' (made of gold). This is an example for the opponent.

Eḷaṇḍiyāyāti eḷaṇḍamayāya. Idaṃ sakavādissa udāharaṇaṃ. Lokiyaṃ voharantassa lokiyoti ayampi ekā laddhi. Sā etarahi ekaccānaṃ andhakānaṃ laddhi. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

'Eḷaṇḍiyāyā' means 'eḷaṇḍamayāya' (made of castor-oil plant). This is an example for the proponent. That one who speaks in a worldly way is worldly—this too is one view. That is the view of some Andhakas at present. The rest here is of clear meaning.

Vohārakathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Discourse on Conventional Usage.

11. Nirodhakathāvaṇṇanā

11. Exposition of the Discourse on Cessation

353. Idāni nirodhakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ appaṭisaṅkhānirodhañca paṭisaṅkhānirodhañca dvepi ekato katvā nirodhasaccanti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi mahisāsakānañceva andhakānañca; te sandhāya dve nirodhāti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā paravādissa. Dve dukkhanirodhāti pañhesu yasmā dve dukkhasaccāni na icchati, tasmā paṭikkhipati. Yasmā dvīhākārehi dukkhaṃ nirujjhatīti icchati, tasmā paṭijānāti. Dve nirodhasaccānītipañhesu dvinnaṃ dukkhasaccānaṃ nirodhavasenaanicchanto paṭikkhipati. Dvīhākārehi dukkhassa nirujjhanato paṭijānāti. Dve tāṇānītiādīsupi eseva nayo.

353. Now there is the discourse on cessation. Herein, for those whose view is that, having combined both cessation without discernment and cessation with discernment into one, it is the truth of cessation—just as is the view of the Mahisāsakas and Andhakas at present—with reference to them, the question, ‘Are there two cessations?’ is by the proponent, and the assertion is by the opponent. In the questions, ‘Are there two cessations of suffering?’, because he does not accept two truths of suffering, he rejects it; because he accepts that suffering ceases in two ways, he affirms it. In the questions, ‘Are there two truths of cessation?’, not accepting it on the basis of the cessation of two truths of suffering, he rejects it; he affirms it because suffering ceases in two ways. The same method applies in ‘Are there two refuges?’ and so forth.

Atthi dvinnaṃ nibbānānantiādīsu pucchāsu uccanīcatādīni apassanto paṭikkhipati.

In questions such as 'Are there two Nibbānas?' and so forth, he rejects it by not seeing high and low and so forth.

Appaṭisaṅkhāniruddheti ye paṭisaṅkhāya lokuttarena ñāṇena aniruddhā suddhapakatikattā vā uddesaparipucchādīnaṃ vā vasena na samudācaraṇato niruddhāti vuccanti, te saṅkhāre. Paṭisaṅkhā nirodhentīti. Lokuttarañāṇena nirodhenti anuppattibhāvaṃ gamenti. Nanu appaṭisaṅkhāniruddhā saṅkhārāti pucchā paravādissa[Pg.167]. Tattha bhaggānaṃ puna abhañjanato appaṭisaṅkhāniruddhānaṃ vā ariyamagge uppanne tathā nirujjhanatova sakavādī accantabhaggataṃ paṭijānāti. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

Regarding 'ceased without discernment': this refers to those formations which, not having been ceased by supramundane knowledge with discernment, are called 'ceased' either because of their pure nature or because they do not arise by way of exposition, questioning, and so forth. 'To cause cessation with discernment' means to cause cessation with supramundane knowledge, to bring them to a state of non-arising. 'But are not formations ceased without discernment?' is the question of the opponent. Therein, the proponent affirms utter destruction, because what has been broken is not broken again, or because those things that have ceased without discernment cease in such a way when the noble path has arisen. The rest here is of clear meaning.

Nirodhakathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Discourse on Cessation.

Dutiyo vaggo.

The Second Section.

3. Tatiyavaggo

3. The Third Section

1. Balakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Exposition of the Discourse on Powers

354. Idāni balakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ anuruddhasaṃyutte ‘‘imesañca panāhaṃ, āvuso, catunnaṃ satipaṭṭhānānaṃ bhāvitattā bahulīkatattā ṭhānañca ṭhānato aṭṭhānañca aṭṭhānato yathābhūtaṃ pajānāmī’’tiādīni (saṃ. ni. 5.913) dasasuttāni ayoniso gahetvā ‘‘tathāgatabalaṃ sāvakasādhāraṇa’’nti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, laddhiyaṃ ṭhatvā paṭiññā paravādissa. Tathāgatabalañca nāmetaṃ sāvakehi sādhāraṇampi atthi asādhāraṇampi sādhāraṇāsādhāraṇampi. Tattha āsavānaṃ khaye ñāṇaṃ sādhāraṇaṃ. Indriyaparopariyattiñāṇaṃ asādhāraṇaṃ. Sesaṃ sādhāraṇañca asādhāraṇañca. Ṭhānāṭṭhānādīni hi sāvakā padesena jānanti, tathāgatā nippadesena. Iti tāni uddesato sādhāraṇāni, na niddesato. Ayaṃ pana avisesena sabbampi sādhāraṇanti āha. Tamenaṃ tato vivecetuṃ tathāgatabalaṃ sāvakabalanti puna anuyogo āraddho. Tattha paṭhamapañhe niddesato sabbākāravisayataṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Dutiyapañhe uddesato ṭhānāṭṭhānamattādijānanavasena paṭijānāti. Taññevātiādipañhesu sabbākārena ninnānākaraṇatāya abhāvena paṭikkhipati. Pubbayogo ca pubbacariyā ca atthato ekaṃ, tathā dhammakkhānañca dhammadesanā ca.

354. Now there is the discourse on powers. Herein, some—like the Andhakas nowadays—wrongly grasp the ten suttas in the Anuruddha Saṃyutta, such as: “Friends, through the development and cultivation of these four foundations of mindfulness, I understand the possible as possible and the impossible as impossible as it really is,” and hold the view that “the Tathāgata’s powers are common to his disciples.” With reference to them, the question is by the proponent, and the assertion, standing firm in their view, is by the opponent. The Tathāgata’s powers are indeed both common and uncommon to his disciples, and also partly common and partly uncommon. Among them, the knowledge of the destruction of the taints is common. The knowledge of the varying maturity of others’ faculties is uncommon. The rest are both common and uncommon. For disciples know the possible and impossible, etc., partially, while the Tathāgatas know them completely. Thus, in terms of a general description, they are common, but not in terms of a detailed explanation. Yet this one asserts that all are common without distinction. To distinguish him from that, the question, 'Is the Tathāgata's power a disciple's power?' is again raised. In the first question, it is rejected by considering the all-encompassing scope in the detailed explanation. In the second question, it is acknowledged in terms of a general description, such as knowing just the possible and impossible, etc. In the questions beginning with 'Is it just this?', it is rejected due to the lack of differentiation in all aspects. Past striving and past conduct are the same in meaning, as are the proclamation of the Dhamma and the teaching of the Dhamma.

Indriyaparopariyattipañhe ekadesena sādhāraṇataṃ sandhāya sāvakavisaye paṭijānāti.

In the question on the varying maturity of others’ faculties, he affirms it with respect to the domain of disciples, considering the partial commonality.

355. Idāni [Pg.168] yasmā uddesato ṭhānāṭṭhānādīni sāvako jānāti, tasmā sāvakassa tathā jānanaṃ pakāsetvā tena jānanamattasāmaññena tesaṃ sāvakasādhāraṇattaṃ patiṭṭhāpetuṃ sāvako ṭhānāṭṭhānaṃ jānātītiādayo paravādipañhā honti. Tattha indriyaparopariyattiñāṇaṃ channaṃ asādhāraṇañāṇānaṃ aññataranti na gahitaṃ. Āsavakkhayena vā āsavakkhayanti yaṃ tathāgatassa āsavakkhayena saddhiṃ sāvakassa āsavakkhayaṃ paṭicca vattabbaṃ siyā nānākaraṇaṃ, taṃ natthi. Vimuttiyā vā vimuttinti padepi eseva nayo. Sesamettha uttānatthameva.

355. Now, because the disciple knows the possible and impossible, etc., in terms of a general description, therefore, having shown the disciple's knowledge in that way, to establish that these are common to disciples by that mere commonality of knowledge, the opponent's questions such as, "Does the disciple know the possible and impossible?" etc., are raised. Herein, the knowledge of the varying maturity of others’ faculties is not taken as one of the six uncommon knowledges. As for "by the destruction of the taints, or the destruction of the taints," whatever distinction should be stated regarding the disciple's destruction of the taints in relation to the Tathāgata's destruction of the taints, there is none. The same method applies to the phrase "by liberation, or liberation." The rest here is of clear meaning.

356. Idāni yaṃ sakavādinā ‘‘āsavānaṃ khaye ñāṇaṃ sādhāraṇa’’nti anuññātaṃ, tena saddhiṃ saṃsanditvā sesānampi sādhāraṇabhāvaṃ pucchituṃ puna āsavānaṃ khayetiādayo paravādipañhāva honti. Tesaṃ vissajjane sakavādinā āsavakkhaye visesābhāvena taṃ ñāṇaṃ sādhāraṇanti anuññātaṃ. Itaresupi visesābhāvena sādhāraṇatā paṭikkhittā. Puna ṭhānāṭṭhānādīnaṃ āsavakkhayeneva saddhiṃ saṃsanditvā asādhāraṇapucchā paravādisseva. Tattha āsavakkhayañāṇe paṭikkhepo, sesesu ca paṭiññā sakavādissa. Tato indriyaparopariyattena saddhiṃ saṃsanditvā asādhāraṇapucchā paravādissa. Sā saṅkhipitvā dassitā. Tathāpi indriyaparopariyatte paṭiññā, sesesu ca paṭikkhepo sakavādissa. Tato ṭhānāṭṭhānādīhi saddhiṃ saṃsanditvā indriyaparopariyattassa sādhāraṇapucchā paravādissa. Sāpi saṅkhipitvāva dassitā. Tattha indriyaparopariyatte paṭikkhepo. Sesesu ca paṭiññā sakavādissāti.

356. Now, in order to ask about the commonality of the remaining powers by comparing them with what the proponent has acknowledged as, “the knowledge of the destruction of the taints is common,” the opponent's questions, beginning with “the destruction of the taints,” etc., are again raised. In answering them, the proponent acknowledges that knowledge as common due to the absence of distinction in the destruction of the taints. For the others, commonality is rejected due to the presence of a distinction. Again, by comparing the possible and impossible, etc., with the destruction of the taints, the questions about what is not common belong solely to the opponent. There, the proponent rejects it in the case of the knowledge of the destruction of the taints, but affirms it in the case of the rest. Then, by comparing with the varying maturity of others’ faculties, the questions about what is not common belong to the opponent. This has been briefly shown. Even so, the proponent affirms it in the case of the varying maturity of others’ faculties, but rejects it in the case of the rest. Next, by comparing the possible and impossible, etc., with the varying maturity of others’ faculties, the questions about the commonality of the varying maturity of others’ faculties belong to the opponent. That too has been briefly shown. There, the proponent rejects it in the case of the varying maturity of others’ faculties, but affirms it in the case of the rest.

Balakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of Powers.

2. Ariyantikathāvaṇṇanā

2. Exposition of the Ariyanti Discussion.

357. Idāni ariyantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘na kevalaṃ āsavakkhayañāṇameva ariyaṃ, atha kho purimānipi nava balāni ariyāni’’cceva laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya ariyanti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Puna yadi taṃ ariyaṃ, maggādīsu tena aññatarena [Pg.169] bhavitabbanti maggādivasena pucchā sakavādissa, paṭikkhepo itarassa.

357. Now, there is what is called the Ariyanti discussion. In this regard, some hold the view that "not only the knowledge of the destruction of the taints is noble, but also the preceding nine powers are noble," just as the Andhakas do nowadays. With reference to them, the question "Is it noble?" is the proponent's question, and the other's acknowledgment. Again, if that is noble, it must be one of the path, etc.—thus the proponent's question in terms of the path, etc., and the other's rejection.

Puna suññatārammaṇādivasena pucchā sakavādissa. Tattha dve suññatā – sattasuññatā ca saṅkhārasuññatā ca. Sattasuññatā nāma diṭṭhiyā parikappitena sattena suññā pañcakkhandhā. Saṅkhārasuññatā nāma sabbasaṅkhārehi suññaṃ vivittaṃ nissaṭaṃ nibbānaṃ. Tattha paravādī nibbānārammaṇataṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, saṅkhārārammaṇataṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Manasi karotīti puṭṭhopi nibbānameva sandhāya paṭikkhipati, saṅkhāre sandhāya paṭijānāti. Tato sakavādinā ‘‘ṭhānāṭṭhānādimanasikāro saṅkhārārammaṇo, suññatamanasikāro nibbānārammaṇo’’ti imaṃ nayaṃ gahetvā ‘‘dvinnaṃ phassānaṃ dvinnaṃ cittānaṃ samodhānaṃ hotī’’ti puṭṭho lesokāsaṃ alabhanto paṭikkhipati. Animittāpaṇihitesupi eseva nayo. Sattanimittābhāvato hi khandhā animittā. Saṅkhāranimittābhāvato nibbānaṃ. Ekadhammasmimpi āropetvā ṭhapetabbasaṅkhātena ca paṇidahitabbaṭṭhena paṇihitasaṅkhaṃ gatena sattapaṇidhinā appaṇihitā khandhā. Taṇhāpaṇidhinā taṇhāya vā ārammaṇabhūtena sabbasaṅkhārapaṇidhinā appaṇihitaṃ nibbānaṃ. Tasmā idhāpi paṭikkhepo ca paṭiññā ca purimanayeneva veditabbā.

Again, the proponent's question is based on the object of emptiness, and so on. Herein, there are two kinds of emptiness: emptiness of a being and emptiness of formations. Emptiness of a being means the five aggregates are empty of a being conceived by view. Emptiness of formations means Nibbāna is empty, secluded, and detached from all formations. Here, the opponent rejects by referring to Nibbāna as the object, but accepts by referring to formations as the object. Even when asked, 'Does one attend to it?', he rejects by referring to Nibbāna and accepts by referring to formations. Then, the proponent, taking up this method—'Attention to the possible and impossible has formations as its object, while attention to emptiness has Nibbāna as its object'—when asked, 'Is there a concurrence of two contacts and two consciousnesses?', and finding no opportunity for evasion, rejects it. The same method applies even in the case of the signless and the desireless. For the aggregates are signless due to the absence of a sign of a being. Nibbāna is signless due to the absence of the sign of formations. The aggregates are desireless, being free from the seven kinds of aspiration, which are designated as 'aspired to' because they are an object of aspiration and are reckoned as something to be established in relation to a single thing. Nibbāna is desireless because it is not an object of aspiration by craving, or by the aspiration for all formations that are objects of craving. Therefore, here too, rejection and acceptance should be understood in the same way as before.

358. Tato ‘‘yathā satipaṭṭhānādayo lokuttaradhammā ariyā ceva suññatādiārammaṇā ca, kiṃ te evaṃ ṭhānāṭṭhānañāṇa’’nti anulomapaṭilomapucchā honti. Tattha sabbāpi paṭiññā sabbe ca paṭikkhepā paravādisseva. Imināvupāyena sesañāṇesupi pucchāvissajjanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Pāḷiyaṃ pana sesāni saṅkhipitvā avasāne cutūpapātañāṇameva vibhattaṃ. Tato paraṃ sakasamayepi ‘‘ariya’’nti siddhena āsavānaṃ khayañāṇena saddhiṃ saṃsanditvā sesañāṇānaṃ anulomato ca paṭilomato ca ariyabhāvapucchā honti. Tā sabbā paravādissa, paṭiññā paṭikkhepo ca sakavādissa. Te uttānatthāyeva. Pāḷiyaṃ panettha paṭhamanavamāneva dassetvā satta ñāṇāni saṅkhittānīti.

358. Then, questions are asked in forward and reverse order: 'Just as the supramundane states, such as the foundations of mindfulness, are noble and have emptiness, etc., as their object, are they thus the knowledge of what is possible and impossible?' Here, all affirmations and all rejections belong solely to the opponent. By this method, the questioning and answering regarding the remaining knowledges should be understood. However, in the Pāli text, the remaining ones are summarized, and only the knowledge of the passing away and rebirth of beings is explained in detail at the end. Thereafter, even within one's own school, questions about the nobility of the remaining knowledges are asked, both in forward and reverse order, by comparing them with the knowledge of the destruction of the taints, which is established as 'noble.' All these belong to the opponent, while affirmation and rejection belong to the proponent. These are obvious in meaning. In the Pāli text here, however, only the first and the ninth are shown, and the seven knowledges are summarized.

Ariyantikathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Ariyanti Discussion.

3. Vimuttikathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discussion of Liberation.

363. Idāni [Pg.170] vimuttikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘vītarāgacittānaṃ vimuttipayojanaṃ nāma natthi. Yathā pana malīnaṃ vatthaṃ dhoviyamānaṃ malā vimuccati, evaṃ sarāgaṃ cittaṃ rāgato vimuccatī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya sarāganti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Tato rāgasahagatantiādinā nayena puṭṭho maggakkhaṇe cittaṃ vimuccati nāma. Tadā ca evarūpaṃ cittaṃ natthīti paṭikkhipati.

363. Now comes the discussion called 'Liberation'. Here, for those who hold the view that 'For those whose minds are free from lust, there is no such thing as the purpose of liberation. Just as a soiled cloth, being washed, is liberated from stains, so a lustful mind is liberated from lust'—as is the view of the Andhakas nowadays—the question 'Is it lustful?' is from the proponent, while the admission is from the other. Then, when asked in terms of 'accompanied by lust,' etc., it is said that the mind is liberated at the moment of the path. And at that time, he rejects that such a mind exists.

Saphassantiādinā nayena puṭṭhopi yathā phasso ca cittañca ubho rāgato vimuccanti, evaṃ rāgassa vimuttiṃ apassamāno paṭikkhipati. Sadosādīsupi imināvupāyena attho veditabbo.

Even when asked in terms of 'with contact,' etc., since he does not see how both contact and mind are liberated from lust, he rejects the proposition. The same method should be understood in the case of aversion, etc.

Vimuttikathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discussion of Liberation.

4. Vimuccamānakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Discussion of Being Liberated.

366. Idāni vimuccamānakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘jhānena vikkhambhanavimuttiyā vimuttaṃ, maggakkhaṇe samucchedavimuttiyā vimuccamānaṃ nāma hotī’’ti laddhi, te sandhāya vimuttaṃ vimuccamānanti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarasa.

366. Now comes the discussion called 'Being Liberated'. Here, for those who hold the view that 'What is liberated by jhāna is liberated by liberation through suppression, while at the moment of the path it is called being liberated by liberation through eradication'—referring to them, the proponent's question is, 'Is that which is liberated being liberated?', while the acknowledgement is from the other.

Puna ekadesanti pucchā sakavādissa. Tattha ekadesanti bhāvanapuṃsakaṃ. Yathā vimuttaṃ, ekadesena vā ekadese vā avimuttaṃ hoti kiṃ evaṃ ekadesaṃ vimuttaṃ, ekadesaṃ avimuttanti pucchati. Kiṃ kāraṇā evaṃ pucchatīti? ‘‘Vimuttaṃ vimuccamāna’’nti vippakatabhāvena vuttattā. Yathā hi kariyamānā kaṭādayo vippakatattā ekadesena katā ekadesena akatā honti, tathā idampi ekadesaṃ vimuttaṃ ekadesaṃ avimuttanti āpajjati. Tato paravādī kaṭādīnaṃ viya cittassa ekadesābhāvā paṭhamapañhe paṭikkhipitvā dutiye vimuccamānassa apariniṭṭhitavimuttitāya paṭijānāti. Lokiyajjhānakkhaṇaṃ vā sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Na hi taṃ tadā samucchedavimuttiyā vimuccamānaṃ. Lokuttarajjhānakkhaṇaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Tañhi tadā samucchedavimuttiyā vimuttekadesena vimuccamānantissa laddhi. Tato sakavādī ‘‘yadi te ekameva [Pg.171] cittaṃ ekadesaṃ vimuttaṃ ekadesaṃ avimuttaṃ, evaṃ sante yo ekeneva cittena sotāpanno hoti, sopi te ekadesaṃ sotāpanno, ekadesaṃ na sotāpanno āpajjatī’’ti codanatthaṃ ekadesaṃ sotāpannotiādimāha. Itaro taṃ vidhānaṃ apassanto paṭikkhipati. Sesavāresupi eseva nayo.

Again, the proponent's question is 'partly'. Here, 'partly' is a neuter noun of state. For example, if something is liberated, is it partly or in some part unliberated? Thus, he asks, 'Is one part liberated and one part unliberated?' Why does he ask in this way? Because it is stated in terms of 'liberated' and 'being liberated,' in an incomplete state. Just as mats, etc., being made, are partly made and partly unmade due to their incomplete state, so too here, it would follow that one part is liberated and one part is unliberated. Thereupon, the opponent, due to the absence of parts in the mind, unlike in mats etc., having rejected the first question, acknowledges it in the second due to the incomplete liberation of that which is being liberated. Or he rejects it with reference to the moment of mundane jhāna, for at that time it is not being liberated by way of liberation through eradication. He acknowledges it with reference to the moment of supramundane jhāna, for then it is being liberated by way of liberation through eradication—hence his view that 'it is partly liberated while being liberated'. Then, the proponent, intending to censure, says, 'If for you, a single mind is partly liberated and partly unliberated, then in that case, one who is a stream-enterer with a single mind would, for you, also be partly a stream-enterer and partly not a stream-enterer.' To illustrate this, he says, 'partly a stream-enterer,' and so on. The other, not seeing that implication, rejects it. The same method applies in the remaining sections.

Uppādakkhaṇapañhe yadi ekameva cittaṃ vimuttañca vimuccamānañca, ekasmiṃ khaṇe vimuttaṃ ekasmiṃ vimuccamānaṃ āpajjati. Kiṃ te evarūpaṃ cittanti attho.

In the question concerning the moment of arising: if a single mind is both liberated and being liberated, it would follow that in one moment it is liberated and in another it is being liberated. The meaning is: 'What is such a mind to you?'

367. Suttasādhane paṭhamasuttaṃ paravādissa. Tatrāssāyamadhippāyo – vimuccatīti vippakataniddeso. Tasmā yaṃ tassa yogino evaṃ jānato evaṃ passato etehi āsavehi cittaṃ vimuccati, taṃ vimuccamānaṃ nāma hotīti. Dutiyasuttaṃ sakavādissa. Tatrāssāyamadhippāyo – yadi te vimuccatīti vacanato vimuttaṃ vimuccamānaṃ, idha vimuccatīti vacanābhāvato vimuttameva siyā, na vimuccamānanti.

367. In adducing the sutta proof, the first sutta is for the opponent. Herein, this is the intended meaning: 'is liberated' (vimuccati) is an incomplete designation. Therefore, when the mind of that yogi, knowing thus and seeing thus, is liberated from these taints, that is called 'being liberated'. The second sutta is for the proponent. Herein, this is the intended meaning: if, for you, on account of the statement 'is liberated' (vimuccati), what is liberated is 'being liberated', then here, due to the absence of the statement 'is liberated', it should be only 'liberated', not 'being liberated'.

Idāni ‘‘yathā te vippakatavimuttitāya vimuccamānaṃ, kiṃ evaṃ vippakatarāgāditāya rajjamānādīnipi atthī’’ti codanatthaṃ puna atthi cittantiādi āraddhaṃ. Paravādināpi tathārūpaṃ cittaṃ apassantena sabbaṃ paṭikkhittaṃ. Atha naṃ sakavādī ‘‘dveyeva koṭiyo, tatiyā natthī’’ti anubodhento nanu rattañceva arattañcātiādimāha. Tassattho – nanu bhadramukha, rāgasampayuttaṃ cittaṃ rattaṃ vippayuttaṃ arattanti dveva koṭiyo, rajjamānaṃ nāma tatiyā koṭi natthīti? Duṭṭhādīsupi eseva nayo. Atha naṃ āmantāti paṭijānitvā ṭhitaṃ. Vimuttipakkhepi dveyeva koṭiyo dassetuṃ hañci rattañcevātiādimāha. Tassattho – yadi etā dve koṭiyo sampaṭicchasi, avimuttañceva vimuttañcā ti imāpi sampaṭiccha. Kilesasampayuttañhi cittaṃ avimuttaṃ, vippayuttaṃ vimuttaṃ. Vimuccamānaṃ nāmāti paramatthato tatiyā koṭi natthīti.

Now, for the purpose of censure with the question, 'Just as for you there is 'being liberated' by way of incomplete liberation, are there also states of 'being lustful', etc., by way of incomplete lust, etc.?', the passage beginning 'Is there a mind?' is introduced. The opponent, not seeing such a mind, rejected it all. Then the proponent, instructing him that 'There are only two alternatives, a third does not exist,' said, 'Is it not so that there is the lustful and the lust-free?' and so on. Its meaning is: 'Good sir, is it not so that there are only two alternatives—a mind associated with lust is lustful, and one dissociated is lust-free? A third alternative, called 'being lustful,' does not exist.' The same method applies to the hateful, etc. Then, having acknowledged 'Yes,' he stands his ground. To show that in the case of liberation also there are only two alternatives, he said, 'If there is the lustful...' and so on. Its meaning is: 'If you accept these two alternatives, then accept these also: the unliberated and the liberated. For a mind associated with defilements is unliberated, while one dissociated is liberated. In an ultimate sense, a third alternative called 'being liberated' does not exist.'

Vimuccamānakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of 'Being Liberated'.

5. Aṭṭhamakakathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Commentary on the Discussion Concerning the Eighth Person.

368. Idāni [Pg.172] aṭṭhamakakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ anulomagotrabhumaggakkhaṇe kilesānaṃ samudācārābhāvato aṭṭhamakassa sotāpattimaggaṭṭhapuggalassa dve pariyuṭṭhānā pahīnāti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi andhakānañceva sammitiyānañca; tesaṃ aññataraṃ sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, maggakkhaṇato paṭṭhāya diṭṭhiyā anuppattiṃ sandhāya paṭiññā itarassa. Tato yasmā diṭṭhi nāmesā sotāpannasseva pahīnā, na maggaṭṭhassa, tasmā aṭṭhamako puggalo sotāpannoti anuyogo sakavādissa. Vicikicchāpañhepi eseva nayo. Anusayapañhe pariyuṭṭhānato añño anusayoti tesaṃ laddhi, tasmā ‘‘na heva’’nti paṭikkhittaṃ.

368. Now there is the discussion concerning the eighth person. Herein, there is the view of those who hold that for the eighth person, the individual established on the path to stream-entry, two obsessions are abandoned at the path-moment, due to the non-occurrence of defilements; such is the view of the Andhakas and the Sammitiyas nowadays. With reference to one of them, the question is the proponent's; with reference to the non-arising of wrong view from the path-moment onwards, the admission is the opponent's. Then, because this thing called wrong view is abandoned only by the stream-enterer, not by one on the path, the proponent's rejoinder is, therefore, that the eighth person is a stream-enterer. The same method applies to the question on doubt. In the question on the underlying tendencies, their view is that an obsession is different from an underlying tendency; therefore, it was rejected with 'Not so'.

Sīlabbataparāmāsapañhepi sīlabbataparāmāsapariyuṭṭhānanti vohāraṃ na passati, tasmā paṭikkhipati. Pariyuṭṭhānamevassa pahīnanti laddhi.

Also in the question concerning the clinging to precepts and observances, he does not see the usage 'obsession of clinging to precepts and observances,' and therefore he rejects it. His view is that the obsession itself is abandoned.

369. Maggo bhāvitoti pañhe tasmiṃ khaṇe bhāveti, na bhāvito. Tasmā paṭikkhipati. Amaggenātiādianuyoge paṭhamamaggeneva pahīnabhāvaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Yadi hi amaggena pahīyetha, gotrabhupuggalādīnampi pahīyethāti āpajjanato. Uppajjissatīti pucchā paravādissa, vissajjanaṃ sakavādissa. Sesaṃ sabbattha uttānatthamevāti.

369. In the question, 'Is the path developed?', at that moment one is developing it, but it is not yet developed. Therefore, he rejects it. In the rejoinder, 'By the non-path?' and so on, he rejects it with reference to the fact that abandonment is by the first path itself. For if it were abandoned by a non-path, it would follow that it would be abandoned even for individuals such as the one at change-of-lineage. 'Will it arise?' is the opponent's question; the answer is the proponent's. The rest everywhere is of plain meaning.

Aṭṭhamakakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion Concerning the Eighth Person.

6. Aṭṭhamakassa indriyakathāvaṇṇanā

6. The Commentary on the Discussion of the Faculties of the Eighth Person.

371. Idāni aṭṭhamakassa indriyakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘aṭṭhamako maggakkhaṇe indriyāni paṭilabhati nāma, no cassa paṭiladdhāni hontī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya natthi saddhindriyanti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Natthi saddhāti puṭṭho pana saddhindriyato saddhāya nānattaṃ sallakkhetvā paṭikkhipati. Sesesupi eseva nayo. Yathā pana yassa atthi mano, tassa manindriyampi atthi; evaṃ yassa [Pg.173] saddhādayo atthi, tassa atthi saddhindriyādīnipīti dīpanatthaṃ atthi mano atthi manindriyantiādi āraddhaṃ. Taṃ sabbaṃ uttānatthameva saddhiṃ suttasādhanenāti.

371. Now there is the discussion concerning the faculties of the eighth person. Herein, with reference to those who hold the view that 'the eighth person acquires the faculties at the path-moment, but they are not yet acquired by him'—as do the Andhakas nowadays—the question, 'Is there no faculty of faith?' is the proponent's, and the admission is the opponent's. But when asked, 'Is there no faith?', he rejects it, having noted the difference between faith and the faculty of faith. The same method applies to the remaining cases. However, to illustrate that just as one who has a mind also has the faculty of mind, so too one who has faith and so on also has the faculties of faith and so on, the passage beginning 'There is mind, there is the faculty of mind' is introduced. All of that, together with the adducing of the sutta, is of plain meaning.

Aṭṭhamakassa indriyakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of the Faculties of the Eighth Person.

7. Dibbacakkhukathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Commentary on the Discussion of the Divine Eye.

373. Idāni dibbacakkhukathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ catutthajjhānadhammūpatthaddhaṃ maṃsacakkhumeva dibbacakkhu nāma hotīti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi andhakānañceva sammitiyānañca; te sandhāya maṃsacakkhunti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa.

373. Now there is the discussion of the divine eye. Herein, there is the view of those for whom the physical eye itself, when supported by the states of the fourth jhāna, is called the divine eye—as is the view of the Andhakas and the Sammitiyas nowadays. With reference to them, the question, 'Is it the physical eye?' is the proponent's, and the admission is the opponent's.

Puna ‘‘maṃsacakkhu dibbacakkhu, dibbacakkhu maṃsacakkhū’’ti puṭṭho taṃ mattameva taṃ na hotīti paṭikkhipati. Yādisantiādipucchāsupi ubhinnaṃ ekasabhāvābhāveneva paṭikkhipati.

Again, when asked, 'Is the physical eye the divine eye, and is the divine eye the physical eye?', he rejects it, stating that it is not merely so. Also in questions such as, 'Of what kind?', he rejects it precisely because the two do not have a single, identical nature.

Visayotiādīsu ubhinnampi rūpāyatanameva visayo. Maṃsacakkhu pana āpāthagatameva passati. Itaraṃ anāpāthagataṃ tiropabbatādigatampi. Dibbacakkhussa ca atisukhumampi rūpaṃ gocaro, na tādisaṃ itarassāti evametesaṃ ānubhāvagocarā asadisā.

In questions concerning the object and so forth, the object for both is indeed the sphere of form. However, the physical eye sees only what has come into its range, while the other sees even what is beyond its range, such as what is behind a mountain and so on. And for the divine eye, even extremely subtle form is its domain, which is not so for the other. Thus, their power and range are dissimilar.

Upādiṇṇaṃ hutvā anupādiṇṇaṃ hotīti puṭṭho yasmā maṃsacakkhu upādiṇṇaṃ, dibbacakkhu anupādiṇṇaṃ, na ca maṃsacakkhumeva dibbacakkhūti icchati, tasmā paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho yasmā ‘‘maṃsacakkhussa uppādo, maggo dibbassa cakkhuno’’ti vacanaṃ nissāya maṃsacakkhupaccayā dibbacakkhu uppajjati, tañca rūpāvacarikānaṃ catunnaṃ mahābhūtānaṃ pasādoti icchati, tasmā paṭijānāti. Kāmāvacaraṃ hutvāti puṭṭhopi yasmā na maṃsacakkhumeva dibbacakkhūti icchati, tasmā paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho rūpāvacarajjhānapaccayena uppannattā rūpāvacaraṃ nāma jātanti paṭijānāti.

When asked, 'Having been clung to, does it become unclung to?' he denies it because the physical eye is clung to, the divine eye is unclung to, and he does not hold the view that the physical eye itself is the divine eye. When asked a second time, he affirms it because, relying on the statement, 'The arising of the physical eye is the path to the divine eye,' the divine eye arises dependent on the physical eye, and he holds the view that it is the sensitivity of the four great elements pertaining to the form realm. Even when asked, 'Having been of the sensual realm, does it become of the form realm?' he denies it because he does not hold the view that the physical eye itself is the divine eye. When asked a second time, he affirms that it is called 'of the form realm' because it arises dependent on the form-realm jhāna.

Rūpāvacaraṃ hutvā arūpāvacaranti puṭṭhopi tato paraṃ bhāvanāya arūpāvacarakkhaṇe rūpāvacaracittassa abhāvā paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho arūpāvacarikānaṃ [Pg.174] catunnaṃ mahābhūtānaṃ pasādo hutvā uppajjatīti laddhiyā paṭijānāti. Apariyāpannabhāvaṃ panassa na icchati, tasmā paṭikkhipatiyeva.

Even when asked, 'Having been of the form realm, does it become of the formless realm?' he denies it because beyond that, in the moment of the formless realm through development, the consciousness of the form realm is absent. When asked a second time, he affirms it according to the view that it arises as the sensitivity of the four great elements pertaining to the formless realm. However, he does not hold the view that it is unincluded, and thus he denies it.

374. Dibbacakkhuṃ dhammupatthaddhanti kāmāvacaradhammena upatthambhitaṃ hutvā. Puna dhammupatthaddhanti lokuttaradhammena upatthaddhaṃ. Dveva cakkhūnīti puṭṭho kiñcāpi dibbacakkhuno dhammupatthaddhassa paññācakkhubhāvaṃ na icchati, paññācakkhussa pana atthitāya paṭikkhipati. Puna puṭṭho maṃsacakkhu dhammupatthaddhaṃ dibbacakkhu hotīti laddhivasena paṭijānāti. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

374. The divine eye is 'supported by the Dhamma'—meaning, being supported by sense-sphere phenomena. Again, 'supported by the Dhamma' means supported by supramundane phenomena. When asked, 'Are there only two eyes?' although he does not hold the view that the divine eye supported by the Dhamma is the wisdom eye, he denies it because of the existence of the wisdom eye. Again, when asked, he affirms it according to the view that the physical eye, supported by the Dhamma, becomes the divine eye. The rest here is of clear meaning.

Dibbacakkhukathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on the Divine Eye.

8. Dibbasotakathāvaṇṇanā

8. The Exposition of the Discussion on the Divine Ear.

375. Idāni dibbasotakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ekaṃyeva sotanti puṭṭho dvinnaṃ atthitāya paṭikkhipati. Puna puṭṭho yasmā tadeva dhammupatthaddhaṃ dibbasotaṃ nāma hoti, tasmā paṭijānāti. Sesaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayamevāti.

375. Now comes the discussion on the divine ear. Here, when asked, 'Is there only one ear?' he denies it because of the existence of two. When asked again, he affirms it because that very ear, being supported by the Dhamma, is called the divine ear. The rest is precisely as stated above.

Dibbasotakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on the Divine Ear.

9. Yathākammūpagatañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

9. The Exposition of the Discussion on the Knowledge of Beings Faring According to Their Deeds.

377. Idāni yathākammūpagatañāṇakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘iti dibbena cakkhunā visuddhena…pe… yathākammūpage satte pajānātī’’ti (dī. ni. 1.246; paṭi. ma. 1.106) suttaṃ ayoniso gahetvā yathākammūpagatañāṇameva dibbacakkhunti laddhi, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Puna yathākammūpagatañca manasi karotīti puṭṭho ekacittassa ārammaṇadvayābhāvā paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho nānācittavasena paṭijānāti. Puna lesokāsaṃ adatvā dvinnaṃ phassānanti puṭṭho paṭikkhipati. Iti yathā iminā yathākammūpagatapadena, evameva ime vata bhonto, sattātiādipadehipi saddhiṃ yojanāsu attho veditabbo.

377. Now comes the discussion on the knowledge of beings faring according to their deeds. Here, concerning those who, taking the sutta passage “With the divine eye, purified…he understands beings faring according to their deeds” (Dī. Ni. 1.246; Paṭi. Ma. 1.106) unwisely, hold the view that the knowledge of beings faring according to their deeds is itself the divine eye—the question is posed to the proponent, and the admission is given by the other. Again, when asked whether he also attends to that which fares according to deeds, he denies it because a single consciousness cannot have two objects. When asked a second time, he concedes it by way of different consciousnesses. Further, when asked whether there are two contacts without giving any loophole, he denies it. Thus, just as the meaning should be understood in connection with this phrase “faring according to their deeds,” so too should it be understood in connection with phrases such as “these good sirs, beings,” and so forth, in the applications.

378. Āyasmā [Pg.175] sāriputto yathākammūpagataṃ ñāṇaṃ jānātīti idaṃ sakavādī yasmā thero appicchatāya abhiññāñāṇāni na vaḷañjetīti ekacce na jānanti, tāni panassa neva atthīti maññanti, tasmā taṃ ‘‘dibbacakkhuno alābhī thero’’ti maññamānaṃ pucchati. Teneva kāraṇena ‘‘atthāyasmato sāriputtassa dibbacakkhū’’ti parato puṭṭho paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho yaṃkiñci sāvakena pattabbaṃ, sabbaṃ taṃ therena anuppattanti paṭijānāti. Idānissa vikkhepaṃ karonto sakavādī nanu āyasmā sāriputtotiādimāha. Imañhi gāthaṃ thero vaḷañjanapaṇidhiyā eva abhāvena āha, na abhiññāñāṇassa abhāvena. Paravādī pana abhāvenevāti atthaṃ sallakkheti. Tasmā tassa laddhiyā therassa yathākammūpagatañāṇameva atthi, no dibbacakkhu. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘tena hi na vattabbaṃ yathākammūpagatañāṇaṃ dibbacakkhū’’ti.

378. Regarding the statement, “The Venerable Sāriputta knows the knowledge of beings faring according to their deeds,” the proponent asks this because some do not know that the elder does not exercise his higher knowledges due to his being of few wishes, and they even think that he does not possess them; therefore, he asks the opponent, who thinks, “The elder is one who has not obtained the divine eye.” For the same reason, when asked by the other, “Does the Venerable Sāriputta possess the divine eye?” the proponent denies it. When asked a second time, he admits that whatever can be attained by a disciple, all that has been attained by the elder. Now, creating a diversion, the proponent says, “Does not the Venerable Sāriputta…” and so forth. Indeed, the elder spoke this verse due to the absence of any intention to exercise them, not due to the absence of higher knowledge. The opponent, however, takes the meaning to be that it is due to the absence itself. Therefore, according to his view, the elder possesses only the knowledge of beings faring according to their deeds, not the divine eye. Hence it is said, “Therefore, it should not be said that the knowledge of beings faring according to their deeds is the divine eye.”

Yathākammūpagatañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on the Knowledge of Beings Faring According to Their Deeds.

10. Saṃvarakathāvaṇṇanā

10. The Exposition of the Discussion on Restraint.

379. Idāni saṃvarakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ tāvatiṃse deve upādāya tatuttari devesu yasmā te pañca verāni na samācaranti, tasmā saṃvaro atthīti laddhi, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, verasamudācāraṃ apassato paṭiññā itarassa. Tato yasmā saṃvaro nāma saṃvaritabbe asaṃvare sati hoti, tasmā asaṃvarapucchā sakavādissa, devesu pāṇātipātādīnaṃ abhāvena paṭikkhepo itarassa.

379. Now comes the discussion on restraint. Here, concerning those who hold the view that since the devas, starting from the Tāvatiṃsa devas and in the devas above them, do not engage in the five kinds of harmful conduct, they therefore possess restraint—the question is posed to the proponent, and the admission is given by the other, who does not see the practice of harmful conduct. Then, since restraint exists when there is non-restraint regarding what should be restrained, the question about non-restraint is posed to the proponent, and the other’s denial is due to the absence of killing and so forth among the devas.

Atthi manussesūtiādi saṃvare sati asaṃvarassa asaṃvare ca sati saṃvarassa pavattidassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ.

The statement “There is among humans,” and so forth, is said to show the occurrence of non-restraint when there is restraint, and of restraint when there is non-restraint.

380. Pāṇātipātā veramaṇīti ādipañhesu pāṇātipātādīnaṃ asamācaraṇavasena paṭiññā, pāṇātipātādīnaṃ natthitāya paṭikkhepo veditabbo. Paṭilomapañhā uttānatthāyeva.

380. In the questions beginning with “Abstaining from the taking of life,” the admission is made by way of not engaging in the taking of life and so forth, and the denial should be understood as due to the non-existence of the taking of life and so forth. The reverse questions are of obvious meaning.

Avasāne natthi devesu saṃvarotipañhe pāṇātipātādīni katvā puna tato saṃvarābhāvaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā sakavādissa. Tato chalavasena [Pg.176] yadi saṃvaro natthi, sabbe devā pāṇātipātinotiādipucchā paravādissa. Devānaṃ verasamudācārassa abhāvena paṭikkhepo sakavādissa. Nahevanti vacanamattaṃ gahetvā laddhipatiṭṭhāpanaṃ paravādissa. Evaṃ patiṭṭhitā pana laddhi appatiṭṭhitāva hotīti.

At the end, in the question “Is there no restraint among the devas?” the proponent’s admission is made with reference to the absence of restraint from killing and so forth, after such acts have been done. Then, by way of a trick, the opponent asks, “If there is no restraint, are all devas killers of living beings?” and so forth. The proponent denies it due to the absence of the practice of harmful conduct among the devas. Seizing merely the words “It is not so,” the opponent establishes his view. Thus, the view so established is, however, unestablished.

Saṃvarakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on Restraint.

11. Asaññakathāvaṇṇanā

11. The Exposition of the Discussion on Non-Perception.

381. Idāni asaññakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘saṅkhārapaccayā viññāṇa’’nti vacanato vinā viññāṇena paṭisandhi nāma natthi. ‘‘Saññuppādā ca pana te devā tamhā kāyā cavantī’’ti vacanato asaññasattānampi cutipaṭisandhikkhaṇe saññā atthīti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Tato naṃ sakavādī ‘‘kiṃ te taṃ ṭhānaṃ saññābhavo’’tiādīhi codetuṃ saññābhavo saññāgatītiādimāha. Taṃ sabbaṃ tato parañca pāḷinayeneva veditabbanti.

381. Now there is the discussion called 'Non-Perception'. Herein, for those who hold the view that, because of the statement 'Conditioned by formations is consciousness,' there is no rebirth-linking without consciousness, and because of the statement 'And those devas, with the arising of perception, pass away from that body,' even non-percipient beings have perception at the moment of death and rebirth-linking—just like the Andhakas at present—the question is for the proponent, and the admission is for the other. Then, the proponent, in order to challenge him with questions such as 'Is that state of yours a perception-existence?' and so forth, states 'A perception-existence is a perception-destination,' and so forth. All that and what follows should be understood according to the method of the Pāli text.

Asaññakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Non-Perception.

12. Nevasaññānāsaññāyatanakathāvaṇṇanā

12. The Explanation of the Discourse on the Sphere of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception

384. Idāni nevasaññānāsaññāyatanakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘nevasaññānāsaññāyatana’’nti vacanato na vattabbaṃ ‘‘tasmiṃ bhave saññā atthī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha sabbaṃ pāḷinayeneva veditabbanti.

384. Now there is the discussion called 'The Sphere of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception'. Herein, for those who hold the view that, because of the expression 'the sphere of neither perception nor non-perception,' it should not be said that 'perception exists in that state of being'—just like the Andhakas at present—the question is for the proponent, and the admission is for the other. The rest here should all be understood according to the method of the Pāli text.

Nevasaññānāsaññāyatanakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Sphere of Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception.

Tatiyo vaggo.

The Third Chapter.

4. Catutthavaggo

4. The Fourth Chapter.

1. Gihissa arahātikathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Discourse on a Layperson Being an Arahant.

387. Idāni [Pg.177] gihissa arahāti kathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ yasakulaputtādīnaṃ gihibyañjane ṭhitānaṃ arahattappattiṃ disvā ‘‘gihi assa arahā’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa. Tattha gihissāti yo gihisaṃyojanasampayuttatāya gihi, so arahaṃ assāti attho. Paravādī pana adhippāyaṃ asallakkhetvā gihibyañjanamattameva passanto paṭijānāti. Idānissa ‘‘gihi nāma gihisaṃyojanena hoti, na byañjanamattena. Yathāha bhagavā –

387. Now there is the discussion called 'A Layperson is an Arahant'. Herein, for those who hold the view that 'a layperson can be an arahant,' having seen the attainment of arahantship by the clansman Yasa and others, who remained in the outward appearance of a householder—just like the Uttarāpathakas at present—the question is for the proponent. Herein, 'a layperson' means one who is a layperson on account of being connected with the fetters of a householder; the meaning is 'could such a one be an arahant?' But the opponent, not discerning the intended meaning and seeing only the outward appearance of a householder, admits it. Now, to him: 'A layperson is so called by the fetters of a householder, not merely by outward appearance. As the Blessed One has said—'

‘Alaṅkato cepi samaṃ careyya,Santo danto niyato brahmacārī;

Sabbesu bhūtesu nidhāya daṇḍaṃ,So brāhmaṇo so samaṇo sa bhikkhū’’’ti. (dha. pa. 142);

“Though adorned, if he should live in peace, calm, tamed, restrained, leading the holy life, having laid aside the rod toward all beings— he is a brahmin, he is an ascetic, he is a monk.”

Imaṃ nayaṃ dassetuṃ atthi arahatotiādi āraddhaṃ. Taṃ sabbaṃ uttānatthamevāti.

To show this method, the passage beginning 'An arahant exists...' and so forth, is introduced. All of that has a clear meaning.

Gihissa arahātikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on a Layperson Being an Arahant.

2. Upapattikathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Explanation of the Discourse on Rebirth.

388. Idāni upapattikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘opapātiko hoti tatthaparinibbāyī’’tivacanāni (pu. pa. 35-40) ayoniso gahetvā suddhāvāsesu upapattiyā arahāti laddhi, ‘‘yesaṃ vā upahaccaparinibbāyī’’ti padaṃ parivattitvā ‘‘upapajjaparinibbāyī’’ti pariyāpuṇantānaṃ saha upapattiyā arahā hotīti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Tattha yasmā upapatticittaṃ nāma lokiyaṃ, tena sotāpannādayopi na honti, pageva arahā. Tasmāssa [Pg.178] imaṃ nayaṃ dassetuṃ saha upapattiyā sotāpannotiādi āraddhaṃ.

388. Now there is the discussion called 'Rebirth'. Herein, for those who, having taken the statements 'he is spontaneously reborn, attaining final Nibbāna there' unwisely, hold the view that one becomes an arahant by way of rebirth in the Pure Abodes; or for those who, altering the phrase 'one who attains final Nibbāna after an interval' to 'one who attains final Nibbāna upon being reborn,' learn it as the view that one becomes an arahant together with rebirth—just like the Uttarāpathakas at present—the question is for the proponent, and the admission is for the other. Herein, since the rebirth-consciousness is mundane, by it one cannot even be a stream-enterer or the like, much less an arahant. Therefore, to show them this method, the passage beginning '[Is one] a stream-enterer together with rebirth?' and so forth, is introduced.

389. Sāriputtotiādi imesu mahātheresu ko ekopi saha upapattiyā arahā nāmāti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ.

389. Regarding Sāriputta and others, it is stated for the purpose of challenging the view: 'Is even one among these great elders an arahant together with rebirth?'

390. Upapattesiyenāti paṭisandhicittena. Tañhi upapattiṃ esati gavesati, tasmā upapattesiyanti vuccati. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

390. 'By that which seeks rebirth' means by the rebirth-linking consciousness. For that seeks or searches for rebirth, therefore it is called 'that which seeks rebirth'. The rest here has a clear meaning.

Upapattikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Rebirth.

3. Anāsavakathāvaṇṇanā

3. The Explanation of the Discourse on the Taintless.

391. Idāni anāsavakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ye dhammā anāsavassa arahato, sabbe te anāsavāti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya arahatoti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ anāsavā nāma maggādayo, kiṃ tassa teyeva uppajjantīti codanatthaṃ maggo phalantiādi āraddhaṃ. Cakkhu anāsavanti puṭṭho tassa sāsavattā paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho anāsavassetanti paṭijānāti.

391. Now there is the discussion on the taintless. Herein, for those who hold the view that all phenomena of the taintless arahant are themselves taintless—just as is the case with the Uttarāpathakas nowadays—with reference to them, the question concerning the arahant is for the proponent, and the admission is for the other. Then, to challenge him with 'Do only these, namely the path and so forth, which are called taintless, arise for him?', the discussion concerning the path, the fruit, and so on, is introduced. When asked 'Is the eye taintless?', he rejects it because it is tainted. When asked a second time, 'Does it belong to the taintless one?', he admits it.

392. Cīvarapañhe ekova dhammo anāsavo sāsavo ca hotīti lakkhaṇavirodhabhayā paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho anāsavassa hutvā sāsavassa hotīti paṭijānāti. Taññeva anāsavanti pañhādvayepi eseva nayo. Sakavādī pana taññevāti anuññātattā ‘‘maggo anāsavo hutvā’’tiādīhi codeti. Iminā upāyena sabbattha attho veditabboti.

392. In the question concerning robes, he rejects the notion that a single phenomenon can be both taintless and tainted, fearing a contradiction in characteristics. When asked a second time, he admits that having belonged to a taintless one, it can belong to a tainted one. The same method applies to both questions concerning 'that very thing is taintless'. But the proponent, because 'that very thing' has been conceded, challenges with statements beginning 'the path, having been taintless...' and so on. By this method, the meaning should be understood everywhere.

Anāsavakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Taintless.

4. Samannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Explanation of the Discourse on Accomplishment.

393. Idāni [Pg.179] samannāgatakathā nāma hoti. Tattha dve samannāgamā paccuppannakkhaṇe samaṅgībhāvasamannāgamo ca rūpāvacarādīsu aññatarabhūmippattito paṭilābhasamannāgamo ca. So yāva adhigatavisesā na parihāyati, tāvadeva labbhati. Yesaṃ pana ṭhapetvā ime dve samannāgame añño upapattidhammavasena eko samannāgamo nāma hotīti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi uttarāpathakānaṃ, tesaṃ pattidhammo nāma koci natthīti anubodhanatthaṃ arahā catūhi phalehi samannāgatoti pucchā sakavādissa, pattiṃ sandhāya paṭiññā itarassa. Athassa ‘‘yadi te arahā catūhi khandhehi viya catūhi phalehi samannāgato, evaṃ sante ye catūsu phalesu cattāro phassādayo, tehi te arahato samannāgatatā pāpuṇātī’’ti codanatthaṃ arahā catūhi phassehītiādi āraddhaṃ. Taṃ sabbaṃ paravādinā ekakkhaṇe catunnaṃ phassādīnaṃ abhāvā paṭikkhittaṃ. Anāgāmipañhādīsupi eseva nayo.

393. Now there is the discussion on accomplishment. Herein, there are two kinds of accomplishment: the accomplishment of being endowed at the present moment, and the accomplishment of attainment upon reaching any one of the form realms and so forth. This is obtained only as long as the attained distinction does not decline. But for those who, setting aside these two kinds of accomplishment, hold the view that there is another kind of accomplishment based on the nature of rebirth—just as is the case with the Uttarāpathakas nowadays—to make them understand that there is no such thing as an attainment-nature for them, the question 'Is the arahant accomplished in the four fruits?' is posed by the proponent, and the admission comes from the other with reference to attainment. Then, to challenge him with 'If the arahant is accomplished in the four fruits like the four aggregates, then it would follow that the arahant is accomplished in the four contacts and so forth that are in the four fruits,' the passage beginning 'Is the arahant accomplished in the four contacts?' and so on is introduced. All this is rejected by the opponent due to the absence of the four contacts and so forth at a single moment. The same method applies to the questions concerning the non-returner and so forth.

395. Sotāpattiphalaṃ vītivattoti na paṭhamajjhānaṃ viya dutiyajjhānalābhī; puna anuppattiyā pana vītivattoti pucchati. Sotāpattimaggantiādi yaṃ vītivatto, tenassa puna asamannāgamaṃ dassetuṃ āraddhaṃ.

395. The question 'Has the fruit of stream-entry been transcended?' does not mean transcended in the way that one who attains the second jhāna transcends the first jhāna; rather, it asks whether it has been transcended in the sense of not being attained again. The passage beginning 'the path of stream-entry' and so on is introduced to show his non-possession again of that which has been transcended.

396. Tehi ca aparihīnoti pañhe yasmā yathā paccanīkasamudācārena lokiyajjhānadhammā parihāyanti, na evaṃ lokuttarā. Maggena hi ye kilesā pahīyanti, phalena ca paṭippassambhanti, te tathā pahīnāva tathā paṭippassaddhāyeva ca honti, tasmā sakavādinā āmantāti paṭiññātaṃ. Svāyamattho parato ‘‘arahatā cattāro maggā paṭiladdhā’’tiādīsu pakāsitoyeva. Sesaṃ uttānatthamevāti.

396. In the question 'And not fallen away from them?', because worldly jhāna phenomena fall away due to the arising of opposing factors, supramundane phenomena do not. For the defilements abandoned by the path and tranquillized by the fruit remain abandoned and tranquillized in that way. Therefore, the proponent of one's own doctrine acknowledges with 'Yes'. This meaning is clearly shown later in statements like 'the arahant has attained the four paths' and so on. The rest is of clear meaning.

Samannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Being Endowed.

5. Upekkhāsamannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Explanation of the Discussion on Being Endowed with Equanimity.

397. Arahā [Pg.180] chahi upekkhāhīti kathāyapi imināva nayena attho veditabbo. Arahā hi chasu dvāresu upekkhānaṃ uppattibhabbatāya tāhi samannāgatoti vuccati, na ekakkhaṇe sabbāsaṃ uppattibhāvenāti.

397. In the discussion 'An Arahant with six kinds of equanimity,' the meaning should be understood in this very way. For the Arahant is said to be endowed with them because of the potential for their arising at the six sense-doors, not because of the arising of all of them at a single moment.

Upekkhāsamannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on Being Endowed with Equanimity.

6. Bodhiyābuddhotikathāvaṇṇanā

6. The Explanation of the Discussion on Being a Buddha by Means of Enlightenment.

398. Idāni bodhiyā buddhotikathā nāma hoti. Tattha bodhīti catumaggañāṇassāpi sabbaññutaññāṇassāpi adhivacanaṃ. Tasmā yesaṃ yathā odātena vaṇṇena odāto, sāmena vaṇṇena sāmo, evaṃ bodhiyā buddhoti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi uttarāpathakānaṃyeva; te sandhāya pucchā ca anuyogo ca sakavādissa, paṭiññā ca paṭikkhepo ca itarassa.

398. Now there is the discussion called 'A Buddha by Means of Enlightenment.' Here, 'enlightenment' is a designation for both the knowledge of the four paths and the knowledge of omniscience. Therefore, for those whose view is 'a Buddha by means of enlightenment'—just as 'white' is by means of white color, and 'dark' by means of dark color—as is the case, for example, among the Uttarāpathakas nowadays; with reference to them, the question and investigation belong to the proponent of our own view, and the admission and refutation belong to the other.

Atītāyāti pañhe tasmiṃ khaṇe abhāvato paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho paṭilābhaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Puna kiccavasena puṭṭho kiccābhāvato paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho yaṃ tena tāya karaṇīyaṃ kataṃ, tattha sammohābhāvaṃ paṭijānāti. Lesokāsaṃ pana adatvā dukkhaṃ parijānātītiādinā nayena puṭṭho tassa kiccassa abhāvā paṭikkhipati.

In the question regarding the past, he rejects it because of its non-existence at that moment. When asked a second time, he acknowledges it with reference to its acquisition. Again, when asked in terms of function, he rejects it due to the absence of the function. When asked a second time, he acknowledges the absence of delusion regarding what was to be done by him through that, which has been done. However, when asked in a manner that does not allow a loophole, such as 'Is suffering fully understood?', he rejects it due to the absence of that function.

Anāgatapañhe tasmiṃ khaṇe maggañāṇassa abhāvā paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho ‘‘agamā rājagahaṃ buddho’’ti (su. ni. 410) anāgatāya bodhiyā buddhabhāvaṃ maññamāno paṭijānāti. Bodhikaraṇīyaṃ karotīti puṭṭho tasmiṃ khaṇe kiccābhāvena paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho yadi na kareyya, buddhoti na vucceyya. Yasmā avassaṃ karissati, tasmā karotiyeva nāmāti paṭijānāti. Puna lesokāsaṃ adatvā puṭṭho paṭikkhipati. Paccuppannapañho saddhiṃ saṃsandanāya uttānatthova.

In the question about the future, he rejects it because of the absence of the knowledge of the path at that moment. When asked a second time, he acknowledges it, considering the future enlightenment as Buddhahood, as in the phrase, 'The Buddha went to Rājagaha' (Snp 410). When asked, 'Does he perform what is to be done by enlightenment?', he rejects it at that moment due to the absence of the task. When asked a second time, he acknowledges that if he were not to perform it, he would not be called a Buddha. Since he will inevitably do so, he affirms that he indeed performs it. Again, when asked without giving room for equivocation, he rejects it. The question about the present, in comparison, is of clear meaning.

399. Tisso bodhiyo ekato katvā puṭṭho sabbaññutaññāṇaṃ sandhāya tīhipi buddhoti vattabbabhāvato paṭijānāti. Puna tīhiti puṭṭho sabbāsaṃ [Pg.181] ekakkhaṇe abhāvā paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho atītānāgatapaccuppannassa sabbaññutaññāṇassa vasena paṭijānāti. Puna lesokāsaṃ adatvā satataṃ samitanti puṭṭho paṭikkhipati.

399. When asked combining the three enlightenments, he acknowledges it with reference to the knowledge of omniscience, because it can be said that he is a Buddha by means of all three. Again, when asked about the three, he rejects it because of the non-existence of all of them at a single moment. When asked a second time, he acknowledges it by way of the omniscient knowledge of the past, future, and present. Again, when asked without giving room for equivocation, 'Is it continuous and constant?', he rejects it.

Na battabbaṃ bodhiyāti pucchā paravādissa, bodhiyā abhāvakkhaṇe abuddhabhāvāpattito paṭiññā sakavādissa. Nanu bodhipaṭilābhāti pañhe pana yasmiṃ santāne bodhisaṅkhātaṃ maggañāṇaṃ uppannaṃ, tattha buddhoti sammutisabbhāvato paṭiññā tasseva. Tassa adhippāyaṃ ajānitvā hañcīti laddhiṭṭhapanā paravādissa. Idānissa asallakkhaṇaṃ pākaṭaṃ kātuṃ bodhipaṭilābhā buddhoti bodhiyā buddhoti pucchā sakavādissa. Tassattho – ‘‘kiṃ te yasmā bodhipaṭilābhā buddho, tasmā bodhiyā buddho’’ti. Itaro ‘‘bodhipaṭilābho nāma bodhiyā uppajjitvā niruddhāyapi santāne uppannabhāvoyeva. Bodhi nāma maggakkhaṇe ñāṇa’’nti imaṃ vibhāgaṃ asallakkhentova puna paṭijānāti. Tato sakavādinā bodhipaṭilābhā bodhīti puṭṭho vacanokāsaṃ alabhanto paṭikkhipatīti.

The question, 'Should it not be said, "A Buddha by means of enlightenment"?' is the opponent's; the admission is the proponent's, due to the consequence of this view leading to the state of being a non-Buddha at a moment when enlightenment is absent. However, in the question, 'Is it not by the attainment of enlightenment that one is a Buddha?', his admission is due to the existence of the convention 'Buddha' for a continuum in which the knowledge of the path, called enlightenment, has arisen. Not understanding his intention, the opponent establishes his own view with 'If so...'. Now, to make his lack of discernment clear, the proponent asks, 'If one is a Buddha by the attainment of enlightenment, is one a Buddha by enlightenment?' The meaning is: 'Is it your view that because one is a Buddha by means of the attainment of enlightenment, therefore one is a Buddha by means of enlightenment?' The other, not discerning this distinction—that 'attainment of enlightenment' is the state of its having arisen in the continuum even after that enlightenment has arisen and ceased, while 'enlightenment' is the knowledge at the moment of the path—again admits it. Then, when asked by the proponent, 'Is the attainment of enlightenment enlightenment?', not finding a way to answer, he rejects it.

Bodhiyābuddhotikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on Being a Buddha by Means of Enlightenment.

Iti imā tissopi kathā uttarāpathakānaṃyeva.

Thus, these three discussions also belong solely to the Uttarāpathakas.

7. Lakkhaṇakathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Explanation of the Discourse on Characteristics.

400. Idāni lakkhaṇakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘yehi samannāgatassa mahāpurisassa dveva gatiyo bhavantī’’ti (dī. ni. 1.258) imaṃ suttaṃ ayoniso gahetvā lakkhaṇasamannāgato bodhisattova hotīti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa.

400. Now there is the discussion called 'Characteristics.' Here, taking the sutta 'For one endowed with which, a great man has only two destinies' (DN 14) improperly, some hold the view that only a Bodhisatta is endowed with the characteristics—such as the Uttarāpathakas nowadays. With reference to them, the question is the proponent's, and the admission is the other's.

Cakkavattisattoti pañhesu yasmā cakkavattī sattopi ca bodhisattopi, tasmā abodhisattaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Bodhisattaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti.

In the questions concerning 'a wheel-turning monarch as a being,' since a wheel-turning monarch is a being and may also be a bodhisatta, he rejects it with reference to a non-bodhisatta and acknowledges it with reference to a bodhisatta.

402. Dvattiṃsimānītisuttaṃ [Pg.182] bodhisattameva sandhāya vuttaṃ. So hi pacchime bhave buddho hoti, itaresu cakkavattī, tasmā ābhatampi anābhatasadisamevāti.

402. The sutta on the thirty-two marks was spoken with reference to the Bodhisatta alone, for in his last existence he becomes a Buddha, while in others he becomes a wheel-turning monarch. Therefore, even what is adduced is as if it were not adduced.

Lakkhaṇakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Characteristics.

8. Niyāmokkantikathāvaṇṇanā

8. The Explanation of the Discourse on Entry into the Fixed Course.

403. Idāni niyāmokkantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ghaṭikārasutte jotipālassa pabbajjaṃ sandhāya ‘‘bodhisatto kassapabhagavato pāvacane okkantaniyāmo caritabrahmacariyo’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya bodhisattoti pucchā sakavādissa, laddhiyaṃ ṭhatvā paṭiññā itarassa. Tato yasmā niyāmoti vā brahmacariyanti vā ariyamaggassa nāmaṃ, bodhisattānañca ṭhapetvā pāramīpūraṇaṃ aññā niyāmokkanti nāma natthi. Yadi bhaveyya, bodhisatto sotāpanno sāvako bhaveyya. Na cetamevaṃ. Kevalañhi naṃ buddhā attano ñāṇabale ṭhatvā – ‘‘ayaṃ buddho bhavissatī’’ti byākaronti, tasmā puna bodhisattoti anuyogo sakavādissa. Pacchimabhavaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhepo itarassa. Dutiyapañhe jotipālakālaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā tasseva. Sāvako hutvātiādīsupi eseva nayo. Anussaviyoti anussavena paṭividdhadhammo. Pacchimabhavaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipitvā jotipālakāle anussavaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti.

403. Now comes the discussion called 'Entry into the Fixed Course.' Herein, with reference to Jotipāla's going forth in the Ghaṭikāra Sutta, the question concerning the Bodhisatta is posed by the proponent to those who hold the view that 'the Bodhisatta entered the fixed course in the dispensation of the Blessed One Kassapa and lived the holy life'—such as the Andhakas nowadays; the opponent makes an admission, standing on their view. Because 'fixed course' or 'holy life' are names for the Noble Path, and for Bodhisattas, apart from the fulfillment of the perfections, there is no other entry into the fixed course. If there were, the Bodhisatta would be a stream-enterer disciple. But this is not so. For the Buddhas, standing on the power of their own knowledge, declare, 'This one will become a Buddha.' Therefore, a further question concerning the Bodhisatta is posed by the proponent. The rejection is given by the opponent with reference to the final existence. In the second question, the admission is given by that same one with reference to the time of Jotipāla. The same method applies in the cases of 'having been a disciple,' and so on. 'Anussaviyo' means one who has penetrated the Dhamma through oral tradition. Having rejected with reference to the final existence, he makes an admission with reference to the time of Jotipāla, based on oral tradition.

404. Aññaṃ satthārantiāḷārañca rāmaputtañca sandhāya vuttaṃ. Āyasmā ānandotiādi ‘‘okkantaniyāmāva sāvakā honti, na itare okkantaniyāmā evarūpā hontī’’ti dassetuṃ vuttaṃ.

404. 'Another teacher' is said with reference to Āḷāra and Rāmaputta. The phrase 'the Venerable Ānanda, and so on,' is stated to show that 'only disciples are those who have entered the fixed course; others are not of such a kind.'

Sāvako jātiṃ vītivattoti yāya jātiyā sāvako, taṃ vītivatto aññasmiṃ bhave asāvako hotīti pucchati. Itaro sotāpannādīnaṃ sotāpannādisāvakabhāvato paṭikkhipati. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

'A disciple has overcome birth' asks whether a disciple, having overcome a particular birth, becomes a non-disciple in another existence. The other rejects this with reference to stream-enterers and so on, on account of their being disciples as stream-enterers and so on. The rest here is self-explanatory.

Niyāmokkantikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on Entry into the Fixed Course.

9. Aparāpi samannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā

9. A Further Explanation of the Discussion on Being Endowed.

406. Idāni [Pg.183] aparāpi samannāgatakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘catutthamaggaṭṭho puggalo pattidhammavasena tīhi phalehi samannāgato’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha heṭṭhā catūhi phalehi samannāgatakathāyaṃ vuttanayeneva veditabbanti.

406. Now there is a further discussion called 'Being Endowed.' Herein, with regard to those who hold the view that 'a person established in the fourth path is endowed with the three fruits by way of attainment'—just as the Andhakas do nowadays—the question is for the proponent, and the admission is for the opponent. The rest here should be understood in the same manner as was stated previously in the discussion on being endowed with the four fruits.

Aparāpi samannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā.

A Further Explanation of the Discussion on Being Endowed.

10. Sabbasaṃyojanappahānakathāvaṇṇanā

10. The Explanation of the Discussion on the Abandoning of All Fetters.

413. Idāni saṃyojanappahānakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘nippariyāyeneva sabbasaṃyojanappahānaṃ arahatta’’nti laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Puna sabbe saṃyojanāti puṭṭho heṭṭhā vuttamaggattayena pahīne sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho tena maggena appahīnassa abhāvā paṭijānāti. Sakkāyadiṭṭhiādīsupi paṭhamamaggena pahīnabhāvaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, catutthamaggena anavasesappahānaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Eseva nayo sabbatthāti.

413. Now there is a discussion called 'The Abandoning of the Fetters.' Herein, with regard to those who hold the view that 'the abandoning of all fetters without remainder is Arahantship'—just as the Andhakas do nowadays—the question is for the proponent, and the admission is for the opponent. When asked again about 'all the fetters,' he denies, with reference to those abandoned by the three previously mentioned paths. When asked a second time, he affirms, because there is nothing unabandoned by that path. Regarding personality view, etc., he denies, with reference to their abandonment by the first path; then he affirms, with reference to their complete abandonment without remainder by the fourth path. The same method applies throughout.

Sabbasaṃyojanappahānakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on the Abandoning of All Fetters.

Catuttho vaggo.

The Fourth Chapter.

5. Pañcamavaggo

5. The Fifth Chapter.

1. Vimuttikathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Discussion on Liberation.

418. Idāni vimuttikathā nāma hoti. Tattha vipassanā, maggo, phalaṃ, paccavekkhaṇanti catunnaṃ ñāṇānaṃ vimuttiñāṇanti nāmaṃ. Tesu vipassanāñāṇaṃ niccanimittādīhi vimuttattā, tadaṅgavimuttibhāvena vā vimuttattā vimuttiñāṇaṃ. Maggo [Pg.184] samucchedavimutti, phalaṃ paṭippassaddhivimutti, paccavekkhaṇañāṇaṃ pana vimuttiṃ jānātīti vimuttiñāṇaṃ. Evaṃ catubbidhe vimuttiñāṇe nippariyāyena phalañāṇameva vimutti. Sesāni ‘‘vimuttānī’’ti vā ‘‘avimuttānī’’ti vā na vattabbāni. Tasmā ‘‘idaṃ nāma vimuttiñāṇaṃ vimutta’’nti avatvā aviseseneva ‘‘vimuttiñāṇaṃ vimutta’’nti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā paravādissa. Puna yaṃkiñcīti puṭṭho paccavekkhaṇādīni sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Paṭipannassāti puṭṭho maggañāṇassa anāsavataṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Yasmā pana taṃ sotāpannassa phale ṭhitassa ñāṇaṃ na hoti, tasmā vimuttaṃ nāma na hotīti codanatthaṃ puna sakavādī sotāpannassātiādimāha. Iminā upāyena sabbattha attho veditabbo.

418. Now there is a discussion called 'Liberation.' Herein, insight, path, fruit, and reviewing—the knowledge of these four is called the knowledge of liberation. Among them, the knowledge of insight is called the knowledge of liberation because it is liberated from the signs of permanence, etc., or because it is liberated by way of provisional liberation. The path is liberation by cutting off; the fruit is liberation by tranquilization; but the reviewing knowledge is called the knowledge of liberation because it knows liberation. Thus, among the fourfold knowledge of liberation, it is the knowledge of the fruit alone that is liberation in an absolute sense. The others cannot be said to be either 'liberated' or 'not liberated.' Therefore, the proponent's question is directed at those whose doctrine is that, without specifying 'this particular knowledge of liberation is liberated,' but stating without distinction 'the knowledge of liberation is liberated'—just as the Andhakas do; the admission is made by the opponent. Further, when asked 'whatever,' he rejects it with reference to reviewing, and so on. When asked about 'one who has entered the path,' he admits it with reference to the untainted nature of the path knowledge. But since that knowledge does not exist for a stream-enterer established in the fruit, it is therefore not called 'liberated.' To make this a point of censure, the proponent then says 'for a stream-enterer,' and so on. By this method, the meaning should be understood everywhere.

Vimuttikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on Liberation.

2. Asekhañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Explanation of the Discussion on the Adept's Knowledge.

421. Idāni asekhakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā ānandattherādayo sekhā ‘‘uḷāro bhagavā’’tiādinā nayena asekhe jānanti, tasmā ‘‘sekhassa asekhañāṇaṃ atthī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Jānāti passatīti idaṃ attanā adhigatassa jānanavasena vuttaṃ. Gotrabhunotiādi heṭṭhimāya bhūmiyaṃ ṭhitassa uparūpariñāṇassa abhāvadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Nanu āyasmā ānando sekho ‘‘uḷāro bhagavā’’ti jānātīti paravādī asekhe bhagavati pavattattā taṃ asekhañāṇanti icchati, na panetaṃ asekhaṃ. Tasmā evaṃ patiṭṭhāpitāpi laddhi appatiṭṭhāpitāva hotīti.

421. Now there is the discussion on the adept. Herein, because trainees like the Venerable Ānanda know adepts in such ways as, 'The Blessed One is sublime,' the proponent's question is directed at those, such as the Northerners, who hold the view that 'a trainee possesses an adept's knowledge,' and the opponent makes an admission. The phrase 'he knows, he sees' is stated with reference to knowing what has been personally attained. The phrase 'the change-of-lineage being,' and so on, is stated to show the absence of higher knowledge for one established on a lower stage. The opponent—because the Venerable Ānanda, a trainee, knows 'The Blessed One is sublime,' and this knowledge pertains to the Blessed One, who is an adept—desires to consider that an adept's knowledge; but it is not an adept's knowledge. Therefore, even though this view is thus established, it remains unestablished.

Asekhañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on the Adept's Knowledge.

3. Viparītakathāvaṇṇanā

3. The Explanation of the Discussion on Inversion.

424. Idāni viparītakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘yvāyaṃ pathavīkasiṇe pathavīsaññī samāpajjati, tassa taṃ ñāṇaṃ viparītañāṇa’’nti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi [Pg.185] andhakānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Pathaviṃ nissāya uppannanimittañhi na pathavīyeva, tatra cāyaṃ pathavīsaññī. Tasmā viparītañāṇanti ayametassa adhippāyo. Tato sakavādī ‘‘lakkhaṇapathavīpi sasambhārapathavīpi nimittapathavīpi pathavīdevatāpi sabbā pathavīyeva, tāsu pathavīti ñāṇaṃ viparītaṃ na hoti. Anicce niccantiādivipariyeso pana viparītañāṇaṃ nāma. Kiṃ te idaṃ etesu aññatara’’nti codetuṃ anicce niccantiādimāha. Itaro vipallāsalakkhaṇābhāvaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, pathavīnimittaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti.

424. Now there is the discourse called 'Inversion'. Herein, the proponent's question is directed at those who hold the view that 'for one who attains the earth kasiṇa, perceiving earth, that knowledge is inverted knowledge'—such as the Andhakas—and the admission is from the other. For the sign that arises dependent on earth is not the earth itself, yet this person perceives it as earth. Therefore, his intention is that this is inverted knowledge. Then the proponent, to challenge him, says: 'Characteristic earth, composite earth, sign-earth, and the earth deity—all these are earth. Knowledge of earth regarding these is not inverted. However, the perversion of perceiving the impermanent as permanent, and so forth, is what is called inverted knowledge. Is this knowledge of yours any of these?' The other, referring to the absence of the characteristic of perversion, rejects this; referring to the earth-sign, he admits it.

Kusalanti sekkhaputhujjanānaṃ ñāṇaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Atthi arahatoti pañhesupi vipallāsalakkhaṇābhāvena paṭikkhipati. Pathavīnimittaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Sabbeva pathavīti sabbaṃ taṃ pathavīkasiṇaṃ lakkhaṇapathavīyeva hotīti pucchati. Sakavādī tathā abhāvato paṭikkhipati. Nanu pathavī atthi, atthi ca koci pathaviṃ pathavito samāpajjatīti pucchā sakavādissa. Tassattho – nanu nimittapathavī atthi, atthi ca koci taṃ pathaviṃ pathavitoyeva samāpajjati, na āpato vā tejato vāti. Pathavī atthītiādi ‘‘yadi yaṃ yathā atthi, taṃ tathā samāpajjantassa ñāṇaṃ viparītaṃ hoti, nibbānaṃ atthi, tampi samāpajjantassa sabbavipariyesasamugghātanaṃ maggañāṇampi te viparītaṃ hotū’’ti dassanatthaṃ vuttanti.

The term 'wholesome' is stated with reference to the knowledge of trainees and ordinary people. In the questions such as, 'Does it exist for an Arahant?', he rejects it due to the absence of the characteristic of perversion. He admits it with reference to the earth-sign. The question 'Is all of it earth?' means 'Is all of that earth kasiṇa merely characteristic earth?' The proponent rejects this, as it is not so. The proponent's question is: 'Surely, earth exists, and does someone attain earth as earth?' Its meaning is: 'Surely, the sign-earth exists, and does someone attain that earth as earth, and not as water or fire?' The phrase 'earth exists,' etc., is stated to show: 'If the knowledge of one who attains something as it exists is inverted, then for you, even the path knowledge that eradicates all perversions regarding the existing Nibbāna would be inverted.'

Viparītakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Inversion.

4. Niyāmakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Explanation of the Discourse on Certainty.

428-431. Idāni niyāmakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yo puggalo sammattaniyāmaṃ okkamissati, taṃ ‘‘bhabbo esa dhammaṃ abhisametu’’nti yasmā bhagavā jānāti, tasmā ‘‘aniyatassa puthujjanasseva sato puggalassa niyāmagamanāya ñāṇaṃ atthī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya aniyatassāti pucchā sakavādissa. Tattha niyāmagamanāyāti niyāmo vuccati maggo, maggagamanāya maggokkamanāyāti attho. Yaṃ panassa ñāṇaṃ disvā bhagavā ‘‘bhabbo aya’’nti jānāti, taṃ sandhāya paṭiññā paravādissa.

Now there is the discourse called 'Certainty'. Herein, since the Blessed One knows of the person who will enter the right course of certainty, 'This one is capable of realizing the Dhamma,' therefore the proponent's question, 'Is it for one who is undetermined?', is directed at those who hold the view that 'there is knowledge for an undetermined ordinary person, while still an ordinary person, to attain certainty,' such as the Northerners nowadays. Here, 'to attain certainty' means: certainty is called the path; the meaning is to go to the path, to enter the path. The opponent's admission is made with reference to that knowledge, seeing which the Blessed One knows, 'This one is capable.'

Athassa [Pg.186] sakavādī ayuttavāditaṃ dīpetuṃ niyatassāti viparītānuyogamāha. Tattha paṭhamapañhe maggena niyatassa aniyāmagamanāya ñāṇaṃ nāma natthīti paṭikkhipati. Dutiye natthibhāvena paṭijānāti. Tatiye aniyatassa natthīti puṭṭhattā laddhivirodhena paṭikkhipati. Puna paṭhamapañhameva catutthaṃ katvā niyatassa niyāmagamanādivasena tayo pañhā katā. Tesu paṭhame yasmā ādimaggena niyatassa puna tadatthāya ñāṇaṃ natthi, tasmā paṭikkhipati. Dutiye natthibhāveneva paṭijānāti. Tatiye laddhivirodheneva paṭikkhipati. Puna paṭhamapañhaṃ aṭṭhamaṃ katvā aniyatassa aniyāmagamanādivasena tayo pañhā katā. Tesaṃ attho vuttanayeneva veditabbo. Puna paṭhamapañhameva dvādasamaṃ katvā taṃmūlakā atthi niyāmotiādayo pañhā katā. Tattha yasmā niyāmagamanāya ñāṇaṃ nāma maggañāṇameva hoti, tasmā taṃ sandhāya atthi niyāmoti vuttaṃ. Itaro pana niyāmoti vutte paṭikkhipati, ñāṇanti vutte paṭijānāti. Satipaṭṭhānādīsupi eseva nayo. Paccanīkaṃ uttānatthameva. Gotrabhunotiādi yena yaṃ appattaṃ, tassa taṃ natthīti dassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Bhagavā jānātīti attano ñāṇabalena jānāti, na tassa niyāmagamanañāṇasabbhāvato. Tasmā iminā kāraṇena patiṭṭhitāpissa laddhi appatiṭṭhitāyevāti.

Then, to show the opponent's incorrect assertion, the proponent poses a counter-question, 'Is it for one who is certain?' Here, in the first question, he rejects it because there is no knowledge for one made certain by the path to attain non-certainty. In the second, he admits it as non-existent. In the third, he rejects it due to contradiction with his doctrine, because it was asked whether it does not exist for the undetermined. Again, making the first question the fourth, three questions are formed regarding the certain one's attainment of certainty, and so on. Among these, in the first, he rejects it because for one made certain by the initial path, there is no knowledge to attain that again. In the second, he admits it as non-existent. In the third, he rejects it due to contradiction with his doctrine. Again, making the first question the eighth, three questions are formed regarding the uncertain one's attainment of non-certainty, and so on. Their meaning should be understood in the way already stated. Again, making the first question the twelfth, questions based on it, such as 'Is there certainty?', are formed. Here, because the knowledge for attaining certainty is indeed path knowledge, it is said, 'Is there certainty?' with reference to that. But when 'certainty' is mentioned, the other rejects it; when 'knowledge' is mentioned, he admits it. The same method applies to the foundations of mindfulness, etc. The opposing argument is indeed clear in meaning. The phrase 'change-of-lineage,' etc., is stated to show that for one who has not attained something, that thing does not exist. 'The Blessed One knows' means He knows by the power of His own knowledge, not because of the existence of that person's knowledge for attaining certainty. Therefore, by this reasoning, even if their view seems established, it remains unestablished.

Niyāmakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Certainty.

5. Paṭisambhidākathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Explanation of the Discourse on Analytical Knowledges.

432-433. Idāni paṭisambhidākathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘yaṃkiñci ariyānaṃ ñāṇaṃ, sabbaṃ lokuttaramevā’’ti gahetvā ‘‘sabbaṃ ñāṇaṃ paṭisambhidā’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sammutiñāṇapañhesu pathavīkasiṇasammutiyaṃ samāpattiñāṇaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, niruttiñāṇaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Ye keci sammutinti pañhe puthujjane sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Cetopariyāyapañhesu puthujjanassa ñāṇaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, ariyassa ñāṇaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Sabbā paññātipañhesu kasiṇasamāpattipañhaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, lokuttaraṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Pathavīkasiṇasamāpattintiādi ‘‘yā etesu ettakesu ṭhānesu paññā, kiṃ sabbā sā paṭisambhidā’’ti pucchanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Tena [Pg.187] hi sabbaṃ ñāṇanti yasmā sabbā lokuttarapaññā paṭisambhidā, tasmā sabbanti vacanaṃ sāmaññaphalena saddhiṃ patiṭṭhāpetīti.

Now there is the discourse on analytical knowledges. Herein, the proponent's question is directed at those who, grasping that 'whatever knowledge of the noble ones is entirely supramundane,' hold the doctrine that 'all knowledge is analytical knowledge,' like the Andhakas; the admission is from the other. In questions concerning conventional knowledge, regarding the convention of the earth kasiṇa, one rejects it with reference to the knowledge of attainment, and affirms it with reference to the knowledge of expression. In the question concerning 'any conventional knowledge,' one rejects it with reference to ordinary people. In questions concerning knowledge of others’ minds, one rejects it with reference to the knowledge of an ordinary person, and affirms it with reference to the knowledge of a noble one. In the question, 'Is all wisdom analytical knowledge?', one rejects it with reference to kasiṇa attainment, and affirms it with reference to the supramundane. The phrase 'earth kasiṇa attainment,' and so on, is stated for the purpose of asking: 'The wisdom in these many instances—is all of it analytical knowledge?' Therefore, the statement 'In that case, all knowledge...' establishes this together with the fruit of recluseship, because all supramundane wisdom is analytical knowledge.

Paṭisambhidākathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Analytical Knowledges.

6. Sammutiñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Discourse on Conventional Knowledge

434-435. Idāni sammutiñāṇakathā nāma hoti. Tattha sammutisaccaṃ paramatthasaccanti dve saccāni. Ye pana evaṃ vibhāgaṃ akatvā saccanti vacanasāmaññena sammutiñāṇampi ‘‘saccārammaṇamevā’’ti vadanti, seyyathāpi andhakā; te ayuttavādinoti tesaṃ vādavisodhanatthaṃ ayaṃ kathā āraddhā. Tattha na vattabbanti pucchā paravādissa, paramatthasaccaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā sakavādissa. Sammutisaccamhīti sammutiṃ anupaviṭṭhe saccamhi. Paccatte vā bhummavacanaṃ, sammutisaccanti attho. Sammutiñāṇaṃ saccārammaṇaññevāti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Tato naṃ ‘‘yadi taṃ avisesena saccārammaṇaññeva, tena ñāṇena dukkhapariññādīni kareyyā’’ti codetuṃ tena ñāṇenātiādimāha.

434-435. Now begins the discourse on conventional knowledge. Herein, there are two truths: conventional truth and ultimate truth. But those who, without making such a distinction, say that even conventional knowledge has 'truth as its object' merely by the common usage of the word 'truth,' like the Andhakas, are speakers of what is inappropriate. This discourse is begun in order to refute their view. Here, the question 'Should it not be said?' is from the opponent; the assertion, made with reference to ultimate truth, is from one's own school. 'In conventional truth' means in a truth that has entered into convention. Or, it is a locative case in the sense of 'itself'; the meaning is 'conventional truth.' The question 'Is conventional knowledge with only truth as its object?' is from one's own school, the admission is from the other. Then, to challenge him, 'If it is indiscriminately with only truth as its object, then with that knowledge one should accomplish the full comprehension of suffering, etc.,' he said 'with that knowledge,' and so forth.

Sammutiñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse on Conventional Knowledge.

7. Cittārammaṇakathāvaṇṇanā

7. Commentary on the Discourse on Mind as Object

436-438. Idāni cittārammaṇakathā nāma hoti. Tattha cetopariyāye ñāṇanti vacanamattameva gahetvā ‘‘taṃ ñāṇaṃ cittārammaṇamevā’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Athassa ‘‘yo sarāgādivasena cittaṃ jānāti, tassa rāgādayopi ārammaṇā honti, tasmā na vattabbaṃ taṃ cittārammaṇaññevā’’ti codanatthaṃ nanu atthi kocītiādi āraddhaṃ. Phassārammaṇeti phassasaṅkhāte ārammaṇe. Vedanārammaṇetiādīsupi eseva nayo. Puna phassārammaṇe ñāṇaṃ na vattabbanti puṭṭho phassassa phusanalakkhaṇaṃ [Pg.188] manasikaroto phassovārammaṇaṃ hotīti paṭijānāti. Kiṃ panetaṃ phassapariyāye ñāṇanti puṭṭho pana tādisassa suttapadassa abhāvā paṭikkhipati. Vedanādīsupi eseva nayo. Idāni yaṃ nissāya laddhi, tadeva dassetvā laddhiṃ patiṭṭhāpetuṃ nanu cetopariyāye ñāṇantiādimāha. Sā panesā vacanamattābhinivesena patiṭṭhāpitāpi appatiṭṭhāpitāva hotīti.

436-438. Now begins the discourse on mind as object. Herein, with reference to those who, taking the mere phrase 'knowledge of penetration of mind,' hold the doctrine that 'that knowledge has only the mind as its object'—like the present-day Andhakas—the question is from one's own school, the admission from the other. Then, to challenge him by saying, 'One who knows the mind by way of lust, etc., also has lust, etc., as objects; therefore, it should not be said that it has only the mind as its object,' the phrase 'Is there not someone...' and so on is introduced. 'With contact as object' means with an object reckoned as contact. The same method applies to 'with feeling as object,' and so on. When asked again, 'Should it not be said that there is knowledge with contact as its object?', one admits that for one who attends to the characteristic of contact as touching, contact itself is the object. But when further asked, 'What then is this knowledge in terms of contact?', one denies it due to the absence of such a sutta passage. The same method applies to feeling, etc. Now, to establish the doctrine by showing that upon which it relies, he said, 'Is there not knowledge of penetration of mind?' and so on. However, this doctrine, even though established merely by attachment to the words, is as if not established at all.

Cittārammaṇakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse on Mind as Object.

8. Anāgatañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Commentary on the Discourse on Knowledge of the Future

439-440. Idāni anāgatañāṇakathā nāma hoti. Tattha anāgataṃ nāma antarampi atthi, anantarampi. Tesu anantare ekanteneva ñāṇaṃ natthi. Yathā ca anantare, tathā ekavīthiekajavanapariyāpannepi. Tattha ye sabbasmimpi anāgate ñāṇaṃ icchanti, seyyathāpi andhakā; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yaṃ te anāgate ñāṇaṃ, kiṃ tena anantaraṃ anāgataṃ mūlādivasena jānātī’’ti codetuṃ anāgataṃ mūlatotiādimāha. Tattha mūlatotiādīni sabbāni kāraṇavevacanāneva. Kāraṇañhi yaṃ attano phalaṃ karoti, taṃ tattha mūlayati patiṭṭhātīti mūlaṃ. Tato ca taṃ hinoti pavattayatīti hetu. Tadeva taṃ nideti ‘‘handa naṃ gaṇhathā’’ti. Niyyāteti viyāti nidānaṃ. Tato taṃ sambhavatīti sambhavo. Pabhavatīti pabhavo. Tattha ca taṃ samuṭṭhāti, taṃ vā naṃ samuṭṭhāpetīti samuṭṭhānaṃ. Tadeva naṃ āharatīti āhāro. Tañcassa apariccajitabbaṭṭhena ārammaṇaṃ. Tadeva cetaṃ paṭicca etīti paccayo. Tato naṃ samudetīti samudayoti vuccati. Yasmā pana anantaraṃ cittaṃ etehākārehi na sakkā jānituṃ, tasmā na hevanti paṭikkhipati. Anāgataṃ hetupaccayatanti yā anantarānāgate citte hetupaccayatā, taṃ jānāti. Ye tattha dhammā hetupaccayā honti, te jānātīti attho. Sesapadesupi eseva nayo. Gotrabhunotiādi yasmiṃ anāgate ñāṇaṃ na uppajjati, taṃ sarūpato dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Pāṭaliputtassāti [Pg.189] suttaṃ yasmiṃ anāgate ñāṇaṃ uppajjati, taṃ dassetuṃ āhaṭaṃ. Yasmā panetaṃ na sabbasmiṃ anāgate ñāṇassa sādhakaṃ; tasmā anāhaṭamevāti.

439-440. Now begins the discourse on knowledge of the future. Herein, 'the future' is both that which is non-immediate and that which is immediate. Among these, there is certainly no knowledge of the immediate. And just as with the immediate, so too with what is included in a single cognitive series and a single impulsion. Here, with reference to those who desire knowledge of the entire future, like the Andhakas, the question is from one's own school, the admission from the other. Then, to challenge him, 'That knowledge of the future which you possess—does it know the immediate future by way of its root, etc.?' he said 'the future by way of its root,' and so on. Here, 'by way of its root,' and so on, are all synonyms for cause. For a cause is that which produces its own result; it is called a root (mūla) because it grounds (mūlayati) and establishes (patiṭṭhāti) it there. And from that, it sends it forth (hinoti) and makes it proceed (pavattayati); hence it is called a cause (hetu). That very thing directs it, saying, 'Come now, take it,' and delivers it, as it were; thus it is called a source (nidāna). From that, it comes into being (sambhavati); hence it is called an origin (sambhava). It arises (pabhavati) from that; hence it is called a source (pabhava). And there, it arises (samuṭṭhāti) from that, or it causes that to arise (samuṭṭhāpeti); thus it is called an arising (samuṭṭhāna). That very thing brings it (āharati); hence it is called a nutriment (āhāra). And because it should not be abandoned, it is called an object (ārammaṇa). And that very thing comes depending on this; hence it is called a condition (paccaya). From that, it arises together (samudeti); hence it is called an origin (samudaya). But because the immediate consciousness cannot be known in these ways, he therefore rejects it, saying, 'It is not so.' As for 'knows the causal conditionality of the future,' this means one knows that causal conditionality which is in the immediate future consciousness. The meaning is: one knows those phenomena that are causal conditions there. The same method applies to the remaining terms. 'Change-of-lineage,' etc., is said to show, by its own nature, that future in which knowledge does not arise. The sutta concerning Pāṭaliputta is cited to show that future in which knowledge does arise. But because this is not proof of knowledge of the entire future, it is therefore as if not cited.

Anāgatañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse on Knowledge of the Future.

9. Paṭuppannañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Discourse on Knowledge of the Present

441-442. Idāni paṭuppannañāṇakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘sabbasaṅkhāresu aniccato diṭṭhesu tampi ñāṇaṃ aniccato diṭṭhaṃ hotī’’ti vacanaṃ nissāya ‘‘avisesena sabbasmiṃ paccuppanne ñāṇaṃ atthī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya paṭuppanneti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi avisesena paṭuppanne ñāṇaṃ atthi, khaṇapaccuppannepi tena bhavitabbaṃ. Evaṃ sante dvinnaṃ ñāṇānaṃ ekato abhāvā teneva ñāṇena taṃ jānitabbaṃ hotī’’ti codanatthaṃ tenāti anuyogo sakavādissa. Tattha paṭhamapañhe teneva taṃ jānituṃ na sakkāti paṭikkhepo itarassa. Dutiyapañhe santatiṃ sandhāya paṭiññā tasseva. Paṭipāṭito bhaṅgaṃ passanto bhaṅgānupassaneneva bhaṅgānupassanāñāṇaṃ passatīti adhippāyo. Tena ñāṇena taṃ ñāṇaṃ jānātītiādīsupi eseva nayo. Tena phassena taṃ phassantiādīnissa lesokāsanivāraṇatthaṃ vuttāni. Yaṃ panetena laddhipatiṭṭhāpanatthaṃ nanu sabbasaṅkhāretiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha nayato taṃ ñāṇaṃ diṭṭhaṃ hoti, na ārammaṇatoti adhippāyena paṭiññā sakavādissa. Tasmā evaṃ patiṭṭhitāpissa laddhi appatiṭṭhitāva hoti.

Now, there is a discussion called 'Knowledge of the Present.' Here, some, relying on the statement, 'When all conditioned things are seen as impermanent, that knowledge too is seen as impermanent,' hold the view that 'there is knowledge in every present without distinction,' like the Andhakas. With reference to them, the question 'Is there knowledge in the present?' is for the proponent of one's own doctrine, the admission for the other. Then, to challenge him, the proponent of one's own doctrine follows up: 'If there is knowledge in every present without distinction, then it must exist even in a momentary present. If so, since two knowledges do not arise simultaneously, it would have to be known by that very knowledge.' In the first question, the other's rejection is that it is impossible to know it by that knowledge itself. In the second question, his admission is with reference to continuity. The meaning is that one who sees dissolution sequentially sees the knowledge of contemplation of dissolution through the contemplation of dissolution itself. The same method applies to statements like 'that knowledge knows that knowledge,' and so on. Phrases like 'that contact contacts that contact,' and so on, are stated to prevent any pretext. Moreover, the statement 'Indeed, all conditioned things...' and so on, was made by him to establish his doctrine. There, the admission of the proponent of one's own doctrine is with the intention that that knowledge is seen by way of method, not as an object. Therefore, even though his doctrine is established in this way, it remains unestablished.

Paṭuppannañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of Knowledge of the Present.

10. Phalañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

10. Commentary on the Discussion on the Knowledge of Fruits.

443-444. Idāni phale ñāṇakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘buddhāpi sattānaṃ ariyaphalappattiyā dhammaṃ desenti sāvakāpi, iti iminā sāmaññena [Pg.190] buddhānaṃ viya sāvakānampi tena tena sattena pattabbe phale ñāṇaṃ atthī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya sāvakassāti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi sāvakassa phale ñāṇaṃ atthi, yathā buddhā samānepi sotāpattiphale attano ñāṇabalena ‘ayaṃ ekabījī, ayaṃ kolaṃkolo, ayaṃ sattakkhattuparamo’ti phalassakataṃ paññapenti, kiṃ te evaṃ sāvakopī’’ti codetuṃ sāvako phalassa kataṃ paññapetīti āha. Itaro paṭikkhipati.

Now there is the discussion on knowledge of the fruits. Here, the view of those who hold that 'just as the Buddhas teach the Dhamma for beings to attain the noble fruits, so do the disciples; thus, in this general sense, like the Buddhas, the disciples too have knowledge of the fruit attainable by each particular being,' is like that of the Andhakas. With reference to them, the question concerning the disciple is for the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the other's is the admission. Then, to challenge him, he says: 'If the disciple has knowledge of the fruits, just as the Buddhas, even regarding the same stream-entry fruit, declare the distinctness of the fruit by the power of their own knowledge, saying: "This one is a one-seeder, this one is a family-to-family goer, this one is one with at most seven more existences," does the disciple also declare the distinctness of the fruit in this way?' The other rejects it.

Atthi sāvakassa phalaparopariyattītiādi phale ñāṇassa atthitāya paccayapucchanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Ayañhettha adhippāyo – buddhānaṃ ‘‘idaṃ phalaṃ paraṃ, idaṃ opara’’nti evaṃ phalānaṃ uccāvacabhāvajānanasaṅkhātā phale paropariyatti nāma atthi. Tathā indriyapuggalaparopariyattiyo, tāsaṃ atthitāya tassa tassa puggalassa tesaṃ tesaṃ indriyānaṃ vasena taṃ taṃ phalaṃ jānanti, kiṃ te sāvakassāpi etā paropariyattiyo atthīti.

The question 'Does the disciple have knowledge of the higher and lower states of fruits?' and so on, is made for the purpose of inquiring into the conditions for the existence of knowledge regarding the fruits. Here, the intention is this: The Buddhas possess what is called the knowledge of the higher and lower states of fruits, which consists in knowing 'This fruit is higher, this is lower.' Similarly, there are the knowledges of the higher and lower states of faculties and individuals. Due to the existence of these, they know each particular fruit according to the faculties of each particular individual. Is it that the disciples also possess these knowledges of higher and lower states?

Atthi sāvakassa khandhapaññattītiādīnipi ‘‘yadi te sāvakassa buddhānaṃ viya phale ñāṇaṃ atthi, imā hi pissa paññattīhi bhavitabbaṃ. Kimassa tā atthi, sakkoti so etā paññattiyo attano balena jānituṃ vā paññapetuṃ vā’’ti codanatthaṃ vuttāni. Sāvako jinotiādi ‘‘yadi sāvakassa buddhānaṃ viya phale ñāṇaṃ atthi, evaṃ sante sveva jino’’ti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Sāvako anuppannassāti pañhepi ayameva nayo. Aññāṇīti pañhe avijjāsaṅkhātassa aññāṇassa vihatattā paṭikkhitto, na panassa buddhānaṃ viya phale ñāṇaṃ atthi. Tasmā appatiṭṭhitova paravādīvādoti.

The questions 'Does the disciple have the designation of aggregates?' and so forth, are made for the purpose of censure, meaning: 'If the disciple has knowledge of the fruits like the Buddhas, then these designations must also belong to him. Does he possess them? Can he know or establish these designations by his own power?' The statement 'The disciple is a conqueror,' and so on, is made for the purpose of censure, meaning: 'If the disciple has knowledge of the fruits like the Buddhas, then in that case, he himself would be a Conqueror.' In the question concerning the disciple and the unarisen, the same method applies. In the question 'Is he ignorant?', it is rejected because ignorance, which is reckoned as non-knowledge, has been destroyed; however, he does not possess knowledge of the fruits like the Buddhas. Therefore, the opponent's argument is indeed unestablished.

Phalañāṇakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discussion on the Knowledge of Fruits.

Pañcamo vaggo.

The Fifth Chapter.

Mahāpaṇṇāsako samatto.

The Great Fifty is concluded.

6. Chaṭṭhavaggo

6. The Sixth Chapter.

1. Niyāmakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discussion on Certainty.

445-447. Idāni [Pg.191] niyāmakathā nāma hoti. Tattha niyāmoti ‘‘bhabbo niyāmaṃ okkamituṃ kusalesu dhammesu sammatta’’nti (pu. pa. 13) vacanato ariyamaggo vuccati. Yasmā pana tasmiṃ uppajjitvā niruddhepi puggalo aniyato nāma na hoti, tasmā ‘‘so niyāmo niccaṭṭhena asaṅkhato’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Tato ‘‘yadi so asaṅkhato, evarūpena tena bhavitabba’’nti dīpento nibbānantiādimāha. Saṃsandanapucchā uttānatthāyeva.

Now there is the discussion on certainty. Herein, 'certainty' refers to the Noble Path, according to the statement, 'capable of entering into certainty, the rightness in wholesome states' (Pug. 13). However, because a person is not called 'uncertain' even after that path, having arisen, has ceased, some, like the Andhakas, hold the view that 'this certainty is unconditioned in the sense of being permanent.' With reference to them, the question is for the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the admission is for the other. Then, clarifying, 'If it is unconditioned, it must be of such a nature,' he states what begins with 'Nibbāna.' The question for comparison is of straightforward meaning.

Atthi kecītiādi niyāmassa saṅkhatabhāvadīpanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Maggo asaṅkhatotipañhe tassa uppādanirodhabhāvato paṭikkhipatīti. Niyāmo saṅkhatotipañhe niruddhepi magge niyāmassa atthitaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Sotāpattiniyāmotiādipañhesupi anulomato ca paṭilomato ca imināva nayena attho veditabbo. Pañca asaṅkhatānīti puṭṭho pañcannaṃ asaṅkhatānaṃ āgataṭṭhānaṃ apassanto paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho catunnaṃ sammattaniyāmānaṃ niyāmavacanato nibbānassa ca asaṅkhatabhāvato paṭijānāti. Micchattaniyāmapañho niyāmavacanamattena asaṅkhatatāya ayuttabhāvadīpanatthaṃ vuttoti.

The passage beginning 'There are some,' and so on, is stated for the purpose of explaining the conditioned nature of certainty. In the question 'Is the path unconditioned?', it is rejected because of its nature of arising and ceasing. In the question 'Is certainty conditioned?', he rejects it with reference to the existence of certainty even when the path has ceased. And in questions such as 'Is the certainty of stream-entry...?', the meaning should be understood in the same way, both in direct and reverse order. Being asked 'Are there five unconditioned things?', not seeing a textual source for five unconditioned things, he rejects it. Being asked a second time, he affirms it because of the term 'certainty' for the four right certainties, and because of the unconditioned nature of Nibbāna. The question concerning the wrong certainty is stated for the purpose of explaining its inappropriateness, merely by the term 'certainty' implying an unconditioned state.

Niyāmakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discussion on Certainty.

2. Paṭiccasamuppādakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discussion on Dependent Origination.

448. Idāni paṭiccasamuppādakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ nidānavagge ‘‘uppādā vā tathāgatānaṃ anuppādā vā tathāgatānaṃ ṭhitāva sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā’’tiādivacanato (saṃ. ni. 2.20) ‘‘paṭiccasamuppādo asaṅkhato’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānañca mahisāsakānañca; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa.

448. Now there is the exposition on dependent origination. Here, concerning those who, based on statements in the Nidānavagga such as, “Whether Tathāgatas arise or do not arise, that element stands firm, the fixedness of the Dhamma,” hold the view that “dependent origination is unconditioned,” as do the Pubbaseliyas and the Mahisāsakas—with reference to them, the question is by the proponent of their own view, the affirmation by the other.

449. Avijjā [Pg.192] asaṅkhatāti ādayo pañhā avijjādīnaṃyeva paṭiccasamuppādabhāvadassanatthaṃ vuttā. Yena panatthena tattha ekekaṃ aṅgaṃ ‘‘paṭiccasamuppādo’’ti vuccati, so paṭiccasamuppādavibhaṅge vuttoyeva.

449. The questions beginning with “Is ignorance unconditioned?” were stated for the purpose of showing that ignorance and so forth are themselves dependently arisen. However, the sense in which each individual factor there is called “dependent origination” has indeed been explained in the Exposition of Dependent Origination.

451. Avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārāti yā tattha dhammaṭṭhitatātiādi yena suttena laddhi patiṭṭhāpitā, tasseva atthadassanena laddhibhindanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Ayañhettha attho – yā ayaṃ heṭṭhā ‘‘ṭhitāva sā dhātu dhammaṭṭhitatā dhammaniyāmatā’’ti vuttā na sā aññatra avijjādīhi visuṃ ekā atthi. Avijjādīnaṃ pana paccayānaṃyevetaṃ nāmaṃ. Uppannepi hi tathāgate anuppannepi avijjāto saṅkhārā sambhavanti, saṅkhārādīhi ca viññāṇādīni, tasmā ‘‘avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā’’ti yā etasmiṃ pade saṅkhāradhammānaṃ kāraṇaṭṭhena ṭhitatāti dhammaṭṭhitatā. Tesaṃyeva ca dhammānaṃ kāraṇaṭṭheneva niyāmatāti dhammaniyāmatāti avijjā vuccati. Sā ca asaṅkhatā, nibbānañca asaṅkhatanti pucchati. Paravādī laddhivasena paṭijānitvā puna dve asaṅkhatānīti puṭṭho suttābhāvena paṭikkhipitvā laddhivaseneva paṭijānāti. Sesapadesupi eseva nayo. Heṭṭhā vuttasadisaṃ pana tattha vuttanayeneva veditabbanti.

451. The statement, 'With ignorance as condition, volitional formations arise,' is made for the purpose of breaking down, by showing its meaning, that view which was established by the sutta concerning the fixedness of the Dhamma (dhammaṭṭhitatā) and so forth. The meaning here is this: that which was stated earlier as 'that element stands firm, the fixedness of the Dhamma, the lawfulness of the Dhamma,' does not exist as a single separate thing apart from ignorance and so forth. Rather, this is merely a name for those very conditions such as ignorance. For whether Tathāgatas have arisen or not, volitional formations arise from ignorance, and from volitional formations, consciousness and so forth. Therefore, in the phrase 'with ignorance as condition, volitional formations arise,' the fixedness of the Dhamma (dhammaṭṭhitatā) is the fact of standing firm as a cause for the phenomena of volitional formations. And the lawfulness of the Dhamma (dhammaniyāmatā) is the lawfulness in the sense of being a cause for those very phenomena; it is ignorance that is so called. He asks: 'Is that unconditioned, and Nibbāna unconditioned?' The opponent, having first affirmed based on his view, when asked again whether there are two unconditioned states, rejects it due to the absence of a sutta to support it, but still affirms based on his view. The same method applies to the remaining points. However, what is similar to what was stated earlier should be understood in the same way as explained there.

Paṭiccasamuppādakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse on Dependent Origination.

3. Saccakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discourse on the Truths

452-454. Idāni saccakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘cattārimāni, bhikkhave, tathāni avitathānī’’ti (saṃ. ni. 5.1090) suttaṃ nissāya ‘‘cattāri saccāni niccāni asaṅkhatānī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Ayañhissa adhippāyo – dukkhasamudayamaggesu vatthusaccaṃ saṅkhataṃ, lakkhaṇasaccaṃ asaṅkhataṃ. Nirodhe vatthusaccaṃ nāma natthi asaṅkhatameva tanti. Tasmā āmantāti āha. Taṃ panassa laddhimattameva. So hi dukkhaṃ vatthusaccaṃ icchati, tathā samudayaṃ maggañca. Yāni pana nesaṃ bādhanapabhavaniyyānikalakkhaṇāni, tāni lakkhaṇasaccaṃ nāmāti, na ca bādhanalakkhaṇādīhi aññāni dukkhādīni nāma atthīti. Tāṇānītiādīsu adhippāyo vuttanayeneva veditabbo.

Now there is the exposition on the truths. Here, concerning those who, relying on the sutta, “Monks, these four are real, not unreal,” hold the view that “the four truths are permanent and unconditioned,” like the Pubbaseliyas—with reference to them, the question is by the proponent of their own view, the affirmation by the other. For this is his intention: in the truths of suffering, origin, and path, the objective truth is conditioned, while the characteristic truth is unconditioned. In cessation, there is no objective truth; it is only unconditioned. Therefore, he says, “Yes.” But that is merely his view. For he considers suffering as an objective truth, and likewise origin and path. But those characteristics of theirs that are afflictive, productive of origination, and leading to liberation, are called the characteristic truth; and there are no other sufferings, etc., apart from those afflictive characteristics and so on. In phrases beginning with “those as protection,” the intended meaning should be understood in the same way as explained above.

Dukkhasaccanti [Pg.193] pañhe laddhivasena lakkhaṇaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Dukkhanti pañhe vatthuṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Ito paraṃ suddhikapañhā ca saṃsandanapañhā ca sabbe pāḷianusāreneva veditabbā. Avasāne laddhipatiṭṭhāpanatthaṃ āhaṭasuttaṃ atthassa micchā gahitattā anāhaṭasadisamevāti.

In the question 'Is it the truth of suffering?', he affirms based on his view, referring to the characteristic. In the question 'Is it suffering?', he rejects, referring to the objective reality. From here onward, all the simple questions and the questions of comparison should be understood in accordance with the Pāli text itself. At the end, the sutta brought forward for the purpose of establishing a view, since its meaning was wrongly grasped, is as if it were not brought forward.

Saccakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse on the Truths.

4. Āruppakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Discourse on the Immaterial States

455-456. Idāni āruppakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘cattāro āruppā āneñjā’’ti vacanaṃ nissāya ‘‘sabbepi te dhammā asaṅkhatā’’ti laddhi, te sandhāya ākāsānañcāyatananti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti. Sādhakasuttampi atthaṃ ajānitvā āhaṭattā anāhaṭasadisamevāti.

Now comes the discourse on the immaterial states. Herein, with reference to those who, relying on the statement “the four immaterial states are imperturbable,” hold the view that “all those phenomena are unconditioned,” the question “Is the sphere of infinite space...?” is for the proponent of one’s own doctrine, the affirmation for the other. The rest here is quite straightforward. And the sutta cited as proof, because it is brought forward without understanding its meaning, is as if it were not brought forward at all.

Āruppakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse on the Immaterial States.

5. Nirodhasamāpattikathāvaṇṇanā

5. Commentary on the Discourse on the Attainment of Cessation

457-459. Idāni nirodhasamāpattikathā nāma hoti. Tattha nirodhasamāpattīti catunnaṃ khandhānaṃ appavatti. Yasmā pana sā kariyamānā kariyati, samāpajjiyamānā samāpajjiyati, tasmā nipphannāti vuccati. Saṅkhatāsaṅkhatalakkhaṇānaṃ pana abhāvena na vattabbā ‘‘saṅkhatāti vā asaṅkhatā’’ti vā. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘yasmā saṅkhatā na hoti, tasmā asaṅkhatā’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānañceva uttarāpathakānañca; te sandhāya nirodhasamāpattīti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Uppādentītiādi samāpajjanapaṭilābhavaseneva vuttaṃ. Yathā pana rūpādayo asaṅkhatadhamme uppādenti; na tathā taṃ keci uppādenti nāma. Nirodhā vodānaṃ vuṭṭhānanti phalasamāpatti veditabbā. Asaṅkhatā pana taṃ [Pg.194] natthiyeva, tasmā paṭikkhipati. Tena hīti yasmā saṅkhatā na hoti, tasmā asaṅkhatāti laddhi. Idaṃ pana asaṅkhatabhāve kāraṇaṃ na hotīti vuttampi avuttasadisamevāti.

Now comes the discourse on the attainment of cessation. Herein, the attainment of cessation is the non-occurrence of the four aggregates. However, because it is made when being made, and entered when being entered, it is therefore called “produced.” Since it lacks the characteristics of the conditioned or the unconditioned, it cannot be said to be either “conditioned” or “unconditioned.” Here, with reference to those who hold the view that “because it is not conditioned, therefore it is unconditioned”—such as the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas—the question “Is the attainment of cessation...?” is for the proponent of one’s own doctrine, the affirmation for the other. The terms “producing” and so on are stated only in relation to entering and obtaining it. Just as material form and others do not produce an unconditioned phenomenon, so too does no one truly produce it. “Emergence from cessation, a purification,” should be understood as the attainment of fruition. However, that attainment is not unconditioned, therefore he rejects it. The phrase 'If that is so...' introduces the view: 'Because it is not conditioned, therefore it is unconditioned.' But since this is not a reason for its being unconditioned, what is said is as good as unsaid.

Nirodhasamāpattikathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse on the Attainment of Cessation.

6. Ākāsakathāvaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Discourse on Space

460-462. Idāni ākāsakathā nāma hoti. Tattha tividho ākāso – paricchedākāso, kasiṇugghāṭimākāso, ajaṭākāso. ‘‘Tucchākāso’’tipi tasseva nāmaṃ. Tesu paricchedākāso saṅkhato, itare dve paññattimattā. Yesaṃ pana ‘‘duvidhopi yasmā saṅkhato na hoti, tasmā asaṅkhato’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi uttarāpathakānaṃ mahisāsakānañca; te sandhāya ākāsoti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

Now comes the discourse on space. Therein, space is threefold: delimited space, space from removing the kasiṇa, and unobstructed space. “Empty space” is also a name for that same thing. Among these, delimited space is conditioned, while the other two are mere designations. However, for those who hold the view that “since neither of the two is conditioned, therefore it is unconditioned”—such as the Uttarāpathakas and the Mahīsāsakas—the question “Is space...?” is for the proponent of one’s own doctrine, and the affirmation is for the other. The rest here is of plain meaning.

Ākāsakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Space.

7. Ākāso sanidassanotikathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Exposition of the Discourse on Whether Space is Visible.

463-464. Idāni ākāso sanidassanotikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ tāḷacchiddādīsu ñāṇappavattiṃ nissāya ‘‘sabbopi ajaṭākāso sanidassano’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya ākāso sanidassanoti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi sanidassano, evaṃvidho bhaveyyā’’ti codanatthaṃ rūpantiādi vuttaṃ. Cakkhuñca paṭiccātipañhesu evarūpassa suttassa abhāvena paṭikkhipitvā tulantarikādīnaṃ upaladdhiṃ nissāya paṭijānāti. Dvinnaṃ rukkhānaṃ antaranti ettha rukkharūpaṃ cakkhunā disvā antare rūpābhāvato ākāsanti manodvāraviññāṇaṃ uppajjati, na cakkhuviññāṇaṃ. Sesesupi eseva nayo. Tasmā asādhakametanti.

Now comes the discourse called “Is space visible?” Here, those who, relying on the occurrence of knowledge regarding keyholes and so on, hold the view that “all unobstructed space is visible”—such as the Andhakas—are referred to. The question “Is space visible?” is for the proponent of one’s own doctrine, and the affirmation is for the other. Then, to challenge them with, “If it were visible, it would be of such a nature,” the words “form, etc.” are stated for the purpose of censure. In the questions regarding “depending on the eye,” having rejected this due to the absence of such a sutta, they affirm it relying on the perception of gaps, such as that between pillars. Regarding “the space between two trees,” here, having seen the form of the trees with the eye, a mind-door consciousness arises thinking “space” due to the absence of form in between, not an eye-consciousness. The same method applies to the remaining cases. Therefore, this is not a valid proof.

Ākāso sanidassanotikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Whether Space is Visible.

10. Pathavīdhātusanidassanātiādikathāvaṇṇanā

10. The Exposition of the Discourse Beginning with 'Is the Earth Element Visible?'

465-470. Idāni [Pg.195] pathavīdhātu sanidassanātiādikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ pāsāṇaudakajālarukkhacalanānañceva pañcindriyapatiṭṭhokāsānañca vaṇṇāyatanaṃ kāyaviññattikāle hatthapādādirūpañca disvā ‘‘pathavīdhātuādayo sanidassanā’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya sabbakathāsu ādipucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesaṃ sabbattha pāḷianusārena ceva heṭṭhā vuttanayena ca veditabbanti. Pathavīdhātu sanidassanāti ādiṃ katvā kāyakammaṃ sanidassananti pariyosānakathā niṭṭhitā.

Now comes the discourse beginning with 'Is the earth element visible?' Herein, for those who, upon seeing rocks, water, nets, the movement of trees, the visible object which is the basis for the establishment of the five sense faculties, and forms such as hands and feet at the time of bodily intimation, hold the view that 'the earth element and others are visible,' such as the Andhakas; referring to them, the initial question in all discourses is for the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the admission is for the other. The rest should be understood everywhere according to the Pāli text and the method stated previously. The discourse beginning with 'Is the Earth Element Visible?' and ending with 'Is Bodily Action Visible?' is concluded.

Chaṭṭho vaggo.

The Sixth Chapter.

7. Sattamavaggo

7. The Seventh Chapter.

1. Saṅgahitakathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Exposition of the Discourse on Inclusion.

471-472. Idāni saṅgahitakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā dāmādīhi balibaddādayo viya keci dhammā kehici dhammehi saṅgahitā nāma natthi, tasmā ‘‘natthi keci dhammā kehici dhammehi saṅgahitā, evaṃ sante ekavidhena rūpasaṅgahotiādi niratthaka’’nti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi rājagirikānañceva siddhatthikānañca; te sandhāya aññenatthena saṅgahabhāvaṃ dassetuṃ pucchā sakavādissa, attano laddhivasena paṭiññā itarassa. Idāni yenatthena saṅgaho labbhati, taṃ dassetuṃ nanu atthi keci dhammātiādi āraddhaṃ. Taṃ sabbaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayattā uttānatthameva. Yā panesā paravādinā laddhipatiṭṭhāpanatthaṃ yathā dāmena vātiādikā upamā āhaṭā, sakavādinā taṃ anabhinanditvā appaṭikkositvā ‘‘hañci dāmena vā’’ti tassa laddhi bhinnāti veditabbā. Ayañhettha attho – yadi te dāmādīhi balibaddādayo saṅgahitā nāma, atthi keci dhammā kehici dhammehi saṅgahitāti.

Now comes the discourse on inclusion. Herein, since some phenomena are not in fact included by other phenomena in the way that oxen and so forth are by ropes and so forth, some hold the view that 'there are no phenomena included by other phenomena, and thus statements like "inclusion of form in one way" and so forth are meaningless,' such as the Rājagirikā and the Siddhatthikā; referring to them, to show the state of inclusion in another sense, the question is for the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the admission is for the other according to his own view. Now, to show by what meaning inclusion is obtained, the discussion beginning with 'Are there not some phenomena?' is commenced. All that is of plain meaning because the method has been stated previously. But as for the simile beginning with 'just as by a rope' brought by the opponent to establish his view, it should be understood that the proponent, without approving or refuting it, broke his view by saying, 'If indeed by a rope.' The meaning here is: if oxen and so forth are indeed included by ropes and so forth, then there are some phenomena included by some other phenomena.

Saṅgahitakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Inclusion.

2. Sampayuttakathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Exposition of the Discourse on Association.

473-474. Idāni [Pg.196] sampayuttakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā tilamhi telaṃ viya na vedanādayo saññādīsu anupaviṭṭhā, tasmā ‘‘natthi keci dhammā kehici dhammehi sampayuttā, evaṃ sante ñāṇasampayuttantiādi niratthakaṃ hotī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi rājagirikasiddhatthikānaññeva; te sandhāya aññenevatthena sampayuttataṃ dassetuṃ pucchā sakavādissa, attano laddhivasena paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamidhāpi heṭṭhā vuttanayattā uttānatthameva. Yo panesa paravādinā ‘‘yathā tilamhi tela’’ntiādiko upamāpañho āhaṭo, so yasmā vedanāsaññānaṃ viya tilatelānaṃ lakkhaṇato nānattavavatthānaṃ natthi. Sabbesupi hi tilaaṭṭhitacesu tiloti vohāramattaṃ, teneva tilaṃ nibbattetvā gahite purimasaṇṭhānena tilo nāma na paññāyati, tasmā anāhaṭasadisova hotīti.

Now comes the discourse on association. Herein, since feelings and so forth have not entered into perceptions and so forth in the way that oil has into sesame, those who hold the view that 'there are no phenomena associated with any phenomena, and thus statements such as "associated with knowledge" and so forth are meaningless,' such as the Rājagirikā and the Siddhatthikā themselves; referring to them, to show association in another sense, the question is for the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the admission is for the other according to his own view. The rest here too is of plain meaning because the method has been stated previously. But as for the question with the simile beginning with 'as oil in sesame' brought by the opponent, it is because there is no distinct determination of characteristics between sesame and oil as there is between feelings and perceptions. For in all sesame seeds and cakes, it is merely the convention 'sesame'; and because when oil is extracted from sesame, the sesame is no longer apparent in its original form, therefore it is like an inapplicable simile.

Sampayuttakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Association.

3. Cetasikakathāvaṇṇanā

3. The Exposition of the Discourse on Mental Concomitants.

475-477. Idāni cetasikakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā phassikādayo nāma natthi, tasmā ‘‘cetasikenāpi na bhavitabbaṃ, iti natthi cetasiko dhammo’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi rājagirikasiddhatthikānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sahajātoti sampayuttasahajātaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Phassikāti tādisaṃ vohāraṃ apassantassa pucchā paravādissa. Kiṃ vohārena, yathā cittanissitakoti cetasiko, evaṃ sopi phassanissitattā phassikoti vutte doso natthīti paṭiññā sakavādissa. Sesaṃ uttānatthamevāti.

Now comes the discourse on mental concomitants. Herein, since there are no such things as 'contact-factors' and so forth, some hold the view that 'there can be no mental concomitant either; thus there is no mental concomitant phenomenon,' such as the Rājagirikas and Siddhatthikas; referring to them, the question is by the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the admission is by the other. 'Co-arisen' is said in reference to that which is associated and co-arisen. 'Contact-factor' is a question from the opponent who does not see such a usage. 'What is wrong with the usage? Just as what is dependent on the mind is a mental concomitant, so too, since this is dependent on contact, there is no fault in calling it a contact-factor'—this is the assertion of the proponent of one's own doctrine. The rest is of plain meaning.

Cetasikakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Mental Concomitants.

4. Dānakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Exposition of the Discourse on Giving.

478. Idāni [Pg.197] dānakathā nāma hoti. Tattha dānaṃ nāma tividhaṃ – cāgacetanāpi, viratipi, deyyadhammopi. ‘‘Saddhā hiriyaṃ kusalañca dāna’’nti (a. ni. 8.30) āgataṭṭhāne cāgacetanā dānaṃ. ‘‘Abhayaṃ detī’’ti (a. ni. 8.39) āgataṭṭhāne virati. ‘‘Dānaṃ deti annaṃ pāna’’nti āgataṭṭhāne deyyadhammo. Tattha cāgacetanā ‘‘deti vā deyyadhammaṃ, denti vā etāya deyyadhamma’’nti dānaṃ. Virati avakhaṇḍanaṭṭhena lavanaṭṭhena vā dānaṃ. Sā hi uppajjamānā bhayabheravādisaṅkhātaṃ dussīlyacetanaṃ dāti khaṇḍeti lunāti vāti dānaṃ. Deyyadhammo diyyatīti dānaṃ. Evametaṃ tividhampi atthato cetasiko ceva dhammo deyyadhammo cāti duvidhaṃ hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘cetasikova dhammo dānaṃ, na deyyadhammo’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi rājagirikasiddhatthikānaṃ; te sandhāya cetasikoti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ deyyadhammavasena codetuṃ labbhāti pucchā sakavādissa, annādīni viya so na sakkā dātunti paṭikkhepo itarassa. Puna daḷhaṃ katvā puṭṭhe ‘‘abhayaṃ detī’’ti suttavasena paṭiññā tasseva. Phassapañhādīsu pana phassaṃ detītiādivohāraṃ apassanto paṭikkhipateva.

478. Now comes the discussion on giving. Herein, giving is of three kinds: the intention to give, abstention, and the gift itself. In the passage, 'Faith, moral shame, and skillful giving,' the intention to give is called giving. In the passage, 'One gives safety,' abstention is called giving. In the passage, 'One gives food and drink,' the gift itself is called giving. Herein, the intention to give is called giving because one gives a gift, or because by it a gift is given. Abstention is called giving in the sense of severing or cutting. For when it arises, it severs or cuts the volition of immorality, which is designated as fear and terror—thus it is called giving. The gift is called giving because it is given. Thus, these three kinds are, in essence, of two kinds: a mental concomitant and the gift itself. Herein, for those who hold the view that 'giving is only a mental concomitant, not the gift itself,' such as the Rājagirikas and Siddhatthikas, the question about the mental concomitant is posed by the proponent of one's own doctrine, while the admission is by the other. Then, to challenge him regarding the gift itself, the proponent of one's own doctrine poses the question, while the other rejects it, saying that it cannot be given like food and so on. Again, when pressed firmly, the admission is made by that same party, citing the sutta passage, 'One gives safety.' But in questions like those about contact, not finding the conventional expression 'one gives contact' and so on, the other simply rejects it.

479. Aniṭṭhaphalantiādi acetasikassa dhammassa dānabhāvadīpanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Na hi acetasiko annādidhammo āyatiṃ vipākaṃ deti, iṭṭhaphalabhāvaniyamanatthaṃ panetaṃ vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Ayampi hettha adhippāyo – yadi acetasiko annādidhammo dānaṃ bhaveyya, hitacittena aniṭṭhaṃ akantaṃ bhesajjaṃ dentassa nimbabījādīhi viya nimbādayo aniṭṭhameva phalaṃ nibbatteyya. Yasmā panettha hitapharaṇacāgacetanā dānaṃ, tasmā aniṭṭhepi deyyadhamme dānaṃ iṭṭhaphalameva hotīti.

479. The passage beginning 'undesirable result' is stated to clarify the nature of a non-mental phenomenon as giving. For a non-mental phenomenon like food and so on does not yield a future result. But it should be understood that this is said to establish the certainty of a desirable result. The intention here is also this: if a non-mental phenomenon like food and so on were giving, then when one gives unpleasant or unwanted medicine with a beneficial intention, it would produce only an undesirable result, just as from neem seeds, neem trees are produced. But since here the volition of giving, pervaded by benefit, is what constitutes giving, therefore, even if the object given is undesirable, the giving still yields a desirable result.

Evaṃ paravādinā cetasikadhammassa dānabhāve patiṭṭhāpite sakavādī itarena pariyāyena deyyadhammassa dānabhāvaṃ sādhetuṃ dānaṃ iṭṭhaphalaṃ vuttaṃ bhagavatātiādimāha. Paravādī pana cīvarādīnaṃ iṭṭhavipākataṃ apassanto paṭikkhipati. Suttasādhanaṃ paravādīvādepi yujjati sakavādīvādepi, na pana ekenatthena. Deyyadhammo iṭṭhaphaloti iṭṭhaphalabhāvamattameva paṭikkhittaṃ. Tasmā tena hi na vattabbanti iṭṭhaphalabhāveneva na vattabbatā yujjati[Pg.198]. Dātabbaṭṭhena pana deyyadhammo dānameva. Dinnañhi dānānaṃ saṅkarabhāvamocanatthameva ayaṃ kathāti.

Thus, when the opponent establishes the mental concomitant as the act of giving, the proponent of one's own doctrine, in another way, seeks to establish the gift-worthy object as the act of giving by stating that the Blessed One has declared giving to yield desirable results. The other, however, rejects this, not seeing the desirable results of robes and other gifts. The argument based on the sutta is valid whether it is the other's view or the proponent of one's own doctrine's view, but not in the sense of a single meaning. That the gift-worthy object yields desirable results—only the mere state of being a desirable result is rejected. Therefore, the statement 'it should not be said by him' is valid only regarding the state of being a desirable result. However, in the sense of being fit to be given, the gift-worthy object is precisely giving itself. Indeed, this discussion is solely for the purpose of resolving the confusion about gifts that have been given.

Dānakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on Giving.

5. Paribhogamayapuññakathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Explanation of the Discussion on Merit Consisting of Use.

483. Idāni paribhogamayapuññakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘tesaṃ divā ca ratto ca, sadā puññaṃ pavaḍḍhatī’’ti (saṃ. ni. 1.47) ca ‘‘yassa bhikkhave, bhikkhu cīvaraṃ paribhuñjamāno’’ti (a. ni. 4.51) ca evamādīni suttāni ayoniso gahetvā yesaṃ paribhogamayaṃ nāma puññaṃ atthī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi rājagirikasiddhatthikasammitiyānaṃ; te sandhāya paribhogamayanti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘puññaṃ nāma phassādayo kusalā dhammā, na tato paraṃ, tasmā phassādīhi te vaḍḍhitabba’’nti codetuṃ paribhogamayo phassotiādi āraddhaṃ. Taṃ sabbaṃ itarena tesaṃ avaḍḍhanato paṭikkhittaṃ. Latāviyātiādīni ‘‘kiriyāya vā bhāvanāya vā vināpi yathā latādīni sayameva vaḍḍhanti, kiṃ te evaṃ vaḍḍhantī’’ti codanatthaṃ vuttāni. Tathā panassa avaḍḍhanato na hevāti paṭikkhittaṃ.

483. Now there is the discussion called 'Merit Consisting of Use.' Herein, taking suttas such as “For them, day and night, merit always increases” and “Monks, when a monk uses a robe” and so on inappropriately, there is a view, 'there is merit called "consisting of use,"' as held by the Rājagirikas, Siddhatthikas, and Sammitiyas. Concerning them, the proponent asks, 'Is there merit consisting of use?' and the other acknowledges it. Then, to challenge them by saying, 'Merit is wholesome states beginning with contact, not beyond that; therefore, they should be increased by contact and so on,' the proponent begins with 'merit consisting of use is contact,' etc. All of that is rejected by the other because it does not lead to their increase. The examples of creeping plants and so on are stated for the purpose of challenging them, saying: 'Even without action or development, just as creepers and so on grow by themselves, do they grow in this way?' However, because it does not increase in that way, it is rejected with 'not so.'

484. Na samannāharatīti pañhe paṭiggāhakānaṃ paribhogena purimacetanā vaḍḍhati, evaṃ taṃ hoti puññanti laddhivasena paṭijānāti. Tato anāvaṭṭentassātiādīhi puṭṭho dāyakassa cāgacetanaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Tattha anāvaṭṭentassāti dānacetanāya purecārikena āvajjanena bhavaṅgaṃ anāvaṭṭentassa aparivaṭṭentassa. Anābhogassāti nirābhogassa. Asamannāharantassāti na samannāharantassa. Āvajjanañhi bhavaṅgaṃ vicchinditvā attano gatamagge uppajjamānaṃ dānacetanaṃ samannāharati nāma. Evaṃkiccena iminā cittena asamannāharantassa puññaṃ hotīti pucchati. Amanasikarontassāti manaṃ akarontassa. Āvajjanena hi tadanantaraṃ uppajjamānaṃ manaṃ karoti nāma. Evaṃ akarontassāti attho. Upayogavacanasmiñhi etaṃ bhummaṃ. Acetayantassāti cetanaṃ anuppādentassa. Apatthentassāti [Pg.199] patthanāsaṅkhātaṃ kusalacchandaṃ akarontassa. Appaṇidahantassāti dānacetanāvasena cittaṃ aṭṭhapentassāti attho. Nanu āvaṭṭentassāti vāre ābhogassāti ābhogavato. Atha vā ābhogā assa, ābhogassa vā anantaraṃ taṃ puññaṃ hotīti attho.

484. In the question 'Does one not bring it to mind?', it is acknowledged in terms of the view that the donor's initial volition increases through the recipient's use, and thus it becomes merit. Then, when asked with 'for one not adverting,' and so on, the opponent rejects it, referring to the donor’s volition of generosity. Herein, 'for one not adverting' means for one not turning, not revolving, the life-continuum by the advertence that precedes the volition of giving. 'For one without effort' means for one without exertion. 'For one not bringing to mind' means for one not bringing to mind. For advertence, indeed, interrupting the life-continuum, brings to mind the volition of giving arising in its own course. Thus, the proponent asks whether merit arises for one who does not bring to mind with this mind, which performs such a function. 'For one not attending' means for one not applying the mind. For what arises immediately after advertence is called 'making mind' or attending. 'Not doing so' is the meaning. Indeed, this is a locative usage in the sense of application. 'For one not intending' means for one not arousing volition. 'For one not aspiring' means for one not generating the wholesome desire known as aspiration. 'For one not directing' means for one not fixing the mind by way of the volition of giving. Now, in the section on 'for one adverting,' 'for one with effort' means for one who possesses effort. Or alternatively, the meaning is that effort is his, or that the merit arises immediately after the effort.

485. Dvinnaṃ phassānantiādīsupi ekakkhaṇe dāyakassa dvinnaṃ phassādīnaṃ abhāvā paṭikkhipati, dāyakassa ca paribhuñjantassa cāti ubhinnaṃ phassādayo sandhāya paṭijānāti. Apicassa pañcannaṃ viññāṇānaṃ samodhānaṃ hotīti laddhi, tassāpi vasena paṭijānāti. Atha naṃ sakavādī pariyāyassa dvāraṃpidahitvā ujuvipaccanīkavasena codetuṃ kusalādipañhaṃ pucchati. Tatrāpi kusalākusalānaṃ ekassekakkhaṇe sampayogābhāvaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Paribhogamayaṃ pana cittavippayuttaṃ uppajjatīti laddhiyā paṭijānāti. Atha naṃ sakavādī suttena niggaṇhāti.

485. Even in the question 'of two contacts,' etc., the opponent rejects it because at a single moment, the donor does not have two instances of contact, etc. However, it is acknowledged with reference to the contact, etc., of both the donor and the one using the offering. Moreover, there is the view that a convergence of the five sense-consciousnesses occurs, and it is acknowledged on that basis as well. Then, the proponent, closing the door to indirect reasoning, challenges him by way of direct opposition with a question about what is skillful, etc. There too, it is rejected with reference to the absence of the simultaneous association of skillful and unskillful states at a single moment. However, it is acknowledged based on the view that merit consisting of use arises disconnected from the mind. Then, the proponent refutes him with a sutta.

486. Suttasādhane ārāmaropakādīnaṃ anussaraṇapaṭisaṅkharaṇādivasena antarantarā uppajjamānaṃ puññaṃ sandhāya sadā puññaṃ pavaḍḍhatīti vuttaṃ. Appamāṇo tassa puññābhisandoti idaṃ appamāṇavihārino dinnapaccayattā ca ‘‘evarūpo me cīvaraṃ paribhuñjatī’’ti anumodanavasena ca vuttaṃ. Taṃ so paribhogamayanti sallakkheti. Yasmā pana paṭiggāhakena paṭiggahetvā aparibhuttepi deyyadhamme puññaṃ hotiyeva, tasmā sakavādīvādova balavā, tattha paṭiggāhakena paṭiggahiteti attho daṭṭhabbo. Sesaṃ uttānatthamevāti.

486. In the proof from the sutta, it is said that 'merit always increases' with reference to the merit arising intermittently through recollecting, reflecting, etc., regarding the planting of parks, etc. 'Immeasurable is his flood of merit'—this is said because of the requisites given to one dwelling in the immeasurable meditations, and also by way of rejoicing with the thought, 'Such a one is using my robe.' He (the opponent) recognizes that as 'merit consisting of use.' However, since merit indeed arises even when the offered item is accepted by the recipient but not yet used, therefore, the argument of the proponent is stronger; there, the meaning should be understood as 'accepted by the recipient.' The rest is clear in meaning.

Paribhogamayapuññakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on Merit Consisting of Use.

6. Itodinnakathāvaṇṇanā

6. The Explanation of the Discussion on What is Given from Here.

488-491. Idāni ito dinnakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘ito dinnena yāpenti, petā kālaṅkatā tahi’’nti (pe. va. 19) vacanaṃ nissāya ‘‘yaṃ ito cīvarādi dinnaṃ teneva yāpentī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi rājagirikasiddhatthikānaṃ; te sandhāya ito dinnenāti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa[Pg.200]. Puna cīvarādivasena anuyutto paṭikkhipati. Añño aññassa kārakoti aññassa vipākadāyakānaṃ kammānaṃ añño kārako, na attanāva attano kammaṃ karotīti vuttaṃ hoti. Evaṃ puṭṭho pana itaro suttavirodhabhayena paṭikkhipati. Dānaṃ dentanti dānaṃ dadamānaṃ disvāti attho. Tattha yasmā attano anumoditattā ca tesaṃ tattha bhogā uppajjanti, tasmāssa iminā kāraṇena laddhiṃ patiṭṭhapentassāpi appatiṭṭhitāva hoti. Na hi te ito dinneneva vatthunā yāpenti. Sesesupi suttasādhanesu eseva nayoti.

488-491. Now comes the discussion called 'Given from Here.' Here, regarding those who, relying on the statement, 'They subsist on what is given from here, the departed who have passed away there' (Pe. Va. 19), hold the view that 'they subsist on that very thing which is given from here, such as robes, etc.,' like the Rājagirikas and Siddhatthikas; with reference to them, the question 'by what is given from here?' is posed by the proponent, and the other party acknowledges it. Then, being pressed concerning robes, etc., he refutes it. 'Another is the doer for another': It is said that the doer of actions that yield results for another is different; one does not perform one's own action by oneself. However, when asked thus, the other refutes it for fear of contradicting the Sutta. 'Dānaṃ dentanti': This means 'seeing someone giving a gift.' There, because their enjoyments arise there due to their own rejoicing, even when one establishes a view based on this reason, it remains unestablished. For they do not subsist solely on things given from here. In the remaining proofs from the suttas, the method is the same.

Ito dinnakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on What is Given from Here.

7. Pathavīkammavipākotikathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Explanation of the Discussion of 'Earth as the Result of Kamma'.

492. Idāni pathavī kammavipākotikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā ‘‘atthi issariyasaṃvattaniyaṃ kammaṃ, ādhipaccasaṃvattaniyaṃ kamma’’nti ettha issarānaṃ bhāvo issariyaṃ nāma, adhipatīnañca bhāvo ādhipaccaṃ nāma, pathavissariyaādhipaccasaṃvattanikañca kammaṃ atthīti vuttaṃ. Tasmā yesaṃ ‘‘pathavī kammavipāko’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pathavīti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sukhavedanīyātiādi kammavipākasabhāvadassanavasena vuttaṃ. ‘‘Phasso hotī’’tiādinā nayena niddiṭṭhesu vipākesu phasso sukhavedanīyādibhedo hoti. So ca saññādayo ca sukhavedanādīhi sampayuttā, vedanādayo saññādīhi, sabbepi sārammaṇā, atthi ca nesaṃ purecārikaāvaṭṭanādisaṅkhātaṃ āvajjanaṃ, kammapaccayabhūtā cetanā, yo tattha iṭṭhavipāko, tassa patthanā, paṇidhānavasena pavattā mūlataṇhā, kiṃ te evarūpā pathavīti pucchati. Itaro paṭikkhipati. Paṭilomapucchādīni uttānatthāneva.

492. Now comes the discussion called 'Earth as the Result of Kamma.' Here, because it is said, 'There is kamma conducive to sovereignty, kamma conducive to dominion,' the state of lords is called sovereignty, and the state of rulers is called dominion; and it is stated that there is kamma conducive to sovereignty and dominion over the earth. Therefore, for those who hold the view that 'earth is the result of kamma,' like the Andhakas, the question 'Is it earth?' is posed by the proponent, and the other party acknowledges it. 'Accompanied by pleasant feeling,' etc., is stated to show the nature of the result of kamma. Among the results described in the manner of 'contact arises,' etc., contact is of the kind associated with pleasant feeling, etc. That contact, along with perception, etc., is associated with pleasant feeling, etc.; and feeling, etc., is associated with perception, etc. All have objects, and there is also advertence, which is designated as the forerunner, turning towards, etc.; the volition that is the kamma-condition; and the root craving that proceeds by way of aspiration and resolve for a desired result there. He asks, 'Is the earth of such a nature for you?' The other refutes it. The counter-questions, etc., are clear in meaning.

493. Kammavipāko paresaṃ sādhāraṇoti pañhe phassādayo sandhāya paṭikkhipati, kammasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpañca pathavīādīnaṃyeva ca sādhāraṇabhāvaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Asādhāraṇamaññesanti suttaṃ parasamayato āharitvā [Pg.201] dassitaṃ. Sabbe sattā pathaviṃ paribhuñjantīti pañhe pathaviṃ anissite sandhāya paṭikkhipati, nissite sandhāya paṭijānāti. Pathaviṃ aparibhuñjitvā parinibbāyantīti pañhe āruppe parinibbāyantānaṃ vasena paṭijānāti. Kammavipākaṃ akhepetvāti idaṃ parasamayavasena vuttaṃ. Kammavipākañhi khepetvāva parinibbāyantīti tesaṃ laddhi. Sakasamaye pana katokāsassa kammassa uppannaṃ vipākaṃ akhepetvā parinibbānaṃ natthi. Tesañca laddhiyā pathavī sādhāraṇavipākattā uppannavipākoyeva hoti. Taṃ vipākabhāvena ṭhitaṃ akhepetvā parinibbānaṃ na yujjatīti codetuṃ vaṭṭati. Itaro laddhivasena paṭikkhipati. Cakkavattisattassa kammavipākanti pañhe asādhāraṇaṃ phassādiṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, sādhāraṇaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Pathavīsamuddasūriyacandimādayo hi sabbesaṃ sādhāraṇakammavipākoti tesaṃ laddhi.

493. Regarding the question, 'Is the result of kamma common to others?', he refutes it with reference to contact, etc., but affirms it with reference to kamma-produced form and the common nature of earth, etc. 'Asādhāraṇamaññesaṃ' ('Not common to others'): This sutta passage is cited from another school. In the question, 'Do all beings make use of the earth?', he refutes it with reference to those not relying on earth but affirms it with reference to those relying on it. In the question, 'Do they attain final Nibbāna without making use of the earth?', he affirms it with reference to those attaining Nibbāna in the formless realms. 'Kammavipākaṃ akhepetvā' ('Without having exhausted the result of kamma'): This is stated from the perspective of another school. For they hold that one attains final Nibbāna only after exhausting the results of kamma. But in our own tradition, there is no final Nibbāna without exhausting the arisen result of kamma for which opportunity has been made. According to their view, since earth is a common result, it is only an arisen result. It is proper to object that it is not possible to attain Nibbāna without exhausting that which persists as a result. The other refutes it according to his view. In the question, 'Is it the result of kamma for a wheel-turning being?', he refutes it with reference to the uncommon contact, etc., but affirms it with reference to what is common. For they hold that the earth, ocean, sun, moon, etc., are the common results of kamma for all beings.

494. Issariyasaṃvattaniyanti ettha issariyaṃ nāma bahudhanatā. Ādhipaccaṃ nāma sesajane attano vase vattetvā tehi garukātabbaṭṭhena adhipatibhāvo. Tattha kammaṃ paṭilābhavasena taṃsaṃvattanikaṃ nāma hoti, na janakavasena. Tasmā vipākabhāve asādhakametanti.

494. Regarding 'conducive to sovereignty': here, sovereignty means abundant wealth. Dominion means the state of being a master, in the sense of making other people act according to one's will and being worthy of their respect. There, kamma is called 'conducive to that' in the sense of acquisition, not in the sense of generation. Therefore, this is not a proof for its being a state of result.

Pathavī kammavipākotikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on 'The Earth is a Result of Kamma'.

8. Jarāmaraṇaṃ vipākotikathāvaṇṇanā

8. Explanation of the Discussion on 'Aging and Death are a Result'.

495. Idāni jarāmaraṇaṃ vipākotikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘atthi dubbaṇṇasaṃvattaniyaṃ kammaṃ appāyukasaṃvattaniyaṃ kamma’’nti ettha dubbaṇṇatā nāma jarā. Appāyukatā nāma maraṇaṃ. Taṃsaṃvattaniyañca kammaṃ atthi. Tasmā jarāmaraṇaṃ vipākoti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Paṭilomapañhe anārammaṇanti rūpadhammānaṃ tāva anārammaṇameva, arūpānaṃ pana jarāmaraṇaṃ sampayogalakkhaṇābhāvā anārammaṇameva.

495. Now, the discussion called 'Aging and Death are a Result' takes place. Herein, for those who hold the view, 'There is kamma conducive to unattractiveness and kamma conducive to a short life,' unattractiveness is aging, and a short life is death. And there is kamma conducive to that. Therefore, their view is that aging and death are a result, as is the case with the Andhakas. With reference to them, the question is for the proponent, and the assertion is for the opponent. In the counter-question, regarding 'without an object': for material phenomena, it is indeed without an object; for immaterial phenomena, however, aging and death are without an object due to the absence of the characteristic of association.

496. Akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ jarāmaraṇaṃ akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ vipākoti pañhe jarāmaraṇena nāma aniṭṭhavipākena bhavitabbanti laddhiyā paṭijānāti[Pg.202]. Teneva kāraṇena kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ jarāmaraṇassa kusalavipākataṃ paṭikkhipati. Parato cassa akusalavipākataññeva paṭijānāti.

496. In the question, 'Are aging and death the result of unwholesome phenomena?', he asserts this based on the view that aging and death must be an undesirable result. For that same reason, he rejects that the aging and death of wholesome phenomena is a wholesome result. And further, he asserts that it is only an unwholesome result.

Kusalānañca akusalānañcāti pucchāvasena ekato kataṃ, ekakkhaṇe pana taṃ natthi. Abyākatānaṃ avipākānaṃ jarāmaraṇaṃ vipākoti vattabbatāya pariyāyo natthi, tasmā abyākatavasena pucchā na katā.

The question 'Are they wholesome and unwholesome?' is made collectively, but they do not occur in a single moment. There is no way to assert that aging and death are results of indeterminate, non-resultant phenomena; therefore, the question is not framed in terms of the indeterminate.

497. Dubbaṇṇasaṃvattaniyanti ettha dubbaṇṇiyaṃ nāma aparisuddhavaṇṇatā. Appāyukatā nāma āyuno ciraṃ pavattituṃ asamatthatā. Tattha akusalakammaṃ kammasamuṭṭhānassa dubbaṇṇarūpassa kammapaccayo hoti, asadisattā panassa taṃvipāko na hoti. Utusamuṭṭhānādino pana taṃpaṭilābhavasena āyuno ca upacchedakavasena paccayo hoti. Evametaṃ pariyāyena taṃsaṃvattanikaṃ nāma hoti, na vipākaphassādīnaṃ viya janakavasena, tasmā vipākabhāve asādhakaṃ. Sesamettha heṭṭhā vuttasadisamevāti.

497. Regarding 'conducive to unattractiveness': here, unattractiveness means impure complexion. A short life means the inability of the life-faculty to continue for long. Herein, unwholesome kamma is a kamma-condition for unattractive materiality arisen from kamma, but due to its dissimilarity, it is not its result. For that which arises from temperature and so on, however, it becomes a condition by way of acquiring that and by way of cutting off the life-faculty. Thus, it is called 'conducive to that' indirectly, not in the generative sense like resultant contact and so on; therefore, it is not a proof for its being a state of result. The rest here is similar to what was stated above.

Jarāmaraṇaṃ vipākotikathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discussion on 'Aging and Death are a Result'.

9. Ariyadhammavipākakathāvaṇṇanā

9. Explanation of the Discussion on the Result of Noble Dhammas.

498. Idāni ariyadhammavipākakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ kilesappahānamattameva sāmaññaphalaṃ, na cittacetasikā dhammāti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya natthi ariyadhammavipākoti pucchā sakavādissa. Tattha ariyadhammavipākoti maggasaṅkhātassa ariyadhammassa vipāko. Kilesakkhayamattaṃ ariyaphalanti laddhiyā paṭiññā itarassa. Sāmaññanti samaṇabhāvo, maggassetaṃ nāmaṃ. ‘‘Sāmaññañca vo, bhikkhave, desessāmi sāmaññaphalañcā’’ti hi vuttaṃ. Brahmaññepi eseva nayo.

498. Now, the discussion on the result of noble dhammas is thus named. Here, for those who hold the view that the fruit of recluseship is merely the abandoning of defilements, and not mind and mental factors—as is the case with the Andhakas; with reference to them, the proponent's question is: 'Is there no result of noble dhammas?' Herein, 'result of noble dhammas' means the result of the noble dhammas designated as the path. Based on their view that the noble fruit is merely the destruction of defilements, the assertion is for the opponent. 'Recluseship' means the state of a recluse; this is a name for the path. For it is said: 'Bhikkhus, I will teach you recluseship and the fruit of recluseship.' The same principle applies to the holy life.

Sotāpattiphalaṃ na vipākotiādīsu sotāpattimaggādīnaṃ apacayagāmitaṃ sandhāya ariyaphalānaṃ navipākabhāvaṃ paṭijānāti, dānaphalādīnaṃ paṭikkhipati[Pg.203]. So hi ācayagāmittikassa evaṃ atthaṃ dhāreti – vipākasaṅkhātaṃ ācayaṃ gacchanti, taṃ vā ācinantā gacchantīti ācayagāmino, vipākaṃ apacinantā gacchantīti apacayagāminoti. Tasmā evaṃ paṭijānāti ca paṭikkhipati ca.

In statements such as, 'The fruit of stream-entry is not a result,' he asserts that noble fruits are not results, with reference to the stream-entry path and so on leading to diminution, but he rejects this for the results of giving and so on. For he understands the meaning of 'leading to accumulation' thus: 'They go to accumulation, designated as result, or they go while accumulating it'—such are 'leading to accumulation'; 'they go while diminishing result'—such are 'leading to diminution.' Therefore, he asserts in one case and rejects in another.

500. Kāmāvacaraṃ kusalaṃ savipākaṃ ācayagāmītiādikā pucchā paravādissa, paṭiññā ca paṭikkhepo ca sakavādissa. Lokiyañhi kusalaṃ vipākacutipaṭisandhiyo ceva vaṭṭañca ācinantaṃ gacchatīti ācayagāmi. Lokuttarakusalaṃ cutipaṭisandhiyo ceva vaṭṭañca apacinantaṃ gacchatīti apacayagāmi. Evametaṃ savipākameva hoti, na apacayagāmivacanamattena avipākaṃ. Imamatthaṃ sandhāyettha sakavādino paṭiññā ca paṭikkhepo ca veditabbāti.

500. The question, 'Is sense-sphere wholesome kamma with result and leading to accumulation?' and so on, is for the opponent, while the assertion and rejection are for the proponent. For mundane wholesome kamma proceeds while accumulating results, death and rebirth-linking, and the round of existence, hence it is 'leading to accumulation.' Supramundane wholesome kamma proceeds while diminishing death and rebirth-linking and the round of existence, hence it is 'leading to diminution.' Thus, it is indeed with a result, not without a result merely because of the expression 'leading to diminution.' With reference to this meaning, the proponent's assertion and rejection here should be understood.

Ariyadhammavipākakathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discussion on the Result of Noble Dhammas.

10. Vipāko vipākadhammadhammotikathāvaṇṇanā

10. Explanation of the Discussion on 'A Result is a Phenomenon that is a Condition for a Result'.

501. Idāni vipāko vipākadhammadhammotikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā vipāko vipākassa aññamaññādipaccayavasena paccayo hoti, tasmā vipākopi vipākadhammadhammoti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Tassa vipākoti tassa vipākadhammadhammassa vipākassa yo vipāko, sopi te vipākadhammadhammo hotīti pucchati. Itaro āyatiṃ vipākadānābhāvaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho tappaccayāpi aññassa vipākassa uppattiṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Evaṃ sante panassa kusalākusalassa viya tassāpi vipākassa vipāko, tassāpi vipākoti vaṭṭānupacchedo āpajjatīti puṭṭho samayavirodhabhayena paṭikkhipati.

501. Now, the discussion called 'A Result is a Phenomenon that is a Condition for a Result' takes place. Herein, since a result is a condition for another result by way of mutual condition and so on, some hold the view that a result is also a phenomenon that is a condition for a result, as is the case with the Andhakas. With reference to them, the question is for the proponent, and the assertion is for the opponent. He asks: 'Regarding the result of that phenomenon which is a condition for a result—is its result also a phenomenon that is a condition for a result for you?' The opponent denies it, with reference to the absence of future result-giving. When asked a second time, he affirms it, considering the arising of another result due to that condition. But when asked, 'If this is so, then just as wholesome and unwholesome kamma has its result, so too would that result have its result, and that result its result, leading to a non-cessation of the round of existence?', he denies it for fear of contradicting his own doctrine.

Vipākoti vātiādimhi vacanasādhane pana yadi vipākassa vipākadhammadhammena ekatthatā bhaveyya, kusalākusalabyākatānaṃ ekatthataṃ āpajjeyyāti paṭikkhipati. Vipāko ca vipākadhammadhammo cāti ettha [Pg.204] ayaṃ adhippāyo – so hi catūsu vipākakkhandhesu ekekaṃ aññamaññapaccayādīsu paccayaṭṭhena vipākadhammadhammataṃ paccayuppannaṭṭhena ca vipākaṃ maññamāno ‘‘vipāko vipākadhammadhammo’’ti puṭṭho āmantāti paṭijānāti. Atha naṃ sakavādī ‘‘yasmā tayā ekakkhaṇe catūsu khandhesu vipāko vipākadhammadhammopi anuññāto, tasmā tesaṃ sahagatādibhāvo āpajjatī’’ti codetuṃ evamāha. Itaro kusalākusalasaṅkhātaṃ vipākadhammadhammaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Taññeva akusalanti yadi te vipāko vipākadhammadhammo, yo akusalavipāko, so akusalaṃ āpajjati. Kasmā? Vipākadhammadhammena ekattā. Taññeva kusalantiādīsupi eseva nayo.

However, in the analysis of the word 'result,' if a result were identical in substance with a resultant phenomenon, then wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate states would also become identical in substance—hence the denial. The meaning here regarding 'a result and a resultant phenomenon' is this: He, considering each of the four resultant aggregates to be a resultant phenomenon in the sense of being a condition in mutual conditionality, etc., and to be a result in the sense of being produced by a condition, when asked, 'Is a result a resultant phenomenon?' affirms it. Then the proponent of his own doctrine, intending to challenge him, says, 'Since you acknowledge that in a single moment, with respect to the four aggregates, there is both a result and a resultant phenomenon, it follows that they are co-arisen,' etc. The other denies this, with reference to the resultant phenomenon that is classified as wholesome and unwholesome. 'If that very thing is unwholesome,' if for you the result is a resultant phenomenon, then the unwholesome result would become unwholesome. Why? Because of its identity with a resultant phenomenon. The same reasoning applies in the cases of 'If that very thing is wholesome,' etc.

502. Aññamaññapaccayāti idaṃ sahajātānaṃ paccayamattavasena vuttaṃ, tasmā asādhakaṃ. Mahābhūtānampi ca aññamaññapaccayatā vuttā, na ca tāni vipākāni, na ca vipākadhammadhammānīti.

502. 'Mutual conditionality' is stated here merely in terms of a condition for co-arisen states; therefore, it is inconclusive. Moreover, mutual conditionality is also stated for the great primary elements, yet they are neither results nor resultant phenomena.

Vipāko vipākadhammadhammotikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on 'A Result is a Resultant Phenomenon'.

Sattamo vaggo.

The Seventh Chapter.

8. Aṭṭhamavaggo

8. The Eighth Chapter.

1. Chagatikathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Discourse on the Six Destinies.

503-504. Idāni chagatikathā nāma hoti. Tattha asurakāyena saddhiṃ chagatiyoti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānañceva uttarāpathakānañca; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ sakavādī ‘‘pañca kho panimā, sāriputta, gatiyo’’ti (ma. ni. 1.153) lomahaṃsanapariyāye paricchinnānaṃ gatīnaṃ vasena codetuṃ nanu pañca gatiyotiādimāha. Itaro suttavirodhabhayena paṭijānāti. Kasmā pana sakavādī cha gatiyo na sampaṭicchati, nanu ‘‘catūhāpāyehi ca vippamutto’’ti ettha asurakāyopi gahitoti. Saccaṃ gahito, na panesā gati. Kasmā? Visuṃ abhāvato. Asurakāyasmiñhi kālakañcikā asurā petagatiyā saṅgahitā[Pg.205], vepacittiparisā devagatiyā, asurakāyoti visuṃ ekā gati nāma natthi.

Now there is the discussion called 'The Six Destinies.' Herein, with reference to the view held by some—such as the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas—that there are six destinies including the asura realm, the question is from the proponent of his own doctrine, and the affirmation is from the other. Then the proponent of his own doctrine, intending to challenge them based on the destinies defined in the Lomahaṃsana Pariyāya, 'Sāriputta, there are these five destinies' (MN 1.73), says, 'Are there not five destinies?' and so on. The other, fearing contradiction with the sutta, concedes. But why does the proponent of his own doctrine not accept six destinies? Is it not that in the phrase 'freed from the four states of woe,' the asura realm is also included? True, it is included, but it is not a destiny. Why? Because it does not exist separately. For the Kālakañjika asuras are included in the destiny of ghosts, while the assembly of Vepacitti are included in the destiny of devas. Thus, there is no separate destiny called the asura realm.

Idāni etameva atthaṃ dassetuṃ nanu kālakañcikātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha samānavaṇṇāti sadisarūpasaṇṭhānā bībhacchā virūpā duddassikā. Samānabhogāti sadisamethunasamācārā. Samānāhārāti sadisakheḷasiṅghāṇikapubbalohitādiāhārā. Samānāyukāti sadisaāyuparicchedā. Āvāhavivāhanti kaññāgahaṇañceva kaññādānañca. Sukkapakkhe samānavaṇṇāti sadisarūpasaṇṭhānā abhirūpā pāsādikā dassanīyā pabhāsampannā. Samānabhogāti sadisapañcakaāmaguṇabhogā. Samānāhārāti sadisasudhābhojanādiāhārā. Sesaṃ vuttanayameva. Nanu atthi asurakāyoti idaṃ asurakāyasseva sādhakaṃ. Tassa pana visuṃ gatiparicchedābhāvena na gatisādhakanti.

Now, to illustrate this very point, the passage beginning with 'Are not the Kālakañjikas...?' is introduced. Therein, 'of similar appearance' means having a similar physical form and shape—repulsive, deformed, and unpleasant to see. 'Of similar enjoyment' means sharing similar sexual conduct. 'Of similar food' means consuming similar food, such as saliva, mucus, pus, and blood. 'Of similar lifespan' means having a similar life-limit. 'Marriage' refers to both taking a maiden and giving a maiden in marriage. In the bright fortnight, 'of similar appearance' means having a similar physical form and shape—beautiful, lovely, pleasing to behold, and possessing radiance. 'Of similar enjoyment' means enjoying similar pleasures of the five sense qualities. 'Of similar food' means consuming similar food, such as ambrosial food. The rest follows the same method. 'But is there not an asura realm?' This supports the existence of the asura realm. However, since there is no distinct delineation of it as a destiny, it does not serve as proof for a separate destiny.

Chagatikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Six Destinies.

2. Antarābhavakathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Explanation of the Discourse on the Intermediate State.

505. Idāni antarābhavakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘antarā parinibbāyī’’ti suttapadaṃ ayoniso gahetvā ‘‘antarābhavo nāma atthi, yattha satto dibbacakkhuko viya adibbacakkhuko, iddhimā viya aniddhimā mātāpitisamāgamañceva utusamayañca olokayamāno sattāhaṃ vā atirekasattāhaṃ vā tiṭṭhatī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānañceva sammitiyānañca; te sandhāya atthīti pucchā sakavādissa, laddhiyaṃ ṭhatvā paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ye ca bhagavatā tayo bhavā vuttā, tesaṃ vasena codetuṃ kāmabhavotiādimāha. Tatrāyaṃ adhippāyo – yadi te antarābhavo nāma koci bhavo atthi, tena kāmabhavādīnaṃyeva aññatarena bhavitabbaṃ pañcavokārabhavādinā viya, tena taṃ pucchāmi – ‘‘kiṃ te ayaṃ antarābhavo nāma kāmabhavo, udāhu rūpabhavo arūpabhavo vā’’ti? Itaro tathā anicchanto sabbaṃ paṭikkhipati. Kāmabhavassa cātiādi yadi antarābhavo nāma atthi, imesaṃ bhavānaṃ antarā dvinnaṃ sīmānaṃ sīmantarikā [Pg.206] viya bhaveyyāti codetuṃ āraddhaṃ. Paravādī pana tathā anicchanto sabbapañhe paṭikkhipati kevalaṃ laddhiyā, na sahadhammena. Teneva naṃ sakavādī ‘no vata re’ti paṭisedheti.

505. Now there is the discussion on the intermediate state. Herein, with reference to those who, improperly grasping the sutta phrase 'one who attains final Nibbāna in the interval,' hold the view that there is an intermediate state in which a being—like one with the divine eye, yet without the divine eye; like one with psychic power, yet without psychic power—observing the union of his parents and the proper season, remains for seven days or more than seven days (such as the Pubbaseliyas and the Sammitīyas), the question 'Does it exist?' is from the proponent of his own doctrine, and the affirmation, standing firm in their view, is from the other. Then, to challenge them based on the three existences taught by the Blessed One, he begins with 'the sensual existence,' and so on. Here, the intention is this: if for you there is indeed some existence called the intermediate state, it must be one of the sensual existence, the form existence, or the formless existence, just as with the five-constituent existence. Therefore, I ask: 'Is this so-called intermediate state the sensual existence, or the form existence, or the formless existence?' The other, not wishing it to be so, rejects everything. The passage beginning 'Of the sensual existence...' is introduced to challenge that if there is indeed an intermediate state, it would be between these existences like the space between two boundaries. But the opponent, unwilling to agree, rejects every question purely out of adherence to his view, not in accordance with the Dhamma. For that very reason, the proponent of his own doctrine refutes them, saying, 'Surely not!'

506. Pañcamī sā yonītiādīnipi yathāparicchinnayoniādīsu so samodhānaṃ na gacchati, atha tena tato tato atirekena bhavitabbanti codetuṃ vuttāni. Antarābhavūpagaṃ kammanti yadi sopi eko bhavo, yathā kāmabhavūpagādīni kammāni atthīti satthārā vibhajitvā dassitāni, evaṃ tadupagenāpi kammena bhavitabbanti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Yasmā pana parasamaye antarābhavūpagaṃ nāma pāṭiyekkaṃ kammaṃ natthi, yaṃ yaṃ bhavaṃ upapajjissati, tadupageneva kammena antarābhave nibbattatīti tesaṃ laddhi, tasmā ‘naheva’nti paṭikkhittaṃ. Atthi antarābhavūpagā sattāti puṭṭhopi kāmabhavūpagāyeva nāma teti laddhiyā paṭikkhipati. Jāyantītiādīni puṭṭhopi tattha jātijarāmaraṇāni ceva cutipaṭisandhiparamparañca anicchanto paṭikkhipati. Rūpādivasena puṭṭhopi yasmā antarābhavasattassa anidassanaṃ rūpaṃ, vedanādayopi aññesaṃ viya na oḷārikāti tassa laddhi, tasmā paṭikkhipati. Imināva kāraṇena pañcavokārabhavabhāvepi paṭikkhepo veditabbo.

506. The statement 'the fifth womb,' and so on, is made to challenge the opponent that the intermediate state does not fall into the categories of wombs already defined, and thus it must be something additional to them. The kamma leading to the intermediate state—if that too is an existence, just as the Teacher has distinctly shown that there are kammas leading to the sensual existence and so forth, then there must also be kamma leading to that intermediate state—this is stated for the purpose of challenging. However, because, according to the opponent's system, there is no specific kamma called 'leading to the intermediate state,' but rather, their view is that whichever existence one is about to enter, the intermediate state arises through the kamma leading to that existence; therefore, it is rejected with 'certainly not.' When asked whether there are beings bound for the intermediate state, he rejects it based on their view that they are simply called beings bound for the sensual existence. When asked about birth, and so on, he rejects it because he does not accept birth, aging, and death, or the succession of passing away and rebirth there. When asked in terms of form, and so on, he rejects it because, in their view, the being in the intermediate state has unmanifest form, and feelings and other mental states are not as gross as in others. For this very reason, the rejection should be understood even in the case of the five-constituent existence.

507. Idāni kāmabhavo bhavo gatītiādi bhavasaṃsandanaṃ nāma hoti. Tatrāyaṃ adhippāyo – yadi te antarābhavo nāma koci bhavo bhaveyya, yathā kāmabhavādīsu bhavagatiādibhedo labbhati, tathā tatrāpi labbhetha. Yathā vā tattha na labbhati, tathā imesupi na labbhetha. Samānasmiñhi bhavabhāve etesvevesa vibhāgo atthi, na itarasminti ko ettha visesahetūti. Itaro puna laddhimattavasena taṃ taṃ paṭijānāti ceva paṭikkhipati ca.

507. Now, the statement 'the sensual existence is an existence, a destination,' and so forth—this is called the linking of existences. Here, the intention is this: If that intermediate state were indeed some kind of existence, then just as distinctions like 'existence' and 'destination' are found in the sensual existence and so forth, they should also be found there. Or, just as they are not found there, so too they should not be found in these. For if the state of existence is the same, and this distinction exists in these but not in the other, what is the reason for the difference here? The other, however, merely based on adherence to views, both affirms and rejects this and that.

508. Sabbesaññeva sattānaṃ atthi antarābhavoti puṭṭho yasmā nirayūpagaasaññasattūpagaarūpūpagānaṃ antarābhavaṃ na icchati, tasmā paṭikkhipati. Teneva kāraṇena paṭilome paṭijānāti. Ānantariyassātiādi yesaṃ so antarābhavaṃ na icchati, te tāva vibhajitvā [Pg.207] dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Taṃ sabbaṃ pāḷianusāreneva veditabbaṃ saddhiṃ suttasādhanenāti.

508. When asked whether all beings have an intermediate state, he rejects it because he does not accept an intermediate state for those bound for hell, for non-percipient beings, or for those bound for the formless realms. For the same reason, he acknowledges it in the converse. The statement 'Of the one who commits a crime with immediate retribution,' and so on, is made to show, by distinguishing them, those for whom he does not accept an intermediate state. All this should be understood in accordance with the Pāḷi text, together with scriptural evidence.

Antarābhavakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse on the Intermediate State.

3. Kāmaguṇakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discourse on the Strands of Sensual Pleasure

510. Idāni kāmaguṇakathā nāma hoti. Tattha sakasamaye tāva kāmadhātūti vatthukāmāpi vuccanti – kilesakāmāpi kāmabhavopi. Etesu hi vatthukāmā kamanīyaṭṭhena kāmā, sabhāvanissattasuññataṭṭhena dhātūti kāmadhātu. Kilesakāmā kamanīyaṭṭhena ceva kamanaṭṭhena ca kāmā, yathāvuttenevatthena dhātūti kāmadhātu. Kāmabhavo kamanīyaṭṭhena kamanaṭṭhena vatthukāmapavattidesaṭṭhenāti tīhi kāraṇehi kāmo, yathāvuttenevatthena dhātūti kāmadhātu. Parasamaye pana – ‘‘pañcime, bhikkhave, kāmaguṇā’’ti vacanamattaṃ nissāya pañceva kāmaguṇā kāmadhātūti gahitaṃ. Tasmā yesaṃ ayaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi pubbaseliyānaṃ; te sandhāya kāmadhātunānattaṃ bodhetuṃ pañcevāti pucchā sakavādissa, laddhivasena paṭiññā itarassa. Nanu atthītiādi kilesakāmadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Tattha tappaṭisaṃyuttoti kāmaguṇapaṭisaṃyutto, kāmaguṇārammaṇoti attho. No ca vata re vattabbe pañcevāti imesu tappaṭisaṃyuttachandādīsu sati pañceva kāmaguṇā kāmadhātūti na vattabbaṃ. Etepi hi chandādayo kamanīyaṭṭhena kāmā ca dhātu cātipi kāmadhātu. Kamanaṭṭhena kāmasaṅkhātā dhātūtipi kāmadhātūti attho.

510. Now, this is called the discourse on the strands of sensual pleasure. Herein, in our own school, the term 'sensual element' refers to the objects of sensual pleasure, the defilements of sensual pleasure, and sensual existence. Among these, the objects of sensual pleasure are called 'sensual' in the sense of being desirable, and 'element' in the sense of being empty, devoid of a living being and an intrinsic nature—thus, 'sensual element'. The defilements of sensual pleasure are called 'sensual' in the sense of being desirable and in the sense of desiring, and 'element' in the sense previously stated—thus, 'sensual element'. Sensual existence is called 'sensual' for three reasons: in the sense of being desirable, in the sense of desiring, and in the sense of being the sphere where objects of sensual pleasure prevail; and 'element' in the sense previously stated—thus, 'sensual element'. In another school, however, based solely on the statement, 'Monks, these five are strands of sensual pleasure,' only the five strands of sensual pleasure are taken as the 'sensual element'. Therefore, for those who hold this view, such as the Pubbaseliyas of the present day, the question 'Only five?' is posed by the proponent of our own school to clarify the diversity of the sensual element, while the affirmation of the other is based on their doctrine. The statement 'Surely, do they exist?' and so forth, is spoken to show the defilements of sensual pleasure. Herein, 'associated with them' means 'associated with the strands of sensual pleasure,' which is to say, 'having the strands of sensual pleasure as their object'. But it should not be said, 'Only these five,' for when these associated desires and so forth exist, it should not be said that only the five strands of sensual pleasure constitute the sensual element. For these desires and so forth are also the sensual element, being 'sensual' in the sense of being desirable and also being an 'element'. Alternatively, they are the sensual element because they are an 'element' designated as 'sensual' in the sense of desiring. This is the meaning.

Manussānaṃ cakkhuntiādi vatthukāmadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Tattha paravādī channampi āyatanānaṃ vatthukāmabhāvena nakāmadhātubhāvaṃ paṭikkhipitvā puna manoti puṭṭho mahaggatalokuttaraṃ sandhāya nakāmadhātubhāvaṃ paṭijānāti. Yasmā pana sabbopi tebhūmakamano kāmadhātuyeva, tasmā naṃ sakavādī suttena niggaṇhāti.

The statement 'the eye of humans' and so forth is made to show the objects of sensual pleasure. Herein, the opponent, having rejected that the six sense bases are the sensual element, when questioned again about the mind, acknowledges that it is not the sensual element, referring to the exalted and supramundane. However, since all mind belonging to the three planes of existence is indeed the sensual element, the proponent of our own school refutes him with a sutta.

511. Kāmaguṇā [Pg.208] bhavotiādi bhavassa kāmadhātubhāvadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Yasmā pana kāmaguṇamatte bhavoti vohāro natthi, tasmā paravādī nahevāti paṭikkhipati. Kāmaguṇūpagaṃ kammantiādi sabbaṃ kāmaguṇamattassa nakāmadhātubhāvadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Kāmadhātusaṅkhātakāmabhavūpagameva hi kammaṃ atthi, kāmabhavūpagā eva ca sattā honti. Tattha jāyanti jiyanti miyanti cavanti upapajjanti, na kāmaguṇesūti iminā upāyena sabbattha attho veditabboti.

511. The statement 'strands of sensual pleasure are existence' and so forth is made to show that existence is the sensual element. However, since there is no conventional expression 'existence is merely strands of sensual pleasure,' the opponent refutes it with 'no indeed'. The statement 'kamma leading to the strands of sensual pleasure' and so forth—all this is made to show that mere strands of sensual pleasure are not the sensual element. For only kamma that leads to sensual existence, which is designated as the sensual element, exists; and beings exist only as those who have gone to sensual existence. There they are born, age, die, pass away, and are reborn—not in the mere strands of sensual pleasure. By this method, the meaning should be understood everywhere.

Kāmaguṇakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse on the Strands of Sensual Pleasure.

4. Kāmakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Discourse on Sensual Pleasures

513-514. Idāni kāmakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘pañcime, bhikkhave, kāmaguṇā’’ti vacanamattaṃ nissāya rūpāyatanādīni pañcevāyatanāni kāmāti laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānaṃ; tesaṃ kilesakāmasseva nippariyāyena kāmabhāvaṃ dassetuṃ pañcevāti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

513-514. Now comes the discourse on sensual pleasures. Here, for those who hold the view, like the Pubbaseliyas, that the five sense objects, such as visible forms, are themselves sensual pleasures—based merely on the statement, 'Monks, there are these five strands of sensual pleasure'—the question 'Are there only five?' is posed by the proponent of our own school, and the other affirms it. This is in order to show them that it is sensual defilement itself that is sensuality in the primary sense. The rest here is clear in meaning.

Kāmakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse on Sensual Pleasures.

5. Rūpadhātukathāvaṇṇanā

5. Commentary on the Discourse on the Form Realm

515-516. Idāni rūpadhātukathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘rūpino dhammā rūpadhātu nāmā’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya rūpinoti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ sakavādī yasmā rūpadhātu nāma rūpabhavo, na rūpamattameva, tasmā tenatthena codetuṃ rūpadhātūtiādimāha. Taṃ sabbaṃ kāmaguṇakathāyaṃ vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Sāva kāmadhātūti puṭṭho bhūmiparicchedena virodhaṃ passamāno paṭikkhipati. Puna daḷhaṃ katvā puṭṭho attano laddhivasena paṭijānāti. Evaṃ sante pana dvīhi bhavehi samannāgatatā āpajjati, tena taṃ sakavādī kāmabhavena cāti ādimāha. Itaro ekassa dvīhi samannāgatābhāvato paṭikkhipatīti.

Now comes the discussion on the form realm. Here, with reference to those who hold the view that 'material phenomena are called the form realm,' such as the Andhakas, the question 'Are they material?' is from the proponent, and the acknowledgement is from the other. Then, because the form realm is the existence of form, not merely form itself, the proponent, in order to challenge him on that point, says, 'the form realm,' and so on. All of this should be understood in the same way as explained in the discussion on sensual pleasures. When asked, 'Is that the sense-sphere realm?' he rejects it, seeing the contradiction in the distinction of planes. When asked again firmly, he acknowledges it in accordance with his own view. This being so, it would follow that one is endowed with two existences; therefore, the proponent says to him, 'with sensual existence,' and so on. The other rejects this, because one cannot be endowed with two.

Rūpadhātukathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Discussion on the Form Realm.

6. Arūpadhātukathāvaṇṇanā

6. Exposition of the Discussion on the Formless Realm.

517-518. Arūpadhātukathāyapi [Pg.209] imināvupāyena attho veditabbo. Arūpadhammesu pana vedanākkhandhameva gahetvā vedanā bhavotiādinā nayenettha desanā katā. Tattha kiṃ te arūpino dhammāti saṅkhaṃ gatā vedanādīsu aññatarā hotīti evamattho daṭṭhabbo. Sesaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbanti.

In the discussion on the formless realm, too, the meaning should be understood by this same method. However, concerning formless phenomena, the teaching here is given by taking only the feeling aggregate, according to the method 'feeling is existence,' and so on. Here, the meaning should be understood thus: the question 'What are those formless phenomena?' refers to any one of the phenomena reckoned as such, beginning with feeling. The rest should be understood in the same way as explained above.

Arūpadhātukathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Discussion on the Formless Realm.

7. Rūpadhātuyā āyatanakathāvaṇṇanā

7. Exposition of the Discussion on the Sense Bases in the Form Realm.

519. Idāni rūpadhātuyā āyatanakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘rūpī manomayo sabbaṅgapaccaṅgī ahīnindriyo’’ti (dī. ni. 1.87) suttaṃ nissāya brahmakāyikānaṃ ghānādinimittānipi āyatanānevāti kappetvā saḷāyataniko tesaṃ attabhāvoti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānañceva sammitiyānañca; te sandhāya saḷāyatanikoti pucchā sakavādissa, laddhivasena paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ yaṃ tattha āyatanaṃ natthi, tassa vasena codetuṃ atthi tattha ghānāyatanantiādi āraddhaṃ. Tato paravādī yaṃ tattha ajjhattikānaṃ tiṇṇaṃ āyatanānaṃ ghānādikaṃ saṇṭhānanimittaṃ tadeva āyatananti laddhiyā paṭijānāti. Bāhirānaṃ gandhāyatanādīnaṃ vasena puṭṭho ghānappasādādayo tattha na icchati, tasmā tesaṃ gocaraṃ paṭisedhento paṭikkhipati. Paṭilomapañhasaṃsandanapañhesupi imināvupāyena attho veditabbo.

519. Now comes the discussion on the sense bases in the form realm. Here, with reference to those who, relying on the sutta, 'Possessed of form, mind-made, complete with all major and minor limbs, not deficient in any faculty' (Dī. Ni. 1.87), conceive that even the features of the nose and other organs of the Brahmā-beings are sense bases, and thus hold the view that their existence has six sense bases—such as the Andhakas and the Sammitiyas—the question 'Does it have six sense bases?' is from the proponent, and the acknowledgement from the other is in accordance with their view. Then, in order to challenge him on the basis of the sense base that is not present there, the argument 'Is the nose-base there?' and so on, is initiated. Thereupon, the opponent acknowledges, according to his view, that the very configuration-sign of the three internal sense bases—the nose and so on—is the sense base there. When questioned about the external sense bases, such as the odor-base and so on, he does not accept the sensitive matter of the nose, etc., there; therefore, denying their object-domain, he rejects it. In the reverse questions and in the questions that connect the threads as well, the meaning should be understood by this method.

521. Atthi tattha ghānāyatanaṃ atthi gandhāyatanaṃ tena ghānena taṃ gandhaṃ ghāyatīti tasmiṃyeva parasamaye ekacce ācariye sandhāya vuttaṃ. Te kira tattha cha ajjhattikāni āyatanāni paripuṇṇāni icchanti, āyatanena ca nāma sakiccakena bhavitabbanti tehi ghānādīhi te gandhādayo ghāyanti sāyanti phusantītipi icchanti. Taṃ laddhiṃ sandhāya paravādī āmantāti paṭijānāti.

521. 'There is the nose-base there, there is the odor-base; with that nose one smells that odor.' This was said with reference to certain teachers of that very same school. They, it seems, hold that the six internal sense bases are complete there, and that a sense base must have its own function. They also hold that with those sense organs—the nose and so on—they smell odors, taste flavors, and touch tangibles. With reference to that view, the opponent acknowledges by saying, 'Yes.'

522. Atthi [Pg.210] tattha mūlagandhotiādīni pana puṭṭho atthibhāvaṃ sādhetuṃ asakkonto paṭikkhipati. Nanu atthi tattha ghānanimittantiādi saṇṭhānamattasseva sādhakaṃ, na āyatanassa, tasmā udāhaṭampi anudāhaṭasadisamevāti.

522. But when asked, 'Is there a root-odor there?' and so on, being unable to establish its existence, he rejects it. Surely, the question 'Is there a sign of a nose there?' and so on, proves only the mere configuration, not the sense base. Therefore, what is cited is just like what is not cited.

Rūpadhātuyā āyatanakathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Discussion on the Sense Bases in the Form Realm.

8. Arūpe rūpakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Exposition of the Discussion on Form in the Formless Realm.

524-526. Idāni arūpe rūpakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpa’’nti vacanato āruppabhavepi oḷārikarūpā nissaṭaṃ sukhumarūpaṃ atthīti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya atthi rūpanti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

Now comes the discussion on form in the formless realm. Here, with reference to those who, based on the statement 'Conditioned by consciousness, name-and-form arises,' hold the view that even in the formless existence there is a subtle form devoid of gross form—such as the Andhakas—the question 'Is there form?' is from the proponent, and the acknowledgement is from the other. The rest here has a plain meaning.

Arūpe rūpakathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Discussion on Form in the Formless Realm.

9. Rūpaṃ kammantikathāvaṇṇanā

9. Exposition of the Discussion on 'Form is Kamma'.

527-537. Idāni rūpaṃ kammantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ kāyavacīviññattisaṅkhātaṃ rūpameva kāyakammaṃ vacīkammaṃ nāma, tañca kusalasamuṭṭhānaṃ kusalaṃ, akusalasamuṭṭhānaṃ akusalanti laddhi, seyyathāpi mahisāsakānañceva sammitiyānañca; te sandhāya kusalena cittena samuṭṭhitanti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ sace taṃ kusalaṃ, yvāyaṃ sārammaṇādibhedo kusalassa labbhati, atthi te so tassāti codetuṃ sārammaṇantiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha patthanā paṇidhīti cetanāyevetaṃ vevacanaṃ. Kusalacetanāyeva hi pakappayamānā patthanāti. Pakappanavasena ṭhitattā paṇidhīti ca vuccati. Parato pana kusalena cittena samuṭṭhitā vedanā saññā cetanā saddhātiādīsu vedanādīnaññeva cettha patthanā paṇidhīti labbhati, na cetanāya. Kasmā? Dvinnaṃ cetanānaṃ ekato abhāvā, sotapatitattā pana evaṃ tanti gatāti veditabbā. Rūpāyatanantiādi purimavāre ‘‘sabbantaṃ kusala’’nti saṃkhittassa pabhedadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ[Pg.211]. Sesā saṃsandananayā, vacīkammakathā ‘‘akusalena cittena samuṭṭhita’’ntiādividhānañca sabbaṃ pāḷianusāreneva veditabbaṃ. Asucīti panettha sukkaṃ adhippetaṃ. Suttasādhanaṃ uttānatthameva.

Now comes the discussion on 'Form is kamma.' Here, with reference to those who hold the view that form itself, designated as bodily and verbal intimation, is called bodily kamma and verbal kamma, and that what is originated by the wholesome is wholesome, and what is originated by the unwholesome is unwholesome—such as the Mahisāsakas and the Sammitiyas—the question 'Has it arisen from a wholesome mind?' is from the proponent, and the acknowledgement is from the other. Then, in order to challenge him, 'If that is wholesome, does it have those distinctions found in the wholesome, such as having an object?', the argument beginning 'having an object' is initiated. Here, 'aspiration' and 'resolve' are synonyms for volition. For it is wholesome volition itself that, when aspiring, is called 'aspiration.' And because it stands by way of aspiration, it is called 'resolve.' But further on, among feeling, perception, volition, faith, and so on, which have arisen from a wholesome mind, it is only feeling and the others that are obtained here as 'aspiration' and 'resolve,' not volition. Why? Because two volitions do not arise together; but it should be understood that the textual tradition proceeds in this way because it has entered the stream of the argument. 'The form-base,' etc., was said in the previous section to show the classification of the abbreviated phrase 'all that is wholesome.' The remaining methods of connection, the discussion on verbal kamma, and the procedure for 'arisen from an unwholesome mind,' etc., should all be understood by following the Pāli text. Here, by 'impure' is meant semen. The scriptural proof has a plain meaning.

Rūpaṃ kammantikathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Discussion on 'Form is Kamma'.

10. Jīvitindriyakathāvaṇṇanā

10. Exposition of the Discussion on the Life Faculty.

540. Idāni jīvitindriyakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ nāma cittavippayutto arūpadhammo, tasmā rūpajīvitindriyaṃ natthīti laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānañceva sammitiyānañca; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Natthi rūpīnaṃ dhammānaṃ āyūti pañhe upādinnarūpānampi tiṇakaṭṭhādīnampi santānavasena pavattimeva āyu ṭhiti yapanā yāpanā iriyanā vattanā pālanāti icchati, tasmā paṭikkhipati. Atthīti pañhepi iminā kāraṇena paṭijānāti. Atthi arūpajīvitindriyanti pañhe arūpadhammānaṃ cittavippayuttaṃ jīvitindriyasantānaṃ nāma atthīti icchati, tasmā paṭijānāti.

540. Now there is the discussion on the life faculty. Herein, for those who hold the view that the life faculty is a mind-disassociated immaterial phenomenon, and therefore there is no material life faculty—such as the Pubbaseliyas and the Sammitiyas—regarding them, the question is from the proponent of his own doctrine, and the affirmation is from the other. To the question, ‘Is there no life for material phenomena?’, he rejects it, because he holds that even for clung-to matter and for things such as grass and wood, their very process by way of continuity is life, persistence, duration, maintenance, subsistence, functioning, activity, and preservation. To the question, ‘Is there?’, he also affirms for this reason. To the question, ‘Is there an immaterial life faculty?’, he affirms it because he holds that for immaterial phenomena there is indeed what is called the continuity of the life faculty, which is mind-disassociated.

541. Rūpīnaṃ dhammānaṃ āyu arūpajīvitindriyanti pañhe sattasantāne rūpino vā hontu arūpino vā, sabbesaṃ cittavippayuttaṃ arūpajīvitindriyameva icchati, tasmā paṭijānāti.

541. To the question, ‘Is the life of material phenomena the immaterial life faculty?’, he holds that in the continuum of a being, whether phenomena are material or immaterial, for all of them it is precisely the mind-disassociated, immaterial life faculty; therefore, he affirms it.

542. Nirodhasamāpannapañhesupi cittavippayuttaṃ arūpajīvitameva sandhāya paṭikkhipati ca paṭijānāti ca. Sakavādī pana taṃ asampaṭicchanto yaṃ arūpapavatte asati atthi, rūpena tena bhavitabbanti codetuṃ hañcītiādimāha. Saṅkhārakkhandhapañhe phassādisaṅkhārakkhandhaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, kāyakammādisaṅkhārakkhandhaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Kāyaviññatti vacīviññatti sammāvācā sammākammanto jīvitindriyanti evamādayopi dhammā saṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannātissa laddhi. Sakavādī pana taṃ asampaṭicchanto yadi niruddhepi arūpapavatte saṅkhārakkhandho atthi, catunnampi khandhānaṃ atthitā hotūti codetuṃ atthi vedanākkhandhoti ādimāha. Itaro antosamāpattiṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, samāpajjantassa ca vuṭṭhahantassa ca pubbāparabhāgaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti.

542. Regarding the questions on the attainment of cessation, he denies and affirms with reference only to the mind-disassociated, immaterial life faculty. However, the proponent of his own doctrine, not accepting that, says, ‘If...’ and so on, to argue: ‘If something exists in the absence of the immaterial process, then it must be by means of form.’ To the question on the formations aggregate, he denies with reference to the formations aggregate of contact and so on, and affirms with reference to the formations aggregate of bodily action and so on. According to his view, phenomena such as bodily intimation, verbal intimation, right speech, right action, and the life faculty are also included in the formations aggregate. The proponent of his own doctrine, not accepting that, says, ‘The feeling aggregate exists,’ and so on, to argue: ‘If the formations aggregate exists even when the immaterial process has ceased, then all four aggregates must exist.’ The other denies with reference to being within the attainment and affirms with reference to the preceding and subsequent stages of one entering and emerging from it.

543. Asaññasattavārepi [Pg.212] eseva nayo. Tassa hi laddhiyā asaññasattānaṃ paṭisandhikāle cittaṃ uppajjitvā nirujjhati, tena saha cittavippayuttaarūpajīvitindriyaṃ uppajjitvā yāvatāyukaṃ pavattati. Tasmā tesaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ natthīti puṭṭho paṭikkhipati, atthīti puṭṭho paṭijānāti. Vedanākkhandhādayopi tesaṃ pavattivasena paṭikkhipati, cutipaṭisandhivasena paṭijānāti. Sakavādī pana taṃ anicchanto ‘‘sace tattha ekakkhaṇepi vedanādayo atthi, pañcavokārabhavattaṃ pāpuṇātī’’ti codetuṃ pañcavokārabhavoti āha. Itaro suttavirodhabhayā paṭikkhipati.

543. The same method applies in the section on non-percipient beings. For according to his view, at the moment of rebirth-linking for non-percipient beings, consciousness arises and ceases, and along with it, the mind-disassociated, immaterial life faculty arises and continues for the duration of the lifespan. Therefore, when asked, ‘Do they have no life faculty?’, he rejects it; when asked, ‘Is there?’, he affirms it. The feeling aggregate and so on, he also denies with regard to their ongoing process, but affirms with regard to death and rebirth-linking. However, the proponent of his own doctrine, not accepting that, says, ‘a being of the five-aggregate existence,’ in order to argue: ‘If feeling and so on exist there even for a single moment, it would attain the state of a five-aggregate existence.’ The other denies this out of fear of contradicting the suttas.

544-545. Ekadesaṃ bhijjatīti pañhe sampayuttaṃ bhijjati, vippayuttaṃ tiṭṭhatīti tassa laddhi, tasmā paṭijānāti. Dve jīvitindriyānīti pucchā paravādissa, paṭiññā sakavādissa. Rūpārūpavasena hi dve jīvitindriyāni, tehiyeva satto jīvati, tesaṃ bhaṅgena maratīti vuccati. Cutikkhaṇasmiñhi dvepi jīvitāni saheva bhijjanti.

544-545. To the question, ‘Does it break in part?’, he affirms it, because it is his view that the associated part breaks, while the disassociated part remains; therefore he affirms it. ‘Two life faculties’ is a question from the opponent; the affirmation is from the proponent of his own doctrine. For there are two life faculties, classified as material and immaterial; a being lives by means of these, and at their breaking is said to die. For at the moment of death, both life faculties break together.

Jīvitindriyakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of the Life Faculty.

11. Kammahetukathāvaṇṇanā

11. The Commentary on the Discussion of Kamma as Cause.

546. Idāni kammahetukathā nāma hoti. Tattha yena arahatā purimabhave arahā abbhācikkhitapubbo, so tassa kammassa hetu arahattā parihāyatīti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānañceva sammitiyānañca; te sandhāya kammahetūti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesaṃ parihānikathāyaṃ vuttanayameva.

546. Now there is the discussion called 'Kamma as Cause.' Herein, concerning the view held by some—such as the Pubbaseliyas and the Sammitiyas—that an arahant, who in a former existence had previously falsely accused an arahant, falls away from arahantship because of that kamma as cause; regarding them, the question concerning kamma as cause is from the proponent of his own doctrine, while the affirmation is from the other. The rest is in accordance with the method stated in the discussion on falling away.

Handa hi arahantānaṃ abbhācikkhatīti idaṃ yassa kammassa hetu parihāyati, taṃ sampaṭicchāpetuṃ vadati. Atha naṃ sakavādī taṃ pakkhaṃ paṭijānāpetvā ‘‘yadi evaṃ yehi arahanto na abbhācikkhitapubbā, te sabbe arahattaṃ pāpuṇeyyu’’nti codetuṃ ye kecītiādimāha. Itaro tassa kammassa arahattaṃ sampāpuṇane niyāmaṃ apassanto paṭikkhipati.

Indeed, to make the opponent admit that falsely accusing arahants is the kamma due to which one falls away, he speaks. Then, the proponent, having had that position acknowledged, argues: 'If so, then all those who have never falsely accused an arahant should attain arahantship,' and states, 'Whoever,' etc. The other, not seeing any certainty that such kamma leads to the attainment of arahantship, rejects it.

Kammahetukathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of Kamma as Cause.

Aṭṭhamo vaggo.

The Eighth Chapter.

9. Navamavaggo

9. The Ninth Chapter.

1. Ānisaṃsadassāvīkathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Commentary on the Discussion of Seeing the Benefits.

547. Idāni [Pg.213] ānisaṃsadassāvīkathā nāma hoti. Tattha sakasamaye saṅkhāre ādīnavato nibbānañca ānisaṃsato passantassa saṃyojanappahānaṃ hotīti nicchayo. Yesaṃ pana tesu dvīsupi ekaṃsikavādaṃ gahetvā ‘‘ānisaṃsadassāvinova saṃyojanappahānaṃ hotī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Athassa ‘‘ekaṃsikavādo tayā gahito, ādīnavopi daṭṭhabboyevā’’ti vibhāgadassanatthaṃ sakavādī saṅkhāretiādimāha.

547. Now there is the discussion called 'Seeing the Benefits.' Herein, in one's own doctrine, it is certain that for one who sees the danger in formations and the benefit of Nibbāna, the abandoning of fetters occurs. But as for those who, holding to a one-sided view in these two matters, have the doctrine that 'the abandoning of fetters occurs only for one who sees the benefits'—such as the Andhakas; regarding them, the question is from the proponent of his own doctrine, while the affirmation is from the other. Then, to show him the distinction, the proponent of his own doctrine says, ‘formations…’ and so on, arguing, 'A one-sided view has been adopted by you, but the danger, too, should indeed be seen.'

Saṅkhāre ca aniccato manasikaroti, nibbāne ca ānisaṃsadassāvī hotīti pañhasmiṃ ayamadhippāyo – ānisaṃsadassāvissa saṃyojanānaṃ pahānaṃ hotīti tesaṃ laddhi. Nanu saṅkhāre aniccato manasikaroto saṃyojanā pahīyantīti ca puṭṭho āmantāti paṭijānāti. Tena te saṅkhāre ca aniccato manasikaroti, nibbāne ca ānisaṃsadassāvī hotīti idaṃ āpajjati, kiṃ sampaṭicchasi etanti. Tato paravādī ekacittakkhaṇaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, dutiyaṃ puṭṭho nānācittavasena paṭijānāti. Sakavādī panassa adhippāyaṃ madditvā aniccamanasikārassa ānisaṃsadassāvitāya ca ekato paṭiññātattā dvinnaṃ phassānaṃ dvinnaṃ cittānaṃ samodhānaṃ hotīti pucchati. Itaro dvinnaṃ samodhānaṃ apassanto paṭikkhipati. Dukkhatotiādipañhesupi eseva nayo. Kiṃ panettha sanniṭṭhānaṃ, kiṃ aniccādito manasikaroto saṃyojanā pahīyanti, udāhu nibbāne ānisaṃsadassāvissa, udāhu dvepi ekato karontassāti. Yadi tāva aniccādito manasikaroto pahānaṃ bhaveyya, vipassanācitteneva bhaveyya. Atha ānisaṃsadassāvino, anussavavasena nibbāne ānisaṃsaṃ passantassa vipassanācitteneva bhaveyya, atha dvepi ekato karontassa bhaveyya, dvinnaṃ phassādīnaṃ samodhānaṃ bhaveyya. Yasmā pana ariyamaggakkhaṇe aniccādimanasikārassa kiccaṃ nipphattiṃ gacchati puna niccatotiādigahaṇassa anuppattidhammabhāvato, nibbāne ca paccakkhatova ānisaṃsadassanaṃ ijjhati, tasmā kiccanipphattivasena aniccādito [Pg.214] manasikaroto ārammaṇaṃ katvā pavattivasena ca nibbāne ānisaṃsadassāvissa saṃyojanānaṃ pahānaṃ hotīti veditabbaṃ.

He attends to formations as impermanent and sees the benefit in Nibbāna—this is the meaning in the question. 'For one who sees the benefit, the fetters are abandoned'—this is their tenet. When asked, 'Are the fetters abandoned for one who attends to formations as impermanent?' he acknowledges it, saying, 'Yes.' Therefore, this follows: 'He attends to formations as impermanent and sees the benefit in Nibbāna.' Do you accept this? Then, the opponent rejects it by referring to a single moment of mind, but when questioned a second time, he acknowledges it in terms of different moments of mind. The proponent, however, pressing his own view, asks whether there is a conjunction of two contacts and two minds, since it was acknowledged that attending to impermanence and seeing the benefit occur together. The other, not seeing their conjunction, rejects it. The same method applies to questions on suffering, etc. Now, what is the conclusion here? Are the fetters abandoned for one who attends to impermanence, etc., or for one who sees the benefit in Nibbāna, or for one who does both together? If the abandoning were to occur by attending to impermanence, etc., it would be through the insight-mind alone. If it were for one who sees the benefit, it would be through the insight-mind alone for one who sees the benefit of Nibbāna by way of report. If it were for one who does both together, there would be a conjunction of two contacts, etc. However, because at the moment of the noble path the function of attending to impermanence, etc., is fulfilled—since the state has been reached wherein the grasping of permanence, etc., does not arise again—and because the direct seeing of the benefit in Nibbāna is accomplished, it should be understood that the abandoning of the fetters occurs for one who attends to impermanence, etc., by way of the fulfillment of its function, and for one who sees the benefit in Nibbāna by way of its occurrence as an object.

548. Nibbāne sukhānupassīti suttaṃ nibbāne sukhānupassanādibhāvameva sādheti, na ānisaṃsadassāvitāmattena saṃyojanānaṃ pahānaṃ. Tasmā ābhatampi anābhatasadisamevāti.

548. The sutta 'Seeing happiness in Nibbāna' establishes only the state of seeing happiness in Nibbāna, etc., not the abandoning of fetters merely by seeing the benefit. Therefore, the evidence brought forward is as if it were not brought forward.

Ānisaṃsadassāvīkathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on Seeing the Benefit.

2. Amatārammaṇakathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Exposition of the Discourse on the Deathless as Object.

549. Idāni amatārammaṇakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘nibbānaṃ maññatī’’tiādīnaṃ ayoniso atthaṃ gahetvā amatārammaṇaṃ saṃyojanaṃ hotīti laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ sace amatārammaṇaṃ saṃyojanaṃ, amatassa saṃyojaniyādibhāvo āpajjatīti codetuṃ amataṃ saṃyojaniyantiādimāha. Itaro suttavirodhabhayena sabbaṃ paṭikkhipati. Iminā upāyena sabbavāresu attho veditabbo. Nibbānaṃ nibbānatoti āhaṭasuttaṃ pana diṭṭhadhammanibbānaṃ sandhāya bhāsitaṃ, tasmā asādhakanti.

549. Now begins the discourse on the Deathless as object. Herein, with reference to those who, having wrongly grasped the meaning of such phrases as 'he conceives Nibbāna,' hold the tenet that having the Deathless as an object is a fetter—such as the Pubbaseliyas—the question is put by the Sakavādin, and the admission is by the other. Then, in order to challenge him by showing that if having the Deathless as an object is a fetter, it would follow that the Deathless becomes something that can be fettered, etc., he says, 'The Deathless is something that can be fettered,' and so forth. The other rejects all of this for fear of contradicting the suttas. By this method, the meaning should be understood in all sections of the debate. The sutta brought forward, 'Nibbāna is Nibbāna,' however, was spoken with reference to Nibbāna in this very life; therefore, it is not a valid proof.

Amatārammaṇakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discourse on the Deathless as Object.

3. Rūpaṃ sārammaṇantikathāvaṇṇanā

3. The Exposition of the Discourse 'Form Has an Object'.

552-553. Idāni rūpaṃ sārammaṇantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha rūpaṃ sappaccayaṭṭhena sārammaṇaṃ nāma hoti, na aññaṃ ārammaṇaṃ karotīti ārammaṇapaccayavasena. Yesaṃ pana avisesena rūpaṃ sārammaṇanti laddhi, seyyathāpi uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya ārammaṇatthassa vibhāgadassanatthaṃ pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha pāḷianusāreneva veditabbaṃ. Na vattabbanti pañhe olubbhārammaṇaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā sakavādissa. Dutiyapañhepi paccayārammaṇaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā tasseva. Iti sappaccayaṭṭhenevettha sārammaṇatā siddhāti.

Now begins the discourse called 'Form Has an Object.' Herein, form is called 'having an object' in the sense of being conditioned, not in the sense that it takes something else as its object by way of the object-condition. But with reference to those who hold the tenet that form has an object without distinction—such as the Uttarāpathakas—the question is put by the Sakavādin for the sake of showing the distinction in the meaning of 'object,' and the admission is by the other. The remainder here should be understood in accordance with the Pāli text itself. In the question, 'It should not be said,' the admission by the Sakavādin is with reference to engrossment in an object. In the second question too, the admission is by him with reference to the condition as object. Thus, its having an object is established here only in the sense of being conditioned.

Rūpaṃ sārammaṇantikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discourse 'Form Has an Object'.

4. Anusayā anārammaṇakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Exposition of the Discourse 'Latent Tendencies Have No Object'.

554-556. Idāni [Pg.215] anusayā anārammaṇātikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ anusayā nāma cittavippayuttā ahetukā abyākatā, teneva ca anārammaṇāti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānañceva ekaccānañca uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya anusayāti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ anārammaṇena nāma evaṃvidhena bhavitabbanti codetuṃ rūpantiādimāha. Kāmarāgotiādi kāmarāgānusayato anaññattā dassitaṃ. Saṅkhārakkhandho anārammaṇoti pañhe cittasampayuttasaṅkhārakkhandhaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Anusayaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ kāyakammādirūpañca saṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannaṃ, taṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Imināvupāyena sabbavāresu attho veditabbo. Sānusayoti pañhe pana appahīnānusayattā sānusayatā anuññātā. Na anusayānaṃ pavattisabbhāvā. Yo hi appahīno, na so atīto, nānāgato, na paccuppanno ca. Maggavajjhakileso panesa appahīnattāva atthīti vuccati. Evarūpassa ca idaṃ nāma ārammaṇanti na vattabbaṃ. Tasmā taṃ paṭikkhittaṃ. Taṃ panetaṃ na kevalaṃ anusayassa, rāgādīnampi tādisameva, tasmā anusayānaṃ anārammaṇatāsādhakaṃ na hotīti.

Now begins the discourse called 'Latent Tendencies Have No Object.' Herein, with reference to those who hold the tenet that latent tendencies are dissociated from mind, rootless, and indeterminate, and for that very reason have no object—such as the Andhakas and some Uttarāpathakas—the question regarding latent tendencies is put by the Sakavādin, and the admission is by the other. Then, to challenge him by showing that something without an object must be of such a nature, he says, 'Form,' and so forth. 'Sensual desire,' and so forth, is shown because of its non-difference from the latent tendency of sensual desire. In the question, 'The volitional formations aggregate has no object,' he rejects it with reference to the volitional formations aggregate associated with mind. He admits it with reference to the latent tendency, the life faculty, and bodily action, etc., which are included in the volitional formations aggregate. By this method, the meaning should be understood in all sections of the debate. In the question, 'With latent tendencies,' the state of having latent tendencies is conceded because they are unabandoned, not because of the actual occurrence of latent tendencies. For what is unabandoned is not past, nor future, nor present. But this defilement, which is to be abandoned by the path, is said to exist precisely because it is unabandoned. And for such a thing, it cannot be said, 'This is its object.' Therefore, that is rejected. This, however, applies not only to a latent tendency but also to lust, etc., which are of the same nature; therefore, it does not prove that latent tendencies are without an object.

Anusayā anārammaṇātikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discourse 'Latent Tendencies Have No Object'.

5. Ñāṇaṃ anārammaṇantikathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Exposition of the Discourse 'Knowledge Has No Object'.

557-558. Idāni ñāṇaṃ anārammaṇantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā arahā cakkhuviññāṇasamaṅgī ñāṇīti vuccati, tassa ñāṇassa tasmiṃ khaṇe ārammaṇaṃ natthi, tasmā ñāṇaṃ anārammaṇanti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha anusayakathāyaṃ vuttanayeneva veditabbanti.

Now comes the discourse called 'Knowledge Being Objectless'. Here, since an arahant endowed with eye-consciousness is called 'one who knows', and at that moment there is no object for that knowledge, therefore, 'knowledge is objectless'—this is the belief of some, like the Andhakas. With reference to them, the question is posed by one's own party, and the admission is made by the other. The rest here should be understood in the same way as stated in the discourse on latent tendencies.

Ñāṇaṃ anārammaṇantikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge Being Objectless.

6. Atītānāgatārammaṇakathāvaṇṇanā

6. The Explanation of the Discourse on Past and Future Objects.

559-561. Idāni atītānāgatārammaṇakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā atītānāgatārammaṇaṃ nāma natthi, tasmā tadārammaṇena cittena ārammaṇassa [Pg.216] natthitāya anārammaṇena bhavitabbanti atītaṃ anārammaṇanti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi uttarāpathakānaṃ, te sandhāya atītārammaṇanti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti.

Now comes the discourse on past and future objects. Here, since there is no such thing as an object of the past or future, therefore, a mind that takes such an object, due to the non-existence of the object, must be objectless—'the past is objectless' is the belief of some, such as the Uttarāpathakas. With reference to them, the question 'Is the past an object?' is posed by one's own party, and the admission is made by the other. The rest here proceeds just as in the Pāli text.

Atītānāgatārammaṇakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Past and Future Objects.

7. Vitakkānupatitakathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Explanation of the Discourse on Being Accompanied by Applied Thought.

562. Idāni vitakkānupatitakathā nāma hoti. Tattha vitakkānupatitā nāma duvidhā – ārammaṇato ca sampayogato ca. Tattha asukacittaṃ nāma vitakkassārammaṇaṃ na hotīti niyamābhāvato siyā sabbaṃ cittaṃ vitakkānupatitaṃ, vitakkavippayuttacittasabbhāvato pana na sabbaṃ cittaṃ vitakkānupatitaṃ. Iti imaṃ vibhāgaṃ akatvā aviseseneva sabbaṃ cittaṃ vitakkānupatitanti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi uttarāpathakānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha pāḷivaseneva niyyātīti.

562. Now comes the discourse on being accompanied by applied thought. Here, being accompanied by applied thought is of two kinds: with regard to object and with regard to association. In this regard, since there is no fixed rule that a certain mind is not the object of applied thought, all mind could be accompanied by applied thought. However, because of the existence of mind dissociated from applied thought, not all mind is accompanied by applied thought. Thus, without making this distinction, those who hold the belief that all mind is indiscriminately accompanied by applied thought—such as the Uttarāpathakas—with reference to them, the question is posed by one's own party, and the admission is made by the other. The rest here proceeds according to the Pāli text.

Vitakkānupatitakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Being Accompanied by Applied Thought.

8. Vitakkavipphārasaddakathāvaṇṇanā

8. The Explanation of the Discourse on the Sound of Thought Diffusion.

563. Idāni vitakkavipphārasaddakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā ‘‘vitakkavicārā vacīsaṅkhārā’’ti vuttā, tasmā sabbaso vitakkayato vicārayato antamaso manodhātupavattikālepi vitakkavipphāro saddoyevāti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānaṃ; te sandhāya sabbasoti pucchā sakavādissa paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ yadi vitakkavipphāramattaṃ saddo, phassādivipphāropi saddo bhaveyyāti codetuṃ sabbaso phusayatotiādimāha. Itaro tādisaṃ suttalesaṃ apassanto paṭikkhipati. Vitakkavipphāro saddo sotaviññeyyoti vitakkassa vipphāramattameva saddoti katvā pucchati, na vitakkavipphārasamuṭṭhitaṃ suttapamattānaṃ [Pg.217] saddaṃ, itaro paṭikkhipati. Nanu vitakkavipphārasaddo na sotaviññeyyoti idaṃ tasseva laddhiyā dasseti. So hi vitakkavipphāramattameva saddaṃ vadati, so na sotaviññeyyoti. Itaro pana ‘‘vitakkavipphārasaddaṃ sutvā ādisatī’’ ti (dī. ni. 3.148) vacanato sotaviññeyyovāti vadati.

563. Now comes the discourse on the sound of thought diffusion. Here, since it is said, 'Applied thought and sustained thought are verbal formations,' therefore, for those who hold the belief that when applying thought and sustaining thought in any way, even at the moment of the mind-element's arising, the diffusion of thought is indeed sound—such as the Pubbaseliyas—with reference to them, the question 'in all cases?' is posed by one's own party, and the admission is made by the other. Then, to refute him by arguing, 'If the mere diffusion of thought is sound, then the diffusion of contact, etc., would also be sound,' he says, 'in all cases, when contacting,' etc. The other, not seeing such a scriptural fragment, rejects it. 'The sound of thought diffusion is cognizable by the ear'—he asks this, taking sound to be merely the diffusion of thought, not the sound arising from the diffusion of thought of those who are heedless of the suttas. The other rejects it. 'Surely, the sound of thought diffusion is not cognizable by the ear'—this shows his own belief. For he speaks of sound as merely the diffusion of thought, and that is not cognizable by the ear. But the other, based on the statement, 'Having heard the sound of thought diffusion, he declares' (Dī. Ni. 3.148), says it is indeed cognizable by the ear.

Vitakkavipphārasaddakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Sound of Thought Diffusion.

9. Nayathācittassa vācātikathāvaṇṇanā

9. The Explanation of the Discourse on Speech Not in Accordance with Mind.

564. Idāni nayathācittassa vācātikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā koci aññaṃ bhaṇissāmīti aññaṃ bhaṇati, tasmā nayathācittassa vācā cittānurūpā cittānugatikā na hoti, vināpi cittena pavattatīti yesaṃ laddhi; seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi taṃsamuṭṭhāpakaṃ cittaṃ na siyā, phassādayopi tasmiṃ khaṇe na siyu’’nti codetuṃ aphassakassātiādimāha. Na bhaṇitukāmotiādīsu yasmā aññaṃ bhaṇissāmīti aññaṃ bhaṇantopi bhaṇitukāmoyeva nāma hoti, tasmā na hevāti paṭikkhipati.

564. Now comes the discourse on speech not in accordance with mind. Here, because someone, thinking 'I will say one thing,' says another, therefore, speech not in accordance with mind is neither in harmony with mind nor does it follow mind, but occurs independently of mind—this is the view of some, such as the Pubbaseliyas. With reference to them, the question is posed by one's own party, and the admission is made by the other. Then, to refute them, he says, 'If the mind that produces it were not present, then contact and other factors would also not be present at that moment,' beginning with 'of one without contact.' Regarding such phrases as 'not wishing to speak,' since even one who says something other than what they intended to say is still considered one who wishes to speak, it is therefore rejected with 'it is not so.'

565. Nanu atthi koci aññaṃ bhaṇissāmītiādīsu cīvaranti bhaṇitukāmo cīranti bhaṇeyya. Tattha aññaṃ bhaṇitukāmatācittaṃ, aññaṃ bhaṇanacittaṃ, iti pubbabhāgena cittena asadisattā ayathācitto nāma hoti, tenassa kevalaṃ anāpatti nāma hoti, na pana cīranti vacanasamuṭṭhāpakacittaṃ natthi, iti acittakā sā vācāti atthaṃ sandhāya iminā udāharaṇena ‘‘nayathācittassa vācā’’ti patiṭṭhāpitāpi appatiṭṭhāpitāva hotīti.

565. Is it not the case that someone, intending to say 'robe,' might say 'bark-cloth'? Here, the mind intending to say one thing and the mind uttering another are dissimilar to the preceding mind-moment, so it is called 'speech not in accordance with the mind.' For this reason, for him there is only non-offense, but it is not that the mind producing the utterance 'bark-cloth' is absent. Thus, with reference to the meaning that such speech is mindless, even though 'speech not in accordance with the mind' is established by this example, it is as if it were not established.

Nayathācittassa vācātikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Speech Not in Accordance with Mind.

10. Nayathācittassa kāyakammantikathāvaṇṇanā

10. The Explanation of the Discourse on Bodily Action Not in Accordance with Mind.

566-567. Idāni [Pg.218] nayathācittassa kāyakammantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā koci aññatra gacchissāmīti aññatra gacchati, tasmā nayathācittassa kāyakammaṃ cittānurūpaṃ cittānugatikaṃ na hoti, vināpi cittena pavattatīti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānaṃyeva, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbanti.

Now comes the discourse on bodily action not in accordance with mind. Here, because someone, thinking 'I will go to one place,' goes to another, therefore, bodily action not in accordance with mind is neither in harmony with mind nor does it follow mind, but occurs independently of mind—this is the view of some, such as the Pubbaseliyas themselves. With reference to them, the question is posed by one's own party, and the admission is made by the other. The rest here should be understood in the same way as stated above.

Nayathācittassa kāyakammantikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Bodily Action Not in Accordance with Mind.

11. Atītānāgatasamannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā

11. The Explanation of the Discourse on Being Endowed with the Past and Future.

568-570. Idāni atītānāgatehi samannāgatakathā nāma hoti. Tattha samannāgatapaññatti paṭilābhapaññattīti dve paññattiyo veditabbā. Tāsu paccuppannadhammasamaṅgī samannāgatoti vuccati. Aṭṭha samāpattilābhino pana samāpattiyo kiñcāpi na ekakkhaṇe pavattanti, aññā atītā honti, aññā anāgatā, aññā paccuppannā, paṭivijjhitvā aparihīnatāya pana lābhīti vuccati. Tattha yesaṃ imaṃ vibhāgaṃ aggahetvā yasmā jhānalābhīnaṃ atītānāgatāni jhānānipi atthi, tasmā ‘‘te atītenapi anāgatenapi samannāgatā’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ. Te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti. ‘‘Aṭṭhavimokkhajhāyī’’tiādi pana lābhībhāvassa sādhakaṃ, na samannāgatabhāvassāti.

568-570. Now, there is what is called the discourse on being endowed with the past and future. Herein, two concepts should be understood: the concept of being endowed and the concept of obtaining. One possessing present phenomena is called 'endowed.' However, for those who have gained the eight attainments, although the attainments do not occur simultaneously—some are past, some future, and some present—they are called 'gainers' because they have penetrated and not deteriorated from them. Herein, for those who, not grasping this distinction, hold the view that because those who have gained jhāna also have past and future jhānas, therefore 'they are endowed with the past and the future'—this is a view like that of the Andhakas. With reference to them, the question is from the proponent of his own doctrine, and the affirmation is from the other. The rest here is clear in meaning. 'One who contemplates the eight deliverances,' etc., is evidence for the state of being a gainer, not for the state of being endowed.

Atītānāgatasamannāgatakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Being Endowed with the Past and Future.

Navamo vaggo.

The Ninth Chapter.

10. Dasamavaggo

10. The Tenth Chapter

1. Nirodhakathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Discourse on Cessation

571-572. Idāni nirodhakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘upapattesiyanti saṅkhaṃ gatassa bhavaṅgacittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇena saheva kiriyāti saṅkhaṃ gatā [Pg.219] kusalā vā akusalā vā cattāro khandhā cittasamuṭṭhānarūpañcāti pañcakkhandhā uppajjanti. Tesu hi anuppannesu bhavaṅge niruddhe santativicchedo bhaveyyā’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya upapattesiyeti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Tattha upapattesiyeti catūsupi padesu bahuvacanabhummatthe ekavacanabhummaṃ. Upapattesiyesu pañcasu khandhesu aniruddhesūti ayañhettha attho. Dasannanti upapattesiyakhandhānañca kiriyakhandhānañca vasena vuttaṃ. Tattha paṭhamapañhe khandhalakkhaṇavasena kiriyavasena ca pañceva nāma te khandhāti paṭikkhipati. Dutiyapañhe purimapacchimavasena upapattesiyakiriyavasena ca nānattaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Dvinnaṃ pana phassānaṃ cittānañca samodhānaṃ puṭṭho suttalesābhāvena paṭikkhipati.

571-572. Now is the discourse on cessation. Herein, those who hold the view that 'at the moment of the dissolution of the life-continuum consciousness, which is reckoned as seeking rebirth, together with what is reckoned as functional, the five aggregates—namely, the four mental aggregates, wholesome or unwholesome, and mind-produced material form—arise, for if these have not arisen when the life-continuum were to cease, there would be a break in the continuity of existence'—this is a view like that of the Andhakas. With reference to them, the question 'Is one seeking rebirth?' is from the proponent of his own doctrine, while the other affirms it. Herein, regarding 'Is one seeking rebirth?', in all four instances the singular form is used in the sense of the plural. The meaning here is 'concerning the five aggregates seeking rebirth, while they have not ceased.' 'Of the ten' refers to the aggregates seeking rebirth and the functional aggregates. In the first question, he rejects it by stating that those aggregates are indeed five in terms of their characteristics and their function. In the second question, he affirms the diversity by considering the former and latter, and also in terms of the aggregates seeking rebirth and the functional aggregates. When asked about the conjunction of two contacts and consciousnesses, he rejects it due to the absence of a hint in the scriptures.

Kiriyā cattāroti rūpena vinā kusalā akusalā vā cattāro gahitā. Kiriyāñāṇanti paravādinā cakkhuviññāṇasamaṅgikkhaṇe arahato anuññātaṃ anārammaṇañāṇaṃ. Niruddhe maggo uppajjatīti pucchā paravādissa, aniruddhe anuppajjanato paṭiññā sakavādissa. Mato maggaṃ bhāvetīti chalena pucchā paravādissa. Yasmā pana paṭisandhito yāva cuticittā satto jīvatiyeva nāma, tasmā sakavādī na hevanti paṭikkhipati.

By 'four functional aggregates' is meant the four mental aggregates, apart from material form, which are taken as neither wholesome nor unwholesome. Functional knowledge is the non-objective knowledge acknowledged by the opponent at the moment an Arahant is endowed with eye-consciousness. The question from the opponent is: 'Does the path arise when it has ceased?' The affirmation from the proponent of his own doctrine is made because it does not arise while it has not ceased. The question, 'Does a dead person develop the path?' is a trick question from the opponent. Since a being is indeed said to be living from rebirth-linking up to the death-consciousness, the proponent of his own doctrine rejects it, saying, 'It is not so.'

Nirodhakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Cessation.

2. Rūpaṃmaggotikathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Explanation of the Discourse 'Form is the Path'

573-575. Idāni rūpaṃ maggotikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘sammāvācākammantājīvā rūpa’’nti laddhi, seyyathāpi mahisāsakasammitiyamahāsaṃghikānaṃ; te sandhāya maggasamaṅgissāti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi te sammāvācādayo rūpaṃ, na viratiyo, yathā sammādiṭṭhādimaggo sārammaṇādisabhāvo, evaṃ tampi rūpaṃ siyā’’ti codetuṃ sārammaṇotiādimāha. Tattha paṭikkhepo ca paṭiññā ca paravādino laddhianurūpena veditabbā. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

573-575. Now is the discourse called 'Form is the Path'. Herein, for those who hold the view that 'right speech, right action, and right livelihood are form,' such as the Mahīśāsakas, Sammitīyas, and Mahāsaṅghikas—with reference to them, the question 'Is one endowed with the path?' is from the proponent of his own doctrine, while the other affirms it. Then, to challenge them, saying: 'If right speech and the like are form, and not abstinences, then just as right view and the rest of the path have the nature of being with an object and so on, so too should that form be,' he states 'with an object' and so on. Here, the rejection and the affirmation should be understood in accordance with the other's established view. The rest here is clear in meaning.

Rūpaṃ maggotikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse 'Form is the Path'.

3. Pañcaviññāṇasamaṅgissa maggakathāvaṇṇanā

3. The Explanation of the Discourse on the Path for One Endowed with the Five Consciousnesses

576. Idāni [Pg.220] pañcaviññāṇasamaṅgissa maggakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā na nimittaggāhī hotī’’ti suttaṃ nissāya ‘‘pañcaviññāṇasamaṅgissa atthi maggabhāvanā’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṃghikānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘sace tassa maggabhāvanā atthi, pañcaviññāṇagatikena vā maggena, maggagatikehi vā pañcaviññāṇehi bhavitabbaṃ, na ca tāni maggagatikāni anibbānārammaṇattā alokuttarattā ca, na maggo pañcaviññāṇagatiko tesaṃ lakkhaṇena asaṅgahitattā’’ti codetuṃ nanu pañcaviññāṇā uppannavatthukātiādimāha. Tatrāyaṃ adhippāyo – yadi pañcaviññāṇasamaṅgissa maggabhāvanā siyā, yena manoviññāṇena maggo sampayutto, tampi pañcaviññāṇasamaṅgissa siyā. Evaṃ sante yadidaṃ ‘‘pañcaviññāṇā uppannavatthukā’’tiādi lakkhaṇaṃ vuttaṃ, taṃ evaṃ avatvā ‘‘cha viññāṇā’’ti vattabbaṃ siyā. Tathā pana avatvā ‘‘pañcaviññāṇā’’tveva vuttaṃ, tasmā na vatabbaṃ ‘‘pañcaviññāṇasamaṅgissa atthi maggabhāvanā’’ti. Yasmā cettha ayameva adhippāyo, tasmā sakavādī taṃ lakkhaṇaṃ paravādiṃ sampaṭicchāpetvā no ca vata re vattabbe pañcaviññāṇasamaṅgissa atthi maggabhāvanāti āha.

576. Now there is the discourse called 'The Path for One Endowed with the Five Consciousnesses.' Here, concerning those who, based on the sutta 'having seen a form with the eye, one is not an apprehender of signs,' hold the view that 'there is path-development for one endowed with the five consciousnesses'—such as the Mahāsāṅghikas—with reference to them, the question is from the proponent of his own doctrine, and the affirmation is from the other. Then, to challenge them, saying, 'If there is path-development for such a person, then either the path must proceed by way of the five consciousnesses, or the five consciousnesses must be path-going. But those are not path-going because they do not have Nibbāna as their object, nor are they supramundane; and the path does not proceed by way of the five consciousnesses because it is not included in their characteristic,' he begins by saying, 'Are not the five consciousnesses based on an arisen physical basis?' etc. Herein, this is the intention: If there were path-development for one endowed with the five consciousnesses, then the mental consciousness with which the path is associated would also belong to one endowed with the five consciousnesses. If this were so, then instead of stating the characteristic 'the five consciousnesses are based on an arisen physical basis,' etc., one would have to say 'six consciousnesses.' But since it is not said thus, and only 'five consciousnesses' is stated, therefore one should not say 'there is path-development for one endowed with the five consciousnesses.' Because this is precisely the intention here, the proponent of his own doctrine, after having the opponent accept that characteristic, says: 'And indeed, it should not be said that there is path-development for one endowed with the five consciousnesses.'

Aparo nayo – pañcaviññāṇā uppannavatthukā, maggo avatthukopi hoti. Te ca uppannārammaṇā, maggo navattabbārammaṇo. Te purejātavatthukāva maggo avatthukopi. Te purejātārammaṇā, maggo apurejātārammaṇo. Te ajjhattikavatthukāva maggo avatthukopi hoti. Te ca rūpādivasena bāhirārammaṇā, maggo nibbānārammaṇo. Te aniruddhaṃ vatthuṃ nissayaṃ katvā pavattanato asambhinnavatthukā, maggo avatthukopi. Te aniruddhāneva rūpādīni ārabbha pavattanato asambhinnārammaṇā, maggo nibbānārammaṇo. Te nānāvatthukā, maggo avatthuko vā ekavatthuko vā. Te nānārammaṇā maggo ekārammaṇo. Te attano attanova rūpādigocare pavattanato na aññamaññassa gocaravisayaṃ paccanubhonti, maggo rūpādīsu ekampi gocaraṃ na karoti. Te kiriyamanodhātuṃ purecārikaṃ katvā uppajjanato na asamannāhārā na amanasikārā uppajjanti, maggo nirāvajjanova. Te sampaṭicchanādīhi vokiṇṇā uppajjanti, maggassa vokāroyeva natthi. Te aññamaññaṃ pubbacarimabhāvena [Pg.221] uppajjanti, maggassa tehi saddhiṃ purimapacchimatāva natthi, tesaṃ anuppattikāle tikkhavipassanāsamaye, tesaṃ anuppattidese āruppepi ca uppajjanato. Te sampaṭicchanādīhi antaritattā na aññamaññassa samanantarā uppajjanti, maggassa sampaṭicchanādīhi antaritabhāvova natthi. Tesaṃ aññatra abhinipātā ābhogamattampi kiccaṃ natthi, maggassa kilesasamugghātanaṃ kiccanti. Yasmā cettha ayampi adhippāyo, tasmā sakavādī imehākārehi paravādiṃ maggassa apañcaviññāṇagatikabhāvaṃ sampaṭicchāpetvā no ca vata re vattabbe pañcaviññāṇasamaṅgissa atthi maggabhāvanāti āha.

Another method: The five sense-consciousnesses have arisen bases, while the path may also be without a base. And they have arisen objects, whereas the path has an object that is not describable as arisen. They have only pre-arisen bases, while the path may also be without a base. They have pre-arisen objects, whereas the path does not have a pre-arisen object. They have only internal bases, while the path may also be without a base. And they have external objects, such as forms, etc., whereas the path has Nibbāna as its object. Because they proceed by relying on an unceased base, they have an unbroken base, while the path may also be without a base. Because they proceed by taking unceased objects, such as forms, etc., they have an unbroken object, whereas the path has Nibbāna as its object. They have various bases, while the path has either no base or one base. They have various objects, whereas the path has a single object. Because they operate within their own respective spheres of forms, etc., they do not experience each other’s spheres of objects, whereas the path does not make even one of the forms, etc., its object. Because they arise by making the functional mind-element their forerunner, they do not arise without bringing to mind or without attention, whereas the path is without adverting. They arise interspersed with receiving consciousness, etc., whereas for the path there is no interspersion at all. They arise in a state of preceding and succeeding one another, whereas for the path there is no anteriority or posteriority with them, because it arises at the time of sharp insight when they have not arisen, and in the formless realms where they do not arise. Because they are interrupted by receiving consciousness, etc., they do not arise immediately after one another, whereas for the path there is no state of being interrupted by receiving consciousness, etc. Apart from their mere impact upon an object, they have no function, not even of mere adverting, whereas the function of the path is the eradication of defilements. Since this is also the intended meaning here, the proponent of his own doctrine, having made the opponent accept by these means that the path does not share the nature of the five consciousnesses, says: 'And indeed, it should not be said that there is path-development for one endowed with the five sense-consciousnesses.'

577. Suññataṃ ārabbhāti ‘‘yathā lokuttaramaggo suññataṃ nibbānaṃ ārabbha, lokiyo suddhasaṅkhārapuñjaṃ ārabbha uppajjati, kiṃ te evaṃ cakkhuviññāṇa’’nti pucchati. Itaro ‘‘cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpe cā’’ti vacanato paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho ‘‘na nimittaggāhī’’ti vacanato yaṃ tattha animittaṃ, tadeva suññatanti sandhāya paṭijānāti. Cakkhuñca paṭiccāti pañhadvayepi eseva nayo.

577. 'Does it take emptiness as its object?'—This question asks: just as the supramundane path arises taking emptiness, Nibbāna, as its object, and the mundane path arises taking the mere aggregate of formations as its object, is it so with eye-consciousness? The other denies this, citing the statement, 'dependent on the eye and on forms.' When asked the second question, 'Is it not an apprehender of signs?', he affirms, with reference to the fact that what is signless therein is itself emptiness. The principle of 'dependent on the eye and on forms' applies to both questions.

578-579. Cakkhuviññāṇaṃ atītānāgataṃ ārabbhāti ettha ayamadhippāyo – manoviññāṇasamaṅgissa atthi maggabhāvanā, manoviññāṇañca atītānāgatampi ārabbha uppajjati, kiṃ te evaṃ cakkhuviññāṇampīti. Phassaṃ ārabbhātiādīsupi eseva nayo. Cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā na nimittaggāhīti ettha javanakkhaṇe na nimittaggāhitā vuttā, na cakkhuviññāṇakkhaṇe. Tasmā lokiyamaggampi sandhāyetaṃ asādhakanti.

578-579. 'Does eye-consciousness take the past and future as its object?' Herein, this is the intended meaning: for one endowed with mind-consciousness there is path-development, and mind-consciousness arises taking even the past and future as its object; is it so for eye-consciousness too? The same principle applies to the questions beginning with, 'Does it take contact as its object?' In the statement, 'Having seen a form with the eye, one is not an apprehender of signs,' the non-apprehension of signs is spoken of for the javana-moment, not for the moment of eye-consciousness. Therefore, this is not conclusive even with reference to the mundane path.

Pañcaviññāṇasamaṅgissa maggakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on the Path for One Endowed with the Five Consciousnesses.

4. Pañcaviññāṇā kusalāpītikathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Commentary on the Discourse: Are the Five Sense-Consciousnesses Wholesome and Accompanied by Joy?

580-583. Idāni pañcaviññāṇā kusalāpītikathā nāma hoti. Sā heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva atthato veditabbāti.

580-583. Now there is the discourse named, 'Are the Five Sense-Consciousnesses Wholesome and Accompanied by Joy?' Its meaning should be understood according to the method stated previously.

Pañcaviññāṇā kusalāpītikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discourse: Are the Five Sense-Consciousnesses Wholesome and Accompanied by Joy?

5. Pañcaviññāṇā sābhogātikathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Commentary on the Discourse: Are the Five Sense-Consciousnesses Accompanied by Deliberation?

584-586. Idāni [Pg.222] pañcaviññāṇā sābhogātikathā nāma hoti. Tattha ābhogo nāma kusalākusalavasena hoti satthārā ca ‘‘cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā nimittaggāhī hoti, na nimittaggāhī hotī’’tiādi vuttaṃ, taṃ ayoniso gahetvā ‘‘pañcaviññāṇā sābhogā’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṃghikānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha purimakathāsadisamevāti.

584-586. Now there is the discourse named, 'Are the Five Sense-Consciousnesses Accompanied by Deliberation?' Herein, deliberation occurs by way of the wholesome and unwholesome. And because the Teacher has said, 'Having seen a form with the eye, one becomes an apprehender of signs, or one does not become an apprehender of signs,' etc., the question by the proponent of his own doctrine is posed with reference to those—such as the Mahāsāṅghikas—who, having improperly grasped this, hold the doctrine that 'the five sense-consciousnesses are accompanied by deliberation'; the acknowledgement is by the other. The rest here is just like the previous discourse.

Pañcaviññāṇā sābhogātikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discourse: Are the Five Sense-Consciousnesses Accompanied by Deliberation?

6. Dvīhi sīlehītikathāvaṇṇanā

6. The Commentary on the Discourse Concerning Two Kinds of Virtue.

587-589. Idāni dvīhi sīlehītikathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘sīle patiṭṭhāya naro sapañño’’tiādivacanato (saṃ. ni. 1.23) yasmā lokiyena sīlena sīlavā lokuttaraṃ maggaṃ bhāveti, tasmā ‘‘purimena ca lokiyena maggakkhaṇe lokuttarena cāti dvīhi sīlehi samannāgato nāma hotī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṃghikānaṃyeva, te sandhāya maggasamaṅgīti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi so ekakkhaṇe lokiyalokuttarehi dvīhi sīlehi samannāgato, dvīhi phassādīhipi tena samannāgatena bhavitabba’’nti codetuṃ dvīhi phassehītiādimāha. Itaro tathārūpaṃ nayaṃ apassanto paṭikkhipati. Lokiyena ca lokuttarena cāti pañhe pubbe samādinnañca maggakkhaṇe uppannasammāvācādīni ca sandhāya paṭijānāti.

587-589. Now there is the discourse named, 'With Two Kinds of Virtue.' Herein, from the saying, 'A wise person, established in virtue...' (Saṃyutta Nikāya 1.23), since a virtuous person cultivates the supramundane path by means of mundane virtue, the question about one endowed with the path is posed by the proponent of his own doctrine with reference to those—such as the Mahāsāṅghikas—whose doctrine is that 'one is endowed with two kinds of virtue, namely, the previous mundane virtue and the supramundane virtue at the moment of the path'; the acknowledgement is by the other. Then, to challenge him, he says, 'If at one moment he is endowed with two kinds of virtue, mundane and supramundane, then he must also be endowed with two kinds of contact,' and so on. The other, not seeing such a principle, rejects it. To the question, 'With mundane and with supramundane?', he acknowledges, with reference both to the virtue previously undertaken and to right speech, etc., arisen at the moment of the path.

Lokiye sīle niruddheti pucchā paravādissa, khaṇabhaṅganirodhaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā sakavādissa. Itaro pana taṃ vītikkamaṃ viya sallakkhento dussīlotiādimāha. Laddhipatiṭṭhāpanaṃ panassa pubbe abhinnasīlataṃyeva dīpeti, na dvīhi samannāgatataṃ. Tasmā appatiṭṭhitāva laddhīti.

The question, 'Is mundane virtue ceased?' is from the opponent; the acknowledgement, with reference to cessation by momentary dissolution, is from the proponent of his own doctrine. The other, however, regarding that as a transgression, says, 'He is immoral,' and so on. But the establishment of his doctrine only indicates the previous state of unbroken virtue, not the state of being endowed with two. Therefore, the doctrine is unestablished.

Dvīhi sīlehītikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discourse Concerning Two Kinds of Virtue.

7. Sīlaṃ acetasikantikathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Commentary on the Discourse: Is Virtue Non-Mental?

590-594. Idāni [Pg.223] sīlaṃ acetasikantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā sīle uppajjitvā niruddhepi samādānahetuko sīlopacayo nāma atthi, yena so sīlavāyeva nāma hoti, tasmā ‘‘sīlaṃ acetasika’’nti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṃghikānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha ‘‘dānaṃ acetasika’’ntikathāyaṃ vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Laddhipatiṭṭhāpanampi ayoniso gahitattā appatiṭṭhāpanamevāti.

590-594. Now there is the discourse entitled 'Virtue is Non-Mental.' Herein, because even after virtue has arisen and ceased, there exists an accumulation of virtue due to the undertaking, by which one is indeed called virtuous, therefore, with reference to those whose doctrine is that 'virtue is non-mental'—such as the Mahāsaṅghikas—the question is from the proponent of his own view, and the acknowledgement is from the other. The rest here should be understood in the same way as stated in the discourse on 'Giving is Non-Mental.' And the establishment of the doctrine, being improperly grasped, is indeed a non-establishment.

Sīlaṃ acetasikantikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discourse 'Virtue is Non-Mental'.

8. Sīlaṃ na cittānuparivattītikathāvaṇṇanā

8. The Commentary on the Discourse 'Virtue is Not Consequent Upon Consciousness'.

595-597. Idāni sīlaṃ na cittānuparivattītikathā nāma hoti. Tattha na cittānuparivattīti bhāsantarameva nānaṃ, sesaṃ purimakathāsadisamevāti.

595-597. Now there is the discourse entitled 'Virtue is Not Consequent Upon Consciousness.' Herein, 'not consequent upon consciousness' is merely a different expression; the rest is indeed similar to the previous discourse.

Sīlaṃ na cittānuparivattītikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discourse 'Virtue is Not Consequent Upon Consciousness'.

9. Samādānahetukathāvaṇṇanā

9. The Commentary on the Discourse 'Undertaking as a Cause'.

598-600. Idāni samādānahetukathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘ārāmaropā’’ti gāthāya atthaṃ ayoniso gahetvā ‘‘sadā puññaṃ pavaḍḍhatī’’ti vacanato ‘‘samādānahetukaṃ sīlaṃ vaḍḍhatī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṃghikānaññeva, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, cittavippayuttaṃ sīlopacayaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā paravādissa. Sesaṃ purimakathāsadisamevāti.

598-600. Now there is the discourse entitled 'Undertaking as a Cause.' Herein, having improperly grasped the meaning of the verse beginning 'Planters of parks,' and from the saying 'merit always increases,' there are those whose doctrine is that 'virtue which has undertaking as its cause grows'—such as the Mahāsaṅghikas. With reference to them, the question is from the proponent of his own view, and with reference to the accumulation of virtue dissociated from consciousness, the acknowledgement is from the opponent. The rest is indeed similar to the previous discourse.

Samādānahetukathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discourse 'Undertaking as a Cause'.

10. Viññatti sīlantikathāvaṇṇanā

10. The Commentary on the Discourse 'Intimation is Virtue'.

601-602. Idāni viññatti sīlantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha kāyaviññatti kāyakammaṃ, vacīviññatti vacīkammanti gahitattā ‘‘viññatti sīla’’nti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṃghikānañceva sammitiyānañca; te sandhāya viññattīti [Pg.224] pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ yasmā sīlaṃ nāma virati, na rūpadhammo, tasmā tenatthena codetuṃ pāṇātipātā veramaṇītiādimāha. Abhivādanaṃ sīlantiādi yathārūpaṃ viññattiṃ so ‘‘sīla’’nti maññati taṃ uddharitvā dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Yasmā pana sā virati na hoti, tasmā puna pāṇātipātātiādimāha. Laddhi panassa chalena patiṭṭhitattā appatiṭṭhitāyevāti.

601-602. Now there is the discourse entitled 'Intimation is Virtue.' Herein, because bodily intimation is taken as bodily action and verbal intimation as verbal action, there are those whose doctrine is that 'intimation is virtue'—such as the Mahāsaṅghikas and the Sammitīyas. With reference to them, the question 'Is it intimation?' is from the proponent of his own view, and the acknowledgement is from the other. Then, because virtue is abstention, not a material phenomenon, he says, 'Abstention from taking life,' and so forth, in order to challenge him with that meaning. The statement 'Greeting is virtue,' and so forth, is said in order to bring up and show that he considers such an intimation to be 'virtue.' But since that is not abstention, he again says, 'Taking life,' and so forth. His doctrine, however, being established by pretext, is indeed not established.

Viññatti sīlantikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discourse 'Intimation is Virtue'.

11. Aviññatti dussīlyantikathāvaṇṇanā

11. The Commentary on the Discourse 'Non-Intimation is Immorality'.

603-604. Idāni aviññatti dussīlyantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha cittavippayuttaṃ apuññūpacayañceva āṇattiyā ca pāṇātipātādīsu aṅgapāripūriṃ sandhāya ‘‘aviññatti dussīlya’’nti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṃghikānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘sace sā dussīlyaṃ, pāṇātipātādīsu aññatarā siyā’’ti codetuṃ pāṇātipātotiādimāha. Pāpakammaṃ samādiyitvāti ‘‘asukaṃ nāma ghātessāmi, asukaṃ bhaṇḍaṃ avaharissāmī’’ti evaṃ pāpasamādānaṃ katvā. Ubho vaḍḍhantīti puṭṭho dānakkhaṇe pāpassa anuppattiṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho cittavippayuttaṃ pāpūpacayaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Sesamettha paribhogamayakathāyaṃ vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Laddhipatiṭṭhāpanampissa pāpasamādinnapubbabhāgameva sādheti; na aviññattiyā dussīlabhāvanti.

603-604. Now there is the discourse entitled 'Non-Intimation is Immorality.' Herein, with reference to the accumulation of demerit dissociated from consciousness and the fulfillment of the factors by command in acts such as taking life, there are those whose doctrine is that 'non-intimation is immorality'—such as the Mahāsaṅghikas. With reference to them, the question is from the proponent of his own view, and the acknowledgement is from the other. Then, to challenge him, he says, 'If that is immorality, it should be one of the acts such as taking life,' and so forth. 'Having undertaken an evil action' means having made an evil undertaking thus: 'I will kill so-and-so, I will steal such-and-such goods.' When asked, 'Do both increase?' he rejects it, with reference to the non-arising of evil at the moment of giving. When asked a second time, he acknowledges it, with reference to the accumulation of evil dissociated from consciousness. The rest here should be understood in the same way as stated in the discourse concerning use. And the establishment of his doctrine proves only the preliminary part of the evil that was undertaken, not the state of immorality of the non-intimation.

Aviññatti dussīlyantikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discourse 'Non-Intimation is Immorality'.

Dasamo vaggo.

The Tenth Chapter.

Dutiyapaṇṇāsako samatto.

The Second Fifty is concluded.

11. Ekādasamavaggo

11. The Eleventh Chapter.

1-3. Tissopi anusayakathāvaṇṇanā

1–3. The Commentary on the Three Discourses on Latent Tendencies.

605-613. Idāni [Pg.225] anusayā abyākatā, ahetukā, cittavippayuttāti tissopi anusayakathā nāma honti. Tattha yasmā puthujjano kusalābyākate citte vattamāne ‘‘sānusayo’’ti vattabbo, yo cassa tasmiṃ khaṇe hetu, na tena hetunā anusayā sahetukā, na tena cittena sampayuttā, tasmā ‘‘te abyākatā, ahetukā, cittavippayuttā’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṃghikānañceva sammitiyānañca; te sandhāya tīsupi kathāsu pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayattā sakkā pāḷimaggeneva jānitunti, tasmā na vitthāritanti.

605–613. Now there are the three discourses on latent tendencies: that they are indeterminate, rootless, and dissociated from consciousness. Herein, because an ordinary person is to be called 'one with latent tendencies' even when a wholesome or indeterminate consciousness is occurring, and because the root present at that moment does not make the latent tendencies rooted, nor are they associated with that consciousness, therefore, there are those whose doctrine is that 'they are indeterminate, rootless, and dissociated from consciousness'—such as the Mahāsaṅghikas and the Sammitīyas. With reference to them, in all three discourses the question is from the proponent of his own view, and the acknowledgement is from the other. The rest, following the method stated previously, can be known through the Pāli text itself; therefore, it is not elaborated upon.

Tissopi anusayakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Three Discourses on Latent Tendencies.

4. Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Commentary on the Discourse on Knowledge.

614-615. Idāni ñāṇakathā nāma hoti. Tattha maggañāṇena aññāṇe vigatepi puna cakkhuviññāṇādivasena ñāṇavippayuttacitte vattamāne yasmā taṃ maggacittaṃ na pavattati, tasmā ‘‘na vattabbaṃ ñāṇī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṃghikānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi aññāṇe vigate ‘ñāṇī’ti paññatti na siyā, rāgādīsu vigatesu vītarāgādipaññattipi na siyāti puggalapaññattiyaṃ akovidosī’’ti codetuṃ rāge vigatetiādimāha. Itaro tesu vigatesu sarāgādibhāve yuttiṃ apassanto paṭikkhipati. Pariyosāne yasmā ñāṇapaṭilābhena so ñāṇīti vattabbataṃ arahati, tasmā na hevanti paṭikkhepo sakavādissāti.

614–615. Now there is the discourse on knowledge. Herein, even though ignorance is removed by path-knowledge, when a consciousness dissociated from knowledge subsequently occurs by way of eye-consciousness and so on, because that path-consciousness does not recur, there are those whose doctrine is that 'one should not be called knowledgeable'—such as the Mahāsaṅghikas. With reference to them, the question is from the proponent of his own view, and the acknowledgement is from the other. Then, to challenge him, saying, 'If, when ignorance is removed, the designation "knowledgeable" does not exist, then when lust and so on are removed, designations like "free from lust" should also not exist—thus you are unskilled in the concept of a person,' he says, 'When lust is removed,' and so forth. The other, not seeing the logic in the state of being 'with lust,' etc., when these are removed, rejects it. In conclusion, because through the attainment of knowledge one deserves to be called 'knowledgeable,' therefore the proponent's rejection is, 'It is not so.'

Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on Knowledge.

5. Ñāṇaṃ cittavippayuttantikathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Commentary on the Discourse 'Knowledge is Dissociated from Consciousness'.

616-617. Idāni [Pg.226] ñāṇaṃ cittavippayuttantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā arahā cakkhuviññāṇādisamaṅgī paṭiladdhaṃ maggañāṇaṃ sandhāya ‘‘ñāṇī’’ti vuccati, na cassa taṃ tena cittena sampayuttaṃ, tasmā ‘‘ñāṇaṃ cittavippayutta’’nti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi te ñāṇaṃ cittavippayuttaṃ cittavippayuttesu rūpādīsu aññataraṃ siyā’’ti codetuṃ rūpantiādimāha. Itaro paṭikkhipati. Sesaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayameva. Pariyosāne pana paññavāti puṭṭho paṭilābhavasena taṃ pavattiṃ icchati, tasmā paṭijānātīti.

616–617. Now there is the discussion entitled 'Knowledge is Dissociated from Consciousness.' Herein, because an arahant endowed with eye-consciousness and so forth is called 'knowledgeable' with reference to the path-knowledge he has attained, and that knowledge is not associated with that consciousness, the view of some, such as the Pubbaseliyas, is that 'knowledge is dissociated from consciousness.' With reference to them, the question is from the proponent of his own view, and the admission is from the other. Then, to challenge him by saying, 'If your knowledge is dissociated from consciousness, it would have to be one among things dissociated from consciousness, such as material form,' he states, 'Is it material form?' and so on. The other denies this. The rest is in accordance with the method stated above. At the end, however, when asked, 'Is one endowed with wisdom?', he accepts its occurrence by way of attainment; therefore, he assents.

Ñāṇaṃ cittavippayuttantikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion entitled 'Knowledge is Dissociated from Consciousness.'

6. Idaṃ dukkhantikathāvaṇṇanā

6. The Commentary on the Discussion entitled 'This is Suffering.'

618-820. Idāni idaṃ dukkhantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘lokuttaramaggakkhaṇe yogāvacaro idaṃ dukkhanti vācaṃ bhāsati, evamassa idaṃ dukkhanti vācaṃ bhāsato ca idaṃ dukkhanti ñāṇaṃ pavattatī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, maggakkhaṇe tathā vācābhāsanaṃ ñāṇappavattiñca sandhāya paṭiññā itarassa. Yasmā pana so sesasaccapaṭisaṃyuttaṃ vācaṃ puthujjanova bhāsati, na ca tassa tathā ñāṇappavattīti icchati, tasmā samudayādipañhesu paṭikkhipati. Rūpaṃ aniccantiādi dukkhapariyāyadassanavasena vuttaṃ. Itaro pana sakasamaye tādisaṃ vohāraṃ apassanto paṭikkhipati. Iti ca danti cātiādi yadi tassa dukkhe ñāṇaṃ pavattati, i-kāra daṃ-kāra du-kāra kha-kāresu paṭipāṭiyā catūhi ñāṇehi pavattitabbanti dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Itaro pana tathā na icchati, tasmā paṭikkhipati.

618–820. Now there is the discussion entitled 'This is Suffering.' Herein, the view of some, such as the Andhakas, is that 'at the moment of the supramundane path, the yogin utters the words, "This is suffering," and as he utters the words, "This is suffering," the knowledge, "This is suffering," arises.' With reference to them, the question is from the proponent of his own view, and the admission by the other is with reference to such utterance of words and the arising of knowledge at the moment of the path. But since he holds that only an ordinary person speaks words connected with the remaining truths, and he does not accept that knowledge arises in that way for him, he therefore rejects the questions about the origin and so on. 'Form is impermanent,' etc., is stated from the perspective of seeing the aspects of suffering. The other, however, not seeing such usage in his own system, rejects it. The passage beginning 'And "i," and "daṃ,"' is said to show that if knowledge of suffering arises for him, it would have to arise sequentially with four knowledges regarding the letters 'i,' 'daṃ,' 'du,' and 'kha.' The other, however, does not accept it thus; therefore, he rejects it.

Idaṃ dukkhantikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion entitled 'This is Suffering.'

7. Iddhibalakathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Commentary on the Discussion of Psychic Powers.

621-624. Idāni [Pg.227] iddhibalakathā nāma hoti. Tattha iddhipādabhāvanānisaṃsassa atthaṃ ayoniso gahetvā ‘‘iddhibalena samannāgato kappaṃ tiṭṭheyyā’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṃghikānaṃ; te sandhāya iddhibalena samannāgato kappaṃ tiṭṭheyyāti pucchā sakavādissa. Tattha kappo nāma mahākappo, kappekadeso, āyukappoti tividho. ‘‘Cattārimāni, bhikkhave, kappassa asaṅkhyeyyānī’’ti (a. ni. 4.156) ettha hi mahākappova kappoti vutto. ‘‘Brahmakāyikānaṃ devānaṃ kappo āyuppamāṇa’’nti (a. ni. 4.123) ettha kappekadesā. ‘‘Kappaṃ nirayamhi paccati, kappaṃ saggamhi modatī’’ti (cūḷava. 354) ettha āyukappo. Āyukappanaṃ āyuvidhānaṃ kammassa vipākavasena vā vassagaṇanāya vā āyuparicchedoti attho. Tesu mahākappaṃ sandhāya pucchati, itaro paṭijānāti.

621–624. Now there is the discussion on psychic powers. Herein, some, such as the Mahāsaṅghikas, having wrongly grasped the meaning of the benefit of developing the bases of psychic power, hold the view that 'one endowed with psychic power could remain for an eon.' With reference to them, the question, 'Could one endowed with psychic power remain for an eon?' is from the proponent of his own view. Here, an 'eon' is of three kinds: a great eon, a fraction of an eon, and a lifespan-eon. In the passage, 'Bhikkhus, these are the four incalculables of an eon' (AN 4.156), the great eon is called 'eon.' In 'For the Brahmakāyika devas, an eon is the measure of their lifespan' (AN 4.123), it refers to fractions of an eon. In 'For an eon one is tormented in hell, for an eon one rejoices in heaven' (Cv. VII.3.5), it refers to a lifespan-eon. A lifespan-eon means the determination of a lifespan, that is, the delimitation of a life either by way of the result of kamma or by a number of years. Among these, he asks with reference to the great eon, and the other admits it.

Atha naṃ sakavādī ‘‘sace te iddhibalena samannāgato, ‘yo ciraṃ jīvati, so vassasataṃ appaṃ vā bhiyyo’ti (saṃ. ni. 2.143) evaṃ paricchinnā āyukappā uddhaṃ mahākappaṃ vā mahākappekadesaṃ vā jīveyya iddhimayikenassa āyunā bhavitabba’’nti codetuṃ iddhimayiko so āyūtiādimāha. Itaro ‘‘jīvitindriyaṃ nāma iddhimayikaṃ natthi, kammasamuṭṭhānamevā’’ti vuttattā paṭikkhipati. Ko panettha iddhimato viseso, nanu aniddhimāpi āyukappaṃ tiṭṭheyyāti? Ayaṃ viseso – iddhimā hi yāvatāyukaṃ jīvitappavattiyā antarāyakare dhamme iddhibalena paṭibāhitvā antarā akālamaraṇaṃ nivāretuṃ sakkoti, aniddhimato etaṃ balaṃ natthi. Ayametesaṃ viseso.

Then the proponent of his own view, in order to challenge him, began by saying, 'Is that lifespan created by psychic power?' The challenge is: 'If one endowed with psychic power could live beyond the lifespan-eon, which is defined thus, "One who lives long lives for a hundred years or a little more" (SN 2.143), up to a great eon or a fraction of a great eon, his life would have to be one created by psychic power.' The other rejects this, because it is said, 'There is no life faculty created by psychic power; it is originated solely from kamma.' What, then, is the distinction for one with psychic power? Could not one without psychic power also remain for a full lifespan? This is the distinction: one with psychic power is able, by means of psychic power, to ward off conditions that obstruct the continuation of life for as long as the lifespan lasts, and thus can prevent an untimely death in the interim. One without psychic power does not have this ability. This is the distinction between them.

Atītaṃ anāgatanti idaṃ avisesena kappaṃ tiṭṭheyyāti paṭiññātattā codeti. Dve kappetiādi ‘‘yadi iddhimā jīvitaparicchedaṃ atikkamituṃ sakkoti, na kevalaṃ ekaṃ anekepi kappe tiṭṭheyyā’’ti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Uppanno phassotiādi na sabbaṃ iddhiyā labbhati, iddhiyā avisayopi atthīti dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

The question about 'the past' and 'the future' is raised because it was admitted without specification that one could remain for an eon. The passage beginning 'Two eons' is stated for the purpose of the challenge: 'If one with psychic power is able to surpass the limit of life, one could remain not just for one but for many eons.' The passage beginning 'Contact has arisen' is stated to show that not everything is obtained through psychic power; there are also matters beyond the scope of psychic power. The rest here is of plain meaning.

Iddhibalakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of Psychic Powers.

8. Samādhikathāvaṇṇanā

8. The Commentary on the Discussion of Concentration.

625-626. Idāni [Pg.228] samādhikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ekacittakkhaṇe uppannāpi ekaggatā samādhānaṭṭhena samādhīti aggahetvā ‘‘satta rattindivāni ekantasukhapaṭisaṃvedī viharitu’’ntiādivacanaṃ (ma. ni. 1.180) nissāya ‘‘cittasantati samādhī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi sabbatthivādānañceva uttarāpathakānañca; te sandhāya cittasantatīti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi cittasantati samādhi, cittasantati nāma atītāpi atthi, anāgatāpi atthi. Na hi ekaṃ paccuppannacittameva cittasantati nāma hoti, kiṃ te sabbāpi sā samādhī’’ti codetuṃ atītātiādimāha, itaro tathā anicchanto paṭikkhipati.

625–626. Now there is the discussion on concentration. Herein, some, not taking one-pointedness—even if arisen in a single mind-moment—as concentration in the sense of unification, but relying on statements such as, 'to dwell experiencing exclusive happiness for seven days and nights' (MN 1.180), hold the view that 'continuity of consciousness is concentration.' This is the doctrine of the Sarvāstivādins and the Uttarāpathakas. With reference to them, the question, 'Is the continuity of consciousness concentration?' is from the proponent of his own view, and the admission is from the other. Then, to challenge him by saying, 'If the continuity of consciousness is concentration, then continuity of consciousness exists in the past and also in the future—for it is not just a single present consciousness that is called "continuity of consciousness"—is all of that concentration for you?', he says, 'Is it past?' and so on. The other, not accepting this, rejects it.

Nanu atītaṃ niruddhantiādi ‘‘cittasantatiyaṃ paccuppannameva cittaṃ kiccakaraṃ, atītānāgataṃ niruddhattā anuppannattā ca natthi, kathaṃ taṃ samādhi nāma hotī’’ti dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Ekacittakkhaṇikoti pucchā paravādissa. Tato yā sakasamaye ‘‘samādhiṃ, bhikkhave, bhāvethā’’tiādīsu paccuppannakusalacittasampayuttā ekaggatā samādhīti vuttā, taṃ sandhāya paṭiññā sakavādissa. Cakkhuviññāṇasamaṅgītiādi ‘‘ekacittakkhaṇiko’’ti vacanamattaṃ gahetvā chalena vuttaṃ, teneva sakavādinā paṭikkhittaṃ. Nanu vuttaṃ bhagavatāti suttaṃ purimapacchimavasena pavattamānassa samādhissa abbokiṇṇataṃ sādheti, na santatiyā samādhibhāvaṃ, tasmā asādhakanti.

Is it not so that 'the past has ceased,' etc., was said to show that 'in the continuity of consciousness, only the present mind performs a function; the past and future do not exist because they have ceased and have not arisen, so how can that be called concentration?' The question, 'Is it of a single mind-moment?' is the opponent's. Then, with reference to what is stated in one's own doctrine, such as, 'Monks, develop concentration,' that one-pointedness associated with a present wholesome mind is called concentration—this is the proponent's affirmation. The statement 'endowed with eye-consciousness,' etc., was uttered deceitfully by merely taking the phrase 'of a single mind-moment,' and for that very reason it was refuted by the proponent. The sutta beginning 'Has it not been said by the Blessed One?' establishes the uninterrupted nature of concentration as it proceeds in its earlier and later phases, not the nature of concentration as a continuity. Therefore, it is not a valid proof.

Samādhikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on Concentration.

9. Dhammaṭṭhitatākathāvaṇṇanā

9. The Exposition of the Discussion on the Fixedness of Phenomena.

627. Idāni dhammaṭṭhitatākathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘ṭhitāva sā dhātū’’ti vacanaṃ nissāya ‘‘paṭiccasamuppādasaṅkhātā dhammaṭṭhitatā nāma ekā atthi, sā ca parinipphannā’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi parinipphannānaṃ avijjādīnaṃ aññā [Pg.229] dhammaṭṭhitatā nāma parinipphannā atthi, tāyapi ca te dhammaṭṭhitatāya aññā ṭhitatā parinipphannā āpajjatī’’ti codetuṃ tāya ṭhitatātiādimāha. Paravādī evarūpāya laddhiyā abhāvena paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho anantarapaccayatañceva aññamaññapaccayatañca sandhāya paṭijānāti. Sesaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayattā uttānatthamevāti.

627. Now there is the discussion on the fixedness of phenomena. Here, based on the statement 'that element remains fixed,' with reference to those whose doctrine is that 'there exists a certain fixed state of phenomena, designated as dependent origination, and it is perfected'—such as the Andhakas—the question is the proponent's, and the affirmation is the other's. Then, in order to challenge him by saying, 'If there exists another perfected fixed state of phenomena called dhammaṭṭhitatā, distinct from perfected phenomena such as ignorance, then from that fixed state of phenomena, another perfected fixed state would result,' he says, 'by that fixed state,' etc. The opponent rejects this due to the absence of such a doctrine. Asked a second time, he affirms with reference to both immediate conditionality and mutual conditionality. The rest is clear in meaning, being in accordance with the method stated previously.

Dhammaṭṭhitatākathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on the Fixedness of Phenomena.

10. Aniccatākathāvaṇṇanā

10. The Exposition of the Discussion on Impermanence.

628. Idāni aniccatākathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘aniccānaṃ rūpādīnaṃ aniccatāpi rūpādayo viya parinipphannā’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi te rūpādayo viya aniccatā parinipphannā, tassāpi aññāya parinipphannāya aniccatāya bhavitabba’’nti codetuṃ tāya aniccatāyātiādimāha. Itaro dvinnaṃ aniccatāya ekato abhāvena paṭikkhipitvā puna yasmā sā aniccatā niccā na hoti, teneva aniccena saddhiṃ antaradhāyati, tasmā paṭijānāti. Athassa sakavādī lesokāsaṃ adatvā yā tena dutiyā aniccatā paṭiññātā, tāyapi tato parāyapīti paramparavasena anupacchedadosaṃ āropento tāya tāyevātiādimāha. Jarā parinipphannātiādi yasmā uppannassa jarāmaraṇato aññā aniccatā nāma natthi, tasmā aniccatāvibhāgānuyuñjanavasena vuttaṃ. Tatrāpi paravādino purimanayeneva paṭiññā ca paṭikkhepo ca veditabbo.

628. Now there is the discussion on impermanence. Here, with reference to those whose doctrine is that 'the impermanence of impermanent things like form, etc., is itself perfected like form and so on'—such as the Andhakas—the question is the proponent's, and the affirmation is the other's. Then, in order to challenge him by saying, 'If impermanence is perfected for you like form and so on, then it must have another perfected impermanence,' he says, 'with that impermanence,' etc. The other, having rejected this due to the non-existence of two impermanences as one, then affirms it because that impermanence is not permanent, and for that very reason it disappears along with the impermanent thing itself. Then the proponent, giving him no opportunity for evasion, imputes the fault of non-cessation in a successive manner, saying 'with that, and with that too,' etc., because of the second impermanence affirmed by him. 'Aging is perfected,' etc., is said by way of an inquiry into the divisions of impermanence, because for that which has arisen, there is no other thing called impermanence apart from aging and death. There too, the opponent's affirmation and rejection should be understood in the same way as before.

629. Rūpaṃ parinipphannantiādi yesaṃ sā aniccatā, tehi saddhiṃ saṃsandanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Tattha ‘‘yathā parinipphannānaṃ rūpādīnaṃ aniccatājarāmaraṇāni atthi, evaṃ parinipphannānaṃ aniccatādīnaṃ tāni natthī’’ti maññamāno ekantena paṭikkhipatiyevāti.

629. 'Form is perfected,' etc., is said for the purpose of comparison with those for whom that impermanence exists. Here, one who thinks, 'Just as there is impermanence, aging, and death for perfected things like form, etc., so those things do not exist for perfected things like impermanence, etc.,' rejects it absolutely.

Aniccatākathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on Impermanence.

Ekādasamo vaggo.

The Eleventh Chapter.

12. Dvādasamavaggo

12. The Twelfth Chapter.

1. Saṃvaro kammantikathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Exposition of the Discussion on 'Restraint is Action'.

630-632. Idāni [Pg.230] saṃvaro kammantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā nimittaggāhī hoti, na nimittaggāhī hotī’’ti suttaṃ nissāya ‘‘saṃvaropi asaṃvaropi kamma’’nti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṃghikānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa.

630-632. Now there is the discussion on 'Restraint is Action.' Here, based on the sutta, 'Having seen a form with the eye, one becomes a grasper of signs, or one does not become a grasper of signs,' with reference to those whose doctrine is that 'both restraint and non-restraint are action'—such as the Mahāsaṅghikas—the question is the proponent's, and the affirmation is the other's.

Atha naṃ yā sakasamaye cetanā ‘‘kamma’’nti vuttā yathā sā kāyavacīmanodvāresu pavattamānā kāyakammādināmaṃ labhati, tathā ‘‘yadi te saṃvaro kammaṃ, sopi cakkhundriyādīsu pavattamāno cakkhukammādināmaṃ labheyyā’’ti codetuṃ cakkhundriyasaṃvaro cakkhukammantiādimāha. Itaro tādisaṃ suttapadaṃ apassanto catūsu dvāresu paṭikkhipitvā pañcame kāyadvāre pasādakāyaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, viññattikāyaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. So hi pasādakāyampi viññattikāyampi kāyindriyantveva icchati. Manodvārepi vipākadvāraṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, kammadvāraṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Asaṃvarepi eseva nayo. ‘‘Cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā’’ti suttaṃ tesu dvāresu saṃvarāsaṃvarameva dīpeti, na tassa kammabhāvaṃ, tasmā asādhakanti.

Then, in order to challenge him by saying, 'Just as volition, which in one's own doctrine is called "action," when proceeding through the doors of body, speech, and mind, receives the name of bodily action, etc., so too, if restraint is action for you, it too, when proceeding through the eye faculty, etc., should receive the name of eye action, etc.,' he says, 'eye-faculty restraint is eye action,' etc. The other, not seeing such a sutta passage, rejects it in the four doors; in the fifth, the body-door, he rejects it with reference to the sensitive body but affirms it with reference to bodily intimation. For he holds that both the sensitive body and bodily intimation are simply the body faculty. In the mind-door too, he rejects it with reference to the door of result but affirms it with reference to the door of action. This same method applies to non-restraint. The sutta, 'Having seen a form with the eye,' reveals only restraint and non-restraint in those doors, not their nature as action. Therefore, it is not a valid proof.

Saṃvaro kammantikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on 'Restraint is Action'.

2. Kammakathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Exposition of the Discussion on Kamma.

633-635. Idāni kammakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘nāhaṃ, bhikkhave, sañcetanikānaṃ kammāna’’nti (a. ni. 10.217) suttapadaṃ nissāya ‘‘sabbaṃ kammaṃ savipāka’’nti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṃghikānaṃ; tesaṃ ‘‘cetanāhaṃ, bhikkhave, kammaṃ vadāmī’’ti (a. ni. 6.63) satthārā avisesena cetanā ‘‘kamma’’nti vuttā; sā ca kusalākusalāva savipākā, abyākatā avipākāti imaṃ vibhāgaṃ dassetuṃ sabbaṃ kammanti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Puna sabbā cetanāti pañhesu abyākataṃ sandhāya paṭikkhepo, kusalākusale sandhāya paṭiññā veditabbā[Pg.231]. Vipākābyākatātiādi savipākāvipākacetanaṃ sarūpena dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Sesamettha uttānatthameva. ‘‘Nāhaṃ, bhikkhave’’ti suttaṃ sati paccaye diṭṭhadhammādīsu vipākapaṭisaṃvedanaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, tasmā asādhakanti.

633-635. Now there is the discussion on kamma. Here, based on the sutta passage, “Monks, of volitional actions that have been done and accumulated, I do not declare the termination without their result having been experienced” (AN 10.217), some, such as the Mahāsaṅghikas, hold the view that “all kamma is with result.” To them, in order to show this distinction—that although the Teacher has stated without distinction, “Volition, monks, I declare to be kamma” (AN 6.63), only wholesome and unwholesome volition is with result, while indeterminate volition is without result—the question, ‘Is all kamma with result?’ is posed by the proponent, and the admission is made by the other. Furthermore, in the questions, ‘Is all volition with result?’, the denial refers to indeterminate volition, while the affirmation should be understood as referring to wholesome and unwholesome volition. The phrase beginning “Resultant-indeterminate” is stated to show, by its own nature, volition that is with result and volition that is without result. The rest here is of clear meaning. The sutta passage, “Monks, I do not say…,” is stated with reference to experiencing the result in this very life and so on, when conditions are present; therefore, it is not probative.

Kammakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discussion on Kamma.

3. Saddo vipākotikathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discussion that Sound is a Result.

636-637. Idāni saddo vipākotikathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘so tassa kammassa katattā upacitattā ussannattā vipulattā brahmassaro hotī’’tiādīni (dī. ni. 3.236) ayoniso gahetvā ‘‘saddo vipāko’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṃghikānaṃ; tesaṃ ‘‘kammasamuṭṭhānā arūpadhammāva vipākāti nāmaṃ labhanti. Rūpadhammesu panāyaṃ vohāro natthī’’ti dassetuṃ pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sukhavedanīyotiādi ‘‘vipāko nāma evarūpo hotī’’ti dassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. ‘‘So tassa kammassā’’ti suttaṃ lakkhaṇapaṭilābhadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Mahāpuriso hi kammassa katattā suciparivāropi hoti, na ca parivāro vipāko, tasmā asādhakametanti.

636-637. Now there is the discussion that sound is a result. Here, some, such as the Mahāsaṅghikas, incorrectly grasp phrases like “Due to the doing, accumulation, abundance, and greatness of that kamma, he has a voice like Brahmā” (DN 3.236) and hold the view that “sound is a result.” To show them that “only formless phenomena arising from kamma receive the designation of ‘result,’ but this usage does not apply to material phenomena,” the question is posed by the proponent, and the admission is made by the other. The phrase beginning “To be felt as pleasant” is stated to illustrate that “a result is of such a nature.” The sutta statement “Due to that kamma of his…” is made to show the attainment of characteristics. For a great man, due to the doing of kamma, also has a pure retinue, yet the retinue is not the result; therefore, this is not probative.

Saddo vipākotikathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discussion that Sound is a Result.

4. Saḷāyatanakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Discussion on the Six Sense Bases.

638-640. Idāni saḷāyatanakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā saḷāyatanaṃ kammassa katattā uppannaṃ, tasmā ‘‘vipāko’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṃghikānaṃ; te sandhāya cakkhāyatanaṃ vipākoti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayameva. Saḷāyatanaṃ vipākoti ettha manāyatanaṃ siyā vipāko. Sesāni kevalaṃ kammasamuṭṭhānāni, na vipāko. Tasmā asādhakametanti.

638-640. Now there is the discussion on the six sense bases. Herein, because the six sense bases arise due to the doing of kamma, some, such as the Mahāsaṅghikas, hold the view that they are a “result.” With reference to them, the question, “Is the eye sense base a result?” is posed by the proponent, and the admission is made by the other. The rest is in the same manner as stated above. In the statement, “The six sense bases are a result,” the mind sense base could be a result. The remaining ones are merely originated by kamma, not a result. Therefore, this is not probative.

Saḷāyatanakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discussion on the Six Sense Bases.

5. Sattakkhattuparamakathāvaṇṇanā

5. Commentary on the Discussion on the Seven-Times-at-Most.

541-545. Idāni [Pg.232] sattakkhattuparamakathā nāma hoti, tattha yasmā ‘‘sattakkhattuparamo’’ti vuttaṃ, tasmā ‘‘sattakkhattuparamo puggalo sattakkhattuparamatāya niyato’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi uttarāpathakānaṃ; tesaṃ ṭhapetvā ‘‘ariyamaggaṃ añño tassa niyamo natthi, yena so sattakkhattuparamatāya niyato bhaveyyā’’ti imaṃ vibhāgaṃ dassetuṃ pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa.

541-545. Now there is the discussion on the seven-times-at-most. Here, because it is said “seven-times-at-most,” some, such as the Uttarāpathakas, hold the view that “a seven-times-at-most individual is fixed by the nature of being seven-times-at-most.” To them, in order to show this distinction—that apart from the Noble Path, there is no other fixed course for him by which he would be fixed in the state of being seven-times-at-most—the question is posed by the proponent, and the admission is made by the other.

Mātā jīvitātiādīsu ayamadhippāyo – dve niyāmā sammattaniyāmo ca micchattaniyāmo ca. Sammattaniyāmo ariyamaggo. So avinipātadhammatañceva phaluppattiñca niyameti. Micchattaniyāmo ānantariyakammaṃ. Taṃ anantarā nirayūpapattiṃ niyameti. Tattha sattakkhattuparamo sotāpattimaggena avinipātadhammatāya ca phaluppattiyā ca niyamito. Sesamagganiyāmo panassa natthi anadhigatattā, ānantariyampi kātuṃ so abhabbo. Tvaṃ panassa niyāmaṃ icchasi, tena taṃ vadāma – ‘‘kiṃ te so iminā micchattaniyāmena niyamito’’ti.

In the phrases like “depriving mother of life,” this is the meaning: there are two fixed courses, the fixed course of rightness and the fixed course of wrongness. The fixed course of rightness is the Noble Path. It fixes both the state of not being subject to downfall and the arising of fruition. The fixed course of wrongness is an action with immediate result. It fixes rebirth in hell immediately thereafter. Here, the seven-times-at-most individual is fixed by the path of stream-entry with respect to not being subject to downfall and with respect to the arising of fruition. But there is no fixed course of the remaining paths for him, as they have not been attained; and he is incapable of performing an action with immediate result. But you desire a fixed course for him, so we say to you: “Is he, then, fixed by this fixed course of wrongness?”

Abhabbo antarāti pañhesu ānantariyābhāvaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, sattakkhattuparamaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Atthi so niyāmoti pañhe sattakkhattuparamatāya niyāmaṃ apassanto paṭikkhipati. Atthi te satipaṭṭhānātiādi niyāmasaṅkhāte maggadhamme dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Tassa pana puna paṭhamamaggānuppattito tepi natthi, tasmā paṭikkhipati. Sesamettha uttānatthameva. Nanu so sattakkhattuparamoti ettha bhagavā ‘‘ayaṃ puggalo ettake bhave sandhāvitvā parinibbāyissati, ayaṃ ettake’’ti attano ñāṇabalena byākaroti, na bhavaniyāmaṃ nāma kiñci tena sattakkhattuparamo, kolaṃkolo, ekabījī vāti vuttaṃ, tasmā asādhakametanti.

In the questions, “Is he incapable…?” he denies with reference to the absence of an action with immediate result, but admits with reference to the seven-times-at-most state. In the question, “Is there that fixed course?” he denies, not seeing a fixed course in the state of being a seven-times-at-most. The phrase beginning, “Are there for you the foundations of mindfulness?” is stated to show the path-states designated as a fixed course. But for him, even those do not exist, since the first path does not arise again; therefore, he denies. The rest here is of clear meaning. Regarding the statement, “Surely, he is a seven-times-at-most,” here the Blessed One declares by the power of his knowledge: “This person, after wandering through so many existences, will attain final Nibbāna; this one, through so many.” He is not called a “seven-times-at-most,” a “family-to-family,” or a “single-seed” because of some so-called fixed course of existence. Thus, this is not probative.

Sattakkhattuparamakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discussion on the Seven-Times-at-Most.

646-647. Kolaṃkolaekabījikathāyopi imināvupāyena veditabbā.

646-647. The discussions on the Kolaṅkola and the Ekabījī should also be understood in this manner.

Kolaṃkolaekabījikathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discussion on the Kolaṅkola and the Ekabījī.

8. Jīvitāvoropanakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Commentary on the Discussion on Taking Life.

648-649. Idāni [Pg.233] jīvitāvoropanakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā dosasampayuttena cittena pāṇātipāto hoti, doso ca diṭṭhisampannassa appahīno, tasmā ‘‘diṭṭhisampanno sañcicca pāṇaṃ jīvitā voropeyyā’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyāparaseliyānaṃ; te sandhāya diṭṭhisampannoti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sañcicca mātarantiādipañhesu pana ‘‘aṭṭhānametaṃ anavakāso’’ti suttabhayena paṭikkhipati. Satthari agāravotiādi satthārādīsu sagāravassa sikkhāpadassa vītikkamābhāvadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Itaro pana akusalavasena tassa agāravo nāma natthīti paṭikkhipitvā sagāravabhāvañca sampaṭicchitvā puna agāravoti puṭṭho tesu tesu kiccesu pasutatāya vikkhittānaṃ asatiyā amanasikārena cetiye abhivādanapadakkhiṇakaraṇābhāvaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Puna ohadeyyātiādinā nayena puṭṭho tādisāya kiriyāya sañcicca akaraṇato paṭikkhipati. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

648-649. Now comes the discussion on taking life. Here, since the taking of life occurs with a mind associated with aversion, and aversion is not abandoned by one endowed with right view, therefore, with reference to those who hold the view that “one endowed with right view would intentionally take the life of a living being”—such as the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas—the question, “Is one endowed with right view?”, is the proponent's, and the admission is the other's. However, regarding questions such as, “Would one intentionally kill one’s mother?”, he rejects it by saying, “This is impossible, it cannot occur,” out of fear of the suttas. “Disrespect toward the Teacher,” and so forth, is stated to show the absence of transgression of the training rule concerning one who is respectful toward the Teacher and others. The other party, however, rejects this, saying that with regard to unwholesome states, there is no such thing as disrespect for him. Having accepted the state of being respectful, when asked again about “disrespect,” he acknowledges it by referring to the lack of paying homage or circumambulating shrines due to being preoccupied with various tasks, being distracted, unmindful, or inattentive. When asked further in the manner of, “Would he disparage?”, he rejects it by stating the intentional non-performance of such an action. The rest here is clear in meaning.

Jīvitāvoropanakathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discussion on Taking Life.

9. Duggatikathāvaṇṇanā

9. Explanation of the Discussion on States of Woe

650-652. Idāni duggatikathā nāma hoti. Tattha ye duggatiñca duggatisattānaṃ rūpādiārammaṇaṃ taṇhañcāti ubhayampi duggatīti gahetvā puna tathā avibhajitvā aviseseneva ‘‘diṭṭhisampannassa pahīnā duggatī’’ti vadanti, seyyathāpi uttarāpathakā; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Āpāyike rūpe rajjeyyātiādi paravādino laddhiyā diṭṭhisampannassa duggati appahīnā, tassa vasena codetuṃ vuttaṃ. Sesamettha uttānatthameva. Nirayaṃ upapajjeyyātiādi duggatipahānameva duggatigāminitaṇhāpahānaṃ vā dīpeti, na duggatisattānaṃ rūpādiārammaṇāya taṇhāya pahānaṃ, tasmā asādhakanti.

650-652. Now comes the discussion on states of woe. Here, some—such as the Uttarāpathakas—taking both the woeful state itself and the craving of beings in a woeful state for objects such as form to be the “woeful state,” without making this distinction, declare undifferentiatedly, “For one endowed with right view, the woeful state is abandoned.” With reference to them, the question is the proponent's, and the admission is the other's. The statement, “One might be attached to forms in the lower realms,” and so on, is made in order to challenge the opponent based on his view that for one endowed with right view, the woeful state is not abandoned. The rest here is clear in meaning. Statements like, “He might be reborn in hell,” illustrate only the abandoning of the woeful state or the abandoning of craving that leads to a woeful state, not the abandoning of craving for objects such as form on the part of beings in a woeful state. Therefore, this is not a valid proof.

Duggatikathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discussion on States of Woe.

653. Sattamabhavikakathāyapi [Pg.234] eseva nayoti.

653. The same method applies also to the discussion on one who is to be reborn at most seven more times.

Dvādasamo vaggo.

The Twelfth Chapter.

13. Terasamavaggo

13. The Thirteenth Chapter.

1. Kappaṭṭhakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Discussion on Remaining for an Aeon

654-657. Idāni kappaṭṭhakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘saṅghaṃ samaggaṃ bhetvāna, kappaṃ nirayamhi paccatī’’ti ‘‘sakalampi kappaṃ saṅghabhedako niraye tiṭṭhatī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi rājagirikānaṃ; te sandhāya kappaṭṭhoti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Buddho ca loketi idaṃ vinā buddhuppādena saṅghabhedassa abhāvadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Kappo ca saṇṭhāti saṅgho ca bhijjatītiādi ‘‘yadi so sakalaṃ kappaṃ tiṭṭhati, saṇṭhahanato paṭṭhāya taṃ kammaṃ katvā tattha uppajjitvā tiṭṭheyyā’’ti dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Atītantiādi heṭṭhā vuttādhippāyameva. Kappaṭṭho iddhimāti pañhe bhāvanāmayaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, parasamaye panassa jātimayaṃ iddhiṃ icchanti, taṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Chandiddhipādotiādi ‘‘jātimayāya iddhiyā iddhimāti laddhimattametaṃ, kiṃ tena, yadi panassa iddhi atthi, iminā nayena iddhipādā bhāvitā bhaveyyu’’nti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Āpāyiko nerayikoti suttaṃ yaṃ so ekaṃ kappaṃ asītibhāge katvā tato ekabhāgamattaṃ kālaṃ tiṭṭheyya, taṃ āyukappaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, tasmā asādhakanti.

654-657. Now comes the discussion on remaining for an aeon. Here, with reference to those who hold the view that, “Having divided a harmonious Saṅgha, one is cooked in hell for an aeon,” or, “A schismatic of the Saṅgha remains in hell for an entire aeon”—such as the Rājagirikās—the question, “Does one remain for an aeon?”, is the proponent's, and the admission is the other's. The phrase, “And a Buddha in the world,” is stated to show that without the arising of a Buddha, there can be no schism in the Saṅgha. The statement, “The aeon is established, and the Saṅgha is divided,” and so on, is made to illustrate that, “if one were to remain for the entire aeon, one would have to be reborn there and remain, having performed that deed, from the very establishment of the aeon.” The term “past,” and so on, has the same meaning as previously explained. Regarding the question, “Is one who remains for an aeon possessed of psychic power?”, the rejection is made with reference to power born of meditative development; but in the doctrine of others, they hold that such a one has innate psychic power, and the acknowledgment is made with reference to that. The phrase, “The basis of psychic power that is will,” and so on, is stated to challenge: “This view that one is ‘endowed with psychic power’ through innate ability is a mere view—what of that? But if one truly possesses psychic power, then the bases of psychic power must have been developed in this way.” The sutta stating, “Bound for the lower realms, for hell,” where one would remain for a period equivalent to one part of an aeon divided into eighty, is said with reference to a lifespan-aeon. Therefore, it is not a valid proof.

Kappaṭṭhakathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discussion on Remaining for an Aeon.

2. Kusalapaṭilābhakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Discussion on the Acquisition of Wholesome States

658-659. Idāni kusalapaṭilābhakathā nāma hoti. Tattha kappaṭṭho sakasamaye kāmāvacarakusalameva paṭilabhati. Yena pana taṃ upapattiṃ paṭibāheyya, taṃ mahaggataṃ lokuttaraṃ vā na paṭilabhati. Yesaṃ pana imaṃ vibhāgaṃ akatvā aviseseneva ‘‘so kusalacittaṃ na paṭilabhatī’’ti [Pg.235] laddhi, seyyathāpi uttarāpathakānaṃ; tesaṃ vibhāgadassanena taṃ laddhiṃ bhindituṃ pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

658-659. Now comes the discussion on the acquisition of wholesome states. Therein, one who remains for an aeon, in his own time, acquires only sense-sphere wholesome states. But he does not acquire that which would prevent that rebirth, namely, the exalted or supramundane. But with reference to those who, without making this distinction, hold the view that 'he does not acquire wholesome consciousness' without differentiation—as is the case with the Uttarāpathakas—the question is the proponent's, in order to break that view by showing the distinction, and the admission is the other's. The rest here is clear in meaning.

Kusalapaṭilābhakathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discussion on the Acquisition of Wholesome States.

3. Anantarāpayuttakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of the Discussion on What is Immediately Consequential

660-662. Idāni anantarāpayuttakathā nāma hoti. Tattha anantarāpayutto nāma yena khandhabhedato anantarā vipākadāyakaṃ mātughātādi ānantariyakammaṃ āṇattaṃ. Tattha yassa niyatāya āṇattiyā āṇatto taṃ kammaṃ karissati, so atthasādhikāya cetanāya uppāditattā micchattaniyato hoti, abhabbo sammattaniyāmaṃ okkamituṃ. Yassa aniyatāya āṇattiyā āṇatto taṃ kammaṃ karissati, so atthasādhikāya cetanāya anuppāditattā na micchattaniyato, bhabbo sammattaniyāmaṃ okkamitunti idaṃ sakasamaye sanniṭṭhānaṃ. Yesaṃ pana ‘‘aniyatāyapi āṇattiyā abhabboyeva sammattaniyāmaṃ okkamitu’’nti laddhi, seyyathāpi uttarāpathakānaṃ; tesaṃ taṃ laddhiṃ bhindituṃ sakavādī pubbapakkhaṃ datvā anantarāpayuttoti paravādinā attānaṃ pucchāpeti. Tenettha paṭhamapucchā paravādissa, atthasādhikacetanāya abhāvaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā sakavādissa. Tato paravādī mātughātādikammassa āṇattattāva ‘‘so micchattaniyato’’ti maññati. Tasmā micchattaniyāmañcāti pañhaṃ pucchati. Sakavādī pana ekassa puggalassa dvinnaṃ niyāmānaṃ anokkantimattameva sandhāya na hevanti paṭikkhipati.

Now, there is the discussion called 'On One Incited to an Act with Immediate Result.' Therein, 'one incited to an act with immediate result' refers to one who has been commanded to perform an action with immediate result, such as matricide, which yields its result immediately after the breakup of the aggregates. In this regard, one who is commanded by a fixed command will perform that action; because it is produced by a purposeful intention, he is fixed in wrongness and incapable of entering the fixed course of rightness. One who is commanded by an unfixed command will perform that action; because it is not produced by a purposeful intention, he is not fixed in wrongness and is capable of entering the fixed course of rightness—this is the conclusion in one's own doctrine. However, for those who hold the view that 'even by an unfixed command, one is incapable of entering the fixed course of rightness'—as is the case with the Northerners—to break that view, the proponent of one's own doctrine, having presented the preliminary argument, has the opponent question him regarding 'one incited to an act with immediate result.' Therefore, here the first question is from the opponent, and the admission, referring to the absence of purposeful intention, is from the proponent of one's own doctrine. Then the opponent thinks that 'he is fixed in wrongness' simply because the action of matricide, etc., has been commanded. Therefore, he asks the question: 'And is he fixed in wrongness?' But the proponent of one's own doctrine rejects it, saying 'Not so,' referring merely to the non-entry of one individual into the two fixed courses.

Nanu taṃ kammanti mātughātādikammaṃ. Tattha aniyatāṇattiṃ sandhāya ‘‘āmantā’’ti paṭiññā sakavādissa. Aniyatampi hi āṇattiṃ payojetvā ṭhitassa ‘‘ananucchavikaṃ mayā kata’’nti kukkuccaṃ uppajjateva, vippaṭisāro jāyateva. Hañcītiādi kukkuccuppattimattaṃ gahetvā paravādinā laddhipatiṭṭhāpanatthaṃ vuttaṃ.

'Is that not an action?'—namely, the action of matricide, etc. Therein, referring to the unfixed command, the admission 'Yes' is from the proponent of one's own doctrine. For even in one who has instigated an unfixed command, remorse (kukkucca) certainly arises, thinking, 'I have done something unsuitable,' and regret certainly arises. The phrase 'If so,' etc., is stated by the opponent to establish their doctrine, taking only the mere arising of remorse.

661. Idāni yassa aniyatāṇattikassāpi anantarāpayuttassa paravādinā sammattaniyāmokkamanaṃ paṭisiddhaṃ, tameva puggalaṃ gahetvā anantarāpayutto [Pg.236] puggalo abhabboti pucchā sakavādissa, attano laddhivasena paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ sakavādī ‘‘abhabbo nāma mātughātādikammānaṃ kārako, kiṃ te tena tāni kammāni katānī’’ti codetuṃ mātā jīvitā voropitātiādimāha. Itaro tesaṃ vatthūnaṃ arogatāya tathārūpaṃ kiriyaṃ apassanto ‘‘na heva’’nti paṭikkhipati.

661. Now, taking that very person for whom, though he was incited to an act with immediate result by an unfixed command, the opponent has denied entry into the fixed course of rightness, the proponent of one's own doctrine asks the question: 'Is a person incited to an act with immediate result incapable?' and the admission, according to his own doctrine, is from the other. Then, to accuse him, the proponent of one's own doctrine says, 'An incapable person is one who performs actions such as matricide. Have those actions been done by you?' and so on, 'Was your mother deprived of life?' The other, not seeing such an action in those instances due to their being unharmed, rejects it, saying, 'Certainly not.'

Taṃ kammaṃ paṭisaṃharitvāti aniyatāṇattikammaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tañhi ‘‘mā kho mayā āṇattaṃ ākāsī’’ti āṇattaṃ nivārentena paṭisaṃhaṭaṃ nāma hoti. Paṭisaṃhaṭattāyeva cettha kukkuccaṃ paṭivinoditaṃ, vippaṭisāro paṭivinīto nāma hoti. Evaṃ santepi panettha purimāṇattiyāyeva niyatabhāvaṃ maññamāno paravādī ‘‘āmantā’’ti paṭijānāti. Atha naṃ sakavādī tassa kammassa paṭisaṃhaṭabhāvaṃ sampaṭicchāpetvā attano laddhiṃ patiṭṭhāpetvā hañcītiādimāha.

The phrase 'having withdrawn that action' is stated with reference to the action of an unfixed command. For it is called 'withdrawn' when one prevents the commanded action by saying, 'Do not do what was commanded by me!' And here, by the very fact of its being withdrawn, remorse is dispelled, and regret is said to be removed. Even so, the opponent, thinking that the previous command is fixed, admits by saying, 'Yes.' Then the proponent of one's own doctrine, having made him accept the fact that that action was withdrawn and having established his own doctrine, says, 'If so,' etc.

662. Puna anantarāpayuttoti pariyosānapañhe paṭhamapañhe viya pucchā paravādissa, paṭiññā sakavādissa. Nanu taṃ kammanti anuyogo paravādissa, paṭisaṃhaṭakālato pubbe payuttakālaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā sakavādissa. Payuttapubbatāmattaṃ gahetvā aniyatāṇattivasena hañcīti laddhipatiṭṭhāpanaṃ paravādissa. Ayaṃ pana laddhi ayoniso patiṭṭhitattā appatiṭṭhitāva hotīti.

662. Again, regarding 'one incited to an act with immediate result,' in the concluding question, as in the first question, the question is from the opponent, and the admission is from the proponent of one's own doctrine. 'Is that not an action?' is the retort from the opponent, and the admission from the proponent of one's own doctrine refers to the time of instigation before the time of withdrawal. By merely taking the fact of its prior instigation, the opponent establishes a doctrine by way of an unfixed command, saying 'If so.' But this doctrine, because it is improperly established, is simply unestablished.

Anantarāpayuttakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on One Incited to an Act with Immediate Result.

4. Niyatassa niyāmakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Explanation of the Discussion on the Fixed Course of One Who is Fixed.

663-664. Idāni niyatassa niyāmakathā nāma hoti. Tattha duvidho niyāmo – micchattaniyāmo ca ānantariyakammaṃ, sammattaniyāmo ca ariyamaggo. Ime dve niyāme ṭhapetvā añño niyāmo nāma natthi. Sabbepi hi sesā tebhūmakadhammā aniyatā nāma. Tehi samannāgatopi aniyatoyeva. Buddhehi pana attano ñāṇabalena ‘‘ayaṃ satto anāgate bodhiṃ pāpuṇissatī’’ti byākato bodhisatto puññussadattā niyatoti vuccati. Iti imaṃ vohāramattaṃ gahetvā ‘‘pacchimabhaviko bodhisatto [Pg.237] tāya jātiyā bhabbo dhammaṃ abhisametu’’nti adhippāyena ‘‘niyato niyāmaṃ okkamatī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyāparaseliyānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Micchattaniyatotiādi aññena niyāmena niyatassa aññaniyāmābhāvadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Pubbe maggaṃ bhāvetvātiādi niyāmappabhedadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Satipaṭṭhānantiādi ekasmimpi niyāme dhammappabhedadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Bhabbo bodhisattoti vacanaṃ kevalaṃ bodhisattassa bhabbataṃ dīpeti, na niyatassa niyāmokkamanaṃ, tasmā asādhakaṃ. So hi pubbe ekenapi niyatadhammena aniyato bodhimūle saccadassanena niyāmaṃ okkantoti.

Now there is the discussion called 'On the Fixed Course of One Who is Fixed.' Herein, there are two kinds of fixed courses: the fixed course of wrongness, which is an action with immediate result, and the fixed course of rightness, which is the noble path. Apart from these two fixed courses, there is no other fixed course. Indeed, all other phenomena of the three realms are called unfixed. Even one endowed with them remains unfixed. However, the Bodhisatta, declared by the Buddhas through their power of knowledge as, 'This being will attain enlightenment in the future,' is called 'fixed' due to the abundance of merit. Thus, taking this mere conventional expression, with reference to those whose tenet is that 'the Bodhisatta in his final existence is capable of realizing the Dhamma in that birth' and that 'the fixed one enters the fixed course'—such as the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas—the question is from the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the admission is from the other. The phrase 'fixed in wrongness' and so forth is stated to show the absence of another fixed course for one who is fixed by a particular fixed course. The phrase 'having previously developed the path' and so forth is stated to show the divisions of the fixed course. The phrase 'foundations of mindfulness' and so forth is stated to show the divisions of phenomena within a single fixed course. The statement 'the Bodhisatta is capable' merely indicates the Bodhisatta's capability, not the entry of the fixed one into the fixed course, and thus it is inconclusive. For he, though previously unfixed by even a single fixed phenomenon, enters the fixed course through the vision of truth at the root of enlightenment.

Niyatassa niyāmakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on the Fixed Course of One Who is Fixed.

5. Nivutakathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Explanation of the Discussion on the Concealed.

665-667. Idāni nivutakathā nāma hoti. Tattha suddhassa suddhakiccābhāvato nīvaraṇehi nivuto ophuṭo pariyonaddho ca nīvaraṇaṃ jahatīti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya nivutotipucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Ratto rāgantiādi nivutassa nīvaraṇajahane dosadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Parisuddhe pariyodātetiādi vikkhambhanavisuddhiyā visuddhassa samucchedavisuddhidassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Tassa evaṃ jānatotiādi jānato passato āsavakkhayaṃ dīpeti, na nivutassa nīvaraṇajahanaṃ, tasmā asādhakanti.

Now there is the discussion on being covered. Herein, the question, 'Is one covered?', is for the proponent of his own view, and the admission is for the other, this being directed at those whose tenet is that one who is covered, enveloped, and bound by the hindrances abandons the hindrances, because for one who is pure there is no function of purification; such as the Uttarāpathakas. The phrase 'one is stained by lust' and so forth is stated to show the fault in the abandonment of hindrances by one who is covered. The phrase 'purified, cleansed' and so forth is stated to show the purity of eradication for one who is pure through the purity of suppression. The phrase 'for one who knows thus' and so forth indicates the destruction of the taints for one who knows and sees, not the abandonment of hindrances by one who is covered; therefore, it is not a valid proof.

Nivutakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on Being Covered.

6. Sammukhībhūtakathāvaṇṇanā

6. The Exposition of the Discussion on Being Face-to-Face.

668-670. Idāni sammukhībhūtakathā nāma hoti. Tattha sammukhībhūtoti saṃyojanānaṃ sammukhībhāvaṃ tehi samaṅgībhāvaṃ upagato. Sesamettha nivutakathāsadisamevāti.

Now there is the discussion on being face-to-face. Herein, 'face-to-face' means one who has attained the state of being face-to-face with the fetters, the state of being endowed with them. The rest here is just like the discussion on being covered.

Sammukhībhūtakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on Being Face-to-Face.

7. Samāpanno assādetītikathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Exposition of the Discussion on 'One Who Has Attained Relishes'.

671-673. Idāni [Pg.238] samāpanno assādetītikathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati, so tadassādetī’’tiādivacanaṃ (a. ni. 4.123) nissāya ‘‘samāpanno assādeti, sā cassa jhānanikanti jhānārammaṇā hotī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ, te sandhāya samāpannoti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Taṃ jhānaṃ tassa jhānassa ārammaṇanti pañhesu tasseva tadārammaṇataṃ apassanto suttavirodhabhayena paṭikkhipati, ‘‘tadassādetī’’tivacanamattena paṭijānāti. So tadassādetīti suttaṃ jhānalābhino jhānā vuṭṭhāya jhānassādaṃ sādheti, na antosamāpattiyaṃyeva jhānanikantiyā jhānārammaṇataṃ, tasmā asādhakanti.

Now there is the discussion on 'One Who Has Attained Relishes.' Herein, based on the statement, 'Having entered upon and abided in the first jhāna, he relishes that' (cf. A.N. 4.123), the question, 'Does one who has attained relish?', is for the proponent of his own view, and the admission is for the other, this being directed at those whose tenet is that 'one who has attained relishes, and that delight in jhāna has jhāna as its object'; such as the Andhakas. In the questions concerning that jhāna being the object of that jhāna, not seeing that it has itself as its object, he rejects this out of fear of contradicting the sutta, and affirms it merely on the basis of the statement 'he relishes that.' The sutta passage 'he relishes that' establishes that one who has obtained jhāna, having emerged from jhāna, enjoys the taste of jhāna, not that the delight in jhāna having jhāna as its object occurs within the attainment itself. Therefore, this is not a valid proof.

Samāpanno assādetītikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on 'One Who Has Attained Relishes'.

8. Asātarāgakathāvaṇṇanā

8. The Exposition of the Discussion on Lust for the Unpleasant.

674. Idāni asātarāgakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘yaṃkiñci vedanaṃ vedeti sukhaṃ vā dukkhaṃ vā adukkhamasukhaṃ vā, so taṃ vedanaṃ abhinandati abhivadatī’’ti (ma. ni. 1.409) sutte diṭṭhābhinandanavasena vuttaṃ. ‘‘Abhinandatī’’tivacanaṃ nissāya ‘‘dukkhavedanāyapi rāgassādavasena abhinandanā hoti. Tasmā atthi asātarāgo’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya atthi asātarāgoti pucchā sakavādissa. Tattha asātarāgoti asāte dukkhavedayite ‘‘aho vata me etadeva bhaveyyā’’ti rajjanā. Āmantāti laddhivasena paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha uttānatthameva.

674. Now there is the discussion on lust for the unpleasant. Herein, in the sutta, it is said: 'Whatever feeling one feels—pleasant, painful, or neither-painful-nor-pleasant—one delights in that feeling, welcomes it' (cf. M.N. 1.409). This is stated in terms of delighting in views. Based on the statement 'delights in,' the question, 'Is there lust for the unpleasant?', is for the proponent of his own view, this being directed at those whose tenet is that 'there is delighting in painful feeling too, due to the relish of lust. Therefore, there is lust for the unpleasant'; such as the Uttarāpathakas. Here, 'lust for the unpleasant' means being impassioned towards an unpleasant, painful feeling with the thought, 'Oh, that this very thing might be for me!' The admission 'Yes' is from the other, in accordance with his tenet. The rest of the meaning here is evident.

675. So taṃ vedanaṃ abhinandatīti sutte pana vinivaṭṭetvā dukkhavedanameva ārabbha rāguppatti nāma natthi, samūhaggahaṇena pana vedayitalakkhaṇaṃ dhammaṃ dukkhavedanameva vā attato samanupassanto diṭṭhimaññanāsaṅkhātāya diṭṭhābhinandanāya vedanaṃ abhinandati, dukkhāya vedanāya vipariṇāmaṃ abhinandati, dukkhāya vedanāya abhibhūto tassā paṭipakkhaṃ kāmasukhaṃ patthayantopi [Pg.239] dukkhavedanaṃ abhinandati nāma. Evaṃ dukkhavedanāya abhinandanā hotīti adhippāyo. Tasmā asādhakametaṃ asātarāgassāti.

675. However, in the sutta passage 'he delights in that feeling,' if one sets aside the others, there is no such thing as an arising of lust that has only painful feeling as its object. Rather, by grasping the aggregate, one who regards the phenomenon characterized by feeling—or even just painful feeling—as self, delights in feeling through the delight in views, which is reckoned as the conceit of views. One delights in the change of painful feeling. And being overwhelmed by painful feeling, while longing for sensual pleasure as its opposite, one is said to 'delight in painful feeling' only by name. This is the intended meaning of how there is delight in painful feeling. Therefore, this is not a valid proof for lust for the unpleasant.

Asātarāgakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on Lust for the Unpleasant.

9. Dhammataṇhāabyākatātikathāvaṇṇanā

9. The Exposition of the Discussion on 'Craving for Phenomena is Indeterminate'.

676-680. Idāni dhammataṇhā abyākatātikathā nāma hoti. Tattha rūpataṇhā…pe… dhammataṇhāti imāsu chasu taṇhāsu yasmā sabbapacchimā taṇhā dhammataṇhāti vuttā, tasmā sā abyākatāti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesapañhānaṃ pāḷiyā attho niyyāti. Kāmataṇhātiādīhi tīhi koṭṭhāsehi chapi taṇhā saṅkhipitvā dassitā. Rūpādīsu hi chasu ārammaṇesu kāmassādavasena pavattā taṇhā kāmataṇhā. ‘‘Bhavissati attā ca loko cā’’ti sassatadiṭṭhisahagatā taṇhā bhavataṇhā. ‘‘Na bhavissatī’’ti ucchedadiṭṭhisahagatā taṇhā vibhavataṇhāti. Nanu sā dhammataṇhāti padaṃ taṇhāya dhammārammaṇaṃ ārabbha pavattiṃ dīpeti, na abyākatabhāvaṃ tasmā asādhakanti.

Now there is the discussion on 'Craving for Phenomena is Indeterminate.' Herein, among the six cravings—craving for forms... and so forth... craving for phenomena—the question is for the proponent of his own view, and the admission is for the other, this being directed at those whose tenet is that since the very last craving is called 'craving for phenomena,' it is therefore indeterminate; such as the Pubbaseliyas. The meaning of the remaining questions is deduced from the Pāli text. The six cravings are shown summarized into three divisions: 'sensual craving,' and so forth. For, craving that proceeds by way of the relish of sensual pleasure in the six objects beginning with forms is 'sensual craving.' Craving accompanied by the eternalist view, 'the self and the world will exist,' is 'craving for existence.' Craving accompanied by the annihilationist view, 'it will not exist,' is 'craving for non-existence.' Surely, the term 'craving for phenomena' indicates the proceeding of craving in relation to a mental phenomenon as its object, not its indeterminate nature. Therefore, this is not a valid proof.

Dhammataṇhā abyākatātikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on 'Craving for Phenomena is Indeterminate'.

10. Dhammataṇhānadukkhasamudayotikathāvaṇṇanā

10. The Exposition of the Discussion on 'Craving for Phenomena is Not the Origin of Suffering'.

681-685. Idāni dhammataṇhā nadukkhasamudayotikathā nāma hoti. Tatrāpi yasmā sā dhammataṇhāti vuttā, tasmā na dukkhasamudayoti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānaṃyeva; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesaṃ purimakathāsadisamevāti.

Now there is the discussion on 'Craving for Phenomena is Not the Origin of Suffering.' Here too, the question is for the proponent of his own view, and the admission is for the other, this being directed at those whose tenet is that since it is called 'craving for phenomena,' it is therefore not the origin of suffering; such as the Pubbaseliyas. The rest is just like the previous discussion.

Dhammataṇhā nadukkhasamudayotikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on 'Craving for Phenomena is Not the Origin of Suffering'.

Terasamo vaggo.

The Thirteenth Chapter.

14. Cuddasamavaggo

14. The Fourteenth Chapter.

1. Kusalākusalapaṭisandahanakathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Exposition of the Discussion on the Relinking of Wholesome and Unwholesome.

686-690. Idāni [Pg.240] kusalākusalapaṭisandahanakathā nāma hoti. Tattha kusalaṃ vā akusalassa, akusalaṃ vā kusalassa anantarā uppajjanakaṃ nāma natthīti tesaṃ aññamaññaṃ paṭisandhānaṃ na yujjati. Ye pana yasmā ekavatthusmiññeva rajjati virajjati ca, tasmā taṃ aññamaññaṃ paṭisandahatīti laddhiṃ gahetvā ṭhitā, seyyathāpi mahāsaṅghikā; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa; paṭiññā itarassa. Āvaṭṭanā paṇidhīti ubhayaṃ āvajjanasseva nāmaṃ. Tañhi bhavaṅgaṃ āvaṭṭetīti āvaṭṭanā. Bhavaṅgārammaṇato aññasmiṃ ārammaṇe cittaṃ paṇidahati ṭhapetīti paṇidhi. Kusalaṃ anāvaṭṭentassāti yaṃ taṃ akusalānantaraṃ paṭisandahantaṃ kusalaṃ uppajjati, taṃ anāvaṭṭentassa uppajjatīti pucchati. Itaro pana vinā āvajjanena kusalassa uppattiṃ apassanto paṭikkhipati. Kusalaṃ ayoniso manasikarototi idaṃ yadi akusalānantaraṃ kusalaṃ uppajjeyya, akusalasseva āvajjanena ayoniso manasikaroto uppajjeyyāti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Sesaṃ yathāpāḷimeva niyyāti. Nanu yasmiṃyeva vatthusminti vacanaṃ ekārammaṇe sarāgavirāguppattiṃ dīpeti, na kusalākusalānaṃ anantarataṃ, tasmā asādhakanti.

686-690. Now there is the discussion called 'The Relinking of Wholesome and Unwholesome'. Herein, there is no such thing as the wholesome arising immediately after the unwholesome, or the unwholesome immediately after the wholesome; thus their mutual relinking is not valid. However, with reference to those who hold the view that because one becomes attached to and detached from the very same object, therefore the one is relinked to the other—such as the Mahāsāṅghikas—the question is for the proponent of one's own view; the admission is from the other. 'Averting' (āvaṭṭanā) and 'directing' (paṇidhi) are both names for advertence (āvajjanā). For it averts the life-continuum, hence it is called 'averting.' It directs and establishes the mind on an object other than the object of the life-continuum, hence it is called 'directing.' 'For one for whom the wholesome does not avert' (kusalaṃ anāvaṭṭentassa)—this asks if that wholesome which, being relinked, arises immediately after the unwholesome, arises for one who does not avert. The other, not seeing the arising of the wholesome without advertence, rejects it. 'For one who attends unwisely to the wholesome' (kusalaṃ ayoniso manasikaroto)—this is said for the purpose of censure: if the wholesome were to arise immediately after the unwholesome, it would arise for one who attends unwisely, by the very advertence of the unwholesome. The rest proceeds just as in the Pāli. The statement, 'Is it not in the very same object?' reveals the arising of attachment and detachment in a single object, not the immediacy of the wholesome and unwholesome; therefore, it is inconclusive.

Kusalākusalapaṭisandahanakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on the Relinking of Wholesome and Unwholesome.

2. Saḷāyatanuppattikathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Explanation of the Discussion on the Arising of the Six Sense Bases.

691-692. Idāni saḷāyatanuppattikathā nāma hoti. Tattha upapattesiyena paṭisandhicittena saheva opapātikānaṃ saḷāyatanaṃ uppajjati. Gabbhaseyyakānaṃ ajjhattikāyatanesu manāyatanakāyāyatanāneva paṭisandhikkhaṇe uppajjanti. Sesāni cattāri sattasattatirattimhi. Tāni ca kho yena kammunā paṭisandhi gahitā, tasseva aññassa vā katattāti ayaṃ sakasamaye vādo. Yesaṃ pana ekakammasambhavattā sampannasākhāviṭapānaṃ rukkhādīnaṃ aṃkuro viya bījamattaṃ saḷāyatanaṃ mātukucchismiṃ paṭisandhikkhaṇeyeva uppajjatīti laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānaṃ; te sandhāya saḷāyatananti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sabbaṅgapaccaṅgītiādi saḷāyatane [Pg.241] sati evarūpo hutvā okkameyyāti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Mātukucchigatassāti pucchā paravādissa. Parato mātukucchigatassa pacchā kesāti pucchā sakavādissa. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

691-692. Now there is the discussion called 'The Arising of the Six Sense Bases'. Herein, for spontaneously born beings, the six sense bases arise together with the rebirth-linking consciousness. For womb-born beings, at the moment of rebirth-linking, only the mind base and the body base among the internal sense bases arise. The remaining four arise in seventy-seven nights. And that these arise due to the same kamma by which rebirth was taken, or due to the action of another—this is a doctrine in our own system. But some, such as the Pubbaseliyas, hold the view that, because they arise from a single kamma, the six sense bases arise as a mere seed in the mother's womb at the very moment of rebirth-linking, like the sprout of trees that are complete with branches and foliage. With reference to them, the question 'The six sense bases?' is for the proponent of one's own view; the admission is from the other. The words 'With all limbs and minor limbs complete,' etc., are said for the purpose of censure, implying: 'If the six sense bases were present, one would have to enter the womb having become of such a form.' The question 'For one who has entered the mother's womb?' is for the opponent. The question 'For one who has entered the mother's womb, does hair arise afterwards?' is for the proponent of one's own view. The rest here is clear in meaning.

Saḷāyatanuppattikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on the Arising of the Six Sense Bases.

3. Anantarapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā

3. The Explanation of the Discussion on the Contiguity Condition.

693-697. Idāni anantarapaccayakathā nāma hoti. Tattha naccagītādīsu rūpadassanasaddasavanādīnaṃ lahuparivattitaṃ disvā ‘‘imāni viññāṇāni aññamaññassa anantarā uppajjantī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya cakkhuviññāṇassāti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sotaviññāṇaṃ rūpārammaṇaṃyevāti yadi cakkhuviññāṇassa anantarā uppajjeyya, vipākamanodhātu viya rūpārammaṇaṃ siyāti codetuṃ vuttaṃ. Cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpe ca uppajjati sotaviññāṇanti pañhesu suttābhāvena paṭikkhipitvā anantaruppattiṃ sallakkhento laddhivasena paṭijānāti. Taññeva cakkhuviññāṇaṃ taṃ sotaviññāṇanti yathā paṭhamajavanānantaraṃ dutiyajavanaṃ manoviññāṇabhāvena taññeva hoti, kiṃ te tathā etampi dvayaṃ ekamevāti pucchati. Iminā nayena sabbavāresu attho veditabbo. Naccati gāyatītiādivacanaṃ ārammaṇasamodhāne lahuparivattitāya vokiṇṇabhāvaṃ dīpeti, na anantarapaccayataṃ, tasmā asādhakanti.

693-697. Now there is the discussion called 'The Contiguity Condition'. Herein, some—such as the Uttarāpathakas—hold the view that 'these consciousnesses arise immediately after one another,' having seen the rapid succession in such things as dancing and singing, the seeing of forms, the hearing of sounds, and so on. With reference to them, the question concerning eye-consciousness is for the proponent of one's own view; the admission is from the other. The censure is stated thus: 'If ear-consciousness were to arise immediately after eye-consciousness, it would have form as its object, just like the resultant mind-element.' In the questions, having rejected the proposition 'ear-consciousness arises dependent on the eye and on forms' due to the absence of a sutta, he, considering the immediate arising in accordance with his view, admits it. He asks: 'Is that very eye-consciousness that ear-consciousness?' This is to ask: 'Just as the second impulsion following the first impulsion is the very same in being mind-consciousness, are these two also one and the same?' In this way, the meaning should be understood in all cases. The statement 'dances, sings,' and so on, illustrates the intermingled state due to the rapid succession when objects come together, not the contiguity condition. Therefore, it is inconclusive.

Anantarapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on the Contiguity Condition.

4. Ariyarūpakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Explanation of the Discussion on Noble Form.

698-699. Idāni ariyarūpakathā nāma hoti. Tattha sammāvācākammantā rūpaṃ, tañca kho ‘‘sabbaṃ rūpaṃ cattāri ca mahābhūtāni catunnañca mahābhūtānaṃ upādāyarūpa’’nti (ma. ni. 3.67) vacanato upādāyarūpanti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya ariyarūpaṃ mahābhūtānaṃ upādāyāti pucchā [Pg.242] sakavādissa. Tattha ariyānaṃ rūpaṃ, ariyaṃ vā rūpanti ariyarūpaṃ. Āmantāti laddhiyaṃ ṭhatvā paṭiññā itarassa. Kusalanti puṭṭho laddhivaseneva paṭijānāti. Anāsavapucchādīsupi eseva nayo. Yaṃ kiñci rūpanti suttaṃ ṭhapetvā bhūtāni sesarūpassa upādābhāvaṃ dīpeti, na sammāvācākammantānaṃ. Tesañhi rūpamattaññeva asiddhaṃ, kuto upādārūpatā; tasmā asādhakanti.

698-699. Now there is the discussion called 'Noble Form'. Herein, with reference to those—such as the Uttarāpathakas—whose view is that right speech and right action are form, and that this is derived form according to the statement, 'All form consists of the four great elements and form derived from the four great elements' (MN 3.67), the question is for the proponent of one's own view: 'Is noble form derived from the great elements?' Herein, 'noble form' means the form of the noble ones, or form that is noble. The other's admission, standing on his view, is 'Yes.' When asked, 'Is it wholesome?' he admits it on the basis of his view. The same method applies to the questions about the taintless, and so on. The sutta statement, 'Whatever form there is,' indicates the derived nature of the remaining form, apart from the elements, but not of right speech and right action. For these, their nature as mere form is itself unestablished, so how could they be derived form? Therefore, it is inconclusive.

Ariyarūpakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on Noble Form.

5. Añño anusayotikathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Explanation of the Discussion 'Latent Tendency is Another Thing'.

700-701. Idāni añño anusayotikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā puthujjano kusalābyākate citte vattamāne sānusayoti vattabbo, na pariyuṭṭhitoti tasmā añño anusayo, aññaṃ pariyuṭṭhānanti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya añño kāmarāgānusayoti pucchā sakavādissa paṭiññā itarassa. Sesaṃ heṭṭhā anusayakathāyaṃ vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Sānusayotiādi pana tasmiṃ samaye anusayassa appahīnattā sānusayoti vattabbataṃ, anuppannattā ca pariyuṭṭhitoti avattabbataṃ dīpeti, na anusayapariyuṭṭhānānaṃ aññattaṃ, tasmā asādhakanti.

Now there is what is called the discussion, 'Is the Latent Tendency Another Thing?' Here, because an ordinary person, when a wholesome or indeterminate mind is occurring, should be said to have latent tendencies but not to be obsessed, therefore some—such as the Andhakas—hold that the latent tendency is one thing and obsession another. With reference to them, the question, 'Is the latent tendency of sensual lust another thing?' is posed by the Sakavādin, and the admission is made by the other. The rest should be understood in the way stated in the discussion on latent tendencies above. However, the phrase 'has latent tendencies,' and so on, indicates that at that time one is said to have latent tendencies because the latent tendency has not been abandoned, and that one cannot be said to be obsessed because obsession has not arisen. This does not indicate that the latent tendency and obsession are different; therefore, it is not a valid proof.

Añño anusayotikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion, 'Is the Latent Tendency Another Thing?'

6. Pariyuṭṭhānaṃ cittavippayuttantikathāvaṇṇanā

6. Explanation of the Discussion: 'Are Obsessions Disassociated from Consciousness?'

702. Idāni pariyuṭṭhānaṃ cittavippayuttantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā aniccādito manasikarotopi rāgādayo uppajjanti. Vuttampi cetaṃ – ‘‘appekadā, bho bhāradvāja, asubhato manasikarissāmīti subhatova manasikarotī’’ti (saṃ. ni. 4.127). Tasmā pariyuṭṭhānaṃ cittavippayuttanti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃyeva; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

702. Now comes the discussion called, 'Are Obsessions Disassociated from Consciousness?' Here, this is because even while attending to impermanence and so forth, lust and other defilements arise. And this was said: 'Sometimes, friend Bhāradvāja, intending to attend to the unattractive, one attends to the attractive.' Therefore, the doctrine of those who hold that obsessions are disassociated from consciousness is just that of the Andhakas. With reference to them, the question is posed by the Sakavādin, and the admission is made by the other. The remainder here is clear in meaning.

Pariyuṭṭhānaṃ cittavippayuttantikathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discussion: 'Are Obsessions Disassociated from Consciousness?'

7. Pariyāpannakathāvaṇṇanā

7. Explanation of the Discussion on What is Comprised.

703-705. Idāni [Pg.243] pariyāpannakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā kāmarāgo kāmadhātuṃ anuseti, kāmadhātupariyāpannoti ca vuccati, tasmā rūparāgārūparāgāpi rūpadhātuarūpadhātuyo anusenti. Rūpadhātuarūpadhātupariyāpannāyeva ca nāma hontīti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānañceva sammitiyānañca; te sandhāya rūparāgoti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Tattha anusetīti yathā kāmarāgo kāmavitakkasaṅkhātaṃ kāmadhātuṃ sahajātavasena anuseti, kiṃ te evaṃ rūparāgo rūpadhātunti pucchati. Pariyāpannoti yathā ca so tividhāya kāmadhātuyā kilesakāmavasena pariyāpannattā kāmadhātupariyāpanno, kiṃ te evaṃ rūparāgopi rūpadhātupariyāpannoti pucchati. Itaro panassa adhippāyaṃ asallakkhento kevalaṃ laddhivasena āmantāti paṭijānāti. Atha naṃ tamatthaṃ sallakkhāpetuṃ kusalavipākakiriyasaṅkhātehi samāpattesiyādīhi saṃsanditvā pucchituṃ samāpattesiyotiādimāha. Sesamettha yathāpāḷimeva niyyāti. Nanu kāmarāgotiādivacanampi kāmarāgasseva kāmadhātuyaṃ anusayabhāvaṃ pariyāpannatañca dīpeti, na itaresaṃ itaradhātūsūti.

703-705. Now comes the discussion called 'What is Comprised'. Here, since sensual desire underlies the sense-sphere realm and is called 'comprised in the sense-sphere realm,' similarly, desire for form and desire for the formless underlie the form and formless realms. Thus, they are called 'comprised in the form and formless realms'—this is the doctrine of those, such as the Andhakas and the Sammatiyas. It is with reference to them that the question concerning desire for form is posed by the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the admission is by the other. Here, 'underlies' means: just as sensual desire underlies the sense-sphere realm, which is characterized by sense-sphere thoughts, through co-nascence, does desire for form similarly underlie the form realm for you? —this is what is asked. 'Comprised' means: just as that sensual desire is comprised in the threefold sense-sphere realm by way of defilement-sensuality, is desire for form similarly comprised in the form realm for you? —this is what is asked. The other party, however, not discerning his intention, merely affirms based on their own doctrine. Then, to make him discern that meaning, he speaks of attainments and so forth, beginning with 'Is it an attainment?', connecting them with what is skillful, resultant, and functional, in order to question him. The remainder here should be understood just as it is in the text. Indeed, the statement 'sensual desire' and so forth indicates that sensual desire alone underlies and is comprised in the sense-sphere realm, not other desires in other realms.

Pariyāpannakathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discussion on What is Comprised.

8. Abyākatakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Explanation of the Discussion on the Indeterminate.

706-708. Idāni abyākatakathā nāma hoti. Tattha vipākakiriyarūpanibbānasaṅkhātaṃ catubbidhaṃ abyākataṃ avipākattā abyākatanti vuttaṃ. Diṭṭhigataṃ ‘‘sassato lokoti kho, vaccha, abyākatameta’’nti (saṃ. ni. 4.416 thokaṃ visadisaṃ) sassatādibhāvena akathitattā. Yesaṃ pana imaṃ vibhāgaṃ aggahetvā purimābyākataṃ viya diṭṭhigatampi abyākatanti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānañceva uttarāpathakānañca; tesaṃ taṃ vibhāgaṃ dassetuṃ diṭṭhigataṃ abyākatanti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti.

706-708. Now comes the discussion called 'The Indeterminate'. Here, the fourfold indeterminate—namely, resultant, functional, material form, and Nibbāna—is said to be indeterminate because it is not a result. A dogmatic view is indeterminate because it is not stated in terms of eternalism and so forth, as in the phrase: 'Vaccha, that the world is eternal, that is indeterminate' (Saṃyutta Nikāya 4.416, slightly different). But for those whose doctrine, without grasping this distinction, holds a dogmatic view to be indeterminate like the former indeterminate—such as the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas; to show them this distinction, the question 'Is a dogmatic view indeterminate?' is posed by the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the admission is by the other. The remainder here should be understood just as it is in the text.

Abyākatakathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discussion on the Indeterminate.

9. Apariyāpannakathāvaṇṇanā

9. Explanation of the Discussion on What is Not Comprised.

709-710. Idāni [Pg.244] apariyāpannakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā puthujjano jhānalābhī kāmesu vītarāgoti vattabbo hoti, na pana vigatadiṭṭhikoti, tasmā diṭṭhigataṃ apariyāpannanti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti.

709-710. Now comes the discussion on what is not comprised. Here, since an ordinary person who has attained jhāna can be said to be free from lust for sensual pleasures but not free from wrong view, the doctrine of some—such as the Pubbaseliyas—is that a dogmatic view is not comprised. With reference to them, the question is posed by the Sakavādin, and the admission is made by the other. The remainder here proceeds just as in the Pāḷi text.

Apariyāpannakathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discussion on What is Not Comprised.

Cuddasamo vaggo.

The Fourteenth Section.

15. Pannarasamavaggo

15. The Fifteenth Section.

1. Paccayatākathāvaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Discussion on Conditionality.

711-717. Idāni paccayatākathā nāma hoti. Tattha yo dhammo hetupaccayena paccayo, so yesaṃ hetupaccayena paccayo, tesaññeva yasmā ārammaṇānantarasamanantarapaccayena paccayo na hoti, yo vā ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo, so yasmā tesaṃyeva anantarasamanantarapaccayena paccayo na hoti, tasmā paccayatā vavatthitāti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṅghikānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti.

711-717. Now comes the discussion on conditionality. Here, since whatever state is a condition by way of root condition, for those very states for which it is a root condition, it is not a condition by way of object, contiguity, or immediacy condition; or whatever is a condition by way of object condition, for those very states, it is not a condition by way of contiguity or immediacy condition; therefore, 'conditionality is demarcated'—this is the doctrine of those such as the Mahāsaṅghikas. With reference to them, the question is posed by the Sakavādin, and the admission is made by the other. The remainder here proceeds just as in the Pāḷi text.

Paccayatākathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discussion on Conditionality.

2. Aññamaññapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Discussion on Mutual Conditionality.

718-719. Idāni aññamaññapaccayakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ samaye ‘‘avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārā’’ti ayameva tanti, ‘‘saṅkhārapaccayāpi avijjā’’ti ayaṃ natthi, tasmā avijjāva saṅkhārānaṃ paccayo, na pana saṅkhārā avijjāyāti laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṅghikānaṃ; te sandhāya avijjāsaṅkhārādīnaṃ aññamaññapaccayatāpi atthīti dassetuṃ pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa[Pg.245]. Avijjā saṅkhārenāti ettha apuññābhisaṅkhārova gahito. Tasmā saṅkhārapaccayāpi avijjāti ettha sahajātaaññamaññaatthiavigatasampayuttavasena paccayatā veditabbā. Upādānapaccayāpi taṇhāti ettha ṭhapetvā kāmupādānaṃ sesāni tīṇi upādānāni avijjāya saṅkhārā viya taṇhāya paccayā hontīti veditabbāni. Sesaṃ yathāpāḷimeva niyyāti. Jarāmaraṇapaccayāti pucchā paravādissa, nāmarūpaṃ viññāṇapaccayāti sakavādissāti.

718-719. Now comes the discussion on mutual conditionality. Here, for those whose doctrine is that 'with ignorance as condition, volitional formations arise' is the only teaching, and 'with volitional formations as condition, ignorance arises' does not exist, therefore, their doctrine is that ignorance is a condition for volitional formations, but volitional formations are not a condition for ignorance, as with the Mahāsāṅghikas. With reference to them, to show that there is also mutual conditionality between ignorance, volitional formations, and so forth, the question is posed by the proponent of one's own view, and the affirmation is given by the other. Here, by 'ignorance with volitional formations,' only the unwholesome volitional formation is taken. Therefore, in 'with volitional formations as condition, ignorance,' the conditionality should be understood by way of co-nascence, mutuality, presence, non-disappearance, and association. Here, in 'with clinging as condition, craving,' excluding sensual clinging, the other three clingings should be understood to be conditions for craving, just as volitional formations are for ignorance. The rest proceeds just as in the Pāli text. The question 'with aging-and-death as condition?' is for the proponent of the opposing view, and 'name-and-form as condition for consciousness?' is for the proponent of one's own view.

Aññamaññapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on Mutual Conditionality.

3. Addhākathāvaṇṇanā

3. The Explanation of the Discussion on Time.

720-721. Idāni addhākathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘tīṇimāni, bhikkhave, kathāvatthūnī’’ti (a. ni. 3.68) suttaṃ nissāya kālasaṅkhāto addhā nāma parinipphanno atthīti yesaṃ laddhi; tesaṃ ‘‘addhā nāma koci parinipphanno natthi aññatra kālapaññattimattā. Rūpādayo pana khandhāva parinipphannā’’ti vibhāgaṃ dassetuṃ addhā parinipphannoti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘sace so parinipphanno, rūpādīsu anena aññatarena bhavitabba’’nti codetuṃ rūpantiādimāha. Itaro paṭikkhipati. Sesaṃ yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti.

720-721. Now comes the discussion on time. Here, the doctrine of some is that, based on the sutta 'There are, monks, these three grounds for discussion' (AN 3.68), time, reckoned as a period, is something that is an ultimate reality. To show them the distinction that 'time is not anything that is an ultimate reality apart from being a mere designation, but the aggregates such as form are ultimate realities,' the question 'Is time an ultimate reality?' is posed by the proponent of one's own view, and the affirmation is given by the other. Then, to challenge him by saying, 'If it is an ultimate reality, it must be one of form and so forth,' one says 'form,' and so forth. The other denies it. The rest proceeds just as in the Pāli text.

Addhākathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on Time.

4. Khaṇalayamuhuttakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Explanation of the Discussion on Moments, Instants, and Muhuttas.

722-723. Khaṇalayamuhuttakathāsupi eseva nayo. Sabbepi hete khaṇādayo addhāpariyāyā evāti.

722-723. The same method applies to the discussions on moments, instants, and muhuttas. For all these—moments and so forth—are simply terms for time.

Khaṇalayamuhuttakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on Moments, Instants, and Muhuttas.

5. Āsavakathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Explanation of the Discussion on Taints.

724-725. Idāni āsavakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā catūhi āsavehi uttari añño āsavo nāma natthi, yena cattāro āsavā [Pg.246] sāsavā siyuṃ, tasmā cattāro āsavā anāsavāti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi hetuvādānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi te āsavā anāsavā, evaṃ sante tehi maggādilakkhaṇappattehi bhavitabba’’nti codetuṃ maggotiādimāha. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

724-725. Now comes the discussion on taints. Here, because there is no other taint beyond the four taints by which the four taints would be tainted, some hold the view that the four taints are untainted, such as the Hetuvādins. With reference to them, the question is posed by the proponent of one's own view, and the affirmation is given by the other. Then, to challenge them by saying, "If those taints are untainted, then they must possess the characteristics of the path and so forth," he says 'path,' and so forth. The rest here is of clear meaning.

Āsavakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on Taints.

6. Jarāmaraṇakathāvaṇṇanā

6. The Explanation of the Discussion on Aging-and-Death.

726-727. Idāni jarāmaraṇakathā nāma hoti. Tattha jarāmaraṇaṃ nāma aparinipphannattā lokiyanti vā lokuttaranti vā na vattabbaṃ. ‘‘Lokiyā dhammā lokuttarā dhammā’’ti hi duke jarāmaraṇaṃ neva lokiyapade, na lokuttarapade niddiṭṭhaṃ. Tattha yesaṃ imaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ anādiyitvā lokuttarānaṃ dhammānaṃ jarāmaraṇaṃ lokuttaranti laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṅghikānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti.

726-727. Now comes the discussion on aging-and-death. Herein, aging-and-death cannot be said to be either mundane or supramundane because it is not an ultimate reality. For in the pair 'mundane phenomena and supramundane phenomena,' aging-and-death is not designated in either the mundane category or the supramundane category. With reference to those who, disregarding this characteristic, hold the view that the aging-and-death of supramundane phenomena is supramundane—such as the Mahāsāṅghikas—the question is posed by the proponent of one's own view, and the affirmation is given by the other. The rest here proceeds just as in the Pāli text.

Jarāmaraṇakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on Aging-and-Death.

7. Saññāvedayitakathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Explanation of the Discussion on Perception and Feeling.

728-729. Idāni saññāvedayitakathā nāma hoti. Tattha saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti nāma na koci dhammo, catunnaṃ pana khandhānaṃ nirodho. Iti sā neva lokiyā na lokuttarā. Yasmā pana lokiyā na hoti, tasmā lokuttarāti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi hetuvādānaṃyeva; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesaṃ purimakathāsadisamevāti.

728-729. Now comes the discussion on perception and feeling. Herein, the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling is not any particular phenomenon, but the cessation of the four mental aggregates. Thus, it is neither mundane nor supramundane. However, since it is not mundane, the view that it is supramundane is held by some—such as the Hetuvādins. With reference to them, the question is posed by the proponent of one's own view, and the affirmation is given by the other. The rest is similar to the previous discussion.

Saññāvedayitakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discussion on Perception and Feeling.

8. Dutiyasaññāvedayitakathāvaṇṇanā

8. The Explanation of the Second Discussion on Perception and Feeling.

730-731. Idāni [Pg.247] yasmā sā lokuttarā na hoti, tasmā lokiyāti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi hetuvādānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesaṃ purimasadisamevāti.

730-731. Now, since that attainment is not supramundane, some hold the view that it is mundane—such as the Hetuvādins. With reference to them, the question is posed by the proponent of one's own view, and the affirmation is given by the other. The rest is similar to the previous discussion.

Dutiyasaññāvedayitakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Second Discussion on Perception and Feeling.

9. Tatiyasaññāvedayitakathāvaṇṇanā

9. The Explanation of the Third Discussion on Perception and Feeling.

732. Idāni yasmā ‘‘asuko maraṇadhammo, asuko na maraṇadhammo’’ti sattānaṃ maraṇadhammatāya niyāmo natthīti saññāvedayitanirodhaṃ samāpannopi kālaṃ kareyyāti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi rājagirikānaṃ; tesaṃ samāpannāyapi maraṇadhammatāya maraṇasamayañca amaraṇasamayañca dassetuṃ pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ yasmā kālaṃ karontassa nāma maraṇantikehi phassādīhi bhavitabbaṃ, tasmā tenākārena codetuṃ atthītiādimāha.

732. Now, since there is no fixed rule for beings that 'this one is subject to death, this one is not subject to death,' some hold the view that even one who has attained the cessation of perception and feeling might pass away—such as the Rājagirikas. For them, to demonstrate the time of death and the time of non-death even for one who has attained it and is subject to death, the question is posed by the proponent of one's own view, and the affirmation is given by the other. Then, because one who is passing away must experience contact and so forth near the time of death, therefore, to challenge him in that manner, he says 'there is,' and so forth.

Aphassakassa kālakiriyātiādīni puṭṭho sesasatte sandhāya paṭikkhipati visaṃ kameyyātiādīni puṭṭho samāpattiānubhāvaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Dutiyavāre sarīrapakatiṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Evaṃ sante pana samāpattiānubhāvo nāma na hoti, teneva na nirodhasamāpannoti anuyuñjati.

When asked about the death of one without contact and so forth, he rejects it with reference to other beings. When asked about 'could one die by poison?' and so forth, he rejects it with reference to the power of the attainment. In the second turn, he acknowledges it with reference to the nature of the body. But if this is so, then there is no such thing as the power of the attainment, and thus he is interrogated: 'Then he is not one who has attained cessation?'

733-734. Na kālaṃ kareyyāti pucchā paravādissa. Atthi so niyāmoti paravādissa pañhe pana yasmā evarūpo niyāmo nāma natthi, tasmā paṭikkhipati. Cakkhuviññāṇasamaṅgītiādi sakavādinā ‘‘niyāme asantepi maraṇasamayeneva marati, nāsamayenā’’ti dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Tatrāyamadhippāyo – yadi niyāmābhāvena kālakiriyā bhaveyya, cakkhuviññāṇasamaṅginopi bhaveyya. Tato ‘‘pañcahi viññāṇehi na cavati, na upapajjatī’’ti suttavirodho siyā. Yathā pana cakkhuviññāṇasamaṅgissa kālakiriyā na hoti, tathā nirodhasamāpannassāpīti.

733-734. 'He would not die'—this is the question of the opponent. Regarding the opponent's question, 'Is there such a fixed rule?', since there is no such fixed rule, he rejects it. 'Endowed with eye-consciousness' and so forth is said by the proponent to show that even in the absence of a fixed rule, one dies only at the time of death, not at an untimely moment. Herein, this is the intention: if death were to occur due to the absence of a fixed rule, it would also occur for one endowed with eye-consciousness. Then there would be a contradiction with the sutta, which states, 'One does not pass away or reappear with the five consciousnesses.' Just as death does not occur for one endowed with eye-consciousness, so too it does not occur for one who has attained cessation.

Tatiyasaññāvedayitakathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Third Discussion on Perception and Feeling.

10. Asaññasattupikākathāvaṇṇanā

10. Exposition of the Discussion Pertaining to Non-percipient Beings

735. Idāni [Pg.248] asaññasattupikākathā nāma hoti. Tattha saññāvirāgavasena pavattabhāvanā asaññasamāpattipi nirodhasamāpattipi saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti nāma. Iti dve saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpattiyo lokiyā ca lokuttarā ca. Tattha lokiyā puthujjanassa asaññasattupikā hoti, lokuttarā ariyānaṃ, sā ca nāsaññasattupikā. Imaṃ pana vibhāgaṃ akatvā avisesena saññāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti asaññasattupikāti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi hetuvādānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ yasmā asaññasamāpattiṃ samāpannassa alobhādayo atthi, na nirodhasamāpattiṃ, tasmā tesaṃ vasena codetuṃ atthītiādimāha.

735. Now comes the discussion called 'Pertaining to Non-percipient Beings'. Herein, the meditative development that proceeds by way of dispassion towards perception—both the attainment of non-perception and the attainment of cessation—is called the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling. Thus, there are two attainments of the cessation of perception and feeling: mundane and supramundane. Of these, the mundane one, belonging to an ordinary person, pertains to the realm of non-percipient beings, while the supramundane one belongs to the noble ones, and that does not pertain to the realm of non-percipient beings. But for those who, without making this distinction, hold the undifferentiated view that the attainment of the cessation of perception and feeling pertains to the realm of non-percipient beings—such as the Hetuvādins—the question is posed by the proponent, and the admission is made by the other. Then, since for one who has attained the attainment of non-perception, non-greed and other wholesome qualities exist, but not for one who has attained the attainment of cessation, he says, beginning with 'there is', in order to challenge them on that basis.

736. Idhāpi asaññīti pañhe idha saññāvirāgavasena samāpannattā asaññitā anuññātā, tatrāpi asaññasatteneva. Tasmā imaṃ paṭiññaṃ gahetvā laddhiṃ patiṭṭhapentena chalena patiṭṭhāpitā hoti. Idha vā nirodhasamāpattiṃ sandhāya asaññitā anuññātā. Tatrāpi ito cutassa anāgāmino nirodhasamāpattimeva tasmāpi imāya paṭiññāya patiṭṭhāpitā laddhi appatiṭṭhitāyevāti.

736. Here too, in the question 'Is one non-percipient?', non-percipience is acknowledged because one has attained it by way of dispassion towards perception; there too, it is only as a non-percipient being. Therefore, when one establishes a doctrine by taking this admission, it is established through a trick. Or here, non-percipience is acknowledged with reference to the attainment of cessation. There too, for a non-returner who has passed away from here, it is only the attainment of cessation. Therefore, the doctrine established by this admission is indeed unfounded.

Asaññasattupikākathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Discussion Pertaining to Non-percipient Beings.

11. Kammūpacayakathāvaṇṇanā

11. Exposition of the Discussion on the Accumulation of Kamma

737. Idāni kammūpacayakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ kammūpacayo nāma kammato añño cittavippayutto abyākato anārammaṇoti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānañceva sammitiyānañca; te sandhāya aññaṃ kammanti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi kammato añño kammūpacayo, phassāditopi aññena phassūpacayādinā bhavitabba’’nti codetuṃ añño phassotiādimāha. Itaro laddhiyā abhāvena paṭikkhipati.

737. Now comes the discussion called 'The Accumulation of Kamma'. Herein, for those who hold the view that the accumulation of kamma is something other than kamma, dissociated from consciousness, indeterminate, and without an object—such as the Andhakas and the Sammitiyas—with reference to them, the question, 'Is kamma one thing and its accumulation another?' is posed by the proponent, and the admission is made by the other. Then, to challenge them, he says, beginning with 'Is contact one thing...', arguing, 'If the accumulation of kamma is something other than kamma, then there must also be an accumulation of contact and so on, other than contact and so on.' The other rejects this, as he does not hold such a view.

738-739. Kammena [Pg.249] sahajātoti pañhesu cittavippayuttaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, cittasampayuttaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Kusaloti pañhesupi cittavippayuttaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Parato akusalotipañhesupi eseva nayo.

738-739. In the questions 'Is it conascent with kamma?', he rejects it with reference to what is dissociated from consciousness, but acknowledges it with reference to what is associated with consciousness. In the questions 'Is it wholesome?', he also acknowledges it with reference to what is dissociated from consciousness. The same method also applies to the subsequent questions, 'Is it unwholesome?'

740. Sārammaṇoti puṭṭho pana ekantaṃ anārammaṇameva icchati, tasmā paṭikkhipati. Cittaṃ bhijjamānanti yadā cittaṃ bhijjamānaṃ hoti, tadā kammaṃ bhijjatīti attho. Bhummatthe vā paccattaṃ, citte bhijjamāneti attho. Ayameva vā pāṭho. Tattha yasmā sampayutto bhijjati, vippayutto na bhijjati, tasmā paṭijānāti ceva paṭikkhipati ca.

740. When asked 'Is it with an object?', he insists that it is exclusively without an object; therefore, he rejects it. 'When the mind is breaking' means that when the mind is breaking, the kamma breaks. Or, the accusative is used in the sense of the locative, meaning 'when the mind is breaking'. Or, this latter is an alternative reading. Here, since the associated breaks, but the dissociated does not break, he therefore both acknowledges and denies.

741. Kammamhi kammūpacayoti kamme sati kammūpacayo, kamme vā patiṭṭhite kammūpacayo, kammūpacayatova vipāko nibbattati. Tasmiṃ pana kamme niruddhe yāva aṃkuruppādā bījaṃ viya yāva vipākuppādā kammūpacayo tiṭṭhatītissa laddhi, tasmā paṭijānāti. Taññeva kammaṃ, so kammūpacayo, so kammavipākoti yasmā kammamhi kammūpacayo, so ca yāva vipākuppādā tiṭṭhatītissa laddhi, tasmā naṃ tesaṃ tiṇṇampi ekattaṃ pucchati vipāko sārammaṇoti idaṃ vipāko viya vipākadhammadhammopi ārammaṇapaṭibaddhoyevāti codanatthaṃ pucchati. Itaro pana laddhivasenekaṃ paṭijānāti, ekaṃ paṭikkhipati. Paṭilomepi eseva nayo. Sesamettha yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti.

741. 'The accumulation of kamma in kamma' means that when kamma exists, there is an accumulation of kamma, or when kamma is established, there is an accumulation of kamma; from that very accumulation of kamma, the result arises. However, it is his view that even when that kamma has ceased, the accumulation of kamma persists until the result arises, just like a seed remains until a sprout appears. Therefore, he acknowledges it. Because it is his view that the accumulation of kamma exists in kamma and persists until the result arises, he therefore asks him about the unity of these three: 'Is that very kamma the accumulation of kamma, and is that the result of kamma?' He asks the question, 'Is the result with an object?' for the purpose of challenging, meaning that just as the result is dependent on an object, so too are phenomena that have the nature of being results dependent on an object. The other, however, accepts one aspect based on his view and rejects another. The same method applies in the reverse section. The rest here is to be understood according to the Pāli text itself.

Kammūpacayakathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Discussion on the Accumulation of Kamma.

Pannarasamo vaggo.

The Fifteenth Chapter.

Tatiyapaṇṇāsako samatto.

The Third Fifty is Concluded.

16. Soḷasamavaggo

16. The Sixteenth Chapter

1. Niggahakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Exposition of the Discussion on Refutation

743-744. Idāni [Pg.250] niggahakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ye loke balappattā vasībhūtā, te yadi parassa cittaṃ niggaṇhituṃ na sakkuṇeyyuṃ, kā tesaṃ balappatti, ko vasībhāvo. Balappattiyā pana vasībhāvena ca addhā te parassa cittaṃ niggaṇhantīti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṅghikānaṃ; te sandhāya paro parassāti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Tattha niggaṇhātīti saṃkilesāpattito nivāreti. Sesamettha yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti. Paggahakathāyapi eseva nayo.

743-744. Now there is the discussion called 'Refutation.' Herein, if those in the world who have attained power and mastery could not restrain another's mind, what is their attainment of power, what is their mastery? But for those whose doctrine is that, assuredly through the attainment of power and through mastery, they can restrain another's mind—such as the Mahāsaṅghikas—concerning them, the question, 'Does one person restrain another's mind?' is from the proponent, the admission from the other. Herein, 'restrains' means prevents from the arising of defilements. The rest here is to be understood just as in the Pāli text. The same method applies to the discussion on upholding.

Niggahakathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Discussion on Refutation.

3. Sukhānuppadānakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Exposition of the Discussion on the Bestowal of Happiness

747-748. Idāni sukhānuppadānakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘bahūnaṃ vata no bhagavā sukhadhammānaṃ upahattā’’ti (ma. ni. 2.148) suttaṃ nissāya paro parassa sukhaṃ anuppadetīti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi hetuvādānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Dukkhaṃ anuppadetīti puṭṭho pana tādisaṃ suttapadaṃ apassanto paṭikkhipati. Attano sukhantiādipañhe yaṃ attano parassa vā, taṃ anuppadātuṃ na sakkā. Yaṃ tasseva, kiṃ tattha anuppadānaṃ nāmāti paṭikkhipati. Nevattanotiādipañhe pana yaṃ evarūpaṃ, na taṃ anuppadinnaṃ nāma bhavitumarahatīti laddhiyāpaṭijānāti. No ca vata retitādisassa sukhassa abhāvā vuttaṃ. Sukhadhammānaṃ upahattātivacanaṃ bhagavato paresaṃ sukhuppattiyā paccayabhāvaṃ dīpeti, na annādīnaṃ viya sukhassa anuppadānaṃ, tasmā asādhakanti.

747-748. Now there is the discourse called 'The Bestowal of Happiness.' Herein, based on the sutta passage, 'Truly, the Blessed One is a provider for us of many states of happiness' (MN 2.148), is the doctrine of those who believe that one can bestow happiness upon another—such as the Hetuvādins. Concerning them, the question is posed by the proponent, and the admission is made by the other. However, when asked whether one can bestow suffering, he rejects it, not finding such a sutta passage. In the questions beginning 'one's own happiness,' he rejects them, saying that what is one's own or another's cannot be bestowed. As for that which is one's very own, what is meant by 'bestowal'?—thus he rejects it. However, in the question beginning 'neither one's own,' he admits according to his doctrine that a thing of such a nature is not fit to be called 'bestowed.' But this is not said because of the absence of happiness of that sort. The statement 'a provider of states of happiness' indicates the Blessed One's role as a condition for the arising of others' happiness, not the bestowal of happiness as in the case of food and so on; therefore, it is not probative.

Sukhānuppadānakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse on the Bestowal of Happiness.

4. Adhigayhamanasikārakathāvaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Discourse on Attention by Grasping.

749-753. Idāni [Pg.251] adhigayha manasikārakathā nāma hoti. Tattha duvidho manasikāro nayato ca ārammaṇato ca. Tattha ekasaṅkhārassāpi aniccatāya diṭṭhāya sabbe saṅkhārā aniccāti avasesesu nayato manasikāro hoti. Atīte pana saṅkhāre manasikaronto na anāgate manasikātuṃ sakkoti. Atītādīsu aññataraṃ manasikaroto ārammaṇato manasikāro hoti. Tattha paccuppanne manasikaronto yena cittena te manasikaroti, taṃ paccuppannakkhaṇe manasikātuṃ na sakkoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā’’tiādivacanaṃ nissāya ‘‘manasikaronto nāma adhigayha adhigaṇhitvā saṅgaṇhitvā sabbe saṅkhāre ekato manasikarotī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyāparaseliyānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa.

749-753. Now there is the discourse called 'Attention by Grasping.' Herein, attention is twofold: by way of principle and by way of object. Herein, when the impermanence of even a single formation is seen, attention by way of principle occurs regarding the remaining formations as being impermanent. But one who attends to a past formation is not able to attend to a future one. When one attends to any one among the past and so on, attention by way of object occurs. Herein, one who attends to the present is not able, in that present moment, to attend to the very mind with which one attends to them. Herein, regarding those who, relying on statements like 'all formations are impermanent,' hold the view that 'one who attends, having grasped, comprehended, and collected, attends to all formations together'—such as the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas—the question is posed by the proponent, and the admission is made by the other.

Atha naṃ yasmā sabbe ekato manasikarontena yena cittena te manasikaroti, tampi manasikātabbaṃ hoti. Tasmā taṃcittatāya codetuṃ tena cittenāti āha. Itaro ārammaṇaṃ katvā na sakkā jānitunti sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Evaṃlakkhaṇaṃ cittanti ñātattā pana tampi cittaṃ ñātameva hotīti sandhāya paṭijānāti. Atha vā taññeva tassa ārammaṇaṃ na hotīti paṭikkhipati. ‘‘Sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā, yadā paññāya passatī’’tiādīni nissāya uppannaladdhivasena paṭijānāti. Sesapañhadvayepi eseva nayo. Tena phassenātiādīsu pana tathārūpaṃ suttaṃ apassanto paṭikkhipateva. Atītādipañhesu heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva paṭikkhepapaṭiññā veditabbā. Sesaṃ yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti. Sabbe saṅkhārātiādivacanaṃ nayato dassanaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ, na ekakkhaṇe ārammaṇato, tasmā asādhakanti.

Then, since the mind with which one attends to all things together must also be attended to, therefore, to challenge him regarding that very state of mind, he says, 'with that mind.' The other rejects this, implying that it cannot be known by making it an object. However, he admits it, intending that since it is known that 'the mind has such a characteristic,' that mind is indeed known. Alternatively, he rejects it, saying that very thing is not its object. He admits it based on the doctrine that arises through reliance on statements like 'all formations are impermanent, when one sees with wisdom.' The same method applies to the remaining two questions. Regarding 'by that contact,' and so on, not finding such a sutta, he simply rejects it. In the questions about the past, and so on, the rejection and admission should be understood in the manner stated above. The rest is to be construed just as in the Pāli text. The statement 'all formations,' and so on, is spoken referring to seeing by way of principle, not as an object in a single moment; therefore, it is not probative.

Adhigayhamanasikārakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse on Attention by Grasping.

5. Rūpaṃ hetūtikathāvaṇṇanā

5. Commentary on the Discourse: 'Is Form a Cause?'

754-756. Idāni rūpaṃ hetūti kathānāma hoti. Tattha hetūti kusalamūlādino hetuhetussāpi nāmaṃ, yassa kassaci paccayassāpi. Imaṃ [Pg.252] pana vibhāgaṃ akatvā ‘‘cattāro mahābhūtā hetū’’ti vacanamattaṃ nissāya aviseseneva rūpaṃ hetūti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Alobho hetūti kiṃ te rūpaṃ alobhasaṅkhāto hetūti pucchati, itaro paṭikkhipati. Sesesupi eseva nayo. Mahābhūtā upādāyarūpānaṃ upādāyahetūti ettha paccayaṭṭhena hetubhāvo vutto, na mūlaṭṭhena, tasmā asādhakanti.

754-756. Now there is the discourse called 'Is Form a Cause?' Herein, 'cause' is a name for a root-cause, such as a wholesome root, and also for any condition whatsoever. But without making this distinction, some, like the Uttarāpathakas, hold the view that form is a cause without differentiation, simply based on the statement, 'The four great elements are causes.' Concerning them, the question is posed by the proponent, and the admission is made by the other. He asks, 'Is your form a cause designated as non-greed?' The other rejects it. The same method applies to the remaining cases. That the great elements are a cause for derived form by way of support is stated here in the sense of a condition, not in the sense of a root; therefore, it is not probative.

Rūpaṃ hetūtikathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse: 'Is Form a Cause?'

757-759. Sahetukakathāyampi imināva nayena attho veditabboti.

757-759. In the discourse on being with a cause, too, the meaning should be understood in this same way.

Rūpaṃ sahetukantikathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse: 'Is Form With a Cause?'

7. Rūpaṃ kusalākusalantikathāvaṇṇanā

7. Commentary on the Discourse: 'Is Form Wholesome or Unwholesome?'

760-764. Idāni rūpaṃ kusalākusalantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘kāyakammaṃ vacīkammaṃ kusalampi akusalampī’’tivacanaṃ nissāya kāyavacīkammasaṅkhātaṃ kāyaviññattivacīviññattirūpaṃ kusalampi akusalampīti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahisāsakānañceva sammitiyānañca; te sandhāya rūpaṃ kusalanti pucchā sakavādissa paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi te rūpaṃ kusalaṃ, evaṃvidhena anena bhavitabba’’nti codetuṃ sārammaṇanti ādimāha. Parato akusalapañhepi eseva nayo. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

760-764. Now there is the discourse called 'Is Form Wholesome or Unwholesome?' Here, relying on the statement, 'Bodily action and verbal action are both wholesome and unwholesome,' is the doctrine of those who hold that form designated as bodily and verbal action—namely, the form of bodily intimation and verbal intimation—is both wholesome and unwholesome, such as the Mahīsāsakas and the Sammatiyas. Concerning them, the question 'Is form wholesome?' is posed by the proponent, and the admission is made by the other. Then, to challenge him, he begins by saying, 'with an object,' in order to censure him thus: 'If form is wholesome for you, it must be of this nature.' The same method applies to the subsequent question on the unwholesome. The rest here is of plain meaning.

Rūpaṃ kusalākusalantikathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse: 'Is Form Wholesome or Unwholesome?'

8. Rūpaṃ vipākotikathāvaṇṇanā

8. Commentary on the Discourse: 'Is Form a Result?'

765-767. Idāni rūpaṃ vipākotikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yaṃ kammassa katattā uppannā cittacetasikā viya kammassa katattā uppannaṃ taṃ rūpampi vipākoti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānañceva sammitiyānañca; te [Pg.253] sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi te rūpaṃ vipāko, evaṃvidhena anena bhavitabba’’nti codetuṃ sukhavedanīyantiādimāha. Sesaṃ yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti.

765-767. Now there is the discourse called 'Is Form a Result?' Herein, there is the doctrine of those—such as the Andhakas and the Sammatiyas—that just as mind and mental factors that have arisen because kamma has been done are results, so too form that has arisen because kamma has been done is also a result. Concerning them, the question is posed by the proponent, and the admission is made by the other. Then, to challenge him, he begins by saying, 'accompanied by pleasant feeling,' in order to censure him thus: 'If form is a result for you, it must be of this nature.' The rest is to be construed as in the Pāli text.

Rūpaṃ vipākotikathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse: 'Is Form a Result?'

9. Rūpaṃ rūpāvacarārūpāvacarantikathāvaṇṇanā

9. Commentary on the Discourse: 'Does Form Pertain to the Form Realm or the Formless Realm?'

768-770. Idāni rūpaṃ rūpāvacarārūpāvacarantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yaṃ kāmāvacarakammassa katattā rūpaṃ, taṃ yasmā kāmāvacaraṃ, tasmā rūpāvacarārūpāvacarakammānampi katattā rūpena rūpāvacarārūpāvacarena bhavitabbanti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya atthi rūpaṃ rūpāvacarārūpāvacaranti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha heṭṭhā vuttanayamevāti.

768-770. Now there is the discussion entitled 'Form is of the Form-Sphere or Formless-Sphere.' Herein, some—such as the Andhakas—hold the view that since form which is due to the performance of kamma pertaining to the sense-sphere is of the sense-sphere, therefore, due to the performance of kamma pertaining to the form-sphere and the formless-sphere, form must also be of the form-sphere and the formless-sphere. With reference to them, the question, 'Is form of the form-sphere and formless-sphere?' is the proponent's; the admission is the other's. The remainder here is just according to the method stated above.

Rūpaṃ rūpāvacarārūpāvacarantikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion 'Form is of the Form-Sphere or Formless-Sphere'.

10. Rūpārūpadhātupariyāpannakathāvaṇṇanā

10. The Commentary on the Discussion of What is Included in the Form and Formless Realms.

771-775. Idāni rūparāgo rūpadhātupariyāpanno arūparāgo arūpadhātupariyāpannoti kathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā kāmarāgo kāmadhātupariyāpanno, tasmā rūparāgārūparāgehipi rūpadhātuarūpadhātupariyāpannehi bhavitabbanti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Kevalañhi tattha ‘‘rūpadhātuṃ anuseti, arūpadhātuṃ anusetī’’ti padaṃ viseso. Sā ca laddhi andhakānañceva sammitiyānañca. Ayaṃ andhakānaṃyevāti.

771-775. Now there is the discussion entitled 'Lust for Form is Included in the Form Realm; Lust for the Formless is Included in the Formless Realm.' Herein, with reference to those who hold the view—such as the Andhakas—that since sensual lust is included in the sense-sphere realm, lust for form and lust for the formless must also be included in the form realm and the formless realm, the question is the proponent's; the admission is the other's. The remainder should be understood in the manner stated above. The only difference here is the phrase, 'it lies latent in the form realm, it lies latent in the formless realm.' And this view is held by both the Andhakas and the Sammitiyas. This one, however, is only of the Andhakas.

Rūparāgo rūpadhātupariyāpanno arūparāgo arūpadhātupariyāpannotikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion 'Lust for Form is Included in the Form Realm; Lust for the Formless is Included in the Formless Realm'.

Rūpārūpadhātupariyāpannakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of What is Included in the Form and Formless Realms.

Soḷasamo vaggo.

The Sixteenth Chapter.

17. Sattarasamavaggo

17. The Seventeenth Chapter.

1. Atthi arahato puññūpacayakathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Commentary on the Discussion 'There is Accumulation of Merit for an Arahant'.

776-779. Idāni [Pg.254] atthi arahato puññūpacayotikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ arahato dānasaṃvibhāgacetiyavandanādīni kammāni disvā atthi arahato puññūpacayoti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘arahā nāma pahīnapuññapāpo, so yadi puññaṃ kareyya, pāpampi kareyyā’’ti codetuṃ apuññūpacayoti āha. Itaro pāṇātipātādikiriyaṃ apassanto paṭikkhipati. Puññābhisaṅkhārantiādīsu bhavagāmikammaṃ arahato natthīti paṭikkhipati. Dānaṃ dadeyyātiādīsu kiriyacittena dānādipavattisabbhāvato sakavādī paṭijānāti. Itaro cittaṃ anādiyitvā kiriyāpavattimattadassaneneva laddhiṃ patiṭṭhapeti. Sā pana ayoniso patiṭṭhāpitattā appatiṭṭhāpitā hotīti.

776-779. Now there is the discussion entitled, 'There is Accumulation of Merit for an Arahant.' Herein, with reference to those—such as the Andhakas—who, upon seeing an Arahant's actions such as giving, sharing, and venerating shrines, hold the view that 'there is accumulation of merit for an Arahant,' the question is the proponent's; the admission is the other's. Then, in order to challenge him with the argument, 'An Arahant has abandoned both merit and demerit; if he were to accumulate merit, he would also accumulate demerit,' the proponent asks about the accumulation of demerit. The other, not seeing any action such as the taking of life, rejects this. In the section on 'meritorious formations,' etc., the proponent rejects that an Arahant has kamma that leads to becoming. In the section on 'he may give a gift,' etc., the proponent admits this, because the occurrence of giving and so on is with a functional consciousness. The other, not taking consciousness into account, establishes his view merely by seeing the occurrence of the action. But that view, being established without proper attention, is not truly established.

Atthi arahato puññūpacayotikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion 'There is Accumulation of Merit for an Arahant'.

2. Natthi arahato akālamaccūtikathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Commentary on the Discussion 'There is No Untimely Death for an Arahant'.

780. Idāni natthi arahato akālamaccūtikathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘nāhaṃ, bhikkhave, sañcetanikānaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ upacitānaṃ apaṭisaṃveditvā byantībhāvaṃ vadāmī’’ti (a. ni. 10.217) suttassa atthaṃ ayoniso gahetvā ‘‘arahatā nāma sabbakammavipākaṃ paṭisaṃvedayitvāva parinibbāyitabbaṃ, tasmā natthi, arahato akālamaccū’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi rājagirikānañceva siddhatthikānañca; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘sace tassa natthi akālamaccu, arahantaghātakena nāma na bhavitabba’’nti codetuṃ natthi arahantaghātakoti āha. Itaro ānantariyakammassa ceva tādisānañca puggalānaṃ sabbhāvato paṭikkhipati.

780. Now there is the discussion entitled 'There is no untimely death for an Arahant.' Herein, with reference to those—such as the Rājagirikas and the Siddhatthikas—who, having inappropriately grasped the meaning of the sutta, 'Monks, I do not declare the termination of intentional actions that have been done and accumulated without their result having been experienced' (AN 10.217), hold the view that 'an Arahant must indeed experience the result of all kamma before attaining final Nibbāna; therefore, there is no untimely death for an Arahant,' the question is the proponent's; the admission is the other's. Then, in order to challenge him with the argument, 'If there is no untimely death for an Arahant, then there can be no such thing as a slayer of an Arahant,' the proponent states, 'There is no slayer of an Arahant.' The other rejects this on account of the existence of immediately resultant kamma and of such individuals.

781. Visaṃ na kameyyāti pañhe ‘‘yāva pubbe katakammaṃ parikkhayaṃ na gacchati, tāva na kamatī’’ti laddhiyā paṭikkhipati. Sesamettha yathāpāḷimeva niyyāti.

781. Regarding the question, 'Would poison not take effect?', he rejects this with the view that 'so long as previously performed kamma is not exhausted, it does not take effect.' The remainder here is to be inferred exactly as in the Pāḷi text.

782. Nāhaṃ, [Pg.255] bhikkhaveti suttaṃ idaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ – sañcetanikānaṃ kammānaṃ katānaṃ vipākaṃ apaṭisaṃveditvā avinditvā ananubhavitvā byantībhāvaṃ tesaṃ kammānaṃ parivaṭumaparicchinnabhāvaṃ na vadāmi, tañca kho diṭṭhadhammavedanīyānaṃ diṭṭheva dhamme, na tato paraṃ, upapajjavedanīyānaṃ anantaraṃ upapattiṃ upapajjitvāva na tato paraṃ, aparāpariyavedanīyānaṃ yadā vipākokāsaṃ labhanti, tathārūpe aparāpare vā pariyāye. Evaṃ sabbathāpi saṃsārapavatte sati laddhavipākavāre kamme na vijjateso jagatippadeso, yatthaṭṭhito mucceyya pāpakammāti. Evaṃ sante yadetaṃ ‘‘aladdhavipākavārampi kammaṃ avassaṃ arahato paṭisaṃveditabba’’nti kappanāvasena ‘‘natthi arahato akālamaccū’’ti laddhipatiṭṭhāpanaṃ kataṃ, taṃ dukkaṭamevāti.

782. The sutta beginning 'Monks, I...' was spoken with reference to this: I do not declare the termination of intentional actions that have been done and accumulated without their result having been experienced, found, and undergone. And indeed, for those actions whose results are to be experienced in this very life, they are experienced in this very life, not beyond; for those whose results are to be experienced in the next rebirth, they are experienced immediately upon rebirth, not beyond; and for those whose results are to be experienced in subsequent existences, they are experienced whenever they find an opportunity for fruition, in this or that subsequent occasion. Thus, as long as the cycle of existence continues, for kamma that has received its opportunity for fruition, there is no place in this world where one can stand and be freed from evil kamma. This being so, the establishment of the doctrine that 'there is no untimely death for an Arahant' by way of the supposition that 'even kamma whose opportunity for fruition has not yet been received must inevitably be experienced by an Arahant' is indeed wrongly done.

Natthi arahato akālamaccūtikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion 'There is No Untimely Death for an Arahant'.

3. Sabbamidaṃ kammatotikathāvaṇṇanā

3. The Commentary on the Discussion 'All This is from Kamma'.

783. Idāni sabbamidaṃ kammatotikathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘kammunā vattati loko’’ti suttaṃ nissāya ‘‘sabbamidaṃ kammakilesavipākavaṭṭaṃ kammatova hotī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi rājagirikānañceva siddhatthikānañca; te sandhāya sabbamidanti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘evaṃ sante kammampi kammato āpajjatī’’ti codetuṃ kammampi kammatoti āha. Itaro yadi kammampi kammatova nāma taṃ kammaṃ vipākoyeva siyāti paṭikkhipati. Pubbekatahetūti ‘‘yadi sabbamidaṃ kammato, pubbekatahetunā tena bhavitabba’’nti codetuṃ pucchati, itaro pubbekatahetuvādabhayena paṭikkhipati.

783. Now, this is called the discussion 'All This Is from Kamma.' Here, based on the sutta 'The world proceeds by kamma,' for those whose doctrine is 'all this cycle of kamma, defilements, and results arises from kamma alone,' such as the Rājagirikas and the Siddhatthikas; referring to them, the question 'Is all this from kamma?' is posed by the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the other affirms it. Then, to challenge him with 'If that is so, then kamma itself would arise from kamma,' he asks, 'Is kamma also from kamma?' The other rejects this, saying, 'If kamma itself is indeed from kamma, then that kamma would merely be a result.' The question 'Is it due to a past-made cause?' is asked to challenge him with 'If all this is from kamma, then it must be due to a past-made cause.' The other, fearing the doctrine of a past-made cause, rejects it.

784. Kammavipākatoti ‘‘yadi sabbamidaṃ kammato, yaṃ atītabhave pavattassa hetubhūtaṃ kammaṃ, tampi purimatare bhave kammatoti kammavipāko sampajjati, tena te sabbamidaṃ kammavipākato āpajjatī’’ti codetuṃ pucchati. Itaro bījato aṃkurasseva paccuppannapavattassa kammato nibbattiṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Dutiyaṃ puṭṭho tassāpi kammassa bījassa purimabījato viya [Pg.256] purimakammato pavattattā paṭijānāti. Pāṇaṃ haneyyātiādi ‘‘yadi sabbaṃ kammavipākato, pāṇātipātādīni kammavipākeneva kareyyā’’ti codetuṃ vuttaṃ. Itaro dussīlyacetanāpi purimakammanibbattā ekena pariyāyena vipākoyevāti laddhiyā paṭijānāti. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi te pāṇātipāto kammavipākato nibbattati, pāṇātipāto viya vipākopi saphalo āpajjatī’’ti codetuṃ saphaloti āha. Itaro pāṇātipātassa nirayasaṃvattanikādibhāvato saphalataṃ passanto paṭijānāti. Kammavipākassa pana idaṃ nāma phalanti vuttaṭṭhānaṃ apassanto paṭikkhipati. Adinnādānādīsupi eseva nayo. Gilānapaccayabhesajjaparikkhāro saphaloti deyyadhammavasena dānaphalaṃ pucchati. Kammunā vattatīti suttaṃ ‘‘natthi kamma’’nti akammavāditaṃ paṭikkhipitvā ‘‘atthi kamma’’nti kammavāditaṃ kammassakataṃ dīpeti. Na sabbasseva kammato nibbattiṃ, tasmā asādhakanti.

784. ‘Is it from the result of kamma?’ The question is posed to challenge them: ‘If all this is from kamma, then the kamma that was the cause in a past existence must also be from kamma in a still earlier existence; thus, the result of kamma comes about, and thereby all this would arise for you from the result of kamma.’ The other rejects this, referring to the arising of presently occurring kamma from previous kamma, like a sprout from a seed. When asked a second time, they admit it, since that kamma-seed arises from a previous kamma, just as a seed arises from a previous seed. ‘Would one kill living beings, etc.?’ This is said to challenge them: ‘If everything is from the result of kamma, then killing living beings and so on would be done solely by the result of kamma.’ The other admits this, holding the view that even immoral volition, being produced by past kamma, is in a way a result. Then, to challenge them with ‘If killing living beings arises for you from the result of kamma, then, like killing living beings, the result would also be fruitful,’ he asks, ‘Is it fruitful?’ The other, seeing that killing living beings is fruitful in that it leads to hell and so on, admits it. But regarding the result of kamma, not seeing any instance where it is said, ‘This is the fruit,’ they reject it. The same method applies to stealing and so on. ‘Are the requisites of medicine for the sick fruitful?’ This asks about the fruit of giving in terms of things that can be given. The sutta ‘The world proceeds by kamma’ rejects the doctrine of no-kamma—the view that ‘there is no kamma’—and, affirming the doctrine of kamma—the view that ‘there is kamma’—it illustrates ownership of kamma. It does not show the arising of everything from kamma; hence, it is not a valid proof.

Sabbamidaṃ kammatotikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion 'All This Is from Kamma'.

4. Indriyabaddhakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Commentary on the Discourse on What Is Bound to the Faculties.

786-787. Idāni indriyabaddhakathā nāma hoti. Tattha duvidhaṃ dukkhaṃ – indriyabaddhaṃ, anindriyabaddhañca. Indriyabaddhaṃ dukkhavatthutāya dukkhaṃ, anindriyabaddhaṃ udayabbayapaṭipīḷanaṭṭhena ‘‘yadaniccaṃ taṃ dukkha’’nti saṅgahitattā dukkhaṃ. Imaṃ vibhāgaṃ aggahetvā ‘‘yassa pariññāya bhagavati brahmacariyaṃ vussati, taṃ indriyabaddhameva dukkhaṃ, na itara’’nti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi hetuvādānaṃ, tesaṃ itarassāpi dukkhabhāvaṃ dassetuṃ indriyabaddhaññevāti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yasmā bhagavatā ‘yadaniccaṃ taṃ dukkha’nti vuttaṃ, tasmā indriyabaddheneva tena aniccena bhavitabba’’nti codetuṃ indriyabaddhaññeva aniccantiādimāha. Nanu anindriyabaddhaṃ aniccanti nanu pathavīpabbatapāsāṇādi anindriyabaddhampi aniccanti attho.

786-787. Now, this is called the discourse on what is bound to the faculties. Herein, suffering is of two kinds: suffering bound to the faculties and suffering not bound to the faculties. Suffering bound to the faculties is suffering by way of being a basis for suffering, while suffering not bound to the faculties is suffering because it is included under the statement, 'Whatever is impermanent is suffering,' by way of oppression through rise and fall. Without grasping this distinction, some hold the view that 'Only suffering bound to the faculties is the suffering for the full understanding of which the holy life is lived under the Blessed One, not the other kind'—such as the proponents of Hetuvāda. To show them that the other kind is also suffering, the question 'Is it only suffering bound to the faculties?' is posed by the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the other affirms it. Then, to challenge him with 'Since the Blessed One said, "Whatever is impermanent is suffering," therefore that which is impermanent must be only that which is bound to the faculties,' he asks, 'Is only that which is bound to the faculties impermanent?' and so on. The meaning of 'Is not that which is not bound to the faculties impermanent?' is 'Are not things not bound to the faculties, such as the earth, mountains, and rocks, also impermanent?'

788. Na vattabbaṃ indriyabaddhaññeva dukkhanti pañhe āmantāti paṭiññā sakavādissa. Anindriyabaddhañhi dukkhadomanassānaṃ ārammaṇaṃ hoti. Uṇhakālasmiñhi aggi sītakāle ca vāto dukkhassa ārammaṇaṃ, niccampi [Pg.257] bhogavināsādayo domanassassa. Tasmā vināpi aniccaṭṭhena anindriyabaddhaṃ dukkhanti vattabbaṃ. Kammakilesehi pana anibbattattā dukkhaṃ ariyasaccanti na vattabbaṃ, tathā maggena apariññeyyattā. Yasmā pana tiṇakaṭṭhādinirodho vā utubījādinirodho vā dukkhanirodhaṃ ariyasaccaṃ nāma na hoti, tasmā indriyabaddhaṃ dukkhañceva ariyasaccañca, itaraṃ pana dukkhamevāti idaṃ nānattaṃ dassetuṃ paṭijānāti. Yathā indriyabaddhassātiādivacanaṃ indriyabaddhassa pariññāya brahmacariyavāsaṃ pariññātassa puna anuppattiṃ dīpeti. Tenevettha sakavādinā paṭikkhepo kato. ‘‘Yadaniccaṃ taṃ dukkha’’nti vacanena pana saṅgahitassa anindriyabaddhassa dukkhabhāvaṃ paṭisedhetuṃ na sakkāti, tasmā asādhakanti.

788. In response to the question 'It should not be said that only what is bound to the faculties is suffering,' the proponent of one's own doctrine affirms it. For what is not bound to the faculties is indeed a basis for suffering and distress. Indeed, in the hot season, fire, and in the cold season, wind, become a basis for suffering. Likewise, the destruction of wealth and so on are always a basis for distress. Therefore, even without the aspect of impermanence, what is not bound to the faculties should be called suffering. However, because it is not produced by kamma and defilements, it should not be called the Noble Truth of suffering, and similarly, because it is not to be fully understood by the path. But since the cessation of grass and sticks or the cessation of seasons and seeds is not called the Noble Truth of the Cessation of Suffering, therefore, to show this difference, he admits that what is bound to the faculties is both suffering and a Noble Truth, while the other is merely suffering. The statement beginning 'As for what is bound to the faculties...' shows that the holy life is lived for the full understanding of what is bound to the faculties, and that for one who has fully understood it, there is no further arising. For this reason, the rejection is made here by the proponent of one's own doctrine. But it is impossible to deny the suffering nature of what is not bound to the faculties, as it is included by the statement, 'Whatever is impermanent is suffering.' Therefore, this is not a valid proof.

Indriyabaddhakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discourse on What Is Bound to the Faculties.

5. Ṭhapetvā ariyamaggantikathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Commentary on the Discussion 'Except for the Noble Path'.

789-790. Idāni ṭhapetvā ariyamaggantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘yasmā ariyamaggo ‘dukkhanirodhagāminipaṭipadā’ti vutto, tasmā ṭhapetvā ariyamaggaṃ avasesā saṅkhārā dukkhā’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi hetuvādānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi evaṃ samudayassāpi dukkhabhāvo āpajjatī’’ti codetuṃ dukkhasamudayopīti āha. Itaro hetulakkhaṇaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Puna puṭṭho pavattapariyāpannabhāvaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Tīṇevāti pañhesu suttavirodhabhayena paṭikkhipati, laddhivasena paṭijānāti. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

789-790. Now, there is a discussion called 'Excluding the Noble Path'. Here, regarding those who hold the view—such as the Hetuvādins—that 'since the Noble Path is called "the path leading to the cessation of suffering," therefore, excluding the Noble Path, all remaining conditioned things are suffering'—with reference to them, the question is posed by the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the admission is by the other. Then, in order to challenge him with 'if that is so, then the origin of suffering would also be suffering,' he says, 'also the origin of suffering.' The other rejects this by referring to the characteristic of a cause. When questioned again, he affirms by referring to the state of being included in the ongoing process. In the questions about 'only three,' he rejects this due to fear of contradicting the Suttas, but affirms it based on his own view. The rest here is clear in meaning.

Ṭhapetvā ariyamaggantikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion 'Excluding the Noble Path'.

6. Na vattabbaṃ saṅgho dakkhiṇaṃ paṭiggaṇhātītikathāvaṇṇanā

6. The Commentary on the Discussion 'It Should Not Be Said That the Saṅgha Receives an Offering'.

791-792. Idāni na vattabbaṃ saṅgho dakkhiṇaṃ paṭiggaṇhātītikathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘paramatthato maggaphalāneva saṅgho, maggaphalehi añño [Pg.258] saṅgho nāma natthi, maggaphalāni ca na kiñci paṭiggaṇhanti, tasmā na vattabbaṃ saṅgho dakkhiṇaṃ paṭiggaṇhātī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi mahāpuññavādīsaṅkhātānaṃ vetullakānaṃ; te sandhāya na vattabbanti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi saṅgho na paṭiggaṇheyya, na naṃ satthā āhuneyyātiādīhi thomeyyā’’ti codetuṃ nanu saṅgho āhuneyyotiādimāha. Saṅghassa dānaṃ dentīti ‘‘ye te saṅghassa denti, te paṭiggāhakesu asati kassa dadeyyu’’nti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Āhutiṃ jātavedo vāti suttaṃ parasamayato āgataṃ. Tattha mahāmeghanti meghavuṭṭhiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Vuṭṭhiñhi medanī paṭiggaṇhāti, na meghameva. Maggo paṭiggaṇhātīti ‘‘maggaphalāni saṅgho’’ti laddhiyā vadati, na ca maggaphalāneva saṅgho. Maggaphalapātubhāvaparisuddhe pana khandhe upādāya paññattā aṭṭha puggalā saṅgho, tasmā asādhakametanti.

791-792. Now, there is a discussion called 'It Should Not Be Said That the Saṅgha Receives an Offering'. Here, regarding those who hold the view—such as the present-day Vetullakas, known as the Mahāpuññavādins—that 'in the ultimate sense, the Saṅgha is only the path and fruits, and there is no Saṅgha apart from the path and fruits, and the path and fruits do not receive anything, therefore it should not be said that the Saṅgha receives an offering'—with reference to them, the question 'it should not be said' is posed by the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the admission is by the other. Then, in order to challenge him with 'if the Saṅgha did not receive, the Teacher would not praise them with such terms as “worthy of offerings,”' he says, 'Is not the Saṅgha worthy of offerings, etc.?' The statement 'They give a gift to the Saṅgha' is said with the intention to challenge: 'If there were no recipients, to whom would those who give to the Saṅgha give?' The sutta 'The fire god accepts the oblation' comes from another school. There, 'great cloud' is said with reference to rainfall. For the earth receives the rain, not the cloud itself. The statement 'The path receives' is spoken according to the view that 'the Saṅgha is the path and fruits,' but the Saṅgha is not merely the path and fruits. Rather, the Saṅgha is the eight individuals designated in dependence on the aggregates purified by the manifestation of the path and fruits. Therefore, this is not a valid proof.

Na vattabbaṃ saṅgho dakkhiṇaṃ paṭiggaṇhātītikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion 'It Should Not Be Said That the Saṅgha Receives an Offering'.

7. Na vattabbaṃ saṅgho dakkhiṇaṃ visodhetītikathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Commentary on the Discussion 'It Should Not Be Said That the Saṅgha Purifies an Offering'.

793-794. Idāni na vattabbaṃ saṅgho dakkhiṇaṃ visodhetītikathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘maggaphalāneva saṅgho nāma, na ca tāni dakkhiṇaṃ visodhetuṃ sakkonti, tasmā na vattabbaṃ saṅgho dakkhiṇaṃ visodhetī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi tesaññeva; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Āhuneyyotiādi ‘‘yadi saṅgho dakkhiṇaṃ visodhetuṃ na sakkuṇeyya, na naṃ satthā evaṃ thomeyyā’’ti dassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Visodhetīti mahapphalaṃ karoti. Saṅghasmiñhi appaṃ dinnaṃ bahu hoti, bahu dinnaṃ bahutaraṃ. Dakkhiṇeyyāti dakkhiṇārahā dakkhiṇāya anucchavikā, dakkhiṇaṃ visodhetuṃ samatthāti attho. Dakkhiṇaṃ ārādhentīti sampādenti, appamattikāyapi dakkhiṇāya mahantaṃ phalaṃ pāpuṇantīti attho. Sesaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayamevāti.

793-794. Now, there is a discussion called 'It Should Not Be Said That the Saṅgha Purifies an Offering'. Here, regarding those who hold the view—such as those very same ones—that 'the Saṅgha is only the path and fruits, and these cannot purify an offering, therefore it should not be said that the Saṅgha purifies an offering'—with reference to them, the question is posed by the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the admission is by the other. The phrase beginning 'Worthy of offerings' is said to show: 'If the Saṅgha were incapable of purifying an offering, the Teacher would not praise them thus.' 'Purifies' means 'makes it of great fruit.' For a little given to the Saṅgha becomes much, and much given becomes even more. 'Worthy of offerings' means worthy of an offering, suitable for an offering, capable of purifying an offering. 'They fulfill an offering' means they accomplish it; the meaning is that they attain a great fruit even from a small offering. The rest is as explained above.

Na vattabbaṃ saṅgho dakkhiṇaṃ visodhetītikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion 'It Should Not Be Said That the Saṅgha Purifies an Offering'.

8. Na vattabbaṃ saṅgho bhuñjatītikathāvaṇṇanā

8. The Commentary on the Discussion 'It Should Not Be Said That the Saṅgha Eats'.

795-796. Idāni [Pg.259] na vattabbaṃ saṅgho bhuñjatītikathā nāma hoti. Tatrāpi ‘‘maggaphalāneva saṅgho nāma, na ca tāni kiñci bhuñjanti, tasmā na vattabbaṃ saṅgho bhuñjati, pivati, khādati, sāyatī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi tesaṃyeva; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi saṅgho na bhuñjeyya, saṅghabhattādikaraṇaṃ niratthakaṃ bhaveyyā’’ti codetuṃ nanu atthi keci saṅghabhattāni karontītiādimāha. Gaṇabhojanantiādi ‘‘yadi saṅgho na bhuñjeyya, kassa gaṇabhojanādīni siyu’’nti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Aṭṭha pānānīti idampi ‘‘yadi saṅgho na piveyya, kassetāni pānāni satthā anujāneyyā’’ti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Sesamidhāpi heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbanti.

795-796. Now, there is a discussion called 'It Should Not Be Said That the Saṅgha Eats.' Here too, regarding those whose doctrine is that 'the Saṅgha is only the paths and fruits, and these do not consume anything; therefore, it should not be said that the Saṅgha eats, drinks, chews, or tastes'—just as for those very ones; with reference to them, the question is posed by the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the admission is by the other. Then, in order to challenge them with 'if the Saṅgha does not eat, the preparation of meals for the Saṅgha would be meaningless,' he states, beginning with: 'Surely, there are some who prepare meals for the Saṅgha?' The phrase beginning 'a meal for a group' is stated for the purpose of challenging: 'If the Saṅgha does not eat, for whom would there be group meals and the like?' This, too, 'the eight drinks,' is stated for the purpose of challenging: 'If the Saṅgha does not drink, for whom would the Teacher have allowed these drinks?' The rest here, too, should be understood in the same way as stated above.

Na vattabbaṃ saṅgho bhuñjatītikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion 'It Should Not Be Said That the Saṅgha Eats'.

9. Na vattabbaṃ saṅghassa dinnaṃ mahapphalantikathāvaṇṇanā

9. The Commentary on the Discussion 'It Should Not Be Said That What Is Given to the Saṅgha Is of Great Fruit'.

797-798. Idāni na vattabbaṃ saṅghassa dinnaṃ mahapphalantikathā nāma hoti. Tatrāpi ‘‘maggaphalāneva saṅgho nāma, na ca sakkā tesaṃ kiñci dātuṃ, na ca tehi paṭiggaṇhituṃ, nāpi tesaṃ dānena koci upakāro ijjhati, tasmā na vattabbaṃ saṅghassa dinnaṃ mahapphala’’nti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi tesaṃyeva; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Āhuneyyotiādi ‘‘yadi saṅghassa dinnaṃ mahapphalaṃ na bhaveyya, na naṃ satthā evaṃ thomeyyā’’ti dassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Sesaṃ yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti.

797-798. Now, there is a discussion called 'It Should Not Be Said That What Is Given to the Saṅgha Is of Great Fruit.' Here too, regarding those whose doctrine is that 'the Saṅgha is only the paths and fruits, and it is not possible to give anything to them, nor for them to receive it, nor is any benefit accomplished by giving to them; therefore, it should not be said that what is given to the Saṅgha is of great fruit'—just as for those very ones; with reference to them, the question is posed by the proponent of one's own doctrine, and the admission is by the other. The phrase beginning 'worthy of offerings' is stated to show: 'If what is given to the Saṅgha were not of great fruit, the Teacher would not praise them thus.' The rest proceeds just as in the Pāḷi.

Na vattabbaṃ saṅghassa dinnaṃ mahapphalantikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion 'It Should Not Be Said That What Is Given to the Saṅgha Is of Great Fruit'.

10. Na vattabbaṃ buddhassa dinnaṃ mahapphalantikathāvaṇṇanā

10. The Commentary on the Discussion 'It Should Not Be Said That What Is Given to the Buddha Is of Great Fruit'.

799. Idāni na vattabbaṃ buddhassa dinnaṃ mahapphalantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘buddho bhagavā na kiñci paribhuñjati, lokānuvattanatthaṃ pana paribhuñjamānaṃ viya attānaṃ dasseti, tasmā nirupakārattā na vattabbaṃ tasmiṃ dinnaṃ mahapphala’’nti yesaṃ [Pg.260] laddhi, seyyathāpi tesaṃyeva; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Dvipadānaṃ aggotiādi ‘‘manussadussīlepi dānaṃ sahassaguṇaṃ hoti, kimaṅgaṃ pana evarūpe aggapuggale’’ti dassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Sesamettha yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti.

799. Now, there is a discussion called 'It should not be said that what is given to the Buddha is of great fruit.' Herein, concerning those whose doctrine is that 'the Blessed One, the Buddha, does not consume anything, but for the sake of conforming to the world, he displays himself as if consuming; therefore, since it is of no service to him, it should not be said that what is given to him is of great fruit'—as is the case with them; with reference to them, the question is for the proponent of his own view, the assertion for the other. The phrase beginning 'foremost of bipeds' is stated to show: 'Even a gift given to an immoral human is a thousandfold in fruit; how much more so when given to such a supreme individual?' The rest here is to be understood just as in the Pāḷi text.

Na vattabbaṃ buddhassa dinnaṃ mahapphalantikathāvaṇṇanā.

The commentary on the discussion that 'It should not be said that what is given to the Buddha is of great fruit.'

11. Dakkhiṇāvisuddhikathāvaṇṇanā

11. The Commentary on the Discussion on the Purification of Offerings.

800-801. Idāni dakkhiṇāvisuddhikathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘yadi paṭiggāhakato dakkhiṇā visujjheyya, mahapphalā bhaveyya. Dāyakena dānaṃ dinnaṃ, paṭiggāhakena vipāko nibbattitoti añño aññassa kārako bhaveyya, paraṃkataṃ sukhadukkhaṃ āpajjeyya, añño kareyya, añño paṭisaṃvedeyya. Tasmā dāyakatova dānaṃ visujjhati, no paṭiggāhakato, dāyakasseva cittavisuddhi vipākadāyikā hotī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Āhuneyyātiādi ‘‘yadi paṭiggāhakato dānaṃ na visujjheyya, kimassa āhuneyyādibhāvo kareyyā’’ti dassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Añño aññassa kārakoti yadi dāyakassa dānacetanā paṭiggāhakena katā bhaveyya, yuttarūpaṃ siyā. Tassa pana dānacetanā parisuddhā paṭiggāhakasaṅkhātaṃ vatthuṃ paṭicca mahāvipākaṭṭhena visujjhati, tasmā acodanā esā ‘‘paṭiggāhakato dānaṃ visujjhatī’’ti.

Now comes the discussion on the purification of offerings. Herein, concerning those whose doctrine is that 'if an offering were purified by the recipient, it would be of great fruit. The donor gives the gift, and the recipient generates the result—thus one would be the doer for another, happiness and suffering caused by another would be incurred, one would act, and another would experience. Therefore, a gift is purified by the donor, not by the recipient; it is the purity of the donor’s mind that yields the result'—as is the case with the Uttarāpathakas; with reference to them, the question is for the proponent of his own view, the assertion for the other. The phrase beginning 'worthy of offerings' is stated to show: 'If a gift were not purified by the recipient, what purpose would their status as worthy of offerings and so on serve?' The charge 'one is the doer for another' would be appropriate if the donor's intention to give were created by the recipient. However, the donor's pure intention to give, in dependence on the object designated as the recipient, is purified in the sense of yielding a great result. Therefore, this is not a valid objection to the statement, 'An offering is purified by the recipient.'

Dakkhiṇāvisuddhikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on the Purification of Offerings.

Sattarasamo vaggo.

The Seventeenth Chapter.

18. Aṭṭhārasamavaggo

18. The Eighteenth Chapter.

1. Manussalokakathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Commentary on the Discussion on the Human World.

802-803. Idāni manussalokakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘tathāgato loke, jāto loke saṃvaḍḍho, lokaṃ abhibhuyya viharati [Pg.261] anupalitto lokenā’’ti (saṃ. ni. 3.94) suttaṃ ayoniso gahetvā ‘‘bhagavā tusitabhavane nibbatto tattheva vasati, na manussalokaṃ āgacchati, nimmitarūpamattakaṃ panettha dassetī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi etarahi vetullakānaṃyeva, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ puṭṭhokāsena ceva suttasādhanena ca saññāpetuṃ nanu atthītiādimāha. Loke jātoti paravādī tusitapuraṃ sandhāya vadati. Satthārā panetaṃ manussalokaññeva sandhāya lokaṃ vuttaṃ. Lokaṃ abhibhuyyāti paravādī manussalokaṃ abhibhavitvāti diṭṭhiyā vadati, satthā pana ārammaṇalokaṃ abhibhavitvā vihāsi. Anupalitto lokenāti paravādī manussalokena anupalittataṃva sandhāya vadati, satthā pana lokadhammesu kilesehi anupalitto vihāsi. Tasmā asādhakametanti.

Now comes the discussion on the human world. Herein, some, having improperly grasped the sutta that states, 'The Tathāgata is in the world, born in the world, grown up in the world, having overcome the world, he dwells unstained by the world' (Saṃyutta Nikāya 3.94), hold the view that 'the Blessed One was born in the Tusita heaven and dwells there, not coming to the human world, but only displays a mere created form here'—as is the case with the Vetullakas nowadays. With reference to them, the question is for the proponent of his own view, the assertion for the other. Then, to convince him by the opportunity for questioning and by proof from the suttas, he says, beginning with 'Is there not...?' 'Born in the world'—the opponent says this with reference to the Tusita realm. But the Teacher spoke of 'the world' with reference to this very human world. 'Having overcome the world'—the opponent speaks from his view of having conquered the human world, but the Teacher dwelt having overcome the world of sense objects. 'Unstained by the world'—the opponent speaks with reference to being unstained by the human world, but the Teacher dwelt unstained by defilements in regard to worldly conditions. Therefore, this is not proof.

Manussalokakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on the Human World.

2. Dhammadesanākathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Commentary on the Discussion on the Teaching of the Dhamma.

804-806. Idāni dhammadesanākathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘tusitapure ṭhito bhagavā dhammadesanatthāya abhinimmitaṃ pesesi, tena ceva tassa ca desanaṃ sampaṭicchitvā āyasmatā ānandena dhammo desito, na buddhena bhagavatā’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi vetullakānaññeva; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi tena dhammo desito, sveva satthā bhaveyyā’’ti codetuṃ abhinimmito jinotiādimāha. Itaro tathā asampaṭicchanto paṭikkhipati. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

Now comes the discussion on the teaching of the Dhamma. Herein, concerning those whose doctrine is that 'the Blessed One, standing in the Tusita realm, sent forth a created being for the purpose of teaching the Dhamma, and having received the teaching from that created being, the Venerable Ānanda taught the Dhamma, not the Buddha, the Blessed One'—as is the case with the Vetullakas; with reference to them, the question is for the proponent of his own view, the assertion for the other. Then, to challenge him by saying, 'If the Dhamma was taught by that created being, he himself would be the Teacher,' he states the phrase beginning with 'the created conqueror.' The other, not accepting it thus, rejects it. The rest here is of clear meaning.

Dhammadesanākathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on the Teaching of the Dhamma.

3. Karuṇākathāvaṇṇanā

3. The Commentary on the Discussion on Compassion.

807-808. Idāni karuṇākathā nāma hoti. Tattha piyāyitānaṃ vatthūnaṃ vipattiyā sarāgānaṃ rāgavasena karuṇāpatirūpikaṃ pavattiṃ disvā ‘‘rāgova [Pg.262] karuṇā nāma, so ca bhagavato natthi, tasmā natthi buddhassa bhagavato karuṇā’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘karuṇā nāmesā nikkilesatāya ceva sattārammaṇatāya ca cetovimuttitāya ca ekādasānisaṃsatāya ca mettādīhi samānajātikā, tasmā yadi bhagavato karuṇā natthi, mettādayopissa na siyu’’nti codanatthaṃ natthi buddhassa bhagavato mettātiādimāha. Ākāruṇikoti pañhe tathārūpaṃ vohāraṃ apassanto paṭikkhipati. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

Now comes the discussion on compassion. Herein, some, seeing that in those with attachment, a counterfeit of compassion arises through attachment due to the misfortune of beloved objects, hold the doctrine: 'What is called compassion is merely attachment, and the Blessed One is without that; therefore, the Buddha, the Blessed One, has no compassion'—as is the case with the Uttarāpathakas. With reference to them, the question is for the proponent of his own view, the assertion for the other. Then, for the purpose of challenging him, he says, beginning with 'The Buddha, the Blessed One, has no loving-kindness,' arguing: 'This which is called compassion is of the same nature as loving-kindness and so on, due to its being without defilement, having beings as its object, being a liberation of mind, and having eleven benefits. Therefore, if the Blessed One has no compassion, he would also not have loving-kindness and the like.' Regarding the question, 'Is he without compassion?', the opponent, not finding such a designation, rejects it. The rest here is of clear meaning.

Karuṇākathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on Compassion.

4. Gandhajātakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Commentary on the Discussion on Fragrant Substances.

809. Idāni gandhajātakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ buddhe bhagavati ayoniso pemavasena ‘‘bhagavato uccārapassāvo aññe gandhajāte ativiya adhigaṇhāti, natthi tato ca sugandhataraṃ gandhajāta’’nti laddhi, seyyathāpi ekaccānaṃ andhakānañceva uttarāpathakānañca; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti.

809. Now comes the discussion on fragrant substances. Herein, concerning those who, due to unwise affection for the Buddha, the Blessed One, held the doctrine that 'the Blessed One's excrement and urine greatly surpass other fragrant substances; there is no fragrant substance more fragrant than that'—as is the case with some of the Andhakas and the Uttarāpathakas; with reference to them, the question is for the proponent of his own view, the assertion for the other. The rest here is to be understood just as in the Pāḷi text.

Gandhajātakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on Fragrant Substances.

5. Ekamaggakathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Commentary on the Discussion on the Single Path.

810-811. Idāni ekamaggakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ buddhe bhagavati ayoniso pemavaseneva ‘‘bhagavā sotāpanno hutvā sakadāgāmī, sakadāgāmī hutvā anāgāmī, anāgāmī hutvā arahattaṃ sacchākāsi, ekeneva pana ariyamaggena cattāri phalāni sacchākāsī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi tesaññeva; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ catūhi phalehi saddhiṃ uppannānaṃ catunnaṃ phassādīnaṃ ekato [Pg.263] samodhānavasena codetuṃ catunnaṃ phassānantiādimāha. Sotāpattimaggenātiādi ‘‘kataramaggena sacchikarotī’’ti pucchanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Arahattamaggenāti ca vutte tena sakkāyadiṭṭhiādīnaṃ pahānābhāvavasena codeti. Bhagavā sotāpannoti buddhabhūtassa sotāpannabhāvo natthīti paṭikkhipati. Parato pañhadvayepi eseva nayo. Sesamettha yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti.

Now is the discussion on the single path. Here, some, due to unwise affection for the Blessed One, hold the view: 'The Blessed One, having become a stream-enterer, then a once-returner, then a non-returner, and then realized Arahantship, realized the four fruits with a single noble path.' This is the view of those very ones. With reference to them, the question is for the proponent of his own view, and the admission is for the other. Then, to challenge them by way of the simultaneous conjunction of the four contacts and other states that have arisen together with the four fruits, it is said: 'The four contacts,' and so on. 'With the stream-entry path,' and so on, is said for the purpose of asking, 'By which path does he realize it?' And when it is said, 'With the Arahant path,' it challenges them by way of the non-abandonment of personality-view and other defilements. The statement 'The Blessed One is a stream-enterer' is rejected because there is no state of a stream-enterer for one who has become a Buddha. The same method applies to the two subsequent questions as well. The rest here is to be understood exactly as in the Pāli.

Ekamaggakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on the Single Path.

6. Jhānasaṅkantikathāvaṇṇanā

6. Explanation of the Discussion on Jhāna Transition.

813-816. Idāni jhānasaṅkantikathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu vivicceva kāmehi paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharati, vitakkavicārānaṃ vūpasamā dutiyaṃ jhānaṃ, tatiyaṃ jhānaṃ, catutthaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharatī’’ti (saṃ. ni. 5.923-934) imaṃ paṭipāṭidesanaṃ nissāya ‘‘tassa tassa jhānassa upacārappavattiṃ vināva jhānā jhānaṃ saṅkamatī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi mahisāsakānañceva ekaccānañca andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi te dutiyajjhānūpacāraṃ appatvā uppaṭipāṭiyā paṭhamajjhānā dutiyajjhānameva saṅkamati, paṭhamato tatiyaṃ, dutiyato catutthampi saṅkameyyā’’ti codetuṃ paṭhamā jhānātiādimāha. Yā paṭhamassātiādi ‘‘yadi paṭhamato anantaraṃ dutiyaṃ, dutiyādīhi vā tatiyādīni samāpajjati, ekāvajjanena samāpajjeyyā’’ti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Kāme ādīnavatoti paṭhamaṃ kāme ādīnavato manasi karoto pacchā uppajjati. Jhānakkhaṇe panesa nimittameva manasi karoti. Taññeva paṭhamanti ‘‘yadi purimajavanato pacchimajavanaṃ viya anantaraṃ uppajjeyya, ṭhapetvā purimapacchimabhāvaṃ lakkhaṇato taññeva taṃ bhaveyyā’’ti codetuṃ pucchati. Iminā upāyena sabbattha attho veditabbo. Vivicceva kāmehītiādīhi paṭipāṭiyā jhānānaṃ desitabhāvaṃ dīpeti, na anantaruppattiṃ, tasmā asādhakanti.

Now is the discussion called the Discussion on Jhāna Transition. Here, some hold the thesis that 'a meditator transitions from jhāna to jhāna without the occurrence of the access concentration of that jhāna,' based on the sequential exposition: 'Here, monks, a monk, secluded from sensual pleasures, enters and dwells in the first jhāna; with the stilling of applied and sustained thought, he enters and dwells in the second jhāna, the third jhāna, and the fourth jhāna' (Saṃ. Ni. 5.923-934). This is the thesis of the Mahīśāsakas and some of the Andhakas. With reference to them, the question is for the proponent of his own view, and the admission is for the other. Then, to challenge him, he says, 'If, without attaining the access concentration of the second jhāna, you transition from the first jhāna directly to the second jhāna in an irregular sequence, then you should also be able to transition from the first to the third, and from the second to the fourth.' The phrase 'from the first,' etc., is stated for the purpose of challenging the opponent: 'If one attains the second immediately after the first, or the third and so on after the second and so on, then one should attain them with a single act of advertence.' As for 'seeing the danger in sensual pleasures,' it means that first, one attends to the danger in sensual pleasures, and only afterward does the jhāna arise. But at the moment of jhāna, one attends solely to the sign. As for 'just that first one,' he asks to challenge the opponent: 'If it were to arise immediately after the preceding impulsion, like a subsequent impulsion after a preceding one, then, setting aside the prior and subsequent nature, would it not be identical in characteristic?' The meaning should be understood in this way throughout. By 'secluded from sensual pleasures,' etc., it is shown that the jhānas are taught in sequence, not as arising immediately one after another. Therefore, this is not a valid proof.

Jhānasaṅkantikathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discussion on Jhāna Transition.

7. Jhānantarikakathāvaṇṇanā

7. Explanation of the Discussion on the Intermediate Jhāna.

817-818. Idāni [Pg.264] jhānantarikakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ samaye ‘‘pañcakanaye pañca jhānāni vibhattāni, kevalaṃ tayo samādhī uddiṭṭhā’’ti avitakkavicāramattassa samādhino okāsaṃ ajānantānaṃ ‘‘paṭhamassa ca dutiyassa ca jhānassa antare jhānantarikā nāma esā’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi sammitiyānañceva ekaccānañca andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘jhānampi cetasikā dhammā, phassādayopi, tasmā yadi jhānantarikā nāma bhaveyya, phassantarikādīhipi bhavitabba’’nti codanatthaṃ atthi phassantarikātiādimāha.

Now is the discussion called the Discussion on the Intermediate Jhāna. Here, for those in whose system 'in the fivefold method, five jhānas are distinguished, but only three concentrations are designated,' not recognizing the scope of a concentration that is merely without applied thought but with sustained thought, they hold the thesis that 'this is called the intermediate jhāna between the first and second jhāna,' like the Sammitiyas and some of the Andhakas. With reference to them, the question is for the proponent of his own view, and the admission is for the other. Then, to challenge him, he says, 'Jhāna is a mental factor, and so are contact and so on. Therefore, if there were something called an intermediate jhāna, there would also have to be an intermediate contact, etc.' He says 'is there an intermediate contact?' and so on, for the purpose of challenging the opponent.

Dutiyassa ca jhānassāti ‘‘yadi jhānantarikā nāma bhaveyya, dutiyatatiyādīnipi jhānāneva, tesampi antarikāya bhavitabba’’nti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. So kevalaṃ laddhiyā abhāvena paṭikkhipati ceva paṭijānāti ca. Paṭhamassa cāti puṭṭho laddhivasena paṭijānāti.

As for 'and of the second jhāna,' it is stated for the purpose of challenging the opponent: 'If there were something called an intermediate jhāna, then since the second, third, and so on, are also jhānas, they too must have an intermediate state.' He denies this simply because he has no such thesis, while acknowledging his own position. And as for 'of the first,' when asked, he acknowledges it in accordance with his thesis.

819. Savitakko savicārotiādi ‘‘tiṇṇampi samādhīnaṃ samādhibhāve samāne avitakko vicāramattova samādhi jhānantariko, na itaroti ko ettha visesahetū’’ti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ.

819. As for 'with applied thought and sustained thought,' etc., it is stated for the purpose of challenging the opponent: 'Even though the three concentrations are the same in respect of being concentration, the concentration that is merely without applied thought but with sustained thought is an intermediate jhāna, and not the others—what is the reason for this distinction here?'

820-822. Dvinnaṃ jhānānaṃ paṭuppannānanti paṭhamadutiyāni sandhāya pucchati. Itaro ‘‘tesaṃ paccuppannānaṃyeva antare avitakko vicāramatto samādhi jhānantariko nāma hotī’’ti laddhiyā paṭijānāti. Paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ niruddhanti puṭṭho tiṇṇaṃ ekakkhaṇe pavatti na yuttāti paṭijānāti. Avitakko vicāramatto samādhi paṭhamaṃ jhānanti catukkanayavasena pucchati. Sakavādī tasmiṃ naye tassa abhāvā paṭikkhipati. Nanu tayo samādhīti etthāyamadhippāyo – yathā tesu tīsu samādhīsu dve samādhī jhānāneva, na jhānantarikā, evaṃ itarenapi jhāneneva bhavitabbaṃ, na jhānantarikāyāti.

As for 'of the two jhānas that are present,' he asks referring to the first and second. The other acknowledges, according to his thesis, that 'the concentration that is merely without applied thought but with sustained thought, which is between those present jhānas, is called the intermediate jhāna.' When asked 'has the first jhāna ceased?', he acknowledges that it is not proper for three states to occur in a single moment. He asks, according to the fourfold system, 'Is the concentration that is merely without applied thought but with sustained thought the first jhāna?' The proponent of his own view denies this because of its absence in that system. Now, as for 'are there not three concentrations?', the intention here is this: just as among those three concentrations, two concentrations are indeed jhānas, not intermediate jhānas, so also the other should be a jhāna, not an intermediate jhāna.

Jhānantarikakathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discussion on the Intermediate Jhāna.

8. Samāpanno saddaṃ suṇātītikathāvaṇṇanā

8. Explanation of the Discussion on Whether One in Attainment Hears Sound.

823-825. Idāni [Pg.265] samāpanno saddaṃ suṇātītikathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘yasmā paṭhamassa jhānassa saddo kaṇḍako vutto bhagavatā, yadi ca samāpanno taṃ na suṇeyya, kathaṃ kaṇḍako siyā. Tasmā samāpanno saddaṃ, suṇātī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Cakkhunā rūpaṃ passatītiādi ‘‘samāpannassa tāva pañcadvārappavattaṃ natthi, tasmiṃ asati yadi so saddaṃ suṇeyya, rūpampi passeyyā’’ti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Saddo kaṇḍakoti vikkhepakarattā vuttaṃ. Oḷārikena hi saddena sote ghaṭṭite paṭhamajjhānato vuṭṭhānaṃ hoti, tenetaṃ vuttaṃ, tasmā asādhakaṃ. Dutiyassa jhānassātiādi ‘‘yathā aññopi kaṇḍako antosamāpattiyaṃ natthi, evaṃ saddassavanampī’’ti bodhanatthaṃ vuttaṃ, taṃ sabbaṃ uttānatthamevāti.

823-825. Now comes the discussion entitled, 'One in Attainment Hears Sound.' Herein, 'Because sound is called a thorn for the first jhāna by the Blessed One, if one in attainment did not hear it, how could it be a thorn? Therefore, one in attainment hears sound'—this is the view of some, such as the Pubbaseliyas. With reference to them, the question is from the proponent of the orthodox view, and the admission is from the other party. 'One sees form with the eye,' and so forth, is said for the purpose of challenging: 'For one in attainment, there is no activity of the five sense doors. In the absence of that, if one were to hear sound, one would also see form.' 'Sound is a thorn' is said because it is a cause of distraction. For when a gross sound strikes the ear, emergence from the first jhāna occurs—for this reason it is said. Therefore, this is not a valid proof. 'For the second jhāna,' and so forth, is said for the purpose of explaining that 'just as no other thorn exists within the attainment, so too does the hearing of sound not exist.' All this is of clear meaning.

Samāpanno saddaṃ suṇātītikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion: 'One in Attainment Hears Sound'.

9. Cakkhunārūpaṃpassatītikathāvaṇṇanā

9. The Commentary on the Discussion: 'One Sees Form with the Eye'.

826-827. Idāni cakkhunā rūpaṃ passatītikathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘cakkhunā rūpaṃ disvā’’ti vacanaṃ nissāya ‘‘pasādacakkhumeva rūpaṃ passatī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṅghikānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi cakkhunā rūpaṃ passeyya, rūpena rūpaṃ passeyyātī’’ti codetuṃ rūpena rūpaṃ passatīti āha. Itaro rūpāyatanaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipitvā puna puṭṭho cakkhumeva sandhāya paṭijānāti. Paṭivijānātīti ettha ayamadhippāyo – passatīti hi mayaṃ paṭijānanaṃ sandhāya pucchāma, na cakkhūpasaṃhāramattaṃ. Tasmā vadehi tāva ‘‘kiṃ te cakkhumā rūpena rūpaṃ paṭivijānātī’’ti. Itaro purimanayeneva paṭikkhipati ceva paṭijānāti ca. Atha naṃ ‘‘evaṃ sante rūpaṃ manoviññāṇaṃ āpajjati, tañhi paṭivijānāti nāmā’’ti codetuṃ rūpaṃ manoviññāṇanti āha. Itaro lesaṃ alabhanto paṭikkhipateva. Atthi cakkhussa āvaṭṭanātiādi ‘‘yadi cakkhu paṭivijānanaṭṭhena passati, cakkhuviññāṇassa viya tassāpi āvajjanāya [Pg.266] bhavitabba’’nti codetuṃ pucchati. Itaro yasmā na āvajjanapaṭibaddhaṃ cakkhu, na taṃ āvajjanānantaraṃ uppajjati, tasmā na hevanti paṭikkhipati. Sotena saddantiādīsupi eseva nayo. Idha, bhikkhave, bhikkhu cakkhunā rūpaṃ passatīti sasambhārakathānayena vuttaṃ. Yathā hi usunā vijjhantopi ‘‘dhanunā vijjhatī’’ti vuccati, evaṃ cakkhuviññāṇena passantopi ‘‘cakkhunā passatī’’ti vutto, tasmā asādhakametaṃ. Sesesupi eseva nayopi.

826-827. Now comes the discussion entitled, 'One Sees Form with the Eye.' Herein, based on the expression 'having seen form with the eye,' some, such as the Mahāsaṅghikas, hold the view that 'the sensitive eye itself sees form.' With reference to them, the question is from the proponent of the orthodox view, and the admission is from the other party. Then, to challenge them with, 'If one were to see form with the eye, one would see form with form,' he says, 'Does one see form with form?' The other party, referring to the form-base, denies this, but when questioned again, admits it with reference to the eye itself. Herein, the intention of 'perceives' is this: we ask with reference to the admission 'sees,' not merely with reference to the eye. Therefore, you should say, 'Does your eye perceive form with form?' The other party denies and admits in the same way as before. Then, to challenge them with, 'This being so, form would become mind-consciousness, for that is what is called 'perceiving',' he says, 'Is form mind-consciousness?' The other party, finding no way of evasion, simply denies. 'Is there adverting of the eye?' and so forth, is asked to challenge: 'If the eye sees in the sense of perceiving, then like eye-consciousness, it too must have adverting.' The other party denies with 'not so,' because the eye is not connected with adverting, nor does it arise immediately after adverting. The same method applies to 'sound with the ear,' and so on. Here, monks, the statement 'a monk sees form with the eye' is spoken by way of a statement including its components. Just as one who pierces with an arrow is said to 'pierce with a bow,' so too, one who sees with eye-consciousness is said to 'see with the eye.' Therefore, this is not a valid proof. The same method applies to the remaining cases as well.

Cakkhunā rūpaṃ passatītikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion: 'One Sees Form with the Eye'.

Aṭṭhārasamo vaggo.

The Eighteenth Chapter.

19. Ekūnavīsatimavaggo

19. The Nineteenth Chapter.

1. Kilesapajahanakathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Commentary on the Discussion of Abandoning Defilements.

828-831. Idāni kilesapajahanakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘yasmā kilesapahānaṃ nāma atthi, pahīnakilesassa ca atītāpi kilesā pahīnāva honti, anāgatāpi, paccuppannāpi, tasmā atītepi kilese pajahati, anāgatepi, paccuppannepī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi ekaccānaṃ uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya atītetiādipucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesaṃ yathāpāḷimeva niyyāti. Natthi kilese jahatīti imasmiṃ pana paravādissa pañhe yasmā kacavaraṃ pajahantassa kacavare chaḍḍanavāyāmo viya kilese pajahantassa na atītādibhedesu kilesesu vāyāmo atthi, nibbānārammaṇe pana ariyamagge pavattite kilesā anuppannāyeva nuppajjantīti pahīnā nāma honti, tasmā na hevanti paṭikkhipati. Tena hi atīte kilese pajahatītiādi pana yasmā ‘‘natthi kilesapajahanā’’ti na vattabbaṃ, tasmā atītādibhede pajahatīti chalena vuttaṃ.

828-831. Now comes the discussion entitled, 'The Abandoning of Defilements.' Herein, some, such as certain Uttarāpathakas, hold the view that 'since the abandoning of defilements exists, and for one who has abandoned defilements, past defilements are indeed abandoned, as are future and present ones, therefore one abandons defilements of the past, future, and present.' With reference to them, the question concerning the past, and so forth, is from the proponent of the orthodox view, and the admission is from the other party. The rest proceeds just as in the Pāli text. However, regarding the opponent's question, 'Does one not abandon defilements?', it is refuted for this reason: just as for one abandoning rubbish there is an effort in discarding the rubbish, for one abandoning defilements there is no such effort regarding defilements in the categories of past, and so on. Rather, when the noble path, which has Nibbāna as its object, proceeds, defilements that have not yet arisen simply do not arise—thus they are called 'abandoned.' Therefore, he refutes with 'not so.' Then, regarding the statement 'one abandons past defilements,' and so on, since it should not be said that 'there is no abandoning of defilements,' it is therefore stated by way of a pretext that one abandons them in the categories of past, and so forth.

Kilesapajahanakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of Abandoning Defilements.

2. Suññatakathāvaṇṇanā

2. The Commentary on the Discussion of Emptiness.

832. Idāni [Pg.267] suññatakathā nāma hoti. Tattha suññatāti dve suññatā khandhānañca anattalakkhaṇaṃ nibbānañca. Tesu anattalakkhaṇaṃ tāva ekaccaṃ ekena pariyāyena siyā saṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannaṃ, nibbānaṃ, apariyāpannameva. Imaṃ pana vibhāgaṃ aggahetvā ‘‘suññatā saṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannā’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Animittanti sabbanimittarahitaṃ nibbānaṃ. ‘‘Appaṇihito’’tipi tasseva nāmaṃ. Kasmā panetaṃ ābhatanti? Avibhajjavādīvāde dosāropanatthaṃ. Yassa hi avibhajitvā ‘‘ekadeseneva suññatā saṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannā’’ti laddhi, tassa nibbānampi saṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannanti āpajjati. Imassa dosassāropanatthaṃ ‘‘animittaṃ appaṇihita’’nti ābhataṃ. Itaro tassa pariyāpannabhāvaṃ anicchanto paṭikkhipati. Saṅkhārakkhandho na aniccotiādi nibbānasaṅkhātāya suññatāya aniccabhāvāpattidosadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ.

832. Now comes the discussion entitled, 'Emptiness.' Herein, 'emptiness' refers to two kinds: the characteristic of not-self of the aggregates, and Nibbāna. Among these, the characteristic of not-self may, in a certain way, be included in the aggregate of formations; Nibbāna, however, is never included. But without grasping this distinction, some, such as the Andhakas, hold the view that 'emptiness is included in the aggregate of formations.' With reference to them, the question is from the proponent of the orthodox view, and the admission is from the other party. 'The Signless' refers to Nibbāna, which is devoid of all signs. 'The Undirected' is also a name for it. Why then is this introduced? For the purpose of imputing a fault in the argument of one who does not make distinctions. For one who holds the view, without making a distinction, that 'emptiness is in one part included in the aggregate of formations,' for him it would follow that Nibbāna too is included in the aggregate of formations. For the purpose of imputing this fault, 'the Signless' and 'the Undirected' are introduced. The other party, not wishing for it to be included, rejects this. The statement 'The aggregate of formations is not impermanent,' and so forth, is said for the purpose of showing the fault that would follow of emptiness, designated as Nibbāna, having the state of being impermanent.

833. Saṅkhārakkhandhassa suññatāti ‘‘yadi aññassa khandhassa suññatā aññakkhandhapariyāpannā, saṅkhārakkhandhasuññatāyapi sesakkhandhapariyāpannāya bhavitabba’’nti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Saṅkhārakkhandhassa suññatā na vattabbātiādi ‘‘yadi saṅkhārakkhandhasuññatā sesakkhandhapariyāpannā na hoti, sesakkhandhasuññatāpi saṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannā na hotī’’ti paṭilomadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ.

833. The statement "the emptiness of the aggregate of formations" is stated for the purpose of a challenge: "If the emptiness of one aggregate is included in another aggregate, then the emptiness of the aggregate of formations should also be included in the remaining aggregates." The assertion that "the emptiness of the aggregate of formations cannot be stated" and so on is stated to show the converse: "If the emptiness of the aggregate of formations is not included in the remaining aggregates, then the emptiness of the remaining aggregates is also not included in the aggregate of formations."

834. Suññamidaṃ, bhikkhave, saṅkhārāti suttaṃ parasamayato ābhataṃ. Tattha saṅkhārāti ‘‘sabbe saṅkhārā aniccā’’ti āgataṭṭhāne viya pañcakkhandhā, te ca attattaniyasuññattā suññatāti sāsanāvacaraṃ hoti, na virujjhati, tasmā anuññātaṃ. Yasmā panetaṃ na suññatāya saṅkhārakkhandhapariyāpannabhāvaṃ dīpeti, tasmā asādhakanti.

834. The sutta passage, "Monks, these formations are empty," is cited from another school. Here, "formations" refers to the five aggregates, as in the passage, "All formations are impermanent." And since they are empty of self and what belongs to self, this is within the scope of the teaching and is not contradictory; therefore, it is permitted. However, because this does not demonstrate that emptiness is included in the aggregate of formations, it is not a valid proof.

Suññatakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Emptiness.

3. Sāmaññaphalakathāvaṇṇanā

3. The Explanation of the Discourse on the Fruits of Recluseship

835-836. Idāni sāmaññaphalakathā nāma hoti. Tattha maggavīthiyampi phalasamāpattivīthiyampi ariyamaggassa vipākacittaṃ sāmaññaphalaṃ nāmāti [Pg.268] sakasamaye sanniṭṭhānaṃ. Yesaṃ pana tathā aggahetvā ‘‘kilesapahānañceva phaluppatti ca sāmaññaphalaṃ, tasmā asaṅkhata’’nti laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha heṭṭhā vuttanayattā yathā pāḷimeva niyyātīti.

835-836. Now there is the discourse called the discourse on the fruits of recluseship. Herein, the resultant consciousness of the noble path, whether in the path-process or the fruition-attainment process, is called the fruit of recluseship; this is the established conclusion in one's own system. But for those who, not having grasped it thus, hold the view that “the abandoning of defilements and the arising of the fruit is the fruit of recluseship, therefore it is unconditioned”—as is the doctrine of the Pubbaseliyas—with reference to them, the question is for the proponent of his own doctrine, and the affirmation is for the opponent. The rest here, because it follows the method stated earlier, is to be derived directly from the Pāḷi text.

Sāmaññaphalakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on the Fruits of Recluseship.

4. Pattikathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Explanation of the Discourse on Attainment

837-840. Idāni pattikathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘yaṃ yaṃ paṭilabbhati, tassa tassa paṭilābho patti nāma. Sā ca asaṅkhatā’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyānaññeva; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamidhāpi heṭṭhā vuttanayattā yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti. Na vattabbantiādi yāya laddhiyā patti asaṅkhatāti maññati, taṃ pakāsetuṃ vuttaṃ. Tattha sakavādī ‘‘na hevaṃ vattabbe’’ti paṭikkhipanto kevalaṃ pattiyā rūpādibhāvaṃ na sampaṭicchati. Na hi patti nāma koci dhammo atthi, na pana asaṅkhatabhāvaṃ anujānāti. Itaro pana paṭikkhepamatteneva asaṅkhatāti laddhiṃ patiṭṭhapeti, sā ayoniso patiṭṭhāpitattā appatiṭṭhitāyevāti.

837-840. Now there is the discourse called the discourse on attainment. Herein, concerning those whose doctrine is that “whatever is obtained, the obtaining of that is called attainment, and that is unconditioned”—as is the doctrine of the Pubbaseliyas themselves—with reference to them, the question is for the proponent of his own doctrine, and the affirmation is for the opponent. The rest here, because it follows the method stated earlier, is to be derived directly from the Pāḷi text. “It should not be said,” etc., is stated to clarify the doctrine by which one considers attainment to be unconditioned. Here, the proponent of his own doctrine, rejecting by saying, “It should not be said thus,” does not accept that attainment has the nature of form, etc. For there is no such phenomenon as attainment, nor does he concede its unconditioned nature. The other, however, merely by the rejection, establishes the doctrine that it is unconditioned. But because this is established unwisely, it is not firmly established.

Pattikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Attainment.

5. Tathatākathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Explanation of the Discourse on Suchness

841-843. Idāni tathatākathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘rūpādīnaṃ sabbadhammānaṃ rūpādisabhāvatāsaṅkhātā tathatā nāma atthi, sā ca saṅkhatesu rūpādīsu apariyāpannattā asaṅkhatā’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi ekaccānaṃ uttarāpathakānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamidhāpi heṭṭhā vuttanayattā pākaṭamevāti.

841-843. Now there is the discourse called the discourse on suchness. Herein, concerning those whose doctrine is that “there exists what is called suchness, defined as the inherent nature of all phenomena such as form, etc., and since it is not included among conditioned phenomena such as form, etc., it is unconditioned”—as is the doctrine of some Northerners—with reference to them, the question is for the proponent of his own doctrine, and the affirmation is for the opponent. The rest here, because it follows the method stated earlier, is evident.

Tathatākathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Suchness.

6. Kusalakathāvaṇṇanā

6. The Explanation of the Discourse on Wholesome States

844-846. Idāni [Pg.269] kusalakathā nāma hoti. Tattha anavajjampi kusalaṃ iṭṭhapākampi. Anavajjaṃ nāma kilesavippayuttaṃ. Ayaṃ nayo ṭhapetvā akusalaṃ sabbadhamme bhajati. Iṭṭhavipākaṃ nāma āyatiṃ upapattipavattesu iṭṭhaphalanipphādakaṃ puññaṃ. Ayaṃ nayo kusalattike ādipadameva bhajati. Yesaṃ pana imaṃ vibhāgaṃ aggahetvā anavajjabhāvamatteneva nibbānaṃ kusalanti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ, tesaṃ iṭṭhavipākaṭṭhena nibbānassa kusalatābhāvaṃ dīpetuṃ pucchā sakavādissa, attano laddhivasena paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamidhāpi heṭṭhā vuttanayattā uttānatthamevāti.

844-846. Now there is the discourse called the discourse on wholesome states. Herein, what is blameless is wholesome, and what has a desirable result is wholesome. Blameless means dissociated from defilements. This principle applies to all phenomena except the unwholesome. What has a desirable result refers to merit that produces desirable fruits in future existences and continuities. This principle applies only to the first term of the wholesome triad. But for those who, not having grasped this distinction, hold the view that Nibbāna is wholesome merely because of its blameless nature—as is the doctrine of the Andhakas—the question is for the proponent of his own doctrine to demonstrate to them the absence of Nibbāna’s wholesomeness in the sense of having a desirable result, and the affirmation is for the opponent according to his own doctrine. The rest here, because it follows the method stated earlier, is of evident meaning.

Kusalakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Discourse on Wholesome States.

7. Accantaniyāmakathāvaṇṇanā

7. The Explanation of the Discourse on the Absolutely Fixed Course

847. Idāni accantaniyāmakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘sakiṃ nimuggo nimuggova hotī’’ti (a. ni. 7.15) suttaṃ nissāya ‘‘atthi puthujjanassa accantaniyāmatā’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi ekaccānaṃ uttarāpathakānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Mātughātakotiādi ‘‘niyatamicchādiṭṭhikassa ca mātughātakādīnañca samāne micchattaniyāme mātughātakādīhipi te accantaniyatehi bhavitabba’’nti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Itaro ‘‘niyatamicchādiṭṭhiko saṃsārakhāṇuko bhavantarepi niyatova ime pana ekasmiññeva attabhāve’’ti laddhiyā na hevanti paṭikkhipati.

847. Now there is the discourse called the discourse on the absolutely fixed course. Herein, concerning those who, relying on the sutta, "Once submerged, one remains submerged" (AN 7.15), hold the view that "there is an absolutely fixed course for an ordinary person," such as some Northerners—with reference to them, the question is for the proponent of his own doctrine, and the affirmation is for the opponent. The mention of "matricide, etc." is stated for the purpose of objection: "Since there is a sameness of fixed wrongness for one with fixed wrong view and for matricides, etc., it must be that these matricides, etc., are also on an absolutely fixed course." The other, holding the view that "one with fixed wrong view is a post in saṃsāra, fixed even in a future existence, but these others are so only in a single lifetime," rejects this by saying, "Not so."

848. Vicikicchā uppajjeyyāti ‘‘ayaṃ niyato vā no vā’’ti evaṃ uppajjeyyāti pucchati. Itaro anuppattikāraṇaṃ apassanto paṭijānāti. Nuppajjeyyāti puṭṭho pana yaṃ diṭṭhiṃ āsevanto niyāmaṃ okkanto, tattha anuppattiṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Tato pahīnāti puṭṭho maggena appahīnattā paṭikkhipati, taṃ diṭṭhiṃ ārabbha asamudācārato paṭijānāti. Atha naṃ yasmā pahānaṃ nāma vinā ariyamaggena natthi, tasmā tassa vasena codetuṃ sotāpattimaggenātiādimāha. So ekamaggenāpi appahīnattā [Pg.270] paṭikkhipati. Puna katamenāti puṭṭho micchāmaggaṃ sandhāya akusalenātiādimāha.

848. One asks if doubt would arise in this way: 'Is this person on a fixed course or not?' The other, not seeing a reason for its non-arising, acknowledges that it would. But when asked if it would not arise, referring to the view he cultivates, having entered the fixed course, he acknowledges its non-arising with reference to that. When asked whether it is abandoned, he denies it, since it has not been abandoned by the path; but he affirms that it is, on account of not acting in accordance with that view. Then, since abandonment does not exist without the noble path, to challenge him on that basis, one says, "by the stream-entry path," etc. He denies it because it has not been abandoned even by a single path. When further asked, "By which?", he refers to the wrong path, saying, "by the unwholesome," etc.

849. Ucchedadiṭṭhi uppajjeyyāti dutiyaniyāmuppattiṃ pucchati. Itaro yasmā ‘‘yepi te okkalā vayabhiññā natthikavādā akiriyavādā ahetukavādā’’ti (ma. ni. 3.143) vacanato tissopi niyatamicchādiṭṭhiyo ekassa uppajjanti, tasmā paṭijānāti.

849. If an annihilationist view were to arise—this asks about the arising of the second fixed course. The other party acknowledges it because, as it is said, 'Those Okkalas who are annihilationists, proponents of nihilism, proponents of inaction, proponents of causelessness' (MN 3.143), thus even three fixed wrong views arise in one person.

850. Atha naṃ ‘‘na ca nāma so accantaniyāmo’’ti codetuṃ hañcītiādimāha. Accantaniyatassa hi dutiyaniyāmo niratthako. Nuppajjeyyāti pañhe yaṃ sassatadiṭṭhiyā sassatanti gahitaṃ, tadeva ucchijjissatīti gahetvā anuppattiṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Pahīnāti puṭṭho maggena appahīnattā paṭikkhipati, vuttanayena anuppajjanato paṭijānāti. Sassatadiṭṭhi uppajjeyyātiādīsupi eseva nayo. Sesaṃ vicikicchāvāre vuttanayameva.

850. Then, to challenge him with 'But surely, that is not an absolute certainty,' he says 'if so,' and so on. For one who is absolutely fixed, a second fixed course is meaningless. In the question, 'Would it not arise?', taking that which is grasped as 'eternal' by the eternalist view as 'it will be cut off,' he acknowledges its non-arising. When asked, 'Is it abandoned?', he denies it because it has not been abandoned by the path, but acknowledges it on account of its non-arising in the way explained. The same method applies to questions such as, 'Would an eternalist view arise?'. The rest is as explained in the section on doubt.

851-852. Na vattabbanti pucchā paravādissa, suttassa atthitāya paṭiññā sakavādissa. Na pana so bhavantarepi nimuggova. Imasmiññeva hi bhave abhabbo so taṃ diṭṭhiṃ pajahitunti ayamettha adhippāyo, tasmā asādhakametanti. Sabbakālaṃ ummujjitvā nimujjatītiādi vacanamatte abhinivesaṃ akatvā attho pariyesitabboti dassanatthaṃ vuttanti.

851-852. The question, 'Should it not be said?' is the opponent's; the proponent's assertion is due to the existence of the sutta. But he is not submerged even in another existence. The meaning here is that in this very existence he is incapable of abandoning that view; therefore, this is inconclusive. This is said to show that the meaning should be sought without adhering to mere statements such as 'at all times emerging and submerging'.

Accantaniyāmakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discussion of Absolute Certainty.

8. Indriyakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Commentary on the Discussion of the Faculties

853-856. Idāni indriyakathā nāma hoti. Tattha lokiyā saddhā saddhā eva nāma, na saddhindriyaṃ. Tathā lokiyaṃ vīriyaṃ…pe… sati… samādhi… paññā paññāyeva nāma, na paññindriyanti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi hetuvādānañceva mahisāsakānañca; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa[Pg.271]. Natthi lokiyā saddhātiādi yasmā lokiyāpi saddhādayova dhammā adhipatiyaṭṭhena indriyaṃ, na saddhādīhi aññaṃ saddhindriyādi nāma atthi, tasmā lokiyānampi saddhādīnaññeva saddhindriyādibhāvadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Atthi lokiyo manotiādi yathā te lokiyāpi manādayo dhammā manindriyādīni, evaṃ lokiyā saddhādayopi saddhindriyānīti upamāya tassatthassa vibhāvanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Sesamettha yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti.

853-856. Now there is the discussion on the faculties. Herein, 'Mundane faith is merely called faith, not the faculty of faith. Similarly, mundane energy… mindfulness… concentration… wisdom is merely called wisdom, not the faculty of wisdom'—this is the doctrine of some, such as the Hetuvādins and the Mahīsāsakas. With reference to them, the question is the proponent's, the assertion is the other's. As to 'There is no mundane faith,' etc.: because even mundane states such as faith are faculties in the sense of sovereignty, and there is nothing called the faculty of faith, etc., apart from faith, etc., themselves, this is said to show that even mundane states such as faith have the status of being the faculties of faith. As to 'There is a mundane mind,' etc.: this is said to clarify that meaning by way of analogy: just as those mundane states such as mind are the faculties of mind, so too are mundane states such as faith the faculties of faith. The rest here proceeds just as in the Pāli text.

Indriyakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discussion of the Faculties.

Ekūnavīsatimo vaggo.

The Nineteenth Section.

20. Vīsatimavaggo

20. The Twentieth Section

1. Asañciccakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discussion of Unintentionality

857-862. Idāni asañciccakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘ānantariyavatthūni nāma garūni bhāriyāni, tasmā asañciccāpi tesu vatthūsu vikopitesu ānantariko hotī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi ekaccānaṃ uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya asañciccāti pucchā sakavādissa, laddhivasena paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yasmā ānantariyakammaṃ nāma kammapathappattaṃ. Yadi ca asañcicca kammapathabhedo siyā, avasesā pāṇātipātādayopi asañcicca bhaveyyu’’nti codanatthaṃ asañciccapāṇaṃ hantvātiādimāha. Itaro tathārūpāya laddhiyā abhāvena paṭikkhipati. Sesaṃ yathāpāḷimeva niyyāti. Na vattabbaṃ mātughātakoti pucchā paravādissa, rogapaṭikārādikāle asañcicca ghātaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā sakavādissa. Nanu mātā jīvitā voropitāti pañhepi asañcicca voropitaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā sakavādisseva. Evaṃ adhippāyaṃ pana aggahetvā hañcīti laddhipatiṭṭhāpanaṃ itarassa. Taṃ ayoniso patiṭṭhāpitattā appatiṭṭhitameva. Pitughātakādīsupi eseva nayo. Saṅghabhedake pana dhammasaññiṃ sandhāya saṅghabhedo ānantarikoti pucchā sakavādissa, ‘‘saṅghaṃ samaggaṃ bhetvāna, kappaṃ [Pg.272] nirayamhi paccatī’’ti vacanaṃ ayoniso gahetvā paṭiññā paravādissa. Puna sabbeti puṭṭho sakapakkhe dhammasaññiṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, parapakkhe dhammasaññiṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Dhammasaññīti pañhadvayepi eseva nayo. Nanu vuttaṃ bhagavatāti suttaṃ ekanteneva dhammavādissa ānantarikabhāvadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Āpāyiko nerayikoti gāthāyapi adhammavādīyeva adhippeto. Itaro pana adhippāyaṃ aggahetvā laddhiṃ patiṭṭhapeti. Sā ayoniso patiṭṭhāpitattā appatiṭṭhitāyevāti.

857-862. Now there is the discussion on unintentionality. Herein, 'The bases for acts with immediate consequence are grave and weighty; therefore, even if one violates those bases unintentionally, one commits an act with immediate consequence'—this is the doctrine of some, such as certain Uttarāpathakas. With reference to them, the question about unintentionality is the proponent's, and the assertion, according to their doctrine, is the other's. Then, to challenge them, it is said, 'having unintentionally killed a living being,' etc., for this reason: 'Because an act with immediate consequence is one that has attained to a course of action. If there could be an unintentional breach of a course of action, the remaining acts, such as killing living beings, could also be unintentional.' The other party rejects this, as they do not hold such a doctrine. The rest proceeds just as in the Pāli text. The question, 'Should one not say “a matricide”?' is the opponent's; the proponent's assertion is with reference to an unintentional killing at a time such as treating an illness. Indeed, even in the question, 'Was the mother deprived of life?', the assertion is the proponent's, with reference to an unintentional deprivation. However, without grasping this intention, the other party establishes their doctrine with 'if so.' But because it is established improperly, it remains unestablished. The same method applies to patricide and the rest. Regarding a schismatic, however, the question, 'Is creating a schism an act with immediate consequence?' is the proponent's, with reference to one who perceives his action as Dhamma. The opponent asserts this by improperly taking the statement, 'Having split a united Saṅgha, one is cooked in hell for an eon.' When asked again, 'All of them?', the proponent rejects it, with reference to one on his own side who perceives his action as Dhamma, but acknowledges it, with reference to one on the other side who perceives his action as Dhamma. In both questions regarding one who perceives his action as Dhamma, the method is the same. The sutta, 'Was it not said by the Blessed One?', was spoken to show that one who speaks according to the Dhamma is absolutely subject to the immediate consequence. In the verse, 'Bound for the plane of misery, for hell,' it is one who speaks not according to the Dhamma who is intended. The other party, however, without grasping the intended meaning, establishes their doctrine. Because it is established improperly, it remains unestablished.

Asañciccakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discussion of Unintentionality.

2. Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discussion of Knowledge

863-865. Idāni ñāṇakathā nāma hoti. Tattha duvidhaṃ ñāṇaṃ – lokiyañca lokuttarañca. Lokiyaṃ samāpattiñāṇampi hoti dānādivasena pavattaṃ kammassakatañāṇampi; lokuttaraṃ saccaparicchedakaṃ maggañāṇampi phalañāṇampi. Imaṃ pana vibhāgaṃ akatvā ‘‘saccaparicchedakameva ñāṇaṃ na itaraṃ, tasmā natthi puthujjanassa ñāṇa’’nti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi hetuvādānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Paññātiādi ñāṇavevacanadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Tenetaṃ dīpeti – yadi tassa ñāṇaṃ natthi, paññādayopi natthi. Atha paññādayo atthi, ñāṇampi atthi. Kasmā? Paññādīnaṃ ñāṇato anaññattāti. Paṭhamaṃ jhānantiādi samāpattiñāṇassa dassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Dānaṃ dadeyyātiādi kammassakatañāṇassa. Dukkhaṃ parijānātīti lokuttaramaggañāṇameva dīpeti, na ca lokuttarameva ñāṇanti.

863-865. Now comes the discussion on knowledge. Herein, knowledge is twofold: mundane and supramundane. Mundane knowledge includes both knowledge of attainment in concentration and knowledge of the ownership of kamma operative in acts like giving. Supramundane knowledge includes the path knowledge that discerns the truths and fruition knowledge. However, without making this distinction, some, such as the Hetuvādins, hold the view that 'only the knowledge that discerns the truths is knowledge, not the other kinds; therefore, an ordinary person has no knowledge.' With reference to them, the question is for the proponent of our own school, while the affirmation is for the other. The terms 'wisdom' and so forth are mentioned to show synonyms of knowledge. This is explained thus: If that person has no knowledge, then there is also no wisdom and the like. But if wisdom and the like exist, then knowledge also exists. Why? Because wisdom and the like are not different from knowledge. The phrase 'the first jhāna' and so on is stated to show knowledge of attainment in concentration. 'One should give gifts' and so on refers to the knowledge of the ownership of kamma. 'One fully understands suffering' points specifically to supramundane path knowledge, not that knowledge is solely supramundane.

Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on Knowledge.

3. Nirayapālakathāvaṇṇanā

3. The Exposition of the Discussion on the Hell-Wardens.

866. Idāni nirayapālakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘niraye nerayikakammāneva nirayapālarūpavasena vadhenti, natthi nirayapālā nāma sattā’’ti [Pg.273] yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi tattha nirayapālā na siyuṃ, kammakāraṇāpi na bhaveyyuṃ. Kāraṇikesu hi sati kāraṇā’’ti codetuṃ natthi nirayesūtiādimāha.

866. Now comes the discussion on the Hell-Wardens. Herein, with reference to those who hold the view that 'in hell, it is the kamma of the hell-beings themselves that torments them in the form of hell-wardens, and there are no beings called hell-wardens'—such as the Andhakas—the question is for the proponent of our own school, and the affirmation is for the other. Then, to challenge them by saying, 'If there were no hell-wardens there, there would also be no acts of torment. For where there are tormentors, there is torment,' he stated, 'there are in hells,' and so on.

867-868. Atthi manussesūti paccakkhena ñāpanatthaṃ. Yathā hi manussesu sati kāraṇikesu kāraṇā, evaṃ tatthāpīti ayamettha adhippāyo. Atthi nirayesūti pucchā paravādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Na vessabhū nopi ca pettirājāti paravādinā sakasamayato suttaṃ ābhataṃ. Taṃ pana sāsanāvacarikanti sakavādinā anuññātaṃ. Tattha vessabhūti eko devo. Pettirājāti pettivisaye petamahiddhiko. Somādayo pākaṭā eva. Idaṃ vuttaṃ hoti – attano kammehi ito paṇunnaṃ paralokaṃ pattaṃ purisaṃ na ete vessabhūādayo hananti. Yehi pana so kammehi tattha paṇunno, tāni sakāni kammāniyeva naṃ tattha hanantīti kammassakataṃ dīpeti, na nirayapālānaṃ abhāvaṃ. Sakavādinā pana tamenaṃ, bhikkhaveti ābhatāni suttapadāni nītatthānevāti.

867-868. 'There are among humans' is stated to make it known through direct experience. Just as among humans, where there are agents of punishment, there are acts of punishment, so too is it there—this is the intended meaning here. 'There are in hells' is the question for the opponent, and the affirmation for the proponent of our own school. 'Not Vessabhū nor the King of the Petas' is a citation brought by the opponent from their own tradition. But this is acknowledged by the proponent of our own school as something within the scope of the teaching. Here, 'Vessabhū' is a certain deva. 'King of the Petas' refers to one with great power among the departed in the realm of the departed. Soma and others are well-known. This is said to mean—Vessabhū and others do not kill a person who, having been driven from here by their own kamma, has gone to the other world. Rather, it is their own kamma that kills them there—thus illustrating the ownership of kamma, not the absence of hell-wardens. The proponent of our own school, however, considers that the sutta passages beginning with 'monks' are of definitive meaning.

Nirayapālakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on the Hell-Wardens.

4. Tiracchānakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Exposition of the Discussion on Animals.

869-871. Idāni tiracchānakathā nāma hoti. Tattha devesu erāvaṇādayo devaputtā hatthivaṇṇaṃ assavaṇṇaṃ vikubbanti, natthi tattha tiracchānagatā. Yesaṃ pana tiracchānavaṇṇino devaputte disvā ‘‘atthi devesu tiracchānagatā’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi devayoniyaṃ tiracchānagatā siyuṃ, tiracchānayoniyampi devā siyu’’nti codetuṃ atthi tiracchānagatesūtiādimāha. Kīṭātiādi yesaṃ so abhāvaṃ icchati, te dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Erāvaṇoti pañhe tassa atthitāya paṭiññā sakavādissa[Pg.274], na tiracchānagatassa. Hatthibandhātiādi ‘‘yadi tattha hatthiādayo siyuṃ, hatthibandhādayopi siyu’’nti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Tattha yāvasikāti yavassa dāyakā. Kāraṇikāti hatthācariyādayo, yehi te nānāvidhaṃ kāraṇaṃ kareyyuṃ. Bhattakārakāti hatthiādīnaṃ bhattarandhakā. Na hevanti tathā anicchanto paṭikkhipatīti.

869-871. Now is the discussion on animals. Herein, among the devas, deva-sons like Erāvaṇa perform transformations into the appearance of elephants and horses; there are no creatures of the animal realm there. But with reference to those who, seeing deva-sons with animal forms, hold the view that 'there are creatures of the animal realm among the devas'—such as the Andhakas—the question is for the proponent of our own school, and the affirmation is for the other. Then, to challenge him by saying, 'If there were creatures of the animal realm in the deva world, there would also be devas in the animal realm,' he said, 'Are there devas among the animals,' and so on. 'Insects,' and so on, are mentioned to show those whose non-existence he wishes to establish. Regarding 'Erāvaṇa' in the question, the proponent of our own school affirms its existence, but not as a creature of the animal realm. 'Elephant keepers,' and so on, are stated for the purpose of challenging by saying, 'If there were elephants and the like there, there would also be elephant keepers and the like.' Here, 'yāvasikā' means givers of barley. 'Kāraṇikā' refers to elephant trainers and the like, by whom they would be made to perform various actions. 'Bhattakārakā' means cooks for elephants and the like. 'Not indeed' is said by him, rejecting it as he does not wish it to be so.

Tiracchānakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on Animals.

5. Maggakathāvaṇṇanā

5. The Exposition of the Discussion on the Path.

872-875. Idāni maggakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yesaṃ ‘‘pubbeva kho panassa kāyakammaṃ vacīkammaṃ ājīvo suparisuddho hotī’’ti (a. ni. 3.431) idañceva suttaṃ sammāvācākammantājīvānañca cittavippayuttataṃ nissāya ‘‘nippariyāyena pañcaṅgikova maggo’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi mahisāsakānaṃ, te sandhāya pañcaṅgikoti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sammāvācā maggaṅgaṃ, sā ca na maggotiādi parasamayavasena vuttaṃ. Parasamayasmiñhi sammāvācādayo maggaṅganti āgatā. Rūpattā pana maggo na hotīti vaṇṇitā. Sammādiṭṭhi maggaṅgantiādi maggaṅgassa amaggatā nāma natthīti dassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Pubbeva kho panassāti sutte parisuddhasīlassa maggabhāvanā nāma hoti, na itarassāti āgamaniyapaṭipadāya visuddhibhāvadassanatthaṃ ‘‘kāyakammaṃ vacīkammaṃ ājīvo suparisuddho hotī’’ti vuttaṃ, na imehi vinā pañcaṅgikabhāvadassanatthaṃ. Tenevāha ‘‘evamassāyaṃ ariyo aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo bhāvanāpāripūriṃ gacchatī’’ti. Sakavādinā ābhatasuttaṃ nītatthamevāti.

872-875. Now is the discussion on the path. Herein, with reference to those who hold the view that 'the path is unconditionally fivefold,' such as the Mahīśāsakas—basing this on the sutta, 'beforehand, his bodily action, verbal action, and livelihood were already well-purified' (AN 3.431), and on the fact that right speech, right action, and right livelihood are disassociated from consciousness—the question 'Is the path fivefold?' is for the proponent of our own school, and the affirmation is for the other. That right speech is a path factor, but it is not the path—this and so on is stated according to another school’s doctrine. For in another school, right speech and the like are presented as path factors. However, because they are of the nature of form, they are not the path—this has been explained. That 'right view is a path factor,' and so on, is stated to show that there is no such thing as a path factor not being the path. In the sutta, the phrase 'beforehand, his…' indicates that the development of the path occurs for one whose virtue is already purified, not for others. To demonstrate the arising of purification through the proper preliminary practice, it is said, 'his bodily action, verbal action, and livelihood were well-purified'—not to show the fivefold nature of the path in the absence of these. Therefore, it is said: 'Thus, this Noble Eightfold Path goes to the fulfillment of development.' The sutta cited by the proponent of our own school is of definitive meaning.

Maggakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Discussion on the Path.

6. Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā

6. The Exposition of the Discussion on Knowledge.

876-877. Idāni ñāṇakathā nāma hoti. Tattha dhammacakkappavattane dvādasākārañāṇaṃ sandhāya ‘‘dvādasavatthukaṃ ñāṇaṃ lokuttara’’nti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi [Pg.275] pubbaseliyānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘sace taṃ dvādasavatthukaṃ, dvādasahi maggañāṇehi bhavitabba’’nti codetuṃ dvādasātiādimāha. Itaro maggassa ekattaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati, ekekasmiṃ sacce saccañāṇakiccañāṇakatañāṇānaṃ vasena ñāṇanānattaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Dvādasa sotāpattimaggātiādīsupi eseva nayo. Nanu vuttaṃ bhagavatāti suttaṃ saddhiṃ pubbabhāgaparabhāgehi ñāṇanānattaṃ dīpeti, na ariyamaggassa dvādasa ñāṇataṃ. Tasmā asādhakanti.

876-877. Now is the discussion on knowledge. Here, regarding the twelve aspects of knowledge in the turning of the Wheel of Dhamma, for those whose view is that “the twelve-based knowledge is supramundane,” such as the Pubbaseliyas—the question is for the proponent of one’s own school, the affirmation for the other. Then, to challenge him by saying, “if that is twelve-based, there must be twelve path knowledges,” he said “twelve,” and so on. The other party denies this by referring to the oneness of the path, and affirms the diversity of knowledge based on truth-knowledge, function-knowledge, and accomplished-knowledge in each truth. The same method applies even to “twelve stream-entry paths,” and so on. But has it not been said by the Blessed One? The sutta, together with its preliminary and concluding parts, reveals the diversity of knowledges, not that the Noble Path consists of twelve knowledges. Therefore, it is not a valid proof.

Ñāṇakathāvaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Discourse on Knowledge.

Vīsatimo vaggo.

The Twentieth Chapter.

Catutthapaṇṇāsako samatto.

The Fourth Fifty is concluded.

21. Ekavīsatimavaggo

21. The Twenty-First Section.

1. Sāsanakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Discourse on the Dispensation.

878. Idāni sāsanakathā nāma hoti. Tattha tisso saṅgītiyo sandhāya ‘‘sāsanaṃ navaṃ kata’’nti ca ‘‘atthi koci tathāgatassa sāsanaṃ navaṃ karotī’’ti ca ‘‘labbhā tathāgatassa sāsanaṃ navaṃ kātu’’nti ca yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi ekaccānaṃ uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya tīsupi kathāsu pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Satipaṭṭhānātiādi sāsanaṃ nāma satipaṭṭhānādayo ceva ariyadhammā, kusalādīnañca desanā. Tattha yesaṃ bhagavatā desitā satipaṭṭhānādayo, ṭhapetvā te aññesaṃ vā satipaṭṭhānādīnaṃ karaṇena akusalādīnaṃ vā kusalādibhāvakaraṇena sāsanaṃ navaṃkataṃ nāma bhaveyya, kiṃ taṃ evaṃ kataṃ kenaci, atthi vā koci evaṃ karoti, labbhā vā evaṃ kātunti tīsupi pucchāsu codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Sesaṃ sabbattha yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti.

878. Now is the discussion on the Dispensation. Here, referring to the three Councils, for those whose view is that “the Dispensation has been renewed,” or “there is someone who renews the Tathāgata’s Dispensation,” or “it is possible to renew the Tathāgata’s Dispensation”—such as certain Northern Sectarians—regarding them, in all three discussions, the question is from the proponent of one’s own school, and the affirmation is from the other. The Dispensation is the name for the foundations of mindfulness and the like, and the noble doctrines, as well as the teaching of wholesome qualities and so on. Here, if—setting aside the foundations of mindfulness and other teachings proclaimed by the Blessed One—the Dispensation would be called renewed by the making of other foundations of mindfulness and the like, or by transforming unwholesome qualities into wholesome qualities and so on, then has such a thing ever been done by anyone? Or is there anyone who does so? Or is it possible to do so? In all three questions, this is stated for the purpose of censure. The remainder is to be understood everywhere according to the Pāli text itself.

Sāsanakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse on the Dispensation.

2. Avivittakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Discourse on Non-Separation.

879-880. Idāni [Pg.276] avivittakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yassa puggalassa yo dhammo paccuppanno, so tena avivitto nāmāti idaṃ sakasamaye sanniṭṭhānaṃ. Yasmā pana puthujjanena tedhātukā dhammā apariññātā, tasmā so ekakkhaṇeyeva sabbehipi tedhātukehi dhammehi avivittoti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi tesaññeva, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Phassehītiādi sabbesaṃ phassādīnaṃ ekakkhaṇe pavattidosadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Sesaṃ sabbattha uttānatthamevāti.

879-880. Now is the discussion on non-separation. Here, whatever phenomenon is present for a person, he is said to be not separate from it—this is the established conclusion in their own system. However, because the phenomena of the three realms have not been fully understood by an ordinary person, they are therefore not separate from all phenomena of the three realms in a single moment—this is the view of some, such as those very ones. With reference to them, the question is from the proponent of one’s own school, the affirmation from the other. “By contact,” and so on, is said to show the fault of all contacts and so on occurring in a single moment. The rest is clear in meaning everywhere.

Avivittakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse on Non-Separation.

3. Saññojanakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Commentary on the Discourse on the Fetters.

881-882. Idāni saññojanakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā arahā sabbaṃ buddhavisayaṃ na jānāti, tasmā tassa tattha avijjāvicikicchāhi appahīnāhi bhavitabbanti saññāya ‘‘atthi kiñci saññojanaṃ appahāya arahattappattī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṅghikānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atthi kiñci sakkāyadiṭṭhītiādi arahato sabbasaṃyojanappahānadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Sabbaṃ buddhavisayanti pañhadvaye arahato sabbaññutaññāṇābhāvena paṭisedho kato, na avijjāvicikicchānaṃ appahānena. Itaro pana tesaṃ appahīnataṃ sandhāya tena hīti laddhiṃ patiṭṭhapeti. Sā ayoniso patiṭṭhāpitattā appatiṭṭhitāva hotīti.

881-882. Now is the discussion on the fetters. Here, because an arahant does not know the entire domain of a Buddha, with the perception that ignorance and doubt concerning it must therefore not be abandoned in them, some hold the view, “There is attainment of arahantship without having abandoned some fetter”—such as the Mahāsaṅghikas. With reference to them, the question is from the proponent of one’s own school, the affirmation from the other. “Is there any identity-view?” and so on, is stated to demonstrate the arahant’s abandonment of all fetters. In the two questions concerning “the entire domain of a Buddha,” the denial is made due to the arahant’s lack of omniscient knowledge, not due to the non-abandonment of ignorance and doubt. The other, however, establishes their view with “in that case,” referring to the non-abandonment of these. Because it is improperly established, it remains unestablished.

Saññojanakathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse on the Fetters.

4. Iddhikathāvaṇṇanā

4. Commentary on the Discourse on Psychic Power.

883-884. Idāni iddhikathā nāma hoti. Tattha iddhi nāmesā katthaci ijjhati, katthaci na ijjhati, aniccādīnaṃ niccādikaraṇe ekanteneva na ijjhati. Sabhāgasantatiṃ pana parivattetvā visabhāgasantatikaraṇe vā sabhāgasantativaseneva [Pg.277] ciratarappavattane vā yesaṃ atthāya kariyati, tesaṃ puññādīni kāraṇāni nissāya katthaci ijjhati, bhikkhūnaṃ atthāya pānīyassa sappikhīrādikaraṇe viya mahādhātunidhāne dīpādīnaṃ cirasantānappavattane viya cāti idaṃ sakasamaye sanniṭṭhānaṃ. Yaṃ pana āyasmā pilindavaccho rañño pāsādaṃ suvaṇṇantveva adhimucci, taṃ nissāya yesaṃ ‘‘atthi adhippāyaiddhī’’ti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya atthi adhippāyaiddhīti pucchā sakavādissa. Tattha adhippāyaiddhīti adhippāyaiddhi, yathādhippāyaṃ ijjhanaiddhīti attho. Āmantāti laddhimatte ṭhatvā paṭiññā paravādissa. Atha naṃ aniccādīnaṃ niccāditāya anuyuñjituṃ niccapaṇṇā rukkhā hontūtiādimāha. Sesamettha uttānatthameva. Laddhipatiṭṭhāpane suvaṇṇo ca panāsīti rañño puññūpanissayena āsi, na kevalaṃ therassa adhippāyeneva. Tasmā asādhakametanti.

883-884. Now is the discourse on psychic power. Here, this psychic power succeeds in some cases, but in others it does not. It absolutely does not succeed in making the impermanent permanent, and so forth. However, when it is done for the sake of those beings—by transforming a homogeneous continuity into a heterogeneous continuity, or by prolonging a homogeneous continuity for a very long time—it succeeds in some cases, relying on causes such as their merit. This is like making water into ghee, milk, and so forth, for the sake of monks, or like prolonging the continuity of lamps and so on for a long time in the great relic chamber. This is the conclusion in one's own system. But based on the fact that the Venerable Pilindavaccha resolved upon the king’s palace as gold, some, such as the Andhakas, hold the view that there is ‘intentional psychic power.’ With reference to them, the question, ‘Is there intentional psychic power?’ is from the proponent of one’s own school. Here, ‘intentional psychic power’ means the psychic power of succeeding according to one’s intention. ‘Yes,’ is the affirmation of the opponent, standing merely on their doctrine. Then, to challenge him regarding making the impermanent permanent, and so forth, he says, ‘May the leaves of the trees be permanent,’ and so on. The rest here is clear in meaning. In establishing the doctrine, it became gold due to the king’s merit as a supporting condition, not solely due to the elder’s intention. Therefore, this is not a valid proof.

Iddhikathāvaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Discourse on Psychic Power.

5. Buddhakathāvaṇṇanā

5. Commentary on the Discourse on the Buddhas.

885. Idāni buddhakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ṭhapetvā tasmiṃ tasmiṃ kāle sarīravemattataṃ āyuvemattataṃ pabhāvemattatañca sesehi buddhadhammehi buddhānaṃ buddhehi hīnātirekatā nāma natthi. Yesaṃ pana aviseseneva atthīti laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya atthi buddhānanti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ buddhadhammehi anuyuñjituṃ satipaṭṭhānatotiādimāha. Itaro tesaṃ vasena hīnātirekataṃ apassanto paṭikkhipatiyevāti.

885. Now, this is the discourse on the Buddhas. Here, apart from the differences in bodily size, lifespan, and radiance at various times, there is no inferiority or superiority among the Buddhas in terms of the remaining Buddha-qualities. However, for those who hold the doctrine that there is absolutely no distinction, such as the Andhakas, the question 'Are there Buddhas?' is posed by the proponent of one's own school, and the opponent's assertion is 'Yes'. Then, to examine him regarding the Buddha-qualities, he says, 'starting with the foundations of mindfulness,' and so on. The other party, not seeing any inferiority or superiority in those qualities, simply rejects it.

Buddhakathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Discourse on the Buddhas.

6. Sabbadisākathāvaṇṇanā

6. Exposition of the Discourse on All Directions

886. Idāni sabbadisākathā nāma hoti. Tattha catūsu disāsu heṭṭhā uparīti samantato lokadhātusannivāsaṃ, sabbalokadhātūsu ca [Pg.278] buddhā atthīti attano vikappasippaṃ uppādetvā ‘‘sabbadisāsu buddhā tiṭṭhantī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi mahāsaṅghikānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Puratthimāyāti puṭṭho sakyamuniṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Puna puṭṭho laddhivasena aññalokadhātuyaṃ ṭhitaṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Kinnāmo so bhagavātiādi ‘‘sace tvaṃ jānāsi, nāmādivasena naṃ kathehī’’ti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Iminā upāyena sabbattha attho veditabboti.

886. Now, this is the discourse on all directions. Here, the doctrine of those such as the Mahāsaṅghikas, who generate their own imaginative skill by conceiving of the assemblage of world-systems in the four directions—below, above, and all around—and that Buddhas exist in all world-systems, is that 'Buddhas stand in all directions'. The question is posed by the proponent of one's own school, and the opponent's assertion is 'Yes'. When asked about the eastern direction, he denies it with reference to Sakyamuni. When asked again, he affirms it based on the doctrine of a Buddha dwelling in another world-system. 'What is the name of that Blessed One?' and so on—this is stated for the purpose of challenging him, meaning, 'If you know, then state his name and so forth'. By this method, the meaning should be understood everywhere.

Sabbadisākathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Discourse on All Directions.

7. Dhammakathāvaṇṇanā

7. Exposition of the Discourse on Phenomena

887-888. Idāni dhammakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā rūpādayo rūpādisabhāvena niyatā na taṃ sabhāvaṃ vijahanti, tasmā sabbadhammā niyatāti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānañceva ekaccānañca uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya sabbe dhammāti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘sace te niyatā, micchattaniyatā vā siyuṃ sammattaniyatā vā, ito añño niyāmo nāma natthī’’ti codetuṃ micchattaniyatātiādimāha. Tattha paṭikkhepo ca paṭiññā ca paravādissa. Rūpaṃ rūpaṭṭhenātiādi yenatthena niyatāti vadati, tassa vasena codetuṃ vuttaṃ. Tatrāyaṃ adhippāyo – rūpañhi rūpaṭṭhena niyatanti rūpaṃ rūpameva, na vedanādisabhāvanti adhippāyena vattabbaṃ, ito aññathā na vattabbaṃ. Kasmā? Rūpaṭṭhato aññassa rūpassa abhāvā. Rūpasabhāvo hi rūpaṭṭho, rūpasabhāvo ca rūpameva, na rūpato añño. Vedanādīhi panassa nānattapaññāpanatthaṃ esa vohāro hotīti. Tasmā ‘‘rūpaṃ rūpaṭṭhena niyata’’nti vadantena rūpaṃ niyatanti vuttaṃ hoti. Niyatañca nāma micchattaniyataṃ vā siyā sammattaniyataṃ vā, ito añño niyāmo nāma natthīti. Atha kasmā paṭijānātīti? Atthantaravasena. Rūpaṃ rūpaṭṭhena niyatanti ettha hi rūpaṃ rūpameva, na vedanādisabhāvanti ayamattho. Tasmā paṭijānāti. Ito aññathā panassa niyatattaṃ natthīti puna teneva nayena codetuṃ micchattaniyatantiādimāha[Pg.279]. Taṃ sabbaṃ uttānatthameva. Tena hi rūpanti laddhipi ayoniso patiṭṭhāpitattā appatiṭṭhitāva hotīti.

887-888. Now, this is the discourse on phenomena. Herein, because forms and so on are fixed by their own nature as forms and so forth, and do not abandon that nature, the tenet of those such as the Andhakas and some of the Northerners is that all phenomena are fixed. With reference to them, the question 'Are all phenomena fixed?' is posed by the proponent of one's own school, and the affirmation is given by the other. Then, to challenge him, it is said: 'If they are fixed, they would be fixed in wrongness or fixed in rightness; there is no other fixed principle besides these.' Thus he speaks, beginning with 'fixed in wrongness.' Herein, the rejection and the affirmation belong to the opponent. The statement 'Form is fixed by its nature as form' and so on is made to challenge him based on the meaning by which he says they are fixed. The intention here is this: when it is said 'form is fixed by its nature as form,' it means that form is merely form, not of the nature of feeling, etc. It should be stated with this intention; it should not be stated otherwise. Why? Because there is no form apart from the characteristic of form. For the nature of form is the characteristic of form, and the nature of form is form itself, not something else apart from form. However, this expression is used to distinguish it from feeling, etc. Therefore, by saying 'form is fixed by its nature as form,' it is said that form is fixed. And what is called 'fixed' is either fixed in wrongness or fixed in rightness; there is no other fixed principle besides these. Then why does he affirm it? Because of a different meaning. Here, the meaning of 'form is fixed by its nature as form' is that form is merely form, not of the nature of feeling, etc. Therefore, he affirms it. However, its fixedness is not otherwise than this. Thus, to challenge him again in the same way, he speaks, beginning with 'fixed in wrongness,' etc. All this is clear in meaning. Therefore, even the tenet 'form is...' is not firmly established because it is improperly established.

Dhammakathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Discourse on Phenomena.

8. Kammakathāvaṇṇanā

8. Exposition of the Discourse on Kamma

889-891. Idāni kammakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘yasmā diṭṭhadhammavedanīyādīni diṭṭhadhammavedanīyaṭṭhādīhi niyatāni, tasmā sabbe kammā niyatā’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi tesaññeva; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Diṭṭhadhammavedanīyaṭṭhena niyatanti ettha diṭṭhadhammavedanīyaṃ diṭṭhadhammavedanīyaṭṭhameva. Sace diṭṭheva dhamme vipākaṃ dātuṃ sakkoti deti, no ce ahosikammaṃ nāma hotīti imamatthaṃ sandhāya paṭiññā sakavādissa. Micchattasammattaniyāmavasena panetaṃ aniyatamevāti sabbaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbanti.

889-891. Now, this is the discourse on kamma. Here, with reference to those whose tenet is that 'since actions such as those ripening in this very life are fixed by their characteristic of ripening in this very life, etc., therefore all kamma is fixed'—as in the case of those same ones—the question is posed by the proponent of one's own school, and the affirmation is given by the other. In 'fixed by the characteristic of ripening in this very life,' here, 'ripening in this very life' is simply the characteristic of ripening in this very life. If it is able to give its result in this very life, it does; if not, it becomes defunct kamma—this meaning is implied by the affirmation of the proponent of one's own school. However, with respect to the fixed principles of wrongness and rightness, this is truly undetermined; everything should be understood in the same way as explained above.

Kammakathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Discourse on Kamma.

Ekavīsatimo vaggo.

Twenty-first Chapter.

22. Bāvīsatimavaggo

22. Twenty-second Chapter

1. Parinibbānakathāvaṇṇanā

1. Exposition of the Discourse on Parinibbāna

892. Idāni parinibbānakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘yasmā arahā sabbaññuvisaye appahīnasaṃyojanova parinibbāyati, tasmā atthi kiñci saṃyojanaṃ appahāya parinibbāna’’nti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha heṭṭhā vuttanayamevāti.

892. Now, this is the discourse on Parinibbāna. Here, the question is posed by the proponent of one's own school to those whose tenet is that 'since an arahant attains Parinibbāna in the domain of the Omniscient One with fetters not yet abandoned, therefore there is Parinibbāna without having abandoned some fetter'—as is the case with the Andhakas; and the affirmation is from the other. The rest here is to be understood in the manner stated above.

Parinibbānakathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Discourse on Parinibbāna.

2. Kusalacittakathāvaṇṇanā

2. Exposition of the Discourse on Wholesome Consciousness

894-895. Idāni [Pg.280] kusalacittakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā arahā sativepullappatto parinibbāyantopi sato sampajānova parinibbāti, tasmā kusalacitto parinibbāyatīti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ yasmā kusalacitto nāma puññābhisaṅkhārābhisaṅkharaṇādivasena hoti, tasmā tenatthena codetuṃ arahā puññābhisaṅkhārantiādimāha. Sesamettha yathāpāḷimeva niyyāti. Sato sampajānoti idaṃ javanakkhaṇe kiriyasatisampajaññānaṃ vasena asammohamaraṇadīpanatthaṃ vuttaṃ, na kusalacittadīpanatthaṃ. Tasmā asādhakanti.

894-895. Now, this is the discourse on Wholesome Consciousness. Here, the question is posed by the proponent of one's own school to those whose tenet is that 'since an arahant, having attained the fullness of mindfulness, attains Parinibbāna mindfully and with clear comprehension, therefore one attains Parinibbāna with a wholesome consciousness'—as is the case with the Andhakas; and the affirmation is from the other. Then, since wholesome consciousness exists by way of forming meritorious volitional activities and so forth, to challenge him on that point, he says, 'Does an arahant form meritorious volitional activities?' and so forth. The rest here proceeds exactly according to the Pāli text. The phrase 'mindful and with clear comprehension' is stated with reference to the functional mindfulness and clear comprehension at the moment of impulsion, for the purpose of indicating death without delusion, not for the purpose of indicating wholesome consciousness. Therefore, it is not a valid proof.

Kusalacittakathāvaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Discourse on Wholesome Consciousness.

3. Āneñjakathāvaṇṇanā

3. Exposition of the Discourse on Imperturbability

896. Idāni āneñjakathā nāma hoti. Tattha bhagavā catutthajjhāne ṭhito parinibbāyīti sallakkhetvā ‘‘arahā āneñje ṭhito parinibbāyatī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi ekaccānaṃ uttarāpathakānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Pakaticitteti bhavaṅgacitte. Sabbe hi saññino sattā bhavaṅgacitte ṭhatvā bhavaṅgapariyosānena cuticittena kālaṃ karonti. Iti naṃ iminā atthena codetuṃ evamāha. Tattha kiñcāpi catuvokārabhave arahato pakaticittampi āneñjaṃ hoti, ayaṃ pana pañho pañcavokārabhavavasena uddhaṭo. Tasmā no ca vata re vattabbeti āha. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

896. Now comes the discussion on imperturbability. Here, reflecting that the Blessed One attained Parinibbāna while abiding in the fourth jhāna, the question is posed by the proponent of his own view to those whose tenet is that 'an arahant attains Parinibbāna while abiding in the imperturbable'—as is the case with some Northerners; the affirmation is from the other. By 'natural consciousness' is meant the life-continuum consciousness. For all sentient beings with perception, abiding in the life-continuum consciousness, pass away with a death-consciousness at the end of the life-continuum. Thus, to challenge him with this meaning, he said this. Although in a four-constituent existence even the natural consciousness of an arahant is imperturbable, this question, however, is raised concerning a five-constituent existence. Therefore, he said, 'Indeed, it should not be said thus!' The rest here is of plain meaning.

Āneñjakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on the Imperturbable.

4. Dhammābhisamayakathāvaṇṇanā

4. The Commentary on the Discussion on the Penetration of the Dhamma.

897. Idāni dhammābhisamayakathā nāma hoti. Tattha atītabhave sotāpannaṃ mātukucchiyaṃ vasitvā nikkhantaṃ disvā ‘‘atthi gabbhaseyyāya dhammābhisamayo’’ti [Pg.281] yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi ekaccānaṃ uttarāpathakānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘yadi tattha dhammābhisamayo atthi, dhammābhisamayassa kāraṇehi dhammadesanādīhi bhavitabba’’nti codetuṃ atthi gabbhaseyyāya dhammadesanātiādimāha. Suttassātiādi bhavaṅgavāraṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Gabbhaseyyāya hi yebhuyyena bhavaṅgameva pavattati. Teneva satto kiriyamayappavattābhāvā sutto, bhāvanānuyogassa abhāvā pamatto, kammaṭṭhānapariggāhakānaṃ satisampajaññānaṃ abhāvā muṭṭhassati asampajāno nāma hoti, tathārūpassa kuto dhammābhisamayoti?

897. Now comes the discussion on the penetration of the Dhamma. Here, having seen one who, having become a stream-enterer in a past existence, dwelt in the mother's womb and then emerged, the question is posed by the proponent of his own view to those whose tenet is that 'there is penetration of the Dhamma in the womb'—as is the case with some Northerners; the affirmation is from the other. Then, to challenge him that 'if there is penetration of the Dhamma there, there must be causes for the penetration of the Dhamma, such as the teaching of the Dhamma,' he says, 'Is there teaching of the Dhamma in the womb?' and so forth. The phrase 'asleep,' and so on, is stated with reference to the life-continuum phase. For in the womb, it is mostly the life-continuum that proceeds. Therefore, the being is called 'asleep' due to the absence of active process, 'heedless' due to the absence of application to development, and 'unmindful and not clearly comprehending' due to the absence of mindfulness and clear comprehension that grasp a meditation subject. How could there be penetration of the Dhamma for such a one?

Dhammābhisamayakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on the Penetration of the Dhamma.

5-7. Tissopikathāvaṇṇanā

5-7. The Commentary on the Discussion concerning Tissa.

898-900. Idāni tissopikathā nāma honti. Tattha acirajātānaṃ pana sotāpannānaṃ arahattappattiṃ suppavāsāya ca upāsikāya sattavassikaṃ gabbhaṃ disvā ‘‘atthi gabbhaseyyāya arahattappattī’’ti ca supine ākāsagamanādīni disvā ‘‘atthi dhammābhisamayo’’ti ca ‘‘atthi tattha arahattappattī’’ti ca idhāpi yesaṃ laddhiyo, seyyathāpi tesaññeva; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha purimakathā sadisamevāti.

Now, these are called the discussions concerning Tissa. Here, some hold the tenet that 'there is attainment of arahantship in the womb,' having seen the attainment of arahantship by recently born stream-enterers and the seven-year pregnancy of the laywoman Suppavāsā. And they hold the tenets that 'there is realization of the Dhamma' and 'there is attainment of arahantship there,' having seen in a dream things such as traveling through the sky. For those here whose views are such—as is the case with those same ones—the question is posed by the proponent of his own view, and the affirmation is from the other. The rest here is just like the previous discussion.

Tissopikathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion concerning Tissa.

8. Abyākatakathāvaṇṇanā

8. The Commentary on the Discussion of the Undetermined.

901-902. Idāni abyākatakathā nāma hoti. Tattha ‘‘atthesā, bhikkhave, cetanā, sā ca kho abbohārikā’’ti (pārā. 235) vacanato ‘‘sabbaṃ supinagatassa cittaṃ abyākata’’nti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi ekaccānaṃ uttarāpathakānaññeva, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha yathā pāḷimeva niyyāti. Supinagatassa cittaṃ abbohārikanti idaṃ [Pg.282] āpattiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Supinagatassa hi pāṇātipātādivasena kiñcāpi akusalacittaṃ pavattati, vatthuvikopanaṃ pana natthīti na sakkā tattha āpattiṃ paññapetuṃ. Iminā kāraṇena taṃ abbohārikaṃ, na abyākatattāti.

Now, this is the discussion of the undetermined. Here, because of the statement, “There is intention, bhikkhus, but it is non-actionable” (Pārā. 235), some hold the view that “All the consciousness of one who is dreaming is undetermined”—such as certain Northerners. Concerning them, the question is posed by the proponent of his own view, and the affirmation is from the other. The rest here proceeds just as in the Pāli text. The phrase, “The consciousness of one who is dreaming is non-actionable,” is stated with reference to an offense. For although an unwholesome consciousness arises in one who is dreaming by way of killing living beings and so on, there is no violation of the object, so it is not possible to lay down an offense in that case. For this reason, it is non-actionable, not because it is undetermined.

Abyākatakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of the Undetermined.

9. Āsevanapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā

9. The Commentary on the Discussion on the Repetition Condition.

903-905. Idāni āsevanapaccayakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā sabbe dhammā khaṇikā, na koci muhuttampi ṭhatvā āsevanapaccayaṃ āsevati nāma. Tasmā natthi kiñci āsevanapaccayatā. Āsevanapaccayatāya uppannaṃ pana na kiñci atthīti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi tesaññeva; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ suttavaseneva paññāpetuṃ nanu vuttaṃ bhagavatā pāṇātipātotiādi ābhataṃ. Taṃ sabbaṃ uttānatthamevāti.

Now, this is the discussion on the repetition condition. Here, since all phenomena are momentary, nothing remains even for a moment to perform the function of a repetition condition. Therefore, there is no such thing as a repetition condition, and nothing whatsoever has arisen by way of a repetition condition. For those whose view is such—as is the case with those same ones—the question is posed by the proponent of his own view, and the affirmation is from the other. Then, to establish the point by means of the Sutta itself, the passage beginning, 'Has it not been stated by the Blessed One, "killing living beings..."' has been adduced. All of that is of plain meaning.

Āsevanapaccayakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion on the Repetition Condition.

10. Khaṇikakathāvaṇṇanā

10. The Commentary on the Discussion of Momentariness.

906-907. Idāni khaṇikakathā nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā sabbasaṅkhatadhammā aniccā, tasmā ekacittakkhaṇikāyeva. Samānāya hi aniccatāya eko lahuṃ bhijjati, eko cirenāti ko ettha niyāmoti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi pubbaseliyāparaseliyānaṃ; te sandhāya ekacittakkhaṇikāti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Citte mahāpathavītiādīsu tesaṃ tathā saṇṭhānaṃ apassanto paṭikkhipati. Cakkhāyatanantiādi ‘‘yadi sabbe ekacittakkhaṇikā bhaveyyuṃ, cakkhāyatanādīni cakkhuviññāṇādīhi saddhiṃyeva uppajjitvā nirujjheyyu’’nti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Itaro pana antomātukucchigatassa viññāṇuppattiṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati[Pg.283], pavattaṃ sandhāya laddhivasena paṭijānāti. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti. Tena hi ekacittakkhaṇikāti yasmā niccā na honti, tasmā ekacittakkhaṇikāti attano ruciyā kāraṇaṃ vadati. Taṃ avuttasadisamevāti.

Now, this is the discussion of momentariness. Herein, some, such as the Pubbaseliyas and Aparaseliyas, hold the view: 'Since all conditioned phenomena are impermanent, they last only for a single mind-moment. For, given the shared characteristic of impermanence, what fixed rule is there that one thing perishes quickly and another after a long time?' Concerning them, the question, 'Do they last only for a single mind-moment?' is posed by the proponent of his own view, and the affirmation is from the other. Not seeing such a constitution in the case of consciousness, the great earth, and so on, he rejects it. The phrase 'the eye-base, etc.' is stated to raise the objection: 'If all things lasted only for a single mind-moment, then the eye-base and other sense-bases would arise and cease simultaneously with eye-consciousness, etc.' The other, however, denies this with reference to the arising of consciousness within the mother’s womb, but accepts it by way of his doctrine with reference to the ongoing process. The rest here is of plain meaning. Therefore, when he gives the reason, 'They last only for a single mind-moment because they are not permanent,' he speaks according to his own preference. But this is as good as saying nothing at all.

Khaṇikakathāvaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Discussion of Momentariness.

Bāvīsatimo vaggo.

The Twenty-second Chapter.

23. Tevīsatimavaggo

23. The Twenty-third Chapter.

1. Ekādhippāyakathāvaṇṇanā

1. The Commentary on the Discussion on a Single Intention.

908. Idāni ekādhippāyakathā nāma hoti. Tattha kāruññena vā ekena adhippāyena ekādhippāyo, saṃsāre vā ekato bhavissāmāti itthiyā saddhiṃ buddhapūjādīni katvā paṇidhivasena eko adhippāyo assāti ekādhippāyo. Evarūpo dvinnampi janānaṃ ekādhippāyo methuno dhammo paṭisevitabboti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānañceva vetullakānañca; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha yathāpāḷimeva niyyātīti.

908. Now comes the discussion on a single intention. Herein, 'single intention' means a single intention either through compassion, or a single intention by way of aspiration, having performed acts such as offerings to the Buddha together with a woman, with the thought, 'We will be together in saṃsāra.' The question is posed by the proponent of his own view to those whose tenet is that 'sexual intercourse is to be engaged in by two people with such a single intention'—as is the case with the Andhakas and the Vetullakas; the affirmation is from the other. The rest here proceeds exactly according to the Pāli text.

Ekādhippāyakathāvaṇṇanā.

The commentary on the discussion on a single intention.

2. Arahantavaṇṇakathāvaṇṇanā

2. The commentary on the discussion on the guise of arahants.

909. Idāni arahantavaṇṇakathā nāma hoti. Tattha iriyāpathasampanne ākappasampanne pāpabhikkhū disvā ‘‘arahantānaṃ vaṇṇena amanussā methunaṃ dhammaṃ paṭisevantī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi ekaccānaṃ uttarāpathakānaṃ; te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

909. Now comes the discussion on the guise of arahants. Herein, the question is posed by the proponent of his own view to those whose tenet is that 'non-humans engage in sexual intercourse in the guise of arahants,' having seen wicked monks accomplished in deportment and appearance—as is the case with some Northerners; the affirmation is from the other. The rest here is of plain meaning.

Arahantavaṇṇakathāvaṇṇanā.

The commentary on the discussion on the guise of arahants.

3-7. Issariyakāmakārikākathāvaṇṇanā

3-7. The commentary on the discussion on exercising one's own will.

910-914. Idāni [Pg.284] issariyakāmakārikākathā nāma hoti. Chaddantajātakādīni sandhāya ‘‘bodhisatto issariyakāmakārikāhetu vinipātaṃ gacchati, gabbhaseyyaṃ okkamati, dukkarakārikaṃ akāsi, aparantapaṃ akāsi, aññaṃ satthāraṃ uddisī’’ti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ, te sandhāya pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Sesaṃ paṭhamakathāyaṃ uttānatthameva. Dutiyakathāyaṃ iddhimāti yadi issariyakāmakārikāhetu gaccheyya, iddhiyā gaccheyya, na kammavasenāti codanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Itaro pana paṭhamapañhe bhāvanāmayaṃ sandhāya paṭikkhipati. Dutiyapañhe puññiddhiṃ sandhāya paṭijānāti. Tatiyakathāyaṃ issariyakāmakārikāhetu nāma dukkarakārikā micchādiṭṭhiyā kariyati. Yadi ca so taṃ kareyya, sassatādīnipi gaṇheyyāti codanatthaṃ sassato lokotiādi vuttaṃ. Catutthakathāyampi eseva nayoti.

910-914. Now comes the discussion on exercising one's own will. With reference to the Chaddanta Jātaka and others, the question is posed by the proponent of his own thesis to those, such as the Andhakas, who hold the view that 'the Bodhisatta, because of exercising his own will, goes to a state of woe, takes conception in a womb, performed difficult practices, inflicted self-torment, and designated another teacher'; the admission is from the other. The rest is of clear meaning as in the first discussion. In the second discussion, the statement 'if one were to go due to exercising one's own will, he would go by psychic power, not by the force of kamma,' is said for the purpose of challenging. But the other rejects this in the first question, with reference to what is born of development. In the second question, he accepts it, with reference to the power of merit. In the third discussion, the point is that difficult practices, for the sake of exercising one's own will, are performed with wrong view. And if he were to do that, he would also grasp at eternalism and so on. Hence, 'the world is eternal,' and so on, is said for the purpose of challenging. The same method applies in the fourth discussion.

Issariyakāmakārikākathāvaṇṇanā.

The commentary on the discussion on exercising one's own will.

8. Patirūpakathāvaṇṇanā

8. The commentary on the discussion on counterparts.

915-916. Idāni rāgapatirūpakathā nāma hoti. Tattha mettākaruṇāmuditāyo sandhāya ‘‘na rāgo rāgapatirūpako’’ti ca issāmacchariyakukkuccāni sandhāya ‘‘na doso dosapatirūpako’’ti ca hasituppādaṃ sandhāya ‘‘na moho mohapatirūpako’’ti ca dummaṅkūnaṃ puggalānaṃ niggahaṃ pesalānaṃ bhikkhūnaṃ anuggahaṃ pāpagarahitaṃ kalyāṇapasaṃsaṃ āyasmato pilindavacchassa vasalavādaṃ bhagavato kheḷāsakavādaṃ moghapurisavādañca sandhāya ‘‘na kileso kilesapatirūpako’’ti ca yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi andhakānaṃ; te sandhāya sabbakathāsu pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ yasmā phassādipatirūpakā naphassādayo nāma natthi, tasmā rāgādipatirūpakā narāgādayopi natthīti [Pg.285] codetuṃ atthi na phassotiādimāha. Itaro tesaṃ abhāvā paṭikkhipati. Sesaṃ sabbattha uttānatthamevāti.

915-916. Now comes the discussion on the counterpart of lust. Herein, with reference to loving-kindness, compassion, and sympathetic joy, it is said, 'Lust is not a counterpart of lust.' With reference to envy, stinginess, and remorse, it is said, 'Hatred is not a counterpart of hatred.' With reference to the arising of laughter, it is said, 'Delusion is not a counterpart of delusion.' And with reference to the censure of ill-behaved individuals, the support of amiable bhikkhus, the dispraise of evil, the praise of good—such as the Venerable Pilindavaccha's 'outcast' speech, the Blessed One's 'spittle-eater' speech, and the 'worthless man' speech—it is said, 'Defilement is not a counterpart of defilement.' This is the view of those like the Andhakas. Addressing them, the question in all discussions is from the proponent of his own thesis, and the admission is from the other. Then, since there is no such thing as a counterpart of contact, etc., that is not contact, etc., therefore, to challenge them that there is also no such thing as a counterpart of lust, etc., that is not lust, etc., he said, 'Is there not contact?' etc. The other rejects this due to their non-existence. The rest is of clear meaning everywhere.

Patirūpakathāvaṇṇanā.

The commentary on the discussion on counterparts.

9. Aparinipphannakathāvaṇṇanā

9. The commentary on the discussion on the unrealized.

917-918. Idāni aparinipphannakathā nāma hoti. Tattha –

917-918. Now comes the discussion on the unrealized. Herein—

‘‘Dukkhameva hi sambhoti, dukkhaṃ tiṭṭhati veti ca;

Nāññatra dukkhā sambhoti, nāññaṃ dukkhā nirujjhatī’’ti. (saṃ. ni. 1.171) –

"Suffering alone comes into being, suffering persists and passes away; nothing other than suffering comes into being, nothing other than suffering ceases."

Vacanaṃ nissāya dukkhaññeva parinipphannaṃ, sesā khandhāyatanadhātuindriyadhammā aparinipphannāti yesaṃ laddhi, seyyathāpi ekaccānaṃ uttarapathakānañceva hetuvādānañca; te sandhāya rūpaṃ aparinipphannanti pucchā sakavādissa, paṭiññā itarassa. Atha naṃ ‘‘sace rūpaṃ aparinipphannaṃ, na aniccādisabhāvaṃ siyā’’ti codetuṃ rūpaṃ na aniccantiādimāha. Itaro tathārūpaṃ rūpaṃ apassanto paṭikkhipati. Sakavādī nanu rūpaṃ aniccantiādi vacanena tassa ekaṃ laddhiṃ paṭisedhetvā dutiyaṃ pucchanto dukkhaññeva parinipphannantiādimāha. Athassa tampi laddhiṃ paṭisedhetuṃ na yadaniccantiādimāha. Tatrāyaṃ adhippāyo – na kevalañhi paṭhamasaccameva dukkhaṃ. Yaṃ pana kiñci aniccaṃ, taṃ dukkhameva. Rūpañca aniccaṃ, tasmā tampi parinipphannaṃ. Iti yaṃ tvaṃ vadesi ‘‘rūpaṃ aparinipphannaṃ, dukkhaññeva parinipphanna’’nti, taṃ no vata re vattabbe ‘‘dukkhaññeva parinipphanna’’nti. Vedanādimūlikādīsupi yojanāsu eseva nayo. Dhammāyatanadhammadhātūsu pana ṭhapetvā nibbānaṃ sesadhammānaṃ vasena aniccatā veditabbā. Indriyāni aniccānevāti.

Relying on this statement, 'only suffering is fully realized; the remaining aggregates, sense bases, elements, faculties, and phenomena are unrealized'—this is the view held by some, such as certain Northerners and proponents of causation. Addressing them, the question, 'Is form unrealized?' is from the proponent of his own thesis, and the admission is from the other. Then, to challenge him by saying, 'If form were unrealized, it would not have the nature of impermanence, etc.,' he said, 'Form is not impermanent,' etc. The other, not seeing such a form, rejects it. The proponent of his own thesis, having refuted one of his views with the statement, 'Is not form impermanent?' etc., then asks a second question, saying, 'Is only suffering fully realized?' etc. Then, to refute that view as well, he said, 'Is not whatever is impermanent suffering?' Herein, this is the intention: it is not only the first truth that is suffering. But whatever is impermanent, that is suffering. And form is impermanent; therefore, it too is fully realized. Thus, what you say, 'Form is unrealized, only suffering is fully realized,' that indeed, friend, should not be said, 'Only suffering is fully realized.' The same method applies in the applications rooted in feeling, etc. However, regarding the sense base of phenomena and the element of phenomena, apart from Nibbāna, the impermanence of the remaining phenomena should be understood. The faculties are indeed impermanent.

Aparinipphannakathāvaṇṇanā.

The commentary on the discussion on the unrealized.

Tevīsatimo vaggo.

The twenty-third chapter.

Nigamanakathā

The concluding discussion.

Ettāvatā [Pg.286] ca –

And thus far—

Paṇṇāsakehi catūhi, tīhi vaggehi ceva ca;

Saṅgahetvā kathā sabbā, ūnatisatabhedanā.

By four groups of fifty, and by three chapters as well, all the discussions are included, having one hundred and twenty-seven divisions.

Kathāvatthuppakaraṇaṃ, kathāmaggesu kovido;

Yaṃ jino desayi tassa, niṭṭhitā atthavaṇṇanā.

Of the Kathāvatthu treatise, expert in the paths of discussion, which the Conqueror taught, the explanation of the meaning is completed.

Imaṃ terasamattehi, bhāṇavārehi tantiyā;

Ciraṭṭhitatthaṃ dhammassa, saṅkharontena yaṃ mayā.

This work, which I have compiled in a text of about thirteen recitation sections, is for the long duration of the Dhamma.

Yaṃ pattaṃ kusalaṃ tena, lokoyaṃ sanarāmaro;

Dhammarājassa saddhamma-rasamevādhigacchatūti.

By the merit attained by this, may this world, together with humans and gods, attain the very taste of the True Dhamma of the Dhamma King.

Kathāvatthu-aṭṭhakathā niṭṭhitā.

The Kathāvatthu Commentary is completed.

Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa

Homage to the Blessed One, the Arahant, the Perfectly Self-Enlightened One.

Abhidhammapiṭake

In the Abhidhamma Piṭaka.

Yamakappakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā

The Commentary on the Book of Pairs

Saṅkhepeneva [Pg.287] devānaṃ, devadevo surālaye;

Kathāvatthuppakaraṇaṃ, desayitvā raṇañjaho.

Briefly, the God of gods in the heavenly abode, the conqueror of defilements, having taught the Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa to the gods.

Yamassa visayātīto, nānāyamakamaṇḍitaṃ;

Abhidhammappakaraṇaṃ, chaṭṭhaṃ chaṭṭhāna desako.

Beyond Yama's realm, adorned with various pairs, the sixth treatise of the Abhidhamma, the expounder of the sixth.

Yamakaṃ ayamāvatta-nīlāmalatanūruho;

Yaṃ desayi anuppatto, tassa saṃvaṇṇanākkamo;

Idāni yasmā tasmāssa, hoti saṃvaṇṇanā ayanti.

The Yamaka, which he, whose body is adorned with spiraling, dark-blue, flawless hair, attained and taught; the order of its description—now, for that reason, this description arises.

1. Mūlayamakaṃ

1. The Root Pair

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Summary Section

1. Mūlayamakaṃ, khandhayamakaṃ, āyatanayamakaṃ, dhātuyamakaṃ, saccayamakaṃ, saṅkhārayamakaṃ, anusayayamakaṃ, cittayamakaṃ, dhammayamakaṃ, indriyayamakanti imesaṃ dasannaṃ yamakānaṃ vasena idaṃ pakaraṇaṃ dasavidhena vibhattanti hi vuttaṃ. Tattha yesaṃ dasannaṃ yamakānaṃ vasena idaṃ pakaraṇaṃ dasavidhena vibhattaṃ, tesañceva imassa ca pakaraṇassa nāmattho tāva evaṃ veditabbo – kenaṭṭhena yamakanti? Yugaḷaṭṭhena. Yugaḷañhi yamakanti vuccati – ‘yamakapāṭihāriyaṃ, yamakasālā’tiādīsu viya. Iti yugaḷasaṅkhātānaṃ yamakānaṃ vasena desitattā imesu dasasu ekekaṃ yamakaṃ nāma. Imesaṃ pana yamakānaṃ samūhabhāvato sabbampetaṃ pakaraṇaṃ yamakanti veditabbaṃ.

1. It is said that this treatise is divided in ten ways by means of these ten pairs: the Root Pair, the Aggregate Pair, the Sense-base Pair, the Element Pair, the Truth Pair, the Formation Pair, the Underlying Tendency Pair, the Mind Pair, the Dhamma Pair, and the Faculty Pair. Herein, regarding the ten pairs by means of which this treatise is divided in ten ways, and also the meaning of the name of this treatise, it should first be understood thus: In what sense is it called 'yamaka'? In the sense of 'pair.' For 'pair' is called 'yamaka'—as in the expressions 'the twin miracle,' 'the twin-hall,' and so on. Thus, because each of these ten is taught by means of yamakas, designated as pairs, each is called a 'yamaka.' Moreover, because this entire treatise is a collection of these yamakas, it should be understood as 'Yamaka.'

Tattha mūlavasena pucchāvissajjanaṃ katvā desitattā dasannaṃ tāva sabbapaṭhamaṃ mūlayamakanti vuttaṃ. Tassa uddesavāro, niddesavāroti dve vārā honti[Pg.288]. Tesu uddiṭṭhānukkamena niddisitabbattā uddesavāro paṭhamo. Tassa ye keci kusalā dhammā, sabbe te kusalamūlā; ye vā pana kusalamūlā, sabbe te dhammā kusalāti idaṃ yamakaṃ ādi. Tassa kusalākusalamūlasaṅkhātānaṃ dvinnaṃ atthānaṃ vasena atthayamakanti vā, tesaññeva atthānaṃ vasena anulomapaṭilomato pavattapāḷidhammavasena dhammayamakanti vā, anulomapaṭilomato pavattapucchāvasena pucchāyamakanti vā tidhā yamakabhāvo veditabbo. Sesesupi eseva nayo.

Herein, because the questions and answers are given based on the root, therefore, first of all, it is called the Root Pair of the ten. It has two sections: the Summary Section and the Detailed Exposition Section. Among these, the Summary Section comes first because the exposition should follow the order of what is recited. Herein, the pair begins with: "Whatever states are wholesome, are they all rooted in the wholesome? Or whatever are rooted in the wholesome, are they all wholesome states?" The nature of this pair should be understood in three ways: as a pair of meanings by means of the two meanings designated as wholesome and unwholesome roots; or as a pair of phenomena by means of those same meanings, proceeding in forward and reverse order according to the text of the Dhamma; or as a pair of questions by means of questions proceeding in forward and reverse order. The same method applies to the remaining pairs.

Idāni imesaṃ yamakānaṃ vasena desite imasmiṃ mūlayamake uddesavārassa tāva nayayamakapucchāatthavārappabhedavasena pāḷivavatthānameva evaṃ veditabbaṃ – kusalattikamātikāya hi ‘kusalā dhammā’ti idaṃ ādipadaṃ nissāya mūlanayo, mūlamūlanayo, mūlakanayo, mūlamūlakanayoti ime cattāro nayā honti. Tesaṃ ekekasmiṃ naye mūlayamakaṃ, ekamūlayamakaṃ, aññamaññamūlayamakanti tīṇi tīṇi yamakāni. Evaṃ catūsu nayesu dvādasa yamakāni, ekekasmiṃ yamake anulomapaṭilomavasena dve dve pucchāti catuvīsati pucchā, ekekāya pucchāya sanniṭṭhānasaṃsayavasena dve dve atthāti aṭṭhacattālīsa atthāti.

Now, in this Root Pair, which is taught by means of these pairs, the arrangement of the Pali text in the Summary Section should be understood as follows, by way of the distinctions of method, pair, question, and meaning: Based on the initial phrase "wholesome states" from the wholesome triad matrix, there are four methods: the root method, the root-root method, the rooted method, and the root-rooted method. For each of these methods, there are three pairs: the root pair, the single-root pair, and the reciprocal-root pair. Thus, in the four methods, there are twelve pairs. In each pair, there are two questions by way of forward and reverse order, making twenty-four questions. For each question, there are two meanings—affirmation and doubt—making forty-eight meanings.

Tattha ye keci kusalā dhammāti kusalesu ‘‘kusalā nu kho, na kusalā nu kho’’ti sandehābhāvato imasmiṃ pade sanniṭṭhānattho veditabbo. Sabbe te kusalamūlāti ‘‘sabbe te kusalā dhammā kusalamūlā nu kho, nanu kho’’ti evaṃ vimativasena pucchitattā imasmiṃ pade saṃsayattho veditabbo. So ca kho veneyyānaṃ saṃsayaṭṭhāne saṃsayadīpanatthaṃ vutto, tathāgatassa pana saṃsayo nāma natthi. Ito paresupi pucchāpadesu eseva nayo.

Herein, in the phrase "whatever states are wholesome," because there is no doubt such as "are they wholesome or not?" the meaning in this phrase should be understood as affirmation. In the phrase "are they all rooted in the wholesome?" because it is asked with an attitude of inquiry, such as "are all those wholesome states rooted in the wholesome, or are they not?" the meaning in this phrase should be understood as doubt. This, however, was stated for the purpose of illuminating doubt where doubt exists for those who are to be guided, for the Tathāgata has no doubt whatsoever. The same method applies to the subsequent questions.

Yathā ca kusalapadaṃ nissāya ime cattāro nayā, ekekasmiṃ naye tiṇṇaṃ tiṇṇaṃ yamakānaṃ vasena dvādasa yamakāni, ekekasmiṃ yamake dvinnaṃ dvinnaṃ pucchānaṃ vasena catuvīsati pucchā; ekekāya pucchāya dvinnaṃ dvinnaṃ atthānaṃ vasena aṭṭhacattālīsa atthā ca honti. Akusalapadaṃ nissāyapi tatheva. Abyākatapadaṃ nissāyapi tatheva. Tīṇipi padāni ekato katvā niddiṭṭhaṃ nāmapadaṃ nissāyapi tathevāti kusalattikamātikāya catūsu padesu sabbepi soḷasa nayā, aṭṭhacattālīsa yamakāni[Pg.289], channavuti pucchā, dvenavutisataṃ atthā ca uddesavasena vuttāti veditabbā. Ettāvatā mūlavāro nāma paṭhamaṃ uddiṭṭho hoti.

Just as based on the wholesome term there are these four methods, and in each method three pairs, making twelve pairs; and in each pair two questions, making twenty-four questions; and for each question two meanings, making forty-eight meanings; so too it is when based on the unwholesome term, and so too when based on the indeterminate term. And so too it is when based on the nominal term, which is indicated by combining all three terms. Thus, it should be understood that in the wholesome triad matrix, across the four terms, there are in all sixteen methods, forty-eight pairs, ninety-six questions, and one hundred and ninety-two meanings stated by way of summary. With this, the first section, called the Root Section, has been set forth.

Tato paraṃ ye keci kusalā dhammā, sabbe te kusalahetūtiādayo tasseva mūlavārassa vevacanavasena nava vārā uddiṭṭhā. Iti mūlavāro, hetuvāro, nidānavāro, sambhavavāro, pabhavavāro, samuṭṭhānavāro, āhāravāro, ārammaṇavāro, paccayavāro, samudayavāroti sabbepi dasa vārā honti. Tattha mūlavāre āgataparicchedeneva sesesupi nayādayo veditabbāti sabbesupi dasasu vāresu saṭṭhisatanayā, asītiadhikāni cattāri yamakasatāni, saṭṭhiadhikāni navapucchāsatāni, vīsādhikāni ekūnavīsati atthasatāni ca uddiṭṭhānīti veditabbāni. Evaṃ tāva uddesavāre nayayamakapucchāatthavārappabhedavasena pāḷivavatthānameva veditabbaṃ.

Thereafter, nine further sections are pointed out by way of synonyms for that same Root Section, with questions such as, 'Whatever wholesome states there are, are they all wholesome causes?' Thus, there are ten sections in all: Root Section, Cause Section, Source Section, Generation Section, Origin Section, Arising Section, Nutriment Section, Object Section, Condition Section, and Collection Section. Herein, the method and so on that have come in the Root Section should be understood in the remaining sections as well. Thus, in all ten sections, it should be understood that one hundred and sixty methods, four hundred and eighty pairs, nine hundred and sixty questions, and one thousand nine hundred and twenty meanings have been pointed out. In this way, in the Summary Section, the arrangement of the Pali text should be understood simply in terms of the divisions of section, method, pair, question, and meaning.

Mūlaṃ hetu nidānañcāti gāthā dasannampi vārānaṃ uddānagāthā nāma. Tattha mūlādīni sabbānipi kāraṇavevacanāneva. Kāraṇañhi patiṭṭhānaṭṭhena mūlaṃ. Attano phalanipphādanatthaṃ hinoti pavattatīti hetu. ‘Handa, naṃ gaṇhāthā’ti dassentaṃ viya attano phalaṃ nidetīti nidānaṃ. Etasmā phalaṃ sambhotīti sambhavo. Pabhavatīti pabhavo. Samuṭṭhāti ettha phalaṃ, etena vā samuṭṭhātīti samuṭṭhānaṃ. Attano phalaṃ āharatīti āhāro. Appaṭikkhipitabbena attano phalena ālambiyatīti ālambaṇaṃ. Etaṃ paṭicca appaṭikkhipitvā phalaṃ eti pavattatīti paccayo. Etasmā phalaṃ samudetīti samudayo. Evametesaṃ padānaṃ vacanattho veditabbo.

“The root, the cause, and the origin,” etc., is the summary verse for all ten sections. Herein, “root” and the rest are all synonyms for “cause.” For a cause is called “root” in the sense of being a foundation. It is called “cause” (hetu) because it proceeds for the purpose of producing its own fruit. It is called “origin” (nidāna) because it indicates its own fruit, as if showing and saying, “Here, take this.” From this, a fruit comes into being—thus it is called “coming into being” (sambhavo). From this it originates—thus it is called “source” (pabhavo). A fruit arises from this, or arises by means of this—thus it is called “arising” (samuṭṭhāna). It brings its own fruit—thus it is called “nutriment” (āhāro). It is relied upon by its own fruit, in a way that cannot be rejected—thus it is called “support” (ālambaṇa). Dependent on this, not rejecting it, a fruit comes to be and proceeds—thus it is called “condition” (paccayo). From this, a fruit originates—thus it is called “origination” (samudayo). In this way, the meaning of these terms should be understood.

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Summary Section.

Niddesavāravaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Exposition Section.

50. Idāni yekeci kusalā dhammātiādinā nayena niddesavāro āraddho. Tattha ye kecīti anavasesavacanaṃ. Kusalā dhammāti kusalattikassa padabhājane vuttalakkhaṇā anavajjasukhavipākā kusalasabhāvā. Sabbe te kusalamūlāti kiṃ te sabbeyeva kusalamūlāti pucchati. Tīṇeva [Pg.290] kusalamūlānīti na te sabbe kusalamūlāni, alobhādīni pana tīṇi eva kusalamūlānīti attho. Avasesā kusalā dhammā na kusalamūlāti avasesā phassādayo kusalā dhammā kusalamūlāni nāma na honti. Atha vā avasesā phassādayo kusalā dhammāyeva nāma, na kusalamūlānītipi attho. Ye vā pana kusalamūlāti ye vā pana paṭhamapucchāya dutiyapadena kusalamūlāti tayo alobhādayo gahitā. Sabbe te dhammā kusalāti kiṃ te sabbe tayopi dhammā kusalāti pucchati. Āmantāti sabbesampi kusalamūlānaṃ kusalabhāvaṃ sampaṭicchanto āha. Ayaṃ tāva mūlanaye mūlayamakassa attho. Iminā upāyena sabbapucchāsu vissajjananayo veditabbo. Yaṃ pana yattha visesamattaṃ atthi, tadeva vaṇṇayissāma.

50. Now, the exposition section has been commenced with the phrase, “whatever wholesome states,” etc. Herein, “whatever” is an all-inclusive term. “Wholesome states” refers to those states described in the analysis of terms under the wholesome triplet, characterized as blameless, resulting in happiness, and being of a wholesome nature. “Are all these roots of the wholesome?”—this asks whether all of them are roots of the wholesome. “There are only three roots of the wholesome”—this means that not all of them are roots of the wholesome, but rather the three, namely non-greed and so on, are the roots of the wholesome. “The remaining wholesome states are not roots of the wholesome”—that is, the remaining wholesome states such as contact and so on are not called roots of the wholesome. Alternatively, the meaning is that the remaining wholesome states such as contact and so on are indeed called wholesome states, but not roots of the wholesome. “Or whatever are roots of the wholesome”—this refers to the three, non-greed and so on, which are taken up by the second part of the first question-pair. “Are all these states wholesome?”—this asks whether all three states are wholesome. “Yes”—this is said, affirming the wholesome nature of all the roots of the wholesome. This, for now, is the meaning of the root-pair in the root method. By this method, the way of answering all questions should be understood. Whatever distinctions exist in each case, only those will we explain.

51. Ekamūlayamake tāva sabbe te kusalamūlena ekamūlāti gaṇanaṭṭhena ekamūlakaṃ aggahetvā samānaṭṭhena gahetabbā. Ayañhettha attho – sabbe te kusalamūlena samānamūlā. Yaṃ phassassa mūlaṃ, tadeva vedanādīnanti. Atha nesaṃ tathābhāvaṃ sampaṭicchanto āmantāti āha. Kusalasamuṭṭhānanti kusalacittasamuṭṭhānarūpaṃ dassitaṃ. Ekamūlanti alobhādinā kusalamūlena samānamūlaṃ. Yatheva hi phassādīnaṃ alobhādayo hetupaccayattā mūlaṃ, tathā taṃ samuṭṭhānarūpassāpi, kusalalakkhaṇābhāvena pana taṃ na kusalaṃ.

51. In the single-root pair, firstly, the phrase “all these are of a single root with the wholesome root” should be understood not in the numerical sense of having one root, but in the sense of having a common root. The meaning here is this: all these have a common root with the wholesome root. The root of contact is the same as that of feeling and so on. Then, accepting that they are so, one says, “Yes.” By “arisen from the wholesome,” materiality arisen from wholesome consciousness is shown. “Of a single root” means having a common root with the wholesome root, that is, with non-greed and so on. For just as non-greed and so on are the root for contact and so on by being a root-condition, so too are they for the materiality arisen therefrom; but because it lacks the characteristic of the wholesome, that materiality is not wholesome.

52. Aññamaññayamake ‘yekeci kusalā’ti apucchitvā yekeci kusalamūlena ekamūlāti pucchā katā. Kasmā? Imināpi byañjanena tassevatthassa sambhavato. Kusalamūlānīti idaṃ purimassa visesanaṃ. ‘Mūlāni yāni ekato uppajjantī’ti hi vuttaṃ, tāni pana kusalamūlānipi honti akusalaabyākatamūlānipi, idha kusalamūlānīti visesadassanatthamidaṃ vuttaṃ. Aññamaññamūlāni cāti aññamaññaṃ hetupaccayena paccayā hontīti attho. Tasseva paṭilomapucchāya ‘sabbe te dhammā kusalamūlena ekamūlā’ti avatvā sabbe te dhammā kusalāti vuttaṃ. Kasmā? Atthavisesābhāvato. Kusalamūlena ekamūlāti hi pucchāya katāya ‘mūlāni yāni ekato uppajjantī’ti heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva vissajjanaṃ kātabbaṃ bhaveyya, evañca sati atthavisesābhāvo hoti. Tasmā tathā akatvā [Pg.291] evaṃ pucchā katā. Iminā upāyena mūlamūlanayādīsupi aññamaññamūlayamake pucchāviseso veditabbo.

52. In the mutual-root pair, the question is asked not as, “whatever wholesome states,” but as, “whatever states are of a single root with the wholesome root.” Why? Because this phrasing also makes that same meaning possible. “Roots of the wholesome” is a qualification of the preceding. For it was said, “roots that arise together,” but those can be wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate roots. Here, “roots of the wholesome” is stated to show the distinction. “And are mutually rooted” means they are conditions for each other by way of the root-condition. In the reverse question for this pair, instead of saying, “are all these states of a single root with the wholesome root,” it is said, “are all these states wholesome.” Why? Because there is no special meaning. For if the question had been asked as, “are of a single root with the wholesome root,” the answer would have had to be given in the same way as stated below, “roots that arise together,” and in that case there would be no special meaning. Therefore, the question was not asked in that way, but was asked thus. By this method, the distinction in the question in the mutual-root pair of the root-root method and others should be understood.

53-55. Mūlamūlanaye sabbe te kusalamūlamūlāti sabbe te kusalamūlasaṅkhātā mūlāti pucchati. Ekamūlamūlāti samānaṭṭhena ekameva mūlamūlaṃ etesanti ekamūlamūlā. Aññamaññamūlamūlāti aññamaññassa mūlaṃ aññamaññamūlaṃ, aññamaññamūlaṃ hetupaccayaṭṭhena mūlaṃ etesanti aññamaññamūlamūlā.

53-55. In the root-root method, “Are all these rooted in wholesome roots?” means one asks: “Are all those roots designated as wholesome roots?” “Rooted in a single root” means they have a single common root, in the sense of sameness. “Rooted in mutual roots” means that the root of one another is a mutual root, and they have that mutual root as their root in the sense of a root-condition.

56. Mūlakanaye kusalamūlakāti hetupaccayaṭṭhena kusalaṃ mūlaṃ etesanti kusalamūlakā.

56. In the rooted-method, “wholesome-rooted” means they have a wholesome root as their root in the sense of a root-condition.

57-61. Mūlamūlakanaye kusalamūlamūlakāti kusalānaṃ mūlaṃ kusalamūlaṃ. Hetupaccayaṭṭheneva kusalamūlaṃ mūlaṃ etesanti kusalamūlamūlakāti. Ayaṃ tāva kusalapadaṃ nissāya nayayamakapucchāsu visesattho.

57-61. In the root-rooted-method, “wholesome-root-rooted” means: the root of wholesome states is a wholesome root. Because a wholesome root is the root for these in the sense of a root-condition, they are “wholesome-root-rooted.” This, for now, is the special meaning in the questions of the method-pairs that relate to the wholesome term.

62-73. Akusalapadādīsupi eseva nayo. Ayaṃ pana viseso, ahetukaṃ akusalanti vicikicchāya ceva uddhaccena ca sampayuttaṃ mohaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ.

62-73. The same method applies to the unwholesome terms and so on. This, however, is the distinction: “unwholesome without a root” is said in reference to the delusion associated with doubt and restlessness.

74-85. Ahetukaṃ abyākatanti aṭṭhārasa cittuppādā rūpaṃ, nibbānañca. Abyākatamūlena na ekamūlanti idha pana ṭhapetvā sahetukaabyākatasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ, sesaṃ labbhati. Sahetukaabyākatasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ abyākatamūlena ekamūlaṃ hoti, taṃ abbohārikaṃ katvā ekato labbhamānakavaseneva cetaṃ vissajjanaṃ kataṃ.

74-85. Rootless indeterminate states are the eighteen types of consciousness, materiality, and Nibbāna. Regarding “not of a single root with the indeterminate root,” here, excepting materiality arisen from a rooted-indeterminate state, the remainder is obtained. Materiality arisen from a rooted-indeterminate state is of a single root with the indeterminate root, but treating that as non-conventional, this answer is given only by way of what is obtained collectively.

86-97. Nāmā dhammāti nāmasaṅkhātā dhammā. Te atthato cattāro arūpino khandhā, nibbānañca. Naveva nāmamūlānīti kusalākusalaabyākatamūlavasena nava mūlāni. Ahetukaṃ nāmaṃ nāmamūlena na ekamūlanti ahetukaṃ sabbampi aṭṭhārasa cittuppādavicikicchuddhaccasampayuttamohanibbānasaṅkhātaṃ nāmaṃ nāmamūlena na ekamūlaṃ. Na hi taṃ tena saddhiṃ uppajjati. Sahetukaṃ [Pg.292] nāmaṃ nāmamūlenāti padepi sahetukaṃ nāmaṃ nāmamūlenāti attho. Sesaṃ sabbattha uttānatthamevāti.

86-97. 'Name-states' are states designated as 'name.' In meaning, these are the four immaterial aggregates and Nibbāna. 'Nine roots of name' means there are nine roots by way of wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate roots. 'Name without a root is not of a single root with the name-root' means that all rootless name—namely, the eighteen types of consciousness, the delusion associated with doubt and restlessness, and Nibbāna, designated as name—is not of a single root with the name-root. For it does not arise together with it. In the phrase 'name with a root by the name-root,' the meaning is 'name with a root by the name-root.' The rest is clear in meaning everywhere.

Mūlavāravaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Root Section.

98-99. Hetuvārādīsupi imināvupāyena attho veditabbo. Mūlaṃ hetu nidānañcātigāthā yathāniddiṭṭhānaṃ dasannampi vārānaṃ puna uddānavaseneva vuttāti.

98-99. In the sections beginning with conditions, the meaning should be understood by this same method. The verse "root, cause, origin," etc., is stated as an introductory verse again for all ten sections, just as was indicated.

Mūlayamakavaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Root Yamaka.

2. Khandhayamakaṃ

2. The Yamaka on the Aggregates

1. Paṇṇattiuddesavāravaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Recitation Section of the Designation Division.

1. Idāni mūlayamake desiteyeva kusalādidhamme khandhavasena saṅgaṇhitvā mūlayamakānantaraṃ desitassa khandhayamakassa vaṇṇanā hoti. Tattha pāḷivavatthānaṃ tāva evaṃ veditabbaṃ – imasmiñhi khandhayamake tayo mahāvārā honti – paṇṇattivāro, pavattivāro, pariññāvāroti. Tesu paṇṇattivāro khandhānaṃ nāmābhidhānasodhanavaseneva gatattā paṇṇattivāroti vuccati. Pavattivāro tena sodhitanāmābhidhānānaṃ khandhānaṃ uppādanirodhavasena pavattiṃ sodhayamāno gato, tasmā pavattivāroti vuccati. Pariññāvāro iminānukkamena pavattānaṃ khandhānaṃ saṅkhepeneva tisso pariññā dīpayamāno gato, tasmā pariññāvāroti vuccati. Tattha paṇṇattivāro uddesaniddesavasena dvīhākārehi vavatthito. Itaresu visuṃ uddesavāro natthi. Ādito paṭṭhāya pucchāvissajjanavasena ekadhā vavatthitā. Tattha pañcakkhandhātipadaṃ ādiṃ katvā yāva na khandhā, na saṅkhārāti padaṃ tāva paṇṇattivārassa uddesavāro veditabbo. Pucchāvārotipi tasseva nāmaṃ. Tattha pañcakkhandhāti ayaṃ yamakavasena pucchitabbānaṃ khandhānaṃ uddeso. Rūpakkhandho…pe… viññāṇakkhandhoti tesaññeva pabhedato nāmavavatthānaṃ.

1. Now, since the Root Yamaka has been taught, the commentary on the Aggregate Yamaka, which was taught after the Root Yamaka, is presented by grouping the wholesome and other phenomena by way of the aggregates. Herein, the Pāli arrangement should first be understood as follows: In this Aggregate Yamaka, there are three main divisions—the Designation Division, the Process Division, and the Full-Understanding Division. Among these, the Designation Division is so called because it is concerned with clarifying the naming and designation of the aggregates. The Process Division is so called because it clarifies the process, in terms of arising and cessation, of the aggregates whose names and designations have been clarified. The Full-Understanding Division is so called because it briefly illuminates the three kinds of full-understanding of the aggregates that proceed in this sequence. Herein, the Designation Division is established in two ways: by way of recitation and explanation. In the others, there is no separate recitation section. From the beginning, they are established in one way by way of question and answer. Herein, starting from the phrase “the five aggregates” up to the phrase “not aggregates, not formations,” this should be understood as the recitation section of the Designation Division. The Question Section is also just a name for that. Herein, “the five aggregates” is the recitation of the aggregates to be questioned in pairs. The detailed naming of them is as follows: “the form aggregate… the consciousness aggregate.”

2-3. Idāni [Pg.293] imesaṃ khandhānaṃ vasena padasodhanavāro, padasodhanamūlacakkavāro, suddhakhandhavāro, suddhakhandhamūlacakkavāroti cattāro nayavārā honti. Tattha rūpaṃ rūpakkhandho, rūpakkhandho rūpantiādinā nayena padameva sodhetvā gato padasodhanavāro nāma. So anulomapaṭilomavasena duvidho hoti. Tattha anulomavāre ‘rūpaṃ rūpakkhandho, rūpakkhandho rūpa’ntiādīni pañca yamakāni. Paṭilomavārepi ‘na rūpaṃ, na rūpakkhandho; na rūpakkhandho na rūpa’ntiādīni pañceva. Tato paraṃ tesaññeva padasodhanavāre sodhitānaṃ khandhānaṃ ‘rūpaṃ rūpakkhandho, khandhā vedanākkhandho’tiādinā nayena ekekakhandhamūlakāni cattāri cattāri cakkāni bandhitvā gato padasodhanamūlakānaṃ cakkānaṃ atthitāya padasodhanamūlacakkavāro nāma. Sopi anulomapaṭilomavasena duvidho hoti. Tattha anulomavāre ‘rūpaṃ rūpakkhandho, khandhā vedanākkhandho’tiādīni ekekakhandhamūlakāni cattāri cattāri katvā vīsati yamakāni. Paṭilomavārepi ‘na rūpaṃ, na rūpakkhandho; na khandhā na vedanākkhandho’tiādīni vīsatimeva.

2-3. Now, with regard to these aggregates, there are four methodical divisions: the Word Clarification Division, the Word Clarification Root-Cycle Division, the Pure Aggregate Division, and the Pure Aggregate Root-Cycle Division. Here, the Word Clarification Division is so called because it proceeds by clarifying just the words themselves in the manner of "form is the form aggregate, the form aggregate is form," and so on. It is twofold: in forward and reverse order. Herein, in the forward order, there are five pairs, such as "form is the form aggregate, the form aggregate is form." In the reverse order, there are also just five pairs, such as "not form, not the form aggregate; not the form aggregate, not form." Thereafter, the Word Clarification Root-Cycle Division is so called because it proceeds by constructing four cycles, each based on a single aggregate, for those aggregates clarified in the Word Clarification Division—such as "form is the form aggregate, aggregates are the feeling aggregate," and so on—due to the presence of these cycles rooted in word clarification. This too is twofold: in forward and reverse order. Herein, in the forward order, there are twenty pairs, making four cycles each based on a single aggregate root, such as "form is the form aggregate, aggregates are the feeling aggregate." In the reverse order, there are also twenty pairs, such as "not form, not the form aggregate; not aggregates, not the feeling aggregate."

Tato paraṃ rūpaṃ khandho khandhā rūpantiādinā nayena suddhakhandhavaseneva gato suddhakhandhavāro nāma. Tattha khandhā rūpantiādīsu khandhā rūpakkhandho, khandhā vedanākkhandhoti attho gahetabbo. Kasmā? Niddesavāre evaṃ bhājitattā. Tattha hi ‘rūpaṃ khandhoti āmantā. Khandhā rūpakkhandhoti rūpakkhandho khandho ceva rūpakkhandho ca, avasesā khandhā na rūpakkhandho’ti evaṃ ‘khandhā rūpa’ntiādīnaṃ khandhā rūpakkhandhotiādinā nayena padaṃ uddharitvā attho vibhatto. Teneva ca kāraṇenese suddhakhandhavāroti vutto. Vacanasodhane viya hi ettha na vacanaṃ pamāṇaṃ. Yathā yathā pana suddhakhandhā labbhanti, tathā tathā atthova pamāṇaṃ. Parato āyatanayamakādīsupi eseva nayo. Esopi ca suddhakhandhavāro anulomapaṭilomavasena duvidho hoti. Tattha anulomavāre ‘rūpaṃ khandho khandhā rūpa’ntiādīni pañca yamakāni. Paṭilomavārepi ‘na rūpaṃ na khandho, na khandhā na rūpa’ntiādīni pañceva.

Then, the section proceeding by way of 'form is an aggregate, aggregates are form,' and so on, is called the Pure Aggregates Section because it proceeds solely by way of the pure aggregates. There, in phrases such as 'aggregates are form,' the meaning should be understood as 'aggregates are the form aggregate,' 'aggregates are the feeling aggregate,' and so on. Why? Because it is analyzed thus in the exposition section. For there, to the question 'Is form an aggregate?' the answer is 'Yes.' To the question 'Are aggregates the form aggregate?' the answer is: 'The form aggregate is both an aggregate and the form aggregate; the remaining aggregates are aggregates, but not the form aggregate.' In this way, for phrases such as 'aggregates are form,' the meaning is analyzed by specifying the term in the manner of 'aggregates are the form aggregate,' and so on. For this very reason, it is called the Pure Aggregates Section. For here, unlike in the clarification of wording, the wording is not the authority; rather, in whatever way the pure aggregates are found, in that way the meaning is the authority. This same method applies in the subsequent Yamakas, such as the Āyatana Yamaka. This Pure Aggregates Section is also twofold: in forward and reverse order. In the forward section, there are five pairs, such as 'form is an aggregate, aggregates are form,' and so on. In the reverse section, there are also just five pairs, such as 'not form, not an aggregate; not aggregates, not form,' and so on.

Tato paraṃ tesaññeva suddhakhandhānaṃ rūpaṃ khandho, khandhā vedanātiādinā nayena ekekakhandhamūlakāni cattāri cattāri cakkāni bandhitvā gato suddhakhandhamūlakānaṃ cakkānaṃ atthitāya suddhakhandhamūlacakkavāro nāma. Tattha [Pg.294] khandhā vedanātiādīsu khandhā vedanākkhandhotiādinā nayena attho veditabbo. Itarathā niddesavārena saddhiṃ virodho hoti. Sopi anulomapaṭilomavasena duvidho hoti. Tattha anulomavāre ‘rūpaṃ khandho, khandhā vedanā’tiādīni ekekakhandhamūlakāni cattāri cattāri katvā vīsati yamakāni. Paṭilomavārepi ‘na rūpaṃ, na khandho, na khandhā na vedanā’tiādīni vīsatimeva. Evaṃ tāva ekena yamakasatena dvīhi pucchāsatehi ekekapucchāya sanniṭṭhānasaṃsayavasena dve dve atthe katvā catūhi ca atthasatehi paṭimaṇḍito paṇṇattivārassa uddesavāro veditabboti.

Next, based on those same pure aggregates, by way of 'form is an aggregate, aggregates are feeling,' and so on, four cycles each are constructed for each single aggregate as a root; thus, due to the presence of these cycles rooted in the pure aggregates, it is called the pure aggregate root-cycle division. There, in phrases like 'aggregates are feeling,' the meaning should be understood in the manner of 'aggregates are the aggregate of feeling,' and so on. Otherwise, there would be a conflict with the section on exposition. This too is twofold: in forward and reverse order. In the forward section, there are twenty pairs, made by taking each single aggregate as the root in sets of four, such as 'form is an aggregate, aggregates are feeling,' and so on. In the reverse section, there are also twenty pairs like 'not form, not an aggregate; not aggregates, not feeling,' and so on. Thus, adorned with one hundred pairs, two hundred questions, making two meanings for each question by way of conclusion and doubt, and thus four hundred meanings—this is how the recitation section of the designation division should be understood.

Paṇṇattiuddesavāravaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Recitation Section of the Designation Division.

1. Paṇṇattiniddesavāravaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Exposition Section of the Designation Division.

26. Idāni rūpaṃ rūpakkhandhotiādinā nayena niddesavāro āraddho. Tattha rūpaṃ rūpakkhandhoti yaṃkiñci rūpanti vuccati. Sabbaṃ taṃ rūpaṃ rūpakkhandhoti vacanasodhanatthaṃ pucchati. Piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ, rūpaṃ, na rūpakkhandhoti yaṃ ‘piyarūpaṃ sātarūpa’nti ettha rūpanti vuttaṃ, taṃ rūpameva, na rūpakkhandhoti attho. Rūpakkhandho rūpañceva rūpakkhandho cāti yo pana rūpakkhandho, so rūpantipi rūpakkhandhotipi vattuṃ vaṭṭatīti attho. Rūpakkhandho rūpanti ettha pana yasmā rūpakkhandho niyameneva rūpanti vattabbo. Tasmā āmantāti āha. Iminā upāyena sabbavissajjanesu attho veditabbo. Yo pana yattha viseso bhavissati, tatheva taṃ vaṇṇayissāma. Saññāyamake tāva diṭṭhisaññāti ‘papañcasaññā’tiādīsu āgatā diṭṭhisaññā. Saṅkhārayamake avasesā saṅkhārāti ‘aniccā vata saṅkhārā’tiādīsu āgatā saṅkhārakkhandhato avasesā saṅkhatadhammā. Paṭilomavārepi eseva nayoti.

26. Now the section on exposition has been commenced by way of the method beginning with 'form is the aggregate of form,' and so on. Herein, 'form is the aggregate of form' refers to whatever is called form. 'Is all that form the aggregate of form?'—this is asked for the clarification of the statement. Regarding the statement, 'Pleasant form, delightful form is form, but not the aggregate of form,' the meaning is that what is called 'form' here, in 'pleasant form, delightful form,' is form itself, not the aggregate of form. As for 'the aggregate of form is both form and the aggregate of form,' the meaning is that whatever is the aggregate of form, it is fitting to call it both 'form' and 'the aggregate of form.' Here, however, regarding 'the aggregate of form is form,' since the aggregate of form must invariably be called form, therefore it is said 'yes.' By this method, the meaning in all replies should be understood. Wherever there will be a distinction, we shall explain it accordingly. First, in the section on perception, 'perception of views' refers to the perception of views that occurs in phrases like 'proliferated perceptions,' and so on. In the section on formations, 'the remaining formations' refers to the remaining conditioned phenomena apart from the aggregate of formations, as found in phrases like 'formations are indeed impermanent,' and so on. The same method applies in the reverse section.

Padasodhanavāro niṭṭhito.

The section on word clarification is concluded.

28. Padasodhanamūlacakkavāre khandhā vedanākkhandhoti yekeci khandhā, sabbe te vedanākkhandhoti pucchati. Sesapucchāsupi eseva nayo. Paṭilome na khandhā na vedanākkhandhoti ettha ye paññattinibbānasaṅkhātā dhammā [Pg.295] khandhā na honti, te yasmā vedanākkhandhopi na honti, tasmā āmantāti āha. Sesavissajjanesupi eseva nayoti.

28. In the section on the root cycle of word clarification, regarding 'Are aggregates the feeling aggregate?', it is asked whether all aggregates, whatever aggregates there are, are the feeling aggregate. The same method applies in the remaining questions. In the reverse, regarding 'not aggregates, not the feeling aggregate,' since those phenomena designated as concepts and Nibbāna, which are not aggregates, are also not the feeling aggregate, therefore it is said 'yes.' The same method applies in the remaining answers.

Padasodhanamūlacakkavāro niṭṭhito.

The section on the root cycle of word clarification is concluded.

38. Suddhakhandhavāre rūpaṃ khandhoti yaṃkiñci rūpanti vuttaṃ, sabbaṃ taṃ khandhoti pucchati. Tattha yasmā piyarūpasātarūpasaṅkhātaṃ vā rūpaṃ hotu, bhūtupādārūpaṃ vā, sabbaṃ pañcasu khandhesu saṅgahaṃ gacchateva. Tasmā āmantāti paṭijānāti. Dutiyapade ‘khandhā rūpa’nti pucchitabbe yasmā rūpantivacanena rūpakkhandhova adhippeto, tasmā vacanaṃ anādiyitvā atthavasena pucchanto khandhā rūpakkhandhoti āha. Iminā nayena sabbapadesu attho veditabbo. Parato āyatanayamakādīnaṃ niddesavārepi eseva nayo. Saññā khandhoti etthāpi diṭṭhisaññā vā hotu, saññā eva vā, sabbāyapi khandhabhāvato āmantāti vuttaṃ. Saṅkhārā khandhoti padepi eseva nayo. Khandhavinimuttako hi saṅkhāro nāma natthi.

38. In the section on the pure aggregates, regarding 'form is an aggregate,' it is asked whether all that is called form is an aggregate. Herein, since whether it is form designated as pleasant and delightful, or primary and derived matter, all are indeed included in the five aggregates, therefore it is affirmed 'yes.' In the second phrase, when 'aggregates are form' is to be asked, since by the word 'form' the aggregate of form itself is intended, therefore, disregarding the wording and asking based on the meaning, one says, 'aggregates are the aggregate of form.' By this method, the meaning in all phrases should be understood. The same method applies in the subsequent sections on the exposition of the sense bases, and so on. Regarding 'perception is an aggregate,' here too, whether it is perception of views or just perception, since all are of the nature of an aggregate, it is said 'yes.' The same method applies in the phrase 'formations are an aggregate' too. For there is no formation that is truly exempt from the aggregates.

39. Paṭilome na rūpaṃ na khandhoti yaṃ dhammajātaṃ rūpaṃ na hoti, taṃ khandhopi na hotīti pucchati. Vissajjane panassa rūpaṃ ṭhapetvā avasesā khandhā na rūpaṃ, khandhāti rūpato aññe vedanādayo khandhā rūpameva na honti, khandhā pana hontīti attho. Rūpañca khandhe ca ṭhapetvā avasesāti pañcakkhandhavinimuttaṃ nibbānañceva paññatti ca. Ito paresupi ‘avasesā’ti padesu eseva nayoti.

39. In the reverse, regarding 'not form, not an aggregate,' it is asked whether a phenomenon that is not form is also not an aggregate. In its reply, however, 'excluding form, the remaining aggregates are not form, but are aggregates' means that the aggregates other than form, such as feeling and so on, are indeed not form, but they are aggregates. And 'excluding form and the aggregates, the remainder' refers to Nibbāna and concepts, which are free from the five aggregates. In subsequent instances of the word 'remainder' too, the same method applies.

Suddhakhandhavāro niṭṭhito.

The section on the pure aggregates is concluded.

40-44. Suddhakhandhamūlacakkavāre rūpaṃ khandhotiādīnaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva attho veditabboti.

40-44. In the section on the root cycle of the pure aggregates, the meaning of 'form is an aggregate,' and so on, should be understood in the way explained previously.

Suddhakhandhamūlacakkavāro niṭṭhito.

The section on the root cycle of the pure aggregates is concluded.

Paṇṇattiniddesavāravaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Exposition Section of the Designation Division.

2. Pavattivāravaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Section on Occurrence.

50-205. Idāni [Pg.296] yassa rūpakkhandhotiādinā nayena pavattivāro āraddho. Kasmā panettha uddesavāro na vuttoti? Heṭṭhā dassitanayattā. Paṇṇattivārasmiñhi uddesavāre nayo dassito. Tena pana nayena sakkā so idha avuttopi jānitunti taṃ avatvā niddesavārova āraddho. Imasmiṃ pana pavattivārasaṅkhāte mahāvāre uppādavāro, nirodhavāro, uppādanirodhavāroti tayo antaravārā honti. Tesu paṭhamo dhammānaṃ uppādalakkhaṇassa dīpitattā uppādavāroti vuccati. Dutiyo tesaññeva nirodhalakkhaṇassa dīpitattā nirodhavāroti vuccati. Tatiyo ubhinnampi lakkhaṇānaṃ dīpitattā uppādanirodhavāroti vuccati. Uppādavārena cettha dhammānaṃ uppajjanākārova dīpito. Nirodhavārena ‘uppannaṃ nāma niccaṃ natthī’ti tesaññeva aniccatā dīpitā. Uppādanirodhavārena tadubhayaṃ.

50-205. Now the section on occurrence has been commenced by way of the method beginning with 'for whom the aggregate of form,' and so on. Why is the summary section not stated here? Because the method has been shown previously. For indeed, in the section on designations, the method was shown in the summary section. By that method, it is possible to understand it even if it is not stated here; therefore, without stating it, only the detailed section has been commenced. In this great section, however, known as the section on occurrence, there are three intermediate sections: the section on arising, the section on cessation, and the section on arising and cessation. Among these, the first is called the section on arising because it reveals the characteristic of arising of phenomena. The second is called the section on cessation because it reveals the characteristic of cessation of those same phenomena. The third is called the section on arising and cessation because it reveals both characteristics. Here, by the section on arising, only the mode of origination of phenomena is revealed. By the section on cessation, the impermanence of those same phenomena is revealed, as in: 'What has arisen is indeed not permanent.' By the section on arising and cessation, both are revealed.

Tattha uppādavāre tāva tiṇṇaṃ addhānaṃ vasena cha kālabhedā honti – paccuppanno, atīto, anāgato, paccuppannenātīto, paccuppannenānāgato, atītenānāgatoti. Tesu ‘yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjatī’ti paccuppannābhidhānavasena paccuppanno veditabbo. So paccuppannānaṃ dhammānaṃ paccakkhato gahetabbattā ativiya suviññeyyoti paṭhamaṃ vutto. Yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjitthāti atītābhidhānavasena atīto veditabbo. So paccakkhato anubhūtapubbānaṃ atītadhammānaṃ anumānena anāgatehi suviññeyyatarattā dutiyaṃ vutto. Yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjissatīti anāgatābhidhānavasena anāgato veditabbo. So paccakkhato ca anubhūtapubbavasena ca gahitadhammānumānena ‘anāgatepi evarūpā dhammā uppajjissantī’ti gahetabbato tatiyaṃ vutto.

Here, in the section on arising, there are first six divisions of time by way of the three periods: present, past, future, present-past, present-future, and past-future. Among these, 'for whom the aggregate of form arises' is to be understood as the present, by way of the designation of the present. It is stated first because it is very easily understood, since present phenomena are to be directly apprehended. 'For whom the aggregate of form arose' is to be understood as the past, by way of the designation of the past. It is stated second because it is more easily understood than future phenomena, being inferred from past phenomena that were previously experienced directly. 'For whom the aggregate of form will arise' is to be understood as the future, by way of the designation of the future. It is stated third because it is to be apprehended by inference based on phenomena already grasped through direct experience and past experience, thinking, 'such phenomena will also arise in the future.'

Yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjati, tassa vedanākkhandho uppajjitthāti paccuppannena saddhiṃ atītābhidhānavasena paccuppannenātīto veditabbo. So missakesu tīsu suviññeyyatarattā catutthaṃ vutto. Yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjati tassa vedanākkhandho uppajjissatīti paccuppannena saddhiṃ anāgatābhidhānavasena paccuppannenānāgato veditabbo. So paccakkhato gahetabbānaṃ dhammānaṃ atthitāya atthato suviññeyyataroti pañcamaṃ vutto. Yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjittha, tassa vedanākkhandho uppajjissatīti atītena [Pg.297] saddhiṃ anāgatābhidhānavasena atītenānāgato veditabbo. So purimehi duviññeyyoti chaṭṭhaṃ vutto.

'For whom the aggregate of form arises, for him the aggregate of feeling arose' — this is to be understood as the present-past, by way of designating the past together with the present. It is stated as the fourth because it is more easily understood among the three mixed cases. 'For whom the aggregate of form arises, for him the aggregate of feeling will arise' — this is to be understood as the present-future, by way of designating the future together with the present. It is stated as the fifth because it is more easily understood in reality due to the existence of phenomena to be directly apprehended. 'For whom the aggregate of form arose, for him the aggregate of feeling will arise' — this is to be understood as the past-future, by way of designating the future together with the past. It is stated as the sixth because it is more difficult to understand than the previous ones.

Evametesu chasu kālabhedesu yvāyaṃ paṭhamo paccuppanno, tattha puggalato, okāsato, puggalokāsatoti tayo vārā honti. Tesu yassāti puggalavasena khandhānaṃ uppattidīpano puggalavāro. Yatthāti okāsavasena khandhānaṃ uppattidīpano okāsavāro. Yassa yatthāti puggalokāsavasena khandhānaṃ uppattidīpano puggalokāsavāro. Ime pana tayopi vārā paṭhamaṃ anulomanayena niddisitvā pacchā paṭilomanayena niddiṭṭhā. Tesu ‘uppajjati’ ‘uppajjittha,’ ‘uppajjissatī’ti vacanato uppattidīpano anulomanayo. ‘Nuppajjati’, ‘nuppajjittha,’ ‘nuppajjissatī’ti vacanato anuppattidīpano paṭilomanayo.

Thus, among these six divisions of time, in the first, which is the present, there are three sections: by way of the individual, by way of the location, and by way of the individual and location. Among these, 'whose' refers to the section on the individual, which reveals the arising of aggregates by way of the individual. 'Where' refers to the section on the location, which reveals the arising of aggregates by way of the location. 'Whose where' refers to the section on the individual and location, which reveals the arising of aggregates by way of the individual and location. These three sections, however, are first specified in direct order and then specified in reverse order. Among these, the direct order reveals arising with statements like 'arises,' 'arose,' and 'will arise.' The reverse order reveals non-arising with statements like 'does not arise,' 'did not arise,' and 'will not arise.'

Tattha paccuppannakāle tāva puggalavārassa anulomanaye ‘‘yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjati, tassa vedanākkhandho uppajjati. Yassa vā pana vedanākkhandho uppajjati, tassa rūpakkhandho uppajjati. Yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjati, tassa saññākkhandho saṅkhārakkhandho, viññāṇakkhandho, uppajjati. Yassa vā pana viññāṇakkhandho uppajjati, tassa rūpakkhandho uppajjatī’’ti evaṃ rūpakkhandhamūlakāni cattāri yamakāni; ‘‘yassa vedanākkhandho uppajjati, tassa saññākkhandho uppajjatī’’tiādinā nayena vedanākkhandhamūlakāni tīṇi; saññākkhandhamūlakāni dve; saṅkhārakkhandhamūlakaṃ ekanti aggahitaggahaṇena dasa yamakāni honti.

Here, in the present time, in the section on the individual, in the direct order: "For whom the form aggregate arises, for them the feeling aggregate arises. Or, for whom the feeling aggregate arises, for them the form aggregate arises. For whom the form aggregate arises, for them the perception aggregate, the formation aggregate, and the consciousness aggregate arise. Or, for whom the consciousness aggregate arises, for them the form aggregate arises." Thus, there are four pairs rooted in the form aggregate. "For whom the feeling aggregate arises, for them the perception aggregate arises," and so on; in this manner there are three rooted in the feeling aggregate; two rooted in the perception aggregate; one rooted in the formation aggregate. Thus, by taking what has not been taken, there are ten pairs.

Tattha rūpakkhandhamūlakesu catūsu ādito ekameva vissajjitaṃ. Sesāni tena sadisavissajjanānīti tantiyā lahubhāvatthaṃ saṅkhittāni. Vedanākkhandhādimūlakesupi ‘āmantā’ti ekasadisameva vissajjanaṃ. Tasmā tānipi tantiyā lahubhāvatthaṃ saṅkhittānevāti evametāni paccuppannakāle puggalavāre anulomanaye ekayamakavissajjaneneva dasa yamakāni vissajjitāni nāma hontīti veditabbāni. Yathā ca puggalavāre dasa, evaṃ okāsavāre dasa, puggalokāsavāre dasāti paccuppannakāle tīsu vāresu anulomanaye tiṃsa yamakāni honti. Yathā ca anulomanaye, evaṃ paṭilomanayepīti sabbānipi paccuppannakāle saṭṭhi [Pg.298] yamakāni honti. Tesu vīsapucchāsataṃ, cattārīsāni ca dve atthasatāni hontīti veditabbāni. Evaṃ sesesupi pañcasu kālabhedesu puggalādibhedato anulomapaṭilomanayavasena cha cha vārā. Ekekasmiṃ vāre dasa dasa katvā saṭṭhi saṭṭhi yamakānīti tīṇi yamakasatāni. Tāni purimehi saddhiṃ saṭṭhādhikāni tīṇi yamakasatāni, vīsādhikāni sattapucchāsatāni, cattārīsāni ca cuddasa atthasatāni honti. Idaṃ tāva uppādavāre pāḷivavatthānaṃ. Yathā ca uppādavāre, tathā nirodhavārepi, uppādanirodhavārepīti sabbasmimpi pavattimahāvāre asīti yamakasahassaṃ, saṭṭhisatādhikāni dve pucchāsahassāni, vīsaṃ tisatādhikāni ca cattāri atthasahassāni veditabbāni.

Here, among the four pairs rooted in the form aggregate, only one is resolved at the beginning. The rest are abbreviated for the sake of brevity in the text, as their resolutions are similar to that one. Even regarding those rooted in the feeling aggregate and so on, the resolution is simply 'yes,' being of one similar kind. Therefore, these too are abbreviated for the sake of brevity in the text. Thus, it should be understood that in the present time, in the section on individuals, in the progressive order, these ten pairs are resolved by the resolution of a single pair. Just as there are ten in the section on individuals, so too there are ten in the section on locations, and ten in the section on individuals and locations. Thus, in the present time, in the three sections in the progressive order, there are thirty pairs. And just as in the progressive order, so too in the reverse order—thus, in all, in the present time, there are sixty pairs. Among these, it should be understood that there are 120 questions and 240 answers. Similarly, in the remaining five divisions of time, based on the divisions of individuals and so forth, following both progressive and reverse orders, there are six sections each. In each section, counting ten pairs each, there are sixty pairs, totaling three hundred pairs. These, together with the previous ones, make 360 pairs, 720 questions, and 1,440 answers. This, for now, is the arrangement of the Pali text in the arising section. Just as in the arising section, so too in the cessation section, and in the arising and cessation section—thus, in the entire great section on occurrence, it should be understood that there are 80,000 pairs, 2,160 questions, and 4,320 answers.

Pāḷi pana uppādavāre nirodhavāre ca tīsu asammissakakālabhedesu tasmiṃ tasmiṃ vāre ekekameva yamakaṃ vissajjetvā saṅkhittā. Tīsu missakakālabhedesu ‘yassa vedanākkhandho uppajjati, tassa saññākkhandho uppajjitthā’tiādinā nayena vedanākkhandhādimūlakesupi ekaṃ yamakaṃ vissajjitaṃ. Uppādanirodhavāre pana chasupi kālabhedesu taṃ vissajjitameva. Sesāni tena samānavissajjanattā saṅkhittānīti. Idaṃ sakalepi pavattimahāvāre pāḷivavatthānaṃ.

The Pali text, however, in the arising section and the cessation section, is abbreviated, having resolved just one pair in each of the three unmixed time divisions for each section. In the three mixed time divisions, one pair is resolved even in those rooted in the feeling aggregate and so on, in the manner of “for whom the feeling aggregate arises, for them had the perception aggregate arisen,” etc. In the arising-and-cessation section, however, that is resolved in all six time divisions. The rest are abbreviated because their resolution is similar to that. This is the arrangement of the Pali text in the entire great section on occurrence.

Atthavinicchayatthaṃ panassa idaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ veditabbaṃ – imasmiñhi pavattimahāvāre catunnaṃ pañhānaṃ pañca vissajjanāni sattavīsatiyā ṭhānesu pakkhipitvā atthavinicchayo veditabbo. Tattha purepañho, pacchāpañho, paripuṇṇapañho, moghapañhoti ime cattāro pañhā nāma. Ekekasmiñhi yamake dve dve pucchā. Ekekapucchāyapi dve dve padāni. Tattha yāya pucchāya vissajjane ekeneva padena gahitakkhandhassa uppādo vā nirodho vā labbhati, ayaṃ purepañho nāma. Yāya pana pucchāya vissajjane dvīhipi padehi gahitakkhandhānaṃ uppādo vā nirodho vā labbhati, ayaṃ pacchāpañho nāma. Yāya pana pucchāya vissajjane ekenapi padena gahitakkhandhassa dvīhipi padehi gahitakkhandhānaṃ uppādo vā, nirodho vā labbhati, ayaṃ paripuṇṇapañho nāma. Yāya pana pucchāya vissajjane paṭikkhepo vā, paṭisedho vā labbhati, ayaṃ moghapañho nāma. Yasmā panesa adassiyamāno na sakkā jānituṃ, tasmā naṃ dassayissāma.

For the determination of its meaning, this characteristic should be known: in this great section on occurrence, the meaning should be discerned by placing the five resolutions of the four questions in twenty-seven instances. Herein, there are four types of questions: the prior question, the subsequent question, the complete question, and the futile question. In each pair, there are two questions. Each question also has two terms. Herein, the question where, in the resolution, the arising or cessation of the aggregate taken with just one term is obtained, this is called the prior question. The question where, in the resolution, the arising or cessation of the aggregates taken with both terms is obtained, this is called the subsequent question. The question where, in the resolution, the arising or cessation of the aggregate taken with one term, or of the aggregates taken with both terms, is obtained, this is called the complete question. The question where, in the resolution, rejection or denial is obtained, this is called the futile question. Since this cannot be known unless it is shown, therefore we will demonstrate it.

‘Yattha [Pg.299] rūpakkhandho nuppajjati, tattha vedanākkhandho nuppajjatī’ti pucchāya tāva uppajjatīti imasmiṃ vissajjane ekeneva padena gahitassa vedanākkhandhassa uppādo labbhati, iti ayañceva añño ca evarūpo pañho purepañhoti veditabbo. ‘Yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjittha, tassa vedanākkhandho uppajjitthā’ti pucchāya pana ‘āmantā’ti imasmiṃ vissajjane dvīhi padehi gahitānaṃ rūpavedanākkhandhānaṃ yassa kassaci sattassa atīte uppādo labbhati. Iti ayañceva añño ca evarūpo pañho pacchāpañhoti veditabbo.

In the question, “Where the form aggregate does not arise, does the feeling aggregate not arise there?” in the resolution ‘it arises,’ the arising of the feeling aggregate, taken with just one term, is obtained. Thus, this and other such questions should be understood as prior questions. In the question, “For whom the form aggregate had arisen, for them had the feeling aggregate arisen?” however, in the resolution ‘yes,’ the arising of both form and feeling aggregates in the past for any being is obtained. Thus, this and other such questions should be understood as subsequent questions.

‘Yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjati, tassa vedanākkhandho uppajjatī’ti imāya pana paṭhamapucchāya ‘asaññasattaṃ upapajjantāna’ntiādike imasmiṃ vissajjane ‘asaññasattaṃ upapajjantānaṃ tesaṃ rūpakkhandho uppajjati, no ca tesaṃ vedanākkhandho uppajjatī’ti imasmiṃ koṭṭhāse ekeneva padena gahitassa rūpakkhandhassapi uppādo labbhati. ‘Pañcavokāraṃ upapajjantānaṃ tesaṃ rūpakkhandho ca uppajjati vedanākkhandho ca uppajjatī’ti imasmiṃ koṭṭhāse dvīhipi padehi saṅgahitānaṃ rūpavedanākkhandhānampi uppādo labbhati. Iti ayañceva añño ca evarūpo pañho paripuṇṇapañhoti veditabbo. Purepacchāpañhotipi etasseva nāmaṃ. Etassa hi vissajjane purimakoṭṭhāse ekena padena saṅgahitassa rūpakkhandhasseva uppādo dassito. Dutiyakoṭṭhāse dvīhi padehi saṅgahitānaṃ rūpavedanākkhandhānaṃ. Imināyeva ca lakkhaṇena yattha ekena padena saṅgahitassa khandhassa uppādo vā nirodho vā labbhati, so purepañhoti vutto. Yattha dvīhipi padehi saṅgahitānaṃ khandhānaṃ uppādo vā nirodho vā labbhati, so pacchāpañhoti vutto.

However, in this first question, ‘For whom the form aggregate arises, for them does the feeling aggregate arise?’, in this resolution beginning with ‘those arising in the non-percipient realm,’ in this section, ‘For those arising in the non-percipient realm, the form aggregate arises, but for them the feeling aggregate does not arise,’ the arising of the form aggregate, encompassed by one term, is obtained. In this section, ‘For those arising in the five-constituent existence, the form aggregate arises, and the feeling aggregate also arises,’ the arising of the form and feeling aggregates, encompassed by two terms, is also obtained. Thus, this and any other such question should be understood as a complete question. This is also called a ‘prior-and-subsequent question.’ For in its resolution, in the first section, only the arising of the form aggregate, encompassed by one term, is shown. In the second section, the arising of the form and feeling aggregates, encompassed by two terms, is shown. And by this very characteristic, wherever the arising or cessation of an aggregate, encompassed by one term, is obtained, that is called a prior question. Wherever the arising or cessation of aggregates, encompassed by two terms, is obtained, that is called a subsequent question.

‘Yassa rūpakkhandho nuppajjittha, tassa vedanākkhandho nuppajjitthā’ti imāya pana pucchāya ‘natthī’ti imasmiṃ vissajjane paṭikkhepo labbhati. ‘Yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjati, tassa vedanākkhandho nirujjhatī’ti pucchāya ‘no’ti imasmiṃ vissajjane paṭisedho labbhati. Tasmā ayañceva duvidho añño ca evarūpo pañho moghapañhoti veditabbo. Tucchapañhotipi vuccati. Evaṃ tāva cattāro pañhā veditabbā.

However, in the question ‘For whom the form aggregate did not arise, for them did the feeling aggregate not arise?’, in this resolution ‘it does not exist,’ rejection is obtained. In the question ‘For whom the form aggregate arises, for them does the feeling aggregate cease?’, in this resolution ‘no,’ denial is obtained. Therefore, this twofold question and others like it should be understood as futile questions. They are also called empty questions. Thus, these four questions should be understood.

Pāḷigatiyā vissajjanaṃ, paṭivacanavissajjanaṃ, sarūpadassanena vissajjanaṃ, paṭikkhepena vissajjanaṃ, paṭisedhena vissajjananti imāni pana pañca vissajjanāni nāma[Pg.300]. Tattha yaṃ vissajjanaṃ pāḷipadameva hutvā atthaṃ vissajjeti, idaṃ pāḷigatiyā vissajjanaṃ nāma. Taṃ purepañhe labbhati. ‘Yattha rūpakkhandho nuppajjati tattha vedanākkhandho nuppajjatī’ti hi pañhe ‘uppajjatī’ti idaṃ vissajjanaṃ pāḷipadameva hutvā atthaṃ vissajjayamānaṃ gataṃ, tasmā evarūpesu ṭhānesu pāḷigatiyā vissajjanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Yaṃ pana vissajjanaṃ paṭivacanabhāvena atthaṃ vissajjeti, idaṃ paṭivacanavissajjanaṃ nāma. Taṃ pacchāpañhe labbhati. ‘Yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjittha, tassa vedanākkhandho uppajjitthā’ti hi pañhe ‘āmantā’ti idaṃ vissajjanaṃ paṭivacanavaseneva atthaṃ vissajjayamānaṃ gataṃ, tasmā evarūpesu ṭhānesu paṭivacanavissajjanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Yaṃ vissajjanaṃ sarūpena dassetvā atthaṃ vissajjeti; idaṃ sarūpadassanena vissajjanaṃ nāma. Taṃ paripuṇṇapañhe labbhati. ‘Yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjati; tassa vedanākkhandho uppajjatī’ti hi pañhe ‘asaññasattaṃ upapajjantāna’nti idaṃ vissajjanaṃ ‘imesaṃ rūpakkhandho uppajjati, no ca vedanākkhandho, imesaṃ rūpakkhandho ca uppajjati, vedanākkhandho cā’ti sarūpadassaneneva atthaṃ vissajjayamānaṃ gataṃ. Tasmā evarūpesu ṭhānesu sarūpadassanena vissajjanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Yaṃ pana vissajjanaṃ tathārūpassa atthassābhāvato atthapaṭikkhepena pañhaṃ vissajjeti, idaṃ paṭikkhepena vissajjanaṃ nāma. Yaṃ tathārūpassa atthassa ekakkhaṇe alābhato atthapaṭisedhanena pañhaṃ vissajjeti, idaṃ paṭisedhena vissajjanaṃ nāma. Taṃ moghapañhe labbhati. ‘Yassa rūpakkhandho nuppajjittha, tassa vedanākkhandho nuppajjitthā’ti hi pañhe ‘natthī’ti idaṃ vissajjanaṃ; evarūpo nāma satto natthīti atthapaṭikkhepena pañhaṃ vissajjayamānaṃ gataṃ; tasmā evarūpesu ṭhānesu paṭikkhepena vissajjanaṃ veditabbaṃ. ‘Yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjati, tassa vedanākkhandho nirujjhatī’ti pañhe pana ‘no’ti idaṃ vissajjanaṃ ekasmiṃ paṭisandhikkhaṇe uppādena saddhiṃ nirodho nāma na labbhatīti atthapaṭisedhanena pañhaṃ vissajjayamānaṃ gataṃ, tasmā evarūpesu ṭhānesu paṭisedhena vissajjanaṃ veditabbaṃ.

Now, there are these five types of resolutions: resolution by textual quotation, resolution by direct answer, resolution by specification, resolution by rejection, and resolution by denial. Among these, a resolution that resolves the meaning by being a direct quotation from the Pāli text is called a resolution by textual quotation. This is found in a prior question. For example, in the question, ‘Where the form aggregate does not arise, does the feeling aggregate not arise?’ the resolution ‘It arises’ resolves the meaning by being a direct quotation from the Pāli text. Therefore, in such cases, it should be understood as a resolution by textual quotation. A resolution that resolves the meaning by way of a direct answer is called a resolution by direct answer. This is found in a subsequent question. For example, in the question, ‘For whom the form aggregate has arisen, has the feeling aggregate arisen?’ the resolution ‘Yes’ resolves the meaning by way of a direct answer. Therefore, in such cases, it should be understood as a resolution by direct answer. A resolution that resolves the meaning by showing its own nature is called a resolution by specification. This is found in a complete question. For example, in the question, ‘For whom the form aggregate arises, does the feeling aggregate arise?’ the resolution ‘For those being reborn in the non-percipient realm…’ resolves the meaning by specification, thus: ‘For these, the form aggregate arises but not the feeling aggregate; for these, both the form aggregate and the feeling aggregate arise.’ Therefore, in such cases, it should be understood as a resolution by specification. A resolution that answers a question by rejecting its premise, due to the absence of such a thing, is called a resolution by rejection. A resolution that answers a question by denying its premise, due to its not being obtainable in a single moment, is called a resolution by denial. These are found in a futile question. For example, in the question, ‘For whom the form aggregate has not arisen, has the feeling aggregate not arisen?’ the resolution ‘There is not’ answers the question by rejecting its premise, stating, ‘Such a being does not exist.’ Therefore, in such cases, it should be understood as a resolution by rejection. In the question, ‘For whom the form aggregate arises, does the feeling aggregate cease?’ the resolution ‘No’ answers the question by denying its premise, stating, ‘Cessation together with arising in a single moment of rebirth-linking is not obtainable.’ Therefore, in such cases, it should be understood as a resolution by denial.

Idāni ime cattāro pañhā, imāni ca pañca vissajjanāni, yesu sattavīsatiyā ṭhānesu pakkhipitabbāni, tāni evaṃ veditabbāni – asaññasattaṃ upapajjantānanti ekaṃ ṭhānaṃ, asaññasatte tatthāti ekaṃ, asaññasattānanti ekaṃ; asaññasattā cavantānanti ekaṃ; arūpaṃ upapajjantānanti ekaṃ, arūpe tatthāti ekaṃ, arūpānanti ekaṃ, arūpā cavantānanti ekaṃ, arūpe pacchimabhavikānanti [Pg.301] ekaṃ, arūpe parinibbantānanti ekaṃ; ye ca arūpaṃ upapajjitvā parinibbāyissantīti ekaṃ; pañcavokāraṃ upapajjantānanti ekaṃ, pañcavokāre tatthāti ekaṃ, pañcavokārānanti ekaṃ pañcavokārā cavantānanti ekaṃ, pañcavokāre pacchimabhavikānanti ekaṃ, pañcavokāre parinibbantānanti ekaṃ; suddhāvāsaṃ upapajjantānanti ekaṃ, suddhāvāse tatthāti ekaṃ, suddhāvāsānanti ekaṃ, suddhāvāse parinibbantānanti ekaṃ; sabbesaṃ upapajjantānanti ekaṃ, sabbesaṃ cavantānanti ekaṃ; sabbasādhāraṇavasena pacchimabhavikānanti ekaṃ, parinibbantānanti ekaṃ, catuvokāraṃ pañcavokāraṃ upapajjantānanti ekaṃ, cavantānanti ekaṃ. Evaṃ imesaṃ catunnaṃ pañhānaṃ imāni pañca vissajjanāni imesu sattavīsatiyā ṭhānesu pakkhipitvā imasmiṃ pavattimahāvāre atthavinicchayo veditabbo. Evaṃ viditvā hi pañhaṃ vissajjantena suvissajjito hoti, atthañca vinicchayantena suvinicchito hoti.

Now these four questions and these five replies are to be placed in twenty-seven instances, which should be understood as follows: 'For those being reborn into the non-percipient realm'—one instance; 'for those dwelling there in the non-percipient realm'—one instance; 'for non-percipient beings'—one instance; 'for non-percipient beings passing away'—one instance; 'for those being reborn into the formless realm'—one instance; 'for those dwelling there in the formless realm'—one instance; 'for formless beings'—one instance; 'for formless beings passing away'—one instance; 'for those in their last existence in the formless realm'—one instance; 'for those attaining final Nibbāna in the formless realm'—one instance; 'for those who, having been reborn into the formless realm, will attain final Nibbāna'—one instance; 'for those being reborn into the five-aggregate realm'—one instance; 'for those dwelling there in the five-aggregate realm'—one instance; 'for five-aggregate beings'—one instance; 'for five-aggregate beings passing away'—one instance; 'for those in their last existence in the five-aggregate realm'—one instance; 'for those attaining final Nibbāna in the five-aggregate realm'—one instance; 'for those being reborn into the Pure Abodes'—one instance; 'for those dwelling there in the Pure Abodes'—one instance; 'for Pure Abode beings'—one instance; 'for those attaining final Nibbāna in the Pure Abodes'—one instance; 'for all beings being reborn'—one instance; 'for all beings passing away'—one instance; 'for those in their last existence in a universal sense'—one instance; 'for those attaining final Nibbāna'—one instance; 'for those being reborn into the four-aggregate and five-aggregate realms'—one instance; 'for those passing away'—one instance. Thus, these five replies to the four questions are to be placed in these twenty-seven instances, and the meaning should be discerned accordingly in this great section on the course of existence. For, having understood thus, one who answers the questions answers well, and one who discerns the meaning discerns well.

Tatthāyaṃ nayo – yassa rūpakkhandho uppajjatīti yassa puggalassa uppādakkhaṇasamaṅgitāya rūpakkhandho uppajjati. Tassa vedanākkhandho uppajjatīti vedanākkhandhopi tassa tasmiññeva khaṇe uppajjatīti pucchati. Asaññasattaṃ upapajjantānanti acittakapaṭisandhivasena asaññasattabhavaṃ upapajjantānaṃ. Tesaṃ rūpakkhandho uppajjatīti tesaṃ ekantena rūpakkhandho uppajjatiyeva. Pavatte uppannānaṃ rūpakkhandho uppajjatipi nirujjhatipi, tasmā ‘asaññasattāna’nti avatvā’asaññasattaṃ upapajjantāna’nti vuttaṃ. No ca tesaṃ vedanākkhandho uppajjatīti acittakattā pana tesaṃ vedanākkhandho nuppajjateva. Idaṃ sattavīsatiyā ṭhānesu paṭhame ṭhāne paripuṇṇapañhassa purimakoṭṭhāse sarūpadassanena vissajjanaṃ. Pañcavokāraṃ upapajjantānanti rūpārūpamissakapaṭisandhivasena pañcavokārabhavaṃ upapajjantānaṃ. Tesaṃ rūpakkhandho ca uppajjati, vedanākkhandho cāti tesaṃ ekantena rūpavedanākkhandhasaṅkhātā dvepi khandhā uppajjantiyeva. Pavatte pana tattha uppannānaṃ te khandhā uppajjantipi nirujjhantipi, tasmā ‘pañcavokārāna’nti avatvā ‘pañcavokāraṃ upapajjantāna’nti vuttaṃ. Idaṃ pañcavokāraṃ upapajjantānanti ṭhāne paripuṇṇapañhassa pacchimakoṭṭhāse sarūpadassanena vissajjanaṃ. Iminā upāyena sabbāni vissajjanāni veditabbāni.

Herein, the method is as follows: 'For whom the material aggregate arises'—this refers to the person for whom the material aggregate arises, being endowed with the moment of its origination. 'For them the feeling aggregate arises'—this asks whether the feeling aggregate also arises for that same person at that very moment. 'For those being reborn into the non-percipient realm'—this refers to those who are being reborn into the non-percipient state of existence by way of rebirth-linking without consciousness. For them, the material aggregate certainly arises. For those who have arisen in the course of existence, the material aggregate both arises and ceases; therefore, instead of saying 'for non-percipient beings,' it is said 'for those being reborn into the non-percipient realm.' But for them, the feeling aggregate does not arise because they are without consciousness. This is the reply by specification, in the first part of the complete question in the first instance among the twenty-seven instances. 'For those being reborn into the five-aggregate realm'—this refers to those who are being reborn into the five-aggregate state of existence by way of rebirth-linking comprising both material and immaterial factors. For them, both aggregates, namely the material aggregate and the feeling aggregate, certainly arise. However, for those who have arisen there in the course of existence, these aggregates both arise and cease; therefore, instead of saying 'for five-aggregate beings,' it is said 'for those being reborn into the five-aggregate realm.' This is the reply by specification, in the latter part of the complete question in the instance 'for those being reborn into the five-aggregate realm.' By this method, all the replies should be understood.

Idaṃ panettha uppādanirodhesu niyamalakkhaṇaṃ – sakalepi hi imasmiṃ khandhayamake tattha tattha uppannānaṃ pavatte yāva maraṇā khandhānaṃ apariyantesu uppādanirodhesu [Pg.302] vijjamānesupi lahuparivattānaṃ dhammānaṃ vinibbhogaṃ katvā uppādanirodhe dassetuṃ na sukaranti pavattiyaṃ uppādanirodhe anāmasitvā abhinavaṃ vipākavaṭṭaṃ nipphādayamānena nānākammena nibbattānaṃ paṭisandhikhandhānaṃ uppādaṃ dassetuṃ sukhanti paṭisandhikāle uppādavaseneva uppādavāro kathito. Uppannassa pana vipākavaṭṭassa pariyosānena nirodhaṃ dassetuṃ sukhanti maraṇakāle nirodhavasena nirodhavāro kathito.

Herein, this is the principle of determination regarding arising and ceasing: For, throughout this entire Khandhayamaka, even though for those who have arisen here and there in the course of existence until death there are endless arisings and ceasings of aggregates, it is not easy to distinguish and show the arising and ceasing of phenomena that are swift in their transformations. Therefore, without referring to the arising and ceasing in the course of existence, it is easy to show the arising of the rebirth-linking aggregates, which are produced by various kamma and bring forth a new round of results. Thus, the section on arising is taught by way of arising only at the time of rebirth-linking. And since it is easy to show the cessation at the conclusion of the arisen round of results, the section on cessation is taught by way of cessation only at the time of death.

Kiṃ panettha pavattiyaṃ uppādanirodhānaṃ anāmaṭṭhabhāve pamāṇanti? Pāḷiyeva. Pāḷiyañhi visesena uppādavārassa anāgatakālavāre ‘pacchimabhavikānaṃ tesaṃ rūpakkhandho ca nuppajjissati, vedanākkhandho ca nuppajjissatī’ti ayaṃ pāḷi atipamāṇameva. Pacchimabhavikānañhi pavatte rūpārūpadhammānaṃ uppajjituṃ yuttabhāve satipi ‘rūpakkhandho ca nuppajjissati, vedanākkhandho ca nuppajjissatī’ti sanniṭṭhānaṃ katvā vuttabhāvena pavatte uppādo na gahitoti veditabbo. ‘Suddhāvāse parinibbantānaṃ tesaṃ tattha saññākkhandho na nirujjhittha, no ca tesaṃ tattha vedanākkhandho na nirujjhatī’ti ayaṃ pana pāḷi pavatte nirodhassa anāmaṭṭhabhāve ativiya pamāṇaṃ. Suddhāvāse parinibbantānañhi cuticittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe ṭhitānaṃ paṭisandhito paṭṭhāya pavatte uppajjitvā niruddhasaññākkhandhānaṃ gaṇanapatho natthi. ‘Evaṃ santepi tesaṃ tattha saññākkhandho na nirujjhitthā’ti sanniṭṭhānaṃ katvā vuttabhāvena pavatte nirodho na gahitoti veditabbo.

What is the authority here for the non-inclusion of arising and cessation in the course of existence? The Pāḷi itself. For in the Pāḷi, specifically in the future tense section of the arising section, this statement is ample authority: ‘For those in their final existence, their material aggregate will not arise, and their feeling aggregate will not arise.’ For, even though it is suitable for material and immaterial phenomena to arise in the course of existence for those in their final existence, because it is stated after making the conclusion, ‘the material aggregate will not arise, and the feeling aggregate will not arise,’ it should be understood that arising in the course of existence is not included. This Pāḷi statement, ‘For those attaining final Nibbāna in the Pure Abodes, their perception aggregate did not cease there, but it is not that their feeling aggregate does not cease there,’ is, however, very great authority for the non-inclusion of cessation in the course of existence. For those attaining final Nibbāna in the Pure Abodes, who are at the dissolution moment of the death-consciousness, there is no way to count the perception aggregates that arose and ceased in the course of existence from rebirth-linking onwards. Because it is stated after making the conclusion, ‘Even so, their perception aggregate did not cease there,’ it should be understood that cessation in the course of existence is not included.

Evamettha uppādanirodhesu niyamalakkhaṇaṃ viditvā paṭisandhiuppādameva cutinirodhameva ca gahetvā tesu tesu ṭhānesu āgatānaṃ vissajjanānaṃ atthavinicchayo veditabbo. So pana sakkā ādivissajjane vuttanayena sabbattha viditunti vissajjanapaṭipāṭiyā na vitthārito. Iminā pana evaṃ dinnenapi nayena yo etesaṃ atthavinicchayaṃ jānituṃ na sakkoti, tena ācariye payirupāsitvā sādhukaṃ sutvāpi jānitabbo.

Having thus understood the characteristic of definiteness in arising and cessation in this matter, one should understand the determination of meaning for the answers that appear in their respective places by taking only rebirth-arising and only death-cessation. But this can be understood everywhere by the method stated in the initial answer, so it is not elaborated in detail in the sequence of answers. Yet, even with this method thus given, if someone is unable to understand the determination of meaning of these, they should approach a teacher, listen carefully, and then understand it.

Uppādassa nirodhassa, uppannañcāpi ekato;

Nayassa anulomassa, paṭilomanayassa ca.

Of the arising and the ceasing, and also of what has arisen together; of the method in direct order, and of the method in reverse order.

Vasena yāni khandhesu, yamakāni ca pañcasu;

Puggalaṃ atha okāsaṃ, puggalokāsameva ca.

The pairs concerning the five aggregates, by means of which; the individual, then the location, and the individual-location as well.

Āmasitvā [Pg.303] pavattesu, ṭhānesu kathayī jino;

Tesaṃ pāḷivavatthānaṃ, dassitaṃ anupubbato.

Having contemplated, the Conqueror spoke in the sections on continuity; the determination of those Pāḷi texts was shown in due order.

Vinicchayatthaṃ atthassa, pañhāvissajjanāni ca;

Vissajjanānaṃ ṭhānāni, yāni tāni ca sabbaso.

For the purpose of determining the meaning, the questions and answers; the bases for answers, and all those entirely.

Dassetvā ekapañhasmiṃ, yojanāpi pakāsitā;

Vitthārena gate ettha, pañhāvissajjanakkame.

Having shown in a single question, the applications were also made clear; in this, which proceeds in detail in the sequence of questions and answers.

Atthaṃ vaṇṇayatā kātuṃ, kiṃ nu sakkā ito paraṃ;

Nayena iminā tasmā, atthaṃ jānantu paṇḍitāti.

In explaining the meaning, what more can be done than this? Therefore, let the wise understand the meaning by this method.

Pavattimahāvāravaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Great Section on Continuity.

3. Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā

3. The Explanation of the Section on Full Understanding.

206-208. Tadanantare pariññāvārepi chaḷeva kālabhedā. Anulomapaṭilomato dveyeva nayā. Puggalavāro, okāsavāro, puggalokāsavāroti imesu pana tīsu puggalavārova labbhati, na itare dve. Kiṃ kāraṇā? Sadisavissajjanatāya. Yo hi koci puggalo yattha katthaci ṭhāne rūpakkhandhaṃ ce parijānāti, vedanākkhandhampi parijānātiyeva. Vedanākkhandhaṃ ce parijānāti, rūpakkhandhampi parijānātiyeva. Rūpakkhandhaṃ ce na parijānāti, vedanākkhandhampi na parijānātiyeva. Vedanākkhandhaṃ ce na parijānāti, rūpakkhandhampi na parijānātiyeva. Tasmā tesupi ‘yattha rūpakkhandhaṃ parijānāti, tattha vedanākkhandhaṃ parijānātī’ti ādivasena pucchaṃ katvā ‘āmantā’tveva vissajjanaṃ kātabbaṃ. Siyāti sadisavissajjanatāya te idha na labbhantīti veditabbā.

206-208. Immediately following, in the section on full understanding as well, there are only six divisions by time. There are only two methods: direct and reverse. But among these three—the individual section, the location section, and the individual-location section—only the individual section is found, not the other two. What is the reason? Because of the similarity of the answers. For whatever individual in whatever place fully understands the form aggregate, they indeed also fully understand the feeling aggregate. If they fully understand the feeling aggregate, they indeed also fully understand the form aggregate. If they do not fully understand the form aggregate, they indeed also do not fully understand the feeling aggregate. If they do not fully understand the feeling aggregate, they indeed also do not fully understand the form aggregate. Therefore, in those cases also, after asking a question beginning with, ‘Where one fully understands the form aggregate, there one also fully understands the feeling aggregate,’ the answer must be given simply as, ‘Yes.’ It should be understood that those two are not found here due to the similarity of the answers.

Atha vā pariññākiccaṃ nāma puggalasseva hoti, no okāsassa, puggalova parijānituṃ samattho, no okāsoti puggalavārovettha gahito, na okāsavāro. Tassa pana aggahitattā tadanantaro puggalokāsavāro labbhamānopi na gahito. Yo panesa puggalavāro gahito, tattha paccuppannakāle rūpakkhandhamūlakāni cattāri, vedanākkhandhamūlakāni tīṇi, saññākkhandhamūlakāni dve, saṅkhārakkhandhamūlakaṃ ekanti [Pg.304] heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva anulomanaye aggahitaggahaṇena dasa yamakāni. Paṭilomanaye dasāti vīsati. Tathā sesesupīti ekekasmiṃ kāle vīsati vīsati katvā chasu kālesu vīsaṃ yamakasataṃ, cattārīsāni dve pucchāsatāni, asītyādhikāni cattāri atthasatāni ca hontīti idamettha pāḷivavatthānaṃ.

Alternatively, the task of full understanding belongs only to the individual, not to the location. Only the individual is capable of fully understanding, not the location; hence, only the section on individuals is taken here, not the section on locations. And because the latter is not taken, the immediately following individual-location section, though obtainable, is also not taken. As for this section on individuals that is taken, in the present time, there are four rooted in the form aggregate, three rooted in the feeling aggregate, two rooted in the perception aggregate, and one rooted in the formations aggregate—making ten pairs in the direct method by including what was not previously included, as explained below. In the reverse method, there are ten—thus twenty. Similarly, in the remaining cases, with twenty pairs in each of the six time periods, there are one hundred and twenty pairs, two hundred and forty questions, and four hundred and eighty meanings. This is the textual determination here.

Atthavinicchaye panettha atītānāgatapaccuppannasaṅkhātā tayo addhā pavattivāre viya cutipaṭisandhivasena na labbhanti. Pavatte cittakkhaṇavaseneva labbhanti. Tenevettha ‘yo rūpakkhandhaṃ parijānāti, so vedanākkhandhaṃ parijānātī’tiādīsu pucchāsu ‘āmantā’ti vissajjanaṃ kataṃ. Lokuttaramaggakkhaṇasmiñhi nibbānārammaṇena cittena pañcasu khandhesu pariññākiccanibbattiyā yaṃ kiñci ekaṃ khandhaṃ parijānanto itarampi parijānātīti vuccati. Evamettha ‘parijānātī’ti pañhesu anulomanaye pariññākiccassa matthakappattaṃ aggamaggasamaṅgiṃ sandhāya ‘āmantā’ti vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Paṭilomanaye pana ‘na parijānātī’ti pañhesu puthujjanādayo sandhāya ‘āmantā’ti vuttaṃ. ‘Parijānitthā’ti imasmiṃ pana atītakālavāre maggānantaraaggaphale ṭhitopi pariññākiccassa niṭṭhitattā parijānitthayeva nāma.

Here in the determination of meaning, the three periods designated as past, future, and present are not found by way of death and rebirth as in the section on continuity. They are found only by way of mind-moments in the course of existence. Therefore, here, in questions such as, ‘Does one who fully understands the form aggregate also fully understand the feeling aggregate?’, the answer given is, ‘Yes.’ For at the moment of the supramundane path, with consciousness taking Nibbāna as its object, by the accomplishment of the task of full understanding regarding the five aggregates, one who fully understands any one aggregate is said to fully understand the others as well. Thus, here in the direct method, in the questions, ‘Does one fully understand?’, it should be understood that the answer ‘Yes’ is stated in reference to one endowed with the supreme path who has reached the culmination of the task of full understanding. In the reverse method, however, in the questions, ‘Does one not fully understand?’, the answer ‘Yes’ is stated in reference to ordinary persons and others. In this past-tense section, regarding the question ‘Had one fully understood?’, even one established in the supreme fruition immediately after the path, because the task of full understanding is completed, is indeed said to have fully understood.

209. Yo rūpakkhandhaṃ parijānāti, so vedanākkhandhaṃ parijānitthāti pañhena aggamaggasamaṅgiṃ pucchati. Yasmā panesa khandhapañcakaṃ parijānātiyeva nāma, na tāva niṭṭhitapariññākicco; tasmā ‘no’ti paṭisedho kato. Dutiyapañhe pana parijānitthāti arahantaṃ pucchati. Yasmā paneso niṭṭhitapariññākicco. Natthi tassa pariññeyyaṃ nāma; tasmā ‘no’ti paṭisedho kato. Paṭilomanayavissajjane panettha arahā rūpakkhandhaṃ na parijānātīti arahato pariññāya abhāvena vuttaṃ. Aggamaggasamaṅgī vedanākkhandhaṃ na parijānitthāti arahattamaggaṭṭhassa aniṭṭhitapariññākiccatāya vuttaṃ. Na kevalañca vedanākkhandhameva, ekadhammampi so na parijānittheva. Idaṃ pana pucchāvasena vuttaṃ. No ca rūpakkhandhanti idampi pucchāvaseneva vuttaṃ. Aññampi pana so khandhaṃ parijānāti.

209. With the question, ‘One who fully understands the form aggregate, has he fully understood the feeling aggregate?’, it asks about one endowed with the supreme path. Since this one indeed fully understands the five aggregates, but has not yet completed the task of full understanding, the denial ‘no’ is made. In the second question, however, ‘has he fully understood?’ asks about an arahant. Since this one has completed the task of full understanding, there is nothing left for him to fully understand; therefore, the denial ‘no’ is made. Here in the answer in the reverse method, the statement that ‘the arahant does not fully understand the form aggregate’ is said because of the absence of any further full understanding for an arahant. The statement that ‘the one endowed with the supreme path has not fully understood the feeling aggregate’ is said because the one at the path of arahantship has not yet completed the task of full understanding. And not only the feeling aggregate, but he has not fully understood even a single phenomenon. This, however, is said in the context of the question. ‘And not the form aggregate’—this too is said in the context of the question. But he does fully understand another aggregate.

210-211. Yo rūpakkhandhaṃ parijānāti, so vedanākkhandhaṃ parijānissatīti ettha yasmā maggaṭṭhapuggalo ekacittakkhaṇiko, tasmā so parijānissatīti saṅkhaṃ na gacchati. Tena vuttaṃ ‘no’ti. Te rūpakkhandhañca na [Pg.305] parijānitthāti pucchāsabhāgena vuttaṃ, na parijāniṃsūti panettha attho. Iminā upāyena sabbattha atthavinicchayo veditabboti.

210-211. Regarding the question, “Will one who fully understands the form aggregate fully understand the feeling aggregate?”—here, because the person standing on the path exists for a single mind-moment, the designation ‘he will fully understand’ does not apply. Hence, it is said, ‘No.’ The statement, “They did not fully understand the form aggregate,” is expressed in the manner of a question, but the meaning here is, “they did not fully understand.” In this way, the determination of the meaning should be understood in all instances.

Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Section on Full Understanding.

Khandhayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Yamaka of Aggregates is concluded.

3. Āyatanayamakaṃ

3. The Yamaka of Sense Bases

1. Paṇṇattiuddesavāravaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Recitation Section on Designations.

1-9. Idāni mūlayamake desiteyeva kusalādidhamme āyatanavasenāpi saṅgaṇhitvā khandhayamakānantaraṃ desitassa āyatanayamakassa vaṇṇanā hoti. Tattha khandhayamake vuttanayeneva pāḷivavatthānaṃ veditabbaṃ. Yatheva hi tattha paṇṇattivāro, pavattivāro, pariññāvāroti tayo mahāvārā honti, tathā idhāpi. Vacanatthopi nesaṃ tattha vuttanayeneva veditabbo. Idhāpi ca paṇṇattivāro uddesaniddesavasena dvidhā vavatthito. Itare niddesavaseneva. ‘Tattha dvādasāyatanānī’ti padaṃ ādiṃ katvā yāva nāyatanā na manoti, tāva paṇṇattivārassa uddesavāro veditabbo. Tattha dvādasāyatanānīti ayaṃ yamakavasena pucchitabbānaṃ āyatanānaṃ uddeso. Cakkhāyatanaṃ…pe… dhammāyatananti tesaññeva pabhedato nāmavavatthānaṃ. Yamakavasena pucchāsukhatthañcettha paṭhamaṃ paṭipāṭiyā ajjhattarūpāyatanāni vuttāni. Pacchā bāhirarūpāyatanāni. Pariyosāne manāyatanadhammāyatanāni.

1-9. Now, the exposition of the Sense-Base Yamaka, which was taught after the Aggregate Yamaka, is undertaken, having also organized by way of the sense bases the wholesome and other phenomena already taught in the Root Yamaka. Herein, the arrangement of the Pāḷi should be understood in the same way as stated in the Aggregate Yamaka. Just as there are three great sections there—the section on designations, the section on occurrence, and the section on full understanding—so too here. The meaning of their terms should also be understood in the same way as explained there. Here too, the section on designations is established in two parts: the recitation and the exposition. The others are only by way of exposition. Beginning with the phrase, “Therein, the twelve sense bases,” and continuing up to, “is not a sense base, is not the mind,” this should be understood as the recitation section of the chapter on designations. Herein, “the twelve sense bases” is the enumeration of the sense bases to be questioned by way of the Yamaka. “The eye-base... up to... the mind-object base” is the establishment of their names according to their classification. For the sake of ease in questioning by way of the Yamaka, the internal form-bases are stated first in sequence, followed by the external form-bases. At the end are the mind-base and the mind-object base.

Yathā pana heṭṭhā khandhavasena, evamidha imesaṃ āyatanānaṃ vasena padasodhanavāro, padasodhanamūlacakkavāro, suddhāyatanavāro, suddhāyatanamūlacakkavāroti, cattārova nayavārā honti. Ekeko cettha anulomapaṭilomavasena duvidhoyeva. Tesamattho tattha vuttanayeneva veditabbo. Yathā pana khandhayamake padasodhanavārassa anulomavāre ‘rūpaṃ rūpakkhandho, rūpakkhandho rūpa’ntiādīni pañca yamakāni, tathā idha ‘cakkhu, cakkhāyatanaṃ; cakkhāyatanaṃ; cakkhū’tiādīni dvādasa. Paṭilomavārepi ‘na cakkhu, na cakkhāyatanaṃ; na cakkhāyatanaṃ, na cakkhū’tiādīni dvādasa[Pg.306], padasodhanamūlacakkavārassa panettha anulomavāre ekekāyatanamūlakāni ekādasa ekādasa katvā dvattiṃsasataṃ yamakāni. Paṭilomavārepi dvattiṃsasatameva. Suddhāyatanavārassāpi anulomavāre dvādasa, paṭilomavāre dvādasa, suddhāyatanamūlacakkavārassāpi anulomavāre ekekāyatanamūlakāni ekādasa ekādasa katvā dvattiṃsasataṃ yamakāni. Paṭilomavārepi dvattiṃsasatamevāti evamidha chasattatādhikehi pañcahi yamakasatehi, dvipaññāsādhikehi ekādasahi pucchāsatehi, caturādhikehi tevīsāya atthasatehi ca paṭimaṇḍito paṇṇattivārassa uddesavāro veditabbo.

Just as below in the section on aggregates, here too there are four sections of method with regard to these sense-bases: the term-analysis section, the root-wheel section of term-analysis, the pure sense-base section, and the root-wheel section of pure sense-bases. Each of these is twofold, in forward and reverse order. Their meaning should be understood according to the method explained there. Just as in the Aggregate Yamaka, in the forward order of the term-analysis section, there are five dyads such as 'form is the form aggregate, the form aggregate is form,' so here there are twelve dyads like 'the eye, the eye-base; the eye-base, the eye.' In the reverse order, there are also twelve dyads like 'not the eye, not the eye-base; not the eye-base, not the eye.' Here, in the forward order of the root-wheel section of term-analysis, there are eleven dyads for each sense-base as a root, amounting to three thousand two hundred dyads. In the reverse order also, three thousand two hundred. In the pure sense-base section, there are twelve dyads in the forward order and twelve in the reverse. In the root-wheel section of pure sense-bases, there are eleven dyads for each sense-base as a root, amounting to three thousand two hundred dyads. In the reverse order also, three thousand two hundred. Thus, the recitation section of the designation chapter should be understood as adorned with 576 dyads, 1,152 questions, and 2,304 explanations.

Paṇṇattiuddesavāravaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Recitation Section on Designations.

1. Paṇṇattiniddesavāravaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Exposition Section on Designations.

10-17. Niddesavāre pana heṭṭhā khandhayamakassa paṇṇattivāraniddese vuttanayeneva attho veditabbo. Aññatra visesā. Tatrāyaṃ viseso – dibbacakkhūti dutiyavijjāñāṇaṃ. Paññācakkhūti tatiyavijjāñāṇaṃ. Dibbasotanti dutiyaabhiññāñāṇaṃ. Taṇhāsotanti taṇhāva. Avaseso kāyoti nāmakāyo, rūpakāyo, hatthikāyo, assakāyoti evamādi. Avasesaṃ rūpanti rūpāyatanato sesaṃ bhūtupādāyarūpañceva piyarūpasātarūpañca. Sīlagandhotiādīni vāyanaṭṭhena sīlādīnaṃyeva nāmāni. Attharasotiādīnipi sādhumadhuraṭṭhena atthādīnaññeva nāmāni. Avaseso dhammoti pariyattidhammādianekappabhedoti ayamettha viseso.

10-17. In the exposition section, however, the meaning should be understood in the same way as explained in the exposition of the designation section of the Aggregate Yamaka below, except for the special points. Herein, the special points are as follows: “Divine eye” refers to the knowledge of the second science. “Wisdom eye” refers to the knowledge of the third science. “Divine ear” refers to the knowledge of the second supernormal knowledge. “Stream of craving” means craving itself. “The remaining body” refers to the mental body, physical body, elephant body, horse body, and so on. “The remaining form” means form apart from the form sense-base, including primary and derived matter, as well as pleasing and delightful form. “Fragrance of virtue” and similar terms are merely names for virtue and so on, in the sense of wafting. “Essence of meaning” and similar terms are merely names for meaning and so on, in the sense of being excellent and sweet. “The remaining Dhamma” refers to the various classifications, such as the Dhamma of the scriptures and so on. This is the special point here.

Paṇṇattiniddesavāravaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Exposition Section on Designations.

2. Pavattivāravaṇṇanā

2. The Explanation of the Occurrence Section.

18-21. Idhāpi ca pavattivārassa uppādavārādīsu tīsu antaravāresu ekekasmiṃ chaḷeva kālabhedā. Tesaṃ ekekasmiṃ kāle puggalavārādayo tayo vārā. Te sabbepi anulomapaṭilomanayavasena duvidhāva [Pg.307] honti. Tattha paccuppannakāle puggalavārassa anulomanaye yathā khandhayamake rūpakkhandhamūlakāni cattāri, vedanākkhandhamūlakāni tīṇi, saññākkhandhamūlakāni dve, saṅkhārakkhandhamūlakaṃ ekanti aggahitaggahaṇena dasa yamakāni honti. Evaṃ ‘‘yassa cakkhāyatanaṃ uppajjati, tassa sotāyatanaṃ uppajjati; yassa vā pana sotāyatanaṃ uppajjati, tassa cakkhāyatanaṃ uppajjati; yassa cakkhāyatanaṃ uppajjati, tassa ghāṇāyatanaṃ, jivhāyatanaṃ, kāyāyatanaṃ, rūpāyatanaṃ, saddāyatanaṃ, gandhāyatanaṃ, rasāyatanaṃ, phoṭṭhabbāyatanaṃ, manāyatanaṃ, dhammāyatanaṃ, uppajjati; yassa vā pana dhammāyatanaṃ uppajjati, tassa cakkhāyatanaṃ uppajjatī’’ti evaṃ cakkhāyatanamūlakāni ekādasa. ‘‘Yassa sotāyatanaṃ uppajjati, tassa ghānāyatanaṃ uppajjatī’’tiādinā nayena sotāyatanamūlakāni dasa; ghānāyatanamūlakāni nava, jivhāyatanamūlakāni aṭṭha; kāyāyatanamūlakāni satta; rūpāyatanamūlakāni cha; saddāyatanamūlakāni pañca; gandhāyatanamūlakāni cattāri; rasāyatanamūlakāni tīṇi; phoṭṭhabbāyatanamūlakāni dve; manāyatanamūlakaṃ ekanti aggahitaggahaṇena chasaṭṭhi yamakāni honti.

18-21. Here also, in the occurrence section, within its three intermediate sections beginning with the arising section, there are six divisions of time in each. In each of these times, there are three sections: the individual section and so on. All of these are twofold according to the forward and reverse methods. In the present time, regarding the forward method of the individual section, as in the Aggregate Dyad, there are four rooted in the aggregate of form, three rooted in the aggregate of feeling, two rooted in the aggregate of perception, and one rooted in the aggregate of formations—thus, by taking what has not yet been taken, there are ten dyads. Similarly: 'For whom the eye-base arises, for them the ear-base arises; or alternatively, for whom the ear-base arises, for them the eye-base arises. For whom the eye-base arises, for them the nose-base, tongue-base, body-base, form-base, sound-base, smell-base, taste-base, tactile-base, mind-base, and mental-object base arise; or alternatively, for whom the mental-object base arises, for them the eye-base arises.' Thus, there are eleven dyads rooted in the eye-base. Following the same method: 'For whom the ear-base arises, for them the nose-base arises,' and so on—there are ten dyads rooted in the ear-base; nine rooted in the nose-base; eight rooted in the tongue-base; seven rooted in the body-base; six rooted in the form-base; five rooted in the sound-base; four rooted in the smell-base; three rooted in the taste-base; two rooted in the tactile-base; and one rooted in the mind-base—thus, by taking what has not yet been taken, there are sixty-six dyads.

Tattha cakkhāyatanamūlakesu ekādasasu ‘‘yassa cakkhāyatanaṃ uppajjati, tassa sotāyatanaṃ, ghānāyatanaṃ, rūpāyatanaṃ, manāyatanaṃ, dhammāyatanaṃ uppajjatī’’ti imāni pañceva vissajjitāni. Tesu paṭhamaṃ vissajjetabbaṃ tāva vissajjitaṃ. Dutiyaṃ kiñcāpi paṭhamena sadisavissajjanaṃ, cakkhusotāyatanānaṃ pavattiṭṭhāne pana ghānāyatanassa na ekantena pavattito ‘‘kathaṃ nu kho etaṃ vissajjetabba’’nti vimatinivāraṇatthaṃ vissajjitaṃ. Rūpāyatanamanāyatanadhammāyatanehi saddhiṃ tīṇi yamakāni asadisavissajjanattā vissajjitāni. Sesesu jivhāyatanakāyāyatanehi tāva saddhiṃ dve yamakāni purimehi dvīhi saddhiṃ sadisavissajjanāni. Saddāyatanassa paṭisandhikkhaṇe anuppattito tena saddhiṃ yamakassa vissajjanameva natthi. Gandharasaphoṭṭhabbāyatanehipi saddhiṃ tīṇi yamakāni purimehi dvīhi sadisavissajjanāneva hontīti tantiyā lahubhāvatthaṃ saṅkhittāni. Sotāyatanamūlakesu yaṃ labbhati, taṃ purimehi sadisavissajjanamevāti ekampi pāḷiṃ nāruḷhaṃ. Ghānāyatanamūlakesu rūpāyatanena saddhiṃ ekaṃ, manāyatanadhammāyatanehi saddhiṃ dveti tīṇi yamakāni pāḷiṃ āruḷhāni. Sesāni ghānāyatanayamakena sadisavissajjanattā nāruḷhāni. Tathā jivhāyatanakāyāyatanamūlakāni. Rūpāyatanamūlakesu [Pg.308] manāyatanadhammāyatanehi saddhiṃ dveyeva vissajjitāni. Gandharasaphoṭṭhabbehi pana saddhiṃ tīṇi rūpāyatanamanāyatanehi saddhiṃ sadisavissajjanāni. Yatheva hettha ‘‘sarūpakānaṃ acittakāna’’ntiādi vuttaṃ, tathā idhāpi ‘‘sarūpakānaṃ agandhakānaṃ, arasakānaṃ aphoṭṭhabbakāna’’nti yojanā veditabbā. Gandhādīni cettha āyatanabhūtāneva adhippetāni. Tasmā ‘‘sarūpakānaṃ sagandhāyatanāna’’nti āyatanavasenettha attho daṭṭhabbo.

Here, among the eleven dyads rooted in the eye-base, the five statements—'For whom the eye-base arises, for them the ear-base, nose-base, form-base, mind-base, and mental-object base arise'—have been answered. Among these, the first has already been answered. The second, though it has a similar answer to the first, has been answered to resolve the doubt, 'How should this be answered?', since the nose-base does not necessarily arise in the place of occurrence of the eye- and ear-bases. The three dyads with the form-base, mind-base, and mental-object base have been answered due to their dissimilar answers. The remaining two dyads with the tongue-base and body-base have similar answers to the first two. Since the sound-base does not arise at the moment of rebirth-linking, there is no answer at all for the dyad concerning it. The three dyads with the smell, taste, and tangible bases also have similar answers to the first two; for the sake of the text's brevity, they have been abbreviated. Among the dyads rooted in the ear-base, whatever is applicable has a similar answer to the previous ones, and thus not even one Pāḷi passage has been included. Among the dyads rooted in the nose-base, three have been included in the Pāḷi: one with the form-base, and two with the mind-base and mental-object base. The rest have not been included, as they have a similar answer to the nose-base dyad. The same applies to the dyads rooted in the tongue-base and body-base. Among the dyads rooted in the form-base, only two have been answered—those with the mind-base and mental-object base. However, the three dyads with the smell, taste, and tangible bases have similar answers to those with the form-base and mind-base. Just as it was stated here, 'of those with form but without consciousness,' and so on, so too here the application should be understood as: 'of those with form but without odour, without taste, without tactile sensation.' And here, odour and so on are intended as being the bases themselves. Therefore, the meaning here should be understood in terms of the bases, as 'of those with form and with the odour-base,' and so on.

Saddāyatanamūlakāni atthābhāvato pāḷiṃ nāruḷhāneva. Gandharasaphoṭṭhabbamūlakāni cattāri tīṇi dve ca heṭṭhimehi sadisavissajjanattā pāḷiṃ nāruḷhāni. Manāyatanamūlakaṃ vissajjitamevāti evametāni paccuppannakāle puggalavārassa anulomanaye katipayayamakavissajjaneneva chasaṭṭhiyamakāni vissajjitāni nāma hontīti veditabbāni. Yathā ca puggalavāre, evaṃ okāsavārepi puggalokāsavārepi chasaṭṭhīti paccuppannakāle tīsu vāresu anulomanaye aṭṭhanavutisataṃ yamakāni honti. Yathā ca anulomanaye, evaṃ paṭilomanayepīti sabbānipi paccuppannakāle channavutādhikāni tīṇi yamakasatāni honti. Tesu dvānavutādhikāni satta pucchāsatāni, caturāsītādhikāni ca pannarasa atthasatāni hontīti veditabbāni. Evaṃ sesesupi pañcasu kālabhedesūti sabbānipi chasattatādhikāni tevīsati yamakasatāni. Tato diguṇā pucchā, tato diguṇā atthāti idamettha uppādavāre pāḷivavatthānaṃ. Nirodhavārauppādanirodhavāresupi eseva nayoti. Sabbasmimpi pavattivāre aṭṭhavīsāni ekasattati yamakasatāni. Tato diguṇā pucchā, tato diguṇā atthā veditabbā. Pāḷi pana manāyatanaṃ dhammāyatanañca ekasadisaṃ, nānaṃ natthi. Upari pana ‘‘vārasaṅkhepo hotī’’tiādīni vatvā tattha tattha saṅkhittā. Tasmā yaṃ tattha tattha saṅkhittaṃ, taṃ sabbaṃ asammuyhantehi sallakkhetabbaṃ.

The yamakas rooted in the sound base are not included in the Pāli text due to the absence of meaning. The four, three, and two yamakas rooted in the smell, taste, and touch bases are not included in the Pāli text because their answers are similar to the preceding ones. The yamaka rooted in the mind base has already been answered. Thus it should be understood that in the present time, in the forward order of the person-section, by the answering of only a few yamakas, these sixty-six yamakas are considered answered. Just as in the person-section, so too in the location-section and the person-location section, there are sixty-six; thus in the present time, across the three sections in the forward order, there are one hundred and ninety-eight yamakas. And just as in the forward order, so too in the reverse order; thus all together in the present time, there are three hundred and ninety-six yamakas. Among these, it should be understood that there are seven hundred and ninety-two questions, and one thousand five hundred and eighty-four meanings. Similarly, in the remaining five divisions of time, all together there are two thousand three hundred and seventy-six yamakas. From this, the questions are doubled, and from that the meanings are doubled; this is the arrangement of the Pāli text in the arising-section. The same method applies in the cessation-section and the arising-cessation section. In the entire process-section, there are seven thousand one hundred and twenty-eight yamakas. From this, the questions are doubled, and from that the meanings are to be understood as doubled. However, in the Pāli text, the mind base and the mental-object base are treated as identical; there is no distinction. Above, after stating, “a summary of the section occurs,” and so forth, it is abbreviated in various places. Therefore, whatever is abbreviated in various places should be carefully noted by those who are not confused.

Atthavinicchaye panettha idaṃ nayamukhaṃ. Sacakkhukānaṃ asotakānanti apāye jātibadhiraopapātikaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. So hi sacakkhuko asotako hutvā upapajjati. Yathāha – ‘‘kāmadhātuyā upapattikkhaṇe kassaci aparāni dasāyatanāni pātubhavanti. Opapātikānaṃ petānaṃ[Pg.309], opapātikānaṃ asurānaṃ, opapātikānaṃ tiracchānagatānaṃ, opapātikānaṃ nerayikānaṃ; jaccabadhirānaṃ upapattikkhaṇe dasāyatanāni pātubhavanti, cakkhāyatanaṃ rūpaghānagandhajivhārasakāyaphoṭṭhabbāyatanaṃ manāyatanaṃ dhammāyatana’’nti. Sacakkhukānaṃ sasotakānanti sugatiduggatīsu paripuṇṇāyatane ca opapātike rūpībrahmāno ca sandhāya vuttaṃ. Te hi sacakkhukā sasotakā hutvā upapajjanti. Yathāha – ‘‘kāmadhātuyā upapattikkhaṇe kassaci ekādasāyatanāni pātubhavanti; kāmāvacarānaṃ devānaṃ, paṭhamakappikānaṃ manussānaṃ, opapātikānaṃ petānaṃ, opapātikānaṃ asurānaṃ, opapātikānaṃ tiracchānagatānaṃ, opapātikānaṃ nerayikānaṃ, paripuṇṇāyatanānaṃ. Rūpadhātuyā upapattikkhaṇe pañcāyatanāni pātubhavanti, cakkhāyatanaṃ rūpasotamanāyatanaṃ dhammāyatana’’nti.

Herein, this is the guiding principle for the determination of meaning. The phrase 'of those with eyes but without ears' is stated in reference to a spontaneously arisen, congenitally deaf being in the plane of misery. For such a one is reborn with eyes but without ears. As it is said: “At the moment of rebirth in the sense-sphere, for some, ten sense bases appear: for spontaneously arisen hungry ghosts, spontaneously arisen titans, spontaneously arisen animals, and spontaneously arisen hell-beings; for the congenitally deaf, at the moment of rebirth, ten sense bases appear: the eye base, form base, nose base, smell base, tongue base, taste base, body base, tangible-object base, mind base, and mental-object base.” The phrase 'of those with eyes and with ears' is stated in reference to spontaneously arisen beings with complete sense bases in good and bad destinations, and also to the form-realm Brahmās. For they are reborn with eyes and with ears. As it is said: “At the moment of rebirth in the sense-sphere, for some, eleven sense bases appear: for sense-sphere devas, humans of the first aeon, spontaneously arisen hungry ghosts, spontaneously arisen titans, spontaneously arisen animals, spontaneously arisen hell-beings, and those with complete sense bases. At the moment of rebirth in the form realm, five sense bases appear: the eye base, the form base, the ear base, the mind base, and the mental-object base.”

Aghānakānanti brahmapārisajjādayo sandhāya vuttaṃ. Te hi sacakkhukā aghānakā hutvā upapajjanti. Kāmadhātuyaṃ pana aghānako opapātiko natthi. Yadi bhaveyya ‘‘kassaci aṭṭhāyatanāni pātubhavantī’’ti vedayya. Yo gabbhaseyyako pana aghānako siyā, so ‘‘sacakkhukāna’’nti vacanato idha anadhippeto. Sacakkhukānaṃ saghānakānanti jaccabadhirampi paripuṇṇāyatanampi opapātikaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Saghānakānaṃ acakkhukānanti jaccandhampi jaccabadhirampi opapātikaṃ sandhāya vuttameva. Saghānakānaṃ sacakkhukānanti paripuṇṇāyatanameva opapātikaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ.

The phrase 'of those without a nose' is stated in reference to the attendants of Brahmā and others. For they are reborn with eyes but without a nose. In the sense-sphere, however, there is no spontaneously arisen being who is noseless. If there were, it would be stated, ‘For some, eight sense bases appear.’ A womb-born being who might be noseless, however, is not intended here by the statement ‘of those with eyes.’ The phrase 'of those with eyes and a nose' is stated in reference to a spontaneously arisen being who is congenitally deaf, as well as one with complete sense bases. The phrase 'of those with a nose but without eyes' is stated in reference to a spontaneously arisen being who is either congenitally blind or congenitally deaf. The phrase 'of those with a nose and with eyes' is stated in reference only to a spontaneously arisen being with complete sense bases.

Sarūpakānaṃ acakkhukānanti ettha jaccandhajaccabadhiraopapātikesu aññataropi gabbhaseyyakopi labbhatiyeva. Sacittakānaṃ acakkhukānanti ettha heṭṭhā vuttehi jaccandhādīhi tīhi saddhiṃ arūpinopi labbhanti. Acakkhukānanti ettha purimapade vuttehi catūhi saddhiṃ asaññasattāpi labbhanti. Sarūpakānaṃ aghānakānanti ettha gabbhaseyyakā ca asaññasattā ca sesarūpībrahmāno ca labbhanti. Sacittakānaṃ aghānakānanti ettha gabbhaseyyakā ca rūpārūpabrahmāno ca labbhanti. Acittakānaṃ arūpakānantipadesu pana ekavokāracatuvokārasattāva labbhantīti iminā nayena sabbesu puggalavāresu puggalavibhāgo veditabbo.

In the case of 'of those with form but without eyes,' here one finds any one of the spontaneously arisen who are congenitally blind or congenitally deaf, and also a womb-born being. In the case of 'of those with consciousness but without eyes,' here, in addition to the three types mentioned above, formless beings are also found. In the case of 'of those without eyes,' here, along with the four types mentioned in the previous phrase, non-percipient beings are also found. In the case of 'of those with form but without a nose,' here, womb-born beings, non-percipient beings, and the remaining form-realm Brahmās are found. In the case of 'of those with consciousness but without a nose,' here, womb-born beings and the form-realm and formless-realm Brahmās are found. But in the phrases 'of those without consciousness' and 'of the formless,' only beings with one constituent or four constituents are found. In this way, the classification of individuals should be understood in all person-sections.

22-254. Okāsavāre yattha cakkhāyatananti rūpībrahmalokaṃ pucchati. Teneva āmantāti vuttaṃ. Tasmiñhi tale niyamato tāni āyatanāni [Pg.310] paṭisandhiyaṃ uppajjanti. Idamettha nayamukhaṃ. Iminā nayamukhena sakalepi pavattivāre attho veditabbo. Pariññāvāro khandhayamake vuttanayoyevāti.

22-254. In the location-section, when the question is asked, “Where does the eye base arise?”, it refers to the form-realm Brahma-world. Therefore, the answer is given in the affirmative. For in that plane, those bases invariably arise at rebirth-linking. This is the guiding principle here. By this guiding principle, the meaning in the entire process-section should be understood. The section on full understanding follows the same method as explained in the Aggregate-Yamaka.

Pavattivāravaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Process-Section.

Āyatanayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Āyatanayamaka is concluded.

4. Dhātuyamakaṃ

4. The Yamaka on Elements.

1-19. Idāni teyeva mūlayamake desite kusalādidhamme dhātuvasena saṅgaṇhitvā āyatanayamakānantaraṃ desitassa dhātuyamakassa vaṇṇanā hoti. Tattha āyatanayamake vuttanayeneva pāḷivavatthānaṃ vetidabbaṃ. Idhāpi hi paṇṇattivārādayo tayo mahāvārā, avasesā antaravārā ca saddhiṃ kālappabhedādīhi āyatanayamake āgatasadisāyeva. Idhāpi ca yamakapucchāsukhatthaṃ paṭipāṭiyā ajjhattikabāhirā rūpadhātuyova vatvā viññāṇadhātuyo vuttā. Dhātūnaṃ pana bahuttā idha āyatanayamakato bahutarāni yamakāni, yamakadiguṇā pucchā, pucchādiguṇā ca atthā honti. Tattha cakkhudhātumūlakādīsu yamakesu labbhamānānaṃ yamakānaṃ atthavinicchayo āyatanayamake vuttanayeneva veditabbo. Taṃsadisāyeva hettha atthagati, teneva ca kāraṇena pāḷipi saṅkhittā. Pariññāvāro pākatikoyevāti.

Now, having grouped by way of elements those same wholesome and other phenomena that were pointed out in the Root Dyad, the explanation of the Dyad of Elements, which follows the Dyad of Bases, is to be given. Here, the arrangement of the Pāli text should be understood in the same way as stated in the Dyad of Bases. For here as well, the three great sections—the section on designations and others—along with the remaining intermediate sections, together with the divisions of time and so forth, are similar to those found in the Dyad of Bases. Moreover, for the sake of ease in answering the dyadic questions, the internal and external elements of form are mentioned in order first, followed by the elements of consciousness. However, due to the greater number of elements here, there are more dyads than in the Dyad of Bases, questions are double the dyads, and meanings are double the questions. In the dyads rooted in the eye-element and so forth, the determination of meaning for the dyads that arise should be understood in the same way as explained in the Dyad of Bases. The treatment of meaning here is similar, and for this reason, the Pāli text is concise. The section on full understanding is just as before.

Dhātuyamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Dyad of Elements is concluded.

5. Saccayamakaṃ

5. The Dyad of Truths

1. Paṇṇattivāravaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Section on Designations

1-9. Idāni teyeva mūlayamake desite kusalādidhamme saccavasena saṅgaṇhitvā dhātuyamakānantaraṃ desitassa saccayamakassa vaṇṇanā hoti. Tatthāpi heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva paṇṇattivārādayo tayo mahāvārā [Pg.311] antaravārādayo ca avasesappabhedā veditabbā. Paṇṇattivāre panettha catunnaṃ saccānaṃ vasena padasodhanavāro, padasodhanamūlacakkavāro, suddhasaccavāro, suddhasaccamūlacakkavāroti imesu catūsu vāresu yamakagaṇanā veditabbā.

Now, having grouped those very wholesome and other phenomena, which were taught in the Root Dyad, by way of the truths, the explanation of the Dyad of Truths, which follows the Dyad of Elements, is given. Here too, the three major sections—the section on designations, etc.—and the remaining subdivisions should be understood as previously explained. In the section on designations here, the counting of the dyads should be understood in these four sections: the section on analysis of terms, the root-cycle section of analysis of terms, the section on pure truths, and the root-cycle section of pure truths.

10-26. Paṇṇattivāraniddese pana avasesaṃ dukkhasaccanti dukkhavedanāya ceva taṇhāya ca vinimuttā tebhūmakadhammā veditabbā. Avaseso samudayoti saccavibhaṅge niddiṭṭhakāmāvacarakusalādibhedo dukkhasaccassa paccayo. Avaseso nirodhoti tadaṅgavikkhambhanasamucchedapaṭipassaddhinirodho ceva khaṇabhaṅganirodho ca. Avaseso maggoti ‘‘tasmiṃ kho pana samaye pañcaṅgiko maggo hoti, aṭṭhaṅgiko maggo, micchāmaggo, jaṅghamaggo, sakaṭamaggo’’ti evamādiko.

In the exposition of the section on designations, the remaining aspect of the truth of suffering should be understood as the phenomena of the three realms that are free from both painful feeling and craving. The remaining aspect of the origin is the cause of the truth of suffering, with distinctions such as wholesome sense-sphere states and the like, as defined in the Analysis of the Truths. The remaining aspect of cessation is cessation by substitution, by suppression, by eradication, and by tranquility, as well as momentary cessation. The remaining aspect of the path refers to such things as: “At that time, the path is fivefold, the path is eightfold, the wrong path, the footpath, the cart-path,” and so forth.

Paṇṇattivāravaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Section on Designations

2. Pavattivāravaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Section on Occurrence

27-164. Pavattivāre panettha paccuppannakāle puggalavārassa anulomanaye ‘‘yassa dukkhasaccaṃ uppajjati, tassa samudayasaccaṃ uppajjati; yassa vā pana samudayasaccaṃ uppajjati, tassa dukkhasaccaṃ uppajjatī’’ti dukkhasaccamūlakehi tīhi, samudayasaccamūlakehi dvīhi, nirodhasaccamūlakena ekenāti labbhamānañca alabbhamānañca gahetvā pāḷivasena chahi yamakehi bhavitabbaṃ. Tesu yasmā nirodhassa neva uppādo, na nirodho yujjati, tasmā dukkhasaccamūlakāni samudayasaccamaggasaccehi saddhiṃ dve, samudayasaccamūlakaṃ maggasaccena saddhiṃ ekanti tīṇi yamakāni āgatāni. Tassa paṭilomanayepi okāsavārādīsupi eseva nayo. Evamettha sabbavāresu tiṇṇaṃ tiṇṇaṃ yamakānaṃ vasena yamakagaṇanā veditabbā. Atthavinicchaye panettha idaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ – imassa hi saccayamakassa pavattivāre nirodhasaccaṃ tāva na labbhateva. Sesesu pana tīsu samudayasaccamaggasaccāni ekantena pavattiyaṃyeva labbhanti. Dukkhasaccaṃ cutipaṭisandhīsupi pavattepi labbhati. Paccuppannādayo pana tayo kālā cutipaṭisandhīnampi pavattiyāpi vasena labbhanti. Evamettha yaṃ yaṃ labbhati, tassa tassa vasena atthavinicchayo veditabbo.

In the section on occurrence, regarding the present time in the individual section, in the forward order: “For whom the truth of suffering arises, for them the truth of origin arises; or for whom the truth of origin arises, for them the truth of suffering arises.” Based on the truth of suffering as the root, three dyads are formed; based on the truth of origin as the root, two dyads; and based on the truth of cessation as the root, one dyad. Thus, considering both what is obtainable and unobtainable, six dyads should be formed according to the text. Among these, because neither arising nor cessation is applicable to cessation, therefore, two dyads are formed by combining the truth of suffering as the root with the truths of origin and path, and one dyad is formed by combining the truth of origin as the root with the truth of path—thus, three dyads are obtained. In the reverse order, as well as in sections like the occasion section, the same method applies. Thus, in all sections, the counting of dyads should be understood on the basis of three dyads each. In the analysis of meaning here, this is the characteristic: in the section on occurrence of this Dyad of Truths, the truth of cessation is not obtainable at all. Among the remaining three, the truths of origin and path are definitely obtainable only in occurrence. The truth of suffering is obtainable in death and rebirth-linking as well as in occurrence. The three times—present, etc.—are obtainable based on death and rebirth-linking as well as occurrence. Thus, here, the analysis of meaning should be understood according to whatever is obtainable.

Tatridaṃ [Pg.312] nayamukhaṃ – sabbesaṃ upapajjantānanti antamaso suddhāvāsānampi. Tepi hi dukkhasacceneva upapajjanti. Taṇhāvippayuttacittassāti idaṃ dukkhasaccasamudayasaccesu ekakoṭṭhāsassa uppattidassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Tasmā pañcavokāravaseneva gahetabbaṃ. Catuvokāre pana taṇhāvippayuttassa phalasamāpatticittassa uppādakkhaṇe ekampi saccaṃ nuppajjati. Idaṃ idha na gahetabbaṃ. Tesaṃ dukkhasaccañcāti tasmiñhi khaṇe taṇhaṃ ṭhapetvā sesaṃ dukkhasaccaṃ nāma hotīti sandhāyetaṃ vuttaṃ. Maggassa uppādakkhaṇepi eseva nayo. Tattha pana rūpameva dukkhasaccaṃ nāma. Sesā maggasampayuttakā dhammā saccavinimuttā. Teneva kāraṇena ‘‘arūpe maggassa uppādakkhaṇe tesaṃ maggasaccaṃ uppajjati, no ca tesaṃ dukkhasaccaṃ uppajjatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Sabbesaṃ upapajjantānaṃ pavatte taṇhāvippayuttacittassa uppādakkhaṇe tesaṃ tatthāti tesaṃ tasmiṃ upapattikkhaṇe taṇhāvippayuttacittuppattikkhaṇe cāti evamettha khaṇavasena okāso veditabbo. Aññesupi evarūpesu eseva nayo. Anabhisametāvīnanti catusaccapaṭivedhasaṅkhātaṃ abhisamayaṃ appattasattānaṃ. Abhisametāvīnanti abhisamitasaccānanti. Iminā nayamukhena sabbattha atthavinicchayo veditabbo.

Here is the method—for all beings who are reborn, even including those in the Pure Abodes. For they too are reborn only through the truth of suffering. “The mind free from craving”—this is stated to show the arising of one aspect of the truths of suffering and the origin of suffering. Therefore, it should be understood only in terms of the five-constituent existence. However, in the four-constituent existence, at the moment of the arising of the fruition-attainment mind free from craving, not even a single truth arises. This is not to be taken here. “Of them, the truth of suffering”—this is stated intending that at that moment, apart from craving, the remainder is called the truth of suffering. The same applies at the moment of the arising of the path. There, only form is called the truth of suffering. The remaining path-associated states are freed from the truths. For this reason, it is said: “In the formless realm, at the moment of the path's arising, the truth of the path arises for them, but the truth of suffering does not arise for them.” For all beings who are reborn, at the moment of the arising of a mind free from craving in the course of existence—for them, there—that is, for them at that moment of rebirth and at the moment of the arising of a mind free from craving—the occasion should be understood in terms of these moments. The same applies in other similar cases. “Those who have not penetrated”—refers to beings who have not attained the penetration known as the realization of the four truths. “Those who have penetrated”—refers to those who have realized the truths. Through this method, the meaning should be discerned in all cases.

Pavattivāravaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Section on Occurrence

3. Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā

3. Exposition of the Section on Full Understanding

165-170. Pariññāvāre pana ñātapariññā, tīraṇapariññā, pahānapariññāti tissopettha pariññāyo labbhanti. Yasmā ca lokuttaradhammesu pariññā nāma natthi; tasmā idha dve saccāni gahitāni. Tattha dukkhasaccaṃ parijānātīti ñātatīraṇapariññāvaseneva vuttaṃ. Samudayasaccaṃ pajahatīti ñātapahānapariññāvasena. Iti imāsaṃ pariññānaṃ vasena sabbapadesu attho veditabboti.

165-170. In the section on comprehension, the three comprehensions are obtained here: comprehension as the known, comprehension as scrutinizing, and comprehension as abandoning. And since there is no such thing as comprehension in the supramundane states, therefore two truths are taken here. Therein, 'one fully understands the truth of suffering' is stated only by way of comprehension as the known and as scrutinizing. 'One abandons the truth of the origin' is stated by way of comprehension as the known and as abandoning. Thus, the meaning in all passages should be understood by way of these comprehensions.

Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Section on Comprehension.

Saccayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Exposition of the Pairs of Truths is concluded.

6. Saṅkhārayamakaṃ

6. The Pairs of Formations

1. Paṇṇattivāravaṇṇanā

1. Exposition of the Section on Designations.

1. Idāni [Pg.313] tesaññeva mūlayamake desitānaṃ kusalādidhammānaṃ labbhamānavasena ekadesaṃ saṅgaṇhitvā saccayamakānantaraṃ desitassa saṅkhārayamakassa vaṇṇanā hoti. Tatthāpi heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva paṇṇattivārādayo tayo mahāvārā, antaravārādayo ca avasesapabhedā veditabbā. Ayaṃ panettha viseso – paṇṇattivāre tāva yathā heṭṭhā khandhādayo dhamme uddisitvā ‘‘rūpaṃ rūpakkhandho; cakkhu cakkhāyatanaṃ; cakkhu cakkhudhātu; dukkhaṃ dukkhasacca’’nti padasodhanavāro āraddho. Tathā anārabhitvā ‘‘assāsapassāsā kāyasaṅkhāro’’ti paṭhamaṃ tayopi saṅkhārā vibhajitvā dassitā.

1. Now, having gathered a portion, according to availability, of the wholesome and other phenomena previously taught in those same Root Pairs, the exposition of the Pairs of Formations, taught immediately after the Pairs of Truths, takes place. Here too, the three major sections, such as the Section on Designations, as well as the remaining subdivisions, such as the intermediate sections, should be understood in the same way as stated before. However, this is the distinction here: In the Section on Designations, instead of starting thus with the section on the analysis of terms as before, where phenomena such as the aggregates were enumerated with 'Form is the form aggregate; the eye is the eye base; the eye is the eye element; suffering is the truth of suffering,' it first analyzes and presents the three formations with the phrase 'In-breath and out-breath are the bodily formation.'

Tattha kāyassa saṅkhāro kāyasaṅkhāro. ‘‘Assāsapassāsā kāyikā, ete dhammā kāyappaṭibaddhā’’ti (ma. ni. 1.463; saṃ. ni. 4.348 atthato samānaṃ) hi vacanato kāraṇabhūtassa karajakāyassa phalabhūto eva saṅkhāroti kāyasaṅkhāro. Aparo nayo – saṅkhariyatīti saṅkhāro. Kena saṅkhariyatīti? Kāyena. Ayañhi vāto viya bhastāya karajakāyena saṅkhariyatīti. Evampi kāyassa saṅkhāroti kāyasaṅkhāro. Kāyena kato assāsapassāsavātoti attho. ‘‘Pubbeva kho, āvuso visākha, vitakketvā vicāretvā pacchā vācaṃ bhindati, tasmā vitakkavicārā vacīsaṅkhāro’’ti (ma. ni. 1.463; saṃ. ni. 4.348) vacanato pana saṅkharotīti saṅkhāro. Kiṃ saṅkharoti? Vaciṃ. Vaciyā saṅkhāroti vacīsaṅkhāro. Vacībhedasamuṭṭhāpakassa vitakkavicāradvayassetaṃ nāmaṃ. ‘‘Saññā ca vedanā ca cetasikā ete dhammā cittapaṭibaddhā’’ti (ma. ni. 1.463; saṃ. ni. 4.348) vacanatoyeva pana tatiyapadepi saṅkhariyatīti saṅkhāro. Kena saṅkhariyati? Cittena. Karaṇatthe sāmivacanaṃ katvā cittassa saṅkhāroti cittasaṅkhāro. Sabbesampi cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ cetasikadhammānametaṃ adhivacanaṃ. Vitakkavicārānaṃ pana vacīsaṅkhārabhāvena visuṃ gahitattā ‘‘ṭhapetvā vitakkavicāre’’ti vuttaṃ.

Here, the formation of the body is the bodily formation. 'In-breaths and out-breaths are bodily; these phenomena are bound up with the body' (Majjhima Nikāya 1.463; Saṃyutta Nikāya 4.348, the meaning being the same)—thus, because they are a result of the causal physical body, this formation is indeed the bodily formation. Another explanation: it is called a formation because it is formed. By what is it formed? By the body. For this, like wind in a bellows, is formed by the physical body. Thus, it is also called the bodily formation, meaning the in-breath and out-breath wind is made by the body. 'First, friend Visākha, one thinks and reflects, and afterward one breaks into speech; therefore, thought and examination are the verbal formation' (Majjhima Nikāya 1.463; Saṃyutta Nikāya 4.348)—thus, because it forms, it is called a formation. What does it form? Speech. The formation of speech is the verbal formation. This is a name for the pair of thought and examination, which give rise to the breaking into speech. However, from the very statement 'Perception and feeling are mental; these phenomena are bound up with the mind' (Majjhima Nikāya 1.463; Saṃyutta Nikāya 4.348), in the third term too, it is called a formation because it is formed. By what is it formed? By the mind. Taking the genitive case in the sense of instrumentality, it is called the mental formation, the formation of the mind. This is a designation for all mental phenomena that arise from the mind. However, because thought and examination are separately taken as the verbal formation, it is said, 'excluding thought and examination.'

2-7. Idāni [Pg.314] kāyo kāyasaṅkhāroti padasodhanavāro āraddho. Tassa anulomanaye tīṇi, paṭilomanaye tīṇīti cha yamakāni. Padasodhanamūlacakkavāre ekekasaṅkhāramūlakāni dve dve katvā anulomanaye cha, paṭilomanaye chāti dvādasa yamakāni. Suddhasaṅkhāravāre pana yathā suddhakhandhavārādīsu ‘‘rūpaṃ khandho, khandhā rūpaṃ; cakkhu āyatanaṃ, āyatanā cakkhū’’tiādinā nayena yamakāni vuttāni. Evaṃ ‘‘kāyo saṅkhāro, saṅkhārā kāyo’’ti avatvā ‘‘kāyasaṅkhāro vacīsaṅkhāro, vacīsaṅkhāro kāyasaṅkhāro’’tiādinā nayena kāyasaṅkhāramūlakāni dve, vacīsaṅkhāramūlakaṃ ekanti anulome tīṇi, paṭilome tīṇīti sabbānipi suddhikavāre cha yamakāni vuttāni. Kiṃ kāraṇā? Suddhikaekekapadavasena atthābhāvato. Yathā hi khandhayamakādīsu rūpādivisiṭṭhānaṃ khandhānaṃ cakkhādivisiṭṭhānañca āyatanādīnaṃ adhippetattā ‘‘rūpaṃ khandho, khandhā rūpaṃ, cakkhu āyatanaṃ, āyatanā cakkhū’’ti suddhikaekekapadavasena attho atthi. Evamidha ‘‘kāyo saṅkhāro, saṅkhārā kāyo’’ti natthi. Kāyasaṅkhāroti pana dvīhipi padehi ekova attho labbhati. Assāso vā passāso vāti suddhikaekekapadavasena atthābhāvato ‘‘kāyo saṅkhāro, saṅkhārā kāyo’’ti na vuttaṃ. ‘‘Kāyo kāyasaṅkhāro’’tiādi pana vattabbaṃ siyā. Tampi kāyavacīcittapadehi idha adhippetānaṃ saṅkhārānaṃ aggahitattā na yujjati. Suddhasaṅkhāravāro hesa. Padasodhane pana vināpi atthena vacanaṃ yujjatīti tattha so nayo gahitova. Idha pana kāyasaṅkhārassa vacīsaṅkhārādīhi, vacīsaṅkhārassa ca cittasaṅkhārādīhi, cittasaṅkhārassa ca kāyasaṅkhārādīhi, aññattā ‘‘kāyasaṅkhāro vacīsaṅkhāro, vacīsaṅkhāro, kāyasaṅkhāro’’ti ekekasaṅkhāramūlakāni dve dve katvā cha yamakāni yujjanti. Tesu aggahitaggahaṇena tīṇeva labbhanti. Tasmā tāneva dassetuṃ anulomanaye tīṇi, paṭilomanaye tīṇīti cha yamakāni vuttāni. Suddhasaṅkhāramūlacakkavāro panettha na gahitoti. Evaṃ paṇṇattivārassa uddesavāro veditabbo.

2-7. Now the section on the analysis of terms, 'the body is the bodily formation,' is begun. In its forward order, there are three pairs; in the reverse order, three pairs—thus six pairs. In the root round of the analysis of terms, taking each formation as a root to make two pairs, there are six pairs in the forward order and six in the reverse—thus twelve pairs. However, in the pure formations section, as in the pure aggregates section and so forth, pairs are stated in the manner of 'form is an aggregate, aggregates are form; the eye is a base, bases are the eye,' and so on. Thus, instead of saying 'the body is a formation, formations are the body,' it is stated in the manner of 'bodily formation is verbal formation, verbal formation is bodily formation,' and so on. Here, with two pairs rooted in bodily formation and one in verbal formation, there are three in the forward order and three in the reverse—making six pairs in the pure section. Why is this? Because there is no meaning by way of single pure terms. For just as in the aggregate pairs and so on, because the aggregates specified as form, etc., and the bases specified as the eye, etc., are intended, there is meaning by way of single pure terms—'form is an aggregate, aggregates are form; the eye is a base, bases are the eye.' So here, 'the body is a formation, formations are the body' does not apply. But 'bodily formation' obtains a single meaning from both terms. Since there is no meaning by way of single pure terms—'in-breath or out-breath'—the statement 'the body is a formation, formations are the body' is not made. One might say, 'the body is bodily formation,' and so on. But that too is unsuitable, because the formations intended here by the terms body, speech, and mind are not grasped. This is indeed the pure formations section. In the analysis of terms, however, an expression is suitable even without meaning, so that method is indeed adopted there. Here, however, since bodily formation is distinct from verbal formation and so on, verbal formation from mental formation and so on, and mental formation from bodily formation and so on, six pairs are suitable, such as 'bodily formation is verbal formation, verbal formation is bodily formation,' by making two pairs for each formation as a root. Among these, by the principle of taking up the un-taken, only three are obtained. Therefore, to show just these, three pairs are stated in the forward order and three in the reverse—six pairs in total. The root round of pure formations, however, is not included here. Thus, the enumeration section of the Section on Designations should be understood.

8-18. Niddesavāre panassa anulome tāva yasmā na kāyādayova kāyasaṅkhārādīnaṃ nāmaṃ, tasmā noti paṭisedho kato. Paṭilome na kāyo na kāyasaṅkhāroti yo na kāyo so kāyasaṅkhāropi na hotīti pucchati. Kāyasaṅkhāro na kāyo kāyasaṅkhāroti [Pg.315] kāyasaṅkhāro kāyo na hoti, kāyasaṅkhāroyeva panesoti attho. Avasesanti na kevalaṃ sesasaṅkhāradvayameva. Kāyasaṅkhāravinimuttaṃ pana sesaṃ sabbampi saṅkhatāsaṅkhatapaṇṇattibhedaṃ dhammajātaṃ neva kāyo, na kāyasaṅkhāroti iminā upāyena sabbavissajjanesu attho veditabboti.

8-18. However, in the Exposition Section, first, in the forward order, since 'body' and so on are not the names for 'bodily formations' and so on, therefore the negation 'no' is made. In the reverse order, 'not the body, not bodily formation' asks whether that which is not the body is also not a bodily formation. 'A bodily formation is not the body, it is a bodily formation' means that a bodily formation is not the body, but it is indeed a bodily formation. 'The rest' means not only the remaining pair of formations. But all the remaining phenomena, classified as conditioned, unconditioned, and concept, apart from bodily formation, are neither the body nor a bodily formation. By this method, the meaning in all the answers is to be understood.

Paṇṇattivāravaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Section on Concepts.

2. Pavattivāravaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Section on Occurrence.

19. Pavattivāre panettha paccuppannakāle puggalavārassa anulomanaye ‘‘yassa kāyasaṅkhāro uppajjati, tassa vacīsaṅkhāro uppajjatī’’ti kāyasaṅkhāramūlakāni dve, vacīsaṅkhāramūlakaṃ ekanti tīṇeva yamakāni labbhanti; tāni gahitāneva. Tassa paṭilomanayepi okāsavārādīsupi eseva nayo. Evamettha sabbavāresu tiṇṇaṃ tiṇṇaṃ yamakānaṃ vasena yamakagaṇanā veditabbā.

19. Here in the Section on Occurrence, in the present time, in the forward method of the Section on Individuals, regarding the question, 'For one for whom a bodily formation arises, for them does a verbal formation arise?', two couplets are rooted in bodily formation and one is rooted in verbal formation—thus only three couplets are obtained; these have been taken up. This same method applies in its reverse method and also in the sections beginning with the Section on Location. Thus, here in all sections, the enumeration of couplets should be understood as being by way of three couplets each.

Atthavinicchaye panettha idaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ – imasmiñhi saṅkhārayamake ‘‘assāsapassāsānaṃ uppādakkhaṇe vitakkavicārānaṃ uppādakkhaṇe’’tiādivacanato paccuppannādikālabhedo pavattivasenāpi gahetabbo, na cutipaṭisandhivaseneva. ‘‘Dutiyajjhāne tatiyajjhāne tattha kāyasaṅkhāro uppajjatī’’tiādivacanato ca jhānampi okāsavasena gahitanti veditabbaṃ. Evamettha yaṃ yaṃ labbhati, tassa tassa vasena atthavinicchayo veditabbo.

Here, in the determination of meaning, this is the characteristic feature: For in this Formations-Yamaka, based on statements such as 'at the moment of arising of in-breaths and out-breaths, at the moment of arising of applied and sustained thought,' the distinction of time, such as the present, should be understood also by way of occurrence, not only by way of death and rebirth-linking. And from statements such as 'in the second jhāna, in the third jhāna, a bodily formation arises there,' it should be understood that jhāna is also taken by way of location. Thus, here, the determination of meaning should be understood by way of whatever is obtained.

Tatridaṃ nayamukhaṃ – vinā vitakkavicārehīti dutiyatatiyajjhānavasena vuttaṃ. Tesanti tesaṃ dutiyatatiyajjhānasamaṅgīnaṃ. Kāmāvacarānanti kāmāvacare uppannasattānaṃ. Rūpāvacaradevānaṃ pana assāsapassāsā natthi. Arūpāvacarānaṃ rūpameva natthi. Vinā assāsapassāsehīti rūpārūpabhavesu nibbattasattānaṃ vitakkavicāruppattiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ.

Herein, this is the introductory method: 'Without applied and sustained thought'—this is said by way of the second and third jhānas. 'For them' means for those endowed with the second and third jhānas. 'For those of the sense-sphere' means for beings arisen in the sense-sphere. However, for the devas of the form-sphere, there are no in-breaths and out-breaths. For those of the formless-sphere, there is no form at all. 'Without in-breaths and out-breaths'—this is said with reference to the arising of applied and sustained thought for beings reborn in the form and formless existences.

21. Paṭhamajjhāne kāmāvacareti kāmāvacarabhūmiyaṃ uppanne paṭhamajjhāne. Aṅgamattavasena cettha paṭhamajjhānaṃ gahetabbaṃ, na appanāvaseneva. Anappanāpattepi hi savitakkasavicāracitte idaṃ saṅkhāradvayaṃ uppajjateva.

21. 'In the first jhāna, in the sense-sphere'—this refers to the first jhāna that has arisen in the sense-sphere plane. Here, the first jhāna should be understood by way of its factors only, not by way of absorption. For even in a mind with applied and sustained thought that has not attained absorption, this pair of formations certainly arises.

24. Cittassa [Pg.316] bhaṅgakkhaṇeti idaṃ kāyasaṅkhārassa ekantacittasamuṭṭhānattā vuttaṃ. Uppajjamānameva hi cittaṃ rūpaṃ vā arūpaṃ vā samuṭṭhāpeti, na bhijjamānaṃ.

24. 'At the dissolution-moment of consciousness'—this is said because a bodily formation is exclusively mind-originated. For consciousness, while arising, originates form or formless phenomena, not while dissolving.

37. Suddhāvāsānaṃ dutiye citte vattamāneti paṭisandhito dutiye bhavaṅgacitte. Kāmañcetaṃ paṭisandhicittepi vattamāne tesaṃ tattha nuppajjittheva. Yāva pana abbokiṇṇaṃ vipākacittaṃ vattati, tāva nuppajjittheva nāmāti dassanatthametaṃ vuttaṃ. Yassa vā jhānassa vipākacittena te nibbattā, taṃ satasopi sahassasopi uppajjamānaṃ paṭhamacittameva. Vipākacittena pana visadisaṃ bhavanikantiyā āvajjanacittaṃ dutiyacittaṃ nāma. Taṃ sandhāyetaṃ vuttanti veditabbaṃ.

37. 'For the Pure Abodes, while the second consciousness is occurring'—this refers to the second life-continuum consciousness after rebirth-linking. Although, even while the rebirth-linking consciousness is occurring, it certainly does not arise for them there. However, this is stated to show that as long as the uninterrupted resultant consciousness continues, it certainly does not arise. Or, by the resultant consciousness of whichever jhāna they are reborn, that consciousness, even if arising a hundred or a thousand times, is only the first consciousness. However, the adverting consciousness, which is dissimilar to the resultant consciousness due to craving for existence, is called the 'second consciousness'. It should be understood that this is said with reference to that.

44. Pacchimacittasamaṅgīnanti sabbapacchimena appaṭisandhikacittena samaṅgībhūtānaṃ khīṇāsavānaṃ. Avitakkaavicāraṃ pacchimacittanti rūpāvacarānaṃ dutiyajjhānikādicuticittavasena, arūpāvacarānañca catutthajjhānikacuticittavasenetaṃ vuttaṃ. Tesanti tesaṃ pacchimacittasamaṅgīādīnaṃ.

44. 'For those endowed with the final consciousness' means for the destroyers of cankers who are endowed with the very last, non-rebirth-linking consciousness. 'The final consciousness is without applied and sustained thought'—this is said by way of the death-consciousness of those in the form-sphere, beginning with the second jhāna, and by way of the fourth-jhāna death-consciousness of those in the formless-sphere. 'For them' means for those endowed with the final consciousness, and so on.

79. Yassa kāyasaṅkhāro nirujjhati, tassa cittasaṅkhāro nirujjhatīti ettha niyamato kāyasaṅkhārassa cittasaṅkhārena saddhiṃ ekakkhaṇe nirujjhanato āmantāti paṭivacanaṃ dinnaṃ. Na cittasaṅkhārassa kāyasaṅkhārena saddhiṃ. Kiṃ kāraṇā? Cittasaṅkhāro hi kāyasaṅkhārena vināpi uppajjati ca nirujjhati ca. Kāyasaṅkhāro pana cittasamuṭṭhāno assāsapassāsavāto. Cittasamuṭṭhānarūpañca cittassa uppādakkhaṇe uppajjitvā yāva aññāni soḷasacittāni uppajjanti, tāva tiṭṭhati. Tesaṃ soḷasannaṃ sabbapacchimena saddhiṃ nirujjhatīti yena cittena saddhiṃ uppajjati, tato paṭṭhāya sattarasamena saddhiṃ nirujjhati. Na kassaci cittassa uppādakkhaṇe vā ṭhitikkhaṇe vā nirujjhati, nāpi ṭhitikkhaṇe vā bhaṅgakkhaṇe vā uppajjati. Esā cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa dhammatāti niyamato cittasaṅkhārena saddhiṃ ekakkhaṇe nirujjhanato āmantāti vuttaṃ. Yaṃ pana vibhaṅgappakaraṇassa sīhaḷaṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ sattarasamassa cittassa uppādakkhaṇe nirujjhatī’’ti vuttaṃ, taṃ imāya pāḷiyā virūjjhati. Aṭṭhakathāto ca pāḷiyeva balavatarāti pāḷiyaṃ vuttameva pamāṇaṃ.

79. Regarding 'For one for whom a bodily formation ceases, for them does a mental formation cease?', here the reply 'Yes' is given because, as a rule, the bodily formation ceases in the same moment as the mental formation. But not the mental formation with the bodily formation. What is the reason? Because a mental formation can arise and cease even without a bodily formation. However, the bodily formation, being the wind of in-breaths and out-breaths, is mind-originated. And mind-originated matter arises at the arising-moment of a consciousness and persists until sixteen other consciousnesses have arisen. It ceases together with the last of those sixteen. That is, it ceases together with the seventeenth consciousness, counting from the one with which it arose. It does not cease at the arising-moment or presence-moment of any consciousness, nor does it arise at the presence-moment or dissolution-moment. This is the nature of mind-originated matter. Thus, it is said 'Yes' because, as a rule, it ceases in the same moment as the mental formation. However, what is stated in the Sinhalese commentary to the Vibhaṅga—'mind-originated matter ceases at the arising-moment of the seventeenth consciousness'—contradicts this Pāli text. And since the Pāli is more authoritative than the commentary, only what is stated in the Pāli should be taken as the authority.

128. Yassa kāyasaṅkhāro uppajjati, tassa vacīsaṅkhāro nirujjhatīti ettha yasmā kāyasaṅkhāro cittassa uppādakkhaṇe uppajjati, na ca tasmiṃ khaṇe [Pg.317] vitakkavicārā nirujjhanti, tasmā noti paṭisedho katoti. Iminā nayamukhena sabbattha atthavinicchayo veditabbo. Pariññāvāro pākatikoyevāti.

128. For whom the bodily formation arises, for him does the verbal formation cease? Here, because the bodily formation arises at the moment of the arising of consciousness, and at that moment applied and sustained thought do not cease, therefore the denial 'no' is made. By this method, the determination of meaning should be understood in all cases. The chapter on full understanding is the natural one.

Pavattivāravaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Section on the Round of Existence.

Saṅkhārayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Saṅkhāra-Yamaka is concluded.

7. Anusayayamakaṃ

7. The Yamaka on Latent Tendencies

Paricchedaparicchinnuddesavāravaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Section on Delimitation and Enumerated Delimitation

1. Idāni tesaññeva mūlayamake desitānaṃ kusalādidhammānaṃ labbhamānavasena ekadesaṃ saṅgaṇhitvā saṅkhārayamakānantaraṃ desitassa anusayayamakassa atthavaṇṇanā hoti. Tattha pāḷivavatthānaṃ tāva veditabbaṃ – imasmiñhi anusayayamake khandhayamakādīsu viya desanaṃ akatvā aññena nayena pāḷidesanā katā. Kathaṃ? Paṭhamaṃ tāva paricchedato, uddesato, uppattiṭṭhānatoti tīhākārehi anusaye gahāpetuṃ paricchedavāro, paricchinnuddesavāro, uppattiṭṭhānavāroti, tayo vārā desitā. Tato sattannaṃ mahāvārānaṃ vasena anusaye yojetvā yamakadesanā katā. Tattha sattānusayāti ayaṃ ‘‘satteva, na tato uddhaṃ, na heṭṭhā’’ti gaṇanaparicchedena paricchinditvā anusayānaṃ desitattā paricchedavāro nāma. Kāmarāgānusayo…pe… avijjānusayoti ayaṃ paricchedavārena paricchinnānaṃ nāmamattaṃ uddisitvā ‘‘ime nāma te’’ti desitattā paricchinnuddesavāro nāma. Kattha kāmarāgānusayo anuseti…pe… ettha avijjānusayo anusetīti ayaṃ ‘‘imesu nāma ṭhānesu ime anusayā anusenti’’ti evaṃ tesaṃyeva uppattiṭṭhānassa desitattā uppattiṭṭhānavāro nāma.

1. Now, having gathered a portion of those same wholesome and other states taught in the Mūla-Yamaka according to their obtainability, the explanation of the meaning of the Anusaya-Yamaka, which was taught after the Saṅkhāra-Yamaka, is given. Herein, first, the arrangement of the Pāli text should be understood—for in this Anusaya-Yamaka, the teaching is not presented as in the Khandha-Yamaka and others, but is given in a different manner. How? First, to grasp the latent tendencies in three ways—by delimitation, by enumeration, and by the place of arising—the sections on delimitation, enumerated delimitation, and the place of arising are taught. Then, the teaching of the pairs is given by applying the latent tendencies according to the seven great sections. Herein, "seven latent tendencies" is called the section on delimitation because the latent tendencies are taught by delimiting them through enumeration, stating, "Seven only, neither more nor less." "The latent tendency of sensual desire… the latent tendency of ignorance" is called the section on enumerated delimitation because, after delimiting them in the section on delimitation, their mere names are enumerated, teaching, "These are their names." "Where does the latent tendency of sensual desire lie latent… where the latent tendency of ignorance lies latent" is called the section on the place of arising because it teaches, "In these places these latent tendencies lie latent," thus indicating the very places where these latent tendencies arise.

Yesaṃ pana sattannaṃ mahāvārānaṃ vasena anusaye yojetvā yamakadesanā katā, tesaṃ imāni nāmāni – anusayavāro, sānusayavāro, pajahanavāro, pariññāvāro, pahīnavāro, uppajjanavāro dhātuvāroti. Tesu paṭhamo anusayavāro. So anulomapaṭilomanayavasena duvidho hoti.

Now, for those seven great sections according to which the Yamaka teaching is given by applying the latent tendencies, these are their names: the section on latent tendencies, the section with latent tendencies, the section on abandoning, the section on full understanding, the section on what has been abandoned, the section on arising, and the section on elements. Among these, the first is the section on latent tendencies. It is twofold by way of the direct and reverse method.

Tattha [Pg.318] anulomanaye ‘‘yassa anuseti, yattha anuseti, yassa yattha anusetī’’ti puggalokāsatadubhayavasena tayo antaravārā honti. Tesu paṭhame puggalavāre ‘‘yassa kāmarāgānusayo anuseti, tassa paṭighānusayo anuseti; yassa vā pana paṭighānusayo anuseti, tassa kāmarāgānusayo anuseti; yassa kāmarāgānusayo anuseti, tassa mānānusayo, diṭṭhānusayo, vicikicchānusayo, bhavarāgānusayo, avijjānusayo anuseti. Yassa vā pana avijjānusayo anuseti, tassa kāmarāgānusayo anusetī’’ti kāmarāgānusayamūlakāni cha yamakāni. Puna agahitaggahaṇavasena paṭighānusayamūlakāni pañca, mānānusayamūlakāni cattāri, diṭṭhānusayamūlakāni tīṇi, vicikicchānusayamūlakāni dve, bhavarāgānusayamūlakaṃ ekanti evaṃ sabbānipi ekamūlakāni ekavīsati. Puna ‘‘yassa kāmarāgānusayo ca paṭighānusayo ca anusentī’’ti evaṃ āgatāni dukamūlakāni pañca, tikamūlakāni cattāri, catukkamūlakāni tīṇi, pañcakamūlakāni dve, chakkamūlakaṃ ekanti aparānipi pannarasa honti. Tāni purimehi ekavīsatiyā saddhiṃ chattiṃsāti puggalavāre chattiṃsa yamakāni. Tathā okāsavāre, tathā puggalokāsavāreti sabbānipi anulomanaye aṭṭhasataṃ yamakāni. Tathā paṭilomanayeti anusayavāre soḷasādhikāni dve yamakasatāni, tato diguṇā pucchā, tato diguṇā atthā ca veditabbā. Yathā cettha, evaṃ sānusayavāro, pajahanavāro, pariññāvāro, pahīnavāro, uppajjanavāroti imesampi pañcannaṃ vārānaṃ, ekekasmiṃ yamakagaṇanā; yamakadiguṇā pucchā, pucchādiguṇā ca atthā veditabbā. Ayaṃ panettha purimesu tīsu vāresu viseso. Okāsavāre ‘‘yattha tatthā’’ti avatvā yato tatoti nissakkavacanena desanā katā. Sesaṃ tādisameva.

Here, in the direct method, there are three intermediate sections based on the individual, the location, and both: "in whom it lies latent, where it lies latent, in whom and where it lies latent." Among these, in the first section concerning individuals: "In whom the latent tendency of sensual desire lies latent, in him does the latent tendency of aversion lie latent; or in whom the latent tendency of aversion lies latent, in him does the latent tendency of sensual desire lie latent. In whom the latent tendency of sensual desire lies latent, in him do the latent tendencies of conceit, wrong view, doubt, craving for existence, and ignorance lie latent. Or in whom the latent tendency of ignorance lies latent, in him does the latent tendency of sensual desire lie latent." Thus, there are six pairs rooted in the latent tendency of sensual desire. Again, by taking what has not been taken, there are five pairs rooted in the latent tendency of aversion, four rooted in the latent tendency of conceit, three rooted in the latent tendency of wrong view, two rooted in the latent tendency of doubt, and one rooted in the latent tendency of craving for existence. In this way, all twenty-one pairs are rooted in a single root. Further, "in whom both the latent tendency of sensual desire and the latent tendency of aversion lie latent," and so on, there are five pairs rooted in two roots, four in three roots, three in four roots, two in five roots, and one in six roots. Thus, there are another fifteen pairs. Together with the previous twenty-one, there are thirty-six pairs in the individual section. Similarly, in the location section, and likewise in the individual-location section, there are altogether one hundred and eight pairs in the direct method. Similarly in the reverse method. Thus, in the section on latent tendencies, there are two hundred and sixteen pairs. From that, the questions are double, and the meanings should be understood as double the questions. As it is here, so also in these five sections—with latent tendencies, abandoning, full understanding, what has been abandoned, and arising—in each one the calculation of pairs is the same; the questions are double the pairs, and the meanings are to be understood as double the questions. Here, however, there is a distinction in the first three sections. In the location section, instead of saying "where, there," the teaching is given with the expression "from where, there," using an expression in the ablative case. The rest is just the same.

Yo panāyaṃ sabbapacchimo dhātuvāro nāma, so pucchāvāro, vissajjanāvāroti dvidhā ṭhito. Tassa pucchāvāre kāmadhātuyā cutassa kāmadhātuṃ upapajjantassāti vatvā ‘‘kāmadhātuṃ vā pana upapajjantassa kāmadhātuyā cutassā’’ti na vuttaṃ. Kiṃ kāraṇā? Atthavisesābhāvato. Dvepi hi etā pucchā ekatthāyeva, tasmā ekekasmā yamakā ekekameva pucchaṃ pucchitvā sabbapucchāvasāne pucchānukkameneva ‘‘kāmadhātuyā [Pg.319] cutassa kāmadhātuṃ upapajjantassa kassaci satta anusayā anusentī’’tiādinā nayena vissajjanaṃ kataṃ.

Now, this last section, called the section on elements, stands as twofold: the question section and the answer section. In its question section, having stated "Of one who has deceased in the sense-sphere and is being reborn in the sense-sphere," it is not stated "or of one who is being reborn in the sense-sphere and has deceased in the sense-sphere." What is the reason? Because there is no difference in meaning. For both these questions have the same meaning. Therefore, from each pair, only one question is asked, and at the end of all the questions, according to the order of the questions, the answer is given in this way: "Of one who has deceased in the sense-sphere and is being reborn in the sense-sphere, do the seven latent tendencies lie latent in anyone?" and so on.

Tattha ‘‘kāmadhātuyā cutassa kāmadhātuṃ upapajjantassa, rūpadhātuṃ, arūpadhātuṃ, nakāmadhātuṃ, narūpadhātuṃ naarūpadhātuṃ, upapajjantassā’’ti cha suddhikapucchā; ‘‘nakāmadhātuṃ, naarūpadhātuṃ, narūpadhātuṃ; naarūpadhātuṃ, nakāmadhātuṃ, narūpadhātuṃ, upapajjantassā’’ti tisso missakā pucchā cāti kāmadhātumūlakā nava anulomapucchā honti. Tathā rūpadhātumūlakā nava, arūpadhātumūlakā navāti sattavīsati anulomapucchā honti. Tathā nakāmadhātunarūpadhātunaarūpadhātumūlakā sattavīsati paṭilomapucchā. Puna ‘‘nakāmadhātuyā, naarūpadhātuyā, narūpadhātuyā, naarūpadhātuyā, nakāmadhātuyā, naarūpadhātuyā’’ti sattavīsati dukamūlakā pucchāti sabbāpi sampiṇḍitā ekāsīti pucchā honti. Tāsaṃ vasenettha vissajjanaṃ katanti idaṃ dhātuvāre pāḷivavatthānaṃ. Evaṃ tāva sakalepi anusayayamake pāḷivavatthānametaṃ veditabbaṃ.

Herein, “for one who has passed away from the sensual realm and is being reborn in the sensual realm, the form realm, the formless realm, not the sensual realm, not the form realm, not the formless realm”—these are six pure questions. “For one being reborn not in the sensual realm, not in the formless realm, not in the form realm; not in the formless realm, not in the sensual realm, not in the form realm”—these are three mixed questions. Thus, there are nine direct questions rooted in the sensual realm. Similarly, there are nine rooted in the form realm and nine rooted in the formless realm, making twenty-seven direct questions. Likewise, there are twenty-seven reverse questions rooted in not the sensual realm, not the form realm, and not the formless realm. Again, from “not in the sensual realm, not in the formless realm, not in the form realm; not in the formless realm, not in the sensual realm, not in the form realm,” there are twenty-seven questions rooted in dyads. Altogether, when combined, there are eighty-one questions. The answers herein are given in accordance with them. This is the arrangement of the Pāli text in the section on the elements. Thus, this arrangement of the Pāli text in the entire Yamaka on Latent Tendencies should be understood.

Ādito paṭṭhāya panettha yaṃ yaṃ anuttānaṃ, tattha tattha ayaṃ vinicchayakathā – anusayāti kenaṭṭhena anusayā? Anusayanaṭṭhena. Ko esa anusayanaṭṭho nāmāti? Appahīnaṭṭho. Ete hi appahīnaṭṭhena tassa tassa santāne anusenti nāma, tasmā anusayāti vuccanti. Anusentīti anurūpaṃ kāraṇaṃ labhitvā uppajjantīti attho. Athāpi siyā – anusayanaṭṭho nāma appahīnākāro. Appahīnākāro ca uppajjatīti vattuṃ na yujjati, tasmā na anusayā uppajjantīti. Tatridaṃ paṭivacanaṃ – appahīnākāro anusayo, anusayoti pana appahīnaṭṭhena thāmagatakileso vuccati. So cittasampayutto sārammaṇo sappaccayaṭṭhena sahetuko ekantākusalo atītopi hoti anāgatopi paccuppannopi, tasmā uppajjatīti vattuṃ yujjati.

From the beginning, wherever anything herein is unclear, this is the definitive discussion: ‘Latent tendencies’—in what sense are they latent tendencies? In the sense of lying latent. What is this sense of lying latent? It is the sense of not being abandoned. For these, because they lie latent in the mental continuum of this or that being in the sense of not being abandoned, are called ‘latent tendencies.’ ‘They lie latent’ means they arise upon obtaining a suitable condition. Or it might be said: the sense of lying latent is the state of not being abandoned. And it is not fitting to say that the state of not being abandoned arises; therefore, latent tendencies do not arise. To this, the reply is: the state of not being abandoned is the latent tendency, but by ‘latent tendency’ is meant a defilement that has gained strength in the sense of not being abandoned. It is associated with consciousness, has an object, is with its condition and with its cause, is exclusively unwholesome, and can be past, future, or present. Therefore, it is fitting to say that it arises.

Tatridaṃ pamāṇaṃ – abhidhamme tāva kathāvatthusmiṃ (kathā. 554 ādayo) ‘‘anusayā abyākatā, anusayā ahetukā, anusayā cittavippayuttā’’ti sabbe vādā paṭisedhitā. Paṭisambhidāmagge (paṭi. ma. 3.21) ‘‘paccuppanne kilese pajahatī’’ti pucchaṃ katvā anusayānaṃ paccuppannabhāvassa atthitāya ‘‘thāmagatānusayaṃ pajahatī’’ti [Pg.320] vuttaṃ. Dhammasaṅgahe pana mohassa padabhājane ‘‘avijjānusayo avijjāpariyuṭṭhānaṃ avijjālaṅgī moho akusalamūlaṃ, ayaṃ tasmiṃ samaye moho hotī’’ti (dha. sa. 390) akusalacittena saddhiṃ avijjānusayassa uppannabhāvo vutto. Imasmiṃyeva anusayayamake sattannaṃ mahāvārānaṃ aññatarasmiṃ uppajjanavāre ‘‘yassa kāmarāgānusayo uppajjati, tassa paṭighānusayo uppajjatī’’tiādi vuttaṃ. Tasmā ‘‘anusentīti anurūpaṃ kāraṇaṃ labhitvā uppajjantī’’ti yaṃ vuttaṃ, taṃ iminā tantippamāṇena suvuttanti veditabbaṃ. Yampi ‘‘cittasampayutto sārammaṇo’’tiādi vuttaṃ, tampi suvuttameva. Anusayo hi nāmesa parinipphanno cittasampayutto akusaladhammoti niṭṭhamettha gantabbaṃ. Kāmarāgānusayotiādīsu kāmarāgo ca so appahīnaṭṭhena anusayo cāti kāmarāgānusayo. Sesapadesupi eseva nayo.

Herein, this is the authority: first, in the Abhidhamma, in the Kathāvatthu (Kv 554ff.), all the views that “latent tendencies are indeterminate,” “latent tendencies are rootless,” and “latent tendencies are dissociated from consciousness” are refuted. In the Paṭisambhidāmagga (Paṭi. M. 3.21), after the question, “Does one abandon defilements in the present?” is posed, it is said, “one abandons a latent tendency that has gained strength,” because of the existence of latent tendencies in the present. In the Dhammasaṅgaṇī, in the exposition of terms for delusion, it is said: “The latent tendency of ignorance, the obsession of ignorance, the fetter of ignorance, delusion, the unwholesome root—this is the delusion at that time” (Dhs §390), thus stating the arising of the latent tendency of ignorance together with unwholesome consciousness. In this very Yamaka on Latent Tendencies, in one of the seven great sections, in the section on arising, it is said: “For whomever the latent tendency of sensual lust arises, for him the latent tendency of aversion arises,” and so on. Therefore, what was stated—“‘They lie latent’ means they arise upon obtaining a suitable condition”—should be understood as well-spoken in accordance with this scriptural authority. And what was stated—“associated with consciousness, has an object,” etc.—is also well-spoken. For it should be concluded here that a latent tendency is indeed a fully developed, unwholesome state associated with consciousness. In expressions such as ‘the latent tendency of sensual lust,’ it is sensual lust and it is a latent tendency in the sense of not being abandoned; hence, ‘the latent tendency of sensual lust.’ This same method applies to the remaining terms.

Paricchedaparicchinnuddesavāravaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Section of Delimitation and the Statement of the Delimited.

Uppattiṭṭhānavāravaṇṇanā

The Commentary on the Section of the Place of Arising.

2. Idāni tesaṃ uppattiṭṭhānaṃ pakāsetuṃ kattha kāmarāgānusayo anusetītiādimāha. Tattha kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsūti kāmāvacarabhūmiyaṃ sukhāya ca upekkhāya cāti dvīsu vedanāsu. Ettha kāmarāgānusayo anusetīti imāsu dvīsu vedanāsu uppajjati. So panesa akusalavedanāsu sahajātavasena ārammaṇavasena cāti dvīhākārehi anuseti. Akusalāya sukhāya vedanāya ceva upekkhāya vedanāya ca sahajātopi hutvā uppajjati. Tā vedanā ārammaṇaṃ katvāpi uppajjatīti attho. Avasesā pana kāmāvacarakusalavipākakiriyavedanā ārammaṇameva katvā uppajjati. Kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsu anusayamāno cesa tāhi vedanāhi sampayuttesu saññāsaṅkhāraviññāṇesupi anusetiyeva. Na hi sakkā vedanāsu anusayamānena taṃsampayuttehi saññādīhi saddhiṃ asahajātena vā bhavituṃ, taṃsampayutte vā saññādayo ārammaṇaṃ akatvā uppajjituṃ. Evaṃ santepi [Pg.321] pana yasmā imā dve vedanāva sātasantasukhattā assādaṭṭhena kāmarāgānusayassa uppattiyā sesasampayuttadhammesu padhānā, tasmā ‘‘dvīsu vedanāsu ettha kāmarāgānusayo anusetī’’ti vuttaṃ, oḷārikavasena hi bodhaneyye sukhaṃ bodhetunti.

2. Now, to show their place of arising, he begins with, “Where does the latent tendency of sensual lust lie latent?” Herein, “in the two feelings in the sensual realm” means in the sensual-sphere plane, in pleasant feeling and in neutral feeling. The latent tendency of sensual lust lies latent, that is, it arises, in these two feelings. It lies latent in two ways: by way of co-nascence and by way of object. It arises having co-arisen with unwholesome pleasant feeling and with unwholesome neutral feeling. It also arises by taking those feelings as its object—this is the meaning. But as for the remaining sensual-sphere feelings—wholesome, resultant, and functional—it arises only by taking them as its object. And while this latent tendency lies latent in the two feelings of the sensual realm, it also lies latent in the perception, formations, and consciousness associated with those feelings. For it is impossible for that which lies latent in feelings not to be co-nascent with the associated perception and so on, or to arise without taking the associated perception and so on as its object. Even so, because these two feelings alone, being agreeable, peaceful, and pleasant, are primary among the other associated states for the arising of the latent tendency of sensual lust in the sense of gratification, it is therefore said, “the latent tendency of sensual lust lies latent herein in two feelings.” For by means of the gross, what is to be understood is easily explained.

Nanu cesa ārammaṇavasena anusayamāno na kevalaṃ imāsu dvīsu vedanāsu ceva vedanāsampayuttadhammesu ca anuseti, iṭṭhesu pana rūpādīsupi anusetiyeva. Vuttampi cetaṃ vibhaṅgappakaraṇe (vibha. 816) ‘‘yaṃ loke piyarūpaṃ sātarūpaṃ, ettha sattānaṃ kāmarāgānusayo anusetī’’ti imasmimpi pakaraṇe anusayavārassa paṭilomanaye vuttaṃ. ‘‘Yattha kāmarāgānusayo nānuseti tattha diṭṭhānusayo nānusetīti dukkhāya vedanāya rūpadhātuyā arūpadhātuyā ettha kāmarāgānusayo nānuseti, no ca tattha diṭṭhānusayo nānuseti. Apariyāpanne ettha kāmarāgānusayo ca nānuseti, diṭṭhānusayo ca nānusetī’’ti. Ettha hi dukkhavedanāya ceva rūpadhātuādīsu ca nānusetīti vuttattā sasampayuttadhammaṃ dukkhavedanaṃ saokāse rūpārūpāvacaradhamme nava ca, lokuttaradhamme ṭhapetvā avasesesu rūpasaddagandharasaphoṭṭhabbesu anusetīti vuttaṃ hoti. Taṃ idha kasmā na vuttanti? Anoḷārikattā. Heṭṭhā vuttanayena hi vedanānaññeva oḷārikattā imesaṃ pana anoḷārikattā etesu rūpādīsu anusetīti na vuttaṃ, atthato pana labbhati. Tasmā etesupi kāmarāgānusayo anusetiyevāti veditabbo. Na hi satthā sabbaṃ sabbattha katheti. Bodhaneyyasattānaṃ pana vasena katthaci yaṃ labbhati, taṃ sabbaṃ katheti, katthaci na katheti. Tathā hi anena katthaci diṭṭhānusayo anusetīti pucchitvā ‘‘sabbasakkāyapariyāpannesu dhammesu ettha diṭṭhānusayo anusetī’’ti yaṃ labbhati taṃ sabbaṃ kathitaṃ. Aparasmiṃ ṭhāne vissajjantena ‘‘rūpadhātuyā arūpadhātuyā ettha vicikicchānusayo ca mānānusayo ca diṭṭhānusayo ca anusenti, kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsu ettha vicikicchānusayo ca kāmarāgānusayo ca mānānusayo ca diṭṭhānusayo ca anusenti, dukkhāya vedanāya ettha vicikicchānusayo ca paṭighānusayo ca diṭṭhānusayo ca avijjānusayo [Pg.322] ca anusentī’’ti yaṃ labbhati taṃ sabbaṃ akathetvā rūpadhātuarūpadhātūhi saddhiṃ tisso vedanāva kathitā. Vedanāsampayuttā pana arūpadhammā, sabbañca rūpaṃ na kathitaṃ. Kiñcāpi na kathitaṃ, diṭṭhānusayo panettha anusetiyeva. Evameva kiñcāpi idha rūpādiiṭṭhārammaṇaṃ na kathitaṃ, kāmarāgānusayo panettha anusetiyevāti. Evaṃ tāva kāmarāgānusayassa anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ veditabbaṃ.

Does not this latent tendency, lying latent by way of the object, lie latent not only in these two feelings and the states associated with feeling, but also in agreeable forms and so on? And this has been stated in the Vibhaṅga (Vibh. 816): 'Whatever in the world is pleasing and agreeable, here the latent tendency of sensual lust lies latent in beings.' Moreover, in the reverse method of the section on latent tendencies in this same treatise, it is said: 'Is it that where the latent tendency of sensual lust does not lie latent, the latent tendency of wrong view does not lie latent there? In painful feeling, the form realm, and the formless realm, the latent tendency of sensual lust does not lie latent, but the latent tendency of wrong view does lie latent there. In the unincluded, neither the latent tendency of sensual lust nor the latent tendency of wrong view lies latent.' Here, since it is said that it does not lie latent in painful feeling and in the form realm, etc., it is implied that, having excluded painful feeling with its associated states, the nine form-sphere and formless-sphere states with their bases, and the supramundane states, it does lie latent in the remaining forms, sounds, smells, tastes, and tangibles. So why is this not mentioned here? Because of their non-grossness. For by the method explained previously, due to the grossness of feelings alone, it was not stated that it lies latent in these forms, etc., which are non-gross; but the meaning is obtained. Therefore, it should be understood that the latent tendency of sensual lust indeed lies latent in these as well. For the Teacher does not explain everything in every context. Rather, according to the beings to be awakened, in some places he explains everything that is relevant, and in other places he does not. For example, in one place, when asked where the latent tendency of wrong view lies latent, he explains fully: 'It lies latent in all states encompassed by identity view.' But in another place, when answering, he says: 'In the form realm and the formless realm, the latent tendencies of doubt, conceit, and wrong view lie latent. In the sensual realm, in the two feelings, the latent tendencies of doubt, sensual lust, conceit, and wrong view lie latent. In painful feeling, the latent tendencies of doubt, aversion, wrong view, and ignorance lie latent.' Here, he mentions only the three feelings along with the form and formless realms, but does not mention the immaterial states associated with feeling or all material form. Although these are not mentioned, the latent tendency of wrong view still lies latent there. Similarly, although agreeable objects such as form are not mentioned here, the latent tendency of sensual lust still lies latent in them. Thus, the sphere of the latent tendency of sensual lust should be understood.

Paṭighānusayassa pana ‘‘dukkhāya vedanāyā’’ti vacanato dve domanassavedanā kāyaviññāṇasampayuttā dukkhavedanāti tisso vedanā anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ. So panesa domanassavedanāsu sahajātavasena ārammaṇavasena cāti dvīhākārehi anuseti. Avasesadukkhavedanāya pana ārammaṇavaseneva anuseti. Tāsu vedanāsu anusayamāno cesa tāhi sampayuttesu saññākkhandhādīsupi anusetiyeva. Yāya hi vedanāya esa sahajāto, taṃsampayuttehi saññādīhipi sahajātova. Yā ca vedanā ārammaṇaṃ karoti, tāhi sampayutte saññādayopi karotiyeva. Evaṃ santepi pana yasmā dukkhavedanāva asātadukkhavedayitattā nirassādaṭṭhena paṭighānusayassa uppattiyā sesasampayuttadhammesu adhikā; tasmā ‘‘dukkhāya vedanāya ettha paṭighānusayo anusetī’’ti vuttaṃ, oḷārikavasena hi bodhaneyye sukhaṃ bodhetunti.

Regarding the latent tendency of aversion, the phrase 'in painful feeling' indicates that two feelings of displeasure and the painful feeling associated with body-consciousness—making three feelings—serve as the sphere for the latent tendency. This latent tendency lies latent in feelings of displeasure in two ways: by co-arising and by taking as an object. In the remaining painful feeling, however, it lies latent only by taking as an object. When it lies latent in those feelings, it also lies latent in the associated perception aggregate and other factors. For with whatever feeling it co-arises, it also co-arises with the associated perceptions, etc. And whatever feeling it takes as its object, it also takes the associated perceptions, etc., as its object. Even so, because painful feeling—being an unpleasant, painful experience and devoid of savor—is more significant than the other associated phenomena for the arising of the latent tendency of aversion, it is therefore said, 'Here, the latent tendency of aversion lies latent in painful feeling.' For by means of what is gross, those who are to be taught are easily instructed.

Nanu cesa ārammaṇavasena anusayamāno na kevalaṃ dukkhavedanāya ceva taṃsampayuttadhammesu ca anuseti, aniṭṭhesu pana rūpādīsupi anusetiyeva? Vuttampi cetaṃ vibhaṅgappakaraṇe (vibha. 816) ‘‘yaṃ loke appiyarūpaṃ asātarūpaṃ, ettha sattānaṃ paṭighānusayo anusetī’’ti imasmimpi pakaraṇe anusayavārassa paṭilomanaye vuttaṃ – ‘‘kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsu ettha paṭighānusayo nānuseti, no ca tattha kāmarāgānusayo nānuseti. Rūpadhātuyā arūpadhātuyā apariyāpanne ettha paṭighānusayo ca nānuseti, kāmarāgānusayo ca nānusetī’’ti. Ettha hi dvīsu kāmāvacaravedanāsu ceva rūpadhātuādīsu ca nānusetīti vuttattā sasampayuttadhammā dve vedanā saokāse rūpārūpāvacaradhamme nava ca, lokuttaradhamme ṭhapetvā avasesesu rūpādīsu anusetīti vuttaṃ hoti[Pg.323]. Taṃ idha kasmā na vuttanti? Anoḷārikattā. Heṭṭhā vuttanayena hi dukkhavedanāya eva oḷārikattā imesaṃ pana anoḷārikattā etesu rūpādīsu anusetīti na vuttaṃ. Atthato pana labbhati, tasmā etesupi paṭighānusayo anusetiyevāti veditabbo.

Does not this latent tendency, lying latent by way of its object, lie latent not only in painful feeling and the states associated with it, but also in disagreeable forms and so on? Indeed, this is stated in the Vibhaṅga (Vibh. 816): 'Whatever in the world is unpleasing and disagreeable, here the latent tendency of aversion lies latent in beings.' Moreover, in this very treatise, in the reverse method of the section on latent tendencies, it is said: 'In the two feelings in the sensual realm, the latent tendency of aversion does not lie latent, but the latent tendency of sensual lust does lie latent there. In the form realm, the formless realm, and the unincluded, neither the latent tendency of aversion nor the latent tendency of sensual lust lies latent.' Here, since it is said that it does not lie latent in the two sense-sphere feelings and in the form realm and so on, it is implied that, having excluded the two feelings with their associated states, the nine form-sphere and formless-sphere states with their bases, and the supramundane states, it does lie latent in the remaining forms, etc. So why is it not stated here? Because of their non-grossness. For by the method stated previously, due to the grossness of painful feeling alone, it was not stated that the latent tendency lies latent in these forms, etc., which are non-gross. But the meaning is obtained; therefore, it should be known that the latent tendency of aversion does indeed lie latent in these as well.

Kiṃ pana itarā dve vedanā iṭṭhārammaṇaṃ vā paṭighassa ārammaṇaṃ na hontīti? No na honti. Parihīnajjhānassa vippaṭisāravasena sasampayuttadhammā tā vedanā ārabbha domanassaṃ uppajjati. Iṭṭhārammaṇassa ca paṭiladdhassa vipariṇāmaṃ vā appaṭiladdhassa appaṭilābhaṃ vā samanussaratopi domanassaṃ uppajjati. Domanassamattameva pana taṃ hoti, na paṭighānusayo. Paṭighānusayo hi aniṭṭhārammaṇe paṭihaññanavasena uppanno thāmagato kileso, tasmā ettha domanassena saddhiṃ paṭigho uppannopi attano paṭighakiccaṃ akaraṇabhāvena eva paṭighānusayo na hoti abbohārikattaṃ gacchati. Yathā hi pāṇātipātacetanāya saddhiṃ uppannopi byāpādo manokammaṃ nāma na hoti abbohārikattaṃ gacchati, evaṃ paṭighānusayo na hoti, abbohārikattaṃ gacchati. Vuttampi cetaṃ ekaccaṃ iṭṭhārammaṇaṃ nekkhammasitampi vā domanassaṃ sandhāya ‘‘yaṃ evarūpaṃ domanassaṃ paṭighaṃ tena pajahati na tattha paṭighānusayo anusetī’’ti (ma. ni. 1.465). Evaṃ paṭighānusayassa anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ veditabbaṃ.

But do the other two feelings not become an object for aversion? It is not that they do not. For one whose jhāna has declined, sorrow arises by way of regret concerning those feelings and their associated states. Also, when one reflects on the change of a desirable object that was obtained or the non-obtainment of what was not obtained, sorrow arises. However, this is merely sorrow, not the latent tendency to aversion. The latent tendency to aversion is a defilement that has become firm, arisen by way of being repelled by an undesirable object. Therefore, even if aversion arises here along with sorrow, because it does not perform its function of aversion, it does not become the latent tendency to aversion; it becomes inoperative. Just as ill-will, even if it arises along with the intention to kill, is not called mental action and becomes inoperative, so too it does not become the latent tendency to aversion; it becomes inoperative. And this has been stated with reference to sorrow concerning a certain desirable object or even sorrow based on renunciation: 'One abandons that aversion, which is sorrow of such a kind, by means of that [path], but the latent tendency to aversion does not lie latent there' (cf. MN 1.465). Thus, the place where the latent tendency to aversion lies latent should be understood.

Mānānusayassa pana ‘‘kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsū’’tiādivacanato dve kāmāvacaravedanā rūpārūpadhātuyo cāti idaṃ tividhaṃ anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ. Tassa akusalāsu vedanāsu kāmarāgānusayassa viya sahajātānusayatā veditabbā. Sasampayuttadhammāsu pana sabbāsupi kāmāvacarāsu sukhaadukkhamasukhavedanāsu rūpārūpadhātūsu ca ārammaṇavaseneva anuseti. Anusayavārassa pana paṭilomanaye ‘‘dukkhāya vedanāya apariyāpanne ettha kāmarāgānusayo ca nānuseti, mānānusayo ca nānusetī’’ti vuttattā ṭhapetvā dukkhavedanañceva navavidhaṃ lokuttaradhammañca sesarūpārūpadhammesupi ayaṃ anusetiyevāti. Evaṃ mānānusayassa anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ veditabbaṃ.

Regarding the latent tendency to conceit, from the statement 'in the sensuous realm, in two feelings,' etc., it is understood that these two sensuous-sphere feelings and the form and formless spheres constitute the threefold basis for its lying latent. Its co-arising as a latent tendency should be understood to occur in unwholesome feelings, like that of the latent tendency to sensual desire. However, in its associated states, and in all sensuous-sphere pleasant and neither-painful-nor-pleasant feelings, and in the form and formless spheres, it lies latent only by way of the object. But in the reverse order of the Anusaya section, because it is said: 'In that which is not comprised in painful feeling, here the latent tendency to sensual desire does not lie latent, nor does the latent tendency to conceit,' therefore, excluding painful feeling and the nine kinds of supramundane phenomena, this [tendency] also lies latent in the remaining phenomena of the form and formless spheres. Thus, the basis for the latent tendency to conceit should be understood.

Diṭṭhānusayavicikicchānusayā [Pg.324] pana kevalaṃ lokuttaradhammesveva nānusenti. Tebhūmakesu pana sabbesupi anusentiyeva. Tena vuttaṃ – ‘‘sabbasakkāyapariyāpannesu dhammesu ettha diṭṭhānusayo anuseti, ettha vicikicchānusayo anusetī’’ti. Tattha sabbasakkāyapariyāpannesūti saṃsāravaṭṭanissitaṭṭhena sakkāyapariyāpannesu sabbadhammesūti attho. Tattha panete pañcasu cittuppādesu sahajātānusayanavasena anusenti. Te vā pana pañca cittuppāde aññe vā tebhūmakadhamme ārabbha pavattikāle ārammaṇānusayanavasena anusentīti. Evaṃ diṭṭhānusayavicikicchānusayānaṃ anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ veditabbaṃ.

The latent tendencies of wrong view and doubt, however, do not lie latent in supramundane phenomena at all. But in all phenomena of the three planes, they certainly do lie latent. Therefore it is said: 'Here, the latent tendency of wrong view lies latent in all phenomena comprised in the existing body; here, the latent tendency of doubt lies latent.' Here, 'in all phenomena comprised in the existing body' means in all phenomena comprised therein in the sense of being dependent on the cycle of existence. Here, these lie latent in five types of consciousness by way of co-arising as a latent tendency. Or, by way of being an object-based latent tendency, they lie latent at the time of their occurrence in relation to those five types of consciousness or other phenomena of the three planes. Thus, the basis for the latent tendencies of wrong view and doubt should be understood.

Bhavarāgānusayo pana kiñcāpi diṭṭhivippayuttesu catūsu cittesu uppajjanato sahajātānusayanavasena ‘‘kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsu anusetī’’ti vattabbo bhaveyya. Kāmadhātuyaṃ panesa dvīhi vedanāhi saddhiṃ uppajjamānopi rūpārūpāvacaradhammameva paṭilabhati. Kāmadhātuyā pariyāpannaṃ ekadhammampi ārammaṇaṃ na karoti, tasmā ārammaṇānusayanavasena niyamaṃ katvā ‘‘rūpadhātuyā arūpadhātuyā ettha bhavarāgānusayo anusetī’’ti vuttaṃ. Apica rāgo nāmesa kāmarāgabhavarāgavasena duvidho. Tattha kāmarāgo kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsu anusetīti vutto. Sace pana bhavarāgopi kāmarāgo viya evaṃ vucceyya, kāmarāgena saddhiṃ desanā saṃkiṇṇā viya bhaveyyāti rāgakilesaṃ dvidhā bhinditvā kāmarāgato bhavarāgassa visesadassanatthampi evaṃ desanā katāti. Evaṃ bhavarāgānusayassa anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ veditabbaṃ.

However, although the latent tendency to craving for existence arises in the four consciousnesses dissociated from views, it could be said that it lies latent in two feelings in the sensuous realm by way of co-arising as a latent tendency. But even though it arises together with two feelings in the sensuous realm, it only takes form-sphere and formless-sphere phenomena as its object. It does not make even a single phenomenon comprised in the sensuous realm its object. Therefore, having made a restriction by way of the object-based latent tendency, it is said: 'Here, the latent tendency to craving for existence lies latent in the form realm and the formless realm.' Furthermore, craving is of two kinds: sensual craving and craving for existence. Herein, sensual craving is said to lie latent in two feelings in the sensuous realm. But if craving for existence were also to be stated in this way, like sensual craving, the teaching would seem to be confused with that of sensual craving. Thus, in order to show the distinction of craving for existence from sensual craving by dividing the defilement of craving into two, the teaching has been given in this way. In this way, the basis for the latent tendency to craving for existence should be understood.

Avijjānusayo pana sabbesupi tebhūmakadhammesu anuseti. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘sabbasakkāyapariyāpannesu dhammesu ettha avijjānusayo anusetī’’ti. Tassa dvādasasu cittuppādesu sahajātānusayatā veditabbā. Ārammaṇakaraṇavasena pana na kiñci tebhūmakadhammaṃ ārabbha na pavattatīti. Evaṃ avijjānusayassa anusayanaṭṭhānaṃ veditabbaṃ. Ayaṃ tāva paricchedavāraparicchinnuddesavārauppattiṭṭhānavāresu vinicchayakathā.

The latent tendency of ignorance, however, lies latent in all phenomena of the three planes. Therefore it is said: 'Here, the latent tendency of ignorance lies latent in all phenomena comprised in the existing body.' Its co-arising as a latent tendency should be understood to occur in the twelve types of unwholesome consciousness. However, by way of taking an object, there is no phenomenon of the three planes in relation to which it does not occur. Thus, the basis for the latent tendency of ignorance should be understood. This, then, is the definitive discourse on the Section on Delimitation, the Section on the Summary of the Delimited, and the Section on the Basis of Arising.

Uppattiṭṭhānavāravaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Section on the Basis of Arising.

Mahāvāro

The Great Section

1. Anusayavāravaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Section on Latent Tendencies

3. Sattannaṃ [Pg.325] pana mahāvārānaṃ paṭhame anusayavāre yassa kāmarāgānusayo anuseti, tassa paṭighānusayo anusetīti ettha yadetaṃ ‘‘āmantā’’ti paṭivacanaṃ dinnaṃ, taṃ duddinnaṃ viya khāyati. Kasmā? Kāmarāgapaṭighānaṃ ekakkhaṇe anuppattito. Yathā hi ‘‘yassa manāyatanaṃ uppajjati, tassa dhammāyatanaṃ uppajjatīti ‘āmantā’, assāsapassāsānaṃ uppādakkhaṇe tesaṃ kāyasaṅkhāro ca uppajjati, vacīsaṅkhāro ca uppajjatī’’tiādīsu manāyatanadhammāyatanāni kāyasaṅkhāravacīsaṅkhārā ca ekakkhaṇe uppajjanti, na tathā kāmarāgapaṭighā. Kāmarāgo hi aṭṭhasu lobhasahagatacittuppādesu uppajjati. Paṭigho dvīsu domanassasahagatesūti, natthi nesaṃ ekakkhaṇe uppatti; tasmā ettha ‘no’ti paṭisedho kattabbo siyā. Taṃ akatvā pana ‘āmantā’ti paṭivacanassa dinnattā heṭṭhāyamakesu viya ettha khaṇapaccuppannavasena vattamānavohāraṃ aggahetvā aññathā gahetabbo.

3. However, in the first section, the Anusaya Section, of the seven great sections, regarding the question, 'For whom does the latent tendency for sensual desire lie dormant, for him does the latent tendency for aversion lie dormant?', the reply 'Yes' that was given seems to have been ill-given. Why? Because sensual desire and aversion do not arise in the same moment. For just as in cases such as, 'For whom the mind-base arises, for him the mental-object base arises? Yes,' and 'At the moment of the arising of in-breaths and out-breaths, both the bodily formation and the verbal formation arise,' the mind-base and mental-object base, and the bodily and verbal formations, arise in the same moment. But this is not so with sensual desire and aversion. For sensual desire arises in the eight consciousnesses accompanied by greed, and aversion in the two accompanied by displeasure; there is no arising of them in the same moment. Therefore, a denial, 'No,' should have been made here. But since the reply 'Yes' was given without doing so, the present usage here should not be taken as referring to a momentary presence, as in the preceding Yamakas; instead, it should be understood differently.

Kathaṃ? Appahīnavasena. Appahīnatañhi sandhāya ayaṃ ‘‘anusetī’’ti vattamānavohāro vutto, na khaṇapaccuppannataṃ. Yasmā ca appahīnataṃ sandhāya vutto, tasmā ‘‘yassa kāmarāgānusayo anuseti, tassa paṭighānusayo anusetī’’ti pucchāya yassa kāmarāgānusayo appahīno, na anuppattidhammataṃ āpādito, tassa paṭighānusayopi appahīnoti evamattho daṭṭhabbo. Yasmā ca tesu yasseko appahīno, tassa itaropi appahīnova hoti, tasmā ‘‘āmantā’’ti vuttaṃ. Yadi evaṃ, yaṃ upari uppajjanavāre ‘yassa kāmarāgānusayo uppajjati, tassa paṭighānusayo uppajjatī’ti pucchitvā ‘āmantā’ti vuttaṃ; tattha kathaṃ attho gahetabboti? Tatthāpi appahīnavaseneva uppattipaccaye sati uppattiyā anivāritavasena vā. Yathā hi cittakammādīni ārabhitvā apariniṭṭhitakammantā cittakārādayo tesaṃ kammantānaṃ akaraṇakkhaṇepi mittasuhajjādīhi diṭṭhadiṭṭhaṭṭhāne ‘‘imesu divasesu kiṃ karothā’’ti vuttā, ‘‘cittakammaṃ karoma, kaṭṭhakammaṃ karomā’’ti vadanti. Te kiñcāpi tasmiṃ khaṇe na karonti avicchinnakammantattā pana katakhaṇañca kattabbakhaṇañca upādāya karontiyeva nāma honti. Evameva yamhi santāne anusayā appahīnā, yamhi vā pana nesaṃ santāne uppattipaccaye sati uppatti anivāritā, tattha anuppajjanakkhaṇepi [Pg.326] uppannapubbañceva kālantare uppajjanakañca upādāya yassa kāmarāgānusayo uppajjati, tassa paṭighānusayo uppajjatiyeva nāmāti evamattho veditabbo. Ito paresupi evarūpesu vissajjanesu eseva nayo. No ca tassāti idaṃ anāgāmissa kāmarāgabyāpādānaṃ anavasesato pahīnattā vuttaṃ. Tiṇṇaṃ puggalānanti puthujjanasotāpannasakadāgāmīnaṃ. Dvinnaṃ puggalānanti sotāpannasakadāgāmīnaṃ. Paratopi evarūpesu ṭhānesu eseva nayo.

How? By way of non-abandonment. For this present usage 'lies dormant' is stated with reference to non-abandonment, not to momentary presence. And because it is stated with reference to non-abandonment, therefore, in the question 'For whom does the latent tendency for sensual desire lie dormant, for him does the latent tendency for aversion lie dormant?', the meaning should be understood thus: for whom the latent tendency for sensual desire is not abandoned, not brought to a state of non-arising, for him the latent tendency for aversion is also not abandoned. And because for such a one, if one is not abandoned, the other is also not abandoned, therefore 'Yes' is said. If so, then regarding what was said above in the section on arising, when it was asked 'For whom does the latent tendency for sensual desire arise, for him does the latent tendency for aversion arise?' and 'Yes' was said, how should the meaning be understood there? There too, it is by way of non-abandonment, or by way of the non-prevention of arising when the conditions for arising are present. For just as painters and others, having undertaken painting and other crafts, whose work is not yet finished, even at a moment when they are not doing that work, when asked by friends and companions wherever they are seen, 'What are you doing these days?', reply, 'We are doing painting work, we are doing carpentry work.' Although they are not doing it at that moment, because their work is uninterrupted, by taking into account the moments when they have done it and the moments when they will do it, they are indeed said to be doing it. Just so, in a continuum in which the latent tendencies are not abandoned, or in which, when the conditions for their arising are present, their arising is not prevented, even at a moment when they are not arising, by taking into account what has arisen previously and what will arise at another time, it should be understood that for whom the latent tendency for sensual desire arises, for him the latent tendency for aversion indeed arises. In similar answers beyond this, the same method applies. 'But not for him'—this is said because for the non-returner, sensual desire and ill-will have been completely abandoned without remainder. 'Of three persons'—meaning the ordinary person, the stream-enterer, and the once-returner. 'Of two persons'—meaning the stream-enterer and the once-returner. In similar cases beyond this, the same method applies.

14. Okāsavārassa paṭhamadutiyapucchāsu yasmā kāmarāgānusayo kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsu anuseti, paṭighānusayo dukkhavedanāya; tasmā ‘no’ti paṭisedho kato. Tatiyapucchāyaṃ ubhinnampi kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsu anusayanato ‘āmantā’ti paṭivacanaṃ dinnaṃ. Rūpadhātuarūpadhātuyā pana mānānusayassa kāmarāgānusayena saddhiṃ asādhāraṇaṃ uppattiṭṭhānaṃ. Tasmā no ca tattha kāmarāgānusayoti vuttaṃ. Iminā nayena sabbesaṃ uppattiṭṭhānavāraṃ oloketvā sādhāraṇāsādhāraṇaṃ uppattiṭṭhānaṃ veditabbaṃ.

14. In the first and second questions of the Okāsa Section, because the latent tendency for sensual desire lies dormant in two feelings in the sense-sphere realm, and the latent tendency for aversion in painful feeling, the denial 'No' is made. In the third question, since both lie dormant in two feelings in the sense-sphere realm, the reply 'Yes' is given. However, in the form realm and the formless realm, the basis of arising for the latent tendency for conceit is not shared with the latent tendency for sensual desire. Therefore it is said: 'And the latent tendency for sensual desire is not there.' By this method, having examined the section on the basis of arising for all latent tendencies, one should understand the shared and unshared bases of arising.

20. Dukamūlakapucchāyaṃ yasmā kāmarāgapaṭighānusayā nāpi ekasmiṃ ṭhāne uppajjanti, na ekaṃ dhammaṃ ārammaṇaṃ karonti, tasmā natthīti paṭikkhepo kato. Ayañhettha adhippāyo. Yasmiṃ ime dve anusayā anusayeyyuṃ, taṃ ṭhānameva natthi. Tasmā ‘‘kattha mānānusayo anusetī’’ti ayaṃ pucchā apucchāyevāti. Aññesupi evarūpesu eseva nayo.

20. In the question of the Dyad Root, since the latent tendencies for sensual desire and aversion neither arise in one and the same basis, nor take a single phenomenon as their object, the denial 'there is none' is made. This is the intended meaning here. There is no basis whatsoever where these two latent tendencies could lie dormant. Therefore, the question 'Where does the latent tendency for conceit lie dormant?' is indeed a non-question. The same principle applies in other similar cases.

27. Puggalokāsavāre catunnanti puthujjanasotāpannasakadāgāmianāgāmīnaṃ.

27. In the Section on Individuals and Bases, 'of four' means of the ordinary person, the stream-enterer, the once-returner, and the non-returner.

36. Paṭilomanaye yassa kāmarāgānusayo nānusetīti ayaṃ pucchā anāgāmiṃ gahetvā pucchati.

36. In the reverse method, the question, 'For whom does the latent tendency for sensual desire not lie dormant?', is asked with reference to the non-returner.

56. Dvinnaṃ [Pg.327] puggalānaṃ sabbattha kāmarāgānusayo nānusetīti anāgāmiarahantānaṃ. Kāmadhātuyā tīsu vedanāsūti ca vedanāggahaṇena vedanāsampayuttakānampi tesaṃ vatthārammaṇānampīti sabbesampi kāmāvacaradhammānaṃ gahaṇaṃ veditabbaṃ. Ayaṃ anusayavāre vinicchayakathā.

56. For two individuals, the latent tendency for sensual desire does not lie dormant anywhere—namely, for the non-returner and the arahant. And regarding 'in the three feelings in the sense-sphere realm,' by the term 'feelings,' it should be understood that this includes all sense-sphere phenomena: those associated with feelings, as well as their bases and objects. This is the analytical discussion on the Anusaya Section.

Anusayavāravaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Section on Latent Tendencies.

2. Sānusayavāravaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Section on (States) with Latent Tendencies.

66-131. Sānusayavāre pana yo kāmarāgānusayena sānusayoti yathā ekantarikajarādirogena ābādhiko yāva tamhā rogā na muccati, tāva tassa rogassa anuppattikkhaṇepi sarogoyeva nāma hoti. Evaṃ sasaṃkilesassa vaṭṭagāmisattassa yāva ariyamaggena anusayā samugghātaṃ na gacchanti, tāva tesaṃ anusayānaṃ anuppattikkhaṇepi sānusayoyeva nāma hoti. Evarūpaṃ sānusayataṃ sandhāya ‘āmantā’ti vuttaṃ. Sesamettha anusayavārasadisameva.

In the section on being with underlying tendencies, one who has the underlying tendency of sensual desire is with an underlying tendency. Just as a person afflicted by an intermittent disease like a fever is considered diseased until freed from that disease—even at a moment when the disease is not manifest—so too, for a being bound to the cycle of existence and still tainted by defilements, as long as the underlying tendencies are not uprooted by the noble path, they are called 'one with underlying tendencies'—even at a moment when these are not manifest. It is with reference to such a state of being with underlying tendencies that 'yes' was said. The rest here is similar to the section on underlying tendencies.

Okāsavāre pana ‘‘rūpadhātuyā arūpadhātuyā ettha mānānusayena sānusayo’’ti vutte tāsu dhātūsu puggalassa sānusayatā paññāyeyya, anusayassa uppattiṭṭhānaṃ na paññāyeyya. Anusayassa ca uppattiṭṭhānadassanatthaṃ ayaṃ vāro āraddho, tasmā tato mānānusayena sānusayoti vuttaṃ. Evañhi sati tato dhātudvayato uppannena mānānusayena sānusayoti anusayassa uppattiṭṭhānaṃ dassitaṃ hoti. Imassa pana pañhassa atthe avutte ādipañhassa attho pākaṭo na hotīti paṭhamaṃ na vutto, tasmā so evaṃ veditabbo. Yato kāmarāgānusayenāti yato uppannena kāmarāgānusayena sānusayo, kiṃ so tato uppannena paṭighānusayenapi sānusayoti? Yasmā panete dve ekasmā ṭhānā nuppajjanti; tasmā ‘‘no’’ti paṭisedho kato. Arahā sabbatthāti arahā sabbadhammesu uppajjanakena kenaci anusayena nirānusayoti. Iminā atthavasena nippadesaṭṭhānesu bhummavacanameva katanti. Iminā upāyena sabbattha atthavinicchayo veditabboti.

Now, in the section on opportunity, when it is said, 'In the form realm and the formless realm, here one is with the underlying tendency of conceit,' a person's state of being with underlying tendencies in those realms would be evident, but the place of arising of the underlying tendency would not be evident. This section has been introduced to show the place of arising of the underlying tendency. Therefore, it is said, 'with the underlying tendency of conceit from there.' For in this way, when one is with the underlying tendency of conceit that has arisen from those two realms, the place of arising of the underlying tendency is indicated. However, since the meaning of the initial question would not be clear if the meaning of this question were not stated, it was not stated at first. Therefore, it should be understood thus: 'From which one is with the underlying tendency of sensual desire' means, from which arisen underlying tendency of sensual desire one is with an underlying tendency, is one also with the underlying tendency of aversion that has arisen from there? But since these two do not arise from the same place, the denial 'no' is made. 'The Arahant everywhere' means the Arahant is without underlying tendencies with respect to all phenomena, through any underlying tendency that could arise. By this reasoning, in cases where no specific location is mentioned, only the locative case is used. By this method, the analytical determination of the meaning should be understood everywhere.

Sānusayavāravaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Section on Being with Underlying Tendencies.

3. Pajahanavāravaṇṇanā

3. The Explanation of the Section on Abandoning.

132-197. Pajahanavāre [Pg.328] pajahatīti tena tena maggena pahānapariññāvasena pajahati, āyatiṃ anuppattidhammataṃ āpādeti. Āmantāti anāgāmīmaggaṭṭhaṃ sandhāya paṭivacanaṃ. Tadekaṭṭhaṃ pajahatīti pahānekaṭṭhataṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Noti arahattamaggaṭṭhaṃ sandhāya paṭisedho.

In the section on abandoning, 'abandons' means one abandons by means of the respective path, through the full understanding that is abandonment, and brings about the state of not being subject to future arising. 'Yes' is a reply referring to one established in the path of the non-returner. 'Abandons that which has the same object' is said with reference to the oneness of abandoning. 'No' is a denial referring to one established in the path of Arahantship.

Yato kāmarāgānusayaṃ pajahatīti yato uppajjanakaṃ kāmarāgānusayaṃ pajahatīti attho. Aṭṭhamakoti arahattaphalaṭṭhato paṭṭhāya paccorohanagaṇanāya gaṇiyamāno sotāpattimaggaṭṭho aṭṭhamako nāma. Dakkhiṇeyyagaṇanāya hi arahā aggadakkhiṇeyyattā paṭhamo, arahattamaggaṭṭho dutiyo, anāgāmī tatiyo…pe… sotāpattimaggaṭṭho aṭṭhamo. So idha ‘‘aṭṭhamako’’ti vutto. Nāmasaññāyeva vā esā tassāti. Anāgāmimaggasamaṅgiñca aṭṭhamakañca ṭhapetvā avasesāti saddhiṃ puthujjanena sekkhāsekkhā. Tesu hi puthujjano pahānapariññāya abhāvena nappajahati. Sesā tesaṃ anusayānaṃ pahīnattā. Dvinnaṃ maggasamaṅgīnanti dve maggasamaṅgino ṭhapetvāti attho. Iminā nayena sabbattha vinicchayo veditabboti.

The meaning of 'from which one abandons the underlying tendency of sensual desire' is 'from which one abandons the underlying tendency of sensual desire that is prone to arising.' The eighth person: Counting in descending order from one established in the fruit of Arahantship, the one established in the path of stream-entry is called the eighth. For in the enumeration of those worthy of offerings, the Arahant is first as the foremost worthy of offerings, the one established in the path of Arahantship is second, the non-returner is third… and so on… the one established in the path of stream-entry is eighth. Here, that one is called 'the eighth.' Or, this is merely a designation for that person. Excluding the one endowed with the path of the non-returner and the eighth person, the remaining—together with the worldling—are trainees and those beyond training. Among them, the worldling does not abandon due to the absence of the full understanding that is abandonment. The rest do not abandon them, since for them those underlying tendencies have already been abandoned. 'Of the two endowed with the path' means excluding the two persons endowed with the path. In this way, the analytical determination should be understood in every instance.

Pajahanavāravaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Section on Abandoning.

4. Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā

4. The Explanation of the Section on Full Understanding.

198-263. Pariññāvāre parijānātīti tīhi pariññāhi parijānāti. Sesamettha heṭṭhā vuttanayameva. Ayampi hi vāro pajahanavāro viya maggaṭṭhānaññeva vasena vissajjitoti.

In the section on full understanding, 'fully understands' means one fully understands with the three kinds of full understanding. The rest here is to be understood in the same way as explained before. This section, like the section on abandoning, is explained solely by way of those established in the path.

Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Section on Full Understanding.

5. Pahīnavāravaṇṇanā

5. The Explanation of the Section on What is Abandoned.

264-274. Pahīnavāre phalaṭṭhavaseneva desanā āraddhā. Anāgāmissa hi ubhopete anusayā pahīnā, tasmā ‘‘āmantā’’ti vuttaṃ.

In the section on what is abandoned, the teaching was commenced solely with reference to those established in the fruit. For a non-returner, both these underlying tendencies are abandoned; therefore, 'yes' was said.

275-296. Okāsavāre [Pg.329] yattha kāmarāgānusayo pahīno tattha paṭighānusayo pahīnoti pucchitvā na vattabbo pahīnoti vā appahīnoti vāti vuttaṃ taṃ kasmāti? Uppattiṭṭhānassa asādhāraṇattā. Aññaṃ hi kāmarāgānusayassa uppattiṭṭhānaṃ, aññaṃ paṭighānusayassa. Abhāvitamaggassa ca yattha anusayo uppajjati, magge bhāvite tattheva so pahīno nāma hoti. Tattha yasmā neva kāmarāgānusayaṭṭhāne paṭighānusayo uppajjati, na paṭighānusayaṭṭhāne kāmarāgānusayo, tasmā tattha so pahīnoti vā appahīnoti vā na vattabbo. So hi yasmiṃ attano uppattiṭṭhāne kāmarāgānusayo pahīno, tasmiṃ appahīnattā tattha pahīnoti na vattabbo. Yaṃ kāmarāgānusayassa uppattiṭṭhānaṃ, tasmiṃ aṭṭhitattā tattha appahīnoti na vattabbo.

In the section on opportunity, when asked whether, at the place where the underlying tendency of sensual desire is abandoned, the underlying tendency of aversion is also abandoned, it is said that it should not be stated that it is abandoned or not abandoned. Why is that? Because the place of their arising is not common. For the place of arising of the underlying tendency of sensual desire is one thing, and that of the underlying tendency of aversion is another. Moreover, for one who has not developed the path, wherever an underlying tendency arises, when the path is developed, it is right there that it is said to be abandoned. Since the underlying tendency of aversion never arises in the place of the underlying tendency of sensual desire, nor does the underlying tendency of sensual desire in the place of the underlying tendency of aversion, therefore it should not be said that it is abandoned or not abandoned there. For that tendency should not be said to be 'abandoned' there, since it is not abandoned in that place. Nor should it be said to be 'not abandoned' there, since it does not exist in the place where the tendency to sensual desire arises.

Yattha kāmarāgānusayo pahīno, tattha mānānusayo pahīnoti ettha pana sādhāraṇaṭṭhānaṃ sandhāya āmantāti vuttaṃ. Kāmarāgānusayo hi kāmadhātuyā dvīsu vedanāsu anuseti. Mānānusayo tāsu ceva rūpārūpadhātūsu ca. So ṭhapetvā asādhāraṇaṭṭhānaṃ sādhāraṇaṭṭhāne tena saddhiṃ pahīno nāma hoti. Tasmā ‘āmantā’ti vuttaṃ. Iminā nayena sabbasmimpi okāsavāre pahīnatā ca navattabbatā ca veditabbā. ‘Natthī’ti āgataṭṭhānesu pana heṭṭhā vuttasadisova vinicchayo. Puggalokāsavāro, okāsavāragatikoyeva.

Regarding the question, 'Where the underlying tendency of sensual desire is abandoned, is the underlying tendency of conceit abandoned there?', here 'yes' is stated with reference to a common location. For the underlying tendency of sensual desire lies latent in two feelings in the sense-sphere realm. The underlying tendency of conceit lies latent in those same feelings as well as in the form and formless realms. Therefore, setting aside the non-common location, in the common location it is said to be abandoned together with it. Thus, 'yes' was said. In this way, in the entire section on opportunity, abandonment and non-sayability should be understood. But in instances where 'there is not' appears, the analytical determination is just as was said before. The section on persons and opportunity is of the same nature as the section on opportunity.

297-307. Paṭilomanaye yassa kāmarāgānusayo appahīnoti puthujjanasotāpannasakadāgāmivasena pucchati. Kiñcāpi hi ime dve anusayā puthujjanato paṭṭhāya yāva anāgāmimaggaṭṭhā channaṃ puggalānaṃ appahīnā. Idha pana parato ‘‘tiṇṇaṃ puggalānaṃ dvinnaṃ puggalāna’’ntiādivacanato maggaṭṭhā anadhippetā, tasmā puthujjanasotāpannasakadāgāminova sandhāya ‘āmantā’ti vuttaṃ. Dvinnaṃ puggalānanti sotāpannasakadāgāmīnaṃ. Iminā nayena puggalavāre vinicchayo veditabbo.

297-307. In the reverse method, the question asks, 'For whom is the underlying tendency of sensual desire not abandoned?' with reference to ordinary persons, stream-enterers, and once-returners. Although these two underlying tendencies are not abandoned by six types of individuals, from ordinary persons up to those standing on the path of non-returning, here, however, because the statement that follows, 'for three types of individuals, for two types of individuals,' and so on, does not refer to those standing on the path, therefore 'yes' was said only with reference to ordinary persons, stream-enterers, and once-returners. 'For two types of individuals' means for stream-enterers and once-returners. In this way, the determination in the section on individuals should be understood.

308-329. Okāsavārapuggalokāsavārā pana heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbāti.

308-329. However, the section on location and the section on persons and location should be understood in the same way as explained above.

Pahīnavāravaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Section on Abandonment.

6. Uppajjanavāravaṇṇanā

6. Explanation of the Section on Arising.

330. Uppajjanavāro [Pg.330] anusayavārasadisoyeva.

330. The section on arising is similar to the section on underlying tendencies.

7. Dhātupucchāvāravaṇṇanā

7. Explanation of the Section of Questions about Elements.

332-340. Dhātuvārassa pucchāvāre tāva kati anusayā anusentīti kati anusayā santānaṃ anugatā hutvā sayanti. Kati anusayā nānusentīti kati anusayā santānaṃ na anugatā hutvā sayanti. Kati anusayā bhaṅgāti kati anusayā anusenti nānusentīti evaṃ vibhajitabbāti attho. Sesamettha yaṃ vattabbaṃ siyā, taṃ heṭṭhā pāḷivavatthāne vuttameva.

332-340. In the section of questions on the elements, first, 'How many underlying tendencies underlie?' means how many underlying tendencies lie dormant, having followed the mental continuum. 'How many underlying tendencies do not underlie?' means how many underlying tendencies do not lie dormant, not having followed the mental continuum. 'How many underlying tendencies are a matter of division?' means how many underlying tendencies are to be analyzed as 'they underlie' and 'they do not underlie'—this is the meaning. Whatever else needs to be said here has already been stated in the earlier delineation of the Pāli.

7. Dhātuvissajjanāvāravaṇṇanā

7. Explanation of the Section on the Elucidation of Elements.

341-349. Niddesavāre panassa kassaci satta anusayā anusentīti puthujjanavasena vuttaṃ. Kassaci pañcāti sotāpannasakadāgāmivasena vuttaṃ. Tesañhi diṭṭhānusayo ca vicikicchānusayo ca pahīnāti pañceva anusenti. Tattha yathā anusayavāre ‘‘anusentī’’ti padassa uppajjantīti attho gahito, evamidha na gahetabbo. Kasmā? Tasmiṃ khaṇe anuppajjanato. Kāmadhātuṃ upapajjantassa hi vipākacittañceva kammasamuṭṭhānarūpañca uppajjati, akusalacittaṃ natthi. Anusayā ca akusalacittakkhaṇe uppajjanti, na vipākacittakkhaṇeti tasmiṃ khaṇe anuppajjanato tathā attho na gahetabbo. Kathaṃ pana gahetabboti? Yathā labbhati tathā gahetabbo. Kathañca labbhati? Appahīnaṭṭhena. Yathā hi rāgadosamohānaṃ appahīnattā. Kusalābyākatacittasamaṅgī puggalo ‘‘sarāgo sadoso samoho’’ti vuccati, evaṃ maggabhāvanāya appahīnattā paṭisandhikkhaṇepi tassa tassa puggalassa te te anusayā anusentīti vuccanti. Na kevalañca vuccanti, appahīnattā pana te anusentiyeva nāmāti veditabbā.

341-349. In the exposition section, 'For some, seven underlying tendencies underlie' is stated with reference to ordinary persons. 'For some, five' is stated with reference to stream-enterers and once-returners. For them, the underlying tendencies of wrong view and doubt are abandoned, so only five underlie. Here, unlike in the section on underlying tendencies where the word 'underlie' was understood to mean 'arise,' that meaning should not be taken here. Why? Because they do not arise at that moment. For one being reborn in the sense-sphere realm, only resultant consciousness and kamma-originated matter arise; unwholesome consciousness is not present. Underlying tendencies arise only at the moment of unwholesome consciousness, not at the moment of resultant consciousness; hence, because they do not arise at that moment, that meaning should not be taken. How then should it be taken? It should be taken as it is available. And how is it available? In the sense of not being abandoned. Just as a person endowed with wholesome or indeterminate consciousness is called 'one with lust, hatred, and delusion' because lust, hatred, and delusion have not been abandoned, so too, because they have not been abandoned by path-development, even at the moment of rebirth-linking, those underlying tendencies are said to underlie that individual. And it should be understood that they not only are said to underlie, but they do indeed underlie because they are unabandoned.

Anusayā bhaṅgā natthīti yassa hi yo anuseti, so anusetiyeva; yo nānuseti, so nānusetiyeva. Ayaṃ anuseti ca nānuseti ca, ayaṃ siyā anuseti siyā nānusetīti, evaṃ vibhajitabbo anusayo nāma natthi. Rūpadhātuṃ upapajjantassa kassaci tayoti [Pg.331] anāgāmivasena vuttaṃ. Tassa hi kāmarāgapaṭighadiṭṭhivicikicchānusayā cattāropi anavasesato pahīnā. Itare tayova appahīnā. Tena vuttaṃ – ‘‘kassaci tayo anusayā anusentī’’ti.

'There are no underlying tendencies that are a matter of division' means that for whomever a certain tendency underlies, it simply underlies; for whomever it does not underlie, it simply does not underlie. There is no such thing as an underlying tendency that is to be analyzed as 'this one both underlies and does not underlie,' or 'this one may underlie and may not underlie.' 'For some being reborn in the form realm, three underlie' is stated with reference to non-returners. For them, the four underlying tendencies of sensual desire, aversion, wrong view, and doubt are all abandoned without remainder. The other three remain unabandoned. Hence, it is said, 'For some, three underlying tendencies underlie.'

Na kāmadhātunti kāmadhātuyā paṭisiddhattā sesā dve dhātuyo upapajjantassāti attho. Satte vāti yasmā ariyasāvakassa rūpadhātuyā cutassa kāmadhātuyaṃ upapatti nāma natthi, puthujjanasseva hoti, tasmā sattevāti niyametvā vuttaṃ. ‘‘Arūpadhātuyā cutassa kāmadhātuṃ upapajjantassa sattevā’’ti etthāpi eseva nayo. Rūpadhātuyā upapatti natthīti kasmā natthi? Upapattinipphādakassa rūpāvacarajjhānassa abhāvā. So hi sabbaso rūpasaññānaṃ samatikkamā taṃ dhātuṃ upapannoti nāssa tattha rūpāvacarajjhānaṃ atthi. Tadabhāvā rūpadhātuyaṃ upapatti natthīti veditabbā. Arūpadhātuyā cutassa na kāmadhātunti ettha arūpadhātuyeva adhippetā. Iminā nayena sabbavissajjanesu attho veditabboti.

'Not the sense-sphere realm' means for one who is being reborn in the remaining two realms, since the sense-sphere realm is excluded. 'Only seven' is stated with restriction because for a noble disciple who has passed away from the form realm, there is no such thing as rebirth in the sense-sphere realm—it happens only for an ordinary person. Similarly, in the phrase 'for one who has passed away from the formless realm and is being reborn in the sense-sphere realm, only seven,' the same principle applies. Why is there no rebirth in the form realm? Because the form-sphere jhāna, which produces rebirth, is absent. For one who has completely transcended all perceptions of form and is reborn in that realm, there is no form-sphere jhāna for him. Due to its absence, it should be understood that there is no rebirth in the form realm. In the phrase 'for one who has passed away from the formless realm, not the sense-sphere realm,' only the formless realm is meant. In this way, the meaning should be understood in all elucidations.

Dhātuvāravaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Section on Elements.

Anusayayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Yamaka on Underlying Tendencies is completed.

8. Cittayamakaṃ

8. The Yamaka on Consciousness.

Uddesavāravaṇṇanā

Explanation of the Section on the Summary.

1-62. Idāni tesaññeva mūlayamake desitānaṃ kusalādidhammānaṃ labbhamānavasena ekadesameva saṅgaṇhitvā anusayayamakānantaraṃ desitassa cittayamakassa atthavaṇṇanā hoti. Tattha pāḷivavatthānaṃ tāva veditabbaṃ. Imasmiñhi cittayamake mātikāṭhapanaṃ, ṭhapitamātikāya vissajjananti dve vārā honti. Tattha mātikāṭhapane puggalavāro, dhammavāro, puggaladhammavāroti āditova tayo suddhikamahāvārā honti.

1-62. Now, having collected just a part of those very wholesome and other states taught in the Mūlayamaka, by way of their obtainability, comes the explanation of the meaning of the Yamaka on Consciousness, which was taught after the Yamaka on Underlying Tendencies. Herein, first, the establishment of the Pāli text should be understood. In this Yamaka on Consciousness, there are two sections: the setting out of the matrix and the elucidation of the established matrix. Herein, in the setting out of the matrix, there are from the beginning three pure, great sections: the section on individuals, the section on phenomena, and the section on individuals and phenomena.

Tattha ‘‘yassa cittaṃ uppajjati, na nirujjhatī’’ti evaṃ puggalavasena cittassa uppajjananirujjhanādibhedaṃ dīpento gato puggalavāro nāma. ‘‘Yaṃ cittaṃ uppajjati, na nirujjhatī’’ti evaṃ dhammavaseneva cittassa uppajjananirujjhanādibhedaṃ dīpento gato dhammavāro nāma. ‘‘Yassa yaṃ cittaṃ uppajjati, na nirujjhatī’’ti evaṃ ubhayavasena [Pg.332] cittassa uppajjananirujjhanādibhedaṃ dīpento gato puggaladhammavāro nāma. Tato ‘‘yassa sarāgaṃ citta’’nti soḷasannaṃ padānaṃ vasena apare sarāgādipadavisesitā soḷasa puggalavārā, soḷasa dhammavārā, soḷasa puggaladhammavārāti aṭṭhacattālīsaṃ missakavārā honti. Te sarāgādipadamattaṃ dassetvā saṅkhittā. Tato ‘‘yassa kusalaṃ citta’’ntiādinā nayena chasaṭṭhidvisatasaṅkhānaṃ abhidhammamātikāpadānaṃ vasena apare kusalādipadavisesitā chasaṭṭhidvisatapuggalavārā, chasaṭṭhidvisatadhammavārā chasaṭṭhidvisatapuggaladhammavārāti aṭṭhanavutisattasatā missakavārā honti. Tepi kusalādipadamattaṃ dassetvā saṅkhittāyeva. Yānipettha sanidassanādīni padāni cittena saddhiṃ na yujjanti, tāni moghapucchāvasena ṭhapitāni.

Herein, the section called the 'Section on Individuals' proceeds by explaining the distinctions of arising, cessation, and so forth of consciousness in terms of an individual, thus: 'For whom consciousness arises, it does not cease.' The section called the 'Section on Phenomena' proceeds by explaining the distinctions of arising, cessation, and so forth of consciousness purely in terms of phenomena, thus: 'Whatever consciousness arises, it does not cease.' The section called the 'Section on Individuals and Phenomena' proceeds by explaining the distinctions of arising, cessation, and so forth of consciousness in terms of both, thus: 'For whom whatever consciousness arises, that does not cease.' Following this, by way of the sixteen terms, there are further sections specified by terms such as 'with lust'—sixteen Sections on Individuals, sixteen Sections on Phenomena, and sixteen Sections on Individuals and Phenomena—making forty-eight mixed sections. These are abbreviated, showing only terms like 'with lust.' Then, by the method beginning with 'For whom a wholesome consciousness,' by way of the two hundred and sixty-six terms of the Abhidhamma matrix, there are further sections specified by terms such as 'wholesome'—two hundred and sixty-six Sections on Individuals, two hundred and sixty-six Sections on Phenomena, and two hundred and sixty-six Sections on Individuals and Phenomena—making seven hundred and ninety-eight mixed sections. These too are abbreviated, showing only terms like 'wholesome.' Herein, terms such as 'with sight' that do not accord with consciousness are set aside as futile questions.

Tesu pana tīsu vāresu sabbapaṭhame suddhikapuggalamahāvāre uppādanirodhakālasambhedavāro, uppāduppannavāro, nirodhuppannavāro, uppādavāro, nirodhavāro, uppādanirodhavāro uppajjamānanirodhavāro, uppajjamānuppannavāro, nirujjhamānuppannavāro, uppannuppādavāro, atītānāgatavāro, uppannuppajjamānavāro, niruddhanirujjhamānavāro, atikkantakālavāroti cuddasa antaravārā. Tesu uppādavāro, nirodhavāro, uppādanirodhavāroti imesu tīsu vāresu anulomapaṭilomavasena cha cha katvā aṭṭhārasa yamakāni. Uppannuppādavāre atītānāgatakālavasena anulomato dve, paṭilomato dveti cattāri yamakāni. Sesesu ādito niddiṭṭhesu tīsu, anantare niddiṭṭhesu tīsu; avasāne niddiṭṭhesu catūsūti dasasu vāresu anulomato ekaṃ, paṭilomato ekanti dve dve katvā vīsati yamakāni. Evaṃ sabbesupi cuddasasu antaravāresu dvācattālīsa yamakāni, caturāsīti pucchā aṭṭhasaṭṭhiatthasataṃ hoti. Yathā ca ekasmiṃ suddhikapuggalamahāvāre, tathā suddhikadhammavārepi suddhikapuggaladhammavārepīti tīsu mahāvāresu chabbīsatiyamakasataṃ, tato diguṇā pucchā, tato diguṇā atthā ca veditabbā. Idaṃ pana vārattayaṃ sarāgādivasena soḷasaguṇaṃ, kusalādivasena chasaṭṭhidvisataguṇaṃ katvā imasmiṃ cittayamake anekāni yamakasahassāni, tato diguṇā pucchā, tato diguṇā atthā ca hontīti. Pāṭho pana saṃkhittoti. Evaṃ tāva imasmiṃ cittayamake pāḷivavatthānaṃ veditabbaṃ.

Now, in these three sections, the very first great pure section on individuals includes fourteen intermediate sections: the section on the combination of the time of arising and cessation, the section on arising and what has arisen, the section on cessation and what has arisen, the section on arising, the section on cessation, the section on arising and cessation, the section on the cessation of what is arising, the section on what is arising and what has arisen, the section on what is ceasing and what has arisen, the section on what has arisen and arising, the section on past and future, the section on what has arisen and what is arising, the section on what has ceased and what is ceasing, and the section on elapsed time. Among these, in the three sections on arising, cessation, and arising and cessation, there are eighteen yamakas, being six each in forward and reverse order. In the section on what has arisen and arising, there are four yamakas: two in forward order and two in reverse, based on past and future time. In the remaining ten sections—three specified at the beginning, three specified immediately after, and four specified at the end—there are twenty yamakas, being two each with one in forward order and one in reverse. Thus, in all fourteen intermediate sections, there are forty-two yamakas, eighty-four questions, and one hundred and sixty-eight meanings. Just as in the one great pure section on individuals, so too in the great pure section on phenomena and the great pure section on individuals and phenomena, there are one hundred and twenty-six yamakas in the three great sections; the questions are double that, and the meanings are double that again. Furthermore, this threefold section, when multiplied sixteenfold by way of states such as lust, and two hundred and sixty-six-fold by way of states such as wholesome, results in many thousands of yamakas in this Yamaka on Consciousness; the questions are double that, and the meanings are double that again. The text, however, is concise. Thus far, the structure of the Pāli text in this Yamaka on Consciousness should be understood.

Mātikāṭhapanavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Establishment of the Matrix.

Niddeso

Exposition

1. Puggalavāravaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Section on Individuals

63. Idāni [Pg.333] ṭhapitānukkamena mātikaṃ vissajjetuṃ yassa cittaṃ uppajjati na nirujjhatītiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha uppajjatīti uppādakkhaṇasamaṅgitāya uppajjati na nirujjhatīti nirodhakkhaṇaṃ appattatāya na nirujjhati. Tassa cittanti tassa puggalassa tato paṭṭhāya cittaṃ nirujjhissati nuppajjissatīti pucchati. Tesaṃ cittanti yesaṃ paricchinnavaṭṭadukkhānaṃ khīṇāsavānaṃ sabbapacchimassa cuticittassa uppādakkhaṇo vattati, etesaṃ tadeva cuticittaṃ uppādappattatāya uppajjati nāma, bhaṅgaṃ appattatāya na nirujjhati. Idāni pana bhaṅgaṃ patvā taṃ tesaṃ cittaṃ nirujjhissati, tato appaṭisandhikattā aññaṃ nuppajjissati. Itaresanti pacchimacittasamaṅgiṃ khīṇāsavaṃ ṭhapetvā avasesānaṃ sekkhāsekkhaputhujjanānaṃ nirujjhissati ceva uppajjissati cāti yaṃ taṃ uppādakkhaṇappattaṃ taṃ nirujjhissateva. Aññaṃ pana tasmiṃ vā aññasmiṃ vā attabhāve uppajjissati ceva nirujjhissati ca. Dutiyapucchāvissajjanepi tathārūpasseva khīṇāsavassa cittaṃ sandhāya ‘āmantā’ti vuttaṃ. Nuppajjati nirujjhatīti bhaṅgakkhaṇe arahato pacchimacittampi sesānaṃ bhijjamānacittampi. Tato paṭṭhāya pana arahato cittaṃ na nirujjhissatīti sakkā vattuṃ uppajjissatīti pana na sakkā. Sesānaṃ uppajjissatīti sakkā vattuṃ, na nirujjhissatīti na sakkā. Tasmā ‘no’ti paṭisedho kato. Dutiyapañhe yassa cittaṃ na nirujjhissati, uppajjissatīti so puggaloyeva natthi, tasmā natthīti paṭikkhepo kato.

63. Now, to explain the matrix in the established sequence, the text is introduced beginning, “For whom consciousness arises, it does not cease,” and so on. Herein, “arises” means it arises by being endowed with the moment of arising; “does not cease” means it does not cease because it has not reached the moment of cessation. The question is asked concerning that individual’s consciousness: from that point onward, will that consciousness cease or will it not arise? “For them, consciousness…” refers to those whose suffering in the round is fully comprehended, the Arahants, for whom the moment of arising of the very last death-consciousness is occurring. For them, that very death-consciousness is said to arise because it has reached the moment of arising, and it does not cease because it has not reached the moment of dissolution. But now, upon reaching dissolution, that consciousness of theirs will cease, and because there is no subsequent rebirth-linking, another will not arise. “For others” refers to all except the Arahant endowed with the final consciousness. For the remaining trainees, those beyond training, and ordinary people, that which has reached the moment of arising will indeed cease, and another will arise in this or another existence and will also cease. In the answer to the second question, with reference to the consciousness of such an Arahant, it is said, “Yes.” The phrase “does not arise, it ceases” refers to the final consciousness of an Arahant at the moment of dissolution and the disintegrating consciousness of others. From that point onward, however, it can be said that the Arahant’s consciousness will not cease, but it cannot be said that it will arise. For others, it can be said that it will arise, but it cannot be said that it will not cease. Therefore, the denial “No” is given. In the second question, 'for whom consciousness will not cease and will arise', no such individual exists; therefore, the rejection “there is not” is given.

65-82. Uppannanti uppādasamaṅginopetaṃ nāmaṃ. Uppādaṃ patvā aniruddhassāpi. Tattha uppādasamaṅgitaṃ sandhāya ‘āmantā’ti, uppādaṃ patvā aniruddhabhāvaṃ sandhāya ‘‘tesaṃ cittaṃ uppanna’’nti vuttaṃ. Anuppannanti uppādaṃ appattaṃ. Tesaṃ cittaṃ uppajjitthāti etthāpi sabbesaṃ tāva cittaṃ khaṇapaccuppannameva hutvā uppādakkhaṇaṃ atītattā uppajjittha nāma, nirodhasamāpannānaṃ nirodhato pubbe uppannapubbattā, asaññasattānaṃ saññībhave uppannapubbattā. Uppajjittha ceva uppajjati cāti uppādaṃ pattattā uppajjittha, anatītattā uppajjati nāmāti attho.

65-82. 'Arisen' is a term for that which is endowed with the moment of arising, even for that which has reached arising but has not ceased. Herein, referring to being endowed with the moment of arising, 'Yes' is said; and referring to having reached arising but not yet having ceased, it is said, 'Their mind has arisen.' 'Not arisen' means not having reached arising. 'Their mind had arisen'—here, the mind of all of them, being momentarily present, is called 'had arisen' because it has passed the moment of arising; for those attained to cessation, because it had arisen previously before cessation; and for non-percipient beings, because it had arisen previously in a percipient existence. 'Had arisen and arises' means 'had arisen' because it has reached arising, and 'arises' because it has not passed—this is the meaning.

Uppādakkhaṇe anāgatañcāti uppādakkhaṇe ca cittaṃ anāgatañca cittanti attho.

'At the moment of arising and the future' means the mind at the moment of arising and the future mind—this is the meaning.

83. Atikkantakālavāre uppajjamānaṃ khaṇanti uppādakkhaṇaṃ. Tattha kiñcāpi uppādakkhaṇo uppajjamāno nāma na hoti, uppajjamānassa pana khaṇattā evaṃ [Pg.334] vutto. Khaṇaṃ vītikkantaṃ atikkantakālanti na ciraṃ vītikkantaṃ tameva pana uppādakkhaṇaṃ vītikkantaṃ hutvā atikkantakālanti saṅkhaṃ gacchati. Nirujjhamānaṃ khaṇanti nirodhakkhaṇaṃ. Tattha kiñcāpi nirodhakkhaṇo nirujjhamāno nāma na hoti, nirujjhamānassa pana khaṇattā evaṃ vutto. Khaṇaṃ vītikkantaṃ atikkantakālanti kiṃ tassa cittaṃ evaṃ nirodhakkhaṇampi vītikkantaṃ hutvā atikkantakālaṃ nāma hotīti pucchati. Tattha yasmā bhaṅgakkhaṇe cittaṃ uppādakkhaṇaṃ khaṇaṃ vītikkantaṃ hutvā atikkantakālaṃ hoti, nirodhakkhaṇaṃ khaṇaṃ vītikkantaṃ hutvā atikkantakālaṃ nāma na hoti. Atītaṃ pana cittaṃ ubhopi khaṇe khaṇaṃ vītikkantaṃ hutvā atikkantakālaṃ nāma, tasmā ‘‘bhaṅgakkhaṇe cittaṃ uppādakkhaṇaṃ vītikkantaṃ, bhaṅgakkhaṇaṃ avītikkantaṃ, atītaṃ cittaṃ uppādakkhaṇañca vītikkantaṃ bhaṅgakkhaṇañca vītikkantanti vissajjanamāha. Dutiyapañhassa vissajjane yasmā atītaṃ cittaṃ ubhopi khaṇe vītikkantaṃ hutvā atikkantakālaṃ nāma hoti, tasmā atītaṃ cittanti vuttaṃ. Paṭilomapañhassa vissajjane yasmā uppādakkhaṇe ca cittaṃ anāgatañca cittaṃ ubhopi khaṇe khaṇaṃ vītikkantaṃ hutvā atikkantakālaṃ nāma na hoti, tesaṃ khaṇānaṃ avītikkantattā. Tasmā ‘‘uppādakkhaṇe cittaṃ anāgataṃ citta’’nti vuttaṃ. Dutiyavissajjanaṃ pākaṭameva.

83. In the section on past time, 'the arising moment' refers to the moment of arising. Although the moment of arising is not actually called 'arising,' it is referred to as such because it is the moment of that which is arising. A moment that has passed is called 'past time.' Though it has not passed for long, that very moment of arising, having passed, is reckoned as past time. 'The ceasing moment' refers to the moment of cessation. Although the moment of cessation is not actually called 'ceasing,' it is referred to as such because it is the moment of that which is ceasing. It is asked: 'Does that mind, having passed even the cessation moment, become past time?' In this regard, since at the moment of dissolution the mind becomes past time by having passed the moment of arising, but it does not become past time by having passed the moment of cessation. However, a past mind is called 'past time' by having passed both moments. Therefore, the answer states: 'At the moment of dissolution, the mind has passed the moment of arising, but has not passed the moment of dissolution. A past mind has passed both the moment of arising and the moment of dissolution.' In the answer to the second question, since a past mind is called 'past time' by having passed both moments, it is referred to as a 'past mind.' In the answer to the reverse question, since neither the mind at the moment of arising nor the future mind is called 'past time' by having passed the moment, because for them those moments have not passed. Therefore, it is stated: 'The mind at the moment of arising and the future mind.' The second answer is clear.

84-113. Dhammavārepi imināvupāyena sabbavissajjanesu attho veditabbo. Puggaladhammavāro dhammavāragatikoyeva.

84-113. Also in the chapter on phenomena, the meaning in all answers should be understood in this way. The chapter on individuals and phenomena follows the same course as the chapter on phenomena.

114-116. Sabbepi missakavārā yassa sarāgaṃ cittantiādinā nayena mukhamattaṃ dassetvā saṅkhittā. Vitthāro pana nesaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbo. Tesu pana ‘‘yassa sarāgaṃ cittaṃ uppajjati, na nirujjhati; tassa cittaṃ nirujjhissati, nuppajjissatī’’ti evaṃ vitthāretabbatāya pucchāva sadisā hoti. Yasmā pana sarāgaṃ cittaṃ pacchimacittaṃ na hoti, tasmā ‘‘yassa sarāgaṃ cittaṃ uppajjati, na nirujjhati; tassa cittaṃ nirujjhissati, nuppajjissatīti no’’ti evaṃ vissajjitabbattā vissajjanaṃ asadisaṃ hoti. Taṃ taṃ tassā tassā pucchāya anurūpavasena veditabbanti.

114-116. All the mixed sections are summarized, only showing the beginning, with the method 'for whom a lustful mind arises,' and so on. But their detailed explanation should be understood in the same way as stated above. Among these, the question to be elaborated thus, 'For whom a lustful mind arises, and does not cease; will that mind cease, but not arise?' is similar. But because a lustful mind is not a final mind, the answer, 'For whom a lustful mind arises, and does not cease; will that mind cease, but not arise? No,' should be given, thus the answer is dissimilar. This should be understood according to the appropriateness of each particular question.

Cittayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Cittayamaka is concluded.

9. Dhammayamakaṃ

9. The Dhammayamaka

1. Paṇṇattiuddesavāravaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Exposition Section on Designations

1-16. Idāni [Pg.335] tesaññeva mūlayamake desitānaṃ kusalādidhammānaṃ mātikaṃ ṭhapetvā cittayamakānantaraṃ desitassa dhammayamakassa vaṇṇanā hoti. Tattha khandhayamake vuttanayeneva pāḷivavatthānaṃ veditabbaṃ. Yathā hi tattha paṇṇattivārādayo tayo mahāvārā, avasesā antaravārā ca honti, tathā idhāpi. ‘‘Yo kusalaṃ dhammaṃ bhāveti, so akusalaṃ dhammaṃ pajahatī’’ti āgatattā panettha pariññāvāro, bhāvanāvāro nāmāti veditabbo. Tattha yasmā abyākato dhammo neva bhāvetabbo, na pahātabbo, tasmā taṃ padameva na uddhaṭaṃ. Paṇṇattivāre panettha tiṇṇaṃ kusalādidhammānaṃ vasena padasodhanavāro, padasodhanamūlacakkavāro, suddhadhammavāro, suddhadhammamūlacakkavāroti imesu catūsu vāresu yamakagaṇanā veditabbā.

1-16. Now, having established the matrix of wholesome states and the like, which were taught in the Mūlayamaka, the commentary on the Dhammayamaka, which was taught after the Cittayamaka, is given. Herein, the arrangement of the Pāli text should be understood in the same way as stated in the Khandhayamaka. Just as there are three great sections—the section on designations and so on—and the remaining intermediate sections, so too here. Since it is stated, "One who develops a wholesome state abandons an unwholesome state," it should be understood that this contains the section on full understanding and the section on development. Herein, because an indeterminate state is neither to be developed nor to be abandoned, that term itself is not taken up. In the section on designations here, the enumeration of pairs should be understood in these four sections—the section on term-purification, the section on the root-cycle of term-purification, the section on pure phenomena, and the section on the root-cycle of pure phenomena—by way of the three wholesome states and so on.

1. Paṇṇattiniddesavāravaṇṇanā

1. Commentary on the Explanation Section on Designations

17-32. Paṇṇattivāraniddese pana kusalā kusaladhammāti kusalānaṃ ekantena kusaladhammattā ‘‘āmantā’’ti vuttaṃ. Sesavissajjanesupi eseva nayo. Avasesā dhammā na akusalā dhammāti avasesā dhammā akusalā na honti, dhammā pana hontīti attho. Iminā nayena sabbavissajjanāni veditabbāni.

17-32. In the Explanation of the Section on Designations, regarding "Are wholesome states wholesome phenomena?", since wholesome states are exclusively wholesome phenomena, it is said, "Yes." This same method applies to the remaining answers. Regarding "Are the remaining phenomena not unwholesome phenomena?", the meaning is that the remaining phenomena are not unwholesome, but they are phenomena. By this method, all the answers should be understood.

Paṇṇattivāravaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Section on Designations.

2. Pavattivāravaṇṇanā

2. Commentary on the Section on Occurrence

33-34. Pavattivāre panettha paccuppannakāle puggalavārassa anulomanaye ‘‘yassa kusalā dhammā uppajjanti, tassa akusalā dhammā uppajjanti; yassa vā pana akusalā dhammā uppajjanti, tassa kusalā dhammā uppajjantī’’ti kusaladhammamūlakāni dve yamakāni, akusaladhammamūlakaṃ ekanti tīṇi yamakāni honti. Tassa paṭilomanayepi okāsavārādīsupi eseva nayo. Evamettha sabbavāresu tiṇṇaṃ tiṇṇaṃ yamakānaṃ vasena yamakagaṇanā veditabbā. Atthavinicchaye panettha idaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ – imassa hi dhammayamakassa [Pg.336] pavattimahāvāre ‘‘uppajjanti nirujjhantī’’ti imesu uppādanirodhesu kusalākusaladhammā tāva ekantena pavattiyaṃyeva labbhanti, na cutipaṭisandhīsu. Abyākatadhammā pana pavatte ca cutipaṭisandhīsu cāti tīsupi kālesu labbhanti. Evamettha yaṃ yattha yattha labbhati, tassa vasena tattha tattha vinicchayo veditabbo.

33-34. Here, in the Section on Occurrence, in the present time, in the Section on Individuals, in the forward order: “For one for whom wholesome states arise, for that one do unwholesome states arise? Or again, for one for whom unwholesome states arise, for that one do wholesome states arise?” Thus, there are two couplets rooted in wholesome states and one couplet rooted in unwholesome states, making three couplets in total. This same method applies in the reverse order, and also in the sections beginning with the Opportunity Section. In this way, throughout all sections, the calculation of couplets should be understood as being three couplets each. Here, in the determination of meaning, this is the characteristic: in the Great Section on Occurrence of this Dhamma-yamaka, regarding “arising and ceasing,” wholesome and unwholesome states are obtained exclusively in the course of life, not at death and rebirth-linking. But indeterminate states are obtained in the course of life and at death and rebirth-linking, thus in all three times. Accordingly, wherever something is obtained, the determination should be understood based on that.

Tatridaṃ nayamukhaṃ – kusalākusalānaṃ tāva ekakkhaṇe anuppajjanato ‘‘no’’ti paṭisedho kato. Abyākatā cāti cittasamuṭṭhānarūpavasena vuttaṃ.

Here is the method of approach: First, because wholesome and unwholesome states do not arise in a single moment, the negation "no" is made. And "indeterminate" is said in reference to mind-produced materiality.

35-36. Yattha kusalā dhammā nuppajjantīti asaññabhavaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tenevettha ‘‘āmantā’’ti vissajjanaṃ kataṃ. Uppajjantīti idampi asaññabhavaṃyeva sandhāya vuttaṃ. Abyākatānaṃ pana anuppattiṭṭhānassa abhāvā ‘‘natthī’’ti paṭikkhepo kato.

35-36. "Where wholesome states do not arise" refers to the realm of non-perception. Therefore, the answer "Yes" was given here. The statement 'they arise' is also said with reference to the realm of non-perception. However, since there is no place where indeterminate states do not arise, the denial "There is not" was made.

49. Dutiye akusaleti bhavaṃ assādetvā uppannesu nikantijavanesu dutiye javanacitte. Dutiye citte vattamāneti paṭisandhito dutiye bhavaṅgacitte vattamāne saha vā paṭisandhiyā bhavaṅgaṃ vipākavasena ekameva katvā bhavanikantiyā āvajjanacitte. Tañhi kiriyacittattā abyākatajātiyaṃ vipākato dutiyaṃ nāma hoti.

49. Regarding 'in the second unwholesome,' it refers to the second impulsion consciousness among those that have arisen with craving, having relished existence. When it says 'in the second consciousness occurring,' it refers to the second life-continuum consciousness occurring after rebirth-linking, or to the adverting consciousness that arises due to craving for existence, having made the life-continuum one with rebirth-linking as a single result. For that adverting consciousness, being a functional consciousness, is called the second in terms of result, belonging to the indeterminate class.

57. Yassa cittassa anantarā aggamagganti gotrabhucittaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Kusalā dhammā uppajjissantīti te aggamaggadhammeyeva sandhāya vuttaṃ.

57. Regarding 'the consciousness immediately after which is the supreme path,' it is spoken with reference to the change-of-lineage consciousness. "Wholesome states will arise" is spoken with reference specifically to those states pertaining to the supreme path.

79. Yassa cittassa anantarā aggamaggaṃ paṭilabhissanti, tassa cittassa uppādakkhaṇeti idaṃ cittajātivasena vuttaṃ. Tajjātikassa hi ekāvajjanena uppannassa tato orimacittassa uppādakkhaṇepi etaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ labbhateva.

79. The phrase 'at the moment of arising of that consciousness'—referring to the consciousness immediately after which one will attain the supreme path—is stated in terms of the class of consciousness. For in the case of one of that same class that has arisen with a single adverting, this characteristic is certainly obtained even at the moment of arising of the consciousness prior to that.

99. Nirodhavārepi kusalākusalānaṃ ekato anirujjhanato ‘‘no’’ti vuttaṃ. Iminā nayamukhena sabbattha vinicchayo veditabboti.

99. In the Section on Cessation, too, because wholesome and unwholesome states do not cease at once, it is said 'no.' Through this method of approach, the determination should be understood everywhere.

Dhammayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Dhammayamaka is concluded.

10. Indriyayamakaṃ

10. The Couplets on the Faculties

Idāni [Pg.337] tesaññeva mūlayamake desitānaṃ kusalādidhammānaṃ labbhamānavasena ekadesaṃ saṃgaṇhitvā dhammayamakānantaraṃ desitassa indriyayamakassa vaṇṇanā hoti. Tattha khandhayamakādīsu vuttanayeneva pāḷivavatthānaṃ veditabbaṃ. Idhāpi hi paṇṇattivārādayo tayo mahāvārā avasesā antaravārā ca saddhiṃ kālappabhedādīhi khandhayamakādīsu āgatasadisāva. Indriyānaṃ pana bahutāya dhātuyamakatopi bahutarāni yamakāni honti. Yathā pana heṭṭhā puggalavārādīsu cakkhāyatanacakkhudhātumūlake naye cakkhāyatanacakkhudhātūhi saddhiṃ jivhāyatanakāyāyatanāni na yojitāni. Jivhāyatanakāyāyatanamūlakāni ca yamakāneva na gahitāni, tathā idhāpi cakkhundriyamūlake naye jivhindriyakāyindriyāni na yojitāni, jivhindriyakāyindriyamūlakāni ca yamakāneva na gahitāni. Tesaṃ aggahaṇe kāraṇaṃ tattha vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Manindriyaṃ pana yathā cakkhundriyādimūlakehi tatheva itthindriyādimūlakehipi saddhiṃ yasmā yojanaṃ gacchati, tasmā nikkhittapaṭipāṭiyā ayojetvā sabbehipi cakkhundriyamūlakādīhi saddhiṃ pariyosāne yojitanti veditabbaṃ. Cakkhundriyena saddhiṃ itthindriyapurisindriyajīvitindriyāni yojitāni sukhindriyadukkhindriyadomanassindriyāni paṭisandhiyaṃ natthīti na gahitāni. Somanassindriyaupekkhindriyāni paṭisandhiyaṃ uppattisabbhāvato gahitāni. Tathā saddhindriyādīni pañca. Lokuttarāni tīṇi paṭisandhiyaṃ abhāveneva na gahitāni. Iti yāni gahitāni, tesaṃ vasenettha cakkhundriyamūlake naye yamakagaṇanā veditabbā. Yathā cettha, evaṃ sabbattha. Yāni pana na gahitāni, tesaṃ vasena yamakāni na gaṇetabbāni. Gaṇentena vā moghapucchāvasena gaṇetabbānīti evaṃ tāva sabbavāresu pāḷivavatthānameva veditabbaṃ.

Now, having gathered a portion of those very same wholesome states and so on, as they are obtainable, which were taught in the Mūla-yamaka, the exposition of the Indriya-yamaka, taught immediately after the Dhamma-yamaka, is now given. Here, the arrangement of the Pāli text should be understood in the same way as in the Khandha-yamaka and the other Yamakas. Indeed, here too, the three great sections beginning with the Designation Section, along with the remaining intermediate sections and the distinctions of time and so on, are similar to those found in the Khandha-yamaka and the other Yamakas. However, because the faculties are numerous, there are more couplets here than even in the Dhātu-yamaka. Just as below in the sections on individuals and so on, in the method based on the eye-sphere and eye-element, the tongue-sphere and body-sphere were not conjoined, and the couplets themselves based on the tongue-sphere and body-sphere were not taken, so too here in the method based on the eye-faculty, the tongue-faculty and body-faculty are not conjoined, and the couplets themselves based on the tongue-faculty and body-faculty are not taken. The reason for their non-inclusion should be understood in the same way as explained there. The mind-faculty, however, since it is conjoined with those rooted in the eye-faculty and so on, just as with those rooted in the femininity-faculty and so on, therefore, without being conjoined in the laid-down order, it should be understood that it is conjoined at the end with all, beginning with the eye-faculty. The femininity-faculty, masculinity-faculty, and life-faculty are conjoined with the eye-faculty; the pleasure-faculty, pain-faculty, and displeasure-faculty are not taken because they are not present at rebirth-linking. The joy-faculty and equanimity-faculty are taken because their arising is possible at rebirth-linking. Similarly, the five faculties beginning with the faith-faculty. The three supramundane faculties are not taken precisely because of their absence at rebirth-linking. Thus, the counting of couplets in the method based on the eye-faculty here should be understood by means of those that are taken. As it is here, so it is everywhere. However, those that are not taken should not be counted as couplets by means of them. Or, if one counts them, they should be counted by means of meaningless questions. Thus, for the time being, the arrangement of the Pāli text in all sections should be understood in this way.

Pavattivāravaṇṇanā

Commentary on the Section on Occurrence

1-86. Atthavinicchaye panettha idaṃ nayamukhaṃ – sacakkhukānaṃ na itthīnanti brahmapārisajjādīnañceva rūpīnaṃ purisanapuṃsakānañca vasena vuttaṃ. Tesañhi itthindriyaṃ nuppajjati. Sacakkhukānaṃ na purisānanti rūpībrahmānañceva itthinapuṃsakānañca vasena vuttaṃ. Tesañhi purisindriyaṃ nuppajjati. Acakkhukānaṃ upapajjantānaṃ tesaṃ jīvitindriyaṃ uppajjatīti ekavokāracatuvokārakāmadhātusatte sandhāya vuttaṃ. Sacakkhukānaṃ vinā somanassenāti upekkhāsahagatānaṃ [Pg.338] catunnaṃ mahāvipākapaṭisandhīnaṃ vasena vuttaṃ. Sacakkhukānaṃ vinā upekkhāyāti somanassasahagatapaṭisandhikānaṃ vasena vuttaṃ. Upekkhāya acakkhukānanti ahetukapaṭisandhivasena vuttaṃ. Ahetukānanti ahetukapaṭisandhicittena saddhiṃ saddhindriyādīnaṃ abhāvato vuttaṃ. Tattha hi ekanteneva saddhāsatipaññāyo natthi. Samādhivīriyāni pana indriyappattāni na honti. Sahetukānaṃ acakkhukānanti gabbhaseyyakavasena ceva arūpīvasena ca vuttaṃ. Añño hi sahetuko acakkhuko nāma natthi. Sacakkhukānaṃ ahetukānanti apāye opapātikavasena vuttaṃ. Sacakkhukānaṃ ñāṇavippayuttānanti kāmadhātuyaṃ duhetukapaṭisandhikānaṃ vasena vuttaṃ. Sacakkhukānaṃ ñāṇasampayuttānanti rūpībrahmāno ceva kāmāvacaradevamanusse ca sandhāya vuttaṃ. Ñāṇasampayuttānaṃ acakkhukānanti arūpino ca tihetukagabbhaseyyake ca sandhāya vuttaṃ.

1-86. In the determination of meaning here, this is the method of exposition: “For those with eyes, not females” is stated by way of the Brahmā’s Retinue and other fine-material beings who are male and neuter. For them, the female faculty does not arise. “For those with eyes, not males” is stated by way of the fine-material Brahmās and female and neuter beings. For them, the male faculty does not arise. “For those without eyes, when they are reborn, their life-faculty arises” is stated with reference to beings of the one-constituent and four-constituent planes, and beings of the sense-desire realm. “For those with eyes, without joy” is stated with reference to the four great resultant rebirth-linking consciousnesses accompanied by equanimity. “For those with eyes, without equanimity” is stated with reference to those whose rebirth-linking consciousness is accompanied by joy. “For those without eyes, with equanimity” is stated by way of the rootless rebirth-linking. “Rootless” is stated because of the absence of the faith-faculty and so on, together with the rootless rebirth-linking consciousness. For in that case, there is absolutely no faith, mindfulness, or wisdom. But concentration and energy, though present, do not attain the level of faculties. “For those with roots, without eyes” is stated by way of womb-born beings and formless beings. For there is no other being with roots who is without eyes. “For those with eyes, rootless” is stated by way of spontaneously arisen beings in the planes of misery. “For those with eyes, dissociated from knowledge” is stated with reference to those reborn with two roots in the sense-desire realm. “For those with eyes, associated with knowledge” is stated with reference to the fine-material Brahmās and the gods and humans of the sense-desire realm. “For those without eyes, associated with knowledge” is stated with reference to formless beings and womb-born beings with three roots.

190. Jīvitindriyamūlake vinā somanassena upapajjantānanti dvepi jīvitindriyāni sandhāya vuttaṃ. Pavatte somanassavippayuttacittassa uppādakkhaṇeti arūpajīvitindriyaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Iminā nayena sabbatthāpi paṭisandhipavattivasena jīvitindriyayojanā veditabbā. Somanassindriyādimūlakesupi paṭisandhipavattivasenevattho gahetabbo. Paṭilomanaye pana nirodhavāre ca etesañceva aññesañca dhammānaṃ yathālābhavasena cutipaṭisandhipavattesu tīsupi anuppādanirodhā veditabbā.

190. “For those reborn without joy, based on the life-faculty” is stated with reference to both life-faculties. “At the moment of arising of consciousness dissociated from joy in the course of existence” is stated with reference to the formless life-faculty. By this method, the conjoining of the life-faculty should be understood everywhere by way of rebirth-linking and the course of existence. The meaning should be taken similarly for those based on the joy-faculty and others, by way of rebirth-linking and the course of existence. However, in the reverse method and in the cessation section, the non-arising and cessation of these and other phenomena should be understood in all three occurrences—death, rebirth-linking, and the course of existence—according to their obtainability.

281. Anāgatavāre eteneva bhāvenāti etena purisabhāveneva, antarā itthibhāvaṃ anāpajjitvā purisapaṭisandhiggahaṇenevāti attho. Katici bhave dassetvā parinibbāyissantīti katici paṭisandhiyo gahetvā itthibhāvaṃ appatvāva parinibbāyissantīti attho. Dutiyapucchāyapi eseva nayo.

281. “In the future section, in this very state” means in this very male state, without undergoing a female state in between, by taking only a male rebirth-linking—this is the meaning. “After manifesting a few existences, they will attain final Nibbāna” means they will attain final Nibbāna after taking a few rebirth-linkings without attaining a female state—this is the meaning. The same method applies to the second question as well.

361. Paccuppannena atītavāre suddhāvāsānaṃ upapatticittassa bhaṅgakkhaṇe manindriyañca nuppajjitthāti cittayamake viya uppādakkhaṇātikkamavasena atthaṃ aggahetvā tasmiṃ bhave anuppannapubbavasena gahetabboti. Iminā nayamukhena sabbasmimpi pavattivāre atthavinicchayo veditabbo.

361. In the present-past section, concerning the Pure Abodes, the statement that the mind-faculty also did not arise at the moment of dissolution of the rebirth-consciousness should be understood not by taking the meaning as the moment of arising having passed, as in the Citta Yamaka, but by taking it as not having arisen previously in that existence. By this method of exposition, the determination of meaning should be understood in the entire process section.

Pavattivāravaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Process Section.

Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Section on Full Understanding.

435-482. Pariññāvāre [Pg.339] pana cakkhumūlakādīsu ekameva cakkhusotayamakaṃ dassitaṃ. Yasmā pana sesānipi lokiyaabyākatāni ceva lokiyaabyākatamissakāni ca pariññeyyāneva, tasmā tāni anupadiṭṭhānipi imināva dassitāni honti. Yasmā pana akusalaṃ ekantato pahātabbameva, ekantaṃ kusalaṃ bhāvetabbameva, lokuttarābyākataṃ sacchikātabbaṃ, tasmā ‘‘domanassindriyaṃ pajahatī’’ti ‘‘anaññātaññassāmītindriyaṃ bhāvetī’’ti ‘‘aññātāvindriyaṃ sacchikarotī’’ti vuttaṃ. Aññindriyaṃ pana bhāvetabbampi atthi sacchikātabbampi, taṃ bhāvanāvaseneva gahitaṃ. Tattha dve puggalāti sakadāgāmimaggasamaṅgī ca, arahattamaggasamaṅgī ca. Tesu eko samucchindituṃ asamatthattā domanassindriyaṃ na pajahati nāma. Eko pahīnadosattā cakkhundriyaṃ na parijānātīti anuppādaṃ āpādetuṃ asamatthatāya na parijānāti. Iminā nayena sabbavissajjanesu attho veditabboti.

435-482. In the section on full understanding, among the sections beginning with the eye-base, only the eye-ear pair is shown. However, since the remaining mundane indeterminate states and those mixed with mundane indeterminate states are also to be fully understood, they are implicitly indicated by this, even though they are not explicitly stated. Furthermore, since the unwholesome must be entirely abandoned, the wholesome must be entirely developed, and the supramundane indeterminate must be realized, it is therefore said: “One abandons the faculty of displeasure,” “One develops the faculty of ‘I shall know the unknown’,” and “One realizes the faculty of one who has final knowledge.” The faculty of final knowledge (`aññindriya`), however, is both to be developed and to be realized; it is included here only by way of development. Here, “two persons” refers to one who is endowed with the path of the once-returner and one who is endowed with the path of arahantship. Among them, one, being unable to eradicate it, is said not to abandon the faculty of displeasure. The other, due to having abandoned aversion, does not fully understand the eye-faculty—that is, being unable to bring about its non-arising, one does not fully understand it. In this way, the meaning in all the answers should be understood.

Pariññāvāravaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Section on Full Understanding.

Indriyayamakavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Indriya Yamaka is concluded.

Nigamanakathā

Concluding Verses

Ettāvatā ca –

And thus far:

Yassovāde ṭhatvā, niṭṭhitakiccassa kiccasampanno;

Yuvatijanopi atīto, suvihitaniyamo yamassāṇaṃ.

Standing in the instruction of him whose task is finished, one's own task is accomplished; He has gone beyond even the youthful, his discipline is well-ordered, his command is over Death.

Devaparisāya majjhe, devapure sabbadevadevena;

Yamakaṃ nāma pakāsitaṃ, yamāmalalomena yaṃ tena.

In the midst of the assembly of devas, in the city of devas, by the deva of all devas, the treatise called Yamaka was taught by him who is restrained, stainless, and without blemish.

Pāḷivavatthānavidhiṃ, pucchāvissajjane ca atthanayaṃ;

Dassetuṃ āraddhā, yamakaaṭṭhakathā mayā tassa.

I have begun this commentary on the Yamaka in order to show the method of establishing the Pāli text and the way of meaning in questions and answers.

Sā [Pg.340] subahuantarāye, lokamhi yathā anantarāyena;

Ayamajja pañcamattehi, tantiyā bhāṇavārehi.

May she, in a world with many obstacles, be without obstacle; this day, by means of the text's five recitation measures.

Niṭṭhaṃ pattā evaṃ, niṭṭhānaṃ pāpuṇantu sabbepi;

Hitasukhanibbattikarā, manorathā sabbasattānanti.

Just as this work has reached completion, so may all beings attain the final goal; may the aspirations of all beings, which produce welfare and happiness, be fulfilled.

Yamakappakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Yamaka Treatise is concluded.

Namo tassa bhagavato arahato sammāsambuddhassa

Homage to the Blessed One, the Arahant, the Perfectly Enlightened One.

Abhidhammapiṭake

In the Abhidhamma Piṭaka

Paṭṭhānappakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā

The Commentary on the Paṭṭhāna Treatise

Devātidevo [Pg.341] devānaṃ, devadānavapūjito,Desayitvā pakaraṇaṃ, yamakaṃ suddhasaṃyamo.

The deva above devas, honored by devas and dānavas, of pure restraint, having taught the Yamaka treatise.

Atthato dhammato ceva, gambhīrassātha tassa yaṃ,Anantaraṃ mahāvīro, sattamaṃ isisattamo.

And that which is next to that profound treatise in meaning and in Dhamma, that seventh treatise, the Great Hero, the seventh and best of sages, taught.

Paṭṭhānaṃ nāma nāmena, nāmarūpanirodhano,Desesi atigambhīra-nayamaṇḍitadesanaṃ.

He who brings about the cessation of name-and-form taught the Paṭṭhāna by name, a discourse adorned with extremely profound methods.

Idāni tassa sampatto, yasmā saṃvaṇṇanākkamo,Tasmā naṃ vaṇṇayissāmi, taṃ suṇātha samāhitāti.

Now, since the time has come for its exposition, therefore I shall expound it; listen to it with a focused mind.

Paccayuddesavaṇṇanā

Description of the Exposition of Conditions

Sammāsambuddhena hi anulomapaṭṭhāne dvāvīsati tike nissāya tikapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma niddiṭṭhaṃ, sataṃ duke nissāya dukapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma niddiṭṭhaṃ. Tato paraṃ dvāvīsati tike gahetvā dukasate pakkhipitvā dukatikapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma dassitaṃ. Tato paraṃ dukasataṃ gahetvā dvāvīsatiyā tikesu pakkhipitvā tikadukapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma dassitaṃ. Tike pana tikesuyeva pakkhipitvā tikatikapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma dassitaṃ. Duke ca dukesuyeva pakkhipitvā dukadukapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma dassitaṃ. Evaṃ –

Indeed, by the Perfectly Self-Enlightened One, in the Anuloma Paṭṭhāna, relying on twenty-two triads, the Tikapaṭṭhāna was designated; relying on one hundred dyads, the Dukapaṭṭhāna was designated. Thereafter, taking the twenty-two triads and inserting them into the hundred dyads, the Dukatikapaṭṭhāna was shown. Then, taking the hundred dyads and inserting them into the twenty-two triads, the Tikadukapaṭṭhāna was shown. Moreover, inserting triads into triads themselves, the Tikatikapaṭṭhāna was shown. And inserting dyads into dyads themselves, the Dukadukapaṭṭhāna was shown. Thus—

Tikañca paṭṭhānavaraṃ dukuttamaṃ,Dukaṃ tikañceva tikaṃ dukañca;

Tikaṃ tikañceva dukaṃ dukañca,Cha anulomamhi nayā sugambhīrāti.

The supreme Paṭṭhāna of triads, and the excellent Paṭṭhāna of dyads; the dyad and the triad, and the triad and the dyad; the triad and the triad, and the dyad and the dyad—these six methods in the direct order are very profound.

Paccanīyapaṭṭhānepi [Pg.342] dvāvīsati tike nissāya tikapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma. Dukasataṃ nissāya dukapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma. Dvāvīsati tike dukasate pakkhipitvā dukatikapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma. Dukasataṃ dvāvīsatiyā tikesu pakkhipitvā tikadukapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma. Tike tikesuyeva pakkhipitvā tikatikapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma. Duke dukesuyeva pakkhipitvā dukadukapaṭṭhānaṃ nāmāti evaṃ paccanīyepi chahi nayehi paṭṭhānaṃ niddiṭṭhaṃ. Tena vuttaṃ –

In the Paccanīya Paṭṭhāna also, relying on twenty-two triads, it is called Tikapaṭṭhāna. Relying on one hundred dyads, it is called Dukapaṭṭhāna. Taking the twenty-two triads and inserting them into the hundred dyads, it is called Dukatikapaṭṭhāna. Taking the hundred dyads and inserting them into the twenty-two triads, it is called Tikadukapaṭṭhāna. Inserting triads into triads themselves, it is called Tikatikapaṭṭhāna. Inserting dyads into dyads themselves, it is called Dukadukapaṭṭhāna. Thus, in the Paccanīya also, the Paṭṭhāna is designated by six methods. Therefore it is said:

‘‘Tikañca paṭṭhānavaraṃ dukuttamaṃ,Dukaṃ tikañceva tikaṃ dukañca;

Tikaṃ tikañceva dukaṃ dukañca,Cha paccanīyamhi nayā sugambhīrā’’ti.

“The supreme Paṭṭhāna of triads, and the excellent Paṭṭhāna of dyads; the dyad and the triad, and the triad and the dyad; the triad and the triad, and the dyad and the dyad—these six methods in the reverse order are very profound.”

Tato paraṃ anulomapaccanīyepi etenevupāyena cha nayā dassitā. Tenāha –

Thereafter, in the Anuloma-Paccanīya also, six methods are shown in the same way. Therefore it is said:

‘‘Tikañca paṭṭhānavaraṃ dukuttamaṃ,Dukaṃ tikañceva tikaṃ dukañca;

Tikaṃ tikañceva dukaṃ dukañca,Cha anulomapaccanīyamhi nayā sugambhīrā’’ti.

“The supreme Paṭṭhāna of triads, and the excellent Paṭṭhāna of dyads; the dyad and the triad, and the triad and the dyad; the triad and the triad, and the dyad and the dyad—these six methods in the direct-reverse order are very profound.”

Tadanantaraṃ paccanīyānulomamhi eteheva chahi nayehi niddiṭṭhaṃ. Tenāha –

Following that, in the Paccanīyānuloma, it is designated by these same six methods. Therefore it is said:

‘‘Tikañca paṭṭhānavaraṃ dukuttamaṃ,Dukaṃ tikañceva tikaṃ dukañca;

Tikaṃ tikañceva dukaṃ dukañca,Cha paccanīyānulomamhi nayā sugambhīrā’’ti.

“The supreme Paṭṭhāna of triads, and the excellent Paṭṭhāna of dyads; the dyad and the triad, and the triad and the dyad; the triad and the triad, and the dyad and the dyad—these six methods in the reverse-direct order are very profound.”

Evaṃ anulome cha paṭṭhānāni, paccanīye cha, anulomapaccanīye cha, paccanīyānulome cha paṭṭhānānīti idaṃ ‘‘catuvīsatisamantapaṭṭhānasamodhānapaṭṭhānamahāpakaraṇaṃ nāmā’’ti hi vuttaṃ.

Thus, there are six Paṭṭhānas in the direct order, six in the reverse order, six in the direct-reverse order, and six in the reverse-direct order. Indeed, it has been said: 'This is called the Great Treatise of the Paṭṭhāna, the Compilation of the Twenty-Four Comprehensive Paṭṭhānas'.

Tattha yesaṃ catuvīsatiyā samantapaṭṭhānānaṃ samodhānavasenetaṃ catuvīsatisamantapaṭṭhānasamodhānaṃ paṭṭhānamahāpakaraṇaṃ nāmāti vuttaṃ, tesañceva imassa ca pakaraṇassa nāmattho tāva evaṃ veditabbo. Kenaṭṭhena [Pg.343] paṭṭhānanti? Nānappakārapaccayaṭṭhena. ‘Pa-kāro’ hi nānappakāratthaṃ dīpeti, ṭhānasaddo paccayatthaṃ. Ṭhānāṭṭhānakusalatātiādīsu hi paccayo ṭhānanti vutto. Iti nānappakārānaṃ paccayānaṃ vasena desitattā imesu catuvīsatiyā paṭṭhānesu ekekaṃ paṭṭhānaṃ nāma. Imesaṃ pana paṭṭhānānaṃ samūhato sabbampetaṃ pakaraṇaṃ paṭṭhānanti veditabbaṃ.

Here, it has been said that this Great Treatise of the Paṭṭhāna, the Compilation of the Twenty-Four Comprehensive Paṭṭhānas, exists by way of synthesizing these twenty-four comprehensive Paṭṭhānas. First, the meaning of the name for both those and this treatise should be understood thus. In what sense is it “Paṭṭhāna”? In the sense of conditions of various kinds. For the prefix ‘pa’ indicates the meaning of variety, and the word ‘ṭhāna’ signifies the meaning of condition. For in phrases such as “skill in conditions and non-conditions,” ‘ṭhāna’ is said to be condition. Thus, because each of these twenty-four Paṭṭhānas is taught by way of various conditions, each is called a Paṭṭhāna. But, collectively, all of this treatise should be understood as Paṭṭhāna.

Aparo nayo – kenaṭṭhena paṭṭhānanti? Vibhajanaṭṭhena. ‘‘Paññāpanā paṭṭhapanā vivaraṇā vibhajanā uttānīkamma’’nti (ma. ni. 1.371) āgataṭṭhānasmiñhi vibhajanaṭṭhena paṭṭhānaṃ paññāyati. Iti kusalādīnaṃ dhammānaṃ hetupaccayādivasena vibhattattā imesu catuvīsatiyā paṭṭhānesu ekekaṃ paṭṭhānaṃ nāma. Imesaṃ pana paṭṭhānānaṃ samūhato sabbampetaṃ pakaraṇaṃ paṭṭhānaṃ nāmāti veditabbaṃ.

Another method: In what sense is it called Paṭṭhāna? In the sense of analysis. For in the passage, “Explanation, establishing, revealing, analysis, making plain,” the term paṭṭhapana is understood in the sense of analysis. Thus, because wholesome and other phenomena are classified by way of root-condition and so on, each of these twenty-four Paṭṭhānas is called a Paṭṭhāna. Collectively, all of this treatise is to be understood as Paṭṭhāna.

Aparo nayo – kenaṭṭhena paṭṭhānanti? Paṭṭhitatthena. Gamanaṭṭhenāti attho. ‘‘Goṭṭhā paṭṭhitagāvo’’ti (ma. ni. 1.156) āgataṭṭhānasmiñhi yena paṭṭhānena paṭṭhitagāvoti vutto, taṃ atthato gamanaṃ hoti. Iti nātivitthāritanayesu dhammasaṅgaṇīādīsu anissaṅgagamanassa sabbaññutaññāṇassa hetupaccayādibhedabhinnesu kusalādīsu vitthāritanayalābhato nissaṅgavasena pavattagamanattā imesu catuvīsatiyā paṭṭhānesu ekekaṃ paṭṭhānaṃ nāma. Imesaṃ pana paṭṭhānānaṃ samūhato sabbampetaṃ pakaraṇaṃ paṭṭhānaṃ nāmāti veditabbaṃ.

Another method: In what sense is it “Paṭṭhāna”? In the sense of “setting forth.” The meaning is “in the sense of going.” For in the passage “Cows set forth from the pen,” the setting forth by which they are called “cows set forth” is, in meaning, a going. Thus, because the all-knowing knowledge, which proceeds unhindered, obtains extensively elaborated methods in the wholesome and other states, which are divided into root-condition and so on—in contrast to the Dhammasaṅgaṇī and other methods that are not excessively detailed—each of these twenty-four Paṭṭhānas is called a Paṭṭhāna, due to its proceeding in an unhindered manner. However, the collection of these Paṭṭhānas, this entire treatise, should be understood as Paṭṭhāna.

Tattha anulomamhi tāva paṭhamaṃ tikavasena desitattā tikapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma. Tassa padacchedo – tikānaṃ paṭṭhānaṃ ettha atthīti tikapaṭṭhānaṃ. Tikānaṃ nānappakārakā paccayā etissā desanāya atthīti attho. Dutiyavikappepi tikānaṃ paṭṭhānantveva tikapaṭṭhānaṃ. Hetupaccayādivasena tikānaṃ vibhajanāti attho. Tatiyavikappe hetupaccayādibhedabhinnatāya laddhavitthārā tikā eva paṭṭhānaṃ tikapaṭṭhānaṃ. Sabbaññutaññāṇassa nissaṅgagamanabhūmīti attho. Dukapaṭṭhānādīsupi eseva nayo. Evaṃ anulome chapaṭṭhānāni viditvā paccanīyādīsupi imināvupāyena veditabbāni.

Here, first, in the direct order, because it is taught by way of triads, it is called Tikapaṭṭhāna. Its word analysis is: “The Paṭṭhāna of triads exists here,” hence Tikapaṭṭhāna. The meaning is that the various kinds of conditions for the triads exist in this teaching. In the second alternative, too, “the Paṭṭhāna of triads” is simply Tikapaṭṭhāna. The meaning is the classification of triads by way of root-condition, etc. In the third alternative, because of the division into root-condition, etc., the triads themselves, having obtained elaboration, are the Paṭṭhāna, hence Tikapaṭṭhāna. The meaning is the sphere of unhindered movement of the all-knowing knowledge. The same method applies to Dukapaṭṭhāna, etc. Thus, having understood the six Paṭṭhānas in the direct order, those in the reverse order, etc., should also be understood by this method.

Yasmā panetāni anulome, paccanīye, anulomapaccanīye, paccanīyānulometi samantā cha cha hutvā catuvīsati honti; tasmā ‘‘catuvīsati samantapaṭṭhānānī’’ti [Pg.344] vuccanti. Iti imesaṃ catuvīsatiyā khuddakapaṭṭhānasaṅkhātānaṃ samantapaṭṭhānānaṃ samodhānavasenetaṃ catuvīsatisamantapaṭṭhānasamodhānaṃ paṭṭhānamahāpakaraṇaṃ nāma.

Since these, in the direct order, reverse order, direct-reverse order, and reverse-direct order, become six each on all sides, totaling twenty-four, they are therefore called “the twenty-four comprehensive Paṭṭhānas.” Thus, by way of a compilation of these twenty-four comprehensive Paṭṭhānas, reckoned as the minor Paṭṭhānas, this great treatise is called “Paṭṭhānamahāpakaraṇa,” the Compilation of the Twenty-Four Comprehensive Paṭṭhānas.

Taṃ panetaṃ ye tikādayo nissāya niddiṭṭhattā ‘‘tikapaṭṭhānaṃ dukapaṭṭhānaṃ…pe… dukadukapaṭṭhāna’’nti vuttaṃ, te anāmasitvā yesaṃ paccayānaṃ vasena te tikādayo vibhattā te paccaye dassetuṃ ādito tāvassa mātikānikkhepavāro nāma vutto; paccayavibhaṅgavārotipi tasseva nāmaṃ. So uddesaniddesato duvidho. Tassa hetupaccayo…pe… avigatapaccayoti ayaṃ uddeso.

This treatise, because it is expounded based on triads, etc., and is specified as “Tikapaṭṭhāna,” “Dukapaṭṭhāna,”… up to “Dukadukapaṭṭhāna,” without referring to these, but to show the conditions by which these triads, etc., are distinguished, the section called “the laying down of the matrix” is first stated; the section on the analysis of conditions is also its name. It is twofold: by way of enunciation and exposition. Its enunciation is: “Root condition… non-disappearance condition.”

Tattha hetu ca so paccayo cāti hetupaccayo. Hetu hutvā paccayo, hetubhāvena paccayoti vuttaṃ hoti. Ārammaṇapaccayādīsupi eseva nayo. Tattha hetūti vacanāvayavakāraṇamūlānametaṃ adhivacanaṃ. ‘‘Paṭiññā hetū’’tiādīsu hi loke vacanāvayavo hetūti, vuccati. Sāsane pana ‘‘ye dhammā hetuppabhavā’’tiādīsu (mahāva. 60) kāraṇaṃ. ‘‘Tayo kusalā hetū, tayo akusalā hetū’’tiādīsu (dha. sa. 1059) mūlaṃ hetūti vuccati. Taṃ idha adhippetaṃ. Paccayoti ettha pana ayaṃ vacanattho – paṭicca etasmā etīti paccayo, appaccakkhāya naṃ vattatīti attho. Yo hi dhammo yaṃ dhammaṃ appaccakkhāya tiṭṭhati vā uppajjati vā, so tassa paccayoti vuttaṃ hoti.

Herein, “root condition” means that it is both a root and a condition. It is said to be a condition by being a root, a condition by way of its root-nature. The same method applies to the object condition, etc. Herein, the word “root” (hetu) is a designation for a part of speech, a cause, and a root. In the world, in statements like “acknowledgment is a root,” a part of speech is called a “root.” In the Dispensation, however, in statements like “those phenomena arising from a root,” it means a cause. In statements like “three wholesome roots, three unwholesome roots,” it means a root. That is what is intended here. As for “condition,” here it has this meaning: “that which comes to be in dependence on this” (paṭicca etasmā eti), meaning it proceeds without rejecting it. For whatever phenomenon exists or arises without rejecting another phenomenon, that is said to be its condition.

Lakkhaṇato pana upakārakalakkhaṇo paccayo, yo hi dhammo yassa dhammassa ṭhitiyā vā uppattiyā vā upakārako hoti, so tassa paccayoti vuccati. Paccayo, hetu; kāraṇaṃ nidānaṃ sambhavo, pabhavoti atthato ekaṃ, byañjanato nānaṃ. Iti mūlaṭṭhena hetu, upakārakaṭṭhena paccayoti saṅkhepato mūlaṭṭhena upakārako dhammo hetupaccayo. So hi sāliādīnaṃ sālibījādīni viya, maṇippabhādīnaṃ viya ca maṇivaṇṇādayo kusalādīnaṃ kusalādibhāvasādhakoti ācariyānaṃ adhippāyo. Evaṃ sante pana taṃsamuṭṭhānarūpesu hetupaccayatā na sampajjati. Na hi so tesaṃ kusalādibhāvaṃ sādheti, na ca paccayo na hotīti. Vuttañhetaṃ ‘‘hetū hetusampayuttakānaṃ dhammānaṃ taṃsamuṭṭhānānañca [Pg.345] rūpānaṃ hetupaccayena paccayo’’ti. Ahetukacittānañca vinā etena abyākatabhāvo siddho.

By way of characteristic, a condition has the characteristic of assisting. For whatever phenomenon assists in the stability or arising of another phenomenon, that is called its condition. Condition, root, cause, origin, source, and genesis—these are one in meaning, but different in expression. Thus, briefly, it is a root by way of its fundamental meaning, and a condition by way of its assisting meaning. A phenomenon that assists by way of its fundamental meaning is the root condition. For, according to the teachers' intention, just as rice seeds and so forth are for rice and so forth, and the color of a gem and so forth is for the gem's radiance and so forth, so it establishes the wholesome nature of wholesome states and so forth. However, if this is the case, the status of root condition does not apply to co-arisen material phenomena. For it does not establish their wholesome nature, and yet it is a condition. For it is said: “The roots are a condition by the root condition for the phenomena associated with the roots and for the material phenomena co-arisen with them.” Moreover, without this, the indeterminate nature of rootless consciousness is established.

Sahetukānampi ca yonisomanasikārādipaṭibaddho kusalādibhāvo na sampayuttahetupaṭibaddho. Yadi ca sampayuttahetūsu sabhāvatova kusalādibhāvo siyā, taṃsampayuttesu hetupaṭibaddho alobho kusalo vā siyā abyākato vā. Yasmā pana ubhayathāpi hoti, tasmā yathā sampayuttesu, evaṃ hetūsupi kusalāditā pariyesitabbā. Kusalādibhāvasādhanavasena pana hetūnaṃ mūlaṭṭhaṃ aggahetvā suppatiṭṭhitabhāvasādhanavasena gayhamāne na kiñci virujjhati. Laddhahetupaccayā hi dhammā viruḷhamūlā viya pādapā thirā honti suppatiṭṭhitā, ahetukā pana tilabījakādisevālā viya na suppatiṭṭhitā. Iti mūlaṭṭhena upakārakoti suppatiṭṭhitabhāvasādhanena upakārako dhammo hetupaccayoti veditabbo.

And for those with roots, the wholesome nature, etc., is connected with wise attention, etc., not dependent on the associated roots. And if the wholesome nature, etc., were naturally present in the associated roots, then non-greed, being connected with them, would be either wholesome or indeterminate. However, since it occurs in both ways, the wholesome nature, etc., must be sought in the roots just as it is in the associated factors. However, if the roots' fundamental meaning is not taken as establishing the wholesome nature, etc., but is taken as establishing firmness, then nothing is contradicted. For phenomena that have obtained the root condition, like trees with well-grown roots, become firm and well-established. Rootless phenomena, however, like moss or water plants on sesame seeds, are not well-established. Thus, it should be understood that a phenomenon that assists by way of its fundamental meaning, that is, by establishing firmness, is the root condition.

Tato paresu ārammaṇavasena upakārako dhammo ārammaṇapaccayo. So ‘‘rūpāyatanaṃ cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyā’’ti ārabhitvāpi ‘‘yaṃ yaṃ dhammaṃ ārabbha ye ye dhammā uppajjanti cittacetasikā dhammā, te te dhammā tesaṃ tesaṃ dhammānaṃ ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’ti osāpitattā na koci dhammo na hoti. Yathā hi dubbalo puriso daṇḍaṃ vā rajjuṃ vā ālambitvāva uṭṭhahati ceva tiṭṭhati ca, evaṃ cittacetasikā dhammā rūpādiārammaṇaṃ ārabbheva uppajjanti ceva tiṭṭhanti ca. Tasmā sabbepi cittacetasikānaṃ dhammānaṃ ārammaṇabhūtā dhammā ārammaṇapaccayoti veditabbā.

Next, a phenomenon that assists by way of an object is the object condition. And although it begins with “the form base is for the eye-consciousness element,” because it concludes with “Whatever mental states and mental factors arise in dependence on whatever phenomena as objects, those phenomena are a condition for those respective phenomena by way of the object condition,” no phenomenon is excluded. Just as a weak person rises and stands only by relying on a stick or a rope, so too do mental states and mental factors arise and persist only by relying on form and other objects. Therefore, all phenomena that serve as objects for mental states and mental factors should be understood as the object condition.

Jeṭṭhakaṭṭhena upakārako dhammo adhipatipaccayo. So sahajātārammaṇavasena duvidho. Tattha ‘‘chandādhipati chandasampayuttakānaṃ dhammānaṃ taṃsamuṭṭhānānañca rūpānaṃ adhipatipaccayena paccayo’’tiādivacanato chandavīriyacittavīmaṃsasaṅkhātā cattāro dhammā sahajātādhipatipaccayoti veditabbā, no ca kho ekato. Yadā hi chandaṃ dhuraṃ jeṭṭhakaṃ katvā cittaṃ pavattati, tadā chandova adhipati, na itare. Esa nayo sesesupi. Yaṃ pana dhammaṃ garuṃ katvā arūpadhammā pavattanti, so nesaṃ ārammaṇādhipati. Tena [Pg.346] vuttaṃ – ‘‘yaṃ yaṃ dhammaṃ garuṃ katvā ye ye dhammā uppajjanti cittacetasikā dhammā, te te dhammā tesaṃ tesaṃ dhammānaṃ adhipatipaccayena paccayo’’ti.

A phenomenon that assists by way of pre-eminence is the dominant condition. It is twofold: by way of co-nascence and by way of object. Herein, from the statement beginning “Desire as dominant condition is a condition by way of dominant condition for the phenomena associated with desire and for the material phenomena co-arisen with them,” it should be understood that the four phenomena—namely, desire, energy, consciousness, and investigation—are co-nascent dominant conditions, but not simultaneously. For when consciousness proceeds making desire the foremost and chief, then desire alone is the dominant condition, not the others. The same method applies to the rest. However, when immaterial phenomena proceed by taking a certain phenomenon as weighty, that is their object dominant condition. Hence it is said: “By taking whatever phenomena as weighty, whatever mental states and mental factors arise, those phenomena are a condition for those respective phenomena by way of dominant condition.”

Anantarabhāvena upakārako dhammo anantarapaccayo. Samanantarabhāvena upakārako dhammo samanantarapaccayo. Idañca paccayadvayaṃ bahudhā papañcayanti. Ayaṃ panettha sāro – yo hi esa cakkhuviññāṇānantarā manodhātu, manodhātuanantarā manoviññāṇadhātūtiādi cittaniyamo, so yasmā purimacittavaseneva ijjhati, na aññathā. Tasmā attano attano anantaraṃ anurūpassa cittuppādassa uppādanasamatthova dhammo anantarapaccayo. Tenevāha – ‘‘anantarapaccayoti cakkhuviññāṇadhātu taṃsampayuttakā ca dhammā manodhātuyā taṃsampayuttakānañca dhammānaṃ anantarapaccayena paccayo’’tiādi.

A phenomenon that assists by way of contiguity is the contiguous condition. A phenomenon that assists by way of immediate contiguity is the immediate contiguous condition. These two conditions are elaborated in many ways. But here is the essence: The sequence of consciousness, such as the mind-element immediately following eye-consciousness, and the mind-consciousness-element immediately following the mind-element, etc., succeeds only through the preceding consciousness, and not otherwise. Therefore, a phenomenon capable of producing the arising of a suitable consciousness immediately after itself is the contiguous condition. Hence it is said: 'The eye-consciousness-element and its associated phenomena are a condition for the mind-element and its associated phenomena by way of the contiguous condition,' and so on.

Yo anantarapaccayo, sveva samanantarapaccayo. Byañjanamattameva hettha nānaṃ, upacayasantatiādīsu viya, adhivacananiruttidukādīsu viya ca, atthato pana nānaṃ natthi. Yampi ‘‘addhānantaratāya anantarapaccayo, kālānantaratāya samanantarapaccayo’’ti ācariyānaṃ mataṃ, taṃ ‘‘nirodhā vuṭṭhahantassa nevasaññānāsaññāyatanakusalaṃ phalasamāpattiyā samanantarapaccayena paccayo’’tiādīhi virujjhati. Yampi tattha vadanti – ‘‘dhammānaṃ samuṭṭhāpanasamatthatā na parihāyati, bhāvanābalena pana vāritattā dhammā samanantaraṃ nuppajjantī’’ti, tampi kālānantaratāya abhāvameva sādheti. Bhāvanābalena hi tattha kālānantaratā natthīti, mayampi etadeva vadāma. Yasmā ca kālānantaratā natthi, tasmā samanantarapaccayatā na yujjati. Kālānantaratāya hi tesaṃ samanantarapaccayo hotīti laddhi. Tasmā abhinivesaṃ akatvā byañjanamattatovettha nānākaraṇaṃ paccetabbaṃ, na atthato. Kathaṃ? Natthi etesaṃ antaranti hi anantarā. Saṇṭhānābhāvato suṭṭhu anantarāti samanantarā.

What is the contiguous condition is precisely the immediate contiguous condition. Here, the difference is merely in expression, as in the cases of accumulation and continuity, etc., or designation and expression, etc., but there is no difference in meaning. Even the teachers' view that 'the contiguous condition is due to uninterruptedness in time, and the immediate contiguous condition is due to temporal contiguity' is contradicted by statements such as 'for one emerging from cessation, the wholesome state of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception is a condition for fruition attainment by way of the immediate contiguous condition,' and so on. Even what they say there—'the capacity to produce phenomena does not diminish, but because they are prevented by the power of development, phenomena do not arise immediately contiguously'—this too only proves the absence of temporal contiguity. For there, due to the power of development, temporal contiguity does not exist—this is what we also say. And since temporal contiguity does not exist, the status of an immediate contiguous condition is untenable. For the doctrine is that their immediate contiguous condition is due to temporal contiguity. Therefore, without insisting on this, the distinction here should be accepted as merely terminological, not substantial. How so? 'There is nothing between them'—thus they are contiguous. 'Being thoroughly contiguous due to the absence of any interval'—thus they are immediate contiguous.

Uppajjamāno saha uppajjamānabhāvena upakārako dhammo sahajātapaccayo, pakāsassa padīpo viya. So arūpakkhandhādivasena chabbidho hoti. Yathāha – cattāro khandhā arūpino aññamaññaṃ sahajātapaccayena paccayo. Cattāro mahābhūtā aññamaññaṃ…pe… okkantikkhaṇe nāmarūpaṃ [Pg.347] aññamaññaṃ…pe… cittacetasikā dhammā cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ rūpānaṃ…pe… mahābhūtā upādārūpānaṃ…pe… rūpino dhammā arūpīnaṃ dhammānaṃ kiñcikāle sahajātapaccayena paccayo; kiñci kāle na sahajātapaccayena paccayoti. Idaṃ hadayavatthumeva sandhāya vuttaṃ.

A phenomenon that assists by way of arising together is the co-nascence condition, like a lamp for light. It is sixfold by way of the immaterial aggregates, etc. As it is said: 'The four immaterial aggregates are a condition for each other by way of the co-nascence condition. The four great elements are a condition for each other… At the moment of conception, name-and-form are a condition for each other… Consciousness and mental factors are a condition for mind-originated material phenomena… The great elements are a condition for derived material phenomena… Material phenomena are sometimes a condition for immaterial phenomena by way of the co-nascence condition; sometimes they are not a condition by way of the co-nascence condition.' This is said with reference to the heart-base.

Aññamaññaṃ uppādanupatthambhanabhāvena upakārako dhammo aññamaññapaccayo. Aññamaññupatthambhakaṃ tidaṇḍaṃ viya. So arūpakkhandhādivasena tividho hoti. Yathāha – cattāro khandhā arūpino aññamaññapaccayena paccayo. Cattāro mahābhūtā…pe… okkantikkhaṇe nāmarūpaṃ aññamaññapaccayena paccayoti.

A phenomenon that assists by way of mutually producing and supporting is the mutuality condition. Like three sticks mutually supporting each other. It is threefold by way of the immaterial aggregates, etc. As it is said: 'The four immaterial aggregates are a condition for each other by way of the mutuality condition. The four great elements… At the moment of conception, name-and-form are a condition for each other by way of the mutuality condition.'

Adhiṭṭhānākārena nissayākārena ca upakārako dhammo nissayapaccayo, tarucittakammādīnaṃ pathavīpaṭādayo viya. So ‘‘cattāro khandhā arūpino aññamaññaṃ nissayapaccayena paccayo’’ti evaṃ sahajāte vuttanayeneva veditabbo. Chaṭṭho panettha koṭṭhāso ‘‘cakkhāyatanaṃ cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyā, sotaghānajivhākāyāyatanaṃ kāyaviññāṇadhātuyā taṃsampayuttakānañca dhammānaṃ nissayapaccayena paccayo. Yaṃ rūpaṃ nissāya manodhātu ca manoviññāṇadhātu ca vattanti, taṃ rūpaṃ manodhātuyā ca manoviññāṇadhātuyā ca taṃsampayuttakānañca dhammānaṃ nissayapaccayena paccayo’’ti evaṃ vibhatto.

A phenomenon that is helpful by way of being a foundation and a basis is the dependence condition, like the earth and so on for trees, paintings, etc. It should be understood in the same way as explained in the conascence condition: “The four immaterial aggregates are a condition for each other by dependence condition.” The sixth section here is distinguished thus: “The eye-base is a condition for the eye-consciousness element by dependence condition. The ear-base, nose-base, tongue-base, and body-base are a condition for the body-consciousness element and its associated phenomena by dependence condition. That material form on which the mind-element and mind-consciousness element depend is a condition for the mind-element, the mind-consciousness element, and their associated phenomena by dependence condition.”

Upanissayapaccayoti idha pana ayaṃ tāva vacanattho – tadadhīnavuttitāya attano phalena nissito, na paṭikkhittoti nissayo. Yathā pana bhuso āyāso upāyāso, evaṃ bhuso nissayo upanissayo. Balavakāraṇassetaṃ adhivacanaṃ. Tasmā balavakāraṇabhāvena upakārako dhammo upanissayapaccayoti veditabbo. So ārammaṇūpanissayo, anantarūpanissayo pakatūpanissayoti tividho hoti. Tattha ‘‘dānaṃ datvā sīlaṃ samādiyitvā uposathakammaṃ katvā taṃ garuṃ katvā paccavekkhati, pubbe suciṇṇāni garuṃ katvā paccavekkhati, jhānā vuṭṭhahitvā jhānaṃ garuṃ katvā paccavekkhati, sekkhā gotrabhuṃ garuṃ katvā paccavekkhanti, vodānaṃ garuṃ katvā paccavekkhanti, sekkhā maggā vuṭṭhahitvā maggaṃ garuṃ katvā paccavekkhantī’’ti evamādinā nayena ārammaṇūpanissayo tāva ārammaṇādhipatinā saddhiṃ nānattaṃ akatvā vibhatto. Tattha yaṃ ārammaṇaṃ garuṃ katvā cittacetasikā uppajjanti, taṃ niyamato tesaṃ ārammaṇesu balavārammaṇaṃ hoti[Pg.348]. Iti garukātabbamattaṭṭhena ārammaṇādhipati, balavakāraṇaṭṭhena ārammaṇūpanissayoti evametesaṃ nānattaṃ veditabbaṃ.

As for the decisive support condition, first, its meaning here is this: because its occurrence is dependent on that, it is depended upon by its own result, not rejected—thus it is a support (nissaya). Just as intense effort is extreme effort, so intense support is decisive support. This is a designation for a strong cause. Therefore, a phenomenon that is helpful by way of being a strong cause should be understood as a decisive support condition. It is of three kinds: object decisive support, immediately contiguous decisive support, and natural decisive support. Here, object decisive support is distinguished without making a difference from the object-dominance condition, in such ways as: “Having given a gift, undertaken virtue, performed the Uposatha observance, one reviews that, making it important. Having previously done good deeds, one reviews them, making them important. Having arisen from jhāna, one reviews the jhāna, making it important. Disciples review the change-of-lineage, making it important. They review purification, making it important. Disciples, having arisen from the path, review the path, making it important.” Herein, whatever object is made important, and upon which consciousness and mental factors arise, that is invariably a strong object for them. Thus, the distinction between these should be understood as: object-dominance condition by way of being something to be made important, and object decisive support by way of being a strong cause.

Anantarūpanissayopi ‘‘purimā purimā kusalā khandhā pacchimānaṃ pacchimānaṃ kusalānaṃ khandhānaṃ upanissayapaccayena paccayo’’tiādinā nayena anantarapaccayena saddhiṃ nānattaṃ akatvāva vibhatto. Mātikānikkhepe pana nesaṃ ‘‘cakkhuviññāṇadhātu taṃsampayuttakā ca dhammā manodhātuyā taṃsampayuttakānañca dhammānaṃ anantarapaccayena paccayo’’tiādinā nayena anantarassa ca ‘‘purimā purimā kusalā dhammā pacchimānaṃ pacchimānaṃ kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ upanissayapaccayena paccayo’’tiādinā nayena upanissayassa ca āgatattā nikkhepaviseso atthi, sopi atthato ekībhāvameva gacchati. Evaṃ santepi attano attano anantaraṃ anurūpassa cittuppādassa pavattanasamatthatāya anantaratā purimacittassa ca pacchimacittuppādane balavatāya anantarūpanissayatā veditabbā. Yathā hi hetupaccayādīsu kañci dhammaṃ vināpi cittaṃ uppajjati, na evaṃ anantaracittaṃ, vinā cittassa uppatti nāma atthi, tasmā balavapaccayo hoti. Iti attano attano anantaraṃ anurūpacittuppādavasena anantarapaccayo, balavakāraṇavasena anantarūpanissayoti evametesaṃ nānattaṃ veditabbaṃ.

The immediate decisive support condition is also explained without making a distinction from the contiguity condition, as in the phrase: “The preceding wholesome aggregates are a condition for the succeeding wholesome aggregates by way of the decisive support condition,” and so on. However, in the exposition of the matrix, since both the contiguity condition, as in “The eye-consciousness element and its associated phenomena are a condition for the mind-element and its associated phenomena by way of the contiguity condition,” and so on, and the decisive support condition, as in “The preceding wholesome phenomena are a condition for the succeeding wholesome phenomena by way of the decisive support condition,” and so on, are presented, there is a specific exposition, but in meaning, it amounts to the same thing. Even so, contiguity is to be understood by way of the ability to bring about the arising of a suitable mind immediately after itself, and the immediate decisive support by way of the strength of the preceding mind in producing the subsequent mind. For just as a mind arises even without some phenomena in the case of root conditions, etc., it is not so without an immediately preceding mind; there is no such thing as the arising of a mind without a [preceding] mind. Therefore, it is a strong condition. Thus, the contiguity condition is by way of the arising of a suitable mind immediately after itself, and the immediate decisive support by way of being a strong cause. In this way, their distinction should be understood.

Pakatūpanissayo pana pakato upanissayo pakatūpanissayo. Pakato nāma attano santāne nipphādito vā saddhāsīlādi; upasevito vā utubhojanādi. Pakatiyāyeva vā upanissayo pakatūpanissayo, ārammaṇānantarehi asammissoti attho. Tassa ‘‘pakatūpanissayo – saddhaṃ upanissāya dānaṃ deti, sīlaṃ samādiyati, uposathakammaṃ karoti, jhānaṃ uppādeti, vipassanaṃ uppādeti, maggaṃ uppādeti, abhiññaṃ uppādeti, samāpattiṃ uppādeti, sīlaṃ… sutaṃ… cāgaṃ… paññaṃ upanissāya dānaṃ deti…pe… samāpattiṃ uppādeti. Saddhā… sīlaṃ… sutaṃ… cāgo… paññā saddhāya… sīlassa… sutassa… cāgassa… paññāya upanissayapaccayena paccayo’’tiādinā nayena anekappakārako pabhedo veditabbo. Iti ime saddhādayo pakatā ceva balavakāraṇaṭṭhena upanissayā cāti pakatūpanissayoti.

Natural decisive support, however, is a decisive support that is natural. ‘Natural’ means something produced in one’s own continuum, such as faith, virtue, etc.; or something made use of, such as climate, food, etc. Alternatively, it is natural decisive support because it is a decisive support by its very nature, meaning it is not mixed with object or contiguity conditions. Its manifold divisions should be understood by way of such phrases as: “Having taken faith as decisive support, one gives a gift, undertakes virtue, observes the Uposatha, develops jhāna, develops insight, develops the path, develops supernormal knowledge, attains meditative attainments. Having taken virtue… learning… generosity… wisdom as decisive support, one gives a gift…pe… attains meditative attainments. Faith… virtue… learning… generosity… wisdom are a condition for faith… virtue… learning… generosity… wisdom by way of the decisive support condition.” Thus, these things such as faith are both natural and decisive supports in the sense of being strong causal factors; therefore, they are called natural decisive supports.

Paṭhamataraṃ uppajjitvā vattamānabhāvena upakārako dhammo purejātapaccayo. So pañcadvāre vatthārammaṇahadayavatthuvasena ekādasavidho hoti[Pg.349]. Yathāha – cakkhāyatanaṃ cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyā taṃsampayuttakānañca dhammānaṃ purejātapaccayena paccayo. Sota… ghāna… jivhā… kāyāyatanaṃ, rūpāyatanaṃ, sadda… gandha… rasa… phoṭṭhabbāyatanaṃ, kāyaviññāṇadhātuyā taṃsampayuttakānañca dhammānaṃ purejātapaccayena paccayo. Rūpasaddagandharasaphoṭṭhabbāyatanaṃ manodhātuyā taṃsampayuttakānañca dhammānaṃ purejātapaccayena paccayo. Yaṃ rūpaṃ nissāya manodhātu ca manoviññāṇadhātu ca vattanti, taṃ rūpaṃ manodhātuyā taṃsampayuttakānañca dhammānaṃ purejātapaccayena paccayo, manoviññāṇadhātuyā taṃsampayuttakānañca dhammānaṃ kiñci kāle purejātapaccayena paccayo, kiñci kāle na purejātapaccayena paccayoti.

The phenomenon that is helpful by having arisen earlier and being present is the pre-nascence condition. It is of eleven kinds by way of the five sense-bases, the five sense-objects, and the heart-base. As it is said: “The eye-base is a condition for the eye-consciousness element and its associated phenomena by way of the pre-nascence condition. The ear-base… nose-base… tongue-base… body-base; the visible form base, sound base… odor base… taste base… tangible base are a condition for the body-consciousness element and its associated phenomena by way of the pre-nascence condition. The visible-form base, sound base, odor base, taste base, and tangible base are a condition for the mind-element and its associated phenomena by way of the pre-nascence condition. That material form on which the mind-element and the mind-consciousness element function is a condition for the mind-element and its associated phenomena by way of the pre-nascence condition; and for the mind-consciousness element and its associated phenomena, at some times it is a pre-nascence condition, and at other times it is not a pre-nascence condition.”

Purejātānaṃ rūpadhammānaṃ upatthambhakaṭṭhena upakārako arūpadhammo pacchājātapaccayo, gijjhapotakasarīrānaṃ āhārāsācetanā viya. Tena vuttaṃ – ‘‘pacchājātā cittacetasikā dhammā purejātassa imassa kāyassa pacchājātapaccayena paccayo’’ti.

The immaterial phenomenon that is helpful by way of supporting pre-nascent material phenomena is the post-nascence condition, like the volition of desire for food supporting the bodies of vulture chicks. Therefore, it is said: “Post-nascent consciousness and mental factors are a condition for this pre-nascent body by way of the post-nascence condition.”

Āsevanaṭṭhena anantarānaṃ paguṇabalavabhāvāya upakārako dhammo āsevanapaccayo, ganthādīsu purimāpurimābhiyogo viya. So kusalākusalakiriyajavanavasena tividho hoti. Yathāha – purimā purimā kusalā dhammā pacchimānaṃ pacchimānaṃ kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ āsevanapaccayena paccayo. Purimā purimā akusalā…pe… kiriyābyākatā dhammā pacchimānaṃ pacchimānaṃ kiriyābyākatānaṃ dhammānaṃ āsevanapaccayena paccayoti.

The phenomenon that is helpful by way of repetition, for the sake of the proficiency and strength of the immediately succeeding phenomena, is the repetition condition, like the repeated application in texts, etc. It is threefold by way of wholesome, unwholesome, and functional javanas. As it is said: “The preceding wholesome phenomena are a condition for the subsequent wholesome phenomena by way of the repetition condition. The preceding unwholesome…pe…functional indeterminate phenomena are a condition for the subsequent functional indeterminate phenomena by way of the repetition condition.”

Cittapayogasaṅkhātena kiriyābhāvena upakārako dhammo kammapaccayo. So nānākkhaṇikāya ceva kusalākusalacetanāya sahajātāya ca sabbāyapi cetanāya vasena duvidho hoti. Yathāha – kusalākusalaṃ kammaṃ vipākānaṃ khandhānaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpānaṃ kammapaccayena paccayo. Cetanā sampayuttakānaṃ dhammānaṃ taṃ samuṭṭhānānañca rūpānaṃ kammapaccayena paccayoti.

The phenomenon that is helpful by way of being an action, designated as mental exertion, is the kamma condition. It is twofold: by way of wholesome and unwholesome volition occurring at different moments, and by way of all co-nascent volition. As it is said: “Wholesome and unwholesome kamma is a condition for the resultant aggregates and for materiality produced by kamma by way of the kamma condition. Volition is a condition for its associated phenomena and the materiality originated by it by way of the kamma condition.”

Nirussāhasantabhāvena nirussāhasantabhāvāya upakārako vipākadhammo vipākapaccayo. So pavatte cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ, paṭisandhiyaṃ kaṭattā ca [Pg.350] rūpānaṃ, sabbattha ca sampayuttadhammānaṃ vipākapaccayo hoti. Yathāha – vipākābyākato eko khandho tiṇṇaṃ khandhānaṃ, cittasamuṭṭhānānañca rūpānaṃ, vipākapaccayena paccayo…pe… paṭisandhikkhaṇe vipākābyākato eko khandho…pe… dve khandhā dvinnaṃ khandhānaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpānaṃ vipākapaccayena paccayo. Khandhā vatthussa vipākapaccayena paccayoti.

The resultant phenomenon that is helpful by way of being free from exertion and tranquil, for the sake of being free from exertion and tranquil, is the result condition. It is a result condition for consciousness-originated materiality in the course of existence, for kamma-originated materiality at rebirth, and for associated phenomena everywhere. As it is said: “One resultant-indeterminate aggregate is a condition for three aggregates and consciousness-originated materiality by way of the result condition…pe… At the moment of rebirth, one resultant-indeterminate aggregate…pe… two aggregates are a condition for two aggregates and kamma-originated materiality by way of the result condition. The aggregates are a condition for the physical base by way of the result condition.”

Rūpārūpānaṃ upatthambhakaṭṭhena upakārakā cattāro āhārā āhārapaccayo. Yathāha – kabaḷīkāro āhāro imassa kāyassa āhārapaccayena paccayo. Arūpino āhārā sampayuttakānaṃ dhammānaṃ taṃsamuṭṭhānānañca rūpānaṃ āhārapaccayena paccayoti. Pañhāvāre pana ‘‘paṭisandhikkhaṇe vipākābyākatā āhārā sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpānaṃ āhārapaccayena paccayo’’tipi vuttaṃ.

The four kinds of nutriment that are helpful by way of supporting material and immaterial phenomena are the nutriment condition. As it is said: “Physical nutriment is a condition for this body by way of the nutriment condition. Immaterial nutriments are a condition for associated phenomena and for the materiality originated by them by way of the nutriment condition.” In the section on questions, it is also stated: “At the moment of rebirth, resultant-indeterminate nutriments are a condition for the associated aggregates and for kamma-originated materiality by way of the nutriment condition.”

Adhipatiyaṭṭhena upakārakā itthindriyapurisindriyavajjā vīsatindriyā indriyapaccayo. Tattha cakkhundriyādayo pañca arūpadhammānaṃyeva, sesā rūpārūpānaṃ paccayā honti. Yathāha – cakkhundriyaṃ cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyā, sota… ghāna… jivhā… kāyindriyaṃ kāyaviññāṇadhātuyā taṃsampayuttakānañca dhammānaṃ indriyapaccayena paccayo. Rūpajīvitindriyaṃ kaṭattārūpānaṃ indriyapaccayena paccayo. Arūpino indriyā sampayuttakānaṃ dhammānaṃ taṃsamuṭṭhānānañca rūpānaṃ indriyapaccayena paccayoti. Pañhāvāre pana ‘‘paṭisandhikkhaṇe vipākābyākatā indriyā sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpānaṃ indriyapaccayena paccayo’’tipi vuttaṃ.

Twenty faculties, excluding the femininity and masculinity faculties, that are helpful by way of dominance are the faculty condition. Among them, the five sense faculties such as the eye faculty are conditions only for immaterial phenomena, while the remaining ones are conditions for both material and immaterial phenomena. As it is said: 'The eye faculty is a condition for the eye-consciousness element and for the states associated with it by way of the faculty condition. The ear… nose… tongue… body faculty is a condition for the body-consciousness element and for the states associated with it by way of the faculty condition. The material life faculty is a condition for kamma-produced materiality by way of the faculty condition. The immaterial faculties are conditions for associated states and for the materiality originating from them by way of the faculty condition.' In the section on questions, it is also stated: 'At the moment of rebirth-linking, resultant-indeterminate faculties are conditions for the associated aggregates and for kamma-produced materiality by way of the faculty condition.'

Upanijjhāyanaṭṭhena upakārakāni ṭhapetvā dvipañcaviññāṇesu kāyikasukhadukkhavedanādvayaṃ sabbānipi kusalādibhedāni satta jhānaṅgāni jhānapaccayo. Yathāha – jhānaṅgāni jhānasampayuttakānaṃ dhammānaṃ taṃsamuṭṭhānānañca rūpānaṃ jhānapaccayena paccayoti. Pañhāvāre pana paṭisandhikkhaṇe vipākābyākatāni jhānaṅgāni sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpānaṃ jhānapaccayena paccayo’’tipi vuttaṃ.

The seven jhāna factors of all types, such as wholesome, which are helpful by way of close contemplation—excluding the pair of bodily pleasant and painful feeling in the two sets of five sense-consciousnesses—are the jhāna condition. As it is said: 'Jhāna factors are a condition for jhāna-associated states and for material phenomena originating from them by way of the jhāna condition.' In the section on questions, it is also stated: 'At the moment of rebirth-linking, resultant-indeterminate jhāna factors are a condition for the associated aggregates and for kamma-produced materiality by way of the jhāna condition.'

Yato tato vā niyyānaṭṭhena upakārakāni kusalādibhedāni dvādasa maggaṅgāni maggapaccayo. Yathāha – ‘‘maggaṅgāni maggasampayuttakānaṃ dhammānaṃ taṃsamuṭṭhānānañca rūpānaṃ maggapaccayena paccayo’’ti. Pañhāvāre pana ‘‘paṭisandhikkhaṇe vipākābyākatāni maggaṅgāni sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpānaṃ [Pg.351] maggapaccayena paccayo’’ti vuttaṃ. Na ete pana dvepi jhānamaggapaccayā yathāsaṅkhyaṃ dvipañcaviññāṇāhetukacittesu labbhantīti veditabbā.

The twelve path factors of all types, such as wholesome, which are helpful by way of leading out from this or that, are the path condition. As it is said: 'Path factors are a condition for path-associated states and for material phenomena originating from them by way of the path condition.' In the section on questions, it is stated: 'At the moment of rebirth-linking, resultant-indeterminate path factors are a condition for the associated aggregates and for kamma-produced materiality by way of the path condition.' It should be understood that these two, the jhāna and path conditions, are not found respectively in the two sets of five sense-consciousnesses and in the rootless consciousnesses.

Ekavatthukaekārammaṇaekuppādekanirodhasaṅkhātena sampayuttabhāvena upakārakā arūpadhammā sampayuttapaccayo. Yathāha – ‘‘cattāro khandhā arūpino aññamaññaṃ sampayuttapaccayena paccayo’’ti.

Immaterial phenomena that are helpful through their state of association—characterized by a single base, a single object, a single arising, and a single ceasing—are the association condition. As it is said: 'The four immaterial aggregates are a condition for one another by way of the association condition.'

Ekavatthukādibhāvānupagamena upakārakā rūpino dhammā arūpīnaṃ, arūpino dhammā rūpīnaṃ vippayuttapaccayena paccayo. So sahajātapacchājātapurejātavasena tividho hoti. Vuttañhetaṃ – sahajātā kusalā khandhā cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ rūpānaṃ vippayuttapaccayena paccayo. Pacchājātā kusalā khandhā purejātassa imassa kāyassa vippayuttapaccayena paccayoti. Abyākatapadassa pana sahajātavibhaṅge ‘‘paṭisandhikkhaṇe vipākābyākatā khandhā kaṭattārūpānaṃ vippayuttapaccayena paccayo. Khandhā vatthussa, vatthu khandhānaṃ vippayuttapaccayena paccayo’’ti vuttaṃ. Purejātaṃ pana cakkhundriyādivatthuvaseneva veditabbaṃ. Yathāha – purejātaṃ cakkhāyatanaṃ cakkhuviññāṇassa…pe… kāyāyatanaṃ kāyaviññāṇassa vippayuttapaccayena paccayo. Vatthu vipākābyākatānaṃ kiriyābyākatānaṃ khandhānaṃ vatthu kusalānaṃ khandhānaṃ, vatthu akusalānaṃ khandhānaṃ vippayuttapaccayena paccayoti.

Material phenomena helpful to immaterial phenomena, and immaterial phenomena helpful to material phenomena, by not undergoing the state of having a single base, etc., are a condition by way of dissociation. It is threefold: by way of conascence, post-nascence, and pre-nascence. And this has been stated: 'Conascent wholesome aggregates are a condition for consciousness-originated materiality by way of the dissociation condition. Post-nascent wholesome aggregates are a condition for this pre-arisen body by way of the dissociation condition.' Regarding the term 'indeterminate,' in the section on conascence, it is stated: 'At the moment of rebirth-linking, resultant-indeterminate aggregates are a condition for kamma-produced materiality by way of the dissociation condition. The aggregates are a condition for the base, and the base is a condition for the aggregates, by way of the dissociation condition.' Pre-nascence, however, should be understood only in terms of the bases such as the eye faculty. As it is said: 'The pre-nascent eye-base is a condition for eye-consciousness…pe… the body-base is a condition for body-consciousness by way of the dissociation condition. The base is a condition for resultant-indeterminate and functional-indeterminate aggregates; the base is a condition for wholesome aggregates; the base is a condition for unwholesome aggregates by way of the dissociation condition.'

Paccuppannalakkhaṇena atthibhāvena tādisasseva dhammassa upatthambhakaṭṭhena upakārako dhammo atthipaccayo. Tassa arūpakkhandhamahābhūtanāmarūpacittacetasikamahābhūtāyatanavatthuvasena sattadhā mātikā nikkhittā. Yathāha – cattāro khandhā arūpino aññamaññaṃ atthipaccayena paccayo; cattāro mahābhūtā aññamaññaṃ, okkantikkhaṇe nāmarūpaṃ aññamaññaṃ, cittacetasikā dhammā cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ rūpānaṃ mahābhūtā upādārūpānaṃ, cakkhāyatanaṃ cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyā…pe… kāyāyatanaṃ…pe… rūpāyatanaṃ…pe… phoṭṭhabbāyatanaṃ kāyaviññāṇadhātuyā taṃsampayuttakānañca dhammānaṃ atthipaccayena paccayo. Rūpāyatanaṃ…pe… phoṭṭhabbāyatanaṃ manodhātuyā taṃsampayuttakānañca dhammānaṃ atthipaccayena paccayo. Yaṃ rūpaṃ nissāya manodhātu ca manoviññāṇadhātu ca vattanti, taṃ rūpaṃ manodhātuyā ca manoviññāṇadhātuyā ca taṃsampayuttakānañca dhammānaṃ atthipaccayena paccayoti. Pañhāvāre pana sahajātaṃ, purejātaṃ, pacchājātaṃ, āhāraṃ, indriyantipi nikkhipitvā sahajāte tāva ‘‘eko khandho tiṇṇaṃ khandhānaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānānañca [Pg.352] rūpānaṃ atthipaccayena paccayo’’tiādinā nayena niddeso kato. Purejāte purejātānaṃ cakkhādīnaṃ vasena niddeso kato. Pacchājāte purejātassa imassa kāyassa pacchājātānaṃ cittacetasikānaṃ paccayavasena niddeso kato. Āhārindriyesu pana ‘‘kabaḷīkāro āhāro imassa kāyassa atthipaccayena paccayo. Rūpajīvitindriyaṃ kaṭattārūpānaṃ atthipaccayena paccayo’’ti evaṃ niddeso katoti.

A phenomenon that is helpful by way of supporting a similar phenomenon through its state of presence, which is characterized as present, is the presence condition. Its matrix is set forth in seven ways: by way of the immaterial aggregates, the great elements, name-and-form, mind and mental factors, the great elements, the sense bases, and the physical base. As it is said: 'The four immaterial aggregates are a condition for one another by way of the presence condition; the four great elements are a condition for one another; at the moment of conception, name-and-form are a condition for one another; mind and mental factors are a condition for mind-originated materiality; the great elements are a condition for derived materiality; the eye base is a condition for the eye-consciousness element… and so on… the body base… the form base… the tangible base is a condition for the body-consciousness element and its associated phenomena by way of the presence condition. The form base… and so on… the tangible base is a condition for the mind element and its associated phenomena by way of the presence condition. That material form depending on which the mind element and the mind-consciousness element occur, that material form is a condition for the mind element, the mind-consciousness element, and their associated phenomena by way of the presence condition.' In the question section, however, having laid down conascence, pre-nascence, post-nascence, nutriment, and faculty, the exposition regarding conascence is made in this way: 'One aggregate is a condition for the other three aggregates and for mind-originated materiality by way of the presence condition,' and so on. Regarding pre-nascence, the exposition is made by way of the pre-arisen eye, etc. Regarding post-nascence, the exposition is made by way of the post-nascent mind and mental factors being a condition for this pre-arisen body. Regarding nutriment and faculty, the exposition is made thus: 'Physical nutriment is a condition for this body by way of the presence condition. The material life faculty is a condition for kamma-born materiality by way of the presence condition.'

Attano anantaraṃ uppajjamānānaṃ arūpadhammānaṃ pavattiokāsassa dānena upakārakā samanantaraniruddhā arūpadhammā natthipaccayo. Yathāha – samanantaraniruddhā cittacetasikā dhammā paṭuppannānaṃ cittacetasikānaṃ dhammānaṃ natthipaccayena paccayoti.

Immaterial phenomena that have just ceased, being helpful by giving an opportunity for the occurrence of immaterial phenomena arising immediately after them, are the absence condition. As it is said: 'Just-ceased mind and mental factors are a condition for presently arisen mind and mental factors by way of the absence condition.'

Te eva vigatabhāvena upakārakattā vigatapaccayo. Yathāha – samanantaravigatā cittacetasikā dhammā paṭuppannānaṃ cittacetasikānaṃ dhammānaṃ vigatapaccayena paccayoti.

Those same phenomena, being helpful by way of their disappearance, are the disappearance condition. As it is said: 'Just-disappeared mind and mental factors are a condition for presently arisen mind and mental factors by way of the disappearance condition.'

Atthipaccayadhammā eva avigatabhāvena upakārakattā avigatapaccayoti veditabbā. Desanāvilāsena pana tathā vinetabbaveneyyavasena vā ayaṃ duko vutto; sahetukadukaṃ vatvāpi hetusampayuttaduko viyāti.

The phenomena of the presence condition should be understood as the non-disappearance condition, as they are helpful by way of their non-disappearance. This pair, however, is stated for the sake of elegance in teaching or according to the disposition of those to be trained, just as the 'associated-with-a-root pair' is stated after stating the 'with-a-root pair'.

Imesu pana catuvīsatiyā paccayesu asammohatthaṃ –

Now, for the sake of non-confusion regarding these twenty-four conditions:

Dhammato kālato ceva, nānappakārabhedato;

Paccayuppannato ceva, viññātabbo vinicchayo.

The determination should be understood by way of the phenomena, by way of time, by way of various distinctions, and by way of the conditioned phenomena.

Tattha dhammatoti – imesu hi paccayesu hetupaccayo tāva nāmarūpadhammesu nāmadhammekadeso. Ārammaṇapaccayo saddhiṃ paññattiyā ca abhāvena sabbepi nāmarūpadhammā. Adhipatipaccaye sahajātādhipati nāmadhammekadeso, tathā kammajhānamaggapaccayā. Ārammaṇādhipati sabbepi garukātabbā ārammaṇadhammā. Anantarasamanantarapacchājātaāsevanavipākasampayuttanatthivigatapaccayā nāmadhammāva. Nibbānassa asaṅgahitattā nāmadhammekadesotipi vattuṃ vaṭṭati. Purejātapaccayo rūpekadeso. Sesā yathālābhavasena nāmarūpadhammāti evaṃ tāvettha dhammato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

Therein, 'by way of the phenomena' means: among these conditions, the root condition is a portion of mental phenomena within mentality-materiality phenomena. The object condition, together with concepts and absence, comprises all mentality-materiality phenomena. In the dominance condition, conascent dominance is a portion of mental phenomena; likewise for the kamma, jhāna, and path conditions. Object-dominance comprises all object-phenomena that are to be regarded as weighty. The contiguity, immediacy, post-nascence, repetition, result, association, absence, and disappearance conditions are solely mental phenomena. As Nibbāna is unincluded, it is also fitting to call it a portion of mental phenomena. The pre-nascence condition is a portion of material phenomena. The remaining conditions are mentality-materiality phenomena, as they may be found. Thus, the determination should first be understood by way of the phenomena.

Kālatoti [Pg.353] –

'By way of time' means:

Paccuppannāva hontettha, paccayā dasa pañca ca;

Atītā eva pañceko, te kāle dvepi nissito;

Tayo tikālikā ceva, vimuttā cāpi kālatoti.

Herein, fifteen conditions are only present; five are only past; one depends on both times; three are of the three times; and one is free from time.

Etesu hi hetupaccayo sahajātaaññamaññanissayapurejātapacchājātavipākaāhāraindriyajhānamaggasampayuttavippayuttaatthiavigatapaccayoti ime pannarasa paccayā paccuppannadhammāva honti. Anantarapaccayo samanantaraāsevananatthivigatapaccayoti ime pañca atītāyeva honti. Eko pana kammapaccayo, so paccuppannātīte dvepi kāle nissito hoti. Sesā ārammaṇapaccayo adhipatipaccayo upanissayapaccayoti ime tayo paccayā tekālikāpi honti, paññattiyā saddhiṃ nibbānassa saṅgahitattā kālavimuttāpīti. Evamettha kālatopi viññātabbo vinicchayo.

Among these, the root, conascence, mutuality, support, pre-nascence, post-nascence, result, nutriment, faculty, jhāna, path, association, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance conditions—these fifteen conditions are only present phenomena. The contiguity, immediacy, repetition, absence, and disappearance conditions—these five are only past. The kamma condition, however, depends on both times, present and past. The remaining three conditions—object, dominance, and decisive support—are of the three times; and as they include Nibbāna along with concepts, they are also timeless. Thus, the determination should also be understood by way of time.

Nānappakārabhedato paccayuppannatoti imesaṃ pana dvinnaṃ padānaṃ attho niddesavāre āvibhavissatīti.

The meaning of these two terms, 'by way of various distinctions' and 'by way of the conditioned phenomena,' will become manifest in the section on the exposition.

Paccayuddesavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Summary of Conditions.

Paccayaniddeso

The Exposition of Conditions

1. Hetupaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

1. The Explanation of the Exposition of the Root Condition

1. Idāni sabbepi te paccaye uddiṭṭhapaṭipāṭiyā niddisitvā dassetuṃ hetupaccayoti hetū hetusampayuttakānaṃ dhammānaṃ taṃsamuṭṭhānānañca rūpānaṃ hetupaccayena paccayotiādimāha. Tattha hetupaccayoti catuvīsatiyā paccayesu nikkhittapaṭipāṭiyā sabbapaṭhamaṃ bhājetabbassa paduddhāro. Sesapaccayesupi imināva nayena paṭhamaṃ bhājetabbapadaṃ uddharitvā vissajjanaṃ katanti veditabbaṃ. Ayaṃ panettha sambandho – yo paccayuddese hetupaccayoti uddiṭṭho, so niddesato ‘‘hetū hetusampayuttakānaṃ dhammānaṃ taṃsamuṭṭhānānañca rūpānaṃ hetupaccayena paccayo’’ti evaṃ veditabbo[Pg.354]. Iminā upāyena sabbapaccayesu bhājetabbassa padassa vissajjanena saddhiṃ sambandho veditabbo.

1. Now, to explain all those conditions in the order they were enumerated, one begins by stating the root condition: 'Roots are a condition by way of root condition for the states associated with them and for the material phenomena originating from them.' Herein, the term 'root condition' is the extraction of the first phrase to be analyzed among the twenty-four conditions arranged in sequence. For the remaining conditions as well, it should be understood that the phrase to be analyzed is first extracted in the same way and then explained. The connection here is this: what was stated in the enumeration of conditions as 'root condition' should be understood from the detailed exposition as, 'Roots are a condition by way of root condition for the states associated with them and for the material phenomena originating from them.' By this method, the connection of the phrase to be analyzed with its explanation should be understood for all conditions.

Idāni hetū hetusampayuttakānanti ettha ‘‘hetusampayuttakāna’’nti avatvā ‘‘hetū hetusampayuttakāna’’nti kasmā vuttanti? Paccayassa ceva paccayuppannānañca vavatthāpanato. Hetusampayuttakānanti hi vutte hetunā sampayuttakānaṃ hetupaccayena paccayoti attho bhaveyya. Evaṃ sante asuko nāma dhammo hetupaccayena paccayoti paccayavavatthānaṃ na paññāyeyya. Athāpi hetunā sampayuttakānaṃ hetusampayuttakānanti atthaṃ aggahetvāva yesaṃ kesañci sampayuttakānaṃ hetū hetupaccayena paccayoti attho bhaveyya, evaṃ sante hetunā vippayuttā cakkhuviññāṇādayopi sampayuttakāyeva, hetunā sampayuttā kusalādayopi. Tattha ayaṃ hetu asukassa nāma sampayuttakadhammassa paccayoti paccayuppannavavatthānaṃ na paññāyeyya. Tasmā paccayañceva paccayuppannañca vavatthāpento ‘‘hetū hetusampayuttakāna’’nti āha. Tassattho – hetusampayuttakānaṃ kusalādidhammānaṃ yo hetu sampayuttako, so hetupaccayena paccayoti. Tatrāpi ‘‘paccayo’’ti avatvā ‘‘hetupaccayenā’’ti vacanaṃ hetuno aññathā paccayabhāvapaṭisedhanatthaṃ. Ayañhi hetu hetupaccayenāpi paccayo hoti, sahajātādipaccayenāpi. Tatrāssa yvāyaṃ sahajātādipaccayavasena aññathāpi paccayabhāvo, tassa paṭisedhanatthaṃ hetupaccayenāti vuttaṃ. Evaṃ santepi ‘‘taṃsampayuttakāna’’nti avatvā kasmā ‘‘hetusampayuttakāna’’nti vuttanti? Niddisitabbassa apākaṭattā. Taṃsampayuttakānanti hi vutte yena te taṃsampayuttakā nāma honti, ayaṃ nāma soti niddisitabbo apākaṭo. Tassa apākaṭattā yena sampayuttā te taṃsampayuttakāti vuccanti, taṃ sarūpatova dassetuṃ ‘‘hetusampayuttakāna’’nti vuttaṃ.

Now, in the phrase 'hetū hetusampayuttakānaṃ,' why is it said thus and not just 'hetusampayuttakānaṃ'? It is for the purpose of defining both the condition and the conditioned phenomena. For if it were said 'hetusampayuttakānaṃ,' the meaning would be '[a condition] for states associated with a root,' and in that case, the definition of the condition would not be apparent. Or again, if, without taking 'hetusampayuttakānaṃ' to mean 'those associated with a root,' the meaning were 'roots are a condition by way of root condition for any associated phenomena,' then in that case, phenomena dissociated from roots—such as eye-consciousness and others—would also be considered 'associated,' as would wholesome and other phenomena associated with roots. In that case, the definition of the conditioned phenomenon—that is, for which specific associated state this root is a condition—would not be apparent. Therefore, to define both the condition and the conditioned, it is said, 'hetū hetusampayuttakānaṃ.' Its meaning is this: for states associated with roots, such as wholesome states, the associated root is a condition for them by way of root condition. Here, instead of simply saying 'paccayo' (a condition), the phrase 'hetupaccayena' (by way of root condition) is used to preclude the root's being a condition in another way. For this root is a condition both by way of root condition and by way of other conditions like conascence. To preclude its being a condition in other ways, such as by conascence, the phrase 'hetupaccayena' is used. Even so, why is it said 'hetusampayuttakānaṃ' instead of 'taṃsampayuttakānaṃ'? Because that which is to be specified is not manifest. If it were said 'taṃsampayuttakānaṃ,' that with which they are associated would not be manifest. Due to this lack of clarity, to show in its own form that with which they are associated, the phrase 'hetusampayuttakānaṃ' is used.

Taṃsamuṭṭhānānanti ettha pana niddisitabbassa pākaṭattā taṃ-gahaṇaṃ kataṃ. Ayañhettha attho – te hetū ceva hetusampayuttakā ca dhammā samuṭṭhānaṃ etesanti taṃsamuṭṭhānāni. Tesaṃ taṃsamuṭṭhānānaṃ, hetuto ceva hetusampayuttadhammehi ca nibbattānanti attho. Iminā cittasamuṭṭhānarūpaṃ gaṇhāti[Pg.355]. Kiṃ pana taṃ cittato aññenapi samuṭṭhātīti? Āma, samuṭṭhāti. Sabbepi hi cittacetasikā ekato hutvā rūpaṃ samuṭṭhāpenti. Lokiyadhammadesanāyaṃ pana cittassa adhikabhāvato tathāvidhaṃ rūpaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānanti vuccati. Tenevāha cittacetasikā dhammā cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ rūpānaṃ sahajātapaccayena paccayoti.

In the term 'taṃsamuṭṭhānānaṃ,' however, the prefix 'taṃ' (that) is used because what is to be specified is manifest. Herein, the meaning is: those roots and the states associated with the roots are the origin of these material phenomena; therefore, they are called 'taṃsamuṭṭhānāni' (originating from them). 'Tesaṃ taṃsamuṭṭhānānaṃ' means: for those originating from them, that is, arisen from those roots and from the states associated with the roots. By this, he includes mind-originated matter. But does that matter arise from something other than mind as well? Yes, it does. For all mind and mental factors, having come together, produce matter. However, in the teaching of worldly phenomena, because of the predominance of mind, such matter is called 'mind-originated.' Therefore, it is said: 'Mind and mental factors are a condition by way of conascence for mind-originated matter.'

Yadi evaṃ idhāpi ‘‘taṃsamuṭṭhānāna’’nti avatvā cittasamuṭṭhānānanti kasmā na vuttanti? Acittasamuṭṭhānānampi saṅgaṇhanato. Pañhāvārasmiñhi ‘‘paṭisandhikkhaṇe vipākābyākatā hetū sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpānaṃ hetupaccayena paccayoti āgataṃ’’. Tassa saṅgaṇhanatthaṃ idha cittasamuṭṭhānānanti avatvā taṃsamuṭṭhānānanti vuttaṃ. Tassattho – cittajarūpaṃ ajanayamānāpi te hetū hetusampayuttakā dhammā sahajātādipaccayavasena samuṭṭhānaṃ etesanti taṃsamuṭṭhānāni. Tesaṃ taṃsamuṭṭhānānaṃ pavatte cittajānaṃ paṭisandhiyañca kaṭattārūpānampi hetū hetupaccayena paccayoti. Iminā upāyena aññesupi taṃsamuṭṭhānānanti āgataṭṭhānesu attho veditabbo.

If that is so, why is 'taṃsamuṭṭhānānaṃ' (originating from them) used here instead of 'cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ' (originating from mind)? It is to include that which does not originate from mind. For in the Question Section, it is stated: 'At the moment of rebirth-linking, the resultant-indeterminate roots are a condition by way of root condition for the associated aggregates and for the materiality produced by kamma.' To include that, 'originating from them' is said here instead of 'originating from mind.' Its meaning is this: even while not generating mind-originated matter, those roots and states associated with the roots are the origin of this kamma-produced matter by way of conascence and other conditions; thus, they are called 'originating from them.' For these phenomena 'originating from them'—namely, for mind-originated matter in the course of existence and for kamma-produced matter at rebirth-linking—the roots are a condition by way of root condition. In this way, the meaning should be understood in other places where 'originating from them' is mentioned.

Kasmā panāyaṃ hetu paṭisandhiyameva kaṭattārūpānaṃ hetupaccayo hoti, na pavatteti? Paṭisandhiyaṃ kammajarūpānaṃ cittapaṭibaddhavuttitāya. Paṭisandhiyañhi kammajarūpānaṃ cittapaṭibaddhā pavatti, cittavasena uppajjanti ceva tiṭṭhanti ca. Tasmiñhi khaṇe cittaṃ cittajarūpaṃ janetuṃ na sakkoti, tānipi vinā cittena uppajjituṃ vā ṭhātuṃ vā na sakkonti. Tenevāha – ‘‘viññāṇapaccayā nāmarūpaṃ, tasmiṃ patiṭṭhite viññāṇe nāmarūpassa avakkanti hotī’’ti (saṃ. ni. 2.39). Pavattiyaṃ pana tesaṃ citte vijjamānepi kammapaṭibaddhāva pavatti, na cittapaṭibaddhā. Avijjamāne cāpi citte nirodhasamāpannānaṃ uppajjantiyeva.

But why is this root a condition for kamma-produced matter only at rebirth-linking, and not in the course of existence? Because at rebirth-linking, kamma-produced matter has an occurrence that is bound up with consciousness. For at rebirth-linking, the occurrence of kamma-produced matter is bound up with consciousness; it arises and persists dependent on consciousness. At that moment, consciousness is not able to generate mind-originated matter, nor can that kamma-produced matter arise or persist without consciousness. Therefore it is said: 'With consciousness as condition, there is name-and-form; when that consciousness is established, there is the descent of name-and-form' (SN 12.39). In the course of existence, however, although consciousness is present for that kamma-produced matter, its occurrence is bound up with kamma, not with consciousness. And it arises even when consciousness is absent, as for those who have attained the cessation attainment.

Kasmā pana paṭisandhikkhaṇe cittaṃ cittajarūpaṃ janetuṃ na sakkotīti? Kammavegakkhittatāya ceva appatiṭṭhitavatthutāya ca dubbalattā. Tañhi tadā kammavegakkhittaṃ apurejātavatthukattā ca appatiṭṭhitavatthukanti dubbalaṃ hoti. Tasmā papāte patitamatto puriso kiñci sippaṃ kātuṃ viya rūpaṃ janetuṃ na sakkoti; kammajarūpameva panassa cittasamuṭṭhānarūpaṭṭhāne tiṭṭhati. Tañca kammajarūpasseva bījaṭṭhāne tiṭṭhati. Kammaṃ panassa khettasadisaṃ, kilesā [Pg.356] āpasadisā. Tasmā santepi khette āpe ca paṭhamuppattiyaṃ bījānubhāvena rukkhuppatti viya paṭisandhikkhaṇe cittānubhāvena rūpakāyassa uppatti. Bīje pana vigatepi pathavīāpānubhāvena rukkhassa uparūpari pavatti viya; vinā cittena kammatova kaṭattārūpānaṃ pavatti hotīti veditabbā. Vuttampi cetaṃ – ‘‘kammaṃ khettaṃ viññāṇaṃ bījaṃ taṇhā sneho’’ti (a. ni. 3.77).

Why then is consciousness unable to produce mind-originated matter at the moment of rebirth-linking? Because it is weak, due to being propelled by the force of kamma and having an unestablished base. For at that time, being propelled by the force of kamma and lacking a pre-arisen base, it has an unestablished base and is thus weak. Therefore, just as a man who has just fallen from a precipice is unable to perform any skill, so too consciousness cannot produce matter; instead, for that being, kamma-produced matter stands in the place of mind-originated matter. And that consciousness itself stands in the position of a seed for that very kamma-produced matter. Moreover, kamma is like the field, and defilements are like water. Thus, even though the field and water are present, just as a tree first sprouts through the power of the seed, so too at the moment of rebirth-linking, the arising of the material body occurs through the power of consciousness. And just as when the seed is gone, the tree continues to grow upwards through the power of the earth and water, so too it should be understood that even without consciousness, the continuation of matter produced by that kamma occurs from kamma alone. And this has also been said: 'Kamma is the field, consciousness the seed, and craving the moisture' (A.N. 3.77).

Ayañca panattho okāsavaseneva gahetabbo. Tayo hi okāsā – nāmokāso, rūpokāso, nāmarūpokāsoti. Tattha arūpabhavo nāmokāso nāma. Tatra hi hadayavatthumattampi rūpapaccayaṃ vinā arūpadhammāva uppajjanti. Asaññabhavo rūpokāso nāma. Tatra hi paṭisandhicittamattampi arūpapaccayaṃ vinā rūpadhammāva uppajjanti. Pañcavokārabhavo nāmarūpokāso nāma. Tatra hi vatthurūpamattampi vinā paṭisandhiyaṃ arūpadhammā, paṭisandhicittañca vinā kammajāpi rūpadhammā nuppajjanti. Yuganaddhāva rūpārūpānaṃ uppatti. Yathā hi sassāmike sarājake gehe sadvārapālake rājāṇattiṃ vinā paṭhamappaveso nāma natthi, aparabhāge pana vināpi āṇattiṃ purimāṇattiānubhāveneva hoti, evameva pañcavokāre paṭisandhiviññāṇarājassa sahajātādipaccayataṃ vinā rūpassa paṭisandhivasena paṭhamuppatti nāma natthi. Aparabhāge pana vināpi paṭisandhiviññāṇassa sahajātādipaccayānubhāvaṃ purimānubhāvavasena laddhappavesassa kammato pavatti hoti. Asaññabhavo pana yasmā arūpokāso na hoti, tasmā tattha vināva arūpapaccayā asaññokāsattā rūpaṃ pavattati, assāmike suññagehe attano gehe ca purisassa paveso viya. Arūpabhavopi yasmā rūpokāso na hoti, tasmā tattha vināva rūpapaccayā aññokāsattā arūpadhammā pavattanti. Pañcavokārabhavo pana rūpārūpokāsoti natthettha arūpapaccayaṃ vinā paṭisandhikkhaṇe rūpānaṃ uppattīti. Iti ayaṃ hetu paṭisandhiyameva kaṭattārūpānaṃ paccayo hoti, na pavatteti.

This matter should be understood by way of the spheres. There are three kinds of spheres: the sphere of mentality, the sphere of materiality, and the sphere of mentality-materiality. Here, the formless existence is called the sphere of mentality. There, only immaterial phenomena arise, without a material condition, not even a heart-base. The non-percipient existence is called the sphere of materiality. There, only material phenomena arise, without an immaterial condition, not even a rebirth-linking consciousness. The five-aggregate existence is called the sphere of mentality-materiality. There, at rebirth, immaterial phenomena do not arise without a material base, nor do kamma-produced material phenomena arise without the rebirth-linking consciousness. The arising of materiality and immateriality is yoked together. Just as in a house with an owner, a king, and a gatekeeper, there is no first entry without the king's command, but later, even without a command, entry occurs due to the power of the previous command—just so, in the five-aggregate existence, there is no first arising of materiality by way of rebirth without the co-nascent conditionality and so on of the king that is the rebirth-linking consciousness. But later, even without the power of the co-nascent conditionality and so on of the rebirth-linking consciousness, the continuation of what has gained entry by way of the former power occurs from kamma. The non-percipient existence, however, since it is not the sphere of mentality, materiality continues there even without an immaterial condition, because it is the non-percipient sphere, like the entry of a man into an unowned, empty house, or into his own house. The formless existence, too, since it is not the sphere of materiality, immaterial phenomena continue there even without a material condition, because it is the other sphere. But the five-aggregate existence is the sphere of mentality-materiality, so there is no arising of materiality at the rebirth moment without an immaterial condition. Thus, this cause is a condition for kamma-produced matter only at rebirth, not in the course of existence.

Nanu ‘‘hetū sahajātānaṃ hetupaccayena paccayoti vutte sabbopi ayamattho gahito hoti, atha kasmā ‘‘hetusampayuttakānaṃ dhammānaṃ taṃsamuṭṭhānānañca rūpāna’’nti idaṃ gahitanti? Pavattiyaṃ kaṭattārūpādīnaṃ paccayabhāvapaṭibāhanato. Evañhi sati yāni pavattiyaṃ hetunā [Pg.357] saha ekakkhaṇe kaṭattārūpāni ceva utuāhārasamuṭṭhānāni ca jāyanti, tesampi hetū hetupaccayoti āpajjeyya, na ca so tesaṃ paccayo. Tasmā tesaṃ paccayabhāvassa paṭibāhanatthametaṃ gahitanti veditabbaṃ.

Is it not the case that when it is said, 'Roots are a condition for co-nascent phenomena by way of the root condition,' all this meaning is understood? Then why is this phrase 'for the phenomena associated with the roots and for the material phenomena originating from them' included? To prevent [the root] from being a condition for kamma-produced matter and so on in the course of existence. For if this were not so, then in the course of existence, it would follow that the roots are also a root-condition for the kamma-produced matter and the matter originating from temperature and nutriment which arise at the same moment as the roots; but it is not a condition for them. Therefore, it should be understood that this is included to prevent its being a condition for them.

Idāni ‘‘nānappakārabhedato paccayuppannato’’ti imesaṃ padānaṃ vasenettha viññātabbo vinicchayo. Tesu nānappakārabhedatoti ayañhi hetu nāma jātito kusalākusalavipākakiriyabhedato catubbidho. Tattha kusalahetu bhūmantarato kāmāvacarādibhedena catubbidho, akusalahetu kāmāvacarova vipākahetu kāmāvacarādibhedena catubbidho, kiriyahetu kāmāvacaro rūpāvacaro arūpāvacaroti tividho. Tattha kāmāvacarakusalahetu nāmato alobhādivasena tividho. Rūpāvacarādikusalahetūsupi eseva nayo. Akusalahetu lobhādivasena tividho. Vipākakiriyahetū pana alobhādivasena tayo tayo honti. Taṃtaṃcittasampayogavasena pana tesaṃ tesaṃ hetūnaṃ nānappakārabhedoyevāti evaṃ tāvettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

Now, the analysis of the phrases 'due to the diversity of kinds' and 'from the condition-produced' is to be understood here. Among these, regarding 'due to the diversity of kinds': this root, by nature, is fourfold, divided into wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, and functional. Among these, the wholesome root is fourfold, being divided according to the various planes into sense-sphere and so on. The unwholesome root is only of the sense-sphere. The resultant root is fourfold, being divided into sense-sphere and so on. The functional root is threefold: of the sense-sphere, form-sphere, and formless-sphere. Among these, the sense-sphere wholesome root is threefold by name: by way of non-greed and so on. The same method applies to the wholesome roots of the form-sphere and so on. The unwholesome root is threefold: by way of greed and so on. The resultant and functional roots, however, are each threefold: by way of non-greed and so on. Moreover, due to their association with various types of consciousness, there is indeed a diversity of kinds among these roots. Thus, first, the analysis should be understood here with respect to 'due to the diversity of kinds'.

Paccayuppannatoti iminā paccayena ime dhammā uppajjanti, imesaṃ nāma dhammānaṃ ayaṃ paccayoti evampi viññātabbo vinicchayoti attho. Tattha imasmiṃ tāva hetupaccaye kāmāvacarakusalahetu kāmabhavarūpabhavesu attanā sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpānañca hetupaccayo hoti, arūpabhave sampayuttadhammānaṃyeva. Rūpāvacarakusalahetu kāmabhavarūpabhavesuyeva sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpānañca hetupaccayo. Arūpāvacarakusalahetu kāmāvacarakusalahetusadisova. Tathā apariyāpannakusalahetu, tathā akusalahetu. Kāmāvacaravipākahetu pana kāmabhavasmiṃyeva attanā sampayuttadhammānaṃ, paṭisandhiyaṃ kaṭattārūpānaṃ, pavatte cittasamuṭṭhānarūpānañca hetupaccayo. Rūpāvacaravipākahetu rūpabhave vuttappakārānaññeva hetupaccayo. Arūpāvacaravipākahetu arūpabhave sampayuttakānaññeva hetupaccayo. Apariyāpannavipākahetu kāmabhavarūpabhavesu sampayuttakānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpānañca arūpabhave arūpadhammānaññeva hetupaccayo. Kiriyahetūsu pana tebhūmakesupi [Pg.358] kusalahetusadisova paccayoti. Evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

'As being produced by the condition' means that these phenomena arise through this condition, or that this is the condition for these phenomena—this is how the analysis is to be understood. Here, in this root condition, the sense-sphere wholesome root is a root condition for its associated phenomena and for the material phenomena originating from consciousness in the sense-sphere and form-sphere existences, and only for its associated phenomena in the formless existence. The form-sphere wholesome root is a root condition for its associated phenomena and for the material phenomena originating from consciousness only in the sense-sphere and form-sphere existences. The formless-sphere wholesome root is similar to the sense-sphere wholesome root. Likewise for the supramundane wholesome root, and also the unwholesome root. The sense-sphere resultant root, however, is a root condition only in the sense-sphere existence for its associated phenomena, for kamma-produced form at rebirth, and for the material phenomena originating from consciousness in the course of existence. The form-sphere resultant root is a root condition in the form-sphere existence for the aforementioned types. The formless-sphere resultant root is a root condition only for its associated phenomena in the formless-sphere existence. The supramundane resultant root is a root condition for its associated phenomena and the material phenomena originating from consciousness in the sense-sphere and form-sphere existences, and for immaterial phenomena alone in the formless-sphere existence. As for the functional roots, in all three planes of existence, they are conditions similar to the wholesome roots. Thus, here the analysis is to be understood also from the perspective of the condition-produced phenomena.

Hetupaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Exposition of the Root Condition.

2. Ārammaṇapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

2. The Explanation of the Exposition of the Object Condition.

2. Ārammaṇapaccayaniddese rūpāyatananti rūpasaṅkhātaṃ āyatanaṃ. Sesesupi eseva nayo. Cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyāti cakkhuviññāṇasaṅkhātāya dhātuyā. Sesapadesupi eseva nayo. Taṃsampayuttakānanti tāya cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyā sampayuttakānaṃ tiṇṇaṃ khandhānaṃ, sabbesampi cakkhupasādavatthukānaṃ catunnaṃ khandhānaṃ rūpāyatanaṃ ārammaṇapaccayena paccayoti attho. Ito paresupi eseva nayo. Manodhātuyāti sasampayuttadhammāya tividhāyapi manodhātuyā rūpāyatanādīni pañca ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo, no ca kho ekakkhaṇe. Sabbe dhammāti etāni ca rūpāyatanādīni pañca avasesā ca sabbepi ñeyyadhammā imā cha dhātuyo ṭhapetvā sesāya sasampayuttadhammāya manoviññāṇadhātuyā ārammaṇapaccayena paccayoti attho. Yaṃ yaṃ dhammaṃ ārabbhāti iminā ye ete etāsaṃ sattannaṃ viññāṇadhātūnaṃ ārammaṇadhammā vuttā, te tāsaṃ dhātūnaṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā uppajjanakkhaṇeyeva ārammaṇapaccayo hontīti dīpeti. Evaṃ hontāpi ca na ekato honti, yaṃ yaṃ ārabbha ye ye uppajjanti, tesaṃ tesaṃ te te visuṃ visuṃ ārammaṇapaccayo hontītipi dīpeti. Uppajjantīti idaṃ yathā najjo sandanti, pabbatā tiṭṭhantīti sabbakālasaṅgahavasena, evaṃ vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Tena yepi ārabbha ye uppajjiṃsu, yepi uppajjissanti, te sabbe ārammaṇapaccayeneva uppajjiṃsu ca uppajjissanti cāti siddhaṃ hoti. Cittacetasikā dhammāti idaṃ ‘‘ye ye dhammā’’ti vuttānaṃ sarūpato nidassanaṃ. Te te dhammāti te te ārammaṇadhammā. Tesaṃ tesanti tesaṃ tesaṃ cittacetasikadhammānaṃ. Ayaṃ tāvettha pāḷivaṇṇanā.

2. In the exposition of the object condition, 'base of form' (rūpāyatana) means the base that is reckoned as form. The same method applies to the rest. 'For the eye-consciousness element' (cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyā) means for the element that is reckoned as eye-consciousness. The same method applies to the remaining terms. 'For those associated with it' (taṃsampayuttakānaṃ) means that the base of form is a condition by way of object for the three aggregates associated with that eye-consciousness element, and for all four aggregates based on the eye-sensitivity. The same method applies to what follows. 'For the mind-element' (manodhātuyā) means that the five objects beginning with the base of form are conditions by way of object for the mind-element together with its associated states in its threefold function, but not in a single moment. 'All phenomena' (sabbe dhammā) means that these five objects beginning with the base of form, and all the remaining knowable phenomena—except for these six elements—are conditions by way of object for the mind-consciousness element together with its associated states. 'Depending on whatever phenomenon' (yaṃ yaṃ dhammaṃ ārabbha) indicates that these object-phenomena which have been stated as objects for these seven consciousness-elements, become an object-condition for those elements precisely at the moment of their arising. And even while being so, they do not occur simultaneously; it also indicates that depending on whatever phenomenon, whatever states arise, those phenomena become separate object-conditions for those respective states. 'They arise' (uppajjanti) should be understood as spoken by way of encompassing all time, just as it is said, “rivers flow, mountains stand.” By that, it is established that also those phenomena on which states arose in the past and those on which states will arise in the future, all arose and will arise only by way of object-condition. 'Mental and associated phenomena' (cittacetasikā dhammā) is an example illustrating the nature of what was stated as “whatever phenomena” (ye ye dhammā). 'Those phenomena' (te te dhammā) refers to those object-phenomena. 'For them' (tesaṃ tesaṃ) means for those respective mental and associated phenomena. This, for now, is the explanation of the Pāli.

Idaṃ pana ārammaṇaṃ nāma rūpārammaṇaṃ saddagandharasaphoṭṭhabbadhammārammaṇanti koṭṭhāsato chabbidhaṃ hoti. Tattha ṭhapetvā paññattiṃ avasesaṃ bhūmito [Pg.359] kāmāvacaraṃ…pe… apariyāpannanti catubbidhaṃ hoti. Tattha kāmāvacaraṃ kusalākusalavipākakiriyarūpabhedato pañcavidhaṃ; rūpāvacaraṃ kusalavipākakiriyato tividhaṃ, tathā arūpāvacaraṃ, apariyāpannaṃ kusalavipākanibbānavasena tividhaṃ hoti. Sabbameva vā etaṃ kusalākusalavipākakiriyarūpanibbānapaññattibhedato sattavidhaṃ hoti. Tattha kusalaṃ bhūmibhedato catubbidhaṃ hoti, akusalaṃ kāmāvacarameva, vipākaṃ catubhūmakaṃ, kiriyaṃ tibhūmakaṃ, rūpaṃ ekabhūmakaṃ kāmāvacarameva, nibbānampi ekabhūmakaṃ apariyāpannameva, paññatti bhūmivinimuttāti evamettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

Now, this object is sixfold by way of division: form-object, sound-object, smell-object, taste-object, touch-object, and mental-object. Herein, excepting concepts, the remainder is fourfold in terms of plane: sense-sphere, fine-material sphere, immaterial sphere, and supramundane. Among these, the sense-sphere is fivefold by division into wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, functional, and form. The fine-material sphere is threefold as wholesome, resultant, and functional; similarly the immaterial sphere. The supramundane is threefold as wholesome, resultant, and Nibbāna. Alternatively, all this is sevenfold by division into wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, functional, form, Nibbāna, and concepts. Herein, the wholesome is fourfold by division of planes; the unwholesome is only of the sense-sphere; the resultant is of four planes; the functional is of three planes; form is of one plane, only the sense-sphere; Nibbāna is also of one plane, only the supramundane; concepts are beyond planes. Thus, the analysis here should be understood according to its various kinds of divisions.

Evaṃ bhinne panetasmiṃ ārammaṇe kāmāvacarakusalārammaṇaṃ kāmāvacarakusalassa, rūpāvacarakusalassa, akusalassa, kāmāvacaravipākassa, kāmāvacarakiriyassa, rūpāvacarakiriyassa cāti imesaṃ channaṃ rāsīnaṃ ārammaṇapaccayo hoti. Rūpāvacarakusalārammaṇaṃ tesu chasu rāsīsu kāmāvacaravipākavajjānaṃ pañcannaṃ rāsīnaṃ ārammaṇapaccayo hoti. Arūpāvacarakusalārammaṇaṃ kāmāvacarakusalassa, rūpāvacarakusalassa, arūpāvacarakusalassa, akusalassa, arūpāvaracaravipākassa, kāmāvacarakiriyassa, rūpāvacarakiriyassa, arūpāvacarakiriyassa cāti imesaṃ aṭṭhannaṃ rāsīnaṃ ārammaṇapaccayo hoti. Apariyāpannakusalārammaṇaṃ kāmāvacararūpāvacarato kusalakiriyānameva ārammaṇapaccayo hoti. Akusalārammaṇaṃ kāmāvacararūpāvacarakusalassa, akusalassa, kāmāvacaravipākassa, kāmāvacararūpāvacarakiriyassa cāti imesaṃ channaṃ rāsīnaṃ ārammaṇapaccayo hoti.

When this object is thus divided, the object of sense-sphere wholesome states is an object-condition for these six groups: sense-sphere wholesome, fine-material-sphere wholesome, unwholesome, sense-sphere resultant, sense-sphere functional, and fine-material-sphere functional. The object of fine-material-sphere wholesome states is an object-condition for five groups among those six, excluding the sense-sphere resultant. The object of immaterial-sphere wholesome states is an object-condition for these eight groups: sense-sphere wholesome, fine-material-sphere wholesome, immaterial-sphere wholesome, unwholesome, immaterial-sphere resultant, sense-sphere functional, fine-material-sphere functional, and immaterial-sphere functional. The object of supramundane wholesome states is an object-condition only for the wholesome and functional states of the sense-sphere and fine-material-sphere. The object of unwholesome states is an object-condition for these six groups: sense-sphere and fine-material-sphere wholesome, unwholesome, sense-sphere resultant, and sense-sphere and fine-material-sphere functional.

Kāmāvacaravipākārammaṇaṃ kāmāvacararūpāvacarakusalassa, akusalassa, kāmāvacaravipākassa, kāmāvacararūpāvacarakiriyassa cāti imesaṃ channaṃ rāsīnaṃ ārammaṇapaccayo hoti. Rūpāvacaravipākārammaṇaṃ kāmāvacararūpāvacarakusalassa, akusalassa, kāmāvacararūpāvacarakiriyassa cāti imesaṃ pañcannaṃ rāsīnaṃ ārammaṇapaccayo hoti. Arūpāvacaravipākārammaṇampi imesaṃyeva pañcannaṃ rāsīnaṃ ārammaṇapaccayo hoti. Apariyāpannavipākārammaṇaṃ kāmāvacararūpāvacarakusalakiriyānaññeva ārammaṇapaccayo hoti.

The object of the sense-sphere resultant is an object-condition for these six groups of states: sense-sphere and fine-material-sphere wholesome, unwholesome, sense-sphere resultant, and sense-sphere and fine-material-sphere functional. The object of the fine-material-sphere resultant is an object-condition for these five groups of states: sense-sphere and fine-material-sphere wholesome, unwholesome, and sense-sphere and fine-material-sphere functional. The object of the immaterial-sphere resultant is also an object-condition for these same five groups of states. The object of the supramundane resultant is an object-condition only for sense-sphere and fine-material-sphere wholesome and functional states.

Kāmāvacarakiriyārammaṇaṃ kāmāvacararūpāvacarakusalassa, akusalassa, kāmāvacaravipākassa, kāmāvacararūpāvacarakiriyassa cāti imesaṃ channaṃ rāsīnaṃ [Pg.360] ārammaṇapaccayo hoti. Rūpāvacarakiriyārammaṇaṃ imesu chasu rāsīsu kāmāvacaravipākavajjānaṃ pañcannaṃ rāsīnaṃ ārammaṇapaccayo hoti. Arūpāvacarakiriyārammaṇaṃ tesaṃ pañcannaṃ arūpāvacarakiriyassa cāti imesaṃ channaṃ rāsīnaṃ ārammaṇapaccayo hoti. Catusamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpakkhandhasaṅkhātaṃ rūpārammaṇaṃ kāmāvacararūpāvacarakusalassa akusalassa kāmāvacaravipākassa kāmāvacararūpāvacarakiriyassa cāti imesaṃ channaṃ rāsīnaṃ ārammaṇapaccayo hoti. Nibbānārammaṇaṃ kāmāvacararūpāvacarakusalassa, apariyāpannato kusalavipākassa, kāmāvacararūpāvacarakiriyassa cāti imesaṃ channaṃ rāsīnaṃ ārammaṇapaccayo hoti. Rūpāvacarakusalakiriyānaṃ keci nicchanti, taṃ yuttito upadhāretabbaṃ. Nānappakārakaṃ pana paññattiārammaṇaṃ tebhūmakakusalassa, akusalassa, rūpāvacaravipākassa, arūpāvacaravipākassa, tebhūmakakiriyassa cāti imesaṃ navannaṃ rāsīnaṃ ārammaṇapaccayo hoti. Tattha yaṃ yaṃ ārammaṇaṃ yesaṃ yesaṃ paccayo, te te taṃtaṃpaccayuppannā nāma hontīti evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

The object of sense-sphere functional states is an object-condition for these six groups of states: sense-sphere and fine-material-sphere wholesome, unwholesome, sense-sphere resultant, and sense-sphere and fine-material-sphere functional. The object of fine-material-sphere functional states is an object-condition for five of these six groups of states, excluding the sense-sphere resultant. The object of immaterial-sphere functional states is an object-condition for these six groups of states: the aforementioned five and immaterial-sphere functional. Material form, designated as the aggregate of form arising from the four origins, is an object-condition for these six groups of states: sense-sphere and fine-material-sphere wholesome, unwholesome, sense-sphere resultant, and sense-sphere and fine-material-sphere functional. Nibbāna as an object is an object-condition for these six groups of states: sense-sphere and fine-material-sphere wholesome, supramundane wholesome and resultant, and sense-sphere and fine-material-sphere functional. Some maintain that it is also an object for fine-material-sphere wholesome and functional states; this should be examined by reason. A concept-object of various kinds is an object-condition for these nine groups of states: wholesome of the three planes, unwholesome, fine-material-sphere resultant, immaterial-sphere resultant, and functional of the three planes. Herein, whatever object is a condition for whichever states, those states are said to be conditionally arisen from that particular condition. Thus, the determination should also be understood from the standpoint of the conditionally arisen.

Ārammaṇapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Object Condition.

3. Adhipatipaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

3. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Dominance Condition

3. Adhipatipaccayaniddese chandādhipatīti chandasaṅkhāto adhipati. Chandaṃ dhuraṃ katvā chandaṃ jeṭṭhakaṃ katvā cittuppattikāle uppannassa kattukamyatāchandassetaṃ nāmaṃ. Sesesupi eseva nayo. Kasmā pana yathā hetupaccayaniddese hetū hetusampayuttakāna’’nti vuttaṃ, evamidha ‘‘adhipatī adhipatisampayuttakānanti avatvā ‘‘chandādhipati chandasampayuttakāna’’ntiādinā nayena desanā katāti? Ekakkhaṇe abhāvato. Purimanayasmiñhi dve tayo hetū ekakkhaṇepi hetupaccayo honti mūlaṭṭhena. Upakārakabhāvassa avijahanato. Adhipati pana jeṭṭhakaṭṭhena upakārako, na ca ekakkhaṇe bahū jeṭṭhakā nāma honti. Tasmā ekato uppannānampi nesaṃ ekakkhaṇe adhipatipaccayabhāvo natthi. Tassa adhipatipaccayabhāvassa ekakkhaṇe abhāvato idha evaṃ desanā katāti.

3. In the exposition of the Dominance Condition, 'desire-dominance' means the dominance reckoned as desire. Making desire the foremost, making desire the chief, this is the name for the desire-to-act that arises at the moment of the arising of consciousness. The same method applies to the rest. But why, just as in the exposition of the Root Condition it was said, 'roots are for the root-associated states,' here it is not said, 'dominance is for the dominance-associated states,' but instead the teaching is given in the manner of 'desire-dominance is for the desire-associated states,' and so on? Because of its non-existence in a single moment. For in the previous method, two or three roots can be a root-condition even in a single moment by way of being a root, since their supportive nature is not abandoned. But dominance is supportive by way of being chief, and there cannot be many chiefs in a single moment. Therefore, even for those that have arisen together, there is no state of being a dominance-condition in a single moment. Because of the non-existence of that state of being a dominance-condition in a single moment, the teaching is given in this way here.

Evaṃ [Pg.361] sahajātādhipatiṃ dassetvā idāni ārammaṇādhipatiṃ dassetuṃ yaṃ yaṃ dhammaṃ garuṃ katvātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha yaṃ yaṃ dhammanti yaṃ yaṃ ārammaṇadhammaṃ. Garuṃ katvāti garukāracittīkāravasena vā assādavasena vā garuṃ bhāriyaṃ laddhabbaṃ avijahitabbaṃ anavaññātaṃ katvā. Te te dhammāti te te garukātabbadhammā. Tesaṃ tesanti tesaṃ tesaṃ garukārakadhammānaṃ. Adhipatipaccayenāti ārammaṇādhipatipaccayena paccayo hotīti ayaṃ tāvettha pāḷivaṇṇanā.

Having thus shown the conascence-dominance condition, now, in order to show the object-dominance condition, the passage beginning with 'whatever phenomenon one makes weighty' is commenced. Herein, 'whatever phenomenon' means whatever object-phenomenon. 'Makes weighty' means having made it weighty, heavy, to be obtained, not to be abandoned, not to be despised, by way of esteem and respect, or by way of savoring. 'Those phenomena' refers to those phenomena that are to be made weighty. 'Of those' means of those phenomena that make weighty. 'By the Dominance Condition' means it is a condition by way of the object-dominance condition. This, indeed, is the explanation of the Pali text here.

Ayaṃ pana adhipati nāma sahajātārammaṇavasena duvidho. Tattha sahajāto chandādivasena catubbidho. Tesu ekeko kāmāvacarādivasena bhūmito catubbidho. Tattha kāmāvacaro kusalākusalakiriyavasena tividho. Akusalaṃ patvā panettha vīmaṃsādhipati na labbhati. Rūpārūpāvacaro kusalakiriyavasena duvidho, apariyāpanno kusalavipākavasena duvidho. Ārammaṇādhipati pana jātibhedato kusalākusalavipākakiriyarūpanibbānānaṃ vasena chabbidhoti evamettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

This Adhipati-Condition, however, is twofold by way of conascence and object. Therein, the conascent is fourfold by way of desire, etc. Among these, each is fourfold by way of the planes, such as the sense-sphere, etc. Therein, the sense-sphere Adhipati-Condition is threefold by way of wholesome, unwholesome, and functional. However, with respect to the unwholesome, the dominance of investigation is not found here. The form-sphere and formless-sphere Adhipati-Conditions are twofold by way of wholesome and functional; the unincluded Adhipati-Condition is twofold by way of wholesome and resultant. The object Adhipati-Condition, however, is sixfold by way of the distinction of class: wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, functional, form, and Nibbāna. Thus, the ascertainment here should be understood by way of various distinctions.

Evaṃ bhinne panettha sahajātādhipatimhi tāva kāmāvacarakusalakiriyasaṅkhāto adhipati duhetukatihetukesu cittuppādesu chandādīnaṃ aññataraṃ jeṭṭhakaṃ katvā uppattikāle attanā sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca adhipatipaccayo hoti. Rūpāvacarakusalakiriyasaṅkhātepi eseva nayo. Ayaṃ pana ekanteneva labbhati. Na hi te dhammā sahajātādhipatiṃ vinā uppajjanti. Arūpāvacarakusalakiriyasaṅkhāto pana pañcavokāre rūpāvacaraadhipatisadisova catuvokāre pana sampayuttadhammānaññeva adhipatipaccayo hoti. Tathā tatthuppanno sabbopi kāmāvacarādhipati. Apariyāpanno kusalatopi vipākatopi pañcavokāre ekanteneva sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpānañca adhipatipaccayo hoti, catuvokāre arūpadhammānaññeva. Akusalo kāmabhave micchattaniyatacittesu ekanteneva sampayuttakānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpānañca adhipatipaccayo hoti. Aniyato kāmabhavarūpabhavesu [Pg.362] attano adhipatikāle tesaññeva. Arūpabhave arūpadhammānaññeva adhipatipaccayo hoti. Ayaṃ tāva sahajātādhipatimhi nayo.

Thus, among these distinctions, first, regarding the conascent Adhipati-Condition: the Adhipati-Condition reckoned as wholesome or functional in the sense-sphere, in arisings of consciousness that are two-rooted or three-rooted, by making one of desire, etc., the chief, at the time of its arising, is an Adhipati-Condition for its associated states and for mind-originated matter. The same method applies to that reckoned as wholesome or functional in the form-sphere. This, however, is obtained absolutely, for those states do not arise without a conascent Adhipati-Condition. As for that reckoned as wholesome or functional in the formless-sphere, in the five-aggregate existence it is similar to the form-sphere Adhipati-Condition, but in the four-aggregate existence it is an Adhipati-Condition only for the associated states. The same applies to any sense-sphere Adhipati-Condition arising there. The unincluded, whether wholesome or resultant, in the five-aggregate existence, is absolutely an Adhipati-Condition for its associated states and for mind-originated matter; in the four-aggregate existence, only for immaterial states. The unwholesome, in the sense-sphere existence, in consciousness fixed in wrong view, is absolutely an Adhipati-Condition for its associated states and for mind-originated matter. The indeterminate, in the sense-sphere and form-sphere existences, at the time of its own dominance, is a condition for those same states. In the formless existence, it is an Adhipati-Condition only for immaterial states. This, then, is the method regarding the conascent Adhipati-Condition.

Ārammaṇādhipatimhi pana kāmāvacarakusalo ārammaṇādhipati kāmāvacarakusalassa lobhasahagatākusalassāti imesaṃ dvinnaṃ rāsīnaṃ ārammaṇādhipatipaccayo hoti. Rūpāvacarārūpāvacarepi kusalārammaṇādhipatimhi eseva nayo. Apariyāpannakusalo pana ārammaṇādhipati kāmāvacarato ñāṇasampayuttakusalassa ceva ñāṇasampayuttakiriyassa ca ārammaṇādhipatipaccayo hoti. Akusalo pana ārammaṇādhipati nāma lobhasahagatacittuppādo vuccati. So lobhasahagatākusalasseva ārammaṇādhipatipaccayo hoti. Kāmāvacaro pana vipākārammaṇādhipati lobhasahagatākusalasseva ārammaṇādhipatipaccayo hoti. Tathā rūpāvacarārūpāvacaravipākārammaṇādhipati. Lokuttaro pana vipākārammaṇādhipati kāmāvacarato ñāṇasampayuttakusalakiriyānaññeva ārammaṇādhipatipaccayo hoti. Kāmāvacarādibhedato pana tividhopi kiriyārammaṇādhipati lobhasahagatākusalasseva ārammaṇādhipatipaccayo hoti. Catusamuṭṭhānikarūpasaṅkhāto rūpakkhandho ārammaṇādhipati lobhasahagatākusalasseva ārammaṇādhipatipaccayo hoti. Nibbānaṃ kāmāvacarato ñāṇasampayuttakusalassa ñāṇasampayuttakiriyassa lokuttarakusalassa lokuttaravipākassa cāti imesaṃ catunnaṃ rāsīnaṃ ārammaṇādhipatipaccayo hotīti evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

Regarding the object Adhipati-Condition, however: the sense-sphere wholesome as object Adhipati-Condition is an object Adhipati-Condition for these two groups: sense-sphere wholesome consciousness and unwholesome consciousness accompanied by greed. The same method applies to the wholesome object Adhipati-Condition in the form-sphere and formless-sphere. But the unincluded wholesome as object Adhipati-Condition is an object Adhipati-Condition for sense-sphere knowledge-associated wholesome consciousness and knowledge-associated functional consciousness. The unwholesome as object Adhipati-Condition, however, is called an arising of consciousness accompanied by greed. It is an object Adhipati-Condition only for unwholesome consciousness accompanied by greed. But the sense-sphere resultant as object Adhipati-Condition is an object Adhipati-Condition only for unwholesome consciousness accompanied by greed. Similarly for the resultant object Adhipati-Condition in the form-sphere and formless-sphere. The supramundane resultant as object Adhipati-Condition, however, is an object Adhipati-Condition only for sense-sphere knowledge-associated wholesome and functional consciousness. But the functional as object Adhipati-Condition, of all three kinds distinguished by sense-sphere, etc., is an object Adhipati-Condition only for unwholesome consciousness accompanied by greed. The aggregate of form, reckoned as arisen from four causes, as object Adhipati-Condition, is an object Adhipati-Condition only for unwholesome consciousness accompanied by greed. Nibbāna, as object Adhipati-Condition, is an object Adhipati-Condition for these four groups: sense-sphere knowledge-associated wholesome consciousness, knowledge-associated functional consciousness, supramundane wholesome consciousness, and supramundane resultant consciousness. Thus, the ascertainment here should be understood also from the perspective of the conditioned states.

Adhipatipaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Dominance Condition.

4. Anantarapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

4. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Contiguity Condition.

4. Anantarapaccayaniddese manodhātuyāti vipākamanodhātuyā. Manoviññāṇadhātuyāti santīraṇakiccāya ahetukavipākamanoviññāṇadhātuyā. Tato paraṃ pana voṭṭhabbanajavanatadārammaṇabhavaṅgakiccā manoviññāṇadhātuyo [Pg.363] vattabbā siyuṃ, tā avuttāpi imināva nayena veditabbāti nayaṃ dassetvā desanā saṅkhittā. ‘‘Purimā purimā kusalā dhammā’’tiādike ca chaṭṭhanaye tā saṅgahitātipi idha na vuttāti veditabbā. Tattha purimā purimāti chasu dvāresupi anantarātītā kusalajavanadhammā daṭṭhabbā. Pacchimānaṃ pacchimānanti anantarauppajjamānānaññeva. Kusalānanti sadisakusalānaṃ. Abyākatānanti idaṃ pana kusalānantaraṃ tadārammaṇabhavaṅgaphalasamāpattivasena vuttaṃ. Akusalamūlake abyākatānanti tadārammaṇabhavaṅgasaṅkhātānaññeva. Abyākatamūlake abyākatānanti āvajjanajavanavasena vā bhavaṅgavasena vā pavattānaṃ kiriyavipākābyākatānaṃ kiriyamanodhātuto paṭṭhāya pana yāva voṭṭhabbanakiccā manoviññāṇadhātu, tāva pavattesu vīthicittesupi ayaṃ nayo labbhateva. Kusalānanti pañcadvāre voṭṭhabbanānantarānaṃ manodvāre āvajjanāntarānaṃ paṭhamajavanakusalānaṃ. Akusalānanti padepi eseva nayo. Yesaṃ yesanti idaṃ sabbesampi anantarapaccayadhammānaṃ. Saṅkhepalakkhaṇanti ayaṃ tāvettha pāḷivaṇṇanā.

4. In the exposition of the Contiguity Condition, 'mind-element' refers to the resultant mind-element. 'Mind-consciousness-element' refers to the rootless resultant mind-consciousness-element that performs the function of investigating. Beyond that, however, the mind-consciousness-elements that perform the functions of determining, impulsion, registration, and life-continuum should be mentioned. Though not stated, they are to be understood by this same method; the teaching is concise because the method has been shown. It should be understood that they are not mentioned here because they are included in the sixth method, in such phrases as 'preceding, preceding wholesome states.' Therein, 'preceding, preceding' should be understood as the immediately past wholesome impulsion-states in the six doors. 'Of subsequent, subsequent' refers only to those arising immediately after. 'Of wholesome states' refers to similar wholesome states. 'Of undeclared states,' however, is stated with reference to registration, life-continuum, and fruition attainment that immediately follow a wholesome state. 'Of undeclared states rooted in unwholesome' refers only to those reckoned as registration and life-continuum. 'Of undeclared states rooted in undeclared' refers to functional and resultant undeclared states that occur either by way of adverting and impulsion or by way of life-continuum. Starting from the functional mind-element up to the mind-consciousness-element with the function of determining, this method is indeed found even in the cognitive processes that have occurred. 'Of wholesome states' refers to the first wholesome impulsions immediately after determining in the five doors and after adverting in the mind door. In the phrase 'of unwholesome states,' the method is the same. 'Of whichever states' applies to all states that are a contiguity condition. This is the characteristic in brief. So far, this is the commentary on the Pāli text.

Ayaṃ pana anantarapaccayo nāma ṭhapetvā nibbānaṃ catubhūmako arūpadhammarāsiyevāti veditabbo. So jātivasena kusalākusalavipākakiriyato catudhā bhijjati. Tattha kusalo kāmāvacarādibhedato catubbidho hoti, akusalo kāmāvacarova vipāko catubhūmako, kiriyānantarapaccayo pana te bhūmakoti evamettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

This Condition of Contiguity, however, should be understood as the aggregate of immaterial states belonging to the four planes, excluding Nibbāna. It is divided into four kinds according to its nature: wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, and functional. Herein, the wholesome is fourfold, by way of the sense-sphere and so forth. The unwholesome is only of the sense-sphere. The resultant is of the four planes. As for the functional Condition of Contiguity, however, it is of the three planes. Thus, the determination here should be understood by way of various distinctions.

Evaṃ bhinne panettha kāmāvacarakusalo attanā sadisasseva kāmāvacarakusalassa anantarapaccayo hoti. Ñāṇasampayuttakāmāvacarakusalo pana rūpāvacarakusalassa arūpāvacarakusalassa lokuttarakusalassāti imesaṃ tiṇṇaṃ rāsīnaṃ anantarapaccayo hoti. Kāmāvacarakusalo ca kāmāvacaravipākassa, rūpāvacarārūpāvacaravipākassa, ñāṇasampayutto lokuttaravipākassāpīti imesaṃ catunnaṃ rāsīnaṃ anantarapaccayo hoti. Rūpāvacarakusalo rūpāvacarakusalassa, ñāṇasampayuttakāmāvacaravipākassa, rūpāvacaravipākassāti imesaṃ tiṇṇaṃ rāsīnaṃ anantarapaccayo hoti. Arūpāvacarakusalo tesaṃ dvinnaṃ vipākānaṃ attano [Pg.364] kusalassa vipākassa cāti avisesena catunnaṃ rāsīnaṃ anantarapaccayo hoti. Visesena panettha nevasaññānāsaññāyatanakusalo anāgāmiphalasaṅkhātassa lokuttaravipākassapi anantarapaccayo hoti. Lokuttarakusalo lokuttaravipākasseva anantarapaccayo hoti. Akusalo avisesena akusalassa ceva kusalākusalavipākassa ca. Visesena panettha sukhamajjhattavedanāsampayutto akusalo rūpāvacarārūpāvacaravipākassāpīti imesaṃ catunnaṃ rāsīnaṃ anantarapaccayo hoti.

Here, when thus distinguished, sense-sphere wholesome consciousness becomes the Condition of Contiguity for similar sense-sphere wholesome consciousness. Sense-sphere wholesome consciousness associated with knowledge, however, becomes the Condition of Contiguity for these three groups: form-sphere wholesome consciousness, formless-sphere wholesome consciousness, and supramundane wholesome consciousness. Sense-sphere wholesome consciousness becomes the Condition of Contiguity for these four groups: sense-sphere resultant consciousness, form-sphere and formless-sphere resultant consciousness, and—when it is associated with knowledge—also for supramundane resultant consciousness. Form-sphere wholesome consciousness becomes the Condition of Contiguity for these three groups: form-sphere wholesome consciousness, sense-sphere resultant consciousness associated with knowledge, and form-sphere resultant consciousness. Formless-sphere wholesome consciousness becomes, without distinction, the Condition of Contiguity for four groups: those two resultant consciousnesses, its own wholesome consciousness, and its own resultant consciousness. Specifically here, wholesome consciousness in the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception also becomes the Condition of Contiguity for supramundane resultant consciousness consisting of the fruit of non-returner. Supramundane wholesome consciousness becomes the Condition of Contiguity only for supramundane resultant consciousness. Unwholesome consciousness, without distinction, becomes the Condition of Contiguity for unwholesome consciousness and for the resultant of wholesome and unwholesome consciousness. Specifically here, unwholesome consciousness associated with pleasant or neutral feeling also becomes the Condition of Contiguity for these four groups, including form-sphere and formless-sphere resultant consciousness.

Kāmāvacaravipākassa ñāṇasampayutto vā ñāṇavippayutto vā vipāko kāmāvacarakiriyāvajjanassa, ñāṇasampayuttavipāko panettha paṭisandhivasena uppajjamānassa rūpāvacarārūpāvacaravipākassāpīti imesaṃ catunnaṃ rāsīnaṃ anantarapaccayo hoti. Rūpāvacaravipāko sahetukakāmāvacaravipākassa rūpāvacarārūpāvacaravipākassa kāmāvacarakiriyāvajjanassāti imesaṃ catunnaṃ rāsīnaṃ anantarapaccayo hoti. Arūpāvacaravipāko tihetukakāmāvacaravipākassa arūpāvacaravipākassa kāmāvacarakiriyāvajjanassāti tiṇṇaṃ rāsīnaṃ anantarapaccayo hoti. Lokuttaravipāko tihetukakāmāvacaravipākassa rūpāvacarārūpāvacaralokuttaravipākassāti catunnaṃ rāsīnaṃ anantarapaccayo hoti.

Sense-sphere resultant consciousness, whether associated with knowledge or dissociated from knowledge, is the Condition of Contiguity for sense-sphere functional adverting. Here, resultant consciousness that is associated with knowledge is also the Condition of Contiguity for form-sphere and formless-sphere resultant consciousness arising by way of rebirth-linking. Thus, it is the Condition of Contiguity for these four groups. Form-sphere resultant consciousness is the Condition of Contiguity for four groups: sense-sphere resultant consciousness with roots, form-sphere and formless-sphere resultant consciousness, and sense-sphere functional adverting. Formless-sphere resultant consciousness is the Condition of Contiguity for three groups: sense-sphere resultant consciousness with three roots, formless-sphere resultant consciousness, and sense-sphere functional adverting. Supramundane resultant consciousness is the Condition of Contiguity for four groups: sense-sphere resultant consciousness with three roots, form-sphere, formless-sphere, and supramundane resultant consciousness.

Kāmāvacarakiriyaṃ kāmāvacarakusalākusalassa catubhūmakavipākassa tebhūmakakiriyassāti navannaṃ rāsīnaṃ anantarapaccayo hoti. Rūpāvacarakiriyaṃ tihetukakāmāvacaravipākassa rūpāvacaravipākassa rūpāvacarakiriyassāti tiṇṇaṃ rāsīnaṃ anantarapaccayo hoti. Arūpāvacarakiriyaṃ tihetukakāmāvacaravipākassa rūpāvacarārūpāvacaralokuttaravipākassa arūpāvacarakiriyassāti pañcannaṃ rāsīnaṃ anantarapaccayo hotīti. Evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

Sense-sphere functional consciousness is the Condition of Contiguity for nine groups: sense-sphere wholesome and unwholesome consciousness, resultant consciousness of the four planes, and functional consciousness of the three planes. Form-sphere functional consciousness is the Condition of Contiguity for three groups: sense-sphere resultant consciousness with three roots, form-sphere resultant consciousness, and form-sphere functional consciousness. Formless-sphere functional consciousness is the Condition of Contiguity for five groups: sense-sphere resultant consciousness with three roots, form-sphere, formless-sphere, and supramundane resultant consciousness, and formless-sphere functional consciousness. Thus, the determination here should be understood also from the perspective of the conditioned.

Anantarapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Exposition of the Contiguity Condition.

5. Samanantarapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

5. Commentary on the Exposition of the Proximity Condition

5. Samanantarapaccayaniddesopi [Pg.365] iminā samānagatikova. Ime pana dve paccayā mahāvitthārā, tasmā sabbacittuppattivasena tesaṃ upaparikkhitvā vitthāro gahetabboti.

5. The exposition of the proximity condition is also of a similar nature to this. However, these two conditions are very extensive; therefore, their extensive details should be examined and grasped in relation to all instances of the arising of consciousness.

Samanantarapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Exposition of the Proximity Condition.

6. Sahajātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

6. Commentary on the Exposition of the Co-nascence Condition

6. Sahajātapaccayaniddese aññamaññanti añño aññassa. Iminā etesaṃ dhammānaṃ ekakkhaṇe paccayabhāvañceva paccayuppannabhāvañca dīpeti. Okkantikkhaṇeti pañcavokārabhave paṭisandhikkhaṇe. Tasmiñhi khaṇe nāmarūpaṃ okkantaṃ viya pakkhandantaṃ viya paralokato imaṃ lokaṃ āgantvā pavisantaṃ viya uppajjati, tasmā so khaṇo ‘‘okkantikkhaṇo’’ti vuccati. Ettha ca rūpanti hadayavatthumattameva adhippetaṃ. Tañhi nāmassa, nāmañca tassa aññamaññaṃ sahajātapaccayaṭṭhaṃ pharati. Cittacetasikāti pavattiyaṃ cattāro khandhā. Sahajātapaccayenāti ettha cittasamuṭṭhānarūpā cittacetasikānaṃ paccayaṭṭhaṃ na pharanti, tasmā ‘‘aññamañña’’nti na vuttaṃ. Tathā upādārūpā bhūtānaṃ. Rūpino dhammā arūpīnaṃ dhammānanti hadayavatthu catunnaṃ khandhānaṃ. Kiñci kāleti kismiñci kāle. Sahajātapaccayenāti paṭisandhiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Na sahajātapaccayenāti pavattiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ.

6. In the exposition of the co-nascence condition, "each other" means one to another. By this, it shows both the state of being a condition and the state of being conditionally arisen for these phenomena in a single moment. "The moment of descent" refers to the moment of rebirth-linking in the five-aggregate existence. At that moment, name-and-form arises as if descending, as if plunging, or as if coming from another world to enter this world. Therefore, that moment is called "the moment of descent." Here, "material form" refers only to the heart-base. That indeed is for name, and name for that; they function as a co-nascence condition for each other. "Mind and mental factors" refers to the four aggregates during the course of existence. Regarding the co-nascence condition, here mind-originated material forms do not function as a condition for mind and mental factors; hence "each other" is not stated. Similarly, derived material forms do not function as a condition for the primary elements. "Material phenomena for immaterial phenomena" means the heart-base for the four aggregates. "At some time" means at any time. "By the co-nascence condition" is stated with reference to rebirth-linking. "Not by the co-nascence condition" is stated with reference to the course of existence.

Ayaṃ pana ‘cattāro khandhā arūpino aññamaññaṃ sahajātapaccayena paccayo’ti evaṃ chahi koṭṭhāsehi ṭhito. Tattha tayo koṭṭhāsā aññamaññavasena vuttā, tayo na aññamaññavasena. Tattha paṭhamakoṭṭhāse arūpameva paccayo ceva paccayuppannañca, dutiye rūpameva, tatiye nāmarūpaṃ, catutthe paccayo arūpaṃ, paccayuppannaṃ rūpaṃ; pañcame paccayopi paccayuppannampi rūpameva; chaṭṭhe paccayo rūpaṃ, paccayuppannaṃ arūpanti ayaṃ tāvettha pāḷivaṇṇanā.

Moreover, this (relation) is established in six sections as follows: 'The four immaterial aggregates are a condition for one another by way of co-nascence condition.' Herein, three sections are stated in terms of mutuality, and three are not in terms of mutuality. In the first section, both the condition and the conditionally arisen are immaterial. In the second, both are material. In the third, both are name-and-form. In the fourth, the condition is immaterial, and the conditionally arisen is material. In the fifth, both the condition and the conditionally arisen are material. In the sixth, the condition is material, and the conditionally arisen is immaterial. This, indeed, is the explanation of the Pāli text here.

Ayaṃ pana sahajātapaccayo jātivasena kusalo akusalo vipāko kiriyaṃ rūpanti pañcadhā bhijjati. Tattha kusalo bhūmito catubbidho [Pg.366] hoti, akusalo ekavidhova vipāko catubbidho, kiriyasaṅkhāto tividho, rūpaṃ ekavidhaṃ kāmāvacaramevāti evaṃ tāvettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

This co-nascence condition, by way of its nature, is divided into five types: wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, functional, and material. Herein, the wholesome is fourfold according to the planes; the unwholesome is only onefold; the resultant is fourfold; that which is termed functional is threefold; and the material is onefold, belonging only to the sense-sphere. Thus, the determination here should be understood according to these various distinctions.

Evaṃ bhinne panettha catubhūmakampi kusalaṃ pañcavokārabhave attanā sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca sahajātapaccayo hoti, tathā akusalaṃ. Yaṃ panettha arūpe uppajjati, taṃ arūpadhammānaṃyeva sahajātapaccayo hoti.

Among these divisions, the wholesome of the four planes, in the five-aggregate existence, is a co-nascence condition for its associated states and for mind-originated material form. Similarly, the unwholesome. But whatever arises herein in the formless existence, that is a co-nascence condition only for the formless states.

Kāmāvacararūpāvacaravipākaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ceva sampayuttadhammānañca sahajātapaccayo hoti. Yaṃ panettha rūpaṃ na samuṭṭhāpeti, taṃ sampayuttadhammānaññeva. Yaṃ paṭisandhiyaṃ uppajjati, taṃ kaṭattārūpānañcāpi sahajātapaccayo hoti. Arūpāvacaravipākaṃ sampayuttadhammānaññeva. Lokuttaravipākaṃ pañcavokāre sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpānañca, catuvokāre arūpānaññeva. Kāmāvacaraarūpāvacarakiriyā pañcavokāre sampayuttakānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpānañca sahajātapaccayo hoti, catuvokāre arūpānaññeva. Rūpāvacarakiriyā sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpānañca ekantena sahajātapaccayo hoti.

Sense-sphere and fine-material-sphere resultant consciousness is a co-nascence condition for mind-originated material form and its associated states. That (resultant consciousness) which herein does not originate material form, is a condition only for the associated states. That which arises at rebirth-linking is also a co-nascence condition for kamma-produced material forms. Formless-sphere resultant consciousness is a condition only for the associated states. Supramundane resultant consciousness, in the five-aggregate existence, is a condition for the associated states and mind-originated material forms, while in the four-aggregate existence, it is a condition only for the immaterial states. Sense-sphere and formless-sphere functional consciousness, in the five-aggregate existence, is a co-nascence condition for the associated states and mind-originated material forms, while in the four-aggregate existence, it is a condition only for the immaterial states. Fine-material-sphere functional consciousness is invariably a co-nascence condition for the associated states and mind-originated material forms.

Catusamuṭṭhānikassa rūpassa kammasamuṭṭhānarūpe ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ tiṇṇaṃ, tīṇi ekassa, dve dvinnaṃ mahābhūtānaṃ, mahābhūtā upādārūpassa sahajātapaccayena paccayo. Kāmāvacararūpāvacarapaṭisandhikkhaṇe vatthurūpaṃ vipākakkhandhānaṃ sahajātapaccayena paccayo. Utucittāhārasamuṭṭhānesu pana mahābhūtāni aññamaññañceva upādārūpassa ca sahajātapaccayena paccayoti evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

Of material phenomena with fourfold origination, in the case of kamma-produced material phenomena, one great element is a condition for three, three for one, and two for two great elements; the great elements are a condition for derived material phenomena by way of co-nascence condition. At the moment of rebirth-linking in the sense-sphere and the fine-material sphere, the physical basis is a condition for the resultant aggregates by way of co-nascence condition. However, in the cases of those originated by temperature, consciousness, and nutriment, the great elements are a condition for one another and for derived material phenomena by way of co-nascence condition. Thus, the determination herein should also be understood from the side of the conditionally arisen.

Sahajātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Co-nascence Condition.

7. Aññamaññapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

7. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Mutuality Condition.

7. Aññamaññapaccayaniddese sahajātapaccayaniddesassa purimānaṃ tiṇṇaṃ koṭṭhāsānaṃ vasena pāḷi āgatā. Tassā tattha vuttasadisāva vaṇṇanāti puna na gahitā. Ayampi ca aññamaññapaccayo jātivasena kusalo akusalo vipāko kiriyaṃ rūpanti pañcadhā bhinno. Tattha kusalo bhūmito [Pg.367] catubbidho. Sabbaṃ purimasadisamevāti evamettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

7. In the exposition of the mutuality condition, the Pāli text is given by way of the first three sections of the exposition of the co-nascence condition. Its commentary is similar to what was stated there, thus it is not taken up again. This mutuality condition is also divided into five kinds by way of its nature: wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, functional, and material. Herein, the wholesome is fourfold by way of plane. All is just as in the preceding. Thus, the determination herein should be understood by way of the various kinds of distinctions.

Evaṃ bhinne panettha sabbampi catubhūmakaṃ kusalaṃ attanā sampayuttadhammānaṃ aññamaññapaccayena paccayo. Tathā akusalaṃ. Vipāke pana kāmāvacararūpāvacaravipākaṃ paṭisandhiyaṃ vatthurūpassa, pavatte sampayuttadhammānaññeva. Arūpāvacaralokuttaravipākaṃ attanā sampayuttadhammānaññeva aññamaññapaccayena paccayo. Sabbampi kiriyaṃ sampayuttadhammānaññeva aññamaññapaccayena paccayo. Catusamuṭṭhānikarūpassa kammasamuṭṭhāne ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ tiṇṇaṃ, tīṇi ekassa, dve dvinnaṃ mahābhūtānaṃ aññamaññapaccayena paccayo. Kāmāvacararūpāvacarapaṭisandhiyaṃ vatthurūpaṃ vipākakkhandhānaṃ aññamaññapaccayena paccayo. Utucittāhārasamuṭṭhānesu mahābhūtāneva mahābhūtānaṃ aññamaññapaccayena paccayoti evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

Among these divisions, all wholesome states of the four planes are a condition for their associated phenomena by way of the mutuality condition. Similarly, the unwholesome. As for resultant states, the resultant of the sense-sphere and fine-material sphere is a condition for the physical basis at rebirth-linking, and in the course of existence, for its associated phenomena only. The resultant of the formless sphere and the supramundane is a condition for its associated phenomena only by way of the mutuality condition. All functional states are a condition for their associated phenomena only by way of the mutuality condition. Of material phenomena with fourfold origination, in the case of the kamma-produced, one great element is a condition for the three others, three for one, and two for two great elements by way of the mutuality condition. At rebirth-linking in the sense-sphere and fine-material sphere, the physical basis is a condition for the resultant aggregates by way of the mutuality condition. In the cases of those originated by temperature, consciousness, and nutriment, the great elements are a condition for the other great elements by way of the mutuality condition. Thus, the determination herein should also be understood from the side of the conditionally arisen.

Aññamaññapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Mutuality Condition.

8. Nissayapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

8. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Dependence Condition.

8. Nissayapaccayaniddese sahajātapaccayaniddesassa purimānaṃ pañcannaṃ koṭṭhāsānaṃ vasena sahajātanissayanayaṃ dassetvā puna chaṭṭhena koṭṭhāsena purejātanissayanayaṃ dassetuṃ cakkhāyatanaṃ cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha yaṃ rūpaṃ nissāyāti vatthurūpaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tañhi nissāya tividhā manodhātu, ṭhapetvā arūpavipākaṃ dvāsattatividhā manoviññāṇadhātūti imāni pañcasattati cittāni vattantīti ayaṃ tāvettha pāḷivaṇṇanā. Ayampi nissayapaccayo jātivasena kusalādibhedato pañcadhāva bhijjati. Tattha kusalo bhūmito catubbidhova akusalo ekavidho vipāko catubbidho, kiriyasaṅkhāto tividho, rūpaṃ ekavidhamevāti evamettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

8. In the exposition of the dependence condition, having shown the co-nascent dependence method by way of the first five sections of the exposition of the co-nascence condition, then with the sixth section, to show the pre-nascent dependence method, the passage beginning, 'the eye-base for the eye-consciousness element,' and so on, is commenced. Herein, the phrase 'depending on which material form' is stated in reference to the physical basis. For, depending on that, the three kinds of mind-element and—excluding the formless resultant—the seventy-two kinds of mind-consciousness element, thus these seventy-five consciousnesses, occur. This, for a start, is the explanation of the Pāli text here. This dependence condition is also divided into five kinds by way of its nature, with the distinctions of wholesome, etc. Herein, the wholesome is fourfold by way of plane; the unwholesome is onefold; the resultant is fourfold; that which is termed functional is threefold; and the material is simply onefold. Thus, the determination herein should be understood by way of the various kinds of distinctions.

Evaṃ bhinne panettha catubhūmakampi kusalaṃ pañcavokāre sampayuttakkhandhānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca nissayapaccayena paccayo hoti. Tathā akusalaṃ[Pg.368]. Yaṃ panettha āruppe uppajjati, taṃ arūpadhammānaññeva nissayapaccayo hoti. Kāmāvacararūpāvacaravipākaṃ pavatte sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca, paṭisandhiyaṃ kaṭattārūpassāpi nissayapaccayo hoti. Arūpāvacaravipākaṃ sampayuttakkhandhānaṃyeva hoti. Lokuttaravipākaṃ pañcavokāre; sampayuttakānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca, catuvokāre arūpasseva nissayapaccayo hoti. Kāmāvacaraarūpāvacarakiriyā pañcavokāre sampayuttakānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca nissayapaccayo hoti, catuvokāre arūpānaññeva. Rūpāvacarakiriyā sampayuttakānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca ekantena nissayapaccayo hoti.

Although thus divided, all wholesome states of the four planes are a dependence condition for their associated aggregates and for mind-originated material phenomena in the five-aggregate existence. Similarly, the unwholesome. Whatever arises in the formless plane here becomes a dependence condition only for formless phenomena. As for resultant states, the resultant states of the sense-sphere and fine-material sphere are a dependence condition for their associated phenomena and for mind-originated material phenomena in the course of existence, and also for kamma-originated material phenomena at rebirth. The resultant states of the formless sphere are a dependence condition only for their associated aggregates. Supramundane resultant states are a dependence condition for their associated aggregates and for mind-originated material phenomena in the five-aggregate existence; in the four-aggregate existence, for formless phenomena only. Functional states of the sense-sphere and formless-sphere are a dependence condition for their associated aggregates and for mind-originated material phenomena in the five-aggregate existence; in the four-aggregate existence, only for formless phenomena. Functional states of the fine-material sphere are exclusively a dependence condition for their associated aggregates and for mind-originated material phenomena.

Catusamuṭṭhānikarūpassa ca kammasamuṭṭhānarūpe ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ tiṇṇaṃ, tīṇi ekassa, dve dvinnaṃ mahābhūtānaṃ, mahābhūtā upādārūpānaṃ, vatthurūpaṃ pañcavokārabhave catubhūmakakusalassa, akusalassa, ṭhapetvā āruppavipākañceva dve pañcaviññāṇāni ca sesatebhūmakavipākassa, tebhūmakakiriyassāti imesaṃ catunnaṃ dhammarāsīnaṃ nissayapaccayo hoti. Cakkhāyatanādīni pañca sasampayuttānaṃ cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ nissayapaccayo hoti. Utucittāhārasamuṭṭhānesu pana mahābhūtā mahābhūtānañceva upādārūpassa ca nissayapaccayena paccayoti evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

Of the four-originated material phenomena, in the kamma-originated material phenomena, one great element is a dependence condition for the three others, three for one, and two for two great elements; the great elements are a dependence condition for the derived material phenomena. The physical basis is a dependence condition in the five-aggregate existence for wholesome states of the four planes, for unwholesome states, and—excluding the formless resultant and the two sets of five consciousnesses—for the remaining resultant states of the three planes, and for the functional states of the three planes—thus for these four groups of phenomena. The eye-base and the other four bases are a dependence condition for their associated eye-consciousness and the others. But in the cases of temperature-, consciousness-, and nutriment-originated material phenomena, the great elements are a dependence condition for the great elements and for the derived material phenomena by way of the dependence condition. Thus, here the determination should be understood also from the conditionally arisen phenomena.

Nissayapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Dependence Condition.

9. Upanissayapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

9. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Decisive Support Condition.

9. Upanissayapaccayaniddese purimā purimāti anantarūpanissaye samanantarātītā labbhanti, ārammaṇūpanissayapakatūpanissayesu nānāvīthivasena purimatarā. Te tayopi rāsayo kusalavasena kusalapade labbhanti, kusalena pana akusale samanantarātītā na labbhanti. Teneva vuttaṃ – ‘‘akusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ kesañci upanissayapaccayena paccayo’’ti[Pg.369]. Idañhi – ‘‘kusalo dhammo akusalassa dhammassa upanissayapaccayena paccayo; ārammaṇūpanissayo pakatūpanissayo. Ārammaṇūpanissayo – dānaṃ datvā sīlaṃ samādiyitvā uposathakammaṃ katvā taṃ garuṃ katvā assādeti abhinandati, taṃ garuṃ katvā rāgo uppajjati, diṭṭhi uppajjati, pubbe suciṇṇāni garuṃ katvā assādeti abhinandati, taṃ garuṃ katvā rāgo uppajjati, diṭṭhi uppajjati. Jhānā vuṭṭhahitvā jhānaṃ garuṃ katvā assādeti abhinandati, taṃ garuṃ katvā rāgo uppajjati diṭṭhi uppajjati. Pakatūpanissayo – saddhaṃ upanissāya mānaṃ jappeti, diṭṭhiṃ gaṇhāti. Sīlaṃ sutaṃ cāgaṃ paññaṃ upanissāya mānaṃ jappeti, diṭṭhiṃ gaṇhāti. Saddhā sīlaṃ sutaṃ cāgo paññā rāgassa dosassa mohassa mānassa diṭṭhiyā patthanāya upanissayapaccayena paccayo’’ti imaṃ nayaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Kusalena abyākate tayopi labbhanti, tathā akusalena akusale.

9. In the exposition of the decisive support condition, in contiguous decisive support, the 'earlier and earlier' states are those that are immediately past; in object decisive support and natural decisive support, they are even earlier states arising by way of various thought-processes. Those three kinds are obtained in the wholesome category by way of wholesome states, but through a wholesome state, an unwholesome state is not obtained as immediately past. Therefore, it is said: "For some unwholesome states, there is a condition by way of decisive support." This is said with reference to the method: "A wholesome state is a condition for an unwholesome state by way of decisive support condition: object decisive support and natural decisive support. Object decisive support: having given a gift, having undertaken morality, having performed the Uposatha observance, one savors and delights in that, and regarding that as important, lust arises, wrong view arises; having savored and delighted in previously well-performed deeds, and regarding them as important, lust arises, wrong view arises. Having emerged from jhāna, one savors and delights in the jhāna, and regarding it as important, lust arises, wrong view arises. Natural decisive support: relying on faith, one cherishes pride, takes up wrong view; relying on morality, learning, generosity, or wisdom, one cherishes pride, takes up wrong view. Faith, morality, learning, generosity, and wisdom are conditions for lust, hatred, delusion, conceit, wrong view, and aspiration by way of decisive support condition." Through the wholesome, all three are obtained in the indeterminate category; likewise, through the unwholesome, they are obtained in the unwholesome category.

Akusalena pana kusale samanantarātītā na labbhanti. Tena vuttaṃ – ‘‘kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ kesañci upanissayapaccayena paccayo’’ti. Idampi hi – ‘‘akusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassa upanissayapaccayena paccayo. Pakatūpanissayo – rāgaṃ upanissāya dānaṃ deti, sīlaṃ samādiyati, uposathakammaṃ karoti, jhānaṃ uppādeti vipassanaṃ uppādeti, maggaṃ uppādeti, abhiññaṃ uppādeti, samāpattiṃ uppādeti; dosaṃ mohaṃ mānaṃ diṭṭhiṃ patthanaṃ upanissāya dānaṃ deti…pe… samāpattiṃ uppādeti. Rāgo doso moho māno diṭṭhi patthanā saddhāya sīlassa sutassa cāgassa paññāya upanissayapaccayena paccayo. Pāṇaṃ hantvā tassa paṭighātatthāya dānaṃ detī’’tiādinā nayena pañhāvāre āgataṃ pakatūpanissayameva sandhāya vuttaṃ. Akusalaṃ pana kusalassa ārammaṇūpanissayo na hoti. Kasmā? Taṃ garuṃ katvā tassa appavattanatoti yathā anantarūpanissayo, evaṃ ārammaṇūpanissayopettha na labbhatīti veditabbo. Akusalena abyākatapade ārammaṇūpanissayova na labbhati. Na hi abyākatā dhammā akusalaṃ garuṃ karonti. Yasmā pana anantaratā labbhati, tasmā ettha ‘‘kesañcī’’ti na vuttaṃ. Abyākatena pana abyākate kusale akusaleti tīsu nayesu tayopi upanissayā labbhanteva. Puggalopi senāsanampīti idaṃ dvayaṃ pakatūpanissayavasena vuttaṃ. Idañhi dvayaṃ kusalākusalapavattiyā balavapaccayo hoti. Paccayabhāvo [Pg.370] cassa panettha pariyāyavasena veditabboti ayaṃ tāvettha pāḷivaṇṇanā.

However, an unwholesome state is not obtained as an immediately past condition for a wholesome state. Therefore, it is said: "For some wholesome states, there is a condition by way of decisive support." This too is said with reference to the method: "An unwholesome state is a condition for a wholesome state by way of decisive support condition. Natural decisive support: relying on lust, one gives a gift, undertakes morality, performs the Uposatha observance, produces jhāna, produces insight, produces the path, produces higher knowledge, produces meditative absorption; relying on hatred, delusion, conceit, wrong view, or aspiration, one gives a gift… produces meditative absorption. Lust, hatred, delusion, conceit, wrong view, and aspiration are conditions for faith, morality, learning, generosity, and wisdom by way of decisive support condition. Having killed a living being, one gives a gift for its counteraction," and so on. This is said in the question section with reference to natural decisive support alone. But an unwholesome state is not an object decisive support for a wholesome state. Why? Because a wholesome state does not arise by regarding an unwholesome one as important; just as contiguous decisive support, so too object decisive support is not obtained here, it should be understood. In the indeterminate category, by way of an unwholesome state, object decisive support is not obtained. For indeterminate states do not regard an unwholesome state as weighty. However, since contiguity is obtained, therefore "for some" is not said here. But by way of the indeterminate, in the indeterminate, wholesome, and unwholesome categories, all three types of decisive support are indeed obtained. "A person and a dwelling"—these two are said by way of natural decisive support. For these two are strong conditions for the occurrence of wholesome and unwholesome states. Here, their role as conditions should be understood indirectly. This, then, is the commentary on the Pāli text here.

Ayaṃ pana upanissayapaccayo nāma saddhiṃ ekaccāya paññattiyā sabbepi catubhūmakadhammā. Vibhāgato pana ārammaṇūpanissayādivasena tividho hoti. Tattha ārammaṇūpanissayo ārammaṇādhipatinā ninnānākaraṇoti heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva nānappakārabhedato gahetabbo. Anantarūpanissayo anantarapaccayena ninnānākaraṇo, sopi heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva nānappakārabhedato veditabbo. Paccayuppannatopi nesaṃ tattha vuttanayeneva vinicchayo veditabbo. Pakatūpanissayo pana jātivasena kusalākusalavipākakiriyarūpabhedato pañcavidho hoti, kusalādīnaṃ pana bhūmibhedato anekavidhoti evaṃ tāvettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

This decisive support condition, together with certain concepts, comprises all phenomena of the four planes. However, when analyzed, it is of three kinds: by way of object decisive support, and so on. Herein, object decisive support is not different from the object-dominance condition, and thus should be understood as having various distinctions according to the method previously stated. Contiguous decisive support is not different from the contiguous condition, and it too should be understood as having various distinctions according to the method previously stated. The determination of their conditioned states should also be understood in the manner stated there. Natural decisive support, however, is fivefold by way of type: wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, functional, and material. Moreover, the wholesome, etc., are of many kinds due to differences in planes. Thus, the determination here should be understood as having various distinctions.

Evaṃ bhinne panettha tebhūmakakusalo catubhūmakassāpi kusalassa akusalassa vipākakiriyassāti catunnaṃ rāsīnaṃ pakatūpanissayo hoti. Lokuttaro akusalasseva na hoti. Amhākaṃ ācariyena ‘‘lokuttaradhammo nibbattito’’ti iminā pana nayena aññesaṃ akusalassāpi hoti. Yassa vā uppajjissati, tassāpi anuttaresu vimokkhesu pihaṃ upaṭṭhāpayato iminā nayena hotiyeva. Akusalo sabbesampi catubhūmakānaṃ khandhānaṃ pakatūpanissayo hoti, tathā tebhūmakavipāko. Lokuttaravipāke heṭṭhimāni tīṇi phalāni akusalasseva na honti, upariṭṭhimaṃ kusalassāpi. Purimanayena pana aññesaṃ vā yassa vā uppajjissati, tassa santāne sabbopi lokuttaravipāko sabbesaṃ kusalādīnaṃ arūpakkhandhānaṃ pakatūpanissayo hoti. Kiriyasaṅkhātopi pakatūpanissayo catubhūmakānaṃ akusalādikhandhānaṃ hotiyeva, tathā rūpasaṅkhāto. Sayaṃ pana rūpaṃ imasmiṃ paṭṭhānamahāpakaraṇe āgatanayena upanissayapaccayaṃ na labhati, suttantikapariyāyena pana labhatīti vattuṃ vaṭṭati. Evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

Thus, when distinguished here, the wholesome of the three planes is a natural decisive support for the four kinds—wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, and functional—of the four planes. The supramundane is not a natural decisive support for the unwholesome alone. But according to our teacher's saying, 'the supramundane dhamma is produced,' by this method it is also a natural decisive support for the unwholesome for others. Or for one in whom it will arise, by establishing longing for the unsurpassed liberations, it certainly is a natural decisive support in this way. The unwholesome is a natural decisive support for all aggregates of the four planes, as is the resultant of the three planes. In the supramundane resultant, the lower three fruits are not a natural decisive support for the unwholesome alone, while the highest is for the wholesome as well. But according to the previous method, for others or for one in whom it will arise, all supramundane resultants in their continuum are a natural decisive support for all of the immaterial aggregates of the wholesome, etc. The functional, so designated, is certainly a natural decisive support for the aggregates of the unwholesome, etc., of the four planes, as is materiality, so designated. However, materiality itself, in this great treatise on the Paṭṭhāna, does not obtain the decisive support condition according to the method that has come down here, but it is fitting to say that it obtains it according to the Suttanta method. Thus, the determination here should also be understood in terms of conditioned states.

Upanissayapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Decisive Support Condition.

10. Purejātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

10. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Pre-arisen Condition.

10. Purejātapaccayaniddese [Pg.371] purejātapaccayena paccayoti ettha purejātaṃ nāma yassa paccayo hoti, tato purimataraṃ jātaṃ jātikkhaṇaṃ atikkamitvā ṭhitikkhaṇappattaṃ. Cakkhāyatanantiādi vatthupurejātavasena vuttaṃ. Rūpāyatanantiādi ārammaṇapurejātavasena. Kiñcikāle purejātapaccayenāti pavattiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Kiñcikāle na purejātapaccayenāti paṭisandhiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Evaṃ sabbathāpi pañcadvāre vatthārammaṇavasena, manodvāre vatthuvasenevāyaṃ pāḷi āgatā, pañhāvāre pana ‘‘ārammaṇapurejātaṃ – sekkhā vā puthujjanā vā cakkhuṃ aniccato dukkhato anattato vipassantī’’ti āgatattā manodvārepi ārammaṇapurejātaṃ labbhateva. Idha pana sāvasesavasena desanā katāti ayaṃ tāvettha pāḷivaṇṇanā.

10. In the exposition of the pre-arisen condition, regarding the phrase 'by the pre-arisen condition as condition': here, 'pre-arisen' refers to that which is a condition for something, having been born before it, passed the moment of arising, and reached the moment of persistence. 'The eye-base, etc.' is stated by way of the physical base being pre-arisen. 'The visible-form base, etc.' is stated by way of the object being pre-arisen. 'At some time by the pre-arisen condition' is said with reference to the course of existence. 'At some time not by the pre-arisen condition' is said with reference to rebirth-linking. Thus, in all cases, this Pāli passage has come down as applying in the five sense-doors by way of physical base and object, and in the mind-door by way of physical base alone. But in the question section, since it has come down that 'pre-arisen as object—trainees or ordinary people contemplate the eye as impermanent, as suffering, as non-self,' pre-arisen as object is certainly obtained in the mind-door as well. Here, however, the teaching is given in a non-exhaustive manner. This, then, is the explanation of the Pāli text here.

Ayaṃ pana purejātapaccayo suddharūpameva hoti. Tañca kho uppādakkhaṇaṃ atikkamitvā ṭhitippattaṃ aṭṭhārasavidhaṃ rūparūpameva. Taṃ sabbampi vatthupurejātaṃ ārammaṇapurejātanti dvidhā ṭhitaṃ. Tattha cakkhāyatanaṃ…pe… kāyāyatanaṃ vatthurūpanti idaṃ vatthupurejātaṃ nāma. Sesaṃ imāya pāḷiyā āgatañca anāgatañca vaṇṇo saddo gandho raso catasso dhātuyo tīṇi indriyāni kabaḷīkāro āhāroti dvādasavidhaṃ rūpaṃ ārammaṇapurejātapaccayo nāmāti evamettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

This pre-arisen condition, however, is purely material form. And that, indeed, is the eighteenfold material form itself, which, having passed the moment of arising, has reached the moment of persistence. All of that stands twofold: as base-pre-arisen and object-pre-arisen. Herein, the eye-base...pe... the body-base, being base-materiality, is called base-pre-arisen. The rest—what is mentioned in this Pāli text and what is not—namely, color, sound, odor, taste, the four great elements, the three faculties, and edible food, these twelve kinds of material form are called the object-pre-arisen condition. Thus, the determination should be understood here in its various distinctions.

Evaṃ bhinne panettha cakkhāyatanaṃ dvinnaṃ cakkhuviññāṇānaṃ purejātapaccayena paccayo, tathā itarāni cattāri sotaviññāṇādīnaṃ. Vatthurūpaṃ pana ṭhapetvā dvipañcaviññāṇāni cattāro ca āruppavipāke sesānaṃ sabbesampi catubhūmakānaṃ kusalākusalābyākatānaṃ cittacetasikānaṃ purejātapaccayo hoti. Rūpādīni pana pañcārammaṇāni dvipañcaviññāṇānañceva manodhātūnañca ekanteneva purejātapaccayā honti. Aṭṭhārasavidhampi panetaṃ rūparūpaṃ kāmāvacarakusalassa rūpāvacarato abhiññākusalassa akusalassa tadārammaṇabhāvino kāmāvacaravipākassa kāmāvacarakiriyassa rūpāvacarato abhiññākiriyassāti imesaṃ channaṃ rāsīnaṃ purejātapaccayo [Pg.372] hotīti evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

Thus, when distinguished here, the eye-base is a condition for the two eye-consciousnesses by way of the pre-arisen condition; similarly, the other four bases are for the ear-consciousnesses, etc. Base-materiality, however, excluding the two sets of fivefold consciousness and the four immaterial resultants, is a pre-arisen condition for all the remaining wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate consciousness and mental factors of the four planes. The five objects—visible forms, etc.—are exclusively pre-arisen conditions for the two sets of fivefold consciousness and for the mind-elements. Moreover, these eighteen kinds of material form are a pre-arisen condition for these six classes: sense-sphere wholesome consciousness, form-sphere wholesome consciousness of higher knowledge, unwholesome consciousness, sense-sphere resultant consciousness that performs registering, sense-sphere functional consciousness, and form-sphere functional consciousness of higher knowledge. Thus, the determination should also be understood here from the side of the conditioned states.

Purejātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Pre-arisen Condition.

11. Pacchājātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

11. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Post-arisen Condition.

11. Pacchājātapaccayaniddese pacchājātāti yassa kāyassa paccayā honti, tasmiṃ uppajjitvā ṭhite jātā. Purejātassāti tesaṃ uppādato paṭhamataraṃ jātassa jātikkhaṇaṃ atikkamitvā ṭhitippattassa. Imassa kāyassāti imassa catusamuṭṭhānikatisamuṭṭhānikabhūtaupādārūpasaṅkhātassa kāyassa. Ettha ca tisamuṭṭhānikakāyoti āhārasamuṭṭhānassa abhāvato brahmapārisajjādīnaṃ kāyo veditabbo. Ayamettha pāḷivaṇṇanā. Ayaṃ pana pacchājātapaccayo nāma saṅkhepato ṭhapetvā āruppavipāke avasesā catubhūmakā arūpakkhandhā. So jātivasena kusalākusalavipākakiriyabhedena catudhā bhijjatīti evamettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

11. In the exposition of the post-nascent condition, 'post-nascent' refers to those [states] which are born after a body has arisen and is established, for which body they are conditions. 'Pre-nascent' refers to that [body] which is born earlier than their arising, having passed the moment of arising and reached the stage of presence. 'This body' means this body, reckoned as materiality consisting of the primary elements and derived matter, originating from four or three causes. Here, 'a body originating from three causes' should be understood as the body of Brahma's retinue and so on, due to the absence of nutriment-originated materiality. This is the textual explanation here. This post-nascent condition, in brief, comprises the immaterial aggregates of the four planes, excluding the formless resultants. It is divided into four kinds by way of its nature—wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, and functional. Thus, the determination here should be understood according to these various distinctions.

Evaṃ bhinne panettha pañcavokārabhave uppannaṃ catubhūmakakusalañca akusalañca uppādakkhaṇaṃ atikkamitvā ṭhitippattassa catusamuṭṭhānikatisamuṭṭhānikarūpakāyassa pacchājātapaccayo hoti. Vipākepi ṭhapetvā paṭisandhivipākaṃ avaseso kāmāvacararūpāvacaravipāko tasseva ekantena pacchājātapaccayo hoti. Lokuttaropi pañcavokāre uppannavipāko tasseva pacchājātapaccayo hoti. Tebhūmakakiriyāpi pañcavokāre uppannāva vuttappakārassa kāyassa pacchājātapaccayo hotīti evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

When thus divided, wholesome and unwholesome consciousness of the four planes, arisen in the five-constituent existence, is a post-nascent condition for the material body—originated from four or three causes—which has passed its moment of arising and reached the stage of presence. Among resultants, excluding the rebirth-linking resultant, the remaining sense-sphere and form-sphere resultants are entirely a post-nascent condition for that same [body]. The supramundane resultant arisen in the five-constituent existence is also a post-nascent condition for that same [body]. The functional consciousness of the three planes, when arisen in the five-constituent existence, is a post-nascent condition for the body of the aforementioned kind. Thus, the determination here should also be understood from the perspective of the conditioned state.

Pacchājātapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Post-Nascent Condition.

12. Āsevanapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

12. Commentary on the Exposition of the Repetition Condition

12. Āsevanapaccayaniddese purimā purimāti sabbanayesu samanantarātītāva daṭṭhabbā. Kasmā panettha anantarapaccaye viya ‘‘purimā purimā kusalā [Pg.373] dhammā pacchimānaṃ pacchimānaṃ abyākatānaṃ dhammāna’’ntiādinā nayena bhinnajātikehi saddhiṃ niddeso na katoti? Attano gatiṃ gāhāpetuṃ asamatthatāya. Bhinnajātikā hi bhinnajātikānaṃ arūpadhammānaṃ āsevanaguṇena paguṇabalavabhāvaṃ sādhayamānā attano kusalādibhāvasaṅkhātaṃ gatiṃ gāhāpetuṃ na sakkonti. Tasmā tehi saddhiṃ niddesaṃ akatvā ye yesaṃ vāsanāsaṅkhātena āsevanena paguṇatarabalavatarabhāvavisiṭṭhaṃ attano kusalādibhāvasaṅkhātaṃ gatiṃ gāhāpetuṃ sakkonti, tesaṃ tehi samānajātikeheva saddhiṃ niddeso katoti veditabbo. Atha vipākābyākataṃ kasmā na gahitanti? Āsevanābhāvena. Vipākañhi kammavasena vipākabhāvappattaṃ kammapariṇāmitaṃ hutvā vattati nirussāhaṃ dubbalanti taṃ āsevanaguṇena attano sabhāvaṃ gāhāpetvā paribhāvetvā neva aññaṃ vipākaṃ uppādetuṃ sakkoti, na purimavipākānubhāvaṃ gahetvā uppajjitunti. Kammavegakkhittaṃ pana patitaṃ viya hutvā uppajjatīti sabbathāpi vipāke āsevanaṃ natthīti āsevanābhāvena vipākaṃ na gahitaṃ. Kusalākusalakiriyānantaraṃ uppajjamānampi cetaṃ kammapaṭibaddhavuttitāya āsevanaguṇaṃ na gaṇhātīti kusalādayopissa āsevanapaccayā na honti. Apica nānājātikattāpete na hontiyeva. Bhūmito pana ārammaṇato vā nānājātikattaṃ nāma natthi. Tasmā kāmāvacarakusalakiriyāmahaggatakusalakiriyānampi, saṅkhārārammaṇañca anulomakusalaṃ nibbānārammaṇassa gotrabhukusalassa āsevanapaccayo hotiyevāti ayaṃ tāvettha pāḷivaṇṇanā. Ayaṃ pana āsevanapaccayo jātito tāva kusalo akusalo kiriyābyākatoti tidhā ṭhito. Tattha kusalo bhūmito kāmāvacaro rūpāvacaro arūpāvacaroti tividho hoti, akusalo kāmāvacarova kiriyābyākato kāmāvacaro rūpāvacaro arūpāvacaroti tividhova, lokuttaro āsevanapaccayo nāma natthīti evamettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

12. In the exposition of the repetition condition, the phrase 'the preceding, preceding' should be understood in all methods as referring to what is immediately past. Why, then, is the exposition here not made with states of different natures, as in the case of the contiguity condition, by a method such as, 'The preceding, preceding wholesome states are a condition for the subsequent, subsequent indeterminate states'? Because they are incapable of causing [the subsequent states] to acquire their own nature. For states of different natures, while bringing about a state of proficiency and strength in other immaterial states through the quality of repetition, cannot cause them to acquire their own nature, designated as wholesome and so on. Therefore, the exposition is not made with those. It should be understood that the exposition is made only with those of the same nature, which are capable of causing [subsequent states] to acquire their own nature—designated as wholesome and so on—which is distinguished by a state of being more proficient and stronger through repetition, which is termed 'imprinting.' Now, why is the resultant-indeterminate not included? Due to the absence of repetition. For the resultant, having attained the state of a resultant through the force of kamma, proceeds as something transformed by kamma, devoid of energy and weak. Thus, it can neither produce another resultant by taking up the quality of repetition to cause it to acquire and develop its own nature, nor can it arise by grasping the influence of a previous resultant. Rather, it arises as if thrown by the force of kamma, like something that has fallen. Therefore, in every respect, there is no repetition in resultants; hence, the resultant is not included due to the absence of repetition. And even when this [resultant] arises immediately after a wholesome, unwholesome, or functional [state], it does not take up the quality of repetition, as its occurrence is bound to kamma. Thus, wholesome states and so on are not repetition conditions for it. Moreover, being of different natures, they are not [such conditions] at all. However, there is no difference of nature based on plane or object. Therefore, a sense-sphere wholesome [state] is indeed a repetition condition for a sublime wholesome [state], and conformity-wholesome with formations as its object is a repetition condition for change-of-lineage-wholesome with Nibbāna as its object. This much is the textual explanation here. This repetition condition, by its nature, is threefold: wholesome, unwholesome, and functional-indeterminate. Therein, the wholesome is threefold by plane: sense-sphere, form-sphere, and formless-sphere. The unwholesome is only of the sense-sphere. The functional-indeterminate is also threefold: sense-sphere, form-sphere, and formless-sphere. There is no such thing as a supramundane repetition condition. Thus, the determination here should be understood according to these various distinctions.

Evaṃ bhinne panettha kāmāvacarakusalaṃ attano anantarassa kāmāvacarakusalasseva. Yaṃ panettha ñāṇasampayuttaṃ, taṃ attanā sadisavedanassa rūpāvacarakusalassa arūpāvacarakusalassa lokuttarakusalassāti imesaṃ [Pg.374] rāsīnaṃ āsevanapaccayo hoti. Rūpāvacarakusalaṃ pana rūpāvacarakusalasseva. Arūpāvacarakusalaṃ arūpāvacarakusalasseva. Akusalaṃ pana akusalasseva āsevanapaccayo hoti. Kiriyato pana kāmāvacarakiriyasaṅkhāto tāva kāmāvacarakiriyasseva. Yo panettha ñāṇasampayutto, so attanā sadisavedanassa rūpāvacarakiriyassa arūpāvacarakiriyassāti imesaṃ rāsīnaṃ āsevanapaccayo hoti. Rūpāvacarakiriyasaṅkhāto pana rūpāvacarakiriyasseva, arūpāvacarakiriyasaṅkhāto arūpāvacarakiriyasseva āsevanapaccayo hoti. Vipāko pana ekadhammassāpi ekadhammopi vā koci vipākassa āsevanapaccayo natthīti evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

When thus divided, a wholesome state of the sense sphere is a repetition condition only for its own immediately subsequent wholesome state of the sense sphere. But that [wholesome state] which is associated with knowledge is a repetition condition for these groups of states with feeling similar to its own: the wholesome state of the form sphere, the wholesome state of the formless sphere, and the supramundane wholesome state. A wholesome state of the form sphere, however, is a repetition condition only for a wholesome state of the form sphere. A wholesome state of the formless sphere is a repetition condition only for a wholesome state of the formless sphere. An unwholesome state, however, is a repetition condition only for an unwholesome state. As for functional states, that designated as a functional state of the sense sphere is a repetition condition only for a functional state of the sense sphere. But that [functional state] which is associated with knowledge is a repetition condition for these groups of states with feeling similar to its own: the functional state of the form sphere and the functional state of the formless sphere. That designated as a functional state of the form sphere, however, is a repetition condition only for a functional state of the form sphere; that designated as a functional state of the formless sphere is a repetition condition only for a functional state of the formless sphere. As for the resultant, however, no single state whatsoever is a repetition condition for any resultant. Thus, the determination should be understood here also from the perspective of the conditioned states.

Āsevanapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Repetition Condition.

13. Kammapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

13. Commentary on the Exposition of the Kamma Condition

13. Kammapaccayaniddese kammanti cetanākammameva. Kaṭattā ca rūpānanti kammassa kaṭattā uppannarūpānaṃ. Kammapaccayenāti anekānampi kappakoṭīnaṃ matthake attano phalaṃ uppādetuṃ samatthena nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayenāti attho. Kusalākusalañhi kammaṃ attano pavattikkhaṇe phalaṃ na deti. Yadi dadeyya, yaṃ manusso devalokūpagaṃ kusalakammaṃ karoti, tassānubhāvena tasmiṃyeva khaṇe devo bhaveyya. Yasmiṃ pana khaṇe taṃ kataṃ, tato aññasmiṃ khaṇe avijjamānampi kevalaṃ kaṭattāyeva diṭṭheva dhamme upapajje vā apare vā pariyāye avasesapaccayasamāyoge sati phalaṃ uppādeti niruddhāpi purimasippādikiriyā viya kālantare pacchimasippādikiriyāya. Tasmā nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayoti vuccati. Cetanā sampayuttakānaṃ dhammānanti yā kāci cetanā attanā sampayuttakānaṃ dhammānaṃ. Taṃsamuṭṭhānānanti iminā paṭisandhikkhaṇe kaṭattārūpampi gaṇhāti. Kammapaccayenāti idaṃ sahajātacetanaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Kusalādīsu hi yā kāci sahajātacetanā sesadhammānaṃ cittapayogasaṅkhātena kiriyābhāvena [Pg.375] upakārikā hoti. Tasmā sahajātakammapaccayoti vuccati. Ayaṃ tāvettha pāḷivaṇṇanā.

13. In the exposition of the kamma condition, “kamma” means volitional action (cetanā) itself. “And of materiality due to having-been-done-ness” means of material forms arisen due to kamma’s having-been-done-ness. “By kamma condition” means by the different-moment kamma condition, which is capable of producing its own fruit even after countless crores of eons. For wholesome and unwholesome kamma does not yield its result in the very moment of its occurrence. If it did, then when a human performs a wholesome kamma leading to the heavenly realm, they would become a deity in that same moment. But even though it is non-existent in a moment other than that in which it was done, merely by its having-been-done-ness, it produces its fruit when there is a conjunction of the remaining conditions—whether in this very life, in the next life, or in a subsequent life—just as a prior skilled action, though ceased, produces a subsequent skilled action at a later time. Therefore, it is called the “different-moment kamma condition.” “Of volition for associated states” refers to any volition for its own associated states. By “for those originated from it,” this also includes kamma-produced materiality at the moment of rebirth-linking. “By kamma condition” here is said in reference to co-nascent volition. For in wholesome and other such states, any co-nascent volition assists the remaining phenomena by means of its functional nature, which is designated as mental application. Therefore, it is called the “co-nascent kamma condition.” This, for now, is the explanation of the Pāli here.

Ayaṃ pana kammapaccayo atthato catubhūmikacetanāmattameva. So hi jātibhedato kusalo akusalo vipāko kiriyāti catudhā bhijjati. Tattha kusalo bhūmito kāmāvacarādivasena catudhā bhijjati. Akusalo ekadhāva vipāko catudhā, kiriyā tidhāvāti evamettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

This condition of kamma is, in its meaning, simply volition in the four planes. It is divided into four kinds by way of class: wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, and functional. Of these, the wholesome is divided into four according to plane, beginning with the sense-sphere. The unwholesome is of one kind, the resultant of four kinds, and the functional of three kinds. Thus, the analysis here should be understood by way of various distinctions.

Evaṃ bhinne panettha sahajātā kāmāvacarakusalacetanā pañcavokāre attanā sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca, catuvokāre sampayuttakkhandhānaññeva sahajātakammapaccayo hoti. Uppajjitvā niruddhā pana attano vipākānaṃ khandhānaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpānaṃ nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayena paccayo hoti. Sā ca kho pañcavokāreyeva, na aññattha. Sahajātā rūpāvacarakusalacetanā attanā sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpānañca ekanteneva sahajātakammapaccayena paccayo. Uppajjitvā niruddhā pana attano vipākānañceva kaṭattārūpānañca nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayena paccayo. Arūpāvacarā pana lokuttarā ca sahajātā kusalacetanā pañcavokāre attanā sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpānañca, catuvokāre sampayuttakkhandhānaññeva sahajātakammapaccayena paccayo. Uppajjitvā niruddhā panesā duvidhāpi attano attano vipākakkhandhānaññeva nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayena paccayo. Sahajātā akusalacetanā pañcavokāre attanā sampayuttakkhandhānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpānañca catuvokāre arūpakkhandhānaññeva sahajātakammapaccayena paccayo. Uppajjitvā niruddhā pana vipākakkhandhānañceva kaṭattārūpānañca nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayena paccayo.

When divided in this way, the co-nascent wholesome volition of the sense sphere here becomes a condition by way of co-nascent kamma for the associated states and for mind-produced materiality in the five-constituent existence, and for the associated aggregates alone in the four-constituent existence. Having arisen and ceased, it then becomes a condition by way of kamma at different moments for its resultant aggregates and for kamma-produced materiality. This, however, applies only in the five-constituent existence, not elsewhere. The co-nascent wholesome volition of the form sphere becomes a condition by way of co-nascent kamma exclusively for the associated states and for mind-produced materiality. Having arisen and ceased, it then becomes a condition by way of kamma at different moments for its own resultant aggregates and for kamma-produced materiality. The co-nascent wholesome volition of the formless sphere and the supramundane becomes a condition by way of co-nascent kamma for the associated states and for mind-produced materiality in the five-constituent existence, and for the associated aggregates alone in the four-constituent existence. Having arisen and ceased, both these become conditions by way of kamma at different moments for their respective resultant aggregates alone. The co-nascent unwholesome volition becomes a condition by way of co-nascent kamma for the associated aggregates and for mind-produced materiality in the five-constituent existence, and for the formless aggregates alone in the four-constituent existence. Having arisen and ceased, it then becomes a condition by way of kamma at different moments for the resultant aggregates and for kamma-produced materiality.

Kāmāvacararūpāvacarato vipākacetanā attanā sampayuttadhammānaṃ pavatte cittasamuṭṭhānarūpānaṃ, paṭisandhiyaṃ kaṭattārūpānañca sahajātakammapaccayena paccayo. Arūpāvacaravipākacetanā attanā sampayuttadhammānaññeva sahajātakammapaccayena paccayo. Lokuttaravipākacetanā pañcavokāre attanā sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca, catuvokāre arūpasseva sahajātakammapaccayena paccayo. Tebhūmikā kiriyacetanā pañcavokāre [Pg.376] sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca sahajātakammapaccayena paccayo. Yā panettha āruppe uppajjati, sā arūpadhammānaññeva sahajātakammapaccayena paccayoti evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

The resultant volition of the sense sphere and the form sphere is a condition, by way of the co-nascent kamma condition, for the associated states and for the mind-produced materiality that arises in the course of life, as well as for the kamma-produced materiality at rebirth. The resultant volition of the formless sphere is a condition, by way of the co-nascent kamma condition, only for its associated states. The supramundane resultant volition in the five-constituent existence is a condition, by way of the co-nascent kamma condition, for its associated states and for the mind-produced materiality, but in the four-constituent existence, it is a condition only for the formless states. The three-plane functional volition in the five-constituent existence is a condition, by way of the co-nascent kamma condition, for its associated states and for the mind-produced materiality. However, that volition which arises in the formless sphere is a condition, by way of the co-nascent kamma condition, only for the formless states. Thus, the analysis should be understood here also from the perspective of the conditioned states.

Kammapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Kamma Condition.

14. Vipākapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

14. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Result Condition.

14. Vipākapaccayaniddese vipākā cattāro khandhāti yasmā kammasamuṭṭhānāpi rūpā vipākā na honti, tasmā ‘‘vipākā’’ti vatvā ‘‘cattāro khandhā’’ti vuttaṃ. Evaṃ ayaṃ pāḷi arūpadhammānaññeva vipākapaccayavasena āgatā. Pañhāvāre pana ‘‘vipākābyākato eko khandho tiṇṇaṃ khandhānaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānānañca rūpānaṃ vipākapaccayena paccayo. Paṭisandhikkhaṇe vipākābyākato eko khandho tiṇṇannaṃ khandhānaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpānaṃ vipākapaccayena paccayo’’ti āgatattā cittasamuṭṭhānakammasamuṭṭhānarūpānampi vipākapaccayo labbhati. Idha pana sāvasesavasena desanā katāti ayaṃ tāvettha pāḷivaṇṇanā. Ayaṃ pana vipākapaccayo vipākabhāvena jātito ekavidho, bhūmibhedato kāmāvacarādivasena catudhā bhijjatīti evamettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

14. In the exposition of the result condition, it is said that “the four aggregates are results.” This is because material forms originated by kamma are not termed ‘results.’ Therefore, having said “results,” it is stated “four aggregates.” Thus, this Pāli passage refers only to immaterial phenomena by way of the result condition. However, in the Question Section, it is stated: “One resultant-indeterminate aggregate is a condition for three aggregates and for mind-originated material forms by way of the result condition. At the moment of rebirth-linking, one resultant-indeterminate aggregate is a condition for three aggregates and for kamma-originated material forms by way of the result condition.” Because of this statement, the result condition is also obtained for mind-originated and kamma-originated material forms. Here, however, the teaching is given in a partial manner. This, then, is the explanation of the Pāli here. This result condition, by way of its nature as result, is of one kind by class. But by distinction of planes, it is divided into four kinds, beginning with the sense-sphere. Thus, the analysis here should be understood by way of various distinctions.

Evaṃ bhinne panettha kāmāvacararūpāvacaravipāko attanā sampayuttadhammānaṃ pavatte cittasamuṭṭhānarūpānaṃ paṭisandhiyaṃ kaṭattārūpānañca vipākapaccayo hoti. Arūpāvacaravipāko sampayuttadhammānaññeva. Lokuttaravipāko pañcavokāre sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca, catuvokāre sampayuttakkhandhānaññeva vipākapaccayo hotīti evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

Thus, when divided in this way, the sense-sphere and form-sphere resultants are a condition for their associated phenomena, for mind-originated material forms in the course of existence, and for kamma-originated material forms at rebirth-linking by way of the result condition. The formless-sphere resultant is a condition only for its associated phenomena. The supramundane resultant is a condition for its associated phenomena and for mind-originated material form in the five-aggregate existence, and only for its associated aggregates in the four-aggregate existence. Thus, in this case, the analysis should also be understood from the standpoint of the conditioned states.

Vipākapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Exposition of the Result Condition.

15. Āhārapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

15. Commentary on the Exposition of the Nutriment Condition.

15. Āhārapaccayaniddese [Pg.377] kabaḷīkāro āhāroti catusantatisamuṭṭhāne rūpe ojā āhāro nāma. So pana yasmā kabaḷaṃ karitvā ajjhoharitova āhārakiccaṃ karoti, na bahi ṭhito, tasmā āhāroti avatvā ‘‘kabaḷīkāro āhāro’’ti vuttaṃ. Kabaḷaṃ karitvā ajjhoharitabbavatthukattā vā kabaḷīkāroti nāmametaṃ tassa. Arūpino āhārāti phassacetanāviññāṇāhārā. Taṃsamuṭṭhānānanti idhāpi kammasamuṭṭhānāni gahitāneva. Vuttañhetaṃ pañhāvāre – paṭisandhikkhaṇe vipākābyākatā āhārā sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpānaṃ āhārapaccayena paccayoti. Ayaṃ tāvettha pāḷivaṇṇanā.

15. In the exposition of the nutriment condition, “morsel food” refers to the nutritive essence (ojā) in material form arisen from the four continuities. But because it performs the function of nutriment only after being made into a morsel and ingested, not while remaining outside, it is not called simply “nutriment” but “morsel food.” Or, because its nature is to be made into a morsel and ingested, this is its name, “morsel food.” The immaterial nutriments are the nutriment of contact, the nutriment of volition, and the nutriment of consciousness. “Those arisen from them” here also includes those arisen from kamma. For it was stated in the section on questions: “At the moment of rebirth-linking, the resultant-indeterminate nutriments are a condition, by way of the nutriment condition, for the associated aggregates and for kamma-originated material forms.” This, then, is the commentary on the passage here.

Ayaṃ pana āhārapaccayo saṅkhepato kabaḷīkāro āhāro, phasso, cetanā, viññāṇanti cattārova dhammā honti. Tattha ṭhapetvā kabaḷīkārāhāraṃ sesā tayo arūpāhārā jātivasena kusalākusalavipākakiriyabhedato catudhā bhijjanti. Puna bhūmibhedena kusalo catudhā, akusalo ekadhā, vipāko catudhā, kiriyā tidhāti evaṃ anekadhā bhijjanti. Kabaḷīkārāhāro pana jātito abyākato, bhūmito kāmāvacarovāti evamettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

This nutriment condition, in brief, consists of just four phenomena: morsel food, contact, volition, and consciousness. Among these, apart from morsel food, the remaining three immaterial nutriments are divided into four types by way of their origin: wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, and functional. Furthermore, by distinction of planes, the wholesome is divided into four, the unwholesome into one, the resultant into four, and the functional into three—thus they are divided in many ways. As for morsel food, by origin it is indeterminate, and by plane it is confined to the sense-sphere. Thus, the analysis here should be understood by way of various distinctions.

Evaṃ bhinne panettha catubhūmakāpi tayo kusalāhārā pañcavokāre attanā sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca āhārapaccayena paccayo, ṭhapetvā pana rūpāvacaraṃ avasesā āruppe sampayuttadhammānaññeva āhārapaccayena paccayo. Akusalāhāresupi eseva nayo. Catubhūmakavipākāhārā pana sabbattha sampayuttakānaṃ āhārapaccayā honti. Kāmāvacararūpāvacaravipākā panettha pañcavokāre uppajjamānā pavatte cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa paṭisandhiyaṃ kaṭattārūpassāpi āhārapaccayā honti. Lokuttarā pana cittasamuṭṭhānarūpasseva, āruppe uppannā rūpassa paccayā na honti. Tebhūmakāpi tayo kiriyāhārā pañcavokāre sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca, kāmāvacarārūpāvacarā pana āruppe sampayuttadhammānaññeva āhārapaccayena paccayo[Pg.378]. Catusantatisamuṭṭhāno kabaḷīkārāhāro kiñcāpi ‘‘imassa kāyassā’’ti avisesato vutto, visesato panāyamettha āhārasamuṭṭhānarūpassa janako ceva anupālako ca hutvā āhārapaccayena paccayo hoti, sesatisantatisamuṭṭhānassa anupālakova hutvā āhārapaccayena paccayo hotīti evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

Thus, when divided in this way, the three wholesome nutriments of the four planes are a condition by way of nutriment for their associated phenomena and for mind-originated material form in the five-aggregate existence. However, excluding the form-sphere, the remaining ones are a condition by way of nutriment only for their associated phenomena in the formless sphere. The same method applies to the unwholesome nutriments. The resultant nutriments of the four planes, however, are conditions by way of nutriment for their associated phenomena everywhere. Here, the sense-sphere and form-sphere resultants, when arising in the five-aggregate existence, are conditions by way of nutriment for mind-originated material form in the course of existence and for kamma-originated material form at rebirth-linking. The supramundane nutriments, however, are conditions only for mind-originated material form, and when arisen in the formless sphere, they are not conditions for material form. The three functional nutriments of the three planes are also conditions by way of nutriment for their associated phenomena and for mind-originated material form in the five-aggregate existence. However, the sense-sphere and formless-sphere ones are conditions by way of nutriment only for their associated phenomena in the formless sphere. Although morsel food, arisen from the four continuities, is spoken of generally as “for this body,” specifically here it is a condition by way of nutriment, being both the producer and sustainer of nutriment-originated material form. For material form arisen from the remaining three continuities, it is only a sustainer as a condition by way of nutriment. Thus, the analysis here should also be understood from the standpoint of the conditioned states.

Āhārapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

Commentary on the Exposition of the Nutriment Condition.

16. Indriyapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

16. Commentary on the Exposition of the Faculty Condition.

16. Indriyapaccayaniddese cakkhundriyanti cakkhusaṅkhātaṃ indriyaṃ. Indriyapaccayenāti sayaṃ purejāto hutvā arūpadhammānaṃ uppādato paṭṭhāya yāva bhaṅgā indriyapaccayena paccayo hoti. Sotindriyādīsupi eseva nayo. Arūpino indriyāti ettha arūpajīvitindriyampi saṅgahitaṃ. Taṃsamuṭṭhānānanti ettha heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva kaṭattārūpampi saṅgahitaṃ. Vuttañhetaṃ pañhāvāre – paṭisandhikkhaṇe vipākābyākatā indriyā sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpānaṃ indriyapaccayena paccayoti. Evaṃ tāvettha pāḷivaṇṇanā veditabbā.

16. In the exposition on the faculty condition, 'eye faculty' means the faculty called the eye. By 'faculty condition' is meant that, having arisen earlier itself, from the arising of immaterial phenomena until their dissolution, it is a condition by way of the faculty condition. The same method applies to the ear faculty and so on. Here, among the immaterial faculties, the immaterial life faculty is also included. As for 'those arisen from it,' here kamma-produced materiality is also included, as explained earlier. For it was said in the question section: 'At the moment of rebirth-linking, the resultant-indeterminate faculties are a condition by way of the faculty condition for the associated aggregates and for kamma-produced materiality.' Thus far, the commentary on the Pāli text should be understood here.

Ayaṃ pana indriyapaccayo itthindriyapurisindriyavajjānaṃ samavīsatiyā indriyānaṃ vasena ṭhito. Itthindriyapurisindriyāni hi kiñcāpi itthiliṅgapurisaliṅgādīnaṃ bījabhūtāni, kalalādikāle pana vijjamānesupi tesu itthiliṅgapurisaliṅgādīnaṃ abhāvā tāni neva tesaṃ, na aññesaṃ indriyapaccayataṃ pharanti. Indriyapaccayo hi attano vijjamānakkhaṇe avinibbhuttadhammānaṃ indriyapaccayataṃ apharanto nāma natthi, tasmā tāni indriyapaccayā na honti. Yesaṃ panetāni bījabhūtāni, tesaṃ tāni suttantikapariyāyena pakatūpanissayabhāvaṃ bhajanti. Iti indriyapaccayo samavīsatiyā indriyānaṃ vasena ṭhitoti veditabbo. So jātito kusalākusalavipākakiriyarūpavasena pañcadhā bhijjati. Tattha kusalo bhūmivasena catudhā, akusalo kāmāvacarova vipāko catudhāva kiriyāsaṅkhāto tidhā, rūpaṃ kāmāvacaramevāti evaṃ anekadhā bhijjatīti evaṃ tāvettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

This faculty condition, however, is established based on the twenty faculties, excluding the female faculty and the male faculty. Although the female faculty and the male faculty are indeed the seeds for female characteristics, male characteristics, and so on, yet during stages such as the embryo, even when they are present, because of the absence of female characteristics, male characteristics, and so on, they do not extend the faculty condition to those or to others. For there is no faculty condition that does not extend the faculty condition to phenomena inseparable from it at the moment of its existence; therefore, those are not faculty conditions. However, for those for which these serve as seeds, they function as natural decisive support according to the Suttanta method. Thus, it should be understood that the faculty condition is established based on the twenty faculties. It is divided into five types by way of origin: wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, functional, and material. Herein, the wholesome is fourfold according to the planes; the unwholesome is solely of the sense-sphere; the resultant is fourfold; the functional, known as kiriyā, is threefold; and material is only of the sense-sphere. Thus, it is divided in many ways. Thus, the analysis should be understood here by way of its various divisions.

Evaṃ [Pg.379] bhinne panettha catubhūmakopi kusalindriyapaccayo pañcavokāre sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca indriyapaccayena paccayo, tathā akusalo. Ṭhapetvā pana rūpāvacarakusalaṃ avasesā kusalākusalā āruppe sampayuttadhammānaññeva indriyapaccayena paccayo. Catubhūmako vipākindriyapaccayo ekanteneva sampayuttakānaṃ indriyapaccayena paccayo. Kāmāvacararūpāvacarā panettha pañcavokāre uppajjanato pavatte cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa, paṭisandhiyaṃ kaṭattārūpassāpi indriyapaccayena paccayā honti. Lokuttarā cittasamuṭṭhānarūpasseva. Āruppe uppannā lokuttaravipākā indriyā rūpassa paccayā na honti. Tebhūmakā kiriyindriyā pañcavokāre sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca, kāmāvacarārūpāvacarā pana āruppe sampayuttadhammānaññeva indriyapaccayataṃ pharanti. Cakkhundriyādivasena chabbidhe rūpindriye cakkhundriyaṃ kusalākusalavipākato sampayuttadhammānaṃ dvinnaṃ cakkhuviññāṇānaṃ, sotindriyādīni tathāvidhānaññeva sotaviññāṇādīnaṃ, rūpajīvitindriyaṃ attanā sahajātarūpānaṃ ṭhitikkhaṇe indriyapaccayena paccayo. Sahajātapaccayatā pana tassa natthīti evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

When thus divided, the wholesome faculty condition, even in the four planes, is a condition by way of the faculty condition for associated phenomena and mind-produced materiality in the five-constituent existence; and similarly for the unwholesome. However, excluding the fine-material-sphere wholesome, the remaining wholesome and unwholesome faculties in the formless sphere are conditions only for associated phenomena by way of the faculty condition. The resultant faculty condition in the four planes is exclusively a condition for associated phenomena by way of the faculty condition. Herein, those of the sense-sphere and fine-material sphere are conditions by way of the faculty condition for mind-produced materiality arising in the five-constituent existence during the course of existence, and also for kamma-produced materiality at rebirth-linking. The supramundane faculties are conditions only for mind-produced materiality. The supramundane resultant faculties that have arisen in the formless sphere are not conditions for materiality. The functional faculties of the three planes are conditions for associated phenomena and mind-produced materiality in the five-constituent existence, while those of the sense-sphere and formless sphere, however, extend their faculty conditionality only to associated phenomena in the formless sphere. Among the six kinds of material faculties, such as the eye faculty, the eye faculty is a condition for the two kinds of eye-consciousness—wholesome-resultant and unwholesome-resultant—and their associated phenomena; the ear faculty and others are similarly conditions for their respective ear-consciousness and so on; the material life faculty is a condition by way of the faculty condition for its co-nascent material states at the moment of their duration. However, it does not have the state of being a co-nascence condition. Thus, the analysis here should also be understood from the standpoint of the conditioned.

Indriyapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Faculty Condition.

17. Jhānapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

17. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Jhāna Condition

17. Jhānapaccayaniddese jhānaṅgānīti dvipañcaviññāṇavajjesu sesacittesu uppannāni vitakkavicārapītisomanassadomanassupekkhācittekaggatāsaṅkhātāni satta aṅgāni. Pañcannaṃ pana viññāṇakāyānaṃ abhinipātamattattā tesu vijjamānānipi upekkhāsukhadukkhāni upanijjhānākārassa abhāvato jhānaṅgānīti na uddhaṭāni. Tattha pacchinnattā pana sesāhetukesupi jhānaṅgaṃ na uddhaṭameva. Taṃsamuṭṭhānānanti idhāpi kaṭattārūpaṃ saṅgahitanti veditabbaṃ. Vuttañhetaṃ pañhāvāre – ‘‘paṭisandhikkhaṇe vipākābyākatāni jhānaṅgāni sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpānaṃ jhānapaccayena [Pg.380] paccayo’’ti. Ayaṃ tāvettha pāḷivaṇṇanā. Ayaṃ pana jhānapaccayo sattannaṃ jhānaṅgānaṃ vasena ṭhitopi jātibhedato kusalākusalavipākakiriyavasena catudhā bhijjati, puna bhūmivasena catudhā; ekadhā, catudhā, tidhāti dvādasadhā bhijjatīti evamettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

17. In the exposition on the jhāna condition, the 'jhāna factors' are the seven factors called initial application, sustained application, joy, happiness, displeasure, equanimity, and one-pointedness of mind, which arise in all consciousnesses except the two sets of fivefold sense consciousnesses. However, although equanimity, pleasure, and pain are present in the five groups of consciousness, they are not designated as jhāna factors because of the absence of the characteristic of absorption, due to their being merely impingements. Furthermore, in the remaining rootless consciousnesses, a jhāna factor is not designated either, because of their deficient nature. Here, 'those arisen from it' should be understood to include kamma-produced materiality. For it was said in the section of questions: 'At the moment of rebirth-linking, the resultant and indeterminate jhāna factors are a condition by way of the jhāna condition for the associated aggregates and for kamma-produced materiality.' Thus far, this is the Pāli explanation here. This jhāna condition, however, though established on the basis of the seven jhāna factors, is divided into four types based on the distinction of origin: wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, and functional. Again, it is divided into four based on the planes; it is divided twelvefold as one, fourfold, and threefold. In this way, the analysis should be understood here according to its various distinctions.

Evaṃ bhinne panettha catubhūmakampi kusalajhānaṅgaṃ pañcavokāre sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca, ṭhapetvā rūpāvacaraṃ avasesaṃ āruppe sampayuttadhammānaññeva jhānapaccayena paccayo. Akusalepi eseva nayo. Kāmāvacararūpāvacaravipākaṃ pavatte sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca, paṭisandhiyaṃ sampayuttadhammānañceva kaṭattārūpassa ca, āruppavipākaṃ sampayuttadhammānaññeva, yañca āruppe lokuttaravipākaṃ uppajjati, tañca. Pañcavokāre pana taṃ cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassapi jhānapaccayena paccayo hoti. Tebhūmakampi kiriyajhānaṅgaṃ pañcavokāre sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca. Yaṃ panettha āruppe uppajjati, taṃ sampayuttadhammānaññeva jhānapaccayena paccayoti evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

When thus divided, the wholesome jhāna factor, even in the four planes, is a condition by way of the jhāna condition for associated phenomena and mind-produced materiality in the five-constituent existence; but, excluding the fine-material-sphere, the remaining wholesome jhāna factor in the formless sphere is a condition only for associated phenomena. The same principle applies to the unwholesome. The resultant jhāna factors of the sense-sphere and fine-material sphere, in the course of existence, are conditions for both associated phenomena and mind-produced materiality; at rebirth-linking, they are conditions for both associated phenomena and kamma-produced materiality. The formless resultant jhāna factors are conditions only for associated phenomena, and this also applies to whatever supramundane resultant jhāna factors arise in the formless sphere. However, in the five-constituent existence, that supramundane resultant jhāna factor is also a condition by way of the jhāna condition for mind-produced materiality. The functional jhāna factor, even in the three planes, is a condition for associated phenomena and mind-produced materiality in the five-constituent existence. Whatever of this arises in the formless sphere is a condition only for associated phenomena by way of the jhāna condition. Thus, the analysis here should also be understood from the standpoint of the conditioned.

Jhānapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Jhāna Condition.

18. Maggapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

18. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Path Condition

18. Maggapaccayaniddese maggaṅgānīti ahetukacittuppādavajjesu sesacittesu uppannāni paññā, vitakko, sammāvācākammantājīvā, vīriyaṃ, sati, samādhi, micchādiṭṭhi, micchāvācākammantājīvāti imāni dvādasaṅgāni. Maggassa pana hetupacchimakattā ahetukacittesu maggaṅgāni na uddhaṭāni. Taṃsamuṭṭhānānanti idhāpi kaṭattārūpaṃ saṅgahitameva. Vuttañhetaṃ pañhāvāre – ‘‘paṭisandhikkhaṇe vipākābyākatāni maggaṅgāni sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpānaṃ maggapaccayena paccayo’’ti. Ayaṃ tāvettha pāḷivaṇṇanā.

18. In the exposition of the path condition, the 'path factors' are these twelve factors: wisdom, thought, right speech, right action, right livelihood, effort, mindfulness, concentration, wrong view, wrong speech, wrong action, and wrong livelihood. These arise in the remaining consciousnesses, excluding rootless consciousness-moments. However, because the path has roots as its essential foundation, path factors are not designated in rootless consciousnesses. 'That which originates from them'—here, kamma-produced materiality is also included. For it is said in the section of questions: 'At the moment of rebirth-linking, the resultant and indeterminate path factors are a condition by way of the path condition for the associated aggregates and for kamma-produced materiality.' Thus far, this is the Pāli explanation here.

Ayaṃ pana maggapaccayo dvādasannaṃ maggaṅgānaṃ vasena ṭhitopi jātibhedato kusalādivasena catudhā, kusalādīnañca kāmāvacarādibhūmibhedato dvādasadhā bhijjatīti evamettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo[Pg.381]. Evaṃ bhinne panettha catubhūmakampi kusalamaggaṅgaṃ pañcavokāre sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca, ṭhapetvā rūpāvacaraṃ avasesaṃ āruppe sampayuttadhammānaññeva maggapaccayena paccayoti sabbaṃ jhānapaccaye viya vitthāretabbanti evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

This path condition, though established on the basis of the twelve path factors, is divided in four ways according to the distinction of type—wholesome, etc.—and these are further divided in twelve ways according to the distinction of planes—sense-sphere, etc. Thus, the analysis here should be understood through its various distinctions. When thus divided, the wholesome path factor of the four planes, in the five-constituent existence, is a condition by way of the path condition for associated phenomena and for mind-produced materiality; and, excluding the fine-material sphere, the remainder in the formless sphere is a condition for associated phenomena only. Everything should be elaborated as in the case of the jhāna condition. Thus, the analysis here should also be understood from the standpoint of the conditioned.

Maggapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Exposition of the Path Condition.

19. Sampayuttapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

19. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Associated Condition

19. Sampayuttapaccayaniddese pāḷi uttānatthā eva. Ayaṃ pana sampayuttapaccayo nāma saṅkhepato sabbepi arūpino khandhā. Pabhedato panesa jātito kusalādīnaṃ, bhūmito ca kāmāvacarādīnaṃ vasena anekadhā bhijjatīti evamettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo. Evaṃ bhinne panettha catubhūmakesupi kusalakkhandhesu eko khandho tiṇṇaṃ khandhānaṃ, tayo ekassa, dve dvinnanti evaṃ sabbepi aññamaññaṃ sampayuttapaccayena paccayo. Akusalavipākakiriyakkhandhesupi eseva nayoti evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

19. In the exposition of the associated condition, the Pāli is of plain meaning. This associated condition refers, in brief, to all immaterial aggregates. In detail, however, it is divided in many ways according to the distinction of type, such as wholesome, etc., and according to the distinction of planes, such as the sense-sphere, etc. Thus, the analysis here should be understood through various distinctions. Among these divisions, in the wholesome aggregates of the four planes, one aggregate is a condition for three aggregates, three aggregates for one, and two aggregates for two—thus, all are mutually conditions for each other through the associated condition. The same method applies to the unwholesome, resultant, and functional aggregates. Thus, the analysis here should also be understood from the perspective of the conditioned phenomena.

Sampayuttapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Exposition of the Associated Condition.

20. Vippayuttapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

20. The Explanation of the Exposition of the Dissociated Condition

20. Vippayuttapaccayaniddese rūpino dhammā arūpīnanti idaṃ tāva hadayavatthuno ceva cakkhundriyādīnañca vasena veditabbaṃ. Rūpadhammesu hi eteyeva cha koṭṭhāsā arūpakkhandhānaṃ vippayuttapaccayena paccayā honti. Rūpāyatanādayo pana ārammaṇadhammā kiñcāpi vippayuttadhammā, vippayuttapaccayā pana na honti. Kiṃ kāraṇā? Sampayogāsaṅkāya abhāvato. Arūpino hi khandhā cakkhādīnaṃ vatthūnaṃ abbhantarato nikkhamantā viya uppajjanti. Tattha āsaṅkā hoti – ‘‘kiṃ nu kho ete etehi sampayuttā, udāhu vippayuttā’’ti. Ārammaṇadhammā pana vatthunissayena uppajjamānānaṃ ārammaṇamattā hontīti natthi tesu sampayogāsaṅkā. Iti sampayogāsaṅkāya [Pg.382] abhāvato na te vippayuttapaccayā. Hadayavatthuādīsu eva panāyaṃ vippayuttapaccayatā veditabbā. Vuttampi cetaṃ pañhāvāre – vatthu kusalānaṃ khandhānaṃ vippayuttapaccayena paccayo. Vatthu akusalānaṃ khandhānaṃ vippayuttapaccayena paccayo. Cakkhāyatanaṃ cakkhuviññāṇassa vippayuttapaccayena paccayo. Sota… ghāna… jivhā… kāyāyatanaṃ kāyaviññāṇassa vippayuttapaccayena paccayo. Vatthu vipākābyākatānaṃ kiriyābyākatānaṃ khandhānaṃ vippayuttapaccayena paccayoti.

20. In the exposition of the dissociated condition, the statement ‘material phenomena for immaterial phenomena’ should first be understood in terms of the heart-base and the eye-faculty, etc. For among material phenomena, these six divisions alone are conditions for the immaterial aggregates by way of the dissociated condition. However, the sense-object of form, etc., though they are dissociated phenomena, are not conditions by way of dissociation. What is the reason? Because there is no suspicion of association. For the immaterial aggregates arise as if emerging from within the bases of the eye, etc. Here, a suspicion arises: “Are these associated with those, or are they dissociated?” However, object-phenomena are merely objects for the mental states arising in dependence on a base, so there is no suspicion of association regarding them. Thus, because there is no suspicion of association, they are not conditions by way of dissociation. This dissociated conditionality should be understood only in relation to the heart-base, etc. And this has been stated in the section of questions: “The base is a condition for the wholesome aggregates by way of the dissociated condition. The base is a condition for the unwholesome aggregates by way of the dissociated condition. The eye-base is a condition for eye-consciousness by way of the dissociated condition. The ear… nose… tongue… body-base is a condition for body-consciousness by way of the dissociated condition. The base is a condition for the resultant-indeterminate and functional-indeterminate aggregates by way of the dissociated condition.”

Arūpino dhammā rūpīnanti idaṃ pana catunnaṃ khandhānaṃ vasena veditabbaṃ. Arūpadhammesu hi cattāro khandhāva sahajātapurejātānaṃ rūpadhammānaṃ vippayuttapaccayā honti, nibbānaṃ pana arūpampi samānaṃ rūpassa vippayuttapaccayo na hoti. ‘‘Catūhi sampayogo catūhi vippayogo’’ti hi vuttaṃ. Iti catunnaṃ arūpakkhandhānaṃyeva vippayuttapaccayatā veditabbā. Vuttampi cetaṃ pañhāvāre – sahajātā kusalā khandhā cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ rūpānaṃ vippayuttapaccayena paccayo. Pacchājātā kusalā khandhā purejātassa imassa kāyassa vippayuttapaccayena paccayo. Paṭisandhikkhaṇe vipākābyākatā khandhā kaṭattārūpānaṃ vippayuttapaccayena paccayo, khandhā vatthussāti. Evaṃ tāvettha pāḷivaṇṇanā veditabbā.

The statement ‘immaterial phenomena for material phenomena,’ however, should be understood in terms of the four aggregates. For among immaterial phenomena, the four aggregates alone are conditions for co-nascent and pre-arisen material phenomena by way of the dissociated condition. Nibbāna, though immaterial, is not a dissociated condition for material phenomena. For it is said: “Association is with four; dissociation is with four.” Thus, the nature of dissociated conditionality should be understood only in relation to the four immaterial aggregates. This is also stated in the section of questions: “Co-nascent wholesome aggregates are a condition for mind-produced materiality by way of the dissociated condition. Post-nascent wholesome aggregates are a condition for this pre-arisen body by way of the dissociated condition. At the moment of rebirth-linking, the resultant-indeterminate aggregates are a condition for kamma-produced materiality by way of the dissociated condition, and the aggregates for the base.” Thus far, the explanation of the Pāli should be understood here.

Ayaṃ pana vippayuttapaccayo nāma saṅkhepato pañcavokārabhave vattamānā rūpārūpadhammā. Tesu rūpaṃ vatthuno cakkhādīnañca vasena chadhā bhinnaṃ, arūpaṃ pañcavokārabhave uppannakusalākusalavipākakiriyavasena catudhā bhinnaṃ. Tassa bhūmito kāmāvacarādivasena catudhā, ekadhā, tidhā, tidhāti ekadasadhā bhedo hoti. Āruppavipākañhi vippayuttapaccayo na hotīti evamettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

This dissociated condition, in brief, is the material and immaterial phenomena occurring in the five-constituent existence. Among them, materiality is divided into six kinds based on the base and the eye, etc. Immateriality, arising in the five-constituent existence, is divided into four kinds based on wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, and functional states. From the standpoint of planes, its division is elevenfold: fourfold, single, threefold, and threefold. For the formless resultant is not a dissociated condition. Thus, the analysis here should be understood through various distinctions.

Evaṃ bhinne panettha pañcavokārabhave uppannaṃ catubhūmakampi kusalaṃ akusalañca attanā samuṭṭhāpitacittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa sahajātavippayuttapaccayena paccayo hoti. Uppādakkhaṇaṃ pana atikkamitvā ṭhitikkhaṇaṃ pattassa purejātassa catusamuṭṭhānikatisamuṭṭhānikarūpakāyassa pacchājātavippayuttapaccayena paccayo hoti. Ettha ca tisamuṭṭhānikakāyoti āhārasamuṭṭhānassa abhāvato brahmapārisajjādīnaṃ kāyo veditabbo. Kāmāvacararūpāvacaravipākaṃ pana pavatte cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa, paṭisandhiyaṃ [Pg.383] kaṭattārūpassa ca sahajātavippayuttapaccayena paccayo hoti. Lokuttaravipākaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānarūpasseva. Tividhampi panetaṃ purejātassa catusamuṭṭhānikatisamuṭṭhānikakāyassa pacchājātavippayuttapaccayena paccayo. Tebhūmakampi kiriyaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānassa sahajātavippayuttapaccayena paccayo, purejātassa catusamuṭṭhānikatisamuṭṭhānikakāyassa pacchājātavippayuttapaccayena paccayo. Chadhā ṭhitesu pana rūpesu vatthurūpaṃ paṭisandhikkhaṇe kāmāvacararūpāvacaravipākānaṃ sahajātavippayuttapaccayena paccayo, pavatte uppajjamānānaṃ catubhūmakakusalānaṃ akusalānaṃ dvipañcaviññāṇavajjānaṃ tebhūmakavipākānaṃ tebhūmakakiriyānañca purejātavippayuttapaccayena paccayo. Cakkhāyatanādīni cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ purejātavippayuttapaccayena paccayoti evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

Thus, in this division, the wholesome and unwholesome states of the four planes that have arisen in the five-constituent existence are a condition for mind-originated matter produced by themselves, by way of conascent-dissociated condition. Having passed the moment of arising and reached the moment of presence, however, they are a condition for the pre-arisen material body of four origins and three origins by way of postnascent-dissociated condition. And here, the body of three origins should be understood as the body of the Brahmā's retinue and so on, due to the absence of nutriment-originated matter. The sense-sphere and form-sphere resultant states, during the course of existence, are a condition for mind-originated matter, and at rebirth-linking, for kamma-originated matter, by way of conascent-dissociated condition. The supramundane resultant state is a condition for mind-originated matter only. All three of these types are also a condition for the pre-arisen material body of four origins and three origins by way of postnascent-dissociated condition. The functional states of the three planes are a condition for mind-originated matter by way of conascent-dissociated condition, and for the pre-arisen material body of four origins and three origins by way of postnascent-dissociated condition. Among the material phenomena established in six ways, the base-materiality, at the moment of rebirth-linking, is a condition for the sense-sphere and form-sphere resultant states by way of conascent-dissociated condition; and during the course of existence, it is a condition for the wholesome and unwholesome states of the four planes (excluding the two sets of fivefold sense-consciousness), the resultant states of the three planes, and the functional states of the three planes, by way of pre-arisen-dissociated condition. The eye-base and so on are conditions for eye-consciousness and so on by way of pre-arisen-dissociated condition. Thus the analysis here should also be understood from the perspective of the conditioned phenomena.

Vippayuttapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Exposition of the Dissociated Condition.

21. Atthipaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

21. Explanation of the Exposition of the Presence Condition.

21. Atthipaccayaniddese cattāro khandhātiādīhi sahajātavasena atthipaccayo niddiṭṭho. Cakkhāyatanantiādīhi purejātavasena. Yaṃ rūpaṃ nissāyāti ettha sahajātapurejātavasena atthipaccayo niddiṭṭho. Evamayaṃ pāḷi sahajātapurejātānaññeva atthipaccayānaṃ vasena āgatā. Pañhāvāre pana sahajātaṃ, purejātaṃ, pacchājātaṃ, āhāraṃ, indriyanti imesaṃ vasena āgatattā pacchājātaāhārindriyavasenāpi atthipaccayo labbhati. Idha pana sāvasesavasena desanā katāti ayaṃ tāvettha pāḷivaṇṇanā.

21. In the exposition of the presence condition, by 'the four aggregates,' and so on, the presence condition is expounded by way of conascence. By 'the eye-base,' and so on, it is by way of prenascence. In the phrase 'depending on that material form,' the presence condition is expounded by way of both conascence and prenascence. Thus, this Pāli text is presented only by way of the conascent and prenascent presence conditions. However, in the Question Section, since it is presented by way of conascence, prenascence, postnascence, nutriment, and faculty, the presence condition is also obtained by way of postnascence, nutriment, and faculty. Here, however, the teaching is given in a non-exhaustive manner. This, for now, is the explanation of the Pāli text here.

Ayaṃ pana atthipaccayo nāma duvidho – aññamaññato, na aññamaññato. Tattha aññamaññaṃ tividhaṃ – arūpaṃ arūpena, rūpaṃ rūpena, rūpārūpaṃ rūpārūpena. ‘‘Cattāro khandhā arūpino’’ti ettha hi sabbacittuppattivasena arūpaṃ arūpena vuttaṃ. ‘‘Cattāro mahābhūtā’’ti ettha sabbasantativasena rūpaṃ rūpena. ‘‘Okkantikkhaṇe nāmarūpa’’nti ettha paṭisandhikhandhānañceva vatthuno ca vasena rūpārūpaṃ rūpārūpena vuttaṃ. Na aññamaññampi tividhaṃ – ‘‘arūpaṃ rūpassa, rūpaṃ rūpassa, rūpaṃ [Pg.384] arūpassa cittacetasikā dhammā’’ti ettha hi pañcavokāravasena arūpaṃ rūpassa vuttaṃ. ‘‘Mahābhūtā upādārūpāna’’nti ettha sabbasantativasena rūpaṃ rūpassa. ‘‘Cakkhāyatanaṃ cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyā’’tiādīsu vatthārammaṇavasena rūpaṃ arūpassa atthipaccayoti vuttaṃ.

This presence condition is of two kinds: with mutuality and without mutuality. Therein, that with mutuality is threefold: immaterial with immaterial, material with material, and material-and-immaterial with material-and-immaterial. In the phrase, 'The four immaterial aggregates,' immaterial with immaterial is stated by way of all occurrences of consciousness. In 'The four great elements,' material with material is stated by way of all continuity. In 'At the moment of descent, name-and-form,' material-and-immaterial with material-and-immaterial is stated by way of the rebirth-linking aggregates and the base. That without mutuality is also threefold: immaterial for material, material for material, and material for immaterial. Here, in the case of 'consciousness and mental factors,' immaterial for material is stated by way of the five-constituent existence. In 'The great elements for derived material forms,' material for material is stated by way of all continuity. In 'The eye-base for the eye-consciousness element,' and so on, material for immaterial is stated as a presence condition by way of base and object.

Apicesa atthipaccayo nāma saṅkhepato khaṇattayappattaṃ nāmañceva rūpañca, vattamānā pañcakkhandhātipi vattuṃ vaṭṭati. So jātibhedato kusalākusalavipākakiriyarūpavasena pañcadhā bhijjati. Tattha kusalo sahajātapacchājātavasena duvidho hoti, tathā akusalo vipākakiriyasaṅkhāto ca. Tesu kusalo kāmāvacarādibhedena catudhā bhijjati, akusalo kāmāvacarova vipāko catubhūmako, kiriyāsaṅkhāto tibhūmako. Rūpasaṅkhāto atthipaccayo kāmāvacarova. So pana sahajātapurejātavasena duvidho. Tattha pañca vatthūni ārammaṇāni ca purejātāneva, hadayavatthu sahajātaṃ vā hoti purejātaṃ vā. Pañhāvāre pana āgato āhāro indriyañca sahajātādibhedaṃ na labhatīti evamettha nānappakārabhedato viññātabbo vinicchayo.

Furthermore, this presence condition, in brief, can be said to be name-and-form that has reached the three moments, and also the present five aggregates. It is divided into five kinds based on the distinction of nature: wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, functional, and material. Therein, the wholesome is twofold, by way of conascence and postnascence; similarly the unwholesome, and also the resultant and the functional. Among these, the wholesome is divided into four kinds based on the distinction of the sense-sphere and so on; the unwholesome is only of the sense-sphere; the resultant is of the four planes; the functional is of the three planes. The presence condition termed material is only of the sense-sphere. It, however, is twofold: by way of conascence and prenascence. Therein, the five physical bases and objects are only prenascent, while the heart-base may be conascent or prenascent. In the Question Section, however, the nutriment and faculty that are mentioned do not obtain the divisions of conascence and so on. Thus the analysis here should be understood according to its various divisions.

Evaṃ bhinne panettha catubhūmakakusalopi sahajāto atthipaccayo pañcavokāre ‘‘eko khandho tiṇṇannaṃ khandhāna’’ntiādinā nayena aññamaññaṃ khandhānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca ṭhapetvā pana rūpāvacarakusalaṃ avaseso āruppe sampayuttakkhandhānaññeva sahajātakusalo atthipaccayena paccayo hoti. Catubhūmako panesa pañcavokāre catusamuṭṭhānikatisamuṭṭhānikakāyassa pacchājāto kusalo atthipaccayena paccayo hoti. Akusalepi eseva nayo. Sopi hi pañcavokāre sampayuttakkhandhānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca, catuvokāre sampayuttakkhandhānaññeva sahajātākusalo atthipaccayena paccayo. Pañcavokāre catusamuṭṭhānikatisamuṭṭhānikakāyassa pacchājātākusalo atthipaccayena paccayo.

Thus, when divided here, the wholesome of the four planes, as a conascent presence condition in the five-constituent existence, is a condition for the aggregates mutually and for mind-originated matter, according to the method 'one aggregate for three aggregates,' and so on. But, excluding the form-sphere wholesome, the remainder, in the formless realm, is a conascent wholesome presence condition only for the associated aggregates. This wholesome of the four planes, in the five-constituent existence, is also a condition for the material body of four origins and three origins by way of postnascent wholesome presence condition. The same method applies to the unwholesome. For that too, in the five-constituent existence, is a conascent unwholesome presence condition for the associated aggregates and for mind-originated matter, while in the four-constituent existence, it is a conascent unwholesome presence condition only for the associated aggregates. In the five-constituent existence, it is a postnascent unwholesome presence condition for the material body of four origins and three origins.

Vipākato pana kāmāvacararūpāvacaro atthipaccayo niyameneva paṭisandhikkhaṇe khandhānañceva kaṭattārūpassa ca sahajātatthipaccayena paccayo. Pavatte [Pg.385] pana sampayuttakkhandhānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca sahajātatthipaccayena paccayo, ṭhitippattassa catusamuṭṭhānikatisamuṭṭhānikakāyassa pacchājātatthipaccayena paccayo. Arūpāvacaravipāko pana āruppe uppannalokuttaravipāko ca attanā sampayuttakkhandhānaññeva sahajātatthipaccayena paccayo. Pañcavokāre lokuttaravipāko sampayuttakkhandhānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca sahajātatthipaccayena paccayo, catusamuṭṭhānikatisamuṭṭhānikakāyassa pacchājātatthipaccayena paccayo. Kiriyato rūpāvacaro atthipaccayo sampayuttakkhandhānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca sahajātatthipaccayena paccayo, catusamuṭṭhānikatisamuṭṭhānikakāyassa pacchājātatthipaccayena paccayo. Kāmāvacarārūpāvacaro pana āruppe sampayuttakkhandhānaññeva, pañcavokāre cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassāpi sahajātatthipaccayena paccayo, catusamuṭṭhānikatisamuṭṭhānikakāyassa pacchājātatthi paccayena paccayo.

Regarding the resultants, the sense-sphere and form-sphere resultant is a presence condition by way of the co-nascent presence condition, necessarily at the moment of rebirth-linking, for both the aggregates and kamma-originated material form. In the course of existence, it is a condition for the associated aggregates and mind-originated material form by way of the co-nascent presence condition, and for the material body originating from four sources and three sources that has attained duration by way of the post-nascent presence condition. The formless-sphere resultant, and the supramundane resultant arisen in the formless realm, are conditions only for their associated aggregates by way of the co-nascent presence condition. The supramundane resultant in the five-aggregate existence is a condition for the associated aggregates and mind-originated material form by way of the co-nascent presence condition, and for the material body originating from four sources and three sources by way of the post-nascent presence condition. Regarding functional consciousness, the form-sphere functional is a presence condition for the associated aggregates and mind-originated material form by way of the co-nascent presence condition, and for the material body originating from four sources and three sources by way of the post-nascent presence condition. The sense-sphere and formless-sphere functional, in the formless realm, is a condition only for the associated aggregates; and in the five-aggregate existence, it is also a condition for mind-originated material form by way of the co-nascent presence condition, and for the material body originating from four sources and three sources by way of the post-nascent presence condition.

Rūpasaṅkhāto pana atthipaccayo sahajāto, purejāto, āhāro, indriyanti catubbidho. Tattha sahajātarūpatthipaccayo catusamuṭṭhānavasena catudhā ṭhito. Tattha kammasamuṭṭhāno ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ tiṇṇannaṃ mahābhūtānaṃ, tīṇi ekassa, dve dvinnaṃ, mahābhūtā upādārūpānanti evaṃ sahajātatthipaccayena paccayo hoti. Paṭisandhikkhaṇe vatthurūpaṃ kāmāvacararūpāvacaravipākakkhandhānaṃ sahajātatthipaccayena paccayo hoti. Tesampi tisamuṭṭhānikarūpaṃ ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ tiṇṇannaṃ mahābhūtānaṃ, tīṇi ekassa, dve dvinnaṃ, mahābhūtā upādārūpānanti evaṃ sahajātatthipaccayena paccayo hoti. Purejātatthipaccayo pana vatthupurejātaārammaṇapurejātavasena duvidho hoti. So duvidhopi heṭṭhā purejātapaccaye vuttanayeneva yojetvā gahetabbo. Āhāratthipaccayopi heṭṭhā kabaḷīkārāhārapaccaye yojitanayeneva yojetabbo. Idha panesa attano aniruddhakkhaṇe paccayabhāvena atthipaccayoti vutto. Rūpajīvitindriyampi heṭṭhā indriyapaccaye rūpajīvitindriyayojanāyaṃ vuttanayeneva yojetabbaṃ. Idha panetampi attano aniruddhakkhaṇeyeva paccayabhāvena atthipaccayoti vuttanti evamettha paccayuppannatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

The presence condition regarding material form is fourfold: co-nascent, pre-nascent, nutriment, and faculty. Herein, the co-nascent material presence condition is established in four ways according to the four sources of origin. Here, regarding kamma-originated matter: one great element is a condition for three great elements, three for one, two for two, and the great elements for the derived material forms—thus, it is a condition by way of co-nascent presence. At the moment of rebirth-linking, the physical basis is a condition by way of co-nascent presence for the sense-sphere and form-sphere resultant aggregates. For the material form originating from the other three sources as well: one great element is a condition for three great elements, three for one, two for two, and the great elements for the derived material forms—thus, it is a condition by way of co-nascent presence. The pre-nascent presence condition, however, is twofold: as the pre-nascent physical basis and as the pre-nascent object. Both should be understood by applying the method explained earlier under the pre-nascent condition. The nutriment presence condition should also be applied in the manner explained earlier under the edible food condition. Here, however, it is called the presence condition because it functions as a condition at the moment of its own non-cessation. The material life faculty, too, should be applied in the manner explained earlier in the application of the material life faculty under the faculty condition. Here, however, this too is called the presence condition because it functions as a condition at the very moment of its own non-cessation. Thus, the analysis here should be understood also from the side of the conditionally arisen phenomena.

Atthipaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Exposition of the Presence Condition.

22. Natthipaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

22. The Explanation of the Exposition of the Absence Condition

22. Natthipaccayaniddese [Pg.386] samanantaraniruddhāti aññena cittuppādena anantarikā hutvā samanantaraniruddhā. Paṭuppannānanti paccuppannānaṃ. Iminā natthipaccayassa okāsadānaṭṭhena natthipaccayabhāvaṃ sādheti. Purimesu hi nirodhavasena pacchimānaṃ pavattanokāsaṃ adentesu tesaṃ paṭuppannabhāvo na siyāti ayamettha pāḷivaṇṇanā. Sesaṃ sabbaṃ anantarapaccaye vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Paccayalakkhaṇameva hettha nānaṃ, paccayānaṃ pana paccayuppannānañca nānākaraṇaṃ natthi. Kevalaṃ pana tattha ‘‘cakkhuviññāṇadhātu taṃsampayuttakā ca dhammā manodhātuyā’’tiādinā nayena paccayā ca paccayuppannā ca sarūpato dassitā. Idha pana ‘‘samanantaraniruddhā cittacetasikā dhammā paṭuppannānaṃ cittacetasikānaṃ dhammāna’’nti sabbepi te nirodhuppādavasena sāmaññato dassitāti.

22. In the exposition of the absence condition, ‘immediately ceased’ means they have ceased immediately, having become without interval to another arising of consciousness. ‘For the present’ means for those that are present. By this, it establishes the nature of the absence condition as giving an opportunity. For if the preceding states, by their cessation, did not give an opportunity for the subsequent states to arise, their present existence would not be possible—this is the explanation of the Pāli here. All the rest should be understood in the same way as explained in the immediately contiguous condition. Only the characteristic of the condition is different here, but there is no differentiation of the conditions and the conditioned states. However, there, the conditions and the conditioned states are shown in their own form, in the way such as ‘the eye-consciousness element and the mental factors associated with it are conditions for the mind element’ and so forth. Here, however, with ‘immediately ceased consciousness and mental factors are conditions for present consciousness and mental factors,’ all these are shown generally by way of cessation and arising.

Natthipaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Exposition of the Absence Condition.

23. Vigatapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

23. The Explanation of the Exposition of the Disappearance Condition

23. Vigatapaccayaniddese samanantaravigatāti samanantarameva vigatā. Iminā vigatapaccayassa vigacchamānabhāveneva paccayabhāvaṃ dasseti. Iti natthipaccayassa ca imassa ca byañjanamatteyeva nānattaṃ, na attheti.

23. In the exposition of the disappearance condition, ‘immediately disappeared’ means disappeared immediately. This shows the nature of the disappearance condition as being a condition precisely through its state of disappearing. Thus, there is only a verbal difference between the absence condition and this one, not a difference in meaning.

Vigatapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Exposition of the Disappearance Condition.

24. Avigatapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā

24. The Explanation of the Exposition of the Non-Disappearance Condition

24. Avigatapaccayaniddese cattāro khandhātiādīnaṃ sabbākārena atthipaccayaniddese vuttanayeneva attho veditabbo. Imassapi hi paccayassa atthipaccayena saddhiṃ byañjanamatteyeva nānattaṃ, na attheti.

24. In the exposition of the non-disappearance condition, the meaning of ‘the four aggregates’ and so forth should be understood in all aspects in the same way as stated in the exposition of the presence condition. For this condition too, there is only a verbal difference with the presence condition, not a difference in meaning.

Avigatapaccayaniddesavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Exposition of the Non-Disappearance Condition.

Paccayaniddesapakiṇṇakavinicchayakathā

The Discourse on the Miscellaneous Analysis of the Exposition of Conditions

Idāni [Pg.387] evaṃ uddesaniddesato dassitesu imesu catuvīsatiyā paccayesu ñāṇacārassa visadabhāvatthaṃ anekadhammānaṃ ekapaccayabhāvato, ekadhammassa anekapaccayabhāvato, ekapaccayassa anekapaccayabhāvato, paccayasabhāgato, paccayavisabhāgato, yugaḷakato, janakājanakato, sabbaṭṭhānikāsabbaṭṭhānikato, rūpaṃ rūpassātiādivikappato, bhavabhedatoti imesaṃ dasannaṃ padānaṃ vasena pakiṇṇakavinicchayo veditabbo. Tattha anekadhammānaṃ ekapaccayabhāvatoti etesu hi ṭhapetvā kammapaccayaṃ avasesesu tevīsatiyā paccayesu anekadhammā ekato paccayā honti. Kammapaccayo pana eko cetanādhammoyevāti evaṃ tāvettha anekadhammānaṃ ekapaccayabhāvato vinicchayo veditabbo.

Now, for the sake of clarity in the course of knowledge regarding these twenty-four conditions, which have thus been shown by way of summary and exposition, the miscellaneous analysis should be understood by way of these ten terms: the state of many phenomena being one condition, the state of one phenomenon being many conditions, the state of one condition being many conditions, similarity of conditions, dissimilarity of conditions, pairing, productive and non-productive, universal and non-universal, the distinction of ‘matter as condition for matter’ and so forth, and the division of existence. Herein, ‘the state of many phenomena being one condition’ means that among these, excluding the kamma condition, in the remaining twenty-three conditions, many phenomena are collectively a condition. However, the kamma condition is solely the one phenomenon of volition. Thus, first, the analysis of the state of many phenomena being one condition should be understood here.

Ekadhammassa anekapaccayabhāvatoti hetupaccaye tāva amoho eko dhammo. So purejātakammāhārajhānapaccayova na hoti, sesānaṃ vīsatiyā paccayānaṃ vasena paccayo hoti. Alobhādosā indriyamaggapaccayāpi na honti, sesānaṃ aṭṭhārasannaṃ paccayānaṃ vasena paccayā honti. Lobhamohā vipākapaccayāpi na honti, sesānaṃ sattarasannaṃ paccayānaṃ vasena paccayā honti. Doso adhipatipaccayopi na hoti, sesānaṃ soḷasannaṃ paccayānaṃ vasena paccayo hoti. Ārammaṇapaccaye rūpāyatanaṃ cakkhuviññāṇadhātuyā ārammaṇapurejātaatthiavigatavasena catudhā paccayo; tathā manodhātuyā ahetukamanoviññāṇadhātuyā ca. Sahetukāya pana ārammaṇādhipatiārammaṇūpanissayavasenāpi paccayo hoti. Iminā nayena sabbesaṃ ārammaṇapaccayadhammānaṃ anekapaccayabhāvo veditabbo.

‘The state of one phenomenon being many conditions’ means that in the root condition, for example, non-delusion is a single phenomenon. It is not a condition by way of pre-arisen, kamma, nutriment, or jhāna conditions, but it is a condition by way of the remaining twenty conditions. Non-greed and non-hatred are not conditions by way of faculty or path conditions, but they are conditions by way of the remaining eighteen conditions. Greed and delusion are not conditions by way of result condition, but they are conditions by way of the remaining seventeen conditions. Hatred is not a condition by way of dominance condition, but it is a condition by way of the remaining sixteen conditions. In the object condition, the form base is a condition for the eye-consciousness element in four ways: as object, pre-arisen, presence, and non-disappearance; similarly for the mind-element and the rootless mind-consciousness element. However, for the rooted consciousness, it is also a condition by way of object, object-dominance, and object-decisive support. In this way, the manifold conditionality of all phenomena of the object condition should be understood.

Adhipatipaccaye ārammaṇādhipatino ārammaṇapaccaye vuttanayeneva anekapaccayabhāvo veditabbo. Sahajātādhipatīsu vīmaṃsā amohahetu viya vīsatidhā paccayo hoti. Chando hetupurejātakammaāhāraindriyajhānamaggapaccayo na hoti, sesānaṃ sattarasannaṃ paccayānaṃ vasena paccayo hoti. Cittaṃ hetupurejātakammajhānamaggapaccayo na hoti, sesānaṃ ekūnavīsatiyā paccayānaṃ vasena paccayo hoti. Vīriyaṃ hetupurejātakammāhārajhānapaccayo na hoti, sesānaṃ ekūnavīsatiyā vasena paccayo hoti.

In the dominance condition, the manifold conditionality of object-dominance should be understood in the same way as explained in the object condition. Among the conascent dominants, investigation (vīmaṃsā) is a condition in twenty ways, like the root of non-delusion (amoha). Desire (chando) is not a condition by way of root, pre-arisen, kamma, nutriment, faculty, jhāna, or path conditions, but it is a condition by way of the remaining seventeen conditions. Consciousness (cittaṃ) is not a condition by way of root, pre-arisen, kamma, jhāna, or path conditions, but it is a condition by way of the remaining nineteen conditions. Energy (vīriyaṃ) is not a condition by way of root, pre-arisen, kamma, nutriment, or jhāna conditions, but it is a condition by way of the remaining nineteen conditions.

Anantarapaccaye [Pg.388] ‘‘cakkhuviññāṇadhātū’’tiādinā nayena vuttesu catūsu khandhesu vedanākkhandho hetupurejātakammāhāramaggapaccayo na hoti, sesānaṃ ekūnavīsatiyā vasena paccayo hoti. Saññākkhandho indriyajhānapaccayopi na hoti, sesānaṃ sattarasannaṃ vasena paccayo hoti. Saṅkhārakkhandhe hetū hetupaccaye vuttanayena, chandavīriyāni adhipatipaccaye vuttanayeneva paccayā honti. Phasso hetupurejātakammaindriyajhānamaggapaccayo na hoti, sesānaṃ aṭṭhārasannaṃ vasena paccayo hoti. Cetanā hetupurejātaindriyajhānamaggapaccayo na hoti. Sesānaṃ ekūnavīsatiyā vasena paccayo hoti. Vitakko hetupurejātakammāhārindriyapaccayo na hoti, sesānaṃ ekūnavīsatiyā vasena paccayo hoti. Vicāro maggapaccayopi na hoti, sesānaṃ aṭṭhārasannaṃ vasena paccayo hoti. Pīti tesaññeva vasena paccayo hoti. Cittekaggatā hetupurejātakammāhārapaccayo na hoti, sesānaṃ vīsatiyā vasena paccayo hoti. Saddhā hetupurejātakammāhārajhānamaggapaccayo na hoti, sesānaṃ aṭṭhārasannaṃ vasena paccayo hoti. Sati tehi ceva maggapaccayena cāti ekūnavīsatiyā vasena paccayo hoti. Jīvitindriyaṃ saddhāya vuttānaṃ aṭṭhārasannaṃ vasena paccayo hoti. Hirottappaṃ tato indriyapaccayaṃ apanetvā sesānaṃ sattarasannaṃ vasena paccayo hoti. Tathā kāyapassaddhādīni yugaḷakāni, yevāpanakesu adhimokkhamanasikāratatramajjhattatā karuṇāmuditā ca. Viratiyo pana tehi ceva maggapaccayena cāti aṭṭhārasadhā paccayā honti. Micchādiṭṭhi tato vipākapaccayaṃ apanetvā sattarasadhā, micchāvācākammantājīvā tehi ceva kammāhārapaccayehi cāti ekūnavīsatidhā. Ahirikaṃ anottappaṃ māno thinaṃ middhaṃ uddhaccanti ime hetupurejātakammavipākāhārindriyajhānamaggapaccayā na honti, sesānaṃ pana soḷasannaṃ paccayānaṃ vasena paccayā honti. Vicikicchāissāmacchariyakukkuccāni tato adhipatipaccayaṃ apanetvā pannarasadhā viññāṇakkhandhassa. Adhipatipaccaye vuttanayeneva anekapaccayabhāvo veditabbo. Samanantarapaccayepi eseva nayo.

In the proximity condition, among the four aggregates mentioned in the way of ‘the eye-consciousness element’ and so forth, the feeling aggregate is not a condition by way of root, pre-arisen, kamma, nutriment, or path, but it is a condition by way of the remaining nineteen. The perception aggregate is also not a condition by way of faculty or jhāna, but it is a condition by way of the remaining seventeen. In the formations aggregate, the roots are conditions in the way stated in the root condition, and desire and energy are conditions in the way stated in the dominance condition. Contact is not a condition by way of root, pre-arisen, kamma, faculty, jhāna, or path, but it is a condition by way of the remaining eighteen. Volition is not a condition by way of root, pre-arisen, faculty, jhāna, or path, but it is a condition by way of the remaining nineteen. Applied thought is not a condition by way of root, pre-arisen, kamma, nutriment, or faculty, but it is a condition by way of the remaining nineteen. Sustained thought is also not a condition by way of path, but it is a condition by way of the remaining eighteen. Joy is a condition in the same ways. One-pointedness of mind is not a condition by way of root, pre-arisen, kamma, or nutriment, but it is a condition by way of the remaining twenty. Faith is not a condition by way of root, pre-arisen, kamma, nutriment, jhāna, or path, but it is a condition by way of the remaining eighteen. Mindfulness is a condition in nineteen ways, since it is a condition by way of those eighteen and also by way of path condition. The life faculty is a condition by way of the eighteen stated for faith. Moral shame and moral dread are conditions by way of the remaining seventeen, having excluded the faculty condition from those eighteen. The same applies to the pairs such as bodily tranquility, and among the miscellaneous factors, to resolution, attention, equanimity, compassion, and altruistic joy. The abstinences, however, are conditions in eighteen ways, since they are conditions by way of those seventeen and also by way of path condition. Wrong view is a condition in seventeen ways, having excluded the result condition from those eighteen; wrong speech, wrong action, and wrong livelihood are conditions in nineteen ways, since they are conditions by way of those seventeen and also by way of kamma and nutriment conditions. Shamelessness, moral fearlessness, conceit, sloth, torpor, and restlessness are not conditions by way of root, pre-arisen, kamma, result, nutriment, faculty, jhāna, or path, but they are conditions by way of the remaining sixteen. Doubt, envy, avarice, and worry are conditions in fifteen ways, having excluded the dominance condition from those sixteen. For the consciousness aggregate, its manifold conditionality should be understood in the same way as stated in the dominance condition. This same method applies also to the contiguity condition.

Sahajātapaccaye catūsu tāva khandhesu ekekassa dhammassa anekapaccayabhāvo vuttanayeneva veditabbo. Cattāri mahābhūtāni ārammaṇaārammaṇādhipatisahajātaaññamaññanissayaupanissayapurejātaatthiavigatavasena [Pg.389] navadhā paccayā honti. Hadayavatthu tesañceva vippayuttassa ca vasena dasadhā paccayo hoti. Aññamaññapaccaye apubbaṃ natthi. Nissayapaccaye cakkhāyatanādīni ārammaṇaārammaṇādhipatinissayaupanissayapurejātaindriyavippayuttaatthiavigatavasena navadhā paccayā honti. Upanissaye apubbaṃ natthi. Purejātapaccaye rūpasaddagandharasāyatanāni ārammaṇaārammaṇādhipatiupanissayapurejātaatthiavigatavasena chadhā paccayā honti. Ettakamevettha apubbaṃ. Pacchājātādīsu apubbaṃ natthi. Āhārapaccaye kabaḷīkārāhāro ārammaṇaārammaṇādhipatiupanissayaāhāraatthiavigatavasena chadhā paccayo hoti. Indriyādīsu apubbaṃ natthi. Evamettha ekadhammassa anekapaccayabhāvatopi viññātabbo vinicchayo.

In the conascence condition, the manifold conditionality of each phenomenon among the four aggregates should be understood in the same way as stated. The four great elements become conditions in nine ways: as object, object-dominance, conascence, mutuality, dependence, decisive support, pre-arisen, presence, and non-disappearance. The heart-base becomes a condition in ten ways: by those same and also by dissociation. In the mutuality condition, there is nothing new. In the dependence condition, the eye-base and so forth become conditions in nine ways: as object, object-dominance, dependence, decisive support, pre-arisen, faculty, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance. In the decisive support condition, there is nothing new. In the pre-arisen condition, the bases of form, sound, odor, and taste become conditions in six ways: as object, object-dominance, decisive support, pre-arisen, presence, and non-disappearance. Only this much is new here. In post-arisen and other conditions, there is nothing new. In the nutriment condition, edible food becomes a condition in six ways: as object, object-dominance, decisive support, nutriment, presence, and non-disappearance. In the faculty and other conditions, there is nothing new. Thus, the determination here should also be understood from the manifold conditionality of a single phenomenon.

Ekapaccayassa anekapaccayabhāvatoti hetupaccayādīsu yassa kassaci ekassa paccayassa yenākārena yenatthena yo paccayuppannānaṃ paccayo hoti, taṃ ākāraṃ taṃ atthaṃ avijahitvāva aññehipi yehākārehi yehi atthehi so tasmiññeva khaṇe tesaṃ dhammānaṃ anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati, tato anekapaccayabhāvato tassa vinicchayo veditabboti attho. Seyyathidaṃ – amoho hetupaccayo, so hetupaccayattaṃ avijahantova adhipatisahajātaaññamaññanissayavipākaindriyamaggasampayuttavippayuttaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi ekādasahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Alobhādosā tato adhipatiindriyamaggapaccaye tayo apanetvā sesānaṃ vasena anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchanti. Idaṃ vipākahetūsuyeva labbhati, kusalakiriyesu pana vipākapaccayatā parihāyati. Lobhadosamohā te tayo vipākañcāti cattāro apanetvā sesānaṃ vasena anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchanti.

From a single condition becoming a multiple condition: Among the root condition and so on, whatever single condition functions as a condition for conditioned phenomena in a particular manner and meaning, without abandoning that manner and meaning, it also becomes a multiple condition for those phenomena in that very moment through other manners and meanings. Therefore, the determination of this should be understood from its nature as a multiple condition. For example: Non-delusion is a root condition. Without abandoning its nature as a root condition, it also becomes a multiple condition through eleven other modes—namely, dominance, conascence, mutuality, dependence, result, faculty, path, association, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance. Non-greed and non-hatred, excluding the three conditions of dominance, faculty, and path, become multiple conditions by way of the remaining. This is obtained only in resultant roots; but in wholesome and functional states, the resultant conditionality is absent. Greed, hatred, and delusion, by excluding those three and the resultant condition—thus four—become multiple conditions by way of the remaining.

Ārammaṇapaccayo taṃ ārammaṇapaccayattaṃ avijahantaṃyeva ārammaṇādhipatinissayaupanissayapurejātavippayuttaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi sattahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Ayamettha ukkaṭṭhaparicchedo, arūpadhammānaṃ pana atītānāgatānaṃ vā rūpadhammānaṃ ārammaṇapaccayabhāve sati ārammaṇādhipatiārammaṇūpanissayamattaññeva uttari [Pg.390] labbhati. Adhipatipaccaye vīmaṃsā amohasadisā. Chando adhipatipaccayo adhipatipaccayattaṃ avijahantova sahajātaaññamaññanissayavipākasampayuttavippayuttaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi aṭṭhahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Vīriyaṃ tesañceva indriyamaggapaccayānañcāti imesaṃ vasena aparehipi dasahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Cittaṃ tato maggapaccayaṃ apanetvā āhārapaccayaṃ pakkhipitvā imesaṃ vasena adhipatipaccayato uttari dasahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Ārammaṇādhipatino pana heṭṭhā ārammaṇapaccaye vuttanayeneva anekapaccayabhāvo veditabbo.

The object condition, without abandoning its nature as an object condition, becomes a multiple condition in seven other modes through object-dominance, dependence, decisive support, pre-arisen, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance. This is the most extensive classification here. However, for immaterial phenomena, or for past and future material phenomena, when they are object conditions, only object-dominance and object-decisive-support are further obtained. In the dominance condition, the investigation is similar to that for non-delusion. Desire, while remaining a dominance condition, becomes a multiple condition in eight other modes through conascence, mutuality, dependence, result, association, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance. Energy, through these same modes and the faculty and path conditions, becomes a multiple condition in ten other modes. Mind, by excluding the path condition from those and including the nutriment condition, becomes a multiple condition in ten other modes in addition to the dominance condition. As for the object-dominance condition, its nature as a multiple condition should be understood in the same way as explained earlier under the object condition.

Anantarasamanantarapaccayā anantarasamanantarapaccayattaṃ avijahantāva upanissayakammaāsevananatthivigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi pañcahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchanti. Ariyamaggacetanāyeva cettha kammapaccayataṃ labhati, na sesadhammā. Sahajātapaccayo sahajātapaccayattaṃ avijahantova hetuadhipatiaññamaññanissayakammavipākaāhāraindriyajhānamaggasampayuttavippayuttaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena aparehi cuddasahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Ayampi ukkaṭṭhaparicchedo vatthusahajātādīnaṃ pana vasenettha hetupaccayādīnaṃ abhāvopi veditabbo. Aññamaññapaccayepi eseva nayo.

The contiguity and immediate contiguity conditions, without abandoning their nature as contiguity and immediate contiguity conditions, become multiple conditions in five other modes through decisive support, kamma, repetition, absence, and disappearance. Here, only the volition of the Noble Path obtains kamma conditionality, not the remaining states. The conascence condition, without abandoning its nature as a conascence condition, becomes a multiple condition in fourteen other modes through root, dominance, mutuality, dependence, kamma, result, nutriment, faculty, jhāna, path, association, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance. This too is the most extensive classification. However, here, in the case of base-conascent factors and so on, the absence of root conditions and so on should also be understood. The same method applies to the mutuality condition.

Nissayapaccayo nissayapaccayattaṃ avijahantova catuvīsatiyā paccayesu attano nissayapaccayattañceva anantarasamanantarapacchājātaāsevananatthivigatapaccaye ca cha apanetvā sesānaṃ vasena aparehipi sattarasahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Ayampi ukkaṭṭhaparicchedova vatthunissayādīnaṃ pana vasenettha hetupaccayādīnaṃ ābhāvopi veditabbo.

The dependence condition, without abandoning its nature as a dependence condition, among the twenty-four conditions, by excluding its own dependence conditionality and the six conditions—contiguity, immediate contiguity, post-nascence, repetition, absence, and disappearance—becomes a multiple condition in seventeen other modes by way of the remaining. This too is the most extensive classification. However, here, in the case of base-dependence factors and so on, the absence of root conditions and so on should also be understood.

Upanissayapaccaye ārammaṇūpanissayo ārammaṇādhipatisadiso. Anantarūpanissayo anantarūpanissayapaccayattaṃ avijahantova anantarasamanantarakammaāsevananatthivigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi chahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Ariyamaggacetanāyeva cettha kammapaccayataṃ labhati, na sesadhammā. Pakatūpanissayo pakatūpanissayova. Purejātapaccayo attano purejātapaccayattaṃ avijahantova ārammaṇaārammaṇādhipatinissayaupanissayaindriyavippayuttaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi [Pg.391] aṭṭhahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Ayampi ukkaṭṭhaniddesova ārammaṇapurejāte panettha nissayaindriyavippayuttapaccayatā na labbhati. Ito uttaripi labbhamānālabbhamānaṃ veditabbaṃ. Pacchājātapaccayo attano pacchājātapaccayabhāvaṃ avijahantova vippayuttaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi tīhākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Āsevanapaccayo āsevanapaccayattaṃ avijahantova anantarasamanantaraupanissayanatthivigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi pañcahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati.

In the decisive support condition, object decisive support is similar to object dominance. The immediate decisive support condition, without abandoning its nature as an immediate decisive support condition, becomes a multiple condition in six other modes through immediate contiguity, contiguity, kamma, repetition, absence, and disappearance. Here, only the volition of the Noble Path obtains the condition of kamma, not the remaining states. The natural decisive support condition is simply the natural decisive support condition. The pre-nascence condition, without abandoning its nature as a pre-nascence condition, becomes a multiple condition in eight other modes through object, object dominance, dependence, decisive support, faculty, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance. This too is an exposition of the strongest cases. However, in the case of object pre-nascence, the conditions of dependence, faculty, and dissociation are not obtained here. What is obtainable and unobtainable beyond this should also be understood. The post-nascence condition, without abandoning its nature as a post-nascence condition, becomes a multiple condition in three other modes through dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance. The repetition condition, without abandoning its nature as a repetition condition, becomes a multiple condition in five other modes through immediate contiguity, contiguity, decisive support, absence, and disappearance.

Kammapaccayo kammapaccayattaṃ avijahantova ekakkhaṇiko tāva sahajātaaññamaññanissayavipākaāhārasampayuttavippayuttaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi navahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Nānākkhaṇiko upanissayaanantarasamanantaranatthivigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi pañcahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Vipākapaccayo vipākapaccayattaṃ avijahantova hetuadhipatisahajātaaññamaññanissayakammaāhāraindriyajhānamaggasampayuttavippayuttaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi cuddasahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Āhārapaccaye kabaḷīkāro āhāro āhārapaccayattaṃ avijahantova atthiavigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi dvīhākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Sesā tayo āhārapaccayattaṃ avijahantāva yathānurūpaṃ adhipatisahajātaaññamaññanissayakammavipākaindriyasampayuttavippayuttaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi ekādasahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchanti.

The kamma condition, without abandoning its nature as a kamma condition, when simultaneous, becomes a multiple condition in nine other modes through co-nascence, mutuality, dependence, result, nutriment, association, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance. The non-simultaneous kamma becomes a multiple condition in five other modes through decisive support, immediate contiguity, contiguity, absence, and disappearance. The result condition, without abandoning its nature as a result condition, becomes a multiple condition in fourteen other modes through root, dominance, co-nascence, mutuality, dependence, kamma, nutriment, faculty, jhāna, path, association, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance. In the nutriment condition, edible food, without abandoning its nature as a nutriment condition, becomes a multiple condition in two other modes through presence and non-disappearance. The remaining three nutriments, without abandoning their nature as nutriment conditions, become multiple conditions in eleven other modes, as appropriate, through dominance, co-nascence, mutuality, dependence, kamma, result, faculty, association, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance.

Indriyapaccaye rūpino pañcindriyā indriyapaccayattaṃ avijahantāva nissayapurejātavippayuttaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi pañcahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchanti. Rūpajīvitindriyampi indriyapaccayattaṃ avijahantaññeva atthiavigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi dvīhākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Arūpino indriyānipi yathānurūpaṃ indriyapaccayattaṃ avijahantāneva hetuadhipatisahajātaaññamaññanissayavipākaāhārajhānamaggasampayuttavippayuttaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi terasahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchanti. Jhānapaccayo jhānapaccayattaṃ avijahantova yathānurūpaṃ [Pg.392] sahajātaaññamaññanissayavipākaindriyamaggasampayuttavippayuttaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi dasahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Maggapaccayo maggapaccayattaṃ avijahantova yathānurūpaṃ jhānapaccaye vuttānaṃ dasannaṃ hetuadhipatīnañcāti imesaṃ vasena aparehipi dvādasahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati.

In the faculty condition, the five material faculties, without abandoning their nature as faculty conditions, become multiple conditions in five other modes through dependence, pre-nascence, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance. The material life faculty also, without abandoning its nature as a faculty condition, becomes a multiple condition in two other modes through presence and non-disappearance. The immaterial faculties also, without abandoning their nature as faculty conditions, become multiple conditions in thirteen other modes, as appropriate, through root, dominance, co-nascence, mutuality, dependence, result, nutriment, jhāna, path, association, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance. The jhāna condition, without abandoning its nature as a jhāna condition, becomes a multiple condition in ten other modes, as appropriate, through co-nascence, mutuality, dependence, result, faculty, path, association, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance. The path condition, without abandoning its nature as a path condition, becomes a multiple condition in twelve other modes, as appropriate, through the ten mentioned for the jhāna condition, and also through root and dominance.

Sampayuttapaccayo sampayuttapaccayattaṃ avijahantova yathānurūpaṃ hetuadhipatisahajātaaññamaññanissayakammavipākaāhāraindriyajhānamaggaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena aparehipi terasahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Vippayuttapaccayo vippayuttapaccayattaṃ avijahantova anantarasamanantaraāsevanasampayuttanatthivigatasaṅkhāte cha paccaye apanetvā sesānaṃ vasena yathānurūpaṃ aparehipi sattarasahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Tattha rūpassa ca arūpassa ca paccayavibhāgo veditabbo. Atthipaccayo atthipaccayattaṃ avijahantova anantarasamanantaraāsevananatthivigatasaṅkhāte pañca paccaye apanetvā sesānaṃ vasena yathānurūpaṃ aparehi aṭṭhārasahākārehi anekapaccayabhāvaṃ gacchati. Natthipaccayavigatapaccayā anantarapaccayasadisā. Avigatapaccayo atthipaccayasadisoyevāti evamettha ekapaccayassa anekapaccayabhāvatopi viññātabbo vinicchayo.

The association condition, without abandoning its nature as an association condition, becomes a multiple condition in thirteen other modes, as appropriate, through root, dominance, co-nascence, mutuality, dependence, kamma, result, nutriment, faculty, jhāna, path, presence, and non-disappearance. The dissociation condition, without abandoning its nature as a dissociation condition, having excluded the six conditions—immediate contiguity, contiguity, repetition, association, absence, and disappearance—becomes a multiple condition in seventeen other modes, as appropriate, through the remaining conditions. Here, the division of conditions regarding material and immaterial phenomena should be understood. The presence condition, without abandoning its nature as a presence condition, having excluded the five conditions—immediate contiguity, contiguity, repetition, absence, and disappearance—becomes a multiple condition in eighteen other modes, as appropriate, through the remaining conditions. The absence condition and the disappearance condition are similar to the immediate contiguity condition. The non-disappearance condition is just like the presence condition. Thus, the determination should be understood from this analysis of how a single condition also becomes a multiple condition.

Paccayasabhāgatoti etesu hi catuvīsatiyā paccayesu anantarasamanantaraanantarūpanissayaāsevananatthivigatā sabhāgā, tathā ārammaṇaārammaṇādhipatiārammaṇūpanissayāti iminā upāyenettha paccayasabhāgatopi viññātabbo vinicchayo.

Similarity of conditions: Among these twenty-four conditions, immediate contiguity, contiguity, immediate decisive support, repetition, absence, and disappearance are of a similar nature. Likewise, by this method, the determination regarding the similarity of conditions should also be understood concerning the object condition, the object dominance condition, and the object decisive support condition.

Paccayavisabhāgatoti purejātapaccayo panettha pacchājātapaccayena visabhāgo, tathā sampayuttapaccayo vippayuttapaccayena, atthipaccayo natthipaccayena, vigatapaccayo avigatapaccayenāti iminā upāyenettha paccayavisabhāgatopi viññātabbo vinicchayo.

Regarding the dissimilarity of conditions: Here, the pre-nascence condition is dissimilar to the post-nascence condition; likewise, the associated condition to the dissociated condition, the presence condition to the absence condition, and the disappearance condition to the non-disappearance condition. Thus, through this method, the dissimilarity of conditions should also be understood in this analysis.

Yugaḷakatoti etesu ca atthasarikkhatāya, saddasarikkhatāya, kālapaṭipakkhatāya, hetuphalatāya, aññamaññapaṭipakkhatāyāti imehi kāraṇehi yugaḷakato viññātabbo vinicchayo. Anantarasamanantarā hi atthasarikkhatāya ekaṃ yugaḷakaṃ nāma; nissayūpanissayā saddasarikkhatāya, purejātapacchājātā [Pg.393] kālapaṭipakkhatāya, kammapaccayavipākapaccayā hetuphalatāya, sampayuttavippayuttapaccayā aññamaññapaṭipakkhatāya ekaṃ yugaḷakaṃ nāma, tathā atthinatthipaccayā, vigatāvigatapaccayā cāti evamettha yugaḷakatopi viññātabbo vinicchayo. Janakājanakatoti etesu ca anantarasamanantarānantarūpanissayapakatūpanissayāsevanapaccayā nānākkhaṇiko, kammapaccayo, natthivigatapaccayāti ime paccayā janakāyeva, na ajanakā. Pacchājātapaccayo kevalaṃ upatthambhakoyeva, na janako. Sesā janakā ca ajanakā ca upatthambhakā cāti attho. Evamettha janakājanakatopi viññātabbo vinicchayo.

Regarding pairs: In these, the analysis should be understood as being paired due to these reasons: similarity in meaning, similarity in sound, opposition in time, cause and effect, and mutual opposition. For instance, contiguity and immediacy form one pair due to similarity in meaning; dependence and decisive support due to similarity in sound; pre-nascence and post-nascence due to opposition in time; the kamma condition and the result condition due to cause and effect; the associated condition and the dissociated condition due to mutual opposition; likewise, the presence and absence conditions, and the disappearance and non-disappearance conditions. Thus, in this analysis, the analysis should also be understood in terms of being paired. Regarding generative and non-generative conditions: Among these, contiguity, immediacy, immediate decisive support, natural decisive support, repetition, the kamma condition of different moments, and the absence and disappearance conditions are solely generative, not non-generative. The post-nascence condition is merely supportive, not generative. The meaning is that the remaining conditions are generative, non-generative, and supportive. Thus, in this analysis, the analysis should also be understood in terms of generative and non-generative conditions.

Sabbaṭṭhānikāsabbaṭṭhānikatoti etesu ca sahajātanissayaatthiavigatapaccayā sabbaṭṭhānikā nāma, sabbesaṃ saṅkhatānaṃ rūpārūpadhammānaṃ ṭhānabhūtā kāraṇabhūtāti attho. Etehi vinā uppajjamāno ekadhammopi natthīti. Ārammaṇaārammaṇādhipatianantarasamanantarānantarūpanissayapakatūpanissayāsevanasampayuttanatthivigatapaccayā asabbaṭṭhānikā nāma. Na sabbesaṃ rūpārūpadhammānaṃ ṭhānabhūtā, arūpakkhandhānaññeva pana ṭhānabhūtā kāraṇabhūtāti attho. Arūpadhammāyeva hi etehi uppajjanti, na rūpadhammā. Purejātapacchājātāpi asabbaṭṭhānikā arūparūpānaññeva yathākkamena paccayabhāvato. Vuttāvasesāpi ekaccānaṃ rūpārūpadhammānaṃ uppattihetuto na sabbaṭṭhānikāti evamettha sabbaṭṭhānikā sabbaṭṭhānikatopi viññātabbo vinicchayo.

Regarding universal and non-universal conditions: Among these, the co-nascence, dependence, presence, and non-disappearance conditions are called universal, meaning that they are the basis and cause for all conditioned phenomena, both material and immaterial. This means that not a single phenomenon arises without them. The object, object predominance, contiguity, immediacy, immediate decisive support, natural decisive support, repetition, associated, absence, and disappearance conditions are called non-universal. This means that they are not the basis for all material and immaterial phenomena, but only the basis and cause for the immaterial aggregates. Indeed, only immaterial phenomena arise through these, not material phenomena. Even the pre-nascence and post-nascence conditions are non-universal, as they are conditions for immaterial and material phenomena respectively. The remaining conditions, too, are non-universal because they are the cause of the arising of only some material and immaterial phenomena. Thus, in this analysis, the analysis should also be understood in terms of universal and non-universal conditions.

Rūpaṃ rūpassātiādivikappatoti etesu ca catuvīsatiyā paccayesu ekapaccayopi ekantena rūpameva hutvā rūpasseva paccayo nāma natthi, ekantena pana rūpaṃ hutvā arūpasseva paccayo nāma atthi. Kataro panesoti? Purejātapaccayo. Purejātapaccayo hi ekantena rūpameva hutvā arūpasseva paccayo hoti. Ekantena rūpameva hutvā rūpārūpasseva paccayo nāmātipi natthi, ekantena pana arūpaṃ hutvā arūpasseva paccayo nāma atthi. Kataro panesoti? Anantarasamanantaraāsevanasampayuttanatthivigatavasena chabbidho. So hi sabbopi ekantena arūpameva hutvā arūpasseva paccayo hoti. Ekantena arūpameva hutvāpi ekantena rūpasseva paccayo nāmātipi atthi. Kataro panesoti? Pacchājātapaccayo. So hi ekantena [Pg.394] arūpaṃ hutvā rūpasseva paccayo hoti; ekantena pana arūpadhammova hutvā rūpārūpānaṃ paccayopi atthi. Kataro panesoti? Hetukammavipākajhānamaggavasena pañcavidho. So hi sabbopi ekantena arūpameva hutvā rūpadhammānaṃ arūpadhammānampi paccayo hoti. Ekantena pana rūpārūpameva hutvā rūpasseva paccayo nāmātipi natthi, arūpasseva pana hoti. Kataro panesoti? Ārammaṇapaccayo ceva upanissayapaccayo ca. Idañhi dvayaṃ ekantena rūpārūpameva hutvā arūpasseva paccayo hoti. Ekantena rūpārūpameva hutvā pana rūpārūpasseva paccayo nāmātipi atthi. Kataro panesoti? Adhipatisahajātaaññamaññanissayaāhāraindriyavippayuttaatthiavigatavasena navavidho. So hi sabbopi ekantena rūpārūpameva hutvā rūpārūpasseva paccayo hotīti evamettha rūpaṃ rūpassātiādivikappatopi viññātabbo vinicchayo.

Regarding the classifications such as 'form is a condition for form': Among these twenty-four conditions, there is no condition that is exclusively form and serves only as a condition for form. However, there is a condition that is exclusively form and serves only as a condition for non-form. Which one is that? The pre-nascence condition. The pre-nascence condition is exclusively form and serves only as a condition for non-form. There is no condition that is exclusively form and serves as a condition for both form and non-form. However, there is a condition that is exclusively non-form and serves only as a condition for non-form. Which one is that? The sixfold condition consisting of contiguity, immediacy, repetition, association, absence, and disappearance. All of these are exclusively non-form and serve only as a condition for non-form. There is also a condition that is exclusively non-form and serves only as a condition for form. Which one is that? The post-nascence condition. This is exclusively non-form and serves only as a condition for form. There is also a condition that is exclusively non-form and serves as a condition for both form and non-form. Which one is that? The fivefold condition consisting of root, kamma, result, jhāna, and path. All of these are exclusively non-form and serve as a condition for both form and non-form phenomena. There is no condition that is exclusively both form and non-form and serves only as a condition for form, but there is one that serves only as a condition for non-form. Which one is that? The object condition and the decisive support condition. These two are exclusively both form and non-form and serve only as a condition for non-form. There is also a condition that is exclusively both form and non-form and serves as a condition for both form and non-form. Which one is that? The ninefold condition consisting of predominance, co-nascence, mutuality, dependence, nutriment, faculty, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance. All of these are exclusively both form and non-form and serve as a condition for both form and non-form. Thus, in this analysis, the analysis should also be understood in terms of the classifications such as 'form is a condition for form'.

Bhavabhedatoti imesu pana catuvīsatiyā paccayesu pañcavokārabhave tāva na koci paccayo na labbhati nāma. Catuvokārabhave pana tayo purejātapacchājātavippayuttapaccaye apanetvā sesā ekavīsatimeva labbhanti. Ekavokārabhave sahajātaaññamaññanissayakammaindriyaatthiavigatavasena satteva labbhanti. Bāhire pana anindriyabaddharūpe sahajātaaññamaññanissayaatthiavigatavasena pañceva labbhantīti evamettha bhavabhedatopi viññātabbo vinicchayoti.

Regarding the distinction of planes of existence: Among these twenty-four conditions, in the five-aggregate plane of existence, there is no condition that is not found. In the four-aggregate plane of existence, only twenty-one are found, excluding the three conditions—pre-nascence, post-nascence, and dissociation. In the one-aggregate plane of existence, only seven are found: co-nascence, mutuality, dependence, kamma, faculty, presence, and non-disappearance. In external non-faculty-bound material phenomena, only five are found: co-nascence, mutuality, dependence, presence, and non-disappearance. Thus, in this analysis, the analysis should also be understood in terms of the distinction of planes of existence.

Paccayaniddesavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

Here ends the explanation of the Chapter on the Exposition of Conditions.

Pucchāvāro

The Chapter of Questions

1. Paccayānulomavaṇṇanā

1. Exposition of the Positive Method

Evaṃ anulomapaṭṭhānādīsu tikapaṭṭhānādivasena catuvīsatisamantapaṭṭhānasamodhāne paṭṭhānamahāpakaraṇe ye tikādayo nissāya niddiṭṭhattā etaṃ tikapaṭṭhānaṃ, dukapaṭṭhānaṃ…pe… dukadukapaṭṭhānanti vuttaṃ. Te anāmasitvā yesaṃ paccayānaṃ vasena te tikādayo vibhattā, te paccaye eva tāva iminā mātikānikkhepapaccayavibhaṅgasaṅkhātena vārena uddesato ca niddesato ca dassetvā, idāni ye tikādayo nissāya niddiṭṭhattā etaṃ tikapaṭṭhānaṃ, dukapaṭṭhānaṃ…pe… dukadukapaṭṭhānanti vuttaṃ. Te [Pg.395] tikādayo imesaṃ paccayānaṃ vasena vitthāretvā dassetuṃ ekekaṃ tikadukaṃ nissāya sattahi mahāvārehi desanā katā. Tesaṃ imāni nāmāni – paṭiccavāro, sahajātavāro, paccayavāro, nissayavāro, saṃsaṭṭhavāro, sampayuttavāro, pañhāvāroti.

Thus, in the Anuloma Paṭṭhāna and so forth, in the comprehensive presentation of the twenty-four universal relations by way of the Triad-Paṭṭhāna, etc., within the Great Treatise of Relations, it is called the Triad-Paṭṭhāna, the Dyad-Paṭṭhāna… and so forth… the Dyad-Dyad-Paṭṭhāna, because it is designated by relying on these triads and so forth. Having first, without touching upon them, shown the very conditions by which those triads and so forth are analyzed in this section called the Mātikānikkhepa Paccayavibhaṅga, both in summary and in detail, now, in order to explain them in detail by means of these conditions, a discourse is given in seven great sections, relying on each triad and dyad. These are their names: the Paṭiccavāra, the Sahajātavāra, the Paccayavāra, the Nissayavāra, the Saṃsaṭṭhavāra, the Sampayuttavāra, and the Pañhāvāra.

Tattha ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo’’ti evaṃ paṭiccābhidhānavasena vutto paṭiccavāro nāma. Kusalaṃ dhammaṃ sahajāto kusalo dhammo’’ti evaṃ sahajātābhidhānavasena vutto sahajātavāro nāma. So purimena paṭiccavārena atthato ninnānākaraṇo. Paṭiccābhidhānavasena bujjhanakānaṃ vasena pana paṭhamo vutto, sahajātābhidhānavasena bujjhanakānaṃ vasena dutiyo. Dvīsupi cetesu rūpārūpadhammavasena paccayā ceva paccayuppannadhammā ca veditabbā. Te ca kho sahajātāva, na purejātapacchājātā labbhanti. ‘‘Kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paccayā kusalo dhammo’’ti evaṃ paccayābhidhānavasena vutto pana paccayavāro nāma. Sopi purimavāradvayaṃ viya rūpārūpadhammavaseneva veditabbo. Paccayo panettha purejātopi labbhati. Ayamassa purimavāradvayato viseso. Tadanantaro ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ nissāya kusalo dhammo’’ti evaṃ nissayābhidhānavasena vutto nissayavāro nāma. So purimena paccayavārena atthato ninnānākaraṇo. Paccayābhidhānavasena bujjhanakānaṃ vasena pana paṭhamo vutto, nissayābhidhānavasena bujjhanakānaṃ vasena dutiyo. Tato paraṃ ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ saṃsaṭṭho kusalo dhammo’’ti evaṃ saṃsaṭṭhābhidhānavasena vutto saṃsaṭṭhavāro nāma. ‘‘Kusalaṃ dhammaṃ sampayutto kusalo dhammo’’ti evaṃ sampayuttābhidhānavasena vutto sampayuttavāro nāma. So purimena saṃsaṭṭhavārena atthato ninnānākaraṇo. Saṃsaṭṭhābhidhānavasena bujjhanakānaṃ vasena pana paṭhamo vutto, sampayuttābhidhānavasena dutiyo. Dvīsupi cetesu arūpadhammavaseneva paccayā paccayuppannā ca veditabbā. Sattamavāre pana yasmā ‘‘kusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo’’tiādinā nayena te te pañhe uddharitvā puna ‘‘kusalā hetū sampayuttakānaṃ khandhāna’’ntiādinā nayena sabbepi te pañhā nijjaṭā niggumbā ca katvā vibhattā, tasmā so vāro pañhānaṃ sādhukaṃ vibhattattā pañhāvārotveva saṅkhyaṃ gato. Rūpārūpadhammavaseneva panettha paccayāpi paccayuppannāpi veditabbā.

Here, the division called the Paṭiccavāra is stated by way of the designation 'dependence' as follows: 'A wholesome phenomenon depends on a wholesome phenomenon.' The division called the Sahajātavāra is stated by way of the designation 'co-nascence' as follows: 'A wholesome phenomenon is co-nascent with a wholesome phenomenon.' This does not differ in meaning from the preceding Paṭiccavāra. However, the first is stated for the sake of those who understand by way of the designation 'dependence,' and the second for the sake of those who understand by way of the designation 'co-nascence.' In both these cases, conditions and condition-arisen phenomena should be understood in terms of material and immaterial phenomena. These are only co-nascent; prior-arisen or later-arisen are not obtained. The division called the Paccayavāra, however, is stated by way of the designation 'condition' as follows: 'A wholesome phenomenon is a condition for a wholesome phenomenon.' This too, like the preceding two divisions, should be understood in terms of material and immaterial phenomena. Here, however, a prior-arisen condition is also obtained. This is its distinction from the preceding two divisions. Following that, the division called the Nissayavāra is stated by way of the designation 'support' as follows: 'A wholesome phenomenon relies on a wholesome phenomenon.' This does not differ in meaning from the preceding Paccayavāra. However, the first is stated for the sake of those who understand by way of the designation 'condition,' and the second for the sake of those who understand by way of the designation 'support.' Next, the division called the Saṃsaṭṭhavāra is stated by way of the designation 'association' as follows: 'A wholesome phenomenon is associated with a wholesome phenomenon.' The division called the Sampayuttavāra is stated by way of the designation 'conjunction' as follows: 'A wholesome phenomenon is conjoined with a wholesome phenomenon.' This does not differ in meaning from the preceding Saṃsaṭṭhavāra. However, the first is stated for the sake of those who understand by way of the designation 'association,' and the second by way of the designation 'conjunction.' In both these cases, conditions and condition-arisen phenomena should be understood only in terms of immaterial phenomena. In the seventh division, however, since those various questions are extracted by such a method as 'A wholesome phenomenon is a condition for a wholesome phenomenon by way of root condition,' and then all those questions are made clear and disentangled by such a method as 'Wholesome roots are conditions for the associated aggregates,' therefore that division is reckoned as the Pañhāvāra due to the questions being thoroughly analyzed. Here too, conditions and condition-arisen phenomena should be understood in terms of material and immaterial phenomena.

Tattha [Pg.396] yo tāva esa sabbapaṭhamo paṭiccavāro nāma, so uddesato niddesato ca duvidho hoti. Tattha uddesavāro paṭhamo, pucchāvārotipi vuccati. Paṇṇattivārotipi tasseva nāmaṃ. So hi kusalādayo paṭicca kusalādīnaṃ hetupaccayādīnaṃ vasena uddiṭṭhattā uddesavāro, kusalādayo paṭicca hetupaccayādivasena kusalādīnaṃ uppattiyā pucchitattā pucchāvāro, kusalādayo paṭicca hetupaccayādivasena kusalādīnaṃ uppattiyā paññāpitattā paṇṇattivārotipi vutto.

Here, that very first division called the Paṭiccavāra is twofold: by way of brief statement and by way of detailed explanation. Among them, the brief statement division is first; it is also called the Question Division. The Designation Division is also a name for it. For it is called the brief statement division because wholesome states and so forth are briefly stated by way of root condition and other conditions, dependent on wholesome states and so forth. It is called the Question Division because the arising of wholesome states and so forth by way of root condition and other conditions, dependent on wholesome states and so forth, is questioned. And it is called the Designation Division because the arising of wholesome states and so forth by way of root condition and other conditions, dependent on wholesome states and so forth, is designated.

25-34. Tattha siyā kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjeyya hetupaccayāti parikappapucchā. Ayañhettha attho – yo kusalo dhammo uppajjeyya hetupaccayā, kiṃ so kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca siyāti atha vā kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca yo kusalo dhammo uppajjeyya, so hetupaccayā siyāti ayamettha attho. Tattha paṭīti sadisatthe vattati. Sadisapuggalo hi paṭipuggalo, sadisabhāgo ca paṭibhāgoti vuccati. Iccāti gamanussukkavacanametaṃ. Ubhayaṃ ekato katvā paṭiccāti paṭigantvā sahuppattisaṅkhātena sadisabhāvena patvā, tena saddhiṃ ekato uppattibhāvaṃ upagantvāti vuttaṃ hoti. Kusalo dhammoti evaṃ sahuppattibhāvena kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjeyya hetupaccayāti pucchati. Atha vā paṭiccāti paccayaṃ katvā. Taṃ pana paccayakaraṇaṃ purejātepi paccaye labbhati sahajātepi. Idha sahajātaṃ adhippetaṃ. Siyā kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca akusalotiādīsupi eseva nayo. Tattha kiñcāpi sahajātavasena kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca akusalo natthi, imasmiṃ pana pucchāvāre yampi vissajjiyamānaṃ atthato labbhati, yampi na labbhati, taṃ sabbaṃ pucchāvasena uddhaṭaṃ. Parato pana vissajjane yaṃ na labbhati, taṃ pahāya yaṃ labbhati, tadeva vissajjitaṃ.

Herein, 'Might a wholesome phenomenon arise dependent on a wholesome phenomenon by way of root condition?' is a hypothetical question. The meaning here is this: 'If a wholesome phenomenon were to arise by way of root condition, might it be dependent on a wholesome phenomenon?' Or, 'If a wholesome phenomenon were to arise dependent on a wholesome phenomenon, might it be by way of root condition?' This is the meaning here. Here, 'paṭi' operates in the sense of 'similar.' For a similar person is indeed called a counterpart, and a similar portion is called a counterpart portion. The word 'icca' is an expression indicating going. Taking both together, 'paṭicca' means having gone towards, having reached by way of similarity, which is co-arising, and thus having entered into the state of arising together with it. Thus, by way of the nature of co-arising, it asks: 'Might a wholesome phenomenon arise dependent on a wholesome phenomenon by way of root condition?' Alternatively, 'paṭicca' means making it a condition. That making-of-a-condition is obtained both in a prior-arisen condition and in a co-arisen condition. Here, the co-arisen is intended. The same method applies to 'Might an unwholesome phenomenon arise dependent on a wholesome phenomenon?' and so forth. Herein, although in terms of co-arising there is no unwholesome phenomenon dependent on a wholesome phenomenon, in this Question Section, whatever is obtained in terms of meaning when being answered, and whatever is not obtained, all that is set forth by way of a question. Later, however, in the answering, what is not obtained is abandoned, and only what is obtained is answered.

Evamettha pucchānaṃ atthañceva pucchāgatiñca ñatvā idāni gaṇanavasena pucchāparicchedo veditabbo. Ettha hi ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭiccā’’ti kusalapadaṃ ādiṃ katvā kusalākusalābyākatantā tisso pucchā, puna tadevādiṃ katvā kusalābyākatādivasena dukappabhedantā tisso, puna tadevādiṃ katvā tikantā ca ekā, evaṃ kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭiccāti kusalādikā [Pg.397] satta pucchā, tathā akusalādikā, tathā abyākatādikā, tathā kusalābyākatādikā, akusalābyākatādikā, kusalākusalādikā, kusalākusalābyākatādikāti sabbāpi sattannaṃ sattakānaṃ vasena kusalattikaṃ nissāya hetupaccaye ekūnapaññāsaṃ pucchā.

Thus, having understood both the meaning of the questions and their course, the delimitation of questions should now be understood by way of enumeration. Herein, taking the term 'wholesome' as the beginning in 'dependent on a wholesome phenomenon,' there are three questions ending with wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate. Again, taking that same term as the beginning, there are three questions ending with the dyad-divisions, by way of wholesome-indeterminate and so forth. Again, taking that same term as the beginning, there is one question ending with the triad. Thus, taking 'dependent on a wholesome phenomenon' as the beginning, there are seven questions beginning with the wholesome. Similarly, there are seven beginning with the unwholesome, seven beginning with the indeterminate, seven beginning with the wholesome-indeterminate, seven beginning with the unwholesome-indeterminate, seven beginning with the wholesome-unwholesome, and seven beginning with the wholesome-unwholesome-indeterminate. In all, relying on the wholesome triad, there are forty-nine questions in the root condition, by way of seven sets of seven.

Tattha ekamūlakāvasānā nava, ekamūladukāvasānā nava, ekamūlatikāvasānā tisso, dukamūlaekāvasānā nava, dukamūladukāvasānā nava, dukamūlatikāvasānā tisso, tikamūlaekāvasānā tisso, tikamūladukāvasānā tisso, tikamūlatikāvasānā ekāti evametā mūlavasenāpi veditabbā. Yathā ca hetupaccaye ekūnapaññāsaṃ, ārammaṇapaccayādīsupi tathevāti sabbesupi catuvīsatiyā paccayesu –

Herein, there are nine [questions] with a single-term basis and a single-term ending; nine with a single-term basis and a dyad ending; three with a single-term basis and a triad ending; nine with a dyad basis and a single-term ending; nine with a dyad basis and a dyad ending; three with a dyad basis and a triad ending; three with a triad basis and a single-term ending; three with a triad basis and a dyad ending; and one with a triad basis and a triad ending. Thus, these should also be understood by way of their bases. And just as there are forty-nine in the root condition, so too in the object condition and so forth. Thus, in all twenty-four conditions—

Sahassamekañca sataṃ, chasattati punāparā;

Pucchā sampiṇḍitā honti, nayamhi ekamūlake.

One thousand, one hundred, and seventy-six more; the questions are thus summed up in the single-basis method.

35-36. Tato paraṃ hetupaccayā ārammaṇapaccayāti dumūlakanayo āraddho. Tattha hetārammaṇaduko…pe… hetuavigatadukoti hetupaccayena saddhiṃ tevīsati dukā honti. Tesu hetupaccaye viya hetārammaṇadukepi ekūnapaññāsaṃ pucchā, tāsu pāḷiyaṃ dveyeva dassitā. Yathā ca hetārammaṇaduke ekūnapaññāsaṃ tathā hetādhipatidukādīsupi. Tattha paṭhamapucchāvasena hetādhipatiduko, hetānantaraduko, hetusamanantaradukoti paṭipāṭiyā tayo duke dassetvā pariyosāne hetuavigataduko dassito, sesaṃ saṅkhittaṃ. Pucchāparicchedo panettha evaṃ veditabbo.

35-36. Thereafter, the two-basis method is commenced, [starting with] 'root condition, object condition.' Herein, the dyad of root-object… and so on… up to the dyad of root-non-disappearance—thus, there are twenty-three dyads together with the root condition. Among these, just as in the root condition, so also in the root-object dyad there are forty-nine questions, of which only two are shown in the Pāli. And just as there are forty-nine in the root-object dyad, so too in the root-dominance dyad and so forth. Herein, by way of the first question, three dyads are shown in sequence—namely, the root-dominance dyad, the root-proximity dyad, and the root-contiguity dyad—and at the end the root-non-disappearance dyad is shown; the rest is condensed. The delimitation of questions here should be understood thus:

Sahassamekañca sataṃ, sattavīsatimeva ca;

Dukesu tevīsatiyā, pucchā honti dumūlake.

One thousand, one hundred, and twenty-seven indeed; in the twenty-three dyads, such are the questions in the two-basis method.

37. Tato paraṃ hetupaccayā ārammaṇapaccayā adhipatipaccayāti timūlakanayo āraddho. Tattha hetārammaṇadukena saddhiṃ adhipatipaccayādīsu bāvīsatiyā paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena bāvīsati tikā honti. Tesu paṭhamapucchāvasena paṭhamattikañca dutiyattikañca dassetvā pariyosānatiko dassito, sesaṃ saṅkhittaṃ. Yathā pana [Pg.398] dukesu, evaṃ tikesupi ekamekasmiṃ tike ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā sabbesupi bāvīsatiyā tikesu –

37. Thereafter, the three-basis method is begun with 'root condition, object condition, dominance condition.' Herein, together with the root-object dyad, twenty-two triads are formed by combining each of the twenty-two conditions beginning with the dominance condition. Among these, the first and second triads are shown by way of the first question, and the final triad is shown; the rest is condensed. And just as in the dyads, so too in the triads: with forty-nine in each triad, in all twenty-two triads—

Sahassamekaṃ pucchānaṃ, aṭṭhasattatimeva ca;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, nayamhi tikamūlake.

One thousand and seventy-eight questions indeed; by calculation, such are the questions in the three-basis method.

38. Tato paraṃ hetupaccayā ārammaṇapaccayā adhipatipaccayā anantarapaccayāti catumūlakanayo āraddho. Tattha paṭhamattikena saddhiṃ anantarapaccayādīsu ekavīsatiyā paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena ekavīsati catukkā honti. Tesu dve catukke dassetvā sesaṃ saṅkhittaṃ. Idhāpi ekamekasmiṃ catukke ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā sabbesupi ekavīsatiyā catukkesu –

38. Thereafter, the four-basis method is begun with 'root condition, object condition, dominance condition, proximity condition.' Herein, together with the first triad, twenty-one tetrads are formed by combining each of the twenty-one conditions beginning with the proximity condition. Among these, two tetrads are shown, and the rest are condensed. Here too, with forty-nine in each tetrad, in all twenty-one tetrads—

Sahassamekaṃ pucchānaṃ, ekūnatiṃsa punāparā;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, nayamhi catumūlake.

One thousand and twenty-nine more; by calculation, such are the questions in the four-basis method.

Tato paraṃ pañcamūlakaṃ ādiṃ katvā yāva sabbamūlakā desanā katā, taṃ sabbaṃ saṅkhipitvā heṭṭhā vuttañca upari vattabbañca ekato katvā pāḷiyaṃ ‘‘ekamūlakaṃ, dumūlakaṃ, timūlakaṃ, catumūlakaṃ, pañcamūlakaṃ, sabbamūlakaṃ asammuyhantena vitthāretabba’’nti nayo dassito. Tattha ekamūlakādīsu yaṃ vattabbaṃ, taṃ vuttameva. Pañcamūlake pana paṭhamacatukkena saddhiṃ samanantarapaccayādīsu samavīsatiyā paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena samavīsati pañcakā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

Thereafter, the teaching was given, beginning with the five-root method up to the all-root method. By condensing all that, and by combining what was said below with what is to be said above, the method is shown in the Pāli text thus: 'The one-root, two-root, three-root, four-root, five-root, and all-root methods should be expounded without confusion.' Therein, what was to be said about the one-root method, etc., has already been said. But in the five-root method, together with the first tetrad, twenty pentads are formed by combining each of the twenty conditions beginning with the contiguity condition. In each of these, having made forty-nine—

Satāni nava pucchānaṃ, asīti ca punāparā;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, nayamhi pañcamūlake.

Nine hundred questions, and eighty more besides; by calculation, these are the questions in the five-root method.

Chamūlake paṭhamapañcakena saddhiṃ sahajātapaccayādīsu ekūnavīsatiyā paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena ekūnavīsati chakkā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the six-root method, together with the first pentad, nineteen sextads are formed by combining each of the nineteen conditions beginning with the conascence condition. In each of these, having made forty-nine—

Satāni nava pucchānaṃ, ekatiṃsa tatoparā;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, nayamhi chakkamūlake.

Nine hundred questions, and thirty-one beyond that; by calculation, these are the questions in the six-root method.

Sattamūlake [Pg.399] paṭhamachakkena saddhiṃ aññamaññapaccayādīsu aṭṭhārasasu paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena aṭṭhārasa sattakā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the seven-root method, together with the first sextad, eighteen septads are formed by combining each of the eighteen conditions beginning with the mutuality condition. In each of these, having made forty-nine—

Satāni aṭṭha pucchānaṃ, dvāsīti ca tatoparā;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, nayamhi sattamūlake.

Eight hundred questions, and eighty-two beyond that; by calculation, these are the questions in the seven-root method.

Aṭṭhamūlake paṭhamasattakena saddhiṃ nissayapaccayādīsu sattarasasu paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena sattarasa aṭṭhakā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the eight-root method, together with the first septad, seventeen octads are formed by combining each of the seventeen conditions beginning with the dependence condition. In each of these, having made forty-nine—

Satāni aṭṭha pucchānaṃ, tettiṃsā ca tatoparā;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, nayamhi aṭṭhamūlake.

Eight hundred questions, and thirty-three beyond that; by calculation, these are the questions in the eight-root method.

Navamūlake paṭhamaaṭṭhakena saddhiṃ upanissayapaccayādīsu soḷasasu paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena soḷasa navakā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the nine-root method, together with the first octad, sixteen nonads are formed by combining each of the sixteen conditions beginning with the decisive support condition. In each of these, having made forty-nine—

Satāni satta pucchānaṃ, caturāsīti tatoparā;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, nayamhi navamūlake.

Seven hundred questions, and eighty-four beyond that; by calculation, these are the questions in the nine-root method.

Dasamūlake paṭhamanavakena saddhiṃ purejātapaccayādīsu pannarasasu paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena pannarasa dasakā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the ten-root method, together with the first nonad, fifteen decads are formed by combining each of the fifteen conditions beginning with the prenascence condition. In each of these, having made forty-nine—

Satāni satta pucchānaṃ, pañcatiṃsa tatoparā;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, nayamhi dasamūlake.

Seven hundred questions, and thirty-five beyond that; by calculation, these are the questions in the ten-root method.

Ekādasamūlake paṭhamadasakena saddhiṃ pacchājātapaccayādīsu cuddasasu paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena cuddasa ekādasakā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the eleven-root method, together with the first decad, fourteen hendecads are formed by combining each of the fourteen conditions beginning with the postnascence condition. In each of these, having made forty-nine—

Cha satāni ca pucchānaṃ, chaḷāsīti tatoparā;

Nayamhi pucchā gaṇitā, ekādasakamūlake.

Six hundred questions, and eighty-six beyond that; in this method are the questions counted, in the eleven-root method.

Dvādasamūlake paṭhamaekādasakena saddhiṃ āsevanapaccayādīsu terasasu paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena terasa dvādasakā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the twelve-root method, together with the first hendecad, thirteen duodecads are formed by combining each of the thirteen conditions beginning with the repetition condition. In each of these, having made forty-nine—

Cha [Pg.400] satāni ca pucchānaṃ, sattatiṃsa tatoparā;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, naye dvādasamūlake.

Six hundred questions, and thirty-seven beyond that; by calculation, these are the questions in the twelve-root method.

Terasamūlake paṭhamadvādasakena saddhiṃ kammapaccayādīsu dvādasasu paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena dvādasa terasakā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the thirteen-root method, together with the first duodecad, twelve tredecads are formed by combining each of the twelve conditions beginning with the kamma condition. In each of these, having made forty-nine—

Satāni pañca pucchānaṃ, aṭṭhāsīti punāparā;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, naye terasamūlake.

Five hundred questions, and eighty-eight more besides; by calculation, these are the questions in the thirteen-root method.

Cuddasamūlake paṭhamaterasakena saddhiṃ vipākapaccayādīsu ekādasasu paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena ekādasa cuddasakā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the fourteen-root method, together with the first tredecad, eleven quattuordecads are formed by combining each of the eleven conditions beginning with the result condition. In each of these, having made forty-nine—

Satāni pañca pucchānaṃ, tiṃsa cātha navāparā;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, naye cuddasamūlake.

Five hundred questions, and then thirty and nine more; by calculation, these are the questions in the fourteen-root method.

Pannarasamūlake paṭhamacuddasakena saddhiṃ āhārapaccayādīsu dasasu paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena dasa pannarasakā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the fifteen-root method, together with the first quattuordecad, ten quindecads are formed by combining each of the ten conditions beginning with the nutriment condition. In each of these, having made forty-nine—

Satāni cattāri pucchānaṃ, navuti ca tatoparā;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, naye pannarasamūlake.

Four hundred questions, and ninety beyond that; by calculation, these are the questions in the fifteen-root method.

Soḷasamūlake paṭhamapannarasakena saddhiṃ indriyapaccayādīsu navasu paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena nava soḷasakā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the sixteen-root method, together with the first quindecad, nine sexdecads are formed by combining each of the nine conditions beginning with the faculty condition. In each of these, having made forty-nine—

Satāni cattāri cattā-līsekā ceva punāparā;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, naye soḷasamūlake.

Four hundred questions, and forty-one more besides; by calculation, these are the questions in the sixteen-root method.

Sattarasamūlake paṭhamasoḷasakena saddhiṃ jhānapaccayādīsu aṭṭhasu paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena aṭṭha sattarasakā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the seventeen-root method, together with the first sexdecad, eight septendecads are formed by combining each of the eight conditions beginning with the jhāna condition. In each of these, having made forty-nine—

Satāni tīṇi pucchānaṃ, navuti dve punāparā;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, naye sattarasamūlake.

Three hundred questions, and ninety-two more besides; by calculation, these are the questions in the seventeen-root method.

Aṭṭhārasamūlake [Pg.401] paṭhamasattarasakena saddhiṃ maggapaccayādīsu sattasu paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena satta aṭṭhārasakā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the eighteen-root method, together with the first septendecad, seven octodecads are formed by combining each of the seven conditions beginning with the path condition. In each of these, having made forty-nine—

Satāni tīṇi pucchānaṃ, tecattārīsameva ca;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, naye aṭṭhārasamūlake.

Three hundred questions, and forty-three as well; by calculation, these are the questions in the eighteen-root method.

Ekūnavīsatimūlake paṭhamaaṭṭhārasakena saddhiṃ sampayuttapaccayādīsu chasu paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena cha ekūnavīsatikā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the nineteen-root method, together with the first octodecuplet, six sets of nineteen are formed by combining each of the six conditions beginning with the association condition. In each of these, forty-nine are made—

Dve satā navuti ceva, catasso ca punāparā;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, naye ekūnavīsatike.

Two hundred and ninety-four questions are counted in the nineteen-root method.

Vīsatimūlake paṭhamaekūnavīsatikena saddhiṃ vippayuttapaccayādīsu pañcasu paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena pañcavīsatikā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the twenty-root method, together with the first novendecuplet, five sets of twenty are formed by combining each of the five conditions beginning with the dissociation condition. In each of these, forty-nine are made—

Dve satā honti pucchānaṃ, cattālīsā ca pañca ca;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, naye vīsatimūlake.

Two hundred and forty-five questions are counted in the twenty-root method.

Ekavīsatimūlake paṭhamavīsatikena saddhiṃ atthipaccayādīsu catūsu paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena cattāro ekavīsatikā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the twenty-one-root method, together with the first vicenuplet, four sets of twenty-one are formed by combining each of the four conditions beginning with the presence condition. In each of these, forty-nine are made—

Sataṃ chanavuti ceva, pucchā honti sampiṇḍitā;

Gaṇitā lakkhaṇaññūhi, ekavīsatike naye.

One hundred and ninety-six questions are thus compiled, reckoned by those skilled in reckoning, in the twenty-one-root method.

Dvāvīsatimūlake paṭhamaekavīsatikena saddhiṃ natthipaccayādīsu tīsu paccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena tayo dvāvīsatikā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the twenty-two-root method, together with the first unvicenuplet, three sets of twenty-two are formed by combining each of the three conditions beginning with the absence condition. In each of these, forty-nine are made—

Cattālīsādhikaṃ sataṃ, satta ceva punāparā;

Pucchā gaṇanato honti, naye dvāvīsatimūlake.

One hundred and forty-seven questions are counted in the twenty-two-root method.

Tevīsatimūlake [Pg.402] paṭhamadvāvīsatikena saddhiṃ dvīsu vigatāvigatapaccayesu ekamekassa yojanāvasena dve tevīsatikā honti. Tesu ekamekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā –

In the twenty-three-root method, together with the first duovicenuplet, two sets of twenty-three are formed by combining each of the two conditions, disappearance and non-disappearance. In each of these, forty-nine are made—

Aṭṭhanavutimevidha, pucchā gaṇanato matā;

Nayamhi tevīsatime, tevīsatikamūlake.

Ninety-eight questions are considered in this way in the twenty-three-root method.

Catuvīsatimūlako pana sabbapaccayānaṃ samodhānavasena veditabbo, teneva sabbamūlakoti vutto. Tattha ekūnapaññāsameva pucchā hontīti sabbāpetā hetupaccayapadameva gahetvā ekamūlakādīnaṃ sabbamūlakapariyosānānaṃ vasena satthārā devaparisati vitthārato vibhattā pucchā idha saṅkhepena dassitā.

The method with twenty-four roots, however, is to be understood as the combination of all conditions; hence, it is called the all-root. In that, there are indeed forty-nine questions. All these questions, taking only the root-condition term, were explained in detail by the Teacher in the assembly of devas, in the manner of the single-root and so on, up to the all-root conclusion, but here they are shown briefly.

Tāsaṃ pana sabbāsampi ayaṃ gaṇanapiṇḍo – ekamūlakanayasmiñhi ekādasa satāni chasattati ca pucchā āgatā. Hetupaccayanaye teneva mūlakena ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā imasmiṃ hetupaccayamūlake gahetabbā, sesā sesapaccayamūlakesu pakkhipitabbā. Dumūlake sattavīsāni ekādasa satāni, timūlake sahassaṃ aṭṭhasattati ca, catumūlake sahassaṃ ekūnatiṃsañca, pañcamūlake asītādhikāni nava satāni, chamūlake ekatiṃsāni nava satāni, sattamūlake dvāsītāni aṭṭha satāni, aṭṭhamūlake tettiṃsāni aṭṭha satāni, navamūlake caturāsītāni satta satāni, dasamūlake pañcatiṃsāni satta satāni, ekādasamūlake chāsītāni cha satāni, dvādasamūlake sattatiṃsāni cha satāni, terasamūlake aṭṭhāsītāni pañca satāni, cuddasamūlake ekūnacattālīsāni pañca satāni, pannarasamūlake navutāni cattāri satāni, soḷasamūlake ekacattālīsāni cattāri sattāni, sattarasamūlake dvānavutāni tīṇi satāni, aṭṭhārasamūlake tecattālīsāni tīṇi satāni, ekūnavīsatimūlake catunavutāni dve satāni, vīsatimūlake pañcacattālīsāni dve satāni, ekavīsatimūlake chanavutisataṃ, dvāvīsatimūlake sattacattālīsasataṃ, tevīsatimūlake aṭṭhanavuti, sabbamūlake ekūnapaññāsāti evaṃ hetupadaṃ ādiṃ katvā vibhattesu ekamūlakādīsu –

Among all of these, this is the summary count: In the single-root method, there are eleven hundred and seventy-six questions. In the root condition method, forty-nine questions should be taken for this root condition root itself, and the rest should be placed in the remaining condition-roots. In the two-root method, there are eleven hundred and twenty-seven. In the three-root method, one thousand and seventy-eight. In the four-root method, one thousand and twenty-nine. In the five-root method, nine hundred and eighty. In the six-root method, nine hundred and thirty-one. In the seven-root method, eight hundred and eighty-two. In the eight-root method, eight hundred and thirty-three. In the nine-root method, seven hundred and eighty-four. In the ten-root method, seven hundred and thirty-five. In the eleven-root method, six hundred and eighty-six. In the twelve-root method, six hundred and thirty-seven. In the thirteen-root method, five hundred and eighty-eight. In the fourteen-root method, five hundred and thirty-nine. In the fifteen-root method, four hundred and ninety. In the sixteen-root method, four hundred and forty-one. In the seventeen-root method, three hundred and ninety-two. In the eighteen-root method, three hundred and forty-three. In the nineteen-root method, two hundred and ninety-four. In the twenty-root method, two hundred and forty-five. In the twenty-one-root method, one hundred and ninety-six. In the twenty-two-root method, one hundred and forty-seven. In the twenty-three-root method, ninety-eight. In the all-root method, forty-nine. Thus, having distinguished beginning with the root-condition term, in the single-root and so on...

Cuddaseva sahassāni, puna satta satāni ca;

Pucchā hetupadasseva, ekamūlādibhedatoti.

Fourteen thousand, and again seven hundred; these are the questions of the root-condition term, by way of the divisions beginning with the single-root.

39-40. Evaṃ [Pg.403] hetupaccayaṃ ādiṃ katvā ekamūlakato paṭṭhāya yāva sabbamūlakanayā pucchābhedaṃ dassetvā idāni ārammaṇapaccayaṃ ādiṃ katvā dassetuṃ siyā kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjeyya ārammaṇapaccayā hetupaccayātiādimāha. Tattha ārammaṇapaccayā hetupaccayāti ettāvatā ārammaṇapaccayaṃ ādiṃ katvā hetupaccayapariyosāno ekamūlakanayo dassito. Tato paraṃ ārammaṇapaccayā adhipatipaccayāti dukamūlakaṃ āraddhaṃ. Tattha imaṃ paṭhamadukañceva ārammaṇāvigatadukañca dassetvā sesaṃ saṅkhittaṃ. Ārammaṇapaccayā hetupaccayāti ayaṃ osānadukopi na dassito. Sace pana katthaci vācanāmagge sandissati, sveva vācanāmaggo gahetabbo. Tato paraṃ ārammaṇapaccayavasena tikamūlakādayo adassetvāva adhipatipaccayaṃ ādiṃ katvā ekakādayo dassetuṃ adhipatipaccayā, anantarapaccayā, samanantarapaccayā, sahajātapaccayā, aññamaññapaccayāti ettakameva vuttaṃ, taṃ ekamūlakavasena vā sabbamūlakavasena vā veditabbaṃ.

39-40. Having thus shown the divisions of questions, beginning with the root condition and extending from the single-root method up to the all-root method, now, to show them beginning with the object condition, he said, beginning with: 'A wholesome state arises dependent on a wholesome state by way of object condition and root condition,' and so on. Herein, by 'by way of object condition and root condition,' the single-root method is shown, beginning with the object condition and ending with the root condition. Thereafter, the two-root method is commenced with 'by way of object condition and predominance condition.' Herein, this first dyad and the object-non-disappearance dyad are shown, while the rest are condensed. The concluding dyad, 'by way of object condition and root condition,' is also not shown here. But if it appears somewhere in the course of the reading, that very course of reading should be adopted. After that, without showing the three-root method and so forth by way of object condition, to show the single-root and so on, beginning with the predominance condition, only this much is said: 'by way of predominance condition, immediately preceding condition, contiguity condition, conascent condition, and mutuality condition.' This should be understood either by way of the single-root or the all-root method.

41. Tato paraṃ avigatapaccayaṃ ādiṃ katvā dumūlakameva dassetuṃ – avigatapaccayā hetupaccayātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha avigatahetuduko, avigatārammaṇaduko, avigatādhipatidukoti paṭipāṭiyā tayo duke vatvā pariyosāne ca avigatavigataduko eko duko dassito. Tato avigatapaccayavaseneva timūlakaṃ dassetuṃ – ‘‘avigatapaccayā hetupaccayā ārammaṇapaccayā, avigatapaccayā hetupaccayā adhipatipaccayā, avigatapaccayā hetupaccayā anantarapaccayā’’ti evaṃ paṭipāṭiyā tayo tike vatvā ‘‘avigatapaccayā hetupaccayā vigatapaccayā’’ti pariyosānattiko vutto. Tato avigatapaccayavaseneva catumūlakaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘avigatapaccayā hetupaccayā ārammaṇapaccayā adhipatipaccayā, avigatapaccayā hetupaccayā ārammaṇapaccayā anantarapaccayā’’ti dve catukke vatvā ‘‘vigatapaccayā’’ti padaṃ uddharitvā ṭhapitaṃ, sesaṃ sabbaṃ saṅkhittaṃ. Tassa saṅkhittabhāvaṃ dassetuṃ ‘‘ekekassa padassa ekamūlakaṃ, dumūlakaṃ, timūlakaṃ, sabbamūlakaṃ asammuyhantena vitthāretabba’’nti vuttaṃ. Tasmā yathā hetupaccayaṃ ādiṃ katvā hetuādipadavasena ekamūlake ekādasa pucchāsatāni chasattati ca pucchā…pe… sabbamūlake ekūnapaññāsaṃ, evaṃ ārammaṇapaccayādīsupi ekamekaṃ ādiṃ katvā ārammaṇādipadavasena ekamekassa [Pg.404] padassa ekamūlake ekādasa pucchāsatāni chasattati ca pucchā…pe… sabbamūlake ekūnapaññāsāti ekekassa padassa ekamūlakādibhede sattasatādhikāni cuddasa pucchā sahassāni honti. Tāsaṃ sabbesupi catuvīsatiyā paccayesu ayaṃ gaṇanaparicchedo –

41. Then, to show only the two-rooted method, beginning with the non-disappearance condition, the section beginning with 'by way of non-disappearance condition, root condition,' and so on, is commenced. Herein, three dyads are stated in sequence: the non-disappearance-root dyad, the non-disappearance-object dyad, and the non-disappearance-predominance dyad. And at the end, the non-disappearance-disappearance dyad is shown as one dyad. Next, to show the three-rooted method by way of the non-disappearance condition: 'by way of non-disappearance condition, root condition, object condition; by way of non-disappearance condition, root condition, predominance condition; by way of non-disappearance condition, root condition, contiguity condition'—thus, three triplets are stated in sequence, and at the end, the concluding triplet 'by way of non-disappearance condition, root condition, disappearance condition' is stated. Then, to show the four-rooted method by way of the non-disappearance condition: 'by way of non-disappearance condition, root condition, object condition, predominance condition; by way of non-disappearance condition, root condition, object condition, contiguity condition'—two quadruples are stated, and the term 'disappearance condition' is extracted and set aside. The rest is all condensed. To explain its condensed nature, it is said: 'For each term, the single-rooted, two-rooted, three-rooted, and all-rooted should be expanded without confusion.' Therefore, just as beginning with the root condition, in the single-rooted, by way of the root-and-so-on term, there are 1,176 questions... up to 49 in the all-rooted, so too for the object condition and others—each taken as the beginning—by way of the object-and-so-on term, for each term, in the single-rooted, there are 1,176 questions... up to 49 in the all-rooted. Thus, for each term, in the divisions of single-rooted and so on, there are fourteen thousand seven hundred questions. For all these, across the twenty-four conditions, this is the calculation section—

Dvāpaññāsasahassāna-ṭṭhasatāni tīṇi satasahassāni;

Kusalattikassa pucchā, anulomanayamhi suvibhattā.

Three hundred fifty-two thousand eight hundred questions; these are the questions of the wholesome triad, well distinguished in the direct order method.

Yathā ca kusalattikassa, evaṃ vedanāttikādīnampīti sabbesupi dvāvīsatiyā tikesu –

Just as with the wholesome triad, so too with the feeling triad and others; thus, in all twenty-two triads—

Ekasaṭṭhisahassāni, cha satāni sattasattati;

Satasahassāni pucchānaṃ, tikabhede pabhedato.

One hundred sixty-one thousand six hundred seventy-seven questions; these are distinguished by way of division in the divisions of triads.

Saṅkhittā vācanāmagge.

Abridged in the course of recitation.

Dukesu pana ‘‘siyā hetuṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca hetudhammo uppajjeyya hetupaccayā’’ti evaṃ hetuṃ paṭicca hetu, hetuṃ paṭicca nahetu, hetuṃ paṭicca hetu ca nahetu ca, nahetuṃ paṭicca nahetu, nahetuṃ paṭicca hetu, nahetuṃ paṭicca hetu ca nahetu ca, hetuñca nahetuñca paṭicca hetu, hetuñca nahetuñca paṭicca nahetu, hetuñca nahetuñca paṭicca hetu ca nahetu cāti ekamekasmiṃ duke hetupaccayādīsu ekamekasmiṃ paccaye nava pucchā honti. Tāsu hetupaccayaṃ ādiṃ katvā ekamūlake dvesatāni soḷasa ca pucchā honti. Tāsu hetupaccayasseva aññena asammissā nava pucchā gahetabbā, sesā aṭṭha vārena gahitā.

Now, in the dyads, (beginning with the example) 'Dependent on a root state, might a root state arise by way of root condition?'—thus, dependent on a root state: a root state; dependent on a root state: a non-root state; dependent on a root state: both a root state and a non-root state; dependent on a non-root state: a non-root state; dependent on a non-root state: a root state; dependent on a non-root state: both a root state and a non-root state; dependent on both a root state and a non-root state: a root state; dependent on both a root state and a non-root state: a non-root state; dependent on both a root state and a non-root state: both a root state and a non-root state—in each dyad, among the root condition and so on, in each condition, there are nine questions. Among these, taking the root condition as the starting point, in the single-root method, there are two hundred and sixteen questions. Of these, nine questions should be taken for the root condition alone, unmixed with others; the remaining are taken in eight turns.

Tāsaṃ dukamūlakādīsu tevīsatiyā vāresu ekekaṃ navakaṃ apanetvā yāva sabbamūlakā ayaṃ gaṇanaparicchedo – dukamūlake tāva ekamūlake dassitesu dvīsu soḷasādhikesu pucchāsatesu nava apanetvā dvesatāni satta ca pucchā honti, tato nava apanetvā timūlake aṭṭhanavutisataṃ. Evaṃ purimapurimato nava nava apanetvā catumūlake ekūnanavutisataṃ, pañcamūlake asītisataṃ, chamūlake ekasattatisataṃ, sattamūlake dvāsaṭṭhisataṃ, aṭṭhamūlake tepaṇṇāsasataṃ, navamūlake [Pg.405] catucattālīsasataṃ, dasamūlake pañcatiṃsasataṃ, ekādasamūlake chabbīsasataṃ, dvādasamūlake sattarasādhikasataṃ, terasamūlake aṭṭhādhikasataṃ, cuddasamūlake navanavuti, pannarasamūlake navuti, soḷasamūlake ekāsīti, sattarasamūlake dvāsattati, aṭṭhārasamūlake tesaṭṭhi, ekūnavīsatimūlake catupaññāsaṃ, vīsatimūlake pañcacattālīsaṃ, ekavīsatimūlake chattiṃsaṃ, dvāvīsatimūlake sattavīsa, tevīsatimūlake aṭṭhārasa, sabbamūlake navāti. Yathā panetāni hetupaccayavasena ekamūlake soḷasādhikāni dve pucchāsatāni…pe… sabbamūlake nava, evaṃ ārammaṇapaccayādīsupi ekamekaṃ ādiṃ katvā ārammaṇādipadavasena ekekassa padassa ekamūlake soḷasādhikāni dve pucchāsatāni…pe… sabbamūlake navāti ekekassa padassa ekamūlakādibhede dve pucchā sahassāni sattasatāni ca pucchā honti. Tāsaṃ sabbesupi catuvīsatiyā paccayesu ayaṃ gaṇanaparicchedo –

Among these, in the twenty-three turns of the two-root method and so on, by removing one set of nine each time up to the all-root method, this is the calculation section: First, in the two-root method, from the two hundred and sixteen questions shown in the single-root method, by removing nine, there are two hundred and seven questions. Then, by removing nine again, in the three-root method, there are one hundred ninety-eight. Thus, by removing nine each time from the previous ones: in the four-root method, one hundred eighty-nine; in the five-root method, one hundred eighty; in the six-root method, one hundred seventy-one; in the seven-root method, one hundred sixty-two; in the eight-root method, one hundred fifty-three; in the nine-root method, one hundred forty-four; in the ten-root method, one hundred thirty-five; in the eleven-root method, one hundred twenty-six; in the twelve-root method, one hundred seventeen; in the thirteen-root method, one hundred eight; in the fourteen-root method, ninety-nine; in the fifteen-root method, ninety; in the sixteen-root method, eighty-one; in the seventeen-root method, seventy-two; in the eighteen-root method, sixty-three; in the nineteen-root method, fifty-four; in the twenty-root method, forty-five; in the twenty-one-root method, thirty-six; in the twenty-two-root method, twenty-seven; in the twenty-three-root method, eighteen; and in the all-root method, nine. Just as these, by way of the root condition, in the single-root method, are two hundred and sixteen questions... and in the all-root method, nine; so too for the object condition and others—each taken as the beginning—by way of the object-and-so-on term, for each term, in the single-root method, there are two hundred and sixteen questions... and in the all-root method, nine. Thus, for each term, in the divisions of single-root and so on, there are two thousand seven hundred questions. For all these, across the twenty-four conditions, this is the calculation section:

Catusaṭṭhisahassāni, puna aṭṭhasatāni ca;

Pucchā hetudukasseva, anulomanaye matā.

Sixty-four thousand, and again eight hundred; these questions of the root dyad alone are considered to be in the direct order method.

Yathā ca hetudukassa, evaṃ sahetukadukādīnampīti sabbasmimpi dukasate –

Just as with the root dyad, so too with the dyad of 'with roots' and so forth—that is, in all one hundred dyads—

Saṭṭhi satasahassāni, cattāri ca tatoparaṃ;

Asīti ca sahassāni, pucchā dukasate vidū.

Six million, four hundred and eighty thousand questions are known by the wise in the hundred dyads.

Ayaṃ tāva suddhike tikapaṭṭhāne ceva dukapaṭṭhāne ca pucchānaṃ gaṇanaparicchedo.

This, firstly, is the enumeration of questions in the Suddhika, in both the Tikapaṭṭhāna and the Dukapaṭṭhāna.

Yaṃ pana tato paraṃ dvāvīsati tike gahetvā dukasate pakkhipitvā dukatikapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma desitaṃ, tattha ‘‘siyā hetuṃ kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca hetu kusalo dhammo uppajjeyya hetupaccayā’’ti evaṃ dvāvīsatiyā tikesu ekekaṃ tikaṃ dukānaṃ satena satena saddhiṃ yojetvā dassetabbānaṃ pucchānaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayena sabbesaṃ ekamūlakādīnaṃ vasena gahetvā paricchedo veditabbo.

Moreover, taking the twenty-two triads and inserting them into the hundred dyads, the exposition called the Dukatikapaṭṭhāna was taught. Therein, the delimitation of the questions to be shown should be understood by taking all of them according to the method stated below, by way of having a single root and so forth. This is exemplified by combining each of the twenty-two triads with each of the hundred dyads, as in the question: 'Might a wholesome phenomenon that is a root arise dependent on a wholesome phenomenon that is a root by way of root condition?'

Yampi tato paraṃ dukasataṃ gahetvā dvāvīsatiyā tikesu pakkhipitvā tikadukapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma desitaṃ, tatthāpi ‘‘siyā kusalaṃ hetuṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo hetudhammo uppajjeyya hetupaccayā’’ti evaṃ dukasate ekekaṃ [Pg.406] dukaṃ dvāvīsatiyā tikehi saddhiṃ yojetvā dassetabbānaṃ pucchānaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayena sabbesaṃ ekamūlakādīnaṃ vasena gahetvā paricchedo veditabbo.

Moreover, having taken the hundred dyads and inserting them into the twenty-two triads, the exposition called the Tikadukapaṭṭhāna was taught. Therein, too, the delimitation of the questions to be shown should be understood by taking all of them according to the method stated below, by way of having a single root and so forth. This is exemplified by combining each dyad in the hundred dyads with the twenty-two triads, as in the question: 'Might a wholesome root-phenomenon arise dependent on a wholesome root-phenomenon by way of root condition?'

Yampi tato paraṃ tike tikesuyeva pakkhipitvā tikatikapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma desitaṃ, tatthāpi ‘‘siyā kusalaṃ sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo sukhāya vedanāya sampayutto dhammo uppajjeyya hetupaccayā’’ti evaṃ dvāvīsatiyā tikesu ekekaṃ tikaṃ sesehi ekavīsatiyā tikehi saddhiṃ yojetvā dassetabbānaṃ pucchānaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayena sabbesaṃ ekamūlakādīnaṃ vasena gahetvā paricchedo veditabbo.

Moreover, inserting triads into triads alone, the exposition called the Tikatikapaṭṭhāna was taught. Therein, too, the delimitation of the questions to be shown should be understood by taking all of them according to the method stated below, by way of having a single root and so forth. This is exemplified by combining each triad in the twenty-two triads with the remaining twenty-one triads, as in the question: 'Might a wholesome phenomenon associated with pleasant feeling arise dependent on a wholesome phenomenon associated with pleasant feeling by way of root condition?'

Yampi tato paraṃ duke dukesuyeva pakkhipitvā dukadukapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma desitaṃ, tatthāpi ‘‘siyā hetuṃ sahetukaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca hetu sahetuko dhammo uppajjeyya hetupaccayā’’ti evaṃ dukasate ekekaṃ dukaṃ sesehi navanavutiyā dukehi saddhiṃ yojetvā dassetabbānaṃ pucchānaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayena sabbesaṃ ekamūlakādīnaṃ vasena gahetvā paricchedo veditabbo. Tathāgatena hi sabbampetaṃ pabhedaṃ dassetvāva devaparisāya dhammo desito, dhammasenāpatissa pana tena ‘‘ajja idañcidañca desita’’nti saṅkhipitvā nayadassanamatteneva desanā akkhātā. Therenāpi saṅkhipitvāva vācanāmaggo pavattito, so therena pavattitanayeneva saṅgītikāle saṅgahaṃ āropito.

Moreover, inserting dyads into dyads alone, the exposition called the Dukadukapaṭṭhāna was taught. Therein, too, the delimitation of the questions to be shown should be understood by taking all of them according to the method stated below, by way of having a single root and so forth. This is exemplified by combining each dyad in the hundred dyads with the remaining ninety-nine dyads, as in the question: 'Might a phenomenon that is a root and is with a root arise dependent on a phenomenon that is a root and is with a root by way of root condition?' Indeed, after showing all these distinctions, the Tathāgata taught the Dhamma to the assembly of devas. However, to the General of the Dhamma, the teaching was explained only by briefly indicating the method, saying, 'Today, this and that was taught.' The Elder, too, established the path of recitation in a summarized form, and it was included in the compilation at the time of the council according to the method established by that Elder.

Taṃ panassa saṅkhepanayaṃ dassetuṃ tikañca paṭṭhānavaranti ayaṃ gāthā ṭhapitā. Tassattho – tikañca paṭṭhānavaranti pavaraṃ tikapaṭṭhānañca. Dukuttamanti uttamaṃ seṭṭhaṃ dukapaṭṭhānañca. Dukatikañcevāti dukatikapaṭṭhānañca. Tikadukañcāti tikadukapaṭṭhānañca. Tikatikañcevāti tikatikapaṭṭhānañca. Dukadukañcāti dukadukapaṭṭhānañca. Cha anulomamhi nayā sugambhīrāti ete tikapaṭṭhānādayo suṭṭhu gambhīrā cha nayā anulomamhi veditabbāti. Tattha dve anulomāni – dhammānulomañca paccayānulomañca. Tattha ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo’’ti evaṃ abhidhammamātikāpadehi saṅgahitānaṃ dhammānaṃ [Pg.407] anulomadesanāvasena pavattaṃ dhammānulomaṃ nāma. ‘‘Hetupaccayā ārammaṇapaccayā’’ti evaṃ catuvīsatiyā paccayānaṃ anulomadesanāvasena pavattaṃ paccayānulomaṃ nāma.

To show that summarized method, this verse was established: 'The triad and the excellent Paṭṭhāna...' Its meaning is: 'The triad and the excellent Paṭṭhāna' refers to the excellent Tikapaṭṭhāna. 'The supreme dyad' refers to the supreme Dukapaṭṭhāna. 'And the dyad-triad indeed' refers to the Dukatikapaṭṭhāna. 'And the triad-dyad' refers to the Tikadukapaṭṭhāna. 'And the triad-triad indeed' refers to the Tikatikapaṭṭhāna. 'And the dyad-dyad' refers to the Dukadukapaṭṭhāna. 'The six methods in forward order are profoundly deep'—these Tikapaṭṭhāna and others are to be understood as six exceedingly deep methods in forward order. Herein, there are two forward orders: the forward order of phenomena and the forward order of conditions. Herein, 'dhammānuloma' is the name of that which proceeds by way of teaching the forward order of phenomena included in the Abhidhamma matrix categories, such as 'a wholesome phenomenon dependent on a wholesome phenomenon.' 'Paccayānuloma' is the name of that which proceeds by way of teaching the forward order of the twenty-four conditions, such as 'root condition, object condition.'

Tattha heṭṭhā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘tikañca paṭṭhānavaraṃ…pe… cha anulomamhi nayā sugambhīrā’’ti ayaṃ gāthā dhammānulomaṃ sandhāya vuttā. Idha pana ayaṃ gāthā tasmiṃ dhammānulome paccayānulomaṃ sandhāya vuttā. Tasmā ‘‘cha anulomamhi nayā sugambhīrā’’ti aṭṭhakathāgāthāya dhammānulome tikapaṭṭhānādayo cha nayā sugambhīrāti evamattho veditabbo. Imasmiṃ panokāse ‘‘hetupaccayā ārammaṇapaccayā’’ti evaṃ pavatte paccayānulome ete dhammānulome tikapaṭṭhānādayo ‘‘cha nayā sugambhīrā’’ti evamattho veditabbo. Tesu anulome tikapaṭṭhāne kusalattikamattasseva vasena ayaṃ imasmiṃ paṭiccavārassa paṇṇattivāre saṅkhipitvā pucchāpabhedo dassito. Sesesu pana tikesu sesapaṭṭhānesu ca ekāpi pucchā na dassitā. Tato paresu pana sahajātavārādīsu kusalattikassāpi vasena pucchaṃ anuddharitvā labbhamānakavasena vissajjanameva dassitaṃ. ‘‘Cha anulomamhi nayā sugambhīrā’’ti vacanato pana imasmiṃ paccayānulome chapi ete paṭṭhānanayā pucchāvasena uddharitvā dassetabbā. Paṭṭhānaṃ vaṇṇayantānañhi ācariyānaṃ bhāro esoti.

In the commentary below, the verse 'The triad and the excellent Paṭṭhāna... the six methods in forward order are profoundly deep' was stated with reference to the forward order of phenomena (dhammānuloma). Here, however, this verse is stated with reference to the forward order of conditions (paccayānuloma) within that forward order of phenomena. Therefore, the meaning of the commentary verse 'The six methods in forward order are profoundly deep' should be understood as: the six methods, such as the Tikapaṭṭhāna, are exceedingly deep in the forward order of phenomena. In this context, however, when the forward order of conditions proceeds as 'root condition, object condition,' the meaning should be understood as: these Tikapaṭṭhāna and other methods, which belong to the forward order of phenomena, are 'six exceedingly deep methods.' Among these, in the Tikapaṭṭhāna of the forward order, the division of questions is briefly shown in the Paṇṇattivāra of this Paṭiccavāra, only with regard to the wholesome triad. However, in the remaining triads and other Paṭṭhānas, not a single question is shown. Furthermore, in subsequent sections like the sahajātavāra, even for the wholesome triad, no question is explicitly raised, but only the answers are given based on what is obtainable. Yet, because of the statement 'The six methods in forward order are profoundly deep,' in this forward order of conditions, all six of these Paṭṭhāna methods should be shown by raising questions. For the teachers who expound the Paṭṭhāna, this is their responsibility.

2. Paccayapaccanīyavaṇṇanā

2. Exposition of the Counter-Conditions

42-44. Idāni paccanīyaṃ hoti. Taṃ dassetuṃ siyā kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjeyya na hetupaccayātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha anulomapucchāhi samappamāṇova pucchāparicchedo. Tenevettha ‘‘yathā anulome hetupaccayo vitthārito, evaṃ paccanīyepi nahetupaccayo vitthāretabbo’’ti vatvā puna pariyosāne ‘‘yathā anulome ekekassa padassa ekamūlakaṃ, dumūlakaṃ, timūlakaṃ, catumūlakaṃ yāva tevīsatimūlakaṃ, evaṃ paccanīyepi vitthāretabba’’nti vuttaṃ. Tevīsatimūlakanti idañcettha dumūlakaṃyeva sandhāya vuttaṃ. Pariyosāne pana sabbamūlakaṃ catuvīsatimūlakampi hotiyeva. Taṃ sabbaṃ saṅkhittamevāti.

42-44. Now comes the antithesis. To demonstrate this, the statement, "A wholesome state may arise dependent on a wholesome state, not by way of root condition," and so forth, is commenced. Here, the scope of inquiry is commensurate with the direct questions. Therefore, it is said here, "Just as the root condition is elaborated in the direct order, so also should the non-root condition be elaborated in the antithesis." Then, at the conclusion, it is said, "Just as in the direct order, for each term there is a single-rooted, two-rooted, three-rooted, four-rooted, up to a twenty-three-rooted case, so also in the antithesis it should be elaborated." This "twenty-three-rooted" is said here with reference to the two-rooted case. However, at the conclusion, all roots, even the twenty-four-rooted case, are indeed present. All this is in brief.

Tikañca [Pg.408] paṭṭhānavaraṃ…pe… cha paccanīyamhi nayā sugambhīrāti etthāpi dve paccanīyāni – dhammapaccanīyañca paccayapaccanīyañca. Tattha ‘‘kusalā dhammā’’ti evaṃ abhidhammamātikāpadehi saṅgahitānaṃ dhammānaṃ ‘‘na kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca na kusalo dhammo’’ti paccanīyadesanāvasena pavattaṃ dhammapaccanīyaṃ nāma. ‘‘Nahetupaccayā nārammaṇapaccayā’’ti evaṃ catuvīsatiyā paccayānaṃ paccanīyadesanāvasena pavattaṃ paccayapaccanīyaṃ nāma. Tattha heṭṭhā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘tikañca paṭṭhānavaraṃ…pe… cha paccanīyamhi nayā sugambhīrā’’ti ayaṃ gāthā dhammapaccanīyaṃ sandhāya vuttā. Idha pana ayaṃ gāthā dhammānulomeyeva paccayapaccanīyaṃ sandhāya vuttā. Tasmā ‘‘cha paccanīyamhi nayā sugambhīrā’’ti aṭṭhakathāgāthāya dhammapaccanīye tikapaṭṭhānādayo cha nayā sugambhīrāti evamattho veditabbo. Imasmiṃ panokāse na hetupaccayā nārammaṇapaccayāti evaṃ pavatte paccayapaccanīye ete dhammānulomeyeva tikapaṭṭhānādayo cha nayā sugambhīrāti evamattho veditabbo.

"And the Tika-Paṭṭhāna is supreme... up to... the six methods in the antithesis are very profound." Here too, there are two antitheses: the antithesis of phenomena and the antithesis of conditions. Herein, concerning "wholesome phenomena"—thus, among the phenomena comprised by the Abhidhamma matrix terms—the teaching that proceeds by way of antithetical exposition, such as "dependent on a non-wholesome phenomenon, a non-wholesome phenomenon arises," is called the antithesis of phenomena. Concerning "Not by root condition, not by object condition"—thus, the teaching that proceeds by way of antithetical exposition among the twenty-four conditions is called the antithesis of conditions. Herein, in the earlier commentary, the verse "the Tika-Paṭṭhāna is supreme... up to... the six methods in the antithesis are very profound" was spoken with reference to the antithesis of phenomena. Here, however, this verse is spoken with reference to the antithesis of conditions within the direct order of phenomena itself. Therefore, in the commentary verse "the six methods in the antithesis are very profound," the meaning should be understood thus: the Tika-Paṭṭhāna and so on—the six methods—are very profound in the antithesis of phenomena. In this case, however, when the antithesis of conditions proceeds as "not by root condition, not by object condition," the meaning should be understood thus: these same Tika-Paṭṭhāna and so on—the six methods—are very profound within the direct order of phenomena itself.

Tesu anulomatikapaṭṭhāneyeva kusalattikamattassa vasena ayaṃ imasmiṃ paṭiccavārassa paṇṇattivāre saṅkhipitvā pucchāpabhedo dassito. Sesesu pana tikesu sesapaṭṭhānesu ca ekāpi pucchā na dassitā. Tato paresu pana sahajātavārādīsu kusalattikassāpi vasena pucchaṃ anuddharitvā labbhamānakavasena vissajjanameva dassitaṃ. ‘‘Cha paccanīyamhi nayā sugambhīrā’’ti vacanato pana imasmiṃ paccayapaccanīye chapi ete paṭṭhānanayā pucchāvasena uddharitvā dassetabbā. Paṭṭhānaṃ vaṇṇayantānañhi ācariyānaṃ bhāro esoti.

Among these, in the direct Tika-Paṭṭhāna itself, by way of the wholesome triad alone, this division of questions is shown concisely in the designation chapter of this conditional chapter. But in the remaining triads and remaining Paṭṭhānas, not even one question is shown. Then, in subsequent chapters such as the conascence chapter, without extracting questions even by way of the wholesome triad, only the answers are shown by way of what is obtainable. However, due to the statement, "the six methods in the antithesis are very profound," in this antithesis of conditions, all six of these Paṭṭhāna methods should also be extracted and shown by way of questions. For the teachers who explain the Paṭṭhāna, this is indeed their burden.

3. Anulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanā

3. Exposition of the Affirmative-Negative

45-48. Idāni anulomapaccanīyaṃ hoti. Taṃ dassetuṃ siyā kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjeyya hetupaccayā naārammaṇapaccayātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha ‘‘hetupaccayā naārammaṇapaccayā…pe… hetupaccayā naavigatapaccayā’’ti hetupadassa sesesu tevīsatiyā paccayesu ekekena saddhiṃ yojanāvasena hetupadādike ekamūlake tevīsati anulomapaccanīyāni. Tesu ekekasmiṃ ekūnapaññāsaṃ katvā sattavīsādhikāni ekādasa pucchāsatāni honti. Dumūlake pana hetārammaṇapadānaṃ sesesu dvāvīsatiyā paccayesu ekekena saddhiṃ [Pg.409] yojanāvasena dvāvīsati anulomapaccanīyānīti evaṃ anulome vuttesu sabbesu ekamūlakādīsu ekekaṃ padaṃ parihāpetvā avasesānaṃ vasena pucchāgaṇanā veditabbā. Ekamūlakādīsu cettha yā pucchā pāḷiyaṃ āgatā, yā ca na āgatā, tā sabbā heṭṭhā vuttanayānusāreneva veditabbā.

45-48. Now comes the affirmative-negative. To demonstrate this, the statement, "A wholesome state may arise dependent on a wholesome state by way of root condition, but not by way of object condition," and so forth, is commenced. Here, concerning "by way of root condition, but not by way of object condition... up to... by way of root condition, but not by way of non-disappearance condition"—by combining the root term with each of the remaining twenty-three conditions, there are twenty-three affirmative-negatives in the single-rooted case beginning with the root term. In each of these, making forty-nine, there are one thousand one hundred and twenty-seven questions. In the two-rooted case, however, by combining the root and object terms with each of the remaining twenty-two conditions, there are twenty-two affirmative-negatives. Thus, in all the single-rooted and other cases mentioned in the direct order, the counting of questions should be understood by way of the remaining terms, having excluded one term at a time. Here, among the single-rooted and other cases, whichever questions appear in the Pāḷi text and whichever do not, all should be understood according to the method stated earlier.

Tikañca paṭṭhānavaraṃ…pe… cha anulomapaccanīyamhi nayā sugambhīrāti ettha pana heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva dve anulomapaccanīyāni – dhammānulomapaccanīyaṃ paccayānulomapaccanīyañca. Tattha ‘‘kusalā dhammā’’ti evaṃ abhidhammamātikāpadehi saṅgahitānaṃ dhammānaṃ ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca na kusalo dhammo’’ti anulomapaccanīyadesanāvasena pavattaṃ dhammānulomapaccanīyaṃ nāma. ‘‘Hetupaccayā naārammaṇapaccayā’’ti evaṃ catuvīsatiyā paccayesu labbhamānapadānaṃ anulomapaccanīyadesanāvasena pavattaṃ paccayānulomapaccanīyaṃ nāma. Tattha heṭṭhā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘tikañca paṭṭhānavaraṃ…pe… cha anulomapaccanīyamhi nayā sugambhīrā’’ti ayaṃ gāthā dhammānulomapaccanīyaṃ sandhāya vuttā. Idha pana ayaṃ gāthā dhammānulomeyeva paccayānulomapaccanīyaṃ sandhāya vuttā. Tasmā ‘‘cha anulomapaccanīyamhi nayā sugambhīrā’’ti aṭṭhakathāgāthāya dhammānulomapaccanīye tikapaṭṭhānādayo cha nayā sugambhīrāti evamattho veditabbo. Imasmiṃ panokāse hetupaccayā nārammaṇapaccayāti evaṃ pavatte paccayānulomapaccanīye ete dhammānulomeyeva tikapaṭṭhānādayo cha nayā sugambhīrāti evamattho veditabbo.

Here, "The Tika-Paṭṭhāna is supreme... and so on... the six methods in the affirmative-negative are very profound." In this context, by the method stated earlier, there are two affirmative-negatives: the affirmative-negative of phenomena and the affirmative-negative of conditions. Herein, concerning "wholesome phenomena"—thus, among the phenomena comprised by the Abhidhamma matrix terms—the teaching that proceeds by way of affirmative-negative exposition, such as "dependent on a wholesome phenomenon, a non-wholesome phenomenon arises," is called the affirmative-negative of phenomena. The teaching that proceeds by way of affirmative-negative exposition among the obtainable terms in the twenty-four conditions, such as "by root condition, not by object condition," is called the affirmative-negative of conditions. Herein, in the earlier commentary, the verse "The Tika-Paṭṭhāna is supreme... and so on... the six methods in the affirmative-negative are very profound" was spoken with reference to the affirmative-negative of phenomena. But in this context, this verse is spoken with reference to the affirmative-negative of conditions within the direct order of phenomena itself. Therefore, the meaning of the commentary verse, "the six methods in the affirmative-negative are very profound," should be understood thus: the Tika-Paṭṭhāna and so on—these six methods—are very profound in the affirmative-negative of phenomena. However, in this passage, when the affirmative-negative of conditions proceeds as "by root condition, not by object condition," the meaning should be understood thus: these same Tika-Paṭṭhāna and so on—the six methods—are very profound within the direct order of phenomena itself.

Tesu anulome tikapaṭṭhāneyeva kusalattikamattassa vasena ayaṃ imasmiṃ paṭiccavārassa paṇṇattivāre saṅkhipitvā pucchāpabhedo dassito. Sesesu pana tikesu sesapaṭṭhānesu ca ekāpi pucchā na dassitā. Tato paresu pana sahajātavārādīsu kusalattikassāpi vasena pucchaṃ anuddharitvā labbhamānakavasena vissajjanameva dassitaṃ. ‘‘Cha anulomapaccanīyamhi nayā sugambhīrā’’ti vacanato pana imasmiṃ paccayānulomapaccanīye chapi ete paṭṭhānanayā pucchāvasena uddharitvā dassetabbā. Paṭṭhānaṃ vaṇṇayantānañhi ācariyānaṃ bhāro esoti.

Among these, in the direct-order Triad-Paṭṭhāna itself, by way of the wholesome triad alone, this division of questions is shown concisely in the Designation Section of this Conditional Section. But in the remaining triads and remaining Paṭṭhānas, not even one question is shown. Then, in subsequent sections such as the Co-nascence Section, without extracting questions even by way of the wholesome triad, only the answers are shown by way of what is obtainable. However, due to the statement, “The six methods in the affirmative-negative are very profound,” in this affirmative-negative of conditions, all six of these Paṭṭhāna methods should also be extracted and shown by way of questions. For this is indeed the burden of the teachers who expound the Paṭṭhāna.

4. Paccanīyānulomavaṇṇanā

4. Explanation of the Negative-Affirmative

49-52. Idāni [Pg.410] paccanīyānulomaṃ hoti. Taṃ dassetuṃ siyā kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjeyya nahetupaccayā ārammaṇapaccayātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha anulomapaccanīyapucchāhi samappamāṇo eva pucchāparicchedo. Ekamūlakādīsu cettha yā pucchā pāḷiyaṃ āgatā, yā ca na āgatā, tā sabbā heṭṭhā vuttanayānusāreneva veditabbā.

Now there is the negative-affirmative. To show this, it begins with [the question]: “Might a wholesome phenomenon arise dependent on a wholesome phenomenon by way of non-root condition, by way of object condition?” and so on. Here, the scope of the questions is exactly equal to the questions in the affirmative-negative. And here, in the sections beginning with the single root, all the questions that appear in the Pāli text, and those that do not appear, should be understood according to the method stated previously.

Tikañca paṭṭhānavaraṃ…pe… cha paccanīyānulomamhi nayā sugambhīrāti etthāpi heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva dve paccayānulomāni – dhammapaccanīyānulomaṃ paccayapaccanīyānulomañca. Tattha ‘‘kusalā dhammā’’ti evaṃ abhidhammamātikāpadehi saṅgahitānaṃ dhammānaṃ ‘‘nakusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo’’ti paccanīyānulomadesanāvasena pavattaṃ dhammapaccanīyānulomaṃ nāma. ‘‘Nahetupaccayā ārammaṇapaccayā’’ti evaṃ catuvīsatiyā paccayesu labbhamānapadānaṃ paccayapaccanīyānulomadesanāvasena pavattaṃ paccayapaccanīyānulomaṃ nāma. Tattha heṭṭhā aṭṭhakathāyaṃ ‘‘tikañca paṭṭhānavaraṃ…pe… cha paccanīyānulomamhi nayā sugambhīrā’’ti ayaṃ gāthā dhammapaccanīyānulomaṃ sandhāya vuttā. Idha pana ayaṃ gāthā dhammānulomeyeva paccayapaccanīyānulomaṃ sandhāya vuttā. Tasmā ‘‘cha paccanīyānulomamhi nayā sugambhīrā’’ti aṭṭhakathāya dhammapaccanīyānulome tikapaṭṭhānādayo cha nayā sugambhīrāti evamattho veditabbo. Imasmiṃ panokāse nahetupaccayā ārammaṇapaccayāti evaṃ pavatte paccayapaccanīyānulome ete dhammānulomeyeva tikapaṭṭhānādayo cha nayā sugambhīrāti evamattho veditabbo.

And the supreme Paṭṭhāna of the Triads… [up to]… “the six methods in the negative-affirmative are very profound.” Here too, according to the method stated previously, there are two negative-affirmative [methods]: the negative-affirmative of phenomena and the negative-affirmative of conditions. Therein, the negative-affirmative of phenomena is that which proceeds by way of the negative-affirmative declaration, “A wholesome phenomenon [arises] dependent on a non-wholesome phenomenon,” concerning phenomena included by the Abhidhamma matrix headings such as “wholesome phenomena.” The negative-affirmative of conditions is that which proceeds by way of the negative-affirmative declaration of the terms obtainable in the twenty-four conditions, such as “by way of non-root condition, by way of object condition.” Here, the verse previously stated in the commentary—“And the supreme Paṭṭhāna of the Triads… [up to]… the six methods in the negative-affirmative are very profound”—was spoken with reference to the negative-affirmative of phenomena. But here, this verse was spoken with reference to the negative-affirmative of conditions within the affirmative of phenomena itself. Therefore, the meaning of “the six methods in the negative-affirmative are very profound” in the commentary should be understood thus: in the negative-affirmative of phenomena, the six methods, such as the Triad-Paṭṭhāna, are very profound. However, in this instance, in the negative-affirmative of conditions that proceeds as “by way of non-root condition, by way of object condition,” the meaning should be understood thus: even in this affirmative of phenomena, these six methods, such as the Triad-Paṭṭhāna, are very profound.

Tesu anulomatikapaṭṭhāneyeva kusalattikamattassapi vasena ayaṃ imasmiṃ paṭiccavārassa paṇṇattivāre saṅkhipitvā pucchāpabhedo dassito. Sesesu pana tikesu sesapaṭṭhānesu ca ekāpi pucchā na dassitā. Tato paresu pana sahajātavārādīsu kusalattikassapi vasena pucchaṃ anuddharitvā labbhamānakavasena vissajjanameva dassitaṃ. ‘‘Cha paccanīyānulomamhi nayā sugambhīrā’’ti vacanato pana imasmiṃ paccayapaccanīyānulome chapi ete paṭṭhānanayā pucchāvasena uddharitvā dassetabbā. Paṭṭhānaṃ vaṇṇayantānañhi ācariyānaṃ bhāro esoti.

Among these, in the direct-order Triad-Paṭṭhāna itself, this division of questions has been shown concisely in the Designation Section of the Conditional Section, even by way of the wholesome triad alone. However, in the remaining triads and remaining Paṭṭhāna sections, not even a single question has been shown. But in the subsequent sections, such as the Co-nascence Section, even regarding the wholesome triad, the answers have been shown by way of what is obtainable, without extracting the questions. However, according to the statement, “The six methods in the negative-affirmative are very profound,” in this negative-affirmative of conditions, all six of these Paṭṭhāna methods should be extracted and shown by way of questions. For this is indeed the burden of the teachers who expound the Paṭṭhāna.

Pucchāvāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Section on Questions is concluded.

1. Kusalattikavaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Wholesome Triad

1. Paṭiccavāravaṇṇanā

1. Explanation of the Conditionality Section

1. Paccayānulomaṃ

1. The Affirmative of Conditions

(1.) Vibhaṅgavāro

The Section on Analysis

53. Idāni [Pg.411] yā etā paṇṇattivāre kusalattikaṃ nissāya hetupaccayādivasena ekūnapaññāsaṃ ādiṃ katvā nayamattaṃ dassentena aparimāṇā pucchā dassitā. Tattha kusalākusalādīnaṃ sahuppattiyā abhāvato yā pucchā ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca akusalo dhammo uppajjati hetupaccayā’’ti evaṃ vissajjanaṃ na labhanti. Tā pahāya yā vissajjanaṃ labhanti, tāyeva vissajjetuṃ ayaṃ kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo dhammo uppajjati hetupaccayātiādinā nayena paṭiccavārassa niddesavāro āraddho.

53. Now, in the Designation Section, countless questions were shown, starting with the forty-nine [types of questions] by way of root condition and so on, by showing just the method, based on the wholesome triad. Therein, because of the absence of simultaneous arising of wholesome, unwholesome, and so on, those questions—such as, “Does an unwholesome phenomenon arise dependent on a wholesome phenomenon by way of root condition?”—do not receive an answer. Setting those aside, in order to answer only those that do receive an answer, this Exposition Section of the Conditional Section has been commenced with the method beginning, “A wholesome phenomenon arises dependent on a wholesome phenomenon by way of root condition,” and so on.

Tattha siyā – sace imā hetupaccayādivasena ekūnapaññāsaṃ pucchā sabbaso vissajjanaṃ na labhanti, atha kasmā dassitā? Nanu yā labhanti, tāyeva dassetabbāti? Āma, dassetabbā siyuṃ. Tathā dassiyamānā pana sabbesu tikadukapaṭṭhānādīsu ekekasmiṃ tike, duke, dukatike, tikaduke, tikatike, dukaduke ca saṅkhepaṃ akatvā dassetabbāyeva bhaveyyuṃ. Kasmā? Yasmā yā kusalattike labhanti, na tāyeva vedanāttikādīsu. Dhammānulomapaccanīye ca tikapaṭṭhāne vitakkattikapītittikānaṃ vissajjane sabbāpetā vissajjanaṃ labhanti, tasmā ukkaṭṭhaparicchedena ekekasmiṃ tike yattakāhi pucchāhi bhavitabbaṃ sabbā kusalattike dassitā. Evaṃ dassitāsu hi yā tattha vissajjanaṃ na labhanti, tā pahāya yā labhanti, tā vuccamānā sakkā sukhena vijānitunti sukhena vijānanatthaṃ sabbāpi kusalattike dassitā. Yā panettha vissajjanaṃ na labhanti, tā pahāya yā labhanti, tāyeva vissajjitāti veditabbā.

Here, one might ask: “If these forty-nine questions by way of root condition and so on do not receive answers at all, then why are they shown? Should not only those that do receive answers be shown?” Yes, they should be shown. However, if they were shown in that way, then in all the Paṭṭhāna sections of triads, dyads, and so on—in each triad, dyad, dyad-triad, triad-dyad, triad-triad, and dyad-dyad—they would have to be shown without abbreviation. Why? Because those that receive answers in the wholesome triad do not necessarily receive them in the feeling triad and so on. And in the affirmative-negative of phenomena, in the Triad-Paṭṭhāna, all these receive answers in the answers for the thought triad and the joy triad. Therefore, by way of the highest enumeration, all the questions that should be in each triad are shown in the wholesome triad. Indeed, when they are shown in this way, setting aside those that do not receive answers there, those that do receive answers can, when stated, be easily understood. Thus, for the sake of easy understanding, all questions are shown in the wholesome triad. It should be understood that, setting aside those here that do not receive answers, only those that do receive answers are answered.

Tattha kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭiccāti catubhūmakakusaladhammesu vedanākkhandhādibhedaṃ ekaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca paṭigantvā sahuppattisaṅkhātena sadisabhāvena patvā, tena saddhiṃ ekato uppattibhāvaṃ upagantvāti attho. Kusalo dhammoti catubhūmakakusaladhammesuyeva saññākkhandhādibhedo eko dhammo. Uppajjatīti uppādato yāva nirodhagamanā uddhaṃ pajjati, nibbattatītipi attho[Pg.412]. Attānaṃ labhati, uppādādayo tayopi khaṇe pāpuṇātīti vuttaṃ hoti. Hetupaccayāti kusalahetunā hetupaccayabhāvaṃ sādhentena.

Here, “dependent on a wholesome phenomenon” means: having taken one phenomenon among the wholesome phenomena of the four planes, distinguished as the feeling aggregate and so on, having attained a similar state by way of what is designated as co-arising, that is, having reached a state of arising together with it—this is the meaning. “Wholesome phenomenon” refers to one phenomenon among the wholesome phenomena of the four planes, distinguished as the perception aggregate and so on. “Arises” means it proceeds upwards from arising until reaching cessation, or it is produced—this is also the meaning. It obtains itself, that is to say, it reaches all three moments beginning with arising—this is stated. “By way of root condition” means by the wholesome root, bringing about the state of being a root condition.

Evaṃ ‘‘uppajjeyyā’’ti pucchāya ‘‘uppajjatī’’ti vissajjanaṃ vatvā idāni yaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca yo dhammo uppajjati, taṃ dhammaṃ khandhavasena dassetuṃ kusalaṃ ekaṃ khandhantiādimāha. Tattha ekanti vedanādīsu catūsu yaṃkiñci ekaṃ. Tayo khandhāti yo yo paccayabhāvena gahito, taṃ taṃ ṭhapetvā avasesā tayo khandhā. Tayo khandheti vedanādīsu yo eko khandho uppajjatīti gahito, taṃ ṭhapetvā sese tayo. Dve khandheti vedanāsaññādukādīsu chasu dukesu yekeci dve khandhe paṭicca. Dve khandhāti ye ye paccayabhāvena gahitā, te te ṭhapetvā avasesā dve khandhā kusalahetunā hetupaccayabhāvaṃ sādhentena uppajjantīti attho.

Thus, having stated the answer “It arises” to the question “Might it arise?”, now, in order to show, by way of aggregates, which phenomenon arises dependent on which phenomenon, it is said, beginning with “one wholesome aggregate.” Here, “one” refers to any one of the four, such as feeling. “Three aggregates” means the remaining three aggregates, excluding whichever one is taken as the condition. “Three aggregates” also refers to the remaining three, excluding whichever single aggregate, such as feeling, is taken as arising. “Two aggregates” means ‘dependent on any two aggregates among the six dyads, such as the dyad of feeling and perception.’ “Two aggregates” means the remaining two aggregates, excluding whichever ones are taken as conditions; the meaning is that they arise, with the wholesome root establishing the state of root-condition.

Yasmā pana eko khandho ekasseva dvinnaṃyeva vā, dve vā pana ekasseva paccayo nāma natthi, tasmā ‘‘ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭicca eko khandho, ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭicca dve khandhā, dve khandhe paṭicca eko khandho’’ti na vuttaṃ. Kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca abyākato dhammo uppajjatītiādīsupi vuttanayeneva attho veditabbo. Cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpanti idaṃ paṭiccatthassa sahajātatthattā yaṃ kusalena sahajātañceva hetupaccayañca labhati, taṃ dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Paratopi evarūpesu ṭhānesu ayameva nayo.

However, since there is no such thing as one aggregate being a condition for just one or for two, or two aggregates being a condition for just one, therefore it is not said, “one aggregate dependent on one aggregate, one aggregate dependent on two aggregates, or two aggregates dependent on one aggregate.” The meaning should be understood in the same way as stated in cases like “an indeterminate phenomenon arises dependent on a wholesome phenomenon,” and so on. The phrase “mind-originated form” is stated to show that which obtains both co-arising with the wholesome and the root condition, because the meaning of “dependent” here is “co-arising.” And elsewhere in such places, this same method applies.

Vipākābyākataṃ kiriyābyākatanti ettha hetupaccayābhāvato ahetukaṃ, rūpena saddhiṃ anuppattito āruppavipākañca na gahetabbaṃ. Paṭisandhikkhaṇeti kaṭattārūpasaṅkhātassa abyākatassa abyākataṃ paṭicca uppattidassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Vipākābyākatanti tasmiṃ khaṇe vijjamānābyākatavasena vuttaṃ. Khandhe paṭicca vatthu, vatthuṃ paṭicca khandhāti idaṃ kaṭattārūpaggahaṇena vatthumhi gahitepi vatthuṃ paṭicca khandhānaṃ uppattidassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ.

Here, regarding ‘resultant indeterminate’ and ‘functional indeterminate’: the rootless [consciousness] should not be included, due to the absence of a root condition; and the formless resultant [consciousness] should not be included, because it does not arise together with form. “At the moment of rebirth-linking” is stated to show the arising of an indeterminate phenomenon dependent on the indeterminate phenomenon designated as kamma-produced form. “Resultant indeterminate” is stated by way of the indeterminate states existing at that moment. “The aggregates dependent on the physical base, the physical base dependent on the aggregates”—this is stated to show the arising of the aggregates dependent on the physical base, even though the physical base is included by the mention of kamma-produced form.

Ekaṃ mahābhūtantiādi rūpābyākataṃ paṭicca rūpābyākatassa uppattidassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Ekaṃ khandhantiādīsu vuttanayeneva panettha atthayojanā veditabbā. Evaṃ rūpābyākatamhi bhūte paṭicca bhūtānaṃ uppattiṃ vatvā idāni bhūte [Pg.413] paṭicca upādārūpānaṃ uppattiṃ dassetuṃ mahābhūte paṭicca cittasamuṭṭhānantiādi vuttaṃ. Evaṃ sante upādārūpanti ettakameva vattabbaṃ, itaradvayaṃ kasmā vuttanti? Mahābhūtepi paṭicca uppattidassanatthaṃ. Yañhi heṭṭhā ‘‘cittasamuṭṭhānañca rūpaṃ kaṭattā ca rūpa’’nti dassitaṃ, taṃ na kevalaṃ khandheyeva ca paṭicca uppajjati, mahābhūtepi pana paṭicca uppajjatīti dassanatthamidaṃ vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Tattha cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ pavatteyeva, kaṭattārūpaṃ paṭisandhiyampi. Upādārūpanti tasseva ubhayassa visesanaṃ.

“One great element,” etc., is stated to show the arising of indeterminate materiality dependent on indeterminate materiality. The meaning here should be understood in the same way as explained in the sections on “one aggregate,” etc. Having thus stated the arising of the primary elements dependent on an indeterminate primary element, now, to show the arising of derived materiality dependent on the primary elements, it is stated, “dependent on the great elements, mind-originated,” etc. If this is the case, only “derived materiality” should be stated. Why then are the other two stated? To show their arising dependent on even the great elements. For what was indicated earlier as “mind-originated materiality and kamma-originated materiality” does not arise solely dependent on the aggregates, but also arises dependent on the great elements—this is the purpose of this statement. Here, mind-originated materiality occurs only in the course of existence, while kamma-originated materiality occurs also at rebirth-linking. “Derived materiality” is a qualification of both.

Kusale khandhe ca mahābhūte ca paṭiccāti ettha cittasamuṭṭhānāva mahābhūtā gahitā. Cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpanti ettha pana bhūtarūpampi upādārūpampi gahitaṃ. ‘‘Ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ paṭicca tayo mahābhūtā’’tiādinā nayena hi bhūtarūpampi khandhe ca mahābhūte ca paṭicca uppajjati. Mahābhūte paṭicca upādārūpanti vuttanayena upādārūpampi. Akusalañca abyākatañcāti pañhāvissajjanesupi eseva nayo. Evaṃ hetupaccaye nava pucchā vissajjitā. Etāyeva hi ettha labbhanti, sesā cattālīsa moghapucchāti na vissajjitā. Iminā upāyena ārammaṇapaccayādīsupi pucchāvissajjanānaṃ attho veditabbo. Tattha tattha pana vicāretabbayuttakameva vicārayissāma.

In the phrase “dependent on the wholesome aggregates and the great elements,” here only mind-originated great elements are taken. In the phrase “mind-originated materiality,” however, both primary materiality and derived materiality are taken. For indeed, primary materiality also arises dependent on the aggregates and the great elements, in the manner stated in the phrase “dependent on one great element, the three other great elements,” and so on. Derived materiality also arises in the manner stated in “derived materiality dependent on the great elements.” This same method also applies in the answers to the questions on “unwholesome and indeterminate.” Thus, under the root-condition, nine questions have been answered. Only these are obtainable here; the remaining forty are futile questions and thus not answered. By this method, the meaning of questions and answers regarding the object-condition and the others should also be understood. There, however, we will examine only what is fitting to examine.

54. Ārammaṇapaccaye tāva rūpassa ārammaṇapaccayavasena anuppattito tāsu navasu rūpamissakā pahāya tissova pucchā vissajjitā. Teneva ca kāraṇena ‘‘vatthuṃ paṭicca khandhā’’ti vatvā ‘‘khandhe paṭicca vatthū’’ti na vuttaṃ. Na hi taṃ ārammaṇapaccayena uppajjati.

54. Regarding the object-condition, first, since materiality does not arise by way of the object-condition, having set aside from those nine questions the ones mixed with materiality, only three questions are answered. For the same reason, it is said, “aggregates dependent on a base,” but it is not said, “a base dependent on aggregates.” For that does not arise by way of the object-condition.

55. Adhipatipaccaye vipākābyākatanti lokuttarameva sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tenevettha ‘‘paṭisandhikkhaṇe’’ti na gahitaṃ. Sesaṃ hetupaccayasadisameva.

55. Regarding the dominance-condition, “resultant-indeterminate” is stated only in reference to the supramundane states. Therefore, “at the moment of rebirth-linking” is not included here. The rest is similar to the root-condition.

56. Anantarasamantaresupi rūpaṃ na labbhatīti ārammaṇapaccaye viya tissova pucchā.

56. In the contiguity and immediate contiguity conditions, too, materiality is not found; therefore, just as in the case of the object-condition, there are only three questions.

57. Sahajātapaccaye paṭisandhikkhaṇeti pañcavokāre paṭisandhivasena vuttaṃ. Heṭṭhā pana paccayavibhaṅge ‘‘okkantikkhaṇe’’ti āgataṃ tampi iminā saddhiṃ atthato ekaṃ, byañjanamattameva hettha nānanti. Apica ‘‘tiṇṇaṃ sannipātā gabbhassa [Pg.414] avakkanti hotī’’ti (ma. ni. 1.408) vacanato okkantīti pañcavokārapaṭisandhiyāvetaṃ nāmaṃ. Paṭisandhīti sabbabhavasādhāraṇaṃ. Idha pana ‘‘kaṭattā ca rūpa’’ntiādivacanato pañcavokārapaṭisandhiyeva adhippetā. Sā hi rūpassapi arūpassapi paccayabhāvañceva paccayuppannabhāvañca saṅgaṇhāti, tasmā paripuṇṇavissajjanā hotīti gahitā. Bāhiraṃ ekaṃ mahābhūtanti anindriyabaddhesu pathavīpāsāṇādīsu mahābhūtaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Paccayavibhaṅgavārasmiñhi cattāro mahābhūtāti ajjhattikañca bāhirañca ekato katvā gahitaṃ. Saṅkhepadesanā hi sā. Ayaṃ pana vitthāradesanā, tasmā sabbaṃ vibhajitvā dassento ‘‘bāhiraṃ ekaṃ mahābhūta’’ntiādimāha. Asaññasattānaṃ ekaṃ mahābhūtaṃ paṭiccāti dvisantatisamuṭṭhānabhūtavasena vuttaṃ. Mahābhūte paṭicca kaṭattārūpanti idaṃ pana kammasamuṭṭhānavaseneva vuttaṃ. Upādārūpanti utusamuṭṭhānavaseneva.

57. In the co-nascence condition, “at the moment of relinking” is stated with reference to relinking in the five-constituent existence. However, in the Analysis of Conditions previously, the term “moment of descent” (okkantikkhaṇa) also appears; that too is one in meaning with this, only the expression differs here. Furthermore, according to the statement, “The descent of an embryo occurs through the union of three factors” (MN 1.408), the term “descent” is a name for relinking in the five-constituent existence. “Relinking” is common to all existences. Here, however, based on statements such as “and kamma-originated materiality,” only relinking in the five-constituent existence is intended. For it encompasses being a condition and being a conditioned state for both materiality and immateriality; thus it is taken because it provides a complete answer. “An external great element” is stated with reference to the great elements in things not bound to faculties, such as earth and stones. In the section on the Analysis of Conditions, “the four great elements” are taken by combining the internal and the external. For that is a concise exposition. This, however, is a detailed exposition; therefore, showing everything by distinguishing them, it states, “an external great element,” etc. For non-percipient beings, “dependent on one great element” is stated with reference to the primary elements arising from two continuities. However, “kamma-originated materiality dependent on the great elements” is stated only in terms of that which is kamma-originated. “Derived materiality” is stated only in terms of that which is temperature-originated.

58. Aññamaññapaccaye khandhe paṭicca vatthu, vatthuṃ paṭicca khandhāti catunnampi khandhānaṃ ekato vatthunā aññamaññapaccayataṃ dassetuṃ vuttaṃ.

58. In the mutuality condition, “the aggregates are dependent on the base, and the base is dependent on the aggregates” is stated to show the mutuality-conditionality of the four immaterial aggregates together with the base.

59. Nissayapaccaye yasmā paṭiccattho nāma sahajātattho, tasmā yā heṭṭhā paccayavibhaṅgavāre cakkhāyatanādīnaṃ nissayapaccayatā dassitā, na sā gahitā. Cakkhāyatanādīni hi purejātāni hutvā paccayā honti, idha sahajātameva labbhati. Teneva vuttaṃ – ‘‘nissayapaccayo sahajātapaccayasadiso’’ti.

59. In the support condition, since the meaning of “dependent on” is the meaning of co-nascent, the support-conditionality of the eye-base, etc., shown in the previous section on the Analysis of Conditions, is not included here. For the eye-base, etc., arise prior and serve as conditions, whereas here only co-nascent phenomena are obtained. Hence it is said, “The support condition is similar to the co-nascence condition.”

60. Upanissayapaccaye rūpassa upanissayapaccayābhāvā tīṇeva vissajjanāni labbhanti, tena vuttaṃ ‘‘ārammaṇapaccayasadisa’’nti. Tattha kiñcāpi na sabbe kusalākusalābyākatā ārammaṇūpanissayaṃ labhanti, ye pana labhanti, tesaṃ vasenetaṃ vuttanti veditabbaṃ.

60. In the decisive support condition, because materiality lacks a decisive support condition, only three answers are obtained. Therefore, it is said, “similar to the object-condition.” Here, although not all wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate states obtain objective decisive support, it should be understood that this is stated with reference to those that do.

61. Purejātapaccaye vatthuṃ purejātapaccayāti vatthuṃ paṭicca vatthunā purejātapaccayataṃ sādhentena uppajjantīti attho. Vipākābyākataṃ ekaṃ khandhanti ettha yaṃ vipākābyākatassa vatthu okkantikkhaṇe sahajātapaccayo hoti, taṃ purejātapaccayabhājaniyattā idha na gahetabbaṃ. Yepi kusalādayo [Pg.415] āruppe purejātapaccayaṃ na labhanti, tepi purejātapaccayabhājaniyatoyeva idha na gahetabbā. Ārammaṇaṃ pana niyamato purejātapaccayabhāvaṃ na labhati. Rūpāyatanādīni hi cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃyeva purejātapaccayataṃ sādhenti, manoviññāṇadhātuyā atītānāgatānipi ārammaṇaṃ hontiyeva. Tasmā idha na gahitaṃ. Khandhavasena hi ayaṃ desanā, na viññāṇadhātuvasena. ‘‘Vipākābyākataṃ ekaṃ khandha’’nti desanāya ca sabbāpi viññāṇadhātuyo gahitā, na cakkhuviññāṇadhātuādayo evāti.

61. In the prenascence condition, the meaning of 'the base as a prenascence condition' is that states arise dependent on the base, which establishes its prenascence-conditionality. Here, regarding 'one resultant-indeterminate aggregate,' that base of the resultant-indeterminate consciousness which is a co-nascence condition at the moment of descent should not be taken here, because it is to be classified under the prenascence condition. Those wholesome states, etc., in the immaterial realms that do not obtain a prenascence condition are also not to be included here, precisely because they are to be classified under the prenascence condition. An object, however, does not necessarily obtain the state of a prenascence condition. For the form-base, etc., establish prenascence-conditionality only for eye-consciousness, etc., whereas even past and future phenomena can be objects for the mind-consciousness element. Therefore, it is not included here. For this teaching is in terms of aggregates, not in terms of consciousness elements. And by the teaching, 'one resultant-indeterminate aggregate,' all consciousness elements are included, not just the eye-consciousness element, etc.

Pacchājāto kusalākusalānaṃ paccayo na hoti, abyākatassapi upatthambhakova na janako, tasmā ‘‘uppajjati pacchājātapaccayā’’ti evaṃ vattabbo ekadhammopi natthīti pacchājātapaccayavasena vissajjanaṃ na kataṃ.

The post-nascence condition is not a condition for wholesome and unwholesome states; and for indeterminate states, it is only a supporter, not a producer. Therefore, since there is not even a single phenomenon that can be described as 'arising by the post-nascence condition,' an answer has not been given in terms of the post-nascence condition.

62. Āsevanapaccaye kāmaṃ sabbā kiriyā āsevanapaccayaṃ na labhanti, labbhamānavasena pana ‘‘kiriyābyākata’’nti vuttaṃ. Tasmā javanakiriyāvettha gahitāti veditabbā.

62. In the repetition condition, indeed, not all functional states obtain the repetition condition, but, in terms of what can be obtained, it is called “functional-indeterminate.” Therefore, it should be understood that here only impulsive functional states are included.

63. Kammapaccaye kusalākusalesu ekakkhaṇiko kammapaccayo veditabbo, tathā kiriyābyākate. Vipākābyākate pana nānākkhaṇikopi, tathā paṭisandhikkhaṇe mahābhūtānaṃ. Cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ pana ekakkhaṇiko. Kaṭattārūpānaṃ nānākkhaṇikova tathā asaññasattarūpānaṃ. Kaṭattārūpaṃ panettha jīvitindriyaṃ. Sesaṃ na ekantato kammasamuṭṭhānattā upādārūpanti vuttaṃ. Evaṃ santepi idha kammasamuṭṭhānameva adhippetaṃ.

63. In the kamma condition, for wholesome and unwholesome kamma, the kamma condition should be understood as single-momentary. Similarly, for functional-indeterminate states. However, for resultant-indeterminate states, it can be multi-momentary, as also at the moment of relinking for the great elements. But for mind-originated materiality, it is single-momentary. For kamma-originated materiality, it is multi-momentary, as also for the materiality of non-percipient beings. Here, the kamma-originated materiality referred to is the life faculty. The rest are not exclusively kamma-originated, hence they are called derived materiality. Even so, here only kamma-originated materiality is intended.

64. Vipākapaccaye kusalākusalaṃ kiriyañca na labbhatīti abyākatavaseneva vissajjanaṃ kataṃ. Cittasamuṭṭhānanti vipākacittasamuṭṭhānameva. Kaṭattārūpanti yathālābhavasena indriyarūpañca vatthurūpañca. Upādārūpanti tadavasesaṃ tasmiṃ samaye vijjamānakaṃ upādārūpaṃ.

64. In the result condition, wholesome, unwholesome, and functional states are not obtained, so the answer is given only in terms of the indeterminate states. “Mind-originated materiality” means only resultant mind-originated materiality. “Kamma-originated materiality” means sense-faculty materiality and base materiality, according to what is obtained. “Derived materiality” means the remaining derived materiality existing at that time.

65. Āhārapaccaye sabbesampi kusalādīnaṃ khandhānaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca arūpāhāravasena uppatti veditabbā, tathā paṭisandhikkhaṇe mahābhūtānaṃ. Cittasamuṭṭhānanti bhavaṅgādicittasamuṭṭhānaṃ. Āhārasamuṭṭhānanti kabaḷīkārāhārasamuṭṭhānaṃ[Pg.416]. Cittasamuṭṭhānanti kusalākusalacittasamuṭṭhānameva. Paccayavibhaṅgavāre āhārapaṭipāṭiyā paṭhamaṃ kabaḷīkāro āhāro dassito, idha pana kusalaṃ dhammanti pucchāvasena paṭhamaṃ arūpāhārā dassitāti veditabbā.

65. In the nutriment condition, it should be understood that the arising of all aggregates of wholesome states, etc., and of mind-originated materiality is due to immaterial nutriment, as is the arising of the great elements at the moment of relinking. 'Mind-originated' refers to that originated by states of consciousness such as the life-continuum. 'Nutriment-originated' refers to that originated by physical nutriment. 'Mind-originated' refers only to that originated by wholesome and unwholesome states of consciousness. In the section on the Analysis of Conditions, physical nutriment is shown first in the sequence of nutriments, but it should be understood that here, due to the question 'a wholesome phenomenon...,' immaterial nutriments are shown first.

66. Indriyapaccaye paccayavibhaṅge indriyapaṭipāṭiyā paṭhamaṃ cakkhundriyādīni dassitāni, idha pana kusalādipucchāvasena paṭhamaṃ arūpindriyānaṃ paccayatā dassitā. Tattha kusalādīsu yathālābhavasena arūpindriyā gahetabbā. Asaññasattānaṃ bhūtarūpesupi jīvitindriyanti.

66. In the faculty condition, in the analysis of conditions, the eye faculty and so forth are presented first in the sequence of faculties, but here, by way of the question concerning the wholesome and so forth, the conditionality of the immaterial faculties is presented first. There, in regard to the wholesome and so forth, the immaterial faculties should be understood according to their availability. For non-percipient beings, the life faculty exists even among the primary material elements.

67. Jhānamaggapaccayesu hetupaccayasadisameva vissajjanaṃ, tenevettha ‘‘hetupaccayasadisa’’nti vuttaṃ.

67. In the jhāna and path conditions, the exposition is similar to that of the root condition; therefore it is said here, 'similar to the root condition.'

68. Sampayuttapaccaye vissajjanaṃ ārammaṇapaccayagatikaṃ, tenevettha ‘‘ārammaṇapaccayasadisa’’nti vuttaṃ.

68. In the associated condition, the exposition follows the course of the object condition; therefore it is said here, 'similar to the object condition.'

69. Vippayuttapaccaye vatthuṃ vippayuttapaccayāti vatthuṃ paṭicca vippayuttapaccayā, vatthunā vippayuttapaccayataṃ sādhentena uppajjantīti attho. Khandhe vippayuttapaccayāti khandhe paṭicca vippayuttapaccayā, khandhehi vippayuttapaccayataṃ sādhentehi uppajjatīti attho. Khandhā vatthuṃ vippayuttapaccayāti vatthuṃ paṭicca khandhā vippayuttapaccayā. Vatthunā vippayuttapaccayataṃ sādhentena uppajjantīti attho. Cittasamuṭṭhānarūpaṃ khandhe vippayuttapaccayāti khandhe paṭicca vippayuttapaccayā cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ khandhehi vippayuttapaccayataṃ sādhentehi uppajjatīti attho. Sesavissajjanesupi vatthuṃ vippayuttapaccayātiādīsupi vuttanayenevattho veditabbo. Vipākābyākate cettha vatthuggahaṇena cakkhādīni saṅgahitabbāni. Ekaṃ mahābhūtantiādi rūpābyākatassa paccayabhāvaṃ dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Cittasamuṭṭhānanti abyākatacittasamuṭṭhānampi kusalākusalacittasamuṭṭhānampi.

69. In the dissociated condition, the statement 'the base is a dissociated condition' means that in dependence on the base, there are dissociated conditions, and the meaning is that they arise establishing the state of being a dissociated condition through the base. The statement 'the aggregates are a dissociated condition' means that in dependence on the aggregates, there are dissociated conditions, and the meaning is that they arise establishing the state of being a dissociated condition through the aggregates. The statement 'the aggregates are a dissociated condition for the base' means that in dependence on the base, the aggregates are dissociated conditions, and the meaning is that they arise establishing the state of being a dissociated condition through the base. The statement 'mind-originated form is a dissociated condition for the aggregates' means that in dependence on the aggregates, mind-originated form is a dissociated condition, and the meaning is that it arises establishing the state of being a dissociated condition through the aggregates. In the remaining expositions as well, such as 'the base is a dissociated condition' and so forth, the meaning should be understood in the same way as stated. Here, in the resultant-indeterminate, by the inclusion of 'base,' the eye and so forth should be understood. The statement 'one great element' and so forth is said to show the conditionality of indeterminate materiality. 'Mind-originated' refers to that which is originated by indeterminate consciousness as well as that originated by wholesome and unwholesome consciousness.

70. Atthipaccaye sabbaṃ sahajātapaccayagatikaṃ. Tenevettha ‘‘sahajātapaccayasadisa’’nti vuttaṃ.

70. In the presence condition, everything follows the course of the co-nascence condition. Therefore it is said here, 'similar to the co-nascence condition.'

71-72. Natthivigatā ārammaṇapaccayagatikā, avigataṃ sahajātagatikaṃ. Tenevettha ‘‘ārammaṇapaccayasadisaṃ, sahajātapaccayasadisa’’nti vuttaṃ[Pg.417]. Ime tevīsati paccayāti saṅkhipitvā dassitānaṃ vasenetaṃ vuttaṃ. Vitthāretabbāti yā pucchā vissajjanaṃ labhanti, tāsaṃ vasena vitthāretabbā. Ayaṃ hetupaccayaṃ ādiṃ katvā ekamūlake paccayānulome paṭiccavārassa kusalattikavissajjane atthavaṇṇanā.

71-72. The absence and disappearance conditions follow the course of the object condition, while the non-disappearance condition follows the course of the co-nascence condition. Therefore it is said here, 'similar to the object condition' and 'similar to the co-nascence condition.' This is stated by way of the twenty-three conditions that have been shown in brief. The meaning of 'should be elaborated' is that they should be elaborated by way of the questions that obtain an exposition. This is the explanation of the meaning in the exposition of the wholesome triad of the Dependent Section in the forward order of conditions, beginning with the root condition, in the single-root section.

(2.) Saṅkhyāvāro

(2.) The Enumeration Section

73. Idāni ye ettha hetupaccayādīsu ekekasmiṃ paccaye vissajjanavārā laddhā, te gaṇanavasena dassetuṃ hetuyā navātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha hetuyā navāti hetupaccaye nava pucchāvissajjanavārā honti. Seyyathidaṃ – kusalena kusalaṃ, kusalena abyākataṃ, kusalena kusalābyākataṃ; akusalena akusalaṃ, akusalena abyākataṃ, akusalena akusalābyākataṃ, abyākatena abyākataṃ, kusalābyākatena abyākataṃ, akusalābyākatena abyākatanti.

73. Now, to present by way of enumeration the occasions for exposition that are obtained in each of the conditions, beginning with the root condition and so forth, the text 'Nine by root' and so forth is commenced. Herein, 'Nine by root' means there are nine occasions for question and exposition in the root condition. Namely: (1) the wholesome by the wholesome, (2) the indeterminate by the wholesome, (3) the wholesome and the indeterminate by the wholesome; (4) the unwholesome by the unwholesome, (5) the indeterminate by the unwholesome, (6) the unwholesome and the indeterminate by the unwholesome; (7) the indeterminate by the indeterminate, (8) the indeterminate by the wholesome and the indeterminate, and (9) the indeterminate by the unwholesome and the indeterminate.

Ārammaṇe tīṇīti kusalena kusalaṃ, akusalena akusalaṃ, abyākatena abyākataṃ. Adhipatiyā navāti hetuyā vuttasadisāva. Dvādasasu hi paccayesu nava navāti vuttaṃ. Sabbesupi pucchāvissajjanāni hetupaccayasadisāneva. Vibhaṅge pana atthi viseso. Dasasu paccayesu tīṇi tīṇīti vuttaṃ. Sabbesupi pucchāvissajjanāni ārammaṇasadisāneva. Vibhaṅge pana atthi viseso. Aññamaññapaccayasmiñhi abyākatapadassa vissajjane rūpampi labbhati, tathā purejātapaccaye. Āsevanapaccaye vipākāni ceva vīthicittāni ca na labbhanti. Vipāke ekanti abyākatameva. Evamettha saṅkhepato nava tīṇi ekanti, tividhova vāraparicchedo. Vitthārato dvādasa navakā, dasa tikā, ekaṃ ekakanti sabbesupi tevīsatiyā paccayesu ekūnacattālīsādhikaṃ vārasataṃ hoti, ekūnacattālīsādhikañca pucchāsataṃ. Ekūnacattālīsādhikaṃ pucchāvissajjanasatantipi tasseva nāmaṃ.

In the object condition, 'three' means the wholesome by the wholesome, the unwholesome by the unwholesome, and the indeterminate by the indeterminate. In the dominance condition, 'nine' means just as stated for the root condition. Indeed, for twelve conditions, it is stated 'nine each.' In all of these, the questions and expositions are similar to those of the root condition. However, there is a distinction in the analysis. For ten conditions, it is stated 'three each.' In all of these, the questions and expositions are similar to those of the object condition. However, there is a distinction in the analysis. Indeed, in the mutuality condition, materiality is also obtained in the exposition of the indeterminate term, and similarly in the pre-nascence condition. In the repetition condition, neither resultants nor process-consciousnesses are obtained. In the resultant condition, 'one' means only the indeterminate. Thus, here in brief, 'nine, three, one' means the division of occasions is threefold. In detail, there are twelve groups of nine, ten groups of three, and one group of one; in all twenty-three conditions, there are one hundred and thirty-nine occasions, and one hundred and thirty-nine questions. The one hundred and thirty-nine questions and expositions are also known by that same name.

74. Evaṃ hetupaccayādike ekamūlake gaṇanaṃ dassetvā ito paresu dumūlakādīsu vitthāradesanaṃ saṅkhipitvā ekamūlake dassitāya desanāya labbhamānagaṇanaññeva ādāya vāraparicchedaṃ dassetuṃ dumūlake tāva hetupaccayā ārammaṇe tīṇītiādimāha. Tatridaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ [Pg.418] – bahugaṇanopi paccayo abahugaṇanena saddhiṃ yutto tena samānagaṇanova hoti. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘hetupaccayā ārammaṇe tīṇī’’ti. Hetuārammaṇaduke ārammaṇe vuttāni tīṇeva vissajjanāni labbhantīti attho. Samānagaṇano pana samānagaṇanena saddhiṃ yutto aparihīnagaṇanova hoti. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘hetupaccayā adhipatiyā navā’’ti. Hetādhipatiduke naveva vissajjanāni labbhantīti attho. Vipāke ekanti hetuvipākaduke vipāke vuttaṃ ekameva vissajjanaṃ labbhatīti evaṃ tāva dumūlake vāraparicchedo veditabbo.

74. Having thus shown the calculation in the single-root section, beginning with the root condition and so forth, summarizing the detailed exposition in the subsequent two-root sections and so forth, and taking only the calculation obtainable from the exposition shown in the single-root section, to present the division of occasions, he first says in the two-root section, 'Regarding root condition and object condition, three' and so forth. Here is the characteristic: Even a condition with a large number, when combined with one with a small number, becomes of the same number as that. Therefore it is said, 'Regarding root condition and object condition, three.' The meaning is that in the root-object dyad, only the three expositions stated regarding the object condition are obtained. However, one with the same number, when combined with one with the same number, does not have a reduced number. Therefore it is said, 'Regarding root condition and dominance condition, nine.' The meaning is that in the root-dominance dyad, only nine expositions are obtained. Regarding result, 'one' means that in the root-result dyad, only the one exposition stated regarding the result condition is obtained. Thus, the division of occasions for the two-root case should be understood in this way.

75. Timūlakādīsupi idameva lakkhaṇaṃ. Tenevāha – hetupaccayā ārammaṇapaccayā adhipatiyā tīṇīti. Hetārammaṇādhipati tike ārammaṇe vuttāni tīṇeva vissajjanāni labbhantīti attho. Evaṃ sabbattha nayo netabbo.

75. The same characteristic applies in the three-root sections and so forth. Therefore he says, 'Root condition, object condition, and dominance condition—three.' The meaning is that in the triad of root, object, and dominance, only the three expositions stated regarding the object condition are obtained. This method should be applied everywhere.

76-79. Dvādasamūlake pana vipākapaccayo na labbhati, tasmā āsevanapaccayā kamme tīṇīti vatvā vipākaṃ aparāmasitvā āhāre tīṇīti vuttaṃ. Terasamūlakādīsupi eseva nayo. Te pana saṅkhipitvā tevīsatimūlakovettha dassito. So duvidho hoti – sāsevano vā savipāko vā. Tattha paṭhamaṃ sāsevano dassito, so tīṇeva vissajjanāni labhati. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘āsevanapaccayā avigate tīṇī’’ti. Savipāko pana āsevanaṃ na labhati, tasmā taṃ pahāya vipākavasena gaṇanāya dassanatthaṃ anantarāyeva ‘‘hetupaccayā…pe… vipākapaccayā āhāre eka’’nti ekaṃ nayaṃ dassetvā pacchā tevīsatimūlakova dassito. Etesu pana dvīsu tevīsatimūlakesu kiñcāpi ekasmiṃ vipākapaccayo natthi, ekasmiṃ āsevanapaccayo, pacchājātapaccayo pana ubhayatthāpi. Ruḷhīsaddena panete tevīsatimūlakātveva veditabbā. Tesu sāsevane āsevanassa vasena sabbattha tīṇeva vissajjanāni, savipāke vipākapaccayassa vasena ekamevāti ayaṃ hetupaccayaṃ ādiṃ katvā ekamūlakādīsu gaṇanā.

76-79. In the twelve-root section, however, the resultant condition is not obtained. Therefore, having said 'three in action due to the repetition condition,' and without referring to the resultant, 'three in nutriment' is stated. The same method applies in the thirteen-root sections and so forth. These, when summarized, are shown here as the twenty-three-root section. It is of two kinds: either with repetition or with resultant. Among them, the first is shown as with repetition, and it obtains only three expositions. Therefore it is said, 'Due to the repetition condition, three in the non-absence condition.' However, the one with resultant does not obtain repetition. Therefore, setting that aside, to show the counting by way of resultant, immediately after, 'Due to the root condition... up to the resultant condition, one in nutriment'—one method is shown. Afterwards, the twenty-three-root section alone is shown. However, among these two twenty-three-root sections, although in one the resultant condition is absent, and in one the repetition condition is absent, the post-nascence condition is present in both. However, by the conventional term, these should be understood as just twenty-three-root sections. Among them, in the one with repetition, by way of the repetition condition, there are always only three expositions. In the one with resultant, by way of the resultant condition, there is only one. This is the counting beginning with the root condition in the single-root sections and so forth.

Yaṃ panetaṃ hetumūlakānantaraṃ ‘‘ārammaṇe ṭhitena sabbattha tīṇeva pañhā’’ti vuttaṃ, taṃ ārammaṇapaccayaṃ ādiṃ katvā ekamūlakepi dumūlakādīsupi sabbattha [Pg.419] ārammaṇapade ceva ārammaṇena saddhiṃ sesapaccayayojanāsu ca yattha navahi bhavitabbaṃ, tattha tayova pañhā hontīti dassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Vipākapade pana vipākapadena saddhiṃ sesapaccayayojanāsu ca ekova pañho hotīti. Iti yaṃ heṭṭhā avocumha ‘‘bahugaṇanopi paccayo abahugaṇanena saddhiṃ yutto tena samānagaṇano hotī’’ti, taṃ suvuttameva.

And what was said immediately after the root-root section, 'In all cases where the object is fixed, there are only three questions,' that is stated to show that, taking the object condition as primary, even in the single-root section and in the two-root sections and so forth, everywhere in the object term and in the combinations of other conditions with the object, where there should be nine, there are only three questions. However, in the resultant term, and in the combinations of other conditions with the resultant term, there is only one question. Thus, what we said below, 'Even a condition with a large number, when combined with one with a small number, becomes of the same number as that,' is indeed well-stated.

80-85. Idāni ye ārammaṇādīnaṃ paccayānaṃ vasena ekamūlakādayo dassetabbā, tesu ekamūlako tāva hetuekamūlakeneva sadisoti ekasmimpi paccaye na dassito. Ārammaṇapaccayavasena pana dumūlake gaṇanaṃ dassetuṃ ārammaṇapaccayā hetuyā tīṇi, adhipatiyā tīṇi…pe… avigate tīṇīti vuttaṃ. Ettha ca ‘‘ārammaṇapaccayā adhipatiyā tīṇi…pe… avigate tīṇī’’ti vattabbe ye hetupaccayādayo paccayā bahugaṇanā, tesaṃ ūnataragaṇanehi ca samānagaṇanehi ca saddhiṃ saṃsandane yā gaṇanā labbhati, taṃ dassetuṃ ārammaṇapaccayassa purimabhāge ṭhitampi hetupaccayaṃ pacchimabhāgeva ṭhapetvā ‘‘ārammaṇapaccayā hetuyā tīṇī’’ti vuttaṃ. Tenetaṃ āvi karoti – ārammaṇapaccayo yena yena bahutaragaṇanena vā samānagaṇanena vā paccayena saddhiṃ dukatikādibhedaṃ gacchati, sabbattha tīṇeva pañhāvissajjanāni veditabbāni. Vipākapaccayena pana saddhiṃ saṃsandane ekameva labbhati, taṃ vipākapaccayādikāya gaṇanāya āvi bhavissatīti idha na dassitaṃ. Yā cesā dumūlake gaṇanā dassitā, timūlakādīsupi esāva gaṇanāti ārammaṇapaccayavasena timūlakādayo na vitthāritā.

80-85. Now, regarding those single-root sections, etc., which are to be shown by way of conditions such as the object-condition, etc.: the single-root section is similar to the single-root section by the root-condition alone, and so it is not shown even in a single condition. However, to show the enumeration of the double-root section by way of the object-condition, it is said: "By the object-condition, three by the root-condition, three by the dominance-condition… up to three by the non-disappearance-condition." Here, although it should have been said, "By the object-condition, three by the dominance-condition… up to three by the non-disappearance-condition," to show the enumeration obtained by comparing the root-condition, etc. (which are conditions of higher enumeration), with those of lesser or equal enumeration, the root-condition, though placed earlier, is placed in the latter part, saying, "By the object-condition, three by the root-condition." This makes it clear that wherever the object-condition, when combined with any condition having a more numerous or equal enumeration, gives rise to divisions such as dualities and triads, the answers to the questions should always be understood as three. However, when compared with the resultant-condition, only one is obtained; this will become clear in the enumeration beginning with the resultant-condition, etc., and so it is not shown here. And this enumeration shown in the double-root section is the same in the triple-root sections, etc.; therefore, the triple-root sections, etc., by way of the object-condition, are not elaborated.

Idāni adhipatipaccayādivasena dumūlakādīsu gaṇanaṃ dassetuṃ adhipatipaccayā hetuyā navātiādi vuttaṃ. Tatthāpi vuttanayeneva paccayasanniveso veditabbo. Yathā ca adhipatipaccayā hetuyā nava, evaṃ sesesupi hetunā samānagaṇanāsu naveva. Iti yo yo paccayo ādimhi tiṭṭhati, tena tena saddhiṃ samānagaṇanānaṃ saṃsandane ādimhi ṭhitassa vasena gaṇanā hoti. Tena pana saddhiṃ ūnataragaṇanānaṃ saṃsandane ūnataragaṇanānaṃyeva vasena gaṇanā hotīti veditabbo. Yathā ca ārammaṇapaccayavasena evaṃ adhipatipaccayavasenāpi tato paresaṃ anantarādīnaṃ vasenāpi timūlakādayo na vitthāritā. Tasmā dumūlake [Pg.420] dassitagaṇanāvaseneva sabbattha sādhetabbā. Teneva vuttaṃ ‘‘ekekaṃ paccayaṃ mūlakaṃ kātuna sajjhāyamaggena gaṇetabbā’’ti.

Now, to show the enumeration in the double-root sections, etc., by way of the dominance-condition, etc., it is said: "By the dominance-condition, with the root-condition, nine," and so on. Herein too, the arrangement of the conditions should be understood in the same way as explained. Just as there are nine by the dominance-condition with the root-condition, so too with the remaining conditions of equal enumeration with the root-condition, there are nine. Thus, whichever condition stands first, the enumeration is done based on that first condition when combining with those of equal enumeration. However, when combining with those of lesser enumeration, the enumeration is done based on the lesser enumeration. And just as with the object-condition, so too with the dominance-condition, and thereafter with the remaining conditions such as the contiguity-condition, etc., the triple-root sections, etc., are not elaborated. Therefore, everywhere the enumeration should be accomplished according to the method shown in the double-root section. Therefore, it is said: "Taking each condition as a root, one should enumerate by way of the recitation method."

Paccayānulomavaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Conditional Concordance.

Paṭiccavāro

The Section on Dependence

Paccayapaccanīyavaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Conditional Opposition

86-87. Paccayapaccanīyaṃ pana yasmā kusalapade na labbhati kusaladhammassa hetupaccayena vinā anuppattito, tasmā akusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭiccātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha nahetupaccayāti hetupaccayapaṭikkhepo hetupaccayaṃ vinā aññena paccayena uppajjatīti attho. Vicikicchāsahagato uddhaccasahagato mohoti ayañhi sampayuttadhammānañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa ca sayaṃ hetupaccayo hoti, aññassa pana sampayuttahetuno abhāvā na hetupaccayā uppajjatīti ṭhapetvā hetupaccayaṃ sesehi attano anurūpapaccayehi uppajjati. Iminā nayena sabbapaccayapaṭikkhepesu attho veditabbo. Ahetukaṃ vipākābyākatanti idaṃ rūpasamuṭṭhāpakavaseneva veditabbaṃ. Aññesupi evarūpesu eseva nayo.

86-87. However, since the conditional opposition is not obtained in the wholesome category because a wholesome phenomenon cannot arise without the root-condition, therefore the phrase "dependent on an unwholesome phenomenon," etc., is begun. Herein, "not by root-condition" means the negation of the root-condition; it signifies that a phenomenon arises by another condition, not by the root-condition. For instance, delusion accompanied by doubt and restlessness—this indeed is a root-condition for its associated phenomena and for mind-originated materiality, but because of the absence of another associated root-condition, it does not arise by the root-condition. Excluding the root-condition, it arises by the remaining conditions suitable to it. In this way, the meaning should be understood in the negations of all the conditions. "Rootless, resultant, indeterminate" should be understood only with reference to the origination of materiality. In other such cases, the same method applies.

88. Naadhipatipaccaye kāmaṃ adhipatipi attanā saddhiṃ dutiyassa adhipatino abhāvā naadhipatipaccayaṃ labhati, yathā pana vicikicchuddhaccasahagato moho ahetuko, na tathā adhipatayo eva nirādhipati. Chandādīsu pana aññataraṃ adhipatiṃ akatvā kusalādīnaṃ uppattikāle sabbepi kusalādayo nirādhipatino. Tasmā mohaṃ viya visuṃ adhipatimattameva anuddharitvā sabbasaṅgāhikavasena esā ‘‘ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭicca tayo khandhā’’tiādikā desanā katāti veditabbā.

88. In the non-dominance condition, desire, though a dominance factor itself, does not obtain the non-dominance condition because of the absence of a second dominance factor alongside it. Just as delusion accompanied by doubt and restlessness is rootless, dominance factors are not in that way without dominance. However, when any one of the dominance factors such as desire is not made a dominance at the time of the arising of wholesome states, etc., all wholesome and other states are without dominance. Therefore, it should be understood that this teaching—'one aggregate conditions three aggregates,' etc.—is stated in an all-inclusive way, without singling out merely the dominance factor, just as with delusion.

89. Nānantaranasamanantaresu nārammaṇe viya rūpameva paccayuppannaṃ. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘nārammaṇapaccayasadisa’’nti. Sahajātapaccayo parihīno. Yathā cesa, tathā nissayaatthiavigatapaccayāpi. Kiṃ kāraṇā? Etehi vinā kassaci anuppattito. Sahajātanissayaatthiavigatapaccayepi hi paccakkhāya ekopi rūpārūpadhammo nuppajjati, tasmā te parihīnā.

89. In the non-contiguity and non-proximity conditions, as in the non-object condition, only materiality is the conditioned phenomenon. Therefore, it is said, 'it is similar to the non-object condition.' The non-co-nascence condition is excluded. As with this, so too are the non-dependence, non-presence, and non-disappearance conditions. What is the reason? Because without these, nothing arises. Indeed, without the co-nascence, dependence, presence, and non-disappearance conditions, not even a single material or immaterial phenomenon arises; therefore, they are excluded.

90. Naaññamaññapaccayavibhaṅge [Pg.421] paṭisandhikkhaṇe vipākābyākate khandhe paṭicca kaṭattārūpanti hadayavatthuvajjaṃ veditabbaṃ.

90. In the analysis of the non-mutuality condition, at the moment of rebirth-linking, kamma-born materiality should be understood as conditioned by the resultant-indeterminate aggregates, with the exception of the heart-basis.

91. Naupanissayapaccayavibhaṅge rūpameva paccayuppannaṃ, tañhi upanissayaṃ na labhati. Arūpaṃ pana kiñcāpi ārammaṇūpanissayapakatūpanissaye na labheyya, anantarūpanissayamuttakaṃ pana natthi. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘nārammaṇapaccayasadisa’’nti.

91. In the analysis of the non-strong-dependence condition, only materiality is the conditioned phenomenon, for it does not obtain strong-dependence. However, the immaterial, though it may not obtain object-strong-dependence or natural strong-dependence, is not without contiguity-strong-dependence. Therefore, it is said, 'It is similar to the non-object condition.'

92. Napurejāte cittasamuṭṭhānarūpanti pañcavokāravasena vuttaṃ.

92. In the analysis of the non-pre-nascence condition, the term 'mind-originated materiality' is stated with reference to the five-constituent existence.

93. Napacchājātapaccayāti ettha sahajātapurejātapaccayā saṅgahaṃ gacchanti. Tasmā sahajātapaccayasadisā ettha pāḷi, sā naadhipatipaccaye vitthāritāti idha saṅkhittā. Nāsevanapaccaye kusalākusalā paṭhamajavanavasena veditabbā, tathā kiriyābyākataṃ. Pāḷi pana idhāpi naadhipatipaccaye vitthāritavasena veditabbā. Tenevāha – ‘‘napacchājātapaccayampi nāsevanapaccayampi nādhipatipaccayasadisa’’nti.

93. In the non-post-nascence condition, the co-nascence and pre-nascence conditions are included. Therefore, the text here is similar to that for the co-nascence condition, and it is abbreviated here because it is elaborated in the non-dominance condition. In the non-repetition condition, wholesome and unwholesome states should be understood by way of the first impulsion, and similarly for functional-indeterminate states. The text here, however, should also be understood by way of the elaboration in the non-dominance condition. Therefore, it is said: 'The non-post-nascence condition and the non-repetition condition are similar to the non-dominance condition.'

94-97. Nakammapaccaye vipākacetanā nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayaṃ labhatīti na gahitā. Nāhārapaccaye ekaccaṃ rūpameva paccayuppannaṃ, tathā naindriyapaccaye.

94-97. In the non-kamma condition, resultant volition is not included because it obtains the different-moment kamma condition. In the non-nutriment condition, only some materiality is the conditioned phenomenon; and similarly in the non-faculty condition.

98. Najhānapaccaye pañcaviññāṇadhammā ceva ekaccañca rūpaṃ paccayuppannaṃ. Pañcaviññāṇasmiñhi vedanā ca cittekaggatā ca dubbalattā upanijjhānalakkhaṇaṃ na pāpuṇantīti jhānapaccaye na gahitā.

98. In the non-jhāna condition, the states of the five sense-consciousnesses and also some materiality are the conditioned phenomena. For in the five sense-consciousnesses, feeling and one-pointedness, being weak, do not attain the characteristic of close contemplation; hence, they are not included in the jhāna condition.

99-102. Namaggapaccaye ahetukavipākakiriyañceva ekaccañca rūpaṃ paccayuppannaṃ. Nasampayuttanonatthinovigatesu rūpameva paccayuppannaṃ. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘nārammaṇapaccayasadisa’’nti.

99-102. In the non-path condition, rootless resultant and functional states and some materiality are the conditioned phenomena. In the non-association, non-presence, and non-disappearance conditions, only materiality is the conditioned phenomenon. Therefore, it is said, 'It is similar to the non-object condition.'

103. Nahetuyā dveti ekamūlakagaṇanāya yathāpāḷimeva niyyāti.

103. The phrase 'two by the non-root condition' proceeds according to the enumeration of the single-root, just as in the Pāli text.

104. Dumūlake nahetupaccayā nārammaṇe ekanti ettha kiñcāpi bahugaṇanena saddhiṃ ūnataragaṇanassa saṃsandane ūnataragaṇanavasena nahetuyā viya dvīhi bhavitabbaṃ. Nārammaṇavasena pana arūpadhammānaṃ parihīnattā abyākataṃ paṭicca rūpābyākatassa uppattiṃ sandhāya ‘‘eka’’nti vuttaṃ[Pg.422]. Sabbesu ekakesupi eseva nayo. Dveti vuttaṭṭhāne pana nahetuyā laddhavasena vāradvayaṃ veditabbaṃ.

104. In the double-root, regarding the phrase 'in the non-object condition, one by the non-root condition': here, although in comparing the lesser enumeration with the more numerous enumeration, it should be two by way of the lesser enumeration, as in the non-root condition, yet by way of the non-object condition, because immaterial phenomena are excluded, 'one' is said with reference to the arising of indeterminate materiality conditioned by the indeterminate. The same method applies in all single cases. But where 'two' is said, two occurrences should be understood as obtained by way of the non-root condition.

105-106. Timūlakādīsu pana sabbesu nārammaṇapaccayassa aparihīnattā ekameva vissajjananti ayaṃ paccanīye nahetupaccayaṃ ādiṃ katvā ekamūlakādīsu gaṇanā.

105-106. However, in all the triple-root, etc., since the non-object condition is not excluded, there is only one solution. This is the enumeration in the negative section, beginning with the non-root condition, in the single-root, etc.

107-130. Nārammaṇapaccayādayo pana ekamūlake tāva purimena sadisattā idhāpi na dassitāyeva. Nārammaṇapaccayavasena dumūlake nārammaṇapaccayā, nahetuyā ekanti nahetudumūlake vuttameva. Nādhipatiyā pañcāti nārammaṇapaccaye laddhavasena veditabbāti evaṃ sabbasaṃsandanesu ūnataragaṇanasseva paccayassa vasena gaṇanā veditabbā. Yattha yattha ca nārammaṇapaccayo pavisati, tattha tattha rūpameva paccayuppannaṃ. Nānantaranasamanantaranaaññamaññanaupanissayanāhāranaindriyanasampayuttanonatthinovigatapaccayānaṃ paviṭṭhaṭṭhānepi eseva nayo. Nāhāranaindriyanajhānanamaggapaccayā sabbattha sadisavissajjanā. Nasahajātādicatukkaṃ idhāpi parihīnamevāti idamettha lakkhaṇaṃ. Iminā pana lakkhaṇena sabbesu dumūlakādīsu ‘‘ayaṃ paccayo mūlaṃ, ayamettha dumūlako, ayaṃ timūlako, ayaṃ sabbamūlako’’ti sallakkhetvā ūnataragaṇanassa paccayassa vasena gaṇanā veditabbāti.

107-130. However, the non-object condition, etc., being similar to the preceding in the single-root, are not shown here either. By way of the non-object condition in the double-root, the phrase 'by non-object condition, one by non-root condition' is already stated in the non-root double-root. 'Five by the non-dominance condition' should be understood as obtained by way of the non-object condition. Thus, in all combinations, the enumeration should be understood based on the condition with the lesser enumeration. And wherever the non-object condition enters, there only materiality is the conditioned phenomenon. The same method applies even in the places where the non-contiguity, non-proximity, non-mutuality, non-strong-dependence, non-nutriment, non-faculty, non-association, non-presence, and non-disappearance conditions have entered. The non-nutriment, non-faculty, non-jhāna, and non-path conditions have the same solutions everywhere. The four beginning with non-co-nascence are also excluded here. This is the characteristic in this case. But by this characteristic, in all the double-root, etc., having discerned 'this condition is a root, this here is a double-root, this is a triple-root, this is an all-root,' the enumeration should be understood based on the condition with the lesser enumeration.

Paccayapaccanīyavaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Conditional Negative.

Paccayānulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Conditional Positive-Negative.

131-189. Idāni anulomapaccanīye gaṇanaṃ dassetuṃ hetupaccayā nārammaṇe pañcātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha hetādhipatimaggapaccayesu anulomato ṭhitesu sahajātādayo cattāro sabbaṭṭhānikapaccayā, āhārindriyajhānamaggapaccayā cattāroti ime aṭṭha paccanīyato na labbhanti. Hetupaccayādivasena hi uppajjamāno dhammo ime aṭṭha paccaye alabhanto nāma natthi. Ārammaṇaanantarasamanantaraupanissayasampayuttanatthivigatapaccayesu pana anulomato ṭhitesu arūpaṭṭhānikā paccanīkato [Pg.423] na labbhanti. Na hi ārammaṇapaccayādīhi uppajjamānā anantarasamanantarapaccayādayo na labhanti. Sahajātaaññamaññanissayakammāhārindriyaatthiavigatapaccayesu pana anulomato ṭhitesu cattāro sabbaṭṭhānikāyeva, paccanīkato na labbhanti. Etesañhi paccayānaṃ vasena uppajjamāno sabbaṭṭhānike alabhanto nāma natthi. Pacchājātapaccayassa anulomato ṭhānaṃ nāma natthi. Evaṃ sesesu anulomato ṭhitesu ye ca labbhanti, ye ca na labbhanti, te sallakkhetvā sabbesupi dumūlakādīsu nayesu tesaṃ tesaṃ paccayānaṃ saṃsandane ūnataragaṇanānaṃyeva vasena gaṇanā veditabbāti.

131-189. Now, to show the calculation in the direct-reverse mode, the section beginning with 'by way of root condition, five in non-object' is commenced. Here, when the root, dominance, and path conditions are established in the direct order, the four universally applicable conditions—co-nascence and the others—and the four conditions—nutriment, faculty, jhāna, and path—these eight are not obtainable in the reverse order. For there is no phenomenon arising by way of the root condition and the others which lacks these eight conditions. However, when the object, contiguity, immediate, support, association, absence, and disappearance conditions are established in the direct order, the conditions pertaining to the immaterial sphere are not obtainable in the reverse order. For phenomena arising by way of the object condition and the others do not lack the contiguity, immediate, and other conditions. When the co-nascence, reciprocity, dependence, kamma, nutriment, faculty, presence, and non-disappearance conditions are established in the direct order, only the four universally applicable conditions are not obtainable in the reverse order. For there is no phenomenon arising by way of these conditions which lacks the universally applicable conditions. There is no establishment in the direct order for the post-nascence condition. Thus, in the remaining cases, when established in the direct order, having discerned which are obtainable and which are not, in all the methods of the dyads and so forth, the calculation should be understood based on the lesser count in their respective combinations.

Paccayānulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Direct-Reverse of Conditions.

Paccayapaccanīyānulomavaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Reverse-Direct of Conditions

190. Idāni paccanīyānulome gaṇanaṃ dassetuṃ nahetupaccayā ārammaṇe dvetiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha hetumhi paccanīkato ṭhite ṭhapetvā adhipatiṃ avasesā anulomato labbhanti. Pacchājāto pana anulomato sabbattheva na labbhati, ye nava paccayā ‘‘arūpānaññevā’’ti vuttā, tesu purejātañca āsevanañca ṭhapetvā avasesesu sattasu paccanīkato ṭhitesu sesā arūpaṭṭhānikā anulomato na labbhanti. Yo hi ārammaṇādīhi nuppajjati, na so anantarādayo labhati. Paṭisandhivipāko pana purejātato, sabbavipāko ca saddhiṃ kiriyamanodhātuyā āsevanato anuppajjamānopi anantarādayo labhati, tasmā ‘‘purejātañca āsevanañca ṭhapetvā’’ti vuttaṃ.

190. Now, to show the calculation in the reverse-direct mode, the section beginning with 'by way of non-root condition, two in object' is commenced. Here, when the root condition is established in the reverse order, excluding dominance, the remaining conditions are obtained in the direct order. However, the post-nascence condition is never obtained at all in the direct order. Among the nine conditions stated as 'only for the immaterial,' excluding pre-nascence and habitual recurrence, when the remaining seven conditions are established in the reverse order, the remaining conditions pertaining to the immaterial sphere are not obtained in the direct order. For what does not arise through the object condition, etc., does not obtain the contiguity condition, etc. But the rebirth-linking resultant, though not arising from pre-nascence, and all resultants, along with the functional mind-element, though not arising from habitual recurrence, do obtain the contiguity condition, etc. Therefore, it is said, 'excluding pre-nascence and habitual recurrence.'

Purejātapacchājātaāsevanavipākavippayuttesu paccanīkato ṭhitesu ekaṃ ṭhapetvā avasesā anulomato labbhanti. Kammapaccaye paccanīkato ṭhite ṭhapetvā vipākapaccayaṃ avasesā anulomato labbhanti. Āhārindriyesu paccanīkato ṭhitesu ṭhapetvā sabbaṭṭhānike ceva aññamaññakammāhārindriyapaccaye ca avasesā anulomato na labbhanti, itare yujjamānakavasena labbhanti. Jhānapaccaye paccanīkato ṭhite. Hetādhipatiāsevanamaggapaccayā [Pg.424] anulomato na labbhanti. Maggapaccaye paccanīkato ṭhite hetādhipatipaccayā anulomato na labbhanti. Vippayuttapaccaye paccanīkato ṭhite purejātapaccayaṃ ṭhapetvā avasesā anulomato labbhanti. Evaṃ tesu tesu paccayesu paccanīkato ṭhitesu ye ye anulomato na labbhanti, te te ñatvā tesaṃ tesaṃ paccayānaṃ saṃsandane ūnataragaṇanānaṃ vasena gaṇanā veditabbā.

When pre-nascence, post-nascence, habitual recurrence, resultant, and dissociation conditions are established in the reverse order, excluding one, the remaining are obtained in the direct order. When the kamma condition is established in the reverse order, excluding the resultant condition, the remaining are obtained in the direct order. When the nutriment and faculty conditions are established in the reverse order, excluding the universally applicable conditions and the reciprocity, kamma, nutriment, and faculty conditions, the remaining are not obtained in the direct order; the others are obtained as applicable. When the jhāna condition is established in the reverse order, the root, dominance, habitual recurrence, and path conditions are not obtained in the direct order. When the path condition is established in the reverse order, the root and dominance conditions are not obtained in the direct order. When the dissociation condition is established in the reverse order, excluding the pre-nascence condition, the remaining are obtained in the direct order. Thus, concerning these various conditions established in the reverse order, having known which ones are not obtained in the direct order, the calculation in the combination of those respective conditions should be understood based on the lesser count.

191-195. Dumūlakādīsu ca nayesu yaṃ yaṃ paccayaṃ ādiṃ katvā ye ye dukādayo dassitā, te te labbhamānālabbhamānapaccayavasena yathā yathā dassitā, tathā tathā sādhukaṃ sallakkhetabbā. Tattha yaṃ nahetuvasena dumūlakādayo naye dassentena nahetupaccayā nārammaṇapaccayā…pe… nāsevanapaccayāti vatvā ‘‘yāva āsevanā sabbaṃ sadisa’’nti vuttaṃ. Tassa, ‘‘naaññamaññapaccayā sahajāte eka’’ntiādīhi sadisatā veditabbā. Yaṃ pana ‘‘nakamme gaṇite pañca gaṇhātī’’ti sīhaḷabhāsāya likhitaṃ, tassattho – nahetupaccayaṃ ādiṃ katvā nakammapaccayāti evaṃ nakammapaccayena ghaṭite sahajāte ekanti evaṃ dassitā pañceva paccayā anulomato labbhanti, na aññeti. Evaṃ aññesupi evarūpesu ṭhānesu byañjanaṃ anādiyitvā adhippetatthoyeva gahetabbo. Evarūpañhi byañjanaṃ attano saññānibandhanatthaṃ porāṇehi sakasakabhāsāya likhitaṃ.

191-195. In the methods of the dyads and so forth, whichever condition is taken as the beginning and whichever dyads, etc., are shown, they should be carefully noted according to whether the conditions are obtainable or unobtainable. There, when showing the methods of the dyads and so forth by way of the non-root condition, it is said, 'not the root condition, not the object condition... up to... not the habitual recurrence condition,' and then, 'up to habitual recurrence, all is the same.' Its similarity should be understood by statements like, 'in the co-nascent, the non-reciprocity condition is one,' etc. However, what is written in the Sinhalese language as, 'when non-kamma is reckoned, it takes five,' its meaning is: starting with the non-root condition, up to the non-kamma condition, thus, when connected with the non-kamma condition, in co-nascence, one—thus, only five conditions are obtained in the direct order, not others. Similarly, in other such instances, the wording should not be adhered to, but only the intended meaning should be grasped. For such wording was written by the ancients in their own language for the sake of their own conventions.

Apica imasmiṃ paccanīyānulome paccayuppannadhammesupi atthi dhammo kammapaccayaṃ labhati, na indriyapaccayaṃ. So asaññesu ceva pañcavokāre pavatte ca rūpajīvitindriyavasena veditabbo. Atthi dhammo maggapaccayaṃ labhati, nahetupaccayaṃ. So vicikicchuddhaccasahajātamohavasena veditabbo. Atthi dhammo jhānapaccayaṃ labhati, namaggapaccayaṃ. So manodhātuahetukamanoviññāṇadhātuvasena veditabbo. Yattha kaṭattārūpāni nānākkhaṇikakammavaseneva kammapaccayaṃ labhanti, tattha rūpadhammā hetādhipativipākindriyajhānamaggapaccaye na labhanti, sabbaṭṭhānikā paccanīyā na honti. Ahetuke adhipatipaccayo natthīti imesampi pakiṇṇakānaṃ vasenettha gaṇanavāro asammohato veditabbo.

Moreover, in this reverse-direct mode concerning conditioned phenomena, there is a phenomenon that receives the kamma condition but not the faculty condition. This should be understood by way of the material life-faculty in non-percipient beings and in the course of five-aggregate existence. There is a phenomenon that receives the path condition but not the root condition. This should be understood by way of delusion co-arisen with doubt and agitation. There is a phenomenon that receives the jhāna condition but not the path condition. This should be understood by way of the mind-element and the rootless mind-consciousness-element. Where material forms produced by kamma receive the kamma condition only by way of kamma of diverse moments, there material phenomena do not receive the root, dominance, resultant, faculty, jhāna, or path conditions. The universally applicable conditions are not negated. In the rootless, there is no dominance condition. Thus, by way of these miscellaneous cases, the section on calculation here should be understood without confusion.

Tatrāyaṃ [Pg.425] nayo – nahetupaccayā ārammaṇe dveti ettha tāva ahetukamoho ceva ahetukavipākakiriyā ca paccayuppannaṃ, tasmā akusalenākusalaṃ, abyākatena abyākataṃ sandhāyettha dveti vuttaṃ. Sesesupi eseva nayo. Āsevane pana vipākaṃ na labbhati, tathā kiriyamanodhātu. Tasmā kiriyāhetumanoviññāṇadhātuvasenettha abyākatena abyākataṃ veditabbaṃ. Vipāke ekanti abyākatena abyākatameva. Magge ekanti akusalena akusalameva.

Here is the method: Regarding 'in non-root condition, two in object'—here, to begin with, rootless delusion and rootless resultant-and-functional states are the conditioned phenomena. Therefore, it is said 'two' in this connection, with reference to the unwholesome conditioning the unwholesome, and the indeterminate conditioning the indeterminate. The same method applies to the rest. However, in repetition, a resultant is not obtained, and likewise with the functional mind-element. Therefore, here, the indeterminate conditioning the indeterminate should be understood by way of the functional rootless mind-consciousness-element. In resultant, 'one' means only the indeterminate conditioning the indeterminate. In path, 'one' means only the unwholesome conditioning the unwholesome.

196-197. Nārammaṇamūlake hetuyā pañcāti rūpameva sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tañhi kusalaṃ akusalaṃ abyākataṃ kusalābyākataṃ akusalābyākatañcāti pañca koṭṭhāse paṭicca uppajjati. Sabbapañcakesu eseva nayo. Aññamaññe ekanti bhūtarūpāni ceva vatthuñca sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tāni hi nārammaṇapaccayā aññamaññapaccayā uppajjanti. Timūlakepi eseva nayo.

196-197. Regarding 'in the non-object-rooted section, five in root,' this is said with reference only to material form. For it arises dependent on five categories: wholesome, unwholesome, indeterminate, wholesome-and-indeterminate, and unwholesome-and-indeterminate. The same method applies to all the sets of five. Regarding 'one in mutual condition,' this is said with reference to the primary elements and the physical basis. For these arise by way of mutual condition, not by way of object condition. The same method applies also in the three-rooted section.

198-202. Nādhipatimūlake hetuyā navāti anulome hetumhi vuttāneva. Tīṇītiādīnipi heṭṭhā anulome vuttasadisāneva. Timūlake dveti heṭṭhā nahetupaccayā ārammaṇe vuttasadisāneva.

198-202. Regarding 'in the non-dominance-rooted section, nine in root,' they are just as stated in the root section in the positive series. The 'three,' etc., are also similar to what was said below in the positive series. 'Two in the three-rooted section' is similar to what was said below regarding 'in non-root condition, in object'.

203-233. Napurejātamūlake hetuyā sattāti heṭṭhā ‘‘āruppe kusalaṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭiccā’’tiādinā nayena purejāte dassitāneva. Sabbasattakesu eseva nayo. Nakammamūlake hetuyā tīṇītiādīsu cetanāva paccayuppannā. Tasmā kusalaṃ akusalaṃ abyākatañca paṭicca uppattiṃ sandhāya tīṇīti vuttaṃ. Iminā nayena ‘‘ekaṃ dve tīṇi pañca satta navā’’ti āgataṭṭhānesu gaṇanā veditabbā. ‘‘Cattāri cha aṭṭhā’’ti imā pana tisso gaṇanā natthevāti.

203-233. Regarding 'in the non-prenascence-rooted section, seven in root,' they are just as shown below in the prenascence section by the method beginning with 'in the immaterial sphere, a wholesome aggregate dependent on one aggregate…' This same method applies to all the sets of seven. In the non-kamma-rooted section, in 'three in root,' etc., volition itself is the conditioned phenomenon. Therefore, 'three' is said with reference to arising in dependence on wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate. By this method, the enumeration should be understood in the places where 'one, two, three, five, seven, nine' occur. But these three enumerations, 'four, six, eight,' do not exist at all.

Paccayapaccanīyānulomavaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Positive of the Negative of Conditions.

Niṭṭhitā ca paṭiccavārassa atthavaṇṇanā.

The explanation of the meaning of the Dependence Section is concluded.

2. Sahajātavāravaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Conascence Section

234-242. Sahajātavāre [Pg.426] kusalaṃ dhammaṃ sahajātoti kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca tena sahajāto hutvāti attho. Sesamettha paṭiccavāre vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Avasāne panassa ‘‘paṭiccattaṃ nāma sahajātattaṃ, sahajātattaṃ nāma paṭiccatta’’nti idaṃ ubhinnampi etesaṃ vārānaṃ atthato ninnānākaraṇabhāvadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Atthato hi ete dvepi ninnānākaraṇā. Evaṃ santepi aññamaññassa atthaniyamanatthaṃ vuttā. ‘‘Cakkhuñca paṭicca rūpe cā’’tiādīsu hi asahajātampi paṭicca uppajjatīti vuccati. Sahajātampi ca upādārūpaṃ bhūtarūpassa paccayo na hoti. Iti paṭiccavārena sahajātapaccayabhāvaṃ, sahajātavārena ca paṭiccāti vuttassa sahajātabhāvaṃ niyametuṃ ubhopete vuttā. Apica tathā bujjhanakānaṃ ajjhāsayavasena desanāvilāsena niruttipaṭisambhidāppabhedajānanavasena cāpi ete ubhopi vuttāti.

234–242. In the Conascence Section, “a wholesome phenomenon is a condition through conascence” means that having arisen dependently on that wholesome phenomenon, it is conascent with it. The rest here should be understood in the same way as explained in the Dependence Section. At its end, it is stated: “Dependence is called conascence, and conascence is called dependence.” This is said to show that these two sections are not different in meaning, that they do not have a different nature. For in meaning, these two are indeed not different. Even so, they are stated to delimit the meaning of each other. For in statements like “dependent on the eye and on forms,” it is said that even a non-conascent phenomenon arises dependently. And conascent derived materiality is not a condition for primary materiality. Thus, both are stated: the Dependence Section to delimit the state of being a conascent condition, and the Conascence Section to delimit the conascent nature of what is called “dependent.” Moreover, both are stated for the sake of those who understand accordingly, according to their disposition, through the elegance of the teaching, and by way of the knowledge of the distinctions in the analytical knowledge of language.

Sahajātavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The Explanation of the Conascence Section is concluded.

3. Paccayavāravaṇṇanā

3. Explanation of the Condition Section

243. Paccayavāre kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paccayāti kusaladhamme patiṭṭhito hutvā kusalaṃ dhammaṃ nissayaṭṭhena paccayaṃ katvāti attho. Kusalaṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ paccayāti kusalaṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ nissayapaccayaṃ katvā tayo khandhā uppajjanti hetupaccayāti vuttaṃ hoti. Imināvupāyena sabbapadesu attho veditabbo. Vatthuṃ paccayā vipākābyākatā kiriyābyākatā khandhāti idaṃ pañcavokāre pavattivasena vuttaṃ. Pañcavokāre pavattiyañhi khandhānaṃ purejātaṃ vatthu nissayapaccayo hoti. Paṭiccaṭṭhassa pana sahajātaṭṭhattā paṭiccavāre esa nayo na labbhatīti paṭisandhiyaṃ sahajātameva vatthuṃ sandhāya ‘‘vatthuṃ paṭicca khandhā’’ti vuttaṃ. Kusalaṃ ekaṃ khandhañca vatthuñca paccayā tayo khandhātiādīsupi imināva nayena attho veditabbo.

243. In the Condition Section, 'a wholesome phenomenon is a condition' means: having been established in a wholesome phenomenon, one makes that wholesome phenomenon a condition in the sense of support. 'One wholesome aggregate is a condition' means: having made one wholesome aggregate a support condition, three aggregates arise; this is said to be by root condition. The meaning in all instances should be understood by this method. 'The physical basis is a condition for resultant-indeterminate and functional-indeterminate aggregates'—this is said with reference to occurrence in the five-constituent existence. For in occurrence in the five-constituent existence, the prenascent physical basis is a support condition for the aggregates. But since the meaning of 'dependence' is 'conascence,' this method is not found in the Dependence Section. Therefore, with reference to the conascent physical basis at rebirth-linking, it is said, 'dependent on the physical basis, the aggregates arise.' The meaning in instances such as 'one wholesome aggregate and the physical basis are conditions for three aggregates' should also be understood by this same method.

Abyākataṃ [Pg.427] dhammaṃ paccayā kusalo ca abyākato cāti kusalābyākatānaṃ hetupaccayavasena ekato uppattiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Kusaluppattikkhaṇasmiñhi vatthuṃ nissāya kusalā khandhā, cittasamuṭṭhāne ca mahābhūte nissāya cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ upādārūpaṃ hetupaccayavasena ekato uppajjati. Iti paccayabhūtassa abyākatassa nānattepi paccayuppannānaṃ hetupaccayavasena ekato uppattiṃ sandhāyetaṃ vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Aññesupi evarūpesu ṭhānesu eseva nayo. Evaṃ imasmiṃ hetupaccaye sahajātañca purejātañca nissayaṭṭhena paccayaṃ katvā sattarasa pañhā vissajjitā. Tattha khandhā ceva bhūtā ca sahajātavasena, vatthu sahajātapurejātavasena gahitaṃ. Paṭiccavāre pana sahajātavasena paccayo labbhati, tasmā tattha naveva pañhā vissajjitā. Ye panete ettha sattarasa pañhā vissajjitā, tesu ekādike ekāvasāne vissajjane kusalādīsu ekapaccayato eko paccayuppanno. Ekādike dukāvasāne ekapaccayato nānāpaccayuppanno. Dukādike ekāvasāne nānāpaccayato eko paccayuppanno. Dukādike dukāvasāne nānāpaccayato nānāpaccayuppanno.

'By condition of an indeterminate phenomenon, a wholesome and an indeterminate phenomenon arise'—this is said with reference to the simultaneous arising of the wholesome and the indeterminate by way of root condition. For at the moment of the arising of the wholesome, the wholesome aggregates arise in dependence on the physical basis, and mind-originated derived materiality arises in dependence on the mind-originated primary elements, simultaneously by way of root condition. Thus, it should be understood that this is said with reference to the simultaneous arising of the conditioned phenomena by way of root condition, even though the indeterminate phenomenon that has become a condition is diverse. This same method applies in other similar instances. In this way, in this root condition, seventeen questions have been answered by taking both the conascent and the prenascent as a condition in the sense of support. Here, the aggregates and the primary elements are taken as conascent, while the physical basis is taken as both conascent and prenascent. In the Dependence Section, however, the condition is obtained only as conascent; therefore, only nine questions are answered there. Now, regarding these seventeen questions that are answered here: in the answer with a single beginning and a single ending, from one condition, one conditioned phenomenon arises in the wholesome, etc.; in the answer with a single beginning and a double ending, from one condition, diverse conditioned phenomena arise; in the answer with a double beginning and a single ending, from diverse conditions, one conditioned phenomenon arises; in the answer with a double beginning and a double ending, from diverse conditions, diverse conditioned phenomena arise.

248-252. Ārammaṇapaccayādīsupi imināvupāyena pañhāvissajjanappabhedo veditabbo. Yaṃ panetaṃ ārammaṇapaccaye vatthuṃ paccayā khandhāti vuttaṃ, taṃ paṭisandhikkhaṇe vipākakkhandheyeva sandhāya vuttaṃ. Cakkhuviññāṇādīni abyākataṃ nissāya ārammaṇapaccayena uppajjantānaṃ pabhedadassanatthaṃ vuttāni. Puna vatthuṃ paccayāti pavatte vipākakiriyābyākatānaṃ uppattidassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Sesaṃ purimanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Evaṃ imasmiṃ ārammaṇapaccaye sahajātañca purejātañca paccayaṃ katvā satta pañhā vissajjitā. Tattha khandhā sahajātavasena, vatthu sahajātapurejātavasena, cakkhāyatanādīni purejātavaseneva gahitāni. Paṭiccavāre pana sahajātavaseneva paccayo labbhati. Tasmā tattha tayova pañhā vissajjitā.

In the object condition and others, the distinction of questions and answers should be understood by this same method. What was said regarding 'the base as condition for the aggregates' refers specifically to the resultant aggregates at the moment of rebirth-linking. Eye-consciousness and so on, arising dependent on the indeterminate by way of the object condition, are stated for the purpose of showing the distinction. Again, 'the base as condition' is stated to indicate the arising of resultant, functional, and indeterminate phenomena in the course of existence. The rest should be understood in the same way as before. Thus, in this object condition, seven questions have been answered by treating both the co-arisen and the pre-arisen as conditions. Therein, the aggregates are taken by way of co-arising, the base by way of both co-arising and pre-arising, and the eye-base and so on solely by way of pre-arising. However, in the Dependence Section, the condition is obtained only by way of co-arising. Therefore, there, only three questions have been answered.

253-254. Adhipatipaccaye vipākābyākataṃ lokuttarameva veditabbaṃ. Anantarasamanantarā rūpābhāvena ārammaṇasadisā. Parato āsevananatthivigatesupi eseva nayo.

In the Dominance Condition, the resultant-indeterminate should be understood as only supramundane. The contiguity and proximity conditions are similar to the object condition due to the absence of materiality. Further, this same method applies also in the repetition, absence, and disappearance conditions.

255. Sahajātapaccaye [Pg.428] kaṭattārūpaṃ upādārūpanti upādārūpasaṅkhātaṃ kaṭattārūpaṃ. Idaṃ asaññasattānaññeva rūpaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Cakkhāyatanādīni pañcavokāravasena vuttāni.

255. In the Co-arising Condition, 'kamma-born materiality is derived materiality' means kamma-born materiality designated as derived materiality. This is stated with reference only to the materiality of non-percipient beings. The eye-base and so on are stated by way of the five-aggregate existence.

256-257. Aññamaññapaccaye ca yathā ārammaṇapaccayā evanti vissajjanasamataṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Paccayuppannesu pana nānattaṃ atthi.

And in the Mutual Condition, the statement that it is 'just as in the object condition' is said with reference to the similarity of the answer. However, there is diversity among the conditioned phenomena.

258. Upanissayapaccaye ārammaṇapaccayasadisanti rūpābhāvatopi vissajjanasamatāyapi vuttaṃ.

258. In the Strong Dependence Condition, the statement that it is 'similar to the object condition' is said both due to the absence of materiality and due to the similarity of the answer.

259-260. Vatthuṃ purejātapaccayātiādīnaṃ paṭiccavāre vuttanayenevattho gahetabbo.

The meaning of “the base as a pre-arisen condition” and so on should be understood in the way stated in the Dependence Section.

261-266. Kammapaccaye tīṇīti kusalaṃ paccayā kusalo abyākato kusalābyākato cāti evaṃ tīṇi veditabbāni. Akusalepi eseva nayo.

In the Kamma Condition, 'three' should be understood thus: the wholesome as condition for the wholesome, the wholesome as condition for the indeterminate, and the wholesome as condition for the wholesome-indeterminate. This same method applies also to the unwholesome.

267-268. Vippayuttapaccaye khandhe vippayuttapaccayāti khandhe nissāya vippayuttapaccayā uppajjantīti attho. Khandhā vatthuṃ vippayuttapaccayāti khandhā vatthuṃ nissāya vippayuttapaccayā uppajjantīti attho. Sesaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ.

In the Dissociation Condition, 'aggregates are a condition through dissociation' means that phenomena arise dependent on aggregates by way of dissociation condition. 'Aggregates and the base are a condition through dissociation' means that phenomena arise dependent on aggregates and the base by way of dissociation condition. The rest should be understood in the manner previously stated.

269-276. Idāni yathāladdhāni vissajjanāni gaṇanavasena dassetuṃ hetuyā sattarasātiādimāha. Tattha hetuyā sattarasāti kusalena kusalaṃ, kusalena abyākataṃ, kusalena kusalābyākatanti evaṃ kusalavasena ekādikāni ekāvasānāni dve, dukāvasānaṃ ekanti tīṇi vuttāni honti, tathā akusalavasena. Abyākatena abyākataṃ, teneva kusalaṃ, akusalaṃ, kusalābyākataṃ akusalābyākatañca; kusalābyākatehi kusalaṃ, abyākataṃ, kusalābyākataṃ; akusalābyākatehi akusalaṃ, abyākataṃ, akusalābyākatanti evaṃ sattarasa veditabbāni.

Now, to present the answers as obtained by way of calculation, it is said, beginning with 'seventeen in the root condition.' Herein, 'seventeen in the root condition' are: by the wholesome, the wholesome; by the wholesome, the indeterminate; and by the wholesome, the wholesome-indeterminate—thus, with respect to the wholesome, three are stated: two beginning with one and ending with one, and one ending with two. Similarly with respect to the unwholesome. By the indeterminate, the indeterminate; by that same condition, the wholesome, the unwholesome, the wholesome-indeterminate, and the unwholesome-indeterminate. By the wholesome-indeterminate, the wholesome, the indeterminate, and the wholesome-indeterminate. By the unwholesome-indeterminate, the unwholesome, the indeterminate, and the unwholesome-indeterminate. Thus, seventeen should be understood.

Ārammaṇe sattāti kusalena kusalaṃ; akusalena akusalaṃ, abyākatena abyākataṃ, kusalaṃ, akusalaṃ; kusalābyākatena kusalaṃ; akusalābyākatena akusalanti evaṃ satta.

“Seven in the object condition” are: by the wholesome, the wholesome; by the unwholesome, the unwholesome; by the indeterminate, the indeterminate, the wholesome, and the unwholesome; by the wholesome-indeterminate, the wholesome; by the unwholesome-indeterminate, the unwholesome—thus, seven.

Vipāke [Pg.429] ekanti abyākatena abyākatameva. Evamettha sattarasa, satta, ekanti tayo vāraparicchedā honti. Tesu dvādasa sattarasakā, dasa sattakā, ekaṃ ekakanti te sabbe sādhukaṃ sallakkhetvā parato dukatikādivasena paccayasaṃsandane ūnataragaṇanassa vasena gaṇanā veditabbā. Sakkā hi imāya gaṇanāya dukamūlādīsu vāraparicchede jānitunti puna ‘‘kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paccayā kusalo dhammo’’ti anāmasitvā gaṇanavaseneva vāraparicchedaṃ dassetuṃ hetupaccayā ārammaṇe sattātiādi āraddhaṃ.

“One in the resultant condition” is only the indeterminate by the indeterminate. Thus, here there are three section divisions: seventeen, seven, and one. Among these conditions, twelve belong to the seventeen-group, ten to the seven-group, and one to the one-group. All these should be carefully noted, and then, in the subsequent sections of dyads, triads, and so on, the calculation in the connection of conditions should be understood by way of the lesser count. For by this calculation it is possible to know the section divisions in the Dyad-group and so on. Hence, without repeating 'a wholesome phenomenon is a condition for a wholesome phenomenon,' the exposition beginning with 'seventeen in the root condition, seven in the object condition,' etc., was undertaken to show the section divisions merely by enumeration.

Tattha kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paccayā kusalo dhammo uppajjati hetupaccayā ārammaṇapaccayā. Kusalaṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ paccayā tayo khandhāti iminā nayena ārammaṇe laddhavissajjanāni vitthāretabbāni. Ayaṃ tāva anulome nayo.

Herein, 'a wholesome phenomenon arises conditioned by a wholesome phenomenon by way of root condition and object condition.' 'One wholesome aggregate is a condition for three aggregates'—by this method, the answers obtained in the object condition should be elaborated. This, for now, is the method in the positive order.

277-285. Paccanīye pana kusalaṃ na labbhatīti akusalaṃ dhammaṃ paccayāti akusalameva ādiṃ katvā vissajjanaṃ āraddhaṃ. Taṃ yathāpāḷimeva niyyāti. Yañhettha vattabbaṃ siyā, taṃ paṭiccavārassa paccanīye vuttameva.

In the negative order, however, since the wholesome is not found, the answer is begun starting with 'an unwholesome phenomenon as condition.' This proceeds just according to the text. Whatever should be stated here has already been stated in the negative part of the Dependence Section.

286-287. Yaṃ panetaṃ paccanīye laddhavissajjanaparicchedaṃ gaṇanato dassetuṃ nahetuyā cattārītiādi vuttaṃ, tattha cattāri, sattarasa, satta, pañca, tīṇi, ekanti cha paricchedā. Tesaṃ vasena dukatikādīsu paccayasaṃsandane gaṇanā veditabbā. Yo hi paccayo sattarasa vissajjanāni labhati, tena saddhiṃ sadisasaṃsandane sattarasa, ūnatarasaṃsandane sesā chapi paricchedā labbhanti. Evaṃ sesesupi adhikaparicchedaṃ ṭhapetvā samasamā ūnatarā ca labbhantīti.

Now, what was said, beginning with 'four in the no-root condition,' was to show by enumeration the divisions of the answers obtained in the negative order. Herein, there are six divisions: four, seventeen, seven, five, three, and one. According to these, the enumeration in the connection of conditions in the dyads, triads, and so forth should be understood. For whichever condition obtains seventeen answers, with it, in a similar connection, seventeen are obtained; in a connection with a lesser number, the other divisions are also obtained. Similarly, in the remaining cases, having set aside the higher division, the equal and the lesser ones are obtained.

Ettha ca adhikatarā na labbhantīti ayamettha niyamo. Samasamā pana ūnatarā ca atthā virodhe sati labbhanti. Tenettha ‘‘nahetupaccayā nārammaṇe eka’’ntiādi vuttaṃ. Ettha hi nahetuyā catunnaṃ, nārammaṇe pañcannaṃ āgatattā nahetuvasena cattārīti vattabbaṃ siyā, nārammaṇena saddhiṃ ghaṭitattā pana ārammaṇadhammo virujjhatīti akusalaṃ dhammaṃ paccayā akusalo dhammo, abyākataṃ dhammaṃ paccayā akusalo, akusalañca [Pg.430] abyākatañca dhammaṃ paccayā akusaloti tīṇi vissajjanāni parihīnāni. Abyākataṃ dhammaṃ paccayā abyākatoti rūpavasena ekameva vuttaṃ. Evaṃ sabbattha viruddhāviruddhaṃ ñatvā labbhamānaparicchedo veditabbo. Apicettha idaṃ nayamattadassanaṃ. Nādhipatiyā cattārīti nahetuyā laddhāneva. Sesacatukkesupi eseva nayo.

Here, moreover, the more numerous are not obtainable; this is the rule here. However, the equal and the lesser cases are obtainable when there is opposition. Therefore, here it is said, “one in no-root condition, in no-object condition,” and so forth. Here, indeed, because four have come by way of the no-root condition and five by way of the no-object condition, it should be said that four are obtainable by way of the no-root condition. But because it is connected with the no-object condition, the object-phenomenon is opposed, and therefore, “an unwholesome phenomenon as condition for an unwholesome phenomenon, an indeterminate phenomenon as condition for an unwholesome phenomenon, and both an unwholesome and an indeterminate phenomenon as condition for an unwholesome phenomenon”—these three answers are omitted. “An indeterminate phenomenon as condition for an indeterminate phenomenon” is stated only once, in terms of material form. Thus, everywhere, knowing what is opposed and unopposed, the obtainable division should be understood. Moreover, here this is merely a glimpse of the method. For the no-predominance condition, four are just those obtained with the no-root condition. The same method applies to the remaining fourfold sets.

Nānantare ekanti ahetukacittasamuṭṭhānassa ceva sesarūpassa ca vasena abyākatena abyākataṃ. Evaṃ sabbesu ekakesu yujjamānakarūpaṃ jānitabbaṃ. Napurejāte dveti idhāpi nahetuvasena cattārīti vattabbaṃ siyā, napurejātena saddhiṃ ghaṭitattā pana abyākataṃ dhammaṃ paccayā akusalo, akusalañca abyākatañca dhammaṃ paccayā akusaloti vatthupurejātavasena dve vissajjanāni parihīnāni. Āruppe pana ahetukamohassa ahetukakiriyassa ca vasena dve vuttāni. Navippayutte dveti āruppe ahetukākusalakiriyavasena dve. Nonatthi novigatesu ekanti sabbassa rūpassa vasena abyākatena abyākataṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ. Tikādīsu apubbaṃ natthi.

In no-immediacy condition, one: this is the indeterminate conditioned by the indeterminate, in terms of rootless-consciousness-originated matter and the remaining matter. Thus, in all single cases, the applicable form should be known. In no-prenascence condition, two: here also, it should be said that four are obtainable by way of the no-root condition. However, because of its connection with the no-prenascence condition, “an indeterminate phenomenon as condition for an unwholesome phenomenon” and “both an unwholesome and an indeterminate phenomenon as condition for an unwholesome phenomenon”—these two answers are omitted by way of the base-prenascence. But in the formless sphere, two are stated by way of rootless delusion and rootless functional consciousness. In no-dissociation condition, two: in the formless sphere, two are stated by way of rootless unwholesome and functional consciousness. In no-absence and no-disappearance conditions, one: this is to be seen as the indeterminate conditioned by the indeterminate in terms of all matter. In the triads and so forth, there is nothing new.

288. Nārammaṇamūlake pana naadhipatiyā pañcāti nārammaṇe laddhāneva. Nakamme ekanti ettha cittasamuṭṭhānañca kaṭattārūpañca aggahetvā sesarūpavasena abyākatena abyākataṃ veditabbaṃ.

288. However, in the no-object-condition root, five in no-predominance condition are just those obtained in the no-object condition. In no-kamma condition, one: here, not taking consciousness-originated matter and kamma-born matter, it should be understood as the indeterminate conditioned by the indeterminate in terms of the remaining matter.

289-296. Nādhipatimūlake napurejāte sattāti napurejāte laddhāneva. Napacchājāte sattarasāti imānipi tattha laddhāni sattaraseva. Nānantaranasamanantaranaaññamaññanaupanissayanasampayuttanonatthinovigatamūlakāni nārammaṇamūlakasadisāneva. Imināva nayamattadassanena sabbattha āgatānāgataṃ labbhamānālabbhamānañca veditabbanti.

289-296. In the no-predominance-condition root, seven in no-prenascence condition are just those obtained in the no-prenascence condition. In no-postnascence condition, seventeen: these too are just those seventeen obtained there. The roots of no-immediacy, no-contiguity, no-mutuality, no-decisive support, no-association, no-absence, and no-disappearance conditions are similar to the no-object-condition root. By this mere glimpse of the method, what has been stated and what has not been stated, and what is obtainable and what is not obtainable, should be understood everywhere.

Paccanīyavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of the negative conditions is completed.

297-328. Imināyeva pana lakkhaṇena anulomaṃ purato katvā anulomapaccanīye paccanīyaṃ purato katvā paccanīyānulome ca gaṇanaparicchedo āgatānāgataṃ labbhamānālabbhamānañca veditabbanti.

297-328. Moreover, by this very characteristic, having placed the positive first in the positive-negative, and having placed the negative first in the negative-positive, the delimitation of the count, what has been stated and what has not been stated, and what is obtainable and what is not obtainable, should be understood.

Paccayavāravaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The exposition of the Section on Conditions is completed.

4. Nissayavāravaṇṇanā

4. Exposition of the Section on Dependence

329-337. Nissayavāre [Pg.431] kusalaṃ dhammaṃ nissāyāti kusalaṃ dhammaṃ patiṭṭhaṭṭhena nissayaṃ katvāti attho. Sesamettha paccayavāre vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Avasāne panassa ‘‘paccayattaṃ nāma nissayattaṃ, nissayattaṃ nāma paccayatta’’nti idaṃ ubhinnampi etesaṃ vārānaṃ atthato ninnānākaraṇabhāvadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Atthato hi etepi paṭiccasahajātā viya ninnānākaraṇā. Evaṃ santepi aññamaññassa atthaniyamanatthaṃ vuttā. Avijjāpaccayā saṅkhārātiādīsu hi anissāya vattamānaṃ nānākkhaṇikampi ‘‘paccayā uppajjatī’’ti vuttaṃ. Aññamaññaṃ allīyitvā ṭhitakaṭṭhādīsu ca ekaṃ ekassa nissayapaccayo na hoti, tathā upādārūpaṃ mahābhūtassa nissayapaccayo na hotiyeva. Iti paccayavārena nissayapaccayabhāvaṃ nissayavārena ca paccayāti vuttassa sahajātapurejātabhāvaṃ niyametuṃ ubhopete vuttā. Apica tathā bujjhanakānaṃ ajjhāsayavasena desanāvilāsena niruttipaṭisambhidāpabhedajānanavasena cāpi ete ubhopi vuttāti.

329-337. In the Section on Dependence, ‘depending on a wholesome phenomenon’ means making a wholesome phenomenon a dependence in the sense of a foundation. The rest here should be understood in the same way as explained in the Section on Conditions. At its end, however, it is said, ‘Condition-ness is dependence-ness, and dependence-ness is condition-ness,’ in order to show that these two sections are not different in meaning. For in meaning, these too are not different, like things that are dependently co-arisen. Even so, they are stated to define the meaning for each other. For instance, in ‘dependent on ignorance, formations arise,’ and so forth, it is said that even a non-simultaneous phenomenon, which occurs without dependence, ‘arises from a condition.’ And in cases like pieces of wood leaning against each other, one is not a dependence-condition for another; similarly, derived matter is not a dependence-condition for the great elements. Thus, both these sections are stated in order to define, by means of the Section on Conditions, the nature of the dependence-condition, and by means of the Section on Dependence, the co-arisen and prenascent nature of what is called a ‘condition.’ Moreover, these two are also stated according to the disposition of those who understand in such a way, through the elegance of the teaching, and through the knowledge of the varieties of the analytical knowledge of language.

Nissayavāravaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Section on Dependence.

5. Saṃsaṭṭhavāravaṇṇanā

5. Exposition of the Intermingled Section.

338-346. Saṃsaṭṭhavāre kusalaṃ dhammaṃ saṃsaṭṭhoti kusalaṃ dhammaṃ ekuppādādilakkhaṇena sampayogaṭṭhena paccayaṃ katvāti attho. Kusalaṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ saṃsaṭṭhoti kusalaṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ sampayuttapaccayaṃ katvā tayo khandhā uppajjanti hetupaccayāti vuttaṃ hoti. Iminā upāyena sabbapadesu attho veditabbo. Imasmiṃ pana hetupaccaye arūpadhammasseva sampayogaṭṭhena paccayaṃ katvā tayo pañhā vissajjitā. Yathā ca hetupaccaye, tathā ārammaṇapaccayādīsupi, kevalaṃ vipākapaccaye ekameva vissajjanaṃ.

338-346. In the Section on the Intermingled, ‘a wholesome phenomenon is intermingled’ means making a wholesome phenomenon a condition in the sense of association, characterized by single arising and so forth. ‘One wholesome aggregate is intermingled’ means that, having made one wholesome aggregate an association-condition, three aggregates arise by root-condition—this is what is stated. By this method, the meaning should be understood in all instances. Here, however, in the root-condition, with only formless phenomena having been made a condition in the sense of association, three questions are answered. And just as in the root-condition, so too in the object-condition and so forth, except that in the resultant-condition, there is only one answer.

347-350. Idāni yathāladdhāni vissajjanāni gaṇanavasena dassetuṃ hetuyā tīṇītiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha sabbatikesu kusalena kusalaṃ, akusalena [Pg.432] akusalaṃ, abyākatena abyākatanti ayameva niyamo. Ekake pana abyākatena abyākatameva labbhatīti evamettha bāvīsatiyā paccayesu tīṇi, vipāke ekanti dve paricchedā. Pacchājāte anulomaṃ natthi. Tasmā tīṇi ekanti imesaññeva vasena dukatikādīsu paccayasaṃsandane yattha vipākapaccayo pavisati; tattha ekaṃ, sesesu tīṇīti evaṃ gaṇanā veditabbā. Sesamettha anulome uttānatthameva.

347-350. Now, to show the answers as obtained by way of enumeration, it is stated, 'three by way of root condition,' and so forth. Here, in all the triads, 'wholesome with wholesome, unwholesome with unwholesome, and indeterminate with indeterminate'—this is indeed the rule. But in the single-item groups, only 'indeterminate with indeterminate' is obtained. Thus, here, among the twenty-two conditions, there are two divisions: three, and one in the resultant condition. In the post-nascence condition, there is no positive application. Therefore, based only on these three and one, in the combination of conditions in the dyads, triads, and so forth, wherever the resultant condition enters, there it is one; in the rest, it is three. Thus the enumeration should be understood. The remainder here, in the positive application, is indeed clear in meaning.

351-354. Paccanīye pana kusalaṃ na labbhatīti akusalameva ādiṃ katvā vissajjanaṃ kataṃ, taṃ uttānatthameva.

351-354. But in the negative, since the wholesome is not obtained, the answer is given beginning only with the unwholesome; that is indeed clear in meaning.

359. Yaṃ panettha paccanīye vissajjanaparicchedaṃ gaṇanato dassetuṃ nahetuyā dvetiādi vuttaṃ, tattha dve tīṇi ekanti tayo paricchedā. Tesaṃ vasena dukatikādīsu paccayasaṃsandane gaṇanā veditabbā. Idhāpi adhikataragaṇanānaṃ ūnataragaṇanena saddhiṃ saṃsandane ūnataragaṇanameva labbhati, samagaṇanena saddhiṃ samagaṇanaṃ. Yasmā cettha arūpadhammāyeva paccayuppannā, tasmā nahetunādhipatinapurejātanapacchājātanāsevananakammanavipākanajhānanamagganavippayuttavasena daseva paccayā paccanīkato dassitā, sesā cuddasa na labbhanti. Yepi labbhanti, tesupi vipāke paccayuppanne nakammanavipākā na labbhanti.

359. Here, in the negative, in order to show the division of answers by way of enumeration, it is stated, 'two by way of non-root condition,' and so forth. In that context, there are two, three, and one—thus there are three divisions. Based on these, the enumeration should be understood in the combination of conditions in the dyads, triads, and so forth. Here too, when combining greater enumerations with lesser enumerations, only the lesser enumeration is obtained; with equal enumerations, an equal enumeration is obtained. Because here only immaterial phenomena are the conditionally arisen, therefore, only ten conditions are shown from the negative perspective: non-root, non-dominance, non-pre-nascence, non-post-nascence, non-repetition, non-kamma, non-resultant, non-jhāna, non-path, and non-dissociation. The remaining fourteen are not obtained. Even among those that are obtained, when the conditionally arisen is a resultant, non-kamma and non-resultant are not obtained.

360-368. Nahetupaccayā nādhipatiyā dveti nahetuyā laddhaṃ dvayameva. Sesadvayesupi eseva nayo. Nakamme ekanti ahetukakiriyacetanaṃ paccayuppannaṃ katvā abyākatena abyākataṃ. Navipāke dveti ahetukamohakiriyavasena dve. Najhāne ekanti ahetukapañcaviññāṇavasena abyākatavissajjanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Namagge ekanti ahetukavipākakiriyavasena abyākatavissajjanaṃ. Imināvupāyena sabbasaṃsandanesu attho veditabboti.

360-368. 'By non-root condition, by non-dominance condition—two' means that the two obtained by non-root condition are meant. The same method applies to the remaining two pairs. 'By non-kamma—one' means that, making rootless functional volition the conditionally arisen, the indeterminate is with the indeterminate. 'By non-resultant—two' means two by way of rootless delusion and functional consciousness. 'By non-jhāna—one' means that the indeterminate answer should be understood by way of the rootless fivefold consciousness. 'By non-path—one' means the indeterminate answer by way of rootless resultant and functional consciousness. By this method, the meaning should be understood in all combinations.

369-383. Anulomapaccanīye heṭṭhā vuttā nahetuādayo daseva paccanīyato labbhanti, na sesā. Yepi labbhanti, tesu hetumhi anulomato ṭhite jhānamaggā paccanīyato na labbhantīti sabbaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbanti.

369-383. In the positive-negative, only the ten conditions stated previously—beginning with the non-root condition—are obtained from the negative side, not the rest. And among those that are obtained, when the root condition stands in the positive application, jhāna and path are not obtained from the negative side. All should be understood according to the method stated previously.

384-391. Paccanīyānulome [Pg.433] nahetupaccayuppannesu ahetukamohova jhānamaggapaccayaṃ labhati, sesā na labhanti. Najhānapaccaye aṭṭhāhetukacittānipi. Nakammapaccayā nahetupaccayā nādhipatipaccayā napurejātapaccayā ārammaṇe ekanti āruppe ahetukakiriyacetanāvasena abyākatena abyākataṃ. Iminā upāyena yaṃ labbhati, yañca na labbhati, tassa vasena sabbattha gaṇanā veditabbāti.

384-391. In the negative-positive, among those arisen by non-root condition, only rootless delusion obtains the jhāna and path conditions; the rest do not. In the non-jhāna condition, the eight rootless consciousnesses also obtain them. 'By non-kamma condition, by non-root condition, by non-dominance condition, by non-pre-nascence condition—one in the object condition' means that in the formless realm, by way of rootless functional volition, the indeterminate is with the indeterminate. By this method, the enumeration everywhere should be understood based on what is obtained and what is not obtained.

Saṃsaṭṭhavāravaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Intermingled Section.

6. Sampayuttavāravaṇṇanā

6. The Commentary on the Associated Section.

392-400. Sampayuttavāre kusalaṃ dhammaṃ sampayuttoti kusalaṃ dhammaṃ sampayuttapaccayaṃ katvāti attho. Sesamettha saṃsaṭṭhavāre vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Avasāne panassa ‘‘saṃsaṭṭhattaṃ nāma sampayuttattaṃ, sampayuttattaṃ nāma saṃsaṭṭhatta’’nti idaṃ ubhinnampi etesaṃ vārānaṃ atthato ninnānākaraṇabhāvadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Atthato hi etepi paṭiccasahajātā viya paccayanissayā viya ca ninnānākaraṇā. Evaṃ santepi aññamaññassa atthaniyamanatthaṃ vuttā. ‘‘Saṃsaṭṭhā yojitā hayā’’tiādīsu (jā. 2.22.70) hi asampayuttampi saṃsaṭṭhanti vuccati. ‘‘Yā sā vīmaṃsā kosajjasahagatā kosajjasampayuttā’’tiādīsu (saṃ. ni. 5.832) asaṃsaṭṭhaṃ vokiṇṇampi sampayuttanti. Iti saṃsaṭṭhavārena ekuppādalakkhaṇassa sampayuttassa saṃsaṭṭhabhāvaṃ sampayuttavārena ca saṃsaṭṭhassa ekuppādādilakkhaṇassa sampayuttabhāvaṃ niyametuṃ ubhopete vuttā. Apica tathā bujjhanakānaṃ ajjhāsayavasena desanāvilāsena niruttipaṭisambhidāpabhedajānanavasena cāpi ete ubhopi vuttāti.

392-400. In the section on association, 'associated with a wholesome phenomenon' means 'having made a wholesome phenomenon a condition by way of association.' The rest here should be understood in the same way as explained in the section on intermingling. But at its end, 'intermingling is association, and association is intermingling'—this is stated to show that these two sections are, in meaning, undifferentiated. For in meaning, these too, like co-nascence and dependence, are undifferentiated. Even so, they are stated for the purpose of defining the meaning for each other. For in phrases like 'horses yoked together are intermingled' (Jā. 2.22.70), even what is not associated is called intermingled. And in phrases like 'that investigation accompanied by laziness, associated with laziness' (Saṃ. Ni. 5.832), even what is un-intermingled and scattered is called associated. Thus, the section on intermingling is stated to define the intermingled nature of what is associated and has the characteristic of single arising; and the section on association is stated to define the associated nature of what is intermingled and has the characteristic of single arising, and so forth. Moreover, both of these are stated according to the disposition of those who are to be enlightened, by the elegance of the teaching, and also by the knowledge of the distinctions of the analytical knowledge of language.

Sampayuttavāravaṇṇanā.

The Commentary on the Associated Section.

Etesu pana chasu vāresu atthi koci paccayo ekantaṃ anulomato na tiṭṭhati, paccanīkatova tiṭṭhati; atthi ekantaṃ paccanīkato na tiṭṭhati, anulomatova tiṭṭhati; atthi anekantaṃ anulomato ceva tiṭṭhati, paccanīkato cāti idaṃ pakiṇṇakaṃ veditabbaṃ. Tattha paṭhamo pañho [Pg.434] pacchājātassa, dutiyo mahācatukkassa, tatiyo yujjamānakānaṃ sesānaṃ vasena veditabboti.

But among these six sections, is there any condition that does not stand exclusively in the positive application, but stands only in the negative? Is there any that does not stand exclusively in the negative, but stands only in the positive application? Is there any that stands non-exclusively in both the positive application and the negative? This should be understood as miscellaneous. Herein, the first question pertains to the post-nascence condition, the second to the great tetrad, and the third should be understood by way of the remaining paired ones.

7. Pañhāvāravibhaṅgavaṇṇanā

7. The Commentary on the Exposition of the Section on Questions.

401-403. Pañhāvāre ‘‘siyā kusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo’’tiādinā kusalattike uddharitabbapucchānaṃ labbhamānavasena vissajjanaṃ dassetuṃ kusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayotiādi vuttaṃ. Kusalo ca nāmesa sayaṃ uppajjanto ṭhapetvā pacchājātañca vipākañca sesehi dvāvīsatiyā paccayehi uppajjati. Kusalassa paccayo honto ṭhapetvā purejātapacchājātavipākavippayutte sesehi vīsatiyā paccayehi paccayo hoti. Tasmā yehi paccayehi kusalo kusalassa paccayo hoti, te paccaye paṭipāṭiyā dassetuṃ hetupaccayenātiādi āraddhaṃ.

401-403. In the Section on Questions, in order to show the answers, according to what is obtainable, to the questions to be raised concerning the wholesome triad, such as, 'Could a wholesome phenomenon be a condition for a wholesome phenomenon by way of root condition?', the statement, 'A wholesome phenomenon is a condition for a wholesome phenomenon by way of root condition,' and so on, was made. Now, a wholesome phenomenon, when it itself arises, arises by way of twenty-two conditions, excluding post-nascence and result. When it is a condition for a wholesome phenomenon, it is a condition by way of twenty conditions, excluding pre-nascence, post-nascence, result, and dissociation. Therefore, in order to show in sequence the conditions by which a wholesome phenomenon is a condition for a wholesome phenomenon, the passage beginning 'by way of root condition' was commenced.

Tattha yā esā paccayavibhaṅgavāre viya ‘‘hetusampayuttakānaṃ dhammāna’’nti akatvā ‘‘hetū sampayuttakānaṃ khandhāna’’nti desanā katā, tassā eva karaṇe idaṃ payojanaṃ – tattha hi suññaṭṭhaṃ dīpetuṃ dhammānanti vuttaṃ. Idha paccayato uppajjamānā dhammā rāsito uppajjanti, na ekekatoti rāsaṭṭhaṃ dīpetuṃ khandhānanti vuttaṃ. Paṭiccavārādīsu vā khandhavasena paccayuppannadesanā āruḷhāti tenevānukkamena idhāpi āruḷhāti. Kasmā panetesu evaṃ āruḷhāti? Asaṅkarato vibhāgadassanatthaṃ. ‘‘Ekaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca sesā dhammā’’ti hi ādinā nayena vuccamāne asukadhammaṃ nāma nissāya asukadhammāti na sakkā asaṅkarato paccaye paccayuppanne ca jānituṃ, evaṃ sante uddesaniddesā nibbisesā siyuṃ. Tasmā asaṅkarato vibhāgadassanatthaṃ evaṃ āruḷhāti veditabbā. Cittasamuṭṭhānānanti idaṃ yassa abyākatassa kusalo hetupaccayena paccayo hoti, tameva dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Paccayavibhaṅge pana kusalādivasena vibhāgaṃ akatvā sāmaññato sabbesaṃ hetūnaṃ vasena uppannarūpadassanatthaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānānanti avatvā taṃsamuṭṭhānānanti vuttaṃ. Tasmā tattha abyākatahetusamuṭṭhānarūpaṃ, okkantikkhaṇe kaṭattārūpampi saṅgahaṃ gataṃ. Iminā upāyena sesesupi evarūpesu vissajjanesu attho veditabbo.

Here, the teaching was given as 'for the aggregates associated with the roots' instead of 'for the phenomena associated with the roots,' as in the Section on the Analysis of Conditions. The purpose for doing so is this: there, 'phenomena' was stated to indicate the aspect of emptiness. Here, however, phenomena arising from conditions arise as a mass, not individually; thus, 'aggregates' was stated to indicate the aspect of a mass. Alternatively, in the Dependent Origination Section and so forth, the teaching of conditionally arisen phenomena is established in terms of aggregates, and so it is established in the same sequence here too. But why is it established in this way in these sections? For the purpose of showing the distinction without confusion. For if it were stated according to the method beginning, 'Depending on one phenomenon, the remaining phenomena arise,' it would not be possible to know without confusion the conditions and the conditionally arisen phenomena, as in 'such-and-such a phenomenon depending on such-and-such a phenomenon.' In that case, the enumeration and the exposition would be undifferentiated. Therefore, it should be understood that it is established in this way for the purpose of showing the distinction without confusion. The phrase 'mind-originated' is stated to show that very indeterminate phenomenon for which a wholesome phenomenon is a condition by way of root condition. In the Analysis of Conditions, however, without making a distinction in terms of wholesome, etc., but generally, 'that-originated' was stated instead of 'mind-originated' to show the form that has arisen by way of all roots. Thus, there, form originated from indeterminate roots and kamma-born form at the moment of conception are also included. By this method, the meaning should be understood similarly in other such explanations.

404. Dānaṃ [Pg.435] datvāti deyyadhammaṃ cajitvā. Yāya vā cetanāya so diyyati, sā cetanā dānaṃ. Datvāti taṃ cetanaṃ pariyodāpetvā visuddhaṃ katvā. Sīlaṃ samādiyitvāti pañcaṅgādivasena niccasīlaṃ gaṇhitvā. Iminā samādānaviratiyeva dassitā. Sampattaviratisamucchedaviratiyo pana loke sīlanti apākaṭattā na vuttā. Kiñcāpi na vuttā, ārammaṇapaccayā pana hontiyeva. Tattha samucchedavirati sekkhānaṃyeva kusalassa ārammaṇaṃ hoti, na itaresaṃ. Uposathakammaṃ katvāti ‘‘pāṇaṃ na hane, na cādinnamādiye’’ti (a. ni. 3.71) evaṃ vuttaṃ uposathadivasesu aṭṭhaṅgauposathakiriyaṃ katvā. Taṃ paccavekkhatīti taṃ kusalaṃ sekkhopi puthujjanopi paccavekkhati, arahāpi paccavekkhateva. Arahatopi hi pubbe kataṃ kusalaṃ kusalameva, yena pana cittena paccavekkhati, taṃ kiriyacittaṃ nāma hoti. Tasmā ‘‘etaṃ kusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassā’’ti imasmiṃ adhikāre na labbhati. Pubbe suciṇṇānīti ‘‘datvā samādiyitvā katvā’’ti hi āsanne katāni vuttāni, imāni na āsanne katānīti veditabbāni. Dānādīhi vā sesāni kāmāvacarakusalāni dassetuṃ idaṃ vuttaṃ. Jhānā vuṭṭhahitvāti jhānā vuṭṭhahitvā. Ayameva vā pāḷi. Sekkhā gotrabhunti sotāpannaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. So hi gotrabhuṃ paccavekkhati. Vodānanti idaṃ pana sakadāgāmianāgāmino sandhāya vuttaṃ. Tesañhi taṃ cittaṃ vodānaṃ nāma hoti. Sekkhāti sotāpannasakadāgāmianāgāmino. Maggā vuṭṭhahitvāti maggaphalabhavaṅgātikkamavasena attanā paṭiladdhā maggā vuṭṭhahitvā, suddhamaggatoyeva pana vuṭṭhāya paccavekkhaṇaṃ nāma natthi.

404. 'Having given a gift' means having relinquished a thing worthy of being given. Or, the volition by which it is given is the gift. 'Having given' means having purified and clarified that volition. 'Having undertaken virtue' means having undertaken the constant virtue, such as the five precepts. By this, only the restraint of undertaking is shown. The restraint on occasion and the restraint of eradication, however, are not stated because they are not well-known as virtue in the world. Although not stated, they do exist as object conditions. Among them, the restraint of eradication is an object for the wholesome consciousness of trainees only, not for others. 'Having performed the Uposatha observance' means having performed the eight-factored Uposatha practice on Uposatha days, as stated: 'One should not kill living beings, nor take what is not given,' etc. (AN 3.71). 'Reflecting on that' means that both the trainee and the ordinary person reflect on that wholesome deed, and even the Arahant reflects. For even for an Arahant, a wholesome deed done in the past is indeed wholesome; however, the mind with which one reflects is called functional consciousness. Therefore, in this context, the case of 'this wholesome phenomenon for a wholesome phenomenon' is not obtained. 'Previously well-practiced': the terms 'having given, having undertaken, having performed' refer to deeds done recently, whereas these should be understood as not done recently. Alternatively, this is stated to show the remaining wholesome deeds of the sense sphere, apart from giving, etc. 'Having emerged from jhāna': this is the Pāli text itself. The phrase 'trainees, on change-of-lineage' is stated with reference to the stream-enterer, for he reflects on the change-of-lineage consciousness. The phrase 'on purification' is stated with reference to the once-returner and non-returner, for their consciousness is called purification. 'Trainees' refers to stream-enterers, once-returners, and non-returners. 'Having emerged from the path' means having emerged from the paths attained by oneself, by way of transcending path, fruit, and life-continuum. However, there is no such thing as reflection having emerged from the mere path.

Kusalaṃ aniccatoti ettha vipassanūpagaṃ tebhūmakakusalameva veditabbaṃ, vipassanākusalaṃ pana kāmāvacarameva. Cetopariyañāṇenāti rūpāvacarakusalaṃ dasseti. Ākāsānañcāyatanantiādīhi arūpāvacarakusalārammaṇavasena uppajjamānaṃ arūpāvacarakusalameva. Kusalā khandhā iddhividhañāṇassātiādīhi puggalaṃ anāmasitvā dhammavasena dasseti. Tenevettha heṭṭhā gahitampi cetopariyañāṇaṃ puna vuttaṃ.

'Wholesome is impermanent'—here, only the mundane wholesome pertaining to the three planes, which is conducive to insight, should be understood; however, wholesome insight itself pertains only to the sense sphere. 'By the knowledge of others' minds'—this indicates form-realm wholesome consciousness. Through 'the base of infinite space,' etc.—this refers to formless-realm wholesome consciousness arising with a formless-realm wholesome state as its object. By 'the wholesome aggregates for the knowledge of the kinds of psychic power,' etc.—this shows the teaching in terms of phenomena, without referring to a person. For that reason, the knowledge of others' minds, which was previously taken up, is stated again here.

405. Assādetīti somanassasahagatalobhasampayuttacittehi anubhavati ceva rajjati ca. Abhinandatīti sappītikataṇhāvasena nandati haṭṭhapahaṭṭho [Pg.436] hoti, diṭṭhābhinandanāya vā abhinandati. Rāgo uppajjatīti assādentassa rāgo uppajjati nāma. Idaṃ aṭṭhapi lobhasahagatāni gahetvā vuttaṃ. Diṭṭhi uppajjatīti abhinandantassa attā attaniyantiādivasena catūhipi cittehi sampayuttā diṭṭhi uppajjati. Asanniṭṭhānagatassa panettha vicikicchā uppajjati. Vikkhepagatassa uddhaccaṃ, akataṃ vata me kalyāṇanti vippaṭisārino domanassaṃ. Taṃ ārabbhāti tāni suciṇṇāni ārammaṇaṃ katvāti attho. Bahuvacanassa hesa ekavacanādeso, jātivasena vā ekavacanamevetaṃ.

405. 'He savors' (`Assādetīti`) means he experiences and is impassioned by means of minds accompanied by joy and associated with greed. 'He delights' (`Abhinandatīti`) means he delights by way of craving accompanied by joy, becomes elated and delighted, or he delights by way of delight in views. 'Lust arises' (`Rāgo uppajjatīti`) means lust arises in one who savors. This is stated by taking the eight types of consciousness accompanied by greed. 'Wrong view arises' (`Diṭṭhi uppajjatīti`) means wrong view associated with the four types of minds arises in one who delights, by way of considering 'self' or 'what belongs to self,' and so on. For one who has not reached a firm conclusion, doubt arises herein. For one who is distracted, restlessness arises. For one who regrets, thinking, 'Alas, I have not done good,' grief arises. 'With reference to that' (`Taṃ ārabbhā`) means having taken those well-done deeds as the object. This is a substitution of the singular for the plural, or it is singular by way of its class.

406. Arahā maggā vuṭṭhahitvāti maggavīthiyaṃ phalānantarassa bhavaṅgassa atikkamavasena vuṭṭhahitvā. Paccavekkhaṇacittāni panassa kiriyābyākatāni. Evaṃ kiriyābyākatassa ārammaṇapaccayaṃ dassetvā puna vipākābyākatassa dassetuṃ sekkhā vātiādimāha. Kusale niruddheti vipassanājavanavīthiyā pacchinnāya. Vipākoti kāmāvacaravipāko. Tadārammaṇatāti tadārammaṇatāya, taṃ kusalassa javanassa ārammaṇabhūtaṃ vipassitakusalaṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā uppajjatīti attho. Na kevalañca tadārammaṇavaseneva, paṭisandhibhavaṅgacutivasenāpi. Vipāko hi kammaṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā gahitapaṭisandhikassa kusalārammaṇo hotiyeva, so pana dubbiññeyyattā idha na dassito.

406. 'An Arahant, having emerged from the path' means having emerged by way of transcending the life-continuum that immediately follows fruition in the path process. His reviewing consciousnesses, however, are functional and indeterminate. Having thus shown the object condition for the functional indeterminate, to show it again for the resultant indeterminate, he says, 'or for trainees,' and so on. 'When the wholesome has ceased' means when the insight-javana process has been cut off. 'Resultant' means the sense-sphere resultant. 'By having that as its object' means that it arises by taking as its object that wholesome insight which was the object of the wholesome javana. And not only by way of having that as its object, but also by way of rebirth-linking, life-continuum, and death. For the resultant consciousness of one who has taken rebirth-linking by taking kamma as its object indeed has a wholesome object; however, because this is difficult to understand, it is not shown here.

Kusalaṃ assādetītiādi akusalajavanāvasāne kusalārammaṇavipākaṃ dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Viññāṇañcāyatanavipākassāti idaṃ dubbiññeyyampi samānaṃ mahaggatavipākassa tadārammaṇabhāvena anuppattito labbhamānakavasena vuttaṃ. Kiriyassāti arahattaṃ patvā asamāpannapubbe ākāsānañcāyatane paṭilomato vā ekantarikavasena vā samāpannakiriyāya. Cetopariyañāṇassātiādīni parato āvajjanāya yojetabbāni. Yā etesaṃ āvajjanā, tassā kusalā khandhā ārammaṇapaccayena paccayoti ayañhettha attho.

'Savoring the wholesome,' and so on, is stated to show the resultant with a wholesome object at the end of the unwholesome javanas. 'And of the resultant of the base of infinite consciousness': this, though difficult to understand, is stated by way of its being obtainable, since an exalted resultant is not attained by way of `tadārammaṇa`. 'Of the functional': this refers to the functional consciousness of one who, having attained Arahantship, attains the base of infinite space—which he had not attained before—either in reverse order or by skipping one jhāna. 'The knowledge of others' minds,' and so on, should be connected with the subsequent advertence. The meaning here is this: the wholesome aggregates are a condition, by way of object condition, for the advertence towards these.

407-409. Rāganti attano vā parassa vā rāgaṃ. Attano rāgavasena panettha vaṇṇanā pākaṭā hoti. Assādetītiādīni vuttatthāneva. Vicikicchādīsu pana tīsu assādetabbatāya abhāvena ‘‘assādetī’’ti na vuttaṃ. Diṭṭhi panettha uppajjati, sā assādetīti padassa parihīnattā [Pg.437] āgatapaṭipāṭiyā paṭhamaṃ na vuttā. Vicikicchādīsuyeva taṃ taṃ sabhāgaṃ paṭhamaṃ vatvā tassa tassa anantarā vuttā. Imesu ca pana rāgādīsu ‘‘kiṃ me pāpadhammā uppajjantī’’ti akkhantivasena vā, ‘‘kataṃ pāpaṃ kataṃ luddha’’nti vippaṭisārādivasena vā domanassuppatti veditabbā.

407-409. 'Lust' (`Rāga`) means one's own lust or another's lust. Here, the explanation is clear with reference to one's own lust. 'He savors' (`Assādetīti`), and so on, have the same meaning as stated before. However, in the case of the three beginning with doubt, 'he savors' is not stated because there is nothing to be savored. Here, a view arises; since the word 'he savors' is omitted, it is not stated first in the established order. In the case of doubt and the others, having first stated the corresponding factor for each, what immediately follows each is then stated. And in these cases of lust and so on, the arising of grief should be understood as occurring either by way of impatience, thinking, 'Why do evil states arise in me?' or by way of remorse and so on, thinking, 'An evil deed was done, a cruel deed was done.'

410. Cakkhuṃ aniccatoti vipassanānukkamena oḷārikāyatanāni vatthurūpañcāti ekādasa rūpāni pākaṭattā gahitāni. Puna rūpāyatanādīni cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ ārammaṇattā gahitāni. Yasmā panesā viññāṇakāyavasena desanā, na dhātuvasena, tasmā manodhātu na gahitā. Evaṃ sabbattha gahitāgahitaṃ veditabbaṃ.

410. 'The eye is impermanent,' and so on: in the sequence of insight, the eleven forms—the gross bases and the physical basis—are taken up because they are manifest. Furthermore, the visible-form base and the others are taken up because they are the objects of eye-consciousness and so on. But since this teaching is by way of the groups of consciousness, not by way of the elements, the mind-element is therefore not taken up. In this way, what is taken up and not taken up should be understood everywhere.

411. Phalaṃ paccavekkhanti nibbānaṃ paccavekkhantīti paccavekkhaṇakusalassa ārammaṇadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ.

411. 'They review the fruition, they review Nibbāna'—this is said for the purpose of showing the object of the wholesome reviewing consciousness.

413-416. Ārammaṇādhipatiniddese sekkhaputhujjanānaṃ vasena catubhūmakakusalaṃ dassitaṃ, tathā sahajātādhipatiniddese. Arahato uttamadhammaṃ adhigatattā lokiyakusalesu garukāro natthīti aggamaggova dassito.

413-416. In the exposition of object-predominance, the wholesome states of the four planes are shown with respect to trainees and worldlings; likewise in the exposition of conascence-predominance. For the Arahant, because the supreme Dhamma has been attained, there is no high regard for mundane wholesome states; thus, only the highest path is shown.

417. Anantarapaccaye purimā purimāti ekabhūmakāpi nānābhūmakāpi kusalā ekato katvā vuttā. Anulomaṃ gotrabhussa, anulomaṃ vodānassāti nānārammaṇavasena. Gotrabhu maggassa, vodānaṃ maggassāti nānābhūmivasena. Kusalaṃ vuṭṭhānassāti ettha pana kusalanti tebhūmakakusalaṃ. Vuṭṭhānanti tebhūmakavipākaṃ. Tehi kusalajavanavīthito vuṭṭhahanti, tasmā vuṭṭhānanti vuccati. Taṃ duvidhaṃ hoti – tadārammaṇaṃ bhavaṅgañca. Tattha kāmāvacarakusalassa ubhayampi vuṭṭhānaṃ hoti, mahaggatassa bhavaṅgameva. Maggo phalassāti idaṃ yasmā lokuttaravipākaṃ javanavīthipariyāpannattā vuṭṭhānaṃ nāma na hoti, tasmā visuṃ vuttaṃ. Anulomaṃ sekkhāyāti asekkhāya kusalaṃ anantaraṃ na hoti, tasmā vibhāgaṃ karoti. Phalasamāpattiyāti sotāpattiphalasakadāgāmiphalaanāgāmiphalasamāpattiyāpi. Phalasamāpattiyāti anāgāmiphalasamāpattiyā. Akusale duvidhampi vuṭṭhānaṃ labbhati. Vipākābyākatā kiriyābyākatāti ettha vipākābyākatā vipākābyākatānaṃyeva, kiriyābyākatā kiriyābyākatānaṃyeva [Pg.438] veditabbā. Bhavaṅgaṃ āvajjanāyātiādi vomissakavasena vuttaṃ. Tattha kiriyāti kāmāvacarakiriyā. Sā duvidhassāpi vuṭṭhānassa anantarapaccayo hoti, mahaggatā bhavaṅgasseva. Iti ye heṭṭhā paccayavibhaṅganiddese ‘‘purimā purimā kusalā dhammā pacchimānaṃ pacchimānaṃ kusalānaṃ dhammānaṃ anantarapaccayena paccayo’’ti ārabhitvā kusalaṃ kusalassa, kusalaṃ abyākatassa, akusalaṃ akusalassa, akusalaṃ abyākatassa, abyākataṃ abyākatassa, abyākataṃ kusalassa, abyākataṃ akusalassāti satta vārā dassitā; tesaṃ vasena idha saṅkhepato anantarapaccayo vibhatto.

417. In the condition of immediacy, ‘each preceding’—whether belonging to a single plane or multiple planes—the wholesome states are spoken of together. The adaptation to the change-of-lineage (gotrabhū) and the adaptation to the purification (vodāna) are by way of different objects. Gotrabhū is for the path, and vodāna is for the path—by way of different planes. Here, ‘wholesome’ refers to the wholesome states of the three planes. ‘Emergence’ refers to the resultant states of the three planes. They emerge from the cognitive process of wholesome impulsion (javana); therefore, it is called ‘emergence.’ It is of two kinds: retention (tadārammaṇa) and life-continuum (bhavaṅga). In this regard, for sense-sphere wholesome states, both kinds of emergence occur; for sublime (mahaggata) states, only life-continuum. ‘The path is for the fruit’—this is stated separately because supramundane resultant states, being included within the impulsion cognitive process, are not called ‘emergence.’ The adaptation to the trainee (sekha) is explained, because wholesome states are not immediately proximate for the non-trainee (asekha); therefore, the distinction is made. ‘Fruition attainment’ refers to the attainments of stream-entry fruit, once-returner fruit, and non-returner fruit. ‘Fruition attainment’ also refers to the non-returner fruit attainment. For unwholesome states, both kinds of emergence are possible. Regarding resultant-indeterminate and functional-indeterminate—here, resultant-indeterminate should be understood as being only for resultant-indeterminate states, and functional-indeterminate only for functional-indeterminate states. ‘Life-continuum for adverting’ and so on are mentioned in a mixed manner. Here, ‘functional’ refers to sense-sphere functional states. It is an immediately proximate condition for both kinds of emergence, while sublime functional states are a condition only for life-continuum. Thus, in the earlier exposition of the analysis of conditions, beginning with ‘the preceding, preceding wholesome states are a condition for the succeeding, succeeding wholesome states by way of the immediately proximate condition,’ seven instances are shown: wholesome for wholesome, wholesome for indeterminate, unwholesome for unwholesome, unwholesome for indeterminate, indeterminate for indeterminate, indeterminate for wholesome, indeterminate for unwholesome. Based on these, the immediately proximate condition is briefly analyzed here.

Vitthārato panettha –

Herein in detail:

Dasadhā sattarasadhā, samasaṭṭhividhena ca;

Bahudhāpi ca niddesaṃ, sādhukaṃ upalakkhaye.

In ten ways, in seventeen ways, and in sixty-six ways; and also in many other ways, one should carefully discern the exposition.

Ayañhi anantarapaccayo na kevalaṃ sattadhāva niddesaṃ labhati, kusalaṃ pana kusalassa vipākassa; akusalaṃ akusalassa vipākassa; vipākaṃ vipākassa kiriyassa; kiriyaṃ kusalassa akusalassa vipākassa kiriyassāti evaṃ dasadhāpi niddesaṃ labhati. Na kevalaṃ dasadhāyeva, kusalaṃ pana kusalassa kusalavipākassa akusalavipākassa; akusalaṃ akusalassa akusalavipākassa kusalavipākassa; kusalavipākaṃ kusalavipākassa akusalavipākassa kiriyassa; akusalavipākaṃ akusalavipākassa kusalavipākassa kiriyassa; kiriyaṃ kiriyassa kusalassa akusalassa kusalavipākassa akusalavipākassāti evaṃ sattarasadhā niddesaṃ labhati.

For this immediately proximate condition not only obtains a sevenfold exposition, but also: wholesome (states) for wholesome (states) and resultant (states); unwholesome (states) for unwholesome (states) and resultant (states); resultant (states) for resultant (states) and functional (states); functional (states) for wholesome, unwholesome, resultant, and functional (states)—thus obtaining a tenfold exposition. Not only a tenfold (exposition), but also: wholesome (states) for wholesome, wholesome-resultant, and unwholesome-resultant (states); unwholesome (states) for unwholesome, unwholesome-resultant, and wholesome-resultant (states); wholesome-resultant (states) for wholesome-resultant, unwholesome-resultant, and functional (states); unwholesome-resultant (states) for unwholesome-resultant, wholesome-resultant, and functional (states); functional (states) for functional, wholesome, unwholesome, wholesome-resultant, and unwholesome-resultant (states)—thus obtaining a seventeenfold exposition.

Na kevalañca sattarasadhāva samasaṭṭhividhenāpi niddesaṃ labhateva. Kathaṃ? Kāmāvacarakusalañhi bhūmibhedena catubbidhassa kusalassa anantarapaccayo hoti, rūpāvacarārūpāvacaraṃ sakasakabhūmikassevāti kusalaṃ kusalassa chabbidhena anantarapaccayo. Kāmāvacarakusalaṃ pana kāmāvacarakusalavipākassa akusalavipākassa rūpāvacaravipākassa arūpāvacaravipākassa lokuttaravipākassa; rūpāvacarakusalaṃ rūpāvacaravipākassa kāmāvacarakusalavipākassa; arūpāvacarakusalaṃ kāmāvacarakusalavipākassa rūpāvacaraarūpāvacaralokuttaravipākassa; lokuttarakusalaṃ lokuttaravipākassāti kusalaṃ vipākassa dvādasavidhena anantarapaccayo[Pg.439]. Akusalaṃ akusalassa akusalavipākassa tebhūmakakusalavipākassāti pañcavidhena anantarapaccayo.

Not only does it receive the seventeenfold classification, but it also obtains a description in sixty-six ways. How? For instance, sense-sphere wholesome (states) serve as the immediately proximate condition for the fourfold wholesome states by way of different planes. Similarly, form-sphere and formless-sphere (wholesome states) for those of their respective planes only. Thus, wholesome acts as the immediately proximate condition for wholesome in six ways. Furthermore, sense-sphere wholesome (states) serve as the immediately proximate condition for the resultant of sense-sphere wholesome, the resultant of unwholesome, the resultant of form-sphere, the resultant of formless-sphere, and the supramundane resultant. Form-sphere wholesome (states) serve as the immediately proximate condition for the resultant of form-sphere and the resultant of sense-sphere wholesome. Formless-sphere wholesome (states) serve as the immediately proximate condition for the resultant of sense-sphere wholesome, the resultant of form-sphere, the resultant of formless-sphere, and the supramundane resultant. Supramundane wholesome (states) serve as the immediately proximate condition for the supramundane resultant. Thus, wholesome acts as the immediately proximate condition for resultant in twelve ways. Unwholesome (states) act as the immediately proximate condition for unwholesome, the resultant of unwholesome, and the wholesome resultant states of the three planes—thus in five ways.

Kāmāvacarakusalavipākaṃ kāmāvacarakusalavipākassa akusalavipākassa rūpāvacaravipākassa arūpāvacaravipākassāti kāmāvacarakusalavipākaṃ vipākassa catubbidhena anantarapaccayo. Rūpāvacaravipākaṃ tebhūmakakusalavipākassāti tividhena anantarapaccayo. Arūpāvacaravipākaṃ arūpāvacaravipākassa kāmāvacarakusalavipākassāti duvidhena anantarapaccayo. Lokuttaravipākaṃ catubhūmakakusalavipākassāti catubbidhena anantarapaccayo. Evaṃ kusalavipākaṃ vipākassa terasadhāpi anantarapaccayo. Akusalavipākaṃ akusalavipākassa kāmāvacarakusalavipākassāti duvidhena anantarapaccayo. Evaṃ sabbathāpi vipākaṃ vipākassa pañcadasavidhena anantarapaccayo. Kāmāvacarakusalavipākaṃ pana kāmāvacarakiriyassa, tathā akusalavipākaṃ, tathā rūpāvacaravipākaṃ, tathā arūpāvacaravipākañcāti vipākaṃ kiriyassa ca catubbidhena anantarapaccayo.

The sense-sphere wholesome resultant is an immediately proximate condition for resultant in four ways: for the sense-sphere wholesome resultant, the unwholesome resultant, the form-sphere resultant, and the formless-sphere resultant. The form-sphere resultant is an immediately proximate condition for the wholesome resultant of the three planes in three ways. The formless-sphere resultant is an immediately proximate condition in two ways: for the formless-sphere resultant and the sense-sphere wholesome resultant. The supramundane resultant is an immediately proximate condition for the wholesome resultant of the four planes in four ways. Thus, the wholesome resultant is an immediately proximate condition for resultant in thirteen ways. The unwholesome resultant is an immediately proximate condition in two ways: for the unwholesome resultant and the sense-sphere wholesome resultant. In this way, altogether, resultant is an immediately proximate condition for resultant in fifteen ways. Moreover, the sense-sphere wholesome resultant is an immediately proximate condition for the sense-sphere functional, and similarly the unwholesome resultant, the form-sphere resultant, and the formless-sphere resultant—thus, resultant is an immediately proximate condition for functional in four ways.

Kāmāvacarakiriyaṃ tebhūmakakiriyassa, rūpāvacarārūpāvacarakiriyaṃ rūpāvacarārūpāvacarānaññevāti kiriyaṃ kiriyassa pañcavidhena anantarapaccayo. Kāmāvacarakiriyaṃ akusalavipākassa ceva catubhūmakakusalavipākassa ca, rūpāvacarakiriyaṃ kāmāvacarakusalavipākarūpāvacaravipākānaṃ arūpāvacarakiriyaṃ catubhūmakakusalavipākassāpīti kiriyaṃ vipākassa ekādasavidhena anantarapaccayo. Kāmāvacarakiriyaṃ pana kāmāvacarakusalassa akusalassāti kusalākusalānaṃ duvidhena anantarapaccayo hoti. Evaṃ samasaṭṭhividhenāpi niddesaṃ labhati.

The sense-sphere functional states are an immediately proximate condition for the functional states of the three planes; the form-sphere and formless-sphere functional states for those of the form-sphere and formless-sphere only—thus, functional for functional in five ways. The sense-sphere functional states are an immediately proximate condition for both unwholesome resultant and wholesome resultant of the four planes; the form-sphere functional states for sense-sphere wholesome resultant and form-sphere resultant; the formless-sphere functional states for wholesome resultant of the four planes as well. Thus, functional is an immediately proximate condition for resultant in eleven ways. Moreover, the sense-sphere functional states are an immediately proximate condition for sense-sphere wholesome and unwholesome states in two ways. In this manner, the exposition is obtained in sixty-six ways as well.

Na kevalañca samasaṭṭhividheneva, bahuvidhenāpi labhateva. Kathaṃ? Kāmāvacarapaṭhamamahākusalacittaṃ tāva attano, catunnañca rūpāvacarakusalānaṃ pādakayogena soḷasannaṃ somanassalokuttarānanti ekavīsatiyā ca kusalānaṃ, javanapariyosāne tadārammaṇabhavaṅgavasena uppajjamānānaṃ ekādasannaṃ kāmāvacaravipākānaṃ, bhavaṅgavaseneva pavattānaṃ rūpāvacarārūpāvacaravipākānaṃ, phalasamāpattivasena pavattānaṃ dvādasannaṃ lokuttaravipākānanti [Pg.440] evaṃ ekavīsatiyā kusalānaṃ; dvattiṃsāya vipākānanti tepaññāsāya cittānaṃ anantarapaccayo hoti. Tathā dutiyakusalacittaṃ. Tatiyacatutthāni pana ṭhapetvā uparibhūmakakusalāni ca lokuttaravipākāni ca sesaekavīsaticittānaṃ. Pañcamachaṭṭhāni attano ca, navannañca uparibhūmakaupekkhākusalānaṃ, tevīsatiyā ca vipākānanti tettiṃsāya. Sattamaaṭṭhamāni ekavīsatiyāva.

Not only in sixty-six ways, but also in many ways it is obtained. How? First, the first great sense-sphere wholesome consciousness is an immediately proximate condition for twenty-one wholesome states: itself, the four form-sphere wholesome states by way of foundational association, and the sixteen supramundane states accompanied by joy. At the conclusion of the impulsion phase, it is an immediately proximate condition for the eleven sense-sphere resultant states arising as retention and life-continuum. It is also a condition for the form-sphere and formless-sphere resultant states occurring only as life-continuum, and for the twelve supramundane resultant states occurring by way of fruition attainment. Thus, it is an immediately proximate condition for fifty-three consciousnesses: twenty-one wholesome states and thirty-two resultant states. Similarly, the second wholesome consciousness is a condition for fifty-three. The third and fourth, however, are a condition for the remaining twenty-one consciousnesses, as the wholesome states of the higher planes and the supramundane resultants are excluded. The fifth and sixth wholesome consciousnesses serve as conditions for thirty-three states: themselves, the nine wholesome states of the higher planes accompanied by equanimity, and twenty-three resultant states. The seventh and eighth wholesome consciousnesses serve as a condition for twenty-one states only.

Pañca rūpāvacarakusalāni attano attano pacchimānaṃ rūpāvacarakusalānaṃ, catunnampi ñāṇasampayuttamahāvipākānaṃ, pañcannaṃ rūpāvacaravipākānañcāti dasannaṃ. Eteneva ca nayena arūpāvacarakusalesu paṭhamaṃ attano vipākena saddhiṃ ekādasannaṃ, dutiyaṃ dvādasannaṃ, tatiyaṃ terasannaṃ, catutthaṃ cuddasannaṃ phalasamāpattiyā cāti pannarasannaṃ lokuttarakusalaṃ attano attano vipākasseva. Aṭṭhasu lobhasahagatesu ekekaṃ akusalaṃ ekādasannaṃ kāmāvacaravipākamanoviññāṇadhātūnaṃ navannaṃ, mahaggatavipākānaṃ attano attano pacchimassa cāti ekavīsatiyā. Dve domanassasahagatāni upekkhāsahagatānaṃ channaṃ kāmāvacaravipākamanoviññāṇadhātūnaṃ attano pacchimassa cāti sattannaṃ. Vicikicchuddhaccasahagatadvayaṃ somanassasahagatāhetukavipākena saddhiṃ ekādasannaṃ kāmāvacaravipākamanoviññāṇadhātūnaṃ navannaṃ rūpāvacarārūpāvacaravipākānaṃ attano pacchimassa cāti ekavīsatiyā.

The five fine-material-sphere wholesome consciousnesses are a condition for ten states: their own respective subsequent fine-material-sphere wholesome consciousnesses, the four great resultant consciousnesses accompanied by knowledge, and the five fine-material-sphere resultant consciousnesses. And in the same way, among the immaterial-sphere wholesome consciousnesses, the first, together with its own resultant, is a condition for eleven; the second, for twelve; the third, for thirteen; the fourth, for fourteen, and with fruition attainment, for fifteen. The supramundane wholesome consciousnesses are a condition for their own respective resultants only. Among the eight unwholesome consciousnesses accompanied by greed, each is a condition for twenty-one: for the eleven sense-sphere resultant consciousnesses, for the nine exalted resultant consciousnesses, and for its own subsequent one. The two unwholesome consciousnesses accompanied by grief are a condition for seven: for the six sense-sphere resultant mind-consciousness-elements accompanied by equanimity and for its own subsequent one. The two unwholesome consciousnesses accompanied by doubt and restlessness are a condition for twenty-one: for the eleven sense-sphere resultant consciousnesses, for the nine fine-material-sphere and immaterial-sphere resultant consciousnesses, and for its own subsequent one.

Kusalavipākapañcaviññāṇā kusalavipākamanodhātuyā, manodhātu dvinnaṃ vipākamanoviññāṇadhātūnaṃ. Tāsu dvīsu somanassasahagatā dasannaṃ vipākamanoviññāṇadhātūnaṃ bhavaṅgabhūtānaṃ tadārammaṇakāle attano pacchimassa voṭṭhabbanakiriyassa cāti dvādasannaṃ. Upekkhāsahagatāhetukamanoviññāṇadhātu pana āvajjanamanodhātuyā dviṭṭhānikāya āvajjanamanoviññāṇadhātuyā dasannañca vipākamanoviññāṇadhātūnanti dvādasannameva. Tihetukamahāvipākā somanassasahagatāhetukavajjānaṃ dasannampi kāmāvacaravipākamanoviññāṇadhātūnaṃ rūpāvacarārūpāvacaravipākānaṃ āvajjanadvayassa cāti ekavīsatiyā, duhetukavipākā ṭhapetvā mahaggatavipāke sesānaṃ dvādasannaṃ. Pañca rūpāvacaravipākā tebhūmakakusalavipākasahetukapaṭisandhicittānaṃ sattarasannaṃ [Pg.441] āvajjanadvayassa cāti ekūnavīsatiyā. Arūpāvacaravipākesu paṭhamaṃ kāmāvacarakusalavipākatihetukapaṭisandhicittānaṃ, catunnaṃ arūpāvacaravipākacittānaṃ catunnaṃ manodvārāvajjanassa cāti navannaṃ. Dutiyaṃ heṭṭhimavipākaṃ vajjetvā aṭṭhannaṃ, tatiyaṃ dve heṭṭhimāni vajjetvā sattannaṃ, catutthaṃ tīṇi heṭṭhimāni vajjetvā channaṃ cattāri lokuttaravipākāni tihetukavipākānaṃ terasannaṃ attano attano pacchimassa cāti cuddasannaṃ.

The five wholesome-resultant sense consciousnesses are a condition for the wholesome-resultant mind-element. The mind-element is a condition for the two resultant mind-consciousness-elements. Among these two, the one accompanied by joy is a condition for twelve: for the ten resultant mind-consciousness-elements that function as life-continuum and as registering, and for the subsequent determining functional consciousness. The rootless mind-consciousness-element accompanied by equanimity, however, is a condition for twelve: for the advertence mind-element, for the advertence mind-consciousness-element, and for the ten resultant mind-consciousness-elements. The great resultant consciousnesses with three roots are a condition for twenty-one: the ten sense-sphere resultant mind-consciousness-elements (excluding the rootless one accompanied by joy), the nine fine-material-sphere and immaterial-sphere resultant consciousnesses, and the two advertence consciousnesses. The resultant consciousnesses with two roots are a condition for the remaining twelve, excluding the exalted resultant consciousnesses. The five fine-material-sphere resultant consciousnesses are a condition for nineteen: for the seventeen rooted wholesome-resultant rebirth-linking consciousnesses of the three realms, and for the two advertence consciousnesses. Among the immaterial-sphere resultant consciousnesses, the first is a condition for nine: for the four sense-sphere wholesome-resultant three-rooted rebirth-linking consciousnesses, for the four immaterial-sphere resultant consciousnesses, and for the mind-door advertence consciousness. The second, excluding the lowest resultant consciousness, is a condition for eight. The third, excluding the two lower ones, is a condition for seven. The fourth, excluding the three lower ones, is a condition for six. The four supramundane resultant consciousnesses are a condition for fourteen: for the thirteen three-rooted resultant consciousnesses, and for their own respective subsequent one.

Akusalavipākapañcaviññāṇā akusalavipākamanodhātuyā, manodhātu akusalavipākāhetukamanoviññāṇadhātuyā. Sā tadārammaṇakāle attano pacchimassa cutikāle paṭisandhivasena bhavaṅgavasena ca pavattānaṃ itaresampi navannaṃ kāmāvacaravipākānaṃ upekkhāsahagatānaṃ dvinnaṃ parittakiriyānañcāti dvādasannaṃ. Kiriyamanodhātu dasannaṃ viññāṇānaṃ hasituppādakiriyā pañcavokāre bhavaṅgavasena pavattānaṃ navannaṃ tihetukavipākānaṃ, tadārammaṇavasena pavattānaṃ pañcannaṃ somanassasahagatavipākānaṃ attano pacchimassa cāti aggahitaggahaṇena terasannaṃ. Voṭṭhabbanakiriyā ṭhapetvā kiriyamanodhātuṃ dasannaṃ kāmāvacarakiriyānaṃ, kāmāvacarakusalākusalānaṃ pañcavokāre bhavaṅgavasena pavattānaṃ pannarasannaṃ vipākacittānañcāti pañcacattālīsāya.

The five unwholesome-resultant sense consciousnesses are for the unwholesome-resultant mind-element; the mind-element is for the unwholesome-resultant rootless mind-consciousness-element. That (unwholesome-resultant rootless mind-consciousness-element) is for its own final moment at the time of registering and at the time of death, for the other nine sense-sphere resultant consciousnesses accompanied by equanimity which occur as rebirth-linking and as life-continuum, and for the two minor functional consciousnesses—thus for twelve. The functional mind-element is for ten consciousnesses. The functional consciousness producing laughter is for the nine triple-rooted resultant consciousnesses which occur as life-continuum in the five-constituent existence, for the five resultant consciousnesses accompanied by joy which occur as registering, and for its own final moment—thus for thirteen by the principle of including the unmentioned. The determining functional consciousness, excluding the functional mind-element, is for the ten sense-sphere functional consciousnesses, for the sense-sphere wholesome and unwholesome consciousnesses, and for the fifteen resultant consciousnesses which occur as life-continuum in the five-constituent existence—thus for forty-five.

Kāmāvacaratihetukasomanassasahagatakiriyadvayaṃ bhavaṅgavasena pavattānaṃ terasannaṃ tihetukavipākānaṃ tadārammaṇavasena pañcannaṃ somanassasahagatavipākānaṃ parikammavasena pavattamānānaṃ catunnaṃ rūpāvacarakiriyānaṃ arahattaphalasamāpattiyā attano pacchimassa cāti aggahitaggahaṇena dvāvīsatiyā duhetukasomanassasahagatakiriyadvayaṃ yathāvuttānaṃ terasannaṃ bhavaṅgacittānaṃ pañcannaṃ tadārammaṇānaṃ attano pacchimassa cāti aggahitaggahaṇena sattarasannaṃ. Kāmāvacaratihetukaupekkhāsahagatakiriyadvayaṃ tesaṃyeva terasannaṃ bhavaṅgānaṃ, tadārammaṇavasena pavattānaṃ channaṃ upekkhāsahagatavipākānaṃ, parikammavasena pavattānaṃ ekissā rūpāvacarakiriyāya catunnaṃ arūpāvacarakiriyānaṃ arahattaphalasamāpattiyā attano pacchimassa cāti aggahitaggahaṇena catuvīsatiyā. Duhetukaupekkhāsahagatakiriyadvayaṃ tesaṃyeva terasannaṃ bhavaṅgānaṃ [Pg.442] channaṃ tadārammaṇānaṃ attano pacchimassa cāti aggahitaggahaṇena aṭṭhārasannaṃ. Rūpāvacarakiriyesu ekekaṃ navannaṃ pañcavokāre tihetukabhavaṅgānaṃ attano pacchimassa cāti dasannaṃ. Arūpāvacarakiriyesu paṭhamaṃ pañcavokāre navannaṃ bhavaṅgānaṃ, catuvokāre ekassa attano pacchimassa cāti ekādasannaṃ. Dutiyaṃ catuvokāre dve bhavaṅgāni labhati. Tatiyaṃ tīṇi, catutthaṃ cattāri phalasamāpattiñcāti tesu ekekaṃ yathāpaṭipāṭiyā ekādasannaṃ dvādasannaṃ terasannaṃ pañcadasannañca anantarapaccayo hoti. Evaṃ bahuvidhenāpi niddesaṃ labhati. Tena vuttaṃ –

The two sense-sphere three-rooted functional consciousnesses accompanied by joy are for the thirteen three-rooted resultant consciousnesses which occur as life-continuum, for the five resultant consciousnesses accompanied by joy which occur as registering, for the four fine-material-sphere functional consciousnesses which occur as preliminary act, for the attainment of Arahantship fruition, and for its own final moment—thus for twenty-two by the principle of including the unmentioned. The two two-rooted functional consciousnesses accompanied by joy are for the aforementioned thirteen life-continuum consciousnesses, for the five registering consciousnesses, and for its own final moment—thus for seventeen by the principle of including the unmentioned. The two sense-sphere three-rooted functional consciousnesses accompanied by equanimity are for those same thirteen life-continuum consciousnesses, for the six resultant consciousnesses accompanied by equanimity which occur as registering, for the one fine-material-sphere functional consciousness and the four immaterial-sphere functional consciousnesses which occur as preliminary act, for the attainment of Arahantship fruition, and for its own final moment—thus for twenty-four by the principle of including the unmentioned. The two two-rooted functional consciousnesses accompanied by equanimity are for those same thirteen life-continuum consciousnesses, for the six registering consciousnesses, and for its own final moment—thus for eighteen by the principle of including the unmentioned. Among the fine-material-sphere functional consciousnesses, each one is for the nine three-rooted life-continuum consciousnesses in the five-constituent existence, and for its own final moment—thus for ten. Among the immaterial-sphere functional consciousnesses, the first is for the nine life-continuum consciousnesses in the five-constituent existence, for the one (life-continuum consciousness) in the four-constituent existence, and for its own final moment—thus for eleven. The second obtains two life-continuum consciousnesses in the four-constituent existence. The third obtains three, and the fourth obtains four, including fruition attainment; among these, each one, in due order, is an immediate condition for eleven, twelve, thirteen, and fifteen respectively. Thus, the explanation is obtained in many ways. Therefore, it is said—

‘‘Dasadhā sattarasadhā, samasaṭṭhividhena ca;

Bahudhāpi ca niddesaṃ, sādhukaṃ upalakkhaye’’ti.

"Tenfold, seventeenfold, and in sixty-two ways as a summation; and also a manifold explanation, one should carefully note well."

Samanantarapaccayādayo uttānatthāyeva.

The conditions beginning with contiguity are of obvious meaning.

423. Upanissaye saddhaṃ upanissāyāti kammakammaphalaidhalokaparalokādīsu saddhaṃ upanissayaṃ katvā. Yathā hi puriso heṭṭhāpathaviyaṃ udakaṃ atthīti saddahitvā pathaviṃ khanati, evaṃ saddho kulaputto dānādīnaṃ phalañca ānisaṃsañca saddahitvā dānādīni pavatteti. Tasmā ‘‘saddhaṃ upanissāyā’’ti vuttaṃ.

423. Regarding the condition of strong reliance: 'relying on faith' means establishing faith as the basis regarding kamma, the fruits of kamma, this world, the next world, and so on. Just as a man, believing there is water beneath the ground, digs the earth, so a faithful son of good family, believing in the fruits and benefits of giving and so forth, engages in acts of giving. Therefore, it is said, 'relying on faith.'

Sīlaṃ upanissāyātiādīsupi ime sīlādayo dhamme upanissayaṃ katvāti attho. Sīlavā hi sīlānubhāvesu sīlānisaṃsesu ca kusalo sīlaṃ upanissāya sīlavantānaṃ dānaṃ deti, uparūpari sīlaṃ samādiyati suparisuddhaṃ akhaṇḍaṃ, cātuddasīādīsu pakkhadivasesu uposathakammaṃ karoti, sīlasampadaṃ nissāya jhānādīni uppādeti. Bahussutopi dānādipuññakiriyāyattā sabbasampattiyo dānādīnañca saṅkilesavodānādibhedaṃ sutamayāya paññāya paṭivijjhitvā ṭhito sutaṃ upanissāya dānādīni pavatteti. Cāgavāpi cāgādhimutto attano cāgasampadaṃ upanissāya dānaṃ deti, sīlavanto hutvā dinnaṃ mahapphalanti sīlaṃ samādiyati, uposathakammaṃ karoti, tāya paṭipattiyā parisuddhacitto jhānādīni uppādeti. Paññavāpi idhalokaparalokahitañceva lokasamatikkamanupāyañca upaparikkhanto ‘‘sakkā imāya paṭipattiyā idhalokahitampi paralokahitampi lokasamatikkamanūpāyañca sampādetu’’nti paññaṃ upanissāya dānādīni pavatteti. Yasmā pana na kevalaṃ [Pg.443] saddhādayo dānādīnaṃyeva upanissayā, attano aparabhāge uppajjamānānaṃ saddhādīnampi upanissayā eva, tasmā saddhā sīlaṃ sutaṃ cāgo paññā saddhāya sīlassa sutassa cāgassa paññāyāti vuttaṃ.

'Relying on virtue' and so on: the meaning here is that these qualities like virtue are made a foundation. For a virtuous person, skilled in the benefits and advantages of virtue, relying on virtue, gives gifts to the virtuous, undertakes higher and higher virtue, perfectly pure and unbroken, performs the Uposatha observance on the fourteenth and other fortnightly days, and, depending on the perfection of virtue, gives rise to jhāna and other attainments. Likewise, the learned one, because all kinds of prosperity depend on meritorious deeds like giving, having discerned through wisdom derived from learning the distinctions between defilement and purification in giving and other deeds, remains steadfast and, relying on learning, engages in giving and other acts. The generous one, devoted to generosity, relying on their own perfection in generosity, gives gifts, undertakes virtue thinking, 'What is given by one who is virtuous is of great fruit,' performs the Uposatha observance, and with that practice, having purified the mind, gives rise to jhāna and other attainments. The wise one, examining what is beneficial in this world and the next as well as the means to transcend the world, reflects, 'Through this practice, one can accomplish what is beneficial in this world and the next, as well as the means to transcend the world,' and relying on wisdom, engages in giving and other deeds. Moreover, not only are faith and the others a foundation for giving and the like, but they also are a foundation for faith and the others that arise in one’s future existence. Therefore, it is said: 'Faith is for faith, virtue for virtue, learning for learning, generosity for generosity, wisdom for wisdom.'

Parikammanti anantaraṃ aggahetvā pubbabhāge parikammaṃ gahetabbaṃ. Yathākammūpagañāṇassa anāgataṃsañāṇassāti imesaṃ dvinnaṃ dibbacakkhuparikammameva, parikammaṃ visuṃ natthi. Dibbacakkhusseva paribhaṇḍañāṇāni etāni, tasmiṃ ijjhamāne ijjhanti evaṃ santepi tadadhimuttatāya sahitaṃ dibbacakkhuparikammaṃ tesaṃ parikammanti veditabbaṃ. Na hi etāni sabbesaṃ dibbacakkhukānaṃ samagatikāni honti. Tasmā bhavitabbamettha parikammavisesenāti. Dibbacakkhu dibbāya sotadhātuyāti dūre rūpāni disvā tesaṃ saddaṃ sotukāmassa dibbacakkhu sotadhātuvisuddhiyā upanissayo hoti. Tesaṃ pana saddaṃ sutvā tattha gantukāmatādivasena dibbasotadhātu iddhividhañāṇassa upanissayo hoti. Evaṃ sabbattha tassa tassa upakārakabhāvavasena upanissayapaccayatā veditabbā.

Preparation should be undertaken in the preliminary stage, not immediately after. For the knowledge of beings’ faring according to their deeds and the knowledge of the future, these two have only the preparation for the divine eye; there is no separate preparation. These are merely the accessory knowledges of the divine eye itself; when that succeeds, these succeed as well. Even so, because of their inclination towards it, the preparation for the divine eye together with that inclination should be understood as their preparation. For these are not common to all who possess the divine eye. Therefore, there must be a special preparation in this case. The divine eye for the divine ear-element: for one who sees forms from afar and wishes to hear their sound, the divine eye becomes a decisive support for the purification of the ear-element. Then, having heard their sound, by way of the desire to go there and so on, the divine ear-element becomes a decisive support for the knowledge of the kinds of psychic power. Thus, in every case, the conditionality of decisive support should be understood by way of its helpfulness in each case.

Maggaṃ upanissāya anuppannaṃ samāpattinti tena tena maggena sithilīkatapāripanthakattā pahīnapāripanthakattā ca taṃ taṃ samāpattiṃ uppādentīti tesaṃ maggo samāpattiyā upanissayo hoti. Vipassantīti uparūparimaggatthāya vipassanti. Atthapaṭisambhidāyātiādi paṭisambhidānaṃ maggapaṭilābheneva ijjhanato vuttaṃ. Evaṃiddhānañca panetāsaṃ pacchā tesu tesu ārammaṇesu pavattiyā maggova upanissayo nāma hoti.

By relying on the path, an unarisen attainment: because through this or that path obstacles are loosened and abandoned, they bring forth this or that attainment. Thus, for them, the path is a decisive support for the attainment. They practice insight: for the sake of progressively higher paths. With discrimination of meaning, and so on: this is stated because the analytical knowledges are accomplished simply by gaining the path. And for these that are thus accomplished, the path itself is indeed the decisive support for their subsequent occurrence in regard to various objects.

Saddhaṃ upanissāya mānaṃ jappetīti ahamasmi saddho pasannoti mānaṃ pavatteti. Diṭṭhiṃ gaṇhātīti tasmiṃ tasmiṃ vacane saddhāvaseneva gantvā paññāya atthaṃ anupaparikkhanto ‘‘atthi puggalo’’tiādivasena diṭṭhiṃ gaṇhāti. Sīlaṃ sutaṃ cāgaṃ paññanti ahamasmi sīlavā sutavā cāgī paññāsampannoti mānaṃ jappeti. Sīlasutacāgapaññāsu pana mānamaññanaṃ viya diṭṭhimaññanaṃ uppādento diṭṭhiṃ gaṇhāti. Rāgassātiādīsu saddhādisampadaṃ upanissāya attukkaṃsanakāle tesu ekeko dhammo rāgassa, paravambhanakāle dosassa, ubhayena sampayuttassa mohassa, vuttappakārānaṃ mānadiṭṭhīnaṃ, saddhādisampadaṃ upanissāya bhavabhogasampattipatthanāya upanissayo hoti. Evamettha [Pg.444] lokiyakusalaññeva dassitaṃ. Lokuttaraṃ pana santaṃ paṇītaṃ uttamaṃ akusalaviddhaṃsanaṃ. Tasmā cando viya andhakāratamānaṃ na akusalassa upanissayo hotīti na gahitaṃ.

Relying on faith, one generates conceit: thinking, 'I am faithful and confident,' one gives rise to conceit. One grasps a view: going by the power of faith alone in this or that statement, without investigating the meaning with wisdom, one grasps a view such as 'there is a person.' Virtue, learning, generosity, and wisdom: thinking, 'I am virtuous, learned, generous, and endowed with wisdom,' one generates conceit. But regarding virtue, learning, generosity, and wisdom, generating the delusion of views just as one does the delusion of conceit, one grasps views. In the case of passion and so on: relying on the accomplishment of faith and so on, at the time of exalting oneself, each of these states becomes a decisive support for passion; at the time of disparaging others, for hatred; for delusion when associated with both; for conceit and views of the kinds mentioned; and, relying on the accomplishment of faith and so on, it becomes a decisive support for the aspiration for attainments of existence and wealth. Thus, only the mundane wholesome is shown here. The supramundane, however, is peaceful, sublime, supreme, and a destroyer of the unwholesome. Therefore, like the moon dispelling the deepest darkness, it is not a decisive support for the unwholesome—hence, it is not included.

Ātāpetītiādi kāyikadukkhavasena abyākatadhammadassanatthaṃ vuttaṃ. Saddho hi saddhaṃ nissāya atisītaṃ atiuṇhanti anosakkitvā nānappakārāni navakammaveyyāvaccādīni karonto attānaṃ ātāpeti paritāpeti, bhogaṃ uppādetvā puññāni karissāmīti pariyeṭṭhimūlakaṃ dukkhaṃ paccanubhoti. Sīlavāpi sīlānurakkhaṇatthaṃ abbhokāsikattādivasena attānaṃ ātāpeti paritāpeti, piṇḍacārikattādivasena pariyeṭṭhimūlakaṃ dukkhaṃ paccanubhoti. Sutavāpi bāhussaccānurūpaṃ paṭipattiṃ paṭipajjissāmīti vuttanayeneva paṭipajjanto attānaṃ ātāpeti paritāpeti, pariyeṭṭhimūlakaṃ dukkhaṃ paccanubhoti. Cāgavāpi cāgādhimuttatāya attano yāpanamattepi paccaye anavasesetvā pariccajanto, aṅgādipariccāgaṃ vā pana karonto attānaṃ ātāpeti paritāpeti, pariccajitabbassa vatthuno uppādanatthaṃ pariyeṭṭhimūlakaṃ dukkhaṃ paccanubhoti. Paññavāpi uparūpari paññaṃ vaḍḍhessāmīti sappaññataṃ nissāya sītuṇhādīni agaṇetvā sajjhāyamanasikāresu yogaṃ karonto attānaṃ ātāpeti paritāpeti, micchājīve ādīnavaṃ sammājīve ca ānisaṃsaṃ disvā micchājīvaṃ pahāya parisuddhena ājīvena jīvitavuttiṃ pariyesanto pariyeṭṭhimūlakaṃ dukkhaṃ paccanubhoti.

'He torments himself,' and so on, is stated to show indeterminate states by way of bodily suffering. For a faithful person, relying on faith, not shrinking back from extreme cold and heat, engages in various tasks like new construction and service, and torments and exhausts himself; thinking, 'Having generated wealth, I will perform meritorious deeds,' he experiences suffering rooted in seeking. A virtuous person, too, for the sake of protecting virtue, torments and exhausts himself by way of practices such as dwelling in the open air, and by way of practices such as going on alms-round, he experiences suffering rooted in seeking. A learned person, too, thinking, 'I will undertake a practice befitting my great learning,' and practicing in the way already described, torments and exhausts himself and experiences suffering rooted in seeking. A generous person, too, due to being intent on generosity, torments and exhausts himself by giving away without reserve even the requisites for his own sustenance, or by making a sacrifice of his limbs and so on; for the purpose of producing an item to be given away, he experiences suffering rooted in seeking. A wise person, too, relying on his wisdom, thinking, 'I will increase wisdom higher and higher,' disregarding cold, heat, and so on, and making an effort in recitation and attention, torments and exhausts himself; and seeing the danger in wrong livelihood and the benefit in right livelihood, having abandoned wrong livelihood, while seeking a living with a pure livelihood, he experiences suffering rooted in seeking.

Kāyikassa sukhassāti saddhādisampattiṃ upanissāya uppannāni sukhopakaraṇāni paribhuñjanakāle saddhādisamuṭṭhānapaṇītarūpaphuṭakāyassa ca tesaṃ vasena avippaṭisāramūlakapāmojjapītisamuṭṭhānarūpaphuṭakāyassa ca sukhuppattikāle tesaṃ kaṭattā uppannavipākasukhakāle ca kāyikassa sukhassa, vuttanayeneva dukkhuppattikāle saddhādiguṇasampattiṃ asahamānehi payuttavadhabandhanādikāle ca kāyikassa dukkhassa, saddhādayo upanissāya pavattitaphalasamāpattikāle pana phalasamāpattiyā etesu ekeko upanissayapaccayena paccayo hotīti veditabbo. Kusalaṃ kammanti kusalacetanā attano vipākassa upanissayapaccayo, sā pana balavacetanāva labbhati, na dubbalā. Tatridaṃ vatthu – ekā kira itthī ubbandhitukāmā rukkhe rajjuṃ laggetvā saṃvidhātabbaṃ saṃvidahati. Atheko coro [Pg.445] rattibhāge taṃ gehaṃ upasaṅkamitvā ‘‘imāya rajjuyā kiñcideva bandhitvā harissāmī’’ti satthena chindituṃ upagato. Atha sā rajju āsīviso hutvā susūti akāsi. Coro bhīto apasakki. Itthī attano nivesanā nikkhamitvā rajjupāse gīvaṃ paṭimuñcitvā ubbandhā kālamakāsi. Evaṃ balavacetanā antarāye nivāretvā attano vipākassa upanissayo hoti. Na panetaṃ ekantato gahetabbaṃ. Katokāsañhi kammaṃ eva vipākassa antarāyaṃ paṭibāhitvā vipaccati, vipākajanakaṃ pana kammaṃ vipākassa upanissayapaccayo na hotīti na vattabbaṃ. Kammanti ettha catubhūmakampi veditabbaṃ. Yaṃ pana parato ‘‘maggo phalasamāpattiyā’’ti vuttaṃ, taṃ acetanāvasena. Tenetaṃ dīpeti – yo koci vipākajanako dhammo, so attano vipākassa upanissayapaccayo hotīti.

Of bodily pleasure: this is at the time of enjoying the instruments of pleasure that have arisen in dependence on the accomplishment of faith and other virtues; and at the time of the arising of pleasure for the body touched by refined matter arisen from faith and so forth, and for the body touched by matter arisen from joy and delight rooted in non-remorse on account of them; and at the time of the pleasure of resultant-consciousness that has arisen because of those actions having been done. In the same way, of bodily suffering: at the time of the arising of suffering, and at the time of slaughter, imprisonment, and the like, inflicted by those who cannot tolerate the accomplishment of virtues like faith. However, at the time of the attainment of fruition that occurs in dependence on faith and so forth, it should be understood that each of these is a condition for the attainment of fruition by way of decisive support condition. Wholesome kamma means wholesome volition, a decisive support condition for its own result. But only strong volition is obtained, not weak. Here is a story: It is said that a certain woman, wishing to hang herself, attached a rope to a tree and was making arrangements. Then, a thief came to her house at night, thinking, 'I will tie something with this rope and steal it,' and approached to cut it with a knife. Then that rope, having become a venomous snake, hissed. The thief, frightened, retreated. The woman then left her house, put her neck in the noose, hanged herself, and died. Thus, strong volition, having prevented an obstacle, becomes a decisive support for its own result. However, this should not be taken as an absolute rule. For kamma that has been given an opportunity indeed ripens, having warded off an obstacle to its result; but it should not be said that kamma that generates a result is not a decisive support condition for the result. Here, 'kamma' should be understood as pertaining to the four planes. But what is said later, 'the path for the attainment of fruition,' that is in the sense of non-volition. By this it is shown: whatever phenomenon produces a result, that is a decisive support condition for its own result.

Rāgaṃ upanissāya pāṇaṃ hanatīti yasmiṃ vatthusmiṃ sāratto hoti, tasmiṃ vā viruddhaṃ, tassa vā atthāya pāṇaṃ hanati. Adinnādānādīsupi etenevupāyena attho veditabbo. Sandhiṃ chindatīti adinnādānavasena vuttaṃ. Tattha sandhinti gehasandhiṃ. Nillopaṃ haratīti nilīyitvā harati. Ekāgārikaṃ karotīti bahūhi saddhiṃ ekameva gehaṃ parivāretvā vilumpati. Paripanthe tiṭṭhatīti panthadūhanakammaṃ karoti. Dosaṃ upanissāyātiādīsu ‘‘anatthaṃ me acarī’’tiādivasena uppannaṃ dosaṃ upanissayaṃ katvā. Mohaṃ upanissāyāti pāṇātipātādīsu ādīnavapaṭicchādakaṃ mohaṃ upanissayaṃ katvā. Mānaṃ upanissāyāti ahaṃ kiṃ hanituṃ na sakkomi, ādātuṃ na sakkomīti mānaṃ upanissayaṃ katvā. Kenaci vā pana avaññāto hoti paribhūto hīḷito, taṃ omānaṃ upanissayaṃ katvātipi attho. Diṭṭhiṃ upanissāyāti yaññādīsu brāhmaṇādayo viya pādasikamilakkhuādayo viya ca diṭṭhiṃ upanissayaṃ katvā. Patthanaṃ upanissāyāti ‘‘sace me idaṃ nāma ijjhissati, evarūpaṃ te balikammaṃ karissāmīti evaṃ devatāyācanasaṅkhataṃ vā, asukaṃ nāma me ghātetvā dehi, asukassa santakaṃ āhara, ehi vā me etāni kammāni karontassa sahāyo hohī’’ti evamādiṃ vā patthanaṃ upanissayaṃ katvā. Rāgo doso moho māno diṭṭhi patthanā rāgassāti. Ettha [Pg.446] rāgo rāgassāpi upanissayo hoti dosādīnampi. Dosādīsupi eseva nayo.

Relying on lust, one kills a living being—this refers to being attached to an object, and killing another who is opposed to it, or killing for its sake. The same method should be understood for theft and other offenses. 'Breaking a joint' is said in the sense of taking what was not given. Here, 'joint' means a house-joint. 'Robbing by stealth' means taking after hiding. 'Committing a single-house-robbery' means surrounding a single house with many people and plundering it. 'Standing on the highway' refers to the act of highway robbery. 'Relying on hatred' and so on means making hatred the decisive support, hatred that has arisen from thinking, 'They have done me wrong,' and so on. 'Relying on delusion' means making delusion the decisive support, delusion which conceals the dangers in actions such as killing living beings. 'Relying on conceit' means making conceit the decisive support, thinking, 'Am I not capable of killing? Am I not capable of taking?' Alternatively, it also means making that disrespect the decisive support because one has been despised, insulted, or humiliated by someone. 'Relying on wrong view' means making wrong view the decisive support, like brahmins and others in sacrifices, or like foot-licking barbarians and others. 'Relying on aspiration' means making aspiration the decisive support, such as 'If such-and-such succeeds for me, I will perform such-and-such an offering for you,' thus in the manner of requesting from deities, or saying 'Kill such-and-such for me,' or 'Bring me what belongs to such-and-such person,' or 'Come, be my helper as I do these deeds,' and so on. Lust, hatred, delusion, conceit, wrong view, and aspiration for lust, and so on. Here, lust can be a decisive support even for lust itself, as it can be for hatred and the others. The same principle applies to hatred and the rest.

Pāṇātipāto pāṇātipātassāti pāṇātipātī asaṃvare ṭhitattā aññampi pāṇaṃ hanati. Yo vā etena hato, tassa ñātimittehi upadduto tesu aññampi hanati. Evaṃ pāṇātipāto pāṇātipātassa upanissayapaccayena paccayo. Bhaṇḍasāmikaṃ pana gopakaṃ vā ghātetvā parabhaṇḍaharaṇe, sāmikaṃ ghātetvā tassa dārātikkame, nāhaṃ hanāmīti musābhaṇane, katassa paṭicchādanatthāya akatassa vā karaṇatthāya pesuññaṃ upasaṃhāre, teneva nayena pharusavācānicchāraṇe, samphappalāpabhaṇane, paraṃ hanitvā abhijjhāyitabbaparavittūpakaraṇābhijjhāyane, yo tena ghātito hoti; tassa mittāmaccā ucchijjantūtiādicintane ‘‘evaṃ me pāṇātipāto nijjiṇṇo bhavissatī’’ti dukkarakārikādivasena diṭṭhiggahaṇakāle pāṇātipāto adinnādānādīnampi upanissayo hoti. Iminā upāyena adinnādānādimūlakesupi cakkesu attho veditabbo.

Killing living beings is a condition for killing living beings, in that one who kills, being unrestrained, kills another living being. Or, the killer, being harassed by the relatives and friends of the one he killed, kills another among them. Thus, killing living beings serves as a decisive support condition for further killing of living beings. Furthermore, in stealing another's goods after killing the owner of the goods or a guard; in committing adultery with a master's wife after killing him; in speaking falsely, 'I did not kill'; in employing slander to conceal what was done or to make what was not done appear as done; in uttering harsh speech in the same manner; in speaking frivolous talk; in coveting the wealth and property of another after killing them; in thinking, 'Let the friends and associates of the one killed be destroyed,' and so on; or at the time of grasping a wrong view through ascetic practices, thinking, 'Thus, my killing will be exhausted'—in such cases, killing becomes a decisive support for theft and other evils. In this way, the meaning should be understood in the cycles rooted in theft and other evils as well.

Mātughātikammaṃ mātughātikammassāti aññaṃ mātaraṃ hanantaṃ disvā ‘‘vaṭṭati evaṃ kātu’’nti attano mātaraṃ hanantassa vā, ekasmiṃ bhave hantvā aparasmimpi hananavasena vā, ekasmiṃyeva bhave ‘‘gaccha, me mātaraṃ hanāhī’’ti punappunaṃ āṇāpanavasena vā, dvīhi pahārehi niyatamaraṇāya dutiyapahāradānavasena vā mātughātikammaṃ mātughātikammassa upanissayo hoti. Sesānipi yathāyogaṃ imināva nayena veditabbāni. Yasmā pana balavākusalaṃ dubbalākusalassa upanissayo na hoti, tasmā kammapathānantariyakammavaseneva desanā katāti vadanti. Taṃ na ekantato gahetabbaṃ. Pāṇātipātādīni hi katvā ‘‘kasmā evamakāsī’’ti codiyamāno kopamattakampi karoti. Vippaṭisārīpi hoti. Appamattakepi ca kilese uppanne taṃ vaḍḍhetvā vītikkamaṃ karoti. Tasmā balavaṃ dubbalassa dubbalañca balavassāpi upanissayo hotiyeva. Yaṃ pana paccayavibhaṅgassa uddesavaṇṇanāyaṃ vuttaṃ ‘‘balavakāraṇaṭṭhena upanissayo hotī’’ti, taṃ kāraṇabhāvasseva balavatāya vuttaṃ, na upanissayapaccayadhammānaṃ. Kammakilesā hi balavantopi dubbalāpi balavakāraṇaṃ hontiyeva.

The act of matricide is a supporting condition for the act of matricide in the following ways: seeing another person killing their mother and thinking, “It is fitting to do so,” then killing one's own mother; or killing one's mother in one existence and then again in another existence; or repeatedly commanding someone, “Go, kill my mother,” in the same existence; or delivering a second blow to ensure certain death. In these ways, the act of matricide serves as a supporting condition for the act of matricide. The remaining cases should be understood in the same manner, as is appropriate. However, since a strong unwholesome state is not a supporting condition for a weak unwholesome one, some say that the teaching is given only with reference to the course of action that is an immediately effective kamma. But this should not be taken as absolute. For having committed acts like killing living beings, when questioned, “Why did you do this?” one may react with even slight anger or experience remorse. And when even minor defilements arise, they can grow and lead to transgression. Therefore, a strong state can indeed be a supporting condition for a weak one, and a weak state for a strong one. As for what was stated in the commentary on the summary of the Analysis of Conditions—'it is a supporting condition in the sense of a strong cause'—that was said concerning the strength of the causal state itself, not of the phenomena that are the supporting condition. For kamma and defilements, whether strong or weak, can indeed be a strong cause.

Rāgaṃ [Pg.447] upanissāya dānaṃ detītiādīsu aho vatāhaṃ cātumahārājikānaṃ devānaṃ sahabyataṃ upapajjeyyanti upapattibhave vā bhogesu vā rāgaṃ upanissāya dānaṃ deti. Sīlasamādānauposathakammesupi eseva nayo. Jhānaṃ pana rāgavikkhambhanatthāya, vipassanaṃ rāgassa pahānatthāya, maggaṃ samucchedanatthāya uppādento rāgaṃ upanissāya uppādeti nāma. Vītarāgabhāvatthāya pana abhiññaṃ samāpattiñca uppādento rāgaṃ upanissāya uppādeti nāma. Ettāvatā hi vītarāgo nāma hoti.

In cases such as giving gifts based on attachment, one thinks, “Oh, if only I could be reborn into the fellowship of the Four Great Kings!”—thus, one gives gifts based on attachment either for rebirth or for enjoyments. The same principle applies to undertaking precepts and Uposatha observances. However, when one generates jhāna for the purpose of suppressing attachment, develops insight for the purpose of abandoning attachment, or brings forth the path for the purpose of eradicating attachment, one is said to generate these states based on attachment. Moreover, when one generates higher knowledge and meditative attainments for the sake of becoming free from attachment, one is said to generate these states based on attachment. For by this much, one is called free from attachment.

Saddhāyāti dānādivasena pavattasaddhāya sīlādīsupi eseva nayo. Yatheva hi dānādivasena saddhādayo uppādento rāgaṃ upanissāya uppādeti nāma, evaṃ rāgādayopi saddhādīnaṃ upanissayapaccayā nāma hontīti veditabbā. Tassa paṭighātatthāyāti tassa paṭibāhanatthāya, vipākokāsassa anuppadānatthāyāti attho. Sappaṭighātesu tāva evaṃ hotu, yāni pana appaṭighātāni ānantariyakammāni, tesu ‘‘tassa paṭighātatthāyā’’ti kasmā vuttanti? Tassa ajjhāsayavasena. Tappaṭighātatthāya pavattemīti hissa ajjhāsayo, taṃ gahetvā evaṃ vuttaṃ.

By faith: The same principle applies to faith that proceeds by way of generosity and so on, and to morality and so on. Just as one who generates faith and the like by way of generosity and so on is said to generate it based on attachment, so too should it be understood that attachment and other defilements are called the decisive-support condition for faith and the like. “For the purpose of obstructing it” means for the purpose of repelling it, that is, to prevent the arising of its resultant opportunity. This may be so in the case of kamma subject to obstruction. But why is it said, “for the purpose of obstructing it,” in the case of non-obstructive kamma, such as deeds with immediate result? It is due to the underlying intention. For the intention is, “I act to repel it,” and thus it is stated accordingly.

Rāgaṃ upanissāya attānaṃ ātāpetīti yattha ratto, tassa dukkarena pattiṃ sampassanto evaṃ karotīti sabbaṃ purimanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Kāyikassa sukhassāti rāgādisamatikkamavasena kusalaṃ katvā paṭiladdhasukhassa vā rāgādivasena anādīnavadassāvino kāme paribhuñjanavasena uppannasukhassa vā. Dukkhassāti ātāpanādivasena uppannasukhassa vā rāgādihetu pavattavadhabandhanādivasena uppannadukkhassa vā. Phalasamāpattiyāti rāgādayo samucchinditvā vā uppāditāya tehi vā aṭṭīyamānena samāpannāya.

“One torments oneself by relying on lust” means that where one is attached, seeing the attainment of that with difficulty, one acts thus—this should be understood in the same way as before. “Bodily happiness” refers to the happiness obtained by doing good through overcoming lust and the like, or to the happiness arising from enjoying sensual pleasures while not seeing the dangers of lust and the like. “Suffering” refers to the happiness arisen by way of self-torment and so on, or to the suffering arisen by way of destruction, bondage, and the like, caused by lust and the like. “Fruition attainment” refers to the fruition attained either by eradicating lust and the like, or by one who is distressed by them.

Kāyikaṃ sukhantiādīsu sukhe uppanne taṃ assādetvā punappunaṃ tathārūpeheva paccayehi taṃ uppādentassa purimaṃ pacchimassa upanissayo hoti. Sītādīsu pana aggisantāpanādīni atisevantassa pubbabhāge sukhaṃ aparabhāge dukkhassa, ‘‘sukho vati missā paribbājikāya taruṇāya lomasāya bāhāya samphasso’’ti kāmesu pātabyataṃ āpajjantassa idha kāyikaṃ sukhaṃ nerayikassa kāyikadukkhassa, arogabhāvena pana sukhino phalasamāpattiṃ samāpajjantassa kāyikaṃ sukhaṃ phalasamāpattiyā upanissayapaccayo [Pg.448] hoti. Dukkhapaṭighātāya pana sukhaṃ sevantassa dukkhapaṭighātāya ca bhagavato viya ābādhaṃ vikkhambhetvā phalasamāpattiṃ samāpajjantassa kāyikadukkhaṃ kāyikasukhassa ceva phalasamāpattiyā ca, upanissayapaccayo hoti. Utusappāyo sukhassa ceva phalasamāpattiyā ca, asappāyo dukkhassa. Utuasappāyaṃ vā abhibhavitvā samāpattisamuṭṭhitarūpavasena uppannaṃ sukhaṃ anubhavitukāmassa asappāyopi utu phalasamāpattiyā paccayova. Bhojanasenāsanesupi eseva nayo. Puna kāyikaṃ sukhantiādīni kevalaṃ ekato dassitāni. Heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva panesaṃ paccayabhāvo veditabbo. Phalasamāpatti kāyikassa sukhassāti samāpattisamuṭṭhānarūpavasena uppannassa sukhassa. Taṃ hesa samāpattito vuṭṭhāya anubhavati.

In the case of bodily pleasure, etc., when pleasure arises, by delighting in it and repeatedly arousing it through similar conditions, the former becomes a decisive support condition for the latter. However, for one who excessively indulges in cold or heat, or warming oneself by fire and so on, pleasure arises in the initial stage, but suffering in the later stage. For one who engages in sensual misconduct, thinking, “How pleasant is the touch of the young, soft-haired arms of the wandering ascetic woman,” the bodily pleasure here becomes a condition for the bodily suffering of a hell-being. Yet, for one who is healthy and attains fruition attainment, bodily pleasure serves as a decisive support condition for fruition attainment. For one who cultivates pleasure to counteract suffering, and for one who, like the Blessed One warding off illness, attains fruition attainment to counteract suffering, bodily suffering becomes a decisive support condition for both bodily pleasure and fruition attainment. A suitable climate is a condition for pleasure and fruition attainment, while an unsuitable climate is a condition for suffering. Even if one overcomes an unsuitable climate and wishes to experience pleasure arisen through absorption-produced material form, the unsuitable climate still serves as a condition for fruition attainment. The same principle applies to food and lodging. Again, “bodily pleasure,” etc., are shown here only together. However, their conditionality should be understood according to the method explained above. “Fruition attainment for bodily pleasure” refers to the pleasure arisen through absorption-produced material form. After emerging from attainment, one experiences that pleasure.

Kāyikaṃ sukhaṃ upanissāya dānantiādīsu ‘‘aho vata me idaṃ sukhaṃ na parihāyeyyā’’ti pattassa vā aparihāyanavasena; ‘‘aho vatāhaṃ āyatiṃ evarūpaṃ sukhaṃ pāpuṇeyya’’nti appattassa vā pattivasena; dukkhepi ‘‘aho vata me dukkhaṃ parihāyeyyā’’ti pattassa parihāyanavasena vā; ‘‘āyatiṃ evarūpaṃ nuppajjeyyā’’ti anuppādapatthanāvasena vā sukhadukkhānaṃ upanissayatā veditabbā. Utubhojanasenāsanāni vuttanayāneva. Puna kāyikaṃ sukhantiādīsu yasmā ‘‘sādhu kho, mārisa, moggallāna, buddhasaraṇagamanaṃ hotī’’ti sukhappattānampi, ‘‘sammāsambuddho vata, so bhagavā, yo evarūpassa dukkhassa pariññāya dhammaṃ desetī’’ti (udā. 18) dukkhappattānampi saddhā uppajjati. Sukhadukkhehi ca saṃyogaviyogatthāya sīlādiparipūraṇaṃ kareyya, tasmā sukhadukkhāni saddhādīnaṃ upanissayabhāvena dassitāni. Utuādīnipi yathāyogaṃ yojetabbāni. Kāyikaṃ sukhaṃ upanissāya pāṇaṃ hanatītiādīsupi vuttanayānusāreneva sukhādīnaṃ upanissayatā veditabbā.

Relying on bodily happiness, in cases such as giving and so forth, one thinks, “Oh, may this happiness of mine not decline!”—by way of the non-decline of what has been attained. Or one thinks, “Oh, may I attain such happiness in the future!”—by way of the attainment of what has not yet been attained. Even in suffering, one thinks, “Oh, may this suffering of mine decline!”—by way of the decline of what has been attained. Or one thinks, “May such suffering not arise in the future!”—by way of the aspiration for non-arising. Thus, the nature of happiness and suffering as decisive support conditions should be understood. Seasons, food, and lodging are just as was stated. Furthermore, regarding bodily happiness and so forth, since faith arises even in those who have attained happiness, as in the statement, “Good indeed, friend Moggallāna, is going for refuge to the Buddha,” and even in those who have attained suffering, as in the statement, “Truly, the Blessed One is the perfectly enlightened one, who teaches the Dhamma for the full understanding of such suffering” (Udāna 18), and one would fulfill virtue and other practices for the sake of union with happiness and separation from suffering, therefore, happiness and suffering are shown as being decisive support conditions for faith and other qualities. Seasons and the like should be connected accordingly. Even in cases such as killing a living being relying on bodily happiness, the nature of happiness and so forth as decisive support conditions should be understood in the same way as explained.

Imasmiṃ pana upanissayabhājanīye kusalo kusalassa tividhenāpi upanissayo, akusalassa duvidhena, abyākatassa tividhena. Akusalo akusalassa tividhena, kusalassa ekavidhena, abyākatassa duvidhena. Abyākatopi abyākatassa tividhena, tathā kusalassa, tathā [Pg.449] akusalassāti. Evaṃ kusalo aṭṭhavidhena, akusalo chabbidhena, abyākato navavidhenāti tevīsatividhena upanissayo bhājitoti veditabbo.

In this analysis of decisive support, the wholesome is a decisive support for the wholesome in three ways, for the unwholesome in two ways, and for the indeterminate in three ways. The unwholesome is a decisive support for the unwholesome in three ways, for the wholesome in one way, and for the indeterminate in two ways. The indeterminate is also a decisive support for the indeterminate in three ways, likewise for the wholesome, and likewise for the unwholesome. Thus, the wholesome is a decisive support in eight ways, the unwholesome in six ways, and the indeterminate in nine ways—in this way decisive support is analyzed into twenty-three types, it should be understood.

424. Purejāte cakkhādīni oḷārikavasena vuttāni. Āpodhātuādīnipi pana purejātārammaṇāni hontiyeva. Vatthu purejātaṃ cakkhāyatanantiādi yaṃ vatthu hutvā purejātaṃ hoti, taṃ dassetuṃ vuttaṃ. Vatthu vipākābyākatānanti pavattiyaṃ purejātapaccayaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ.

424. In the case of the pre-nascent condition, the eye and so forth are stated by way of being gross. But the water element and others are indeed pre-nascent objects. The statement, “The base is pre-nascent, like the eye-base,” and so forth, is said to show that which, having become a base, is pre-nascent. The statement, “The base is resultant and indeterminate,” is said with reference to the pre-nascent condition in the course of existence.

425. Pacchājāte imassa kāyassāti cātumahābhūtikakāyassa. Pacchājātapaccayena paccayoti upatthambhanavasena pacchājāto hutvā paccayo. Upatthambhakaṭṭhena paccayattāyeva hesa pacchājātapaccayoti imasmiṃ pañhāvāre anulomato āgato.

425. In the post-nascent condition, 'for this body' means for the body composed of the four great elements. 'A condition by way of post-nascent condition' means that, having arisen afterward, it is a condition by way of support. Because it is a condition in the sense of supporting, it is called the post-nascent condition—this is presented in this question section in the forward order.

426. Āsevanapaccaye anulomaṃ gotrabhussātiādīnaṃ visuṃ gahaṇe heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva kāraṇaṃ veditabbaṃ.

426. In the repetition condition, regarding the separate mention of adaptation, change-of-lineage, and so forth, the reason should be understood in the same way as stated before.

427. Kammapaccaye kusalā cetanā sampayuttakānanti ettha sahajātanānākkhaṇikavibhāgassa abhāvato sahajātāti na vuttā. Abyākatavissajjane pana so vibhāgo atthi, tasmā tattha vuttā. Paṭisandhiggahaṇaṃ kaṭattārūpānaṃ vasena kataṃ. Cetanā vatthussāti kiñcāpi paṭisandhikkhaṇe vatthupatiṭṭhitā arūpadhammā vatthupaccayā vattanti, cetanā pana vatthussāpi paccayoti dassetuṃ vuttaṃ.

427. In the kamma condition, regarding 'wholesome volition for associated states,' here, because there is no division into co-nascent and different-moment, 'co-nascent' is not stated. However, in the answer concerning the indeterminate, that division exists, so it is stated there. The taking of rebirth-linking is done by way of kamma-produced matter. The statement, 'Volition is a condition for the base,' is said to show that although at the moment of rebirth-linking immaterial phenomena established on a base proceed by way of the base condition, volition, however, is also a condition for the base.

428. Vipākapaccaye paṭisandhivāre imināva nayena attho veditabbo.

428. In the resultant condition, in the section on rebirth-linking, the meaning should be understood in this same way.

429-438. Āhārapaccaye imassa kāyassāti imasmiṃ catusantativasena pavatte cātumahābhūtikakāye āhārasamuṭṭhānassa janakavasena, sesassa upatthambhakavasena āhārapaccayena paccayo. Indriyapaccayādīsupi paṭisandhivāro vuttanayeneva veditabbo. Sesaṃ sabbattha uttānatthamevāti.

429-438. In the nutriment condition, 'for this body' means: in this body composed of the four great elements, which proceeds by way of the fourfold continuity, it is a condition by way of nutriment condition by generating nutriment-originated matter and, for the remainder, by way of supporting. In the faculty condition and so forth, too, the section on rebirth-linking should be understood in the same way as stated. The rest is everywhere of obvious meaning.

Pañhāvāravibhaṅgavaṇṇanā niṭṭhitā.

The explanation of the Analysis of the Question Section is concluded.

Pañhāvārassa ghaṭane anulomagaṇanā

Enumeration of the Forward Order in the Combination of the Question Section

439. Idānettha [Pg.450] yathāladdhāni vissajjanāni gaṇanāvasena dassetuṃ hetuyā sattātiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha sattāti kusalena kusalaṃ, abyākataṃ, kusalābyākatanti tīṇi. Tathā akusalena; abyākatena abyākatamevāti evaṃ satta. Ārammaṇe navāti ekamūlakaekāvasānāni nava. Adhipatiyā dasāti kusalaṃ kusalassa sahajātato ceva ārammaṇato ca; akusalassa ārammaṇatova abyākatassa sahajātato ceva ārammaṇato ca; kusalābyākatassa sahajātatovāti kusalamūlakāni cattāri. Akusalaṃ akusalassa sahajātato ceva ārammaṇato ca; abyākatassa sahajātatova tathā akusalābyākatassāti akusalamūlakāni tīṇi. Abyākato abyākatassa sahajātato ceva ārammaṇato ca; kusalassa ārammaṇatova tathā akusalassāti abyākatamūlakāni tīṇīti evaṃ dasa. Ettha pana ārammaṇādhipatipi sattadhā, sahajātādhipatipi sattadhāva labbhati.

439. Now here, to present the answers as they have been obtained by way of enumeration, the passage beginning, 'In the root condition, seven,' is stated. Therein, 'seven' means: by the wholesome, for the wholesome, for the indeterminate, and for the wholesome-and-indeterminate—three; similarly by the unwholesome—three; by the indeterminate, for the indeterminate only—one; thus there are seven. In the object condition, there are nine: the nine that are single-rooted and single-ended. In the predominance condition, there are ten: wholesome is a condition for wholesome by way of both co-nascence and object; for unwholesome by way of object only; for indeterminate by way of both co-nascence and object; for wholesome-and-indeterminate by way of co-nascence only—thus there are four rooted in the wholesome. Unwholesome is a condition for unwholesome by way of both co-nascence and object; for indeterminate by way of co-nascence only; similarly for unwholesome-and-indeterminate—thus there are three rooted in the unwholesome. Indeterminate is a condition for indeterminate by way of both co-nascence and object; for wholesome by way of object only; similarly for unwholesome—thus there are three rooted in the indeterminate. In this way, there are ten. Here, however, object-predominance is obtained in seven ways, and co-nascent-predominance is also obtained in seven ways.

Anantare sattāti kusalamūlakāni dve, tathā akusalamūlakāni, abyākatamūlakāni tīṇīti evaṃ satta. Samanantarepi etāneva. Sahajāte navāti kusalamūlakāni tīṇi, akusalamūlakāni tīṇi, abyākatamūlakaṃ ekaṃ, tathā kusalābyākatamūlakaṃ, akusalābyākatamūlakañcāti evaṃ nava. Aññamaññe tīṇīti kusalena kusalaṃ, akusalena akusalaṃ, abyākatena abyākatanti evaṃ tīṇi. Nissaye terasāti sahajātatova kusalamūlakāni tīṇi, tathā akusalamūlakāni, tathā abyākatamūlakāni. Ettha pana purejātampi labbhati. Abyākatañhi abyākatassa sahajātampi hoti purejātampi; kusalassa purejātameva tathā akusalassa. Puna kusalābyākato sahajātapurejātato kusalassa, sahajātatova abyākatassa, tathā akusalābyākatoti evaṃ terasa. Upanissaye navāti ekamūlakekāvasānā nava. Tesaṃ vibhaṅge tevīsati bhedā dassitā. Tesu ārammaṇūpanissaye satta, anantarūpanissaye satta, pakatūpanissaye nava honti. Purejāte tīṇīti abyākato abyākatassa, kusalassa, akusalassāti evaṃ tīṇi.

In immediate contiguity, there are seven: two wholesome roots, similarly two unwholesome roots, and three indeterminate roots—thus seven. In proximity, these same. In co-nascence, there are nine: three wholesome roots, three unwholesome roots, one indeterminate root, and also a wholesome-indeterminate root and an unwholesome-indeterminate root—thus nine. In mutuality, there are three: wholesome with wholesome, unwholesome with unwholesome, indeterminate with indeterminate—thus three. In dependence, there are thirteen: from co-nascence, three wholesome roots, similarly three unwholesome roots, and similarly three indeterminate roots. Here, however, pre-nascence is also found. For the indeterminate is related to the indeterminate by both co-nascence and pre-nascence; to the wholesome by pre-nascence only, and similarly for the unwholesome. Again, the wholesome-indeterminate is related to the wholesome by co-nascence and pre-nascence, and to the indeterminate by co-nascence alone; similarly for the unwholesome-indeterminate—thus thirteen. In decisive support, there are nine: nine with a single root and a single conclusion. In their analysis, twenty-three distinctions are shown. Among them, there are seven in object-decisive support, seven in immediate-decisive support, and nine in natural-decisive support. In pre-nascence, there are three: the indeterminate is related to the indeterminate, to the wholesome, and to the unwholesome—thus three.

Pacchājāte [Pg.451] tīṇīti kusalo abyākatassa, akusalo abyākatassa, abyākato abyākatassāti evaṃ tīṇi. Āsevane tīṇi aññamaññasadisāni. Kamme satta hetusadisāni. Tattha dvīsu vissajjanesu nānākkhaṇikakammampi āgataṃ, pañcasu sahajātameva. Vipāke ekaṃ abyākatena abyākataṃ. Āhāraindriyajhānamaggesu satta hetusadisāneva. Indriyaṃ panettha sahajātapurejātavasena āgataṃ. Sampayutte tīṇi aññamaññasadisāni. Vippayutte pañcāti sahajātapacchājātato kusalena abyākataṃ, akusalena abyākataṃ, sahajātapurejātapacchājātato abyākatena abyākataṃ, vatthupurejātato abyākatena kusalaṃ, tathā akusalanti ekaṃ kusalamūlaṃ, ekaṃ akusalamūlaṃ, tīṇi abyākatamūlānīti evaṃ pañca.

In post-nascence, there are three: the wholesome conditioning the indeterminate, the unwholesome conditioning the indeterminate, and the indeterminate conditioning the indeterminate—thus three. In repetition, there are three, similar to mutuality. In kamma, there are seven, similar to the root condition. Here, in two expositions, kamma occurring at different moments is also included; in the five, only that which is co-nascent. In result, there is one: the indeterminate conditioning the indeterminate. In nutriment, faculty, jhāna, and path, there are seven, similar to the root condition. Here, faculty is included by way of co-nascence and pre-nascence. In association, there are three, similar to mutuality. In dissociation, there are five: from co-nascence and post-nascence, the wholesome conditioning the indeterminate, and the unwholesome conditioning the indeterminate; from co-nascence, pre-nascence, and post-nascence, the indeterminate conditioning the indeterminate; from the pre-nascent base, the indeterminate conditioning the wholesome, and similarly the unwholesome—thus, one wholesome-rooted, one unwholesome-rooted, and three indeterminate-rooted—thus five.

Atthiyā terasāti sahajātato kusalena kusalaṃ, sahajātapacchājātato kusalena abyākataṃ, sahajātatova kusalena kusalābyākatanti kusalamūlāni tīṇi, tathā akusalamūlāni, sahajātapurejātapacchājātāhārindriyato pana abyākatena abyākataṃ, vatthārammaṇapurejātato abyākatena kusalaṃ, tathā akusalaṃ, sahajātapurejātato kusalo ca abyākato ca akusalassa; sveva abyākatassa sahajātapacchājātaāhārindriyato sahajātapurejātato ca kusalo ca abyākato ca kusalassa; sveva abyākatassa sahajātapacchājātaāhārindriyatoti evaṃ terasa. Natthivigatesu satta anantarasadisāni. Avigate terasa atthisadisānīti. Evamettha satta gaṇanaparicchedā ekaṃ tīṇi pañca satta nava dasa terasāti. Tesu vipākavasena ekameva ekakaṃ, aññamaññapurejātapacchājātāsevanasampayuttavasena pañca tikā, vippayuttavasena ekameva pañcakaṃ, hetuanantarasamanantarakammaāhārindriyajhānamagganatthivigatavasena dasa sattakā, ārammaṇasahajātaupanissayavasena tayo navakā, adhipativasena ekaṃ dasakaṃ, nissayaatthiavigatavasena tayo terasakāti evaṃ tasmiṃ tasmiṃ paccaye niddiṭṭhavāre gaṇanavasena sādhukaṃ sallakkhetvā tesaṃ vasena dukatikādīsu paccayasaṃsandane gaṇanā veditabbā.

In presence, there are thirteen: from co-nascence, the wholesome with the wholesome; from co-nascence and post-nascence, the wholesome with the indeterminate; from co-nascence alone, the wholesome with the wholesome-and-indeterminate—thus, three wholesome-rooted. Similarly, three unwholesome-rooted. Further, from co-nascence, pre-nascence, post-nascence, nutriment, and faculty, the indeterminate with the indeterminate. From the base, object, and pre-nascence, the indeterminate with the wholesome, and similarly with the unwholesome. From co-nascence and pre-nascence, the wholesome and the indeterminate are conditions for the unwholesome; these same two are also conditions for the indeterminate by way of co-nascence, post-nascence, nutriment, and faculty. And from co-nascence and pre-nascence, the wholesome and the indeterminate are conditions for the wholesome; these same two are also conditions for the indeterminate by way of co-nascence, post-nascence, nutriment, and faculty—thus thirteen. In absence and disappearance, there are seven, similar to immediate contiguity. In non-disappearance, there are thirteen, similar to presence. Thus, here, there are seven numerical enumerations: one, three, five, seven, nine, ten, and thirteen. Among them: by way of result, there is only one single item; by way of mutuality, pre-nascence, post-nascence, repetition, and association, there are five triads; by way of dissociation, only one pentad; by way of root, immediate contiguity, proximity, kamma, nutriment, faculty, jhāna, path, absence, and disappearance, there are ten heptads; by way of object, co-nascence, and decisive support, there are three nonads; by way of dominance, one decad; by way of dependence, presence, and non-disappearance, there are three groups of thirteen. Thus, for each condition, having carefully considered the numerical arrangements in the specified sections, the calculation for the combination of conditions in dyads, triads, etc., should be understood.

440. Ye pana paccayā yesaṃ paccayānaṃ visabhāgā vā viruddhā vā honti, te tehi saddhiṃ na yojetabbā. Seyyathidaṃ – hetupaccayassa tāva ārammaṇānantarasamanantarūpanissayapurejātapacchājātakammāsevanāhārajhānanatthivigatā [Pg.452] adhipatipaccaye ca ṭhapetvā vīmaṃsaṃ sesādhipatino visabhāgā, sahajātādayo sabhāgā. Kasmā? Tathā bhāvābhāvato. Hetupaccayo hi yesaṃ hetupaccayo hoti, tesaṃ sahajātādipaccayopi hoti, ārammaṇādipaccayo pana na hotīti ārammaṇādayo tassa visabhāgā nāma. Tasmā so tehi, te vā tena saddhiṃ, na yojetabbā. Purejātapacchājātasampayuttavippayuttaatthinatthivigatāvigatā ca aññamaññaviruddhā, tepi aññamaññaṃ na yojetabbā. Tattha ayojanīye vajjetvā yojanīyehi yoge ye vārā labbhanti, te saṅkhepato dassetuṃ hetupaccayā adhipatiyā cattārītiādi vuttaṃ.

440. Those conditions which are incompatible or contradictory to other conditions should not be combined with them. For example: with the root condition, the following are incompatible: the object, immediate contiguity, proximity, decisive support, pre-nascence, post-nascence, kamma, repetition, nutriment, jhāna, absence, and disappearance conditions; and in the dominance condition, excepting investigation, the remaining dominances are also incompatible. The co-nascence and other similar conditions are compatible. Why? Because of the presence and absence of such a nature. For those phenomena for which the root condition applies, the co-nascence condition and similar conditions also apply, but the object condition and others do not. Thus, the object condition and others are called incompatible with it. Therefore, it should not be combined with them, nor they with it. Pre-nascence, post-nascence, association, dissociation, presence, absence, disappearance, and non-disappearance are mutually contradictory; they too should not be combined with each other. Here, excluding the non-combinable and combining the combinable, the permutations that are obtained are shown in brief, as when it is said, 'With the root condition and dominance, there are four,' and so on.

Tattha kiñcāpi hetupaccayassa adhipatinā saṃsandane ūnataragaṇanavasena sattahi vārehi bhavitabbaṃ, yasmā pana adhipatīsu vīmaṃsāva hetupaccayo, na itare, tasmā visabhāge vajjetvā sabhāgavasena ‘‘cattārī’’ti vuttaṃ. Tāni evaṃ veditabbāni – kusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo adhipatipaccayena paccayo; kusalā vīmaṃsā sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ, kusalo dhammo abyākatassa dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo adhipatipaccayena paccayo; kusalā vīmaṃsā cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ rūpānaṃ, kusalo dhammo kusalassa ca abyākatassa ca dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo adhipatipaccayena paccayo; kusalā vīmaṃsā sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānānañca rūpānaṃ, abyākato dhammo abyākatassa dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo adhipatipaccayena paccayo; vipākābyākatā kiriyābyākatā vīmaṃsā sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ cittasamuṭṭhānānañca rūpānanti. Ettha ca vipākābyākatā lokuttaratova gahetabbā. Ārammaṇapaccayaanantarapaccayādayo pana visabhāgattā na yojitā. Iminā upāyena sabbattha labbhamānañca alabbhamānañca ñatvā labbhamānavasena vārā uddharitabbā.

Here, although in the combination of the root condition with the dominance condition, there should be seven instances by way of the lesser count, since among the dominance conditions, only investigation is a root condition, not the others, therefore, excluding the dissimilar, it is said 'four' by way of the similar. These should be understood thus: A wholesome phenomenon is a condition for a wholesome phenomenon by way of the root condition and dominance condition; wholesome investigation for the associated aggregates. A wholesome phenomenon is a condition for an indeterminate phenomenon by way of the root condition and dominance condition; wholesome investigation for mind-originated material phenomena. A wholesome phenomenon is a condition for both wholesome and indeterminate phenomena by way of the root condition and dominance condition; wholesome investigation for the associated aggregates and mind-originated material phenomena. An indeterminate phenomenon is a condition for an indeterminate phenomenon by way of the root condition and dominance condition; investigation that is resultant-indeterminate and functional-indeterminate for the associated aggregates and mind-originated material phenomena. And here, the resultant-indeterminate should be taken as only the supramundane. The object condition, contiguity condition, and others are not applied due to dissimilarity. By this method, knowing what is obtainable and unobtainable in all cases, the instances should be extracted according to what is obtainable.

Sahajāte sattāti hetuyā laddhāneva. Aññamaññe tīṇīti suddhikaaññamaññe laddhāneva. Nissaye sattāti hetuyā laddhāneva. Vipāke ekanti suddhikavipāke laddhameva. Indriyamaggesu cattārīti heṭṭhā vuttanayāneva[Pg.453]. Sampayutte tīṇīti suddhikasampayutte laddhāneva. Vippayutte tīṇīti kusalādicittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpaṃ paccayuppannaṃ katvā veditabbāni. Atthiavigatesu sattāti hetuyā laddhāneva.

In the co-arisen, seven [instances] are obtained, just as in the root condition. In mutuality, three [instances] are obtained, just as in pure mutuality. In dependence, seven [instances] are obtained, just as in the root condition. In result, one [instance] is obtained, just as in pure result. In the faculties and paths, four [instances] are just as stated below. In association, three [instances] are obtained, just as in pure association. In dissociation, three [instances] should be understood by taking material phenomenon arising from wholesome consciousness and so on as conditionally produced. In presence and non-disappearance, seven [instances] are obtained, just as in the root condition.

441-443. Evaṃ yehi adhipatipaccayādīhi ekādasahi paccayehi saddhiṃ hetupaccayo yojanaṃ labhati, tesaṃ vasena dumūlakanaye gaṇanaṃ dassetvā idāni timūlakādīsu tassa dassanatthaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ ṭhapento hetusahajātanissayaatthiavigatanti sattātiādimāha. Potthakesu pana nissaupanissaadhipāti evaṃ parihīnakkharāni paccayanāmāni likhanti, taṃ saññākaraṇamattavasena likhitaṃ. Tasmā tādisesu ṭhānesu paripuṇṇā pāḷi kātabbā. Yaṃ panidaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ ṭhapitaṃ, tena idaṃ dīpeti – ayaṃ hetupaccayo sahajātādīhi catūhi saddhiṃ saṃsandane attano vibhaṅge laddhāni satteva vissajjanāni labhati. Sace panettha aññamaññapaccayo pavisati, aññamaññe laddhāni tīṇi labhati. Sace sampayuttapaccayo pavisati, tāneva tīṇi labhati. Sace vippayuttapaccayo pavisati, hetuvippayuttaduke laddhāni tīṇi labhati. Sace vipākapaccayo pavisati, sabbehi vipākasabhāgehi saddhiṃ saṃsandane evameva vissajjanaṃ labhati. Sace panettha indriyamaggapaccayā pavisanti, tehi saddhiṃ dumūlake laddhāni cattāriyeva labhati. Sace tehi saddhiṃ aññamaññapaccayo pavisati, hetādhipatiduke dassitesu catūsu vissajjanesu ‘‘kusalo dhammo abyākatassa, kusalo dhammo kusalassa ca abyākatassa cā’’ti dve apanetvā sesāni dve labhati. Sacepi tattha sampayuttapaccayo pavisati, tāneva dve labhati. Sace pana vippayuttapaccayo pavisati, itarāni dve labhati. Sace pana tesu vipākapaccayo pavisati, sabbattha ekameva labhati. Adhipatinā pana saddhiṃ hetādhipatidukato ūnataragaṇanesu appavisantesu cattāriyeva labhati. Ūnataragaṇanesu pavisantesu tesaṃ vasena dve ekanti labhati. Evaṃ tesaṃ tesaṃ paccayānaṃ samāyoge labbhamānaṃ gaṇanaṃ viditvā timūlakādīsu gaṇanā uddharitabbāti.

441-443. Thus, having shown the calculation in the two-rooted method by way of the eleven conditions, such as the dominance condition, with which the root condition obtains combination, now, to illustrate its application in the three-rooted and other methods, the characteristic is established, saying: 'hetusahajātanissayaatthiavigatanti sattātiādimāha.' In the texts, however, condition names are sometimes written incompletely, such as 'nissaupanissaadhipāti,' with missing letters. This is written merely for the sake of recognition. Therefore, in such places, the full Pāli should be supplied. Now, this established characteristic clarifies this: This root condition, when combined with the four conditions like co-arisen and so on, obtains the seven answers found in its own analysis. If the mutuality condition is also involved here, it obtains three answers as found in mutuality. If the association condition is involved, it obtains those same three. If the dissociation condition is involved, it obtains three answers as found in the root-dissociation pair. If the result condition is involved, it similarly obtains an answer when combined with all states sharing the nature of result. If the faculty and path conditions are involved here, when combined with them, it obtains only four answers as found in the two-rooted method. If the mutuality condition is also involved with them, then, after excluding the two answers—'a wholesome phenomenon for an indeterminate one' and 'a wholesome phenomenon for both a wholesome and an indeterminate one'—from the four answers shown in the root-dominance pair, the remaining two are obtained. If the association condition is also involved there, those same two are obtained. If the dissociation condition is involved, the other two are obtained. If the result condition is involved within these, only one is obtained in all cases. When combined with the dominance condition, if these other conditions do not enter the groups with fewer counts, only four answers are obtained. If they enter the groups with fewer counts, then, depending on them, either two or one is obtained. Thus, having understood the calculation arising from the combination of these various conditions, the calculation should be extracted in the three-rooted and other methods.

Etesu [Pg.454] pana ghaṭanesu sabbapaṭhamāni cattāri ghaṭanāni sāmaññato navannampi hetūnaṃ vasena vuttāni avipākāni. Abyākatena abyākatavissajjane panettha vipākahetupi labbhati.

Among these combinations, the very first four combinations are stated generally as non-resultant by way of all nine roots. However, in the answer of an indeterminate phenomenon for an indeterminate phenomenon, resultant roots are also obtained here.

Tato parāni pañca ghaṭanāni vipākahetuvasena vuttāni. Tattha sabbepi sahajātavipākā ceva vipākasahajātarūpā ca. Tesu paṭhame ghaṭane vipākā ceva taṃsamuṭṭhānarūpā ca labbhanti, dutiye vipākā ceva paṭisandhiyañca vatthurūpaṃ. Tatiye arūpadhammāva. Catutthe vipākacittasamuṭṭhānarūpameva labbhati. Pañcame vatthurūpameva.

Then, the remaining five combinations are stated by way of resultant roots. Herein, all are both co-arisen results and material phenomena co-arisen with result. Among these, in the first combination, both results and material phenomena arisen from them are obtained. In the second, both results and the base material phenomenon at rebirth-linking are obtained. In the third, only immaterial phenomena are obtained. In the fourth, only the material phenomenon produced by resultant consciousness is obtained. In the fifth, only the base material phenomenon is obtained.

Tato parāni pañcadasa ghaṭanāni indriyamaggayuttāni amohahetuvasena vuttāni. Tattha paṭhamāni nava nirādhipatīni, pacchimāni cha sādhipatīni. Nirādhipatikesupi paṭhamāni cattāri sāmaññato sabbattha amohavasena vuttāni, pacchimāni pañca vipākāmohavasena. Tattha nirādhipatikesu paṭhame cattārīti heṭṭhā hetādhipatiduke dassitāneva. Dutiye cittasamuṭṭhānarūpaṃ parihāyati. Tatiye vatthurūpaṃ parihāyati. Catutthe kusalo dhammo cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ, abyākato taṃsamuṭṭhānānanti rūpameva labbhati. Tato parāni vipākayuttāni pañca heṭṭhā vuttanayāneva. Sādhipatikesu paṭhamāni tīṇi ghaṭanāni sāmaññato vipākāvipākahetuvasena vuttāni. Tesu paṭhame cattāri vuttanayāneva. Dutiye rūpaṃ parihāyati, tatiye arūpaṃ parihāyati. Tato parāni tīṇi vipākahetuvasena vuttāni. Tesu paṭhame rūpārūpaṃ labbhati, dutiye arūpameva, tatiye rūpameva. Evampi tesaṃ tesaṃ paccayānaṃ samāyoge labbhamānaṃ gaṇanaṃ viditvā timūlakādīsu gaṇanā uddharitabbāti.

Then, the subsequent fifteen combinations, associated with the faculties and paths, are stated by way of the root of non-delusion. Among them, the first nine are without a dominance factor, and the last six are with a dominance factor. Even among those without a dominance factor, the first four are stated generally as being everywhere by way of non-delusion, while the last five are by way of resultant non-delusion. Here, among those without a dominance factor, the first four are just as shown below in the root-dominance dyad. In the second, mind-originated matter is lost. In the third, base-matter is lost. In the fourth, a wholesome state for mind-originated phenomena, and an indeterminate state for phenomena arisen from that—only matter is obtained. After that, the subsequent five associated with resultant [roots] are just as stated below. Among those with a dominance factor, the first three combinations are stated generally by way of both resultant and non-resultant roots. Among them, in the first [combination], the four [items] are just as stated before. In the second, matter is lost; in the third, the immaterial is lost. Then, the subsequent three are stated by way of the resultant root. Among them, in the first, both matter and the immaterial are obtained; in the second, only the immaterial; in the third, only matter. Thus, having understood the calculation of what is obtained in the combination of these various conditions, the calculation should be extracted for the three-rooted and other groups.

Hetumūlakaṃ niṭṭhitaṃ.

The Root-Based [Section] is concluded.

444. Ārammaṇamūlakepi adhipatipaccayādayo satta ārammaṇena sabhāgā, sesā soḷasa visabhāgāti te ayojetvā satteva yojitā. Tesu adhipatiyā sattāti kusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassa, akusalassa dhammassa, abyākatassāti evaṃ kusalamūlāni tīṇi, akusalamūlaṃ ekaṃ, abyākatamūlāni tīṇīti satta. Nissaye tīṇīti vatthuvasena abyākatamūlāneva. Upanissaye satta heṭṭhimāni eva. Purejāte tīṇīti vatthārammaṇavasena abyākatamūlāni. Vippayutte tīṇīti [Pg.455] vatthuvaseneva. Atthiavigatesu tīṇīti vatthārammaṇavasena. Yathā pana hetumūlake lakkhaṇadassanatthaṃ ghaṭanāni ṭhapitāni, tathā ārammaṇamūlakādīsupi.

444. In the Object-Based [Section] too, the seven conditions beginning with the dominance condition are of a similar nature to the object condition, while the remaining sixteen are of a dissimilar nature. Thus, not applying them, only seven are applied. Among these, in dominance, there are seven: a wholesome state for a wholesome state, for an unwholesome state, and for an indeterminate state—thus, three rooted in the wholesome, one rooted in the unwholesome, and three rooted in the indeterminate, making seven. In dependence, there are three—only those rooted in the indeterminate by way of the base. In strong dependence, the seven are just as the preceding ones. In prenascence, there are three—those rooted in the indeterminate by way of base and object. In dissociation, there are three—only by way of the base. In presence and non-disappearance, there are three—by way of base and object. Just as, for the purpose of illustrating the characteristics in the Root-Based [Section], combinations were established, so too in the Object-Based and other sections.

445. Tattha yāni tāva imasmiṃ ārammaṇamūlake pañca ghaṭanāni ṭhapitāni. Tattha paṭhamaṃ ārammaṇādhipativasena sādhipatikaṃ. Tattha sattāti ārammaṇādhipatiduke laddhavissajjanāneva. Dutiyaṃ nirādhipatikaṃ. Tattha tīṇīti vatthārammaṇavasena ārammaṇavaseneva vā abyākatamūlāni. Tatiyaṃ nissayena vuttaṃ. Tattha tīṇīti vatthuvasena abyākatamūlāni. Catutthapañcamāni sādhipatikāni. Tesu catutthe ekanti vatthārammaṇavasena ārammaṇavaseneva vā abyākatamūlaṃ akusalaṃ. Pañcame ekanti nissayato abyākatamūlakaṃ akusalaṃ. Evamidhāpi labbhamānavasena tikādīsu gaṇanā veditabbā. Tathā adhipatimūlakādīsu. Ārammaṇaindriyavipākavasena vitthārayojanaṃ pana avatvā tattha tattha vattabbayuttakameva vadāmāti.

445. Herein, five combinations are established in this Object-Based [Section]. Among them, the first is with a dominance factor by way of object-dominance. There, the seven are just the answers obtained in the object-dominance dyad. The second is without a dominance factor. There, the three are those rooted in the indeterminate by way of base and object, or only by way of object. The third is stated by way of dependence. There, the three are those rooted in the indeterminate by way of the base. The fourth and fifth are with a dominance factor. Among them, in the fourth, there is one: an unwholesome state rooted in the indeterminate by way of base and object, or only by way of object. In the fifth, there is one: an unwholesome state rooted in the indeterminate by way of dependence. Thus, here too, the calculation in the triads and so on should be understood according to what is obtainable. Similarly, in the Dominance-Based and other sections. However, without stating the detailed application by way of object, faculty, and result, we shall state only what is appropriate to be said in each respective place.

446. Adhipatimūlake sahajāte sattāti sahajātādhipativasena kusalamūlāni tīṇi, akusalamūlāni tīṇi, abyākatamūlaṃ ekaṃ. Sahajātena pana saddhiṃ ārammaṇādhipati, ārammaṇādhipatinā ca saddhiṃ sahajātaṃ na labbhati. Aññamaññe tīṇīti sahajātādhipativaseneva. Nissaye aṭṭhāti kusalamūlāni tīṇi, akusalamūlāni tīṇi, abyākatamūlāni dve. Abyākato hi adhipati abyākatassa sahajātato ceva ārammaṇato ca nissayo hoti, akusalassa ārammaṇatova. Kusalassa pana ubhayathāpi na hotīti abyākatamūlāni dveyevāti evaṃ aṭṭha. Upanissaye satta ārammaṇasadisāneva. Purejāte ekanti abyākatādhipati ārammaṇavasena akusalassa. Vipāke ekaṃ abyākatena abyākataṃ lokuttaraṃ. Āhārādīsu satta heṭṭhā ekamūlake laddhāneva. Vippayutte cattārīti kusalena abyākataṃ, tathā akusalena, abyākatena abyākatañca kusalañca. Atthiavigatesu aṭṭha nissayasadisāneva.

446. In the Dominance-Based [Section], in conascence, there are seven: three rooted in the wholesome, three rooted in the unwholesome, and one rooted in the indeterminate, by way of conascence-dominance. However, object-dominance is not obtained together with conascence, nor is conascence obtained together with object-dominance. In mutuality, there are three, only by way of conascence-dominance. In dependence, there are eight: three rooted in the wholesome, three rooted in the unwholesome, and two rooted in the indeterminate. For an indeterminate dominant factor is a dependence for an indeterminate state by way of both conascence and object, but for an unwholesome state, only by way of object. For a wholesome state, however, it is not a dependence in either way—thus, there are only two rooted in the indeterminate; thus, eight. In strong dependence, there are seven, just as for the object condition. In prenascence, there is one: an indeterminate dominant factor for an unwholesome state by way of object. In result, there is one: an indeterminate state by an indeterminate root, a supramundane case. In nutriment and so forth, there are seven, just as those obtained below in the single-rooted section. In dissociation, there are four: a wholesome state for an indeterminate one; similarly, an unwholesome one; and an indeterminate state for both an indeterminate and a wholesome one. In presence and non-disappearance, there are eight, just as for dependence.

447-452. Ghaṭanāni panettha paṭipāṭiyā ārammaṇādīhi ayojetvā paṭhamaṃ atthiavigatehi yojitāni. Kiṃ kāraṇāti? Ubhayādhipatimissakattā. Tattha paṭhame ghaṭane ārammaṇādhipativasena vatthārammaṇaṃ labbhati[Pg.456], dutiye nissayavasena garuṃ katvā assādentassa vatthumeva, tatiye sahajātādhipativasena kusalādayo rūpānaṃ, ārammaṇādhipativasena vatthu akusalassa. Tato parāni tīṇi ghaṭanāni ārammaṇādhipativasena vuttāni. Tattha paṭhame sattāti heṭṭhā vuttāneva. Dutiye ekanti purejātāni vatthārammaṇāni akusalassa. Tatiye vatthumeva akusalassa. Tato parāni tīṇi ghaṭanāni vipākāvipākasādhāraṇāni sahajātādhipativasena vuttāni. Tattha paṭhame rūpārūpaṃ labbhati, dutiye arūpameva, tatiye rūpameva. Tato parāni tīṇi vipākādhipativasena vuttāni. Tesupi paṭhame rūpārūpaṃ labbhati, dutiye arūpaṃ, tatiye rūpameva. Tato parāni cha ghaṭanāni āhārindriyayuttāni cittādhipativasena vuttāni. Tattha tīṇi avipākāni, tīṇi savipākāni. Tesu gaṇanā pākaṭāyeva. Tato parāni cha ghaṭanāni tatheva viriyādhipativasena vuttāni. Nanu ca adhipatipaṭipāṭiyā paṭhamaṃ viriyādhipativasena vattabbāni siyuṃ, kasmā tathā na vuttānīti? Parato hetuvasena vuttaghaṭanehi sadisattā. Parato hi hetuvasena ghaṭanāni amohassa vīmaṃsādhipatittā vīmaṃsāya ca sammādiṭṭhibhāvato maggasampayuttāni. Viriyampi ca sammāvāyāmamicchāvāyāmabhāvena maggoti tena saddhiṃ ghaṭanāni parato hetuvasena vuttaghaṭanehi sadisānīti parivattetvā vuttāni. Tesupi gaṇanā pākaṭāyeva.

447-452. Here, the combinations are arranged in sequence, not associating them initially with object and so forth, but associating them initially with presence and non-disappearance. Why is this? Because they are mixed with both dominances. In the first combination, the physical base as object is obtained by way of object dominance; in the second, only the physical base for one who delights in it, by way of dependence, making it weighty; in the third, wholesome and other states are obtained as regards material forms by way of co-arisen dominance, while as regards the unwholesome, the physical base is obtained by way of object dominance. The next three combinations are stated by way of object dominance. Among them, in the first, 'seven' is as stated above. In the second, there is one: the pre-arisen physical bases as objects for the unwholesome. In the third, only the physical base for the unwholesome. The next three combinations are common to both resultants and non-resultants, and are stated by way of co-arisen dominance. Among them, in the first, material and immaterial are obtained; in the second, only the immaterial; in the third, only the material. The next three are stated by way of resultant dominance. Among these too, in the first, material and immaterial are obtained; in the second, only the immaterial; in the third, only the material. The next six combinations are connected with nutriment and faculties, and are stated by way of consciousness dominance. Among them, three are non-resultant, and three are resultant. Their enumeration is evident. The next six combinations are similarly stated by way of energy dominance. Now, should they not first be stated by way of energy dominance according to the sequence of dominance? Why are they not stated thus? Because they are similar to the combinations stated later by way of root condition. For later, by way of root condition, the combinations are associated with the path due to the dominance of investigation because of non-delusion, and because investigation is right view. And energy, being right effort and wrong effort, is the path. Therefore, the combinations are stated after reversing their order, as they are similar to the combinations stated later by way of root condition. Their enumeration is also evident.

453-456. Anantarasamanantaramūlakesu sattāti kusalo kusalassa abyākatassa ca, tathā akusalo, abyākato tiṇṇannampīti evaṃ satta. Kamme ekanti kusalā maggacetanā attano vipākābyākatassa. Ghaṭanāni panetesu tīṇi tīṇiyeva. Tāni bahutarapaṭipāṭiyā vuttāni.

453-456. In the root conditions of immediacy and proximity, there are seven: the wholesome for the wholesome and the indeterminate, similarly the unwholesome, and the indeterminate for all three—thus seven. In kamma, there is one: the wholesome path-volition for its own indeterminate result. However, in these, there are just three combinations each. These have been stated in a more extensive sequence.

457-460. Sahajātaaññamaññanissayamūlakesu ye ye dukamūlake paccayā vuttā te teyeva ādito ṭhitena sabhāgā. Tasmā dukamūlake gaṇanaṃ ñatvā ye upari paccayā ghaṭitā, tesu ūnataragaṇanassa vasena sabbaghaṭanesu gaṇanā veditabbā. Tattha sahajātamūlake dasa ghaṭanāni. Tesu pañca avipākāni, pañca savipākāni. Tattha avipākesu tāva paṭhame kusalo kusalassa abyākatassa[Pg.457], kusalābyākatassa, kusalābyākato abyākatassāti cattāri, tathā akusalo, abyākato abyākatassevāti evaṃ nava. Tattha kusalākusalādikesu aṭṭhasu vissajjanesu arūpañceva cittasamuṭṭhānarūpañca labbhati. Abyākate vatthurūpampi. Dutiye ghaṭane abyākatavissajjane rūpesu vatthumeva labbhati, tatiye tīsupi arūpameva, catutthe cittasamuṭṭhānarūpameva, pañcame paṭisandhiyaṃ vatthunā saddhiṃ arūpadhammā. Savipākesu paṭhame vipākā ceva vipākacittasamuṭṭhānarūpañca, dutiye vipākā ceva vatthurūpañca, tatiye vipākameva, catutthe vipākacittasamuṭṭhānameva, pañcame vatthurūpameva labbhati.

457-460. In the root conditions of co-arisen, mutual, and dependence, whatever conditions are stated in the dual-root, those very conditions are similar to those established from the beginning. Therefore, knowing the enumeration in the dual-root, the enumeration in all combinations should be understood by way of the lesser enumeration among the conditions connected above. Herein, in the co-arisen root condition, there are ten combinations. Among them, five are non-resultant and five are resultant. First, among the non-resultants, in the first combination: wholesome for wholesome, for indeterminate, and for wholesome-and-indeterminate; and wholesome-and-indeterminate for indeterminate—thus four. Similarly for the unwholesome; and indeterminate for indeterminate only—thus nine. Herein, in the eight instances of the wholesome, unwholesome, and so forth, both immaterial phenomena and mind-produced material phenomena are obtained. In the indeterminate, the physical base is also obtained. In the second combination, in the indeterminate instance, only the physical base is obtained among material phenomena. In the third, only immaterial phenomena in all three instances. In the fourth, only mind-produced material phenomena. In the fifth, at rebirth-linking, immaterial phenomena together with the physical base. Among the resultants: in the first, both resultant and resultant-mind-produced material phenomena are obtained. In the second, both resultant and the physical base. In the third, only the resultant. In the fourth, only resultant-mind-produced material phenomena. In the fifth, only the physical base is obtained.

Aññamaññamūlake cha ghaṭanāni. Tesu paṭhamāni tīṇi avipākāni, pacchimāni tīṇi savipākāni. Tesu gaṇanā pākaṭāyeva.

In the mutual root condition, there are six combinations. Of these, the first three are non-resultant, the last three are resultant. Their enumeration is evident.

461. Nissayamūlake nissayapaccayā ārammaṇe tīṇīti vatthuṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā pavattakusalādivasena veditabbāni. Upanissaye ekanti vatthuṃ ārammaṇūpanissayaṃ katvā uppannākusalaṃ. Sesaṃ dumūlake heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ.

461. In the root condition of dependence, the three dependence conditions in object should be understood by way of wholesome qualities and so forth that arise by making the physical base an object. In decisive support, there is one: the unwholesome that has arisen by making the physical base an object-decisive support. The rest, in the dual root condition, should be understood in the same way as stated above.

462-464. Imasmiṃ pana nissayapaccaye vīsati ghaṭanāni. Tesu purimāni cha ghaṭanāni purejātasahajātavasena vuttāni, tato cattāri purejātavaseneva, tato dasa sahajātavaseneva. Tattha paṭhame ghaṭane terasāti nissayapaccayavibhaṅge vuttāneva. Dutiye aṭṭhāti sahajātādhipativasena satta, vatthuṃ garuṃ katvā akusalañcāti aṭṭha. Tatiye satta indriyapaccaye laddhāneva. Catutthe pañca vippayutte laddhāni. Pañcame cattārīti kusalādīni cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ, vatthu ca akusalassa. Chaṭṭhe tīṇīti kusalādīni cittasamuṭṭhānassa. Purejātavasena catūsu paṭhame tīṇīti vatthu kusalādīnaṃ, cakkhādīni ca abyākatassa. Dutiye vatthumeva kusalādīnaṃ. Tatiye ekanti vatthu akusalassa. Catutthe cakkhādīni viññāṇapañcakassa. Sahajātavasena dasa savipākāvipākavasena dvidhā bhinditvā sahajātamūlake vuttanayeneva veditabbāni.

462-464. However, in this dependence condition, there are twenty combinations. Among them, the first six combinations are stated by way of pre-arisen and co-arisen, then four solely by way of pre-arisen, then ten solely by way of co-arisen. Among these, in the first combination, the thirteen are exactly as stated in the analysis of the dependence condition. In the second, there are eight: seven by way of co-arisen dominance, and the unwholesome by making the physical base weighty—thus eight. In the third, the seven are obtained in the faculty condition. In the fourth, the five are obtained in dissociation. In the fifth, there are four: the wholesome and so forth for mind-produced phenomena, and the physical base for the unwholesome. In the sixth, there are three: the wholesome and so forth for mind-produced phenomena. In the four by way of pre-arisen, in the first, there are three: the physical base for the wholesome and so forth, and the eye and so forth for the indeterminate. In the second, only the physical base for the wholesome and so forth. In the third, there is one: the physical base for the unwholesome. In the fourth, the eye and so forth for the fivefold consciousness. The ten co-arisen combinations should be understood by dividing them into two by way of resultant and non-resultant, following the method stated in the co-arisen root condition.

465. Upanissayamūlake ārammaṇe sattāti ārammaṇūpanissaye laddhāneva. Adhipatiyā sattāti tāneva. Anantarasamanantaresu anantarūpanissaye laddhāneva. Nissaye ekanti vatthu akusalassa. Purejāte ekanti [Pg.458] tasseva vatthuṃ vā ārammaṇaṃ vā. Āsevane tīṇi anantarūpanissayavasena. Kamme dve pakatūpanissayavasena. Lokuttarakusalacetanā pana anantarūpanissayopi hoti. Vippayutte ekaṃ ārammaṇūpanissayavasena, tathā atthiavigatesu. Natthivigatesu satta anantarasamāneva.

465. In the decisive support root-condition, in object condition there are seven, as they are obtained in object-decisive support. In dominance, there are seven, those very same. In immediacy and proximity, they are as obtained in immediacy-decisive support. In dependence, there is one: the physical base for the unwholesome. In pre-arisen, there is one: its own physical base or object. In repetition, there are three by way of immediacy-decisive support. In kamma, there are two by way of natural decisive support. Supramundane wholesome volition, however, is also an immediacy-decisive support. In dissociation, there is one by way of object-decisive support, and similarly in presence and non-disappearance. In absence and disappearance, there are seven, the very same as in immediacy.

466. Upanissayamūlakāni pana satta ghaṭanāni honti. Tattha purimāni tīṇi ārammaṇūpanissayavasena vuttāni. Tattha paṭhame sattāti kusalo kusalādīnaṃ, tathā abyākato, akusalo akusalassevāti evaṃ satta. Dutiye ekanti cakkhādiabyākataṃ akusalassa. Tatiye vatthu akusalassa. Tato parāni dve anantarūpanissayavasena vuttāni. Tesu gaṇanā pākaṭāyeva. Tato dve anantarapakatūpanissayavasena vuttāni. Tattha paṭhame lokiyakusalākusalacetanāpaccayabhāvato gahetabbā, dutiye lokuttarakusalāva.

466. There are, however, seven combinations in the decisive support root-condition. Among them, the first three are stated by way of object-decisive support. Therein, in the first, there are seven: the wholesome for the wholesome and so forth, similarly the indeterminate, and the unwholesome only for the unwholesome—thus seven. In the second, there is one: the indeterminate eye, etc., for the unwholesome. In the third, the physical base for the unwholesome. Thereafter, two are stated by way of immediacy-decisive support. Their enumeration is quite evident. Then two are stated by way of immediacy- and natural-decisive support. Therein, in the first, mundane wholesome and unwholesome volitions are to be taken as the condition; in the second, only the supramundane wholesome.

467-468. Purejātamūlake ārammaṇe tīṇīti abyākato kusalādīnaṃ. Adhipatiyā ekanti abyākato akusalassa. Sesesupi eseva nayo. Ettha pana satta ghaṭanāni. Tesu paṭhamaṃ vatthārammaṇavasena vuttaṃ, dutiyaṃ vatthuvaseneva, tatiyaṃ ārammaṇavasena, catutthaṃ vatthussa ārammaṇakālavasena, pañcamaṃ ārammaṇādhipativasena, chaṭṭhaṃ vatthuno ārammaṇādhipatikālavasena, sattamaṃ cakkhādivasena.

In the pre-arisen root-condition, in object condition there are three: the indeterminate for the wholesome, etc. In dominance, there is one: the indeterminate for the unwholesome. In the remaining conditions, this is the method. Here, however, there are seven combinations. Of these, the first is stated by way of physical base as object; the second, solely by way of physical base; the third, by way of object; the fourth, by way of the time of the physical base as object; the fifth, by way of object-dominance; the sixth, by way of the time of the physical base's object-dominance; and the seventh, by way of the eye, etc.

469-472. Pacchājātamūlake vīsati paccayā na yujjanti, tayova yojanaṃ labhanti. Ekamevettha ghaṭanaṃ, taṃ kāyassa kusalādīnaṃ vasena veditabbaṃ. Āsevanamūlakepi ekameva ghaṭanaṃ.

In the post-arisen root-condition, twenty conditions are not applicable; only three find application. Here, there is only one combination; it should be understood by way of the wholesome, etc., for the body. In the repetition root-condition also, there is only one combination.

473-477. Kammamūlake anantare ekanti maggacetanāvasena vuttaṃ. Aññamaññe tīṇīti ettha paṭisandhiyaṃ vatthupi gahetabbaṃ. Upanissaye dveti anantarapakatūpanissayavasena heṭṭhā vuttāneva. Evaṃ sesānipi heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbāni. Ettha pana ekādasa ghaṭanāni. Tattha paṭhamāni dve pakatūpanissayānantarūpanissayavibhāgato nānākkhaṇikakammavasena vuttāni. Tato parāni cattāri vipākāvipākato ekakkhaṇikakammavasena vuttāni. Tattha paṭhame arūpena saddhiṃ cittasamuṭṭhānarūpaṃ labbhati, dutiye [Pg.459] arūpena saddhiṃ vatthu, tatiye arūpameva, catutthe cittasamuṭṭhānarūpameva. Paṭisandhiyaṃ pana kaṭattārūpampi labbhati. Tato parāni pañca savipākāni, tāni heṭṭhā vuttanayāneva. Vipākamūlake pañca ghaṭānāni uttānatthāneva.

In the kamma root-condition, in immediacy condition there is one, stated by way of path-volition. In mutuality condition, there are three; here, the physical base should also be taken at rebirth-linking. In decisive support, there are two, by way of immediacy- and natural-decisive support, just as stated above. Similarly, the remaining conditions should also be understood by the method stated above. Here, however, there are eleven combinations. Among them, the first two are stated by way of kamma of different moments, according to the distinction between natural-decisive support and immediacy-decisive support. Thereafter, four are stated by way of kamma of a single moment, as resultant and non-resultant. Among them, in the first, mind-originated matter is obtained together with the immaterial; in the second, the physical base together with the immaterial; in the third, only the immaterial; in the fourth, only mind-originated matter. At rebirth-linking, however, kamma-produced matter is also obtained. Thereafter, there are five with resultant; these are just as stated above. In the resultant root-condition, the five combinations are of obvious meaning.

478-483. Āhāramūlake sattātiādīni vuttanayāneva. Ghaṭanāni panettha catuttiṃsa. Tesu paṭhamāni pañca vipākāvipākasāmaññato vuttāni. Tattha paṭhame cattāropi āhārā labbhanti; dutiye tayo arūpāhārāva. Tatiye vatthupi paccayuppannaṃ hoti, catutthe taṃ parihāyati. Pañcame rūpameva paccayuppannaṃ. Tato parāni pañca savipākaghaṭanāni, tāni heṭṭhā vuttanayāneva. Tato parāni nava ghaṭanāni cetanāhāravasena vuttāni. Tato parāni nava nirādhipativiññāṇāhāravasena. Tato parāni sādhipativiññāṇāhāravasena cha ghaṭanāni vuttāni. Tattha tīṇi vipākāvipākasāmaññavasena vuttāni. Tīṇi vipākavaseneva. Tattha lokiyānaṃ vipākānaṃ abhāvato vatthu parihāyati.

In the nutriment root-condition, the seven, etc., are by the method already stated. Here there are thirty-four combinations. Among them, the first five are stated in terms of what is common to resultant and non-resultant. Therein, in the first, all four nutriments are obtained; in the second, only the three immaterial nutriments. In the third, the physical base is also conditionally arisen; in the fourth, that diminishes. In the fifth, only matter is conditionally arisen. Thereafter, there are five combinations with resultant; these are by the method stated above. Thereafter, nine combinations are stated by way of volition-as-nutriment. Thereafter, nine by way of consciousness-as-nutriment without dominance. Thereafter, six combinations are stated by way of consciousness-as-nutriment with dominance. Among these, three are stated by way of what is common to resultant and non-resultant. Three are stated solely by way of resultant. Here, due to the absence of mundane resultants, the physical base diminishes.

484-495. Indriyamūlake purejāte ekanti cakkhundriyādīnaṃ vasena abyākatena abyākataṃ. Sesaṃ dumūlakaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Ghaṭanāni panettha cha sattati. Tattha paṭhame sabbānipi indriyāni paccayaṭṭhena labbhanti. Dutiye rūpajīvitindriyaṃ hāyati. Na hi taṃ nissayo hoti. Tatiye arūpindriyāni rūpānaṃ. Catutthe cakkhādīni cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ. Tato parāni nava ghaṭanāni sahajātaarūpindriyavasena vuttāni, tato nava maggabhūtānaṃ indriyānaṃ vasena, tato nava jhānaṅgabhūtānaṃ, tato nava jhānamaggabhūtānaṃ, tato nava manindriyavaseneva, tato sādhipatīni cha, tato vīriyavasena maggasampayuttāni cha, tato amohahetuvasena nirādhipatīni nava, sādhipatīni cha. Tesu sabbesu vipākapaccayena ayuttāni ca yuttāni ca heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbāni.

In the faculty root-condition, in pre-arisen there is one: the indeterminate by the indeterminate, by way of the eye faculty, etc. The rest, being two-rooted, should be understood by the method stated above. Here there are seventy-six combinations. In the first, all the faculties are obtained in the sense of a condition. In the second, the material life faculty is omitted, for it is not a support. In the third, the immaterial faculties are for material phenomena. In the fourth, the eye, etc., are for eye-consciousness, etc. Thereafter, nine combinations are stated by way of co-arisen immaterial faculties; then nine by way of faculties that are path factors; then nine by way of those that are jhāna factors; then nine by way of those that are jhāna and path factors; then nine solely by way of the mind faculty; then six with dominance; then six associated with the path by way of energy; then nine without dominance by way of the non-delusion root, and six with dominance. In all these, those not connected and those connected by way of resultant condition should be understood by the method stated above.

496-500. Jhānamūlakepi dumūlakaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Ghaṭanāni panettha chattiṃsa. Tesu paṭhamāni nava indriyamaggabhāvaṃ anāmasitvā sādhāraṇajhānaṅgavaseneva [Pg.460] vuttāni. Tato parāni nava indriyabhūtajhānaṅgavasena, tato nava maggabhūtajhānaṅgavasena, tato nava indriyamaggabhūtajhānaṅgavasena. Catūsupi cetesu navakesu ādito cattāri cattāri vipākāvipākasādhāraṇāni. Avasāne pañca pañca vipākāneva, tāni heṭṭhā vuttanayāneva.

496-500. Even in the jhāna-root, the two-rooted should be understood by the method stated previously. Here, there are thirty-six conjunctions. Among them, the first nine are stated solely by way of common jhāna-factors, without touching upon the state of being a faculty or a path. Thereafter, nine are stated by way of jhāna-factors that have become faculties; then nine by way of jhāna-factors that have become path-factors; then nine by way of jhāna-factors that have become both faculties and path-factors. In each of these four sets of nine, the first four are common to resultant and non-resultant. At the end, five each are resultants only; these are just as stated previously.

501-508. Maggamūlakepi dumūlakaṃ vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ. Ghaṭanāni panettha sattapaññāsa. Tesu paṭhamāni nava indriyajhānabhāvaṃ anāmasitvā suddhikamaggavaseneva vuttāni. Tato nava indriyabhūtamaggavasena, tato nava jhānabhūtamaggavasena, tato nava indriyajhānabhūtamaggavasena, tato cha adhipatibhūtamaggavasena, tato nava nirādhipatimaggahetuvasena, tato cha sādhipatimaggahetuvasena, tattha navakesu pañca pañca chakkesu tīṇi tīṇi vipākāni. Sesāni sādhāraṇāni, tāni heṭṭhā vuttanayāneva.

501-508. Even in the path-root, the two-rooted should be understood by the method previously stated. Here, there are fifty-seven conjunctions. Among these, the first nine are stated solely by way of the simple path, without touching upon the state of being a faculty or jhāna. Then nine by way of the path that has become faculties; then nine by way of the path that has become jhāna; then nine by way of the path that has become both faculties and jhāna; then six by way of the path that has become a dominance; then nine by way of path-causes without dominance; then six by way of path-causes with dominance. Therein, in the sets of nine, five each are resultants; in the sets of six, three each are resultants. The rest are common; these are just as stated previously.

509-510. Sampayuttamūlake dumūlakaṃ uttānatthameva. Ettha pana dveyeva ghaṭanāni. Tattha ekaṃ sādhāraṇavasena, ekaṃ vipākavasena vuttaṃ.

509-510. In the associated-root, the two-rooted is of obvious meaning. Here, however, there are only two conjunctions. Of these, one is stated by way of what is common, and one by way of resultant.

511-514. Vippayuttamūlakepi dumūlakaṃ uttānatthameva. Ghaṭanāni panettha terasa. Tattha paṭhame pañcāti kusalo abyākatassa, tathā akusalo, abyākato tiṇṇannampi. Ettha ca ime vippayuttādayo sahajātāpi honti, pacchājātapurejātāpi. Dutiye purejātasahajātāva tatiye teyeva adhipativasena. Tattha kusalo abyākatassa tathā akusalo, abyākato pana abyākatassa ca ārammaṇādhipativasena akusalassa cāti evaṃ cattāri. Catutthe tīṇīti kusalādīni abyākatassa. Indriyāni panettha rūpānipi arūpānipi. Pañcame paccayā arūpāva chaṭṭhe vatthuvasena rūpāva sattame kusalābyākatānaṃ vipassanāvasena, akusalassa assādanavasena vatthumeva. Aṭṭhame tadevākusalassa, navame cakkhādīni abyākatassa, dasame kusalādayo cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ, ekādasame paṭisandhiyaṃ vatthu khandhānaṃ, dvādasame paṭisandhiyaṃ khandhā kaṭattārūpānaṃ, terasame paṭisandhiyaṃ khandhā vatthussa.

511-514. Even in the dissociated-root, the two-rooted is of obvious meaning. Here, there are thirteen conjunctions. Among these, in the first, there are five: the wholesome for the indeterminate, likewise the unwholesome, and the indeterminate for all three. Here, these dissociated and other conditions are also co-nascent, and post-nascent and pre-nascent. In the second, they are only pre-nascent and co-nascent. In the third, those same ones by way of dominance. Here, the wholesome for the indeterminate, likewise the unwholesome; but the indeterminate is for the indeterminate and also for the unwholesome by way of object-dominance—thus there are four. In the fourth, there are three: the wholesome, etc., for the indeterminate. Here, the faculties are both material and immaterial. In the fifth, the conditions are only immaterial. In the sixth, by way of base, only material. In the seventh, for the wholesome and indeterminate by way of insight, and for the unwholesome by way of gratification, it is the base only. In the eighth, the same for the unwholesome. In the ninth, the eye, etc., for the indeterminate. In the tenth, the wholesome, etc., for mind-originated matter. In the eleventh, at rebirth-linking, the base for the aggregates. In the twelfth, at rebirth-linking, the aggregates for kamma-produced matter. In the thirteenth, at rebirth-linking, the aggregates for the base.

515-518. Atthipaccayamūlake [Pg.461] upanissaye ekanti ārammaṇūpanissayavasena abyākataṃ akusalassa. Sesaṃ dumūlake uttānameva. Ghaṭanāni panettha ekūnatiṃsa. Tesu paṭhame arūpavatthārammaṇamahābhūtaindriyāhārānaṃ vasena sahajātapurejātapacchājātapaccayā labbhanti. Dutiye pacchājātakabaḷīkārāhārā na labbhanti. Paṭhamadutiyaghaṭanāneva adhipatinā saddhiṃ upari tatiyacatutthāni katāni. Puna paṭhamameva catūhi āhārehi saddhiṃ pañcamaṃ, rūpindriyehi saddhiṃ chaṭṭhaṃ, rūpārūpindriyehi saddhiṃ sattamaṃ kataṃ. Dutiyameva vā pana indriyehi saddhiṃ sattamaṃ kataṃ. Paṭhamadutiyāneva vippayuttapaccayena saddhiṃ aṭṭhamanavamāni. Tesu navamaṃ adhipatinā saddhiṃ dasamaṃ kataṃ. Tato ekādasame paccayavasena vatthu hāyati. Dvādasame arūpadhammāyeva paccayā, terasame vatthārammaṇā, cuddasame vatthumeva, pannarasame ārammaṇameva, soḷasame vatthumeva ārammaṇaṃ, sattarasame pana tadeva ārammaṇādhipatibhāvena, aṭṭhārasamepi tadeva ārammaṇūpanissayavasena, ekūnavīsatime cakkhādayova paccayā. Imāni ekūnavīsati pakiṇṇakaghaṭanāni nāma sahajātaṃ aggahetvā vuttāni. Tato parāni dasa sahajātavasena vuttāni.

515-518. In the presence-condition-root, in decisive support, there is one: the indeterminate for the unwholesome by way of object-decisive support. The rest in the two-rooted is of obvious meaning. Here, there are twenty-nine conjunctions. Among them, in the first, co-nascent, pre-nascent, and post-nascent conditions are obtained by way of immaterial phenomena, base, object, great elements, faculties, and nutriment. In the second, post-nascent physical nutriment is not obtained. The first and second conjunctions, together with dominance, are made into the third and fourth above. Again, the first alone, together with the four nutriments, is made into the fifth; together with the material faculties, the sixth; together with the material and immaterial faculties, the seventh. Or, the second alone, together with the faculties, is made into the seventh. The first and second, together with the dissociated condition, are made into the eighth and ninth. Among them, the ninth, together with dominance, is made into the tenth. Then, in the eleventh, the base is omitted by way of condition. In the twelfth, only immaterial phenomena are conditions. In the thirteenth, base and object. In the fourteenth, only the base. In the fifteenth, only the object. In the sixteenth, the base itself is the object. In the seventeenth, that same thing by way of being object-dominance. In the eighteenth, that same thing also by way of object-decisive support. In the nineteenth, only the eye, etc., are conditions. These nineteen are called miscellaneous conjunctions, stated without taking co-nascence. Thereafter, ten are stated by way of co-nascence.

519. Natthivigatamūlakesu anantarasamanantaramūlakesu viya upanissayāsevanakammavasena tīṇiyeva ghaṭanāni, avigatamūlakaṃ atthimūlakasadisamevāti.

519. In the absence-root and disappearance-root, just as in the contiguity-root and immediate-contiguity-root, there are only three conjunctions by way of decisive support, repetition, and kamma. The non-disappearance-root is just like the presence-root.

Yāni panetāni imasmiṃ pañhāvāre ghaṭanāni vuttāni, tāni sabbānipi duvidhāniyeva – pakiṇṇakato sahajātato ca. Tattha sabbesampi ārammaṇamūlakādīnaṃ ādito sahajātaṃ aggahetvā vuttāni pakiṇṇakāni nāma. Tāni ārammaṇamūlake pañcapi, adhipatimūlake cha, anantaramūlake tīṇipi, tathā samanantaramūlake, nissayamūlake dasa, upanissayamūlake satta, purejātamūlake satta, pacchājātamūlake ekameva, tathā āsevanamūlake, kammamūlake dve, āhāramūlake ekaṃ, indriyamūlake cattāri, vippayuttamūlake nava, atthimūlake ekūnavīsati, natthimūlake tīṇipi, tathāvigatamūlake. Avigatamūlake ekūnavīsatīti sabbānipi satañceva tīṇi ca honti. Sahajātanissayabhāvena panetāni pakiṇṇakānīti vuttāni.

Now, as for the conjunctions mentioned in this section of questions, they are all of two kinds—miscellaneous and co-nascent. Herein, of all the roots beginning with the object-root, those stated without initially taking co-nascence are called 'miscellaneous'. These are: five in the object-root, six in the dominance-root, three in the contiguity-root, and likewise in the immediate-contiguity-root, ten in the dependence-root, seven in the decisive-support-root, seven in the prenascent-root, one in the postnascent-root, and likewise in the repetition-root, two in the kamma-root, one in the nutriment-root, four in the faculty-root, nine in the dissociated-root, nineteen in the presence-root, three in the absence-root, and likewise in the disappearance-root. In the non-disappearance-root, there are nineteen—thus, all together they amount to one hundred and three. However, these are called 'miscellaneous' in relation to co-nascent dependence.

Yāni [Pg.462] pana sahajātaṃ labbhanti, tāni sahajātaghaṭanāni nāmāti vuccanti. Tāni ārammaṇamūlake anantarasamanantarapurejātapacchājātaāsevananatthivigatamūlakesu na labbhanti. Na hi te paccayā sahajātānaṃ paccayā honti. Yathā ca sahajātānaṃ na honti, tathā hetusahajātaaññamaññavipākajhānamaggasampayuttapaccayā. Asahajātānanti hetumūlake sabbāni catuvīsatipi ghaṭanāni sahajātaghaṭanāneva. Tathā adhipatimūlake catuvīsati, sahajātamūlake dasapi, aññamaññamūlake chapi, nissayamūlake dasa, kammamūlake nava, vipākamūlake pañcapi, āhāramūlake tettiṃsa, indriyamūlake dvāsattati jhānamūlake chattiṃsāpi, maggamūlake sattapaññāsampi, sampayuttamūlake dvepi, vippayuttamūlake cattāri, atthimūlake dasa, avigatamūlake dasāti sabbānipi tīṇi satāni dvādasa ca honti. Iti purimāni sataṃ tīṇi ca imāni ca dvādasuttarāni tīṇi satānīti sabbānipi pañcadasādhikāni cattāri ghaṭanasatāni pañhāvāre āgatāni. Tesu ye ye paccayadhammā nāmavasena na pākaṭā hutvā paññāyanti, tepi hetumūlakādīnaṃ nayānaṃ ādito vipākāvipākasāmaññato vuttesu ghaṭanesu dassetabbā. Dvādaseva hi hetū cha ārammaṇā cattāro adhipatayo cattāro āhārā vīsati indriyāni satta jhānaṅgāni dvādasa maggaṅgānīti ete paccayadhammā nāma. Tesu ye ye dhammā ekantena kusalā, ekanteneva akusalā, ekantena kusalavipākā, ekantenevākusalavipākā, ekanteneva vipākā, ekanteneva avipākā te te sādhukaṃ sallakkhetvā ye tattha vipākā, te vipākaghaṭanesu, ye avipākā, te avipākaghaṭanesu yathāyogaṃ yojetabbāti.

Those connections which are obtained as co-nascent are called co-nascent connections. These are not obtained in the object-root, contiguity-root, immediate-contiguity-root, prenascent-root, postnascent-root, repetition-root, absence-root, or disappearance-root. For those conditions are not conditions for co-nascent states. And just as those are not conditions for co-nascent states, so too the root, co-nascent, mutuality, resultant, jhāna, path, and association conditions are not for non-co-nascent states. In the root-root, all twenty-four connections are co-nascent connections. Similarly, in the predominance-root, twenty-four; in the co-nascent-root, ten; in the mutuality-root, six; in the support-root, ten; in the kamma-root, nine; in the resultant-root, five; in the nutriment-root, thirty-three; in the faculty-root, seventy-two; in the jhāna-root, thirty-six; in the path-root, fifty-seven; in the association-root, two; in the dissociation-root, four; in the presence-root, ten; and in the non-disappearance-root, ten—all these amount to three hundred and twelve. Thus, the previous one hundred and three, and these three hundred and twelve, amount to all four hundred and fifteen connections, which have been presented in the question section. Among them, those conditioning states which are not clearly designated by name but are discernible should also be shown in the connections mentioned from the root-root onwards, according to the general distinction between resultant and non-resultant, as previously stated. For there are indeed twelve roots, six objects, four predominances, four nutriments, twenty faculties, seven jhāna factors, and twelve path factors—these are named conditioning states. Among them, those states which are entirely wholesome, entirely unwholesome, entirely wholesome-resultant, entirely unwholesome-resultant, entirely resultant, or entirely non-resultant should be carefully discerned. Those which are resultant there should be assigned to resultant connections, and those which are non-resultant to non-resultant connections, as is appropriate.

Pañhāvārassa ghaṭane anulomagaṇanā.

Direct Enumeration of the Connections in the Section of Questions.

Paccanīyuddhāravaṇṇanā

Exposition of the Negative Summary.

527. Idāni paccanīyaṃ hoti. Tattha yathā paṭicca vārādīsu ‘‘akusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca akusalo dhammo uppajjati nahetupaccayā’’tiādinā nayena labbhamānā [Pg.463] pañhā labbhamānānaṃ paccayānaṃ vasena sarūpatova vitthāritā. Evaṃ avitthāretvā ekena lakkhaṇena saṅkhepato paccanīyaṃ dassetuṃ dhammasaṅgāhakehi kusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayotiādinā nayena anulomato kusalādīnaṃ paccayā uddhaṭā. Te ca kho paccayā samūhavasena, no ekekapaccayavaseneva; tasmā ye yattha samūhato dassitā, te vibhajitvā veditabbā. Sabbepi hi ime catuvīsati paccayā aṭṭhasu paccayesu saṅgahaṃ gacchanti. Kataresu aṭṭhasu? Ārammaṇe, sahajāte, upanissaye, purejāte, pacchājāte, kamme, āhāre, indriyeti. Kathaṃ? Ṭhapetvā hi ime aṭṭha paccaye sesesu soḷasasu hetupaccayo aññamaññavipākajhānamaggasampayuttapaccayoti ime cha paccayā ekantena sahajātā hutvā sahajātānaññeva paccayabhāvato sahajātapaccaye saṅgahaṃ gacchanti. Anantarapaccayo samanantaraāsevananatthivigatapaccayoti ime pana pañca uppajjitvā niruddhā attano anantaraṃ uppajjamānānaññeva paccayabhāvato anantarūpanissayalakkhaṇena upanissaye saṅgahaṃ gacchanti. Nissayapaccayo sahajātapurejātabhedato duvidho. Tattha sahajātanissayo sahajātānaññeva nissayapaccayabhāvato sahajātapaccaye saṅgahaṃ gacchati, purejātanissayo purejātapaccaye saṅgahaṃ gacchati.

527. Now comes the negative mode. Here, just as in the conditional mode regarding the sections beginning with "an unwholesome state arises dependent on an unwholesome state, not by way of root condition," and so on, the questions that arise are explained in detail according to their own nature based on the conditions that are obtained. Without elaborating in this way, the compilers of the Dhamma have briefly presented the negative mode with a single characteristic, such as "a wholesome state is a condition for a wholesome state by way of object condition," and so on, extracting the conditions for the wholesome, etc., in the affirmative mode. However, these conditions are presented as a group, not individually for each condition. Therefore, those that are shown as a group should be understood by analyzing them. Indeed, all these twenty-four conditions are included in eight conditions. Which eight? Object condition, co-nascent condition, decisive-support condition, prenascent condition, postnascent condition, kamma condition, nutriment condition, and faculty condition. How so? Excluding these eight conditions, among the remaining sixteen, the root condition, mutual condition, resultant condition, jhāna condition, path condition, and associated condition—these six conditions are invariably co-nascent and, because they function as conditions only for co-nascent states, are included under the co-nascent condition. The contiguity condition, immediate-contiguity condition, repetition condition, absence condition, and disappearance condition—these five, having arisen and ceased, function as conditions only for states that arise immediately after them. Due to their nature as contiguity decisive support, they are included under the decisive-support condition. The support condition is twofold: co-nascent and prenascent. Among these, the co-nascent support, because it functions as a support condition only for co-nascent states, is included under the co-nascent condition. The prenascent support is included under the prenascent condition.

Adhipatipaccayopi sahajātādhipatiārammaṇādhipativasena duvidho. Tattha sahajātādhipati sahajātānaṃyeva adhipatipaccayabhāvato sahajātapaccaye saṅgahaṃ gacchati. Ārammaṇādhipati ārammaṇūpanissayo hotiyevāti ārammaṇūpanissayalakkhaṇena upanissayapaccaye saṅgahaṃ gacchati. Vippayuttapaccayo sahajātapurejātapacchājātabhedato tividho. Tattha sahajātavippayutto sahajātānaññeva vippayuttapaccayabhāvato sahajātapaccaye saṅgahaṃ gacchati. Purejātavippayutto pure uppajjitvā pacchā uppajjamānānaṃ paccayabhāvato purejāte saṅgahito. Pacchājātavippayutto pacchā uppajjitvā pure uppannānaṃ upatthambhanavasena paccayabhāvato pacchājātapaccaye saṅgahaṃ gacchati. Atthipaccayaavigatapaccayā sahajātapurejātapacchājātaāhārindriyānañceva atthiavigatesu ca ekekassa vasena chahi bhedehi ṭhitā. Tattha sahajātaatthiavigatā sahajātānaññeva atthiavigatapaccayabhāvato. Sahajātapaccaye [Pg.464] saṅgahaṃ gacchanti. Purejātā pure uppajjitvā pacchā uppajjamānānaṃ paccayabhāvato purejātapaccaye saṅgahaṃ gacchanti. Pacchājātā pacchā uppajjitvā pure uppannānaṃ upatthambhanavasena paccayabhāvato pacchājātapaccaye saṅgahaṃ gacchanti. Āhārabhūtā kabaḷīkārāhārapaccaye saṅgahaṃ gacchanti. Indriyabhūtā rūpajīvitindriyapaccaye saṅgahaṃ gacchantīti evaṃ ime soḷasa paccayā imesu aṭṭhasu paccayesu saṅgahaṃ gacchantīti veditabbā.

The dominance condition is twofold: as co-nascent dominance and object dominance. Herein, co-nascent dominance is included in the co-nascent condition because it is a dominance condition only for co-nascent states. Object dominance is indeed object-decisive-support; thus, it is included in the decisive-support condition by way of the characteristic of object-decisive-support. The dissociation condition is threefold: as co-nascent, prenascent, and postnascent dissociation. Herein, co-nascent dissociation is included in the co-nascent condition because it is a dissociation condition only for co-nascent states. Prenascent dissociation, having arisen previously, is included in the prenascent condition because it is a condition for states arising subsequently. Postnascent dissociation, having arisen subsequently, is included in the postnascent condition because it is a condition by way of supporting previously arisen states. The presence condition and the non-disappearance condition are established in six ways: by way of the co-nascent, prenascent, postnascent, nutriment, and faculty, and by way of each of the presence and non-disappearance conditions. Herein, co-nascent presence and non-disappearance are included in the co-nascent condition because they are presence and non-disappearance conditions only for co-nascent states. The prenascent, having arisen previously, are included in the prenascent condition because they are a condition for states arising subsequently. The postnascent, having arisen subsequently, are included in the postnascent condition because they are a condition by way of supporting previously arisen states. Those that are nutriment are included in the edible food condition. Those that are faculties are included in the material life-faculty condition. Thus, it should be understood that these sixteen conditions are included in these eight conditions.

Imesampi pana aṭṭhannaṃ paccayānaṃ aññamaññaṃ saṅgaho atthiyeva. Ādito niddiṭṭho hi ārammaṇapaccayo adhipatianadhipatibhedena duvidho. Tattha adhipatibhūto ārammaṇūpanissayalakkhaṇena upanissaye saṅgahaṃ gacchati. Anadhipatibhūto suddho ārammaṇapaccayova. Kammapaccayopi sahajātanānākkhaṇikavasena duvidho. Tattha sahajātakammaṃ attanā sahajātānaññeva kammapaccayabhāvato sahajāteyeva saṅgahaṃ gacchati. Nānākkhaṇikakammaṃ balavadubbalavasena duvidhaṃ. Tattha balavakammaṃ vipākadhammānaṃ upanissayova hutvā paccayo hotīti upanissaye saṅgahaṃ gacchati. Balavampi pana rūpānaṃ dubbalañca arūpānaṃ nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayeneva paccayo. Āhārapaccayopi rūpārūpato duvidho. Tattha arūpāhāro attanā sahajātānaññeva paccayo hotīti sahajātapaccaye saṅgahaṃ gacchati. Rūpāhāro sahajātapurejātapacchājātānaṃ paccayo na hoti. Attano pana uppādakkhaṇaṃ atikkamitvā ṭhitippatto āhārapaccayataṃ sādhetīti āhārapaccayova hoti. Indriyapaccayopi rūpārūpato duvidho. Tattha arūpindriyapaccayo attanā sahajātānaññeva indriyapaccayataṃ sādhetīti sahajāteyeva saṅgahaṃ gacchati. Rūpindriyapaccayo pana ajjhattabahiddhābhedato duvidho. Tattha ajjhattaṃ indriyapaccayo pure uppajjitvā pacchā uppajjamānānaṃ sasampayuttadhammānaṃ cakkhuviññāṇādīnaṃ indriyapaccayo hotīti purejāteyeva saṅgahaṃ gacchati. Bāhiro indriyapaccayo nāma rūpajīvitindriyaṃ, taṃ sahajātānaṃ paccayo hontampi anupālanamattavaseneva hoti, na janakavasenāti indriyapaccayova hoti. Evaṃ ime aṭṭha paccayā aññamaññampi saṅgahaṃ gacchantīti veditabbā. Ayaṃ tāva aṭṭhasu paccayesu avasesānaṃ soḷasannañceva tesaṃyeva ca aṭṭhannaṃ aññamaññavasena saṅgahanayo.

Moreover, there is indeed a mutual inclusion among these eight conditions. Indeed, the object condition, first stated, is twofold by way of dominant and non-dominant. Therein, the object condition that has become dominant is included in the decisive-support condition by the characteristic of object-decisive-support. The non-dominant one is purely the object condition. The kamma condition is also twofold by way of conascent and different-moment. Therein, conascent kamma, being a kamma condition only for those that are conascent with itself, is included in the conascent condition itself. Different-moment kamma is twofold by way of strong and weak. Therein, strong kamma, being a condition for resultant phenomena only as a decisive support, is included in the decisive-support condition. However, strong kamma for material phenomena and weak kamma for immaterial phenomena are conditions purely by way of the different-moment kamma condition. The nutriment condition is also twofold by way of material and immaterial. Therein, immaterial nutriment, being a condition only for those that are conascent with itself, is included in the conascent condition. Material nutriment is not a condition for conascent, prenascent, or postnascent phenomena. But having passed its own moment of arising and attained the moment of presence, it accomplishes the nutriment condition, and thus is purely the nutriment condition. The faculty condition is also twofold by way of material and immaterial. Therein, the immaterial faculty condition, by accomplishing the faculty condition only for those that are conascent with itself, is included in the conascent condition itself. However, the material faculty condition is twofold by way of internal and external. Therein, the internal faculty condition, having arisen earlier, is a faculty condition for subsequently arising associated phenomena such as eye-consciousness, and so on, and is thus included in the prenascent condition itself. The external faculty condition is the material life faculty; though it is a condition for conascent phenomena, it is so only by way of mere maintenance, not by way of generation, and thus it is purely the faculty condition. Thus, it should be understood that these eight conditions also undergo mutual inclusion. This, then, is the method of inclusion for the remaining sixteen conditions among the eight conditions, and also the mutual inclusion of these eight themselves.

Idāni [Pg.465] imesaṃ aṭṭhannaṃ paccayānaṃ ekekasmiṃ catuvīsatiyāpi paccayesu ye ye saṅgahaṃ gacchanti, te te veditabbā. Tattha aṭṭhannaṃ tāva sabbapaṭhame ārammaṇapaccaye ārammaṇapaccayova saṅgahaṃ gacchati, na sesā tevīsati. Dutiye sahajātapaccaye hetupaccayo sahajātādhipatipaccayo sahajātapaccayo aññamaññapaccayo sahajātanissayapaccayo sahajātakammapaccayo vipākapaccayo sahajātaāhārapaccayo sahajātaindriyapaccayo jhānapaccayo maggapaccayo sampayuttapaccayo sahajātavippayuttapaccayo sahajātatthipaccayo sahajātāvigatapaccayoti ime pannarasa paccayā saṅgahaṃ gacchanti. Tatiye upanissayapaccaye adhipatibhūto ārammaṇapaccayo ārammaṇabhūto adhipatipaccayo anantarasamanantaraupanissayaāsevanapaccayā nānākkhaṇiko balavakammapaccayo natthipaccayo vigatapaccayoti ime nava paccayā saṅgahaṃ gacchanti. Catutthe purejātapaccaye purejātanissayapaccayo purejātapaccayo purejātindriyapaccayo purejātavippayuttapaccayo purejātatthipaccayo purejātāvigatapaccayoti ime cha paccayā saṅgahaṃ gacchanti. Pañcame pacchājātapaccaye pacchājātapaccayo pacchājātavippayuttapaccayo pacchājātatthipaccayo pacchājātāvigatapaccayoti ime cattāro paccayā saṅgahaṃ gacchanti. Chaṭṭhe kammapaccaye nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayova saṅgahito. Sattame āhārapaccaye kabaḷīkārāhāravaseneva āhārapaccayo āhāratthipaccayo āhārāvigatapaccayoti ime tayo paccayā saṅgahitā. Aṭṭhame indriyapaccaye rūpajīvitindriyapaccayo indriyatthipaccayo indriyāvigatapaccayoti ime tayo paccayā saṅgahaṃ gacchanti. Evaṃ imesaṃ aṭṭhannaṃ paccayānaṃ ekekasmiṃ ime cime ca paccayā saṅgahaṃ gatāti ñatvā ye yattha saṅgahaṃ gatā, te tassa gaṇanena gahitāva hontīti veditabbā.

Now, it should be understood which conditions are included in each of these eight conditions among the twenty-four conditions. Therein, first of all, in the object condition among the eight, only the object condition itself is included, not the remaining twenty-three. Second, in the conascence condition, these fifteen conditions are included: the root condition, the conascent dominance condition, the conascence condition, the mutuality condition, the conascent dependence condition, the conascent kamma condition, the resultant condition, the conascent nutriment condition, the conascent faculty condition, the jhāna condition, the path condition, the association condition, the conascent dissociation condition, the conascent presence condition, and the conascent non-disappearance condition. Third, in the decisive support condition, these nine conditions are included: the object condition that has become dominant, the dominant condition that has become object, the contiguity condition, the immediate contiguity condition, the decisive support condition, the repetition condition, the strong non-co-momentary kamma condition, the absence condition, and the disappearance condition. Fourth, in the pre-nascence condition, these six conditions are included: the pre-nascent dependence condition, the pre-nascence condition, the pre-nascent faculty condition, the pre-nascent dissociation condition, the pre-nascent presence condition, and the pre-nascent non-disappearance condition. Fifth, in the post-nascence condition, these four conditions are included: the post-nascence condition, the post-nascent dissociation condition, the post-nascent presence condition, and the post-nascent non-disappearance condition. Sixth, in the kamma condition, only the non-co-momentary kamma condition is included. Seventh, in the nutriment condition, these three conditions are included: the nutriment condition by way of physical nutriment, the nutriment-presence condition, and the nutriment-non-disappearance condition. Eighth, in the faculty condition, these three conditions are included: the material life faculty condition, the faculty-presence condition, and the faculty-non-disappearance condition. Thus, knowing that these various conditions are included in each of these eight conditions, it should be understood that those which are included in a particular condition are indeed taken into its reckoning.

Evaṃ sabbapaccayasaṅgāhakānaṃ imesaṃ aṭṭhannaṃ paccayānaṃ vasena ekūnapaññāsāya pañhesu imasmiṃ paccanīye ‘‘kusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo’’tiādayo ime pannarasa pañhā uddharitvā vissajjitā. Tattha kusalo kusalassa, kusalo akusalassa, kusalo abyākatassa, kusalo kusalābyākatassāti kusalādikā cattāro pañhā; tathā akusalādikā; abyākato pana abyākatassa, abyākato [Pg.466] kusalassa, abyākato akusalassāti abyākatādikā tayo; kusalo ca abyākato ca kusalassa; tathā abyākatassa; akusalo ca abyākato ca akusalassa; tathā abyākatassāti dumūlakekāvasānā cattāro honti. Tesu paṭhame pañhe yehi bhavitabbaṃ, te sabbe saṅgahetvā tayo paccayā vuttā. Dutiye dve, tatiye pañca, catutthe ekova pañcame tayo, chaṭṭhe dve, sattame pañca, aṭṭhame ekova navame satta, dasame tayo, ekādasame tayo, dvādasame dve, terasame cattāro, cuddasame dve, pannarasamepi cattārova. Te ‘‘sahajātapaccayenā’’ti avatvā ‘‘sahajātaṃ pacchājāta’’nti vuttā. Tattha kāraṇaṃ parato vakkhāma.

Thus, by way of these eight conditions, which are inclusive of all conditions, these fifteen questions, beginning with 'A wholesome phenomenon is a condition for a wholesome phenomenon by way of object condition,' have been extracted and answered among the forty-nine questions in this antithetical section. Therein, there are four questions beginning with the wholesome: wholesome for wholesome, wholesome for unwholesome, wholesome for indeterminate, and wholesome for wholesome and indeterminate. Similarly, four beginning with the unwholesome. However, for those beginning with the indeterminate, there are three: indeterminate for indeterminate, indeterminate for wholesome, and indeterminate for unwholesome. And there are four dual-rooted questions ending in one: wholesome and indeterminate for wholesome; similarly for indeterminate; unwholesome and indeterminate for unwholesome; similarly for indeterminate. In the first of these questions, all that should be are gathered, and three conditions are stated. In the second, two; in the third, five; in the fourth, one; in the fifth, three; in the sixth, two; in the seventh, five; in the eighth, one; in the ninth, seven; in the tenth, three; in the eleventh, three; in the twelfth, two; in the thirteenth, four; in the fourteenth, two; and in the fifteenth, also four. These are stated as 'conascence and post-nascence,' not as 'by way of the conascence condition.' The reason for this we shall explain later.

Samāsato panettha eko dve tayo cattāro pañca sattāti chaḷeva paccayaparicchedā honti. Ayaṃ pañhāvārassa paccanīye ukkaṭṭhavasena pañhāparicchedo ceva te te paccaye saṅgahetvā dassitapaccayaparicchedo ca. ‘‘Na hetupaccayo’’tiādīsu hi catuvīsatiyāpi paccayapaccanīyesu ekapaccanīyepi ito uddhaṃ pañhā vā paccayā vā na labbhanti, heṭṭhā labbhanti. Tasmā yesu pañhesu ‘‘kusalo dhammo kusalassa ca abyākatassa ca dhammassa sahajātapaccayena paccayo’’ti evaṃ ekova paccayo āgato, tasmiṃ paccaye paṭikkhitte te pañhā parihāyanti. Yasmiṃ pana pañhe ‘‘kusalo dhammo akusalassa dhammassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo upanissayapaccayena paccayo’’ti evaṃ dve paccayā āgatā. Tattha nārammaṇapaccayāti evaṃ ekasmiṃ paccaye paṭikkhittepi itarassa paccayassa vasena so pañho labbhateva. Tesu pana dvīsupi paccayesu paṭikkhittesu so vāro pacchijjati. Evameva yesu pañhesu tayo cattāro pañca satta vā labbhanti, tesu ṭhapetvā paṭikkhitte paccaye avasesānaṃ vasena te pañhā labbhantiyeva. Sabbesu pana paccayesu paṭikkhittesu sabbepi te vārā pacchijjantīti idameva cettha lakkhaṇaṃ. Iminā lakkhaṇena ādito paṭṭhāya tesu tesu pañhesu saṅkhipitvā vuttapaccayānaṃ pabhedo ca tasmiṃ tasmiṃ paccanīye tesaṃ tesaṃ pañhānaṃ parihāni ca veditabbā.

In brief, here there are only six divisions of conditions: one, two, three, four, five, and seven. This is both the division of questions in the antithetical section of the question-section, in terms of their maximum number, and the division of conditions shown by including those very conditions. For in the twenty-four antithetical sections of conditions, such as 'not a root condition,' no questions or conditions are found above this point, but they are found below. Therefore, in those questions where only one condition occurs, such as 'A wholesome phenomenon is a condition for a wholesome and indeterminate phenomenon by way of the conascence condition,' when that condition is rejected, those questions are eliminated. However, in a question where two conditions occur, such as 'A wholesome phenomenon is a condition for an unwholesome phenomenon by way of the object condition and by way of decisive support condition,' if one condition, such as 'not an object condition,' is rejected, the question still obtains by virtue of the other condition. However, if both conditions are rejected, that section is cut off. Similarly, in those questions where three, four, five, or seven conditions obtain, when the rejected condition is set aside, those questions still obtain by virtue of the remaining ones. But if all conditions are rejected, all those sections are cut off—this indeed is the characteristic here. By this characteristic, from the beginning onwards, the distinctions of the conditions stated concisely in those various questions, and the elimination of those very questions in each antithetical section, should be understood.

Tatrāyaṃ [Pg.467] vitthārakathā – paṭhamapañhe tāva tīhi paccayehi ekūnavīsati paccayā dassitā. Kathaṃ? Kusalo hi kusalassa purejātapacchājātavipākavippayutteheva paccayo na hoti, sesehi vīsatiyā hoti, tesu ārammaṇapaccayo ekova sahajāte pana sabbasaṅgāhikavasena pannarasa paccayā saṅgahaṃ gacchantīti vuttā. Tesu hetupaccaye paṭikkhitte cuddasa honti. Kusalo pana kusalassa neva vipākapaccayo na, vippayuttapaccayoti te dve apanetvā sese dvādasa sandhāya sahajātapaccayena paccayoti vuttaṃ. Upanissayapaccayepi sabbasaṅgāhikavasena nava paccayā saṅgahaṃ gacchantīti vuttā. Tesu adhipatibhūto ārammaṇapaccayo ārammaṇabhūto ca adhipatipaccayo ārammaṇūpanissayavasena upanissayameva anupaviṭṭho. Kusalo pana kusalassa nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayo na hotīti taṃ apanetvā sese cha sandhāya upanissayapaccayena paccayoti vuttaṃ. Evaṃ paṭhamapañhe tīhi paccayehi ekūnavīsatipaccayā dassitāti veditabbā. Tesu imasmiṃ hetupaccanīye ‘‘kusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassa nahetupaccayena paccayoti dānaṃ datvā sīlaṃ samādiyitvā uposathakammaṃ katvā taṃ paccavekkhati, pubbe suciṇṇāni paccavekkhatī’’ti evamādinā ārammaṇapaccayādīsu vuttanayeneva uddharitvā pāḷi dassetabbā.

Here is the detailed exposition: In the first question, nineteen conditions are shown by means of three conditions. How? A wholesome state is not a condition for another wholesome state by way of pre-nascence, post-nascence, resultant, or dissociation conditions. However, it is a condition by way of the remaining twenty. Among these, the object condition is only one. But by way of the co-nascence condition, fifteen conditions are included by encompassing all, so it is said. When the root condition is excluded from these, fourteen remain. A wholesome state is neither a resultant condition nor a dissociation condition for another wholesome state. Excluding these two, the remaining twelve are referred to as conditions by way of the co-nascence condition. Similarly, by way of the decisive-support condition, nine conditions are included by encompassing all, so it is said. Among these, the object condition, which functions as predominance, and the predominance condition, which functions as an object, are absorbed into the decisive-support condition by way of object-decisive-support. A wholesome state is not a condition for another wholesome state by way of the karma condition occurring at different moments. Excluding this, the remaining six are referred to as conditions by way of the decisive-support condition. Thus, in the first question, nineteen conditions are shown by means of three conditions; this should be understood. Among these, in this section on the non-root condition, the Pāli should be cited, having extracted it in the manner stated in the object condition and others, as in: 'A wholesome phenomenon is a condition for a wholesome phenomenon by way of the non-root condition,' for example, 'having given a gift, undertaken precepts, performed the Uposatha observance, one reviews that action, one reviews previously well-performed actions.'

Ārammaṇapaccaye pana paṭikkhitte tassa vitthāraṃ apanetvā hetupaccayavitthāraṃ pakkhipitvā sāyeva pāḷi dassetabbā, sesapaccayapaṭikkhepesupi eseva nayo. Tasmiṃ pana paccaye paṭikkhitte ye vārā parihāyanti, te parato vakkhāma.

When the object condition is excluded, however, having removed its detailed exposition and inserted the detailed exposition of the root condition, that same Pāli text should be shown. This same method applies also in excluding the remaining conditions. But when a condition is excluded, the cases that are lost, those we will explain later.

Dutiyapañhe pana dvīhi paccayehi tayo paccayā dassitā. Kathaṃ? Kusalo hi akusalassa anantarādivasena paccayo na hoti. Tasmā te apanetvā ārammaṇūpanissayavasena saṅgahitaṃ ārammaṇādhipatiñceva pakatūpanissayañca sandhāya upanissayapaccayena paccayoti vuttaṃ. Tasmā suddho ārammaṇapaccayo ārammaṇādhipativasena adhipatipaccayo upanissayapaccayoti dutiyapañhe dvīhi paccayehi ime tayo paccayā dassitāti veditabbā.

In the second question, however, three conditions are shown by means of two conditions. How? A wholesome state is not a condition for an unwholesome state by way of contiguity, etc. Therefore, having excluded those, it is stated that it is a condition by way of the decisive-support condition, referring to object-predominance and natural decisive-support. Thus, the pure object condition, the predominance condition by way of object-predominance, and the decisive-support condition—these are the three conditions shown in the second question by means of two conditions; this should be understood.

Tatiyapañhe [Pg.468] pana pañcahi paccayehi aṭṭhārasa paccayā dassitā. Kathaṃ? Kusalo hi abyākatassa aññamaññapurejātāsevanavipākasampayuttehiyeva paccayo na hoti, sesehi ekūnavīsatiyā hoti. Tesu ārammaṇapaccayo eko. Yasmā pana kusalo abyākatassa aññamaññavipākasampayuttavasena paccayo na hoti, hetupaccayo paṭikkhitto, kammapaccayo visuṃ gahito, tasmā ime pañca apanetvā sahajātena dasa paccayā dassitā. Upanissayena heṭṭhā vuttesu chasu ṭhapetvā āsevanaṃ sesā pañca. Pacchājāto ekova tathā sahajātanānākkhaṇikavasena duvidhopi kammapaccayoti evaṃ tatiyapañhe pañcahi paccayehi ime aṭṭhārasa paccayā dassitāti veditabbā.

In the third question, however, eighteen conditions are shown by means of five conditions. How? A wholesome state is not a condition for an indeterminate state by way of mutuality, pre-nascence, repetition, resultant, or association conditions. It is a condition by way of the remaining nineteen. Among these, the object condition is one. Since a wholesome state is not a condition for an indeterminate state by way of mutuality, resultant, or association, the root condition is excluded, and the kamma condition is taken separately. Thus, excluding these five, ten conditions are shown by way of the co-nascence condition. By way of the decisive-support condition, excluding repetition from the six stated below, the remaining five are shown. Post-nascence is one, and the kamma condition is twofold – co-nascent and occurring at different moments. Thus, in the third question, these eighteen conditions are shown by means of five conditions; this should be understood.

Catutthapañhe pana ekena paccayena dasa. Kathaṃ? Kusalo hi kusalābyākatassa sahajāte vuttesu pannarasasu aññamaññavipākasampayuttavippayuttehi paccayo na hoti, hetupaccayo paṭikkhitto. Iti ime pañca apanetvā sesā dasa paccayā ettha ekena paccayena dassitāti veditabbā.

In the fourth question, however, ten conditions are shown by means of one condition. How? A wholesome state is not a condition for a wholesome-and-indeterminate state by way of mutuality, resultant, association, and dissociation among the fifteen conditions stated for co-nascence; and the root condition is excluded. Thus, having eliminated these five, it should be understood that the remaining ten conditions are shown here by means of one condition.

528. Yathā ca imesu kusalādikesu catūsu, tathā akusalādikesupi catūsu pañhesu tehi tehi paccayehi te teyeva paccayā dassitāti veditabbā.

528. Just as in these four questions beginning with the wholesome, so too in the four questions beginning with the unwholesome, it should be understood that those very same conditions are shown by means of those very same conditions.

529. Tato parānaṃ abyākatādīnaṃ tiṇṇaṃ pañhānaṃ paṭhamapañhe sattahi paccayehi tevīsati paccayā dassitā. Kathaṃ? Abyākato hi abyākatassa catuvīsatiyāpi paccayehi paccayo hoti. Hetupaccaye pana paṭikkhitte tevīsati honti. Tesu ārammaṇapaccayo ekova. Yasmā panettha asahajātānampi saṅgahaṇatthaṃ āhārindriyapaccayā visuṃ gahitā. Tasmā ime tayo apanetvā sahajātena dvādasa paccayā dassitā. Upanissayena heṭṭhā vuttā cha, purejāto ekova tathā pacchājātaāhārindriyapaccayāti evamettha sattahi paccayehi ime tevīsati paccayā dassitāti veditabbā. Dutiye tīhi paccayehi dvādasa dassitā. Kathaṃ? Ārammaṇapaccayo eko, upanissayena pana ārammaṇūpanissayavasena ārammaṇādhipatianantarasamanantaranatthivigataupanissayapaccayoti cha [Pg.469] dassitā. Purejātena purejātanissayavippayuttaatthiavigatā pañcāti evamettha tīhi paccayehi ime dvādasa paccayā dassitāti veditabbā. Tatiyepi eseva nayo.

529. Thereafter, in the first of the three questions beginning with the indeterminate, twenty-three conditions are shown by means of seven conditions. How? An indeterminate state, indeed, becomes a condition for an indeterminate state by way of all twenty-four conditions. But when the root condition is excluded, there are twenty-three. Among these, the object condition is only one. Because here, to include even non-co-nascent conditions, the nutriment and faculty conditions are taken separately. Therefore, having eliminated these three, twelve conditions are shown by way of the co-nascence condition. By way of the decisive-support condition, six were stated below; the pre-nascence condition is only one; similarly, the post-nascence, nutriment, and faculty conditions—thus here, these twenty-three conditions are shown by means of seven conditions; this should be understood. In the second question, twelve conditions are shown by means of three conditions. How? The object condition is one; but by way of the decisive-support condition, six are shown as object-decisive-support, object-predominance, contiguity, immediate contiguity, absence, and disappearance decisive-support conditions. By way of the pre-nascence condition, five are shown: pre-nascence, dependence, dissociation, presence, and non-disappearance—thus here, these twelve conditions are shown by means of these three conditions; this should be understood. The same method applies to the third question as well.

530. Tato parānaṃ dukamūlakānaṃ catunnaṃ pañhānaṃ paṭhamapañhe ‘‘sahajātapaccayena purejātapaccayenā’’ti avatvā ‘‘sahajātaṃ purejāta’’nti vuttehi dvīhi nissayaatthiavigatavasena tayo paccayā dassitā. Kusalā hi khandhā vatthunā saddhiṃ ekato kusalassa paccayabhāvaṃ sādhayamānā kiñcāpi sahajātā, sahajātapaccayā pana na honti vatthumissakattā. Tasmā tesaṃ sahajātānaṃ nissayaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena sahajātanti vuttaṃ. Vatthumhipi eseva nayo. Tampi hi kiñcāpi purejātaṃ, khandhamissakattā pana purejātapaccayo na hoti. Kevalaṃ purejātānaṃ nissayādīnaṃ vasena purejātanti vuttaṃ.

530. Thereafter, in the first of the four questions concerning the two-rooted, without stating “by co-arisen condition and by pre-arisen condition,” three conditions are shown by way of dependence, presence, and non-disappearance through the two terms spoken: “co-arisen” and “pre-arisen.” For although the wholesome aggregates, together with the base, are co-arisen while establishing their nature as a condition for the wholesome, they are not co-arisen conditions because they are mixed with the base. Therefore, it is said “co-arisen” by way of the dependence, presence, and non-disappearance of those co-arisen factors. This same method applies to the base. For although it is pre-arisen, it is not a pre-arisen condition because it is mixed with the aggregates. It is called “pre-arisen” merely by way of the dependence, presence, and non-disappearance of pre-arisen factors.

Dutiyapañhe ‘‘sahajātaṃ pacchājātaṃ āhāraṃ indriya’’nti vuttehi catūhipi sahajātanissayaatthiavigatavasena cattāro paccayā dassitā. Imasmiñhi vāre sahajātapaccayo labbhati, pacchājātapaccayādayo na labbhanti. Pacchājātānaṃ pana āhārindriyasaṅkhātānañca atthiavigatānaṃ vasenetaṃ vuttaṃ. Kusalā hi khandhā abyākatā ca mahābhūtā upādārūpānaṃ sahajātapaccayena nissayapaccayena atthiavigatapaccayehīti catudhā paccayā honti. Pacchājātā pana kusalā tehiyeva bhūtehi saddhiṃ tesaññeva upādārūpānaṃ atthiavigatavasena paccayo. Kabaḷīkārāhāropi pacchājātehi kusalehi saddhiṃ purejātassa kāyassa atthiavigatavaseneva paccayo. Rūpajīvitindriyampi pacchājātehi kusalehi saddhiṃ kaṭattārūpānaṃ atthiavigatapaccayeneva paccayo. Iti imaṃ catudhā paccayabhāvaṃ sandhāya ‘‘sahajātaṃ pacchājātaṃ, āhāraṃ indriya’’nti idaṃ vuttaṃ. Pacchājātāhārindriyapaccayā panettha na labbhantiyeva. Parato akusalamissakapañhādvayepi eseva nayoti. Evamettha tesu tesu pañhesu saṅkhipitvā vuttapaccayānaṃ pabhedo veditabbo. Tasmiṃ tasmiṃ pana paccaye tesaṃ tesaṃ pañhānaṃ parihānāparihāniṃ parato āvikarissāmāti.

In the second question, by the four terms spoken—“co-arisen, post-arisen, nutriment, faculty”—four conditions are shown by way of co-arisen, dependence, presence, and non-disappearance. For in this instance, the co-arisen condition is obtained, but the post-arisen, nutriment, and faculty conditions are not. However, this is said with regard to the presence and non-disappearance of what are designated as post-arisen states, nutriment, and faculties. Wholesome aggregates and indeterminate great elements are conditions for derived material phenomena in four ways: by the co-arisen condition, the dependence condition, the presence condition, and the non-disappearance condition. Post-arisen wholesome states, however, together with those same elements, are a condition for those same derived material phenomena by way of presence and non-disappearance. Edible food, together with post-arisen wholesome states, is a condition for the previously arisen body only by way of presence and non-disappearance. The material life-faculty, together with post-arisen wholesome states, is a condition for kamma-produced material phenomena only by way of the presence and non-disappearance condition. Thus, with reference to this fourfold conditionality, it is said, “co-arisen, post-arisen, nutriment, faculty.” Here, however, the post-arisen, nutriment, and faculty conditions are not obtained at all. This same method applies to the two subsequent questions involving unwholesome mixed states. Thus, in each of these questions, the classification of the concisely stated conditions should be understood. We will later clarify the inclusion or exclusion of these questions for each respective condition.

Paccanīyuddhārassa atthavaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Meaning of the Summary of the Negative

Paccanīyagaṇanavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Enumeration of the Negative

532. Idāni [Pg.470] ete ‘‘kusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassā’’tiādayo anulomavasena pannarasa vārā dassitā. Yasmā paccanīyepi eteyeva, na ito uddhaṃ; heṭṭhā pana honti, tasmā yassa yassa paccayassa paccanīye ye ye vārā labbhanti, te te ādito paṭṭhāya gaṇanavasena dassetuṃ nahetuyā pannarasātiādi āraddhaṃ.

532. Now, these fifteen instances beginning with “a wholesome phenomenon is a condition for a wholesome phenomenon” have been shown in the positive order. Since these same instances also apply in the negative section—and there are none more than this, but sometimes fewer—therefore, to show from the beginning by way of enumeration which instances are found for the negative of each condition, the section beginning with “In the non-root condition, fifteen” is commenced.

Tattha nahetuyā sabbesampi yathādassitānaṃ paccayānaṃ vasena pannarasa labbhanti. Nārammaṇe sahajāte hetupaccayo pavisati. Tasmiṃ tasmiṃ vāre suddho ārammaṇapaccayo parihāyati, sesapaccayavasena te vārā vissajjanaṃ labhanti. Yathā ca nārammaṇe, evaṃ sesesupi. Sahajāte hetupaccayo pavisati. Tasmiṃ tasmiñca vāre naupanissaye naanantareti evaṃ paccanīyato ṭhitā paccayā parihāyanti, avasesapaccayavasena te te vārā vissajjanaṃ labhanti. Nasahajāte pana ‘‘kusalo dhammo kusalassa ca abyākatassa ca, akusalo dhammo akusalassa ca abyākatassa ca, kusalo ca abyākato ca dhammā kusalassa, akusalo ca abyākato ca dhammā akusalassāti ime cattāro vārā parihāyanti. Etesañhi catunnaṃ purimesu dvīsu sahajātapaccayena paccayoti ekādasannaṃ paccayānaṃ vasena ekova paccayasaṅgaho vutto. Te tasmiṃ paṭikkhitte aññenākārena vissajjanaṃ na labhanti. Pacchimesu dvīsu nissayaatthiavigatapaccaye sandhāya ‘‘sahajātaṃ purejāta’’nti vuttaṃ. Te sahajāte paṭikkhitte avasesānaṃ hetuādīnañca purejātānañceva nissayaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena vissajjanaṃ na labhanti, tasmā ime cattāropi vārā parihāyanti. Avasesānaṃ vasena ‘‘ekādasā’’ti vuttaṃ.

Herein, in the non-root condition, fifteen instances are obtained by way of all the conditions as shown. In the non-object condition, the conascent root condition applies. In each such instance, the pure object condition is excluded, and those instances are resolved by way of the remaining conditions. Just as in the non-object condition, so too in the others. In the conascent condition, the root condition applies. In each such instance, the conditions standing in opposition, such as the non-decisive-support and non-immediacy conditions, are excluded, and those instances are resolved by way of the remaining conditions. However, in the non-conascent condition, these four instances are excluded: “A wholesome phenomenon is a condition for both wholesome and indeterminate phenomena; an unwholesome phenomenon is a condition for both unwholesome and indeterminate phenomena; wholesome and indeterminate phenomena are conditions for a wholesome phenomenon; and unwholesome and indeterminate phenomena are a condition for an unwholesome phenomenon.” For in the first two of these four, only one collection of conditions is stated—'is a condition by conascent condition'—which comprises a group of eleven conditions. When this is negated, they are not resolved in any other way. In the latter two, with reference to the dependence, presence, and non-disappearance conditions, it is said, “co-arisen, pre-arisen.” When the conascent condition is negated, they are not resolved by way of the remaining root conditions, etc., nor by way of the pre-arisen dependence, presence, and non-disappearance conditions. Therefore, these four instances are also excluded. “Eleven” is stated by way of the remaining ones.

Tattha siyā – yathā hetumhi paṭikkhitte sesānaṃ adhipatiādīnaṃ vasena te vārā laddhā, evaṃ sahajāte paṭikkhitte avasesānaṃ hetuādīnaṃ vasena kasmā na labbhantīti? Nippadesattā. Hetuādayo hi sahajātānaṃ ekadesamattato sappadesā, tasmā tesu paṭikkhittesu aññesaṃ vasena te vārā labbhanti. Sahajāto pana nippadeso sabbepi hetuādayo gaṇhāti, tasmā tasmiṃ paṭikkhitte sabbepi te paṭikkhittā honti. Na hi asahajātā hetupaccayādayo nāma atthi[Pg.471]. Iti sahajātassa nippadesattā tasmiṃ paṭikkhitte sabbepi te ubhopi vārā na labbhanti. ‘‘Sahajātaṃ purejāta’’nti vissajjitavāresu pana kiñcāpi sahajātapaccayoyeva natthi, yasmā panettha sahajātāva arūpakkhandhā nissayaatthiavigatavasena paccayā, sahajāte ca paṭikkhitte ekantena sahajātanissayaatthiavigatā paṭikkhittā honti, tasmā tassa paṭikkhittattā tepi vārā na labbhantīti evaṃ sabbathāpettha ime cattāro vārā parihāyanti. Avasesānaññeva vasena ekādasāti vuttaṃ.

Here it may be asked: Just as when the root condition is excluded, those instances are obtained by way of the remaining dominant conditions, etc., why, when co-nascence is excluded, are they not obtained by way of the remaining root conditions, etc.? Because it is all-encompassing. Root conditions, etc., are indeed partial, being only a part of co-nascent phenomena; therefore, when they are excluded, those instances are obtained by way of others. However, co-nascence is all-encompassing and includes all root conditions, etc.; therefore, when it is excluded, all of them are also excluded. Indeed, there are no root conditions, etc., that are not co-nascent. Thus, because of the all-encompassing nature of co-nascence, when it is excluded, all of them, both instances, are not obtained. In the instances resolved as “conascent, prenascent,” although there is no co-nascent condition as such, since here the immaterial aggregates are conditions only by way of co-nascent dependence, presence, and non-disappearance, and when co-nascence is excluded, the co-nascent dependence, presence, and non-disappearance are entirely excluded, therefore, due to its exclusion, those instances are also not obtained. Thus, in every way, these four instances are excluded here. “Eleven” is stated by way of the remaining ones.

Naaññamaññananissayanasampayuttepi teyeva vārā parihāyanti. Kasmā? Sahajātagatikattā. Yatheva hi arūpadhammabhūto sahajātapaccayo nippadesena cattāro arūpakkhandhe gaṇhāti, tathā aññamaññanissayasampayuttāpīti sahajātagatikattā etesupi paṭikkhittesu te vārā na labbhantīti veditabbā. Tena vuttaṃ naaññamaññe ekādasa, nanissaye ekādasa, nasampayutte ekādasāti.

In the cases of non-reciprocity, non-dependence, and non-association also, those very same instances are excluded. Why? Because of their co-nascent nature. Just as the co-nascent condition, being an immaterial phenomenon, encompasses the four immaterial aggregates without remainder, so too do the reciprocal, dependence, and association conditions have a co-nascent nature; therefore, it should be understood that when these are excluded, those instances are not obtained. Hence it is said: “In non-reciprocity, eleven; in non-dependence, eleven; in non-association, eleven.”

Tattha siyā – kiñcāpi ime avisesena kusalādibhedānaṃ catunnaṃ khandhānaṃ saṅgāhakattā sahajātagatikā, kusalo pana kusalābyākatassa ṭhapetvā sahajātapaccayaṃ aññathā paccayova na hoti, tasmā tasmiṃ paṭikkhitte so vāro parihāyatu. Kusalo pana kusalābyākatānaṃ neva aññamaññapaccayo hoti, tasmiṃ paṭikkhitte so vāro kasmā parihāyatīti? Aññamaññapaccayadhammavasena pavattisabbhāvato. Yatheva hi kusalābyākatā kusalassa sahajātapaccayova na honti. Sahajātadhammavasena pana nissayapaccayādīhi pavattisabbhāvato tasmiṃ paṭikkhitte so vāro parihāyati, evamidhāpi aññamaññapaccayadhammavasena sahajātādīhi pavattisabbhāvato tasmiṃ paṭikkhitte so vāro parihāyati. Naaññamaññapaccayena paccayoti padassa hi ayamattho – ye dhammā aññamaññapaccayasaṅgahaṃ gatā, na tehi paccayo. Kusalo ca kusalābyākatānaṃ sahajātādivasena paccayo honto aññamaññapaccayadhammeheva paccayo hoti, tasmā tasmiṃ paṭikkhitte so vāro parihāyati. Yathā ca so vāro, tathā sesāpi tayoti cattāropi te vārā parihāyanti.

Here it may be asked: Although these conditions, being collectors of the four aggregates of the wholesome and other divisions without distinction, have a co-nascent nature, yet the wholesome is not a condition for the wholesome-and-indeterminate in any other way except as a co-nascent condition; therefore, when that is excluded, let that instance be excluded. But the wholesome is not a reciprocal condition for the wholesome-and-indeterminate; when that is excluded, why should that instance be excluded? Because of the existence of an occurrence by way of reciprocal condition phenomena. Just as the wholesome-and-indeterminate are not co-nascent conditions for the wholesome, yet because there is an occurrence by way of co-nascent phenomena through dependence condition, etc., when that is excluded, that instance is excluded—so too here, because there is an occurrence by way of reciprocal condition phenomena through co-nascent conditions, etc., when that is excluded, that instance is excluded. For the meaning of the phrase 'not a condition by way of reciprocal condition' is this: it is not a condition by means of those phenomena which are included under reciprocal condition. And the wholesome, in being a condition for the wholesome-and-indeterminate by way of co-nascent conditions, etc., is a condition precisely by way of reciprocal condition phenomena; therefore, when that is excluded, that instance is excluded. And just as that instance, so too the remaining three; thus, all four of those instances are excluded.

Nanissaye [Pg.472] ekādasāti etthāpi yasmā tesaṃ vārānaṃ ekentena sahajātapaccayadhammāva nissayabhūtā, tasmā nissaye paṭikkhitte parihāyanti. Napurejāte terasāti sahajātaṃ purejātanti vuttavissajjane dvimūlake dve apanetvā terasa. Yathā hi te sahajāte paṭikkhitte purejātānaññeva nissayaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena vissajjanaṃ na labhanti, tathā purejātepi paṭikkhitte sahajātānaññeva nissayaatthiavigatānaṃ vasena vissajjanaṃ na labhanti, tasmā te apanetvā terasāti veditabbā.

In 'non-dependence, eleven': here too, because for those instances it is exclusively co-nascent condition phenomena that constitute the dependence, therefore, when dependence is excluded, they are excluded. In 'non-prenascent, thirteen': in the resolution stated as 'conascent, prenascent,' by removing the two two-rooted instances, there are thirteen. For just as when the co-nascent is excluded, they do not obtain a resolution by way of only the prenascent dependence, presence, and non-disappearance conditions, so too when the prenascent is excluded, they do not obtain a resolution by way of only the co-nascent dependence, presence, and non-disappearance conditions. Therefore, it should be understood that by removing those, there are thirteen.

Napacchājāte pannarasāti ettha ‘‘pacchājātapaccayena paccayo’’ti vā ‘‘sahajātaṃ pacchājātaṃ āhāraṃ indriya’’nti vā āgataṭṭhānesu ṭhapetvā pacchājātaṃ avasesavasenapi te pañhā labbhanti, tasmā pannaraseva vuttā. Nakammetiādīsu yasmā kammavipākāhārindriyajhānamaggāpi kusalādibhedānaṃ catunnaṃ khandhānaṃ ekadesova tasmā ṭhapetvā te dhamme avasesadhammavasena sahajātadhammā paccayā hontīti ekampi pañhāvissajjanaṃ na parihīnaṃ. Nasampayutte ekādasāti yasmā tesu catūsu vāresu sampayuttadhammā sahajātādipaccayena paccayā honti, tasmā sampayuttapaccayapaṭikkhepena teyeva vārā parihāyantīti veditabbā. Navippayutte navāti dumūlakaekāvasānā cattāro ekamūlakadukāvasānā dve cāti ime cha vārā ekantena vippayuttapaccayadhammehi yuttā. Tehi sahajātādivasena paccayā honti, tasmā vippayutte paṭikkhitte sabbepi te parihāyantīti naveva labbhanti. Tena vuttaṃ ‘‘navippayutte navā’’ti. Noatthinoavigatesupi teyeva veditabbā. Ekantena hi te vārā atthiavigatapaccayadhammayuttā, tasmā te tesaṃ paṭikkhepe parihāyanti. Yepi labbhanti, tesu ārammaṇavasena anantarādivasena vā vissajjanāni kātabbāni. Sahajātapurejātapacchājātaāhārindriyabhedato pañcannaṃ atthiavigatānaṃ vippayuttadhammānaṃ vā vasena na kātabbānīti.

In 'non-postnascent, fifteen': here, in places where it is stated as “condition by postnascent condition” or “conascent, postnascent, nutriment, faculty,” even excluding the postnascent condition, those questions are obtained by way of the remaining conditions; therefore, fifteen are stated. In cases like “not by kamma,” since kamma, kamma-result, nutriment, faculty, jhāna, and path factors are only a part of the four aggregates of wholesome, etc., therefore, excluding these phenomena, the remaining phenomena become conditions by way of co-nascent phenomena; thus, not even a single resolution of a question is excluded. In 'non-association, eleven': because in those four instances, associated phenomena are conditions by way of co-nascent and other conditions, therefore, by the exclusion of the association condition, those very instances are excluded—this should be understood. In 'non-dissociation, nine': four instances that are two-rooted and end in one, and two that are one-rooted and end in a dyad—these six instances are exclusively connected with dissociated condition phenomena. Through them, they are conditions by way of co-nascence and other conditions; therefore, when the dissociation condition is excluded, all of them are excluded, and only nine are obtained. Hence it is said, “in non-dissociation, nine.” In non-presence and non-non-disappearance, the same should be understood. For those instances are exclusively connected with presence and non-disappearance condition phenomena; therefore, when these are excluded, they are excluded. And for those that are obtained, resolutions should be made by way of object condition, proximity condition, etc. They should not be made by way of the five kinds of presence and non-disappearance (divided as co-nascent, prenascent, postnascent, nutriment, and faculty) or by way of dissociated phenomena.

533. Evaṃ paccanīye laddhavāre gaṇanato dassetvā idāni dumūlakādivasena paccayagaṇanaṃ dassetuṃ nahetupaccayā nārammaṇe pannarasātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha nahetumūlakadukesu atirekagaṇano ūnataragaṇanena saddhiṃ yojito ūnataragaṇanova hoti.

533. Having thus shown the enumeration of the obtained instances in the negative section, now, to show the enumeration of conditions by way of the two-rooted, etc., the section beginning with “in non-root condition, in non-object, fifteen” is commenced. Therein, in the dyads rooted in non-root, an enumeration with more, when combined with an enumeration with less, becomes only an enumeration with less.

Timūlake [Pg.473] naupanissaye terasāti kusalo akusalassa, akusalo kusalassāti dve vārā parihāyanti. Kasmā? Nārammaṇena saddhiṃ naupanissayassa ghaṭitattā. Ārammaṇavasena hi upanissayavasena ca imesaṃ pavatti. Tañca ubhayaṃ paṭikkhittaṃ. Ārammaṇādhipati ca ārammaṇūpanissayaggahaṇena gahito hotiyeva.

In the three-rooted, in non-decisive-support, there are thirteen. The two instances, “wholesome for unwholesome” and “unwholesome for wholesome,” are excluded. Why? Because of the combination of non-decisive-support with non-object. For the occurrence of these is by way of object and by way of decisive support, and both of these are negated. Moreover, object-predominance is indeed included by the grasping of object-decisive-support.

Chamūlakepi naupanissaye terasāti teyeva terasa. Sattamūlake pana naupanissaye sattāti nasahajātena saddhiṃ ghaṭitattā tattha parihīnehi catūhi saddhiṃ ‘‘kusalo kusalassa, kusalo akusalassa, akusalo akusalassa, akusalo kusalassā’’ti ime anantarūpanissayapakatūpanissayavasena pavattamānā cattāroti aṭṭha parihāyanti, tasmā avasesānaṃ vasena sattāti vuttaṃ. Napurejāte ekādasāti nasahajātena saddhiṃ ghaṭitattā ekādasa. Napacchājāte navāti tesu ekādasasu sahajātaṃ pacchājātaṃ āhāraṃ indriyanti laddhavissajjanesu dumūlake abyākatante dve vāre apanetvā. Te hi sahajāte paṭikkhittepi pacchājātavasena aparihīnā. Sahajātena pana saddhiṃ pacchājāte paṭikkhitte parihāyantīti sesānaṃ vasena navāti vuttaṃ. Aṭṭhamūlake nanissaye ekādasāti sabbaṃ heṭṭhā vuttasadisameva. Navamūlake naupanissaye pañcāti kusalādayo abyākatantā tayo dumūlakā abyākatantā dve cāti pañca. Tesu nānākkhaṇikakammakabaḷīkārāhārarūpajīvitindriyapacchājātadhammavasena vissajjanaṃ veditabbaṃ.

Even in the six-rooted, in non-decisive-support, there are thirteen; indeed, just those thirteen. But in the seven-rooted, in non-decisive-support, there are seven, because of the combination with non-co-nascent. For there, along with the four [co-nascent instances] that are excluded, these four instances which occur by way of contiguity-decisive-support and natural-decisive-support—namely, ‘wholesome for wholesome,’ ‘wholesome for unwholesome,’ ‘unwholesome for unwholesome,’ and ‘unwholesome for wholesome’—are also excluded; thus, eight are excluded. Therefore, it is said there are seven by way of the remainder. In non-pre-nascence, there are eleven, because of the combination with non-co-nascent. In non-post-nascence, there are nine; this is after excluding from those eleven the two instances of the two-rooted indeterminate states, in which the resolutions are obtained by way of co-nascence, post-nascence, nutriment, and faculty. For even when co-nascence is negated, they are not excluded by way of post-nascence. But when post-nascence is negated along with co-nascence, they are excluded. Thus, it is said there are nine by way of the remainder. In the eight-rooted, in non-dependence, there are eleven. All is just like what was stated above. In the nine-rooted, in non-decisive-support, there are five. That is, the three wholesome, etc., ending in indeterminate, and the two two-rooted ending in indeterminate, making five. Among these, the resolution should be understood by way of different-moment kamma, physical nutriment, material life faculty, and post-nascent phenomena.

Dasamūlake napurejāte pañcātiādīsupi teyeva. Napacchājāte tīṇīti pacchājātavasena labbhamāne dumūlake abyākatante dve apanetvā avasesā. Navippayuttepi teyeva tayo. Noatthiyā dveti nānākkhaṇikakammavasena kusalañca akusalañca kaṭattārūpassa. Vipākaṃ panettha naupanissayena saddhiṃ ghaṭitattā na labbhati. Ekādasamūlake heṭṭhā vuttasadisāva gaṇanā. Dvādasamūlake nakamme ekanti abyākatena abyākataṃ. Tattha ca āhārindriyavasena vissajjanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Terasamūlakādīsupi sabbattha ekanti āgataṭṭhāne idameva gahetabbaṃ. Nāhāre pana indriyavasena vissajjanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Naindriye āhāravasena. Cuddasamūlakādīsu nakammena saddhiṃ ghaṭitattā noatthinoavigatā na labbhantīti [Pg.474] na vuttā. Nāhārapaccayā najhānapaccayāti naindriyaṃ apanetvā vuttaṃ. Tasmā tattha indriyavasena ekaṃ veditabbaṃ. Navipākapaccayā naindriyapaccayāti nāhāraṃ apanetvā vuttaṃ, tasmā tattha āhāravasena ekaṃ veditabbaṃ. Imesu pana dvīsu paccanīyato ṭhitesu gaṇanā nāma natthi, tasmā ekato na dassitāti.

In the ten-rooted, in non-pre-nascence, there are five, etc.; these are the same. In non-post-nascence, there are three; this is the remainder after excluding the two two-rooted indeterminate instances which are obtained by way of post-nascence. Even in non-dissociation, those same three. In non-presence, there are two: that is, wholesome and unwholesome by way of different-moment kamma for kamma-born materiality. Here, however, the resultant is not obtained because it is combined with non-decisive-support. In the eleven-rooted, the enumeration is just like what was stated above. In the twelve-rooted, in non-kamma, there is one: the indeterminate for the indeterminate. And there, a resolution should be understood by way of nutriment and faculty. Even in the thirteen-rooted, etc., wherever 'one' is mentioned, this same principle should be taken. But in non-nutriment, the resolution should be understood by way of faculty; in non-faculty, by way of nutriment. In the fourteen-rooted, etc., because they are combined with non-kamma, 'non-presence' and 'non-disappearance' are not obtained, thus they are not stated. 'Not by nutriment condition, not by jhāna condition'—this is stated having excluded non-faculty. Therefore, there, one should be understood by way of faculty. 'Not by resultant condition, not by faculty condition'—this is stated having excluded non-nutriment. Therefore, there, one should be understood by way of nutriment. But when these two stand in opposition, there is no enumeration as such; therefore, they are not shown together.

Nahetumūlakaṃ.

The Section Rooted in Non-Root.

534. Nārammaṇamūlakādīsupi pannarasaterasaekādasanavāti sabbadukesu cattārova mūlagaṇanaparicchedā. Tikādīsu pana bahupaccayasamāyoge itarānipi satta pañca tīṇi dve ekanti paricchinnagaṇanāni vissajjanāni labbhantiyeva. Tesu yesaṃ paccayānaṃ samāyoge yaṃ yaṃ labbhati, taṃ taṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayena sādhukaṃ sallakkhetvā uddharitabbaṃ. Sabbesu cetesu nārammaṇamūlakādīsu nārammaṇādīni padāni atikkantena hetupadena saddhiṃ paṭhamaṃ bandhitvāva cakkāni katāni. Yasmā pana tāni nahetumūlake vuttasadisāneva honti, tasmā vitthārena adassetvā saṅkhepaṃ katvā dassitāni. Tattha yathā nahetumūlake nārammaṇanaupanissayā visuṃ visuṃ pannarasa vāre labhantāpi samāyoge terasa labhiṃsu, evaṃ sabbattha teraseva labhanti. Yathā ca nārammaṇanasahajātehi saddhiṃ naupanissaye satta vārā honti, evaṃ naupanissayanārammaṇehi saddhiṃ nasahajātepi satta.

534. Even in the sections rooted in non-object, etc., there are fifteen, thirteen, eleven, and nine—these are the four divisions of the root-enumeration in all the dyads. But in the triads, etc., when many conditions are combined, other distinct enumerations of seven, five, three, two, or one are indeed obtained as resolutions. Among these, whatever is obtained by the combination of which conditions, that should be carefully noted and extracted according to the method stated above. And in all these sections rooted in non-object, etc., the terms 'non-object,' etc., are first combined with the positive `hetu` term to form the matrices. But since these are just like those stated in the section rooted in non-root, they have been shown briefly without detailing them. Here, just as in the section rooted in non-root, non-object and non-decisive-support, though separately obtaining fifteen instances, obtained thirteen when combined; so too everywhere, they obtain only thirteen. And just as there are seven instances for non-decisive-support when combined with non-object and non-co-nascent, so too there are seven for non-co-nascent when combined with non-decisive-support and non-object.

538. Nanissayapaccayā naupanissayapaccayā napacchājāte tīṇīti kusalādīni abyākatantāni. Tesu kaṭattārūpañca āhārasamuṭṭhānañca paccayuppannaṃ.

538. 'In non-dependence condition, non-decisive-support condition, non-post-nascence, there are three'—these are the wholesome, etc., ending in indeterminate. Among these, kamma-born materiality and nutriment-produced materiality are the conditionally arisen phenomena.

543-544. Nāhāranaindriyamūlakesu catukkesu nakammena saddhiṃ aghaṭitattā nahetumūlake viya ekentena labbhanti. Naindriyamūlake naupanissaye ca napurejāte ca ṭhapetvā nāhāre tīṇīti kātabbanti naindriyapaccayato paṭṭhāya ime dve paccaye ghaṭetvā naindriyapaccayā…pe… naupanissayapaccayā nāhāre tīṇī. Naindriyapaccayā…pe… napurejātapaccayā nāhāre tīṇīti evaṃ imehi paccayehi saddhiṃ nāhārapaccaye ca gaṇanā kātabbāti [Pg.475] attho. Tattha tīṇīti kusalādīneva abyākatassa. Tattha kusalākusalā kaṭattārūpānaṃ purejātassa ca kāyassa pacchājātapaccayena, abyākatā pana cittacetasikā pacchājātapaccayenevāti imesaṃ vasena tīṇi vissajjanāni kātabbāni. Parato pana napacchājātena saddhiṃ ghaṭitattā nāhāre dveti vuttaṃ. Tattha kaṭattārūpavasena kusalaṃ abyākatassa, tathā akusalanti ettakameva labbhati. Āhārassa pana paṭikkhittattā kabaḷīkārāhāro atthiavigatavasenāpi paccayabhāvaṃ na labhati.

543-544. In the non-nutriment-rooted and non-faculty-rooted tetrads, since they are not combined with non-kamma, they are obtained singly, as in the non-root-rooted. In the non-faculty-rooted, having excluded non-decisive-support and non-pre-nascence, it should be stated that there are three in non-nutriment. This means that, starting from the non-faculty condition, combining these two conditions: ‘by non-faculty condition…pe… by non-decisive-support condition, there are three in non-nutriment’; and ‘by non-faculty condition…pe… by non-pre-nascence condition, there are three in non-nutriment’—thus, with these conditions, a calculation should also be made with the non-nutriment condition. Here, ‘three’ refers to the wholesome, etc., for the indeterminate. Therein, the wholesome and unwholesome are conditions for kamma-born materiality and the pre-nascent body by way of post-nascence condition; but the indeterminate consciousness and mental factors are conditions only by way of post-nascence condition. Thus, three answers should be given based on these. Further on, however, since it is combined with non-post-nascence, it is said there are two in non-nutriment. Therein, by way of kamma-born materiality, only the wholesome for the indeterminate, and similarly the unwholesome, are obtained. As for nutriment, since it is rejected, physical nutriment does not obtain conditionality even by way of presence and non-disappearance.

545. Navippayuttamūlakassa catumūlake naupanissaye pañcāti kusalo sahajātakusalassa, kusalo kaṭattārūpasaṅkhātassa abyākatassa, akusalo sahajātaakusalassa, tathā kaṭattārūpasaṅkhātassa abyākatassa, abyākato sahajātaabyākatassāti evaṃ pañca. Navippayuttapaccayā…pe… naupanissaye tīṇīti heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva kusalādayo tayo abyākatassa.

545. In the non-dissociated-rooted, in the four-rooted, in non-decisive-support, there are five: wholesome for co-nascent wholesome, wholesome for the indeterminate reckoned as kamma-born materiality, unwholesome for co-nascent unwholesome, likewise for the indeterminate reckoned as kamma-born materiality, and indeterminate for co-nascent indeterminate—thus five. By non-dissociation condition…pe… in non-decisive-support, there are three. That is, by the method stated previously, the three—wholesome, etc.—are for the indeterminate.

546. Noatthipaccayā nahetuyā navāti nahetupaccayā noatthiyā vuttā naveva. Sabbepi hi te ekamūlakekāvasānā anantarapakatūpanissayavasena labbhanti. Nārammaṇe navātipi teyeva nārammaṇe ṭhatvā naupanissaye dve kātabbā. Yāva nissayampīti noatthimūlake naye ‘‘noatthipaccayā nahetupaccayā nārammaṇapaccayā’’ti evaṃ cakkabandhagamanena nārammaṇapaccaye ṭhatvā imehi vā tīhi, ito paresu nādhipatiādīsu aññataraññatarena vā saddhiṃ yāva nissayapaccayaṃ pāpuṇāti, tāva gantvā naupanissaye dve vissajjanāni kātabbānīti attho.

546. By non-presence condition, not by root condition—nine. That is, nine are stated as by non-root condition, not by presence condition. For all of them, having a single root and a single conclusion, are obtained by way of contiguity and natural decisive support. Not by object condition, there are also nine. Those same ones, being established in non-object, two are to be stated in non-decisive-support. Even up to dependence condition. This means that in the method of the non-presence-rooted, being established in the non-object condition by proceeding in a cyclical manner—‘by non-presence condition, by non-root condition, by non-object condition’—with these three, or with any one of the others among those further conditions beginning with non-dominance, one reaches up to the dependence condition; having gone thus far, two answers are to be given in non-decisive-support. This is the meaning.

Evaṃ lakkhaṇaṃ ṭhapetvā puna nārammaṇato paṭṭhāya yāva nissayā satta paccaye gahetvā naupanissaye dveti āha. Tattha noatthipaccayā nahetupaccayā nārammaṇapaccayā naupanissaye dve, noatthipaccayā nahetunārammaṇanādhipatipaccayā naupanissaye dveti evaṃ nārammaṇato purimapacchimehi nissayapariyosānehi sabbapadehi saddhiṃ yojanā kātabbā. Dveti panettha kusalo abyākatassa, akusalo abyākatassāti [Pg.476] nānākkhaṇikakammavasena kaṭattārūpassa paccayavasena veditabbāni. Naupanissayapadena saddhiṃ napurejātādīsu sabbattha dve. Kammapaccayo panettha na gahito. Tasmiñhi gahite tepi dve vārā chijjanti, vissajjanameva na labbhati. Evaṃ yena yena saddhiṃ yassa yassa saṃsandane. Yaṃ labbhati, yañca parihāyati, taṃ sabbaṃ sādhukaṃ sallakkhetvā sabbapaccanīyesu gaṇanā uddharitabbāti.

Having thus established the characteristic, he says that again, starting from non-object up to dependence, taking seven conditions, there are two in non-decisive-support. Here, ‘by non-presence condition, by non-root condition, by non-object condition, there are two in non-decisive-support,’ and ‘by non-presence condition, by non-root, non-object, and non-dominance conditions, there are two in non-decisive-support’—thus, from non-object, the combination should be made with all terms, both preceding and succeeding, ending in dependence. Here, ‘two’ refers to the wholesome for the indeterminate, and the unwholesome for the indeterminate—these should be understood as conditions by way of different-moment kamma for kamma-born materiality. With the term ‘non-decisive-support,’ there are two in all cases, such as in non-pre-nascence, etc. The kamma condition, however, is not included here. For if it were included, those two instances would be cut off, and no answer would be obtainable. Thus, in the combination of whatever with whatever, whatever is obtained and whatever is lost—all that should be carefully noted, and the calculation should be carried out in all the negative conditions.

Paccanīyagaṇanavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Calculation of the Negative Conditions.

Anulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Positive and Negative Methods.

550. Anulomapaccanīye ‘‘hetuyā satta, ārammaṇe navā’’ti evaṃ anulome ‘‘nahetuyā pannarasa, nārammaṇe pannarasā’’ti evaṃ paccanīye ca laddhagaṇanesu paccayesu yo paccayo anulomato ṭhito, tassa anulome laddhavārehi saddhiṃ ye paccanīyato ṭhitassa paccanīye laddhavāresu sadisavārā, tesaṃ vasena gaṇanā veditabbā. Anulomasmiñhi hetupaccaye ‘‘hetuyā sattā’’ti satta vārā laddhā, paccanīye nārammaṇapaccaye ‘‘nārammaṇe pannarasā’’ti pannarasa laddhā. Tesu ye hetuyā satta vuttā, tehi saddhiṃ nārammaṇe vuttesu pannarasasu ‘‘kusalo kusalassa, abyākatassa, kusalābyākatassa, akusalo akusalassa, abyākatassa, akusalābyākatassa, abyākato abyākatassā’’ti ime satta sadisā. Te sandhāya hetupaccayā naārammaṇe sattāti vuttaṃ. Naadhipatiyā sattātiādīsupi eseva nayo.

550. In the Positive and Negative Methods, 'by root condition, seven; by object condition, nine'—thus in the positive; and 'not by root condition, fifteen; not by object condition, fifteen'—thus in the negative. Among the conditions for which the counts have been obtained, for whichever condition belongs to the positive method, its calculation should be understood based on the similar instances among those obtained for it in the positive method and those obtained in the negative method for a condition belonging to the negative method. For in the positive method, for the root condition, 'by root condition, seven'—seven instances are obtained; in the negative method, for the non-object condition, 'not by object condition, fifteen'—fifteen are obtained. Among these, the seven stated 'by root condition,' when compared with the fifteen stated 'not by object condition'—namely, 'the wholesome for the wholesome, for the indeterminate, for the wholesome-and-indeterminate; the unwholesome for the unwholesome, for the indeterminate, for the unwholesome-and-indeterminate; the indeterminate for the indeterminate'—these seven are similar. With reference to these, it is said, 'by root condition, not by object condition, there are seven.' The same method applies to 'not by dominance condition, seven,' etc.

Nasahajātassa pana hetupaccayassa abhāvā nasahajāte ekopi na labbhati, tasmā tena saddhiṃ yojanā na katā. Naaññamaññe kusalādayo tayo rūpābyākatassa labbhanti, te sandhāya tīṇīti vuttaṃ. Tathā nasampayutte. Navippayutte pana kusalaṃ kusalassa, akusalaṃ akusalassa, abyākataṃ abyākatassāti arūpadhammavasena tīṇi veditabbāni. Nanissayanoatthinoavigatā nasahajāto viya [Pg.477] na labbhantiyevāti tehipi saddhiṃ yojanā na katā. Evamettha satta tīṇīti dveyeva gaṇanaparicchedā, tesaṃ vasena ūnataragaṇanena saddhiṃ atirekagaṇanassapi gaṇanaṃ parihāpetvā paccayaghaṭanesu gaṇanā veditabbā.

However, since there is no root condition that is not co-nascent, not even one instance is obtained in the non-co-nascent; therefore, no combination is made with it. In non-mutuality, the three—wholesome, etc.—are obtained for indeterminate materiality; with reference to these, it is said, ‘three.’ Similarly in non-association. In non-dissociation, however, ‘the wholesome for the wholesome, the unwholesome for the unwholesome, the indeterminate for the indeterminate’—these three should be understood by way of immaterial phenomena. Just as the non-co-nascent is not obtained, so too non-dependence, non-presence, and non-disappearance are not obtained; therefore, no combination is made with them either. Thus, here, the seven and the three are only two numerical divisions. Based on these, the calculation in the combinations of conditions should be understood by reducing the count of the more numerous group in accordance with the less numerous one.

551. Tattha hetusahajātanissayaatthiavigatanti nārammaṇe sattāti kusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo, sahajātanissayaatthiavigatapaccayena paccayo, nārammaṇapaccayena paccayo. Kusalā hetū sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ hetupaccayena paccayo, sahajātanissayaatthiavigatapaccayena paccayo, nārammaṇapaccayena paccayoti iminā nayena satta vārā uddharitabbā. Nādhipatiyā sattātiādīsupi eseva nayo. Dutiye ghaṭane aññamaññassa paviṭṭhattā ṭhapetvā nasampayuttaṃ sesesu tīṇīti vuttaṃ. Nasampayutte pana aññamaññavippayuttaṃ paṭisandhināmarūpaṃ sandhāya ekanti vuttaṃ. Aññamaññapaccayo cettha anulomaghaṭane paviṭṭhattā paccanīyato na labbhati, tasmā ‘‘naaññamaññe’’ti na vuttaṃ. Yathā cettha, evaṃ sesaghaṭanesupi paviṭṭhapaccayā paccanīyato na labbhantīti na vuttā. Tatiyaghaṭane sampayuttassa paviṭṭhattā sabbattha tīṇiyeva. Catutthaghaṭane vippayuttassa paviṭṭhattā tīṇi kusalādīni cittasamuṭṭhānarūpassa. Pañcame vipākassa paviṭṭhattā sabbattha ekaṃ abyākatena abyākataṃ. Ito paresupi vipākasampayuttesu eseva nayo.

551. Herein, 'seven in not-object' means: a wholesome phenomenon is a condition for a wholesome phenomenon by way of root condition, by way of co-nascence, dependence, presence, and non-disappearance conditions, and by way of not-object condition. Wholesome roots are conditions for the associated aggregates by way of root condition, by way of co-nascence, dependence, presence, and non-disappearance conditions, and by way of not-object condition. In this way, seven instances should be drawn out. The same method applies to 'seven in not-dominance,' and so on. In the second combination, due to the inclusion of mutuality, it is said that there are three in the remaining conditions, excluding not-association. However, in not-association, it is said 'one' with reference to the mutually dissociated rebirth-linking mentality-materiality. Here, the mutuality condition is not obtained from the negative side due to its inclusion in the positive combination; therefore, 'in not-mutuality' is not stated. Just as here, so too in the remaining combinations, the included conditions are not obtained from the negative side and are therefore not stated. In the third combination, due to the inclusion of association, there are only three everywhere. In the fourth combination, due to the inclusion of dissociation, there are three—wholesome, and so on—for mind-originated matter. In the fifth, due to the inclusion of resultant, there is one everywhere: the indeterminate by way of the indeterminate. The same method applies to the resultant-associated states beyond this.

552. Hetusahajātanissayaindriyamaggaatthiavigatanti nārammaṇe cattārīti kusalo kusalassa, abyākatassa, kusalābyākatassa; abyākato abyākatassāti imesaṃ vasena veditabbāni. Sesesupi eseva nayo. Naaññamaññe dveti kusalo abyākatassa, tathā abyākato. Paratopi dvīsu eseva nayo. Iminā upāyena sabbaghaṭanesu labbhamānavasena gaṇanā veditabbā. Sabbānipi cetāni imasmiṃ anulomapaccanīye sahajātavasena ceva pakiṇṇakavasena ca pannarasādhikāni cattāri ghaṭanasatāni vuttāni. Tesu tasmiṃ tasmiṃ ghaṭane ye anulomato ṭhitā paccayā, tesaṃ ekopi paccanīyato na labbhati. Hetumūlake cettha paṭhame ghaṭane anulomato pañcannaṃ paccayānaṃ ṭhitattā paccanīyato ekūnavīsati paccayā āgatā. Evaṃ sesesupi [Pg.478] anulomato ṭhitāvasesā paccanīyato āgatā. Anulomato cettha bahūsupi ṭhitesu paccanīyato ekekova āgatoti veditabbo. Yathā ca hetumūlake, evaṃ ārammaṇādimūlakesupi sabbametaṃ vidhānaṃ yathānurūpato veditabbanti.

552. By way of root, co-nascence, dependence, faculty, path, presence, and non-disappearance, 'four in not-object' should be understood in terms of these cases: a wholesome phenomenon for a wholesome one, for an indeterminate one, and for a wholesome-and-indeterminate one; an indeterminate phenomenon for an indeterminate one. The same method applies to the remaining cases. In not-mutuality, 'two' means: the wholesome for the indeterminate, and likewise the indeterminate. The same method applies to the two beyond this. By this method, the enumeration should be understood based on what is obtained in all combinations. In this positive and negative analysis, all these are stated as four hundred and fifteen combinations, by way of co-nascence and by way of miscellaneous conditions. Among these, in each combination, not even one of the conditions that stand on the positive side is obtained from the negative side. Here, in the first combination rooted in root, since five conditions stand on the positive side, nineteen conditions come from the negative side. Similarly, in the remaining combinations, the conditions other than those standing on the positive side come from the negative side. Here, even when many conditions stand on the positive side, it should be understood that only a single one comes from the negative side. And just as in the root-based combinations, so too in the object-based and other combinations, this entire method should be understood accordingly.

Anulomapaccanīyavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Positive-Negative.

Paccanīyānulomavaṇṇanā

The Explanation of the Negative-Positive.

631. Paccanīyānulomepi ‘‘hetuyā satta, ārammaṇe navā’’ti evaṃ anulome ‘‘nahetuyā pannarasa, nārammaṇe pannarasā’’ti evaṃ paccanīye ca laddhagaṇanesu paccayesu yo paccanīyato ṭhito, tassa paccanīyato laddhavāresu ye anulomato ṭhitassa anulomato laddhavārehi sadisā vārā, tesaṃ vasena gaṇanā veditabbā. Paccanīyasmiñhi nahetupaccaye ‘‘nahetuyā pannarasā’’ti pannarasa vārā laddhā, anulome ārammaṇapaccaye ‘‘ārammaṇe navā’’ti nava vārā laddhā. Tattha ye nahetuyā pannarasa vuttā, tesu ye vārā ārammaṇe vuttehi navahi sadisā, tesaṃ vasena gaṇanā veditabbā. Tattha ye ārammaṇe nava vuttā, te nahetuyā vuttesu pannarasasu kusalo ‘‘kusalākusalābyākatānaṃ, akusalo akusalakusalābyākatānaṃ, abyākato abyākatakusalākusalāna’’nti imehi navahi sadisā, te sandhāya nahetuyā ārammaṇe navāti vuttaṃ. Adhipatiyā dasātiādīsupi eseva nayo. Ārammaṇādīnañhi anulomagaṇanāya ye vārā vuttā nahetupaccayena saddhiṃ saṃsandanepi te sabbe labbhantīti veditabbā. ‘‘Kusalo dhammo kusalassa dhammassa nahetupaccayena paccayo ārammaṇapaccayena paccayo, dānaṃ datvā sīlaṃ samādiyitvā uposathakammaṃ katvā taṃ paccavekkhati, pubbe suciṇṇāni paccavekkhatī’’ti iminā upāyena tesaṃ pāḷi uddharitabbā.

631. Also in the Negative-Positive method, with counts such as 'in root, seven; in object, nine' in the positive, and 'in not-root, fifteen; in not-object, fifteen' in the negative, the enumeration among the conditions thus obtained should be understood in this way: for a condition that stands on the negative side, the count is to be understood based on those of its instances obtained on the negative side that are similar to the instances obtained on the positive side for a condition that stands on the positive side. For, in the negative, for the not-root condition, fifteen instances are obtained, as in 'in not-root, fifteen.' In the positive, for the object condition, nine instances are obtained, as in 'in object, nine.' Therein, among the fifteen stated for not-root, the count should be understood based on those instances that are similar to the nine stated for object. Therein, the nine stated for object are similar to these nine among the fifteen stated for not-root: 'the wholesome for the wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate; the unwholesome for the unwholesome, wholesome, and indeterminate; the indeterminate for the indeterminate, wholesome, and unwholesome.' With reference to these, it is said: 'in not-root, nine by object.' The same method applies to 'in dominance, ten,' and so on. For it should be understood that all those instances stated in the positive enumeration for object, etc., are also obtained when correlated with the not-root condition. The Pāli text for these should be cited by this method: 'A wholesome phenomenon is a condition for a wholesome phenomenon by way of not-root condition and by way of object condition. Having given a gift, undertaken the precepts, or performed the observance day duty, one reflects upon it; one reflects upon previously well-done deeds.'

Nahetupaccayā adhipatiyā dasāti ettha ṭhapetvā vīmaṃsādhipatiṃ sesādhipativasena anulomavibhaṅge āgatavārā uddharitabbā. Evamettha nava [Pg.479] dasasattatīṇiterasaekanti cha gaṇanaparicchedā, tesaṃ vasena ūnataragaṇanena saddhiṃ atirekagaṇanassāpi gaṇanaṃ parihāpetvā nahetumūlakādīnaṃ nayānaṃ timūlakādīsu sabbasaṃsandanesu gaṇanā veditabbā. Idaṃ tāva sādhāraṇalakkhaṇaṃ. Na panetaṃ sabbasaṃsandanesu gacchati, yehi pana paccayehi saddhiṃ yesaṃ paccayānaṃ saṃsandane ye vārā virujjhanti, te apanetvā avasesānaṃ vasenapettha gaṇanā veditabbā.

In 'by not-root condition, by dominance, ten,' the instances that occur in the positive analysis by way of the remaining dominances, excluding dominance by investigation, should be cited. Thus, there are here six numerical divisions: nine, ten, seven, three, thirteen, and one. By means of these, having disregarded the count of the lesser enumeration along with the excess enumeration, the enumeration of the methods beginning with the not-root-based, in all their correlations with the three-rooted, etc., should be understood. This, for now, is the general characteristic. This, however, does not apply in all correlations. In the correlation of certain conditions with certain other conditions, those instances that are in conflict should be removed, and the enumeration here should be understood by way of the remaining ones.

Nahetupaccayā naārammaṇapaccayā adhipatiyā sattāti ettha hi kusalo akusalassa; abyākato kusalassa, akusalassāti ime ārammaṇādhipativasena labbhamānā tayo vārā virujjhanti. Kasmā? Naārammaṇapaccayāti vuttattā. Tasmā te apanetvā sahajātādhipatinayenevettha ‘‘kusalo kusalassa, abyākatassa, kusalābyākatassa; akusalo akusalassa, abyākatassa, akusalābyākatassa; abyākato abyākatassā’’ti satta vārā veditabbā. Tepi nahetupaccayāti vacanato ṭhapetvā vīmaṃsādhipatiṃ sesādhipatīnaṃ vasena. Evaṃ sabbattha ūnataragaṇanapaccayavasena avirujjhamānagaṇanavasena ca gaṇanā veditabbā.

By non-root condition and by non-object condition, in dominance there are seven instances. Here, 'wholesome for unwholesome,' 'indeterminate for wholesome,' and 'for unwholesome'—these three instances, being obtainable by way of object-dominance, are contradicted. Why? Because it is stated, 'by non-object condition.' Therefore, having excluded those, it should be understood that here, by the method of conascent dominance alone, there are seven instances: 'wholesome for wholesome, for indeterminate, and for wholesome-and-indeterminate; unwholesome for unwholesome, for indeterminate, and for unwholesome-and-indeterminate; indeterminate for indeterminate.' These too, because of the statement 'by non-root condition,' are by way of the remaining dominances, having excluded the dominance of investigation. Thus, everywhere, the calculation should be understood by way of conditions with a lesser count and by way of non-conflicting counts.

Yesu ca paccayesu paccanīyato ṭhitesu ye anulomato na tiṭṭhanti, tepi veditabbā. Seyyathidaṃ – anantare paccanīyato ṭhite samanantarāsevananatthivigatā anulomato na tiṭṭhanti, sahajāte paccanīyato ṭhite hetuaññamaññavipākajhānamaggasampayuttā anulomato na tiṭṭhanti, nissaye paccanīyato ṭhite vatthupurejāto anulomato na tiṭṭhati. Āhāre vā indriye vā paccanīyato ṭhite hetuaññamaññavipākajhānamaggasampayuttā anulomato na tiṭṭhanti. Ārammaṇe pana paccanīyato ṭhite adhipatiupanissayā anulomato na tiṭṭhanti, ārammaṇādhipatiārammaṇūpanissayā pana na labbhanti. Iminā upāyena sabbattha yaṃ labbhati, yañca na labbhati, taṃ jānitvā labbhamānavasena vārā uddharitabbā.

And in those conditions where the counteractive stands, those that do not stand in the forward order should also be understood. For example—when in the immediacy condition the counteractive stands, the contiguity, repetition, absence, and disappearance conditions do not stand in the forward order; when in conascence the counteractive stands, the root, mutuality, result, jhāna, path, and association conditions do not stand in the forward order; when in dependence the counteractive stands, the base-prenascence condition does not stand in the forward order. When in nutriment or faculty the counteractive stands, the root, mutuality, result, jhāna, path, and association conditions do not stand in the forward order. But when in the object condition the counteractive stands, dominance and decisive support do not stand in the forward order, and object-dominance and object-decisive support are not obtained. By this method, everywhere, what is obtained and what is not obtained should be known, and the instances should be extracted based on what is obtainable.

Tattha sabbesupi timūlakādīsu anantare sattātiādayo dumūlake laddhavārāyeva sattamūlakādīsu pana nasahajātapaccayā nissaye tīṇīti purejātavasena vatthunissaye tīṇi. Kamme dve nānākkhaṇikavaseneva. Āhāre [Pg.480] ekaṃ kabaḷīkārāhāravasena. Indriye ekaṃ rūpindriyavasena. Kamena gantvā vippayutte tīṇīti kusalādīnaṃ abyākatantāni pacchājātavasena. Atthiavigatesu pañcāti tāni ceva tīṇi, kusalābyākatā abyākatassa, akusalābyākatā abyākatassāti imāni ca dve pacchājātāhārindriyavasenāti. Pacchājātapaccayassa paccanīkabhāvato paṭṭhāya pana atthiavigatesu ekanti abyākato abyākatassa āhārindriyavasena. Nāhāre gahite naindriyapaccayāti na gahetabbaṃ. Tathā naindriye gahite nāhārapaccayāti. Kasmā? Dvīsu ekato gahitesu gaṇetabbavārassa abhāvato. Jhānamaggādīsupi paccanīkato ṭhitesu āhārato vā indriyato vā ekaṃ anulomaṃ akatvāva avasāne indriye ekaṃ, atthiyā ekaṃ, avigate ekaṃ, āhāre ekaṃ, atthiyā ekaṃ, avigate ekanti vuttaṃ. Sesamettha uttānatthamevāti.

Therein, in all cases of the three-rooted, etc., the seven instances in the contiguity condition, etc., are just those whose turns were obtained in the two-rooted. However, in the seven-rooted, etc., by non-conascence condition, in the dependence condition there are three by way of pre-nascence, that is, three in base-dependence. In kamma, there are two by way of the different-moment condition. For nutriment, one by way of physical nutriment. For faculty, one by way of material faculty. Proceeding in order, in the disassociation condition there are three—the wholesome, etc., ending with the indeterminate—by way of post-nascence. In presence and non-disappearance, there are five: those same three, plus these two—the wholesome-and-indeterminate for the indeterminate, and the unwholesome-and-indeterminate for the indeterminate—by way of post-nascent nutriment and faculty. However, starting from the counteractive state of the post-nascence condition, in presence and non-disappearance there is one: the indeterminate for the indeterminate by way of nutriment and faculty. When the condition is 'non-nutriment', the condition 'non-faculty' should not be included; likewise, when the condition is 'non-faculty', the condition 'non-nutriment' should not be included. Why? Because when the two are taken together, there is no instance to be counted. Also in jhāna, path, etc., when they stand in the counteractive, without making a single one forward from either nutriment or faculty, at the end it is said: in faculty one, in presence one, in non-disappearance one; in nutriment one, in presence one, in non-disappearance one. The rest here has a plain meaning.

Nahetumūlakaṃ.

The Non-Root Basis.

636. Nārammaṇamūlakādīsu naaññamaññamūlake naaññamaññapaccayā hetuyā tīṇīti kusalādīni cittasamuṭṭhānānaṃ. Adhipatiyā aṭṭhāti adhipatiyā vuttesu dasasu ‘‘kusalo kusalābyākatassa, akusalo akusalābyākatassā’’ti dve apanetvā sesāni aṭṭha. Sahajāte pañcāti hetuyā vuttehi tīhi saddhiṃ ‘‘kusalo ca abyākato ca abyākatassa, akusalo ca abyākato ca abyākatassā’’ti ime dve. Nissaye sattāti tehi pañcahi saddhiṃ ‘‘abyākato kusalassa, abyākato akusalassā’’ti ime dve vatthuvasena. Kamme tīṇīti hetuyā vuttāneva. Sesatikesupi eseva nayo. Adhipatiyā tīṇīti heṭṭhā vuttāneva.

636. In the non-object basis, etc., in the non-mutuality basis, by non-mutuality condition, there are three instances by root, namely the wholesome, etc., for mind-originated phenomena. In the case of dominance, there are eight: among the ten mentioned under dominance, excluding 'the wholesome for the wholesome-and-indeterminate' and 'the unwholesome for the unwholesome-and-indeterminate,' the remaining eight. In the case of conascence, there are five: the three mentioned under the root condition, along with these two, 'the wholesome and indeterminate for the indeterminate' and 'the unwholesome and indeterminate for the indeterminate.' In the case of dependence, there are seven: the five mentioned above, plus these two, 'the indeterminate for the wholesome' and 'the indeterminate for the unwholesome,' in terms of the base. In the case of kamma, there are three: the very same as those mentioned under the root condition. This same method applies to the remaining triads as well. In the case of dominance, there are three: the very same as those mentioned below.

644. Nāhāramūlake aññamaññe tīṇīti ṭhapetvā āhāre sesacetasikavasena veditabbāni. Yathā ca heṭṭhā, tathā idhāpi nāhāranaindriyesu ekekameva gahitaṃ, na dve ekato.

644. In the non-nutriment basis, there are three in the mutuality condition, which should be understood by way of the remaining mental factors, excluding nutriment. And just as below, so here too: in the non-nutriment and non-faculty conditions, only one is taken at a time, not two together.

648. Nasampayuttapaccayā [Pg.481] hetuyā tīṇīti heṭṭhā naaññamaññe vuttāneva. Adhipatiyā aṭṭhāti vuttāneva. Navippayuttamūlake kamme pañcāti kusalādicetanā sahajātakusalādīnaṃ, nānākkhaṇikā kusalākusalacetanā kammasamuṭṭhānarūpassāti evaṃ pañca. Āhārindriyesu tīṇi sahajātasadisāni. Jhānamaggādīsu tīṇi hetusadisāni.

648. By non-association condition, there are three by root, just as stated below in the non-mutuality condition. For the dominance condition, eight—just as previously stated. In the non-disassociation basis, in kamma, there are five: wholesome and other volitions for conascent wholesome states and so on, and wholesome and unwholesome volitions occurring at different moments for kamma-originated matter—thus, five. In the case of nutriment and faculties, three—similar to the conascent. In the case of jhāna and path, three—similar to the roots.

650. Noatthimūlake yasmā hetu noatthi nāma na hoti, niyamato atthiyeva, tasmā taṃ aggahetvā nārammaṇe navāti vuttaṃ. Yathā ca hetu, tathā aññepi atthipaccayalakkhaṇayuttā ettha anulomato na tiṭṭhanti. Kamme dveti idaṃ pana nānākkhaṇikakammavasena vuttaṃ. Paccanīyato sabbe labbhanti. Yaṃ pana anulomato labbhamānampi aggahetvā tato puretarā paccayā paccanīyato gayhanti, so pacchā yojanaṃ labhati. Tenevettha ‘‘noatthipaccayā nahetupaccayā…pe… noavigatapaccayā kamme dve’’ti vuttaṃ. Kasmā panesa sakaṭṭhāneyeva na gahitoti? Yasmā avasesesupi paccanīyato ṭhitesu ekova anulomato labbhati. Idañhi imasmiṃ paccayānulome lakkhaṇaṃ – yo sabbesu paccanīyato ṭhitesu ekova anulomato labbhati, so pacchā vuccatīti. Noatthipaccayā nohetupaccayā…pe… noavigatapaccayā upanissaye navāti etthāpi eseva nayo. Idaṃ pana pakatūpanissayavasena vuttaṃ. Iminā upāyena sabbattha labbhamānaṃ alabbhamānaṃ purevuttaṃ pacchāvuttañca veditabbanti.

650. In the section based on non-presence, because a root is not called 'non-presence' (for it is invariably present), therefore, not taking that, it is said, 'in non-object, nine.' Just as with a root, so also other factors endowed with the characteristic of the presence condition do not stand here in the positive order. 'In kamma, two'—this, however, is stated with regard to kamma arising in different moments. All are obtainable in the negative order. However, without taking that which is obtainable in the positive order, the earlier conditions are taken in the negative order, and it obtains its connection later. Therefore, here it is said: 'By the non-presence condition, by the non-root condition…pe… by the non-disappearance condition, in kamma, two.' But why is this not taken in its own place? Because even when the remaining factors are established in the negative order, only one is obtainable in the positive order. For this is the characteristic in this positive order of conditions: that which is obtainable in the positive order alone when all are established in the negative order, is spoken of later. 'By the non-presence condition, by the non-root condition…pe… by the non-disappearance condition, in decisive support, nine'—here too, the same method applies. This, however, is stated with regard to natural decisive support. By this method, what is obtainable everywhere, what is unobtainable, what was stated earlier, and what was stated later should be understood.

Pañhāvārassa paccanīyānulomavaṇṇanā.

The explanation of the negative-positive order in the Pañhāvāra.

Niṭṭhitā ca kusalattikapaṭṭhānassa vaṇṇanāti.

Thus ends the explanation of the Paṭṭhāna on the wholesome triad.

2. Vedanāttikavaṇṇanā

2. Explanation of the Triad of Feelings

1. Vedanāttike tisso vedanā rūpaṃ nibbānanti ime dhammā na labbhanti, tasmā ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭicca dve khandhātiādi vuttaṃ. Paṭisandhikkhaṇe sukhāya vedanāyāti sahetukapaṭisandhivasena vuttaṃ. Dukkhavedanā paṭisandhiyaṃ na labbhatīti [Pg.482] dutiyavāre paṭisandhiggahaṇaṃ na kataṃ. Tatiyavāre paṭisandhikkhaṇeti sahetukapaṭisandhivasena vuttaṃ. Sesamettha ito paresu ca paccayesu yathāpāḷimeva niyyāti. Sabbattha tayo tayo vārā vuttā. Tena vuttaṃ hetuyā tīṇi…pe… avigate tīṇīti.

1. In the triad of feelings, the three feelings, form, and Nibbāna—these phenomena are not obtainable; therefore, it is said, 'one aggregate depending on two aggregates,' and so on. 'At the moment of rebirth-linking, with pleasant feeling'—this is stated by way of rebirth-linking with roots. Painful feeling is not obtainable at rebirth-linking—thus, in the second instance, the mention of rebirth-linking is not made. In the third instance, 'at the moment of rebirth-linking'—this is stated by way of rebirth-linking with roots. The remainder here and in the subsequent conditions proceeds exactly as in the Pāli text. Everywhere, three instances each are stated. Therefore it is said: 'By root condition, three... pe... by non-disappearance condition, three.'

6. Paccayasaṃsandane pana sahetukāya vipākadukkhavedanāya abhāvato hetumūlakanaye vipāke dveti vuttaṃ. Adhipatiādīhi saddhiṃ saṃsandanesupi vipāke dveyeva. Kasmā? Vipāke dukkhavedanāya adhipatijhānamaggānaṃ abhāvato. Yehi ca saddhiṃ saṃsandane vipāke dve vārā labbhanti, vipākena saddhiṃ saṃsandane tesupi dveyeva.

6. In the connection of conditions, however, due to the absence of resultant painful feeling with roots, it is said, 'in the resultant, two' in the method based on root condition. Even when connecting with dominance and other conditions, there are still only two in the resultant. Why? Because for resultant painful feeling there is an absence of dominance, absorption, and path. And for those conditions with which, in connection, two instances in the resultant are obtained, when they are connected with the resultant condition, there are also only two.

10. Paccanīye napurejāte āruppe ca paṭisandhiyañca dukkhavedanāya abhāvato dve vārā āgatā. Navippayuttepi āruppe dukkhābhāvato dveyeva. Sabbaarūpadhammapariggāhakā pana sahajātādayo paccayā imasmiṃ paccanīyavāre parihāyanti. Kasmā? Vedanāsampayuttassa dhammassa vedanāsampayuttaṃ paṭicca sahajātādīhi vinā anuppattito pacchājātapaccayañca vināva uppattito.

10. In the negative section, in non-prenascence, in the formless realm, and at rebirth-linking, due to the absence of painful feeling, two instances are given. Even in non-dissociation, in the formless realm, due to the absence of pain, there are only two. However, the co-nascent and other conditions that encompass all immaterial phenomena are omitted in this negative section. Why? Because a phenomenon associated with feeling, conditioned by that which is associated with feeling, does not arise without co-nascent and other such conditions, and it arises even without the post-nascent condition.

17. Paccayasaṃsandane pana napurejāte ekanti āruppe paṭisandhiyañca ahetukādukkhamasukhavedanāsampayuttaṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Nakamme dveti ahetukakiriyasampayuttacetanāvasena vuttaṃ. Sukhāya hi adukkhamasukhāya ca vedanāya sampayutte dhamme paṭicca tāhi vedanāhi sampayuttā ahetukakiriyacetanā uppajjanti. Nahetupaccayā navipākepi eseva nayo. Navippayutte ekanti āruppe āvajjanavasena vuttaṃ. Iminā upāyena sabbasaṃsandanesu gaṇanā veditabbā.

17. However, in the connection of conditions, 'one in non-prenascence' is stated with reference to that which is associated with rootless neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling at rebirth-linking in the formless realm. 'Two in non-kamma' is stated by way of volition associated with rootless functional consciousness. For rootless functional volitions associated with pleasant or neutral feeling arise conditioned by states associated with those feelings. The same method applies to non-root condition and non-resultant. 'One in non-dissociation' is stated by way of advertence in the formless realm. By this method, the enumeration in all connections should be understood.

25-37. Anulomapaccanīye paccanīye laddhapaccayā eva paccanīyato tiṭṭhanti. Paccanīyānulome sabbā rūpadhammapariggāhakā sahajātādayo anulomatova tiṭṭhanti, na paccanīyato. Ahetukassa pana cittuppādassa adhipati natthīti adhipatipaccayo anulomato na tiṭṭhati. Paṭiccavārādīsu pana pacchājāto anulomato na labbhatiyevāti parihīno. Ye cettha anulomato labbhanti, te paccanīyato labbhamānehi saddhiṃ parivattetvāpi [Pg.483] yojitāyeva. Tesu tīṇi dve ekanti tayova vāraparicchedā, te sabbattha yathānurūpaṃ sallakkhetabbā. Yo cāyaṃ paṭiccavāre vutto, sahajātavārādīsupi ayameva vaṇṇanānayo.

25-37. In the positive-negative, the conditions obtained in the negative stand only as negative conditions. In the negative-positive, all those that encompass material phenomena, such as the co-nascent, etc., stand only as positive conditions, not as negative conditions. However, for a rootless thought-moment, there is no dominance, so the dominance condition does not stand as a positive condition. In the sections beginning with the Dependent Origination order, however, the post-nascent is not obtained as a positive condition at all, hence it is excluded. And those here that are obtainable as positive conditions are connected even when combined by alternation with those obtainable as negative conditions. Among these, there are only three delimitations of instances: three, two, or one; these are to be carefully considered appropriately everywhere. And this method of description that has been stated in the Dependent Origination order is the same in the sections beginning with the co-nascent order.

38. Pañhāvāre pana sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānanti tena saddhiṃ sampayuttakānaṃ khandhānaṃ tehiyeva vā hetūhi sukhavedanādīhi vā.

38. In the Pañhāvāra, 'of the associated aggregates' means of the aggregates associated with it, or with those very roots, or with pleasant feeling, etc.

39. Vippaṭisārissāti dānādīsu tāva ‘‘kasmā mayā idaṃ kataṃ, duṭṭhu me kataṃ, akataṃ seyyo siyā’’ti evaṃ vippaṭisārissa. Jhānaparihāniyaṃ pana ‘‘parihīnaṃ me jhānaṃ, mahājāniyo vatamhī’’ti evaṃ vippaṭisārissa. Moho uppajjatīti dosasampayuttamoho. Tathā mohaṃ arabbhāti dosasampayuttamohameva.

39. 'Of one who regrets' means, firstly, of one who, concerning giving etc., regrets thus: 'Why did I do this? I have done it badly. It would have been better if I had not done it.' But concerning the decline of jhāna, one regrets thus: 'My jhāna has declined; alas, I am a great loser!' 'Delusion arises' means delusion associated with aversion. Similarly, 'in relation to delusion' refers only to delusion associated with aversion.

45. Sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṃ bhavaṅgaṃ adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttassa bhavaṅgassāti tadārammaṇasaṅkhātaṃ piṭṭhibhavaṅgaṃ mūlabhavaṅgassa. Vuṭṭhānassāti tadārammaṇassa bhavaṅgassa vā. Ubhayampi hetaṃ kusalākusalajavanato vuṭṭhitattā vuṭṭhānanti vuccati. Kiriyaṃ vuṭṭhānassāti etthāpi eseva nayo. Phalaṃ vuṭṭhānassāti phalacittaṃ bhavaṅgassa. Bhavaṅgena hi phalato vuṭṭhito nāma hoti. Parato ‘‘vuṭṭhāna’’nti āgataṭṭhānesupi eseva nayo.

45. The life-continuum associated with pleasant feeling for the life-continuum associated with neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling: this refers to the subsequent life-continuum, designated as tadārammaṇa, for the root life-continuum. 'For emergence' refers either to the tadārammaṇa or to the bhavaṅga. Both are called 'emergence' because they have emerged from wholesome or unwholesome impulsions. 'For emergence which is functional'—here too the same method applies. 'For emergence which is fruition' means the fruition consciousness for the life-continuum. For one is said to have emerged from fruition by means of the life-continuum. The same method applies to instances where 'emergence' is mentioned further on.

46. Dukkhāya vedanāya sampayuttā khandhāti domanassasampayuttā akusalā khandhā. Adukkhamasukhāya vedanāya sampayuttassa vuṭṭhānassāti tadārammaṇasaṅkhātassa āgantukabhavaṅgassa vā upekkhāsampayuttamūlabhavaṅgassa vā. Sace pana somanassasahagataṃ mūlabhavaṅgaṃ hoti, tadārammaṇassa ca uppattikāraṇaṃ na hoti, javanassa ārammaṇato aññasmimpi ārammaṇe adukkhamasukhavedanaṃ akusalavipākaṃ uppajjateva. Tampi hi javanato vuṭṭhitattā vuṭṭhānanti vuccati. Sahajātapaccayādiniddesā uttānatthāyeva. Nahettha kiñci atthi, yaṃ na sakkā siyā heṭṭhā vuttanayena vedetuṃ, tasmā sādhukaṃ upalakkhetabbaṃ.

46. 'Aggregates associated with painful feeling' means the unwholesome aggregates associated with displeasure. 'For emergence associated with neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling' refers either to the adventitious life-continuum designated as tadārammaṇa, or to the root life-continuum associated with equanimity. If, however, the root life-continuum is accompanied by joy, and there is no cause for the arising of tadārammaṇa, then an unwholesome resultant consciousness with neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling arises even in an object different from the object of the impulsion. That too is called 'emergence' because it has emerged from the impulsion. The exposition of the co-nascent condition and so on is of clear meaning. There is nothing here that cannot be understood by the method stated above; therefore, it should be carefully noted.

62. Idāni yasmiṃ yasmiṃ paccaye ye ye vārā laddhā, sabbe te saṅkhipitvā gaṇanāya dassetuṃ hetuyā tīṇītiādi vuttaṃ. Tattha sabbāni tīṇi [Pg.484] suddhānaṃ tiṇṇaṃ padānaṃ vasena veditabbāni. Ārammaṇe nava ekamūlakekāvasānāni. Adhipatiyā pañca sahajātādhipativasena amissāni tīṇi, ārammaṇādhipativasena ca ‘‘sukhāya sampayutto sukhāya sampayuttassa, adukkhamasukhāya sampayutto adukkhamasukhāya sampayuttassā’’ti dve, tāni na gaṇetabbāni. Sukhāya pana sampayutto adukkhamasukhāya, adukkhamasukhāya sampayutto sukhāyāti imāni dve gaṇetabbānīti evaṃ pañca. Anantarasamanantaresu sattāti sukhā dvinnaṃ, tathā dukkhā, adukkhamasukhā tiṇṇampīti evaṃ satta. Upanissaye navāti sukhasampayutto sukhasampayuttassa tīhipi upanissayehi, dukkhasampayuttassa pakatūpanissayeneva, upekkhāsampayuttassa tīhipi, dukkhasampayutto dukkhasampayuttassa anantarapakatūpanissayehi, sukhasampayuttassa pakatūpanissayena, adukkhamasukhasampayuttassa dvidhā, adukkhamasukhasampayutto adukkhamasukhasampayuttassa tidhāpi, tathā sukhasampayuttassa, dukkhasampayuttassa anantarapakatūpanissayehīti evaṃ nava. Paccayabhedato panettha pakatūpanissayā nava, anantarūpanissayā satta, ārammaṇūpanissayā cattāroti vīsati upanissayā. Purejātapacchājātā panettha chijjanti. Na hi purejātā pacchājātā vā arūpadhammā arūpadhammānaṃ paccayā honti.

62. Now, to show the count by summarizing all the permutations obtained in each condition, it is said: 'In the root condition, three,' and so on. Herein, all three are to be understood by way of the three pure terms. In the object condition, there are nine, with one as the root and one as the conclusion. In the predominance condition, there are five: three unmixed by way of co-nascent predominance, and by way of object predominance, the two—'associated with pleasure for what is associated with pleasure,' and 'associated with neither-pain-nor-pleasure for what is associated with neither-pain-nor-pleasure'—are not to be counted. However, 'associated with pleasure for what is associated with neither-pain-nor-pleasure,' and 'associated with neither-pain-nor-pleasure for what is associated with pleasure'—these two are to be counted; thus there are five. In the contiguous and immediately contiguous conditions, there are seven: pleasure for two, likewise pain for two, and neither-pain-nor-pleasure for all three—thus seven. In the decisive support condition, there are nine: a state associated with pleasure is a condition for a state associated with pleasure by all three decisive supports; for one associated with pain, only by natural decisive support; for one associated with equanimity, by all three. A state associated with pain is a condition for a state associated with pain by immediate and natural decisive support; for one associated with pleasure, by natural decisive support; for one associated with neither-pain-nor-pleasure, in two ways. A state associated with neither-pain-nor-pleasure is a condition for a state associated with neither-pain-nor-pleasure in three ways, and likewise for one associated with pleasure; for one associated with pain, by immediate and natural decisive support—thus there are nine. Here, by way of the distinction of conditions, there are nine natural decisive supports, seven immediate decisive supports, and four object decisive supports, making twenty decisive supports. Pre-nascence and post-nascence are excluded here, for pre-nascent or post-nascent immaterial phenomena are not conditions for immaterial phenomena.

Kamme aṭṭhāti sukhasampayutto sukhasampayuttassa dvidhāpi, dukkhasampayuttassa nānākkhaṇikatova tathā itarassa. Dukkhasampayutto dukkhasampayuttassa dvidhāpi, sukhasampayuttassa natthi, itarassa nānākkhaṇikatova adukkhamasukhasampayutto adukkhamasukhasampayuttassa dvidhāpi, itaresaṃ nānākkhaṇikatoti evaṃ aṭṭha. Paccayabhedato panettha nānākkhaṇikā aṭṭha, sahajātā tīṇīti ekādasa kammapaccayā. Yathā ca purejātapacchājātā, evaṃ vippayuttapaccayopettha chijjati. Arūpadhammā hi arūpadhammānaṃ vippayuttapaccayo na honti. Natthivigatesu satta anantarasadisāva. Evamettha tīṇi pañca satta aṭṭha navāti pañca gaṇanaparicchedā. Tesaṃ vasena paccayasaṃsandane ūnataragaṇanena saddhiṃ saṃsandanesu atirekañca alabbhamānañca apanetvā gaṇanā veditabbā.

In the kamma condition, there are eight: a state associated with pleasure for a state associated with pleasure, in both ways; for one associated with pain, only by way of different moments, and likewise for the other. A state associated with pain for a state associated with pain, in both ways; for one associated with pleasure, it does not occur; for the other, only by way of different moments. A state associated with neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling for a state associated with neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, in both ways; for the others, only by way of different moments—thus, eight. By way of the distinction of conditions, there are eight different-moment and three co-nascent, thus eleven kamma conditions. And just as pre-nascence and post-nascence, so too the dissociation condition is excluded here. For immaterial phenomena are not a dissociation condition for immaterial phenomena. In the absence and disappearance conditions, the seven are just like in the contiguous condition. Thus, here there are three, five, seven, eight, and nine—five numerical divisions. Based on these, in the combination of conditions, the count should be understood by removing what is excessive and what is unobtainable in the combinations with a lesser number.

63-64. Hetuyā [Pg.485] saddhiṃ ārammaṇaṃ na labbhati, tathā anantarādayo. Adhipatiyā dveti dukkhapadaṃ ṭhapetvā sesāni dve. Dukkhasampayutto hi hetu adhipati nāma natthi, tasmā so na labbhatīti apanīto. Sesadvayesupi eseva nayo. Iti hetumūlake dveyeva gaṇanaparicchedā, tesaṃ vasena cha ghaṭanāni vuttāni. Tesu paṭhamaṃ avipākabhūtānaṃ ñāṇavippayuttanirādhipatidhammānaṃ vasena vuttaṃ, dutiyaṃ tesaññeva vipākabhūtānaṃ, tatiyacatutthāni tesaññeva ñāṇasampayuttānaṃ, pañcamaṃ avipākabhūtasādhipatiamohavasena, chaṭṭhaṃ vipākabhūtasādhipatiamohavasena. Paṭhamaṃ vā sabbahetuvasena, dutiyaṃ sabbavipākahetuvasena, tatiyaṃ sabbāmohahetuvasena, catutthaṃ sabbavipākāmohahetuvasena. Pañcamaṃ sabbasādhipatiamohavasena, chaṭṭhaṃ sabbasādhipativipākāmohavasena.

63-64. With the root condition, the object condition is not obtained, and likewise the contiguous condition and others. In the predominance condition, there are two: setting aside the term associated with pain, there are the remaining two. For a root associated with pain is not a predominance factor; therefore, it is not obtained and is removed. The same method applies to the remaining two. Thus, in the section rooted in the hetu condition, there are only two numerical divisions, and based on these, six combinations are stated. Among them, the first is stated by way of non-resultant, knowledge-dissociated phenomena without predominance; the second, by way of those same resultant phenomena; the third and fourth, by way of those same knowledge-associated phenomena; the fifth, by way of non-resultant phenomena with predominance and non-delusion; the sixth, by way of resultant phenomena with predominance and non-delusion. Alternatively, the first is by way of all roots; the second, by way of all resultant roots; the third, by way of all non-delusion roots; the fourth, by way of all resultant non-delusion roots; the fifth, by way of all roots with predominance and non-delusion; the sixth, by way of all resultant roots with predominance and non-delusion.

66. Ārammaṇamūlake adhipatiyā cattārīti ārammaṇādhipativasena sukhaṃ sukhassa, adukkhamasukhassa, adukkhamasukhaṃ adukkhamasukhassa, sukhassāti evaṃ cattāri. Upanissayepi ārammaṇūpanissayavasena cattāro vuttā. Ghaṭanāni panettha ekameva. Adhipatimūlakādīsupi heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva yaṃ labbhati yañca na labbhati, taṃ sabbaṃ sādhukaṃ sallakkhetvā saṃsandanaghaṭanagaṇanā veditabbā.

66. In the object-based section, four are stated for the predominance condition by way of object predominance: pleasant feeling for pleasant feeling, pleasant feeling for neutral feeling, neutral feeling for neutral feeling, and neutral feeling for pleasant feeling—thus four. In the decisive support condition also, four are stated by way of object decisive support. Here, there is only one combination. In the sections based on the predominance condition and others, whatever is obtained and whatever is not obtained should be carefully noted according to the method stated earlier, and the calculation of combinations and connections should be understood accordingly.

83-87. Paccanīyamhi kusalattike vuttanayeneva anulomato paccaye uddharitvā tattha laddhānaṃ vārānaṃ vasena paccanīyato gaṇanavasena nahetuyā navāti sabbapaccayesu nava vārā dassitā. Te ekamūlakekāvasānānaṃ navannaṃ vissajjanānaṃ vasena ‘‘sukhāya vedanāya sampayutto dhammo sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttassa dhammassa nahetupaccayena paccayo, sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttena cittena dānaṃ datvā’’tiādinā nayena pāḷiṃ uddharitvā dassetabbā. Paccayasaṃsandane panettha nahetupaccayā…pe… naupanissaye aṭṭhāti nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayavasena veditabbā. Dubbalakammañhi vipākassa na upanissayo hoti. Kevalaṃ pana nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayeneva paccayo hoti. Sesamettha anulomapaccanīyapaccanīyānulomesu ca tesaṃ tesaṃ paccayānaṃ yoge laddhavāravasena sakkā heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva gaṇetuṃ, tasmā na vitthāritanti.

83-87. In the negative section, in accordance with the method stated in the triad of wholesome states, having extracted the conditions from the affirmative order, and based on the instances obtained therein, by way of negative enumeration, nine instances are shown for the non-root condition among all conditions. These should be demonstrated by way of the nine explanations for the single-root, single-ending questions, by extracting the Pāli in the manner of: “A phenomenon associated with pleasant feeling is a condition for a phenomenon associated with pleasant feeling by the non-root condition; having given a gift with a mind associated with pleasant feeling,” and so on. In the combination of conditions here, from the non-root condition… up to… non-decisive support, eight instances are to be understood by way of the kamma condition occurring at different moments. For feeble kamma is not a decisive support for its result; it is a condition only by way of the kamma condition occurring at different moments. The rest here, in the affirmative-negative and negative-affirmative, for the application of each of those conditions, it is possible to enumerate based on the instances obtained, according to the method stated earlier. Therefore, it is not elaborated.

Vedanāttikavaṇṇanā.

The Exposition on the Triad of Feeling.

3. Vipākattikavaṇṇanā

3. The Exposition on the Triad of Result.

1-23. Vipākattike [Pg.486] vipākaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca vipāko dhammo uppajjati hetupaccayāti ye hetupaccaye terasa vārā vuttā, te saṅkhipitvā gaṇanāya dassetuṃ hetuyā terasāti vuttaṃ. Ārammaṇe pañcātiādīsupi eseva nayo. Evamettha terasa pañca nava satta tīṇi dveti cha gaṇanaparicchedā, tesaṃ vasena paccayasaṃsandane heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva gaṇanā veditabbā.

1-23. In the triad of result, a resultant phenomenon arises dependent on a resultant phenomenon by the root condition—the thirteen instances stated for the root condition are summarized and stated as 'thirteen for the root condition' to show the enumeration. The same method applies to 'for the object condition, five,' and so on. Thus, in this case, there are six numerical sections: thirteen, five, nine, seven, three, and two. Based on these, the enumeration in the combination of conditions should be understood in the same way as stated earlier.

24-52. Paccanīyepi vipākaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca vipāko dhammo uppajjati nahetupaccayāti ye nahetupaccaye dasa vārā vuttā, te saṅkhipitvā gaṇanāya dassetuṃ nahetuyā dasāti vuttaṃ. Na ārammaṇe pañcātiādīsupi eseva nayo. Evamettha dasa pañca terasa dvādasa dve ekaṃ nava tīṇīti aṭṭha gaṇanaparicchedā, tesaṃ vasena paccayasaṃsandane heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva vitthārato gaṇanā veditabbā. Pāḷi pana saṅkhittā, etesaññeva pana laddhagaṇanaraparicchedānaṃ vārānaṃ vasena saṃsanditvā anulomapaccanīyaṃ paccanīyānulomañca veditabbaṃ.

24-52. In the negative section also, a resultant phenomenon arises dependent on a resultant phenomenon by the non-root condition. The ten instances stated for the non-root condition are summarized and stated as 'ten for the non-root condition' to show the enumeration. The same method applies to 'for the non-object condition, five,' and so on. Thus, in this context, there are eight sections of enumeration: ten, five, thirteen, twelve, two, one, nine, and three. Based on these, the detailed enumeration in the combination of conditions should be understood in the manner explained earlier. The Pāli, however, is concise; but by combining these obtained numerical sections by way of instances, both the affirmative-negative and negative-affirmative should be understood.

Sahajātavāro imināva ekagatiko. Paccayanissayasaṃsaṭṭhasampayuttavārā yathāpāḷimeva niyyanti.

The co-nascence section proceeds in this very same way. The sections on condition, dependence, connection, and association proceed according to the Pāli itself.

92. Pañhāvāre kusalākusale niruddheti etasmiṃ vipassanāvasena pavatte kusale sārajjanādivasena pavatte akusale ca niruddhe. Vipāko tadārammaṇatā uppajjatīti kāmāvacaravipāko tadārammaṇatāya uppajjati. Ye pana ‘‘vipassanājavanānaṃ vicikicchuddhaccānañca pariyosāne tadārammaṇaṃ natthī’’ti vadanti, te imāya tantiyā paṭisedhetabbā. Ākāsānañcāyatanakusalaṃ viññāṇañcāyatanassa kiriyassa ārammaṇapaccayena paccayoti arahattaṃ patvā asamāpannapubbā samāpattiyo paṭilomato samāpajjantassa vasenetaṃ vuttaṃ. Iminā upāyena sabbavissajjanesu sādhukaṃ pāḷiṃ upaparikkhitvā attho veditabbo.

92. In the section on questions, 'when wholesome and unwholesome states have ceased' means when wholesome states occurring by way of insight have ceased, and when unwholesome states occurring by way of attachment and so forth have ceased. The resultant state arises as a 'taking that as its object'; thus, a sensual-sphere resultant state arises by way of taking that as its object. But those who say, “There is no tadārammaṇa at the conclusion of insight impulsion processes, or of doubt and agitation,” should be refuted by this text. The wholesome state of the base of infinite space is a condition for the functional consciousness of the base of infinite consciousness by way of the object condition; this is said with reference to one who, having attained arahantship, enters into the attainments in reverse order, not having previously entered them. By this method, one should carefully examine the Pāli in all the explanations and understand the meaning.

120. Hetuyā satta, ārammaṇe nava, adhipatiyā dasātiādīsupi sahajātādhipativasena ārammaṇādhipativasena sahajātanissayavasena purejātanissayavasena anantarūpanissayavasena ārammaṇūpanissayavasena [Pg.487] pakatūpanissayavasena sahajātavippayuttavasena purejātapacchājātavippayuttavasenāti yattha yattha yathā yathā yattakāni vissajjanāni labbhanti, tattha tattha tathā tathā tāni sabbāni sallakkhetabbāni. Tathā paccanīyādīsu anulomavasena vāruddharaṇaṃ, anulomato laddhavārānaṃ paccanīyato gaṇanā, paccayasaṃsandanaṃ, anulomapaccanīye paccanīyānulome ca suddhikesu ceva saṃsandanavasena ca pavattesu hetumūlakādīsu labbhamānavāragaṇanā, alabbhamānānaṃ alabbhamānatāti sabbaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ.

120. For the root condition, seven; for the object condition, nine; for the predominance condition, ten, and so forth—in all these cases, all the explanations should be carefully noted wherever and however many are obtainable, whether by way of co-nascence predominance, object predominance, co-nascence support, pre-nascence support, contiguity support, object decisive support, natural decisive support, co-nascence dissociation, or pre-nascence and post-nascence dissociation. Similarly, in the negative sections and so on, the extraction of instances in the affirmative order, the enumeration from the negative order of the instances obtained from the affirmative order, the combinations of conditions, the enumeration of instances obtainable in the root-based sections and so forth—occurring in the affirmative-negative and negative-affirmative, both in the pure cases and by way of combination—and the non-obtainability of what is not obtainable: all this should be understood in the manner explained earlier.

Yathā cettha, evaṃ ito paresupi tikadukesu. Paṭṭhānapakaraṇañhi pāḷitova anantaṃ aparimāṇaṃ. Tassa padapaṭipāṭiyā atthaṃ vaṇṇayissāmīti paṭipannassa atidīghāyukassāpi āyu nappahoti. Na cassa ekadesaṃ vaṇṇetvā sesamhi nayato dassiyamāne na sakkā attho jānituṃ, tasmā ito paraṃ ettakampi avatvā sesesu tikadukesu heṭṭhā avuttappakārattā yaṃ yaṃ avassaṃ vattabbaṃ, taṃ tadeva vakkhāma. Yaṃ pana avatvā gamissāma, taṃ pāḷinayeneva veditabbanti.

As it is here, so too in the remaining triads and dyads. For the Book of Conditional Relations in Pāli is indeed endless and immeasurable. For one who undertakes to explain its meaning following the sequence of the words, even a very long life would not suffice. Nor is it possible to understand its meaning by explaining a portion and indicating the method for the remainder. Therefore, from now on, without saying even this much, we will speak only of what is absolutely necessary in the remaining triads and dyads, because the manner has not been stated earlier. Whatever we pass over without saying should be understood according to the method of the Pāli.

Vipākattikavaṇṇanā.

The Exposition on the Triad of Result.

4. Upādinnattikavaṇṇanā

4. The Exposition on the Clung-to Triad.

51. Upādinnupādāniyattikassa pañhāvāre vatthu upādāniyānaṃ khandhānaṃ purejātapaccayena paccayoti pavattiṃ sandhāya vuttaṃ. Paṭisandhiyaṃ pana taṃ purejātaṃ na hoti.

51. In the Question Section of the Triad of the Apprehended and Apprehendable, the statement that the physical basis is a condition for the apprehendable aggregates by way of pre-nascence condition is made with reference to the course of existence. At rebirth-linking, however, that is not pre-nascent.

72. Upādinnupādāniyo kabaḷīkāro āhāro upādinnupādāniyassa kāyassa āhārapaccayena paccayoti ettha upādinnupādāniyo kabaḷīkārāhāro nāma kammasamuṭṭhānānaṃ rūpānaṃ abbhantaragatā ojā. Upādinnupādāniyassa kāyassāti tasseva kammasamuṭṭhānarūpakāyassa āhārapaccayena paccayo. Rūpajīvitindriyaṃ viya kaṭattārūpānaṃ anupālanaupatthambhanavasena paccayo, na janakavasena. Yaṃ pana maṇḍūkādayo gilitvā ṭhitānaṃ ahiādīnaṃ kāyassa jīvamānakamaṇḍūkādisarīre ojā āhārapaccayena [Pg.488] paccayoti vadanti, taṃ na gahetabbaṃ. Na hi jīvamānakasarīre ojā aññassa sarīrassa āhārapaccayataṃ sādheti. Anupādinnupādāniyassa kāyassāti ettha pana janakavasenāpi labbhati. Upādinnupādāniyassa ca anupādinnupādāniyassa cāti ettha ekassa upatthambhakavasena, ekassa janakavasena, ubhinnampi vā upatthambhakavaseneva vutto. Dve pana āhārā ekato paccayā hontā upatthambhakāva honti, na janakā. Sesamettha pāḷimeva sādhukaṃ oloketvā veditabbaṃ.

72. The apprehended and apprehendable physical nutriment is a condition for the apprehended and apprehendable body by way of nutriment condition. Here, the apprehended and apprehendable physical nutriment refers to the nutritive essence contained within kamma-originated matter. The apprehended and apprehendable body means that same kamma-originated material body. It is a condition by way of nutriment condition in the sense of maintaining and supporting, like the life faculty of matter for kamma-born matter, not by way of generating. Some say that the nutritive essence in the bodies of living frogs, etc., that have been swallowed and remain in the bodies of snakes, etc., is a condition for the bodies of the snakes, etc., by way of nutriment condition; this should not be accepted. For the nutritive essence in a living body does not establish the state of being a nutriment condition for another body. But in the case of the non-apprehended and apprehendable body, it is also obtained by way of generating. In the case of both the apprehended and apprehendable and the non-apprehended and apprehendable, for one it is stated by way of supporting, for the other by way of generating, or for both only by way of supporting. But when two nutriments are conditions together, they are only supporting, not generating. The rest here should be understood by carefully examining the Pāli text itself.

Upādinnattikavaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Triad of the Apprehended.

5-22. Saṅkiliṭṭhattikādivaṇṇanā

5-22. Exposition of the Triads Beginning with the Defiled.

Saṅkiliṭṭhasaṅkilesikattike sabbaṃ kusalattike vuttanayānusāreneva veditabbaṃ.

In the Triad of the Defiled and Defiling, everything should be understood in accordance with the method stated in the Triad of the Wholesome.

79. Vitakkattike yathākammūpagañāṇassa parikammanti dibbacakkhuparikammameva tassa uppādanatthāya parikammaṃ. Uppannassa pana vaḷañjanakāle parikammaṃ sandhāyetaṃ vuttaṃ. Sesamettha yathāpāḷimeva niyyāti.

79. In the Triad of Thought, the preparatory work for the knowledge of conformity with kamma is the preparatory work for the divine eye, which is for the purpose of its production. But this is stated with reference to the preparatory work at the time of its application once it has arisen. The rest here proceeds exactly as in the Pāli text.

82. Ti tadārammaṇabhavaṅgamūlabhavaṅgānaṃ vasena vuttaṃ. Sesamettha sabbaṃ pāḷivaseneva veditabbaṃ.

82. This is stated in terms of the registering life-continuum and the root life-continuum. The rest here should all be understood as in the Pāli text.

Dassanattike dassanena pahātabbo rāgo uppajjatītiādīsu dassanena pahātabbo puthujjanassa uppajjati. Bhāvanāya pahātabbo sotāpannassāpīti evaṃ uparimassa uparimassa heṭṭhimā heṭṭhimā nuppajjantīti veditabbā. Dassanena pahātabbo dhammo bhāvanāya pahātabbassa dhammassa ekenapi paccayena paccayo na hoti. Sesamettha pāḷiṃ anugantvā kusalattike vuttalakkhaṇavaseneva veditabbaṃ.

In the Triad of Seeing, regarding 'the lust to be abandoned by seeing arises,' and so on—the lust to be abandoned by seeing arises in an ordinary person. That to be abandoned by development arises even in a stream-enterer. Thus, it should be understood that the lower defilements do not arise in the higher stages. A phenomenon to be abandoned by seeing is not a condition by even a single condition for a phenomenon to be abandoned by development. The rest here should be understood by following the Pāli text and in accordance with the characteristics stated in the Triad of the Wholesome.

Dassanenapahātabbahetukattike dassanenapahātabbahetukādīnaṃ vibhāgo aṭṭhakathākaṇḍe vuttanayeneva veditabbo. Vicikicchuddhaccasahagato moho ahetukattā tatiyapade paviṭṭho. Evamettha yesaṃ [Pg.489] dassanabhāvanāhi pahātabbo hetu atthi, te pahātabbahetukā. Yesaṃ so natthi te nevadassanena nabhāvanāyapahātabbahetukāti imaṃ pahātabbahetukavibhāgaṃ ñatvā sesaṃ dassanenapahātabbattike ceva kusalattike ca dassitalakkhaṇānusāreneva veditabbaṃ.

In the Triad of Roots to be Abandoned by Seeing, the classification of roots to be abandoned by seeing, etc., should be understood in accordance with the method stated in the commentary section. The delusion accompanied by doubt and restlessness is included in the third category because it is rootless. Thus, here, those that have a root to be abandoned by seeing or development are 'those with a root to be abandoned.' Those that do not have that are 'those with a root to be abandoned neither by seeing nor by development.' Having understood this classification of roots to be abandoned, the rest should be understood in accordance with the characteristics indicated in the Triad of What is to be Abandoned by Seeing and in the Triad of the Wholesome.

Ācayagāmittike ca paṭiccavārasaṃsaṭṭhavāresu anulomaṃ kusalattikasadisameva. Sesaṃ vissajjanato gaṇanato ca yathāpāḷimeva niyyāti.

In the Triad of Leading to Accumulation, the Dependent Origination Section and the Association Section are similar to the Triad of the Wholesome in the forward order. The rest proceeds exactly as in the Pāli text, both in terms of explanation and enumeration.

Sekkhattike asekkho dhammo sekkhassa dhammassa na kenaci paccayena paccayo. Sekkho asekkhassa anantarapakatūpanissayo pana hoti. Sesamettha yathāpāḷimeva niyyāti, tathā parittattike.

In the Triad of the Trainee, the untrainee state is not a condition for the trainee state by any condition. The trainee state, however, can be an immediately proximate decisive support for the untrainee state. The remainder here follows the wording of the Pāli text, and so also in the Triad of the Limited.

Parittārammaṇattike appamāṇārammaṇācetanāti sekkhānaṃ gotrabhucetanā, paccavekkhaṇacetanātipi vattuṃ vaṭṭati. Vipākānaṃ parittārammaṇānanti paṭisandhiyaṃ kammaṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā, pavatte cakkhuviññāṇādivasenarūpādiārammaṇaṃ, tadārammaṇavasena javanena gahitaparittārammaṇañca ārammaṇaṃ katvā uppannānaṃ. Ye pana ‘‘gotrabhucittena natthi paṭisandhī’’ti vadanti, te iminā suttena paṭisedhetabbā. Sesamettha pāḷinayeneva veditabbaṃ. Hīnattiko saṅkiliṭṭhattikasadiso.

In the Triad of Limited Object, 'volition with an immeasurable object' refers to the change-of-lineage volition of the trainees; it is also proper to say 'reviewing volition.' For resultant states with limited objects: at rebirth-linking, kamma is made the object; and in the course of existence, for those that have arisen, forms and other objects are objects by way of eye-consciousness, etc., and the limited object grasped by impulsion (javana) is also made an object by way of registering. Those who say, 'There is no rebirth-linking with change-of-lineage consciousness,' should be refuted by this discourse. The rest here should be understood according to the method of the Pāli text. The Triad of the Inferior is similar to the Triad of the Defiled.

Micchattattike micchattaniyato sammattaniyatassa, sammattaniyato vā micchattaniyatassa kenaci paccayena paccayo na hoti. Micchattaniyato vā sammattaniyato vā sahajātādhipatirahito nāma natthi. Sammattaniyate ekantato ārammaṇapurejātaṃ natthi, micchattaniyate siyā ārammaṇapurejātaṃ. Aniyataṃ cittaṃ ārabbha niyatā micchādiṭṭhi uppajjeyya. Sesā niyataṃ ārabbha niyataṃ nuppajjati, micchattaniyataṃ garuṃ katvā na koci dhammo uppajjati. Kusalo micchattassa upanissayapaccayo na hoti. Sesamettha pāḷiyaṃ vuttanayeneva veditabbaṃ.

In the Triad of Wrongness, the fixed in wrongness is not a condition for the fixed in rightness, nor is the fixed in rightness a condition for the fixed in wrongness by any condition. There is no state fixed in wrongness or fixed in rightness that is devoid of co-nascent dominance. In the state fixed in rightness, there is absolutely no object-prenascence, but in the state fixed in wrongness, there may be object-prenascence. A fixed wrong view may arise with reference to an undetermined mind. Other fixed states do not arise with reference to fixed states; no state arises having made the fixed in wrongness weighty. The wholesome is not a decisive support condition for wrongness. The remainder should be understood here as stated in the Pāli text.

Maggārammaṇattike paṭiccavārassa anulome vipākapaccayo natthi. Kammapaccayepi imasmiṃ tike nānākkhaṇikaṃ na labbhati, tathā uppannattikaatītattikesu. Paccanīye ahetukaṃ maggārammaṇanti ahetukaṃ maggārammaṇaṃ, āvajjanaṃ sandhāyetaṃ vuttaṃ. Sesamettha pāḷianusāreneva veditabbaṃ.

In the Triad of Path-Object, in the forward order of the Dependent Origination Section, there is no resultant condition. Also, in this triad, kamma condition across different moments is not found, nor in the Triad of the Arisen and the Triad of the Past. In the reverse order, 'rootless path-object' refers to rootless adverting. The rest here should be understood according to the Pāli text.

Uppannattike [Pg.490] ca atītattike ca paṭiccavārādayo natthi, pañhāvāramattameva labbhati. Kasmā? Paṭiccavārādayo hi sahajātapurejātānaññeva honti. Ime ca tikā atītānāgatamissakā. Uppannattike cettha anantarabhāgiyāpi paccayā na labbhanti. Kasmā? Uppannattike atītassa abhāvato. Uppanno ca anuppanno cāti ime cettha dve dhammā uppannassa ca anuppannassa cāti imesaṃ dvinnaṃ na kenaci paccayena paccayo. Anuppanno ca uppādī cāti ime pana dve uppannassa ārammaṇūpanissayavasena dvīhi paccayehi paccayo. Sesamettha pāḷiyaṃ āgatanayeneva veditabbaṃ.

In the Triad of the Arisen and the Triad of the Past, the Dependent Section, etc., do not occur; only the Question Section is found. Why? Because the Dependent Section, etc., apply only to conascence and prenascence conditions. And these triads are a mixture of past and future. In the Triad of the Arisen, even contiguity-group conditions are not found. Why? Because in the Triad of the Arisen, the past is absent. Here, these two states—arisen and unarisen—are not a condition for these two by any condition. However, these two—the unarisen and the arising—are a condition for the arisen by two conditions: object and decisive support. The rest here should be understood according to the method stated in the Pāli text.

Atītattike paccuppannaṃ atītānāgatassa, atītānāgatañca atītānāgatassa na kenaci paccayena paccayo. Nibbānaṃ pana dvīsupi imesu tikesu neva paccayato na paccayuppannato labbhati. Sesamidhāpi pāḷiyaṃ āgatanayeneva veditabbaṃ.

In the Triad of the Past, the present is not a condition for the past and future by any condition; and the past and future are not a condition for the past and future by any condition. Nibbāna, however, is not found as either a condition or a conditioned state in these two triads. The rest here should also be understood according to the method stated in the Pāli text.

Ajjhattattike ajjhattabahiddhāpadaṃ na gahitaṃ. Ajjhattabahiddhāsaṅkhātā hi ubho rāsayo neva ekato paccayā honti, na paccayuppannā; tasmā hatthatale ṭhapitassa sāsapassa vaṇṇopi hatthatalavaṇṇena saddhiṃ ekato ārammaṇaṃ na hotīti veditabbo. Yathā ca ajjhattabahiddhāpadaṃ, evamettha ajjhattārammaṇattikepi ajjhattabahiddhārammaṇapadaṃ na labbhati. Sesaṃ yathāpāḷimeva niyyāti.

In the Triad of the Internal, the category of 'internal and external' is not taken. For the two aggregates designated as internal and external are neither conditions together nor conditioned states; therefore, it should be understood that even the color of a mustard seed placed on the palm of the hand does not become a single object together with the color of the palm. Just as with the category of 'internal and external', so too in the Triad of Internal Objects, the category of 'internal and external objects' is not found. The rest follows as in the Pāli text.

Sanidassanattikepi pāḷivaseneva attho gahetabbo. Gaṇanāpettha pāḷiyaṃ āgatavāre saṅkhipitvā heṭṭhā vuttanayeneva saṃsandanesu saṃsanditvā veditabbāti.

In the Triad of the Visible also, the meaning should be taken as in the Pāli text itself. The enumeration here, too, should be understood by condensing the sections that occur in the Pāli and collating them with the comparisons according to the method stated below.

Dhammānulome tikapaṭṭhānavaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Triad-Paṭṭhāna in the Dhammānuloma.

2. Dukapaṭṭhānavaṇṇanā

2. The Exposition of the Dyad-Paṭṭhāna

Dukapaṭṭhānepi sabbadukesu pañhāvissajjanāni ceva gaṇanā ca pāḷiyaṃ āgatanayeneva veditabbā. Apicettha sahetukahetusampayuttadukānaṃ vissajjanaṃ hetudukavissajjanasadisaṃ; tathā hetūcevasahetukahetūcevahetusampayuttadukānaṃ, tathā sappaccayasaṅkhatadukānaṃ. Idaṃ dukaṃ yathā sappaccayadukaṃ, evaṃ kātabbanti idaṃ yasmā sappaccayo viya appaccayena [Pg.491] saṅkhatopi, asaṅkhatena saddhiṃ yojanaṃ na labbhati, tasmā vuttaṃ. Sārammaṇacittasampayuttasaṃsaṭṭhadukāpi sadisavissajjanāyeva; tathā āsavaoghayogagocchakā. Ete hi tayo aññamaññaṃ sadisavissajjanāyeva. Apica lokiyasāsavasaṃyojaniyaganthaniyanīvaraṇiyaparāmaṭṭhasaṅkilesikadukā āsavavippayuttasāsavasaṃyojanavippayuttasaṃyojaniyaganthavippayuttaganthaniyanīvaraṇavippayuttanīvaraṇiyaparāmāsavippayuttaparāmaṭṭhakilesavippayuttasaṅkilesikapariyāpannasauttaradukāta imepi dukā samānā.

In the Dyad-Paṭṭhāna, both the answers to the questions and the enumeration in all dyads should be understood according to the method given in the Pāli text. Moreover, here, the answers for the dyads of 'with root' (sahetuka) and 'conjoined with root' (hetusampayutta) are similar to the answers for the 'root dyad' (hetuduka); likewise for the dyads of 'root and with root' (hetūcevasahetuka) and 'root and conjoined with root' (hetūcevahetusampayutta), and similarly for the dyads of 'with condition' (sappaccaya) and 'conditioned' (saṅkhata). The 'conditioned' dyad is to be treated like the 'with condition' dyad; this is stated because for the 'conditioned' term, association with the 'unconditioned' term is not found. The dyads of 'with object' (sārammaṇa), 'conjoined with consciousness' (cittasampayutta), and 'associated' (saṃsaṭṭha) also have similar answers; likewise for the groups of taints (āsava), floods (ogha), and yokes (yoga). These three indeed have mutually similar answers. Furthermore, the worldly dyads of 'with taints' (sāsava), 'pertaining to fetters' (saṃyojaniya), 'pertaining to ties' (ganthaniya), 'pertaining to hindrances' (nīvaraṇiya), 'grasped at' (parāmaṭṭha), and 'defiling' (saṅkilesika) are similar to the dyads of 'disjoined from taints' (āsavavippayutta), 'disjoined from fetters' (saṃyojanavippayutta), 'disjoined from ties' (ganthavippayutta), 'disjoined from hindrances' (nīvaraṇavippayutta), 'disjoined from grasping' (parāmāsavippayutta), 'disjoined from defilements' (kilesavippayutta), 'included under the defiling' (saṅkilesikapariyāpanna), and 'with a superior' (sauttara). These dyads too are alike.

Kilesadukaṃ saṃyojanadukasadisaṃ. Saṅkiliṭṭhakilesasampayuttanīvaraṇasampayuttadassanenapahātabbasaraṇadukāpi samānā. Tathākilesā ceva saṅkiliṭṭhanīvaraṇā ceva nīvaraṇasampayuttakilesā ceva kilesasampayuttadukā. Iminā nayena sabbesaṃ atthato sadisānaṃ dukānaṃ vissajjanāni sadisāneva hontīti veditabbāni. Sabbasmimpi pana paṭṭhāne kenaciviññeyyadukaṃ na labbhati. Āsavā ceva āsavasampayuttā ca, saṃyojanā ceva saṃyojanasampayuttā ca, ganthā ceva ganthasampayuttā ca, nīvaraṇā ceva nīvaraṇasampayuttā ca, kilesā ceva saṅkiliṭṭhā cāti evarūpesu dukesu vipākapaccayo ceva nānākkhaṇikakammapaccayo ca na labbhati. Nahetusahetukanahetuahetukesu hetupaccayo natthi. Hetū ceva hetusampayuttā ca, āsavā ceva āsavasampayuttā ca, ganthā ceva ganthasampayuttā cāti imesu dukesu nahetunajhānanamaggā na labbhanti. Saṃyojanā ceva saṃyojanasampayuttā ca, nīvaraṇā ceva nīvaraṇasampayuttā ca, kilesā ceva kilesasampayuttā ca, kilesā ceva saṅkiliṭṭhā cāti imesu pana vicikicchuddhaccasahagatassa mohassa vasena nahetupaccayo labbhati; najhānanamaggapaccayā na labbhantīti evaṃ sabbadukesu labbhamānālabbhamānaṃ upaparikkhitvā pāḷivaseneva vāragaṇanā veditabbāti.

The 'defilement dyad' (kilesaduka) is similar to the 'fetter dyad' (saṃyojanaduka). The dyads of 'defiled' (saṅkiliṭṭha), 'conjoined with defilements' (kilesasampayutta), 'conjoined with hindrances' (nīvaraṇasampayutta), 'to be abandoned by vision' (dassanenapahātabba), and 'with a cause' (saraṇa) are also similar. Likewise, the dyads of 'defilements and defiled' (kilesā ceva saṅkiliṭṭhā ca), 'defiled and hindrances' (saṅkiliṭṭhanīvaraṇā), 'hindrances and conjoined with defilements' (nīvaraṇasampayuttakilesā), and 'conjoined with defilements' (kilesasampayutta) are also similar. In this way, it should be understood that the answers for all dyads that are similar in meaning are indeed similar. However, in the entire Paṭṭhāna, the dyad 'cognizable by some means' (kenaciviññeyya) is not found. In such dyads as 'taints and conjoined with taints' (āsavā ceva āsavasampayuttā ca), 'fetters and conjoined with fetters' (saṃyojanā ceva saṃyojanasampayuttā ca), 'ties and conjoined with ties' (ganthā ceva ganthasampayuttā ca), 'hindrances and conjoined with hindrances' (nīvaraṇā ceva nīvaraṇasampayuttā ca), and 'defilements and defiled' (kilesā ceva saṅkiliṭṭhā ca), the resultance condition (vipākapaccaya) and the different-moment kamma condition (nānākkhaṇikakammapaccaya) are not found. In the dyads of 'not-root and with root' (nahetusahetuka) and 'not-root and without root' (nahetuahetuka), the root condition (hetupaccaya) does not exist. In these dyads—'roots and conjoined with roots' (hetū ceva hetusampayuttā ca), 'taints and conjoined with taints' (āsavā ceva āsavasampayuttā ca), and 'ties and conjoined with ties' (ganthā ceva ganthasampayuttā ca)—the Not-Root, Not-Jhāna, and Not-Path conditions are not found. But in these dyads—'fetters and conjoined with fetters' (saṃyojanā ceva saṃyojanasampayuttā ca), 'hindrances and conjoined with hindrances' (nīvaraṇā ceva nīvaraṇasampayuttā ca), 'defilements and conjoined with defilements' (kilesā ceva kilesasampayuttā ca), and 'defilements and defiled' (kilesā ceva saṅkiliṭṭhā ca)—the Not-Root condition is found, on account of delusion accompanied by doubt and restlessness; but the Not-Jhāna and Not-Path conditions are not found. Thus, having examined what is found and what is not found in all dyads, the enumeration of sections should be understood according to the Pāli text itself.

Dukapaṭṭhānavaṇṇanā.

The Exposition of the Dyad-Paṭṭhāna.

3. Dukatikapaṭṭhānavaṇṇanā

3. The Exposition of the Dyad-Triad Paṭṭhāna

Dukatikapaṭṭhāne hetuṃ kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca hetu kusalo dhammo uppajjati hetupaccayāti evaṃ pañhāmattuddhāravaseneva saṅkhepato desanā [Pg.492] katā. ‘‘Kusalaṃ alobhaṃ paṭicca adoso amoho’’tiādinā pana nayena vitthāro vattabbo siyā, so heṭṭhā dassitanayena sakkā avuttopi jānitunti ekapadepi ekapaccayo vā na vutto. Yā panesā saṅkhepato desanā katā, sā evaṃ katāti veditabbā. Hetudukena hi saddhiṃ kusalapadaṃ yojetvā paṭiccavāre anulomassa ceva paccanīyassa ca vasena sabbe labbhamānakapaccayā dassitā, anulomapaccanīyapaccanīyānulomanayā ceva sahajātavārādayo ca na dassitā, kevalaṃ ‘‘paṭiccavārasadisaṃyeva vitthāretabba’’nti vuttaṃ. Pañhāvāre pañhampi avissajjetvā kevalaṃ pañhuddhāramattaṃ katvā anulomapaccanīyavaseneva labbhamānapaccayā dassitā. Yathā ca kusalapadaṃ, evaṃ akusalaabyākatapadānipi hetudukena saddhiṃ yojetvā hetukusaladukatikaṃ niddisitabbanti vuttaṃ.

In the Dyad-Triad Conditional Relations, the teaching is briefly given merely by raising the question: 'Dependent on a wholesome root-phenomenon, a wholesome root-phenomenon arises due to root condition.' However, the detailed explanation should be given in the manner beginning with 'Dependent on wholesome non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion,' and so on. Even if not explicitly stated, it can be understood by the method shown below; not a single term or a single condition is stated. The concise teaching given here should be understood as having been given in this way: Indeed, by combining the term 'wholesome' (kusala) with the root dyad (hetuduka), all obtainable conditions are shown in the Dependent Relation (paṭiccavāra) by way of the direct order (anuloma) and the reverse order (paccanīya). However, the methods of direct-reverse (anulomapaccanīya), reverse-direct (paccanīyānuloma), and the co-nascence relation (sahajātavāra) and others are not shown; it is merely stated that 'it should be elaborated similarly to the Dependent Relation.' In the Question Relation (pañhāvāra), without answering the question, only the raising of the questions is done, and the obtainable conditions are shown solely by way of the direct and reverse orders. It is stated that just as with the term 'wholesome' (kusala), so too the terms 'unwholesome' (akusala) and 'indeterminate' (abyākata) should be combined with the root dyad (hetuduka), and the root-wholesome dyad-triad (hetukusaladukatika) should be indicated.

Tato paraṃ hetuṃ sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṃ dhammantiādinā nayena hetuvedanādukatikādīni ekavīsati dukatikāni dassitāni. Yasmā pana hetu nāma sanidassanasappaṭigho anidassanasappaṭigho vā natthi, tasmā hetupadena saddhiṃ sanidassanasappaṭighaanidassanasappaṭighapadāni na yojitāni. Evaṃ hetudukena saddhiṃ labbhamānakavasena dvāvīsati tike yojetvā puna te sahetukadukādīhi saraṇadukapariyosānehi sabbadukehi saddhiṃ yojitā. Tattha yaṃ yaṃ padaṃ yena yena padena saddhiṃ yojanaṃ na gacchati, taṃ taṃ pāḷiyaṃyeva na labbhatīti vuttaṃ. Evamettha ekena dukena saddhiṃ bāvīsati tike yojetvā puna aparena bāvīsati, aparena bāvīsatīti paṭipāṭiyā dukasate labbhamānadukapadehi saddhiṃ dvāvīsati tikā yojitāti dvāvīsati tike gahetvā dukasate pakkhipitvā dukatikapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma desitaṃ. Tattha yesu yesu ṭhānesu nayaṃ dassetvā pāḷiyā saṅkhepo kato, tesu tesu ṭhānesu dassitanayānurūpena tassā vitthāro veditabboti.

Beyond that, twenty-one dyad-triads (dukatikāni), such as the root-feeling dyad-triad (hetuvedanādukatika), are shown by the method beginning with 'a root-phenomenon conjoined with pleasant feeling.' However, since there is no root that is 'visible and with impact' (sanidassanasappaṭigha) or 'invisible and with impact' (anidassanasappaṭigha), the terms 'visible and with impact' and 'invisible and with impact' are not combined with the term 'root' (hetu). Thus, by combining twenty-two triads (tika) with the root dyad (hetuduka) in the manner of what is obtainable, these are further combined with all dyads (sabbaduka), starting from the rooted dyad (sahetukaduka) up to the conclusion of the defilement dyad (saraṇaduka). Herein, it is stated that whatever term does not combine with another term is not found in the Pāḷi itself. In this way, by combining twenty-two triads with one dyad, then again twenty-two with another, and yet another twenty-two—thus, in sequence, twenty-two triads are combined with the obtainable dyad terms in a hundred dyads. Taking these twenty-two triads and inserting them into the hundred dyads, the exposition called the 'Dyad-Triad Conditional Relations' (Dukatikapaṭṭhāna) is taught. Wherever the method is shown and the Pāḷi text is summarized, in those very places, its detailed explanation should be understood in accordance with the method shown.

Dukatikapaṭṭhānavaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Dyad-Triad Conditional Relations.

4. Tikadukapaṭṭhānavaṇṇanā

4. Exposition of the Triad-Dyad Conditional Relations.

Tikadukapaṭṭhānepi [Pg.493] kusalaṃ hetuṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo hetu dhammo uppajjati hetupaccayāti pañhāmattuddhāravaseneva desanā katā. Tattha yathā heṭṭhā hetudukena saddhiṃ kusalapadaṃ yojetvā sabbapaccayavasena sabbavāresu saṅkhepato desanā katā, evamidha kusalattikena saddhiṃ hetupadaṃ yojetvā sabbapaccayavasena sabbavāresu saṅkhepato desanā katā. Yathā ca hetupadaṃ, evaṃ nahetupadampi kusalattikena saddhiṃ yojetvā kusalattikahetudukaṃ niṭṭhāpitaṃ. Tato paraṃ sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṃ hetuṃ dhammantiādinā nayena vedanāttikahetudukādīni ekavīsati tikadukāni dassitāni.

In the Triad-Dyad Conditional Relations, the teaching is given briefly by way of merely raising the question: 'Dependent on a wholesome root-phenomenon, a wholesome root-phenomenon arises due to root condition.' Here, just as below, the wholesome term was combined with the root dyad and briefly taught in all instances by way of all conditions, so here the root term is combined with the wholesome triad and briefly taught in all instances by way of all conditions. And just as the root term, so too the non-root term is combined with the wholesome triad, thus completing the wholesome triad-root dyad. Thereafter, by the method beginning 'a root-phenomenon associated with pleasant feeling,' twenty-one triad-dyads, such as the feeling triad-root dyad, are shown.

Evaṃ bāvīsatiyā tikehi saddhiṃ hetudukaṃ yojetvā puna tehiyeva saddhiṃ sahetukadukādayo saraṇadukapariyosānā labbhamānavasena sabbadukā yojitā. Idhāpi yaṃ yaṃ padaṃ yojanaṃ na gacchati, taṃ taṃ pāḷiyaṃyeva paṭikkhittaṃ. Evaṃ dukasataṃ gahetvā dvāvīsatiyā tikesu pakkhipitvā tikadukapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma desitaṃ. Tatrāpi yena yena nayena pāḷi saṅkhittā, so so nayo vitthārato veditabbo.

Thus, having combined the root dyad with the twenty-two triads, and then again having combined the dyads beginning with the rooted dyad up to the conclusion of the defilement dyad with those same triads, all the dyads are combined in an obtainable manner. Here too, whatever term does not go into combination is rejected in the Pāḷi itself. Thus, having taken a hundred dyads and inserted them into the twenty-two triads, the Triad-Dyad Conditional Relations is taught. In this too, by whatever method the Pāḷi is abbreviated, that method should be understood in detail.

Tikadukapaṭṭhānavaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Triad-Dyad Conditional Relations.

5. Tikatikapaṭṭhānavaṇṇanā

5. Exposition of the Triad-Triad Conditional Relations.

Tikatikapaṭṭhānepi kusalaṃ sukhāya vedanāya sampayuttaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca kusalo sukhāya vedanāya sampayutto dhammo uppajjati hetupaccayāti pañhuddhāravaseneva saṅkhepato desanā katā. Ettha ca kusalattikaṃ vedanāttikādīhi, vedanāttikādayo ca kusalattikenāti evaṃ tikesuyeva tikā pakkhittā. Yena yena ca padena saddhiṃ yaṃ yaṃ padaṃ yojanaṃ na gacchati, taṃ taṃ hāpetvā labbhamānavaseneva sabbapaccayesu vārā ca gaṇananayā ca dassitā, tasmā te sādhukaṃ pāḷiṃ upaparikkhitvā veditabbā. Yathā ca kusalattikaṃ vedanāttikādīhi, vedanāttikādayo ca tena saddhiṃ yojetvā veditabbā; tathā ekekaṃ tikaṃ sesehi. Sesā ca tehi saddhiṃ yojetvā veditabbāti.

In the Triad-Triad Conditional Relations also, the teaching is given briefly by way of raising the question: 'Dependent on a wholesome phenomenon associated with pleasant feeling, a wholesome phenomenon associated with pleasant feeling arises due to root condition.' Here, the wholesome triad is combined with the feeling triad and others, and the feeling triad and others are combined with the wholesome triad. Thus, triads are inserted into triads themselves. And whatever term does not go into combination with whatever other term, that is omitted, and the variations and methods of calculation are shown in all conditions only by way of what is obtainable. Therefore, these should be understood well by scrutinizing the Pāḷi. Just as the wholesome triad is to be understood as combined with the feeling triad and others, and the feeling triad and others with it; so too each triad with the remaining ones. And the remaining ones are to be understood as combined with them.

Tikatikapaṭṭhānavaṇṇanā.

Exposition of the Triad-Triad Conditional Relations.

6. Dukadukapaṭṭhānavaṇṇanā

6. Exposition of the Dyad-Dyad Conditional Relations.

Dukadukapaṭṭhānepi [Pg.494] hetusahetukaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca hetusahetuko dhammo uppajjati hetupaccayāti pañhuddhāravaseneva saṅkhepato desanā katā. Tattha hetudukaṃ sahetukadukādīhi, sahetukadukādīni ca tena saddhiṃ yojitāni. Ekekaṃ pana dukaṃ sesehi, sesā ca tehi saddhiṃ paṭipāṭiyā yojetabbā. Idañhi dukadukapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma ‘dukesuyeva duke pakkhipitvā’ desitaṃ. Tenettha sabbadukehi saddhiṃ sabbadukānaṃ yojanā veditabbā. Pāḷi pana saṅkhittā. Yena yena ca padena saddhiṃ yaṃ yaṃ padaṃ yojanaṃ na gacchati, taṃ taṃ hāpetvāva desanā katāti.

In the Dukadukapaṭṭhāna also, the teaching is given briefly by way of raising the question: 'A root-and-with-root phenomenon arises dependent on a root-and-with-root phenomenon by way of root condition.' Here, the root dyad is combined with the 'with-root dyad' and others, and the 'with-root dyad' and others are combined with it. Each dyad, however, is to be combined with the remaining ones, and the remaining ones with them, in due order. This Dukadukapaṭṭhāna is taught by 'inserting dyads into dyads themselves.' Therefore, here the combination of all dyads with all dyads is to be understood. The Pāḷi, however, is abbreviated. And the teaching is given by omitting whatever term does not go into combination with whatever other term.

Dukadukapaṭṭhānavaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Dukadukapaṭṭhāna.

Ettāvatā –

Thus far:

Tikañca paṭṭhānavaraṃ dukuttamaṃ,Dukaṃ tikañceva tikaṃ dukañca;

Tikaṃ tikañceva dukaṃ dukañca,Cha anulomamhi nayā sugambhīrāti. –

The excellent triad and the supreme dyad,Dyad and triad, and triad and dyad;Triad and triad, and dyad and dyad—These six are exceedingly profound methods in the forward order.

Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttagāthāya dīpitā. Dhammānulomapaṭṭhāne cha nayā niddiṭṭhā honti. Paccayavasena panettha ekekasmiṃ paṭṭhāne anulomādayo cattāro cattāro nayāti ekena pariyāyena catuvīsatinayapaṭimaṇḍitaṃ anulomapaṭṭhānaṃyeva veditabbaṃ.

As elucidated by the verse stated in the commentary, six methods are designated in the Dhammānuloma-Paṭṭhāna. Moreover, in each Paṭṭhāna here, by way of conditions, there are four methods each—the forward order and so on. Thus, by one reckoning, the forward Paṭṭhāna itself is to be understood as adorned with twenty-four methods.

7-12. Paccanīyapaṭṭhānavaṇṇanā

7-12. Explanation of the Paccanīya-Paṭṭhāna.

1. Idāni kusalādīnaṃ padānaṃ paṭikkhepavasena dhammānaṃ paccanīyatāya laddhanāmaṃ paccanīyapaṭṭhānaṃ dassetuṃ nakusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca nakusalo dhammo uppajjati hetupaccayātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha nakusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭiccāti kusalassa paccayabhāvaṃ vāreti. Nakusalo dhammo uppajjatīti kusalassa uppattiṃ vāreti, tasmā ‘‘akusalābyākataṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭicca akusalābyākatā tayo khandhā cittasamuṭṭhānañca rūpa’’nti evamādinā nayenettha pañhaṃ vissajjitabbaṃ. Tasmiṃ tasmiṃ paccaye laddhagaṇanā pana pāḷiyaṃ vuttāyeva. Yepi vārā sadisavissajjanā, tepi tattheva dassitā. Tasmā sabbamettha heṭṭhā vuttanayānusārena [Pg.495] pāḷiṃ upaparikkhitvā veditabbaṃ. Yathā cettha, evaṃ dukapaṭṭhāne, dukatikapaṭṭhāne, tikadukapaṭṭhāne tikatikapaṭṭhāne, dukadukapaṭṭhāne ca.

1. Now, to show the Paccanīya-Paṭṭhāna, which has obtained its name by way of the opposition of phenomena through the rejection of terms such as 'wholesome,' etc., the passage beginning 'A non-wholesome phenomenon arises dependent on a non-wholesome phenomenon by way of root condition' has been commenced. Herein, 'dependent on a non-wholesome phenomenon' negates the conditionality of the wholesome. 'A non-wholesome phenomenon arises' negates the arising of the wholesome. Therefore, the question here is to be answered by the method beginning 'one aggregate that is unwholesome or indeterminate conditions three aggregates that are unwholesome or indeterminate, and mind-originated material form.' The numerical counts obtained for each condition, however, are stated in the Pāḷi itself. And those variations with similar answers are also shown there. Thus, all of this here is to be understood by scrutinizing the Pāḷi according to the method stated below. And as it is here, so it is in the Duka-Paṭṭhāna, Dukatika-Paṭṭhāna, Tikaduka-Paṭṭhāna, Tikatika-Paṭṭhāna, and Dukaduka-Paṭṭhāna.

Ettāvatā –

Thus far:

Tikañca paṭṭhānavaraṃ dukuttamaṃ,Dukaṃ tikañceva tikaṃ dukañca;

Tikaṃ tikañceva, dukaṃ dukañca,Cha paccanīyamhi nayā sugambhīrāti. –

The excellent triad and the supreme dyad,Dyad and triad, and triad and dyad;Triad and triad, and dyad and dyad—These six are exceedingly profound methods in the negative order.

Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ [Pg.496] vuttagāthāya dīpitā. Dhammapaccanīyapaṭṭhāne cha nayā niddiṭṭhā honti. Paccayavasena panettha ekekasmiṃ paṭṭhāne anulomādayo cattāro cattāro nayāti ekena pariyāyena catuvīsatinayapaṭimaṇḍitaṃ paccanīyapaṭṭhānaññeva veditabbaṃ.

As elucidated by the verse stated in the commentary, six methods are designated in the Dhammapaccanīya-Paṭṭhāna. Moreover, in each Paṭṭhāna here, by way of conditions, there are four methods each—the forward order and so on. Thus, by one reckoning, the Paccanīya-Paṭṭhāna itself is to be understood as adorned with twenty-four methods.

Paccanīyapaṭṭhānavaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Paccanīya-Paṭṭhāna.

13-18. Anulomapaccanīyapaṭṭhānavaṇṇanā

13-18. Explanation of the Anulomapaccanīya-Paṭṭhāna

1. Idāni kusalādīsu dhammesu paccayadhammaṃ appaṭikkhipitvā paccayuppannassa kusalādibhāvapaṭikkhepavasena dhammānaṃ anulomapaccanīyatāya laddhanāmaṃ anulomapaccanīyapaṭṭhānaṃ dassetuṃ kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca na kusalo dhammo uppajjati hetupaccayātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha kusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭiccāti kusalassa paccayabhāvaṃ anujānāti. Na kusalo dhammo uppajjatīti kusalasseva uppattiṃ vāreti. Tasmā ‘‘kusale khandhe paṭicca cittasamuṭṭhānaṃ rūpa’’ntiādinā nayena vissajjanaṃ dassitaṃ, taṃ sabbaṃ pāḷiṃ oloketvā sādhukaṃ sallakkhetabbaṃ. Yampi yena sadisaṃ, yañca yattha labbhati, yo ca yesaṃ vissajjanānaṃ yesu paccayesu gaṇanaparicchedo, so sabbo pāḷiyaṃ dassito, tasmā pāḷiyeva ettha attho. Yathā cettha, evaṃ dukapaṭṭhānādīsupīti.

1. Now, to demonstrate the Anulomapaccanīya-Paṭṭhāna, which has acquired its name by being direct-negative with respect to states—that is, by not rejecting the conditioning state among wholesome and other states, but by rejecting the wholesome and other nature of the conditioned state—it begins with the statement: 'A not-wholesome state arises dependent on a wholesome state by way of root condition,' and so on. Herein, 'dependent on a wholesome state' acknowledges the state of being a condition of the wholesome. 'A not-wholesome state arises' prevents the arising of a wholesome state itself. Therefore, the explanation is given in the manner of: 'mind-originated form dependent on wholesome aggregates,' and so on. All this should be carefully examined by looking at the Pāḷi text. Whatever is similar to what, whatever is found where, and whatever enumeration and limitation of conditions there is for which explanations, all that is shown in the Pāḷi text; therefore, the Pāḷi itself is the authority here. As it is here, so it is also in the Dukapaṭṭhāna and other sections.

Ettāvatā –

Thus far:

Tikañca paṭṭhānavaraṃ dukuttamaṃ,Dukaṃ tikañceva tikaṃ dukañca;

Tikaṃ tikañceva dukaṃ dukañca,Cha anulomapaccanīyamhi nayā sugambhīrāti. –

The excellent triad and the supreme dyad,Dyad and triad, and triad and dyad;Triad and triad, and dyad and dyad—These six are exceedingly profound methods in the direct-negative.

Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttagāthāya dīpitā dhammānulomapaccanīyapaṭṭhāne cha nayā niddiṭṭhā honti. Paccayavasena panettha ekekasmiṃ paṭṭhāne anulomādayo cattāro cattāro nayāti ekena pariyāyena catuvīsatinayapaṭimaṇḍitaṃ anulomapaccanīyapaṭṭhānaññeva veditabbaṃ.

As elucidated by the verse stated in the commentary, six methods are designated in the Dhammānulomapaccanīya-Paṭṭhāna. Moreover, in each Paṭṭhāna here, by way of conditions, there are four methods each—the forward order and so on. Thus, by one reckoning, the Anulomapaccanīya-Paṭṭhāna itself is to be understood as adorned with twenty-four methods.

Anulomapaccanīyapaṭṭhānavaṇṇanā.

Explanation of the Anulomapaccanīya-Paṭṭhāna.

19-24. Paccanīyānulomapaṭṭhānavaṇṇanā

19-24. Explanation of the Paccanīyānuloma-Paṭṭhāna

1. Idāni kusalādīsu dhammesu paccayadhammaṃ paṭikkhipitvā paccayuppannassa kusalādibhāvaṃ appaṭikkhepavasena dhammānaṃ paccanīyānulomatāya laddhanāmaṃ paccanīyānulomapaṭṭhānaṃ dassetuṃ nakusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca akusalo dhammo uppajjati hetupaccayātiādi āraddhaṃ. Tattha nakusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭiccāti kusalassa paccayabhāvaṃ vāreti. Akusalo dhammo uppajjatīti akusalassa uppattiṃ anujānāti. Nakusalañhi akusalaṃ abyākataṃ vā, tañca sahajātapaccayaṃ katvā uppajjamāno kusalo nāma natthi, tasmā akusalābyākatavasena desanā katā. Tattha ‘‘akusalaṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭicca tayo khandhā’’ti evaṃ nakusalaṃ dhammaṃ paṭicca vissajjanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Abyākato dhammo uppajjati hetupaccayāti ayaṃ pana pañho ‘‘vipākābyākataṃ kiriyābyākataṃ ekaṃ khandhaṃ paṭicca tayo khandhā cittasamuṭṭhānañca rūpa’’nti vissajjitova. Iti sabbapañhesu avissajjitassa atthānurūpaṃ vissajjitassa ca pāḷiāgatameva vissajjanaṃ. Ekekasmiñca tikaduke vārappabhedapaccayagaṇanavidhānaṃ sabbaṃ heṭṭhā vuttanayānusāreneva veditabbaṃ.

1. Now, to demonstrate the Paccanīyānuloma Paṭṭhāna, which has acquired its name from the negative-positive method regarding states—that is, by rejecting the conditioning state in relation to wholesome and other states, but by not rejecting the wholesome and other nature of the conditioned state—it begins with the statement: 'An unwholesome state arises dependent on a not-wholesome state by way of root condition,' and so on. Herein, 'dependent on a not-wholesome state' denies that a wholesome state is a condition. 'An unwholesome state arises' permits the arising of an unwholesome state. For there is no wholesome state that arises by making an unwholesome or indeterminate state a co-nascence condition; therefore, the teaching is given in terms of the unwholesome and the indeterminate. Herein, regarding 'dependent on a not-wholesome state,' the answer should be understood thus: 'Dependent on one unwholesome aggregate, three aggregates arise.' As for the question, 'An indeterminate state arises by way of root condition,' this has been answered thus: 'Dependent on one resultant-indeterminate or functional-indeterminate aggregate, the other three aggregates and mind-originated matter arise.' Thus, in all questions, for what is not answered, the answer conforms to the meaning, and for what is answered, the answer is just as it comes in the Pāli text. And for each triad and dyad, the classification of turns, the grouping of conditions, and the method of calculation should all be understood entirely in accordance with the method explained above.

Ettāvatā ca –

Thus far—

Tikañca paṭṭhānavaraṃ dukuttamaṃ,Dukaṃ tikañceva tikaṃ dukañca;

Tikaṃ tikañceva dukaṃ dukañca,Cha paccanīyānulomamhi nayā sugambhīrāti. –

The Triad and the supreme Paṭṭhāna, the excellent Dyad; the Dyad and the Triad, and the Triad and the Dyad; the Triad and the Triad, and the Dyad and the Dyad—these six methods in the Negative-Positive are truly profound.

Aṭṭhakathāyaṃ vuttagāthāya dīpitā. Dhammapaccanīyānulomapaṭṭhāne cha nayā niddiṭṭhā honti. Paccayavasena panettha ekekasmiṃ paṭṭhāne anulomādayo cattāro cattāro nayāti ekena pariyāyena catuvīsatinayapaṭimaṇḍitaṃ paccanīyānulomapaṭṭhānaññeva veditabbaṃ.

This is illustrated by the verse stated in the commentary. In the Dhamma-Negative-Positive Paṭṭhāna, six methods are indicated. Moreover, by way of conditions, here in each Paṭṭhāna there are four methods each—the Positive, and so on; thus, in one way, the Paccanīyānuloma Paṭṭhāna itself should be understood as being adorned with twenty-four methods.

Paccanīyānulomapaṭṭhānavaṇṇanā.

The Explanation of the Negative-Positive Paṭṭhāna.

Evaṃ [Pg.497] dhammānulomādivasena catūsu vāresu ekekasmiṃ catuvīsatiyā catuvīsatiyā nayānaṃ vasena channavuti nayā honti. Tattha paccayanaye aggahetvā ekekasmiṃ paṭṭhāne tikadukādīnaññeva channaṃ channaṃ nayānaṃ vasenetaṃ catuvīsatinayapaṭimaṇḍitaṃ samantapaṭṭhānamahāpakaraṇaṃ veditabbaṃ. Keci pana ‘‘kusalārammaṇo dhammo akusalārammaṇo dhammo’’tiādinā nayena ārammaṇamātikaṃ nāma ṭhapetvā ‘‘kusalārammaṇo dhammo kusalārammaṇassa dhammassa hetupaccayena paccayo’’tiādinā nayena ārammaṇapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma dassetvā aparampi phassādīnaṃ vasenapi phassapaṭṭhānaṃ nāma uddharitvā dassenti. Taṃ neva pāḷiyaṃ na aṭṭhakathāsu sandissatīti idha na vicāritaṃ. Saṅgītiāruḷhapāḷivaseneva panettha vaṇṇanā katāti veditabbā.

Thus, by way of the Dhamma-Positive and so on, in the four turns, there are ninety-six methods, by way of twenty-four methods in each. Herein, without taking the condition-method, this great treatise, the Samantapaṭṭhāna, should be understood as adorned with twenty-four methods, by way of six methods each for the triads, dyads, and so on, in each Paṭṭhāna. However, some, having established a matrix of objects named 'a state with a wholesome object, a state with an unwholesome object,' and so on, then present a Paṭṭhāna of objects, such as 'a state with a wholesome object is a condition for a state with a wholesome object by way of root condition,' and so on; and further, by way of contact and so on, they extract and present a Paṭṭhāna of contact. Since this is found neither in the Pāli Canon nor in the commentaries, it is not discussed here. It should be understood that the explanation here is made solely in accordance with the Pāli text established at the Council.

Ettāvatā ca –

Thus far—

Sammūḷhā yattha pajā, tantākulādibhāvamāpannā;

Nekavidhadukkhagahanaṃ, saṃsāraṃ nātivattanti.

Where beings are deluded, having fallen into a state like a tangled skein, they do not transcend saṃsāra, the thicket of manifold suffering.

Paccayabhede kusalo, loke garutampi paccayākāraṃ;

Atinippuṇagambhīraṃ, javanabbhūmiṃ buddhañāṇassa.

Skilled in the analysis of conditions, (he understands) the conditional mode, weighty in the world; exceedingly subtle and profound, the swift realm of the Buddha's knowledge.

Kusalādidhammabhedaṃ, nissāya nayehi vividhagaṇanehi;

Vitthārento sattama-mabhidhammappakaraṇaṃ satthā.

Elaborating on the classification of wholesome and other states, relying on various methods and diverse enumerations, the Teacher expounded the seventh Abhidhamma treatise.

Suvihitasanniṭṭhāno, paṭṭhānaṃ nāma yaṃ pakāsesi;

Saddhāya samāraddhā, yā aṭṭhakathā mayā tassa.

That Paṭṭhāna, which he expounded, with its well-established conclusion; this commentary for it was undertaken by me with faith.

Ācariyānaṃ vādaṃ, avihāya vibhajjavādisissānaṃ;

Atibahuvidhantarāye, lokamhi anantarāyena.

Without abandoning the doctrine of the teachers, for the disciples of the Analysts, in a world with very many kinds of obstacles, it was completed without hindrance.

Sā evaṃ ajja katā, cuddasamattehi bhāṇavārehi;

Atthaṃ pakāsayantī, paṭṭhānavarassa sakalassa.

Thus it was completed today, with about fourteen recitation sections, revealing the meaning of the entire supreme Paṭṭhāna.

Sanniṭṭhānaṃ pattā yatheva niṭṭhaṃ tathā bahujanassa;

Sampāpuṇantu sīghaṃ, kalyāṇā sabbasaṅkappā.

Just as this work has reached its conclusion, so may all the wholesome aspirations of the multitude quickly be fulfilled.

Ettāvatā [Pg.498] –

Thus far—

Sattappakaraṇaṃ nātho, abhidhammamadesayi;

Devātidevo devānaṃ, devalokamhi yaṃ pure.

The Lord, the God beyond gods, expounded the seven treatises of the Abhidhamma, which he formerly taught to the devas in the deva-world.

Tassa aṭṭhakathā esā, sakalassāpi niṭṭhitā;

Ciraṭṭhitatthaṃ dhammassa, niṭṭhapentena taṃ mayā.

This commentary for all of it has been completed by me, who finished it for the long endurance of the Dhamma.

Yaṃ pattaṃ kusalaṃ tassa, ānubhāvena pāṇino;

Sabbe saddhammarājassa, ñatvā dhammaṃ sukhāvahaṃ.

By the power of whatever merit has been attained by this, may all beings, having known the happiness-bringing Dhamma of the King of the True Dhamma,

Pāpuṇantu visuddhāya, sukhāya paṭipattiyā;

Asokamanupāyāsaṃ, nibbānasukhamuttamaṃ.

attain, by means of the pure and happy practice, the supreme bliss of Nibbāna, free from sorrow and distress.

Ciraṃ tiṭṭhatu saddhammo, dhamme hontu sagāravā;

Sabbepi sattā kālena, sammā devo pavassatu.

May the True Dhamma long endure; may all beings be respectful towards the Dhamma; may the deva rightly send rain in due season.

Yathā rakkhiṃsu porāṇā, surājāno tathevimaṃ;

Rājā rakkhatu dhammena, attanova pajaṃ pajanti.

Just as the good kings of old protected, so may this king protect the populace with Dhamma, as if they were his own children.

Paṭṭhānappakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā niṭṭhitā.

The Commentary on the Paṭṭhāna Treatise is concluded.

Niṭṭhitā ca pañcapakaraṇaṭṭhakathāti.

And thus the Commentary on the Five Treatises is completed.

Nigamanakathā

Concluding Discourse

Paramavisuddhasaddhābuddhivīriyapaṭimaṇḍitena [Pg.499] sīlācārajjavamaddavādiguṇasamudayasamuditena sakasamayasamayantaragahanajjhogāhaṇasamatthena paññāveyyattiyasamannāgatena tipiṭakapariyattippabhede sāṭṭhakathe satthusāsane appaṭihatañāṇappabhāvena mahāveyyākaraṇena karaṇasampattijanitasukhaviniggatamadhurodāravacanalāvaṇṇayuttena yuttamuttavādinā vādīvarena mahākavinā pabhinnapaṭisambhidāparivāre chaḷabhiññādippabhedaguṇapaṭimaṇḍite uttarimanussadhamme suppatiṭṭhitabuddhīnaṃ theravaṃsappadīpānaṃ therānaṃ mahāvihāravāsīnaṃ vaṃsālaṅkārabhūtena vipulavisuddhabuddhinā buddhaghosoti garūhi gahitanāmadheyyena therena katā ayaṃ sakalassapi abhidhammapiṭakassa aṭṭhakathā –

Adorned with supreme purity of faith, intellect, and energy; endowed with the accumulation of virtues such as morality, conduct, honesty, and gentleness; skilled in deeply penetrating his own and other schools of thought; possessing wisdom and discernment, with unhindered knowledge of the Teacher’s Dispensation, which is differentiated into the three Piṭakas along with their commentaries; a great grammarian, whose sweet and noble speech, issuing from the bliss born of accomplished action, is endowed with charm; a speaker of reasoned discourse, a pre-eminent debater, and a great poet; possessed of the analytical knowledges; an ornament to the lineage of the elders dwelling in the Great Monastery—who are lamps of the Theravada lineage, their intellects well-established in the superhuman state adorned with qualities such as the six supernormal knowledges; with vast and purified intellect, given the name Buddhaghosa by his preceptors; by that elder, this commentary on the entire Abhidhamma Piṭaka has been composed.

Tāva tiṭṭhatu lokasmiṃ, lokanittharaṇesinaṃ;

Dassentī kulaputtānaṃ, nayaṃ paññāvisuddhiyā.

May it long endure in the world for those who seek to cross over, showing to noble sons the way to the purity of wisdom.

Yāva buddhoti nāmampi, suddhacittassa tādino;

Lokamhi lokajeṭṭhassa, pavattati mahesinoti.

As long as the very name “Buddha”—of the pure-minded one, the steadfast one, the foremost in the world, the great sage—endures in the world.

Abhidhammapiṭaka-aṭṭhakathā niṭṭhitā.

The commentary on the Abhidhamma Piṭaka is concluded.